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LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS REVIEWER the category of sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetary appropriation
is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public officers in the DBM which
I. THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE will not bar subsequent correct application.

A. DEFINITION B. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES

• A public office is the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by (1) Must be created either by:
which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the a. the Constitution,
appointing power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign b. the Legislature, or
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the c. a municipality or other body through authority conferred by the
public. [Mechem, cited in Laurel v. Desierto] Legislature;
(2) Must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of government,
Laurel v. Desierto [381 SCRA 48]: Former VP Salvador Laurel was appointed as the to be exercised for the benefit of the public;
head of the National Centennial Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of (3) The powers conferred and the duties discharged must be defined, directly or
the National Centennial Celebration. Subsequently, he was appointed as the Chairman impliedly by the Legislature or through legislative authority;
of ExpoCorp. However, controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding (4) The duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior
contracts. Thereafter, Ombudsman investigated such anomalies, which indicted the power other than the law;
petitioner for the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft law. Petitioner filed a motion to • Exception: If the duties are those of an inferior or subordinate office,
dismiss, questioning the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction over his person, which contended created or authorized by the Legislature and by it placed under the
that he was not a public officer since ExpoCorp is a private Corporation. general control of a superior office or body;
(5) Must have some permanency and continuity
SC ruled that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he
is a public officer. The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its Discussion on the Essential Requisites
mandate is to implement national policies. Moreover, the said office was established
by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, [Second Element]: The delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of government
hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public necessarily means that the powers are to be exercised for the benefit of the public.
officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make • This delegation is the most important element of a public office and
it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any distinguishes it from private employment or a contract. [Laurel v. Desierto]
compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence • The sovereign powers delegated are either legislative, executive or judicial in
and forms no part of the office. nature. [Id.]

Veterans Federation of the Phils. v. Reyes [483 SCRA 526]: Veterans Federation of [Third Element]: Powers conferred and duties imposed upon the office must be
the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640. It defined, directly or impliedly (e.g. by necessary implication).
was contended that Veterans Federation created by law is a public office, considering • Hence, there may be certain GOCCs which, though created by law, are not
that it does not possess a portion of the sovereign functions of the government and delegated with a portion of the sovereign powers of the government (i.e. those
considering further that, it has no budgetary appropriation from DBM and that its funds that are purely proprietary in nature), and thus may not be considered as a
come from membership dues. public office.

SC ruled that the Veterans Federation of the Philippines is a public corporation, hence, [Fourth Element]:
a public office. In Laurel v. Desierto, public office is defined as the right, authority and • GR: The duties must be performed independently and without control of a
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, is invested with some superior power other than the law;
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of • Exception: If the duties are those of an inferior or subordinate office, created
the public. In the instant case, the functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of or authorized by the Legislature and by it placed under the general control of
war veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism – certainly fall within a superior office or body;
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[Fifth Element]: On permanency and continuity (or “unhindered performance) (1) An action for recovery of compensation accruing by virtue of the public
• Permanence and continuity are not indispensable. office. [Santos v Sec. of Labor]
• Hence, even if the tenure of the Chair of the National Centennial Commission
(NCC) is merely temporary, it is a public office. The NCC was an ad-hoc body Santos vs Secretary of Labor [22 SCRA 848]: Santos was employed as Labor
that was created by an Executive Order to perform an executive and sovereign Conciliator I. He got a monthly salary of P3,108 per annum. Thereafter, he got promoted
function—to coordinate the celebrations of the Philippine Centennial. [Laurel as Labor Conciliator II, which increased his monthly salary. Such appointment was
v. Desierto (2002)] approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service. However, the Labor Secretary
o While salary is a usual criterion for determining the nature of a appointed Tiongco, to the same position of Labor Conciliator II. Which prompted
position, it is not a necessary condition. The material factor was the Santos’ demand for the revocation of such appointment to Tiongco and payment of
delegation of sovereign functions. [Id.] salary differentials but was rejected. Before the case could tried on the merits, Santos
o While the Court has previously held that a town fiesta was of a died. Thereafter, his heirs substituted, which triggered the respondents to seek for the
proprietary nature, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National dismissal of the case.
Centennial Celebrations, which are nation-wide. There is no hard
and fast rule for determining the nature of an undertaking or function. SC ruled that public office is a public trust. It is personal to the incumbent thereof or
[Id.] appointee thereto. In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None of
• Moreover, certain public offices exist only for a limited period, e.g. Election the heirs may replace him in that position. It is in this context that we say that the Estate
Board of Canvassers. of the deceased Segundo Santos may not press Santos' claim that he be allowed to
continue holding office as Labor Conciliator II. Actio personalis moritur cum persona (a
C. CHARACTERISTICS personal right of action dies with the person).
• A public office is created to effect the end for which government has been
instituted which is the common good; not profit, honor, or private interest of NOTE: In the instant case, the Court, however, ruled that jurisdiction of the court had
any person, family or class of persons (63 A Am Jur 2d 667) attached before the death of Santos. That jurisdiction continues until the termination of
the suit. It is true that what is left is a money claim for salary differentials but death will
Sec. 1, Art. II, Constitution: not dislodge jurisdiction on that money claim — it subsists. Thus, Court allowed the
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people heirs to file the present petition, since it’s a money claim and not replacing Santos by
and all government authority emanates from them. the heirs to the said position (Labor Conciliator II).

Sec. 1, Art. XI, Constitution: Abeja v. Tanada [236 SCRA 60]: Radovan was declared mayor in Pigbilao Quezon.
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be His rival, Abeja, filed an election protest. Radovan filed a counter protest with
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and counterclaim for damages. Thereafter, Radovan filed a motion that a judgment be
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. rendered. However, the judge, did not rule on the motion. Before the judge could be
replaced, Radovan, died. Radovan was then substituted by his widow wife, insofar as
Public Office Is Not a Property the counterclaim for damages is concerned.
• GR:
o A public office is not the property of the public officer within the SC ruled that A deceased contestant in an election protest cannot be substituted by
provision of the Constitution against deprivation of property without his/her surviving spouse. The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee's
due process of law or within an agreement in a treaty not to impair counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when death
the property or rights of private individuals. terminated his right to occupy the contested office.
o Public office being personal, the death of a public officer terminates
his right to occupy the contested office and extinguishes his No Vested Right to Public Office
counterclaim for damages. [Abeja v Tanada] • GR: A public office, being a mere privilege given by the state, does not vest
• XPN: Heirs may substitute the deceased public officer, through: any rights in the holder of the office. This rule applies when the law is clear.

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• XPN: the Constitution, hence Congress may limit its powers and
(1) When the law is vague, the person’s holding of the office is protected and jurisdiction. [See Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 114135 (1994)]
he should not be deprived of his office. o N.B. The power to create a public office may be delegated by
(2) Constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards Congress, subject to the requirements of a valid delegation of
salary and tenure. legislative powers.

National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. CSC, [221 SCRA Delegation of power to create public office
145]: Garcia was an LLB grad and a 1st grade civil service. She was appointed as Q: What is the effect where an office is created pursuant to illegally delegated powers?
Deputy RD VII, then later, re-appointed as Deputy RD III, upon reclassification of the A: The office would have no existence.
position. EO 649 was enacted, authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration
Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration. Further, U.S.T. v. Board of Tax Appeals: The authority given to the President to "reorganize
law imposed a new requirement of bar membership to qualify for permanent within one year the different executive departments, bureaus and other
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher. Thereafter, Justice Secretary instrumentalities of the Government" in order to promote efficiency in the public service
notified Garcia of the termination of her services on the ground that she was receiving is limited in scope and cannot be extended to other matters not embraced therein.
bribe money. Upon appeal to the MSPB, it was denied on the ground that the Therefore, an executive order depriving the Courts of First Instance of jurisdiction over
termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment. cases involving recovery of taxes illegally collected is null and void, as Congress alone
The CSC issued a resolution directing that Garcia be restored to her position on the has the "power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts."
ground of the vested right theory.
Methods of Organizing offices
SC ruled that there is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or 1. Single-head: one head assisted by subordinates. Swifter decision and
even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special actions but may sometimes be hastily made.
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in 2. Board System: collegial body in formulating polices and implementing
an office or its salary. None of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case. To programs. Mature studies and deliberations but may be slow in responding to
reiterate, the position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was issues and problems.
abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There
is no vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office. Not being a Modification and Abolition
member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law • GR: The power to create an office includes the power to modify or abolish it.
for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated (i.e., this is generally a legislative function)
to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law. • XPN:
(1) Where the Constitution prohibits such modification / abolition;
D. CREATION, MODIFICATION AND ABOLITION OF PUBLIC OFFICE (2) Where the Constitution gives the people the power to modify or abolish
the office;
Modes of Creation of Public Office:
(1) By the Constitution; NOTE: Abolishing an office also abolishes unexpired term: The legislature’s abolition
(2) By statute/law; or of an office (e.g. a court) also abolishes the unexpired term. The legislative power to
(3) By a tribunal or body to which the power to create the office has been create a court carries with it the power to abolish it. [Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, G.R.
delegated. No. 7910 (1955)]

