People vs Mariacos Case Digest
By maechmedina
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS
GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010
FACTS:
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1
plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc
boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no
one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only
realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away
by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He
told them that they were under arrest, but on the women got away.
DOCTRINES:
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of
the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
1. This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
2. This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held to
be valid only as long as officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana
is not necessary.
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal
intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum
prohibitum
LEVISTE VS. CA G.R. NO. 189122 MARCH 17, 2010
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for bail.
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering
that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE:
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal
mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
No. the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on
the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the
allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to
deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental
principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave
caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.
People v. Villareal
G.R. No. 201363
March 18, 2013
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellant: Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati
Facts:
In the morning of December 25, 2006, Police officer Renato de Leon was driving his
motorcycle. From a distance of 8 to 10 meters he saw the appellant Villareal, holding a plastic
sachet of shabu. When Villareal saw him, he immediately ran away. When de Leon caught
Villareal, he was brought to the police station where he was arrested and the alleged shabu was
turned over to be marked as evidence. The substance was tested and was proven to be a 0.03
gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The appellant was charged with
the violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
During the trial de Leon claimed that the appellant had previous criminal charges for the same
offense and that he arrested the appellant because when he saw that the appellant was holding
a powdery white substance, it immediately gave him suspicion as to the matter thereof.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest based on the police officers personal
knowledge of the criminal record of the appellant.
Held:
No, there was no valid warrantless arrest. A lawful warrantless arrest exists when either
of the following circumstances are present: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that he person to be arrested has committed it, and (c)
when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is service final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Based on the distance
and the amount of the powdery substance it is insufficient to conclude, even with clear vision
that such substance constitutes as shabu. The act of the appellant of examining the substance
is not tantamount to arouse suspicion of a commission or possible commission of a crime even
if he has previous criminal history on the same offense.
Personal knowledge is not defined as knowledge of a person’s criminal record, but
personal knowledge as to the actual commission of the crime. The act of running away from
authority also does not automatically imply guilt on the accused. There are various reasons to
run away from authority, and commission of a crime is just one of the possible reasons.
Because there is an absence of overt act there is no justification for the appellant’s warrantless
arrest. Hence, it cannot be presented as evidence in court as it is a fruit of the poisonous tree.
People v. Mengote
G.R. No. 87059
June 22, 1992
Plaintiff-Appelee: People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellant: Rogelio Mengote y Tejas
Facts:
On August 8, 1987, an informant called the Western Police District regarding suspicious
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. Patrolmen
Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan went to the area wearing plainclothes in order to observe
the area. They noticed two men suspiciously looking from side to side. One of them was holding
his abdomen. The policemen revealed to them that they were police officers which caused them
to run away. They were unsuccessful because by then they were already surrounded by police
officers stationed for this operation. The two men were later identified as Nicanor Morellos and
the accused Rogelio Mengote. Both men were searched and a stolen revolver with six live
bullets was found under Mengote’s possession. Morellos was found to be in possession of a
fine knife. Mengote was charged and convicted for violating P.D. 1866. Mengote attested that
the revolver must not have been seized as an incident to a lawful arrest, because the arrest
itself is unlawful.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest of Mengote is unlawful so as to constitute the seizure of stolen
property inadmissible as evidence in court.
Held:
Yes, in no case was it established that the acts of the appellant constitute as an
exception to the rule that warrant of arrest must first be issued before a lawful arrest is
established. Rule 113 of Section 5 of the Rules of Court establishes the instances where
warrant is unnecessary, namely: (a) when, in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when an offense
has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Looking from side to side and holding your abdomen is not enough to constitute as an offense.
It is not even enough to assume probable cause. Warrantless arrest cannot simply be imposed
upon those who merely look suspicious, allowing so would prejudice a person’s constitutional
rights. Knowledge of a crime in the police officers’ presence must precede the arrest. Hence,
the appellant is acquitted from the crime charged.
People v. Malmstedt
G.R. No. 91107
June 19, 1991
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant-Appellant: Mikael Malmstedt
Facts:
On May 11, 1989, the appellant, Malmstedt, a Swedish National, rode a bus stop in
order to catch a trip to Baguio City. On the same day, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command, Captain Alen Vasco ordered to set up a checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province. This was established to prevent the alleged delivery of marijuana in
the area and also to catch a Caucasian coming from Sagada, who based on information
received by Vasco that morning that an alleged Caucasian was the one carrying the drugs.
When the bus arrived at the checkpoint, the NARCOM officers inspected the same and
made notice of the appellant. An officer asked the appellant to furnish them his identification
papers, but the appellant failed to do so. Because the appellant had a buldge near his waist, the
officer also asked that he show what the bulge could be. When they saw that such was a pouch,
the officer the noticed that he had 4 suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packaging
tape. When they were unwrapped, they all contain hashish or marijuana. The appellant was
asked to alight the bus, as he was doing this he grabbed two travelling bags. Each contained
teddy bears. When they brought the accused to their headquarters they found that even the
teddy bears were filled with hashish. Samples from his items were taken to verify if such was
marijuana and this was proven to be true. Because of this a case was filed against the
appellant, the appellant attested that the search was an illegal search and that the illegal items
were merely planted by the officers to arrest him. The court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure is made pursuant to a lawful
warrantless arrest.
