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SOVIETVIETNAM RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF CHINA, 194964

Mari Olsen

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SovietVietnam
Relations and the Role
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Changing alliances

Mari Olsen

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SovietVietnam Relations and the

Role of China, 194964

This book analyses Chinese influence on Soviet policies towards Vietnam and
shows how China, beginning in the late 1940s, was assigned the role as the main
link between Moscow and Hanoi.
Drawing on new information on the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relationship in
the early 1960s, this volume offers a fascinating insight into communication within
the Communist camp. As long as this functioned well, Beijings role as Moscows
major partner in Vietnam was a success. Moscow could focus on other, more
pressing, issues while Beijing took care of Vietnam. With the Sino-Soviet split in
the open, especially from 1963 onwards, Moscow was forced to make the vital
decision on whether to support the Vietnamese communists. This book shows
how the Soviet failure to understand the Vietnamese commitment to reunification, combined with the growing tensions between Moscow and Beijing, reduced
Soviet influence in Hanoi in a significant period leading up to the US intervention
in Vietnam.
The author has used two particular approaches, the leverage of smaller states
on superpower politics and the validity of ideology in foreign policy analysis, to
explain the dynamics of Soviet perceptions of the Chinese role in Vietnam, as
well as to determine from what point Moscow began to perceive Beijing as
a liability rather than an asset in their dealings with Vietnam.
This book will be of great interest to students of Cold War history, International History and Asian politics in general.
Dr Olsen received her doctoral degree in History from the University of Oslo in
2005 and has worked within the field of New Cold War History since 1993. Her
main research interests include Soviet foreign policy towards Vietnam and China
and the role of ideology in foreign policy. Dr Olsen now works in the Norwegian
Ministry of Defence.

Cass Series: Cold War History

Series Editors: Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox
ISSN: 14713829

In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many of the established
truths about the international conflict that shaped the latter half of the twentieth century
have come up for revision. The present series is an attempt to make available interpretations and materials that will help further the development of this new history, and it will
concentrate in particular on publishing expositions of key historical issues and critical
surveys of newly available sources.
1. Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory
Odd Arne Westad (ed.)
2. Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War
Richard Saull
3. British and American Anticommunism before the Cold War
Marrku Ruotsila
4. Europe, Cold War and Co-existence, 19531965
Wilfred Loth (ed.)
5. The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation
Olav Njlstad (ed.)
6. Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations
Silvo Pons and Federico Romero (eds)
7. Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History
Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds)
8. US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion and Public Order
William Rosenau
9. The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist
Challenge
N. Piers Ludlow
10. SovietVietnam Relations and the Role of China, 194964: Changing Alliances
Mari Olsen

SovietVietnam Relations and

the Role of China, 194964
Changing alliances
Mari Olsen

First published 2006

by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4 RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
2006 Mari Olsen
Typeset in Times by
Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Biddles Ltd, Kings Lynn
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Olsen, Mari.
SovietVietnam relations and the role of China, 194964 : changing
alliances / Mari Olsen.1st ed.
p. cm.(Cass seriesCold War history ; 10)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0415384745 (hardback)
1. Vietnam (Democratic Republic)Foreign relationsSoviet Union.
2. Soviet UnionForeign relationsVietnam (Democratic Republic)
3. Vietnam (Democratic Republic)Foreign relationsChina.
4. ChinaForeign relationsVietnam (Democratic) 5. Vietnam
History19451975. I. Title. II. Series.
DS560.69.S65057 2006
327.59704709045dc22
ISBN10: 0415384745
ISBN13: 9780415384742

Contents

Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
1

Choosing sides: The Democratic Republic of Vietnam

and the World, 19451949

ix
xi
xiii

The DRVs search for allies 1

Soviet strategies in Southeast Asia 4
Vietnamese diplomatic initiatives in Bangkok and Moscow 5
Renewed Soviet interest in Asia 11
2

Setting the stage: The Soviet Union, China and the First
Indochina War, 19491953

13

Moscow and the Communist victory in China 14

Recognition 16
The Franco-Vietnamese War 21
Recognition and new challenges 26
3

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

28

Preparing for the conference 29

The final offensive 36
Negotiating in Geneva 38
Geneva and the future of SovietVietnamese relations 44
4

Together for Communism? Sino-Soviet cooperation

and the rebuilding of North Vietnam, 19541957
Reconstruction and consolidation in Vietnam 49
Military cooperation and Chinese withdrawal 53

48

vi Contents
Sino-Soviet relations and the Geneva agreement 55
Hanoi and the Twentieth Congress 59
Land reform and its critics 62
Moscow, Beijing and Hanois new Southern strategy 66
A balancing act 70

Reunification by revolution? The Soviet and Chinese

role in Vietnamese reunification plans, 19571961

72

Accepting two Vietnams 73

Renewed interest in the Geneva agreement 76
Sino-Soviet cooperation 77
The Lao Dong debates its policy on reunification 79
Embarking on a new Southern strategy 84
Mediating the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict 88
Moscow and the new Southern strategy 90
The end of diplomacy? 92

The fight over Laos, 19611962

94

The civil war in Laos 95

Calls for a Geneva conference on Laos 97
Negotiations begin in Geneva 100
A temporary setback 105
Assistance to Laos 108
Geneva: A power struggle? 111

From disinterest to active support, 19621965

113

Soviet perceptions of China in Vietnam 114

Tougher frontlines within the Communist camp 118
Attempts to improve SovietVietnamese relations 121
Hanois turn to China 125
Moscow and the result of the 9th Plenum
of the Lao Dong 129
The tide is turning 132
From disinterest to active support 133
Conclusions: Changing alliances
Appendix 1: Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao Dong
Central Committee

136
151

Contents vii
Appendix 2: Economic assistance and specialists from the
Socialist camp to the DRV, 19551962
Appendix 3: Soviet ambassadors to Vietnam, 19541965
Archives in Moscow, Russia
Notes
Bibliography
Index

155
157
159
161
193
199

Acknowledgements

This study would never have been completed without encouragement and good
advice from a large number of people. I am indebted to my main supervisor, Odd
Arne Westad at LSE. He has played an important role in my academic work
since 1993.
This book is based on my doctoral dissertation written while I was a doctoral
student at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). My supervisor
at PRIO, Hilde Henriksen Waage, has been an important source of inspiration.
PRIO director and Vietnam specialist, Stein Tnnesson, has shared with me his
indepth knowledge of Vietnam and Indochina and contributed with numerous
comments and good advice. I would also like to thank Pavel Baev, librarian
Odvar Leine, and his assistant Olga Baeva for their assistance and support over
the years.
I owe my knowledge of the Russian archives to senior researcher Sven G.
Holtsmark at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) in Oslo. Sven has
been my guide to the archives since my first working trip to Moscow in the
spring of 1994. I could surely not have done this without his support, encouragement and advice. I am also grateful to IFS for publishing my Cand. Philol. thesis
and providing me with a working place while writing my doctoral proposal.
Working in the Moscow archives has not always been easy and has taught me
a lot about patience. However, that is not the fault of the excellent staff, especially in my main archive, the Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian
Federation (AVP RF). The AVP RF reading room staff all deserve special thanks
for their kind assistance during my frequent stays since the mid-1990s: Sergei
Vitalevich Pavlov, Larissa Ivanovna Semichastova, Galina Alekseevna Chuliga,
Natalija Revazovna Chekerija, and not least the archivist in charge of the
Vietnam and China collections, Elisabeta Igorevna Guseva. Over the years I have
also enjoyed the assistance of many other reading room staff and archivists.
Thank you all. I am also greatly indebted to the assistance of the staff at both
Central Committee archives: the pre-1953 archives, Russian State Archive of
Socio-Political History (RGASPI), and the post-1953 archive, the Russian State
Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI).
A number of people have contributed with valuable support, comments and
encouragement to this project from the start. Among these are colleagues and

Acknowledgements

fellow doctoral students at PRIO, doctoral students at the University of Oslo and
abroad, fellow historians working in the Moscow archives, and friends. Some of
the people I would like to thank are: Ragna Boden, Lorenz M. Luthi, Sophie
Quinn-Judge, Galina Murasheva, Nguyen Vu Tung, Luu Doan Huynh, Ranveig
Gausdal, Arne Rksund, Inger Skjelsbk, Elise F. Barth and shild Kols for
their support and encouragement during the course of this project and to the
rest of my friends thank you!
Last, but not least, I would like to thank those who have remained my main
inspiration during these years my husband, Stig Rune, and our daughter,
Aurora for their love and support.
All the people mentioned here are of course without blame for this studys
many insufficiencies I am solely responsible for all conclusions.
Oslo, 27 April 2005
Mari Olsen

Abbreviations

ARVN
CC
CCP
CMAG
CPAG
CPSU
DPRK
DRV
GRU
ICC
KGB
Lao Dong
MAAG
MID
NLF
PAVN
PLA
PRC
RVN
SEAD
SEATO
SVN
USSR
VNFF
VWP

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese)

Central Committee
Chinese Communist Party
Chinese Military Assistance Group
Chinese Political Assistance Group
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Main Intelligence Directorate (Soviet foreign and domestic military
intelligence)
International Control Commission
Committee on State Security
Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam (Vietnamese title of the VWP)
Military Assistance Advisory Group
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (also NLF(SV))
Peoples Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese)
Peoples Liberation Army
Peoples Republic of China
Republic of Vietnam (from 23 October 1955)
Southeast Asia Department (sub-department in MID)
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
State of Vietnam (to 22 October 1955)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vietnam Fatherland Front
Vietnam Workers Party

Introduction

In July 1949, shortly before the Communist victory in China, Liu Shaoqi, one of
Mao Zedongs chief lieutenants, made a secret visit to Moscow. During the meetings in Moscow, Liu and Josef Stalin discussed Chinas future role in the world,
as well as the future relationship between Moscow and Beijing. As part of the
discussions, Stalin proposed an arrangement which had the character of a division of labour, in which China should take on responsibility for helping what he
called national and democratic revolutionary movements in colonial, semi-colonial,
and subordinate countries [. . .].1 He emphasized that China was in a much better
position than the Soviet Union to play such a role in Asia.
Stalins vision of the future labour division between the Soviets and the
Chinese soon became visible in Soviet policies towards the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV). On 18 January 1950, when the Chinese Communists, less
than three months after the declaration of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC),
recognized the DRV, Moscow followed, announcing its recognition on 30 January.
The decision to establish diplomatic relations marked the start of the official
SovietDRV relationship. Both the Soviet and Chinese recognitions were of vital
importance to the Vietnamese leaders, who, at the time, were in the middle of a
war against the French. But in a short-term practical perspective, it was the
victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 194950 that had the strongest
impact on the Vietnamese situation, as the CCP immediately began to support the
Vietnamese in their struggle.
The Soviets, on the other hand, seemed from the early days content with
leaving the practical responsibility to Beijing. The change of power in China
strongly influenced Moscows view on the region and, as a result, forced the
Soviet leadership to pay more attention to the Asian continent. Thus, for the
decades following 1950, the Communist victory in China and, with it, the dominant role of the new Communist state in Asia would have a profound influence
on the future direction of Soviet policies towards Vietnam.
The aim of this study is twofold. On the one hand, it is an analysis of
Soviet policies towards Vietnam from the establishment of the PRC in October
1949 until the late autumn of 1964. A part of this is a discussion of how the
Soviet leadership evaluated developments in SovietVietnamese relations taking
place during this period and what they expected to achieve with regard to the

xiv

Introduction

relationship. On the other hand, it is an analysis of how Soviet leaders from Josef
Stalin to Nikita Khrushchev perceived Chinas role in Vietnam relative to the
Soviet role, and how these perceptions influenced the SovietVietnamese
relationship. The main emphasis will be on explaining how and when Moscows
enthusiasm for the active Chinese role in Vietnam came to an end or, in other
words, from what point was Beijings involvement in Vietnam perceived as
a liability, rather than an asset, in the strategies of Soviet policy makers.

Previous accounts
Both classical and recent works on Soviet foreign policy and on SovietVietnamese,
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese relations have inspired this study. While
completing my Candidata philologiae2 thesis on relations between the Soviet
Union and the Vietnamese Communists in the latter half of the 1950s, I became
increasingly interested in the influence China exercised on this relationship.3 The
specific question of how the Chinese role in Vietnam was perceived by the leadership in Moscow, by the relevant departments in the Soviet foreign ministry and
by Soviet diplomats in both Hanoi and Beijing remains to be the main topic of an
analysis based on available Soviet documents and literature. This study aims to
fill that gap and to expand our knowledge of Soviet perceptions of their prime
ally, and rival-to-be, in Southeast Asia.
In classical works on Soviet foreign policy, Moscows role in Vietnam is
characterized as passive in the early years, dictated by its relations with China, but
not to the extent that Soviet policy makers would allow Vietnam to lapse exclusively
into the Chinese sphere.4 A common conclusion is that, in spite of the low Soviet
interest in the area, Moscow had a high degree of leverage on the Vietnamese
Communists and that Hanoi would not make a decision to resume armed struggle
to reunify Vietnam unless it had been sanctioned by the Soviets in advance.5
These conclusions were made at a time when access to primary sources on the
Soviet side was a far-fetched fantasy at best. During the 1980s, most scholars working
on SovietVietnamese relations subscribed to the theory that the Vietnamese
Communists were loyal clients of the Soviet Union, unable to pursue policies that
would gain their cause and reduced to a pawn in a Great Power puzzle.6
The current work falls within the field of new Cold War history and is an attempt
to complement the already existing works on SovietVietnamese relations by
adding a new perspective. So far three larger studies and several articles based on
Soviet documents have become central in the new history of Soviet foreign relations with Indochina.7 These new works have further expanded our views on the
SovietVietnamese relationship and contest previous assumptions of Moscows
leverage in Hanoi, especially in important questions such as the means and
methods used to achieve Vietnamese unification. Access to fresh sources has
shown that the DRVs decision to launch armed struggle in order to supplement the
diplomatic struggle for reunification was made in spite of Soviet disapproval.8
In his two works on SovietVietnamese relations, Russian scholar Ilya V. Gaiduk
sees Vietnam as a problem that should be eliminated from the Soviet foreign

Introduction

xv

policy agenda to prevent it from becoming a disturbing element for other, more
important issues, such as Soviet relations with the United States and dtente with
the West. In the years from 1954 to 1963, Gaiduk views Vietnam first and foremost as a thorny issue in Moscows relations with the West. He claims that the
Soviet wish for peace in Southeast Asia was dictated by this attitude, and not so
much by a peaceful disposition on the part of the Soviet leaders. Moscows main
problem was, according to Gaiduk, its failure to dictate orders to the Vietnamese, and
also a lack of allies that could help the Soviets discourage the Vietnamese from their
military plans, combined with the escalating Sino-Soviet dispute, which finally made
Moscow decide in favour of a disengagement from Indochina in the early 1960s.9
Similar arguments prevail in his account of the relationship in the period from
1964 to 1973.10 In this work, emphasis is on how the growing Sino-Soviet split
accelerated the rapprochement in SovietDRV relations, while at the same time
forcing Moscow to be very careful in handling its Vietnamese allies in the new
situation. He underlines that, although Moscow did prevail as the main provider
of assistance to the Vietnamese, Chinese influence remained strong. According
to his findings, the Vietnamese skilfully manoeuvred between Moscow and
Beijing and thus preserved their independence, formulating their political aims
while at the same time becoming more and more dependent on material assistance from their allies. He claims that the Soviet Union never obtained monopoly
on such assistance because its influence was wrecked by that of China throughout
the war. Gaiduk further argues that the Soviet Union was the only winner in the
Vietnam War because it was able to promote itself as an ardent supporter of the
principles of proletarian internationalism, leading to a position of status within
the world Communist movement. Unfortunately, Moscow was not able to use the
devastating experience of the American involvement in Vietnam to avoid similar
failures of its own later.11
In view of Gaiduks good access to sources from the Russian archives, his
work on the latter part of the 1950s adds surprisingly little new information to the
history of SovietVietnamese relations in the period. The major problem seems
to be a preoccupation with the American side of the story, combined with a
predisposed view of the Soviets as interest-driven only. As a result, he fails to
properly grasp both the climate in the bilateral relations, and the possible impact
of factors such as ideology on the relations between Moscow and Hanoi. Additional problems are the gap of time between the two studies and his failure to
properly explain why the Soviet Union took over from China as Hanois major
beneficiary from late 1964.
French historian Benoit de Trglod has undertaken research in several
Russian archives, focusing on the early formative years of the SovietVietnamese
relationship. He shows how SovietVietnamese relations were re-established
after the Second World War largely due to Vietnamese efforts out of their representative office in Bangkok in 1947 and 1948. From a Vietnamese point of view,
however, these attempts were unsuccessful, and the Vietnamese were obliged to
wait for the success of the Chinese Communists before they could receive
substantial assistance in their war against the French.12

xvi Introduction
The many new books and articles released on Sino-Vietnamese relations based
on Chinese sources have been of undeniable value and a great inspiration for this
study. Qiang Zhais China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, is a detailed
analysis on the development of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, starting with
the Chinese recognition of the DVR in January 1950. Zhais analysis of Maos
preoccupation with the Soviet factor in the making of Chinas foreign policy
forms a particularly interesting background for my work on Chinese influence on
Soviet policies. Chen Jians Maos China and the Cold War includes several articles on Chinas involvement in the two Vietnam Wars as well as articles on
the Sino-Soviet relationship, and Ang Cheng Guans Vietnamese Communists
Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 19561962 aims to
show the gradual change in Beijings attitude towards the Vietnamese Communists
intensification of the reunification battle, taking into account domestic policies in
both countries, the role of individual leaders and the changing international
conditions, especially within the Communist bloc. Without these and similar
works on Chinese foreign policy the completion of the current study would have
been impossible.13
Another topic which has benefited from the release of sources from both
Soviet and Chinese archives is, of course, the history of Sino-Soviet relations.
Several works on the topic, both classical and recent, have helped define ideas for
the present study.14 Among the more recent works shedding light on this conflict
are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakovs Inside the Kremlins Cold
War, and O.A. Westad (ed.) Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet
Alliance, 19451963, a collection of articles by former Soviet, Chinese and
American historians.15 In addition to the works mentioned above, a significant
effort to publish documents and articles on the Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relationship has been made by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at
the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C.16
Over the last few years a number of new studies have appeared that
further explain the Vietnamese side of the story. Of particular interest to the
present study are the works by American historians Mark Philip Bradley and
Robert K. Brigham. Bradleys work Imagining Vietnam and America analyses
the failure to establish relations between the United States and the DRV and
shows how predetermined perceptions of the other disturbed the USDRV relationship in the pre-Cold War years.17 Brighams study of the foreign policy of the
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF(SV)) is the first of its kind
looking at the complex relationship between the NLF in the south and the Vietnamese Communist leadership in the north. Brigham argues in this study that the
Front was neither a puppet of Hanoi nor an autonomous organization.18

Sources and methods

This is a study of Soviet policies towards Vietnam in the light of the triangular
relationship between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing. It is written from a Soviet
point of view, and the primary sources used come from several former Soviet

Introduction

xvii

archives. However, this is not only a bilateral study nor a complete triangular
study, but rather a study of how the bilateral relationship between two countries
(the Soviet Union and the DRV) was influenced by the policies of a third country
that has close relations with both, namely the PRC.
These distinctions are important because they determine the sources and
perspectives of this study and challenge the author to define the possible pitfalls
inherent in choosing such an approach. The exclusive use of Soviet primary
sources is not unproblematic, and as an author one faces several methodological
problems. I would like to single out four: The first is related to the problem of
studying a triangle from only one side. I have compensated for the problem
of one-sidedness inherent in using only Soviet sources through extensive use of
scholarly works written by experts on Chinese and Vietnamese foreign policy.
A second critical problem has been gaps in the source material. A full coverage
will never be possible, but by using several archives and a wider interpretation of
existing sources, a satisfactory account should still be possible. The last two
problems circle around the question of sources and how they are used: first, to
what extent they reflect what I am looking for, and second, how key issues and
approaches will influence the choice of sources. These four problems are considerable, and with these in mind I hope to have reduced the possibility of a bias that
would seriously undermine the projects main purpose namely to describe and
analyse how the Soviet view of China influenced Moscows perceptions of and
actions towards Vietnam.
The main bulk of documents for this study has been retrieved from the Foreign
Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiyskoy
Federatsii (AVP RF)) and from the two Central Committee archives: the
pre-1953 archive, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsialno-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI))19, and the
post-1953 archive, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (Rossiiskii
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI))20.
Of these three archives, the Foreign Policy archive contains the largest available holdings on SovietChinese and SovietVietnamese relations and contains
documents for the entire period covered in this study. In addition, it also contains
materials on Soviet relations with Laos and Cambodia, as well as collections
from the work of the two conferences in Geneva: the 1954 conference on Korea
and Indochina, and the 1962 conference on Laos. For the period after 1953,
relevant documents are stored in the RGANI. Two parts of this archive have been
of particular interest: the international department responsible for relations with
ruling parties in Socialist countries, and the propaganda department.21 While
working in this study I have had good access to files in the AVP RF and have
gone through all available relevant materials from the Vietnam fund from
1947 to 1965, the China fund for the same period, the Geneva conference fund
(1954/196162), and to a lesser extent the Laos fund, as well as several Foreign
Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister funds for the relevant years.22
The Soviet archives contain documents in several different categories such as
memorandums, analytic and merely descriptive reports of events, instructions to

xviii Introduction
ambassadors, suggestions to, and resolutions by, the Central Committee and the
Politburo, and a large amount of records of conversations. All conversations
between Soviet representatives and local officials, as well as Soviet ministers and
deputy ministers conversations with foreign officials at home and abroad are
recorded and filed in chronological order in the archives. Documents that account
for direct meetings, confrontations between Soviet officials and locals and in
particular the Soviet ambassadors conversations are particularly useful to understand the cultural conceptions that influenced how they saw the Vietnamese and
Chinese.

Approaches and theoretical framework

In this study, two particular approaches, the leverage of smaller states on superpower politics and the validity of ideology as a useful concept for analysis of
international politics, will be used in an attempt to better explain the dynamics of
Soviet perceptions of the Chinese role in Vietnam. With access to more and more
materials from both sides of the conflict, new possible frameworks for the study
of the Cold War have emerged. And with the new materials a need for new
approaches has developed contending that the complex relations between states
during this period cannot be fully understood on the basis of the classical schools
of interpretation of the Cold War.23 Nor can these schools explain all aspects of
the dynamics in the triangular relationship between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing.
Thus, to fully comprehend the history of SovietVietnamese relations from the
late 1940s until the mid-1960s, it is necessary to complement classical theories of
the Cold War with new approaches and theoretical explanations.
New sources and new research have highlighted the fact that during the Cold
War the policies of many smaller, and more peripheral, states had a much more
significant impact on the decision-making of the superpowers than was previously thought. But what can Soviet sources reveal about the leverage of a smaller
client state on the formation of Great Power policy decisions? This study will
examine whether this applied to the SovietVietnamese relationship. To what
extent did Hanoi, rather than listening to its larger allies, first and foremost
follow its own independent policies, at times regardless of whether these were
approved by its allies? And did this behaviour impact Soviet policy towards
Vietnam? Recent studies based on fresh sources point to a more complex relationship between Moscow and Hanoi than what was previously assumed and also
refute some of the earlier arguments on the relationship of strength between the
two countries.24 Both Soviet and Chinese sources seem to support the picture of a
much more independent and strong-minded Vietnamese leadership than previously assumed by historians in the field.25
A second approach is to examine more closely the role of ideology. Ideas,
pre-existing systems of beliefs and values all these are names that attempt to
explain the very content of the category more commonly named ideology. But is
it usable can it be applied to the history of the Cold War and constitute a useful

Introduction

xix

framework for analysis? During the Cold War, ideology was seen as a tool of
limited relevance in helping us understand Soviet policies. Access to new sources
have modified that view, and the impact of ideology now seems to be the major
new finding after more than ten years with at least limited access to archives in
the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China.26
There is yet no universally, or even generally, accepted understanding of the
term ideology and its role in politics. Thus one of the main problems in the use
of ideology within an interpretative framework is how to define it. What is,
within a Soviet policy framework, Soviet real politik? Could it be that what we
define as ideological was considered to be real politik and interest-driven in
the eyes of Soviet policy makers? In the sources now available the evidence that
ideology was taken seriously, especially by Soviet officials and leaders, is overwhelming. In forums never intended for public scrutiny, both Soviet leaders and
officials articulated ideological principles and at times even cited the classics of
MarxismLeninism to support specific positions. According to Vojtech Mastny
there was no double book-keeping.27 Others have described the reading of declassified Soviet communist documents as entering into a conceptual world whose basic
assumptions and categories are fundamentally different from our own.28
With these reflections on the concept of ideology we have to ask ourselves to
what extent the new sources can help us define whether ideology played an
important role and, if it did, in what way? How important was it in Soviet foreign
policy-making during the Cold War, and to what extent may it help us to better
understand the complex relationships within the Socialist camp? According to
William C. Wohlforth, a stronger emphasis on the role of ideology might help to
explain why the relatively weak Soviet Union often seemed so keen to compete
with the wealthy West. And also why Moscow took actions that only fostered
cooperation between its adversaries, and why, when realizing the cost of such
behaviour, the Soviet Union did not stand back from these overextended
commitments.29
The main aim of this study is to evaluate the influence of the PRC on Soviet
policy-making towards Vietnam, and thus fill a gap in the already existing literature on SovietVietnamese relations. Whereas the general international situation
did, of course, play an important part in Soviet policy makers considerations
when planning policies towards Vietnam, the situation with China was special, in
relation both to Vietnam and to the Soviet Union. Moscow depended on Chinese
practical assistance, Chinese knowledge of Vietnam, and in several cases the
Chinese ability to put pressure on or restrain the Vietnamese. As long as the
Sino-Soviet relationship functioned well, Beijings role as Moscows major
partner in Vietnam was a success because it enabled the Soviet leaders to
focus on other issues while ensuring that the Chinese took care of the situation
in Vietnam. However, once Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate, the
more aggressive Chinese stance with regard to developments in Vietnam,
especially from 1963 onwards, forced the Soviets to engage themselves more
actively and make the vital decision on whether to support the Vietnamese
Communists or not.

xx

Introduction

One of the major shortcomings of earlier studies of SovietVietnamese relations has been the exaggerated focus on Moscows power in Hanoi. New sources
available today highlight the fact that during the Cold War many smaller actors
had a stronger position in their relationship with larger powers than previously
thought. Such was also the case in Vietnam. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese
expected the Vietnamese to act as independently as they sometimes did. This
study will show that in the early phases of the SovietVietnamese relationship,
and especially in the years up to 1949, it was the Vietnamese, and not the Soviets,
who played the most active role in seeking and establishing contact with the
other. During the later part of the 1950s, and especially with regard to the shift
from diplomatic to military struggle to achieve a unified Vietnam made during
the 15th Plenum of the Lao Dong in January 1959, the Vietnamese made their
own decisions regardless of, and even at times in opposition to, the Soviets (and
also the Chinese).
In spite of the many new sources indicating that ideology played an important
role as part of Soviet foreign policy thinking, existing studies of the Soviet
Vietnamese relationship have paid surprisingly little attention to this side of the
story. Thus, another argument of this study is that ideological considerations did
play a part in Soviet foreign policy planning towards Vietnam. The Soviet
leaders were convinced that the Vietnamese should learn from the Soviet
experience, and in many areas Soviet advisors attempted to transmit Soviet ideas
and plans to the DRV leadership. At the same time there was a strong conviction
among the DRV leaders that the Soviet Union and China possessed the models
necessary to rebuild and re-strengthen Vietnamese society. These mechanisms
explain why practical cooperation between the Soviets and the Chinese with
regard to Vietnam lasted longer than suggested by the existing literature and the
growing ideological differences at the time. Even during the very early years of
the 1960s, when the polemics were rather strong, and the Soviets had withdrawn
their advisors from China, Moscow and Beijing were able to cooperate in
Vietnam and Indochina.

Choosing sides
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the
World, 19451949

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was established in AugustSeptember

1945, in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender in the Second World
War. In the so-called August Revolution, revolutionary committees paying allegiance to the Communist-led Vietminh1 seized power in all main parts of Vietnam
and established the new Democratic Republic, with Ho Chi Minh as president.
The insurrection was brought about on local initiative, with no significant
involvement by either the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Indeed, the successful August Revolution
seems to have taken Communists worldwide by surprise, and there was virtually
no reporting of the events in Indochina in the international Communist press.2
After the August Revolution, the DRV leaders, in particular President Ho Chi
Minh, initiated an active search for allies. In the latter part of the 1940s, he and
his envoys actively sought support from both the United States and the Soviet
Union, but without any significant effect. The purpose of this chapter is first and
foremost to analyse the role of these initial contacts between the Vietnamese and
the Soviets in the period leading up to Soviet recognition of the DRV in January
1950, while at the same time evaluating Soviet views of the early years of the
Franco-Vietnamese war, and also the first Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
attempts to support the Vietnamese Communists.

The DRVs search for allies

One author has argued that Vietnams post war diplomatic contacts with the
region and the world began in Thailand in 1945, and not in China in 1950.3 In
the years before Soviet and Chinese recognition of the DRV in January 1950,
while the Vietminh was waging a guerrilla war against French colonial forces,
there was little contact between Soviet and Vietnamese leaders. However, during
these years several attempts were made by the Vietnamese side to build a relationship. Although the attempts at securing Soviet support for the struggle against
the French failed, they form an important background for the establishment of a
SovietVietnamese relationship in the years following Soviet recognition of the
DRV. They also highlight the important fact that the Vietnamese Communists
were able to conduct foreign affairs independently before the victory of the Chinese

Choosing sides

Communists in 194950 and may help to explain why the China factor became
the single most important denominator in Soviet policies towards Vietnam in the
following two decades.
Between the August Revolution and the outbreak of war in December 1946,
Ho Chi Minh and his government searched for allies who would both secure him
support against the French reconquest of southern Vietnam and contribute to the
construction of the DRV in the north. While searching for allies, the DRV
government tried to build alliances or solicit support for their new state within
Southeast Asia, with the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese
(Chiang Kai-Shek government/the Guomindang). The very first efforts of this
kind were made in the immediate aftermath of the August Revolution when
Ho Chi Minh sent parallel series of cables to both Stalin and Truman asking for
recognition and support.4 Nothing came out of either. Cooperation with Chiang
Kai-Shek also broke down when he agreed with France to withdraw the Chinese
occupation troops from northern Indochina.5 After the outbreak of full-scale war
from 1947, the DRV government used Bangkok as its main diplomatic outlet.6
Although the Thai government did not recognize the DRV, it allowed the
opening of a Representational Office of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
in Bangkok in the late summer of 1946. The office was set up with the help of
Vietnamese nationals in Thailand and began to operate fully from 14 April 1947. The
office was tolerated by the progressive national government of Pridi Banomyong.
According to one Vietnamese author, the Bangkok office received money and
funds from Pridi, who also allowed the Vietnamese to set up a war base at the
frontier where soldiers could receive training before being sent back through
Laos and Cambodia into Vietnam. Bangkok was a very important liaison point
for the Vietnamese because the DRVs diplomatic mission there could initiate
and maintain contacts with other Southeast Asian countries and world powers
through their Thai embassies. The office was not recognized as a legitimate legation
or embassy but played a significant role in the DRVs foreign affairs. Bangkok
would function as the DRVs main opening to the world until the conservative
coup in Thailand in 1948, after which Rangoon took over some of Bangkoks
role. Thailands new ruler from 1948 deprived the DRV representative office of
its diplomatic status, and it was forced to reduce its activity.7
During 1947, Bangkok was the scene of encounters between Vietnamese and
American officials, as well as Vietnamese and Soviet officials. Ho Chi Minhs
encounters with American officials in France and Vietnam during 1946 had been
characterized by a friendly and respectful atmosphere. The American attitude
towards colonialism and the independence of the Philippines may have provided
some of the Vietnamese leaders with hope that the United States could support
them against France or at least put a moderating pressure on France.8 During
early 1947, shortly after the outbreak of full-scale war between the Vietnamese
and the French, the DRV launched a four-month diplomatic initiative to secure
the support of the Truman administration. The initiative was led by Dr Pham
Ngoc Thach, deputy minister in the Office of the President and one of Ho Chi
Minhs closest advisors. From April to June, Thach approached the Americans in

Choosing sides

Bangkok with several proposals. Among these were calls for recognition,
requests for assistance in mediating the conflict with the French, for loans for
Vietnamese rehabilitation, for economic concessions to US businesses in Vietnam,
and appeals for technical assistance and cultural exchange. However, just like Ho
Chi Minhs attempt to secure American support immediately after the August
Revolution, Pham Ngoc Thachs initiatives in the first half of 1947 failed.9
The DRV began constructing their fragile new state in a period of international
turmoil. On the eve of the Cold War a growing fear of Communism was slowly
spreading among American policy makers. Despite many favourable assessments
from American officials in both Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries,
Ho Chi Minhs government received no support for its case from the Truman
administration and began to realize that it was necessary to turn to other countries
for support. The DRVs approaches to the United States must be evaluated within
the context of the Vietnamese relationship with the French. In the aftermath of
the war anti-colonial sentiments prevailed in the international arena with one distinct exception the French attitude towards its former colony Indochina. In
order to prevent a French re-colonialization of the area, the Vietnamese needed a
strong and independent ally for support.
Parallel to the approaches to the Americans, the DRV leaders also sought support from the Soviet Union. As in the case with the Americans, in the latter half
of the 1940s, contact with Moscow was initiated and maintained largely through
the DRV delegation in Bangkok. Ho Chi Minh had strong links with the Communist world from his prewar work with the Comintern, his role within the French
Communist Party, and, not least, his long-term stays in Moscow. Still, in the
immediate period after the August Revolution, the DRV government was not
successful in securing material support from any of its future Communist allies.10
At that point Mao Zedong did not yet hold power in China and was far away. So
was the Soviet Union.
Soviet sources describe how the first encounters between Soviet and Vietnamese
officials took place in early spring 1947.11 From 23 March to 2 April, a Soviet
delegation led by comrades Zhukov and Plishevskii participated at the Asian
Relations Conference in New Delhi.12 During the conference the Soviets met
with Tran Van Giau, former leader of the August Revolution in Saigon and
southern Vietnam, who led the Vietnamese delegation to the conference. Tran
Van Giau described the situation in Vietnam as a disaster and appealed, on behalf
of Ho Chi Minh, for assistance from Moscow. According to Giau, the French
were gradually tightening the rope around the virtually unarmed Vietnamese
units,[. . .] and would crush the Democratic Republic completely within 4 to 5
months.13 That would happen regardless of the fact that Ho Chi Minh and the
Communist party had the full support and respect of the Vietnamese people.
Vietnam needs immediate assistance, he continued and emphasized that the
major problem was the lack of weapons. The Vietnamese government primarily
needed money in order to purchase weapons through China. In addition, Tran
Van Giau reminded the Soviet delegates that diplomatic support through the
United Nations would also be very much appreciated.14

Choosing sides

The meetings between Tran Van Giau, Zhukov and Plishevskii took place
around the same time as Pham Ngoc Thach began his approaches to the Americans
in Bangkok. However, in the first years after Second World War the Soviet
Union was primarily concerned with developments in Europe. In postcolonial
Asia, Moscow first and foremost paid attention to Indonesia,15 and of course
China and Korea, but showed little interest in the national liberation struggle in
Indochina before 1950.
Soviet strategies in Southeast Asia
Previous accounts of Soviet relations with Southeast Asia in general, and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in particular, suggest that during the early years
of the DRVs existence the Soviet Union appeared to have been appropriately
sympathetic to the Vietminh cause, although non-committal concerning any specific
assistance the Vietnamese might expect.16 In the early post-war years the Soviet
Union did not want to disturb its relations with Paris, where the Communists
were part of the government until March 1947. This fact undermines the suggestions
that the Soviet Union, as early as 1947, played the role as moderator for the
Southeast Asian Communist parties.
In his work Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, Charles B. Mclane distinguishes between two separate developments when characterizing Moscows
colonial strategies in the period from 1947 to 1950. From 1945 to 1947 Moscow
seemed to follow a relatively moderate strategy. A change came, according to
Mclane, towards the end of 1947, when Zhdanov presented a more militant line in
Soviet foreign policies. This was further enhanced with the acceptance of Chinese
views (Liu Shaoqi) through 1949 and early 1950 views that were clearly more
aggressive in terms of assisting Communist revolutions than the initial Soviet
stand. Another equally important development according to Mclane was the shift
of focus from Europe to Asia. This shift apparently began with the Calcutta Conference in 1948, and continued with the CCPs establishment of the PRC in the
fall of 1949.17
In the first years following the Second World War, Stalins attention was
focused on Europe. Naturally enough, the Soviet leaders were much more concerned about their relationship with France, Great Britain and the United States
than with the events in Indochina. There are no records of worldwide appeals on
Vietnams behalf from the Soviet side. When negotiations between Ho Chi
Minh and the French broke down in December 1946, and the Franco-Vietminh
War broke out, the Soviet Union apparently never even considered intervening.
Ignoring the fact that the Franco-Vietminh war was the first case of conflict
between a colonial subject and an imperialist power in an Asian country,
Moscow underestimated a war that would seriously affect the course of events
throughout the East.18 The Soviet reluctance to get directly involved in the
Vietnamese situation underlines how much importance Moscow attached to a
reasonable relationship with the West European states, especially France, and
the United States.

Choosing sides

In a speech at the founding of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)

in September 1947 in Poland, Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov presented
the so-called two-camp thesis. He divided the world into two distinct camps, an
imperialist one led by the United States and the other that of anti-imperialism,
socialism and peace.19 Within that context the DRV was described as associated
with the anti-imperialist camp, and the Vietminh war was termed a powerful
movement for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies.20 The speech
marked a watershed in Soviet post-war strategies. It affirmed a policy already
decided upon by Stalin and the CPSU Central Committee and was an event that
set the tone of international relations during the Cold War.21
In his speech Zhdanov encouraged Communists abroad to be more energetic in
their ways of advancing the common goal. He underlined that through economic
power the Americans aimed at organizing Western Europe and countries politically and economically dependent on the United States such as Near Eastern and
South American countries and Chiang Kai-Sheks China into an anti-Communist
bloc. The Russians, on the other hand, were in the process of forming another
bloc together with the so-called new democracies in Eastern Europe, Finland,
Indonesia and Vietnam and with the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. With
this division into blocs, Zhdanov announced what may be seen as the rebirth of
the two-camp view of the world that was characteristic of Soviet foreign policy
in the late 1920s and early 1930s.22
Although the message inherent in Zhdanovs speech was aimed at all Communist
parties in the world, only the European Communist parties were present during the
founding meeting of the Cominform. There were no representatives from any
colonial or previously colonial country. To convey the message to these parties the
Cominform decided to hold an Asian conference in mid-November the same year.
But the message at this conference only partly reflected the new line in Communist
policy. The key note address to the participants at the conference was delivered by
Asia expert and historian Evgenii Michalovich Zhukov. He acknowledged the need
for a more vigorous role for Communist parties in the colonies, an attitude that to a
much larger degree reflected a way of thinking that was more characteristic of
pre- than post-Zhdanov attitudes towards the Eastern question. At the same time,
records from the conference did not confirm the idea of a more active Soviet policy
towards the colonial world, but rather added more confusion to the state of
Moscows intent in these countries.23 The same Zhukov who gave the opening
speech at the Asian conference was the one who met with Tran Van Giau in New
Delhi in late March or early April 1947 to discuss the situation in Vietnam. As an
academic his role was more as an advisor than a policy maker, but his views on
Soviet policies towards the colonies were influential in the post-war years.

Vietnamese diplomatic initiatives in Bangkok and Moscow

We have seen how the attempts made by Tran Van Giau to solicit support from
the Soviet Union in the spring of 1947 were unsuccessful. Judging by previous
accounts on the SovietVietnamese relationship, the Soviet attitude towards the

Choosing sides

revolutionary struggle in Vietnam was more sympathetic after the Zhdanov

speech. Thus the picture ought to change after September 1947, but Soviet
archival sources do not support this view. In the period after the Cominform
meeting Moscow was equally hesitant once the issue of practical economic or
military assistance was raised. At this time there was also considerable suspicion
of Ho Chi Minh as a rightist deviator who had dissolved the Indochinese
Communist Party.24
Pham Ngoc Thach, who during spring and summer had been in charge of
approaches to the US government, met with the Soviet envoy to Switzerland,
Anatolii Georgevich Kulazhenkov, in Bern in early September of 1947.25 Pham
Ngoc Thach, then described as deputy state secretary of the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Vietnam, was in Switzerland under the
pretext of being treated for tuberculosis. His main aim was to make an illegal trip
to France, where he was supposed to present his credentials to the leading French
Communists Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos. He came to the Soviet mission
in Bern to provide information about the current situation in Vietnam. Describing
how the DRV government organized the fight against the French army, he
emphasized the lack of weapons in the Vietnamese army. Military units did not
have the necessary equipment, and the government did not have enough foreign
currency to buy what they needed. There was also a lack of senior cadres to take
the command. Owing to the situation the CCP decided to assist Vietnam and send
in a group of military advisors.26
On the current situation in Southeast Asia, Pham Ngoc Thach underlined that
during the fight for independence Communist parties had been founded in most
countries and had an important influence among the populations. He emphasized
Vietnams role as the proliferation centre of Communist influence in Southeast
Asia. On his way to Europe Pham Ngoc Thach had met with Communist leaders
in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Burma. He also told
them that the Vietnamese Communist Party (Kompartii Vietnama)27 had
planned a congress of all Southeast Asian Communist parties in 1947, but that
this had proved impossible due to the ongoing war between Vietnam and France.
With regard to the French Communist Party (PCF) Thach reported that they had
so far not discussed the question of Vietnam and had done nothing substantial to
hinder the French imperialist war against the republic.28
Within the PCF the attitude towards support for the Vietminh changed in 1947.
They offered only very prudent political and diplomatic support to the DRV in
1946 while the PCF was a member of the French government coalition and war
had not yet broken out in Indochina. In the spring of 1947, however, the war had
become a highly debated issue in France, and the PCF was evicted from the
coalition. They now became gradually more sympathetic to the Vietminh but had
neither any real power in France nor any influence over Ho Chi Minh. After the
PCF left the French government coalition, the Soviet Union also started to voice
some support for the DRV and blamed the civil war in Indochina on French reactionary circles and British imperialist manoeuvres. According to Moscow, the
French government should bear full responsibility for the situation.29 Pham Ngoc

Choosing sides

Thach also underlined the importance of the many different factions within the
Vietnamese Communist Party and the fact that this party was not an entity as it is
perceived in Europe. According to him, the two PCF leaders he had been in touch
with had expressed the view that Vietnam should focus all its energy on the fight
for independence and not give any concessions to the French imperialists.30
Describing the attitudes towards the United States and Great Britain, Pham
Ngoc Thach claimed that they were hated in all Southeast Asian countries; however, in spite of this the US position was becoming increasingly solid. Countries
were flooded with American goods, and the Americans pretended not to be
against the fight for national liberation. They even encouraged it, assuming that
as soon as the countries were free from English, French and Dutch influence,
they would automatically fall into the hands of the Americans. According to the
US military attach in Siam, who proclaimed his sympathy with the Vietnamese
people, the Americans could not interfere with the war and had no plans to assist
the French. Pham Ngoc Thach also expressed his wish to visit the Soviet Union
and personally inform them about the situation in Southeast Asia. However, he
did not want a Soviet visa in his passport since that could create problems once
he tried to return to Thailand (Siam).31
There are no records of direct support from the Soviet Union to the Vietnamese in
1948. However, the Southeast Asian Youth Conference that took place in Calcutta
in February 1948 has been regarded as a turning point, and there has been much
discussion on the role of the Calcutta conference in Soviet strategies towards
Southeast Asia. According to one scholar, Ho Chi Minhs Vietnam received more
Soviet attention after the Calcutta conference and full Soviet approval from the
spring of that same year.32 The conference took place between 19 and 25 February,
and 39 organisations from both Communist and non-Communist countries sent
their delegations to participate in, or observe, its work. Many of the discussions
at the conference circled around the two-camp doctrine presented by Zhdanov
in September 1947, and the general atmosphere revealed the spreading of militancy in the world Communist movement.33
Because of the outbreak of numerous Communist-led uprisings shortly after
the conference, there have been allegations that Moscow used the conference to
pass on instructions to the Southeast Asian parties. Two specific arguments stand
in the way of such a possibility. The first is that the composition of the conference
did not make it a suitable vehicle for revolutionary instructions. Most participants
were non-Communists, and Moscow did not view meetings such as the Southeast
Asian Youth Conference as a revolutionary tool, but more as an arena to project
Moscows ideas on world affairs to Communist sympathizers and leftists.
Secondly, there was the question of who would have been in charge of passing on
these instructions. The Soviet delegation to the conference consisted of a group
of Central Asians, none of whom held high-ranking positions in the CPSU. It is
unlikely that any of these were trusted to pass on such instructions, and, in addition,
there were few other Communist representatives to receive such instructions. The
only known Southeast Asian Communist who attended the conference was the
Burmese party leader Than Tun.34

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The absence of materials on the Calcutta conference in Soviet diplomatic and

Communist party records reduces the likelihood that this conference played an
important role in distributing instructions from the Soviet Union to the Southeast
Asian Communist parties. However, there are still unexplored sources that might
reveal more about the conference, such as those of the Soviet Youth Organization
Komsomol.35 But even if the conference was not used to pass on instructions, it
has been argued that it served a useful purpose within Soviet strategy. The reason
for that was the emphasis put on discussing the Zhdanov theories and the fact that
one participant after another spoke out in favour of militant anti-imperialism.
Whether Moscow approved of the more militant course taken by the Southeast
Asian Communists after Calcutta is difficult to establish through available materials. There was no fixed pattern in the Soviet response to the upcoming rebellions in Southeast Asia. Nor was there any to draw significant conclusions from
Communist experiences there which might be applied to the rest of the colonial
world. As such the overall conclusion must be that, to find explanations for the
uprisings in the Southeast Asian countries in those years, it will be more fruitful
to look at conditions within the countries themselves.36
Whether it was due to the Calcutta conference or not, from 1948 on meetings
between Soviet and Vietnamese representatives took place on a more regular
basis. The recurring theme at these meetings was the question of Soviet assistance
to the Vietnamese, both economic and military. At a meeting in Moscow in late
August 1948 between the deputy head of the Vietnamese information bureau in
Bangkok, Le Hy, and M. Sh. Bakhitov, deputy head of the Southeast Asia
Department (SEAD) in the Soviet foreign ministry, these issues were raised. The
purpose of the meeting was, according to Le Hy, to report on the situation in
Vietnam. Le Hy informed Bakhitov that at that point the Republic of Vietnam37
(Respublika Viet-Nam) had already for three years fought against the French
military intervention, supported by the British and the Americans and with the
tacit approval of the Guomindang clique in China. Due to its geographic location
(China in the north and French forces in the south) and the developing international political situation, Vietnam fought without any help or support except
moral from the outside. For tactical reasons, the leaders of the Vietnamese
Communist Party had decided to disperse the party into different democratic and
mass organisations to preclude it from officially standing forth as the leading
force in the government and among the masses.38 Le Hys emphasis on the division of the party might have been his way of defending the official dissolution of
the ICP in November 1945, which had caused suspicion in Moscow.
During the meeting with Bakhitov, Le Hy also talked about the original purpose
of his trip. He was on his way to Prague to open a Vietnamese information
agency. The purpose of the office would be to strengthen the ties and improve
contacts with progressive and democratic states. Le Hy would be in charge of the
agency, and the staff would consist of three people among them Australian
Communist Alexander Brotherton. He also reported that he was forced to wait in
Moscow for further instructions from his government. The purpose of his visit to
Moscow was among other things to present an unofficial inquiry on behalf of the

Choosing sides

Communist party circles in Vietnam whether the Soviet government and the
party could help the Vietnamese Republic with weapons, ammunition and other
kinds of equipment and present this as a loan. In case of a positive answer to the
inquiry, Le Hy wondered whether the Soviet Union could send a plenipotentiary
delegation to Vietnam for proper negotiations.39
Le Hy also had another request. He wondered whether the Soviet government
would allow some Vietnamese students to come to the Soviet Union to study. He
underlined the respect of the Vietnamese people for the Soviet Union and emphasized the fact that Ho Chi Minh had lived for nine years in the Soviet Union. He
also added that the Vietnamese government reckoned that for the moment it would
be inconvenient to address an official request for assistance from the Soviet
Union. Because of this he had to present this request on behalf of the Communist
circles in Vietnam and ask whether the Soviet Union could give any kind of assistance to Vietnam in any form that would be convenient for the Soviet Union. If it
should prove impossible to get such support from the Soviet government, he
would do it through the Soviet Communist Party. Bakhitov did not give any
promises, but answered that some action would be taken to clear this up.40
Apparently the Soviets found the organization of Vietnamese representation in
Thailand somewhat confusing. The role of Le Hy was the most prominent
example. His claim to be an official representative of the DRV, and his
approaches to the Soviets for support, seemed to be a source of concern to other
Vietnamese officials. That also caught the attention of the Soviets in Bangkok.
Sergei Nemtchin confronted Nguyen Duc Quy on the issue of Le Hy and was told
that Le Hy had a limited task to organize propaganda about Vietnam in Europe
and that he was not an official representative of the Vietnamese government and
took all decisions on his work independently.41 The confusion around the role of
Le Hy could be part of the reason why Soviet envoy Nemtchin characterized the
behaviour of Vietnamese diplomats in Bangkok as disorganized and amateurish.42
The August meeting with Le Hy was followed up in late September 1948
when the Soviet envoy in Thailand, Sergei Sergeevitch Nemtschin, met with the
head of the Vietnamese delegation in Southeast Asia, Nguyen Duc Quy who
was a proper representative for the DRV. In 1948 the Soviet legation in Bangkok
was the only Soviet representation in Southeast Asia. At that time Thailand and,
from 1948, Burma were the only independent countries in the region, and thus
the only possibilities for setting up representation. Thailand gave Moscow permission to set up the legation in exchange for the Soviet Unions vote at the
United Nations on Thailands bid to join. Thailand was accepted as a UN member, and Moscow formed its first formal diplomatic post in Southeast Asia by
MarchApril 1948.43
The purpose of Nguyen Duc Quys visit to the Soviet envoy was to establish
contacts with the representative of the Soviet Communist Party in Thailand. He
assumed that the envoy, Nemtchin, was also the CPSU representative. Nemtchin,
however, explained that that was not the case and that he only represented the
Soviet state as such. While talking to Nemtchin, Nguyen Duc Quy also referred
to the September 1947 meeting that had taken place in Switzerland between

10

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Pham Ngoc Thach and Anatolii Kylashenkov. The lack of reference to Le Hys
mission in this context further confirmed his unofficial status and accentuated
Nguyen Duc Quys distrust of Hy. From the records of this meeting we have
already seen how Pham Ngoc Thach presented a request from the Vietnamese
government for assistance from the Soviet Union. In addition, according to
Nguyen Duc Quy, Pham Ngoc Thach had also used the opportunity to deliver a
direct request to the Soviet government from Ho Chi Minh, in which the latter
sought support for a proposal that the United Nations intervene in the FrancoVietnamese conflict.44
In addition to Nguyen Duc Quy, another Vietnamese official, referred to as
Chuong, was involved in the discussions.45 He is referred to in Nemtchins reply
as a member of the Vietnamese government and a secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party. His mission was to establish contact
with the Soviet Communist Party, and he needed a visa to go to Moscow. Due to
the situation, Nguyen Duc Quy wondered whether the Soviet mission in Thailand
could act as a liaison between the Vietnamese and the Soviet Communist parties
and assist Chuong in getting a visa to the Soviet Union. According to Nguyen
Duc Quy, Chuong had two tasks to perform: one was to inform Moscow of the
situation in Vietnam, and the second was to discuss assistance to Vietnam.
Returning to conditions in Vietnam, Nguyen Duc Quy reported that the struggle
was in such a phase that it was necessary to receive assistance from abroad since
the Vietminhs heavy weapons were insufficient.46
On a direct question of how to implement this assistance, Nguyen Duc Quy
answered that the Vietnamese wanted the Soviets to help them raise money that
was needed to buy necessary weapons from American smugglers. Vietnam
would need about 25 million US dollars. However, with the ongoing French
blockade it was too difficult to transfer money out of Vietnam. Nguyen Duc Quy
explained that they did have an opportunity to buy weapons from American
smugglers, overcome the blockade and transport these into Vietnam. On numerous occasions during the conversation Nguyen Duc Quy referred to our party as
if to assure Nemtchin that the Vietnamese Communist Party was in charge of
everything in Vietnam.47
Throughout 1948 Vietnamese diplomats in Bangkok continued to approach the
Soviets with requests for assistance, but without any apparent success. Toward
the end of September 1948 Nguyen Duc Quy informed the Soviet attach in
Siam, Igor Grigorevich Ysatchov, that the Vietnamese Communist Party was
about to send a request to the CCP for military aid and as a part of that they
would also ask for two senior officers to lead military operations. To solve the
most immediate problems related to supplies of weapons, they had made a deal
with Burma on intermediate landing of Vietnamese aircraft on Burmese territory
for loading. The Vietnamese were also ready to buy Burmese weapons (US surplus
weapons) and let aircraft drop them over Vietnam with parachutes. That would
help overcome the French blockade.48
In the years before the establishment of the PRC contact between the Chinese
and Vietnamese Communists remained limited, even though Ho Chi Minh, as

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11

well as several of the other leaders in Hanoi, previously had entertained close
connections with the Chinese Communists in the 1920s and 1930s. During his
time as an active member of the PCF in Paris, Ho met several of the men who
would become central within the CCP, such as Zhou Enlai, Wang Ruofei, Xiao
San and Li Fuchun. Ho had also worked in China for a long period in the mid1920s when the Communist International sent him from Moscow to Guangzhou,
where he assisted Mikhail Borodin, the Comintern representative to the new
Chinese revolutionary government led by the Guomindang.49
According to Chinese sources, from 1945 to 1949 assistance from the Chinese
Communists to the Vietminh was mostly in the category of mutual assistance.
One example was the incident in March 1946, when a unit from the CCPs Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) sought refuge in North Vietnam and was welcomed by
the Vietnamese Communists. The unit had withdrawn into Vietnam to avoid a
Guomindang attack, and Ho Chi Minh asked if they could help train his troops so
they would be better prepared for a war against the French. That encounter was
important for the future of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Although no evidence suggests that the CCP provided regular contributions to the Vietminh until 1949, the
CCP sub-bureau in British Hong Kong seems to have provided them with some
funds on a more irregular basis from 1947. Even the lines of communication
between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists were not very strong before
1950. The first direct line of telegraphic communications between the two parties
was set up in the spring of 1947.50
Chinese aid was a welcome support, but the Vietnamese strongly emphasized
that they were not interested in receiving aid only from the CCP. The requests for
Soviet support continued. In early October 1948 Nguyen Duc Quy requested
both military and economic assistance. At the time there was no military academy in Vietnam, and this had resulted in a general lack of officers to lead the
fight against the French. Duc Quy therefore asked about the possibility of educating 50 officers captains and lieutenants in higher military academies in the
Soviet Union. In addition he asked for stipends and educational opportunities
within the area of economy, so that in turn the Vietnamese would be better
equipped to run their own national economy.51
The immediate Soviet reaction was negative. Nemtchin explained that since
the end of the Second World War Soviet educational facilities has been filled up
with those who had interrupted their studies due to the war, and hence there was
very little space for foreign students. Nguyen Duc Quy once again asked
Nemtchin to pass a request for money and weapons to conduct the war to the
Soviet Communist Party, upon which Nemtchin once again replied that since he
was not a Communist party official, he could not pass on such a request.52

Renewed Soviet interest in Asia

The Vietnamese Communists first attempts to establish relations with the outside world have the characteristic of a classic history of rejections. Their attempts
to establish relations with the United States and the Soviet Union went on more

12

Choosing sides

or less parallel tracks. A second wave of attempts to secure assistance from the
United States or the Soviet Union was made through the DRV representative
office in Bangkok during 1947. First, the Vietnamese representatives flirted with
the Americans in the spring, hoping that the US stand on colonialism could
secure support against the French. That attempt failed because those who
favoured support to Ho Chi Minh did not have enough influence within the
Truman administration, and the final lid on the possibility of American support
came with the start of the Cold War, when the Americans already believed that
the DRV was part of the Communist world. The unsuccessful attempts at establishing relations with the Americans were followed by an attempt to secure
assistance from the Soviet Union in the fall of 1947. But Moscow was no more
eager than Washington to assist the Vietnamese, and the DRV was rejected once
again.
Even after the French Communists were expelled from the government, Moscow
remained reluctant to support the Vietminh in their struggle against the French
forces. Thus, by the end of 1948 the Vietnamese Communists had to realize that
their attempts to secure Soviet support in their war against the French had failed.
Repeated requests and pleas to the Soviets both in Bangkok and Moscow had led
to moral support at most. Europe was still the major target of Soviet foreign
policy, and Stalin was not willing to risk that over support for the Vietnamese.
In the late 1940s Vietnam was too far away and too insignificant to become the
main focus of Moscows foreign policy. Thus, as one historian has put it, from
1948 onwards, the Vietnamese had to accept that in the coming years the success
of the CCP and Mao Zedong represented their best chance to break the isolation
in their war for independence.53 So, in short, one could argue that while the
DRVs relations with the world began in Thailand in 1945, and from 1947 were
represented by Bangkok as the only diplomatic outlet for the DRV, the successful
Vietnamese relations with the world began with the Communist victory in China
in 1949, and the subsequent Chinese recognition of the DRV in January 1950.
However, in 1949 the situation in Asia changed dramatically, and in 1950 the
success of the Chinese Communists forced Stalin to pay more attention not only
to China but also to Vietnam. In May 1949 Soviet analysts concluded that the
success of the Peoples Liberation Army of China undoubtedly has a strong
influence on the outcome of the Vietnamese peoples fight for national independence.54 The role of both Moscow and Beijing in Asia was discussed during Liu
Shaoqis visit to Moscow in the summer of 1949, when Stalin suggested that
China take on the main responsibility for supporting revolutionary movements in
the former Asian colonies once the Peoples Republic was in place.55

Setting the stage

The Soviet Union, China and the First
Indochina War, 19491953

After the proclamation of the PRC on 1 October 1949, Stalin met with Mao in
Moscow in December. When they discussed Vietnam, the Soviet leader underlined that the practical part of assisting Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists was primarily a Chinese responsibility.1 The victory of the Chinese
revolution had radically transformed international relations in East Asia. Not
only did it destroy the existing international order based on the Yalta agreements
and the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty, it also forced the established powers to face a
new revolutionary state that had arisen from a civil war. When dealing with this
new state, previous rules no longer applied, neither for the United States nor for
the Soviet Union. Moreover, especially for Moscow this new order would seriously influence its policies towards East Asia.
Earlier the Soviet Union had, by coordinating its policy with that of the United
States, the potential to obtain economic and security advantages in East Asia.
However, when the Chinese revolution finally succeeded, the Soviet Union was
forced to adjust its policy to the objectives of the Chinese Communists.2 As a
result, Stalins attitude in 1949 would prove to have serious consequences for the
future relationship between Moscow and Hanoi. By resting its policy towards
Vietnam on the role of China, Moscow limited its responsibilities as well as its
opportunities, laying parts of the foundation for future frustration over the
situation in Southeast Asia. In sum, the Communist victory in China contributed
to increased attention to developments in the Far East both from the United
States and the Soviet Union. To Moscow, this also meant that its attention was
drawn more specifically to the situation in Vietnam.
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between the Soviet Union
and Vietnam in the first three years after the Communist victory in China. Focus
will be on the impact of the Communist victory in China on SovietVietnamese
relations, the events surrounding Chinese and Soviet recognition of the DRV, the
discussions on how and when to establish SovietVietnamese diplomatic
missions, and, finally, the Soviet, as well as the Chinese, economic, military and
ideological role in the Franco-Vietnamese War.

