Photography, War, Outrage
Author(s): Judith Butler
Reviewed work(s):
Source: PMLA, Vol. 120, No. 3 (May, 2005), pp. 822-827
Published by: Modern Language Association
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[
theories
PMLA
and
methodologies
Photography,
War, Outrage
THE PHENOMENON
OF "EMBEDDEDREPORTING"
SEEMEDTO EMERGE
JUDITH
BUTLER
WITHTHE INVASION
OF IRAQINMARCH
2003. ITISDEFINEDASTHESIT
uation
inwhich
agree to report only from the perspec
by military and governmental authorities. They
traveled only on certain trucks, looked only at certain scenes, and
relayed home only images and narratives of certain kinds of action.
tive established
journalists
Embedded
reporting implies that thismandated perspective would
not itself become the topic of reporters who were offered access to
thewar on the condition that their gaze remained restricted to the
established parameters of designated action. I want to suggest that
embedded reporting has taken place in less explicit ways as well: one
example is the agreement of themedia not to show pictures of the
war dead, our own or their own, on the
grounds that that would
be anti-American. Journalists and newspapers were denounced for
showing coffins of the American war dead shrouded in flags. Such
images should not be seen because theymight arouse certain kinds
of sentiments; themandating ofwhat could be seen?a concern with
regulating content?was
supplemented by control over theperspec
tive from which the action and destruction of war could be seen.
Another
Ghraib
implicit occurrence of embedded reporting is in the Abu
photographs. The camera angle, the frame, the posed sub
jects all suggest that those who took the photographs were actively
involved in the perspective of thewar, elaborating that perspective
and even giving it further validity.
JUDITH BUTLER isMaxine
In her final book, Regarding the Pain of Others (2003), Susan
Sontag remarks that this practice of embedded reporting begins
earlier, with the coverage of the British campaign in the Falklands
Elliot Profes
sor of Rhetoric and Comparative
in 1982, where only two photojournalists were permitted to enter
the region and no television broadcasts were allowed (65). Since that
time, journalists have increasingly agreed to comply with the exigen
cies of embedded reporting to secure access to the action. But what is
Lit
erature at the University of California,
Berkeley. Her recent books
include Pre
carious Life: Powers ofMourning and Vio
the action towhich access is then secured? In the two Iraq wars, the
visual perspective that the Department of Defense permitted to the
lence (Verso, 2003) and Undoing Gender
(Routledge, 2003).
822
2005
BY THE MODERN
LANGUAGE
ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA
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i2o.3
actively structured the cognitive ap
prehension of the war. And though restrict
ing how any of us may see is not exactly the
media
same as dictating a story line, it is a way of
interpreting in advance what will and will not
be included in the field of perception.
itself provide an interpretation, thatwe need
captions and written analysis to supplement
the discrete and punctual image, which can
only affect us and never offer a full under
standing ofwhat we see. Although she is right
thatwe need such captions and analyses, she
nevertheless
leads us into another bind ifwe
agree that the photograph is not an interpre
tation. She writes thatwhereas both prose and
painting can be interpretive, photography is
merely "selective" (6), suggesting that itgives
us a partial
same
imprint of reality. Later
she
text,
elaborates:
"while
in the
painting,
even one that achieves photographic standards
of resemblance, is never more than the stating
is never
of an interpretation, a photograph
an
waves
less than
emanation (light
reflected
by objects)?a material vestige of its subject in
a way that no painting can be" (154).
can
Sontag argued that photographs
move
us momentarily but that they do not
have the power to build an interpretation. If
a photograph becomes effective in informing
or moving us politically, it is only because the
photograph
a relevant
is received within
political
consciousness.
the context of
For
Sontag,
render truths in a dissociated
photographs
moment and so offer us only fragmented or
dissociated truths.As a result, they are always
atomic, punctual, and discrete. Photographs
lack narrative
coherence,
such coherence can alone
consider that the photograph, in framing re
ality, is already interpreting what will count
the frame; this act of delimitation is
surely interpretive, as are the effects of angle,
focus, and light.
in her view, and
supply the needs
of the understanding. Narrative coherence
might be a standard for some sorts of inter
pretation, but surely not for all. Indeed, if the
notion of a "visual interpretation" is not to
become an oxymoron, it seems important to
823
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within
our
For
In my view, itwon't do to say, as Sontag
repeatedly does throughout her writings on
photography, that the photograph cannot by
Judith Butler
itmakes
purposes,
sider that the mandated
sense
to con
visual
image pro
duced by embedded reporting, the one that
complies with state and defense department
requirements, builds an interpretation. We
can even say that the political consciousness
thatmoves the photographer to accept those
restrictions and yield the compliant photo
in the frame itself.We
graph is embedded
do not have to have a caption or a narrative
at work to understand that a political back
ground is being explicitly formulated and
through the frame. In this sense,
the frame takes part in the interpretation of
renewed
thewar compelled by the state; it is not just a
image awaiting its interpretation; it is
visual
itself interpreting, actively, even forcibly.