How a Public Office is Created Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice: The legislative power to create a court carries with
• GR: The creation of a public office is primarily a legislative function. it the power to abolish it. When the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished
• XPN: Where the office is created by the Constitution itself. also.
o The Sandiganbayan is not a constitutional court (or public office) but
a constitutionally- mandated court. It was created by statute and not
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Zandueta v. De la Costa
• GR: When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office SC ruled that Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no
newly created by law -- which new office is incompatible with the former -- he impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
will be considered to have abandoned his former office. within a period of one year. The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the
• XPN: When the non-acceptance of the new appointment would affect public impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on
interest, and the public official is thereby constrained to accept. Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore,
Estoppel to deny existence of office the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the
Q: When is a public officer estopped from denying that he has occupied a public office? date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR
A: When he has acted as a public officer, esp. where he has received public monies Committee did not violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it
by virtue of his office. accepted the second impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint
was filed.
II. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
III. REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC OFFICE
Francisco v. House of Representatives, [G.R. No. 160261, 2003]
• It is clear, the framers intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the Binamira v. Garrucho, [188 SCRA 154]: A memorandum designating Ramon
complaint. Binamira as General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). The Minister
• Commissioner Maambong (amicus curae) explained that the obvious reason sought the approval of the delegation to the president and the same was granted.
in deleting the phrase “to initiate impeachment proceedings” as contained in Allegedly, Binamira discharged duties as the PTA general manager and ex-officio vice
the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood chairman. However, after sometime, Peter Garrucho, as the newly appointed secretary
once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the of tourism demanded for Binamira's resignation which was pursuant to a memorandum
filing of the complaint, and the vote of 1/3 of the House in a resolution of that then Pres. Aquino sent to the former advising him of the invalidity of the delegation
impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was of the position to Binamira as he was not appointed by the president which was what
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph was required under PD 564. PD 564 is the law that created the Ministry of Tourism. On
(2), Article XI of the Constitution. account of the foregoing events, Binamira filed a petition for quo warranto question
Garrucho's post and prayed for reinstatement claiming unjust dismissal.
Initiation takes place by:
1. The act of filing the impeachment verified complaint; and SC ruled that petitioner's claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground.
2. Congress taking initial action of said complaint by its referral to the house His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did
committee on Justice. not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that
it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting
Therefore, once an impeachment complaint has been initiated on the foregoing appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a
manner, another may not be filed with the same official within 1 year. different reason). In either case, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be
rejected
Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, [G.R. No.
193459, 2011]: Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Tapispisan v. CA [459 SCRA 695]: Tapispisan is a public-school teacher at Villamor
Gutierrez, both were based betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Air Base Elementary School. When the Superintendent of Schools, designated
Constitution. The House Plenary referred the two complaints to the House of Rumbaoa as OIC Teacher and Teves as OIC-Principal of 2 different schools in Pasay
Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House of Representative City, Petitioner filed a protest contesting such designation, however, it was denied.
Committee on Justice issued a Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in form and Thereafter, petitioner filed with DECS, however, it was dismissed. Petitioner then
substance. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the brought it to the CSC, however, again it was dismissed on the ground that only
Resolution violated the one-year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 appointment or promotions and not designation can be the subject of a protest.
of the Constitution.
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SC ruled that the designation of Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Umoso v. CSC [234 SCRA 617]: Petitioner was a Senior Civil Engineer who was
Elementary School and Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School promoted to the position of Supervising Civil Engineer. Private respondent, protested
merely imposed on them additional duties on top of those corresponding to their to the appointment, argued that the candidates for promotion had not been fairly
incumbent positions at Villamor Air Base Elementary School. Such designation did not evaluated by the DPWH and claimed that he was entitled to preferential consideration,
confer upon them security of tenure in the positions which they occupy in acting being the next in rank. Thereafter, the committee of the DPWH, recommended the
capacity. The designation was of a temporary nature. The designation was well within protest be upheld, which the Secretary of DPWH approved. Thereafter, petitioner
the prerogative of the said DECS officials. appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, however, it was dismissed. Then, upon
appeal to the CSC, it was ruled that the Secretary of DPWH has ultimate power to
Pimentel v. Ermita [472 SCRA 587]: The issue that brought the case to the Court was appoint.
WON President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is SC ruled that even if petitioner occupies a "next-in-rank" position, that fact alone does
constitutional. not impose on the appointing authority the duty to appoint petitioner. While preferential
consideration is accorded the "next-in-rank" employee in the event of a vacancy for a
SC ruled that the essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary higher position, such consideration does not serve to ensure appointment in his favor.
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office the part of the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position.
occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary,
the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary APPOINTMENT DESIGNATION
before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. DEFINITION Selection, by the authority Connotes merely the
vested with the power, of an imposition by law of additional
Luego v. CSC [143 SCRA 327]: Luego was appointed as Administrative Officer II. The individual who is to exercise duties on an incumbent
appointment was described as permanent. But the CSC approved it as temporary the functions of a given office official.
because of a protest filed by Tuozo against Luego’s appointment. CSC found that When completed, usually with Where the person is merely
Tuozo was better qualified for such position. Thus, then mayor Duterte appointed Tuzo its confirmation, the designated and not appointed,
to the position. Hence, the petition to the SC. appointment results in the implication is that he shall
security of tenure for the hold the office only in a
The SC ruled the following: person chosen unless he is temporary capacity and may
1. [1st Issue: Luegos Appointment was Permanent in Nature]: The stamping of replaceable at pleasure be replaced at will by the
the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the because of the nature of his appointing authority.
appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space office.
provided for in Luego’s appointment paper (CS Form 33). What was temporary NATURE Executive in nature Legislative in Nature
was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself. And what SECURITY OF Usually with security of tenure No security of tenure
made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the TENURE?
condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the WHEN DEEMED Assumption of a designated Assumption of a 2nd
appointee to the position. ABANDONMENT position is not deemed appointive position is usually
2. [2nd Issue: CSC not empowered to determine the nature of the appointment]: OF OFFICE? abandonment of the 1st deemed abandonment of the
the CSC is not empowered to determine the kind of nature of the appointment position first office.
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service
Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws.

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A. WHAT IS PUBLIC OFFICER? No presumption of power
• A public officer is one who performs public functions / duties of government • Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power,
by virtue of direct provision of law, popular election, or appointment by not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of
competent authority. His duties involve the exercise of discretion in the the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents
performance of the functions of the government, and are not of a merely entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such, there is
clerical or manual nature. (See Sec. 2 (14), E.O. 292) no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation
of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant,
Note: For the purpose of applying the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, they are devoid of power. [Villegas v. Subido]
employees, agents, or subordinate officials, of any rank or class, who perform public
duties in the government or in any of its branches shall be deemed as public officers. C. DISQUALIFICATIONS

Illustrations: Authority to prescribe disqualifications: The legislature has the right to prescribe
• In the case of Maniego v. People, a laborer who was in charge of issuing disqualifications in the same manner that it can prescribe qualifications, provided the
summons and subpoenas for traffic violations in a judge's sala was convicted prescribed disqualifications do not violate the Constitution.
for bribery under RPC 203. The court held that even temporary performance
of public functions is sufficient to constitute a person as a public official. Constitutional Disqualifications:
• In the case of People v. Paloma, a sorter and filer of money orders in the 1. General:
Auditor's Office of the Bureau of Posts was convicted for infidelity in the a. Losing candidates cannot be appointed to any governmental office
custody of documents. The court pointed out that the sorting and filing of within one year after such election. [Sec. 6, Art. IX-B]
money orders in the Bureau of Posts is obviously a public function or duty. b. Elective officials during their tenure are ineligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position [Sec. 7(1),
B. WHO ARE NOT PUBLIC OFFICERS? Art. IX-B] unless they forfeit their seat
• Generally, persons holding offices or employment which are not public offices, c. Appointive officials shall not hold any other governmental position,
i.e. those missing one of the essential elements, supra. unless otherwise allowed by law or his position’s primary functions
[Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B]
Example: d. Impeachment: “Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
• Special policemen salaried by a private entity and patrolling only the premises further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
of such private entity (Manila Terminal Co. v. CIR); under the Republic of the Philippines[.]” [Sec. 3(7), Art. XI]
• Concession forest guards (Martha Lumber Mill v. Lagradante);
• Company cashier of a private corporation owned by the government On the holding of multiple offices by high-ranking executive department officials
(Tanchoco v. GSIS) • Par. 1, Sec. 13, Art. VII, Const. The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
Q: May a person be compelled to accept a public office? provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
A: As a general rule, NO. A person cannot be compelled to accept a public office, tenure.
except – • The prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VII is a special rule in relation to Sec. 7, Art. IX
(1) When citizens are required, under conditions provided by law, to render of the Constitution. [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary]
personal military or civil service (Sec. 4, Art. II, 1987 Const.);
(2) When a person who, having been elected by popular election to a public office, Covered officials:
refuses without legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said (a) President
office (Art. 234, RPC; Note: the penalty shall be either arresto mayor, or a fine (b) Vice-President
not exceeding P 1,000.00, or both) (c) Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants

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NOTE: “Members of the Cabinet” here are synonymous with “heads of the executive Other Disqualifications
departments,” i.e. the prohibition does not apply to all officers of cabinet rank. [Civil 1. General
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration] (1) Mental or physical incapacity;
(2) Misconduct or crime: Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
General Rule: The holding of any other office or employment is prohibited for the turpitude are usually disqualified from holding public office;
covered officials in Sec. 13, Art. VII. (3) Removal or suspension from office: This disqualification is not presumed,
and cannot be imposed when not provided in the constitution or in
Exceptions: statutes;
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution (e.g. Secretary of Justice as ex (4) Previous tenure of office: See prohibitions on reappointment for specific
officio member of the JBC); or Constitutional offices;
(2) Ex Officio positions (5) Consecutive terms limit:
(a) Vice-President: 2 consecutive terms
Requirements for valid ex-officio holding: (b) Senator: 2 consecutive terms
(1) The holding of the ex-officio office is provided by law; (c) Representative: 3 consecutive terms
(2) The holding is required by the primary functions of their position; and (d) Elective local officials = 3 consecutive terms [Sec. 8, Art. X,
(3) The position is held without additional compensation. Constitution]
(6) Holding more than one office: to prevent offices of public trust from
Effect of pardon upon the disqualification to hold public office accumulating in a single person, and to prevent individuals from deriving,
• GR: A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office. directly or indirectly, any pecuniary benefit by virtue of their holding of dual
(Art. 36, Revised Penal Code) positions.
• Exceptions:
(1) Where such right to hold public office is expressly restored by the terms 2. Prohibition on Holding Offices in Private Sector
of the pardon (Art. 36, RPC); • Section 7 (b)(1) of RA 6713 considers unlawful for public officials and
(2) When a person is granted pardon because he did not commit the offense employees during their incumbency to own, control, manage, or
imputed to him (Garcia v. Chairman, COA) accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,
Rules governing effects of pardon supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by
(1) A public official who has been convicted of a crime but has been pardoned law.
must secure a reappointment before he / she can reassume his / her former • Private Practice of the Profession: Section 7 of RA 6713 also
position. (Monsanto v. Factoran) generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public
(Note: Acquittal is the only ground for automatic reinstatement of a public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from
officer to his / her former position) engaging in the private practice of their profession during their
(2) Pardon does not exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity incumbency.
imposed upon him / her by the sentence. (Art. 36, par. 2, RPC) o Exception: As an exception, a public official or employee
(3) A convicted public official who has been pardoned is not entitled to backpay can engage in the practice of his or her profession under
and other emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension the following conditions: (1) the private practice is
pendente lite. (Monsanto v. Factoran) authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and (2) the
practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her
Aliens Are Not Eligible for Public Office official functions.
• The purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and
country or a unit of territory thereof. [Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)]

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3. Prohibition on Nepotic Appointments; Exceptions Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
• Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
General Rule on Nepotism: The Civil Service Law prohibits all appointments in the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national and local governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof made in favor national by the said states.
of the relative of: • Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
(1) appointing authority; simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
(2) recommending authority; • While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
(3) chief of the bureau or office; or individual’s volition. The Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens
(4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization.
In the last two cases, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. • Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160 [Local Government
To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued Code], sec. 40(d) must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”
in favor of a relative of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising [Mercado v. Manzano (1999)]
immediate supervision over the appointee [CSC v. Dacoycoy (1999)]
Effect of removal of qualifications during the term
Relative: One who is related within the third degree of either consanguinity or of affinity. Q: What happens if the qualification is lost which the officer is holding office?
[Sec. 59, Civil Service Law] A: The officer must be terminated.

Exceptions: The prohibition on nepotic appointments in the Civil Service Law does not Monsanto v. Factoran, [170 SCRA 190]: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of
apply if the appointee is: Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public
(1) person employed in a confidential capacity Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted
(2) teachers pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be
(3) physicians reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for
(4) member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and
Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek
4. Disqualification in the Local Government Code appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto
avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.
(1) Sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment, within 2 SC ruled that a pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends
years after serving sentence; for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
(2) Removed from office as a result of an administrative case; impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
(3) Convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which
Republic; has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
(4) Dual citizenship; done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain
(5) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non- political cases here or abroad; why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings
(6) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the and benefits.
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of the Local Government Code; or Garcia v. COA, [226 SCRA 356]: SC ruled that the bestowal of executive clemency on
(7) Insane or feeble-minded. petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative
decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the
service. Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to
back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start
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and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from D. SCOPE OF QUALIFICATIONS
the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive
clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Definition:
1. Eligibility: The state or quality of being legally fitted or qualified to be chosen.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, [194 SCRA 317]: According to the 2. Qualification: Endowment/act which a person must do before he can occupy
petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in a public office. May be understood in two senses:
government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President (may a. Endowment: refers to the qualities or attributes which make an
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The individual eligible for public office. It must be possessed at the time
Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment of appointment or election and continuously for as long as the official
requires no confirmation.”) and the secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member of the relationship continues.
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar Council b. Act: refers to the act of entering into the performance of the functions
is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief of the office.
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of Power to Prescribe Qualifications
law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.”) Who may prescribe qualifications?
1. Constitution: When the qualifications are prescribed by the Constitution, they
SC ruled that by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries are generally exclusive, except where the Constitution itself provides
to hold at least two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 otherwise; Hence, Congress cannot pass a statute that requires drug testing
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment which is a direct for candidates for the House and Senate, as the qualifications of members of
contravention of the express mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution Congress are provided in the Constitution [See Social Justice Society v.
which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (2008)]
itself. 2. Congress: In the absence of constitutional inhibition, Congress has the same
right to provide disqualifications that it has to provide qualifications for office.
Caasi v. CA, [191 SCRA 317]: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as [DE LEON]
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local elections of January 18, 1988.
His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the Restrictions on the Power of Congress to Prescribe Qualifications
ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was 1. Congress cannot exceed its constitutional powers;
not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the 2. Congress cannot impose conditions of eligibility inconsistent with
United States of America, not of Bolinao. constitutional provisions;
3. The qualification must be germane to the position ("reasonable relation" rule);
SC held that Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the 4. Where the Constitution establishes specific eligibility requirements for a
U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof particular constitutional office, the constitutional criteria are exclusive, and
that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Congress cannot add to them except if the Constitution expressly or impliedly
Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his gives the power to set qualifications.
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that 5. Congress cannot prescribe qualifications so detailed as to practically amount
status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before to making a legislative appointment: it is unconstitutional and therefore void
he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Court’s for being a usurpation of executive power;
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election
thereto was null and void. Qualification Standards and Requirements under the Civil Service Law
• Qualification standards enumerate the minimum requirements for a class of
positions in terms of education, training and experience, civil service eligibility,