14

Setting the stage

Moscow and the Communist victory in China

When Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949,
Beijing had already been in Communist hands since January that year, and the
PLA was in control of most of Northern China but not yet the regions bordering
Indochina. Maos announcement on 1 October was the result of a long civil war.
The CCP came to power in 1949 with only 4.5 million members, but by the end
of 1950 it had increased to approximately 5.8 million. The first major task for the
new government was to stabilize the economy and consolidate the regime and to
take control of the rest of the country. The PRC aimed to build a new society
based on the development of agriculture and industry. The Guomindang was
declared reactionary, and in principle all citizens were guaranteed rights such as
free speech and free religion. The PRC planned land reforms, collectivization and
heavy industrial development after the Soviet model.3
Mao Zedongs first official visit abroad was to the Soviet Union. He stayed for
roughly two months, from 16 December 1949 to 17 February 1950, and during
his stay he discussed two items of particular interest with the Soviet leader. The
first was the degree and form of Soviet assistance to the PRC, and the second was
the new role of China in Asia and, in particular, Southeast Asia. Parallel to Maos
visit to the Soviet Union, the DRV government sent out a declaration encouraging
all states to recognize the DRV as the only legitimate government of Vietnam. As
such, Chinese, Soviet and other countries recognition of the DRV came at about
the same time as the Sino-Soviet agreement was signed in Moscow.4
Once Mao was in power in China, Stalin, surprised but still pleased with the
successes of the Chinese Communists, had no other option than to support the
CCP. This support was primarily announced through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed on 14 February 1950. The
treaty was not the first of its kind between the two countries. A Sino-Soviet treaty
was signed as early as during the Yalta Conference in 1945 between the Soviet
Union and the Guomindang-led Republic of China. However, with the Communist victory the leaders of the new China were eager to renegotiate or abolish the
existing treaty and establish a new one. The discussions around the treaty took
place during Maos visit to the Soviet Union. Talks between Stalin and Mao in
the latter part of December did not lead to an agreement, and it was only after the
arrival of Zhou Enlai in Moscow on 20 January 1950 that a new treaty came
within reach.5 The signing of the treaty was, of course, important to the newly
founded Communist state, and in the end it was achieved after concessions from
both sides.
While in Moscow, Mao was joined by Ho Chi Minh. Ho had left Beijing for
the Soviet Union together with Zhou Enlai in early February and arrived in Moscow
just in time for the signing of the Sino-Soviet Agreement. During the meetings in
Moscow with Ho and Mao, Stalin once again encouraged China to take the lead
in promoting revolution in Asia, while at the same time emphasizing that the
Soviet Union would provide the necessary assistance.6 A Vietnamese account of
Hos trip to the Soviet Union fixes his arrival to 3 February7 and further tells that

Setting the stage

15

Ho Chi Minhs trip to China and the Soviet Union was kept secret because
Guomindang forces still controlled most of the border regions to Indochina, and
Ho feared for his security. During the trip through the Soviet Union Ho disguised
himself as an old man in indigo clothes, a white towel covering his beard, a
knapsack on his shoulder, like other members of the delegation.8
We do know that Ho and Stalin met at least once while Ho was in Moscow.
According to the memoirs of the Chinese ambassador to Moscow, Ho Chi Minh
attended the banquet held in honour of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.
President Ho used that occasion to explain the situation of the Vietnamese
revolution to Stalin, who apparently had little previous knowledge of what went
on in that country. After listening to Hos account, Stalin apparently agreed to the
strategy and tactics of the Vietnamese Communist Party. He advised Ho to pay
attention to the whole western mountainous region of Vietnam, because control
of that region would allow the Vietnamese Communists to control the whole
country. Stalin also agreed to provide some aid to the Vietminh troops, more specifically a regiment of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, several Molotova trucks and
some medicine. In addition, China would arm one infantry division and an artillery unit. The Soviet aid would be conveyed through China to Vietnam.9
Stalins comment on how Soviet aid to the Vietnamese Communists would be
facilitated by the Chinese shows how the Communist victory in China had an
immediate practical impact on the Vietnamese situation. In more general terms,
this victory meant the end of Vietnams dark days and the beginning of a new
era in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The most important change was the fact that
northern Vietnam no longer faced the prospect of being surrounded by enemies.
Communist China was about to become North Vietnams major ally and provider
in the war against France. In addition, the new situation also implied, as we have
already seen, the possibility of assistance, both economic and military, not only
from China but hopefully also from the Communist bloc in general. In several
ways, the establishment of the PRC functioned as a door opener to the Vietnamese
Communists, who, since the outbreak of the Franco-Vietnamese war, found
themselves increasingly isolated from the outside world. The Chinese Communist victory enabled the DRV to establish successful relations with, and obtain
recognition from, the Communist world. However, on the other hand, the DRVs
inclusion in the Communist world meant a higher degree of isolation from the
rest of the world and in particular, the West. But from a Vietnamese point of
view, in early 1950 the most important task was to establish lasting relations with
the Communist world and first and foremost with the Soviet Union.
In Beijing, Soviet analysts argued that the victory of the Chinese revolution
and the formation of the PRC was of immense importance to people all over the
world but first and foremost to the people of the Far East and Southeast Asia.
They emphasized that the formation of a friendly state such as the PRC at the
northern border of Vietnam significantly eased the difficulties the Vietnamese
were enduring. It facilitated the ongoing war of resistance and broke the blockade
that so far had restrained the DRVs contact with the outside world. Not least, it
provided Hanoi with the opportunity to establish direct contact with the other

16

Setting the stage

peoples democracies. In sum, Soviet analysts in Beijing concluded, the PRC

victory was a vital factor that increased the DRVs success both in the war of
resistance and in the upsurge of the countrys national economy.10
Recognition
On 14 January 1950, while Mao was in Moscow, but before Zhou Enlai and Ho
Chi Minh arrived there, the DRV government sent out, in response to a Chinese
suggestion, a declaration inviting all countries to recognize the DRV as the only
legitimate government in Vietnam. The DRV also recognized the PRC. Because
of the war between the DRV and France and the international atmosphere in
1950, recognition of the DRV by China and the Soviet Union would have consequences beyond the Sino-Vietnamese and SovietVietnamese relationships. This
had to be considered before such steps were taken. Obtaining recognition of the
two major Communist powers was of vital importance especially as an opportunity
to obtain assistance in the struggle against France. Both Moscow and Beijing
concluded that the advantages of recognizing the DRV outweighed the disadvantages. Beijings response came on 16 January, and Moscow replied two weeks
later, on 30 January.11 However, it was first of all Beijing who wanted the
recognition. Mao encouraged Ho Chi Minh to send out the declaration and then
advised Moscow to follow the Chinese lead in this matter.
The events surrounding Chinese recognition of the DRV is a story illustrating
how Maos victory in China prompted closer relations between Hanoi and Beijing.
In December 1949, about two months after Maos proclamation of the founding
of the PRC, Ho Chi Minh sent two envoys to Beijing to seek advice on how to
win the battle against the French. As a result of Hos request, the CCP Politburo
held a meeting on 24 December to discuss whether the PRC should recognize the
DRV. The overall conclusion at the meeting was that it would be more beneficial
than harmful for China to form diplomatic ties with the DRV before an expected
French recognition of the PRC. On 28 December 1949, therefore, the CCP Central
Committee sent a cable to Ho Chi Minh and told him that they were ready to
enter into diplomatic relations with his government.12
Once the issue of recognition was clarified with China, the Vietnamese went forward with their official announcement. On 15 January the first direct and formal
request was sent to China. Mao, who at the time was in Moscow negotiating the
Sino-Soviet Alliance treaty, soon stated that the PRC agreed to establish formal
ties. He also instructed the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 17 January to forward
Ho Chi Minhs request to both the Soviet Union and the other members of the
Socialist camp.13
Chinese sources tell the story of how Mao and Stalin discussed diplomatic
recognition of the DRV. The Chinese leader told Stalin that China was ready to
support the Indochinese people in their struggle for national independence. The
Soviet leader, however, seemed slightly more reluctant to support the Indochinese
struggle but agreed to recognize the DRV after the PRC had done so. Chinese
sources also reveal that Stalin told Mao that Moscow too was willing to supply

Setting the stage

14

17

the necessary aid to Ho Chi Minh. Unfortunately, Soviet documents from these
meetings remain unavailable, and thus Stalins statements cannot be verified.
A plausible explanation of Stalins hesitation could be the Soviet reluctance to
alienate the French.15 As in the case of China, two different factors should be
taken into account when discussing its readiness to assist the DRV. First, the fact
that its position as an Asian power made it less dependent on the European
powers and thus more free to conduct its own policy in its surroundings. Second,
it is vital to take into account that Chinas past influence in Vietnam played a
decisive role in how the Chinese looked upon this neighbouring country. From a
Chinese perspective, Vietnam was, without doubt, within its sphere of interest
and just as the Chinese devoted themselves to the revolution in Vietnam, Beijing
expected the Vietnamese to submit to Chinese advice. After the Communist
victory in China, the Soviet press also paid more attention to Indochina, and
often referred to Chinese influence within the Vietminh. Parallel to this there was
also an increase in Soviet scholarly work on East and Southeast Asia with a
particular focus on the victory of the CCP and its effect on the power balance in
Asia.16
Soviet recognition followed 12 days after the Chinese, on 30 January, and the
official statement was printed in the Soviet press on 31 January. Since the
decision to recognize Hos government had been thoroughly discussed with Mao
in December, the actual Soviet recognition of the DRV did not cause much
discussion. From Moscows point of view, it was rather the slow routine of the
DRV bureaucracy and discussions about diplomatic representation that caused
trouble. On 14 February, two weeks after the official announcement in Pravda,
the Soviets had still not received a confirmation from the Vietnamese, which is
rather strange, since Ho Chi Minh was in Moscow at the time.
Nevertheless, the lack of response from Hanoi was a source of concern in
Moscow. Their reply to Hos request was delivered to the DRV representative in
Bangkok, Nguyen Duc Quy, on 1 February, to be passed on to the DRV Foreign
Minister, Hoang Minh Giam.17 Shortly after, on 3 February, Ho Chi Minh arrived
in Moscow to discuss future assistance with Stalin himself. These discussions
took place, as we have already seen, during the banquet that followed the signing
of the Sino-Soviet treaty. According to Chinese sources, Stalin told Ho that he
would have to depend mainly on Chinese assistance and that the Soviet Union
would not sign an agreement with the DRV similar to the one the latter had
signed with China. Ho Chi Minh returned with Mao to Beijing on 17 February.18
There are no descriptions of these meetings in available Soviet documents or
any comments on Hos visit. The lack of written material, and a slow flow of
information, could be why the foreign ministry officials were concerned with the
lack of answers from the DRV leadership. During his stay in Moscow, Ho most
probably conveyed his answer to the Soviet recognition of Vietnam to Stalin personally, and thus there would be no trace of this in the files. Given the fact that at
the time the DRV had no permanent resident capital it would also be difficult for
it to coordinate and convey a swift formal answer to Moscow.19 They might also
have chosen to trust that their leader would take care of this business while in

18

Setting the stage

Moscow. Thus, in the end this was just the worry of some petty bureaucrat in the
Soviet foreign ministry and had no particular importance to the overall Soviet
Vietnamese relationship.
Since the issue of recognition had already been settled, the parties started to
discuss the exchange of representatives. Due to the situation in Vietnam, neither
the Chinese nor the Soviets wanted to send diplomatic officials. The Chinese did,
however, send Luo Guibo, at the time the director of the General Office of the
CCP Central Military Commission, to serve as the CCP Central Committees
liaison representative to Hos party. Luos instructions were to establish contact
with the ICP,20 investigate the general situation in Vietnam and report his findings
to Beijing so that the Chinese party leadership could make their decisions
on assistance to the Vietnamese Communists. The plan for Luo was to stay in
Vietnam for three months, but he stayed for seven years, until 1957. His first
assignment was as the head of the Chinese Political Advisory Group (CPAG) in
the DRV from 1951 to 1954, and the following three years until 1957 he served
as Chinas ambassador to the DRV.21
As seen above, the Chinese almost immediately established formal contact
with the leadership in northern Vietnam. Moscow, however, did not establish
such channels of information. Although Ho Chi Minh announced his desire to
receive a Soviet ambassador in Vietnam, Moscow declined the offer and underlined that they saw the appointment of a Soviet ambassador to DRV as undesirable
as long as the Vietnamese government had not yet established a permanent residence. Soviet attitudes indicate that the most important issue was the organization of Vietnamese representation in Moscow. This corresponded well with the
main wish of the DRV namely to have an embassy in Moscow. Available
foreign ministry files in Moscow pay surprisingly little attention to the question
of Soviet representation in the DRV. There might be a single reason for this
attitude namely the overall situation in Vietnam. According to both Soviet and
Chinese sources, Moscow and Beijing chose to postpone the installation of
ambassadors in Hanoi due to the unstable situation in the country.22
However, in the meantime, the question of representation had to be solved one
way or another. In February 1950 the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Wang Jiaxiang, informed Andrei Gromyko that Ho Chi Minh had already asked
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai whether the Chinese ambassador could represent
Vietnamese interests in the Soviet Union until the arrival of the Vietnamese
ambassador. The solution proposed by the Vietnamese and the Chinese was
accepted by the Soviets on the terms that the Chinese embassy will be allowed to
represent the interests of the DRV.23 However, the Soviets clearly explained that
the Chinese ambassador could not take on the position of envoy (ambassador) for
Vietnam since the principle of substitute officials was not an accepted diplomatic
practice and could create an unwanted precedence.24 To the Vietnamese it was so
important to be represented in the Soviet Union that they were willing to
compromise their wish for their own embassy for a limited period of time and let
the Chinese handle contacts with the Soviets on the DRVs behalf because they
had no other options at the time. The decision to appoint Nguyen Long Bang

Setting the stage

19

ambassador to Moscow was already made, and the DRV was determinded to get
its own diplomatic representation in order as soon as possible.
While the arrangement with the Chinese secured Vietnamese representation in
the Soviet Union, there was still the question of Soviet representation in
Vietnam. In spite of the Soviet recognition of the DRV in late January 1950,
information on Vietnam continued to come to Moscow mainly through unofficial
DRV representatives in southern China25 and the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
Instead of setting up an embassy in Hanoi under the present circumstances, the
Soviets chose to keep in touch with Vietnamese officials through their consulate
in Canton. The Vietnamese had set up an official delegation in the city, and
information about conditions in Vietnam went via the consulate in Canton to the
Soviet embassy in Beijing. So, in fact, the Soviet consul in Canton functioned as
the Soviet representative in the DRV. However, this arrangement meant that the
information about Vietnamese conditions that was sent to the Far East department in the Soviet foreign ministry was second- and third-hand information.
Soviet foreign ministry officials did not gather first-hand information, at least not
on a regular basis.26
Once the question of recognition and provisional representation was settled, it
was time to sort out the future rank of representatives to the opposite country.
This task should have been easy but turned out to be rather complicated. The
PRC and DRV governments had already decided to exchange ambassadors.
The Soviet foreign minister expected that the Soviet Union and DRV would do
the same; consequently, this was the first intention of both countries. A week
before the recognition took place on 23 January 1950, this was outlined in a letter
from Vietnam to the Soviet Union and other peoples democracies. However, in a
second letter sent in February that year, the DRV foreign minister referred to the
exchange of diplomatic representatives without specifying their exact rank.
Because of the special situation of the PRC ambassador acting as DRV envoy in
Moscow, the Vietnamese found it natural to exchange envoys and not ambassadors with the Soviet Union. According to Soviet representatives at the embassy
in Beijing, it was after a statement made by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinski on
30 January 1950, in which he referred to the Soviet decision to exchange envoys
with the DRV, that the Vietnamese went back on their earlier express wish to
exchange ambassadors.27 The outcome was the exchange of ambassadors, and
the first Vietnamese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Nguyen Long Bang,
arrived in Moscow in April 1952, more than two years after the recognition. It
took two and a half years more, and a Geneva agreement, before the Soviet
Union was properly represented in Hanoi.
The discussions and misunderstandings over the exchange of representatives
might at a glance seem like a small, and quite trivial, issue. However, at the same
time it illustrates the need of the Hanoi government to secure some kind of direct
contact with both of its primary allies. That the Chinese ambassador would represent the DRV in Moscow clearly reflected the StalinMao agreement that
China would take main responsibility for colonial liberation struggles in Asia. At
the same time, the discussion around the level of diplomatic exchange between

20

Setting the stage

Moscow and Hanoi showed that the Vietnamese were anxious to establish
high-level contacts with Moscow and thus probably avoid dependence only on
China, but not on such a high level that it would irritate the Chinese. The
exchange of envoys would be a way to avoid that problem and at the same time
secure the Vietnamese direct and independent contact with Moscow. However, it
is unlikely that the Vietnamese considered it an advantage to be represented
through the PRC; it was rather seen as the only available option at the time.
There is no doubt that recognition from China and the Soviet Union was of
vital importance to the DRV leaders. The Western powers did, of course, see the
situation from a different perspective. In Washington the main concern was the
reports of an ever-growing Chinese assistance to the Vietminh. Chinas new
strength increased American fears of Communist expansion in the area. In Paris
and London the Communist victory in China was seen primarily as a threat to
European colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. From a French point of view this
was reflected in an immediate concern for a possible direct Chinese intervention in
the Franco-Vietminh War.28
The Soviet leadership was rather satisfied with the impact recognition had on
the Western powers and especially on the French government. During the spring
of 1950 the Soviet foreign ministry reports referred to French newspapers that
characterized the carefully constructed recognition of the Bao Dai government as
a bursting soap-bubble threatening not only the American reactionary policies
in Asia but also the pro-American government in France. The French government was characterized as confused and impotent due to the fact that when
Ho Chi Minhs government was recognized by the Democratic Republics the
French government preferred not to react at all, in order to avoid further complications and not find themselves forced to once again attract public attention to
the Indochinese question that thanks to the PCF has become critical to the
French.29
Yet another comment spoke of how Franco-American plans to include
Indochina in their sphere of influence and their efforts to strengthen the international position of the state of Vietnam was upset by the Soviet recognition of the
DRV. Contrary to the predictions in the French bourgeois press, the French
government would not dare to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union or renounce the Franco-Soviet treaty of 10 December 1944. With reference to earlier comments made by former Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, the
Southeast Asia department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID)
emphasized the significance of Socialist education in the DRV. In addition, they
argued that the DRVs strengthened connections with the camp of peace and
democracy would promote the further development of the anti-imperialistic,
national liberation movements in the countries of Southeast Asia.30
Recognition formalized the relationships between the Soviet Union and the
DRV, but did it alter the relationship between Moscow and Hanoi? The effects of
recognition and its impact on relations should be evaluated both in terms of
immediate and long-term results. The immediate result would first of all be a
possible boost of self-confidence among the DRV leaders, as they were now

Setting the stage

21

accepted within the Communist camp. In addition, recognition implied promises

of future support, morally and financially. Since neither the Soviet Union nor the
DRV installed permanent representatives in each others countries immediately,
recognition in itself did not contribute to a more steady flow of information
between them. In spite of this situation, recognition both increased the interest in
the situation in Vietnam among Soviet leaders and also led to an increase in
information about Vietnam arriving through other sources such as the Soviet consulate in Canton and the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
During the first years after recognition the Soviet Union had no permanent
mission in the DRV and relied mainly on reports sent by the Soviet consulate in
Canton. During the early 1950s most of the information was, naturally enough,
related to the war with the French. According to reports from Vietnam, the
situation of the DRV was difficult. The larger cities and the most important lines
of communication, as well as airspace and important ports, were controlled by
the French. However, from the Soviet side, the Americans were seen as the most
important aggressor as they financed the war on behalf of the French.31 To plan a
policy towards Vietnam, the Soviet leadership needed information about the
situation in both the northern and southern parts of the country, as well as
information on the French and American positions in Vietnam.
Recognition of the DRV by China, the Soviet Union and other Socialist
governments was vital to the Hanoi government. The Soviet Union had been at
full liberty to offer recognition to the DRV also at an earlier stage, but until the
victory of the Chinese Communists Stalin had not been willing to offer the
Vietnamese more than moral support at the most. With the changed situation on
the Chinese mainland, Moscow was forced to devote more attention to Vietnam,
and although Stalin granted Mao the practical responsibility for dealing with the
situation in Vietnam, Soviet recognition and the possibility of future support
made a huge difference to Hanoi. The fact that this happened only after the proclamation of the Peoples Republic further underscores Chinas important role
with regard to Vietnam.

The Franco-Vietnamese War

When the Soviet Union and China recognized the DRV, the Franco-Vietminh
war had lasted for more than three years. Not unexpectedly, the war and ways of
assisting the Vietminh was one of the major topics in SovietDRVChina
relations during the early 1950s. Developments in this period show that Beijing
was much more involved in the affairs of the Vietminh than Moscow. As we
have seen in the immediate postwar period, Stalins foreign policy attention in
the latter part of the 1940s was directed primarily towards Europe, to the degree
that Stalins focus on Asia up to 1950 was on developments within China.
His first priority was the relationships with the United States, France and Great
Britain, and all of these states were much more important to Kremlin than events
in Indochina. When negotiations between Ho Chi Minh and the French failed to
produce more than a modus vivendi agreement in September 1946 and full-scale

22

Setting the stage

war broke out in NovemberDecember, the Soviet Union apparently never even
considered speaking up on behalf of the newly founded DRV.
The Soviet foreign ministry was regularly updated on developments in the war
by Canton and through conversations with Vietnamese representatives in Southern China. Many of the details that came through the consulate were probably
also available to Moscow through other, and quicker, sources. And both the Main
Intelligence Directorate (GRU)32 and the CPSU probably had other channels of
information.33 Still, the documents not only contained practical information on
the progress of the war and the development of the economy, they also passed on
the general sentiment existing among the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese
were eager to show the enthusiasm of the people, and the Soviet representatives
willingly reported back to Moscow, even when the information presented had a
clear character of propaganda. One such occasion was in April 1951, when a
report presented to the Soviet consulate in Canton by DRV representatives
described the mood amongst the people of Vietnam by saying that the repeated
victories of the National Liberation Army had strengthened peoples belief in the
final victory in the resistance war against the French and American imperialists. It
added further that the population had begun to participate more actively in the
mobilization of forces that would assist the Vietminh front and that when they
met trouble such as destruction causing floods or sudden attacks by French
forces, this did not decrease the enthusiasm of the population in their effort to
support the front.34 No doubt, the Vietnamese hoped that their will to fight and
overcome all obstacles could lead to more substantial Soviet support in the future.
Parallel to information on developments in the war, Moscow was also updated
on internal developments in Vietnam. In spite of the war economy, the Vietminh
leaders wanted to start building a society in accordance with Socialist principles.
During the latter part of 1950 and the spring of 1951, several conferences were
held to strengthen the foundation of the government, and, according to the
Vietnamese report, those attending the conferences had all been very excited
about the outcome. It was also underlined how this was an opportunity to build a
society that draws on the multi-faceted experience of the peoples democracies
also in a situation when the state in question is established in an occupied zone,
and the opposite party, the marionette regime, is on the way to breakdown without any opportunities to strengthen its position.35 This report shows some of the
channels through which the Soviets received their information about Vietnam,
but more importantly it gives an indication as to how the Vietnamese themselves
wished to present the current development in their country. It is not unlikely that
they hoped such an insight into the current situation would prompt some kind of
Soviet assistance.
The autumn border campaign in 1950 was the first example of active Chinese
assistance to the Vietminh army. Shortly after recognition, Ho asked the Chinese
for military experts to train and advise the Vietminh army before and during battles. The Chinese agreed to send advisors but refused to send field commanders,
and on 17 April 1950 the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) was
formed. The CMAG consisted of advisors to the Peoples Army of Vietnam

Setting the stage

36

23

(PAVN) headquarters, three full divisions, and finally, an officers training

school. Altogether the CMAG would count 281 people of which 79 were advisors
and their assistants.37
The first major task for the CMAG was assisting the PAVN while planning
and conducting the autumn border campaign in the summer/fall of 1950. Ho Chi
Minh presented the idea of such an offensive in June 1950. The aim of the
campaign was to clear out the French forces that occupied the northern part of
Vietnam bordering China. With the French expelled from the area, the lines of
communication with China would be open, and it would become much easier for
the PAVN to receive both supplies and manpower from China. In spite of heavy
losses on the Vietnamese side and the fact that the campaign exposed severe deficiencies within the PAVN with regard to both planning and command structure,
the campaign was considered a success.38
In the early months of 1951 the optimistic mood after the success in their
autumn border campaign, in which Chinese material and practical assistance had
played a significant role, inspired the Vietminh to launch a large-scale regularunit assault on the French positions around Hanoi in the Red River delta and the
border region to China. The attack was a major setback, and the Vietminh lost
around 6,000 soldiers.39 Because this second campaign turned out to be rather
catastrophic, the military situation in the DRV continued to be difficult throughout the latter part of 1951. Although several civilian tasks such as strengthening
of government positions and, not least, the formal establishment of the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) had been successfully completed during 1951, the
army had not been able to gain control over more vital territory. The larger cities
and most important lines of communication remained in the hands of the French,
who also had control over the airspace and the sea. This situation was, according
to the Soviet embassy in Beijing, primarily a result of the increased American
interest in Indochina. Whereas they earlier only assisted the French, the Soviets
now claimed that Americans had become the principal aggressor in the
Indochinese war.40
The difficult military situation was not the only concern of the Soviets in
Vietnam. The countrys economic base remained extremely weak, and there was
no industry to speak of. Once again the Soviet embassy pointed to the role of
China and underlined that in the current situation it would be very difficult for
the DRV government to continue the war on its own and therefore needed
outside assistance, in particular from its closest neighbour the PRC.41
In addition to the CMAG, the Chinese also participated in a campaign initiated
by Ho Chi Minh to consolidate and strengthen the DRV government in 1951.
Early that year the Chinese set up a civilian counterpart to the CMAG, the
CPAG. The group was led by Luo Guibo, future ambassador to the DRV, and
was set up to handle different sections within the North Vietnamese bureaucracy.
It had sections for military affairs, finance and economy, public security, culture
and education, united front, party consolidation and land reform. Altogether it
consisted of over 100 advisors, who during that first year helped Ho Chi Minh set
up laws and policies on matters ranging from finance to treatment of minorities.42

24

Setting the stage

The two advisory groups, CMAG and CPAG, both played vital roles in consolidating the areas under Vietminh occupation and its military forces. They were
both part of a larger programme initiated by Ho Chi Minh and were made possible by generous Chinese military and manpower assistance. In addition, they
both showed Chinas interest in and willingness to contribute to the cause of the
Vietnamese Communists even during a time when they were deeply committed
to another Asian war in Korea.
During 195253 the French turned to a more defensive strategy in the war
against the Vietminh. This change was mainly due to a lack of manpower that
constrained their military effectiveness. The French attitude opened up new
possibilities to the Vietnamese, and in early 1952, this time initiated by the
CMAG, the PAVN began planning a large campaign in the northwest territory of
Vietnam. There were two main reasons for targeting this region in particular:
First, the French defences there were considered to be rather weak and the odds
for a Vietminh victory were good. Second, if the Vietminh could secure this area
under its control, the chances of an attack from its rear would be very unlikely.
The whole plan for the northwest campaign was followed closely in Beijing, and
Luo Guibos strategies were approved by CCP Central Military Commission
before the Vietnamese went into action.43
In contrast to the Chinese, the Soviets apparently were not involved in the
planning and financing of the PAVN campaigns during the Franco-Vietnamese
War. However, the Chinese had asked Moscow for advice and approval before
the autumn 1950 campaign started. While visiting the Soviet Union between
17 August and 22 September 1951, Zhou Enlai mentioned the plan for a Northwest
campaign to Stalin. Zhou was then in Moscow to seek Soviet economic aid.
According to one scholar, Stalin approved of the campaign and suggested that if
the Vietminh could succeed in surrounding Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh could bring up
the issue of peace talks with France. Stalin further added that if Paris rejected any
form of negotiations, the Vietminh could move southwards after taking control
over Hanoi.44
In April 1952 the DRV sent its first ambassador to the Soviet Union. Nguyen
Long Bang was born in 1904 and had been an active revolutionary in Vietnam in
the mid-1920s.45 With Nguyen Long Bangs arrival, the Soviet leaders now had a
direct source of information from Vietnam. Due to the war the Soviets had yet to
set up representation in Vietnam, and when the DRV ambassador came to
Moscow, he was met with questions on whether the DRV had been able to decide
on a capital in the liberated areas of Vietnam. In response to this, Nguyen Long
Bang informed them that although the liberation army had control over several
towns, the DRV did not yet have a permanent capital. Until a decision was made,
the central governmental and party establishments would have to periodically
move from one place to another, principally within the limits of the three provinces Thai Nguyen, Bac Kan and Tuyen Quang. The ambassador also added that
the towns within this area were almost completely in ruins.46
The Soviets were already familiar with the Chinese military assistance to the
DRV, but Nguyen Long Bang could add more details to the tale. In his report to

Setting the stage

25

the Soviet foreign ministry handed over on 14 May 1952, he stated that 80 per cent of
the weapons used by the PAVN were supplied by the Chinese. Parts of the
Vietnamese army in the northern regions of the country were rather well
equipped with light infantry weapons.47 What they did need were machine guns
and automatic weapons. He also emphasized the vital role of the Chinese
advisors in planning attacks and teaching soldiers and officers. The DRV armys
military operations had gained a much higher standard since the Chinese came to
help.48 The facts presented by the DRV ambassador were well received in
Moscow, and the Soviet leaders seemed rather pleased with the Chinese taking
on all the practical and economic issues related to Vietnam.
Although Stalin assured Zhou Enlai that he approved of the forthcoming
campaign, Ho Chi Minh found it best to talk to the Soviet leader himself. He
went on a secret trip from Beijing to Moscow in October 1952 to attend the
Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU. Before the meetings took place Ho and Stalin
corresponded about the circumstances surrounding Hos visit. Because of the
situation in Vietnam, Ho was very reluctant to publicly announce his arrival in
Moscow, as he explains in his letters to the Soviet leader. Throughout the
exchange of letters the tone between the two leaders was extremely polite, and
even to a certain degree loving, this in spite of accusations that Stalin distrusted
Ho Chi Minh.49 In a letter of 30 September 1952, Ho first informed Stalin about
his plans to travel to Moscow and attend the 19th Party congress incognito. He
underlined that he did not want attention drawn to his visit, because he feared that
the enemy (French) could use the opportunity to attack the Vietminh forces.
However, if he would be unable to make it to the Party congress himself, he
would like to send Nguyen Long Bang as his representative. Nevertheless, he
intended to visit Moscow to inform them about the situation in Vietnam and
discuss questions related to the struggle and the work within the Vietnamese
Communist Party with Stalin. Stalin replied with a cable on 2 October 1952, in
which he welcomed Ho to Moscow and said that he approved of the idea of
travelling incognito. In his reply on 17 October, Ho informed Stalin that he
wanted Liu Shaoqi to participate in the discussion about Vietnam.50 During his
stay in Moscow, Ho Chi Minh met with Stalin and Liu Shaoqi on 28 October to
discuss the current policies of the Vietminh.51 On 19 November Ho wrote in his
farewell letter to Stalin that he would work hard on the implementation of land
reform and the war. Since the details of these discussions remain unavailable on
the Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese side, the actual details of the talks remain
unknown; however, taking into account Hos words in his letter of 19 November
the Vietnamese leader most probably sought Stalins support.52
By the summer of 1953 the practice of Chinese military assistance to the DRV
was well established. The current state of Chinas role in Vietnam was discussed
during a meeting between the Soviet ambassador to Beijing, Vasilii Vasilievich
Kuznetsov, and Zhou Enlai in June 1953.53 At the time, the army under Ho Chi
Minhs control was continuously gaining strength and manpower. These forces
had Chinese advisors, and DRV officers were educated in China. From a Chinese
point of view, the main problem was the lack of people to join the armed forces.

26

Setting the stage

As in Korea, most of the population lived in the southern part of the country.
However, Zhou Enlai underlined, we are not going to send our forces to
Indochina.54 The Chinese attitude showed that in 1953 the Chinese were as
involved as they wanted to be in Vietnam. They had no intentions of participating
in the battles along the same lines as they recently did in Korea.
Available sources suggest that the Soviet Unions involvement in the FrancoVietnamese War was minimal and that the interest did not increase even with the
conclusion of the Korean War. Throughout 1953, the DRV government was
preoccupied with the conduct of land reform a campaign that was fully supported by the Chinese contingent in Vietnam and that to a large degree was
formed after the Chinese model. One has, however, to keep in mind that the
North Vietnamese campaign took on a less rigid form than the Chinese reform.
Through the land reform campaign, the DRV leaders showed how much they
depended on the Chinese experience to form their future state. Although
Vietnamese nationalists/Communists had talked about land reform since the
1920s, it was only with Chinese guidance they had gotten so far.55
Recognition and new challenges
With the proclamation of the PRC in 1949, Stalin emphasized Chinas important
role as the leading Communist power in Asia by indicating a division of labour
between Moscow and Beijing. The Soviet Union would deal with Europe, and
China would take charge of developments in Asia. However, Stalins division of
labour proposal should be viewed with some suspicion. Even if the Sino-Soviet
relationship functioned well at the time, Stalins previous experience with
independent Communist leaders, more precisely Tito, suggests that he would not
allow Mao any independence in the region. It is equally unlikely that he would
regard positively the rise of a strong and independent Vietnamese leader such as
Ho Chi Minh. And as a result, during the last years of his life, Stalin did not want
to put the Soviet Union at risk by directly sustaining revolutions in Asia. He left
this burden to China, with regard to both Korea and Indochina.
The major change in Moscows view on the Vietnamese situation came with
the victory of the CCP. Events surrounding the recognition show how both China
and the Soviet Union were considered important partners by the Vietnamese.
During the first few years of the 1950s the triangular relationship between Moscow,
Hanoi and Beijing seems to have functioned satisfactorily in the view of all three
countries. The DRV received large amounts of assistance from China, and to a
lesser extent from the Soviet Union through China, in the form of equipment,
officers and advice. The Soviet Union could follow the situation in Vietnam from
a distance, content with the fact that the aid it provided through China was well
applied, and did nothing to harm Moscows relations with more important countries in the West. The PRC secured its own strong position in the Communist
world, and especially within Asia, acting as provider of equipment and advice to
a struggle that would prevent French or even American domination in Vietnam.
While the PRC was important because it secured Vietnams northern border, the

Setting the stage

27

DRV served as a buffer between the PRC and possible takeover of South
Vietnam by imperialist states.
From a Soviet point of view, this form of cooperation was indeed very advantageous, and it was possible to pursue it because in the first few years of the
1950s Moscow was clearly superior to Beijing within the Socialist camp. The
approach relieved the Soviets of heavy burdens in countries far away, and it
allowed the Chinese a certain amount of liberty in the foreign policy conduct towards
Indochina. The one party that suffered most from this arrangement must have
been the DRV and its leaders; however, even to them the picture was not entirely
grim. They had managed to establish an important link to the Soviet Union and
awakened at least marginal interest in their cause among the Soviet leaders even
though it was through Chinese channels. Later on, the Vietnamese leaders would
regret that they had been unable to forge close relations with Moscow in this
period and hence had became too dependent on China. In retrospective,
Moscow might have shared these regrets wishing that it had not made its own
relationship with the Vietnamese so dependent on Beijing.

The end of the war and the Geneva

conference, 19531954

While both 1951 and 1952 had been bad years for the Vietminh, by 1953 the situation was about to change. With the end of the Korean War that summer, the
Chinese could now be more attentive to the needs of the Vietnamese Communists in their struggle with the French. In 1953 and early 1954, in response to
French military changes, the Vietminh made significant changes in its military
strategy; the implementation of these changes eventually led to the battle at Dien
Bien Phu in the spring of 1954, and subsequent negotiations at Geneva during
that summer.1 Parallel to the changes in military fortunes, the governments of
France, the Soviet Union, China and the DRV became gradually more positive to
seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict.2
The main aim of this chapter is to evaluate the Soviet role in the period leading
up to the conference and during the negotiations in Geneva, primarily with focus
on its position vis--vis its Chinese and Vietnamese allies. Providing advice to
the Vietnamese Communists was an important task for both the Soviets and the
Chinese, and while Moscow was in charge of the stage directions, the Chinese
dealt with all the practicalities. The active role assigned to Beijing also meant
that, on certain occasions, the Soviet leadership allowed its Chinese comrades to
make at least some vital decisions, although only within certain predefined
frameworks discussed with the Soviets in advance.3 By taking on the role as the
active party, Beijings policy considerations would exerted a significant influence on Soviet policies and therefore became one of the most important Soviet
tools during the conference.
Another central focus in this chapter is Moscows overall agenda, which was
not only about the future situation in Indochina. An equally important driving
force behind Soviet strategies and diplomacy during the Geneva conference was
the need to secure Moscows foreign policy interests, both in Indochina and in
other parts of the world. To what extent was this position compatible with its
commitments to its Chinese and Vietnamese allies? Together with the PRC, the
Soviet Union shared a common desire to end the wars in the region, and during
the conference the two countries followed a line of consultations and close cooperation. Moscow was the more moderate partner of the two and expected less
from the final outcome than the Chinese and much less than the DRV.4

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

29

In the aftermath of the conference, strategists in Moscow and Beijing were

accused of restraining the DRV while at the same time letting international strategic considerations take precedence over their ideological commitment to support
the struggle of a fellow Communist party.5 Without doubt, issues other than the
future interest of the Vietnamese Communists played a significant role as part of
Moscows plan in Geneva; notwithstanding this, Soviet policy makers also
worked out their plans based on what they considered to be the best possible solution for Vietnam and the future strategy of the VWP. Is it possible that partition in
itself did not trouble the Soviets, simply because they viewed the final outcome of
the conference as advantageous to Hanoi based on the notion that the North now
would be able to consolidate and rebuild its strength before taking further steps to
achieve reunification? This chapter attempts to further elaborate this question.

Preparing for the conference

After the end of the Korean War in the summer of 1953 the Communist powers
launched what has been labelled a peace offensive. The beginning of this initiative was the proposal of 26 September from the Soviet Union to the governments
of France, Great Britain and the United States to organize a five-power conference,
with the participation of China, to discuss ways of easing international tensions.
On 8 October the Chinese endorsed the Soviet suggestion. Three months later,
Beijing followed up with another proposal in which they emphasized that the
problems in Asia needed to be resolved through direct discussions among the big
powers. The final endorsement of the Soviet proposal came at a four-power
conference in Berlin at the end of January 1954, at which it was decided to
convene an international conference at Geneva to discuss the restoration of peace
in Korea and Indochina during the summer of that year.6
On 8 May the Indochina phase of the conference opened, and more than two
months later, on 20 July 1954, the Geneva agreements were signed. The signing
of the agreements marked the end of the Franco-Vietminh war and the beginning
of French withdrawal from Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). During the
conference, Vietnam was divided into two zones, with separate administrations.
The southern zone, the State of Vietnam (SVN) was ruled by the Americansupported Ngo Dinh Diem, and the northern zone, the DRV, by Ho Chi Minh and
the Communist party.7
One of Moscows main aims before and during the conference was to actively
integrate the PRC into the club of the Four Great Powers the United States,
Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. That was an acknowledgement of the
role China was playing both in Korea and, more recently, in Vietnam. Moscows
emphasis on the Chinese role was not only displayed through Sino-Soviet
cooperation in preparations for the conference but also in SovietAmerican
encounters. The Soviet insistence on bringing China into the conference as an
equal partner, even in spite of American protests, indicates the degree of importance
the Soviets were willing to attach to the role of China in reducing international
tensions in Asia.8

30

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, who was in charge of Soviet

preparations for the conference, argued in a meeting with the US Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles, during the Berlin conference that the Soviets would not
agree to any accusations against China on the question of Indochina. He pointed
to the fact that the war in Indochina began several years before the establishment
of the PRC and thus was a result of the unsatisfactory policies pursued by the
French, and not the fault of the Chinese. Molotov reminded Dulles that at the
beginning of the Berlin conference he had told French Foreign Minister Georges
Bidault that the Soviet Union and the PRC could assist with mediation in the
Indochinese question. However, he remarked, since then the French had not said
anything except on general issues.9
Thus, the status of the PRC and their role during the conference became a
major issue alongside the more practical question of how to organize day-to-day
work during the conference. In March, several conversations took place between
Charles Bohlen, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Vasilii Vasiljevich Kuznetsov on the subject of Chinas role in
Geneva. Bohlen insisted on keeping all discussions within the sphere of the four
Great Powers, whereas the Soviet Union wanted the leaders of the PRC to be
consulted on several issues. In 1954 the United States had not yet recognized the
PRC government and considered Chiang Kai-Sheks Republic of China in
Taiwan to be the legitimate representative of China.
Moscows insistence on keeping the Chinese informed soon led to trouble. A
Soviet comment regarding the organizational aspects of the conference stating
that the Soviet Union had been discussing organizational questions regarding the
conference with Beijing, and that the Peoples Republic of China agreed with
the Soviet position, seriously provoked the Americans.10 Ambassador Bohlen
made it clear to the Soviet Union that they might well consult China if they
wanted to but should keep in mind that the it was the four Great Powers which
were responsible for the conference and that the PRC only had participant status.
Replying to this, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov underlined that the
Soviet Union had no intention of ruining the agreement made in Berlin and
further argued that discussing these practical questions with China would make
organization of the conference easier.11 The Berlin communiqu, the official
announcement following the Berlin conference published on 19 February 1954,
declared that during the Geneva conference the PRC should have a position
equal to that of the four Great Powers.12 In spite of these Soviet arguments,
Washington kept insisting that the four powers, not five, would remain responsible for organizing the conference and added that once the conference began, all
participating countries would have an equal status.13
Once the Berlin conference was over, Soviet officials began preparations for
the conference in Geneva, which was scheduled to open on 26 April. Korea was
the first item, and the session devoted to the Indochina problem was scheduled to
begin on 8 May. In Moscow, the Southeast Asia department in the Soviet foreign
ministry was in charge of compiling preparatory materials for the Soviet delegation to the conference.14 While Moscow was discussing organizational questions

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

31

with the Americans, the Chinese began preparing for the trip to Geneva. The new
leaders in Beijing were about to participate in their first international conference;
and in meetings with the Soviets during preparations for the conference, Prime
Minister Zhou Enlai assured the leaders in Moscow that China would do its best
to cooperate with the Soviets.15
The Chinese were excited by the prospects of participating at the Geneva
conference and not least the acknowledgement of the new China that was
inherent in this event. Since its foundation, the PRC had been excluded from
many activities of the international community, and the fact that it would now
participate at an international conference alongside the Great Powers signalled
that it had emerged as a major power.16 It was in this atmosphere that the Chinese
began their preparations for the conference. The main architect behind the
Chinese preparations was Zhou Enlai. In several speeches to his associates Zhou
analysed the prospects, indicating that while it would probably be difficult to
achieve a peaceful settlement in Korea, the chances of reaching agreement on the
Indochina issue were much better. Zhou further argued that the main reason why
it could be possible to reach consensus on the Indochina issue was the differences
that existed between France and the United States. Based on this, Zhou wanted to
create a Communist strategy that would appeal to the French while at the same
time alienating the Americans. The idea that France was the key to an agreement
was followed by the Chinese throughout.17
In early March, Chinas preparations for the conference had already come
quite far, and by 2 March the Chinese had already worked out a preliminary
document on how to proceed during the conference. The document, entitled
Preliminary Paper on the Estimation of and the Preparation for the Geneva
Conference, maintained that the Chinese should primarily attempt to exploit the
differences between the Western countries. They should try to reach an agreement even if only a temporary one and should continue to strive for the restoration of peace in Indochina even if it might be a long-term struggle. The most
important task was to avoid a fruitless conference. The Chinese were also
prepared to negotiate even if fighting was still going on, and such a situation
should be exploited to increase the differences between the United States and
France, as well as to increase internal pressure in France. From a Chinese point
of view, that could prove to become very valuable for the success of the national
liberation struggles in Indochina.18
During the Geneva preparations China left nothing to chance. The best
example was the case of Huang Hua, who was appointed spokesman for the
Chinese delegation. In early March, Huang was recalled from the Chinese negotiation team at Panmunjon, where negotiations for the Korean conflict took place,
to Beijing, to contribute his knowledge and expertise in international negotiations
to the Geneva team. To make sure that he would be able to handle the different
questions that were likely to be posed in Geneva, a mock meeting with the press
was organized to test his ability to answer properly.19
Alongside national planning procedures, coordination of policies and strategies between the Soviet, Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders was the most

32

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

important part of the preparations. The Chinese played an active part in pushing
preparations forward, not least with regard to the Vietnamese. In mid-March,
Zhou Enlai told Ho Chi Minh to hurry up and start preparations. The Chinese
premier emphasized to the Vietnamese Communists that the current international
situation and military developments in Vietnam were advantageous for the DRV
to conduct a diplomatic struggle. Furthermore, no matter what came of the
Geneva conference it would serve the cause of the Vietnamese struggle to
actively participate. Zhou also encouraged the Vietnamese to make up their mind
on where a demarcation line should go in case a ceasefire was within reach. At
the end of March, Ho left for Beijing and flew on to Moscow. The three parties
had their first meeting to discuss strategies for the conference on 1 April 1954,
when Zhou Enlai, Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong met with Premier Nikita
Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Molotov in Moscow.20
Soviet proposals for the restoration of peace in Indochina were on the table by
mid-March. Although no Soviet records of these meetings are currently available, it is safe to assume that the memorandum served as a basis for negotiations
between the three parties. The document consisted if three parts and the first part
outlined the basis on which the Soviet delegation would negotiate. The Soviet
delegation must establish the right of the representatives of the DRV to participate at the conference. If the Western powers agreed to this, the Soviet delegation should leave it to the Vietnamese and Chinese delegations to show initiative
in putting forth suggestions on the conditions for establishing a ceasefire or the
restoration of peace in Indochina. Finally, the Soviet delegation should strive for
the establishment of ceasefire conditions in Indochina that would be acceptable
to the Ho Chi Minh government, as well as strive for the opening of negotiations
between the DRV and France on further steps to establish peace. Thus, Soviet
policy makers concluded that, while supporting and standing up for the legitimate interests of the DRV, the Soviet delegation should at the same time pursue
the goal of strengthening the relations between the Soviet Union and France.21
These statements from Moscow underlined how the Soviet Union intended to
assign the difficult task of dealing with the Vietnamese Communists to the
Chinese delegation. At the same time Soviet policy priorities were quite clear:
the goal of improving relations with France and, as a part of that, preventing
German rearmament by undermining the establishment of the European Defence
Community (EDC) should not be sacrificed to secure gains for the DRV.
The Soviet plans were further divided into three separate positions. The first
part was labelled the maximum programme. As indicated by its name, this was the
preferred solution seen from a Soviet point of view. Its first condition was a full
ceasefire in the whole territory of Vietnam. In the sphere of FrancoVietnamese
relations it required French recognition of the full sovereignty and independence
of the DRV, withdrawal of all French forces from the territory of Vietnam
within six months, the establishment of a FrenchVietnamese commission to
discuss all questions of the restoration of peace in Indochina and to supervise the
fulfilment of the conditions of the ceasefire, including mutual exchange of
prisoners of war. From the Vietnamese side it would be expected that the DRV

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

33

recognize the presence of French economic and cultural interests in Vietnam (use
of the French merchant fleet, trade/commerce, etc.) on conditions subject to the
agreement between the governments of France and the DRV. The DRV government must present a declaration saying that they would not prosecute persons
who had worked for the French expeditionary corps in the war against the DRV.
The final point in the first position was directed towards the United States,
demanding that their interference in the matters of Indochina must come to a
stop.22
The second Soviet position was more moderate than the first, and therefore a
much more likely basis for negotiations. The section demanding a full ceasefire
had been replaced with a demand for a full stop in military actions on the whole
territory of Indochina, and full French withdrawal was limited to the territory
north of the 16th parallel. In this position, Moscow also put forth the first
mention of a referendum to reunite Vietnam as soon as all French forces had
been withdrawn. However, just as in the first position, the second position
contained a clause that the U.S. interference in the matters of Indochina must
come to a stop.23
Finally, the document contended, the Soviet delegation should resort to the
third, and final, position emphasizing that in case it turns out to be impossible to
reach agreement on the basis of the suggestions of the second position, go for a
solution that military actions should stop on the condition that the French forces
are drawn back to specific places in Vietnam which had already been decided
upon by the two parties involved. After reaching a ceasefire, they should decide
on a commission composed of representatives from France and the DRV which
would work out conditions that would secure a peaceful regulation of the
Vietnamese problem. The commission would also be responsible for observing
the conditions of the ceasefire. In the last point of the third position, the Soviets
underlined that one should provide recommendations for both parties to resolve
difficult questions and to prevent a resurrection of military actions.24 In the very
last comment on the prospects for successful negotiations, the Soviet memorandum concluded that in case we reach no agreement on the Indochinese
problem, we should submit for consideration to the conference the suggestion
recommending that France and the DRV begin direct negotiations on how to
re-establish peace in Indochina.25
From mid-March 1954, when these instructions were on the drafting table, and
until the conference began, issues might have been added or removed. Still, this
draft does give several clues as to how the Soviet delegation intended to pursue
peace in Indochina during the conference. The most noticeable difference
between the first position and the final outcome of the conference is the absence
of suggestions regarding the three most important features of the Final Declaration, namely the partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, the all-Vietnamese
elections to be held within two years and, finally, the establishment of the International Control Commission (ICC).26
In the second position, which was the closest to the actual Final Declaration of
the conference, the Soviets took a more moderate stand. Most important in this

34

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

position was, of course, the very first mention of possible partition at the 16th
parallel. However, there were several elements in this position that were difficult
to negotiate with the Western powers. The most difficult aspects of the second
position were probably the tough stand on US interference and the uncertainties
around the future of the non-Communist part of Vietnam after the proposed
elections. And although a partition at the 16th parallel was indicated in the
suggestion on how and when the French forces would withdraw from Vietnam,
an actual division of the country into two distinctly separate parts was not
mentioned directly in either of the three negotiation positions in the Soviet
memorandum.
While preparing for the conference, Soviet policy makers safeguarded their
positions by introducing several alternative options for negotiations. Such a
strategy was reflected in the three-stage instructions from mid-March. The
strategy document also reveals that to Moscow the most important aspects of the
negotiations were to establish contact between the Vietnamese Communists and
the French government and to make sure that in case none of the other suggestions were accepted by the Western powers, it would at least be possible to reach
an agreement between these two parties. It is also worth noticing that in the third
and final position the Soviets had abandoned the clause prohibiting US interference. That further indicates how far Moscow was willing to go to reach
consensus with the Western powers over the Indochina issue. On a more general
level the thorough planning in the spring of 1954 also shows that the Soviet
leaders were determined to achieve a solution before the closure of the conference,
even if it meant going back on some of their initial wishes laid out in the socalled maximum programme.27
During the spring of 1954, Soviet analysts continued to work on ideas similar
to the three positions outlined above. The continued emphasis on several of the
main aspects of these positions indicate their importance in the discussion of
Soviet strategies for the conference. This was primarily reflected during plans for
discussions with the Chinese, and also the Vietnamese, during the next few
months.28
By early April, the Soviet position seemed clearer and more articulated. One
reason could be information obtained by the Soviet ambassador in Paris on
French ideas for possible solutions to the Indochina problem at the end of March.
However, these solutions were presented not by the government in power but by a
foreign policy advisor to the coming French Prime Minister, Pierre Mends-France.
According to this advisor, France would agree to the following conditions: a
ceasefire in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, free elections controlled by neutral
countries in Vietnam, and introduction in Vietnam, for a limited period of time,
of forces from neutral countries to control the implementation of these free
elections; in addition, France wanted to secure its economic and cultural interests
in Vietnam after an election. Further, the French acknowledged that a new
regime was necessary in Vietnam based on the election results, and that it was
necessary to prevent repressions against those who had collaborated with
the other side during the war. One should, however, note that during this

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

35

conversation emphasis was on regulation of the situation in Vietnam, and for

Laos and Cambodia it was only a question of obtaining a ceasefire. France
wanted to keep the monarchy in Laos and Cambodia and underlined that the
political regime in these countries was not a topic for discussion with regard to
the restoration of peace in Indochina.29
The meetings between the Soviets, Chinese, Vietnamese and North Koreans
took place in Moscow between 1 and 3 April, but the participants were not able
to reach any final decisions on strategies for the Indochina phase of the conference. Thus, the Soviets planned more specific questions that would be raised in
future talks with Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh. Among these were the question of
whether Laos and Cambodia would participate with their own delegations and, if
not, whether representatives from these countries could be included in the DRV
delegation. If the conditions were acceptable to the DRV, the Soviet Union
suggested that the Communist side not initiate a proposal for ceasefire, but
support France if she suggested that. Likewise, a settlement was dependent upon
French support for the DRVs independence and non-alignment, the withdrawal
of all French forces, the DRVs recognition of French economic and cultural
interests in Vietnam, and a guarantee that the DRV abstain from prosecution of
those who had collaborated with France.30 These conditions were all very similar
to those proposed by Mends-Frances foreign policy advisor thus a policy that
at least with time would be acceptable to the French.
The Soviet leaders were also eager to determine Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi
Minhs attitude to all-Vietnamese free elections. In the Soviet plans for negotiations in Geneva, the only mention of elections was the possibility of a referendum in the part of Vietnam south of the 16th parallel, and no suggestions of
common elections for the whole country. Another issue that would have to be
sorted out was the Chinese and North Vietnamese attitude to partition of
Vietnam at the 16th parallel as suggested in the Soviet plans. In case the
Western powers suddenly should suggest a coalition government in Vietnam the
Soviet leaders saw a need for a unified strategy. And finally, Moscow also
wanted to discuss whether the Communist bloc should develop their own
strategy for the partition of Vietnam which would grant advantages to the DRV,
such as recognition of the countrys independence and sovereignty, the withdrawal of French forces, etc.31
All the issues mentioned above were, to some degree, open to discussion, but
on the question of the United States presence in Vietnam, the Communist bloc
had made up their minds: any agreement on Indochina, also a ceasefire, shall
contain a clause on the end of U.S. interference in Indochinese affairs.32 And as
a part of the strategy to avoid a deeper American involvement in the affairs of
Indochina in general and Vietnam in particular, the Communist side attached
great importance to how to present their case in Geneva. Under no circumstances
should it be possible to interpret Communist actions and statements as if the
Peoples Republic at present is providing assistance to the DRV.33 The Soviet
Union feared that an acknowledgement of Chinese assistance to the DRV could
complicate the negotiations.

36

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

The final offensive

Information on developments in the Franco-Vietnamese war was a vital part of
Soviet planning. In 1954, Moscow had no official representative in Vietnam, but
there are indications that Soviet officers visited the southern part of China
bordering Vietnam, or even Vietnam itself, to gather intelligence on the military
situation. At the end of March, Soviet Lieutenant General Petroschevskii, who
worked as military attach at the Soviet embassy in China and military advisor to
the PLA, reported to the Soviet ambassador in China, Pavel Fjodorovich Iudin,
on his conversations with Chinese officials regarding the situation in Indochina.
He informed Pavel on the status of the Vietminh and French forces at Dien Bien
Phu, as well as more details on Vietminh strategies for April. Highlighting the
importance of Chinese assistance and support, Petroschevskii quoted the Chinese
point view on the current and future situation in Indochina. According to
Petroschevskii, the Chinese emphasized how
the people of Vietnam had expressed their wish to see Chinese volunteer
units fight together with the Vietnamese Peoples Army in order to liberate
Indochinese territory, just like we did in Korea. That would be impossible.
To bring Chinese armed forces into the territory of Indo-China could
complicate the international situation, and would be unfavourable for the
national-liberation movements in Thailand and Burma.34
Petruschevskii added what seems to have been a Chinese opinion on how to
solve the Indochinese problem. His Chinese conversation partner outlined three
different ways to resolve the situation; the first option was to hold free elections
for a government among the whole population of Vietnam, after the withdrawal
of occupational troops, in which case most votes would be secured for the Democratic Republic. The second option would be a Korean solution with the partition
of the country into two separate parts, and the third option would be to leave the
situation in its current position.35 Lieutenant General Petruschevskii gathered this
information just before the Moscow meeting between the Soviets, Chinese and
Vietnamese in early April.
Parallel to the preparations for the Geneva conference the Vietminh began
attacking the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. We have already seen how
Chinese military advisors played a crucial role in the planning of Vietminh strategies in this period. In the period from 1950 to 1953 the Chinese had invested
much money and manpower in strengthening the Vietnamese Communist forces.
The Chinese attitude stood in stark contrast to what we have seen from Moscow.
While the Chinese concluded that a victorious Vietnamese army would help
secure success at Geneva, Moscow was reluctant to provide overt assistance to
the Vietnamese in this crucial period leading up to the conference, even when
confronted with rather small requests from the Vietnamese.
One example of Moscows reluctance can be traced to January 1954, when the
Vietnamese sent a request for trucks and regular cars to be used during the spring.

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

37

Reviewing the request, Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Aleksandrovich Zorin

came to the conclusion that, since it was not a question of weapons but about
means of transport, it should be possible to satisfy the request of the Central
Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party, and supply these trucks with the
help of the Chinese.36 There had earlier been requests for weapons such as the
overt hints in the May 1952 report from the Vietnamese ambassador, Nguyen
Long Bang, in which he underlined what kind of weapons the Vietminh lacked.37
However, judging by Zorins comment regarding the trucks, no weapons had
been delivered or would be delivered from the Soviet Union to the Vietnamese
Communists.
The decision to set up a strongly fortified garrison at Dien Bien Phu had been
made by the French General Henri Navarre. Navarre was assigned to the post as
commander of the French forces in Indochina in May 1953 and immediately
began to work out a new three-year strategy aimed at winning back the advantage
on the battle field. The plan was supported by the United States, who was now
free from the burden of Korea and concentrated all its worries on the consequences of a French loss in Indochina. With a dramatic increase in US military
and financial support to France, the French began to send additional forces to
Indochina. General Navarres plan consisted of a three-stage strategy intended to
reverse the balance of forces and strengthen the French military position. During
the fall and winter of 195354 he aimed to secure the strategically crucial Red
River delta, and during the spring of 1954 he wanted to pacify the Communistcontrolled areas in central and south Vietnam, in order to finally launch a general
offensive to pursue, and destroy, the Vietminh main forces in the north.38
The first Vietminh attack on Dien Bien Phu came in January 1954. The attack,
planned by the CMAG, came before the French had firmly established themselves in their positions. The Vietminh suffered heavy losses during this human
wave attack both because they had trouble moving artillery pieces fast enough
and because the French troops moved much faster than expected. But because of
the problems during this first attack, the CMAG and Vietminh decided to change
tactics. Rather than searching for a quick solution they would go for a strategy
of steady progresses. As a part of this steady progress strategy, the Chinese
supplied the Vietminh with anti-aircraft guns that would enable the Vietnamese
to break French air superiority and incapacitate the Dien Bien Phu airstrip. In
addition to providing the anti-aircraft guns, the Chinese taught the Vietminh
soldiers how to use snipers to disrupt French troop activity and to undermine the
French morale. The Chinese also sent engineering experts who had served in
Korea to assist in the construction of trenches in the areas surrounding the French
garrison. The Vietnamese used these trenches to approach the French positions
without the risk of being exposed to French firepower.39
The success of the Vietnamese Communists during the Dien Bien Phu
campaign was to a large degree a result of the enormous practical and logistical
support from the PRC. However, one should not disregard the enormous effort
made by the thousands of Vietnamese men and women who carried out the battle
and, not least, provided the necessary support for the front lines.40 The victory at

38

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

Dien Bien Phu was regarded as imminent both by the Vietnamese and the
Chinese. Beijing explains the Chinese support, emphazising how Mao wanted a
victory at Dien Bien Phu in order to strengthen the Communist position at the
negotiating table.41 And in that regard the timing was perfect. The Vietminh
launched its final offensive on 1 May 1954, and six days later, on 7 May,
the French capitulated. The Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference was
scheduled to open the day after 8 May.42

Negotiating in Geneva
On several occasions, Chinese sources underline the close cooperation between
the Soviet Union and China before and during the conference and add significant
information on the topic currently unavailable in Russian archives. Both Soviet
and Chinese sources emphasize the mutual understanding between Moscow and
Beijing on the importance of Chinas role during the conference. Still, the Soviet
Union was clearly the older brother in Geneva, and during the conference
sessions Zhou Enlai always sought advice, and received approval, from Molotov
before presenting the parties with new suggestions. The reason for this good
cooperation was that the Soviet and the Chinese views were consistent; they both
wanted to end the war in Indochina. However, their expectations from the conference were different. Whereas the Soviet Union was pessimistic and did not
expect too much, China, on the other hand, wanted to strive to achieve results.
The Chinese underlined that just the very fact that the PRC, the DRV, and North
Korea were allowed to participate was in itself a victory.43 To Moscow, however,
the participation of China, North Korea and the DRV at the conference was
among the prerequisites for the negotiations.44
In the spring of 1953 General Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander-in-Chief of the
PAVN, had moved his troops into Laos but withdrew after a few months. In
October 1953 his troops once again entered Laos, and by January 1954, units of
PAVN controlled more than half of Laos and small areas of northern Cambodia.
Giaps offensives were meant to support the liberation movements in these
countries.45
While in pre-conference consultation with both Beijing and Moscow, the
Vietnamese Communists apparently agreed that a settlement following the principle of temporarily dividing Vietnam into two zones was acceptable. However,
the victory at Dien Bien Phu made the Vietnamese believe that they were in a
position to squeeze more concessions from their adversaries at the conference
table. According to Chinese sources, the head of the Vietnamese delegation,
Pham Van Dong, announced at the conference that in order to settle the
Indochina problem, the Vietminh would ask for establishing its virtual control of
most parts of Vietnam (through an on-the-spot truce, followed by a national plebiscite, which they knew that they could win), and, while denying the existence of
Vietminh troops in Laos, pursuing positions for the resistance forces in Laos
and Cambodia by treating the settlement of the Laos and Cambodian problems as
part of a general settlement of the Indochina problem.46 The statements from

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

39

Pham Van Dong caused considerable trouble among the Communist delegations
at the conference. On several occasions, the Chinese had to use considerable
pressure to stop the DRV foreign minister from undermining the possibility of a
settlement.47
On 24 June 1954, while in Moscow during a three-week recess of the Geneva
conference, Foreign Minister Molotov gave a preliminary report on the work of
the conference to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The conference had now
finished its first phase. During this phase it had mainly discussed the Korean
question, on which it had not been able to find common ground, but the participants had also begun discussion of the Indochina issue. Underlining that the
discussion on Indochina was still at a very early stage, Molotov remarked that the
political negotiations had yet to begin. Until now the parties had concentrated on
discussing the terms of a ceasefire.48
However, one of the major problems with regard to establishing a ceasefire
was the Vietnamese refusal to admit that their troops had taken active part in
fighting in both Laos and Cambodia.49 According to Foreign Minister Molotov,
the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had during the
Geneva conference, acknowledged that on the territory of Laos and
Cambodia there had previously been a certain number of Vietnamese
volunteers, that participated in the national-liberation movements of these
countries, but that these volunteers had at one time been withdrawn. They
had also admitted: if we find out that also today there are any Vietnamese
volunteers in these countries, also these remaining volunteers will be called
back. On this point one cannot but see the aspiration of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam to cooperate with all means in order to re-establish
peace in all of Indo-China.50
Molotovs report to the CPSU Plenum was not entirely truthful. What he did not
say in the report was that Vietnam was cooperating with regard to the volunteers
not only because they wanted to withdraw their forces in the neighbouring
countries but rather due to very strong pressure from both their allies, in
particular the Chinese.
While Soviet documentation on negotiations during the conference remains
scarce, the Chinese have released more detailed information on the day-to-day
negotiations in China. One feature that stands out from the Chinese materials,
and that is further reinforced by the lack of materials on the Soviet side, is the
immense task of restraining the Vietnamese. Available materials show that this
task was to a very large degree managed by the Chinese. In Molotovs report
above, cooperation with the DRV is portrayed as uncomplicated, whereas the
actual situation was somewhat different.
When the three delegations from the Soviet Union, the PRC and the DRV met
on 5 May to finalize the Communist stand on the peace settlement in Indochina,
they agreed to pursue an overall settlement including all three Indochinese countries. But the Vietnamese reluctance to withdraw, or even admit to the fact that

40

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

they had troops in Laos and Cambodia, complicated the Chinese wish for a
friendly atmosphere that would encourage continued discussions at the conference. The leader of the Chinese delegation, Zhou Enlai, therefore met with Pham
Van Dong on 8 May and urged him to issue a statement that the Vietminh would
arrange to release all seriously wounded enemy captives at Dien Bien Phu. Zhou
also contacted Wei Guoqing, the chief Chinese military advisor at the Vietminh
headquarters and told him that Geneva should at all times be updated on the
Vietminh handling of this matter.51
However, at the same time the Vietminh victory also strengthened the Chinese
belief that they could achieve a result in Geneva. A member of the Chinese delegation, Wang Bingnan, said that when he heard the news of Dien Bien Phu we
spread it to each other. We were very much encouraged and felt more confident
in solving the Indochina issue.52 As a result, the Chinese delegation came to
Geneva with ambitious instructions from the leadership in Beijing. Their main
aim during the conference was to exercise active diplomacy to break the
American policy of isolation and embargo against China, as well as strive to
reduce world tensions. Further, they should try to conclude agreements so as to
set a precedent for solving international problems through Great Power consultations. Under all this lay the most basic objective of the Chinese government,
namely to prevent an internationalization of the Indochina conflict. The Chinese
would at all costs try to avoid a situation similar to the one they had experienced
in Korea.53
The Chinese side has also argued that Moscow had only a limited interest in
Indochina, and that to the Soviet leaders it was more important to undermine
German rearmament than to continue revolutionary war in Southeast Asia.54 An
examination of available Soviet documents supports the view that China played
the most active role in Geneva. Both Soviet and Chinese sources point to an
active Chinese Foreign Minister, Zhou Enlai, as the man who secured a settlement at Geneva. However, a settlement of the Indochinese problem was of great
importance to the Soviet Union as a means to prevent a possible outbreak of war
in Indochina, and not only in terms of its impact on policies elsewhere.55
Moderating the Vietnamese stand became even more important after the
new French Prime Minister, Pierre Mends-France, took office on 16 June.
Mends-France had promised to resolve the situation in Indochina within
20 July, or resign. With the new climate and a renewed French eagerness to reach
an agreement on Indochina, the Soviet Union and the PRC used all their influence
on Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong to convince them that now was the time to
negotiate with France, and that they should not insist on keeping the demarcation
line on the 14th or 15th parallel.56 The idea of partition was initially presented by
the Chinese. They hoped for a partition at the 16th parallel but realized that such
a solution would cut off one of the essential French colonial highways, and
decided to be willing to accept a partition at the 17th parallel.57
With Pierre Mends-France in charge, Zhou saw an opportunity to reach
agreement in the midst of French distress over the situation in Indochina.
Moscow fully agreed with Zhous stand in this question. It was time to settle

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

41

while Mends-France was in power, also probably because it now seemed

possible to get a negative vote in the French National Assembly on the European
Defence Community. The United States exerted much pressure on the French,
and both Moscow and Beijing feared that if the Vietminh continued to present
the French Prime Minister with unacceptable demands, the French government
would collapse.58
A collapse of the Mends-France government could possibly lead to a worsened situation in Indochina and ruin the chances of a settlement at that point.
Soviet analysts further argued that the one of the main aims of Mends-France
threat to resign unless agreement was reached in Geneva was to put pressure on
the Soviet Union, the PRC and the DRV in order to improve the French position
in the negotiations. Through conversations with close associates of the prime
minister, diplomats at the Soviet embassy in Paris were given the understanding
that the Mends-France government needs
a certain amount of help to achieve a cease-fire in Indochina on conditions
honourable to France and announced that in case they did not succeed,
Mends-France would resign and a new government would take power,
which would probably contribute to an internationalization of the war in
Indochina.59
Such an outcome would, according to the informer, not be in the interest of either
the French or the Soviets.
Thus, with the threat of yet another change of government in France, combined
with the failure of the conference participants to reach agreement on the Korea
question, the pressure to reach an agreement on the Indochina issue would
become even greater. As earlier, the problem was the DRV attitude, and their
refusal to admit the existence of their forces in Laos and Cambodia. At a meeting
between the Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese delegations on 15 June, Molotov,
Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong agreed that the Communist camp should adopt a
new policy with emphasis on the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces,
including the Vietnamese volunteers from Laos and Cambodia. These concessions would in turn be used to opt for a more beneficial situation with regard to
the division of Vietnam into two separate zones. According to Chinese sources,
Molotov and Zhou had discussed this in several private conversations, whereas
Pham Van Dong needed to be persuaded and pressured to concede to this new
strategy.60 To Hanoi, the question of forces in the two neighbouring countries
was difficult because the Vietnamese Communists did not regard Cambodia and
Laos as clearly foreign states and because for military logistical reasons,
Indochina had to be considered one battlefield.61
In every sense of the word, Moscow considered China to be in charge of
dealing with the Vietnamese Communists, as well as to add the necessary pressure
to secure their consent for the negotiating strategy. Therefore, during the conference the Chinese delegation and Zhou Enlai in particular, invested much effort
into reaching consensus with the Vietnamese comrades. In later accounts of the

42

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

conference, the Soviets put particular emphasis on the Chinese role underlining
that the Chinese delegation presented a number of specific suggestions, and
played a vital role in reaching a settlement on the peaceful regulation in Indochina.62 Moscow further emphasized that this was particularly important in July,
during the last stage of discussing the Indochina question. At that point there was
a sharp increase in closed sessions and unofficial meetings between the parties,
and the general opinion was that these meetings played an important role in the
work of the Geneva conference. It was during these sessions and meetings that
the Soviet and Chinese delegations did a tremendous amount of work in order to
bring together the views of the opposing sides. According to the Soviet evaluation of the conference, it was in particular the strong effort of the Chinese delegation that led to a favourable decision in the question of reaching a ceasefire in
Indochina.63
One very important meeting between the Chinese and the Vietnamese took
place during the conference break at Geneva, when Zhou Enlai travelled to the
Chinese city of Liuzhou to meet the leaders of the VWP.64 Realizing the
difficulties of discussing only through telegraphic exchanges, Zhou took this
opportunity to personally discuss the problems of the conference with the
Vietnamese leaders. However, before meeting with the Vietnamese leaders,
Zhou Enlai met with the new French premier, Mends-France, and promised him
to help persuade the DRV to speed up negotiations. Thus, it was with the hope of
concluding a peace settlement the Chinese leaders began the meeting with the
Vietnamese on 3 July. Zhous key argument during the meetings was the danger
of a possible direct American intervention in Indochina. It was of vital importance to prevent an internationalization of the war, which could eventually lead to
American involvement and create a situation similar to the one the Chinese had
met in Korea.65
The result of the Liuzhou meeting was a general consensus between the
Chinese and the Vietnamese on the strategies for the next phase of the negotiations in Geneva. During the meeting, the two parties agreed that they would
propose the 16th parallel for the regroupment of troops, and that the 17th parallel
should be proposed as the provisional military demarcation line. In addition, the
Vietnamese side wanted general elections to be held within six months at the
latest, whereas the Chinese proposed two years. The Chinese proposal was
unpopular with the Vietnamese, who felt that the situation would be very
difficult, once our troops had withdrawn to the North and we had to wait two
years for the election.66 However, upon Hos return to Vietnam the VWP
Central Committee issued an instruction on 5 July (to be known as the July 5th
Document) which apparently reflected the agreements reached in Liuzhou.
It also included the new strategy in which the Indochina problem would be
solved through a ceasefire based on a temporary division of Vietnam into two
zones, as well as the suggestion of a nationwide election that would take place
after the withdrawal of the French forces and, eventually, lead to a reunification
of the whole country.67 Hos acceptance of these conditions, and his emphasis on
the danger of American intervention, shows the strong Chinese influence.