The question that concerned Sontag
On Photography
(1977) and Regarding
Pain ofOthers was whether photographs
in
the
still
ever did have the power?
had the power?or
to communicate
the suffering of others in
such a way that viewers might be prompted
to alter their political assessment of the cur
rent war. For photographs to communicate
effectively, theymust have a transitive func
tion:
they
must
act
on
viewers
in ways
that
bear directly on the judgments that viewers
formulate about the world. Sontag concedes
that photographs are transitive. They do not
merely portray or represent?they relay affect.
In fact, in times of war, this transitive affec
tivity of the photograph may overwhelm and
she is less sure whether a
can
incite
and motivate its view
photograph
ers to
a
view or to assume a
of
point
change
numb
new
its readers;
course
of action.
In the late 1970s, Sontag argued that the
photographic image no longer had the power
to enrage, to incite. She claimed then that the
visual representation of suffering had become
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War,Outrage
Photography,
PMLA
cliched, thatwe had been bombarded by sen
sationalist photography and, as a result, our
capacity for ethical responsiveness had di
minished. In her reconsideration of that thesis
twenty-six years later inRegarding thePain of
Others, she ismore ambivalent about the sta
tus of the photograph, which, she concedes,
can and must represent human
suffering,
teach us how to feel across global distances,
establish through the visual frame a proximity
to suffering that keeps us alert to the human
cost ofwar, famine, and destruction in
places
that may be far from us geographically and
culturally. For photographs to invoke a moral
response, theymust not only maintain the ca
pacity to shock but also appeal to our sense of
moral obligation. She continues to fear that
photography has lost its capacity to shock,
that shock itself has become a kind of cliche,
and that photography tends to aestheticize
suffering to satisfy a consumer demand?this
last function of contemporary photography
it inimical to ethical responsiveness
makes
and political interpretation alike.
In her last book, Sontag still faults pho
tography for not being writing; it lacks narra
tive continuity and remains fatally linked to
themomentary. Photographs cannot produce
ethical pathos in us, she remarks, or if they do,
it is only for a moment: we see something atro
cious and move on a moment later. The pathos
conveyed by narrative forms, however, "does
not wear
out"
(83).
"Narratives
can make
us
understand:
photographs do something else.
haunt
us"
(89). Is she right? Is it correct
They
to say that narratives do not haunt and that
fail tomake us understand?
To
photographs
the extent that photographs
convey affect,
seem
a
to
invoke
kind
of
responsiveness
they
that threatens the only model of understand
ing that Sontag
overwhelming
trusts. Indeed, despite the
power of the photographs of
burning on the skins of crying and
running children during the Vietnam War
(an image whose power Sontag countenances),
napalm
Sontag
resolves
that
"a narrative
seems
more
likely to be effective than an image" to help
mobilize us against a war (122).
Interestingly, although narratives might
mobilize
us, suggesting that they have the
to
move
us in a
power
sustaining way and to
alter our interpretation of the conditions of
thewar, photographs are needed as evidence
of crimes of war.
In fact, Sontag argues that
the contemporary notion of atrocity requires
photographic evidence: if there is no photo
graphic evidence, there is no atrocity. The
only way to support the claim that an atroc
ityhas taken place is to supply photographic
evidence. But if this is true, then not only is
the photograph built into the notion of atroc
itybut the evidence works to establish a given
interpretation and judgment as true. Sontag
would doubtless rejoin that judgment is the
kind of interpretation, a verbal and narra
tive one, that seeks recourse to the photo
graph to substantiate its claims. But even the
most
transparent of documentary
images is
a
and
framed
for
framed,
purpose, carrying
that purpose within its frame and implement
ing that purpose through the frame. Ifwe
take such a purpose to be interpretive, then it
would appear that the photograph still inter
prets the reality that it registers, and this dual
function is preserved even when itworks as
evidence for another interpretation that takes
inwritten or verbal form. After all, the
photograph does not merely refer to the acts
place
of atrocity but also builds and confirms these
acts for those who might name them as such.
