LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK v KRISHNAN

Facts:

Erlinda in her Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners Luzon
Development Bank, Tomas Clemente Jr., and Oscar Ramirez alleged that she is a client of the bank and
maintained several deposits including time deposits. When she presented her Certificates of Time
Deposits for payment because they have become due, the petitioners refused to honor it for the reason
they were fraudulent. She likewise applied for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment which the trial court
granted. Thus, the petitioner bank’s accounts in BPI ( P28,597,472.70 ) and Central Bank (P49,000,000.00)
were garnished. The petitioners then filed an urgent Motion To Recall Quash And/Or Lift Attachment
or Garnishment, which the respondent opposed. They filed on March 9, 2001 an urgent motion to
substitute their garnished accounts with government securities. Again respondent opposed the
motion. The RTC then required the petitioners to justify their motion to discharge. On September 8,
2003, the RTC lifted the garnishment; Erlinda moved to reconsider and for the judge to inhibit. The judge
denied the motion for reconsideration but granted the motion for inhibition. Erlinda then elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals thru a petition for certiorari, which the appellate court granted. It directed
the petitioners to file a counter bond in accordance with Sec. 12 Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
within 10 days from finality of the decision otherwise, the RTC shall immediately reinstate the writ of
attachment previously issued. Since their appeal to the Supreme Court was denied, the case was
remanded to the RTC which required Erlinda to post a new attachment bond in the amount of
P35,000,000.00, and for petitioners to file a counter bond within 10 days from notice of the filing and
approval of Erlinda’s bond. Erlinda filed her attachment bond on June 25, 2009, and the same was
approved by the RTC on July 7, 2009. Petitioners then filed an Omnibus Motion to determine the
sufficiency of the bond and for them to be allowed to deposit Certificates of Titles of real property, and
that the issuance of the writ of attachment be held in abeyance. The RTC denied the motion and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration; petitioners assailed the denial of their motions thru a petition for
certiorari with the CA, which also denied them. Thus, they appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not real property may be posted, in lieu of cash or counter bond, to secure any continent lien
on the petitioners’ property, since Section 2 of Rule 57 only mentions “deposit”, thus it cannot be confined
or construed to refer to cash.

Ruling:

We rule in the negative.

Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that “[a]n order of attachment may be issued
either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much
of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as
hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient
to satisfy the applicant’s demand or the value of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant,
exclusive of costs.”
Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that “[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and
with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the
property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court
from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to
the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached,
exclusive of costs.”

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy
of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the
Court holds that petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing
cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is
unmeritorious.

In fact, in Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante,⁠1 we held that one of the ways to secure
the discharge of an attachment is for the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing
on his behalf, to post a counterbond or make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to that fixed
by the court in the order of attachment.⁠2

Apropos, the trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or
construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the
reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an
amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to
be attached. The proximate relation of the word “deposit” and “amount” is unmistakable in Section 5 of
Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of
money as the word “amount” commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money.

In Alcazar v. Arante,⁠3 we held that in construing words and phrases used in a statute, the general rule is
that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and
common usage meaning. The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-
accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to
forced or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their
ordinary and common use and acceptation.⁠4 Thus, petitioners should not give a special or technical
interpretation to a word which is otherwise construed in its ordinary sense by the law and broaden the
signification of the term “deposit” to include that of real properties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2012 and
Resolution dated September 11, 2012 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ALFREDO C. LIM, JR. v. SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO and CARMEN T. LAZARO, G.R. No. 185734, July
3, 2013

Civil procedure; Writ of preliminary attachment subsists until judgment is satisfied. By its nature,
preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied for
not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to
be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As
such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the
case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual
or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of
summons on the defendant cannot be effected.

In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates
that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same
manner provided by law.

In Chemphil Export & Import Corporation v. CA, the Court pronounced that a writ of attachment is not
extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement between the parties.