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

43

Certain that they had reached consensus with the Vietnamese, the Soviet and
Chinese leaders focused their attention on presenting a deal in Geneva that
Mends-France could accept. When briefing Molotov on the discussion during
the Liuzhou meeting, Zhou admitted that Ho Chi Minh had agreed to the possibility of accepting the 17th parallel as the provisional demarcation line, if it should
prove impossible to reach consensus over the 16th parallel. However, at the same
time Pham Van Dong was still reluctant to carry out the agreements reached in
Liuzhou, and Zhou once again met with Dong to reach a compromise that could
be presented in the negotiations. During the meeting, Zhou emphasized both the
danger of an American intervention and the need to act while Mends-France
was still in power in France to make Dong agree to the present plan for establishing the demarcation line. Finally Dong yielded, and at the end of the conversation Zhou had apparently promised to Dong that once the French had
withdrawn their troops, all of Vietnam will be yours.68
The Chinese performance during the Geneva conference was decisive, not
only in the eyes of the Western powers but also to the Soviets. In his report to the
Central Committee Plenum in late June, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov once
again praised Chinas role and emphasized that the most important aspect of the
Geneva conference was the participation of the PRC,
for the first time, on equal terms with the other Great Powers the USSR,
the United States, Great Britain and France. Chinas participation in the
discussion of both questions the Korean and the Indochinese is important
not only because the new, democratic China has now entered the international arena and assumed its rightful place among the Great Powers, but also
because the Geneva Conference clearly shows that without the participation
of the Peoples Republic of China, it is no longer possible to solve a number
of international problems, and in particular those that concern the situation
in Asia.69
This statement was made even before the conference had reached a final settlement and showed the extent to which Moscow appreciated Chinas effort in
Geneva. The Soviets also went as far as to characterize the Chinese participation
in Geneva as the actual international recognition of the Peoples Republic of
China.70 At the Geneva conference the Chinese also had the opportunity to
establish new contacts, in particular with countries that had yet to recognize the
new Chinese regime. The first meeting between Chinese and American officials
took place in Geneva, and the conference also improved Chinese relations with
the countries of both South and Southeast Asia, in particular with the Indians.71
How close were relations between the Soviets and the Vietnamese on the eve
of the conference? The Soviet Union and the DRV had no bilateral meetings
either before or during the conference. All meetings were at least tripartite and
took place with Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese representatives present and
the occasional North Korean. In contrast, we have seen that there were several
Sino-Vietnamese strategy meetings without the Soviets attending. An obvious

44

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

question then is how close Sino-Vietnamese relations were on the eve of the
conference? The very fact that everything went through the Chinese might
indicate two things: first, that Moscow had other priorities in Geneva, in addition
to reaching an acceptable solution to the problems in Indochina. Second, it could
also mean that Moscow considered this still to be mainly Chinas responsibility.
To this day it remains difficult to evaluate the status of SovietVietnamese relations during the Geneva conference because of the continuous presence of China
whenever the Soviets and the Vietnamese met. The setting further confirms the
picture of China playing the vital role of intermediary all through the conference.
It also shows how Moscow used the Chinese to achieve their own goals during
the conference and that such a strategy was acceptable to the Chinese because to
them the most important underlying aspect was to be accepted as an equal partner
among the other Great Powers. In addition, the Chinese had in contrast to the
Soviets, a clear geostrategic interest in securing the situation in Indochina.

Geneva and the future of SovietVietnamese relations

In the early morning of 21 July 1954, the Geneva conference reached a settlement on the Indochina problem, just in time for Mends-Frances deadline.72 The
result of the Geneva conference was a settlement of the war in Indochina based
on two separate but connected agreements: the Cease-Fire Agreement and the
so-called Final Declaration. The first agreement was a ceasefire signed by the
representatives of the belligerents: Ta Quang Buu, Vice Minister of National
Defence for the DRV, and Brigadier General Henri Deltiel for the French Union
Forces in Indochina. This agreement contained provisions for the regroupment of
troops, and under its terms the troops of the PAVN (the Vietminh) would regroup
north of the 17th parallel, while French union forces would regroup south of it.73
In anticipation of the reunification elections, the provisions of the Agreement
stated that the civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands
of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement.74 In addition, the provisions agreed upon in the ceasefire part of the
Agreement stated that there were to be no troop reinforcements, no augmentation
of weapons, no military bases and no foreign military alliances on the part of the
administration of either zone. The conference also clearly recognized Laos and
Cambodia as independent, sovereign states.
The second agreement, the Final Declaration, was dedicated to Vietnams
political future. It took note of several particulars of the ceasefire prohibiting any
increase in troop levels, armaments, foreign military aid or the signing of alliances. The declaration also stated that the 17th parallel should not be interpreted
in any way as a political or territorial boundary, and that free general elections by
secret ballot were to be held two years later in July 1956 under the supervision of
an ICC.75
The ICC consisted of representatives from India, Poland and Canada, with
India holding the chairmanship. It was established at the time of the ceasefire
to provide for control and supervision, while the actual responsibility for the

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

45

execution of the Agreement rested with the parties. Consultations between

representatives of the two zones to prepare for the elections were to start on 20
July 1955. However, this declaration was not signed by any of the heads of delegations, only verbally endorsed by some of them.76 The agreement also provided
for a joint commission composed of an equal number of representatives from the
two zones, whose task was to facilitate the execution of those provisions of the
Cease-Fire Agreement concerning the joint action of the two parties.77
Moscow considered the Geneva conference a success. Within the international
context, Moscow had three equal issues on the agenda in Geneva: first, to
promote Soviet objectives in Europe, more specifically to put pressure on the
French government and thereby remove the threat of the proposed German
rearmament through the EDC. Second, to remove the threat of escalation in
Indochina through a US military intervention, and third, to introduce the PRC to
the international diplomatic scene and possibly also reduce the tensions in
Chinas relationship with the West, especially the United States.
The Soviet policy with regard to all three issues was a success. The most
notable was probably the effect it had on the future of European military
cooperation. In France, the slow progress at Geneva led to a government
crisis and subsequently to the establishment of a government headed by
Pierre Mends-France, who was not enthusiastic about the idea of the EDC. On
30 August 1954, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC
proposal and thereby undermined the plans for German rearmament at that
point.78 Sino-Soviet cooperation during the conference was also a huge success.
With their common desire to end war in the region, Moscow and Beijing shared
the responsibility of advising the Vietnamese Communists both before and
during the conference. Together the two powers exerted a restraining influence
on the DRV, thereby illustrating how international strategic considerations took
precedence over the ideological obligation to support the struggle of a fellow
Communist party.
From the Soviet policy makers point of view, the Vietnamese situation was a
problem that needed to be solved in order to pursue larger and more important
goals. And while the situation in Indochina was the problem, China was the
means to solve it. The increased attention to China, and Beijings eagerness and
possibility to put pressure on the Vietnamese, was seen as a great benefit in
Moscow. The change of government in France made the situation easier and gave
the Communists a better opportunity to put positive pressure on the French while
they at the same time tried to alienate the Americans. However, while Moscow
wanted a conference to solve the problems of both Korea and Indochina, it did
not want to sacrifice anything else to achieve results in Asia. They used the
Chinese fear of American invasion and a Korea-like situation to make the
Chinese pressure the Vietnamese. Moscow and Beijing had the same goals in
Geneva, but for very different reasons. Both sacrificed a swift Vietnamese reunification in order to safeguard their own priorities. Moscows priorities were a
better relationship with the West and the French rejection of the EDC. Beijing
needed to prevent an American intervention, a second Korean War, and, not

46

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

least, to secure their southern border by the establishment of a Communist state

between themselves and the imperialists.
In later accounts of the conference and its results, however, the Chinese and
the Vietnamese were bitter to both Chinas and the Soviet Unions performance
at Geneva. In a conversation between Mao and Pham Van Dong in midNovember 1968, Mao claimed that the Chinese had made a mistake when going
to the Geneva conference in 1954. He emphasized that President Ho Chi Minh
had not been satisfied that he had to give up the South, and, Mao continued, [. . .]
when I think twice, I see that he was right. The mood of the people in the South at
that time was rising high. Why did we have the Geneva Conference? Perhaps,
France wanted it. Pursuing Maos argument Zhou Enlai added that the suggestion to hold a conference had come from Khrushchev, who had wanted to solve
the problem in Indochina. Without directly criticizing the Soviet involvement,
Mao argued that the general public opinion had been in favour of such a conference but that it had been unfavourable to the Vietnamese Communists, who
could have seized the whole country, had they not been forced to withdraw to the
North. According to Mao, the Chinese and Vietnamese lost an opportunity by
agreeing to participate at the Geneva conference.79
In spite of how the Chinese evaluated their own participation during the
Geneva conference in later accounts, the preparations for and the actual conduct
of the Geneva conference have shown that Moscow regarded China as an integral
part of Soviet policies towards Vietnam. Once preparations for the conference
began, Moscows first priority was to secure the participation of both Beijing and
Hanoi at the negotiating table. Soviet policy makers soon realized that without
the active participation of China it would not be possible to conclude an
agreement in Geneva.
But is it true that only strategic considerations played a part when Moscow
elaborated its policies towards the conference and its main objective Indochina
or is it possible that Soviet thinking with regard to Vietnam also reflected the
ideological views of the Kremlin leadership? There is no doubt that Soviet
conduct at Geneva has shown how self-interest played an important role in Soviet
foreign policy-making both before and during the conference. However, if ideological considerations did play a role, it would, in this case, be in consensus with,
and not in opposition to, the self-interest of the Soviet leaders. While on the one
hand, the conference gave Moscow the perfect opportunity to introduce a new
and by all means large player from the Communist camp, it also permitted the
Soviets to play their policies of splitting the unity among the imperialist powers
together with their Chinese ally. Such a policy was reflected in how they tried to
ally with the French and alienate the Americans.
One possible reason why Moscow found it rather easy to accept an agreement
that seemed disadvantageous to the Vietnamese Communist leaders could have
been based on what Moscow (from a Communist ideological point of view)
thought was both possible to achieve and, not least, appropriate for the DRV at
the time. To Moscow, the idea of consolidating the North while waiting for
elections to reunite both zones was fully compatible with how a Communist

The end of the war and the Geneva conference, 19531954

47

society should develop. In other words, Moscow was satisfied with the results of
the conference, both in terms of their larger strategic goals both in Europe and
Asia and with regard to the prospects for future development of Communism in
Vietnam.
As such, Geneva served the Soviet leaders well but would have serious
implications for future relations between Moscow and the Vietnamese Communists. One can only assume that the conference most probably added to Hanois
suspicions that the Soviet leaders were ready to sacrifice the DRV whenever that
could benefit Soviet foreign policy interests.

Together for Communism?

Sino-Soviet cooperation and the rebuilding of
North Vietnam, 19541957

The main concern of Moscows Vietnam policy in the first few years after the
Geneva conference was how to succeed with their peace offensive towards the
West, while at the same time strengthening their relations with China. However,
during 1955 and 1956 these two policy goals were not always easy to reconcile,
especially not without at times sacrificing the best interests of the Vietnamese.
While focusing on Chinas role, the Soviet leaders failed to understand the seriousness of the developments that took place within the Lao Dong from early
1956 onwards. Publicly the Lao Dong leadership still promoted political struggle
within the Geneva framework, but privately more and more individuals within
the party leadership viewed a strategy of limited military actions as a possible
supplement to the political struggle. From that point onwards Moscow gradually
encountered an increasing distrust among the leaders in Hanoi, who feared that
their Soviet allies were content with a more permanently divided Vietnam. Thus,
in the latter half of the 1950s Moscow wanted a well-functioning relationship
with the DRV, and to achieve that there was no way around China.
China played an important role in Vietnam during these years, not least
because of its contributions to the reconstruction of Vietnamese society, in terms
of both money and manpower. Cooperation with China soon became a condition
for Soviet engagement in Vietnam, and Beijings announcement in late 1955 of
partial Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam was viewed with much concern in
Moscow. Nonetheless, Moscow continued to emphasize both the importance of a
well-functioning Sino-Soviet partnership in Vietnam and Chinas vital role as the
main provider and organizer of aid and advice to the Vietnamese friends in
deciding important questions in their foreign and domestic policies.1
Four topics were particularly central in these first years after the Geneva
conference: the reconstruction and consolidation of Vietnam; the struggle to
implement the provisions of the agreement reached in Geneva, especially the
consultations for and holding of all-Vietnamese free elections; the Twentieth
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and its effect on Moscows relations
with the Lao Dong and the CCP, with particular emphasis on its impact on the
North Vietnamese land reform campaign; and finally Hanois discussions about a
new, and more militant, strategy for reunification.

Together for Communism? 49

Reconstruction and consolidation in Vietnam

After the conclusion of the Geneva agreement, the North Vietnamese had their
hands full with the reconstruction process, and emphasis was on consolidating
the state north of the 17th parallel, rather than political developments in the
South. In the North, the Lao Dong had a solid grip on power, and its leader,
Ho Chi Minh, was a popular and charismatic leader. It was the Communist forces
originating from the Vietminh who took power in the North after the Geneva
partition. By 1954 the Lao Dongs control over the police, the military, the
administration and the people at large was almost total, and accordingly there
was no real opposition in that part of the country. Ho Chi Minh was in a favourable situation as the unquestioned leader of most of the people north of the 17th
parallel and, in addition, some groups south of it.2 Even so, some groups resisted,
such as many of the Catholics in the North. In the early months after Geneva
almost 1 million Catholics, encouraged by the Catholic hierarchy and organized
by Ngo Dinh Diems American advisors, fled from the North to the South.3
In the first months after the Geneva conference contact between Hanoi and
Moscow consisted mostly of official communiqus referring to the Soviet assistance to the DRV during the negotiations at Geneva. The few appeals for assistance were made discreetly, and Moscows assistance was kept on a low level. As
long as the situation in Vietnam was calm, Moscow saw no need to interfere.
Until the end of the Franco-Vietminh war the unstable situation in Vietnam had
been considered a hindrance to a further elaboration of SovietVietnamese
contacts. However, with the new situation after the partition of Vietnam, the
Soviet Union was able to establish an embassy in Hanoi, to maintain close
contact with the DRV leaders. The first Soviet ambassador to the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, Aleksandr Andreevich Lavrishchev, arrived in Hanoi in
late September 1954.4 The establishment of a Soviet embassy in the DRV
enabled Moscow to opt for a more active policy in Vietnam and relieved the
Soviet leaders of their dependence on Chinese intelligence from Vietnam.
Ambassador Lavrishchevs main priorities should, according to Moscow, be to
oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, provide analyses of the
degree of foreign presence in Vietnam and assess the chances of a reunification
within the Geneva framework. More specific instructions were given on the need
to carefully study both capitalist and Communist presence in Vietnam. The
growing American influence in Southeast Asia was a serious concern, especially
as a result of US efforts to include most of the countries in the region in a defence
pact the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).5
In addition, Moscow wanted the embassy to give priority to the study of the
Soviet Unions closest ally in Vietnam the Peoples Republic of China. The
embassy should take particular interest in Chinas role in Southeast Asia as such,
with emphasis on the continuation of friendly relations between China and the
DRV.6 Soviet policy makers were, of course, well aware of the close relationship
that existed between the Vietnamese and Chinese Communists. But at the same
time, the instructions do indicate that from a Soviet point of view the absence of

50

Together for Communism?

such relations was seen as a possibility, and could be exploited to Moscows

advantage.
With regard to the internal developments in Vietnam, the Soviet foreign
ministry focused on the political, economic and military situation. In politics, the
main study object would be the Lao Dong, with emphasis on the condition of its
ideological policy and organizational work, conditions within the leadership, and
its contact with the mass organizations, primarily the Lien Viet (Unified National
Front).7 Moscow also signalled its willingness to provide the DRV government
with the necessary assistance [. . .] to strengthen the democratic system in the
country. Financially the Soviet Union should assist in the restoration and development of the economy and the carrying out of land reform. Militarily Moscow
should give necessary assistance [. . .] to strengthen the forces of the Peoples
Army. In addition, Moscow revealed its intention to establish formal relations
between the two countries in both the economic and military fields.8
Although the Soviet leaders showed their intent to support and advice the
North Vietnamese both economically and to some extent militarily, they maintained that the Lao Dong would remain the authority on internal Vietnamese
affairs. However, contrary to this attitude the instructions to the Soviet ambassador contained a number of suggestions aimed at future North Vietnamese
policies towards the South. According to Soviet policy makers, the DRVs most
important task was the reunification of Vietnam within the Geneva framework, to
be achieved through free general elections as stated in the Final Declaration of the
Geneva agreement. The North Vietnamese should adopt a policy of establishing,
as well as strengthening, already established relations with all patriotic, religious
and political organizations in the South. From a Soviet point of view the aim of
this policy would be to unmask, and then subsequently isolate, the government of
Ngo Dinh Diem as well as the parties, organizations and officials supporting it. It
was also important to eliminate possible provocation by the United States and
France in Indochina. The main aim of the two states, as the Soviets saw it, was to
prevent general elections in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.9
In South Vietnam the consolidation of the new state proceeded somewhat
differently from what we have seen in the North. In June 1954 the United States
pressured Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai to appoint Ngo Dinh Diem Prime Minister,
and in July Diem returned to Saigon to formally take control of the government.
From an American point of view, Diem was a logical choice for the premiership
of an independent Vietnam. He was anti-French and had impeccable credentials
as a nationalist and, even more importantly, as a staunch anti-Communist. He
was also a devout Catholic and had long administrative experience.10 Once in
position, it was soon obvious that Diem lacked many of the qualities required for
the imposing challenges he faced in a divided Vietnam. He loved his country but
was an elitist who had little understanding of the needs and problems of the
Vietnamese people. His ideals were taken from an imperial Vietnam that
no longer existed. In contrast to the leader in the North, he had no plan for
modernizing the nation or mobilizing his people. He lacked the charisma of Ho
Chi Minh, as well as broad support among people in the South.11

Together for Communism? 51

Diems position in Saigon was insecure. Without support from the United
States Diem would not have been able to cope with the enormous problems he
confronted in his first year. The first crisis came with the massive exodus from
the North to the South, consisting mostly of Catholics who, encouraged by Diem
with promises of land and livelihood, fled from the northern Communist regime.
Thereafter followed the sect crisis lasting until the spring of 1955. During his
first year in office Ngo Dinh Diem consolidated his power in all possible areas.
He eliminated his main opponents the three sects and as American advisors
gradually replaced French officials in South Vietnam, Diems position was
solidified.12
In the aftermath of Geneva, the DRV economy was far from strong enough to
finance the costly reconstruction of the country, and the Lao Dong leaders found
it natural to turn to the Soviet Union and China for assistance. The requests for
assistance in the fall of 1954 were modest. They ranged from military assistance
to fulfil the ceasefire agreement to appeals for immediate aid to prevent famine.
Most of the appeals for assistance were, after some internal discussion, eventually sanctioned by Moscow. When DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong asked
permission to use Soviet ships to transfer North Vietnamese forces back from the
South, the Head of the Southeast Asia Department in MID, Kirill Vasilevich
Novikov, declared that he would not recommend providing such assistance to the
DRV.13 But Novikovs recommendations were not followed. Higher officials
within the MID bureaucracy sanctioned the request from Hanoi. Thus, in the end
Soviet ships were used to carry both North Vietnamese forces and civilians, and
at a later stage to transport rice from China to the DRV.14
It was Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov who disagreed with Novikov and
approved the assistance to Hanoi. During the 1950s Molotov was the Soviet
foreign minister who showed the most interest in Vietnam. He had personally
met several of the Vietnamese leaders, and we have already seen that he played
an active role both during preparations for the Geneva conference in the spring of
1954 and during the conference itself. As one of the engineers behind the agreement, Molotov was well acquainted with the current situation and also aware of
possible future complications in Vietnam. We have not gained access to his
personal papers, but his active involvement in the decision-making processes
concerning Vietnam, compared with his successors in the foreign ministry,
Dimitrii Shepilov and Andrey Gromyko, indicates that he had a special interest in
a successful development in the area.
In addition to transport assistance, the North Vietnamese also requested more
direct military assistance. Pham Van Dong stated that he would be pleased if a
group of Soviet military colleagues would arrive in Vietnam to assist in the
implementation of the ceasefire agreement.15 Moscow was aware of the DRVs
need for advice and suggested that a group of advisors should be dispatched to
Vietnam. The decision was not made without concern for possible Chinese reactions. Chinese military advisors had been active in Vietnam since 1950, and the
Soviet leaders did not want to risk any complications with the Chinese. As a
result Moscow decided to engage the military advisors as assistants to the Soviet

52

Together for Communism?

military attach in Hanoi.16 The Head of the Southeast Asia Department in the
Soviet Foreign Ministry, Kirill Novikov, did not specify what kind of complications with the Chinese that could be feared. However, based on what is know
about the Chinese role in Vietnamese military affairs on all levels, it would be
safe to assume that he was afraid the Chinese could be offended if the Soviet
Union offered military assistance without coordinating it with Beijing in advance.
In the autumn of 1954 the Soviet Union and the DRV had not yet signed any
formal agreements on either economic or military assistance. Assistance was
given on request and in most cases without further discussion, but no long-term
plans for assistance was made until Ho Chi Minhs first official visit to the Soviet
Union as DRV head of state in July 1955. With regard to support to reconstructing the country, Moscow constantly reassured the leaders in Hanoi of the
priority given to the rebuilding of North Vietnam. However, the Soviet leaders
emphasized that this was considered very important not only by the Soviet Union
itself but also by the other members of the Socialist camp.17
The leaders in both Moscow and Beijing realized that in order to substantially
support the Vietnamese, Sino-Soviet cooperation was vital. The Soviet leaders
argued that they saw economic as well as technical assistance to the DRV as an
important factor in the struggle for the reunification of Vietnam. But Moscow
had no intention to assist the DRV without any backing from the rest of the
Socialist camp. The absence of a Chinese statement on aid to the DRV was
viewed with special concern.18 From the very start of the official relationship
between Moscow and Hanoi the Soviet government underlined that cooperation
with China was a significant factor in Soviet economic and military assistance to
Hanoi. At the same time this was one of the first occasions when these two countries actively cooperated to rebuild society in a small Communist state, and in
that regard, from a Soviet point of view, the DRV would become a test case for
Sino-Soviet foreign policy cooperation. Such a picture was further strengthened
by the fact that this cooperation continued even when relations between Moscow
and Beijing began to deteriorate, and also when the Chinese announced their
decision to withdraw from North Vietnam.
Economic assistance was the most important part of Soviet policies towards
Vietnam in the early years after Geneva. The first formal economic assistance
agreement between the two countries was signed in July 1955. The signing took
place during DRV President Ho Chi Minhs visit to Moscow from 12 to 18 July
1955. It was mainly an aid programme under which the Soviet Union promised to
assist North Vietnam in a large number of projects. But economic assistance was
only one of several subjects during Hos visit, and before the meetings with the
DRV delegation began, Soviet negotiators were coached on what to discuss with
the Vietnamese. The instructions outlined before these meetings would also
become the basis for Soviet engagement in Vietnam in the years to come. They
touched upon political, economic, military and cultural relations between
Moscow and Hanoi. They outlined the Soviet position in most areas of the
relationship through suggestions on how to respond to requests forwarded by Ho
Chi Minh and his colleagues.19

Together for Communism? 53

In general terms the Soviet negotiators had clear instructions: support would
be given within the framework of the Geneva agreement, and the Soviet Union
would raise the question of political regulation in Vietnam at the next Big Four
meeting in July 1955. The instructions also contained assurances to Ho Chi Minh
and the other North Vietnamese delegates that the Soviet government was ready
to provide, in cooperation with the Chinese friends, the necessary support to the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the struggle for independence and reunification of the country, as well as in the case of the economic and cultural reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.20 However, Moscow said nothing
on the issue that was of most interest to Vietnam, namely the reunification of the
two Vietnams. In 1955 unification was not on the agenda as far as the Soviets
were concerned.
In the first years after Geneva, Soviet economic support for the DRV was very
low key. The kind of assistance provided was identical to that given to other
members of the Socialist bloc, and by no means more important. It might even be
that Soviet financial assistance to some non-Socialist developing countries
exceeded that given to the DRV, even though the Hanoi leaders had eagerly
committed themselves to the ideals of the Socialist world.21 Moreover, during the
first two years after Geneva, the general policy of the Lao Dong seems to have
made little difference in the economic relations between the Soviet Union and the
DRV. Agreements like the one signed in July 1955 were renewed on a regular
basis, and there was no significant increase in the amount of aid given during the
first years after Geneva.22

Military cooperation and Chinese withdrawal

While the economic relationship was fairly well-established by the summer of
1955, the question of military relations between the two countries was much
more delicate. A clear-cut example can be found during the negotiations in the
summer of 1955. The instructions to the Soviet negotiators were clear: if Ho Chi
Minh should raise the question of establishing a joint Sino-Soviet economic and
military mission, he would be told that such a step would not be expedient, as
there had already been established a practice of cooperation in these fields
between the Vietnamese and the Chinese.23
Is it possible that Moscow had already gotten the impression that the Vietnamese
were suspicious of Chinese intentions and therefore opted for a stronger Soviet
engagement, also militarily? If that was the case, in 1955 Moscow did not seem
to be sensitive to the Vietnamese wishes with regard to practical military support.
Nevertheless, this did not exclude the possibility that the DRV could receive
technical aid from the Soviet Union. The question had also been raised earlier. In
a telegram from General Antonov, at the General Staff in the Soviet Ministry of
Defence, to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.A. Zorin in early June 1955,
General Antonov underlined the inexpediency of establishing a joint Sino-Soviet
military mission to coordinate questions related to the construction of the armed
forces of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) in Hanoi.24 His argument was

54

Together for Communism?

rooted in the Chinese military presence. Antonov emphasized that at present

PAVN has Chinese military advisors. These advisors know the peculiarities of
the country and its army. They have many years of experience in advising the
Vietnamese friends on questions of constructing the armed forces, including
the instruction and education of troops.25 Antonovs answer indicates that the
military command in Moscow was unwilling to engage in Vietnamese military
affairs. It preferred the military mission in Hanoi to remain strictly Chinese and
did not want to give promises of military aid to the Vietnamese.
In spite of General Antonovs views, the Vietnamese military leaders
continued to meet with both Chinese and Soviet officials to discuss military
affairs. On 27 June 1955 a Vietnamese military delegation led by Defence
Minister Vo Nguyen Giap made a secret trip to Beijing. While there, they
discussed the reconstruction of the DRV armed forces, as well as future war
plans with Chinese Defence Minister Peng Dehuai and Lieutenant General Petroshevskii, a senior Soviet military advisor in China. We first met Petroshevskii
when he delivered reports from Vietnam during the preparations for the Dien
Bien Phu offensive in the spring of 1954.26 A similar trip to Beijing, also led by
Giap, took place in mid-October 1955, and this time the Vietnamese general
discussed the same questions also with the Soviet general Gushev, of the General
Planning Division of the Soviet General Staff.27
Thus, in the late summer of 1955, when Beijing announced its decision to
withdraw the military advisors who had been sent to North Vietnam in July
August 1950, the Soviets were forced to rethink their own position in Vietnam
and their efforts to provide support for the Vietnamese Communists. The withdrawal was supposed to be carried out in three phases first in September/
October 1955, at the end of 1955 and finally in the spring of 1956. At the request
of the North Vietnamese leaders the military advisors would be replaced by
military specialists assigned to help with the modernization process in the
PAVN. Thus, this decision did not mean an end to the close ties between the
Peoples Liberation Army and the PAVN.28
Although Beijing was prepared to continue its military assistance to the DRV,
the decision to withdraw the advisors caused concern both among the Vietnamese
and the Soviets. Soviet ambassador Zimyanin informed his superiors in Moscow
of the Chinese plans to withdraw all political and economic advisors working
in the DRV before the end of 1955.29 To prevent a total Chinese withdrawal from
the DRV, Moscow turned to Beijing with a plea to retain Chinese assistance to the
DRV. However, the situation must have been seen as somewhat delicate, since
the decision was to present the Soviet discontent to Beijing in a tactful way and
make them understand that the Soviets were in favour of more long-term assistance
from China to the DRV.30 In early December 1955 the Chinese Ambassador to
the DRV, Luo Guibo, informed the Soviets that the Chinese advisors would be
allowed to stay only until the end of 1955.31
According to Chinese scholar Chen Jian, on 24 December 1955 the Chinese
Defence Minister, Peng Dehuai, informed his Vietnamese counterpart,
Vo Nguyen Giap, about the decision to call back the CMAG. The group had been

Together for Communism? 55

in Vietnam since July 1950, but by mid-March 1956 all members of the group
had returned to China.32 It is difficult to say whether the Soviet leaders knew
about the Chinese decision in advance. If so, it could explain why they emphasized the Vietnamese need for Chinese assistance, even before Beijing made the
final decision to withdraw all military advisors. What does seem clear, however,
is that the Soviets relied on the Chinese presence in Vietnam, politically and
economically, as well as militarily. A Chinese withdrawal in any of these fields
would complicate the situation for the Soviets and deprive the DRV of muchneeded resources. With no Chinese presence the Soviets might be forced to
engage themselves more deeply in Vietnam.
The above account shows that in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union still
preferred to leave the major part of the responsibility for military affairs to China.
Why were the Soviet leaders willing to give away influence to the Chinese in
such an important field? Apart from the costs of taking on such a responsibility
one reason could be that at the time, in spite of the growing Soviet interest in the
countrys political affairs, Vietnam was not of primary interest to the Soviet
Union when it came to active military engagement. The Soviets were of course
much more concerned about the military situation in Eastern Europe.33 By
leaving the military responsibility to the Chinese, the Soviets would retain their
control within the Communist sphere without being directly responsible, and at
the same time they would avoid the risk of getting too greatly involved.
Another reason can be traced to the state of Sino-Soviet relations in Vietnam
in 1955. Although it has been claimed that tension between the two had started to
surface, the further record of Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam indicates that
with regard to Vietnam, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was still
functioning. The two powers agreed on the necessity of assisting the DRV.
Beijing had long military experience in Vietnam, and it was therefore natural to
both the Soviet Union and China that the present arrangement continue. In
addition, the Soviets wanted a peaceful, not military, reunification of Vietnam.

Sino-Soviet relations and the Geneva agreement

The Soviet leaders considered the implementation of the agreement, as well as
the existence and work of the ICCs in all three Indochinese countries, as an
important part of its strategy in this area in the latter part of the 1950s. As
co-chairman of the Geneva conference, the Soviet Union was perceived by
many, and among them the Vietnamese, as having a special responsibility for the
implementation of the agreements. According to the provisions in the Final
Declaration of the Geneva conference, general elections should be held in all of
Vietnam in July 1956. The purpose of the elections was a reunification of the two
zones under a government freely chosen by the Vietnamese people. Consultations for elections should start on 20 July 1955, between competent representatives from both the zones.34
The Soviet Union strongly emphasized the diplomatic struggle for the
fulfilment of the Geneva agreement, both through public statements and through

56

Together for Communism?

the promotion of the work of the three ICCs. At the same time the Hanoi
government worked hard to initiate consultations, but in spite of all efforts the
elections were not held. The reason was the attitude of the South Vietnamese
government of Ngo Dinh Diem and his American allies. The prevailing assumption in both the North and the South was that the Communists would most probably receive enough votes in both zones to gain the upper hand in a future
national government.35 Without Diems consent it would be impossible to hold
the consultations. In the North the Lao Dong continued, in spite of the unfavourable situation, to fight for implementation of the Geneva agreement. To succeed,
however, Hanoi depended on the full support of its Communist allies.
While Hanoi strove to initiate consultation talks, Ngo Dinh Diem continued to
consolidate his regime in the southern zone. The prospects for consultations and
an achievement of a solution through diplomatic means were not good. The
French were getting ready to pull out completely, leaving no one in charge of
implementing the provisions agreed upon. The Diem government, which was
supposed to succeed the French and undertake their obligations with regard to the
agreement, refused to participate, claiming that since South Vietnam was not a
signatory of the Geneva accords, it had no obligations whatsoever. During the
autumn of 1955 Diem further consolidated his power.36 On 23 October 1955 he
arranged a referendum in South Vietnam, by which he dethroned the former
emperor Bao Dai and had himself elected president. Shortly afterwards he broke
off economic relations with France, left the French Union, and finally proclaimed
the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) on 26 October 1955.37 The referendum
provoked no major protests from either the Soviet Union or China, indicating that
the two Communist powers accepted the idea of a divided Vietnam. In other
words, during the autumn of 1955 Hanoi was alone in protesting both Diems
refusal to hold consultations and the referendum. To both the North Vietnamese
and the Soviets, it was now clear that the government of Ngo Dinh Diem would
stay in power for a while.
During the spring of 1956 the Lao Dong leaders were worried not only
because of the reluctant attitude of the South Vietnamese government but also by
the French position in this matter. On 3 April 1956 the French gave formal notice
of their withdrawal from Vietnam and announced that they would dissolve their
High Command by 15 April. On 9 April DRVs Prime Minister Pham Van Dong
sent a letter to the Geneva co-chairmen, insisting that the Diem regime take over
Frances legal obligations in regard to the agreement. In reality the French were
forced out of Vietnam. Disagreements between the French and Diem over the
French presence in Vietnam and the American readiness to take on support of the
South Vietnamese was the background for French withdrawal.38 From a South
Vietnamese point of view it would be more convenient to have Americans than
French in the country. Both the North Vietnamese and the Soviets were negative
to the French withdrawal.39 As long as the French had formally been responsible,
there had been a certain chance of a fulfilment of the Geneva agreement. With
the French gone and the Americans gradually taking over their role, the hope for
a peaceful solution was diminished.40

Together for Communism? 57

When the Chinese proposed to convene a second Geneva conference in early
1956, the North Vietnamese soon supported the proposal, hoping that it could
help to improve the political situation in Vietnam. The Soviets, although positive
to such a meeting, were not convinced that it would be possible to convene as
long as the Western powers were reluctant about the idea. Since it was clear at
the time that no elections would be scheduled by July, North Vietnamese were
searching for new solutions. Truong Chinh in this regard expressed the Vietnamese
point of view in a meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov
during the Twentieth Congress in Moscow in February 1956. Encouraged to
report on the current situation in Vietnam, Truong Chinh emphasized that in the
present situation the necessary conditions for conducting these elections do not
exist. At the same time the CC has pointed to the necessity of using all forces in
order to keep the initiative in the political struggle for the regulation of
Vietnams political problems.41
Hanois suggestion in order to keep the initiative was to postpone the
elections. The Lao Dong leaders feared that disbanding entirely the idea of
holding elections could provoke a strong reaction from the people of Vietnam.
To inform people of this now, would according to Truong Chinh result in a
serious worsening of their spirits.42 Based on this the Vietnamese acknowledged, during the spring of 1956, that to insist on a full implementation of the
Geneva agreement will be difficult.43 Accordingly, they claimed that from a
tactical point of view it would be necessary to on the one hand, continue the
fight for a fulfilment of the agreement, but on the other hand, to take new
steps.44
The new steps were basically a plan with two alternatives that was presented
to the Soviet and the Chinese ambassadors in Vietnam. Both alternatives would
provide a solution within the Geneva framework, and both were based on a
postponement of the date for the elections to May 1957. In the first alternative,
labelled the maximum plan, the North Vietnamese expected that the Diem
government and the French fulfil the provisions of the Geneva agreement and
that Diem take over the French obligations. The goal of this plan was to
achieve full implementation through the postponement of elections. The
second option, labelled the minimum plan or modus vivendi, implied that
the opposite side would fulfil only the basic provisions of the agreement such
as securing democratic freedoms and normalizing relations between the two
zones.
In response to the two plans, the Soviets and Chinese agreed that Hanoi would
eventually have to make concessions, but not when it came to questions of principle. Since a postponement of the elections would count as a very large concession, neither the Soviets nor the Chinese were unreservedly positive to the North
Vietnamese suggestion.45 In the spring of 1956 the Soviets and Chinese agreed
that the best solution in Vietnam at the time, taking into account that there would
not be any general elections in the foreseeable future, would be to hope for a new
Geneva conference.46 At the same time, neither the Vietnamese nor the Chinese
attempted to put any pressure on the other powers that had participated in Geneva

58

Together for Communism?

to call for a new conference. The outcome of the North Vietnamese initiative was
just some further meetings between the two co-chairmen of the conference.
Parallel to these developments, the Soviet embassy in Hanoi advocated what
seems to have been a more active policy to secure fulfilment of the Geneva
agreement. Expressing concern over the situation that was developing in the
region, and especially the attempt of the United States, Great Britain and France
to undermine the agreement, the Soviet ambassador suggested that the Soviet
Union, China and the other Socialist states should strive to exploit the existing
disagreements between these powers, and especially India, in order to
strengthen the influence of the Socialist camp in the region.47 One of the
suggestions Zimyanin advanced was that the two co-chairmen, during their
scheduled meeting, could support the Indian suggestion that Ngo Dinh Diem
take on the French obligations with regard to the agreement, thus guaranteeing
that South Vietnam would not join SEATO and also creating conditions that the
ICC would be able to work under. Under such conditions it would be possible
to agree to the British suggestion of a postponement of the elections, especially
because political consultations between South and North Vietnam had yet to
begin.48
Zimyanins thoughts were not reflected in the message that eventually resulted
from the meeting in London between the two co-chairmen on 8 May 1956. In the
public message issued, the two foreign ministers, Andrey Gromyko and Lord
Reading, emphasized the need to preserve peace in Indochina and proclaimed
that the co-chairmen and the ICC would continue their responsibilities. The 8
May message left the world in no doubt that the Communist powers would allow
Vietnam to stay divided. After the meeting, DRV Prime Minister Pham Van
Dong sent a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem on 11 May demanding the normalization of
relations between the two zones.49
On several occasions the Chinese appeared to be more determined to hold on
to the Geneva agreement than the Soviets. The London Talks in May had made
quite clear that there would be no general elections in July 1956, or even in the
very near future. This had, of course, been clear to all concerned parties for a
long time, but the message from London put an end to the last drop of hope. Still,
the Chinese continued to voice their commitment to fulfil the pledge and underlined that they would strive, together with the North Vietnamese, for the full
implementation of the Geneva Agreements.50 The Chinese lack of actual
commitments with regard to the agreement, stood in contrast to that of the Soviet
Union, who still held the position of co-chairman of the conference together with
Great Britain and therefore could not just make promises without any plans of
keeping them. In the end, however, both Moscow and Beijing let the election
deadline in July pass in silence. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese wanted to
provoke another crisis in Vietnam over the question of national reunification and
may even tacitly have considered a continued partition of Vietnam to suit their
interests. Policy makers in both Moscow and Beijing had more pressing issues
coming up the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and China first and foremost on
the domestic arena.

Together for Communism? 59

Hanoi and the Twentieth Congress

Nikita Khrushchevs secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of CPSU in
February 1956 had an immense effect on the Communist world and not least on
the Sino-Soviet relationship. Khrushchevs overall arguments in favour of a
peaceful transition to socialism and his insistence that war between the two world
camps could be avoided led to drawn-out discussions in both Hanoi and Beijing.
The new Soviet foreign policy line endorsing peaceful coexistence would be
difficult to adapt to Chinas more offensive attitudes.51 But to the Chinese the
hardest pill to swallow was the lack of consultation in advance. Mao and his
fellow CCP leaders felt deeply offended by the manner in which their Soviet
comrades handled this matter.52
Within many Communist parties the revelations would have significant
implications for how they viewed the role of their own leadership. Just like the
Chinese participants, the two Lao Dong representatives at the congress, General
Secretary Truong Chinh and Politburo member Le Duc Tho, were both totally
unprepared for the revelations in Khrushchevs speech. In the period immediately after the congress, the Lao Dong leaders in both private conversations and
public speeches acknowledged the new Soviet foreign policy line. However, they
never revealed in detail how the resolutions of the congress would affect their
own policies. In later political analyses the Soviets accused the Vietnamese of
sharing the Chinese point of view with regard to the Twentieth Congress,
accusing the Central Committee of the Lao Dong of sharing the points of view
of the leaders in the Chinese Communist Party and the Albanian Workers Party
on the personality cult question. They did not agree with the decisions of the
Twentieth Congress of the CPSU condemning the personality cult of I.V. Stalin,
but preferred to pass this over in silence.53 The discussions between Soviet and
Vietnamese officials in the period after the congress further confirm the
Vietnamese unease, and not least their reluctance to take a definitive stand with
regard to what happened during the Twentieth Congress.
Hanois first official reaction to the speech came in an editorial published in
the Lao Dong daily Nhan Dan on 28 February 1956. It stated that the DRV fully
supported the results of the CPSU congress but added that the Lao Dong would
further endeavour to study Marxist-Leninist theory and to apply it creatively to
the concrete situation in Vietnam, to combine this theory with the practice of
Vietnams revolution.54 Comments in the editorial indicate that the Lao Dong
had not yet decided whether they wanted to accept the whole concept of this new
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Before giving their full endorsement, the Lao Dong
leaders wanted to properly discuss how this new foreign policy line could be
applied to the specific situation in Vietnam.
During the spring of 1956 the Lao Dong leadership had several discussions
about the Twentieth Congress, and on 31 March the Politburo in Hanoi issued a
communiqu that fully supported the resolutions of the congress. In the end of
April, after the extended 9th Plenum of the Lao Dong Central Committee,
Nguyen Duy Trinh, a member of the LD CC, presented the results of the

60

Together for Communism?

discussions and the evaluations of its implications for the Vietnamese situation to
Moscow. In his conversation with Soviet ambassador Zimyanin, Trinh reported
that the Plenum unanimously and warmly approves the decisions of the Twentieth
Congress of the CPSU.55 This was the official version, but the truth was that
Hanois approval was a result of long discussions within the party. Its background can be found in the months preceding the 9th Plenum.
Starting in mid-March 1956 the Central Committee was evaluating a proposal
from Le Duan, Secretary of the Regional Party Committee in the South, which
contained suggestions for a new strategy in South Vietnam.56 This new strategy
included preparations for a resumption of the armed struggle, and a 14-point plan
for military consolidation of the Nam Bo region, the southern part of South
Vietnam, including the surroundings of Saigon.57 The Lao Dong CC had
extended its 9th Plenum to thoroughly discuss the resolutions of the Twentieth
Congress and their impact on Vietnams domestic and international situation.
During the Plenum the discussions were separated into two interlinked parts. The
first part was dedicated to the examination of the principal questions of the
DRVs foreign and domestic policies and the international situation in the light
of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress. The second part of the Plenum
focused on a discussion of questions related to the party work of the Lao Dong
based on the resolutions of the Soviet congress, the report from the CPSU CC
and Khrushchevs secret speech on the cult of personalities and its consequences.58 Le Duans suggestions for a new strategy towards South Vietnam
could have been discussed in either of the two sessions.
The discussions during the Plenum shed some light on developments within
the Lao Dong during this period. They indicate that the North Vietnamese
considered seriously Khrushchevs revelations of misconduct within the Soviet
party, and immediately focused on their own internal party life to ascertain
whether similar errors had been committed. The Lao Dong leaders acknowledged
that mistakes had been made also within their organization and pointed to the
role of Ho Chi Minh. A certain degree of personality cult had been developed
around Ho, but according to discussions at the Plenum, not to the same degree as
around Stalin.59
Moscow was not able to extract much information on Hanois future policies
towards South Vietnam from their knowledge about the Plenum. The discussions
centred mostly on the domestic policies of the DRV and the situation within the
Lao Dong. The only remark targeting directly the Southern situation concluded
that the general line of the Vietnamese peoples fight to strengthen the DRV and
reunify the country by peaceful means, which had been outlined in the
programme of the Fatherland Front, was the correct line to follow.60 The
decision to continue the political struggle indicates that those in favour of
Le Duans proposed strategy did not officially prevail in the spring of 1956 and
that the further strategy of the Lao Dong would be at least close to the new Soviet
line.61 As a result, the discussion on Southern strategy would continue through
1956, and while Soviet leaders steadily continued on a course of action in which
accommodating the US was more important than the peaceful reunification of

Together for Communism? 61

Vietnam, Hanois hardliners promoting a more militant strategy gradually gained
more influence within the Lao Dong Politburo.
Moscow made no outright attempts to influence the DRV views at this
juncture. However, in the beginning of April 1956, shortly before the 9th Plenum
of the Lao Dong, Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet deputy premier, made a visit to
North Vietnam. Mikoyans visit was the first by a senior Soviet official. At the
time of his arrival the Lao Dong had issued its statement of support for the
resolutions of the Twentieth Congress but had not explicitly stated its full
commitment to the policies outlined there. Neither the Soviets nor the
Vietnamese have outlined the purpose of Mikoyans visit, and no official
communiqu was issued during his stay.62 Still, it is safe to assume that the
purpose was to discuss the results of the Twentieth Congress. The lack of an official communiqu at the end of the stay has led to speculations about the results of
the discussions, but it may just indicate that his visit was a working trip, rather
than an official visit.63
Comments in the following period further support the idea that the two main
subjects during Mikoyans visit were the Twentieth Congress and the DRVs
political and economic development.64 According to Nguyen Duy Trinh,
Mikoyan gave some advice to the Vietnamese regarding the issue of exclusion
from the party, and the Plenum agreed with the advice of comrade Mikoyan and
decided to show more caution when excluding members from the party.65 In
August the same year the Vietnamese once again raised the question of problems
with Stalins theories, and argued that during his visit in April Mikoyan had
remarked that some of the theoretical theses developed by Stalin were wrong.
The Vietnamese now wanted to know more specific details regarding the areas in
which the Stalin theories had been wrong, as this was important both to their
propaganda work and to their theoretical work.66
Parallel to Mikoyans visit the Lao Dong experienced internal turbulence. In
late April 1956 the Vietnamese acknowledged that a certain personality cult
had developed around Ho Chi Minh himself, but these accusations did not lead
to any practical consequences for Hos position in the party and were soon
abolished.67 However, the discussion around Hos role was, as we shall see,
only the start of a larger rearrangement within the party leadership, which led to
a greater number of Politburo members with close ties to the South. After the
Twentieth Congress there had been serious disagreements within the Lao Dong
leadership. Lack of unity and the differences of opinion that existed among the
leaders was a source of worry for Soviet officials, as well as for other DRV
government officials. The reason for this lack of unity was, according to an
official at the prime ministers office, Buy Kong Chung, that the members of
the Politburo were too preoccupied with theory. He argued that when serious
problems were raised, the Politburo members often differed in opinion,
although they would rarely end in open disagreement. This was, according to
the DRV official, due to the lack of ideological unity among the members of
the Politburo, a situation that occurred because the party had yet to work out a
general line or programme.68

62

Together for Communism?

Soviet perceptions of Chinas role in Vietnam were clearly expressed by the

Soviet ambassador in Hanoi, Zimyanin, in July 1956. Chinese withdrawal and
the revelations during the Twentieth Congress set aside, he reemphasized
Chinas role as Hanois closest advisor and ally [. . .] with regard to aid and
advice to the Vietnamese friends in deciding important questions in their foreign
and domestic policies [. . .] the Peoples Republic of China plays a leading role in
organizing such assistance to the Vietnamese friends.69 Zimyanins statement
was characteristic of the way Moscow viewed developments in Vietnam in the
first years after the Geneva conference, and how they, in spite of Chinas
decision to withdraw many of their specialists and advisors from the DRV, still
regarded Chinas role as vital.

Land reform and its critics

The most important stage of Lao Dongs social revolution in North Vietnam was
the land reform. This not only involved the transfer of land from the landlords to
the poor peasants but was more generally aimed at all sources from which the old
rural elite drew its power.70 Based on modified Chinese models, the Communist
authorities in Hanoi introduced land reform in 1953, and during the last phase of
the Franco-Vietminh War the poorer peasants were mobilized into a victorious
military force. The land reform gave the Communists an opportunity to win the
gratitude of the poor and to develop a political structure in the villages while
simultaneously recruiting cadres from among the peasants. To many Vietnamese
peasants the land reform campaign represented their first encounter with communism and may help to explain why the relationship between the peasants and the
ruling Communist party was better in North Vietnam than it was in the Soviet
Union after collectivization.71 After the Geneva conference, during the latter part
of 1954, the same land reform was said to increase agricultural output and efficiency. Through land reform the party leadership expected to achieve rapid
change in the whole structure of North Vietnamese society, and thereby create
conditions on which their power monopoly could safely rest.72
In the early phase, land reform was carried out on a small scale, but from 1955
the campaign intensified. Control was exercised by cadres reporting to a central
land reform committee working outside of the ordinary party channels and in
close cooperation with local village committees. As a part of the campaign, peasants were categorized into five classes ranging from landlord to farm worker.
The leaders concluded that landlords and other feudal elements represented 5 per cent
of the rural population, and cadres were sent out to liquidate these. But few
farmers in the North possessed more than three or four acres of land, which meant
that few peasants actually would fall into the landlord category. Nevertheless,
from 1955 the so-called agricultural reform tribunals were set up, and the cadres
started to execute the 5 per cent who according to their statistics had to belong to
the landlord category.73 The DRV government has never published an official
count of those killed in the land reform, but historians working with the subject
have given estimates of executions ranging from 3,000 to 50,000.74

Together for Communism? 63

In North Vietnam land reform grew more radical as it went on, and by the
spring of 1956 the Lao Dong leaders had started to realize the seriousness of its
excesses. Still, it was not until the autumn that the party leaders fully understood
the consequences of the campaign. Since charges were being made against old
cadres and against men with whom party leaders were personally acquainted, the
Lao Dong leadership began to question the accusations.75 The land reform and
the errors committed during its implementation constituted one of the most
important issues in the DRV in the autumn of 1956. Time had come to disperse
responsibility for the excesses of land reform, a process that also led to changes
within the higher echelons of the party.
As soon as it had been admitted that serious errors had been committed, North
Vietnamese leaders started to encourage criticism from below.76 At the 10th
Plenum the party collectively assumed responsibility for the excesses during the
campaign, but pointed out that certain comrades were personally responsible for
what had happened. The Plenum concluded that the instructions of the Lao Dong
Central Committee on the elimination of enemies within the party organization
had been misunderstood and, as a result, had led to massive repression and physical punishment. Their newfound understanding was, according to Nguyen Duy
Trinh, based on their careful studies of the materials of the Twentieth Congress.
It was now much clearer which mistakes had been committed. However, most of
all they blamed themselves for the uncritical acceptance of Chinese advice.77
Although the Central Committee and the Politburo of the CC assumed collective responsibility for the errors, some party officials also had to be sacrificed to
demonstrate the Lao Dong leaders sincerity in rectifying the errors committed.
Several top officials within the Lao Dong were held personally responsible, the
most prominent of these was Truong Chinh, the General Secretary of the Lao
Dong. He was removed from his post but remained a member of the Politburo.78
Truong Chinh was at the time considered to be close to the CCP. The pseudonym
he had chosen in his youth, Truong Chinh, means long march in Vietnamese.79
The North Vietnamese blamed themselves for having unconditionally followed
the Chinese example on land reform, something that may have led them to
choose Truong Chinh as the official scapegoat. He was the leader most
Vietnamese associated with land reform and was a ruthless ideologue who had
often emphasized the necessity of eliminating class enemies.80
The dismissal of Truong Chinh led to changes within the Lao Dong top leadership. Ho Chi Minh himself took over the post as general secretary and would
therefore, until the next scheduled congress of the Lao Dong, hold the positions
of both president of the DRV and general secretary of the party. At the same
time, Vo Nguyen Giap, commanding general of the PAVN, was appointed
deputy (second) general secretary of the Lao Dong CC. These changes left the
Politburo of the Lao Dong CC with the following members: Ho Chi Minh, Pham
Van Dong, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Hoang Quoc Viet, Le Duc Tho,
Nguyen Chi Thanh and the comrades working in South Vietnam.81
According to Nguyen Duy Trinh, the rearrangement of the party leadership
was part of a broader campaign aimed at mending some of the damage caused

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Together for Communism?

by land reform. The Vietnamese variant of de-Stalinization was named the

rectification of errors campaign, and one of the most important tasks of this
campaign was to achieve unity within the ranks of the party.82 But an even
more important aspect of this was the impact such changes would have on
Hanois strategy towards the southern zone. It reflected a new and more militant
attitude within the top echelons of the party. While the list of Lao Dong Politburo
members from September 1956 refers to the comrades working in the South
and makes no direct references to important figures such as the future general
secretary Le Duan and his southern associate Pham Hung, in December that same
year both of them were listed as Politburo members, and Le Duan singled out as
working in the South.83 Together with Le Duc Tho, Le Duan and Pham Hung
were to become the leading advocates of stepping up the struggle in the South.84
During the autumn of 1956 there was only one incident of revolt against the
DRV government. It took place in the North Vietnamese province of Nghe An in
early November.85 When presenting the Nghe An incident to the Soviet charg
daffaires, A.M. Popov, Nguyen Duy Trinh emphasized that the revolt was
staged to undermine the rectification of errors campaign. He also accused the
participants in the demonstration of being used by the reactionaries to spread
false information for the purpose of undermining the peoples government. The
disorder this activity created enabled the reactionaries to make even more
trouble. After the situation in Nghe An had calmed down, Hanoi could reassure
Moscow that in spite of the temporarily difficult situation in that province, the
present conditions in Vietnam would not lead to events like the ones in Poland or
Hungary.86
The rectification of errors campaign and the subsequent changes within the
Lao Dong leadership do not seem to have had any direct influence on the bilateral relationship between the Soviet Union and the DRV. Moscow approved of
Hanois efforts to mend the damage made during land reform but did nothing to
interfere in the campaign itself. Nor do the foreign ministry materials indicate
any reaction to the changes within the party leadership. The Soviet reaction to
Hanois rectification of errors campaign and its rearrangements in the top leadership was expressed as follows in a note from Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey
Gromyko to the CC CPSU:
Taking into consideration that the questions related to the situation in the
country was recently discussed at the 10th Plenum of the Lao Dong CC, and
taking into consideration that it was the Plenum that took the decision to rectify the errors committed in the past by the Party, it seems to be inexpedient
at the present time to give any advice to the Vietnamese friends on innerpolitical [domestic] questions from our side.87
On the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, however, the rectification campaign and
the changes within the Lao Dong leadership had a much greater effect. There can
be no doubt that the negative Vietnamese attitude towards the Chinese advisors
played a considerable role in the Chinese decision to withdraw from Vietnam.

Together for Communism? 65

In its yearly report from 1956 the Soviet embassy in Hanoi argued that the sharp
criticisms of the Chinese advisors for mistakes made during the conduction of
land reform in the DRV played an important role when the Chinese government
decided to withdraw most of their advisory teams in North Vietnam.
The PRC government has made a significant contribution to the development
and strengthening of the DRV, and therefore the Chinese friends were indeed not
pleased to hear the opinions of individual Vietnamese friends that contained
accusations towards the Chinese advisors for mistakes made during the conduction of land reform in the DRV. One could suppose that such opinions with
address to the Chinese advisors also served as a reason for the decision of the
PRC government to withdraw these from Vietnam.88
The embassy also discussed the problem of nationalist tendencies within
certain parts of the Vietnamese intelligentsia, emphasizing that these have an
anti-Chinese focus and turn, at times, into direct and open attacks against
Chinese representatives in the DRV.89 The possible problems that this antiChinese focus could create, especially in terms of future Chinese involvement in
Vietnam, worried the Soviet leadership.
In the mid-1950s there were several examples of how Sino-Vietnamese cooperation did not always work to the satisfaction of both parties. One such incident
was reported to the Soviet ambassador to Beijing, Pavel Iudin, in January 1956,
around the time when many Chinese advisors were about to leave the DRV. The
Chinese economic advisors were closely involved in the reconstruction of North
Vietnam, but the Vietnamese initiatives with regard to economic planning and
reconstruction were not always to the liking of the Chinese. One example was the
Vietnamese plans for large industrial and mining facilities and their plans to use
most of the assistance received for these purposes. The Chinese emphasized their
disapproval of the plans and encouraged the Vietnamese to concentrate on plans
for increasing the living standards in the North.
According to the Chinese point of view, the Vietnamese should now use all
means to develop their agriculture, produce consumer goods and strive to
compete with South Vietnam in terms of living standards for the population.
They should not try to develop industrial production, which demands large sums
of capital investment, because Vietnam was not yet ready for such development.
With regard to the mining industry they should extract only those minerals
demanded by the Soviet Union and China. In spite of such clear advice, the
Chinese had to admit that they had not been able to fully convince the
Vietnamese, who were prone to speed up the industrialization of their country.90
In spite of the ongoing process of withdrawal, the Chinese took an active interest
in the organization of Vietnamese production and economy. The Soviets had no
comments on the Chinese complaints, perhaps because the Vietnamese plans
were more in line with Soviet ideas than with Chinese.
The Vietnamese dissatisfaction with its Chinese allies, and the subsequent
Chinese decision to withdraw their advisors from Vietnam, should be understood within the wider context of the new ideological foreign policy line of the
Soviet Communists beginning under Nikita Khrushchev. During 1956 these

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Together for Communism?

changes allowed the Vietnamese to display their dissatisfaction and in public

condemn those responsible for the errors committed during the land reform.
Most of these leaders were, as we have seen, very close to Beijing. However, as
the rectification campaign began long after the Chinese decision to withdraw
their advisors, this must be seen only as a result of a long period of criticism
against the Chinese example, in which the outright criticism in the autumn of
1956 was the final drop.