Something of a persistent split takes place
for Sontag between being affected and being
able to think and understand; this difference
is represented in the differing effects of pho
tography and prose. She writes, "[S]entiment
ismore likely to crystallize around a photo
graph
than around
a verbal
slogan." Crys
our
is not the
sentiment,
however,
tallizing
same as affecting our capacity to judge and
understand events of the world or to act to
sentiment crystallizes, it
seems to forestall thinking. Moreover, senti
ward
them. When
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12
ment crystallizes not around the event that is
photographed but around the photographic
image. Sontag voices her concern that the
photograph substitutes for the event to such
an extent that the photograph
structures
more
memory
effectively than reflection or
understanding (89). The problem is less with
the "loss of reality" this entails (the photo
graph still registers the real, ifobliquely) than
with
the triumph of a fixed sentiment over
more clearly cognitive capacities.
It seems tome, though, that the various
forms of embedded reporting suggest the op
If the photograph no longer has the
to
excite and enrage us in such a way
power
thatwe might change our political views and
posite.
then Donald
Rumsfeld's
conducts,
response
to the photos depicting the torture in theAbu
Ghraib prison does not make sense. When,
for instance, Rumsfeld claimed that to show
all the photos of torture and humiliation
and rape would allow them "to define us" as
he attributed to photography
Americans,
enormous
power
to construct
national
an
iden
tity.The photographs would not just commu
nicate something atrocious but also make our
capacity for atrocity into a defining concept
of Americanness.
It seems clear by the final essay of Regard
ing thePain ofOthers that Sontag has changed
her mind about at least two points. The first is
that photographs
stillmaintain
shock us. We
the power to
are not fully immune to their
effects. The second is that the affective transi
tivity of the photograph has its political uses.
Indeed, in the final chapter of the book, the
narrative
voice
is shaken.
In an
emotional,
nearly exasperated outcry, one distinctly dif
ferent from her usual measured rationalism,
Sontag remarks, "Let the atrocious images
haunt us" (115). Whereas
earlier she dimin
ishes the power of the photograph by saying
it only has the power to impress us with its
haunting effects (in contrast, narrative makes
us understand), now it seems that some un
derstanding
is to be wrought from this haunt
o.
Judith Butler
ing.We see the photograph and cannot let
go of the image that is transitively relayed to
us. It brings us close to an
understanding of
the fragility and mortality of human life, the
stakes of death in the scene of politics. She
to know this already in On Photog
raphywhen shewrote, "Photographs state the
seemed
innocence, the vulnerability of lives heading
toward their own destruction, and this link
between photography and death haunts all
photographs of people" (70).
As much as she disdained
those who are
always shocked anew by the atrocities ofwar
(what does one think war is?), she is surely
equally alarmed by coldness in the face of
such images. She writes that the photograph
can
be
an
"invitation
...
to pay
attention,
flect ... examine the rationalizations
re
formass
suffering offered by established powers" (Re
garding the Pain 117). In the increasing out
she expressed in her
rage and exasperation
in her articles on 9/11, and in her
on
Abu
Ghraib, "Regarding the Tor
essay
ture of Others," one can sense the vacillation
last book,
she
undergoes?perhaps
we
all
undergo?in
the face of the photograph. At times her rage
seems to be directed against the
photograph
not just formaking her feel outrage but also
for failing to show her how to transform that
affect into effectivepolitical action. She allows
that she has in the past turned against the
photograph with moralistic denunciation be
cause of its capacity to enrage without direct
ing the rage. Her complaint is that it arouses
our moral sentiments at the same time that it
confirms our political paralysis.
In "Regarding the Torture of Others,"
though, she is aware that Rumsfeld turns
as if the photo
against the photograph,
were
a
war
of
turned against
weapon
graph
and
there
she
America,
clearly exonerates the
photograph from fault: "The administration s
initial response was to say that the president
was shocked and
disgusted by the photo
if the fault or horror lay in the im
graphs?as
ages, not inwhat they depict."