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physical fitness, and other qualities required for successful performance. [Sec. 5. Resident thereof for not less than one year immediately preceding election
22, Book V, Admin. Code day
• The Departments and Agencies are responsible for continuously establishing,
administering and maintaining the qualification standards as an incentive to NOTE: Residency and registration in the district (i.e. requirements 4 and 5) are not
career advancement. [Sec. 7, Rule IV, Omnibus Rules] required for partylist representatives.
• Such establishment, administration, and maintenance shall be assisted and
approved by the CSC and shall be in consultation with the Wage and Position Members of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts [Sec. 7(1), Art. VIII]
Classification Office [Id.] 1. Natural born citizen
• It shall be established for all positions in the 1st and 2nd levels [Sec. 1, Rule 2. At least 40 years old
IV, Omnibus Rules] 3. 15 years or more as a judge or engaged in law practice
4. Of proven Competence, Integrity, Probity and Independence
Political Qualifications
• GR:Political qualifications are not required for public office. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
• Exceptions: CSC COMELEC COA
(1) Membership in the electoral tribunals of either the House of Citizenship Natural-born citizen
Representatives or Senate (Art. VI, Sec. 17, 1987 Const.); Age 35 years old at the time of appointment
(2) Party-list representation; Disqualification Not a candidate for any elective position in the election
(3) Commission on Appointments; immediately preceding appointment
(4) Vacancies in the Sanggunian (Sec. 45, Local Government Code) Competence With proven College degree (a) CPA with at
capacity for public holder least 10 years of
Qualifications Prescribed by the Constitution administration auditing
experience; OR
For President and Vice-President [Sec. 2-3 Art. VII] (b) Member of the
1. Natural-born citizen Bar engaged in
2. Registered voter practice of law for
3. Able to read and write at least 10 years
4. 40 years old on day of election Composition NONE Chairman and At no time shall all
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding Rules majority should be Members of the
election day members of the Commission
bar who have belong to the
For Senator [Sec. 3, Art. VI] been engaged in same profession.
1. Natural-born citizen the practice of law
2. 35 years old on election day for at least 10
3. Able to read and write years.
4. Registered voter Legal Basis [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX- [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX- [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 2 years immediately preceding election B] C] D]
day
NOTES:
For Members of the House of Representative [Sec. 6, Art. VI] • “Practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
1. Natural-born citizen application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
2. 25yearsoldonelectionday Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service which
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter in district in which he shall be elected
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requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. [Cayetano v. has reference to the capacity not of being elected or appointed
Monsod (1991)] to office, but of holding office, and that, therefore, if qualified at
• “Residency” in election law, refers to domicile, i.e. the place where a party the time of commencement of the term or induction into office,
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he intends to return. disqualification of the candidate or appointee at the time of
To successfully effect a change of domicile, the candidate must prove an election or appointment is immaterial;
actual removal or an actual change of domicile. [Aquino v. COMELEC] (b) Qualification election or appointment: Conditions of eligibility
• There is a presumption in favor of domicile of origin. Domicile requires the twin must exist at the time of the election or appointment, and that
elements of actual habitual residence and animus manendi (intent to their existence only at the time of the commencement of the term
permanently remain). Domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is deemed to of office or induction of the candidate or appointee into office is
continue absent a clear and positive proof of a successful change of domicile. not sufficient to qualify him to office.
[Romualdez- Marcos v. COMELEC (1995)]
Note: Reconciliation of the two views: If the provision refers to “holding of office,” rather
Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, [108 Phil. 903]: The petitioners’ cause of action is predicated than to eligibility to office, in defining the qualifications, the courts are inclined to hold
upon the fact that their names appear in a list of qualified physicians, approved and that the qualifications are to be determined at the time of the commencement of the
submitted, to the President of the Philippines, by the Executive Council of the Philippine term. [DE LEON]
Medical Association of the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of section 13 of
Republic Act No. 2382, for appointment as members of the Board of Medical Qualifications are of a continuing nature:
Examiners, and that respondent Dr. Pedro M. Cruz, whom the President appointed to • Qualification is of a continuing nature, and must exist throughout the holding
said board, was not named in said list. Section 13 provides that the six members of the public office. Once the qualifications are lost, the public officer forfeits
composing the Board of Medical Examiners shall be appointed by the President from a the office.
confidential list of not more than 12 names submitted by the council of Philippine
Medical Association. However, the President appointed Dr Pedro Cruz, a previous No estoppel in ineligibility.
member of the Board, despite not being in the list, by virtue of Section 15 of RA 2382 • Knowledge of ineligibility of a candidate and failure to question such
stating that any member may be reappointed for not more than one year. ineligibility before or during the election is not a bar to questioning such
eligibility after such ineligible candidate has won and been proclaimed.
The Court upheld the validity of the appointment of Dr Pedro Cruz considering the Estoppel will not apply in such a case. [Castaneda v. Yap (1952)]
statcon doctrine. Section 15 prevails over Section 13 of RA 2382. In case of conflict
between two (2) provisions of the same statute, the last in order of position is frequently Citizenship requirement should be possessed on start of term.
held to prevail, unless it clearly appears that the intent of Congress is otherwise, and • The Local Government Code does not specify any particular date or time when
no such intent is patent the candidate must possess the required citizenship, unlike for residence and
age. The requirement is to ensure that no alien shall govern our people and
E. DURATION OF QUALIFICATIONS country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or discharge
his start of his term. This liberal interpretation gives spirit, life and meaning to
Time of Possession of Qualifications our law on qualifications consistent with its purpose. [Frivaldo v. COMELEC
(1) If law specifies: At the time specified by the Constitution or law; note examples (1996)]
in Constitution:
(a) Sec. 3, Art. VI: “No person shall be a Senator unless he is [...] on the day Presumption of eligibility: Doubts as to the eligibility of a candidate are presumed in
of the election, is at least [...]” favor of one who has been elected or appointed to public office.
(b) Sec. 2, Art. VII: “No person may be elected President unless he is [...] at
least forty years of age on the day of the election [...]” CSC v. de la Cruz, [437 SCRA 403]: Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC,
(2) If law does not specify: If time is unspecified, there are two views: Air Transportation Office, he was a Check Pilot II. He was promoted to the position:
(a) Qualification during commencement of term or induction into Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. His promotion
office: The word “eligible” as used in constitutions and statutes, was assailed by Calamba, saying he did not meet the 4 yr managerial & supervisory
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qualification for the position. CSC-NCR upheld the protest and recalled the approval of ELEMENTS OF A DE FACTO OFFICERSHIP
the appointment of Dela Cruz. Upon appeal of the ATO Director Gilo, CSC reversed 1. A validly existing public office (i.e. a de jure office)
itself and approved the appointment. (decision of the CSC kept changing). CA approved 2. Actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
the appointment. He has the required qualifications “planning, organizing, directing, 3. Color of title to the office or general acquiescence by the public
coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations 4. He possessed public office under color of an election or an appointment by or
pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation pursuant to a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
of the activities of flying schools. such.
There is color of title to the office in ANY of the following circumstances:
SC ruled that the reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is (1) There is no known appointment or election, but people are induced by
the date of issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or circumstances of reputation or acquiescence to suppose that he is the officer
the date of resolution of the protest against it. We need not rule on CSC’s assertion that he assumes to be. Consequently, people do not to inquire into his authority,
Dela Cruz’s subsequent compliance with the experience standards during the and they submit to him or invoke his action;
pendency of the case should not be counted in his favor since he was anyway qualified (2) He possessed public office under color of a known and valid appointment or
for the position at the time of his appointment. election, but he failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition
(e.g., taking an oath or giving a bond);
Yee v. Director of Public Shools [7 SCRA 832]: SC ruled that upon Antonia’s (3) He possessed public office under color of a known election or appointment,
marriage to Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese citizen, she ceased to be a citizen but such is VOID because:
of the Philippines, and for that reason she is no longer qualified to continue holding the (a) He is ineligible;
civil service position to which she had qualified and had been appointed. Thus, (b) The electing or appointing body is not empowered to do such;
antonia’s removal was due to the loss of her Filipino citizenship and her removal as a (c) His exercise of his function was defective or irregular; and
public-school teacher because of loss of Filipino citizenship is legal. An applicant for (d) The public DOES NOT KNOW of such ineligibility, want of authority,
admission to examination for entrance into the civil service must be a citizen of the or irregularity.
Philippines (Sec. 675 of the Revised Administrative Code). And after he had qualified
himself to be eligible for appointment to a civil service position and had been appointed De Jure De Facto
to such position, he must continue to be such citizen. A voluntary change of citizenship Requisites 1. A de jure office exists; 1. De jure office;
or a change thereof by operation of law disqualifies him to continue holding the civil 2. He is legally qualified for 2. He assumed office under
service position to which he had qualified and had been appointed. the office; color of right or general
3. He is lawfully chosen to acquiescence by the public;
IV. DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS such office; 3. He actually and physically
4. He undertakes to possessed the office in good
De Facto Doctrine: It is the doctrine that a person who is admitted and sworn into perform the duties of faith.
office by the proper authority is deemed to be rightfully in such office until: such office according to
1. he is ousted by judicial declaration in a proper proceeding; or law’s prescribed mode.
2. his admission thereto is declared void. Basis of Right: He has the lawful right Reputation: He possesses office
Authority / title to the office and performs its duties under
Purpose: to ensure the orderly functioning of government. The public cannot afford to color of right, but he is not
check the validity of the officer's title each time they transact with him. technically qualified to act in all
points of law
A. REQUISITES OF DE FACTO OFFICERSHIP How Ousted Cannot be ousted even in a In a direct proceeding (quo
direct proceeding warranto); Cannot be ousted
DE FACTO OFFICER DEFINED: One who has the reputation of being the officer that collaterally
he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. [Torres v. Ribo (1948)]