Held:
Yes, the arrest constitutes a lawful warrantless arrest. Pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5,
arrests are deemed lawful when: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
NARCOM received information regarding the transportation of prohibited drugs the same day
that the items were about to be transported. There was not enough time on the part of
NARCOM to obtain a search warrant. When the accused was search he was in the act of
transporting illegal drugs, such is an offense actually being committed. The search emanates
from the information provided by the informant coupled with the failure of the appellant to
present his passport when asked to do so. He was caught in flagrante delicto, thus when he
was search such was incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. The items therefore, may be
admissible in court.
#180 PEOPLE VS. ALCANTARA
[240 SCRA 122; G.R. NO. 91283; 17 JAN 1995]
Facts:
On July 19, 1988, Venancio Patricio, accompanied by Larry Salvador, drove a ten-wheeler truck a Coca-
Cola plant in Antipolo to load cases of softdrinks. They were about to leave the plant at 10:00pm when
several men approached them to hitch for a ride. Ascertaining that Salvador knew appellant, Venancio
accommodated appellant's request. Appellant had four companions. At Ortigas Ave., one of them poked
a gun at Venancio and grabbed the steering wheel. At the North Diversion Road, Venancio and
Salvador(helper) were brought down from the vehicle and tied to the fence of the expressway,
thereafter they were stabbed and left bleeding to death. Venancio survived but Salvador did
not.Appellant was arrested in the vicinity of Otis Street in Pandacan, Manila. A few days later, he was
turned over to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Sgt. Alberto Awanan brought the appellant to
the MCU hospital and was presented to Venancio for identification. Appellant was brought to the
Headquarters at Camp Crame where he confessed.
Appelant’s Defense: Denial and alibi. He said that he was just applying to be a driver and stayed there
even if he was told that no work was available, to confirm with the truck drivers. While he was applying
for CONCEPCION TRUCKING located across Otis street from the Coca-cola plant. He was arrested. He
denied any knowledge of the "hit" on the Coca-cola delivery truck. He remained in the custody of the
police for two days and two nights. On the third day of his detention, he was turned over to the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Appellant was the brought to the MCU hospital. He was made to
confront Venancio whom he saw for the first time. CHPG Sgt. Awanan asked Venancio twice if appellant
was among those who hijacked the truck he was driving. On both times, Venancio did not respond.
Undaunted, Sgt. Awanan, called to a photographer present, forced appellant to stand about a foot from
Venancio, and told the latter to just point at the suspect. "Basta ituro mo lang," Sgt. Awanan directed.
Venancio obeyed, and pictures of him pointing to the suspect were taken. From the hospital, appellant
was brought to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at Camp Crame. Without being
apprised of his rights nor provided with counsel, he was interrogated and urged to confess his guilt. He
balked. At ten o'clock that night, hours after questioning began, appellant's interrogators started boxing
him and kicking him. He was also hit on the back with a chair, and electrocuted. Still, he refused to admit
to the crime. In the midst of his ordeal, appellant heard someone say, "Tubigan na iyan." He was then
blindfolded and brought to another room where he was made to lie down. Water was slowly and
continuously poured on his face, over his mouth. Appellant could no longer bear the pain caused by the
water treatment. Finally, he confessed to being one of the hijackers. He was led to another room, where
he was handcuffed and left until the following day. Later, he was made to sign prepared statements
containing his full confession.
Alcantara was arraigned under an information charging him and four others (at large) with the crime of
robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
The trial court convicted the accused despite the following inconsistency between Venancio’s affidavit
and testimony:
Affidavit Testimony
1. mentioned 5 assailants - only Alcantara was identified
2. stabbing was preceded by a - only 3 assailants had a
3. conference by all assailants - conference
4. claimed to have allowed assailants - failed to identify Alcantara
5. to hitch a ride because Alcantara - at the hospital and in open
6. was familiar to them - court (pointed to another person)
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.
Held:
YES. The people’s evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the presumption. The
second identification which correctly pointed to accused by Venancio should not be credited. There is no
reason for him to err as they know each other for 3 years. It was also incorrect to give too much weight
to Police Sgt. Awanan’s testimony as to the “previous identification” at the hospital. The testimony of
Sgt. Awanan was not corroborated by Venancio.
The identification procedure was irregular. Due process demands that the identification procedure of
criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the influence of improper suggestion
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor. Conviction must be
based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. There was blatant
violation of the constitutional rights of appellant as an accused. Appellant belongs to the economically
deprived in our society. He is nearly illiterate(third grade education). Our Constitution and our laws
strictly ordain their protection following the Magsaysay desideratum that those who have less in life
should have more in law.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO
ROMULO,petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC.
June 29, 2001
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a
letterrequesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the
plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the
constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which could
only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of
the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings
will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration
of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due
process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.
Issue : Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to
information of public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the
accused.
Ruling : The petition is denied.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in
acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary
is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of
public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force
or influencebut only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity
and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of
the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have
on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can
likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public
trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and
that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial;
it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of
the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible
and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall
then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