Moscow, Beijing and Hanois new Southern strategy

Ever since the preparations for consultations collapsed in the summer of 1955 the
Vietnamese had signalled their readiness to pursue a new kind of policy, a policy
that would imply an increased level of violence compared with the first year after
Geneva. From a Soviet point of view, a change in Lao Dong policies towards the
South should probably have been a source of worry, since it was unlikely to
correspond with the new Soviet foreign policy line with its emphasis on a
peaceful transition to socialism. A new Hanoi strategy would no doubt imply a
more militant approach leading to severe reactions from both the South
Vietnamese authorities and the Americans. Even though the North Vietnamese,
in the spring of 1956, gave several indications of the need to revise their Southern
strategy, they never outlined explicitly to the Soviets what their plans were if a
political solution was impossible.
In April 1956 the 9th Plenum of the Lao Dong CC decided to continue the
political struggle as the correct way to achieve reunification; this decision caused
much protest in the South. Pursuing the political struggle was the pragmatic
course for the Lao Dong in the mid-1950s. There were many reasons for this; one
was the losses of the last war and the reluctance to enter into another bloody
encounter with the West. The main goal for the majority of the leadership was to
create a solid Socialist base in the North before expanding for the purpose of
overthrowing the American-supported government in the South.91
However, many southerners were still bitter about the outcome of Geneva and
therefore called for a reversal of the peaceful strategies and all-out attacks against
the Saigon regime. The main proponent of armed violence in the South was, as
we have already seen, Le Duan. During the 9th Plenum in April his 14-point
March proposal was not officially approved, but in the months following the
Plenum the climate within the Lao Dong leadership apparently began to change,
and coming up to the date scheduled for all-Vietnamese elections there were
several hints from Hanoi to the Soviets on intentions to revise the Southern
strategy. In late June 1956 Ho Chi Minh stated during a meeting with Soviet
Ambassador Zimyanin that one could no longer count on the holding of general
elections.92 Referring to the present situation in Vietnam, Ho said,
at this point one can no longer count on the holding of consultations with
South Vietnam and general elections for Vietnam. Diem refuses to follow
the Geneva Agreement. In South Vietnam a referendum was held, and also

Together for Communism? 67

separate elections. The armed resistance of the sects has been smashed.
Diem has to some extent strengthened his armed forces. The French have left
South Vietnam. As a result a new situation has arisen that one must take into
account in the fight for the unification of the country.93
Ho Chi Minh also pointed to the new measures that needed to be taken as a result
of the new situation and said that the Lao Dong CC was preparing instructions
for the comrades working in the South on the tasks and methods for the further
struggle. Ho also underlined to the Soviets that the Communist networks in the
South had not been completely destroyed in spite of Diems repression. The
Vietnamese people themselves constituted another important factor that,
according to Ho, had to be taken into consideration when planning the future of
Vietnam. He claimed that some of the people had started to ask what needed to
be done to obtain reunification of the country under the present circumstances.
Those who were most worried were the ones who had fled from the South to the
North after partition.
To emphasize to the Soviets the importance of fulfilment of the Geneva agreement, Ho Chi Minh used the respect for the people of Vietnam as an argument. It
would be necessary to give the people an explanation as to why the provisions of
the agreement had not been fulfilled as planned. Thus, several meetings must be
held to help the people of both the North and the South understand the DRVs
fight to reunite the country. The Lao Dong also acknowledged that they had not
done enough in their fight for the fulfilment of the Geneva Agreement. One of
the problems was that they had underestimated the force of their opponents.
Political struggle was the correct option, but too many insufficiencies had
surfaced when they had tried to follow this direction. One example was the
programme of the Fatherland Front the VNFF. It was a good programme, but it
had been drawn up too late, at the time when the armed forces of the DRV had
already left the South. To overcome these difficulties, Ho Chi Minh recommended that one should study Diems tactics more carefully and react more
seriously to them. He also underlined that it was now clear to Hanoi that the
government in Saigon did not want to enter into any consultations.94
Some have claimed that the Lao Dong leaders already in the autumn of 1954
knew that there would not be any general elections on schedule in 1956, or even
at a later date for that matter.95 In June that year Ho Chi Minh told Soviet ambassador Zimyanin that they knew for certain there would be no elections and
declared that the failure to hold elections could lead to serious trouble.96 Hos
argument was further elaborated by DRV Deputy Foreign Minister Ung Van
Khiem and member of the Politburo Pham Hung, in a conversation with the
Soviet ambassador. Pham Hung said that at present it is necessary [. . .] to
strengthen the fight in North and South Vietnam for the fulfilment of the Geneva
Agreement, and to achieve that it is necessary to send another letter to the two
co-chairmen. Zimyanin said that both he and his Chinese colleague, Ambassador
Li Zhimin, agreed with Pham Hungs idea of sending another letter to the
co-chairmen, but that all emphasis should not be on calling a new Geneva

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Together for Communism?

conference. There would be no elections in July, and no new Geneva conference

in the near future. To remind people of the conference was good tactics, but not
the purpose of the fight.97
In 1956 Moscow and Beijing agreed that the struggle for preserving peace and
reuniting the country was the just fight of the Vietnamese. The main task was to
mobilize the whole people to struggle for a full implementation of the agreement.
The fact that the elections had not been held should not be left unnoticed by the
people of the world and should be emphasized in diplomatic documents. The
Soviet and Chinese ambassadors then gave advice on the order in which to send
the letters: one now, and the other after the date scheduled for elections. They
also underlined that none of them should express any form of defeatism or pessimism, as that would undermine the basic task as it was seen from the Vietnamese
side: that is, emphasis on mobilizing the broader masses of the people.98
Ho Chi Minhs and other Lao Dong leaders opinion must be seen in connection with the 8 May messages from the Geneva co-chairmen emphasizing the
need to preserve peace in Indochina.99 Nothing was said about the general elections scheduled to take place about two months later. At this stage the North
Vietnamese leadership could not have been pleased with the behaviour of its
Communist allies. Moscows lack of interest in the election implied their tacit
satisfaction with the situation in Vietnam. By late June 1956 the decision from
April to support the new Soviet line, and to keep to the political struggle, had
already been modified. The Lao Dong Politburo now passed a resolution in
which they decided that even though the struggle was mainly political, it did not
exclude the use of force in limited situations to secure the task of self-defence.
The resolution also stated the need to strengthen the military and half-military
units and create strong bases for these, while at the same time increasing the Lao
Dong influence among the people, as the support of the people was the basic
condition for preservation and development of the armed forces.100
The ascendancy of Le Duan and Pham Hung in the leadership coincides with a
shift in policies towards the South. Sometime between the Lao Dongs 10th and
11th Plenums, held in September and December 1956, respectively, Le Duan
presented another suggestion for policy revision in the document entitled The
Path of Revolution in the South (Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam). The policy
guidance incorporated in the document was aimed both at solving the Lao Dong
leaders problems with the failure of their policy of reunification, and at the problems arising from the conduct of land reform in the North.101
In December 1956 the Nam Bo Regional Committee met to discuss, among
other issues, Le Duans The Path. Considering the needs of the revolutionary
movement in South Vietnam the meeting concluded that it was to a certain
extent, necessary to allow military activities to supplement the political
struggle. However, removing the restriction on the use of force did not imply
that encouragement was given to its immediate employment. It rather
suggested that force would be used at a future time, when circumstances were
ripe. One small exception was made, and a secret document allowing a policy
of limited violence known as killing tyrants was authorized for high-level

Together for Communism? 69

party members only. This was to prevent confusion among lower-level cadres,
who were instructed to continue to build a mass organization in the South.102
Hence, with this approval of tactical violence the Vietnamese Communists
were embarking on a new strategy. The failure of the policy of reunification,
the lack of support from their Communist allies, and finally, the increase in the
number of Politburo members in favour of a new policy were important reasons
behind this change.
At the time when the Lao Dong began to re-evaluate its reunification strategy
Moscows attitude can at best be characterized as expectant. Available sources
indicate that Moscow did possess enough information to realize that a change
was taking place. Soviet leaders also realized that these changes would, in one
way or another, influence the SovietVietnamese relationship. The Lao Dong
leaders knew that a resurgence of armed struggle in the South was unlikely to be
accepted by the Soviet party, thus they preferred to make their own decisions
rather than consulting Moscow.103 In 1956, however, this was not necessarily
done with the purpose to conceal ongoing discussions within the Lao Dong leadership, but as much due to the fact that many of the major decisions concerning
the Southern struggle were not yet taken and were, furthermore, internally
controversial in the Vietnamese leadership.
Both Moscow and Beijing did probably have a rather clear idea about what
was going on behind closed doors in Hanoi. Obviously, to Moscow the early
changes in Hanoi came at a time when there was much turmoil in both Eastern
Europe and the Middle East, which meant that less attention was focused on
the situation in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the Soviets did seem quite content
with the continued partition of Vietnam. The Chinese, on the other hand,
were, according to some, only keeping their revolutionary ambitions at bay,
waiting for better times.104 If such was the case, one might suggest that both
Moscow and Beijing, rather than being kept in the dark without any say in the
matter, did signal, through their non-involvement, that the Vietnamese should
continue to develop their strategies for reunification. At the same time, this is
not to say that Moscow approved the insurgence, but rather to suggest that as
long as Hanois plans did not directly threaten Soviet foreign policy objectives in the world at large, Moscow did not see the need to interfere in
Vietnamese politics. That, however, was not the case in the early 1960s, when
Moscow strongly advised the Vietnamese to refocus on the political struggle
for reunification.
Two particular issues made the difference in these two cases: first, in 1956
both the Soviets and the Chinese doubted that the Vietnamese would actually be
able to reunify the country by force, and second, by the beginning of the 1960s
the Vietnamese had had time to considerably strengthen their military and
economic forces and thus were much better able to carry out a prolonged
struggle. But even more important were the changes in the Sino-Soviet relationship, meaning that in the early 1960s Moscow could no longer be certain that
Beijing would continue to play on their team with regard to constraining the
Vietnamese.

70

Together for Communism?

A balancing act
Soviet policies towards Vietnam in the first years after Geneva reflect how
Moscows attempts to balance the wishes of the Vietnamese and Chinese against
their own need to come to better terms with the West, and in particular the United
States, with few exceptions went in the Vietnamese Communists disfavour. The
introduction of peaceful coexistence as the new line in Soviet foreign policy,
which was further strengthened at the Twentieth Congress in February 1956,
influenced domestic Vietnamese policies, and did, to some degree, inspire the
Vietnamese Communists to re-examine some of their practices during land
reform in their own de-Stalinization: the rectification of errors campaign.
As a result, from 1956 the interests of Soviet leaders and Vietnamese Communists with regard to the future development in Vietnam diverged for a while. In
line with its policy of peaceful coexistence the Soviet Union was relatively satisfied with a divided Vietnam and would not assist the Lao Dong if such assistance
could hamper the improvement of SovietAmerican relations. Hanoi, on the
other hand, still considered reunification its main goal, and was slowly realizing
that to achieve a unified Vietnam it would have to seek support from elsewhere
than Moscow.
In 1956 the Vietnamese Communists were still officially promoting a purely
political struggle as the best way to achieve reunification. However, there were
individuals within the party leadership, and certainly in South Vietnam, who had
lost faith in the political struggle and turned increasingly to a strategy in which
military action would complement the political struggle. To those within the
party in favour of a new strategy, the Soviet bid for peaceful co-existence was a
problem. In spite of the new line in politics outlined at the Twentieth Congress,
and the Lao Dong statement fully endorsing it, Hanoi continued to discuss alternative routes towards reunification. The changes in the Lao Dong leadership had
two effects: first, it downgraded or removed those who had been in charge of
land reform and especially those with the closest bonds to China, with Truong
Chinh as the most prominent example. Second, after the changes the Politburo
would from late 1956 consist of more high-ranking members likely to support a
strategy of insurgence in the South.
The failure to hold elections did not reduce Sino-Soviet cooperation in
Vietnam. Moscow and Beijing were still inclined to continue to cooperate in
Vietnam, and in a comment on Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam the Chinese
ambassador to Hanoi, Luo Guibo, underlined that the Soviet Union and the
Peoples Republic of China should continue to assist their Vietnamese friends in
deciding important questions.105 But Luos friendly remarks disguised problems
just below the surface of the triangular relationship. Even though the Sino-Soviet
cooperation in Vietnam continued in the same pattern, developments in the
two years after Geneva had on several occasions dealt serious blows to both the
Sino-Soviet and the SovietVietnamese relationship.
Chinese withdrawal posed a serious challenge to Moscows Vietnam policy.
The reasons for the withdrawal were many and may be found both on the PRC

Together for Communism? 71

domestic arena based on Beijings wish to focus more on its own domestic needs
and in Vietnam itself. But among the most important reasons were the
Vietnamese criticism and their sometimes outright refusals to follow instructions
by the Chinese advisors. Through 1955 and 1956 Beijing had to deal with
repeated Vietnamese criticism of the overall aspects of Chinas role in Vietnam.
In addition, it is fair to assume that the changes in Moscows foreign policy line
after the Twentieth Congress further accelerated the Chinese wish to withdraw
from its commitments, primarily because the new political environment within
the international Communist movement enabled the Vietnamese to initiate even
stronger criticism of the Chinese. These criticisms must have worried the Soviet
leadership, who depended on the Chinese presence in Vietnam, especially in the
question of sharing the burden of assistance. Absence of Chinese personnel could
possibly force Moscow to take a more active interest in the practical aspects of
the SovietDRV relationship, a situation Moscow most likely would try to avoid.
The underlying principle of Soviet policy towards Vietnam was the use of
China as a foreign policy sub-contractor in Vietnam. During the good days of
the Sino-Soviet relationship this strategy was successful, but as cracks began to
appear in the relations the whole concept became increasingly difficult for
Moscow. However, in spite of the growing foreign policy differences leaders in
both the Soviet Union and the PRC realized the necessity of a continuing good
working relationship with regard to Vietnam.

Reunification by revolution?
The Soviet and Chinese role in Vietnamese
reunification plans, 19571961

The Vietnamese decision of January 1959 to resume armed struggle as a means

of reunification was made exclusively by the Central Committee of the Lao
Dong. It was not a move initiated by either the Soviet Union or China, although
the actions of the two were important parts of the Lao Dongs decision to embark
on a new and more militant strategy. In the years after the Geneva conference,
both the Soviet Union and China failed to give Hanoi the necessary support to
enable them to hold elections, and thereby reunification within the framework of
the Geneva agreement. By the end of the 1950s there was, from a Vietnamese
Communist perspective, only one other option left reunification through
armed struggle. Based on Soviet attitudes and behaviour in the preceding
years Moscows urge to promote dtente and the peaceful transition to
socialism there was no reason at all for the Vietnamese to believe the Soviet
Union would support them in, or even encourage, the launch of armed struggle to
achieve reunification. Thus, from the early 1960s the Vietnamese Communists
pursued the new strategy against the advice of Moscow, and initially also against
the advice of Beijing.
Parallel to the radicalization of the Vietnamese strategy, Sino-Soviet relations
deteriorated. The disagreements within the Communist camp were of great
concern to the Vietnamese, who depended on the combined assistance from
Moscow and Beijing to reconstruct their economy, and not least to prepare for a
reunification struggle in the South. Until early 1961 Moscow and Beijing agreed
that the Vietnamese should continue to emphasize political struggle, but from the
summer of 1961 the Chinese leaders became increasingly positive to the additional use of military struggle to achieve reunification of Vietnam. The development of Soviet and Chinese positions with regard to the Vietnamese reunification
strategy shows how cooperation in Vietnam survived the initial Sino-Soviet
disagreements, and how the Vietnamese were eager to mend the conflict to
prevent it from ruining cooperation between their major allies.
This chapter centres on three main topics: first, Soviet and Chinese cooperation and their views on the future of the Geneva agreement; second, Moscow and
Beijings approach to changes in the Vietnamese reunification strategy; and
finally, the role of the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict and Hanois attempt to
reconcile its allies.

Reunification by revolution? 73

Accepting two Vietnams

The first real test of the sincerity in the SovietVietnamese relationship after the
failure to carry out elections in July 1956 came in January of the following year.
On 23 January 1957 the United States proposed the acceptance of both South
Vietnam and South Korea as independent members of the United Nations.
The American suggestion immediately provoked a Soviet counterproposal on
24 January: to admit North Vietnam and North Korea as well.
The Soviet proposal led to a quick North Vietnamese protest sent to all the
members of the United Nations Security Council. This protest was signed by
DRV Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong and contained references to the Final
Declaration of the Geneva Accords and its 6: the military demarcation line is
provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or
territorial boundary.1 Thus, according to Pham Van Dong, South Vietnam could
not be seen as a separate state and could also not become an independent member
of the United Nations. He also sought support in the declaration of the Bandung
Conference of April 1955, which states, Vietnam could only become a member
of the United Nations as a reunited Vietnam, meaning that none of the two
parts of Vietnam could become a member of the United Nations as long as the
country remained divided into two zones. Pham Van Dongs protest was dated
25 January, the day after the Soviets sent their counterproposal.2 The protest was
directed not only against the US proposal but also completely contradicted the
Soviet counterproposal. With their counterproposal the Soviet Union was by
many, among them Ngo Dinh Diem, seen as accepting a two-state solution for
Vietnam.
Except for a few critical comments on behalf of the Vietnamese, Beijing was
not ready to criticize the Soviet counterproposal. Accusations in the French and
South Vietnamese press implying that there were inconsistencies between Hanoi
and Moscows declarations regarding this question were strongly denied by the
Soviet ambassador to Hanoi in a conversation with his Chinese colleague. He
underlined that there were no inconsistencies, and that the Soviet Union steadfastly defended the fundamental interests of the DRV.3 But of course there was
an inconsistency, which was taken seriously indeed by the Vietnamese themselves, although to a lesser extent by the Chinese. In September 1957 the Chinese
charg daffairs in Hanoi told the Soviet ambassador that some of the
Vietnamese friends had expressed their disagreement with the Soviet proposal
to admit the two states in Vietnam as independent members of the UN. However,
according to Li Zhimin, the Chinese considered the Vietnamese friends to be too
concerned with details regarding any steps from the Socialist camp that could be
interpreted as an indirect recognition of South Vietnam.4 It is not unlikely that
Beijing would consider it an advantage for the two parts of Vietnam to be further
consolidated as it would secure the state in North Vietnam and also the southern
Chinese border.
The prevailing understanding in the literature is that the Soviet counterproposal was a surprise for the Hanoi leadership.5 My reading of the Soviet documents

74

Reunification by revolution?

confirms this. In an extract of a directive from the CC CPSU to the Soviet

delegation at the Second Session of the UN General Assembly in late January
1957, the Soviet policy was outlined as follows: The Soviet Union shall not take
the initiative in posing the question of adopting as members of the United
Nations the DRV and DPRK.6 However, in its second subsection the extract
contains orders on how to proceed if a formal proposal of accepting only South
Korea and South Vietnam was put forward. In that case the delegation should
come forward with a proposal of simultaneous admittance as United Nation
members North Korea, North Vietnam, South Korea and South Vietnam.7 The
Soviets asserted that an acceptance of the two Korean and the two Vietnamese
states as members of the United Nations would contribute to their reunification,
while the acceptance of only one of the parties as a UN member would be an
obstacle on their road to reunification. The directive from the Central Committee
of the CPSU also emphasized that if the question of admitting South Korea and
South Vietnam was raised without any connection to the simultaneous admittance of North Korea and North Vietnam, the delegation should object, and vote
against it in the Security Council, i.e. use their veto.8
What was the background for the Soviet proposal? Historian Marilyn Young
claims that Khrushchev made the proposal because he was anxious to
strengthen dtente but also because of the difference in political and economic
structure between the two states in Vietnam and the fact that they existed separately.9 In the United Nations the Soviet representative argued that to admit
only South Korea and South Vietnam would create the false impression that the
whole of Vietnam and Korea were fully represented in the United Nations. To
admit one state and not the other would discriminate the state left out and tend
to aggravate and perpetuate the division of the two peoples concerned.10 Soviet
attitudes in 1957 indicate that Moscow saw Vietnam as consisting of two independent states, although that was not an argument they used when explaining
their action to their Vietnamese friends. However, time would show that the
Soviet leaders thought increasingly of Vietnam as a permanently divided
country.
In Hanoi the leaders were worried about the propaganda effect of the Soviet
proposal. The Lao Dong officially still aimed at achieving reunification of the
country on a democratic foundation and within the Geneva agreement. In his
attempt to explain the Soviet position to Ung Van Khiem, the Soviet ambassador
emphasized that the Soviet position in the UN defended the fundamental interests
of the DRV, and as such, there were no contradictions in the positions of the
Soviet Union and the DRV. Moscow supported the Vietnamese friends in their
campaign to reunify the country, and the UN proposal did not contradict that
objective. Nevertheless, it had to be taken into consideration that the fight for a
reunified Vietnam unquestionably would be long, and that there was no need to
hold an illusion that the reunification may occur from one day to the next.11 In
other words, the Soviets underlined to the Vietnamese that the reunification
would take time, and that what they had done in the UN question would have no
negative influence on the question of an eventual reunification. Thus, according

Reunification by revolution? 75
to Moscow there were no contradictions between the Soviet and Vietnamese
positions.
Evidently, Zimyanins explanations to Ung Van Khiem were not satisfactory
in Vietnamese eyes; Zimyanin also had to explain Soviet behaviour to Ho Chi
Minh. Once again he argued that the Soviet Union was defending the fundamental interests of the DRV, and that the Soviet position in the UN in no way
contradicted the Geneva agreement and the Vietnamese peoples fight for a
peaceful reunification of the country. When explaining the Soviet position to Ho
Chi Minh, ambassador Zimyanin described it as being guided by principle
while at the same time flexible.12 The flexibility was explained by emphasizing
that if the Soviet Union had been forced to veto the proposal to admit South
Vietnam into the United Nations, the United States would have been forced to
do the same with regard to North Vietnam. These facts should, according to
ambassador Zimyanin, be thoroughly presented in DRV propaganda to show
that there were no contradictions in the positions of the Soviet Union and
the DRV.13
In the end, nothing came of the Soviet proposal. And on 30 January 1957 the
General Assemblys Special Political Committee approved a US-backed resolution recommending that the Security Council reconsider the membership applications of the Republic of Korea and of Vietnam. The Committee also rejected
the Soviet resolution to consider both Vietnams and Koreas as members. On
28 February the General Assembly carried the matter further, when it voted 40 to 8
to recommend to the Security Council that the Republic of Vietnam and of Korea
be admitted into membership.14
It has been argued that the Soviet Union withdrew the proposal after pressure
from Hanoi.15 Due to the lack of documents reflecting internal Soviet discussions, it is difficult to determine how the Soviets themselves evaluated the
pressure form the Vietnamese side. The obvious North Vietnamese displeasure
with the proposal can be part of the reason why it was withdrawn. Nor were the
Chinese unreservedly positive to Moscows position on this question. However,
as long as the Soviet Union remained a permanent member of the Security
Council, it had the power to block the admission of South Vietnam to the UN.
Moscow continued to oppose South Vietnams application for membership, and
the Council was unable to recommend its admission.16
To the Vietnamese Communists the Soviet behaviour in 1957 was only
another of those incidents that made them aware that Moscow could not be
trusted to preserve the interests of the Vietnamese. With the counterproposal,
Moscow indirectly recognized the Republic of South Vietnam and signalled its
acceptance of two independent states in Vietnam. The episode also illustrates the
general Soviet attitude towards Vietnam in the period by forwarding the
proposal without prior consultations with the Vietnamese, Soviet leaders showed
their readiness to make decisions with serious implications for the future of
Vietnam, without letting Hanoi participate in the process. In January 1957 the
Soviet Union, apparently, did not see any reason why they should have consulted
their allies in North Vietnam, or the Chinese for that matter.

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Reunification by revolution?

Renewed interest in the Geneva agreement

The UN proposal led to a renewed interest in the Geneva agreement. From
Hanois point of view the UN proposal and the fulfilment of the Geneva agreement were closely linked. Did Soviet behaviour in the United Nations imply that
Moscow no longer had any interest in implementing the Geneva agreement?
With their proposal that both Vietnams should be admitted into the UN as
independent members, the Soviet leaders indirectly said what the North
Vietnamese feared the most, namely that they had accepted the idea of two
separate states in Vietnam. The events of January underlined to the Vietnamese
that for the moment they were further away than ever from their goal of a united
Vietnam under Communist leadership.
In early 1957 neither Hanoi nor Moscow had completely abandoned the idea
of a full implementation of the Geneva agreement the holding of allVietnamese elections. From the Soviet point of view the implementation should
be done in coordination with China. In response to Hanois insistence that one
had to think of further steps to obtain fulfilment of the agreement, ambassador
Zimyanin told the North Vietnamese that Moscow would have to discuss
this question with the Chinese.17 The Soviet attitude shows that in regard to
Sino-Soviet cooperation the pattern from 1954 to 1956 continued. Despite
signs of growing differences between Moscow and Beijing they agreed on the
necessity to cooperate in Vietnam.
Moscow was positive to the DRVs chances for a fulfilment of the agreement.
In March 1957 the Soviet ambassador stressed to Pham Van Dong that the political position of the DRV was significantly stronger than that of South Vietnam,
and it was also likely that a weakening of the struggle for reunification within the
Geneva framework would be beneficial to the United States (and its position in
South Vietnam). According to the Soviets, the strong position of the DRV and
the danger that abandoning the Geneva agreement would benefit the United
States were two good reasons for continuing the fight for implementation of
the agreement. An important part of this strategy was to preserve and support the
work of the ICC. Although the principal task of the ICC was not to fight the
United States and their interference in the affairs of South Vietnam, the Soviets
emphasized that to the extent it was possible the ICC should be used to unmask
American intrigues in South Vietnam, because to fight for peace in Indochina at
present, and for the reunification of Vietnam, it is necessary to concentrate all
forces on driving back American interference. The principal policy is political
struggle against the aggressive policies of American imperialism.18
During 1957 Moscow continued to encourage the DRV leaders to call for a
second Geneva meeting. However, the Soviet policy makers were also apprehensive of a second meeting, because it could possibly reach conclusions less
beneficial than the ones from the 1954 Geneva agreement and have unfavourable
consequences. But on the positive side, they concluded, Hanoi could use such a
meeting to expose the aggressive policies of the United States and its agents in
Indochina. Thus, in 1957 both Moscow and Beijing encouraged Hanoi to target

Reunification by revolution? 77
their propaganda and their political anger against the United States, while at the
same time they should use all efforts to establish relations between North and
South Vietnam.19
Hanoi were positive to the idea of establishing relations between the two
zones. The North Vietnamese leadership was eager to keep the door between the
two states open. Moscows indirect acceptance of two separate states in Vietnam,
indicated in the UN proposal, and the general reluctance in both Moscow and
Beijing to pursue a solution in Vietnam based on Geneva must have made the
Vietnamese leaders realize that they were now the only remaining party still
hoping for a fulfilment of the Geneva agreement.

Sino-Soviet cooperation
Through the increase in diplomatic exchanges between the DRV and other countries during 1957 and 1958, the North Vietnamese leaders made long visits to
their largest allies, the Soviet Union and China, but they also turned their attention to the East European countries, as well as friendly countries in Asia.20 The
main aim of these trips was to secure economic support for the DRV and also
support for the reunification of the country.21 These visits show how during 1957
and 1958 the North Vietnamese were working hard to gain more friends and
allies both within the Socialist camp and in Asia at large, something that would
make them more independent of the two major economic and military contributors, the Soviet Union and China.
As in previous years, Soviet and Chinese aid remained essential to the
Vietnamese. Even after the withdrawal of many advisors in 1955 and 1956
Beijing was still in charge of the major part of practical assistance to the DRV. It
has been argued that one reason for leaving the practical responsibility to the
Chinese was that Chinese specialists were more easily integrated into North
Vietnamese society than Soviet specialists. Vietnamese complaints over
problems with the interaction between Soviet specialists and Vietnamese citizens
support such suppositions. Moscow even wanted to reduce the number of Soviet
specialists in Vietnam for such reasons.22 Accounts from earlier years, however,
have shown how also the Chinese specialists encountered many problems in their
interactions with the Vietnamese, even though they, at least according to the
Soviets, should have been more easily integrated into Vietnamese society.
Both Moscow and Beijing were sceptical of Hanois extensive use of foreign
specialists and the DRVs total dependence on aid from fraternal countries. In
January 1957 the Soviet Union and China jointly criticized the DRV for relying
on fraternal countries to help them raise over 50 per cent of the budget.23
According to the Vietnamese, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was sceptical about
using foreign specialists in Vietnam, as he feared that the more specialists were
involved, the more mistakes would be made. In 1956, as a part of the rectification
of errors campaign, Lao Dong leaders claimed that part of the mistake was that
the Vietnamese had so uncritically followed the Chinese example when
conducting land reform. Grudges after these accusations were instrumental in

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Reunification by revolution?

1957, when the Chinese were reluctant to send new specialists to the DRV.
To explain this move to the Soviets, the Chinese argued that they feared a high
number of foreign specialists would reduce the initiative among the Vietnamese.
Vietnam should first of all rely on its own resources.24
Dissatisfied with the Chinese attitude, Pham Van Dong revealed to the Soviet
ambassador that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had little faith in Soviet assistance
to the DRV. In the spring of 1957 Zhou had told the Vietnamese that they had to
decide for themselves whether they should ask Moscow for assistance or not, but
that they had to bear in mind the USSR had many obligations.25 Hanoi was
dependent on assistance from both the Soviet Union and China. Thus, Pham Van
Dongs ulterior motive in revealing the Chinese attitude to the Soviets could have
been to push Moscow into proving the Chinese wrong, by showing that the
Soviet Union did care about the situation in Vietnam and would give aid to the
Vietnamese. But most important in this context were probably the memories of
the rectification of errors campaign. It is possible that Beijing wanted to hear the
Lao Dong leaders apologize for the campaign, which had seriously hurt leaders
inspired by the Chinese example, such as Truong Chinh, before they would
provide further assistance to the DRV.
An essential part of Soviet advice to Hanoi was the need to elaborate detailed
plans for the economic development of the country. In his conversations with the
DRV leadership ambassador Zimyanin emphasized the need for careful planning
in Vietnamese requests for economic assistance. Before Ho Chi Minhs 1957
visit to the Soviet Union the ambassador urged the North Vietnamese to have
fully elaborated plans for material aid from the Socialist countries to the DRV.26
The fact that the Vietnamese had intended to use much more of the Soviet aid
than announced for military purposes in 1956 meant that this time the fraternal
countries wanted to see explicit plans for the use of the aid to avoid similar
diversification.
By 1958 the trend within the Vietnamese armed forces was to reduce rather
than enlarge the army. In February 1958 Defence Minister Vo Nguyen Giap
could inform the new Soviet ambassador, Leonid Ivanovich Sokolov,27 that the
Vietnamese military leaders had decided to reduce the PAVN to 1,60,000 troops
before 1960. The ambassador responded by suggesting that the demobilized
forces should be used in the national economy.28 During the years 195759,
PAVN underwent a process of technological modernization, and at the same time
party political controls over the military were instituted at all levels. As a result
of decisions taken by the partys 12th Plenum in March 1957, military units were
assigned tasks in the civilian economy, and in 1958 the Armys involvement in
this sector was increased as units assumed responsibility for running state
farms.29
From 1960 onwards Hanoi again expressed a strong will to accelerate the
tempo of their economic development, and to acquire the necessary assistance
the leaders turned to the Soviet Union. The immediate background, according to
Pham Van Dong, was that they were afraid of falling behind South Vietnam in
economic development. If they could win the economic competition with the

Reunification by revolution? 79
South, it would not only heighten their prestige in Southeast Asia but also have
an important impact on the outcome of the fight to reunify the country. In other
words, without saying it outright to the Soviets, this acceleration was also part of
the preparation for a future war. But a more intensive development did, according
to Pham Van Dong, also require more intensive assistance. However, this time
Moscow was more reserved when responding to the request. Pham Van Dong
emphasized that he understood the Soviet Union could not constantly increase
the amount of aid; nor did the DRV have any right to expect that. To accommodate Moscow, Pham Van Dong suggested that they redirect the aid and use all
forces to more intensively exploit it in order to increase the tempo of development.30 In response to the Vietnamese requests the Soviet Union provided two
assistance payments (long-terms credits) during 1960; the first amount of approximately 79 million roubles came in June, and a second amount of approximately
97 million roubles came in late December. Thus the total amount of Soviet assistance
provided in 1960 was 176 million roubles. According to Soviet sources the
Vietnamese only used a total of 83 million roubles, not even half of what they
were offered.31
In the sphere of economic and military assistance the changes in the
Vietnamese reunification strategy during 1959 and 1960 seem to have had no
drastic impact on the amount of assistance from the Socialist camp to the DRV.
Soviet estimates show that the development of the national economy of the DRV
was fulfilled according to the Three-Year Plan for 195860. The financial part of
the plan had been fully balanced due to the help of Soviet and Chinese experts
and included Soviet credits of 100 million roubles and Chinese credits in the
amount of 600 million yuan. Although the situation so far was favourable, it was
not precluded from the Soviet side that Hanoi would ask for an additional credit
from the Soviet Union. The Soviet attitude to that was positive, and it was underlined that if such a request came, Moscow would consider assisting the North
Vietnamese in developing their economy also beyond 1960.32 All in all, assistance from the Soviet Union to the DRV was kept on the same level as in previous
years, implying a gradual increase, but no substantial change in 195960.33

The Lao Dong debates its policy on reunification

Towards the end of 1958 the Vietnamese Communist Party leadership was
unified in its decision to change the course of the struggle in South Vietnam.
Between the 14th Plenum held in November 1958 and the 15th Plenum of the
Lao Dong Central Committee held from December 1958 to February 1959,
Politburo member Le Duan made a trip to South Vietnam to evaluate the
situation.34 The contents of his report are not known, but it must have concluded
that the situation in South Vietnam demanded a new strategy allowing military
actions to complement the political struggle. In sum, it was the growing desire
for reunification in the North combined with Le Duans report, which underlined
similar strong sentiments for a swift change in the South, that prompted the
Vietnamese Communists to change the strategy of reunification.

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Reunification by revolution?

Although Moscow had settled for a permanent partition of Vietnam, the debate
in Hanoi over what kind of policy to pursue to obtain reunification continued. As
we have already seen, the Lao Dong leaders had started to discuss alternatives to
political struggle as early as 1956, but consensus was not reached until the end of
1958, when they decided to supplement the political struggle with military
action. There are few signs indicating that Hanoi discussed the change of strategy
with Moscow, since the Lao Dong leaders already knew the Soviet preference for
a peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem. The party leadership repeatedly
stressed to Soviet officials the need to revise the Southern strategy and reported
on measures the party had taken in this regard. Soviet diplomats must have been
aware of the ongoing debate within the Lao Dong, but whether they realized its
seriousness is difficult to assess. The records of conversations between Soviet
officials, the party leadership and Chinese representatives in the DRV show that
the Vietnamese expressed, though not always directly, the need to make changes
in the policy towards the South.
Soviet and Chinese positions towards the Vietnamese reunification struggle up
to 1959 were not dissimilar. Although Beijing in general seemed more prone to
accept a more militant strategy on reunification than Moscow, in the late 1950s
the Chinese supported the Soviet position calling for a peaceful reunification
within the Geneva framework. At the same time the Chinese were conscious of
possible disagreements between Moscow and Hanoi. In September 1957, PRC
charg daffaires in Hanoi, Li Zhimin, spoke to the Soviet ambassador about
what he considered to be differences of opinion between the representatives of
the Soviet Communist Partys Central Committee and the Vietnamese Communists with regard to Vietnamese reunification.35
The Soviet ambassador rejected the allegations. The Soviet Union supported
the reunification of Vietnam within the Geneva framework. However, for the
future the tactics of the struggle had to be carefully thought out and, if necessary,
changed according to the situation. It had to be taken into consideration that at
present two different states existed in Vietnam, and Vietnam could possibly
remain divided for a rather long period of time. What complicated the situation
was, according to Zimyanin, that some Vietnamese friends did not quite understand this. The problem was those independent Vietnamese friends, working in
South Vietnam, who believed it was necessary to organize separate attacks
against the Diem regime as a means of inspiring the masses to fight. This manifested an oversimplified, un-Marxist approach to the situation and to the question
of armed insurrection.36 These independent Vietnamese comrades were,
according to Zimyanin, still not willing to bear in mind that the principal target in
this political fight was the United States and that the best solution would be to
stop criticizing Diem and to start considering how to establish contact between
North and South.37
In late 1956 members of the Lao Dong complained about the absence of a
general line of policy and a lack of ideological unity. The party had obviously
faced the problem when, in June 1957, Politburo member Truong Chinh
informed Zimyanin that the party saw it as one of its most urgent tasks to work

Reunification by revolution? 81
out a general line in politics. It was especially important in the period of
transition towards a Socialist state and in finding a direction for unification of the
country. The basis for this general line would be to secure common views and to
strengthen unity within the party with special emphasis on ideology and politics.
Truong Chinh referred to Khrushchevs speech at the Twentieth Congress, a
speech that he said had been carefully studied within the Lao Dong and had made
them understand the importance of criticism, particularly from below. The
speech also had grave consequences for the structure of the party leadership in
the Lao Dong and the principle of collective leadership.38
In conversations with Soviet officials the North Vietnamese leaders repeatedly
underlined that the changes in the Vietnamese situation required a new strategy
to achieve reunification. The Soviet reaction to the Vietnamese attitude is not all
that evident, although the archival documents indicate that Soviet embassy officials received enough information to see a change of attitude within the Lao
Dong leadership. One example is how Hanoi informed them of changes within
the Politburo, which clearly indicated the ascendancy of individuals from the
South or working in the South. On several occasions during 1957 and 1958 North
Vietnamese officials discussed the changing historical conditions in Vietnam
with the Soviet embassy and underlined that because of the new situation, it was
possible that the forthcoming Third Congress of the Lao Dong would make
changes in both the programme and statutes of the party. At present the party was
elaborating separate strategies for the Northern and Southern parts of the country.
Such an approach had been chosen because the party leaders felt that the difference between the situations in the two parts was so important that separate tactics
had to be worked out. The most important task was to develop the revolutionary
line of the party in all of Vietnam under the new conditions.39 The fact that
Southerners gained increasingly more power within the higher echelons of the
party should have told Moscow that changes were being prepared.40 The
question, however, is whether the Soviet embassy in Hanoi and the leadership in
Moscow grasped the serious signals inherent in these changes.
Although hinting on several occasions that changes in the Southern strategy
was underway, there is little evidence in available documents of the Vietnamese
speaking to the Soviets in a direct sense of armed struggle or overthrowing the
Southern regime. The only such direct information can be found in a conversation between second secretary at the Soviet embassy in Hanoi, G. Kadumov, and
an official at the DRV Ministry of State Security, Thum, held on 4 April
1958.41 Thum reported that the DRV Ministry of State Security had concluded
the discussion of two documents approved at the Moscow Conference of
Communist and Workers Parties in November 1957. In the course of the discussion a particularly animated debate had unfolded over the question of Vietnamese
reunification.
The background for the heated debate was the large number of regrouped
Southerners in the ministry; these so-called regroupees were regrouped
Vietminh cadres who had moved to the North after partition in 1954. Like
Southerners in other ministries they had started to lose faith in the peaceful

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Reunification by revolution?

reunification of Vietnam in the near future. Some comrades declared that they no
longer believed in peaceful reunification, since the South Vietnamese government would never agree to such a solution. The regrouped Southerners did,
however, realize that the only acceptable policy for the countries of the Socialist
camp, including the DRV, was a policy of deciding all vexed questions by
peaceful means. The problem, according to Thum, was that this apparently insoluble contradiction worried some Southern comrades who now believed the
country would never be reunited. As a result, some comrades had come to the
conclusion that it was necessary to decide whether to reunify the country through
armed struggle, even if that meant sacrificing their lives.42 Thum also reported
that when some of the Southern regroupees had volunteered to return to South
Vietnam in order to activate underground work to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diems
regime, the response from the party leaders, particularly Le Duan, was negative.
According to Le Duan the comrades in the South had their methods, and the
Southern regroupees in DRV were not updated on these. This refusal of
their services apparently led to even more dissatisfaction among the Southern
regroupees.43
This conversation shows that the Soviet embassy personnel did obtain the
necessary information to capture the general mood among the Vietnamese.
However, Moscows continued emphasis on the need to follow a peaceful line in
politics, and the outright lack of comments with regard to Vietnamese unification, imply that the Soviet leaders either had not yet grasped the seriousness of
the ongoing debate on DRV policy towards the South, or were convinced that the
Vietnamese would not attempt to embark on a new, more militant strategy of
reunification without the consent of their major allies.
While the debate of 195758 over future strategy towards the South unfolded
in Hanoi, the Soviet leaders were still inclined to see a peaceful solution to the
Vietnam problem. The preferred solution would be within the framework of the
Geneva agreement. If that proved impossible, Moscow seemed willing to settle
for a two-state solution in Vietnam. In the instructions from the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet ambassador in Hanoi, Leonid Ivanovich Sokolov,
three areas of priority were accentuated. First, Moscow emphasized the need to
realize the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Union; in other words, no policy
contradicting it should be allowed. Second, it stressed that the difficult situation
due to the temporary partition of Vietnam was likely to continue for some time.
Third, it expected the embassy officials to conduct a more thorough analysis of
US influence in the area. Embassy personnel were instructed to send home
reports on the situation in Vietnam, as well as suggestions on how to handle the
situation.44
Thus, the Soviet instructions from 1958 indicate Moscows changing view on
the situation. In 1954 the emphasis had been on the reconstruction of the DRV in
various fields, and only to a lesser extent on the international context of
Vietnams situation and, as a part of that, Soviet aims in the region. After four
years of experience in Vietnam, and as a result of the changing international situation, the instructions of 1958 reflected to a larger degree Soviet aspirations in

Reunification by revolution? 83
the region. The importance of peaceful co-existence, the growing American
influence and, not least, the long-lasting temporary partition of Vietnam were
now integral factors in Soviet policy planning towards Vietnam. As reflected in
Moscows priorities in Vietnam for 1958, Soviet policy makers were apparently
not yet worried about the changing mood among the Vietnamese leadership.
There are two possible reasons for this. Either the Soviet leaders, just as in the
fall of 1956, did not consider the changes in the Lao Dong a threat to stability in
the region, and thus saw no immediate need to interfere. Or it could be that
Moscow still reckoned that the Chinese had a certain amount of control over the
Vietnamese and thus would see to it that Hanoi neither seriously challenged
the RVN nor provoked their American allies enough to unleash an attack. These
reasons, however, would no longer be valid once the Sino-Soviet split intensified.
During 1957 and 1958 the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated. Diems
move to further consolidate his regime led to a new wave of repression in both
the urban and rural areas. To the people of South Vietnam that meant another
sequence of denunciation, encirclement of villages, searches and raids, arrests of
suspects, plundering, interrogations, torture (even of innocent people), deportation and regrouping of populations suspected of contacts with the rebels.45 Ngo
Dinh Diems Anti Communist Denunciation Campaign initiated in 1956
continued and was supplemented by other campaigns aimed at opponents of the
Diem regime, including both Communists and non-Communists. The background for these campaigns was the continuing competition for rural legitimacy
between Diem and the various opponents of his regime. The RVN had to devote
a large amount of its resources to establishing and maintaining its authority in
rural areas. From 1957 to 1959 Diem failed to cope successfully with problems in
the rural areas, a situation the Lao Dong attempted to exploit.
American economic assistance to the Republic of Vietnam amounted to US$1.7
billion in the period from 1955 to 1961. In May 1958 Saigon housed the largest
US aid mission in the world, and by 1961 the RVN was the third-ranking nonNATO recipient of American aid after Korea and Taiwan. The growing American
influence in South Vietnamese affairs and the increased acceptance of the RVN on
the world stage only served to convince party leaders that they had to redouble
their efforts to reunify Vietnam before the Southern republic became too strong.46
Chinese attitudes during this period were another factor that reassured
Moscow that there was no imminent need to worry about Vietnamese strategies.
Although recent studies of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship indicate that the
North Vietnamese leaders might have been more direct when asking for advice
from Beijing than from Moscow, the Chinese were no more willing to go down
that path than Moscow. Chinese sources reveal that in the summer of 1958 the
Vietnamese Politburo formally asked Beijings advice about the strategy for the
Southern revolution; in response, Beijing emphasized that Hanois most
important task was to promote socialist revolution and reconstruction in the
North.47 At the current stage it would not be possible to realize a revolutionary
transformation in the South, and therefore Hanoi should adopt in the South a
strategy of not exposing our own forces for a long period, build up our own

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Reunification by revolution?

strength, establishing connections with the masses, and waiting for the coming of
proper opportunities.48 The Chinese position indicates that, just like Moscow,
Beijings leaders were not particularly enthusiastic about the Vietnamese plans to
initiate military struggles in South Vietnam at that point.49
Thus, the Chinese neither hindered nor encouraged Hanoi at that stage. The
attitude may well have been rooted in the countrys current situation, as China
was entering a difficult period in both the domestic and international sphere.
Despite the Soviet emphasis on peaceful coexistence the international situation
grew tenser through 1958, and the first direct Sino-Soviet disagreements
surfaced. Moreover, China was in the process of accelerating the Great Leap
Forward, a radical domestic programme aimed at rapid industrialization of the
country. The programme was officially approved at the CCPs 8th Congress in
May 1958. Chinas domestic radicalism soon spilled over into the foreign policy
sphere. In mid-1958 it announced plans to liberate Taiwan, and on 23 August the
Formosan Straits crisis was precipitated when mainland gunners opened fire on
the nationalist-held offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu. The attack on the USsupported nationalists brought to the fore Sino-Soviet differences, as China now
adopted a more militant attitude than the Soviet Union towards Washington.50
The Lao Dong Politburo never formally asked Moscow for advice on the
Southern strategy before they made their decision to start the insurgency. In their
approach to the Chinese, Hanoi counted on the more radical Chinese attitude,
which developed during 1957 and 1958, but even the Chinese wanted to contain
the Vietnamese situation for the time being. Since Moscow was still promoting
its line of peaceful coexistence, it was clear to the Vietnamese Communists that it
would prove difficult to obtain support for a more radical line towards reunification. Also, the Soviet lack of reference to the changes in the Vietnamese Communists attitude to means of reunification indicate that Soviet leaders refused to
believe that Hanoi would embark on a new and more militant road to reunification, especially if it stood in contrast to the general Soviet policy in the area.
Moscow was further reassured in its position by the attitude of Beijing. The
majority of the Chinese leaders were not willing to support the new Vietnamese
strategy, as that could provoke a stronger American interest in Vietnam. Did the
Soviet Union and the PRC more or less turn their backs on the DRV to avoid
involvement, while at the same time tacitly condoning their change in strategy? If
so, Moscows policies must have been rather confusing to the Vietnamese
Communists. This would also imply that Moscow did, to some extent, support
Hanois plans but was reluctant to do so openly. Especially with China gaining
more and more ground in North Vietnam, and the Sino-Soviet relationship
showing increasing signs of fatigue, it remains possible that the Soviets were
afraid to provide too much active support.

Embarking on a new Southern strategy

The major strategy change in Hanois policy towards the South came in 1959 and
1960. Three significant political events took place during these years. The first

Reunification by revolution? 85
was the decision made during the 15th Plenum of the Lao Dong Central
Committee held from December 1958 to February 1959 to resume armed
struggle in the South; the second decision was made at the Third Party Congress
of the Lao Dong in September 1960 and reemphasized this new attitude and the
third was the establishment in December 1960 of an organization that would
carry through these plans, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
(NLF(SV)). Together these three events forced Moscow to pay more attention to
the developments in Vietnam and the new Lao Dong strategy. Initially the
Soviets and Chinese tried to restrain the Vietnamese plans, which they perceived
as a threat to stability in the region, but this task became increasingly difficult as
Soviet and Chinese views on foreign policy visibly began to diverge from the
early 1960s onwards.
At the 15th Plenum the Lao Dong approved in principle the resumption of
armed revolt in the South. The official communiqu with the resolutions of the
15th Plenum was not presented until 13 May 1959, nearly five months after the
meeting itself. The communiqu did not specifically refer to armed struggle but
did outline a change in the course of the Southern strategy. Prior to the announcement in May, Soviet diplomats had repeatedly asked the Lao Dong leaders for
information on the Plenum resolutions. In January, during the Plenum sessions
Ho Chi Minh told Soviet ambassador Sokolov, the present situation in South
Vietnam can be characterized as ripe for revolution.51 In March, when the
embassy once again requested materials from the Plenum, the response was still
negative. According to Nguyen Duy Trinh, it was because the final resolution
had not yet been edited, and the main speaker at the Plenum, Pham Hung, had left
for Indonesia together with Ho Chi Minh.52 Barely a month before the official
announcement, on 15 April, records show that Le Duan informed Sokolov of the
subjects of discussion at the 15th Plenum. However, Sokolov wanted more than
just vague information. What he was most interested in were those decisions of
the Plenum directly concerned with the basic problems of the evolution of the
revolutionary movement in South Vietnam, and the fight for reunification of the
country.53 Moscow never got a clear answer to that question in April. It was not
until after the official communiqu was released on 13 May that the Soviet
embassy was informed in some detail as to what the new strategy consisted of.54
The second decision, made at the Third Party Congress in September 1960,
acknowledged the expansion of armed struggle in South Vietnam with the
purpose of overthrowing the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem.55 The resolutions of the
Third Congress further expanded the resolutions of the 15th Plenum. The aim
was now to set the general policy of the liberation of the South i.e., the overthrow of the Diem regime and the establishment of a coalition government
favourably disposed toward reunification with Communist North Vietnam.56 In
contrast to the resolution from 1959, the decision made at the Third Congress had
been discussed with both the Soviets and the Chinese in advance. During a visit
to Beijing in early October 1959 Nikita Khrushchev evidently discussed the
future strategy in South Vietnam with Ho Chi Minh.57 Evidently, from the
autumn of 1959 Soviet leaders developed a new interest in the situation

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Reunification by revolution?

in Vietnam. North Vietnam now showed itself as much stronger and more
independent than the Soviets expected. Such a situation thus called for a stronger
Soviet interest in the area.
In the spring of 1960 Soviet and Chinese policies on Vietnamese reunification
were still coherent, and they jointly advised the Lao Dong on how to proceed
with the political preparations for the Third Congress. In May that year the Lao
Dong Central Committee had consultations in Moscow with the Central Committees of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, to discuss the thesis in the Lao
Dong political account for the Third Congress. The section of the thesis dedicated to the struggle for the reunification of Vietnam indicated an intention to
expand armed struggle in South Vietnam with the purpose of overthrowing the
regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and create liberated areas governed by the people in
the South. To convince the Soviets and the Chinese that there were really no
drastic changes in the new strategy, the Vietnamese underlined that it was simply
a continuation of the war of resistance (194654), and as such the creation of
liberated areas was the form of gradually accomplishing the reunification of the
mother country.58 However, at this point Soviet policy makers had started to
realize that the Vietnamese could become harder to restrain than previously
thought, and together with the Chinese they attempted to influence the
Vietnamese views.
Although neither Moscow nor Beijing did, according to Soviet documents,
agree with the offensive strategy proposed by the Vietnamese Communists, they
did nothing to actively oppose it either. In 1960 most protests were still rather
modest from both of Hanois allies. While in Moscow for consultations with the
Soviets and Chinese, the Vietnamese comrades were told that due to the developing situation in Vietnam, it would be inexpedient to deny the slogan of
peaceful reunification of Vietnam on the basis of the Geneva agreement. The
Vietnamese apparently agreed with the Soviet and Chinese position and in the
opening address of the Lao Dong CC at the Third Congress set forth a position
envisaging a peaceful reunification of the country.59 To the Soviets it now
seemed as if the Lao Dong had accepted the Soviet and Chinese advice, as the
party leaders set forth a policy promoting a peaceful reunification of the country.
In 1960 that was the only form of Vietnamese reunification the Soviet Union
would accept.
Nevertheless, through 1959 and 1960, parallel to this development, the Lao
Dong gradually managed to rebuild its strength in South Vietnam, and there was
a sharp increase in the number of guerrilla attacks in that part of the country.
From May 1959 the Vietnamese Communists started to infiltrate Southern
regroupees back to the South. Two different groups first made these preparations.
One was in charge of the inland area, the 559th transportation group, directly
under the command of the party centre, and in charge of what has later been
known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The other, group 759, a maritime unit, was
based at the naval headquarters of Quang-Khe and given the responsibility for
infiltration by sea. Before the end of 1960 these groups had succeeded in introducing some 4,500 cadres into the South, a most valuable resource for the

Reunification by revolution? 87
decimated underground party. The sharpest increase in assaults against RVN
officials came in the last quarter of 1959, continuing into 1960. Gradually the
party rebuilt its strength in the South, while the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
was cut off from rural areas, where the party developed large military units.60
Hanois goal during these years was to establish strong points in the South and
become self-sufficient. To achieve that goal party bases were established and
cadres from the party were present in all parts of the administration. According to
the Lao Dong, such a strategy would enable them to gradually take power in
South Vietnam with a minimum of bloodshed. According to Hanoi officials, the
Southerners did not even need weapons from the North. It was also emphasized
that in the present international situation a resumption of the partisan war in the
South would be considered unfavourable to the cause of peace and was therefore
undesirable. The most important task in the South was therefore to preserve
peace at any price while simultaneously preserving and strengthening the revolutionary forces in the South in order to complete the national peoples democratic
revolution for the whole country.61 The establishment of a mass movement in
South Vietnam was, as we have seen earlier, an important part of the Lao Dong
strategy for the South. In 1960 the Lao Dong sent more than 10,000 Communists
to work in the South, and by early 1961 they had managed to establish active and
well-organized party organizations in more than 850 of 1,000 villages.62
Meanwhile in Saigon the government and its American allies were worried
about the decisions of the Communist side in the spring of 1959. While the
leaders in Hanoi had elaborated their new Southern strategy, the Americans had
started to rethink their own military assistance to foreign governments such as
the South Vietnamese. The eventual outcome of this thinking with regard to
Southeast Asia was that the Communist military forces were unlikely to embark
on a conventional war so long as the American commitment to its allies remained
firm. The problem at the time, particularly in South Vietnam and Laos, was how
to deal with a revolutionary movement operating from political bases inside a
threatened country and gradually acquiring a capability for anti-government
violence.63 The solution to the problem was a new strategy the doctrine of
counterinsurgency, a solution based on the following concept: First, a guarantee
of the political and economic stability of the threatened government by means of
increased aid, enabling improvement of administrative efficiency at grassroots
levels. Second, it was also important to provide counter-guerrilla assistance, to
enable the armed forces of the threatened country to defeat rebel terrorist and
guerrilla units in the field.64
The third major event in Hanois strategy change during 1959 and 1960 was
the establishment, in South Vietnam, of the NLF(SV) on 20 December 1960.65
According to reports from the Soviet embassy in Hanoi, the front was designed to
counter the growing American influence in South Vietnam and exploit all patriotic forces opposed to the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. The creation of the front
had, according to the embassy, a positive effect in developing widespread political work among all layers of the Southern population, and the main task was to
eventually overthrow Diems regime and establish an independent, peaceful and

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Reunification by revolution?

neutral state in South Vietnam under the governance of a national democratic

coalition government. Quoting Vietnamese propaganda, the embassy underlined
how the activities of these patriotic forces created an immediate threat to the
regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, which troubled the United States in its effort to
preserve South Vietnam as an American outpost in Southeast Asia.66 Thus, the
front was a formalization of the work we have seen in South Vietnam in the years
after 1955 but now took on the role of a more active opponent to the Southern
regime.
The Soviet embassy further described the establishment of the NLF as another
important step in the development of the national-liberation movement in the
south of the country. The initiator was, according to the embassy report, the Lao
Dong, and until a permanent Central Committee of the NLF was in place all
orders came from the leadership in Hanoi. However, directives from the Lao
Dong would also in the future to some extent determine the activities of the
organization. In the south, the NLF cooperated with a number of organizations
sympathetic to the cause of the DRV.67 Although not positive to a stepped-up
armed struggle in Vietnam, Moscow took note of what had happened but did not
take any immediate action to discourage the formation of the NLF.
In Hanoi the Lao Dong leadership continued to work with a radicalized
strategy for reunification. As seen, this strategy was first suggested in the spring
of 1956 as an alternative to the so far fruitless political fight for reunification
within the framework of the Geneva agreement. The fruitless efforts to secure a
diplomatic solution in the years after Geneva had convinced the Vietnamese
Communists that armed struggle represented the only successful way to reunification. This decision was upheld in spite of the initial advice to the contrary from
both Moscow and Beijing. However, in late 1961 Soviet policy makers had
become increasingly convinced that the Chinese were about to develop a more
positive attitude towards the new Lao Dong strategy and concluded that the
Vietnamese friends had not without influence from the Chinese friends in 1961
taken a course toward initiating armed struggle.68

Mediating the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict

Although relations between Moscow and Beijing rapidly deteriorated during the
late 1950s, Sino-Soviet cooperation continued in Vietnam. The first obvious
signs of difference in the Sino-Soviet relationship came during the Jinmen and
Mazu crisis in mid-1958, when China adopted a more militant attitude towards
the United States than the Soviet Union. The first major crisis in the relationship
came in 1959, when Khrushchev took a neutral stand during the Sino-Indian
border dispute. When arriving for a diplomatic visit to Beijing after the crisis,
Khrushchev unsuccessfully attempted to act as an intermediary, a move Mao and
the Chinese took as a sign of Soviet perfidy. Through the spring of 1960, especially after the U-2 incident in May, relations seemed somewhat better. In June,
the Rumanian Communist Partys Congress, and the Bucharest Conference of
Communist parties that followed it, was the scene of a bitter exchange between

Reunification by revolution? 89
Khrushchev and the Chinese representative, and in July Khrushchev decided to
withdraw all Soviet specialists from China.69
The withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China was viewed with special
concern by the Vietnamese. In response to the Vietnamese ambassador in
Beijing, Chan Ti Binh, who was eager to understand why the Soviet specialists
had been withdrawn, Soviet ambassador Chervonenko explained that there were
mainly two reasons. The CCP had made several efforts to influence the views of
the specialists on important problems related to the current international
situation. As a part of this, they had even showed the specialists confidential
notes sent between the Soviet Union and China and asked the specialists to give
their personal opinion on these documents. Secondly, during 1958 and 1959 there
had been an increasing number of cases in which the Chinese ignored the advice
given by the Soviet specialists and thus put them in situations where they seemed
to be giving false instructions.70
Chan Ti Binh then explained to Chervonenko how the Chinese had hinted to
the Vietnamese that the departure of the Soviet specialists not only had an impact
on the fulfilment of plans in China itself but would also have a serious impact on
the Chinese ability to provide assistance to the DRV.71 Realizing that there were
those who accused the Vietnamese of following the Chinese comrades, Chan Ti
Binh underlined that the disagreements between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties had caused much grief and distress among the Vietnamese and that
they would do all they could to improve relations between the two parties.72
The growing differences between Moscow and Beijing worried the Lao Dong
leaders, and efforts were made to bring the two together to settle the differences
in private. At the time of the Bucharest Conference in late June 1960 Ho Chi
Minh wrote a letter to Nikita Khrushchev expressing his worries over the developing situation within the Communist camp. The contents of the letter were
presented in a conversation between Ho and Soviet charg daffaires Nikolai I.
Godunov on 22 June. Ho Chi Minh emphasized the possible serious consequences of these differences being exposed in the press and underlined that the
present development was not in the interest of the Communist world. With regard
to the effects of the conflict on the Vietnamese Communists Ho Chi Minh said,
within our party [. . .] we have already faced, in connection with these differences, perplexing questions, but we are trying to avoid raising them and call upon
the members of the Lao Dong to wait and not to make any hasty conclusions.73
Watching the controversy, which took place during the Bucharest Conference,
Ho obviously feared a similar scenario could occur at his partys Third Congress
scheduled for September that year. At a meeting with representatives of the
Socialist countries held in late August 1960, shortly before the congress, the Lao
Dong leaders presented the results of a Lao Dong Central Committee visit to the
Soviet Union and China. The issue was once again Sino-Soviet differences, and
the discussion was based on a four-point text containing the Lao Dong view on
the conflict.74 However, to what extent Hos pleas to mend the conflict saved the
congress from becoming a victim of the differences is difficult to estimate based
on available materials.

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Reunification by revolution?

As the differences with Beijing intensified, Moscow devoted more attention to

Hanois stand in the conflict. In October 1961 the Soviet embassy in Hanoi
presented a report entitled Some questions related to the activities of the CC Lao
Dong after the Moscow meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in 1960.
The report underlined Chinese influence on the Vietnamese Communists and the
Lao Dong leaders preference for the CCPs points of view in questions related to
both building socialism in the DRV and the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.
Another insufficiency in the SovietVietnamese relationship was, according to
the report, the lack of information from the Vietnamese to Soviet diplomats with
regard to party plenums and policies towards the South. Lao Dong leaders had
promised to report on steps to be taken in South Vietnam, but according to the
report no information was provided because our friends evidently think that by
openly presenting their views on how to solve the problem of South Vietnam
they will not receive the necessary support from the Soviet Union.75 In 1961
Moscow must have been rather frustrated with its grip on the situation in
Vietnam. The Chinese were clearly increasing their influence at the expense of
Moscow, and in the light of the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship the Soviets
could no longer fully count on China as a support in Vietnam, especially not if
Soviet policies contradicted those of China. Years of neglect and focus elsewhere
were catching up with Soviet policies towards Vietnam.

Moscow and the new Southern strategy

When President John F. Kennedy took office in early 1961 there were 800
American military personnel in South Vietnam. When he died in November
1963 the number was 16,700.76 Parallel to the escalation of the American
commitment, the Lao Dong sought Chinas assistance to counter the increased
American military involvement in South Vietnam. In June 1961 Pham Van
Dong went to Beijing, where Mao expressed a general support for the armed
struggle of the South Vietnamese people, while Zhou Enlai was more moderate
and advised the Vietnamese to stress flexibility in tactics and stay on a course
of combining political and military approaches.77 Beijings position was now
about to change and became increasingly positive to the use of armed struggle
to achieve reunification, in contrast to Moscows continued emphasis on the
political struggle.
In the fall of 1961 the Lao Dong reorganized and strengthened its Central
Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and passed a resolution advocating an intensification of the anti-American struggle. These actions were soon reflected in a
sharp increase in the number of NLF operations in the autumn of 1961. During
the early autumn US intelligence officers reported a total of 200 guerrilla incidents: 50 incidents in September and 150 in October. The successful advance of
the Communist insurgents was definitive when they captured a provincial capital
only 55 miles from Saigon.78
With the increased military activity in South Vietnam, Moscow now had to
decide on their own stand in relation to the new strategy developing in Vietnam.

