Not Precedential
Uploaded by
Scribd Government DocsNot Precedential
Uploaded by
Scribd Government DocsNOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-2259
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,
Appellant
______________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Crim. No. 11-cr-00853-001)
District Judge: Honorable Claire C. Cecchi
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 16, 2014
____________
Before: RENDELL, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 21, 2014)
____________
OPINION
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Christopher Williams pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). In the
agreement, which Williams signed, he stipulated that his total offense level under the
Sentencing Guidelines was 23, and that he voluntarily waived his right to file any appeal
. . . which challenges the sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence falls
within or below the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines offense
level of 23. (AA24). The Guidelines range for a defendant such as Williams, with a
criminal history category of V and a total offense level of 23, is 84 to 105 months
imprisonment. Williams was sentenced to 92 months imprisonment, well within that
range. His appointed counsel has filed an appeal on his behalf, and has moved to
withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We will dismiss the appeal
and grant counsels motion to withdraw.
This case reaches us in an unusual posture. Typically, where there has been a
guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant, if he appeals, raises, in his
opening brief, the reason or reasons why he believes the sentence that was imposed or the
conviction itself should be set aside. And, typically, if there has been an appellate
waiver, the government, in its responsive brief, will invoke that waiver, arguing why it
should be enforced and, failing that, why the reason or reasons the defendant has raised
for invalidating the sentence or the conviction are without merit. Then, typically, the
defendant comes back, seeking, for one reason or another, to set aside the appellate
waiver, a reason that would not, of course, have been raised before the district court, and
so is unpreserved, and, thus, reviewed for plain error. The reviewing court must then
determine whether it has jurisdiction to review the issues raised by the defendant or
whether it will enforce the appellate waiver and not reach those issues. If it concludes
2
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and that the
merits issues pursued on appeal fall within the waiver, it will dismiss the appealunless,
of course, enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. See United States v.
Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203
(3d Cir. 2007). 1
This case is not typical, however, because counsel has not raised even one
arguable issue on the merits, simply concluding that there are no non-frivolous issues for
appellate review because the plea procedure was constitutionally and procedurally sound
and that any appeal by Williams is barred by his appellate waiver. This, counsel seems to
believe, is how one complies with Anders. The government, quite understandably if
somewhat disingenuously, has no problem with defense counsels conclusions. We say
somewhat disingenuously because, while at several points in its submission, the
government is quick to agree that the issues identified by defense counsel have no basis
in law or fact, Appellee Br. at 6; see also id. at 1, 8, defense counsel had not identified
even one.
Under Anders, if appointed counsel finds an appeal to be wholly frivolous,
counsel may so advise the court and request permission to withdraw by filing a brief
referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Anders, 386
U.S. at 744. Nothing is offered here, and so there has been at least technical
We recognize that our cases are somewhat inconsistent as to whether, in the face of a
valid appellate waiver, we will dismiss the appeal because we lack jurisdiction to proceed
to the merits or whether we will affirm the judgment of a district court. We leave a
discussion of that inconsistency for another day.
3
noncompliance with Anders because, we suppose, in counsels view, there simply isnt
anything.
We have, nonetheless, reviewed the record in this case and our review satisfies us
that there are no non-frivolous issues as to the waiver of appeal, the validity of the guilty
plea itself, or the sentence that was imposed, and Williams has not offered any worthy
argument to the contrary in the Informal Brief he has filed; 2 indeed, in that brief, and as
particularly relevant here, he did not even mention, much less challenge, his waiver of
appeal. The waiver was uncomplicated and clearly described both in the plea agreement
that Williams acknowledged, by his signature, he had read and understood, and in open
court, when he confirmed that understanding, albeit on a somewhat minimal exchange
with the District Court. 3
Because the frivolousness of any appeal here is patent, United States v.
Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), we will
dismiss the appeal and grant counsels motion to withdraw.
Williams Informal Brief was received well after the United States filed its brief. The
United States has responded to his submission in a supplemental brief it seeks leave to
file.
3
And we caution the District Court that, where there has been a waiver, more care be
given to framing the appropriate language notifying a defendant of any right to appeal
following the imposition of sentence. See Corso, 549 F.3d at 930, n.2.
4