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Validity of Valid, subject to exceptions Valid as to the public until his title Tuanda vs Sandiganbayan, [249 SCRA 342]: Is the legality or validity of private
Official Acts (e.g., acting beyond his to the office is adjudged respondents’ designation as sectoral representatives a prejudicial question justifying
scope of authority, etc.) insufficient. suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners? In the event
Rule on Rightfully entitled to Conditionally entitled to receive that private respondents’ designations are finally declared invalid, may still be
Compensation compensation; The principle compensation: only when no de considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually
"No work, no pay" is jure officer is declared; rendered?
inapplicable to him. He is paid only for actual services
rendered. SC ruled that the issue in the civil case constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant
suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against
Examples of De Facto Officers petitioners. The facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are
• A judge who continued to exercise his duties after his appointment was closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners’ alleged
disapproved by the CA according to a newspaper report, but before receiving partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents’ salaries and per diems
the official notification regarding the rejection of his appointment (Regala v. as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve
Judge of CFI); whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives
• A lawyer instructed by the Acting Provincial Governor to file an information for were made in accordance with law.
homicide, where the latter had no authority to designate him as assistant
fiscal, and where the DOJ had not authorized him to act as such (People v. The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following: 1) There
Penesa); must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
• A third-ranking councilor who is designated to act as mayor by an officer other public; and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. One
than the proper appointing authority prescribed by law, and lacking the can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There
consent of the Provincial Board (Codilla v. Martinez) can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de
facto officer in a de jure office.
CSC v. Joson, [429 SCRA 773]: Administrator of the POEA appointed Ong as
Executive Assistant IV under a contractual status. Subsequently, Joson wrote to the Lino Luna vs Rodriguez, [37 Phil 136]: The case started on an election contest for
CSC requesting exemption from the rule requiring appointees to confidential staff the office of governor of the Province of Rizal. In which Rodriguez was proclaimed but
positions to meet the prescribed educational qualifications. Thereafter, CSC issued a eventually stepped down due to the contest. Rodriguez now contending that such
resolution approving the appointment of Ong. However, Director of CSC NCR, issued decision by the judge was null and void because the alleged judge who decided the
a post-audit report on the issuance of Ong’s appointment made and invalidated such. case was not then a judge either de jure nor de facto.
Petitioner denied the request for the payment of Ong’s salary. The request for the
payment of salary referred to the period prior to the date of authority to fill the position; SC ruled that the judge is neither a de jure nor de facto. The said judge had ceased to
such claim cannot, therefore, be allowed. CSC concluded that, as the appointing be judge. While it is true that a judge may prepare his opinion outside of the judicial
authority, it is the respondent who shall be personally liable for the payment of salaries. district to which he had been assigned and send it to the clerk of the particular district
Ong filed MR and argued that under the CSC Resolution, Ong may be considered as for promulgation as a decision, yet, under the express provision of the law, such opinion
a de facto public officer who is entitled to the payment of salaries. does not become a decision of the court until it is actually and in fact filed with the clerk.
If he had ceased to be judge and had ceased to be acting as judge, then of course, he
SC ruled that Ong cannot be considered as a de facto public officer. The CA pointed could not be present as judge at the time of the promulgation of the opinion as a
out that Ong is a de jure officer and not of a de facto. A de facto officer is one who is in decision. In order to be a de facto judge he must still be actually acting under some
possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By color of color of right. He cannot be actually acting under any color of right when he has ceased
authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or to be judge and has actually vacated the office by the acceptance of another office and
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer…. It is the color of authority, not by actually entering upon the duties of the other office.
the color of title that distinguishes an officer de facto from a usurper.

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Judge De Jure Judge De Facto Constitution. Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
One who is exercising the office of a An officer who is not fully invested with position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by
judge as a matter of right. He is an officer all of the powers and duties conceded to Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read.
of a court which has been duly and judges, but is exercising the office of Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as
legally elected or appointed. He is an judge under some color of right. A judge the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
officer of the law fully vested with all of de facto may be said to be one who has In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
the powers and functions conceded the reputation of being the officer he possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual
under the law to a judge which relate the assumes to be and yet is not a good discharge of the functions and duties of the office. To be sure, Agra’s concurrent
administration of justice within the officer in point of law — that is, there designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General did not come
jurisdiction over which he presides. exists some defect in his appointment or within the definition of an ex officio capacity. Had either of his concurrent designations
election and in his right to exercise been in an ex officio capacity in relation to the other, the Court might now be ruling in
judicial functions at the particular time. his favor. The OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor included by the
powers of the DOJ—MEANING, one position was not derived from the other.
US v. Abalos, [1 Phil. 73]: Abalos was convicted of grave assault under Artcile 416 of
the Penal Code. The solicitor General filed that the conviction made by the Court of Requirements of a valid Ex-Officio Holding
First Instance be annulled on the ground that said decision was pronounced after JUNE 1. The holding of the ex-officio office is provided by law;
16 by a person who was not a judge. By article 65 of the law organizing courts of justice 2. The holding is required by the primary functions of their position; and
for the Philippine Islands, No. 136 of those promulgated by the legislative commission, 3. The position is held without additional compensation.
the Court of First Instance which then existed became extinguished by the substitution
of those which that same act created. The latter was passed the 11th day of June, of B. EFFECTS OF ACTS OF DE FACTO
the present year and went into effect on the 16th day of the same month. Adding that
the said judge should have ceased to act on June 16, the day on which the new organic Legal Effects of Acts of De Facto
law commenced BUT in fact almost all of them continued exercising their function until 1. As regards the officers themselves: A party suing or defending in his own right
the newly appointed judges arrived to take charge. They also continued to take charge as a public officer must show that he is an officer de jure. It is not sufficient
because (1) they were ignorant about the new organization (2) they could have been that he be merely a de facto officer.
convicted for abandonment of their public functions to the injury of the public. 2. As regards the public and third persons: The acts of a de facto officer are valid
as to third persons and the public until his title to office is adjudged insufficient.
SC ruled it is a universally professed doctrine that the acts of judges, considered such
by common error, whether there be color of title or not (as in this case there was), are Rationale: The doctrine is intended not for the protection of the public officer, but for
valid and effective in favor of the public welfare. This, according to the phrase of one the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of
law, is the most humane course, one which can injure no one, and brings no discredit persons discharging the duties of a public office.
upon the administration of justice. Therefore, they were judges of the new courts DE
FACTO and in good faith. No usurpation of jurisdiction can be imputed to them. As such De Facto Officer’s Official Acts are not Subject to Collateral Attack
judges they were accepted by common error. A de facto officer’s and his acts’ validity cannot be collaterally questioned in
proceedings where he is not a party, or which were not instituted to determine the very
Funa v. Agra [704 Phil. 205 (2013)]: Whether or not the designation of Agra as the question.
Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
violated the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members Remedy: Quo warranto proceedings filed by:
of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants? (1) The person claiming entitlement to the office;
(2) The Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Solicitor-General or
SC ruled that the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with a public prosecutor).
his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in
violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
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Liability of De Facto Officers in the forthcoming elections. Three days later, petitioner withdrew his candidacy, which
A de facto officer generally has the same degree of liability and accountability for official the COMELEC approved. However, Del Rosario, vice mayor of Navotas, took his oath
acts as a de jure officer. as a Municipal Mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon
filing his certificate of candidacy. CFI ruled that petitioner was deemed resigned upon
The de facto officer may be liable for all imposable penalties for ANY of the filing his COC and ordered to reimburse salaries received in favor of Del Rosario.
following acts:
1. usurping or unlawfully holding office; SC ruled that the petitioner is deemed a de facto officer from the moment he assumed
2. exercising the functions of public office without lawful right; Del Rosario’s entitlement to the office of Municipal Mayor, and thus, not required to
3. ineligibility for the public office as required by law reimburse salaries to the latter. It is the general rule that the rightful incumbent of a
4. The officer cannot excuse responsibility for crimes committed in his official specific lawful office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the
capacity by asserting his de facto status. latter during the time of his wrongful tenure though he entered into the office with good
faith and under color of title, which applies to this case. A de facto officer, not having a
Right to Compensation good title, takes the salaries at risk and must account to the de jure officer for whatever
• GR: amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public
o A de facto officer cannot sue for the recovery of salary, fees or other office.
emoluments attached to the office, for the duties he has performed.
His acts, as far as he himself is concerned, are void. Cantillo v. Arrieta [61 SCRA 55]: Petitioner was originally appointed as Temporary
o Moreover, the rightful incumbent may recover from the de facto Municipal Policeman. Subsequently, petitioner was given another provisional
officer the salary received by the latter during his wrongful tenure. appointment as Municipal Policeman in the same municipality and took his oath of office
o A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk by virtue of said appointment. He was later suspended from service as a result of a
and must account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he criminal case filed against him for Infidelity in the Custody of the prisoner and that he
received during the period of his wrongful tenure, even if he occupied was not arraigned in said case. The then Asst. Prov’l Fiscal Fabria moved for the
the office in good faith. [Monroy v CA, 1967] provisional dismissal of the case against petitioner for the insufficient evidence
• XPN: produced by the prosecution to establish petitioner’s guilt. After the dismissal of said
o Where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who in good faith case, petitioner presented oral and written requests for his reinstatement to the service
has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties and likewise prayed for the payment of his back salary. Petitioner commenced a
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, mandamus case demanding that respondent municipality be compelled to pay his back
and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other salaries during his period of suspension basing his claim on sec. 4 of RA 557
compensations attached to the office. [Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, 1991] SC ruled that the law in force at the time of petitioner’s provisional appointment as
o Moreover, in the case of Gen. Manager, Philippine Ports Authority v. municipal policeman was RA 486, or the Police Act of 1966. Sec. 9 thereof enumerates
Monserate [G.R. No . 129616, 2002], the Court held that while the the general qualifications for appointment to a local police agency require inter alia that
assumption of the de jure officer of another position under protest the appointee in the case of an appointment in a municipal police force must have at
and acceptance of corresponding emoluments do not constitute least completed high school. Considering that at the time of petitioner’s primary
abandonment of her rightful office, she cannot recover full back appointment, he was short of the minimum educational requirement for position to
wages for such rightful office. which he had been appointed merely emphasizes his lack of qualifications required by
§ She is only entitled to back pay differentials between the law.This obviously affected the very validity of his appointment and barred the
salary rates for the lower position she assumed and the reinstatement he claimed after his suspension. During his tenure, he was only a de
position she is rightfully entitled to, which amounts are to be facto officer entitled to emolument for actual services rendered. The mistake of the
paid by the de facto officer. proper officials resulting to the non-observance of the rules on the matter, does not
render the legal requirement ineffective and unenforceable. In herein, what was not
Monroy v. CA [20 SCRA 620]: Petitioner was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas Rizal observed was the possession of the general qualifications for the appointment to the
when he filed his certificate of candidacy as representative of the First District of Rizal local police agency
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V. THE CIVIL SERVICE B. ELIGIBILITY

Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-B, Constitution Classification of Positions in the Civil Service
Embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original (a) Career Service – characterized by (a) entrance based on merit and fitness to be
charters. determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly
technical qualifications, (b) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions,
A. JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE and (c) security of tenure.

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION General Rule: Appointments to the Career Service is to be determined as far as
(1) Disciplinary cases practicable by competitive examination.
(2) Cases involving “personnel action” affecting the Civil Service employees:
(a) Appointment certification Exceptions: Appointments to the following positions are exempt from the competitive
(b) Promotion examination requirement:
(c) Transfer i. Policy determining - where the officer is vested with the power of formulating
(d) Reinstatement policies for the government or any of its agencies, subdivisions, or
(e) Reemployment instrumentalities.
(f) Detail, reassignment ii. Primarily Confidential – the officer enjoys primarily such close intimacy with
(g) Demotion the appointing authority which insures freedom intercourse without
(h) Separation embarrassment or freedom of misgiving of betrayal of personal trust on
(3) Employment status confidential matters of the state [De Los Santos v. Mallare (1950)]. The
(4) Qualification standards position characterized by the close proximity of positions of the appointee as
well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship
NOTE: As to the power of the CSC to review an appointee’s qualifications. The only [Civil Service Comm’n v. Javier (2008)].
function of the CSC is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the iii. Highly Technical – requires possession of technical skill or training in a
Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal superior degree. (e.g. City Legal Officer)
requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. [Lapinid v. CSC (1991)] NOTE: It is the nature of the position which determines whether a position is policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical.
LIMITATIONS
1. It cannot order the replacement of the appointee simply because it considers WHO ARE INCLUDED IN THE CAREER SERVICE?
another employee to be better qualified. [Lapinid v. CSC (1991)] 1. Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an
2. The CSC cannot co-manage or be a surrogate administrator of government appropriate examination is required;
offices and agencies. 2. Closed Career positions which are scientific or highly technical in nature;
3. It cannot change the nature of the appointment extended by the appointing these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and
officer. [Luego v. CSC (1986)] universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
Meram v. Edralin [154 SCRA 238]: Civil service laws are designed to eradicate the 3. Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,
system of appointment to public office based on political considerations and to eliminate Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
as far as practicable the element of partisanship and personal favoritism in making Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
appointments. These laws intend to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
as the basis of appointment; to secure more competent employees, and thereby Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
promote better government. \ President;
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4. Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who • SECTION 25(a): A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who
are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in meets all the requirements for the positions to which he is being appointed,
the Department of Foreign Affairs; including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
5. Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
maintain a separate merit system;
6. Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether Recall on Appointments
performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under • Grounds [Admin. Code IRR, Rule VI, § 20; De Rama v. CA (2001)]
the non-career service; and 1. Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided by the agency’s
7. Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. Merit Promotion Plan
2. Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board
(b) Non-career Service – Entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests. 3. Violation of existing collective agreement between management and
Tenure limited to a period specified by law or which is coterminous with the employees relative to promotion
appointing authority or the duration of a particular project. (i.e. elective officials, 4. Violation of other existing civil service laws, rules and regulations
Department Heads and Members of Cabinet)
Distinguished from Recall under the Local Government Code
WHO ARE INCLUDED IN THE NON-CAREER SERVICE? • The CSC has the power to recall an appointment which has been initially
1. Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; approved when it is shown that the same was issued in disregard of pertinent
2. Department Heads and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold positions at CSC laws, rules and regulations. In contrast, recall under Sec 69-75 of the
the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s); Local Government Code is a mode of removal of a public official by the people
3. Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office before the end of his term of office. [Garcia v. COMELEC, (1993)]
and their personal or confidential staff;
4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in Appointments not Requiring CSC Approval
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, a. Presidential appointments
requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to (1) Members of the AFP
be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one b. Police forces
year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own c. Firemen
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring d. Jail guards
agency; and
5. Emergency and seasonal personnel. Limitations on Power to Appoint
C. APPOINTMENTS 1. Constitutional limitations
(1) Prohibition on nepotic appointments by the President
1987 Constitution, Art. IX B, Sec. 2 (2) (2) Midnight appointments ban
• Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and (3) Grant of power of appointment to officers and bodies other than the
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which President
are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by (4) Grant of exclusive power to appoint officials and employees of the
competitive examination. judiciary to the SC
(5) Recommendation of the JBC for appointments to the SC and lower
PD 807, secs. 24 (a) and 25 (a) courts
• SECTION 24(a): Appointment through certification. An appointment through (6) Grant of exclusive power to appoint officials and employees of the
certification to a position in the civil service, except as herein otherwise Constitutional Commissions to the same
provided, shall be issued to a person who has been selected from a list of (7) One-year appointments ban for losing candidates
qualified persons certified by the Commission from an appropriate register of (8) Non-appointment or designation of elective officials
eligibles, and who meets all the other requirements of the position. (9) Prohibition on holding multiple offices for appointive officials
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(10) Grant of exclusive power to appoint officials and employees of the Bureau Heads and other gov’t officials to file a courtesy resignation, which the former
Ombudsman to the same followed. Sec. of Labor requested Achacoso, to turn over his office to the Deputy
(11) Recommendation of the JBC for appointments of the Ombudsman Administrator as the officer-in-charge. But he protested his replacement and declared
and his deputies he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary.
2. Limitations found in statutes Thereafter, he was informed that Sarmiento was appointed as Admin of the POEA,
3. Restrictions as developed under jurisprudence; e.g. again, Achacoso was asked to vacate the position.
(1) Appointing authority cannot preempt appointing power of successor
[Aytona v. Castillo] SC ruled that the mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
(2) Appointing authority cannot appoint himself to a vacancy automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the
(3) No appointment to a post which is not vacant required qualifications. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the
position cannot be appointed to it in the first place. At best, it’s only a temporary
Abrot v. CA [116 SCRA 468]: Petitioners were former employees of respondent City appointment. Thus, when required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain about
of La Carlota, holding various positions and appointments. As Mayor Jalandoni security of tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent BEFORE
assumed office, the 8 petitioners were separated from the service on various grounds. the expiration of the term. Here, once the appointing authority says he’s done, then
Abrot was allegedly made to resign. Thereafter, the Municipal Board of respondent, that’s the expiration of the term, does not violating the rule on security of tenure.
enacted Ordinance No. 49, approving the Budget for Fiscal year 68-69’. It was revealed
that 106 positions were abolished including the positions except that of petitioner. D. PROMOTION