Reunification by revolution? 91
The Chinese role in Vietnam played an important part in this, and in Moscow the
numerous signs of pro-Chinese tendencies among Lao Dong leaders were indeed
taken seriously. The special relationship between the Lao Dong and the CCP was
carefully studied by Soviet officials in both Hanoi and Beijing, as well as in the
Soviet foreign ministrys Southeast Asia Department. As Soviet Ambassador
Suren Akopovich Tovmasyan phrased it in a political report to the Foreign
Ministry: the CC CCP has a definite influence over the political line and activities of the CC Lao Dong.79 To illustrate the extent of the Chinese influence,
Tovmasyan explained that the Vietnamese leaders shared the points of views of
the leaders in the CCP and Albanian Workers Party on the personality cult. They
did not agree with the decision of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist
party of the Soviet Union condemning the personality cult of Stalin, but preferred
to pass this over in silence. And with regard to the case of Albania, the ambassador argued that Ho apparently felt sorry for Enver Hoxha and therefore did not
share the Soviet opinion of him.80
In May 1961 Le Duan discussed the situation in South Vietnam with Nikolai I.
Godunov, then councillor at the Soviet embassy in the DRV. After a detailed
account of the development of the patriotic forces in the South from February to
April, Le Duan told Godunov that the Politburo of the CC Lao Dong had decided
to now take a course to prepare for a general uprising in the South of
Vietnam.81 This decision was, according to Le Duan, made on the basis of the
present situation in the area. Gradually armed struggle would play the most
important role, especially in the mountain areas. With regard to the plains, Le
Duan said that there would be a combination of political and armed struggle,
while in the cities main emphasis would be on the political forms of struggle. He
also maintained that a full general uprising in the South would come in two or
three years at the earliest. On a direct question from Godunov, Le Duan underlined that the political course of the CC Lao Dong with regard to South Vietnam
remained unchanged; what had changed, however, was only the form of the
struggle.82 In July, DRV Acting Foreign Minister Hoang Van Tien further
explained to Godunov that the purpose of this phase of the struggle is to expand
the liberated areas of South Vietnam.83
The Vietnamese use of Soviet planes to transport troops to the South may
serve as an example of how Hanoi from 1961 kept Moscow in the dark about
their strategy in South Vietnam. Due to the work of the NLF the situation in the
South was developing in favour of the patriotic forces. The unstable situation in
Laos provided an open road connection from the DRV into South Vietnam via
the southern part of Laos what was later known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. To
fully exploit the situation the Vietnamese decided, according to Soviet sources, to
use Soviet aircraft, originally provided to the DRV in order to assist Laos, to fly
in equipment for their own bases in South Vietnam. These measures taken by the
Vietnamese to organize large-scale aid to the patriotic movement in South
Vietnam, primarily show that North Vietnam was determined to effect change in
the South, with no concern for the eventual consequences and negative reactions
from their allies. As a part of that, Hanoi attempted to influence the regulation of

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Reunification by revolution?

the Laotian problem, according to Soviet sources, by trying to preserve the unstable
situation in Laos in order to keep the supply route to South Vietnam open.84
The Soviets did, of course, disapprove of Vietnams use of these aircraft but
did nothing to actively prevent the use of them either.85 It is very unlikely that
Moscow would officially have sanctioned the Vietnamese plans for these
aircraft. In 1961 Moscow was reluctant to encourage such behaviour in South
Vietnam because it feared that it could trigger even greater American involvement in the region. But the idea of being kept completely in the dark, without any
decisive powers with regard to further developments in Vietnam, was also not
tempting. Tacit approval, or rather the absence of refusal, is a much more likely
scenario. If that is correct, it emphasizes the hypothesis that Moscow could have
overlooked certain North Vietnamese actions and thereby given some measure of
support without giving their full support to an insurgency in the South.86 In
the end of 1961 Soviet policy makers seemed to be without any other good
alternatives in their dealings with Vietnam.

The end of diplomacy?

The first few years after the Geneva conference were characterized by a wish for
coordination and cooperation from both Moscow and Beijing to secure what they
viewed as a positive development of the situation in the DRV. In the mid-1950s
neither of the two large Communist powers wanted to initiate a policy in
Vietnam that could endanger the relative peace in Southeast Asia. Not even the
failure to hold all-Vietnamese elections in July changed Soviet and Chinese
views on future policies towards Vietnam. Despite the growing differences
between Moscow and Beijing after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the two
powers both wanted to continue the cooperation in Vietnam with the implementation of the Geneva agreement as the ultimate goal.
When the Vietnamese Communists made the decision to start, and subsequently expand, the armed struggle in South Vietnam, Moscow found itself in a
difficult situation. Soviet leaders had not been consulted prior to the decision. It
was made without any active involvement of the Soviet Union, or even China.
During the early part of 1959, Moscow did little to either encourage or, for that
matter, stop the change in the Vietnamese course of reunification. However, from
the autumn of 1959 Soviet interest in the Vietnamese situation was strengthened.
One reason was that Hanois policies now clearly contradicted Moscows line of
peaceful coexistence; another was the growing Soviet fear that the increased
guerrilla activities in South Vietnam could instigate a greater American involvement in Vietnam. Together with Beijing, the Soviets intervened and told the
Vietnamese to tone down the military strategy and focus on the diplomatic road
to reunification. The immediate result of that intervention was that the Lao Dong
leaders now set forth a policy envisaging a peaceful reunification of the country.
However, when the Third Congress of the Lao Dong reaffirmed the new
strategy in September 1960, and the NLF was established in December that year,
the situation was once again changed. The establishment of the NLF provided the

Reunification by revolution? 93
Lao Dong with a front organization in the South. Thus, by the end of 1960 the
Vietnamese policies clearly contradicted the wishes of the Soviet leaders, who
had now clearly expressed that they would not condone an armed struggle for
reunification of Vietnam.
Moscows policies towards Vietnam were further complicated by a deteriorating relationship with Beijing. The Soviet leaders depended on Chinese cooperation in order to contain the Vietnamese wish for a military reunification
struggle. Likewise, the Vietnamese regarded a continued good relationship
between Moscow and Beijing as instrumental for their survival, and continuously
appealed to both powers to end their disagreements. In spite of the many appeals
for unity Hanoi was not able to reconcile the two opponents, and the Vietnamese
leadership now worried that neither of the two powers would support their fight
for reunification. However, from May 1961 Beijing showed signs of approval
with regard to the new Southern strategy, and there were forces in Beijing that
were willing to support the Vietnamese struggle. The change in Chinese foreign
policy strategies was one reason for the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations.
Notwithstanding these diverging views on how to handle the situation in
Vietnam, the Soviets and Chinese were still able to cooperate in the area. The
most prominent example was Sino-Soviet cooperation during the Geneva conference on Laos. Starting in the autumn of 1960, parallel to the changes in
Vietnamese Southern strategies at the Lao Dong Third Congress and the establishment of the NLF, the focal point of Sino-Soviet interest in Indochina
switched from the situation in Vietnam to that in its neighbouring country Laos.

The fight over Laos, 19611962

We work well together at the international arena, like for example in Geneva,
although we do not agree on everything else.1

From the autumn of 1960 Laos became equal to Vietnam in importance in the
eyes of both Soviet and Chinese policy makers. The reason for this renewed
interest in Laos was Prince Souvanna Phoumas return to office after a coup
detat in August 1960. Phouma, who was in favour of a neutralized Laos and
wanted to reduce American interest in the country, started to negotiate with the
Communist led Pathet Lao. Due to his positive view on the Pathet Lao, Souvanna
Phouma was attacked by troops led by the government he had ousted in August.
To counter these attacks he requested, and received, military support from the
Soviet Union and the DRV.2
The interest in Laotian affairs on the part of the DRV, as well as Moscow and
Beijing, began long before the autumn of 1960. During the 1954 Geneva negotiations one of the major problems was Hanois refusal both to admit to having
forces in Laos and to withdrawing them. Ever since the signing of these agreements in July 1954, Moscow had carefully followed the internal development in
Laos, focusing primarily on the position of the Communist-led organization
Pathet Lao.3 Like in Vietnam, Moscow did not wish to see an escalation of the
struggle in Laos and, until the spring of 1960, Soviet policies in Laos coincided
largely with the policy towards Vietnam, namely an emphasis on the fulfilment
of the Geneva agreements.
However, the outbreak of civil war in August of 1960 forced Moscow to
reconsider its policies towards Laos. In cooperation with the North Vietnamese
the Soviet Union established an air bridge, through which they carried supplies
for the Communist-led organization Pathet Lao. The situation in Laos soon
became a test of cooperation between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing in times of
trouble and was the last example of extended Sino-Soviet cooperation before the
total breakdown of relations. To solve the problems in Laos, a second Geneva
conference was scheduled to begin in May 1961. The situation was, however, so
complicated that consensus was not reached before 23 July 1962, when the
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos was signed by the foreign ministers of the
fourteen nations assembled at the Geneva conference.

The fight over Laos, 19611962

95

In the period leading up to the conference, Soviet and Chinese leaders seemed
to share a common view on how to best solve the conflict. This unity, however,
soon began to crack once the conference started in early May 1961. The possible
change of attitudes on the Chinese side, and the Soviet reaction to this, forms the
background for one of the major questions in this chapter, namely how the
Sino-Soviet relationship developed during the conference and how the conference influenced the future of these relations. A second, but equally important,
question concerns the role of Hanoi. The vital Ho Chi Minh Trail went mainly
through Laos, and its existence might be threatened if Laos were to be neutralized or governed by forces more hostile to the North Vietnamese. As such the
question is why the Vietnamese failed in their attempt to manipulate the Soviet
Union in order to fulfil their own policies. This chapter aims to answer these two
questions and give a new and more detailed account of the inner life of the
second Geneva conference. The first part of the chapter will serve as an introduction to the situation in Laos during the latter part of the 1950s and early 1960s
and show how Soviet, Vietnamese and Chinese interests came into conflict with
one another already at an early stage.

The civil war in Laos

While the leaders in Hanoi were discussing the new strategy for Southern
Vietnam, the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in the affairs of its
neighbour, Laos. The situation in Laos deteriorated rapidly in the late 1950s. The
United States had been deeply involved in Laotian politics since 1954.
Washingtons main aim was to strengthen the Royal Laotian Government and
Army and defeat the Pathet Lao, a guerrilla force led by Communists, which had
been established with the help of the Vietminh during the First Indochina War
and remained closely linked to the DRV. After the Geneva conference in 1954
Laos was governed by a coalition led by Prime Minister Prince Souvanna
Phouma.
The strongest group within the coalition was the Communists, and fearing that
they were exercising excessive influence, the Eisenhower administration encouraged anti-Communist elements to vote Souvanna Phouma out of office. During
the turbulent period starting with the government crisis in January to May 1957,
the situation in Laos rapidly deteriorated. Prince Souvanna Phouma resigned his
post as premier on 31 May but was reinstalled on 8 August. At that point he
finally received support from the National Assembly to improve relations with
the Pathet Lao. The developments in Laos during summer and early autumn of
1957 were not popular in Washington. From July 1958 the government had
become progressively neutralist with a pro-Western tilt. This government was
then challenged by the Communist Pathet Lao, who were backed by North
Vietnam. The Americans worked hard to keep a US-backed government led by
Phoui Sananikone, which opposed cooperation with the Pathet Lao, but their
efforts proved insufficient. After the military seized power from the US-backed
government in a coup dtat in August 1960, the leader of the Neutralist faction,

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The fight over Laos, 19611962

Prince Souvanna Phouma, could return to office. This marked the start of the
civil war in Laos.4
During this period, Moscow and Beijing both carefully followed developments
in Laos. In February 1959 DRV Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem informed the
Soviet ambassador that Beijing had urged Hanoi to take measures to assist the
Laotians in the current situation. The Chinese were ready to provide the Pathet
Lao with the necessary support, and the Central Committee of the CCP underlined once again that the Laotian friends ought to continue their legal struggle in
combination with illegal activities . . . and that it was necessary to be prepared in
order not to be taken unawares in case of a reaction, and be able to give a resolute response, if necessary, with arms.5 As a neighbouring country bordering on
both North and South Vietnam, Laos was of tremendous strategic importance to
the Vietnamese Communists. By 1959 there had already been lengthy discussions within the Lao Dong on whether to assist the Pathet Lao and, if they were to
assist, what form the assistance should take. After a discussion of the Chinese
points of view the majority of the Lao Dong Politburo did in principle agree with
the Chinese.6
But despite the consensus between the Vietnamese and the Chinese on how to
handle the situation in Laos, the situation seems to have changed during 1959. In
conversations with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Pushkin in January
1960 Ung Van Khiem reported that the Vietnamese, after consulting the Soviet
and Chinese comrades, had concluded that assistance to the Laotian friends
should have the character of political support in an international scheme, since
providing any other kind of assistance would not be in the interest of the common
good and could lead to dangerous international consequences.7 The Soviet
Union agreed with that position.8
The course of events described above suggests that sometime between
February/March 1959 and January 1960 the leaders in Hanoi changed their official view on how to handle the situation in Laos. The decision was apparently
taken after advice from both the Soviet Union and China. In the spring of 1959,
when presented with first the Chinese and later the Vietnamese position, the
Soviet Union did not disapprove. Almost one year later, in January 1960, Beijing
had changed its point of view and agreed with Moscow that solving the situation
legally would prove to be the best way to achieve a peaceful situation in Laos.
Chinas domestic situation must also have been part of the reason why Chinese
leaders gave in on their initial plans to support a more militant struggle in Laos.
During 1959 and 1960 the Chinese were fully occupied with the continuation of
the Great Leap Forward Campaign, which could possibly have drawn attention
from their involvement elsewhere.
Although the Lao Dong leaders official stance was to support the Soviet and
Chinese point of view in the matter of Laos, there are indications that they in
fact would gain more if the situation in Laos continued to deteriorate. In the late
1950s the Vietnamese Communists used a route through their neighbouring
country to ship supplies and manpower from the North to the South, which has
later been named the Ho Chi Minh Trail. With a stabilized situation in Laos it

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97

would be more difficult for the Vietnamese to defend the use of the trail, and
accordingly, Soviet policy makers concluded that from a North Vietnamese
point of view, disturbances in Laos were to the benefit of their reunification
struggle.9
How did Moscows policies fit into the Laotian picture? From 1959 until the
spring of 1960 Soviet policies in Laos coincided with the policy towards
Vietnam. Moscow did not wish to see an escalation of the struggle. In the autumn
of 1960 the situation changed when Souvanna Phouma regained his position and
started to negotiate with the Pathet Lao, despite the American effort to dissuade
him. He was soon attacked by troops led by the government ousted in August,
and subsequently he started receiving military material from the Soviet Union
and DRV.10 In December 1960 the Soviet Union launched a massive aid
programme to help the Neutralists led by Prince Souvanna Phouma and the
Pathet Lao. The government of Souvanna Phouma and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations on 5 October 1960, and on 13 October the first Soviet
ambassador, Alexandr Nikitich Abramov, arrived in Vientiane.11 The programme
was based on an airlift of goods into Laos from Moscow via Hanoi. Soviet planes
and crews were sent to Hanoi to carry out the assistance, and the North
Vietnamese played a vital role in its distribution.

Calls for a Geneva conference on Laos

The initiative to convene this new Geneva conference came from Cambodias
Prince Sihanouk at the United Nations in September 1960. He suggested that
Laos and Cambodia should form a guaranteed neutral zone to safeguard themselves from foreign interference. The Neutralists in Laos, represented by
Souvanna Phouma, concurred with this proposal. On 15 December Indias
Jawaharlal Nehru suggested to Great Britain and the Soviet Union that the ICC12
should be reactivated in view of the renewed fighting after the coup by Royal
Armed Forces Captain Kong Le and the great amount of foreign intervention.13
On 23 December his initiative was followed up by the Soviet Union and China,
whose leaders wanted to discuss the ongoing war in Laos. This Soviet proposal,
which was essentially a reconvening of the 1954 Geneva conference, gained no
support from the Western powers. On 1 January 1961 Prince Sihanouk suggested
a larger, fourteen-nation conference, which would include those nations that had
been at Geneva in 1954, the members of the ICC, and the Asian nations
bordering Laos.14
Throughout the spring the Americans, in particular, were doubtful about the
proposal and were not ready to support a new Geneva conference. But once an
agreement was reached that the ICC would secure a ceasefire before negotiations
began, the Americans agreed to participate at Geneva. On 24 April 1961 the two
Geneva co-chairmen, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, issued a joint appeal
for a ceasefire. They also proposed that the Indian government convene the ICC
and announced that an international conference for settling the Laotian problem
would be convened in Geneva on 12 May 1961.

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The fight over Laos, 19611962

With the prospects of a conference on Laos, the Pathet Lao and its Communist
supporters hastened to seize as much ground in Laos as possible.15 However,
with the American demand for a ceasefire before talks could take place in late
April, Great Britain twice had to approach Gromyko to warn that further military
moves by the Pathet Lao would endanger the chances of a conference, and that an
effective ceasefire should be arranged at once. In the period leading up to the
Geneva conference the parties on the Socialist side spent much time preparing for
the upcoming discussions. As a part of that, Laotian delegations from both the
Pathet Lao and the Neutralists spent time in both Moscow and Beijing. While
preparing for the conference Beijing improved its relations with Souvanna
Phoumas government, and Souvanna visited China from 22 to 25 April 1961. At
the same time Moscow tried to influence the Pathet Lao and convince them to
agree to a ceasefire, and the Pathet Lao leader, Prince Souphannavong, was
summoned to Moscow on Souvanna Phoumas insistence. On 25 April both
princes agreed to go along with a ceasefire.16 The ceasefire deadline was set for
3 May, and the ICC arrived in Laos on 8 May. On 11 May the ICC reported to
the co-chairmen that there had been a general and demonstrable cessation of
hostilities in Laos since the ceasefire order of 3 May. The conference could
begin.
Despite the fact that the alliance might have looked like a tight ship from the
outside, the Communist bloc did have difficulties reaching common ground on
several questions during the conference. Grounds for disagreement may first of
all be found in the different interests of the involved countries. The Socialist
group at the conference consisted of four different countries: (1) the Soviet
Union, (2) PRC, (3) Poland and (4) the DRV. Of these four Poland was the only
country that had no direct territorial or national security interest in the final
outcome of the conference other than that a peaceful settlement would serve all
countries in general. Poland was a member of this group owing to its role in the
ICC, and as such it represented the Communist camp within the commission.
We have already seen that the Lao-Vietnamese relationship went a long way
back and how the fate of the two countries had become particularly intertwined
with the ongoing war of reunification in Vietnam after the Geneva conference on
Indochina in 1954. We have also seen that North Vietnam was the major beneficiary of an unstable Laos due to its use of Lao territory to transport troops and
equipment to its allies in South Vietnam. Hanoi therefore had a major stake in the
outcome in Laos. In 1961 North Vietnam had approximately twenty thousand
workers in Laos repairing roads and another thousand working as drivers. And
during the spring of 1961 seven hundred North Vietnamese soldiers and auxiliary
personnel were either killed or injured in Laos. According to Chinese historian
Qiang Zhai the policy makers in Hanoi viewed their effort in Laos as a part of
the protracted struggle for the liberation of the unified strategic area of Indochina. Hanois advice to the Pathet Lao was to preserve its base area, maintain
its alliance with the Neutralists, and work for the conditions that would
strengthen its influence and appeal. The main objective of the negotiations was,
according to Hanoi, to achieve an independent and neutral Laos that would be

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99

recognized by other states, but without the need for any international guarantees.
This North Vietnamese view clearly coincides with the Chinese approach to the
Geneva conference, which also aimed at using neutralization in order to gain a
position of strength for the Pathet Lao.17
The position of the PRC before and during the conference is somewhat ambiguous. Initially, the Chinese seemed to favour a continued unstable situation in
Laos but did to some extent back down when the Soviet Union insisted.
However, China was still inclined to think that the Communist force in Laos, the
Pathet Lao, should continue its fighting until it had gained a position of strength
that would help its cause during negotiations. The Soviet Union seems to have
had an altogether different agenda in mind; its main purpose awaiting the conference was to strengthen its relationship with the Western powers. If they could
show cooperation in the Laotian case Moscow hoped to become a more reliable
ally to the West. Despite the differences in agendas the Soviet Union and China
had managed to reach agreement before the conference began. As we shall see
later, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was rather surprised when the
Chinese began suggesting further changes to the Communist strategy on the eve
of the conference.
The PRC had not participated in any large international conference since their
debut at the 1954 Geneva conference. In order to signal how important they
regarded this second Geneva conference to be, the Chinese came to the conference with the largest delegation of all and with an intent to stay in Geneva for as
long as it would take to secure a lasting settlement for Laos.18 Five experienced
diplomats and party officials led the large delegation. The head of the delegation
was Foreign Minister Chen Yi, and he was accompanied by his deputy foreign
minister, Zhang Hanfu; a participant at the 1954 conference, Qiao Guanhua;
Wang Bingnan, the Chinese ambassador to Poland; and Huan Xiang, who was
charg daffaires at the Chinese embassy in London.19 When compared with the
1954 conference the Chinese had now gathered much more experience in foreign
policy and were determined to show this in both numbers and diplomatic action.
Although they welcomed close cooperation with the Soviet Union, they
demanded a larger portion of influence at the conference than what had been the
case roughly seven years earlier.20
Compared with the Chinese the Soviet delegation was less impressive. Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was present during the most central meetings,
but most of the day-to-day business was led by Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi
Pushkin, and in number also the Soviet delegation was less impressive than the
Chinese. In terms of its international relations the Soviet Union expected much
from the Geneva conference. Moscows main goal for the conference was to
reach a political settlement within a limited amount of time. Before the conference began the Soviet leaders expressed the opinion that they expected the
conference to last for six weeks at the most. However, just like the Americans,
the Soviets seem to have had a rather distorted view of the situation in Laos. The
two superpowers both remained fixed on power relations and disregarded the
power of the local forces. According to one author, Moscow was first of all

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The fight over Laos, 19611962

concerned with its relationship with the United States and China, and was not up
to date on the actual conditions inside of Laos.21
Examining the role of Laos, and especially the discussions that took place
during the conference organized to regulate the situation in the country, is
important because it shows how the relationship of strength between Moscow
and Beijing in Asia had changed in the years since the 1954 Geneva conference.
In 1954 Moscow was the natural leader of the two and took upon herself to introduce the PRC on the international diplomatic scene, but by 1961 Beijing had
considerably increased her influence in international affairs and was no longer
willing to automatically consent to the Soviet point of view. As for the North
Vietnamese, they had almost no influence in 1954, but, like the Chinese, they had
increased their influence especially through their close cooperation with the
Communist-led Pathet Lao. Thus, when the 1961 conference began, relations
between Moscow, Beijing and, to some extent, Hanoi were on a much more
equal level than in 1954.

Negotiations begin in Geneva

On the eve of the conference the chances for successful Sino-Soviet cooperation
did indeed look good. Although there were potential sources of conflict in the
two countries, personal aims for the conference, there seems to have been a
universal understanding between them that possible differences would not be
allowed to surface. An example of this may be found as early as in the preconference talks that took place in Geneva during the last few days before the
conference began. Internal discussions in the Communist camp show that the
Soviet Union, in spite of the fact that Chinas handling of the Laos situation was
a constant source of irritation, wished to continue Sino-Soviet cooperation.
Soviet documents on the conference might contribute to a better understanding of
how Soviet delegates perceived Vietnamese, as well as Chinese, attitudes and
behaviour at the Geneva conference, taking into account the difference of interest
among the three countries with regard to the situation in Laos.
On 14 May Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi expressed Chinas perception
of its role in the Laos problem. In a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko, Chen told him that he often found it much easier to agree with the
Soviets separately than when the other Socialist delegations were involved. So,
he suggested that, in addition to the meetings involving all four Socialist delegations present in Geneva, the Soviet and Chinese representatives could sometimes
meet alone. Chen Yi strongly argued that together the two countries possessed
great strength and went on to illustrate this point by describing what he saw as
the Western powers attempts to discover differences in opinion between the
Soviet Union and China. He also added that discovering contradictions and
differences of opinion within the opposing camp could also successfully be used
by the Socialist countries. During the conversation Chen Yi repeated his message
on the necessity of close cooperation and contact between Beijing and Moscow
all through the conference. He emphasized the need for them to stand together

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101

not only when facing the imperialists but also in front of the neutral countries.
We think, said Chen Yi as if it was a less important remark, that the support of
the Peoples Republic of China is important to the Soviet Union.22
Chen Yis comment is important because it illustrates the Chinese perception
of their own position during the conference relative to that of the Soviet Union.
Beijings position had changed significantly during the seven years since the last
Geneva conference, and the Chinese felt that they now, unlike during the 1954
conference, were in a position to set their own demands and have an equally
strong say in the final outcome as the Soviets. Moreover, because of the
increasing Chinese influence on the decisions of the Vietnamese Communists,
Chen Yi knew that without Chinese cooperation and not least their leverage on
the Vietnamese, the Soviets would not be able to secure a successful outcome at
the conference.
In the written transcriptions of this meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
endorsed his views and emphasized that during the conference they faced,
unquestionably, a persistent struggle with the delegations from the Western
powers, in which they would have to show much versatility and firmness to reach
their goals.23 However, in spite of the immediate Soviet comment, the Chinese
attitudes were not left in silence, and in later comments on the conversation,
these are perceived as signs of suspicion and mistrust in relation to both the
Soviet delegates and the delegates from the other Socialist countries. Chen Yis
attempts to suggest a possible division of labour between our delegations when
speaking to the conference and his views that the PRC and the Soviet Union
should present a united front not only when facing the imperialist powers but also
when dealing with the Neutralist powers, was viewed with suspicion by Moscow.
The aim of this approach, a later report argued, was to ensure that in case there
would arise differences in opinion between the Soviet and Chinese delegations,
compromises would not be made in front of representatives from the other
Socialist countries. Thus, it would be better to agree on matters first and then
present the questions to the heads of the Socialist delegations.24
According to the Soviets, the Chinese also showed their suspicions and
mistrust in meetings between the heads of the four Socialist delegations. In the
afternoon of 15 May, the day before the conference was convened, the heads of
the four Socialist delegations met to discuss and coordinate their strategies.25 The
meeting was chaired by Gromyko, who informed the other delegates about his
meetings with the head of the British delegation British Foreign Secretary Alec
Douglas-Home. The two co-chairmen had agreed that the conference would be
opened the next day by Prince Sihanouk; in case he would not be able to make it
on time, the opening of the conference would be rescheduled to 17 May.26
The meetings between the four Socialist delegations would meet several needs
during the conference, the first of which would be to inform the other Socialist
countries of the discussions among the co-chairmen, and the second to allow the
different delegations to voice their opinions on the strategy adopted by the
Soviets in their meetings with the British. There is reason to argue that because of
its position as co-chairman the Soviet Union had gotten a head start on the other

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The fight over Laos, 19611962

Socialist powers when it came to pushing through its own policies. Moscow
seemed content with the pre-conference meetings and the efforts to reach a
common strategy among the Socialist countries. Still, the Socialist delegations
were not able to reach full consensus on all questions. Two particular issues were
to some degree contested: one was the role of the co-chairmen and the other was
the Chinese reluctance towards Indias role within the ICC. Both of these were
linked to the Chinese role at the conference.
Once the conference opened, the Soviet Union and Great Britain resumed their
roles as co-chairmen. And although it was clear from the outset that the Soviets
would function as co-chair together with the British, the Soviet foreign minister
had, before the appointment was made official, several times emphasized to the
Chinese that until the conference was convened the Soviet Union should not be
considered co-chairman. Much of the reason behind the Chinese insistence on
treating Moscow as co-chair was their own view of the 1961 conference as a
widening of the original 1954 Geneva conference. Based on the continuous
emphasis on this subject it is safe to assume that the Chinese considered it an
advantage for the Socialist side if the Soviet Union be allowed to continue as
co-chairman, not least because that would support the Chinese argument that the
current conference was nothing but a continuation of the one held in 1954.
The Chinese view of the Geneva conference as a permanent institution led to a
general discussion on the status of the Geneva conference within the Communist
camp. Gromyko agreed with the head of the Polish delegation, who pointed out
that the conference was not a permanent institution, and argued that the current
conference had wider range of participants and was without doubt to be considered a new and independent conference. Gromyko further argued that regarding
this as a new conference would be advantageous to the Socialist countries, especially if that would mean a confirmation of the co-chairmanship.27
Hanoi and Beijing both viewed the conference as a widening of the one held in
1954. They were also both negative to the role of India as Head of the International Control Commission.28 During the 1954 conference India was named head
of the ICC, mainly because of it status as a neutral state. However, the relationship between China and India had changed considerably during the seven years
since the last conference, and China objected to India in the position as head of
the ICC once again. In the autumn of 1959 the relationship between the Peoples
Republic and India hit an all-time low when hostilities broke out on the
Sino-Indian border. The hostilities were the result of a longstanding dispute
about the line of the frontier between India and Chinese-occupied Tibet in the
Himalayas. After a large-scale uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet the Dalai
Lama fled to India, and a Sino-Indian border conflict lasting from July to October
1959 followed. In 1962 an actual border war broke out between the Peoples
Republic and India. The situation was not improved by the fact that parallel to
Chinas problems, the Soviet Union was trying to cultivate a relationship with
India, as one of the leading countries in the non-aligned movement.29 This was
the background to Beijings harsh words when Gromyko said that the two
co-chairmen had decided to let the Indian representative, V.K. Krishna Menon,

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103

give a speech on the opening day in which he would suggest the order in which
the co-chairs should speak at the conference.30
Differences between Socialist delegations other than the Soviet and Chinese
also surfaced in these early meetings. One of the major issues was the unsolved
differences between Beijing and Warsaw over the question of Indias role. The
Indian delegate Menon was scheduled as the first speaker during the conference,
and the Chinese feared that he would suggest replacing the Soviet Union as one
of the two co-chairmen of the conference. While the Poles agreed with Moscow
that the Indian representative should be allowed to give his speech, the Chinese
angrily argued that you, our Polish friends, have already criticized us during the
meeting that was held not too long ago in Moscow. At that time the Chinese
representatives were silent, but I have to tell you that we do not recognize a
Polish right to evaluate any of our actions. How can you explain that you worry so
much about India and why do you not worry just as much in relation to China?31
According to the Soviet records, the Chinese outburst led to a strong polemic
between the heads of the two delegations. But the Chinese attack on the Poles
was also an attack on the Soviet stand in this question; however, it was more
convenient for Beijing to attack the Poles than aiming directly at Moscow. After
all, just like the Soviets depended on Chinese cooperation, Beijing was equally
dependent on a good relationship with Moscow. What the Chinese feared most at
this point was a total breakdown of negotiations, which could possibly lead to an
American invasion of Laos. Thus, to Beijing the protests against India were yet
another way of showing the Soviets that during this conference they were strong
enough to have an independent position and follow a policy that primarily suited
Chinese interests.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was confident that India would not suggest
other co-chairmen than those who already had the positions. Moreover, he
revealed that he was rather surprised by the sudden turn of the meeting due to the
Chinese and Polish outbursts and that he hoped this would not spoil what had
been achieved during the first five days of discussions and raise even more problems to consider.32 He saw no reason to prevent the Indian head of delegation
from speaking at the beginning of the conference and thought it would only
create problems and misunderstandings if he, a Soviet representative, were to
speak up against him. In a response to Gromykos attitude Chen Yi admitted that
since all the preliminary work for the conference was more or less completed, it
would be difficult to make any changes in the British proposal, which held the
suggestion that the Indian should give a speech on the opening day. As a result
the Chinese would not object to an Indian speech on the question of co-chairmen
and confirmed to the Soviets that they were in line with the tactical approach
agreed upon by the Socialist countries with regard to Southern Vietnam and
SEATO.33 The Chinese back-down was a tactical move to maintain a good
relationship with Moscow more important issues would be at stake later, and at
that point the Chinese would not be as ready to give in to Soviet pressure.
There were other ways of limiting the Indian role. On the last evening before
the conference was convened, the Chinese suddenly came along with suggestions

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for changes in the two documents that the Soviet delegation had prepared for the
first session the coming morning. They had two separate, but interrelated suggestions for changes. Their first suggestion was on how to stop military supplies to
Laos, and the ICCs control of the import of weapons and ammunition. In addition, they wanted to add a special paragraph on the destruction and evacuation of
left-behind Guomindang forces. Through these suggestions it was obvious that
the Chinese argued in favour of a diminished, and as limited as possible, role for
the ICC. They even suggested excluding the paragraph on the ICCs role in
monitoring elections in Laos and wished to change the paragraph that allowed a
majority in the ICC make decisions in questions of procedure.34 Primarily, the
changes suggested by the Chinese would undermine the position of the ICC and,
of course, seriously weaken the role of India.
In what seems to have been an attempt to put more pressure on the Soviets to
agree to these changes, Zhang Hanfu underlined the importance of unanimous
decisions among the Socialist countries and how that would make their decisions and suggestions much stronger. He further argued along the lines that it
was imperative to design the agreement so that the Western powers would be
unable to change everything to their advantage and thereby discredit the
Socialist camp.35
Once the conference was in session the Chinese returned to the Soviets with
the question of left-behind Guomindang soldiers in Laos.36 According to Zhang,
these forces, which were remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Army that retreated
into Laos after the Chinese civil war, were now used actively by the United
States to increase the strength of the anti-Communist forces in Laos. However,
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Pushkin was worried that if the Socialist
powers should interfere in this matter, it could make the United States refrain
from agreeing to a final settlement on the Laotian question.37 The question of the
former Guomindang forces is one example that shows the Chinese as much more
aggressive and hostile to Western governments than the leaders in Moscow.
There is no doubt that on several issues the Soviets shared the Chinese concern
that the Western countries wanted to destroy the conference. There was,
however, a significant difference in the Soviet and Chinese view on how to
approach situations like this one. By emphasizing the need to play down the issue
of the Chiang Kaishistovs throughout the summer, Moscow was able to convince
the Chinese to let this question go and not push it any further.38 A US withdrawal
from the conference could prompt the invasion the Chinese were so eager to
avoid.
The Soviet leaders did indeed take the issue of Guomindang forces in Laos
seriously. Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Pushkin returned to the question and
reassured Zhang Hanfu that the Soviet Union agreed that these forces should be
thrown out of Laos. On this question there was, according to Pushkin, full
consensus between the Soviet and Chinese governments, and that both Chen Yi
and Gromyko would mention this in their speeches to the conference.39 As a
response to Pushkins comments, Zhang Hanfu repeated his arguments on
the necessity of fighting against imperialism and pointed out that the Chinese

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105

delegation saw it as expedient to include the point on the Guomindang forces in

the declaration. This suggestion, however, took Pushkin somewhat by surprise
since there had been no talk about this during the meetings in Moscow prior to
the conference.40
The discussion above exemplifies how representatives from the Peoples
Republic viewed developments at the conference. These attitudes are also
mirrored in Soviet records from the discussions showing that the Chinese were
convinced that without a struggle they would not be able to reach any agreement
with the Western powers. The Soviets, on their part, underlined that the battle at
the conference would be strong and persistent and that there were of course no
warranties that the Western powers would accept all positions and provisions of
the projected agreement. However, it was emphasized from the Soviet side that
much would depend on which questions were posed and in what form they were
presented by the Socialist countries.41 Zhang Hanfu, on his part, repeated that the
Chinese delegation did not proceed on the basis of what would be acceptable to
the Western powers. In the face of this, Pushkin answered that nevertheless the
task of the Socialist countries was to achieve an agreement that would be satisfactory to themselves. The Chinese, however, had a more aggressive stand in this
question. Zhang said that they too wanted an agreement but believed that it could
be reached only through a persistent struggle against the Western powers. It
could also be, he continued, that taking that into account, it might not be possible
to reach an agreement on Laos.42
Soviet recollections of these first days of the conference and the many
disagreements that surfaced illustrate the mood within the Socialist camp at the
time. Every single word uttered by the Chinese was analysed by the Soviets and
at times clearly overestimated. It is very likely that this was also the case on the
Beijing side, in spite of the friendly words uttered by Deng Xiao Ping to Soviet
ambassador Chervonenko at the end of September 1961 that Sino-Soviet cooperation in Geneva worked well, in spite of the many disagreements between the
two powers.43 In such a context the controversy over India was to some extent
blown out of proportion due to the Chinese fear of a hidden Soviet agenda during
the conference.

A temporary setback
While the Geneva conference was in session, Khrushchev and Kennedy met in
Vienna from 3 to 4 June. The Soviet leader saw the meetings in Vienna as a
perfect opportunity to improve relations with the West. During the meetings
Khrushchev told Kennedy that he was not very interested in Laos, and that the
Soviet Union had no interest in taking on responsibilities in such a remote
geographical area. In addition the Soviet leader promised that he would do his
utmost to influence the Laotian forces to establish a truly neutral government,
and also cooperate with the ICC to secure a continued ceasefire.44
In spite of the kind words and promises of Vienna, it soon became evident how
fragile the ceasefire in Laos really was, and how little leverage Khrushchev really

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had with regard to the actions of the Pathet Lao, as well as those of the North
Vietnamese forces. When negotiations began in Geneva in May 1961 it was on
the condition that a full ceasefire had been achieved on Laotian territory.
However, the ceasefire in Laos was of the transient kind, and on 6 June negotiations were halted due to a break of the ceasefire when North Vietnamese and
Pathet Lao forces captured Ban Padong, a base of the Royal Laotian Government. The battle almost led to a total breakdown of the Geneva conference.
According to Marek Thee, the Soviets were not informed of the plans to attack
Ban Padong beforehand.45 Thees account coincides with available sources in the
Russian archives, where there are no indications that the attack was either supervised or supported by Moscow. On the day of the attack the main topic of conversation was a totally different one, namely the forthcoming event of a possible
meeting between the three Laotian princes Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong
and Boun Oum in Zurich.
On 6 June, not long before the meeting was scheduled to take place in Zurich,
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Pushkin was approached by DRV
Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem, who sought advice in relation to the Zurich
meeting. It turned out that Pathet Lao representative Qinim Folsena intended to
have a draft project ready for Souvanna Phouma once he arrived in Geneva. Ung
Van Khiem thought it would be useful if the DRV delegation helped Folsena
with the draft so that Souvanna Phouma would not turn to the French for
assistance. However, there was not much time left, and Ung Van Khiem
wondered whether the Soviets could purposely delay the Pathet Lao leader
Souphanouvong in Moscow in order to buy the North Vietnamese some time
with Souvanna Phouma.
The Soviet response to Ung Van Khiems request was purely negative.
Moscow would, under no circumstances, involve themselves in internal Laotian
affairs at that point. In the delicate situation that Laos was in for the time being, it
would be inexpedient to interfere in internal Laotian affairs. Pushkin then further
added that there was no way the Soviets would hold back the prince in
Moscow.46 Based on the available facts there can be no doubt that the events at
Ban Padong had taken the Soviet leaders by surprise and that due to the current
circumstances there was no way the Soviets would compromise their role at the
conference by holding back the leader of the Pathet Lao in Moscow.
On 7 June Ban Padong and the adjournment of the conference were the main
subjects of conversation at the meeting between the four Socialist delegations.
Delegates were confronted with a statement from Great Britain saying that they
(the British) had agreed to a conference under the precondition of a ceasefire in
Laos and that the current situation could lead to a total abandonment of the
conference. In response to this the Chinese delegate said that if there were no
session tomorrow (8 June), the Chinese would organize a press conference to
tell who was responsible for ruining the conference, namely the Western
governments. After taking note of the Chinese point of view, Pushkin attempted
to calm down the situation and said that he would inform the others as soon as he
had received more details from the leader of the American delegation, Averell

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47

107

Harriman. The attack at Ban Padong only led to a temporary halt in the Geneva
negotiations. On 12 June negotiations were resumed with all parties present.
Once the conference was back in session the next item on the agenda was the
possibility of a meeting between the three Laotian princes, Souvanna Phouma,
Souphanouvong and Boun Oum in Zurich. By mid-June 1961 the general discussions had come to an end, and both the French and the Soviets had presented their
proposals on how to solve the Laotian situation. The conference now awaited the
outcome of the Zurich meeting, since that would, inevitably, have an influence
on the conferences future work. In conversations with the Soviet delegates the
Chinese emphasized that their hope for the meeting was that the three princes
could agree to establish one united delegation that could represent Laos at the
conference table. The Chinese viewed an agreement between the three princes as
extremely useful to achieve a final agreement on Laos.48
The strong Chinese interest in a meeting between the three princes was,
according to historian Qiang Zhai, strongly promoted by Foreign Minister Chen
Yi in conversations outside the formal sessions, and he had urged Sihanouk as
well as the French and Indian delegates to bring the three together for a meeting.
The meeting took place in Zurich on 22 June 1961, and the three princes agreed
to a set of principles that would allow them to create a government of national
union representing the three parties. This government would follow a foreign
policy of peace and neutrality in accordance with the 1954 Geneva accords and
would reinstitute the electoral law and democratic liberties of 1957. However, in
spite of his enthusiasm for the Zurich communiqu, Chen Yi was aware that it
had not solved all internal problems in Laos and emphasized that it would still be
difficult to unite the three forces in a coalition government.49
Although the major part of the discussion was over by the time the three
princes met in Zurich, the parties still had another year to go before an agreement
was signed. However, in spite of several unresolved issues, in particular the role
of SEATO with regard to Laos, in December 1961 the conference was able to
reach provisional agreements on the international aspect of Laoss neutrality. At
the same time the negotiations between the three Laotian factions reached a deadlock, and it was not possible for the conference to move ahead and reach a final
solution.50
During the spring of 1962 the Chinese urged the Pathet Lao to negotiate with
the rightist group from a position of strength. To achieve such a position, in
March the Pathet Lao attacked the town of Nam Tha, where Phoumi Nosavan
had assembled 5,000 soldiers. In conversations with the Chinese in Beijing
Souphanouvong was told that the final settlement in Laos would be decided by
force and that the Pathet Lao should work to increase their own strength before
joining a coalition government. The Chinese provided Souphanouvong with
material assistance during that period, and on 6 May the Pathet Lao captured
Nam Tha. The defeat at Nam Tha weakened Phoumi Nosavans negotiation position with regard to his role in a future government. After this turbulent period the
three princes signed an agreement on 12 June, distributing the portfolios in a
government of national union.51 The battle of Nam Tha further contributed to the

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disagreements between Moscow and Beijing on how to handle the situation in

Laos. Apparently, the Soviets had made an attempt to stop Souphanouvong from
attacking Nam Tha without any success. China showed dislike over the Soviet
wish to solve local problems with superpower dialogues and disagreed with the
Soviet emphasis on the importance of the KennedyKhrushchev summit in
Vienna in June 1961 for the Geneva conference on Laos.52
In the light of the developments in the Sino-Soviet alliance during and after the
Geneva conference on Laos, Deng Xiao Pings references to the well-functioning
cooperation in Geneva seems ironic. The conference was one of the very last
examples of international cooperation between Moscow and Beijing and as such
represents an interesting remnant of a long-lasting alliance. Less than a year after
these friendly words, in June 1962, the Soviet leaders were harsh in their criticisms of the Chinese reaction to the formation of a Laotian government. The
Soviets were furious about the fact that in press statements and public speeches
the Chinese praised the peaceful solution to the Laos problem without even referring to the Soviet role during the negotiations. They strongly emphasized that
internal problems in Southeast Asia should be solved by the Southeast Asian
countries themselves, leaving out any reference to the Soviet involvement. More
than anything this behaviour exemplifies the difference between the Chinese
leaders we met during the 1954 Geneva conference, all eager to learn as much as
possible from the international experience of their Soviet allies, and the selfconfident Chinese representatives at the 196162 conference.
The absence of references to the Soviet role was of course severely criticized
in Moscow. Analysts at the Soviet embassy in Beijing highlighted the statements
made by the acting head of the Chinese foreign ministrys department on the USSR
and Eastern Europe, who argued, in a conversation with the Czechoslovakians,
that a final regulation of the Laos problem was hardly possible; firstly because
the United States hoped that Laos would come under the guardianship of
SEATO, and secondly because at the Geneva conference the Americans expected
to dissolve the forces of Pathet Lao. Moscow contended that such a reaction
from the Chinese side on the achievement of an agreement on the formation of a
Lao government, had a mission to hide the errors committed in Chinese domestic
policy, and create the impression that the events referred to above was a victory
for their policy line, as if it confirmed the correctness of the Chinese leaderships
evaluations of strategy questions and tactics in the struggle with imperialism.53

Assistance to Laos
Parallel to the negotiations in Geneva, Moscow continued the assistance to Laos
initiated in December 1960. There were two main aspects of this assistance
which had an impact not only on relations between the Soviet Union and Laos
but also on SovietVietnamese and SovietChinese relations. Since the
Vietnamese were partly in charge of the practical transport of this aid, Hanoi
wanted to discuss the conditions for delivering these supplies. One part of that
was the condition of the roads leading from the DRV into Laos. Both the roads

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109

going from Vietnam into Laos and, especially, the roads inside Laos were in a
generally bad condition. The second aspect was the question of the airborne
support, the so-called airbridge between Hanoi and Vientiane.
In May 1961, when the Geneva conference was already in session, Vietnamese
Premier Pham Van Dong approached Soviet Ambassador Suren Tovmasyan to
discuss the state of Laotian roads. He emphasized that Vietnam depended on
roads, both within Laos and from Vietnam to Laos, that could be used all year
and in all kinds of weather. At the time the Vietnamese did, according to the
premier, all that was in their power to build this kind of roads but were unable to
complete the task alone. They now hoped to get some assistance from the Soviet
Union, China and the other Socialist countries. Prince Souvanna Phouma had
already requested assistance from the DRV. In an effort to convince the ambassador of the usefulness of such a road, Pham Van Dong argued that it would tie
Laos closer to the DRV, and therefore also the rest of the Socialist camp. He also
added that Souvanna Phouma had also asked Hanoi for assistance in building a
new residence for the Laotian government, a request that he would also present to
the Soviet Union. A positive answer to these requests could, according to the
Vietnamese premier, draw Souvanna Phouma closer to us.54
The assistance to Laos created difficulties in the SovietVietnamese relationship as well as in relations between Moscow and Beijing. In the autumn of 1961
Soviet ambassador Tovmasyan asked DRV Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem
whether discussions about military assistance to Laos and the Pathet Lao should
rather be held separately with the Soviet and the Chinese, or if the Vietnamese
preferred with the two ambassadors together. Tovmasyan also pointed to several
problems with regard to how Soviet aid was transported to Laos. He said that
Vietnam and Laos together should plan exactly what was needed in Laos and
make sure that those Soviet products that had already been sent to Laos, but were
stuck in the DRV, immediately reach Laos. The Soviet ambassador left no doubt
that he was dissatisfied with the slow speed in transporting aid into Laos.55 By
mid-1962 the Soviets advised the Vietnamese to discuss with the Chinese when
aid for Laos passed through Chinese territory and added that Moscow no longer
was willing to cover all expenses related to the transport of this aid. The
Vietnamese were now told to arrange those parts of the operation going through
China directly with the Chinese. Hanoi expressed its dissatisfaction with this new
Soviet attitude and claimed that this new set-up was very unclear.56
The discussion about transportation continued even after the participants
reached a conclusion in Geneva, but now the situation had become more delicate
for the Soviet leadership. During the early autumn of 1962 the Vietnamese kept
complaining about their limited possibilities to transport the necessary goods into
Laos. They reminded the Soviets that from the very beginning aid to Laos was
supposed to be a collaboration between the Soviet Union, the PRC, the DRV and
other Socialist countries. Moreover, the Soviet Union had taken on a certain
responsibility in helping out with the transportation of these goods. The
Vietnamese argued that this could be done by using Soviet airplanes already
stationed in Hanoi and Vinh, but Moscow was reluctant to agree to the proposal.

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The fight over Laos, 19611962

The Soviet Union did not have the authority to negotiate the issue of continued
flights to secure the transport of goods from DRV to Laos. The Soviet government decided that, in order to meet the request from the DRV government, they
would hand over to the Vietnamese side all Soviet airplanes that were transporting aid from the DRV to Laos. Furthermore, Moscow was worried that,
under the current circumstances and with the fresh Soviet signature to the
agreement in Geneva, the use of Soviet-owned airplanes flying into Laos could
be used by their opponents, primarily the United States, to accuse the Soviets of
violating the Geneva agreement. They feared that if that happened, Washington
would be free to openly violate the agreement and threaten the patriotic forces
in Laos.57
At that point Moscow was determined that Soviet planes and pilots should not
be involved in a situation in which they could be accused of violating the terms
of the recently signed Geneva agreement. DRV Acting Premier Le Than Ngi
acknowledged the difficulty of the situation but added that without support it
would be impossible to keep the Royal Army in check. If the Soviet Union could
hand over the airplanes in Hanoi fairly quickly, the DRV could put them into use.
There was, however, another problem, Le Than Ngi added, since the North
Vietnamese did not have enough well-prepared pilots, who would be capable of
replacing the Soviet pilots on these flights.58 It was therefore necessary to delay
the transfer of the aircraft for a period of two months to give the Vietnamese
crews a chance to prepare themselves. In September 1962 DRV Premier Pham
Van Dong asked the Soviet ambassador whether the Soviet Union would
consider establishing an air bridge between Hanoi and Laos for a longer period,
whereupon the Soviet ambassador asked why the Vietnamese could not do this
on their own initiative. According to Pham Van Dong, a Vietnamese air bridge
would only have been misunderstood by the Laotians and would be regarded in a
very negative way.59
By September 1962 Soviet officials seemed tired of both the Vietnamese and
the Chinese positions on assistance to Laos. The Chinese had now turned around
and no longer approved of the continued use of Soviet airplanes for transportation into Laos. That decision was highly unpopular with the Vietnamese leaders,
who, according to Pham Van Dong, were very dissatisfied with the Chinese
position. The Vietnamese kept arguing that Soviet assistance remained the best
solution.60 Acknowledging the necessity of Soviet assistance, Ambassador
Tovmasyan was still somewhat intrigued by the exclusive focus on the need for
Soviet assistance, in comparison with assistance from other countries of the
Socialist camp. He was curious as to why Pham Van Dong did not say a single
word about the necessity of aid from either the PRC or the DRV itself. According
to the ambassador, Dongs statements gave him the impression that the whole
future of Laos depended only on the transfer of cargo on Soviet airplanes
stationed in the DRV, and that the actual work should be done by the Soviet
Union.61
Moscow no longer wanted to be the sole party providing practical assistance to
Laos and demanded increased assistance from the other Socialist states involved.

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111

In a larger context this could lead to problems in Soviet relations with the United
States. The Soviet dissatisfaction with Chinese and Vietnamese attitudes was
obvious in the continuous discussions of the practical part of assistance to Laos.
While the Soviet Union took care of the economics in the operations, Hanoi and
Beijing seem to have done nothing but complain over insufficient Soviet assistance. The Vietnamese were annoyed by the Soviet wish to use others, such
as themselves, to support Laos, especially because it also signalled Soviet
reluctance in assisting Hanoi in similar situations in the near future.

Geneva: A power struggle?

Towards the end of the 1950s, Laos came to play an increasingly important role
as a part of the Soviet relationship with North Vietnam. Before, during and after
the Geneva conference Moscows policies towards Laos became regularly intertwined with their policies towards Vietnam, and no less with their relationship to
China in Southeast Asia. In many respects, cooperation in Geneva was one of the
last highlights of Sino-Soviet cooperation before the relationship broke down.62
From the point of view of an outsider, the union between the Socialist countries in Geneva would have seemed rather solid. However, a closer examination
of intra-bloc relations during the conference shows that, although the Socialists
managed to gather around common answers when facing the West, there was
often a long fight to reach this common ground. As pointed out earlier, these
countries came to Geneva with their own special agendas in mind, agendas that
often conflicted.
The internal discussion within the Communist blocs delegation to the Geneva
conference on Laos clearly showed the Soviet dissatisfaction with the Chinese
and the role they played at the conference. The Laos conference became a kind of
second Geneva, where the mistakes of 1954 were not to be repeated. Analysis
and comments by the Soviet side show that Moscow was seriously irritated with
how the Chinese acted. However, it also shows that despite this discomfort, the
Soviets insisted on continued Sino-Soviet cooperation with regard to both Laos
and Vietnam. Moscow most certainly depended on a continued cooperation with
a strong Chinese state in Asia.
By the Chinese, the Geneva conference on Laos was seen as the perfect opportunity to gain more international acceptance as the unquestionable leader in Asia.
However, just as Moscow was dissatisfied with Beijings behaviour in Geneva,
the Chinese criticized the Soviet Union for what they characterized as attempts
to freeze the situation in Laos and establish a permanent neutrality in the
country on the model of Austria or Switzerland.63 That was not the kind of
neutrality the Chinese could agree to. Together with the Vietnamese they were in
favour of an independent and neutralized Laos recognized by other countries but
not requiring any international guarantees. Both China and Vietnam believed that
such a neutralization could help the Pathet Lao gain the necessary strength.
According to Chinese analysts at the conference, Moscows main aim was to reach
a compromise with the West and prove the success of its peaceful coexistence

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The fight over Laos, 19611962

policy. Such a policy stood in stark contrast to the Chinese aim in Laos, namely
to ensure that the Pathet Lao was in a strong military position before sitting down
at the negotiating table.64
The negotiations over Laos seriously tested the strength of the Soviet
Vietnamese relationship, SovietChinese relationship and the relations between
Hanoi and Beijing. One author has even argued that the competition between the
Vietnamese and the Chinese with regard to Laos was one of the reasons for the
eventual breakdown in cooperation between Hanoi and Beijing.65 The SinoSoviet relationship also suffered from the events in Geneva. The distrust that had
been built up on both sides made it difficult to reconcile their views on what
constituted a successful conference. More than anything, the problem of Laos
showed the difference between the foreign policy doctrines of the two regimes.
However, at the same time the Soviet Union and China shared one vital common
goal: to prevent a stepped-up American interference in Indochina. And to achieve
that, Moscow needed some measure of Chinese cooperation, and thus still hoped
that China could act as an ally in areas of peripheral interest to Soviet foreign
policy such as Indochina.

From disinterest to active support,

19621965

By late 1960 the Soviet leaders had expressed clearly to the Vietnamese Communists
that they would not support an armed struggle for reunification of Vietnam.
Moreover, Moscow expected the Lao Dong leaders to respect its opinion and
proceed with the political struggle. Decision makers in Hanoi, however, did not
feel committed to follow the Soviet line. They continued to build up its military
force in South Vietnam, and by 1961 the situation had changed significantly. The
rapid escalation of the South Vietnamese struggle worried the Soviet leaders,
who felt that the situation, if not contained, could lead to a significant complication of the political situation in the region and transform South Vietnam into a
critical centre of international tension.1
After the conclusion of the Geneva conference on Laos in the summer of 1962
Chinese influence on the Lao Dong leadership became gradually more visible.
This was not least due to Maos insistence that China must support the armed
struggles in South Vietnam and Laos without conditions, at the Tenth Plenum of
the CCPs Central Committee in September 1962.2 The increased Chinese
influence in North Vietnam affected Soviet relations with the Vietnamese, and
especially how Soviet policy makers perceived relations between China and the
DRV. During this period the Soviets also became very dependent on other
Socialist countries to obtain information on developments in the Lao Dong
leadership.
By the end of 1963 the Chinese influence in Vietnam reached its highest peak,
and during the winter and spring of 1964, in spite of regular diplomatic contact,
relations between Soviet officials in Hanoi and the Vietnamese leadership
became very tense. One purpose of this chapter is to analyse the Soviet view of
Beijings growing influence in Hanoi and evaluate the impact of Chinese policies
on Soviet decision-making with regard to Vietnam. A second purpose is to
explain why Moscows interest in Vietnam increased from the summer of 1964.
By the end of that year the Soviet Union had replaced the Chinese as Vietnams
major ally in the war against the United States. This chapter will aim to discuss in
some depth the reasons for this change.

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From disinterest to active support, 19621965

Soviet perceptions of China in Vietnam

We have already seen how, during the last years of the 1950s, the Lao Dong
leadership was divided into two factions: one consisting of those in favour of
continuing a policy of diplomacy and peaceful reunification along the lines of the
Geneva agreements, and another, consisting mainly of persons with a southern
origin advocating a more aggressive policy to obtain reunification. By the early
1960s the main divide was between the so-called pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese
factions in the Lao Dong. Policy makers in Moscow, or at least the Southeast
Asia Department in the Foreign Ministry, were well aware of these factions and
their pro-Soviet versus pro-Chinese preferences. Ho Chi Minh found the division
within the party particularly difficult. While most of the other Lao Dong leaders
were characterized by the Soviets as either pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese, Ho was
primarily referred to as being in a middle position. Individuals within the leadership even argued that it was only due to Ho Chi Minhs position that the Lao
Dong Central Committee refrained from publicly supporting the Chinese point of
view.3 However, Hos continuous attempts to mediate between the two parties
and his attempts to solicit support for the Vietnamese case from both of them
proved to be a very difficult task.4
In the early 1960s the Vietnamese stressed the need to mend the split between
Moscow and Beijing. Although several signs indicated that they leaned increasingly towards the Chinese, Hanoi was determined to keep a reasonably good
relationship with Moscow. However, the growing Chinese influence in North
Vietnam and the close relationship between the two countries could, according to
the Soviet embassy in Hanoi, be seen in a number of different contexts. One
example was Vietnamese travelling arrangements and the habit of stopping over
in Beijing. Delegations from the DRV always travelled via the Chinese capital en
route to other destinations for meeting with the CCP leadership. The Soviet
embassy assumed that these meetings were set up to instruct, as well as debrief,
the Vietnamese delegations after their travels abroad. The North Vietnamese
were also using increasingly more Chinese materials and documents in the
training of cadres within Vietnam. The Chinese importance was further emphasized in how the Vietnamese treated different celebrations and memorial days.5
The Soviet embassy closely followed all the signs, even the smallest, of a
closer Sino-Vietnamese relationship. The smaller issues notwithstanding, the
most important reason for the development in the relationship was Hanoi and
Beijings increasingly coinciding views on the problems of the present international situation. It was their views on the situation within the international
Communist movement which constituted the foundation for the continuing
strong links between the Lao Dong and the CCP. The growing presence of
pro-Chinese elements within the Lao Dong leadership, and also the active
foreign policy support the Chinese has shown the Lao Dong in the question of
reunification of the country, increased Chinese influence in Vietnam.6 By the
spring of 1962 China had become, in Soviet eyes, a most complicating factor
within the SovietVietnamese relationship.7

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115

The intensification of Chinese propaganda further convinced the Soviet

embassy that Beijing was seeking to maximize its influence within Vietnam.
Over the previous year the Chinese had significantly intensified their propaganda
effort in Vietnam. Numerous articles in newspapers and magazines had focused
on the successes of the Peoples Republic. The propaganda was accompanied by
a sizeable amount of economic assistance from China. According to Soviet
numbers, Chinese economic assistance to North Vietnam, in the period from
1955 to 1962, even exceeded Soviet assistance in the same period.8 Put together
these factors contributed to a closer relationship and increased the Chinese
popularity among the Vietnamese population.
However, in Soviet eyes the picture was not only grim. Moscow still had
devoted friends and followers within the Vietnamese leadership. As a contrast to
those within the Lao Dong who wanted an even closer cooperation with the CCP,
it was also possible to detect certain reservations in these pro-Chinese attitudes. Arguing that there is not necessarily a contradiction between a good
SovietVietnamese relationship and these pro-Chinese attitudes, the Soviet
embassy concluded that by April 1962 Chinese influence on Lao Dong policies
was not yet decisive. With emphasis on the fact that what characterized these
people, and their pro-Chinese moods, was a certain limit in their pro-Chinese
sympathies, the Soviets contented that among the Vietnamese leaders there still
existed those who did not exclude the option of closer contact with the Soviet
Union. These individuals did not see the friendship with China as a hindrance to
strengthened ties between the Soviet Union and Vietnam.9
The embassy analysts clearly supported the idea of a possibly stronger relationship between Moscow and Hanoi. In an attempt to diminish the importance
of the strong Chinese influence, the Soviet embassy underlined how the Lao
Dong leaders were forced to take into consideration the latent anti-Chinese feelings that up till now had existed among the Vietnamese population, and how that
could be explained by the historical century-long enmity of the Vietnamese
working class toward the Chinese feudal invaders (aggressors).10 At a time when
the Vietnamese were slowly tilting towards Beijing, officials at the Soviet embassy
in Hanoi were eager to attract attention to those signs coming from the Lao Dong
leaders that could be interpreted as a stronger interest in the Soviet side of the table.
To Moscow, the visit of a Chinese military delegation to North Vietnam from
15 to 31 December 1961 in honour of the seventeenth anniversary celebration
of the founding of the PAVN was yet another illustration of the closeness in
Sino-Vietnamese relations. According to Soviet embassy analysts the aim of the
visit was to show both the Vietnamese leaders and the people that China was
ready to give decisive support in the case of a military conflict, even war, in
South Vietnam. The Chinese readiness to assist, the embassy underlined, did
impress the Vietnamese friends, but they still knew that the Soviet attitude was
very important in terms of determining the practical steps with regard to South
Vietnam.11 However, in a Chinese account of the same visit, Marshal Ye
Jianying, who was leading the delegation, urged caution in his conversations with
Hanois leaders. The Chinese leaders allegedly feared that the Vietnamese

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Communists preference for large-scale battles might drag them into an

unwanted war with the United States. Accordingly, the visitors told Hanoi that
the correct way to defeat the South Vietnamese regime was to engage in guerrilla
warfare in the mountains rather than to launch large-scale operations.12 Thus, the
Embassy was right about the Chinese advice to the Vietnamese but seems to have
exaggerated the actual content of discussions. Although the Chinese influence
was strong, there were many areas of friction between the two states.
In the end of May 1962 Ho Chi Minh told Soviet ambassador Tovmasyan that
he wanted to travel to the Soviet Union to talk with Khrushchev but that he
wanted to make the trip absolutely incognito.13 Hos wish to travel without any
publicity was not at all an attempt to trick the Chinese. As usual he travelled
through Beijing. Arriving in Moscow he met with, among others, Deputy Foreign
Minister Pushkin, with a plea for medicine and medical equipment for the South
Vietnamese patriots. He wanted this assistance to go through the Soviet Red
Cross to the DRV, and from there to South Vietnam. Ho also used the opportunity to thank the Soviet Union for its support in the fight against the American
aggression and the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem.14
In a June 1962 memo from the Southeast Asia department to the heads of the
foreign ministry it was emphasized that after the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a group had emerged among the Vietnamese
leaders that primarily endorsed the Chinese view of foreign policies. This group
distanced itself from the Soviet Union and its allies within the Communist camp.
Nonetheless, several of the veteran leaders in Hanoi, such as Ho Chi Minh and
Pham Van Dong, still underlined the necessity to strengthen the relationship with
the Soviet Union. The fact that the Vietnamese invited cosmonaut Gennadi Titov
(while China did not) was seen by the Southeast Asia Department as a confirmation that Hanoi was intent on a good relationship with Moscow. At the same time
the number of Vietnamese students in the Soviet Union was steadily increasing, a
situation that, according to SEAD, was a sign of a good future relationship
between the two countries.15
But in 1962 the Soviet Union was not at all ready to support a struggle in
Vietnam. Throughout that year Soviet analysts reemphasized the increasing
Chinese influence in all spheres of North Vietnamese society. Political, economic
and cultural relations between the DRV and the PRC, and not least relations
between the Vietnamese and Chinese Communist parties played an increasingly
important role. This was particularly true within the foreign policy sphere, where
Hanois stand diverged from the Soviet foreign policy line on several issues.
Among these were the personality cult, the attitude towards Albania, problems of
war and peace, the role of national liberation movements, and, finally, the road
from capitalism to socialism.16 There is no doubt that the numerous reports from
the embassy describing the ever-increasing Chinese influence in Hanoi must
have made an impression on policy makers in Moscow. We shall see later how
individuals within the Soviet foreign ministry bureaucracy, in the autumn of
1962, suggested how Moscow could improve relations between the Soviet Union
and the Vietnamese and reduce the ever-growing Chinese influence.17

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117

In 1962 Soviet embassy officials in Hanoi were determined to show that

Moscow still had a role to play in Vietnam. They emphasized that the
Vietnamese, in spite of the fact that the Chinese provided more aid to the DRV
than the Soviet Union, always referred to the Soviet Union before China, when
talking about assistance from fraternal countries. Likewise, they emphasized that
the Vietnamese friends had lately refrained from mentioning interrelations
between the DRV and China, Chinese aid and specialists, as well as the usual
statistics of Chinese contributions to the Vietnamese, in conversations with
Soviet embassy officials.18 As the Chinese influence in the North Vietnamese
society and leadership grew, Soviet officials increasingly spoke to those
favouring Soviet influence in Vietnam over Chinese. The pleas for assistance
from pro-Soviet elements within the Lao Dong obviously made an impression on
Soviet officials in Vietnam and then again made them advance pleas to the Soviet
leadership on behalf of the Vietnamese. Moscows lack of interest in support for
the Vietnamese must have been frustrating for the officials working in Vietnam,
who witnessed how the Chinese influence increased without having any means to
counter such a development. In spite of the numerous accounts of the possibilities of increasing Soviet influence in Vietnam, the message did not get through in
Moscow, as the Soviet leaders had their minds set on other foreign policy
problems far away from the worsening situation in Vietnam.19
While Moscows policies towards Vietnam might have seemed passive, and at
best reluctant, that was not the case with regard to Soviet engagement in other
parts of the world. In late May 1962 members of the Soviet Politburo and the
Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party were informed of Nikita Khrushchevs
plans to install missiles in Cuba, and during the summer and autumn of 1962 the
Soviet leadership was fully preoccupied with what would be known as the Cuban
Missile Crisis in October that year.20 The Soviet effort to install missiles in the
United States backyard and thereby pose a much more potent threat to US
security overshadowed developments in Vietnam.
Parallel to the Soviet engagement in the Caribbean, the United States increased
its involvement in both Vietnam and Laos. In the spring of 1962 the United
States launched, together with the Republic of Vietnam, a joint programme
aimed at building the so-called Strategic Hamlets in the South Vietnamese countryside. The aim of the programme was to cut the enemy off from the rural population and fortify villages in order to keep people safe from what Washington
viewed as Vietcong intimidation. However, the system was based on the idea that
the peasants were the victims of such terror and thus underestimated the Southern
peasants support for the National Liberation Front. The programme was never
successful and only further alienated the peasants from the Saigon government,
although the main idea had been to foster loyalty towards the Ngo Dinh Diem
administration.21 In Laos the Kennedy administration decided to turn the country
into a pro-American bastion in late 1962. The American move helped destroy the
recent Geneva agreements that Washington had signed in midsummer that year,
which stated that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Laos and that the
Pathet Lao should join the Neutralist Souvanna Phoumas coalition government.