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War,Outrage
Photography,
PMLA
She rages against the photograph as she
does for depicting an injustice that she does
not know how best to oppose. Justas she rages
times clearly beaten to death. Ifwe see as the
sees, then we consecrate and
photographer
consume the act. But Sontag asks us to notice
frustration with the photograph frustrates
her. To be, as itwere, a white liberal who wor
ries the question of what one can politically
This rebuff to our visual consumerism, which
comes from the shrouded head, the averted
against the photograph formaking her feel a
rage she does not know how to direct, so her
do is to be self-preoccupied,
guilty, intro
even
so once again
and
narcissistic,
spective,
to fail to find a way to respond effectively to
the suffering of others. What
she forgets is
that she iswriting about them and that her
writings become one of themost honest and
trenchant public criticisms of these wars. She
forgetswhat she offers.
At the end of Regarding
thePain ofOth
Wall
allows her to
Jeff
piece by
think through this issue. At thismoment, we
can see her turn both from the photograph
ers, a museum
and from the political exigencies of war to a
exhibition that gives her time and
museum
space for the kind of thinking and writing
she treasures. She confirms her position as
an intellectual while
showing us how Wall's
us
to reflect more care
piece might help
war.
In
this
about
context, Sontag asks
fully
whether the tortured can and do look back,
if they do, what do they see? She was
faulted for saying that the photographs taken
inAbu Ghraib were photographs of "us," and
and
some critics suggested that this was again a
that paradoxi
kind of self-preoccupation
took
the
and
place of a reflec
cally
painfully
tion on the suffering of others. But what she
asked was "whether the nature of the policies
prosecuted by this administration and the hi
erarchies deployed to carry them out makes
in
such acts [of torture] likely. Considered
this light, the photographs are us" ("Regard
ing the Torture").
Perhaps she means
photos,
we
see
ourselves
the photographers
within
that in seeing
seeing,
that we
the
are
to the extent that we live
the visual norms inwhich
the prison
ers are rendered destitute and abject, some
that the dead are "supremely uninterested in
the living" (125)?they do not seek our gaze.
indifference
glance, the glazed eyes?this
to us performs an autocritique
of the role
in media consumption.
of the photograph
Although we might want to see, the photo
graph tells us clearly that the dead do not care
whether we see. For Sontag, this is the ethical
force of the photograph, tomirror and to call
to a halt the final narcissism of our habits of
visual consumption.
She may be right, but perhaps our in
ability to see what we see is also of critical
concern. To learn to see the frame that blinds
us to what we
see is no easy matter. And if
there is a critical role for visual culture dur
ing times of war, it is to thematize the forc
ible frame agreeably and eagerly adopted by
journalists and photographers who under
stand themselves aligned with thewar effort.
What we see in theAbu Ghraib photographs
is that photographers
and subjects can me
morialize
this kind of seeing, inwhich there
is no moral outrage in the face of human suf
fering (in which there is no "human" there,
suffering), the clear belief that the subjects
deserve their torture and their death and
that those who
with
those who
deliver
this torture, along
the deed in
commemorate
the photograph, are doing justice the Ameri
can way. It is not that some stray people in
themilitary or security contractors failed to
a moral perception
see, to feel, tomaintain
of other persons as persons. This not seeing
in the midst of seeing reiterates the visual
norm that is itself a national norm. The Abu
photographs do not only represent
us; they also build an interpretation of who
we are?this Rumsfeld understood?which
Ghraib
iswhy those efforts to interpret their frame,
their purpose, the ethos they convey are criti
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12 o. 3
to this political battle that
is taking place in part through themedium
of the visual image. Sontag may think that
only written interpretations give meaning to
cal contributions
come
ence any more than there is reason to be in
favor of interpretation in the face of visual
experience. Grief, rage, and outrage may be
born precisely inwhat we see, since what we
is a frame,
an
interpretation
of
reality, that,with her, we refuse.
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photographs that enrage and haunt us, and
hers surely do; but for us to respond to those
images with outrage, to be haunted by the
torture depicted there, we must also read
the interpretation compelled and enacted by
the visual frame, coercive and consensually
established. There is no reason to be "against
interpretation" in the name of visual experi
to see
Butler
Judith
Works Cited
H. "Remarks." Defense Department
Donald
Town Hall Meeting.
11May
Pentagon, Washington.
13 May
2004.
2005 <http://www.defenselink.mil/
Rumsfeld,
speeches/2004/sp20040601-secdef0442.html>.
-.
Sontag, Susan. On Photography. New York: Picador, 1977.
Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Picador,
2003.
-.
the Torture of Others." New York
"Regarding
Times Magazine
23 May 2004: 24+. New York State
Gale.
New York Public Lib. 17 June 2005
Newspapers.
<http://www.nypl.org/databases/>.
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