SC ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was proper. Under the charter of the city Promotion
of la Carlota, it was stated that the Board shall have a secretary, who shall be appointed • Movement from one position to another with increase in duties and
by the mayor to serve during the term of appointing power. A vacancy in the office of responsibilities as authorized by law and is usually accompanied by an
the secretary shall be filled temporarily or for the unexpired term in like manner… In the increase in pay.
case at hand, Abrot is not entitled to the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Well-settled is the rule that temporary appointees may be terminated at any time even a. Next-in-rank Rule
without cause. They have no fixed tenure. • Definition: an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a position
previously determined to be next-in-rank to the vacancy proposed to be filled
Maturan v. Maglana [113 SCRA 268]: Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. and who meets the requisites for appointment thereto as previously
This is so because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing any civil determined by the appointing authority and approved by the Commission.
service eligibility for any position in the government. Lack of civil service eligibility [Section 19, paragraph 6, Article VIII of Presidential Decree No.]
makes his appointment temporary and is dependent upon the pleasure of the • The person next in rank shall be given preference in promotion when the
appointing power. position immediately above his is vacated.
• BUT the appointing authority still exercises discretion and is not bound by this
When he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no eligibility. It rule, although he is required to specify the “special reason or reasons” for not
does not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently or during his post; this does not appointing the officer next-in-rank.
apply to his provisional temporary appointment. Gaining civil service eligibility while
actively serving his appointment does not make his temporary appointment Español v. CSC [206 SCRA 715]: Positions of Regional Manager of the National
automatically permanent; it does not follow. Upon his appointment, he had no eligibility Irrigation Administration became vacant. Espanol was chief of the Engineering division,
and that should apply until the end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a while Bulseco was Chief Design Engineer. The position of Design Engineer is below
new appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor cannot be compelled the Chief of the Engineering Division, and the latter is considered next-in-rank to the
to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is discretionary. position of Regional Manager. Bulseco was appointed to the vacant position, so
Espanol filed a protest with the Merit Board, alleging that he has promotional priority
Achacoso v. Macaraig, [195 SCRA 235]: Achacoso as administrator of the POEA. over the former. However, it was dismissed, which the CSC sustained the appointment
Then, the President addressed a request to all the dep’t heads, U-Secs, Assistant Sec., of Bulseco.
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SC ruled that an employee who holds a next-in-rank position who is deemed the most Eugenio v. Torrijos [GR No. L-44042 (1978)]: Respondent Torrijos was appointed to
competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility, and meets the position of Assistant Chief of the Scientific Library and Documentation Division of
the other conditions for promotion shall be promoted to the higher position when it the National Science Development Board. The legality of the appointment was
becomes vacant. However, the appointing authority may promote an employee who is contested by petitioner who claimed that she had preferential right to the disputed
not next-in-rank but, who possesses superior qualifications and competence compared position. Her protest was denied by the NSDB Chairman. Her appeal to the Civil Service
to a next-in-rank employee who merely meets the requirements for the position. Commission did not prosper as it was found that she is not an employee next in rank;
Appointment is essentially discretionary power, involving the consideration of wisdom that the contested position as well as the division where it belongs are newly created
only the appointing authority can decide (not even the Civil Service Commission). offices as a result of the implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan; that the
appointee is qualified and eligible; and that there is absence of a showing that her
b. Automatic Reversion Rule selection has been the result of grave abuse or discretion of fraud. The Commission's
• All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted decision dismissing the appeal was elevated to the Presidential Assistant, Office of the
simultaneously for approval by the Commission. President, but the decision and resolution appealed from was affirmed in toto.
• The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position
invalidates the promotion of those in the lower positions and automatically SC ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents
restores them to their former positions. as the appointing authority has discretion in the choice of who is entitled to promotion
• However, the affected persons are entitled to payment of salaries for services considering as the basic factor, the needs of the public service, especially where no
actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments. [Sec. 13 of question may be raised as to who is the employer next in rank.
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Administrative Code]
PT&T v. CA [412 CRA 263]: Petitioner dismissed private respondents from the service
Requisites of Automatic Reversion Rule: on the ground of insubordination and willful disobedience to a lawful order for refusing
a. Series of promotions to be transferred/relocated. Hence, respondent union, for and in behalf of private
b. All promotional appointments are simultaneously submitted to the respondents, filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
Commission for approval practice contending, among others, that the transfer was prejudicial and inconvenient,
c. The Commission disapproves the appointment of a person to a higher thus unreasonable. Private respondents further claimed that they have the right to
position. refuse or decline the positions being offered them because their respective transfers
resulted in their promotion. For its part, petitioner alleged that the transfer of private
Sison v. Pangramuyen, [84 SCRA 364]: Sison files a petition for quo warranto respondents was made in the lawful exercise of its management prerogative and was
questioning the appointment of Maliwanag as assistant city assessor on November done in good faith. It asserted that the transfer was not unreasonable nor did it involve
1973 by the respondents Commissioner of CSC and the Mayor of Olongapo City. He demotion in rank. Private respondents were in fact promoted from a lower job-grade to
claims that he should be the one appointed as per the next-in rank-rule since his a higher job-grade and receive higher salaries than before. The Labor Arbiter ruled for
position is Chief Deputy Assessor, a position higher than Maliwanag. The petition was the petitioner. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that
filed on March 1975, more than a year after the appointment of Maliwanag. private respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered their reinstatement with full
backwages. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for
SC held that the City Assessor's indorsement to the respondent mayor recommending review.
dismissal of petitioner's protest to the appointment of private respondent Maliwanag
having been reviewed and sustained by the Commissioner, the latter's action should SC ruled that the increase in the private respondents' responsibility can be ascertained
be affirmed, he being primarily charged with the administration of the Civil Service Law from the scalar ascent of their job grades. With or without a corresponding increase in
and rules and regulations absent a showing of palpable error or grave abuse of salary, the respective transfers of the private respondents were in fact promotions.
discretion. Further, SC held that the law regarding the determination of the hierarchical According to the Court, a transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement
relationships of positions are not necessarily controlling, it is still within the mayor’s or reduction or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent
discretion to whether appoint someone in the said office. position cannot be done without the employees' consent. "There is no law that compels
an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotion is in the nature of
a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse. Hence, the exercise by the private
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respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination, or willful REASSIGNMENT
disobedience of a lawful order of the employer. As such, there was no valid cause for • An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in
the private respondent's dismissal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Decision of the the SAME agency.
Court of Appeals. • It is a management prerogative of the CSC and any department or agency
embraced in the Civil Service and does not constitute removal without cause.
E. OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS
Requisites for validity
TRANSFER a. No reduction in rank, status or salary.
• Transfer – movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, b. The reassignment is from one organizational unit to another in the same
level or salary without break in service. agency.
• This may be imposed as an administrative remedy. c. Should have a definite date or duration (c.f. Detail). Otherwise, a floating
assignment would be tantamount to a diminution in status or rank.
General Rule: If transfer is without consent, it violates security of tenure.
REEMPLOYMENT
Exceptions • Names of persons who have been appointed permanently to positions in the
(1) Temporary Appointee career service and who have been separated as a result of reduction in force
(2) Career Executive Service Personnel whose status and salaries are based and/or reorganization, shall be entered in a list from which selection for
on ranks, not on position. reemployment shall be made.