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Although the Americans withdrew their military advisors, the Central

Intelligence Agency stepped up their supply to the Meo tribesmen, a guerrilla
army that worked behind Pathet Lao lines.22
So while the United States and the Peoples Republic of China in their separate
ways increased their involvement and influence in Vietnam and Southeast Asia,
the Soviet Union was more worried about developments in other regions of the
world, and their interest in Vietnam was limited to the question of how to best
avoid a possibly dangerous international situation in the area. This in spite of the
fears expressed in late 1961 that the situation in Vietnam could get out of control
and seriously threaten world peace. Moscow did not change its view on Vietnam
until the aggressive attitude of the Chinese and their readiness to support a fullscale war in Vietnam made the Soviets realize the dangers of a Sino-Vietnamese
war alliance facing the full military powers of the United States.
From the Vietnamese side the emphasis on maintaining a good relationship
with Moscow is an interesting aspect of the so-called triangular relationship
between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing in this period. In reports from the embassies in both Hanoi and Beijing, as well as in several analyses made by the Southeast Asia Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, this behaviour was often
dwelt upon. Was it possible that the Vietnamese could lean increasingly on the
Chinese and allow a high degree of indirect, as well as direct, Chinese influence
in politics and military affairs, while still keeping a good working relationship
with the Soviet Union? In spite of the growing tension between Moscow and
Beijing, and the rapprochement between Hanoi and Beijing in the first half of the
1960s, several of the Vietnamese leaders, and in particular Ho Chi Minh and
Pham Van Dong, often seized the opportunity to praise Soviet assistance and
dedication to the Vietnamese cause. Thus, it is possible that even in 1962
there existed a more general understanding among the Vietnamese leaders that in
the long run, in spite of Chinese propaganda, the Soviet Union was the only
country able to provide the large amount of economic and military assistance
needed in case of an all-out war between the Vietnamese Communists and the
United States.

Tougher frontlines within the Communist camp

Soviet perceptions of the Chinese influence in Vietnam depended not only on
reports from the Hanoi embassy but as much on information obtained by
embassy officials in China and conversations with official representatives from
other fraternal countries. As the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was
deteriorating, Soviet officials became increasingly dependent on other sources
than the Chinese and Vietnamese to determine the degree of Chinese influence in
Vietnam, and even to obtain information on the actual developments, especially
within South Vietnam and relations between the North and the South.
This dependence began in the autumn of 1962, when several signs indicated
that Soviet embassy officials in Vietnam were increasingly isolated from the
leadership in the VWP, and lasted until the autumn of 1964, when full contact

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23

119

between Soviet and Vietnamese officials was re-established. However, in spite

of the growing dependence on information from other Socialist countries, contact
between the Soviets and Vietnamese in Hanoi did not come to a full stop.
Employees at the embassy still had meetings with Lao Dong officials, but much
of the vital information concerning issues such as the developments in the
Sino-Vietnamese relationship came through other Socialist representatives. The
Vietnamese now seemed much more cautious with regard to what they revealed
to the Soviets and were reluctant to take a stand with regard to the escalating
Sino-Soviet conflict. As a result, during this period Moscow became steadily
more dependent on representatives from other Socialist countries to keep up to
date on developments within South Vietnam, and not least on the relationship
between Vietnam and China. This also meant that Moscow to a much larger
degree would have to rely on information gathered by, and interpretations made by,
their closest Socialist allies and in effect they now often dealt with second-hand
information only.
While Moscow knew the preferences of most Vietnamese leaders in the Soviet
versus China question, the Soviet leaders were also influenced by the views of
other Socialist countries. In conversations with representatives from other
Socialist countries they often discussed the question of pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet
tendencies among the Lao Dong leaders. The Polish Ambassador to the DRV,
Findinski, commented on the fact that Truong Chinh spent his vacation in the
Soviet Union, while Pham Van Dong had left for China, and added that he (Findinski) would not even guess what that could mean. However, this was most probably a calculated political decision made in the Lao Dong Politburo. As far as
Findinski was concerned, Truong Chinh should not be trusted, since he was
considered to be the most prominent pro-Chinese figure in the DRV, but with
Pham Van Dong the situation was different. Findinski also suggested to
Tovmasyan that it would be a good idea to bring Le Duan closer to us and give
him more attention.24 The Czechoslovak ambassador in the DRV, Gerold,
supported Findinskis view of Truong Chinh as the most manifest pro-Chinese
among the members of the Politburo of the Lao Dong CC. On the pro-Soviet side
he placed Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap and Nguyen Duy Trinh, while he
characterized the position of Ho Chi Minh himself as centrist.25
In his attempts to explain the Vietnamese position with regard to their relations
with both Moscow and Beijing, Gerold argued that in their foreign policies the
Lao Dong leaders basically supported the Chinese Communist Party without
regard for the interests of the DRV. [. . .] They fear the Chinese and do not want
to put themselves in opposition to them. One example of Chinese influence
surfaced in relation to the Comecon meeting in 1962, when the Vietnamese only
were present only as observers, and not participants. The Chinese did not participate, and the Vietnamese were reluctant to go against the Chinese in this
matter. However, at the very same time Ho Chi Minh went to Moscow during the
meeting in order to show the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party
and the other fraternal countries that they wanted to participate at the Comecon
meeting, but were unable to do so.26

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In spite of such behaviour, according to Gerold, the Lao Dong leadership was
actually to a much larger degree reaching out for the Soviet Communist Party
than for the CCP. The main reason for that was that the Vietnamese leaders were
convinced that the DRV could not count on much assistance from China but in
contrast could in the future receive much economic aid from the Soviet Union.
Thus, he added, it was no coincidence that for the negotiations about renewed
economic aid from the Soviet Union to the DRV, it was Politburo member
Nguyen Duy Trinh who travelled to Moscow to conduct the negotiations, and
nobody else. Duy Trinh was considered to be pro-Soviet.27 Gerold also accused
the Vietnamese leaders of not being aware of Chinas great power-manoeuvring
towards Vietnam, as well as other countries, which should have put them on
guard. What the Vietnamese feared was that the Chinese would eventually lead
the situation into a total split and the founding of a second centre within the international Communist movement. With such a situation they were threatened by
the danger of losing the independence of both the Lao Dong and the DRV.28
In response to the Czechoslovak ambassadors description of the current situation within the Lao Dong, Soviet ambassador Tovmasyan emphasized that the
DRV leaders did not expect much economic aid from China but talked about how
they could rationalize the assistance they had already received from the Soviet
Union and other Socialist countries. That attitude was a result of the implementation of the Chinese slogan Depend on ones own forces, introduced as a part of
the Lao Dong strategy.29 The slogan came from Chinese, but in the Vietnamese
setting the meaning was more neutral because Hanoi was reluctant to follow the
Chinese policies with regard to production. Therefore, he argued, in the
Vietnamese sense the slogan was very different from the Chinese equivalent and
gave it a character of striving for independence, perhaps first of all from the
Chinese.30
In 1962 the image of Chinas role in Vietnam was influenced both by the
Soviets own contact with the Vietnamese and the Chinese and by the information provided by other trusted Socialist officials. Information provided by representatives from other Socialist countries became increasingly important during
the early 1960s. The mood in Vietnam was slowly changing, as the Vietnamese
put increasingly more trust in the Chinese. To keep updated, the Soviets used all
sources available. In that setting the Poles played an important role. The country
was represented in the ICC, a body that had first been established for all three
Indochinese countries during the 1954 Geneva conference and which in 1962
existed for Laos and Vietnam only.
According to the Chinese the ICC for Vietnam had outplayed its role by late
1962, because it was now to a much larger degree serving the interests of the
United States. The Chinese therefore suggested that the ICC for Vietnam should
be isolated and terminated. Both Moscow and Hanoi disagreed with the Chinese
on this and wanted to maintain its presence in Vietnam. The difference in views
over the need for the ICC was a result of how these states pictured the future
development in Vietnam. In 1962 Moscow wanted a political struggle and finally
a reunification through peaceful means, whereas Beijing encouraged the

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121

Vietnamese friends to activate and increase the armed struggle in South Vietnam
and to immediately interfere militarily in the affairs of South Vietnam.31
The behaviour of the North Vietnamese leadership, especially in the first
period after the Geneva conference on Laos, gave room for both hope and disillusionment for the Soviet representatives in Hanoi. On the one hand, it was rather
clear that the overall majority of the Lao Dong leadership were in favour of a
closer relationship with the CCP, but at the same time many signs from the inner
circles of the leadership indicated that many still wished for a deeper Soviet
engagement in Vietnam. Thus, on the eve of Chinese dominance in Hanoi, Soviet
officials in Vietnam kept looking for signs that could indicate the possibility for a
stronger Soviet influence there in the future, while at the same time their superiors in Moscow had other things they considered more important than Vietnam
on their foreign policy agenda. However, before looking at what probably
seemed a point of no return in SovietVietnamese relations in 1963, it is worth
mentioning that there were forces within the Soviet foreign ministry bureaucracy
that were willing to once again take measures to improve the SovietVietnamese
relationship.

Attempts to improve SovietVietnamese relations

In September 1962 analysts in the Southeast Asia Department of the Soviet
foreign ministry suggested several new measures that, according to their view,
would contribute to an improvement of the relationship between the Soviet
Union and the DRV, as well as put a stop to the increasing isolation of the Soviet
ambassador and other Soviet officials in Hanoi. It is very likely that this initiative
was partly a result of Maos declaration that he would support armed struggle in
Vietnam, combined with the increased American interest in both Vietnam and
Laos. The basic idea put forward by the analysts was that, to regain influence in
Vietnam, the Soviet Union would have to show the Vietnamese that the Soviet
leaders were committed to their cause. Two main issues were on the agenda. The
first was the importance of a high-level Soviet visit to the DRV. SEAD suggested
that Nikita Khrushchev visit North Vietnam in order to develop closer and more
personal ties between Soviet and Vietnamese leaders. During such a visit
Khrushchev should further elaborate on the decisions of the 22nd Congress of the
CPSU and provide the Vietnamese with a better understanding of the decisions
of that meeting.
In addition to a visit by Khrushchev, the Soviet Union should devote more
attention to Vietnamese reunification. Moscow should offer political support in
the question of South Vietnam and keep in mind the importance of reunification
in the minds of the Vietnamese people. Their first priority should be to put a stop
to the American intervention in Vietnam, isolate the United States and provide
international support for the NLF. Further, the Soviet Union should contribute to
a withdrawal of support for American policies in South Vietnam on the part of
the British, Australians and US satellites. On that issue there existed differences
in opinion between the imperialist countries that could be used to the advantage

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of the NLF. Another effective measure would, according to the SEAD, be to

contribute to an increase in the authority of the NLF in both Vietnam and abroad.
After defining the core tasks of the South Vietnamese patriots fight, it will be
necessary to discuss the question of a more official form of assistance from the
Soviet Union to the Front. Soviet leaders were also advised to support the establishment of a neutral South Vietnam, which according to analysts in the SEAD,
was a realistic way towards a peaceful solution in the country. And, finally, they
were advised to invite members of the NLF to the Soviet Union.32
Moscows lack of active participation in Vietnam could be explained by what
may seem like an overextension of Soviet foreign policy capabilities during
1962. Their extended involvement in the Third World, and Cuba in particular,
could explain the attitude towards Vietnam. With the increased American interest
in Southeast Asia the Soviet leaders did not want to risk confrontation with
Washington on two fronts both in the Caribbean and in Vietnam. Notwithstanding, the above policy suggestions show that there were probably different
opinions within the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy on how to deal with the
situation in Vietnam. However, few of these suggestions were actually implemented. Most important, Khrushchev did not visit Vietnam, and even though
Moscow strengthened its verbal support for the Vietnamese cause, they did not
provide the practical assistance required by the Vietnamese in their preparations
for a war against the Americans. Even though they spoke out in solidarity with
the Vietnamese fight for reunification, in 1962 the Soviet leadership did little to
convince their Vietnamese comrades that they could depend on Soviet assistance
in times of trouble. The absence of a state visit illustrates Soviet interest in
Vietnam at the time. There was no room for a visit to the DRV on Nikita
Khrushchevs schedule in late 1962, or early 1963. In retrospective, it would
probably have been a good idea.
From the Vietnamese side there were, in spite of numerous accounts of
Hanois preference for the Chinese way with regard to reunification, indications
that many in Hanoi were still open to Soviet policies. Preferences of the Lao
Dong leaders was also a popular subject of conversation with representatives
from other Socialist countries. For the Soviet embassy the Polish representatives
in Hanoi were valuable sources because they had good access to both the
Vietnamese and the Chinese. In October 1962 Polish ambassador Findinski
argued that the Vietnamese friends did not follow the Chinese blindly, and that
even though they were making use of Chinese tactics, it was only to a certain
limit. They were still developing and strengthening the political line within the
NLF. That was, according to Findinski, an indication that the Vietnamese still
aspired to take the Soviet point of view into account. Therefore, he argued, they
were still using both forms of struggle but using them in such a way that they
would not have to take an unnecessary step in the direction of either China or the
Soviet Union.33
According to the Poles, the North Vietnamese were still striving to hold a
middle position between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties. To some
degree the Soviets had even been able to lessen the degree of Chinese influence

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123

among the Vietnamese leadership, and the Polish Ambassador claimed that this
policy had been a success and that the pro-Chinese group led by Le Duan had
weakened its position. The group itself was not extinct as such, but its influence
in the higher echelons of the party had decreased, and its opinion did not count
for as much as it once did. Findinski further added that during a visit to the DRV
a Chinese parliamentary delegation tried to push the Vietnamese friends to
activate military struggle in the South. However, according to one of the
Vietnamese leaders, the Vietnamese friends did not agree with the Chinese in
this matter.34
As a result the Chinese delegations visit to the DRV did not produce any
significant results. The Soviet embassy described the visit as taking place in
circumstances of a struggle between two distinct tendencies: on the one
hand, the tendency to keep the close, friendly relations between the DRV
and China, and on the other hand, the aspiration of the Vietnamese to secure
a certain distance between the Lao Dong and the CCP, and to follow a
middle line, manoeuvring between the CPSU and the CCP; moreover, the
second tendency from our point of view, is gradually getting the upper
hand.35
To judge by these comments, Moscow seemed quite content with the Lao Dongs
effort to stay somewhere in the middle between themselves and the Chinese.
Soviet embassy analysts explained the great attention attached to the timing of
the visit and argued that the Chinese had picked the 13th anniversary of the PRC
in order to get as much publicity as possible. The facts that the meetings between
the Vietnamese and Chinese were colder than one should have expected, and
that the Vietnamese speeches were less overwhelming than the ones held by the
Chinese, and not least what Moscow saw as Ung Van Khiems attempts to show
his friendly feelings towards the Soviet Union during the Chinese visit were all
taken as signs that the Vietnamese were not yet completely incorporated into the
Chinese sphere.36 When comparing the visit to a similar event in North Korea,
Moscow underlined that during that visit the Chinese delegation was much
warmer towards its host.37
According to the Vietnamese, the Chinese delegation came to the DRV to
consolidate Chinas position in the country, [. . . ] but we told them that Vietnam
supports and is ready to support relations not only with China, but also with the
Soviet Union and other countries in the Socialist camp.38 Apparently,
Vietnamese and Soviet views on the visit of the Chinese parliamentary delegation concurred. The delegation did not make a strong impact either on DRV
public opinion or on the Lao Dong leaders. That was underlined by the fact that
the Vietnamese leaders supposedly told the Chinese that they wanted to keep a
certain distance to the CCP and rather follow a course in between the CCP and
the CPSU. The Soviet embassy was, of course, satisfied with such an attitude and
added that the Chinese leadership, apparently, did not completely disapprove of
the Lao Dong policy in the current situation.39

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The Polish ambassadors analysis of the Vietnamese situation was further

confirmed in Tovmasyans conversations with Duong Bac Mai. Duong was a
member of the Political Committee of the DRV National Assembly and deputy
director of the Department in the Central Committee of the Lao Dong on questions related to the Home Front, but in this context his most important role was
that of deputy leader of the SovietVietnamese Friendship Society. He was
among the pro-Soviet elements within the Lao Dong and until he passed away in
1964 Duong had regular contact with the Soviet ambassadors in Hanoi. In meetings with the Soviet ambassador Duong talked about how the whole leadership of
the Lao Dong, with only a few exceptions, were pro-China. Those who supported
China were among the most powerful members of the Central Committee of the
Politburo and included figures such as Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Hoang Van Hoan,
Xuan Thuy, and, not least, Truong Chinh.40
In contrast, those who supported the Soviet Union did not hold as prominent
positions. Within the Politburo nobody except Ho Chi Minh openly supported the
Soviet Union. Of the members Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap and Nguyen
Duy Trinh were considered to be on friendly terms with the Soviets, but they all
preferred to keep their sympathies quiet. According to Duong, it was only thanks
to the position of President Ho Chi Minh that the Lao Dong CC did not overtly
support the Chinese point of view. A short while earlier Ho had stopped an
attempt to begin public criticisms of the Soviet Union based on a Chinese pattern.
However, comrade Ho Chi Minh was already an old man, and many questions
were decided above his head. His weak theoretical education made him lack the
necessary focus in certain situations.41
Eager to turn around the pro-Chinese trend, Duong Bac Mai suggested that the
Soviet Union increase its economic assistance to the DRV. He underlined that he
now talked as a friend of the Soviet Union and the CPSU and that he, and many
others, did not want to see relations between the DRV and the Soviet Union, or
between the Lao Dong and the CPSU, deteriorate, and therefore they would do
everything in their power to avert the current development of events. At the
same time we begged, Mai emphasized, that the CPSU would give us all
possible support in this regard .42
The different views on the future of Vietnam would soon change the relationship between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing. In spite of both the internal Soviet
suggestions to give more active assistance to the Vietnamese and the pleas from
Soviet-friendly elements within the Lao Dong, Moscow was not willing to
engage itself deeper in the Vietnamese situation in late 1962. The strong Chinese
presence was probably one reason. Although it was important to Moscow to keep
updated on developments in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, the Soviet Union
apparently did not view the increasing Chinese influence in Vietnam as an acute
threat to future good relations between themselves and the Vietnamese. Nor did
they seem to look at the division of the Vietnamese into distinct pro-Soviet and
pro-Chinese factions as an opportunity for increased influence. Whether that was
a result of Moscows pure ignorance of the ongoing developments in Vietnam, a
belief that it would be correct to allow the Chinese the main influence in the

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125

country, or simply a result of extensive Soviet engagement in other parts of the

world during the autumn of 1962 is difficult to say. However, it is plausible that
the combination of Soviet foreign policy challenges during the autumn of 1962,
such as the Cuba crisis, and the lack of proper understanding of the situation in
Vietnam steered Soviet attention away from the Indochina peninsula.
During 1963 and early 1964, Moscows dependence on other Socialist countries in Hanoi became even stronger. The main reason for this was that from the
spring of 1963 Hanoi took another large step towards China, and in December
that year the Vietnamese Communists had completely abandoned Soviet ideas on
reunification and sought the full support of the PRC. The Soviet dependence on
the other Socialist countries adds an interesting aspect to the overall analysis of
the SovietVietnamese relationship. It shows that from this time onwards the
Soviet Unions policy towards Vietnam was strongly influenced by the
Vietnamese reluctance to provide information, and Moscow found itself in a
reactive, rather than in an active, role vis--vis the Hanoi leadership. The Soviet
Union was now more of a spectator to events in Vietnam.

Hanois turn to China

The new Vietnamese foreign policy line changed the nature of the relationship
between Moscow and Hanoi, which is best reflected in the changing circumstances for Soviet embassy officials, especially to those stationed in Hanoi and
Beijing. In Beijing meetings with both Vietnamese and Chinese officials now
became both short and rare, and the Soviets depended even more on the accounts
of other Socialist countries ambassadors to obtain the necessary information on
developments in Vietnam. In Hanoi the Soviet ambassador had regular meetings
with top North Vietnamese officials with about the same frequency as in previous
years. Meetings with Chinese representatives, however, seem to have ceased
completely during 1963.
During 1963, pro-Chinese members of the North Vietnamese leadership
increased their influence in both domestic and foreign policy-making, and by
early 1964 the Soviet embassy could only conclude that the leaders in Hanoi
were now mainly pro-Chinese.43 At the same time the ideological conflict
between Moscow and Beijing further intensified, and from China Soviet embassy
officials reported an increasing number of Soviet criticisms coming through
representatives of other Socialist countries. But although the relationship with
Beijing deteriorated, this apparently did not have an immediate influence on
practical relations between Moscow and Hanoi. In both 1962 and 1963 several
Soviet delegations visited the DRV and were well received by the Vietnamese.
During such visits the Vietnamese always emphasized that they intended to
reunify their country through peaceful means while giving the delegates the
impression that apart from the Soviet Union, no other country could assist them
in fulfilling that goal.44
The attitudes and impressions brought back to Moscow by different delegations
visiting the DRV during these years bear witness of a Vietnamese leadership

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eager to hold on to the Soviet link in spite of their intimate relationship with
China. But were these perceptions based on Vietnamese propaganda, or did they
represent a more ambivalent attitude indicating Vietnamese difficulties with
regard to the growing Sino-Soviet differences? Although little is so far known
about discussions between the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions in Vietnam,
reports from the Soviet embassy in Hanoi show that many of the Vietnamese
pronounced their continued belief in the Soviet Union and encouraged the Soviet
ambassador to advance pleas for more Soviet assistance to the DRV.45 Clearly,
with the possibility of a large-scale war with the Americans lurking in the
shadows, the Lao Dong leaders were bound to evaluate which of the larger
Communist powers could give them the necessary wartime assistance.
With the obvious changes in Vietnamese policies it is necessary to ask why
Hanoi went from a middle position to a complete adherence to Beijing during
1963 and early 1964. The change did not occur from one day to another but
developed in stages. In January 1963 the Czechoslovak President, Antonin
Novotny, visited the DRV. During his stay he issued a joint statement together
with Ho Chi Minh that endorsed peaceful coexistence. The Soviet embassy
viewed the visit as an important event that drew the Vietnamese Workers Party
closer to the CPSU.46 However, almost a year later, after the Ninth Plenum in
December 1963, the pro-Chinese elements within the Lao Dong Politburo eased
Ung Van Khiem out of office because he had endorsed the statement after
Novotnys visit.47 Shortly after the conclusion of the visit, influencial proChinese forces in the Lao Dong had, according to the Polish embassy in Hanoi,
started an active campaign to decrease the political significance of the DRV
Czechoslovak communiqu.48 This, along with several other examples, shows
how the climate between the Soviet Union and the DRV was worsening as
relations between China and the Soviet Union declined. The negative effect of
the Novotny visit was the first stage in the Vietnamese turn to Beijing.
Liu Shaoqis state visit to the DRV in May 1963 represents the second stage in
Hanois turn to China. Shortly before Lius visit, in late April, Ung Van Khiem
was expelled from the DRV leadership. According to Soviet ambassador
Tovmasyan, Khiem was expelled owing to his known sympathies with the
CPSU. It happened quite fast and just in time for the Chinese visit. Tovmasyan
characterized it as a present for the Chinese.49 Analysing the official communiqu issued after the visit, the Soviet ambassador argued that the Lao Dong had
now taken large steps towards the CCP on several issues and had even contradicted some of their previous positions. However, the communiqu did not
represent anything fundamentally new in the position of the Lao Dong.
Moreover, the absence of a statement of full agreement between the Lao Dong
and the CCP suggested that there were still disagreements between the two on
several issues. In an analysis of the visit, Soviet diplomats, in spite of the obvious
pro-Chinese attitudes in Vietnam, claimed to see possibilities for a continued
good relationship between Moscow and Hanoi.50
In an assessment of the results of Liu Shaoqis discussions in Vietnam the
embassy primarily underlined the Lao Dongs further deviation from the

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middle position between the Soviet and the Chinese Communist parties and
its slipping over to the Chinese position within the international Communist
movement. The fact that the Lao Dong now accepted the open polemic between
Communist parties and allowed the Chinese and pro-Chinese to conduct a
widespread campaign among the Vietnamese people against the CPSU and
Soviet views was a source of great concern. Tovmasyan also emphasized the
strengthened position of the pro-Chinese elements within both the Lao Dong
and the DRV leadership and the further advancement of Le Duans role.
However, he concluded his report saying that there were still disagreements
between the Lao Dong leadership and the Chinese, and that the Vietnamese
even expressed limited discontent with the strong CCP attacks on us [the
Soviet Union], which brought forth a limited reaction within the ranks of the
Lao Dong.51
On the North Vietnamese, side Liu Shaoqis visit was only one element in a
long chain of events. During the spring of 1963 the relationship between
Moscow and Hanoi went through a significant change. In late February the
DRV foreign ministry presented a document describing the future political
course of the DRV towards South Vietnam. The document was prepared for the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong and the DRV government
by the DRV foreign ministry. It emphasized that in 1963 the NLF(SV) would
have to increase and activate both its military and political forces and that one
now had to relate to the possibility that the war in South Vietnam could be a
war of the Korean type.52
Such a situation also implied the need for more outside assistance, especially
from the other Socialist countries. In early May 1963 the Vietnamese complained
that Moscow had already turned down three requests for material assistance. In
spite of the close relationship with the Chinese the Vietnamese were still
dependent on Soviet assistance. The South Vietnamese forces need for foreign
currency was the background for another request to the Soviets this time for
1 million US dollars. Holding that request up against Chinese assistance, Nguyen
Van Vinh talked about how China was the main provider of weapons, and how
the Chinese prepared, especially for the Vietnamese, foreign weapon models for
use in the South. As a follow-up to that he wondered why the Soviet Union
granted monopoly to one country?53
These statements indicated, according to the Southeast Asia Department in the
Soviet foreign ministry, that within the Lao Dong leadership there was general
agreement that it was only China which indeed helped the South Vietnamese
patriots in their struggle. This opinion was further strengthened through the
overt Chinese propaganda campaign to increase anti-Soviet emotions among
the North Vietnamese population and thereby worsen SovietDRV relations. The
strong anti-Soviet propaganda did, from Moscows point of view, misrepresent
Soviet policies with regard to South Vietnam. Moscows policy was reunification
based on the 1954 Geneva agreement; it gave the people broad moral-political
support, also in economic and military terms, by strengthening the DRV as a base
for reunification of the whole country.54

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From May 1963 moral-political support was no longer enough for either Hanoi
or the NLF or, for that matter, the Chinese. Throughout the summer and autumn
of that year Vietnamese requests for Soviet aid become more overt, and the
requests were often followed by severe criticisms for not providing enough
assistance to the Vietnamese in their fight to reunify the country. Notwithstanding the accusations that Moscow only provided moral support for the
Vietnamese struggle, indications in available Soviet documents suggest that the
Vietnamese did receive weapons from the Soviet Union sometime in the late
summer of 1963.55 Thus, in late August 1963, when the Vietnamese ambassador
to the Soviet Union, Nguyen Van Kinh, asked Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Sergei Georgevich Lapin, whether the Soviet Union intended to take some
measure of action in order to support the struggle of the South Vietnamese
patriots, it is possible that Moscow, in military terms, already was in the process
of delivering the requested supplies.56
While Hanoi was eager to secure more practical support from Moscow, an
equally important concern was the Soviet role with regard to a possible fulfilment of the Geneva agreement. The Vietnamese ambassador handed over a
message from President Ho Chi Minh with regard to the role of the Geneva
co-chairmen and the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. The Deputy
Foreign Minister assured Nguyen Van Kinh that he would look at the letter from
Ho Chi Minh and make sure that the Soviet press would do its best to throw light
on the situation in South Vietnam. After Lapins reassurances the ambassador
said that the DRV planned to send a delegation to the Soviet Union in order to
discuss the problems in the South as soon as possible.57 The Soviets and
Vietnamese had already discussed the plans for a DRV delegation to the Soviet
Union several times, but the Vietnamese kept delaying the trip for different
reasons. The final outcome was the delegation led by Le Duan to Moscow in
January and February 1964.58
In the period leading up to the 9th Plenum of the Lao Dong in December 1963
Soviet diplomats in Hanoi were constantly fed information about the closeness of
the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. But in spite of the tales of a watertight alliance, there were also many signs that the Vietnamese resisted full dependence on
the Chinese. According to the Soviet embassy, the DRV would not necessarily
follow the Chinese immediately if they should opt for a total and final break with
the Soviet Union. Hanoi was still too afraid of being left alone without assistance
from the Socialist camp. The fear that China would virtually absorb Vietnam was
apparent even Le Duan feared that. In a rather sarcastic comment on the
Vietnamese situation, Tovmasyan said to his Czechoslovak colleague, They [the
Vietnamese] can say no to cultural exchange with us, and thus avoid ideological
influence, as some among the Vietnamese talk about, but economic assistance,
on the other hand, they accept with pleasure.59
And the DRV really needed economic assistance from Moscow in 1963. The
Plenum had already been delayed several times, apparently because of the difficult
economic situation in the country. Individuals in the party leadership were also
afraid that the official course they were about to approve at the Plenum could

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deprive them of all future economic assistance from the Soviet Union. And as
more and more Vietnamese came to understand that the increased Chinese influence on the Lao Dong had seriously worsened the economic situation in the
country, they also realized that it would not be very wise to separate themselves
from the Soviet Union. Some comrades even wondered what the United States
would do in South Vietnam if the DRV were to depend only on the Chinese?60
But in spite of these allegations that many of the Vietnamese were well aware
that the only possible partner, in terms of both economic and military capacity, in
case of an American invasion, was the Soviet Union, Hanoi continued on its
current course and made its final step towards China in December 1963.

Moscow and the result of the 9th Plenum of the Lao Dong
According to historian King C. Chen, the Vietnamese made three major decisions
that led to the eventual resumption of arms in South Vietnam. The first was the
decisions of the 15th Plenum in January 1959, the second was the resolutions of
the 3rd Congress in September 1960, and the third and final step towards military
struggle in the South was the resolutions of the 9th Plenum held in December
1963.61
It was during the 9th Plenum that the Lao Dong took its last step away from
Moscows foreign policy line. In his main speech to the Plenum delegates, Le
Duan dismissed the Soviet strategy for the Socialist camp as defensive and
recommended Maos theory of revolutionary war. However, in spite of his enthusiasm for Maos concept of protracted armed struggle as a model strategy for
many Communists in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Le Duan did not pledge
to follow the Maoist model in Vietnam itself. According to Chinese historian
Qiang Zhai, Le Duan did not want an open break with the Soviet party, even if he
disagreed with Moscows international position.62 The participants at the 9th
Plenum voted unanimously in favour of its resolution. Ung Van Khiem, the only
member of the Central Committee who could have voted against the resolution,
was, according to one source, ill during the vote. Thus, from December 1963 the
leadership in Hanoi was 100 per cent pro-China; however, the main difference
between the Vietnamese and the Chinese was that Hanoi had not yet officially
attacked the Soviet Union.63
Many in the Vietnamese leadership were sceptical of the current developments
and approached the Soviets to express their concerns. One major concern was the
economic situation in Vietnam, which had gradually deteriorated since Luo
Shaoqis visit in May 1963. In addition, there was much concern about the prospects for fruitful results from the upcoming meetings in Moscow between Soviet
and Vietnamese leaders. The resolutions approved during the Plenum, the nationwide study of these and not least the composition of the delegation heading for
Moscow did not hint at useful results coming out of the discussions in Moscow.64
In the midst of the Plenum, on Christmas Day 1963, Ho Chi Minh invited the
Soviet ambassador to a friendly lunch with himself, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong
and Xuan Thuy. At the end of the meal Ho Chi Minh announced his retirement to

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the ambassador. Because of his high age he claimed to have reached 74 Ho

had decided that it was time to retire. From now on he would concentrate on
visiting different parts of the country, meet with children and peasants and also
occasionally visit the Soviet ambassador to keep him informed about important
matters. In connection with his retirement Ho told the ambassador that Le Duan
would be in charge of party-related affairs, Pham Van Dong would deal with
governmental issues, Xyan Thuy would be in charge of foreign affairs, and
national assembly-related issues would be the responsibility of Truong Chinh.65
Ho Chi Minhs retirement announcement should probably be seen in connection
with events during the 9th Plenum itself. Ho Chi Minh biographer William J.
Duiker argues that Ho must have had serious reservations about the new strategy
to be adopted in South Vietnam. Because he had always argued in favour of
balancing relations with Moscow and Beijing, Ho clearly rejected a policy of
exclusive reliance on China. However, when the anti-Soviet tone in the speeches
reached a climax, Ho, according to Duiker, left the conference hall quietly to
smoke a cigarette. Apparently Ho did not use his vote during the Plenum, and
the question remains whether he had been intimidated into silence by the new
Lao Dong leadership.66
Was Ho Chi Minhs so-called retirement a result of the strategy changes
during the Plenum? And why did Ho announce his retirement to the Soviet
ambassador in this fashion? It certainly is possible that this was Ho Chi Minhs
way of warning the Soviet ambassador of his decreasing influence in Hanois
policy-making and also a warning of what would come out of the 9th Plenum.
Hos continued emphasis on a good relationship with the Soviet Union did to
some extent make him the last obstacle to those in favour of a full dependence on
China. Still, Ho was not the only member of the Politburo who was reluctant to
burn all bridges with Moscow. Even though the majority of Politburo members
were clearly pro-Chinese in their attitudes, a large faction was still conscious of
the need to avoid a complete break with Moscow.67
In an effort to achieve more support from the Soviet Union, the North
Vietnamese sent a delegation to Moscow in February 1964. The timing for this
trip had been difficult, and it had been delayed several times, most likely due to
the postponement of the 9th Plenum. In addition to Le Duan, the delegation
consisted of Le Duc Tho and the revolutionary poet To Huu.68 As always, the
Vietnamese delegation stopped in Beijing and held a meeting with the Chinese
before heading for the Soviet capital. During the meetings with Mao, Le Duan
reported that the purpose of the trip to the Soviet Union was to explain the Lao
Dongs position after the 9th Plenum to the Soviet leaders and ascertain Soviet
policies. He added that Ho Chi Minh had already decided not to issue a joint
communiqu with the Soviets at the end of the visit. Mao did, of course, use the
opportunity to disparage the Russians and warned Le Duan that Moscows main
goal was to cut some kind of political deal with the United States and therefore
would put pressure on them (China) in order to let the United States know that
they are tough toward China but friendly toward the United States. Le Duans
meeting with Mao took place during a time when the CCP chairman directed the

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131

full force of his propaganda machine to public condemnation of the Soviet

Union.69
At a reception hosted by the Soviet embassy in Hanoi before the delegation
left for Moscow, Le Duan stated that in meetings with the Soviet leaders the
DRV delegation would openly argue their points of view on all basic issues with
regard to the international development and the international Communist movement, even on those questions where we disagree with the CPSU.70 By the time
the delegation reached Moscow, however, Le Duans staunch attitude had been
somewhat modified, and according to Tovmasyan, who was present during the
meetings, the DRV delegation and, in particular, Le Duan had been very
reserved.71
In addition to the somewhat staunch Vietnamese attitude, Soviet behaviour
during the meetings may also have contributed to a generally bad negotiating
environment. In late February 1964, after the delegation had returned from
Moscow, the Polish ambassador in Hanoi disclosed to the Soviet ambassador
what he had heard about the Moscow meetings. Apparently Khrushchev had, in a
joking manner, presented himself to the Vietnamese as the main revisionist,
whereas Suslov had referred to himself as the Stalinist. According to the Pole,
Khrushchevs many jokes over this matter had not been well accepted by the
Vietnamese. Judging by Tovmasyans comments, Le Duan strove not to add to
the worsening of relations between the two parties, but it was often difficult to
separate his position from that of the Chinese when he expressed his views on
different issues. But the meetings had, according to Tovmasyan, been useful, in
spite of certain disagreements.72
Even on the Vietnamese side the meetings were defined as a success. In
conversations with the Soviet ambassador, the Vietnamese claimed that Le Duan
greatly appreciated the results of the meetings.73 But that was not entirely true.
From a Vietnamese point of view Le Duans trip to Moscow was a failure. If the
intention had been to explain the decisions reached at the 9th Plenum and then
appeal to the Soviets for the necessary assistance to continue their armed struggle
in the South, Le Duan left Moscow with nothing. At that point Moscow was only
willing to provide moral support, but did, however, not exclude future cooperation if Hanois attitude towards Moscows views changed.74 Judged by the harsh
tone in meetings between Soviet and Vietnamese officials in Hanoi after Le
Duans trip to Moscow, and the Polish account of Khrushchevs attitude, the
Soviet tone towards the Vietnamese had been rather patronizing. If they tried to
persuade the Vietnamese to follow the Soviet foreign policy line, they did not
succeed but only made the SovietVietnamese relationship deteriorate even
further.
According to Ilya Gaiduk, Soviet influence in Vietnam fell to its post-1954
nadir with the resolutions of the 9th Plenum and remained frozen from the visit of
the North Vietnamese delegation to Moscow in January 1964 until the start of the
hot war in the Tonkin Gulf six months later.75 Judging by the lack of top-level
interest from the Soviet side during this period such an observation would be
correct, but in bilateral relations the local-level diplomacy in this case the role of

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Soviet diplomats in the DRV also plays an important role. In particular, the diplomats through their interactions with Vietnamese officials and their analysis of
developments in the country at large contribute to the overall perceptions of the
other party. During 1963 there were many examples of how several of the Vietnamese leaders strove to maintain a working relationship with the Soviet Union;
the case of Ho Chi Minh himself, and his reluctance to rely exclusively on Chinese
assistance, might well be the prime example that relations were not as frozen as one
could be led to believe by considering only interactions at the very top level.76

The tide is turning

Parallel to the decision made at the 9th Plenum to continue armed struggle in
South Vietnam, the DRV leaders signalled to their Soviet and East European
allies that they were willing to consider negotiations, or at least explore the
possibility through the Poles, to neutralize Vietnam. On one occasion in early
January 1964 Pham Van Dong expressed, we want South Vietnam to be liberated with the help of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. The DRV is
positive to Vietnamese neutralization, just like we have earlier informed the
Soviet and Polish government, but the conditions are not yet ripe .77
In the period immediately following the Le Duan delegations visit to
Moscow, the climate between Soviet diplomats and Vietnamese officials in
Hanoi did seem rather tense. Unfortunately, many of the conversations during the
spring of 1964 remain classified, and researchers are not allowed to view these.
However, from the documents available, Laos once again stands out as a major
discussion topic between the Soviet and the Vietnamese. The Poles suggested a
new Geneva conference on Laos, and so did the French. The North Vietnamese
were ready for a new conference on Laos but rejected a Chinese proposal that the
situation in all of Indochina should be the subject of discussion.78 Moscow was
positive to convene a new conference on Laos.79
At the same time, during the spring and early summer of 1964, the unstable
situation in Indochina was a growing concern among the Soviet leaders. As long
as the Vietnamese were determined to follow their policy of military struggle to
reunify the country, a full-scale war with South Vietnamese and American troops
remained the most likely scenario. In an attempt to warn the Vietnamese, the
Soviet government issued a statement on 27 July, in which they threatened to
resign as co-chairman of the Geneva conference on Laos.80 The Vietnamese soon
responded to this statement and insisted that the Soviet Union remain in the post
as co-chair. Under the cover that they worried about the negative effect a Soviet
withdrawal would have on the people of Laos, Le Duc Tho argued that the problems in Laos should be solved at a possibly forthcoming Geneva conference.81
Undoubtedly, the Vietnamese worried that if the Soviets were to give up the post
as co-chair, they would completely disengage from the region and leave Hanoi
with no other alternatives than to further develop their alliance with China.
From mid-July it is possible to detect a more positive tone between the Soviet
embassy and North Vietnamese officials. Embassy officials claimed to see an

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133

increase in articles on the Soviet Union in the DRV press, which was interpreted
as a positive sign; the Lao Dong leaders also seemed gradually more relaxed in
the company of Soviet officials in Vietnam.82 The signs of improvement came
shortly before the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin. In less than a week after the
Tonkin incident Pham Van Dong emphasized to Soviet charg daffaires Privalov the importance of exchanging opinions in the current situation. We really
do have a war going in our country, Pham Van Dong said to Privalov.83 Shortly
after, in the second half of August, the Soviet embassy seems to have facilitated
contact between UN Secretary General U Thanth, who forwarded an American
proposal for negotiations between Washington and Hanoi, and Pham Van Dong.
The Vietnamese were not against such a proposal but underlined that from their
point of view the best solution was to meet at a conference in Geneva or in a
neutral country that both agree upon.84
During the autumn of 1964 Moscow clearly fought back against the Chinese
influence. There was much emphasis on the increase in disagreements between
the Vietnamese and the Chinese, and among the Lao Dong leaders there was
growing concern that the Chinese would not be able to stand up against a fully
fledged American attack on Vietnam. The Vietnamese had begun to realize that
without cooperation with the Soviet Union it would be impossible to guarantee
the safety of Vietnam, since China did not have the necessary economic strength.
Such worries had been expressed by the Vietnamese during a meeting between
Communist parties from the Far East and Southeast Asia in China sometime in
late August.85
By November Moscows view on support to the Vietnamese had visibly
changed. As we have already seen, Moscows change of heart was the result of a
long process. During the spring and summer of 1964, Soviet diplomats and
Vietnamese officials in Hanoi had resumed a more normal level of contact. The
most important subjects of conversation during that period were the Soviet
threats to resign as co-chairman of the Geneva conference, the question of a new
conference to solve the deteriorating situation in Laos and the question of
whether such a conference could possibly also include sessions on South
Vietnam. The climate between the Soviets and Vietnamese in Hanoi improved
significantly from mid-1964 onwards.
The ultimate sign that relations had improved was the decision to establish
a permanent mission of the NLV(SV) in Moscow. The invitation came on
24 December, during the visit of an NLF delegation to the Soviet Union. On the
day before the invitation, the DRV ambassador to the Soviet Union, Nguyen Van
Kinh, told Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Lapin that the establishment of an
NLFSV mission in Moscow would be very important for the strengthening of the
Fronts international authority.86

From disinterest to active support

Since the early 1960s Soviet representatives in Hanoi and Beijing had kept
reassuring themselves, and not least Moscow, that although several important

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figures within the Vietnamese leadership showed clearly pro-Chinese

sympathies, as an overall tendency they still remained loyal to the Soviet Union
as the ultimate leader of the Socialist camp. That notion was further supported
through conversations with pro-Soviet elements within the Lao Dong. But after
Chinese Premier Luo Shaoqis visit to the DRV in May 1963, and the resolutions
made at the 9th Plenum in December that year, it became increasingly difficult
for Soviet embassy officials to keep up the image of a Vietnamese leadership that
worked independently of Beijing. By the end of 1963 the last obstacle to a
completely pro-Chinese attitude within the Lao Dong, namely Ho Chi Minh
himself, seems to have lost most of his influence on party policies.
The incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964 transformed the Soviet
view on Vietnams importance. The small country in Southeast Asia and its
never-ending battle for reunification and independence had now become the
centre of Cold War superpower rivalry. By the end of 1964 the Soviet Union had
assumed the position of the DRVs main provider of military and economic aid
and advice and had made a complete turnaround from their previous position
with sole emphasis on diplomacy and negotiations. Within less than a year
Moscows involvement in Vietnam had changed from disillusionment and disinterest to active involvement. What was the reason behind this policy change on
the Soviet side?
In the DRV a corresponding change had taken place. In February 1964, while
Le Duan was meeting with Soviet leaders in Moscow, the distrust between the
Soviets and the Vietnamese was obvious to all participants, especially due to the
Soviet reluctance to assist the Vietnamese in their military strategies. Le Duans
position during the Moscow meetings further emphasized the strong Chinese
influence in DRV politics. So why did the leaders in Hanoi, shortly after such a
strong declaration of alliance with the Chinese, turn away from Beijing and
towards Moscow? To some extent the change of heart that took place in Hanoi
and Moscow during the summer and autumn of 1964 were the result of longer
processes within the two parties, but more importantly, it was a response to
the deteriorating security situation in Vietnam, more precisely the threat of an
immediate US intervention.
Hanois main reason for reigniting its alliance with the Soviet Union was
twofold: first, the Vietnamese leaders had realized that the Americans were now
about to escalate their involvement in Vietnam to an extent that would most likely
develop into a full-scale war. The only possible and reliable ally in such a situation
would be the Soviet Union. China had the manpower but not the sophisticated
weapons necessary to fight the Americans. Second, leaders in Hanoi were afraid
that sole dependence on the Chinese would provide fewer alternatives in a time of
war. Leaders in Beijing completely refused to even consider any form of negotiations, whereas the Soviet Union had already signalled that it was positive to, and
even could contribute to, a negotiated solution to the situation in Vietnam if that
proved possible. Thus, it might have been Moscows more positive attitude
towards future negotiations, combined with a growing willingness to provide the
Vietnamese with supplies for the war, that turned the tide from Beijing to Moscow.

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135

The background for the Soviet change of mind consists of three major issues
that to a large degree coincide with Hanois state of mind: first, the gradual realization that the Americans really were about to invade Vietnam, and that the
Vietnamese leaders now needed large amounts of outside support to counter the
American invasion. Moscow realized that no one but the Soviet Union could
provide that kind of assistance. Second, the Sino-Soviet relationship had now
fully collapsed and, with it, the cooperation in support for Vietnam. If the Soviets
wanted to retain any control over developments in Vietnam, they would have to
engage themselves in the country in spite of the possible damage to their relationship with the West. Third, Chinas political strategy was significantly radicalized
through 1963 and 1964, and Moscow was afraid that the strategy Beijing recommended to the Vietnamese could seriously hurt any chances of a reasonable
outcome in the conflict in Vietnam.
Together, these three factors played a significant role in Moscows decision to
support the Vietnamese struggle against the American aggressors. However, it is
important to keep in mind that the changes in strategy and priorities taking place
in both Moscow and Hanoi constituted a gradual process that began sometime
during the summer of 1964 and was due as much to Vietnamese initiatives as to a
more sudden change of mind among the Soviet leaders. Even though relations
between Moscow and Hanoi cooled for a period lasting a little less than a year,
channels of contact were soon reopened once the two states realized that they
were fighting to reach a common goal.

Conclusions: Changing alliances

The DRV will have to deal with the American imperialists on their own.1
Chinese official to Kosygin, Spring 1965

Hanois change of heart starting in mid-1964, and its newfound preference for
Moscow over Beijing, must have been a severe disappointment to the Chinese
leaders. For more than fifteen years, even before the establishment of the PRC in
October 1949, and the subsequent Chinese recognition of the DRV, the CCP
provided assistance to the Vietnamese Communists in their struggle against the
French. In 194950 Stalin encouraged Mao to take particular responsibility for
developments in Vietnam. Beijings central role as the provider of practical aid
and advice to the DRV continued after the temporary division of Vietnam in late
1954 and was an important part of Soviet foreign policy strategy towards the
region. Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam continued well into the early 1960s
but broke down as a result of the deterioration in the Sino-Soviet relationship.
Until the spring of 1963 leaders in Moscow believed that Soviet relations with
Hanoi were in reasonably good shape. That assumption was wrong. The DRV
leaders had already been tilting towards China for a while, and by the end of the
year the leadership in Hanoi was fully integrated into the Chinese sphere of
interest. However, Hanois full China orientation lasted only for a short
period of the year at most, and when the Lao Dong leadership, from the early
autumn of 1964, began moving towards Moscow, it was Beijings turn to worry,
especially about its own future role in Vietnam.
The new Soviet approach to Hanois struggle, and Moscows decision to
actively support Hanoi in its military struggle for reunification, soon created new
problems in the triangular relationship between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing. The
source of Beijings concern was the ongoing rapprochement between Moscow
and Hanoi. While on the one hand the Chinese were satisfied with Moscows
turnabout and their decision to support Vietnam, on the other they were reluctant
to accommodate the Soviets in their efforts to ship supplies to the DRV.
The Chinese attitude was illustrated by Beijings behaviour during the spring
of 1965, when Beijings reluctance to assist the Soviets in their new strategy for
Vietnam became particularly obvious. The Soviet leaders were clearly frustrated

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137

by Beijings lack of cooperation with regard to the transportation of Soviet

military supplies over Chinese territory. The disagreements began already in
February 1965 when a load of Soviet weapons meant for the DRV was held back
at the Sino-Soviet border. To solve the problem Soviet ambassador Shcherbakov
raised the issue with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, who then promised to
take the necessary measures.2 It was, however, unlikely that Pham Van Dong,
in spite of his promises, would be able to solve this issue with the Chinese. The
DRV leaders were in a difficult situation. On the one hand, they desperately
needed the support of the Soviet Union, but on the other, Sino-Soviet disagreements
over this support complicated their relationship with the Chinese, and prevented
vital Soviet assistance from reaching Vietnam.
On the surface, the Chinese problem was the Beijing leaders need to control
all supplies sent to the DRV via Chinese territory. It was a clear demand from
Beijing that they had a right to know what kind of supplies were transported on
their soil. The Chinese demands primarily contributed to numerous delays in the
arrival of Soviet supplies to the DRV. These delays became particularly obvious
in March 1965 when the DRV leaders, to expedite the transfer of military
supplies to Vietnam, specifically asked for the use of aircraft. Moscow agreed,
but Beijing rejected the proposal. In his talks with the Soviet ambassador, Pham
Van Dong was not able to explain the Chinese position. He argued that the
Chinese in principle agreed with the Soviets helping the DRV but that they
might not approve of the methods of the Soviet assistance. He also added that
he had urged the military to negotiate with both the Soviet Union and China on
how to solve the problem of shipping weapons by rail.3 Thus, only one year after
Le Duans fruitless trip to the Soviet capital in February 1964, Moscow had made
a complete turnabout in its view on the need to support the DRV against the
American aggressors. The main problem now was how to arrange the necessary
support to the DRV while at the same time keeping a reasonable balance in the
relationship with the Chinese.
In 1965 Moscow still depended on Beijings assistance to fulfil its promises of
aid to the DRV. The transport controversy illustrates that. Moscows intention to
fully support the DRV could only be undertaken with a minimum of cooperation
from the PRC. At the same time Moscow might still have wanted to include
China as a partner in assisting the Vietnamese, both to simplify its own task and
to present the Communist movement as a tight ship working together to support
the Vietnamese fight for reunification. By implicitly including the Chinese in
their plans for assistance, Moscow could also reduce US attention to its own role
in Vietnam.
However, if Moscows intention was to encourage Chinese participation and
cooperation in Vietnam, the plan did not have an immediate effect. The Chinese
were clearly offended by Soviet claims that they hindered the swift transport of
Soviet aid to Vietnam. Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Zhao emphasized that China
wanted to have an important role in bringing Soviet aid fast to Vietnam and now
felt accused of withholding aid. In spite of the significant increase in assistance
from Moscow to Hanoi the Chinese were still sharp in their criticisms. In Beijing

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in late March the Chinese deputy foreign minister repeatedly asked Soviet
ambassador Chervonenko why Moscow did not provide more assistance to the
DRV, and whether they planned to increase this assistance. However, on his
direct questions on whether the Soviet government intended to send armed forces
and staff to the DRV, and whether they intended to build an airfield in China and
establish an air bridge, the Soviet ambassador replied that in that case such
measures would be presented in a statement from the Soviet government.4
Beijings need for control was not the only reason behind the Sino-Soviet
controversies over aid to the DRV. Most of all the Chinese leaders feared that
Moscow was ready to enter into negotiations with the United States in Vietnam,
and thereby use Vietnam to retain a certain amount of control over China. As a
result, they did not understand why the Soviets were in such a rush to prepare
military measures, if what they really wanted was to negotiate a peaceful solution
to the Vietnamese situation. The Chinese deputy foreign minister asked,
Why, at a time when the American imperialists continue to bomb Vietnam,
keep intensifying the war and the aggressiveness against the DRV, and
threaten us and demand that we surrender, cannot the Socialist countries take
a strong line against the enemy?5
He further added that the Chinese position was not to give in to the enemy, and
that since the morale amongst the Vietnamese was high, the assistance of the
Soviet Union and China was extremely valuable. Therefore negotiations should,
according to the Chinese, be avoided at all costs.6 The reluctance towards negotiations was a result of the duality in Beijings position. On the one hand, they
wanted the war in Vietnam to intensify. On the other, they were inherently suspicious
of all Soviet motives, not least the initiative to negotiate, and viewed them as
being targeted against China.
The duality in the Chinese position was also a problem to the Vietnamese. In
Hanoi the DRV leaders were eager to prevent Sino-Soviet problems from interfering
with their struggle against the United States. In mid-April 1965, when Gromyko
asked DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh about his view on a possible
future top-level meeting between the DRV, PRC and the Soviet Union, the
foreign minister replied that the Chinese wanted two-way meetings between the
Soviet Union and the DRV, and between China and the DRV. According to
Nguyen Duy Trinh, the Chinese argued that due to the existence of different positions
within the Communist camp the Vietnamese friends should discuss their problems
separately with the Soviet Union and China.7 The Vietnamese seem to have been
content with such an arrangement, hoping that, by keeping the rivals separated,
the conflict would not interfere with Hanois war against the United States.
Sino-Soviet disagreements over how to support the Vietnamese in their
struggle for reunification in the 196365 period was part of the reason for
Vietnams ascendancy on Moscows list of foreign policy priorities. During the
1950s and first half of the 1960s, the circumstances in Asia in general, and Indochina
in particular, changed considerably, and so did the Soviet view on Vietnams

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139

significance. Three main factors were particularly central in shaping Soviet

policies towards Vietnam during this period: Vietnamese policies; Soviet relations
with the West and in particular the Americans and, as a part of that, the increased
US engagement in Vietnam; and last, but not least, developments in the Sino-Soviet
relationship. By early 1964 Sino-Soviet relations had collapsed, and with the
possibility of a direct US invasion in Vietnam, Moscow could no longer count on
the Chinese to provide the necessary assistance to Vietnam. The threat of a full-scale
war in Vietnam, making it a hot-spot of the Cold War superpower rivalry,
increased Vietnams importance in Soviet foreign policies and led to active
Soviet involvement starting at the end of 1964.
Thus, by 196465 Moscow had reclaimed its role as the strongest member of
the triangle, and the SovietVietnameseChinese relationship had come full
circle. From late 1964 Hanoi received full support from the Soviet Union both
financially and in terms of weapons and military advice. Although China still
retained an important role due to its proximity to Vietnam, it was no longer in a
position to outbid the Soviets in terms of assistance, especially if the Vietnamese
decided to combine military struggle with negotiations. Moscow now acted as
Hanois main partner in the fight for Vietnamese unification after a downfall
during the strong pro-Chinese era within the Vietnamese Communist leadership.

Establishing a relationship: Moscow and Hanois struggle

While attending a Soviet state banquet in honour of Mao and the signing of the
new Sino-Soviet treaty on 16 February 1950, Ho Chi Minh is reported to have
asked Stalin, albeit in a joking manner, whether Moscow might consider to sign a
treaty along the same lines with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Stalins
response was negative, and Ho left Moscow together with the Chinese delegation
the day after.8 Ho Chi Minhs suggestion, as well as Stalins answer, tell a lot
about the different visions about the future relationship between the Soviet Union
and the DRV at the beginning of the 1950s. While Ho Chi Minh had clear ambitions
of obtaining Stalins assistance for his struggling country, the Soviet leader had
little interest in the situation in Vietnam. The DRV leadership was, in spite of its
active pursuit of Soviet aid and advice, not able to secure Moscows support for a
military struggle to reunify Vietnam in the latter part of the 1950s and during the
first few years of the 1960s.
The core of the SovietVietnamese relationship began with the settlements in
Geneva in the summer of 1954. In classical interpretations, Moscow viewed the
Geneva settlements as a major success. The conference had enabled Moscow to
further international dtente and removed the threat of escalation in Indochina
through American military intervention. In addition, the conference provided
Moscow with the perfect occasion to introduce China as one of the great powers
and possibly also reduce the tensions in Chinas relationship with the West,
especially the United States. More specifically, the conference promoted Soviet
objectives in Europe, as it served as an opportunity to undermine the plans for the
rearmament of Germany within the planned EDC.9

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In the first years after Geneva, Soviet policy makers focused on two particular
issues in Vietnam: first, the reconstruction of the DRV economy and society and,
with it, the development of Socialism in the northern part of Vietnam, and second, the
future reunification of the two zones. The Vietnamese were convinced that the Soviet
Union, and also China, possessed the models Vietnam needed to develop their
country and economy. At the same time it was possible to trace a certain amount of
distrust on the Vietnamese side based on a feeling that neither of the two large powers
really understood the reality of the situation in Vietnam. The Soviet attitude, on the
other hand, was that the Vietnamese, being a younger member of the Socialist camp,
should learn from the more experienced members (in particular the Soviet Union).
These attitudes might serve as one example of how ideology would come to play a
role as part of the SovietVietnamese relationship.
While the DRV leaders looked to the Soviet Union for inspiration in the
reconstruction of the country, the Soviets encouraged the DRV government to
introduce three- and five-year plans for the DRV economy based on a Soviet
model. To develop DRV industry, Moscow provided advisors and skilled
labourers who would educate factory workers and government officials to better
contribute to the reconstruction of the country. In addition. there were also
exchange programmes through which North Vietnamese received training in
different Soviet educational facilities and party schools. Thus, from the mid-1950s
the Soviets made modest attempts to replicate their domestic system in the DRV.
Although this practice took place on a rather small scale, especially due to the
different circumstances in the Soviet Union and the DRV, its very existence justifies
an image of Soviet expansion in the DRV as geo-ideological.10
A new phase in the SovietVietnamese relationship began in the spring of
1956. The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party had both a direct
and an indirect effect on SovietDRV relations. The most visible direct effect
was reflected in the introduction of the new Soviet foreign policy line. Introduced
in 1955 but reemphasized during the Twentieth Congress, the new foreign policy
line with its emphasis on peaceful coexistence was probably one of the main
reasons behind the Soviet decision not to insist on the implementation of
the political provisions of the Geneva agreement. A more indirect effect was
the ideological implications of the revelations of Stalins mistakes during the
congress and its reflections on Sino-Soviet relations. Especially with regard to
land reform and the rectification of errors campaign, comments from Lao Dong
leaders indicate that Khrushchevs denunciation of Stalinism inspired the
Vietnamese Communists to re-examine some of their practices.
The interests of Soviet leaders and Vietnamese Communists with regard to the
future development of Vietnam also diverged. Moscow was satisfied with having a
Socialist regime in North Vietnam and would not assist the Lao Dong if such
assistance could hamper the improvement of SovietAmerican relations. Hanoi, on
the other hand, considered national reunification its main goal and was slowly
realizing that to achieve this goal, Moscow would not be the place to seek support.
One of the major foundations for the SovietVietnamese relationship was a
well-functioning Sino-Soviet economic and military cooperation. Even with the

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141

signing of several agreements on economic and military cooperation between the

Soviet Union and the DRV, Soviet policy makers were inclined to leave most of
the practical assistance to the Chinese. The close cooperation between the
Soviets and the Chinese in Vietnam during the second half of the 1950s was not
without problems, but it was largely successful. Not even the failure to hold the
promised all-Vietnamese elections reduced Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam.
From a DRV point of view this was clearly a beneficial situation, as it had more
to gain from cooperation than competition between the two Communist powers.
In May 1959 Moscow reached a crossroads in its Vietnam policy when the
Hanoi leadership announced its decision to complement the diplomatic struggle
for reunification with a limited military struggle. The change of strategy in Hanoi
was a challenge to Moscow.11 The decision to authorize, and subsequently
expand, an armed insurgency in South Vietnam was made by the Vietnamese
Communists without any active involvement from the Soviet Union and in the
autumn of 1959 provoked serious Soviet concern. Hanois new policies contradicted
the Soviet principle of peaceful coexistence, and together with the Chinese
leaders the Soviets reacted. After conversations with the DRV leaders during
1959 and 1960, in which the Soviets recommended to Hanoi that they maintain a
policy of seeking peaceful reunification of the country, they were under the
impression that the Lao Dong had accepted their advice. Leaders in Moscow were
content that a possibly dangerous situation in Vietnam had been avoided through
cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, who, even at a point when Sino-Soviet
disagreements had become quite acute on other matters, agreed on the need to
contain the impatient Vietnamese and stop their plans for armed struggle.
Thus, by late 1960 the Soviet leaders had several times made known to the
Vietnamese Communists in no uncertain terms that Moscow would not support
an armed struggle for reunification of Vietnam. Moreover, it expected the Lao
Dong leaders to follow its opinion and proceed with the political struggle. But
the Vietnamese Communists had no intention to follow the Soviet line. They
continued to build up their military force in the South, and by 1961 the situation
had changed significantly. The Vietnamese reluctance to follow Soviet and
Chinese advice worried the Soviet leaders, who feared that the aggressiveness of
the Vietnamese could trigger a deeper US involvement in Vietnam. This in turn
could force the Soviets into a situation in which they would have to reconsider
their own position in and strategy towards Vietnam.

Cooperation and coordination: The China factor

From the very beginning of the relationship, Stalin emphasized the important role
of China as the link between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. In Stalins eyes
China would be responsible for guiding the Vietnamese revolution. The fact that
the PRC, less than three months after its own establishment, recognized the DRV
and began to support the Viet Minh in its fight against the French, illustrates how
important the Vietnamese revolution was in the eyes of Chinese leaders. To the
leaders in Hanoi, however, a direct alliance with the Soviet Union would have

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Conclusions: Changing Alliances

been preferable. An alliance with Moscow without the Chinese as intermediaries

would have been advantageous from a North Vietnamese point of view, because
it would satisfy Hanois need for independence from China. In Moscow,
however, the geographical distance and Vietnams lack of strategic importance to
the Soviet Union was a good enough argument to leave responsibility in the area
in the hands of the Chinese.
Communist Chinas entrance onto the scene of international politics in 1954
was a significant event within the Communist camp and contributed to a change
in Moscows view of the situation in Vietnam. During Maos first visit to
Moscow in 1950 Stalin had underlined Chinas important role as the leading
Communist power in Asia, reemphasizing the division of labour he had discussed
with Liu Shaoqi in July 1949. However, Stalins division of labour proposal
should be viewed with some suspicion. It could have been a sincere description
of how Moscow viewed its future position in Asia, with China taking the lead in
that part of the world and the Soviets being content with such a division of
labour. Another possible explanation could be that Stalin, through such a
proposal, wanted to show his trust in the Chinese, while at the same time keeping
a certain amount of control of developments in Asia, through his agent China. An
equally likely explanation, however, is that Stalin wanted to avoid controlling
countries so far away, to minimize Soviet foreign policy risks. Regardless of the
reasons behind Stalins logic in the late 1940s, his thoughts on the respective
roles of Beijing and Moscow would come to have serious implications for the
future relationship between the Soviet Union, China and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.
During the first few years of the 1950s the triangular relationship between
Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing functioned satisfactorily in the view of all three
countries. The DRV received large amounts of assistance through China in the
form of equipment, officers and advice. The Soviet Union could follow the situation in Vietnam from a distance, content with the fact that the aid they provided
through China was well applied and did not harm Moscows relations with more
important Western countries such as France. The PRC secured itself a leading
role in the Communist movement in Asia, acting as provider of equipment,
advice and troops to struggles not only in Korea and Indochina but in several
other countries as well. In the period leading up to the Geneva conference in
1954 the PRC played a much more active role in Vietnam than the Soviet Union
did. Beijings involvement was important to Hanoi because it secured the DRVs
northern border, and to the Soviet Union because it took on responsibilities that
were beyond Soviet capacity, or even choices.
During the Geneva conference itself China played an important role, and the
results of the conference bear witness to a successful Sino-Soviet cooperation.
While the Chinese representatives used their participation at the conference to
learn as much as possible about international diplomacy, the Soviet delegation,
and Molotov in particular, were full of praise with regard to the role of Chinese
chief negotiator Zhou Enlai. Through their quick learning during the conference,
and their ability to influence the Vietnamese, the Chinese had shown themselves

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143

as invaluable partners to Moscow in dealing with Vietnam. This new situation to

some extent enhanced Chinese influence on Soviet policies towards Vietnam and
gave the Chinese more leverage in future Soviet decisions regarding Vietnam.
Hanoi accepted the result of the Geneva conference due to considerable pressure
from both Moscow and Beijing. Although they were not completely satisfied
with the agreement reached at Geneva, the future leaders in North Vietnam
accepted its provisions because a ceasefire and temporary partition of
Vietnam offered several advantages to the Vietminh. One was the possibility
of economic assistance from the Socialist camp, necessary to build Socialism in
North Vietnam. Another was that a ceasefire might contribute to achieving
international recognition also from non-Communist countries. Third, control of
the rice-producing Red River Delta would make the Vietminh able to establish solid
state power in the North and build a base for further revolutionary activities if
that should prove necessary. However, when discussing the 1954 Geneva conference
on later occasions, the Vietnamese and Chinese would jointly accuse the Soviets
of having sold out the Vietnamese national interest for their own benefit.12
Hanois decision from May 1959 to complement the political and diplomatic
efforts for reunification with a military struggle evoked a joint negative response
in Moscow and Beijing. At the time, and well into the early parts of the 1960s,
when disagreements between the Soviets and the Chinese increased, the two
governments agreed on the principle of containing the Vietnamese. Notwithstanding
the common Sino-Soviet interest in avoiding an international crisis in Vietnam,
Khrushchev and Mao had disparate reasons for wanting to contain the Vietnamese.
Moscow was concerned with developments in Europe and anxious not to destroy
a fragile relationship with the West, whereas Beijing was mostly concerned with
its own problematic domestic situation. In the beginning of the 1960s neither of
Hanois two major allies wanted to deal with a potentially dangerous situation in
Vietnam. As a result, they set their differences aside and jointly advised the
Vietnamese to hold on to the strategy of diplomatic struggle to reunify their country.
The 196162 Geneva conference on Laos was where Soviet and Chinese
willingness to put ideological differences aside was most evident. The balance of
power between the Soviet Union and China had changed significantly, and so had
the situation in Indochina. In the seven years since the last Geneva conference
China had strengthened its position within the international Communist movement,
and Hanoi had repeatedly displayed its independence from its two large allies.
From the point of view of an outsider, the union between the Socialist countries
in Geneva would have seemed rather solid. Comments in Soviet documents show
that Moscow was irritated with the way the Chinese acted, but at the same time
they also show that despite this discomfort, the Soviets insisted on continued
Sino-Soviet cooperation with regard to both Laos and Vietnam. Moscow most
certainly wanted to continue its cooperation with a strong Chinese state in Asia.
The negotiations over Laos tested the SovietVietnamese relationship, the
SovietChinese relationship and the Sino-Vietnamese relationship.13 In the
Sino-Soviet case the distrust that had built up on both sides made it difficult to
reconcile views on what constituted a successful conference. However, just like

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Conclusions: Changing Alliances

during the one in 1954, the Soviet Union and China shared one vital common
goal: to prevent further American interference in Indochina. In 1962 there was
only one way to do that, namely to prevent Vietnamese attempts to manipulate
the triangular relationship. That, however, could only be done if Moscow and
Beijing kept their ideological conflict away from mutual relations in Southeast
Asia and worked together to contain the Vietnamese. Soviet policy makers realized
that this could only be achieved in cooperation with the Chinese.
By the end of 1963 the Soviet leaders had to acknowledge that the Hanoi
leadership had been completely absorbed into the Chinese sphere. Although
Moscow initially had wanted the Chinese to take on the major responsibility for
developments in Vietnam, the Soviets had still expected to retain a minimum of
leverage in Hanoi. The increased Chinese influence in the Lao Dong, and with it
the absence of Soviet influence, combined with the growing American engagement
in South Vietnam, was of great concern to the Soviet leadership. The first decisive
step on the road to Beijing came with Chinese Premier Liu Shaoqis visit to the
DRV in May 1963. The second and final step was the resolution adopted by the
Lao Dong Central Committee at its 9th Plenum in December that year. Both
events signalled Hanois readiness to continue armed struggle to reunify Vietnam
with the aid of China, and hence its closeness to the Chinese foreign policy
doctrine. With these developments it became increasingly difficult for Soviet
embassy officials to keep up the image of a Vietnamese leadership that worked
independent of Beijing. By Christmas 1963 the split within the Socialist camp
completely dominated relations between Moscow and Hanoi. The pro-Chinese
Vietnamese leaders were now in charge of Lao Dong policies, while the neutral
and pro-Soviet leaders, and among them Ho Chi Minh, gradually lost influence.
During 1963 and early 1964, Chinese influence in Hanoi reached its highest
level during the almost 15-year-long relationship, and Moscows position was at
a low ebb. This situation was a result of Moscows frustrations with regard to the
SovietVietnamese relationship, the troubles with China and the current international
situation. The Cuban crisis in October 1962 had shaken those in charge of Soviet
foreign policy and made them even more reluctant to involve themselves in
Vietnam. All these factors combined with an overall feeling of resignation made
Moscow decide that for the time being there was nothing it could do with regard
to the Vietnamese situation.
However, while the pro-Chinese Vietnamese gained the upper hand in the Lao
Dong Politburo the Soviets did not withdraw from Vietnam. Officials at the
Soviet embassy in Vietnam continued to work hard to keep the relationship alive.
Such work was welcomed by several Vietnamese Lao Dong leaders who worried
that a total dependence on the Chinese would, in time, hurt the Vietnamese cause
and emphasized to Soviet officials the need for a stronger Soviet involvement in
Vietnam. The problem in 1963 and early 1964 was the discrepancy between the
ideas of those working in Vietnam and those in charge of Soviet policies in
Moscow. In spite of reports that the Soviet Union had many supporters in Vietnam,
Soviet foreign policy makers were reluctant to sacrifice their fragile relationship
with the West for the sake of Vietnam. The Vietnamese leaders had now clearly

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145

chosen the Chinese as their primary allies, and it was now up to China to provide
the necessary assistance.
The change in Soviet policies towards Vietnam came in 1964. From the end of
that year the change was visible to everyone, as Hanoi began receiving large
amounts of Soviet financial and military assistance. However, it is important to
keep in mind that the Soviet change from what might be described as a passive
onlooker to an active participant in the Vietnamese struggle for reunification
began sometime in early summer 1964, with the Tonkin Gulf incident as the final
catalyst. Three main causes can be singled out in an attempt to explain this
change in Soviet policies: first, both Hanoi and Moscow from mid-1964 realized
that the Americans were about to launch a full-scale invasion of Vietnam. The
increased American involvement in Vietnam, represented by the November 1963
assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, the increasing
number of American advisors in South Vietnam and the fact that from early 1964
the Americans virtually ruled South Vietnam as a colony, forced the Soviet
Union to take the situation in Vietnam much more seriously. By mid-1964
Vietnam had become a focal point in the superpower rivalry. Second, cooperation
between the Soviet Union and the PRC had come to a complete stop in all fields,
and Moscow had only limited possibilities for supporting the Vietnamese
through China. Thus, to retain any influence on developments in Vietnam, the
Soviets were forced to engage themselves directly without China serving as an
intermediary. The third and final cause is linked to the internal developments in
China and the Vietnamese understanding of these. In 1964 the radicalization of
Beijings political orientation had reached a point at which it would be impossible
for Hanoi to rely on Chinese assistance exclusively. As a result, by the end of the
year, leaders in Moscow feared that without Soviet assistance and a more active
Soviet involvement, it could become impossible to keep a certain amount of
control over the situation in Vietnam.
One of the Vietnamese reasons for replacing Beijing with Moscow as main
partner was a wish for as many alternatives as possible now that war was coming.
The only partner that could offer several different policy options was the Soviet
Union. Beijings harsh refusal to even consider any form of negotiations only
added to Hanois wish for the Soviet Union as its main ally. Obviously, the
possibility of negotiations with the United States as a means to solve the situation
in both Laos and Vietnam was a much-debated issue between Soviet and Vietnamese
officials in the spring and summer of 1964. Moscow signalled its readiness to
support the DRV in case there were to be negotiations.14 The shift from Beijing
to Moscow was a gradual process that began sometime in mid-1964 and was due
as much to Vietnamese initiatives as to a change of heart among the Soviet leaders.

Explaining changes: Leverage and ideology

In the 15-year period from 1949 to 1964 the SovietVietnamese relationship
went through different stages or phases. These were to a large degree linked to
developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship and Soviet perceptions of the

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Conclusions: Changing Alliances

Chinese role in Vietnam. The changes in relations between these three countries
must be explained through the use of two different, but related approaches: first,
a detailed account based on the basic questions what and why, and second, a
more theoretical analysis accentuating, for instance, the degree of smaller states
leverage on superpower decisions and the validity of ideology as a useful concept
for analysis of international politics.
Hanois active and independent policies in its relations with larger allies give
substance to the idea that during the Cold War a small, or the so-called peripheral,
state could have a significant impact on superpower decisions. Smaller states
could act relatively independently of the superpowers and still obtain support.
The key term in this regard is leverage. The triangular relationship between
Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing is particularly intriguing in that regard because of
the many possible constellations it included. Until the Chinese began questioning
the leading role of the Soviets, the triangle followed the pattern of a hierarchy,
with the Soviet Union on the top, China coming second and Vietnam third, but
with the Soviets leaving the formulation of policies towards Indochina in the
hands of the Chinese. However, as the Chinese gained a more important role
internationally, and post-Stalin leaders began to deviate from what Mao considered
to be the right course, the Chinese began to see themselves on the same level as
the Soviets. As a result the hierarchy between the three states was disturbed, and
the Vietnamese were forced or allowed to deal with two competing patrons.
The Vietnamese initially saw the split as damaging but gradually realized that the
Sino-Soviet rivalry could open up possibilities, allowing them to pursue their
own independent policies.
Before the change in Moscows policy towards Vietnam in 1964 the American
ideas of a strong Soviet influence on the DRV had little basis.15 What neither of
the superpowers realized was the strength in Hanois policies vis--vis both its
allies and its opponents. New sources show that Hanoi had much impact on the
decisions made in Moscow (as well as in Beijing). Lao Dong leaders made their
own decisions and often ignored allied advice that stood in contrast to their own
plans. That approach, however, was not always displayed in active policy-making
but more often through a strategy of withholding essential information that at a
later stage would force the Soviet Union (and occasionally China) to go along
with plans that they would normally not agree to. Hanoi was able to follow this
strategy primarily because Soviet leaders expected the Vietnamese to follow their
lead and take their advice and did not pay necessary attention to information
suggesting otherwise.
While the issue of smaller states leverage on the superpowers policy decisions
can explain the impact of Hanois independence of it allies, the role of ideology
can help explain the changes in alliance partners that took place between the
three states during these years. In the classical interpretations of Cold War
history ideology was often seen in contrast to realism. The basic idea was that
states either pursued ideological goals or were concerned with their security.
With regard to Soviet decision-making during the Cold War, strong evidence
suggests that concerns for expanding state power (security) and promoting

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147

Communist ideology were merged into one body of thinking in which it was
difficult to distinguish one from the other. Ideology became an integrated part of
the Soviet perception of security, and vice versa. The two concepts became mutually
dependent, hence security and ideology defined the framework of Soviet
decision-making. There could, sometimes, be tension between goals derived
from real politik and ideology, but usually both considerations had to be reconciled
before decisive action could be approved.16
Thus ideological beliefs and national interests would not normally stand in
opposition to one another, and the political actor did not have to choose one or
the other way of thinking. Ideologists could differentiate between conduct based
on principles and pragmatic behaviour based on rational calculations, at a given
historical moment. Whereas the first would be aimed at achieving the long-term
goal of a particular order, the second would be more directly concerned with the
short-term survival of a polity. Ideologists would base their final decision on the
opportunities and constraints presented by material reality during the pursuit of
ideologically defined goals, and ideologists in power would know, or quickly
learn, that to obtain the final, long-term goal, ideologies must include technical
prescriptions for their realization. Ideology does not necessarily exclude the use
of reason to determine policies, as many analysts insist.17
In several settings, the 1954 Geneva conference perhaps being the most prominent
example, Moscow sincerely thought that the policy it conducted was in the best
interests of the Vietnamese Communists themselves. As a result, Soviet policy
makers were indifferent to information that suggested the Vietnamese were not
as happy with Soviet decisions as they should have been. It is therefore possible
to view Soviet actions in Vietnam from a different perspective of success,
namely measured on the basis of the current situation in Vietnam, and the Soviet
view of what would benefit the Vietnamese struggle the most at the time. In the
case of Geneva, one should not discard the possibility that Soviet policy makers
reasoned that the results of the conference were appropriate for the current conditions
in the DRV and would, in the long term, from a strategic point of view benefit
both the development of Socialism in Vietnam and the Vietnamese party.
However, such an analysis demands a stronger emphasis on ideology as an
explanatory factor in the SovietVietnamese relationship. It also requires us to
view Soviet policies towards Vietnam as based not only on evaluations of how
this policy would affect Soviet relations with for instance the West but also on a
deeper policy level echoing the basic ideological values of the Soviet state.
However, a major problem when using ideological approaches is to explain
why ideology sometimes matters, while at other times it does not.18 This is also a
problem when using ideology to analyse the triangular relationship between
Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing. Based on the above definition of ideology it is
possible to argue that this was one of the engines pushing forward the triangular
relationship between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing in the mid-1950s. The Soviet
leaders were convinced that the Vietnamese should learn from their experience,
and in many areas Soviet advisors attempted to transmit Soviet ideas and plans to
the Vietnamese leadership. Parallel to this there was a strong conviction among

148

Conclusions: Changing Alliances

the Vietnamese leaders that the Soviet Union and China possessed the models
necessary to build and strengthen Vietnamese society. These mechanisms
explain why practical cooperation between the Soviets and the Chinese with
regard to Vietnam lasted longer than suggested by existing literature and the
growing ideological differences at the time. Even during the early years of
the 1960s when the polemic between Beijing and Moscow was rather strong
and the Soviets had withdrawn their advisors from China, Moscow and Beijing
continued to cooperate in Vietnam and Laos. Regardless of the growing distance
between the Soviet Union and China, their representatives in Vietnam and Laos
agreed to set ideological differences aside to cooperate in supporting the
Communist forces in another country.
If Hanoi had been under the influence of only one ideological centre, the case
would have been rather straightforward. But the DRVs main problem was that it
had close relations with two centres, and both came with the label ideological.
At the outset they all shared the same set of beliefs and ideological principles,
and we have seen that these principles were compatible during the 1950s and first
few years of the 1960s. However, the radicalization of Chinas Communism
combined with the split between Moscow and Beijing seriously complicated
Hanois situation, and eventually forced it to take sides in the conflict. While
Hanois decision to authorize the South-based Communists to take up armed
struggle in 1959 against Moscows wishes can be seen as an example of how a
relatively small state can act independently of the superpowers, the Soviet
decision to give full military, economic and political support to the North Vietnamese
from 1964 could be understood on the basis of ideology as a useful concept in
international politics.
Soviet polices towards Vietnam in the 15-year period from 1949 until 1964
cannot be properly characterized under one single label. It followed several
different tracks: One driven by considerations for the relationship with the United
States and Western Europe, another by the fundamental ideological dynamics
inherent in the Soviet foreign policy doctrine, and, on yet other occasions, it was
influenced by the strong and independent policies of the Vietnamese Communist
leadership. If we contend that in the eyes of Soviet policy makers there was not a
question of choosing between an interest-based and an ideological position when
making decisions regarding Vietnam, we may argue that there was a foreign
policy strategy based on a combination of both positions, a concept labelled
ideological realism. In addition, Moscow was continuously subjected to the
strongly independent policies of the Vietnamese communists which functioned
as a pull factor, showing how this small state at times had a significant impact by
forcing Moscows hand. The combination of these two factors shaped the
SovietVietnamese relationship from the very first contact between the two
states in 194547, until they became close partners in war in late 1964.
Examples of Moscows ideological realist approach include the similarities
between Stalins decision in 1950 to grant China the main responsibility for
Vietnam and the Soviet decision of 1964 to support the Vietnamese Communists
in their fight against the United States. Stalins decision in 1950 was based on the

Conclusions: Changing Alliances

149

assumption that a division of labour would be beneficial to the relationship

between Moscow and Beijing. By 1964 the situation had changed completely,
and Moscow had experienced a long period of serious problems in its relations
with Vietnam. The main cause of these problems was the strong Chinese influence
within the North Vietnamese leadership. As an ideologically defined state, the
Soviet Union saw threat in terms of the expansion of its adversaries domestic
system. China had now become a hindrance to good SovietVietnamese relations,
and to counter the US escalation of warfare in Vietnam, Moscow offered both
practical and ideological support. In 1964 China was as much an adversary as the
United States.
Soviet policies towards Vietnam were influenced by the moves made in
Beijing. Moscows relations with the West, the American involvement in South
Vietnam, the fall of the Diem government and the first bombing raids over North
Vietnam all these factors played important roles in Soviet policy considerations.
However, when looking at the SovietVietnamese relationship in the 15-year
perspective from the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China in October
1949 until the autumn of 1964, the role of China remained a constant and central
factor in Moscows relations with Hanoi. The ups and downs of the Sino-Soviet
relationship made a profound impact on the Soviet perception of its role in
Vietnam, both in terms of active and more passive support. It was the Chinese
Communist victory and the subsequent Chinese recognition of the DRV in
January 1950 that forced Stalin to take a more active interest in the country; it
was the Vietnamese turn to Beijing that made Moscow scale down its interest in
the early 1960s, and finally, the total breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations and the
radicalization of Beijings policies played a vital role when the Soviet leaders in
late 1964 decided to give full support to Hanoi in its military struggle against the
United States.

Appendix 1: Politburo and Secretariat of

the Lao Dong Central Committee

Overview based on information passed on to Soviet officials in Vietnam and

Moscow from 1954 to 1964.

1954 (pr. 11 June 1954)1

Politburo
Ho Chi Minh
Truong Chinh
Le Duan
Hoang Quoc Viet
Pham Van Dong
Vo Nguyen Giap
Nguyen Chi Thanh
Le Van Luong
Members of the Central Committee
Ton Duc Thang
Phan Ding Khai
Nguyen Long Bang (DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union 19541957)
Chu Van Tang
Hoang Van Hoan
Tran Dang Ninh
Tran Quoc Hoan
Le Thanh Nghi
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Pham Thien Hung
Ung Van Khiem

152

Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao Dong CC

Candidates for membership in the CC

Nguyen Khang
Nguyen Van Tran
Ha Huy Giap
Ho Viet Thang
Van Dien Dung
Nguyen Van Kinh (DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union 1957)
To Huu
Nguyen Chanh
Hoang Anh

1956
Politburo: (pr. 7 September 1956)2
Ho Chi Minh (President, Chairman, General Secretary)
Pham Van Dong
Truong Chinh
Vo Nguyen Giap (Commander General PAVN, and Deputy General Secretary)
Hoang Quoc Viet
Le Duc Tho
Nguyen Chi Thanh
the comrades working in South Vietnam
Politburo: (pr. 10 December 1956)3
Ho Chi Minh
Truong Chinh
Pham Van Dong
Vo Nguyen Giap
Nguyen Chi Thanh
Le Duan (working in South Vietnam)
Le Duc Tho
Hoang Van Hoan
Pham Hung
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Le Thanh Nghi

1957
Politburo: (pr. June 1957)4
Ho Chi Minh president/chairman of the party and general secretary
Truong Chinh in charge of rectification of errors campaign, ideological
questions, and the agitation and propaganda department of the CC Lao Dong

Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao Dong CC

153

Pham Van Dong the work of the government and economic questions
Vo Nguyen Giap military questions, assisting Ho Chi Minh in his work
Nguyen Duy Trinh permanent secretary of the Secretariat, together with
Vo Nguyen Giap assisted Ho Chi Minh in his work
Pham Hung occupied with questions concerning South Vietnam, allocating
and organizing people in the South, and also with the leaderships questions
regarding the fight for reunification of the country
Le Thanh Nghi Pham Van Dongs aid in the CCs economic committee
Hoang Van Hoan currently recovering in Moscow, but normally in charge
of work in the National Assembly
Nguyen Chi Thanh assisting Vo Nguyen Giap in the CCs military
committee. In charge of political work within the PAVN
Le Duan recently back from South Vietnam. Currently preparing a report
on the situation and work in Nam Bo
Pham Van Dong, Pham Hung and Nguyen Duy Trinh also part of a commission
within the CC working with questions regarding the organization of the
governments work.

Members of the Secretariat

Ho Chi Minh
Truong Chinh
Pham Van Dong
Vo Nguyen Giap
Nguyen Duy Trinh

1959
31 members of the Central Committe of the Lao Dong (including those abroad
and in South Vietnam)5

Politburo
Ho Chi Minh
Pham Van Dong
Vo Nguyen Giap
Le Duan
Truong Chinh
Pham Hung
Hoang Van Hoan
Le Duc Tho
Le Thanh Ngi
Nguyen Chi Thanh

154

Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao Dong CC

Secretariat
Le Duan
Nguyen Duy Trinh
Pham Hung
Hoan Anh
To Huu
The Committe of South Vietnam (COSVN)
Le Duan (Chairman)

1963
Changes in the leadership according to Ho Chi Minh (25 December 1963)6
Ho Chi Minh retired (according to himself)
Le Duan party related affairs
Pham Van Dong governmental issues
Truong Chinh national assembly-related issues
Xuan Thuy foreign affairs

Appendix 2: Economic assistance and

specialists from the Socialist camp
to the DRV, 195519621

Year
16.07.1955
18.07.1955
01.12.1956
07.03.1959
14.06.1960
23.12.1960
30.12.1961
15.09.1962
Total

Received Used
6.75

6.75
22.5
78.75
96.75
3.5
10.0
225.10

in %

Aid (non-refundable)

6.75 100.0

90.0
6.66
98.6
19.3
85.7
21.8
27.6
60.715 62.7 4.5
3.6
102.9

118.825

52.8 94.5

Source: Soviet assistance (p. 60)

Note
* A total of 8 agreements concluded from 19551962.

Country

Total amount credit/aid

Non-refundable aid

Long-term credits

Total amount
Soviet part
PRC
GDR
Poland
Checkoslovakia
Rumenia
Hungary
Bulgaria

829.0
319.6
411.8
13.5
15.7
15.9
39.4
10.9
2.3

328.4
94.5
202.5
13.5
4.2
8.0
3.4
1.9

500.6
225.1
209.3

11.5
7.9
36.0
9.0
2.3

Source: Other Socialist countries assistance (p. 66)

Note
* Also some minor sums from Mongolia.

Year

Soviet specialists DRV specialists in

in the DRV
the Soviet Union

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963 (01.09)

279
394
165
122
110
181
513
236
195

235
13
11
14
121
121
72

Source: SovietDRV exchange of specialists (pp. 6566)

Appendix 3: Soviet ambassadors to

Vietnam, 19541965

195456: Lavrishchev, Aleksandr Andreevich

195657: Zimyanin, Mikhail Vassiljevich
195761: Sokolov, Leonid Ivanovitsj (advisor, Soviet embassy DRV, 195456)
196164: Tovmasyan, Suren Akopovitsj
196474: Shcherbakov, Ilya Sergeevich (advisor, Soviet embassy Beijing,
196364)

Archives in Moscow, Russia

AVP RF Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii

(Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation)
Fund is the equivalent to collection in Western archives.
Fund 079
Referentura on Vietnam, 19471965
Fund 0100
Referentura on China, 19491965
Fund 0445
The Geneva Conference
1954 (Indochina)
1961/1962 (Laos)
Fund 0570
Referentura on Laos
Fund 06
Secretariat of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov
Fund 021
Secretariat of Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian A. Zorin
Fund 022
Secretariat of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
Fund 026
Secretariat of Deputy Foreign Minister Vasiliy V. Kuznetsov
Fund 0531
Secretariat of Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay T. Fedorenko
Fund 0536
Secretariat of Foreign Minister Dimitriy T. Shepilov

RGASPI Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial noPoliticheskoi Istorii (Russian State Archive of
Social-Political History)
Fund 74
Fund 84
Fund 17
* opis 128
* opis 3
Fund 558

Kliment Y. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the

Supreme Council of the Soviet Union
Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier
The Central Committe of the CPSU
Foreign Policy
Decisions of the Politburo, 19191952
Josef Stalin

160

Archives in Moscow, Russia

RGANI Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei

Istorii (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History)
Fund 2
Fund 5
Fund 6
Fund 11

Fund 89

Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Committee for Party Control, 19341966
Protocol meetings of the commissions of the Central Committee of
the CPSU on questions about ideology, culture and international
party contacts, 19391966
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Trial, 19181992

Notes

Introduction
1 Quoted in John L. Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 67.
2 Norwegian masters thesis.
3 Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution. The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese
Communists, 19541960, Defence Studies 4/97, Norwegian Institute for Defence
Studies: Oslo, 1997.
4 Adam B. Ulam, Expantion and Coexistence. Soviet Foreign Policy, 19171973, Fort
Worth, 1974, p. 699.
5 See also Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance,
Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987; Allan W. Cameron, The Soviet Union
and Vietnam: The Origins of Involvement in W. Raymond Duncan (ed.), Soviet Policy
in Developing Countries, Waltham: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970.
6 An attempt at a different perspective can be found, as the title indicates, in
William R. Smyser, The Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism
Between Russia and China, 19561969, Southeast Asia Series (55), Athens, Ohio: Papers
in International Studies, 1980.
7 Olsen, Solidarity; Ilya V. Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the
Indochina Conflict, 19541963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003; and The
Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996.
8 Olsen, Solidarity especially Chapters 4 & 5.
9 Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam.
10 Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War.
11 The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan will be the most appropriate example in this regard.
12 Benoit de Treglode, Premiers contacts entre le Viet Nam et lUnion Sovietique (19471948).
Nouveaux documents des archives russes, in Approches Asie, No. 19. 1999.
13 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000; see for example the two articles by Chen Jian, China and
the First Indochina War, 19501954 and Chinas Involvement in the Vietnam War,
19641969 in Maos China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2001; and Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists Relations with China
and the Second Indochina Conflict, 19561962, Jefferson, NC: McFarland &
Company, Inc., 1997; and The Vietnam War from the Other side. The Vietnamese
Communists Perspective, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.
14 For the dominant view of this conflict before the new sources were released, see John
Gittings Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 19631967, London, 1968; Donald S.
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 19561961, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1962; Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, New York:

162

15

16

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

Notes

Pegasus, 1967; Peter Jones and Sian Kevill (comps.), Alan J. Day (ed.), China and the
Soviet Union, 19491984, Harlow, 1985.
Of more recent works, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the
Kremlins Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1996 and Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the
Sino-Soviet Alliance, 19451963, Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1998. The largest collection of articles and documents related to the Sino-Soviet
relationship can be found in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin,
published from the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. See in particular
issues 67 and 89 on the Cold War in Asia.
Recent examples are Yang Kuisong, Changes in Mao Zedongs Attitude toward
the Indochina War, 19491973, CWIHP Working Paper No. 34; Odd Arne Westad,
Chen Jian, Stein Tnnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg (eds), 77
Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina,
19641977, CWIHP Working Paper No. 22; Stephen J. Morris, The Soviet
ChineseVietnamese Triangle in the 1970s: The View from Moscow, CWIHP
Working Paper No. 25; see also The Cold War in Asia, CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 Winter
1995.
Mark Philip Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America. The Making of Post-Colonial
Vietnam, 19191950, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Robert K. Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLFs Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam
War, Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Until 1999 this archive was called the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of
Documents on Recent History (Rossiyskiy tsentr khraneniya i izucheniya dokumentov
noveishey istorii (RTsKhIDNI))
Until 1999 this archive was called the Storage Center for Contemporary Documents
(Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoy dokumentatsii (TsKhSD)).
Unfortunately, large sections of the International Department of the RGANI have been
closed for researchers during most of the 1990s.
Since I first came to work in the Moscow archives in May 1994 there have been many
changes in the rules for access. For the AVP RF, several categories of documents that
were available in the first years, such as the conversations of the Soviet embassy
employees, have since been reclassified. Also, it has been increasingly difficult to
obtain photocopies from the archives, especially in the later years.
With the term classical schools of interpretation I mean traditionalism, revisionism
and post-revisionism.
Olsen, Solidarity; Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam.
The leverage of smaller states in international politics has been labelled pericentrism,
and was introduced as a supplementary approach to the study of the Cold War by Tony
Smith in the article New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the
Study of the Cold War, Diplomatic History, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Fall 2000). Pericentrism
has its origin from periphery and emphasises the junior actors of the international
system, and their role as pull factors dragging the Great Powers into new areas of
conflict. I will argue that pericentrism might also work as a suitable common heading
for explanatory factors labelled, for example, Third World in O.A. Westads Bernath
Lecture in 2000, in which he uses the superpower involvement and alliance building
in, for example, the Third World as one possible paradigm or means to understad the
Cold War as an international system; see, O.A. Westad, The New International History
of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms, Diplomatic History, Vol. 24, No. 4
(Fall 2000), 2000a. A similar argument, under the heading alliances, can be found in
Westads Secrets of the Second World: The Russian Archives and the Reinterpretation of Cold War History, Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1997). A similar
concept, however, is Geir Lundestads Empire by Invitation, explaining the role
of the West European states as pull factors when the United States engaged itself

Notes

26

27
28
29

163

in Europe after the Second World War; in Geir Lundestad, The American Empire and
Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective, New York, 1990.
Both archive-based monographs on the Cold War and the numerous attempts to
conceptualize new trends in Cold War research emphasize the rebirth of ideology as an
interpretative tool. See, for example, Gaddis, We Now Know; Zubok and Pleshakov,
Inside the Kremlins Cold War; Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity:
The Stalin Years, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Sergei Goncharov, John
Wilson Lewis and LitaiXue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993; on theoretical interpretations of the
Cold War and the impact of ideology, see, for example, Douglas J. Macdonald,
Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis in
O. A. Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory,
London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000b; Westad, Secrets of the Second World and
The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms.
Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, p. 9.
Nigel Gould-Davies, Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during
the Cold War, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1999), p. 92.
William C. Wohlforth, A Certain Idea of Science. How International Relations
Theory Avoids the New Cold War History, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1,
No. 2 (Spring 1999), p. 52.

1 Choosing sides: The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and

the World, 19451949
1 The full Vietnamese name for this organization was Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh, or
Vietminh for short (League for National Independence).
2 For a detailed account of the events in Vietnam in the fall of 1945, see David Marr,
Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995
and Stein Tnnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945. Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh
and de Gaulle in a World at War, London: Sage, 1991.
3 See Goscha, Christopher E., Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese
Revolution 18851954, London: Curzon Press, 1999, p. 236.
4 Ho Chi Minh sent a series of cables to Truman in the period from 29 September 1945
to 28 February 1946, see Bradley, Mark Philip, Imagining Vietnam and America. The
Making of Post-Colonial Vietnam, 19191950, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2000, p. 237, n. 56; also Igor V. Bukharkin has identified a telegram from Ho to
Stalin dated 22 September 1945, see Igor V. Bukharkin, Moscow and Ho Chi Minh,
19461969, paper presented at the CWIHP conference New Evidence on the Cold
War in Asia, Hong Kong, January 1996.
5 Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks, pp. 249251.
6 Ibid., pp. 236238.
7 According to Bradley, Imagining Vietnam, p. 153, the office opened in late summer
1946, where as others have argued that it was established as early as 1945. See
Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks, pp. 236; for the notion that the
office was in operation from April 1947 see Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese
diplomacy, 19451995, Vol. 1 (19451975), Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000, p. 94.
8 Bradley, Imagining Vietnam, pp. 123125.
9 Ibid., p. 146.
10 Ibid., p. 129.
11 The archival collection Referentura po Vetnamu in the AVP RF (Foreign Policy
Archive of the Russian Federation) was established in 1947, which may serve as an
indication that relations became more frequent from this year onwards. Also in the
party archive RGASPI (now the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History) the

164

12

13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26

Notes

first mention of Vietnam is in 1947, when the Soviet delegation at the Asian Relations
Conference in New Delhi brought back information conveyed by Tran Van Giau, a
member of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party. See Short
Report on the Soviet Delegations Participation at the Asian Relations Conference in
India, written by comrades Zhukov and Plishevskii, 14 May 1947, RGASPI, Fund (f.)
17, Opis (op.) 128, delo (d.) 405, p. 26.
The lack of an initial before the last name Zhukov allows for some speculation as to
which Zhukov we are talking about. There were several Zhukovs within the foreign
ministry bureaucracy in the late 1940s, but none of these seem to have been working
with Asian affairs at this time. I therefore suggest that the person in question was
Evgenii Michailovich Zhukov. He was an acknowledged historian specializing on
Asia and his role during the Asian conference in mid-November 1947 (which has been
established in the literature), as well as several articles on the role of the October
Revolution in the East, indicates that he might very well have been trusted with the
position as head of the Soviet delegation to the conference in New Delhi. Although no
one has placed him as a participant at the New Delhi conference, he did, according to
Charles B. Mclane, visit India in the spring of 1947. He has also been referred to as the
leading Soviet spokesman on colonial affairs in the immediate postwar period. See
Charles B. Mclane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia. An Exploration of Eastern
Policies under Lenin and Stalin, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966,
pp. 251 and 256.
Short Report on the Soviet Delegations Participation at the Asian Relations Conference
in India written by comrades Zhukov and Plishevskii, 14 May 1947, RGASPI, f. 17,
op. 128, d. 405, pp. 1727.
Ibid., p. 26.
According to William J. Duiker the Soviet Union recognized Indonesia in 1947. See
W.J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life, New York: Hyperion, 2000, p. 421. However,
according to the findings in German historian Ragna Bodens ongoing Ph.D. project
on Soviet policy towards Indonesia, 194565 (Philipps-Universitt Marburg) the Soviet
Union recognized Indonesia (then in the form of the USI: United States of Indonesia) on
25 January 1950. This is documented in a letter from Gromyko to Indonesian
foreign minister Mohammed Hatta. They agreed to exchange ambassadors, although only
by the end of 1953, and the exchange took place in 1954.
Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, p. 31.
Mclane, Soviet Strategies, p. 367.
Ibid., p. 274.
Ulam, Expantion and Coexistence, p. 449.
Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, p. 32. Quotation marks in the original text.
Mclane, Soviet Strategies, pp. 351353.
Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 19451996, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1997, pp. 7071.
Mclane, Soviet Strategies, pp. 354355. The nine nations that established the Communist
Information Bureau were all European, and throughout its existence the Cominform
had no formal members from either Asia, Africa or the Americas.
Duiker, William J., Ho Chi Minh: A Life, New York: Hyperion, 2000, pp. 420423.
Record of conversation, A.G. Kylazhenkov Pham Ngoc Thach, 9 September 1947,
Arkhiv Vnesjnei Politiki Rossiskoi Federatsii [Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian
Federation] (AVP RF), Fund (f.) 079 (Vietnam), Opis (op.) 1, Papka (pa.) 1, delo (d. 1),
pp. 3336.
Ibid., pp. 34. I have found no confirmation of support in the literature on Chinese
assistance to the Vietminh of support as early as 1947. It is, however, possible that
this support could have been offered through the Hong Kong branch of the CCP or
by Chinese Communist guerrilla forces in the ChineseVietnamese border areas as
early as 1947, although there is no concrete evidence of this. See Chen Jian, Maos

Notes

27

28
29

30
31

32
33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

165

China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001,
pp. 119120.
In several different contexts during 1947 and 1948, the Russians and their Vietnamese
contacts use the name Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Kompartii Vietnama
when communicating in Russian. In Vietnamese history books the official name is
Indochinese Communist Party (Dang Cong San Dong Duong) until the name was
changed to Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) or Lao Dong in 1951. The name
Vietnamese Communist Party did not become the official party name until 1976.
Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 3536.
Mclane, Soviet Strategies, p. 273. According to a report from the Southeast Asia
Department in the Soviet foreign ministry in January 1947, French domestic policies
were partly to blame for the situation France was dealing with in Vietnam. The Soviet
analysts argue that the only thing worse than Frances own problems in Vietnam was
the possibility of mediation between the Chinese (in this case the Guomindang) and
the United States with regard to Vietnam. See SEAD report About the latest events in
Viet Nam 10 January 1947, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 29.
Record of conversation, A.G. Kylazhenkov Pham Ngoc Thach, 9 September 1947,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 3536. Pham Ngoc Thach refers to the Vietnamese
Communist Party (in Russian Kompartii Vietnama).
Ibid., p. 36. Pham Ngoc Thach played an important role in setting up DRV relations
with non-Communist countries in Asia. He had been a close associate of Tran Van
Giau in Saigon and was a close confidant of Ho Chi Minh. For more bibliographical
data see: Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks, p. 388.
Mclane, Soviet Strategies, p. 432.
Ibid., pp. 357358.
Ibid., p. 359.
I have not been able to find any documentation on the Calcutta conference among available
materials in either the RGASPI or the AVP RF, but that does not exclude the possibility
that such records exist in still restricted materials or in yet to be explored archives such as
the archive of the youth organization Komsomol. According to German historian Ragna
Boden, documents on Calcutta in RGASPI (f. 17, op. 128, d. 1069, No. 36: On sending a
Soviet youth delegation to Calcutta) were still classified in 2002.
Mclane, Soviet Strategies, pp. 359360.
Le Hy did not refer to the DRV.
Record of conversation, M.Sh. Bakhitov Le Hy, 31 August 1948, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 2, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 12
Ibid., p. 2. Once again Le Hy refers to the Vietnamese Republic rather than the DRV,
and in Communist circles is referred to as partijnikh kommunisticheskikh krugov in
the Russian original.
Ibid., p. 3.
Record of conversation, S.S. Nemtchin Nguyen Duc Quy, 21 September 1948, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 2, pa. 1, d. 2, p. 25.
Trglod, Benot de, Premier contacts entre le Viet Nam et lUnion Sovietique (1947
1948). Noveaux documents des archives russes, Approches Asie, No. 19, 1999, p. 134.
Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks, p. 295.
Record of conversation, Soviet envoy to Thailand, Sergei Sergeevitch Nemtchin Head
of the Vietnamese delegation in Southeast Asia Nguyen Duc Quy, 21 September 1948,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 2, pa. 1, d. 2, pp. 2326.
Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks, pp. 298299 refers to a V. Chuong
that most probably was a highly trusted Communist cadre who worked with shifting
the ICPs network from Thailand to China in 1948.
Record of conversation, S.S. Nemtchin Nguyen Dyc Quy, 21 September 1948, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 2, pa. 1, d. 2, p. 24.
Ibid., p. 25.

166

Notes

48 Record of conversation, Soviet Attache in Thailand I.G. Ysatchov Nguyen Duc Quy,
28 September 1948, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 2, pa. 1, d. 2, pp. 2728.
49 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 10; Sophie Quinn-Judge, Ho Chi Minh: The Missing
Years, 19191941, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, Chapter 2.
50 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 1112; according to Chen Jian, Maos
China, technical difficulties and the lack of reliable telegraphic communications
prevented contact between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist leaderships in the
period from 1946 to 1949. However, the ICP and the CCP had established telegraphic
communication late in 1947, but, for technological reasons, this channel of communication
had never been stable (pp. 120, 328 n. 8); for the Vietnamese claim that the CCP had
offered assistance as early as 1947, see record of conversation, A.G. Kylazhenkov Pham
Ngoc Thach, 9 September 1947, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, p. 34.
51 Record of conversation, S.S. Nemtchin Nguyen Duc Quy, 3 October 1948, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 2, pa. 1, d. 2, p. 30.
52 Ibid.
53 de Trglod, Premier contacts, p. 135; de Trglods study has later been complemented
by Christopher Goschas article La survie diplomatique de la RDVN: Le doute sovietique
efface par la confiance chinoise (19451950)?, in Approches Asie, No. 18, 2003. In
this article, Goscha argues that the road to recognition of the DRV was significantly
more difficult on the Communist side than what has previously been known. He
further argues that it was the victory of the Chinese Communists in October 1949 that
reintegrated revolutionary Vietnam into a European Communist setting as the European
Communists initially distrusted the Vietnamese Communists and Ho Chi Minh. Thus,
Communist Chinas confidence in the Vietnamese Communists reduced (or even
eliminated) the initial Soviet doubt.
54 Memorandum The establishment and activities of the marionette government in
Vietnam, by the Southeast Asia Department, 20 September 1949, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 3, pa. 2, d. 5, p. 111.
55 Yang Kuisong, Changes in Mao Zedongs Attitude toward the Indochina War,
19491973, CWIHP Working Paper No. 34, p. 4.

2 Setting the stage: The Soviet Union, China and the First
Indochina War, 19491953
1 Yang Kuisong, Changes in Mao Zedongs Attitude toward the Indochina War,
19491973, CWIHP Working Paper No. 34, Washington, D.C., February 2002, p. 4.
2 Niu Jun, The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance in O.A. Westad (ed.) Brothers in
Arms. The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 19451963, Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, p. 71.
3 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, New York and London: W.W. Norton
& Company, 1990, pp. 514533.
4 Spence, The Search for Modern China, p. 524; Duiker, William J., Ho Chi Minh: A
Life, New York: Hyperion, 2000, p. 419.
5 Niu Jun, The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance in Westad (ed.) Brothers in Arms, p. 73.
6 Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 420422.
7 When working with the early years and especially in 194950 one has to be very
careful as the international events that took place in that period were extremely
complicated, particularly concerning relations between the Soviet Union, the PRC and
Vietnam. Available sources contain plenty of contradictory and clearly false information
concerning events and dates.
8 Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy, 19451995, Vol. 1 (19451975),
Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000, p. 97.

Notes

167

9 Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy, pp. 9798. The region allegedly
mentioned by Stalin is the area bordering Laos that was later used to establish the Ho
Chi Minh trail. However, Stalin probably could not distinguish Vietnam from Indochina,
thus the comment sounds strange.
10 Soviet embassy in Beijing to MID. Memorandum on the politico-economic situation in
DRV, 18 January 1952, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 7, pa. 4, d. 14, p. 96.
11 The first Vietnamese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Nguyen Long Bang, arrived in
Moscow in April 1952. The first Soviet ambassador to the DRV, Aleksandr
Andreevich Lavrishchev, arrived shortly after the conclusion of the Geneva conference
in July/August 1954.
12 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000, pp. 1415.
13 Ibid., p. 15.
14 Ibid.; Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, p. 422.
15 Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin,
Mao, and the Korean War, Stanford, 1993, p. 107.
16 For a Russian article about the history of Vietnamese studies in Russia, see Anatolii A.
Sokolov, From the History of Vietnam Studies in Russia, in Traditional Vietnam. A
Collection of Articles (Moscow, 1996). This historiographical article presents the
different stages and themes within the study of Vietnam and Indochina in Russia from
the earliest times up to 1996. The increase in Soviet scholarly work on Vietnam is also
decribed by Mclane, Charles B., Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia. An Exploration of
Eastern Policies under Lenin and Stalin, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1966, pp. 435437. Mclane underlines the emphasis put on the Chinese Communist
victory in the Soviet scholarly works.
17 K. Michailov to Zorin, 12 February 1950, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 4, pa. 2, d. 2, pp. 12.
18 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 17; Chen Jian, Maos China, p. 120; for
an account of Hos meeting with Stalin in Moscow see Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of
Vietnamese Diplomacy, pp. 9798. The dates of Hos arrival and departure from
Moscow differ significantly in the sources; for this account I have chosen to rely on the
above dates for his visit to Moscow.
19 Vyshinskis diary. Reception for the ambassador of the DRV, Nguyen Long Bang,
22 April 1952, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 7, pa. 3, d. 4, pp. 12.
20 The Indochina Communist Party (ICP) was established in 1930. After February 1951
its name was changed to Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP or Dang Lao Dong Viet
Nam Lao Dong for short). Although ICP was the official name of the party until
1951, we have already seen how, in communication with Soviet representatives during
the latter part of the 1940s and early 1950s, the Vietnamese used the name Vietnamese
Communist Party (Kompartii Vietnama) instead of the correct title ICP.
21 Chen Jian, Maos China, pp. 121, 123124; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars,
pp. 15, 1920. The Vietnamese would have accepted Luo as ambassador as early as
1950, but the Chinese wanted to delay his official appointment because the ongoing
fighting in Vietnam made it inappropriate for the DRV to receive formal representatives
from foreign countries.
22 When he arrived in Moscow in April 1952, the first DRV ambassador, Nguyen Long Bang,
provided first-hand information on the unstable situation in the DRV capital at that time.
The same situation applied for the two years between 1950 and 1952 and prevented the
establishment of a Soviet or Chinese embassy. See Vyshinskis diary. Reception for the
ambassador of the DRV, Nguyen Long Bang, 22 April 1952, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 7, pa. 3,
d. 4, pp. 12. However, it should be emphasized that the Chinese found a way around this
and established separate military and political missions in the DRV in the early 1950s. See
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, Chapter 1.
23 Record of conversation, Andrei Gromyko PRC ambassador to the Soviet Union,
Wang Jiaxiang, 22 February 1950, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 4, p. 2, d. 2, pp. 3637. A copy

168

24
25
26

27

28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Notes

of this conversation was sent to all members of the Politburo. See also Decisions of
the Politburo, 17 March 1950, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1080, p. 55, pkt. 256. Accept the
suggestion of MID USSR to agree with the proposition that the PRC embassy in the
USSR represent the interests of the DRV in the Soviet Union.
Michailov and G. Tynkin to Vyshinsky, 1 April 1950, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 4, pa. 2, d. 2,
p. 42.
S. Mhitarjan to MID. Annotation to the information given by the unofficial DRV
representative in Canton, Gao Hyn Lin, on the situation in Vietnam in April 1951,
28 July 1951, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 6, pa. 3, d. 4, pp. 3234.
The Soviet foreign ministry archive set up a separate fund for Vietnam in 1947. Until
after the Geneva conference in the summer of 1954 the fund mainly consists of materials
gathered by Soviet representatives in China and materials produced by MID in Moscow.
First-hand reports on conditions in Vietnam were rare until the first Soviet Ambassador,
Aleksandr Andreevich Lavrishchev, arrived in Hanoi in late September 1954.
Telegram from M. Bakhitov (Beijing) to V.A. Zorin, 2 June 1950, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 4,
pa. 2, d. 2, pp. 6667. See also Decisions of the Politburo, letter from Vyshinski to
Hoang Minh Giam, 30 January 1950, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1079, pkt. 372, addendum
No. 1, l. 206. In the letter Vyshinski confirmed that he had received the letter of 14
January about recognition from Ho Chi Minh. After looking through the proposal from
the DRV government, and taking into account that the DRV represented the majority of
the Vietnamese population, the Soviet Union made the decision to establish diplomatic
relations between the Soviet Union and the DRV and exchange envoys (obmenjatsja
poslannikami). Notwithstanding the Soviet decision to exchange envoys the Vietnamese
continued to want an ambassador but could not push it yet.
Duiker, Sacred War, pp. 7071.
Extracts from the French press on the issue of recognition, 1950, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 4, pa. 2, d. 2, p. 33.
S. Mkhitarian (2nd secretary Southeast Asia Department). Extracts from the international
press regarding Soviet recognition of the DRV, 10 March 1950, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 4,
pa. 2, d. 2, pp. 4459.
Soviet embassy in Beijing to MID. Memorandum on the politico-economic situation in
the DRV, 18 January 1952, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 7, pa. 4, d. 14, pp. 3097 (conclusion,
pp. 9597).
GRU the Soviet acronym for the Soviet military intelligence (foreign and domestic);
in English the Main Intelligence Directorate.
The date on the document indicating when it was originally written, and the filing date
set by the foreign ministry archivists, could be weeks, and sometimes even months,
apart. This does not necessarily mean that the document did not reach its recipient in
due time, but it indicates that Moscow, particularly in the early period, considered this
only one of several sources on the topic. There is of course also a possibility that
excerpts of the document had been delivered earlier alone or together with oral
information.
Soviet Consulate in Canton to MID, The situation in Vietnam in April 1951(a report
presented to the consulate by DRV representatives in Canton), 15 June 1951, AVP RF,
f. 0100, op. 44, pa. 338, d. 148, p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7.
This was the name that the Vietminh army adopted in 1950.
Chen Jian, Maos China, pp. 123124; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 19.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 26; Chen Jian, Maos China, pp. 124127.
Chen Jian, Maos China, p. 128; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 3334.
Soviet embassy Beijing to MID. Memorandum on the politico-economic situation in
DRV, 18 January 1952, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 7, pa. 4, d. 14, p. 95.
Ibid., AVP RF, f. 079, op. 7, pa. 4, d. 14, p. 95.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 35.

Notes
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50

51
52
53
54
55

169

Ibid., pp. 3637.

Ibid., p. 37.
Diplomaticheskii Slovar, Vol. I III, Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1986, p. 269.
Vyshinskis diary. Reception for the ambassador of the DRV, Nguyen Long Bang,
22 April 1952, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 7, pa. 3, d. 4, pp. 12.
Light infantry weapons are handweapons, smaller cannons, but not larger cannons and
anti-air artillery.
PRC and DRV, report, 8 June 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 8, d. 19, pp. 3839.
According to Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 420422, Stalin had harboured doubts about
Ho Chi Minhs own ideological orthodoxy for many years and became especially
suspicious when Ho sought to establish a relationship with the United States in the
months immediately following the Pacific War. Stalin also disliked how the ICP
formally abolished itself in November 1945. According to Duiker, Stalins suspicion
became particularly obvious in 1947 when the Soviet Union granted recognition to
Indonesia, but not the DRV, perhaps because he doubted that the Vietminh would be
victorious against the French. (However, as shown in Chapter 1 of this study, the
Soviet Union did not recognize Indonesia until January 1950). During Hos visit to
Moscow in early 1950, Stalins dislike of him was clearly on display, and it was only
due to Chinese pressure that Stalin agreed to recognize the DRV. Apparently one of
the reasons why Stalin changed his mind on this issue, and proclaimed his readiness to
support the DRV, was to prevent a possible Beijing Washington alliance.
The only reference to this trip in the Russian archives can be found in correspondence
between Ho and Stalin before and immediately after Hos stay in Moscow. See letters
from Ho Chi Minh to Stalin (Filippov) and letters from Stalin to Ho Chi Minh,
30 September, 17 October and 19 November 1952, RGASPI, f. 558 (Stalin), op. 11, d. 295.
Chinese historian Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 38, has not been able to
find any details on these talks in Chinese archives.
Ho Chi Minh to Stalin (Filippov) and letters from Stalin to Ho Chi Minh, 30 September,
17 October and 19 November 1952, RGASPI, f. 558 (Stalin), op. 11, d. 295.
From March until November 1953, V.V. Kuznetsov held the position as Soviet ambassador to the PRC parallel to his post as deputy foreign minister. He remained in his
post as first deputy foreign minister until 1977.
Record of conversation, V.V. Kuznetsov Zhou Enlai, 16 June 1953, AVP RF,
f. 0100, op. 46, pa. 362, d. 12, pp. 112113.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 3842. The results of the land reform and
its implications for the Sino-Vietnamese relationship will be discussed in Chapter 4.

3 The end of the war and the Geneva conference,

19531954
1 Chen Jian, Maos China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2001, p. 131.
2 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, London: Pimlico, 1991, pp. 207208.
3 See e.g. Chen Jian, China and the Indochina Settlement at the Geneva Conference of
1954. Paper presented at the Symposium on The First Indochina War: Nationalism,
Colonialism, and the Cold War, 13 November 2002, at the Lyndon B. Johnson
Library and Museum, Austin, Texas, p. 31. [Cited with the written permission of the
author, Ang 2002]. According to Chen Jian, Zhou Enlai made a particularly important
independent decision during the last days of the conference when he persuaded both
the Soviets and especially the Vietnamese to change the Communist demand on the
demarcation line from the 16th to the 17th parallel.
4 Qiang Zhai, China and the Geneva Conference of 1954, The China Quarterly (129),
1992, p. 121.

170

Notes

5 Gaiduk, Ilya V., Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict,
19541963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 4950, argues that
Moscow threw the Vietnamese over in 1954. The Geneva Conference and the use of
the DRV as a pawn in a Great Power game serves as a perfect example of this.
6 Chen Jian, Maos China, pp. 133134.
7 The abbreviation SVN (State of Vietnam) will be used for South Vietnam until the
referendum and proclamation of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) on 23 October 1955.
8 In a later account of the Geneva conference, Soviet analysts underlined that the first
days in Geneva showed that the Peoples Republic of China, as a great power, was not
only interested in deciding the urgent international problems in Asia and other parts of
the world, but also ready to actively take part in solving these problems. See The
Geneva Conference and PRC, SEAD report, 11 February 1955, AVP RF, f. 0100,
op. 48, pa. 408, d. 136, p. 4.
9 Record of conversation, Molotov John Foster Dulles (US Secretary of State),
13 February 1954, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 25, d. 7, pp. 3132.
10 Record of conversation, V.V. Kuznetsov (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) Charles
Bohlen (U.S. ambassador), 17 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 026, op. 2, pa. 4, d. 2, p. 42.
11 Ibid.
12 Foreign Minister Molotovs report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the Geneva
Conference, 24 June 1954, see RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94; or download from: http://
www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/index_f.htm (Harvard Project on Cold War Studies).
13 Record of conversation, V.V. Kuznetsov Charles Bohlen, 19 March 1954, AVP RF,
f. 026, op. 2, pa. 4, d. 2, pp. 4950.
14 They based their reports and recommendations on conversations between the Soviet
ambassador in Beijing and Chinese officials, as well as on reports and analytical
documents written by Soviet embassy officials in China.
15 Chen Jian, Maos China, p. 140.
16 Many states had recognized the PRC, including the UK, India and Norway, but not
France or the United States. In addition, the PRC had not yet got access to the United
Nations, as ROC (Taiwan) represented China in that forum.
17 Chen Jian, China and the Indochina Settlement, pp. 45. In his speeches, Zhou used
the carrot and stick analogy, arguing that the carrot should be used to tempt the French,
while the stick should be used to deal with the Americans.
18 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 50; Chen Jian, China and the Indochina
Settlement, pp. 45.
19 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 5051.
20 Excerpts from Molotovs diary: Reception for Chinese Ambassador Zhang Wentien,
6 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 379, d. 5, pp. 1015; see also Qiang Zhai,
China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 5152.
21 SEAD memorandum to Molotov, Gromyko, Zorin, Novikov, Federenko, Sobolov,
Soldatov and Lavrishchev , 17 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 389, d. 107, p. 5.
22 Ibid., pp. 56.
23 Ibid., p. 6.
24 Ibid., pp. 67. The perceptive reader has probably already wondered about my use of
the terms Vietnam and Indochina in the last few paragraphs. My use of the territorial
names here reflects the Soviet background document for these arguments.
25 Ibid., AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 389, d. 107, p. 7.
26 The International Control Commission was set up during the Geneva conference. It
consisted of members from Poland, Canada and India, with India holding the chairmanship. Its task was to supervise the fulfilment of the Geneva Conference and a
separate commission was set up for each of the three Indochinese countries Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia.
27 Before, during and after the conference, the Chinese perceived the Soviets as
somewhat pessimistic with regard to what could be achieved in Geneva. See Qiang

Notes

28

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45
46
47
48
49
50

171

Zhais argument that in contrast to the Chinese the Soviets expected rather little from
the final outcome of the conference. Qiang Zhai, China and the Geneva Conference of
1954, p. 121.
MID USSR Plans for discussions with Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh, 4 April 1954,
AVP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, pa. 106, d. 7, pp. 2326. These plans contained among other
things references on how to relate to France, the question of Vietnamese partition, as
well as the necessity to include the clause demanding the end to US interference.
However, by early April the Soviet position seems clearer and more articulated.
Komitet Informatisii report to Kirill Novikov from N. Solodovnik, 16 July 1954, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 8, d. 19, pp. 120121.
MID USSR Plans for discussions with Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh, 4 April 1954,
AVP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, pa. 106, d. 7, pp. 2324.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Record of conversation, General-Lieutenant Petruschevskii a Chinese official, top
secret one copy only, 30 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 7, d. 15, p. 61.
Ibid.
Deputy foreign minister V. Zorin to Foreign Minister Molotov, 16 January 1954, AVP
RF, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 35, d. 159, p. 3.
The contents of ambassador Nguyen Long Bangs report was used in background
materials for the Geneva conference, but the report was first handed in to the Soviet
foreign ministry on 14 May 1952. Komitet Informatsii report The Peoples Republic
and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 8 June 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 8,
d. 19, pp. 2848. For a more detailed discussion of the report, see Chapter 2.
William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Boulder, CO: Westview,
1981, pp. 154160; Young, Marilyn B., The Vietnam Wars, 19451990, New York:
HarperPerennial, 1991, pp. 3033; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 4344.
For a detailed account of Chinese preparations for Dien Bien Phu, see Chen Jian,
Maos China, pp. 131138 and Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 4349.
The classic work on Dien Bien Phu is Bernhard Falls, Hell in a Very Small Place:
the Siege of Dien Bien Phu, London, 1967; see also Duiker, The Communist Road,
pp. 160162.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 46
Ibid., p. 49. During the first part of the conference from 26 April to 7 May 1954, the
participants tried to solve the problems in Korea. Randle 1969: 157168.
On the Chinese stand, see e.g. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 52.
On the question of Chinese, Korean and DRV participation, we have seen that the
Soviets took a much tougher stand. From the very beginning, they argued that China
should play an important role during the conference. Soviet preparatory materials for
the conference also clearly state that DRV participation was self-evident. See SEAD
memorandum to Molotov, Gromyko, Zorin, Novikov, Federenko, Sobolov, Soldatov
and Lavrishchev, 17 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 47, pa. 389, d. 107, p. 5; and
also MID USSR Plans for discussions with Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh, 4 April
1954, AVP RF, f. 022, op. 7b, pa. 106, d. 7, pp. 2326.
Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954. The Settlement of the Indochinese War, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 8.
Chen Jian, China and the Indochina Settlement, pp. 1112.
Chen Jian, Maos China, pp. 140141.
Foreign Minister Molotovs report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the
Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94, p. 21.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 57.
Foreign Minister Molotovs report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the
Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94, p. 19.

172
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

74
75
76
77
78

79

Notes

Chen Jian, China and the Indochina Settlement, p. 12.

The citation is taken from Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 55.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 5253.
Ibid., p. 52.
The Geneva Conference and PRC, 11 February 1955, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 48, pa. 408,
d. 136, pp. 1327; and Foreign Minister Molotovs report to the CPSU Central Committee
Plenum on the Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 6061.
Chen Jian, Maos China, pp. 142143; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 60.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 6061.
Komitet Informatisii report to Kirill Novikov from N. Solodovnik, 16 July 1954, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 8, d. 19, p. 123.
Chen Jian, China and the Indochina Settlement, p. 16.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 61; Christopher E. Goscha, Vietnam or
Indochina? Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 18871954,
Nias Reports, No. 28, Nordic Institute for Asian Studies, 1995, pp. 145146.
The Geneva Conference and the PRC, 11 February 1955, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 48,
pa. 408, d. 136, p. 14.
Ibid., p. 16.
Record of conversation, V.V. Vaskov Mao Zedong, 5 July 1954, AVP RF, f. 0100,
op. 47, pa. 397, d. 7, pp. 6970.
Chen Jian, China and the Indochina Settlement, pp. 2225.
Luu Van Loi, 50 Years of Vietnamese Diplomacy, 19451995, Vol. 1 (19451975),
Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2000, p. 122.
Chen Jian, China and the Indochina Settlement, pp. 2627.
Foreign Minister Molotovs report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the
Geneva Conference, 24 June 1954, RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 94.
Ibid., pp. 2527.
The Geneva Conference and the PRC, 11 February 1955, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 48,
pa. 408, d. 136, p. 21.
Ibid., pp. 2527.
Rumours say that delegates to the conference stopped the clock in the Palais de
Nations to help Mends-France keep his deadline.
Vietminh was the name of the Vietnamese patriots fighting the French from 1946 to
1954, which were in effect the Communist armed forces. After the Geneva conference
the armed forces of the DRV were organized into the Peoples Army of Vietnam
(PAVN). In 1960, when the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was founded,
many of its founding members were former Vietminh soldiers. Stanley I. Kutler (ed.)
Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1996, p. 565.
Randle, Geneva 1954, p. 596. Article 14 (a) in the Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities in Viet Nam.
Randle, Geneva 1954, pp. 570571. Article 6 and 7 in the Final Declaration.
The Final Declaration was positively agreed to by four out of the nine participants at
the conference, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China.
Young, The Vietnam Wars, pp. 4142.
Randle, Geneva 1954; J.L. Nogee and R.H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since
World War II (3rd edn), New York: Pergamon Press, 1988, pp. 110111; Cameron,
Allan W., The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The Origins of Involvement in
W. Raymond Duncan (ed.), Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, Waltham: GinnBlaisdell, 1970, pp. 189196; Qiang Zhai, China and the Geneva Conference of
1954, p. 113.
Westad, Odd Arne, Chen Jian, Stein Tnnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G.
Hershberg (eds), 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars
in Indochina, 19641977, CWIHP Working Paper No. 22, 1998, p. 42.

Notes

173

4 Together for Communism? Sino-Soviet cooperation and

the rebuilding of North Vietnam, 19541957
1 Record of conversation, Zimyanin Li Zhimin, June/July 1956, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 149.
2 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam. A Political History, London: Andre Deutch, 1969,
pp. 415429; Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War, New York: Pantheon Books, 1985,
pp. 2271. According to a report from the Komitet Informatsii in late December 1954
Ho Chi Minh had many supporters in the South. Information gathered from different
news correspondents reporting from Saigon and foreign press releases indicated that
Ho would receive 90 per cent of the votes in South Vietnam if there were to be general
elections at that time. Komitet Informatsii to Novikov, 29 December 1954, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 9, pa. 7, d. 16, pp. 117130.
3 Young, Marilyn B., The Vietnam Wars, 19451990, New York: HarperPerennial,
1991, p. 45.
4 Ambassador Lavrishchev was already well acquainted with the situation in Vietnam,
as well as with its leaders, from his participation at the Geneva Conference.
5 Molotov to Lavrishchev, 30 September 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 8,
pp. 2326.
6 Ibid.
7 The Lien Viet (Unified National Front) was founded in 1946, reorganized in 1951, and
in 1955 renamed the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VNFF). Ralph B. Smith, An International
History of the Vietnam War: Vol. 1, Revolution versus Containment, 195561, New
York: St. Martins Press, 1983, pp. 6264. The development of the VNFF is described
in Carlyle A. Thayer, War By Other Means. National Liberation and Revolution in
Viet-nam 195460, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992, pp. 2732, 4043, 4648.
8 Molotov to Lavrishchev, 30 September 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 8,
pp. 2326.
9 Ibid.
10 Herring, George C., Americas Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 19501975,
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979, pp. 4748.
11 Herring, Americas Longest War, p. 48.
12 In South Vietnam there were three large religious sects: the Binh Xuyen, whose armed
elements were in control of Cholon, in the area nearby Saigon, and the Cao Dai and the
Hoa Hao, both of whom literally ran states within the state. It was the American
decision of 31 December 1954, to support South Vietnam directly rather than channelling
the aid via France, that enabled Diem to take control over the sects. The shift in American
policies strengthened Diem and weakened the sects, as it deprived them of the financial
support they had received through the French. Herring, Americas Longest War, p. 51;
Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 2122.
13 Novikov to Molotov, 29 July 1954, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 35, d. 156, pp. 12.
14 When the government in Hanoi feared that serious famine was about to hit the country
in late 1954 and early 1955, it turned to Moscow and Beijing for assistance. The
October harvest had failed, and since partition the DRV was deprived of the important
food supplies from southern Vietnam. The critical situation was eventually solved by
shipping rice from China on Soviet ships to the DRV; see record of conversation,
Novikov DRV Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Long Bang, 28 October 1954,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 5, p. 78; and MID to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1954, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 8, p. 10.
15 Record of conversation, Novikov Pham Van Dong, AVP RF, 27 July 1954, f. 06,
op. 13a, pa. 35, d. 158, p. 46.
16 Novikov to Molotov, 29 July 1954, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 13a, pa. 35, d. 156, p. 2.
17 Ibid.; Molotov to Lavrishchev, 30 September 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 8,
pp. 2326.

174

Notes

18 V.V. Kuznetsov to Molotov, 11 January 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 10, d. 15,
pp. 12.
19 Instructions for negotiations with the governmental delegation from the DRV, June/
July 1955, AVP RF, f. 022, op. 8, pa. 117, d. 30, pp. 1221 [Hereafter Instructions
June/July 1955].
20 Instructions June/July 1955: 12.
21 For estimates of Soviet assistance to India, see Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer,
Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, London: MacMillan, 1992.
22 A total of eight agreements on long-term credits and non-refundable aid were signed in
the years from 1955 to 1962. For Soviet overviews of assistance to the DRV both from
the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries see, Economical, trade and cultural
relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, SEAD
memorandum, 3 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, pp. 5879. For the
main figures in this document, see Appendix; an earlier estimate of Soviet assistance
to the DRV can be found in Thakur and Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and
Vietnam, pp. 189192.
23 Instructions June/July 1955: 1221; by 1955 ChineseNorth Vietnamese military
cooperation was already well organized. When established on April 17, 1950 the
Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) consisted of advisors that could assist the
Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) headquarters, three full divisions, and finally an
officers training school. Altogether the CMAG would count 281 people of which 79
were advisors and their assistants. See Qiang Zhai 2000: 19.
24 General Antonov to Deputy Foreign Minister V.A. Zorin, 10 June 1955, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 10, pa. 9, d. 8, p. 32.
25 Ibid.
26 Record of conversation between General-Lieutenant Petruschevskii a Chinese official,
top secret one copy only, 30 March 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 7, d. 15, p. 61.
27 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 74.
28 Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists Relations with China and the Second
Indochina Conflict, 19561962, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1997,
pp. 1318.
29 V.A. Zorin to the CC CPSU, 23 September 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 9, d. 8,
p. 57. The memo to the CC CPSU only contains references to the withdrawal of political
and economic advisors and does not include the military advisors. However, as the
military advisors played a very important role, it is safe to assume that the ambassador
was referring to these as well. Keeping the Chinese military advisors in place was even
more valuable to the Soviets than keeping the other advisors. This was because the
Soviets had always been cautious about introducing Soviet military advisors into
Vietnam, first of all not to offend the Chinese, who had a much longer tradition of
supporting the Vietnamese in that field, and second to avoid increased US focus on
North Vietnam.
30 V.A. Zorin to the CC CPSU, 23 September 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 9, d. 8, p. 57.
31 Record of conversation, L.I. Sokolov Chinese Ambassador to the DRV, Luo Guibo,
8 December 1955, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 10, pa. 9, d. 5.
32 Chen Jian, Maos China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2001, p. 206; see also Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 74.
33 Ulam, Adam B., Expantion and Coexistence. Soviet Foreign Policy, 19171973 (2nd
edn) Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974, pp. 558560.
34 Randle, Robert F., Geneva 1954, The Settlement of the Indochinese War, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 571.
35 George M. Kahin, Intervention: How America became Involved in Vietnam, New York:
Knopf, 1986, p. 93.
36 Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 2123, 3740, 4849.

Notes

175

37 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p. 85; David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success. The

Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 195361, New York: Colombia University
Press, 1991, pp. 125128; Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 4849.
38 Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 7173.
39 Record of conversation, Zimyanin Pham Hung, 23 March 1956, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 3638.
40 On the situation of fulfilling the Geneva Agreement short information, 11 (13)
August 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 14, d. 16, p. 98.
41 Record of conversation, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V.V. Kuznetsov General
Secretary of the Lao Dong, Truong Chinh, 28 February 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11,
pa. 13, d. 2, p. 3.
42 Ibid.
43 Record of conversation between Zimyanin Pham Hung and Ung Van Khiem, 20 April
1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 75.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., pp. 7577.
46 According to Truong Chinh the Vietnamese had now realized that the chances of
convening a new Geneva conference were slim. See record of conversation between
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V.V. Kuznetsov General Secretary of the Lao
Dong, Truong Chinh, 28 February 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 2, pp. 38.
47 Ambassador Zimyanins thoughts were expressed in a memorandum entitled Some
questions on the fulfillment of the Geneva agreement on Indochina, 2 April 1956,
AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 14, d. 16, p. 58.
48 Some questions on the fulfillment of the Geneva agreement on Indochina, 2 April
1956, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 14, d. 16, p. 62.
49 Smith, An International History, pp. 6467; see also Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese
Communists, p. 28.
50 Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists, pp. 2728.
51 See e.g. Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah A. Palmieri, The Dynamics of Soviet
Foreign Policy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1989, pp. 149150; Ulam,
Expantion and Coexistence, pp. 572599; Nogee, J.L. and R.H. Donaldson, Soviet
Foreign Policy since World War II (3rd edn), New York: Pergamon Press, 1988,
pp. 119126; Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus. A History of the USSR, New York:
Routledge, 1990, pp. 239241.
52 According to Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders later
complained repeatedly that Khrushchevs secret speech came as a surprise to the CCP
and other Communist parties. See Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet
Alliance Westad, Odd Arne (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the SinoSoviet Alliance, 19451963, Stanford, 1998, p. 260 and n. 73.
53 Ambassador Suren Akopovich Tovmasyan to MID, 17 October 1961, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, pa. 31, d. 3, p. 44. To exemplify the Vietnamese attitude the report underlines
that the Vietnamese did not want to show a Soviet film critical to Stalin. According to
Politburo member Le Duc Tho showing such a film could lead to new discussions on
the errors committed during land reform. Nor did the Lao Dong share the opinion of
the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries with regard to Albania. According to
officials at the Soviet embassy Ho Chi Minh gave the impression of feeling sorry for
Enver Hoxha. The political letter is concluded by underlining that Ho Chi Minh is,
despite his weaknesses, a friend. The embassy recommends that the contact between
the two countries be strengthened in all fields.
54 Smyser, William R., The Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism Between
Russia and China, 19561969, Athens, Ohio: Papers in International Studies,
Southeast Asia Series (55), 1980, p. 6.
55 Record of conversation between Soviet Ambassador Mikail Vassiljevich Zimyanin
Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 8495.

176

56

57
58
59
60
61

62
63

64

65
66
67

68

69
70
71
72
73
74

Notes

In this conversation Nguyen Duy Trinh presents the discussion during the 9th Plenum of
the Lao Dong CC (quote from p. 93); see also Smyser, The Independent Vietnamese,
pp. 512. These pages contain a discussion of Hanois reaction to the Twentieth Congress.
In 1956 Le Duan held the position of regional secretary in Nam Bo, which was the
southernmost region of the Partys political apparatus in Vietnam. Brigham, Robert K.,
Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLFs Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War, Itacha:
Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 7.
Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 5759.
Record of conversation, Soviet Ambassador Mikail Vassiljevich Zimyanin Nguyen
Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 95.
Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 9091.
Ibid. p. 85.
According to Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 6768, parts of the proposal were
approved and would allow a consolidation of the partys forces and provide a basis for
political violence should that ever become necessary. However, such steps were only
to be undertaken by cadres in the South using their own resources in accordance with
the programme of the Fatherland Front.
Anastas Mikoyan allegedly made full reports from all his trips abroad. I have so far not
been able to localize these reports, nor have I seen other researchers refer to them.
According to Ang Cheng Guan the lack of a joint communiqu at the end of
Mikoyans visit suggests that the Vietnamese and the Russians could not reach a unity
of views. See Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists, p. 21. An explanation as just
could be that the working character of the trip did not call for such communiqu.
Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin Pham Van Dong, 18 May 1956, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 117118. Pham Van Dong reveals that he has not
completely understood Mikoyans ideas on the tempo of the DRVs transition into a
Socialist state. According to the ambassador this would be worked out as soon as the
Three-Year plan for the DRVs national economy was ready.
Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 95.
Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin Truong Chinh and Nguyen Duy Trinh,
16 August 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, pp. 5558.
Record of conversation, M.V. Zimyanin Nguyen Duy Trinh, 27 April 1956, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 8495. Accounts of this situation in available Soviet
documents confirm the notion that Hos position within the party remained the same,
and was not in any way endangered by the revelations during the rectification of errors
campaign.
Record of conversation, Sulinov representative in charge of economic and financial
questions at the PMs office, Buy Kong Chung, 29 October 1956, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, pp. 5760. Soviet official Sulinov has no title in the document or
any organisational affiliation. His inquiries into the internal affairs of the DRV, and the
fact that he has no title or organization may indicate that he represents either the GRU
or the CPSU.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Li Zhimin, June/July 1956, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 149.
Edwin E. Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983, p. 4.
Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam, p. 5.
Buttinger, Vietnam, pp. 418419.
Young, The Vietnam Wars, p. 50; Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History, London:
Pimlico, 1991, pp. 240241; Buttinger, Vietnam, pp. 425437.
The most careful estimate indicating between 3,000 and 15,000 executions was made
by Moise 1983. Fall, Bernard B., The Two Viet-Nams. A Political and Military Analysis,

Notes

75
76
77

78
79
80

81
82
83
84

85

86
87
88

177

London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1963, on the other hand, operates with a much
higher figure 50,000 executions. See also Young, The Vietnam Wars, p. 50.
Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam, p. 237.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ho Chi Minh, 10 August 1956, AVP RF, f. 79,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, pp. 3840.
Land reform in North Vietnam was based much on the experiences had in China and had
also to some degree been supervised by Chinese advisors. See record of conversation,
Zimyanin Nguyen Duy Trinh, 28 August 1956, AVP RF, f. 79, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6,
pp. 7585; see also Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam, p. 238. Moises book
compares land reform in China and Vietnam and is the most extensive study on the topic.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ho Chi Minh, 7 September 1956, AVP RF, f. 79,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, p. 93.
His birth name was Dang Xuan Khu.
P.J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1963,
pp. 4346; Edwin Moise has modified the view that the DRV went disastrously wrong
due to slavish imitation of the Chinese land reform. He argues that Chinese influence
is real and that the Vietnamese reform was based on Chinese models, but the Lao
Dong did not copy these models precisely/correctly and that the mistakes made were
due to misconduct of the reform and not because they imitated the Chinese. See Moise,
Land Reform in China and North Vietnam, pp. 234236.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ho Chi Minh, 7 September 1956, AVP RF, f. 79,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, p. 93. This was also about the same time as Le Duan came up north.
Record of conversation, Soviet charg daffaires A.M. Popov Nguyen Duy Trinh,
25 October 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, p. 54.
Extract from the journal of Soviet charg daffaires, A.M. Popov, 10 December 1956,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, pp. 9399.
In a June 1957 reference to the Lao Dong Politburo members Le Duan is listed as
recently back from South Vietnam, currently preparing a report on the situation in
Nam Bo. Pham Hung is listed as occupied with questions concerning South Vietnam,
allocating and organizing people in the South, and in charge of the leaderships questions
regarding the fight for reunification of the country. See record of conversation,
Zimyanin Nguyen Duy Trinh, 1214 June 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5,
pp. 220235. Le Duc Thos role and his strengthened position in 1956 are underlined
by R.B. Smith, An International History, 1983: 66. Tho is, however, not mentioned as
a Politburo member in 1957 but reappears in 1959.
The disturbances were caused by religious discrimination against the local Catholic
community, which had increased during the conduct of land reform. Members of the Catholic community were advised by an ICC Fixed Team to petition for regrouping to the
south. The ICC Fixed Teams were groups with members from all the three ICC countries
Poland, India and Canada which supervised and controlled that the provisions of the
Geneva agreement were followed in both zones, especially the ceasefire agreement. When
villagers assembled to present their grievances to the Canadian member of the ICC FT, the
local militia attempted to disperse the demonstrators. These attempts proved ineffective,
and reinforcements were called in. As a result violence broke out and shots were fired. All
attempts at mediation failed. Finally troops were sent in to control the demonstrators and
arrest the leaders. The numbers killed and injured remain unknown, but according to the
official version several persons were killed and many more were wounded. Thayer, War
By Other Means, pp. 9495. Quote from p. 95.
Record of conversation, A.M. Popov Nguyen Duy Trinh, 19 November 1956, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 8, pp. 7576.
A. Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 17 October 1956, AVP RF, f. 022, op. 9, pa. 134, d. 56,
p. 1.
Copy from the Embassys Yearly report from 1956, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 19,
p. 80 found in a document dated 12 November 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 30,

178

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

104

105

Notes
d. 20, p. 64. This is a one-page copy from the yearly report of 1956 (filed in 1957).
Yearly reports are still unavailable to researchers in the AVP RF.
Ibid.
Record of conversation, Pavel Iudin, Soviet ambassador in Beijing Van Tziao Chan
(Head of the CC CCP department of relations with brotherly parties), January 1956,
AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 49, pa. 410, d. 9, pp. 2729.
Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy, p. 7.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ho Chi Minh, 21 June 1956, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 129133.
Ibid., p. 129.
Ibid., pp. 129133.
After the signing of the Geneva agreement in July 1954, DRV Prime Minister Pham
Van Dong allegedly said that he did not think there would be any elections. See
Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, p. 15; Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 67.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ho Chi Minh, 21 June 1956, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, pp. 129133.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ung Van Khiem and Pham Hung, 23 June 1956,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 11, pa. 13, d. 5, p. 137.
Ibid., pp. 137140.
Smith, An International History, p. 64.
The Great Vanguard of the Vietnamese People. The History of the Communist Party
of Vietnam, Moscow: Polizdat, 1981, p. 115.
Thayer, War By Other Means, p. 92.
Ibid., pp. 104106.
Gaiduk, Ilya V., Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict,
19541963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, Chapters 5 and 6 argue that in
1956, as well as in 1959, the North Vietnamese leadership deliberately held back
information and misled both the Soviets and the Chinese aiming to force them into
supporting a military reunification struggle in Vietnam.
Yang Kuisong argues that Maos conciliatory attitude in the mid-1950s was a diplomatic
tactic determined by realistic policy needs, and that his endorsement of compromise
and peace in Southeast Asia would begin to waver once the international situation
changed. That is exactly what happened when Khrushchev denounced Stalin at the
Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. Yang Kuisong (transl. Qiang Zhai), Changes in
Mao Zedongs Attitude toward the Indochina War, 19491973, CWIHP Working
Paper No. 34, Washington D.C., February 2002, pp. 1516.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Luo Guibo, 11 August 1956, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, pp. 4142.

5 Reunification by revolution? The Soviet and Chinese role

in Vietnamese reunification plans, 19571961
1 The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, Document 1, 6, see Randle,
Robert F., Geneva 1954, The Settlement of the Indochinese War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1969, p. 570.
2 Pham Van Dongs protest letter of 25 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17,
d. 3, pp. 45.
3 Record of conversation, Soviet Ambassador Zimyanin Chinese Ambassador Luo
Guibo, 30 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, p. 48.
4 Record of conversation, Zimyanin Li Zhimin, 18 September 1957, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, pa. 17, d. 6, p. 70.
5 Duiker, William J., The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Boulder, CO: Westview,
1981, p. 182; Duiker, William J., Sacred War. Nationalism and Revolution in a

Notes

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

179

Divided Vietnam, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995, p. 115; Thayer, Carlyle A., War
By Other Means. National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-nam 195460, Sydney:
Allen and Unwin, 1989, pp. 159160. There is no trace in available Soviet archival
documents of any discussion on the topic between the Soviets and the Vietnamese
prior to the announcement of the counterproposal.
Extract of directive from the CC CPSU to the Soviet delegation to the Second Session of
the UN General Assembly, 29 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 18, d. 18, p. 6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Young, Marilyn B., The Vietnam Wars, 19451990, New York: HarperPerennial,
1991, p. 53.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1956, pp. 110112.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ung Van Khiem, 30 January 1957, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 5051.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ho Chi Minh, 30 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, p. 52.
Ibid.
Thayer, War By Other Means, p. 160; Yearbook of the United Nations 1956, p. 112.
Duiker, The Communist Road, p. 182; Pike, Douglas, Vietnam and the Soviet Union:
Anatomy of an Alliance, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987, p. 42.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1957, pp. 111113.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Pham Van Dong, 18 January 1957, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 1415.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Pham Van Dong, 7 March 1957, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, p. 96.
Ibid., pp. 9197; Thayer, War By Other Means, 1989: 157.
The exchange of visits started with the trip of the President of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet, K.Y. Voroshilov, to Hanoi from 20 to 23 May 1957, followed
by Ho Chi Minhs visit to the Soviet Union in July. Before Hos visit, Soviet ambassador
Zimyanin urged the North Vietnamese to carefully plan questions related to material
aid from the Socialist countries to the DRV, see record of conversation, Zimyanin
Vo Nguyen Giap, 29 May 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 182183;
during this period Ho Chi Minh also went on a tour of Korea, China, the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe (JulyAugust 1957), to Moscow for the 40th anniversary of the
October Revolution (OctoberNovember (December) 1957) and to India and Burma
(February 1958), see Thayer, War By Other Means, 1989: 165166, 169173. The
main aim of these trips was to secure support for the economy of the DRV and also for
the reunification of the country.
Said about the visit to Burma and India, see record of conversation, Soviet charg
daffaires A.M. Popov Ung Van Khiem, 31 January 1958, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13,
pa. 20, d. 8, pp. 1822.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ung Van Khiem, 27 January 1957, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 4143. For exact numbers on Soviet specialists in the
DRV see Appendix.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Luo Guibo, 22 January 1957, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, p. 26.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Pham Van Dong, 27 April 1957, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 156161
Ibid., p. 159, in the Russian text the words many obligations had been put in quotation
marks mnogo nagruzok.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Vo Nguyen Giap, 29 May 1957, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, p. 17, d. 5, pp. 182183.
When he took on the post as ambassador in 1957 Leonid Ivanovich Sokolov was well
acquainted with the situation in Vietnam. He began his diplomatic career as advisor at

180

28
29
30
31
32
33

34

35
36
37
38
39

40

41

Notes

the Soviet embassy in Hanoi in 1954 where he stayed until 1956. In 1957 he returned
to Hanoi to assume the post of Soviet ambassador, after a years work within the
central administration of the Soviet foreign ministry in Moscow. See Diplomaticheskii
slovar, tom III, Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1986, p. 383.
Record of conversation, Soviet ambassador Leonid Ivanovich Sokolov Vo Nguyen
Giap, 25 February 1958, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 8, pp. 3133.
Thayer, War By Other Means, 1989: 177.
Record of conversation, Sokolov Pham Van Dong, 3 May 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op.
15, pa. 28, d. 6, pp. 101104.
Economic, trade and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the DRV, memorandum by the Southeast Asia Department in MID, 3 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, p. 60.
Questions that might be posed during conversations with the Vietnamese friends,
draft, SEAD, 30 January 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 24, d. 13, pp. 1416.
Economic, trade and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the DRV,
memorandum by the Southeast Asia Department in MID, 3 December 1963, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, pp. 5879. Previous estimates of Soviet economic and
military assistance to the DRV in the period show a stable level of assistance with only
smaller variations from one year to another. For estimates, see Pike, Vietnam and the
Soviet Union, p. 139; Thakur, Ramesh and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with
India and Vietnam, London: MacMillan, 1992, p. 117.
According to Soviet documents, the 15th Plenum was held from December 1958 to
February 1959, but the general assumption in the literature of when it was held is
January. See On the situation in South Vietnam, an analysis by Acting Head of
the SEAD in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16,
pa. 32, d. 20, pp. 102108. On the last page of the document was added: The
report has been based on materials from MID, the General Staff of the Soviet
Army, and KGB by the Council of Ministers. For Le Duans report, see Thayer,
War By Other Means, pp. 183185; King C. Chen, Hanois Three Decisions and
the Escalation of the Vietnam War, Political Science Quarterly, 90 (2) 1975,
pp. 244246.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Li Zhimin, 18 September 1957, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, pa. 17, d. 6, p. 69.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Truong Chinh, 8 June 1957, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 199206.
Record of conversation, Zimyanin Nguyen Duy Trinh, 12 and 14 June 1957, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 220235. This document contains information on
the different members of the Politburo and their tasks. Compared to earlier accounts of
Politburo and Central Committee members it shows that leaders known to be in favour
of a new and more aggressive strategy towards the South are gaining more power in
the top party leadership.
On 15 April 1958 Pham Van Dong informed Soviet ambassador Sokolov that the
party had appointed two additional deputy prime ministers to strengthen the
government. The two appointees were members of the Politburo, Truong Chinh
and Pham Hung. With regard to Pham Hungs appointment Dong said: It has to be
taken into account that the appointment of Pham Hung, who is a Southerner, and
has worked for a long time in South Vietnam, calls for certain political consequences in the plans of the fight for a peaceful reunification of the country. See
record of conversation, Sokolov Pham Van Dong, 15 April 1958, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 8, p. 95.
The word Thum is not a Vietnamese name. The closest English translation of the
Vietnamese word thm is stinking or smelling bad.

Notes

181

42 Record of conversation, Second Secretary at Soviet embassy G. Kadumov official at

the DRV Ministry of State Security Thum, 4 April 1958, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13,
pa. 20, d. 10, pp. 202203.
43 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 10, p. 203. The document presented above is
impressive because of the frankness in the discussion. It is rare in the sense that such
information was not often provided, and if so usually in a much vaguer tone. There
seem to be two possible explanations as to why this Vietnamese official was so frank
with a low-ranking embassy official. Thum may have been an informant or a message
deliverer from the DRV internal circle, informing on the general mood among the
regrouped and, by doing so, implicitly warning the Soviets that the pressure on DRV
policy makers from the regrouped in favour of armed struggle was increasing. His
information may also have been a test case, implying that he was a person used by the
party leadership to find out how the Soviets felt about armed struggle to reunify
Vietnam. He might also have been one of the Southern regroupees himself, with a
preference for armed struggle. The ideas of Thums possible role in this record of
conversation originates from an e-mail correspondence with Vietnamese historian
Nguyen Vu Tung on 24 September 1996. See also Olsen 1997: 104105.
44 MID (Deputy Foreign Minister) to Soviet ambassador L.I. Sokolov, 16 April 1958,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 13, pa. 20, d. 3, pp. 1519.
45 Young, The Vietnam Wars, pp. 6061.
46 Thayer, War By Other Means, pp. 123, 128129.
47 Chen Jian, Chinas Involvement in the Vietnam War, 196469, The China Quarterly,
1995 (142), p. 358.
48 Chen Jian, Chinas Involvement in the Vietnam War, 196469, p. 358.
49 Although Mao was cautious when Hanoi decided to renew armed struggle in South
Vietnam, he was also irritated by the Soviet unwillingness to carry on revolution. Yang
Kuisong, Changes in Mao Zedongs Attitude toward the Indochina War, 19491973,
CWIHP Working Paper No. 34, Washington, D.C., February 2002, p. 18.
50 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies. The United States, China, and the Soviet
Union, 19481972, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990, pp. 184, 204205;
Thayer, War By Other Means, p. 180.
51 Record of conversation, Sokolov Ho Chi Minh, 16, 17, 19 January 1959, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, p. 24.
52 Record of conversation, Soviet embassy advisor A.M. Popov Nguyen Duy Trinh,
12 March 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 24, d. 7, p. 168.
53 Record of conversation, Sokolov Le Duan, 15 April 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14,
pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 102107.
54 Record of conversation, A.M. Popov Truong Chinh, 21 May 1959, f. 079, op. 14,
pa. 24, d. 7, pp. 265268.
55 On the situation in South Vietnam, an analysis by Acting Head of the Southeast Asia
Department in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16,
pa. 32, d. 20, pp. 102108; for Hanois decisions in 1959/60 see King C. Chen,
Hanois Three Decisions, pp. 244246.
56 King C. Chen, Hanois Three Decisions, p. 240.
57 Zimyanin to Malin, 16 October 1959, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 52, pa. 442, d. 5, p. 52.
The actual contents of the discussion are not known, but a note referring to the meeting
was found in Soviet files on China. The note confirms that a meeting between Khrushchev,
Mao, Kim Il Sung, and Ho Chi Minh took place in Beijing on 2 October 1959, and that
the discussion evolved around the future strategy in South Vietnam. See also Pravda,
1 October 1959.
58 On the situation in South Vietnam, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in
MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20,
p. 104.
59 Ibid.

182

Notes

60 Thayer, War By Other Means, 1989: 187187; Smith, Ralph B., An International
History of the Vietnam War: Vol. I, Revolution versus Containment, 195561, New
York: St. Martins Press, 1983, p. 168.
61 From Sokolovs journal. Record of information presented in MID DRV by deputy
foreign minister Ung Van Khiem for the heads of diplomatic representation from the
Socialist countries, 15 April 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 28, d. 6, pp. 9197.
62 Record of conversation, Chervonenko Chan Ti Binh, 3 February 1961, AVP RF,
f. 0100, op. 54, pa. 466, d. 7, p. 37.
63 Smith, An International History, Vol. I, p. 184.
64 Ibid., pp. 184185.
65 Brigham, Robert K., Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLFs Foreign Relations and the Viet
Nam War, Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 1.
66 On the situation in South Vietnam, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID
Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 104.
67 The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Soviet embassy in Hanoi to MID,
14 November 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, pp. 8492. Quote from page 84.
68 On the siOn the situation in South Vietnam, an analysis by Acting Head of the
SEAD in MID Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32,
d. 20, p. 107.
69 Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 184, 204205; Thayer, War By Other Means, p. 180;
Zubok, Vladislav and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlins Cold War. From
Stalin to Khrushev, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 230233;
Zagoria, Donald S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict 19561961, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1962, pp. 325327.
70 Record of conversation, Chervonenko Chan Ti Binh, 8 October 1960, AVP RF,
f. 0100, op. 53, pa. 454, d. 9, p. 35.
71 According to Chan Ti Binh, the Chinese deputy foreign minister said that, for
example, this would affect the deliverance of equipment received from the DDR and
Hungary, which could not be installed and sent to Vietnam for use because of the
departure of the Soviet specialists. Record of conversation, Chervonenko Chan Ti
Binh, 8 October 1960, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 53, pa. 454, d. 9, p. 35.
72 Ibid., pp. 3738.
73 Record of conversation, charg daffaires N.I. Godunov Ho Chi Minh, 22 June 1960,
AVP RF, f. 179, op. 15, pa. 28, d. 6, pp. 160162, quote from p. 161.
74 Record of meeting, Soviet advisor Godunov representatives from the Socialist countries,
24 August 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 29, d. 9, pp. 179180. The Lao Dong Fourpoint text was not in the file, and no further comments to the four points were made.
75 Soviet ambassador Suren Akopovich Tovmasjan to MID, 17 October 1961, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 3, pp. 3557, quote from p. 48.
76 Young, The Vietnam Wars, p. 82.
77 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 112.
78 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 112113; Ralph B. Smith, An International
History of the Vietnam War: Vol II, The Struggle for South-East Asia, 19611965,
London: Macmillan, 1985, p. 38.
79 Political letter from Ambassador Tovmasian to MID. Some Questions on the Activities of
the CC Lao Dong after the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in
1960, 17 October 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 3, p. 42.
80 Ibid., pp. 4445.
81 Record of conversation, Councellor Soviet embassy in the DRV Nikolai I. Godunov
Le Duan, 9 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, p. 24.
82 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, pp. 2427. Citation from p. 27.
83 Record of conversation, N.I. Godunov Hoang Van Tien, DRV Acting Foreign
Minister, 5 July 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, p. 116. For an account of

Notes

183

the NLFs foreign relations see Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy for the early 1960s
particularly Chapters 1 and 2.
84 According to a Soviet report the DRV managed to establish a number of bases in
South Vietnam due to the use of these aircraft, and they also flew in three complete
infantry batallions and a considerable number of officers for 20 batallions. See On the
situation in South Vietnam, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID Nikolai
Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 107.
85 The Soviet documents do not say anything about the pilots who flew the planes, but in
later discussions over the same matter the Vietnamese complain about the lack of
educated pilots. It is therefore possible that these planes were equipped with Soviet
pilots who could effectively have stopped all attempts to use the planes for purposes
other than those approved by Moscow in advance. See Chapter 7 of this book.
86 Although this has yet to be documented, one cannot disregard the possibility that opinions
within the Soviet government on whether to support the Vietnamese differed. Until all
existing documents on Soviet involvement in Vietnam have been released (intelligence
reports, military records, personal papers) it remains impossible to document that incidents of tacit approval that were in opposition to the general Soviet line in Vietnam
could have been forced through by individuals or groups within the Soviet leadership
positive to the introduction of insurgency in South Vietnam.

6 The fight over Laos, 19611962

1 Deng Xiao Ping to Soviet ambassador in Beijing, Stephan Chervonenko, 30 September
1961, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 54, pa. 466, d. 8, p. 177.
2 Anderson, David L., Trapped By Success. The Eisenhower Administration and
Vietnam, 195361, New York: Colombia University Press, 1991, p. 191.
3 For the period from 195460, the Vietnam fund in the AVPRF contains much
information on the situation in Laos. This continued also after a separate Laos fund
was opened in 1955.
4 Smith, Ralph B., An International History of the Vietnam War: Vol. I, Revolution
versus Containment, 195561, New York: St. Martins Press, 1983, p. 111; Anderson,
Trapped By Success, p. 191; Lawrence Freedman, Kennedys Wars. Berlin, Cuba,
Laos, and Vietnam, Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford, 2000, p. 294.
5 Record of conversation, Sokolov Ung Van Khiem, 28 February 1959, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 6873; in late May the same year Pham Van Dong
informed the Soviet ambassador in Hanoi that if necessary the DRV was ready to
support Laos with arms and other supplies needed for war. See record of conversation,
Sokolov Pham Van Dong, 26 May 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5,
pp. 123126.
6 Record of conversation, Sokolov Ung Van Khiem, 28 February 1959, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 6873, AVPRF; record of conversation, Sokolov Ung
Van Khiem, 9 March 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14, pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 7477.
7 Record of conversation, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Pushkin Ung Van
Khiem, 12 January 1960, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 15, pa. 28, d. 4, p. 1.
8 Ibid., pp. 13.
9 On the situation in South Vietnam, an analysis by Acting Head of the SEAD in MID
Nikolai Moljakov, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16, pa. 32, d. 20, p. 107.
10 Anderson, Trapped By Success, p. 191.
11 Abramov was originally assigned Soviet ambassador in Cambodia from 1959 to 1962
but was serving as ambassador to Laos simultaneously. That would also explain his
swift arrival in Laos.
12 This refers to the International Control Commission set up during the 1954 Geneva
conference on Indochina. The commission consisted of representatives from India,

184

13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36

Notes

Poland and Canada with India as head of the commission. The commission was set up
with these particular members in order to have one representative from the Western
side, Canada; one from the Socialist countries, Poland; and finally, a member that was
regarded as neutral, India. The changed role and position of India would turn out to be
an issue at the Geneva conference on Laos in 196162.
Captain Kong Le was collaborating with the Pathet Lao forces.
Hall, David K., The Laos Neutralization Agreement, 1962 in Alexander L. George,
Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin (eds) U.S. Soviet Security Cooperation.
Achievements, Failures, Lessons, Oxford UP: NY, 1988.
Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasslov, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao. Partners in
the Struggle for Laos, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 73.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 100.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 108.
All in all the PRC delegation consisted of some 50 men and women, and according to
Arthur Lall who represented India in Geneva, the Chinese delegation made quite an
impression when entering the conference room in Geneva. Arthur Lall, How Communist
China Negotiates, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 12.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 99100.
See e.g. Chinese comments on the Soviet need for their support; record of conversation,
Gromyko Chen Yi, 14 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 23.
Marek Thee, Notes of a Witness. Laos and the Second Indochinese War, New York:
Vintage Books, 1973, pp. 1718.
Record of conversation, Andrei Gromyko Chen Yi, 14 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445,
op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 23. Quote from p. 3.
Ibid., pp. 23.
On contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference
(MayJune) by MID, 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8, p. 33.
Such meetings were held on a regular basis throughout the conference. In addition to
discussing strategies the main purpose of the meetings was to let the Soviets share
information from their meetings with other foreign delegates and, more specifically,
from their meetings with the other co-chair, Great Britain.
Meeting between the head of delegations from the Soviet Union, PRC, DRV and
Poland, 15 May 1961, at 16 h 30 min, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, pp. 78.
Sihanouk did, however, make it to Geneva in time to open the conference on May 16.
Ibid., p. 13.
Ibid.
Roberts, Geoffrey, The Soviet Union in World Politics. Coexistence, Revolution and
Cold War, 19451991, London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 5354.
On contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference
(MayJune) by MID, 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8.
Ibid.
Meeting between the head of delegations from the Soviet Union, PRC, DRV and
Poland, 15 May 1961, at 16 h 30 min, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 1, p. 19.
Ibid., pp. 2021.
On contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference
(MayJune) by MID, 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8, p. 31.
Record of conversation, G.M. Pushkin Zhang Hanfu, 15 May 1961, AVP RF,
f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2, pp. 15. During this conversation Zhang several times
referred to the absence of the word independence in references to Laotian
neutrality. According to the Chinese it was very important that whenever the word
neutrality was mentioned as the future status of Laos, independence should be
mentioned as well.
This was a question the Chinese raised several times in the early days of the conference.

Notes

185

37 Record of conversation, G.M. Pushkin Zhang Hanfu, 16 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445,
op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2, p. 19. The Chinese position on the issue of Chiang Kaishistovs
was also emphasized in the overall Soviet analysis on contacts between the Soviet and
Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference (MayJune), where it was concluded
that after the negotiations during summer 1961 the Chinese had stopped insisting on
the point about the Chiang Kaishistovs. See also 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445,
op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8, p. 31.
38 On contacts between the Soviet and Chinese delegations at the Geneva conference
(MayJune) by MID, 7 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 2, d. 8, p. 31.
39 Record of conversation, G.M. Pushkin Zhang Hanfu, 16 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445,
op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2, p. 20.
40 Apparently, Zhang then went to consult with Chen Yi, whose answer was that he would
reconsider once again whether it would be wise for the Chinese to proceed with the issues
of Chapter 4 of the agreement. In addition he wanted to hear the Soviet comments on the
other Chinese proposals. See, ibid. AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2, pp. 2223.
41 Ibid., p. 20.
42 Ibid.; AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 2.
43 Record of conversation, Chervonenko Deng Xiao Ping, 30 September 1961, AVP
RF, f. 0100, op. 54, pa. 466, d. 8, p. 177.
44 Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists Relations with China and the Second
Indochina Conflict, 19561962, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc.,
1997, p. 194.
45 Thee, Notes of a Witness, p. 131. A discussion of Marek Thees account can also be
found in Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists, pp. 194196.
46 Record of conversation, G.M. Pushkin DRV foreign minister Ung Van Khiem,
6 June 1961, AVP RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 3.
47 Meeting between the heads of the four Socialist delegations, 7 June 1961, AVP
RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 6, pp. 3036.
48 Arguments presented by the heads of the four Socialist delegations concerning the
organization of the further work of the Geneva conference on Laos, 1961, AVP
RF, f. 0445, op. 1, pa. 1, d. 8, p. 23.
49 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 103.
50 Ibid.
51 In the new government, Souvanna Phouma became prime minister in charge of the
Ministry of Defence; Phoumi and Souphanouvong both became deputy prime ministers,
each with veto power over cabinet decisions and departmental decisions in defence, interior
and foreign affairs. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 104105.
52 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 106.
53 On the PRC reaction to the formation of a Lao government, Soviet embassy in
Beijing to MID, 18 June 1962, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 55, pa. 489, d. 67, pp. 223225.
Quotes from p. 225.
54 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Pham Van Dong, 19 May 1961, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, p. 54.
55 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Ung Van Khiem, 8 September 1961, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 16, pa. 31, d. 7, pp. 200201.
56 Record of conversation, Soviet charg daffaires in Hanoi P.I. Privalov Nguyen
Zyan, Deputy director of the Asian Department in the DRV foreign ministry and
Cham, Head of the department of foreign trade with Socialist countries in the Vietnamese
ministry of trade, 9 July 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 61.
57 Record of conversation, P.I. Privalov DRV Acting Premier Minister Le Than Ngi,
24 August 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 89.
58 Ibid.
59 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Pham Van Dong, 7 September 1962, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, pp. 103104.

186

Notes

60 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Pham Van Dong, 24 September 1962, AVP

RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, pp. 129130. The passage on how the Soviet Union was the
best choice to assist the DRV in their help to Laos was followed by a personal comment
made by Ambassador Tovmasyan saying: I personally agree with him. (l. 130).
61 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 134.
62 The conference on Laos in Geneva was emphasized by Deng Xiao Ping in the end of
September 1961 as an example of the fact that Moscow and Beijing were still able to
cooperate on the international arena, although they did not agree on everything else.
See record of conversation, Chervonenko Deng Xiao Ping, 30 September 1961, AVP
RF, f. 0100, op. 54, pa. 466, d. 8, p. 177.
63 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 106. Quotation marks in the original.
64 Ibid., pp. 106108.
65 Ibid., p. 111.

7 From disinterest to active support, 19621965

1 On the situation in South Vietnam, 22 December 1961, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 16,
pa. 32, d. 20, p. 104.
2 Yang Kuisong, Changes in Mao Zedongs Attitude toward the Indochina War,
19491973, CWIHP Working Paper No. 34, Washington, D.C., February 2002, p. 22.
3 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Duong Bac Mai, 18 December 1962, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 226.
4 In January 1962 Chan Ti Binh, the DRV ambassador in Beijing, told Chervonenko that
Ho Chi Minh claimed that he would fight against disagreements within the Communist
camp until his last drop of blood. Chan Ti Binh added that without the Soviet Union
there would not have been a Communist camp, that disagreements would have to be
solved in a friendly way, and that they should be able to find a common course. See,
record of conversation, Soviet ambassador to Beijing, Stephan Chervonenko Chan
Ti Binh, 15 January 1962, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 55, pa. 480, d. 6, p. 11. Chan Ti
Binhs attitude was probably rather representative of how the Vietnamese dealt with
the widening split in the early part of the 1960s.
5 In January 1962, according to the Soviet embassy, the Vietnamese put much more
effort into the celebration of the Chinese recognition of the DRV, than the Soviet
recognition. Also, when celebrating the 32nd anniversary of the foundation of the Lao
Dong, it was the role of the CCP that was underlined, as well as the role of the Chinese
Communists in the Vietnamese revolution. See, memorandum by the Soviet embassy
in the DRV written by L. Kotov, 2nd Secretary, Some aspects of the Vietnamese
Chinese relationship, 10 April 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, pp. 68.
6 Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 8; see also Chen Jian 2001: 211.
7 Regionally Laos was the main issue that contributed to a closer Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Leaders in Hanoi and Beijing held, to a large degree, similar positions on
how to handle, and not least solve, the problems in Laos. Hanoi strongly wanted the air
bridge to Laos to continue, mainly because they used it for two vital purposes: first, to
bring personnel into South Vietnam and, second, to strengthen the Pathet Lao. These
goals coincided with those of the Chinese, who in addition to supporting the Pathet
Lao aimed to strengthen a second force in Laos, the group led by Kham Chan in the
province of Phong Saly. Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 10; sources
from the Chinese side also reveal how Beijing already during the Geneva conference
in 1961 encouraged Hanoi to keep their forces in Laos in secret. See Yang Kuisong,
Changes in Mao Zedongs Attitude, p. 21.
8 Economic, trade and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, memorandum by the Southeast Asia Department MID, 3 December
1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, pp. 5879. However, the Soviets had

Notes

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

187

several reservations with regard to the quality of this assistance and Vietnamese views
on it. According to the SEAD report the Soviet embassy in Hanoi believed that the
Vietnamese leadership realized that hoping for a fast economic development in the
DRV in the next few years, based on Chinese assistance only, was an illusion. Chinese
assistance to the DRV was characterized by overt mistakes, late deliveries and low
quality of goods. (67)
L. Kotov, Some aspects of the VietnameseChinese relationship, 10 April 1962,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 9.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 910. Quotation from p. 10.
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 113.
Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Ho Chi Minh, 26 May 1962, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, pp. 1819. Quotation marks in original text.
Record of conversation, Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin Ho Chi Minh, 7 June
1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 4, pp. 1112.
SovietVietnamese relations, memorandum from the Southeast Asia Department,
2 June 1962, AVP RF, f. 079. op. 17, pa. 35, d. 13, pp. 4041.
L. Kotov, Some aspects of the VietnameseChinese relationship, 10 April 1962,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, pp. 56.
These suggestions might indicate that there were different views also within the foreign
ministry on how to deal with the situation in Vietnam, see AVP RF, memorandum written
by A. Skoryokov, Suggestions for the further development of the political, economic and
cultural relationship with the DRV and for regulation of international problems,
15 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 35, d. 13, pp. 7576.
L. Kotov, Some aspects of the VietnameseChinese relationship, 10 April 1962,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 28.
The Soviet embassy in Hanoi and the Southeast Asia Department in the Soviet foreign
ministry came up with many ideas on how to increase Soviet influence in Vietnam,
ranging from a visit by Nikita Khrushchev to increased economic assistance, but in
1962 none of these were implemented.
Zubok, Vladislav and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlins Cold War. From
Stalin to Khrushev, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 261262.
Kevin Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, London: UCL Press, 1998, p. 56.
LaFeber, Walter, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 19451996, New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1997, pp. 229230.
The Soviet dependence on other Socialist embassies to obtain information on
developments in Vietnam and especially the Sino-Vietnamese relationship coincided
with Maos decision to support the armed struggle in Vietnam. See Yang Kuisong,
Changes in Mao Zedongs Attitude, p. 22.
Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Findinski and Marek Thee, 8 and 10 September
1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 107.
Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Czechoslovak Ambassador to the DRV, Gerold,
11 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 110. Both quotations from
p. 110.
Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 111. Quotations in the original text.
Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 111.
Ibid.
The wording was Opiratsa na svoi sily Depend on ones own forces.
Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 111.
Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Findinski, 20 November 1962, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 201.
Memorandum written by A. Skoryokov, Suggestions for the further development of
the political, economic and cultural relationship with the DRV and for regulation

188

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44

45

46
47
48

49
50
51
52

Notes

of international problems, 15 September 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 35, d. 13,
pp. 7577. Quotation from p. 76.
Record of conversation, Tovmasyan leader of the Polish delegation to the ICC Pokhorilts
and Findinski, 11 October 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 164.
Ibid., p. 165.
Memorandum, The PRC delegation to the DRV, L. Kotov, 2nd Secretary of the Soviet
embassy in the DRV, 11 November 1962, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 138.
The Soviet embassy placed significance on the fact that Ung Van Khiem had placed a
Soviet flag on his car during the visit. See, ibid. The PRC delegation to the DRV,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 36, d. 19, p. 140.
Ibid., p. 148.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 148149.
Xuan Thuy (DRV foreign minister 196365, and DRV representative at the Paris
Peace Talks).
Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Duong Bac Mai, 18 December 1962, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 226.
Ibid. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, p. 228. The last part of the sentence had
quotation marks in the original text.
In late February 1964, after the visit of Le Duans delegation to Moscow, Soviet
ambassador to the DRV Tovmasyan, in a conversation with the Polish ambassador to the
DRV, Shedelevski, provided a clear yes to the Poles direct question as to whether the
DRV now was to be considered pro-Chinese. See record of conversation, Tovmasyan
Shedelevski, 28 February 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 99.
According to a report summarizing two such visits, neither delegation experienced any
form of polemic fights, and the participants were in both cases very satisfied with the
visits. See Memorandum on Political results of the visits to the DRV of delegations
from the Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Defence USSR, 29 January 1963, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 17, pp. 13.
See e.g. record of conversation, Tovmasyan Duong Bac Mai, 18 December 1962,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 17, pa. 34, d. 7, pp. 225228; record of conversation, Tovmasyan
Duong Bac Mai, 29 June 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 6, pp. 249256;
record of conversation, Privalov Duong Bac Mai, 21 October 1963, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 18, pa. 37, d. 8, pp. 4144.
Memorandum About Novotnys visit to the DRV, written by 3rd Secretary Soviet
embassy in Hanoi, L. Boyko, 25 March 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 23,
pp. 3847.
Liu Shaoqis visit to the DRV, Soviet ambassador Tovmasyan to MID, 12 June 1963,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 23, p. 70. Quotation marks in the original text; for
the Chinese account, see Qiang Zhai 2000: 126.
Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Polish charg daffaires Kazimir Hodorek, 9 March
1963, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 6, p. 76. Horodek further added that these efforts had
made many Vietnamese worry that pro-Chinese groups now had full control over the
propaganda machinery of the Lao Dong. They feared that these groups could resort to
repression of those who did not share their points of view. However, it seemed as if the
Vietnamese believed that as long as Ho Chi Minh remained in power it would probably not come to this, but if these groups were able to restrain Hos influence within
the party this could happen. (78)
Liu Shaoqis visit to the DRV, Soviet ambassador Tovmasyan to MID, 12 June 1963,
AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 23, p. 70. Quotation marks in the original text.
Ibid., pp. 7980.
Ibid., p. 85.
SEAD memorandum, G. Zverev, 2nd Secretary, The position of the DRV and the USSR
in relation to South Vietnam, 26 July 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 23, p. 164.

Notes

189

53 Ibid., p. 165.
54 Ibid.
55 In the Soviet foreign ministry files containing records of conversations between the
Soviet ambassador and high-ranking North Vietnamese officials for 1963, many
documents had been censured and were not available to me while I was working in the
reading room. However, later references to individual documents do indicate that the
Vietnamese did receive a certain amount of weapons from the Soviets also in 1963,
under the condition that it would be impossible to identify that these weapons were
delivered by the Soviet Union. However, after the mention of these weapons most of
the conversations between the ambassador and the highest-level Vietnamese officials
have been restricted from view. See e.g. AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, dd. 78.
56 Record of conversation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Georgevich Lapin DRV
Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Van Kinh, 30 August 1963, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 18, pa. 37, d. 4, p. 4.
57 Ibid.
58 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Ho Chi Minh, 20 December 1963, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 8, pp. 159161.
59 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Gerold, 16 November 1963, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 18, p. 37, d. 8, p. 72.
60 Ibid., p. 74.
61 King C. Chen, Hanois Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War,
Political Science Quarterly, 90 (2), 1975.
62 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 125. Quotation marks from the original text.
63 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Dang Kim Xiang, DRV deputy minister of
economy, 17 January 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 16.
64 Ibid., p. 22.
65 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Xuan
Thuy, 25 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 8, pp. 164165. According to
Tovmasyan, Truong Chinh was also supposed to participate during the lunch, but the table
was only set for seven people, so there was no seat for him and he had to leave.
66 Duiker, William J., Ho Chi Minh: A Life, New York: Hyperion, 2000, p. 537.
67 Duikers emphasis on the fact that the North Vietnamese were eager not to completely
alienate the Soviets, in spite of preference for the Chinese strategy by the majority of
the Lao Dong leaders, coincides well with findings in Soviet foreign ministry files. If
this is true, it gives increasing credit to the efforts of the local Soviet diplomacy in
Hanoi that upheld a working relationship with the North Vietnamese authorities, even
at a time when leaders in Moscow displayed less interest for developments in Vietnam.
See Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, p. 537.
68 The inclusion of To Huu in the delegation was significant as he had made his debut as
a political figure during the 9th Plenum when he publicly attacked the Soviet revisionism.
See Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, p. 538.
69 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 126127. Quotation marks in the
original text on p. 127.
70 Tovmasyans diary. Le Duans statements before departure to Moscow. 26 January
1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 26.
71 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Shedelevski, 28 February 1964, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 98.
72 Ibid.
73 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Nguyen Van Vinh, 26 February 1964, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, pp. 8090.
74 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, pp. 127128; and Gaiduk, Ilya V., The
Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996b, p. 10.
75 Gaiduk, Ilya V., Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict,
19541963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 203204.

190

Notes

76 This is based on an analysis of available records of conversations between Soviet

embassy officials and Vietnamese leaders during 1963. Some might argue that the
Vietnamese assertions of their loyalty to the Soviet Union were pure propaganda.
However, the frequency of these assertions and the fact that the Soviet Union, in the
end, was the only reliable partner in a war against the Americans support this view.
Similar arguments on how Vietnamese leaders were reluctant to cut off all contact with
the Soviet Union have been presented in Duiker 2000: 537538.
77 Comments made by Pham Van Dong to Marek Thee, Polish representative in the ICC
Laos, in December 1963. See AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, p. 112; for Pham
Van Dongs statement see record of conversation, Tovmasyan Pham Van Dong,
16 January 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 6, p. 14. Quotation marks in the
original. After expressing that the conditions were not yet ripe, Pham Van Dong
refused to talk more about the subject.
78 Record of conversation, Privalov Gerold, 11 June 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19,
pa. 40, d. 7, p. 60.
79 Record of conversation, Privalov Pham Van Dong, 18 June 1964, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 91.
80 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 132; and Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and
the Vietnam War, pp. 1213.
81 Record of conversation, Privalov Le Duc Tho, 10 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, pp. 202206; and record of conversation, Privalov Pham Van Dong,
15 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 216.
82 For hints on improvements in the SovietVietnamese relationship, see record of
conversation, Privalov Bibov, DDR charg daffaires in Hanoi, 16 July 1964, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, pp. 141142; and record of conversation, Privalov
Pham Van Dong, 9 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, pp. 195197.
83 Record of conversation, Privalov Pham Van Dong, 9 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 197.
84 For the exchanges on the U Thanth issue, see record of conversation, Privalov Pham
Van Dong, 21 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, pp. 233234; and
record of conversation, Privalov Hoang Van Tien, 29 August 1964, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 19, pa. 40, d. 7, p. 242. When delivering the answer to the U Thanth information to
Privalov, the exchange was so secret that everyone except Privalov and Tien had to
leave the room. Tien also underlined that he had written the answer himself.
85 These Vietnamese concerns were referred to by the DDR ambassador to the DRV,
Bergold. See record of conversation, Privalov Bergold, 17 September 1964, AVP
RF, f. 79, op. 19, pa. 40, d. 8, pp. 1215.
86 Record of conversation, Deputy Foreign Minister Lapin DRV Ambassador to the
Soviet Union Nguyen Van Kinh, 23 December 1964, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 19, pa. 40,
d. 4, p. 6.

Conclusion: Changing Alliances

1 Record of conversation, Gromyko Nguyen Duy Trinh, 11 April 1965, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 20, pa. 45, d. 2, p. 13.
2 Record of conversation, Shcherbakov Pham Van Dong, 19 February 1965, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 20, pa. 45, d. 4, p. 53.
3 Record of conversation, Shcherbakov Pham Van Dong, 3 March 1965, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 20, pa. 45, d. 4, pp. 6364.
4 Record of conversation, Chervonenko Liu Zhao, 23 March 1965, AVP RF, f. 0100,
op. 58, pa. 516, d. 5, p. 46.
5 Ibid., pp. 4849.
6 Ibid.

Notes

191

7 Record of conversation, Gromyko Nguyen Duy Trinh, 11 April 1965, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 20, pa. 45, d. 2, pp. 1213.
8 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 19501975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 17.
9 For the classical interpretations of Moscows view on the Geneva settlements, see,
for example, Randle, Robert F., Geneva 1954, The Settlement of the Indochinese
War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969; Nogee, J.L. and Donaldson R.H.,
Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (3rd edn), New York: Pergamon Press,
1988, pp. 110111; Cameron, Allan W., The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The
Origins of Involvement in W. Raymond Duncan (ed.), Soviet Policy in Developing
Countries, Waltham: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, pp. 189196; Qiang Zhai, China and
the Geneva Conference of 1954, The China Quarterly (129), 1992, p. 113. See also
Olsen, Mari, Solidarity and National Revolution. The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese
Communists, 19541960, Defence Studies 4/97, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies, 1997, Chapter 1.
10 According to Nigel Gould-Davies an ideologically driven state would seek to replicate
its domestic system, while in a similar situation a traditional security-seeking state
would attempt to expand their territory. The expansion of ideological states is thus
more geoideological than geopolitical. Likewise, ideological states define security in
terms of the expansion of their own domestic system, and threat in terms of the expansion
of their adversarys domestic system. See Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International
Politics during the Cold War, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter
1999), pp. 101104.
11 For a detailed analysis of Soviet perceptions of the change in DRVs Southern
strategy, see also Olsen, Solidarity, Chapter 5.
12 See e.g. Westad, Odd Arne, Chen Jian, Stein Tnnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and
James G. Hershberg (eds), 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign
Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 19641977, CWIHP Working Paper No. 22,
1998, pp. 142143. A similar notion can be found in Ilya Gaiduks latest work,
where he talks about Geneva primarily as a way to secure peace in Southeast Asia
and prevent American intervention, rather than a way to safeguard the future of a
fellow Communist state exemplified by the Soviet view on Vietnamese partition as
unproblematic. See Confronting Vietnam. Soviet Policy toward the Indochina
Conflict, 19541963, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, Chapter 3 and
Conclusion.
13 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, p. 111.
14 However, that question cannot be answered satisfactorily until we gain full access to
Vietnamese foreign policy archives.
15 According to Marilyn Young, Washington assimilated the war in Vietnam in the
worldwide fight against Communism in general and its Asian branch in
particular. See The Vietnam Wars, 19451990, New York: HarperPerennial,
1991, p. 30.
16 Zubok, Vladislav and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlins Cold War. From
Stalin to Khrushev, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 1215;
Vladislav Zubok, Stalins Plans and Russian Archives, Diplomatic History, 21
(Spring 1997), p. 303.
17 Macdonald, Douglas J., Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold
War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000,
pp. 183184.
18 Douglas J. Macdonald suggests that in order to explain how and why states act, both
ideational and structural analyses are necessary. Ultimately, the study of formal
ideology, intersecting with structural considerations, offers an efficient and relatively
economical means to do so. See Formal Ideologies, p. 194.

192

Notes

Appendix 1: Politburo and Secretariat of the Lao Dong

Central Committee
1 Attached list, 11 June 1954, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 9, pa. 6, d. 7.
2 Record of conversation, Zimyanin Ho Chi Minh, 7 September 1956, AVP RF, f. 079,
op. 11, pa. 13, d. 6, p. 93.
3 Record of conversation, A.M. Popov Ho Chi Minh, June 1957, AVP RF, f. 079, op.
11, pa. 13, d. 8, pp. 9399.
4 Record of conversation, Zimyanin Nguyen Duy Trinh, 1214 June 1957, AVP
RF, f. 079, op. 12, pa. 17, d. 5, pp. 220235.
5 Record of conversation, Sokolov Le Duc Tho, 6 June 1959, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 14,
pa. 23, d. 5, pp. 130133.
6 Record of conversation, Tovmasyan Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and
Xuan Thuy, 25 December 1963, AVP RF, f. 079, op. 18, pa. 37, d. 8, pp. 164165.

Appendix 2: Economic assistance and specialists from the

Socialist camp to the DRV, 195519621
1 Long-term credits and non-refundable aid from other socialist countries to the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (in million roubles), total sums from 1955 to 1962.
Memorandum by the Southeast Asia Department in MID, 3 December 1963, AVP RF,
f. 079, op. 18, pa. 39, d. 24, pp. 5879.

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Index

August Revolution 13
Autumn border campaign (1950)

223

Bangkok
Representational Office of the
Democratic Republic of
Vietnam 2, 12
Vietnamese diplomatic initiatives in
Moscow and 511
Berlin conference 2930
Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the
Sino-Soviet Alliance, 194563
[Westad (ed.)] xvi
Calcutta Conference (1948) 4, 78
Central Office for South Vietnam
(COSVN) 90
China
Dien Bien Phu campaign 368
military assistance to DRV
226
Moscow and Communist victory
in 1416
preparations for the Geneva
conference 301
readiness to assist DRV 17
representation in DRV and Soviet
1819
responsibility for colonial liberation
struggles in Asia 1920
China and the Vietnam Wars, 195075
(Qiang Zhai) xvi
Chinese Military Advisory Group
(CMAG) 224, 37, 54
Chinese Political Advisory Group
(CPAG) 234
Cold War International History Project
(CWIHP) xvi
Cominform 56

Democratic Republic of Vietnam

approaches to America and Soviet
Union 3
China versus Soviet representation
in 1819
Chinese aid 11
Chinese military assistance 226
Chinese recognition 1617
Dien Bien Phu campaign 368
discussions and misunderstandings
over exchange of
representatives 1821
establishment, 1
focus of Soviet foreign ministry 50
Ho Chi Minh as President 1, 23
importance of recognition from China
and Soviet 20
land reform 626
recognition and new challenges 267
recognition as a legitimate
government 1521
recognition from the Communist
world 15
recognition of DRV as the legitimate
government 1621
renewed Soviet interest in 1112
role of Bangkok 23
search for allies 14
Sino-Soviet assistance 77
Sino-Soviet skepticism towards use of
foreign specialists 778
Soviet economic and military
assistance 50, 52
Soviet military cooperation 534
Soviet recognition 1718
transport assistance from Soviet
512
withdrawal of Chinese military
assistance 545

200

Index

Franco-Vietnamese War 4, 216

French Communist Party (PCF) 6
Gaiduk, Ilya V. xivxv, 131
Geneva agreement and Sino-Soviet
relations 558
Geneva conference (1954)
and future SovietVietnamese
relations 447
Geneva agreements (July 20, 1954) 29
Indochina phase (May 8, 1954) 29
negotiating in the 3844
outcome of 447
preparation for the conference 2935
settlement in Indochina
problem 44
Soviets promotion and support to
China 2930
the Final Declaration 44
Geneva conference on Laos
(196162) 97100
Ho Chi Minh
active member of PCF 11
as president of DRV 1
communication between Stalin and 25
links with the communist world 3
meetings with Mao and Stalin
1415
search for allies 13
secret trip to the Nineteenth Congress of
CPSU 25
trip to Soviet 1415
Inside the Kremlins Cold (Zubok and
Pleshakov) xvi
International Control Commission
(ICC) 33
Laos
assistance to 10811
civil war in 957
DRV, China and Soviets interest on 94
Geneva conference to discuss
97100
negotiations in Geneva 1005
temporary setback 1058
Liu Shaoqi
discussion with Stalin about future
relationship between Moscow and
Beijing xiii
Luo Guibo
Chinas representative to Vietnam 18
role in CPAG 234

Mao Zedong 13, 1415

first official visit abroad 14
meeting with Stalin (October 1,
1949) 13
meetings with Ho and Stalin 1415
recognition of DRV 1617
Maos China and the Cold War (Chen
Jian) xvi
maximum plan 578
Mends-France, Pierre 401
minimum plan 578
Molotov, Vyacheslav 20, 30, 32, 389,
41, 43, 51, 142
National Liberation Army 22
Nguyen Long Bang 19, 245
peace offensive 29
Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 23, 53
rectification of errors campaign 645
regroupees 81
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance 14, 16, 17
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) 49
Southeast Asian Youth Conference see
Calcutta Conference (1948)
Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia
(Charles B. Mclane)
shift of focus from Europe to Asia 4
views on colonial strategies of Soviet
Union (194750) 4
Soviet Union
approaches from DRV 34
attempts to improve SovietVietnamese
relations 1215
Chinese representation in 1819
colonial strategies 4
cooperation and coordination 1415
establishing relationship with
Vietnam 13941
from disinterest to active support 1335
impact on the French because of
recognition of DRV 201
information on internal developments in
Vietnam 22
information on the developments of the
Franco-Vietnamese War 22
leverage and ideology 1459
passive role in relations with DRV 4
perceptions of China in Vietnam 11418
preparations for the Geneva
conference 325

Index
promotion of China in Geneva
conference 2930
relations with Europe and United
States 45
renewed interest in Asia 1112
strategies in Southeast Asia 45
success in the Geneva conference 45
and the Communist victory in
China 1416
and the result of the 9th Plenum of Lao
Dong 12932
tougher frontlines within the communist
camp 11821
Vietnams changing alliances 1369
Vietnams turn to China 1259
see also Stalin, Joseph
Stalin, Joseph
discussion with Liu Shaoqi about future
relationship between Moscow and
Beijing xiii
meeting with Ho Chi Minh 15
meeting with Mao 13
meeting with Mao Zedong
(October 1, 1949) 13
meetings with Ho and Mao 1415
recognition of DRV 1617
support to CCP 14
State of Vietnam 29
Thach, Dr Pham Ngoc 67
American support initiatives 23
meeting with Kulazhenkov (1947) 6

201

Tran Van Giau 34, 5

Trglod, Benoit de
formative years of SovietVietnamese
relationship xvxvi
two-camp thesis 5, 7
Vietnamese Communists Relations with
China and the Second Indochina
Conflict, 195662 (Ang Cheng
Guan) xvi
Vietnamese reunification plans
(195761)
end of diplomacy 923
Lao Dong policy on
reunification 7984
meditiating emerging Sino-Soviet
conflict 8890
Moscow and new Southern
strategy 902
new Southern strategy 848
North Vietnam and South
Vietnam 735
renewed interest in the Geneva
Agreement 767
Sino-Soviet cooperation 779
Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP)
23, 37
Zhdanov, Andrei
speech at founding of Cominform 5
two-camp thesis 5, 7, 8
Zhou Enlai 14, 24, 301

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