REINSTATEMENT Manglapus v. Matias, [192 SCRA 496]: Abaya who had been serving the Philippine
• Technically the issuance of a new appointment and is discretionary on the part mission to the UN, got recalled to the Home Office, receiving an assignment order
of the appointing power. transferring him to the Philippine Embassy in Beijing as Minister-Counsellor and Consul
• It cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus. General. However, such transfer and appointment were questioned. PCGG, requested
that Abaya be allowed to testify regarding the investigation of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten
Requisites for validity wealth in the USA. Because of this, the assignment order of Abaya was revoked.
a. Any permanent appointee of a career service position Thereafter, Abaya requesting reconsideration of the recall order on the basis of the
b. No commission of delinquency or misconduct, and is not separated. foreign service circular providing that recall orders are served one-year in advance.
c. The reinstatement is to a position in the same level for which the officer is Sec. Manglapus directed that if Abaya was unable to return to the home office, he
qualified. should file leave application with salaries computed at home office rate and payable in
pesos. Thus, Abaya filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Reinstatement has the same effect as executive clemency, which completely Secretary.
obliterates the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of
dishonesty. He is restored ipso facto upon grant of such. Application for reinstatement SC ruled that the Circular cannot be read as prohibiting recalls or reassignments
= unnecessary. without advance one-year notice under any and all circumstances and conditions, and
even when no harsh transition is entailed by a recall or reassignment, or as absolutely
DETAIL precluding amendment or modification thereof by the Secretary himself.
• movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance
of an appointment. Floreza v. Ongpin, [182 SCRA 692]: Floreza's assignment as consultant in the Office
of the Commissioner was undertaken through the usual issuance of a travel assignment
Requisites for validity order as dictated by the "exigencies of the service." Floreza's movement may not be
a. Only for a limited period. considered as a transfer within the contemplation of Section 27(c) of Presidential
b. Only for employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) for it was more of the detail under Section 24(f)
c. Temporary in nature.
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(Detail) than a transfer. Had it been a transfer, Floreza would have been issued an 24. Pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission
appointment as consultant. required by Civil Service rules and regulations;
25. Insubordination;
F. DISCIPLINE 26. Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding non-
political office;
GR: No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed. 27. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service;
XPN: except for cause as provided by law and after due process. 28. Lobbying for personal interest or gain in legislative halls and offices without
authority;
GROUNDS 29. Promoting the sale of tickets in behalf of private enterprises that are not
1. Dishonesty; intended for charitable or public welfare purposes and even in the latter cases
2. Oppression; if there is no prior authority;
3. Neglect of duty; 30. Nepotism as defined in Section 49 of this Decree.
4. Misconduct;
5. Disgraceful and immoral conduct; PENALTIES
6. Being notoriously undesirable; • In meting out punishment, the same penalties shall be imposed for similar
7. Discourtesy in the course of official duties; offenses and only one penalty shall be imposed in each case.
8. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties; • The disciplining authority may impose the penalty of removal from the service,
9. Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course transfer, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one year without pay,
fine in an amount not exceeding six months' salary, or reprimand.
of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other
valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving
RTC Makati Movement against Graft and Corruption v. Dumlao [247 SCRA 108]:
a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons, or committing
The documentary exhibits presented by Complainant leave no doubt as to the existence
acts punishable under the anti-graft laws;
of Respondent's lending operations, some of which even led to the filing (by
10. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
Respondent) of criminal charges against borrowers who failed to pay their loans under
11. Improper or unauthorized solicitation of contributions from subordinate
the so-called trust agreements. Such despicable acts cannot be tolerated by this Court.
employees and by teachers or school officials from school children;
Respondent's reliance on CB Circular No. 905 implementing Monetary Board
12. Violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules or reasonable office
Resolution No. 225 which effectively suspended the provisions of the Usury Law is
regulations;
misplaced. Although Respondent may not be criminally or civilly liable, he is still
13. Falsification of official document;
administratively liable under the Civil Service Law where lending money at usurious
14. Frequent unauthorized absences or tardiness in reporting for duty, loafing or
rates of interests is specifically listed as grounds for disciplinary action. Courts are not
frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours;
lending institutions. By engaging in lending activities, Respondent has caused dishonor
15. Habitual drunkenness;
to courts of justice.
16. Gambling prohibited by law;
17. Refusal to perform official duty or render overtime service;
Aquino v. Fernandez [413 SCRA 597]: Complainant judge's "Report" asked for
18. Disgraceful, immoral or dishonest conduct prior to entering the service;
disciplinary action against respondent, Stenographer Fernandez in his sala. He alleged
19. Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits;
that respondent failed to type a draft order in Crim. Case No. 419 then pending in
20. Borrowing money by superior officers from subordinates or lending by
complainant's court despite instruction thereto. Also, respondent failed to file prior leave
subordinates to superior officers;
of absence for November 4 to 6, 1998 as required by law. Previously, respondent was
21. Lending money at usurious rates of interest;
reprimanded by the Clerk of Court for her absence in October 1993, and by complainant
22. Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due to the
himself for her absences in October 1986.
government;
23. Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom the
The reprimand meted out by the Clerk of Court in 1993 was improper for lack of
office of the employee concerned has business relations;
authority. For the absences in 1996, it would be inappropriate that respondent be

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penalized anew for the same acts. On the failure to file prior leave of absence where o Such preventive suspension is authorized by the Civil Service Law
the belated application therefor was disapproved by the head of office, respondent shall and cannot, therefore, be considered “unjustified” even if later the
not be entitled to receive the salary corresponding to that period of unauthorized leave charges are dismissed.
of absence. Finally, for failure to type the draft order, respondent committed a simple o It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for
neglect of duty. It is less grave offense where the Court herein imposed a fine of P2,000, the public good.
instead of one-month suspension. o For this reason, it is limited to 90 days unless the delay in the
conclusion of the investigation is due to the employee concerned.
G. PROCEDURE (De Leon, 2014)

CSC v. CA [425 SCRA 394]: The CSC received an anonymous letter-complaint against Preventive Suspension Pending Appeal
Dumlao, a DECS supervisor in Pangasinan. CA granted petition for certiorari and set • An appeal [from the decision of the disciplinary authority] shall not stop the
aside the resolution dismissing Dumlao from service. CA ruled that CSC was without decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or
jurisdiction to investigate and file a formal charge on the basis of a mere anonymous removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive
letter-complaint. suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins the appeal.
[Sec. 47(4), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Admin. Code]
SC ruled that the CA was wrong. Under the provisions of the Admin Code and Uniform • Employees are entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension
Rules, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the pending appeal if they are found innocent.
appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and sworn to. o Such suspension is actually punitive and it is precisely because
Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, respondent is penalized before his sentence is confirmed that he
jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. should be paid his salaries in the event he is exonerated.
o It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of immediate
H. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION execution of the decision against him and continue to do so even
• It is a disciplinary measure which is intended to enable the disciplinary after it is shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was
authority to investigate charges against the respondent by preventing the suspended. (De Leon, 2014)
latter from using his position or office to influence witnesses, to intimidate
them, or to tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of De Guzman v. Apolonio, [472 SCRA 489]: an order of preventive suspension is
the case against him. warranted. It is worth reiterating that preventive suspension is not a punishment or
penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.
KINDS OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
a. Preventive suspension pending investigation Quimbo v. Gervacio [466 SCRA 277]: Preventive suspension pending investigation
b. Preventive suspension pending appeal is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an
unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal
Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent
• The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. As
officer under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such Quimbo’s preventive suspension was carried out pending his investigation, not while
officer involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the his appeal from his conviction was pending, the same cannot be credited to form part
performance of duty or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is of the final penalty of suspension.
guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from service [Sec. 51,
Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Admin. Code] I. DECISION
• No compensation is due for the period of preventive suspension pending
investigation. Caniete v. Secretary of Education [333 SCRA 849]: The Court ruled that the ruling
in Gloria vs. that the employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation is not entitled to compensation because such suspension "is not a penalty
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but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered J. APPEAL
investigation." Upon the other hand, there is right to compensation for preventive
suspension pending appeal if the employee is eventually exonerated. This is because Paredes v. CSC [192 SCRA 84]: Appeal in judicial proceedings is a statutory right that
"preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative This doctrine is also applicable in quasi-judicial proceedings so that one must first
decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for ascertain the law applicable to determine whether or not the party can appeal the order
the period of the suspension. or decision. Appeal to the CSC in an administrative case is extended to the party
adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who
Apuyan v. Sta. Isabel, [430 SCRA 1]: Sta. Isabel’s act of demanding money and has been meted out the penalty
receiving P1,500.00 from the complainant for the lunch and merienda of the policemen
who will accompany him in executing the decision of the Court is a clear violation of Huertas v. Gonzalez [451 SCRA 256]: The petitioner avers that respondent Dizon was
section 9, Rule 141. The Rules require the sheriff to estimate his expenses in the barred from filing a motion for the reconsideration of the Resolution of Secretary Gloria.
execution of the decision. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to the The petitioner cites Section 39(a) of Presidential Decree No. 805, which provides that
Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any appeals where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision.
unspent amount will have to be returned to the prevailing party. In this case, no estimate He also cites Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, where the Court ruled that only
of sheriff's expenses was submitted to the court by respondent. In fact, the money which the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed is entitled to
respondent deputy sheriff had demanded and received from complainant was not appeal from a decision adverse to him, and the ruling of this Court in Mendez v. Civil
among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled Service Commission that the civil service law does not contemplate a review of
that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. The Court
of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross overturned its ruling in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission in Civil Service
dishonesty. Sta. Isabel not only utterly failed to live up to the high ethical standards Commission v. Dacoycoy.
required of a sheriff, but also, he totally ignored Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court. Respondent failed to demonstrate that he followed the procedure laid down by SC ruled that neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the provision
Rule 141. limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. According to that provision,
the CSC was limited to the review of decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than
Malanyaon v. Lising, [106 SCRA 237]: It is obvious that when the statute speaks of thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary; (3) demotion
the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Nothing in the
consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has provision, however, indicates a legislative intent to bar appeals from decisions
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the exonerating a government official or an employee from an administrative charge.
suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.
K. RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
ACQUITTAL DISMISSAL • GR: The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
is always based on the merits, that is, the Dismissal terminates the proceeding, employees. [Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-B] Government employees in the civil service
defendant is acquitted because the either because the court is not a court of are granted the right to form unions enjoyed by workers in the private sector.
evidence does not show that defendant's competent jurisdiction, or the evidence • XPN: However, the constitutional grant to government workers of the right to
guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but does not show that the offense was form labor organizations or unions does not guarantee them the right to
dismissal does not decide the case on committed within the territorial bargain collectively with the government or to engage in concerted activities
the merits or that the defendant is not jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint including the right to strike, which are enjoyed by private employees.
guilty. or information is not valid or sufficient in o They are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
form and substance, etc. leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass actions which will result
in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services

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SSS Employees Association v. CA [175 SCRA 686]: While the Constitution and the Doctrine of necessary implication
Labor Code are silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, they are • all powers necessary for the effective exercise of the express powers are
prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of deemed impliedly granted (Nachura, 2015)
1987 of the Civil Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180. Government
employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Authority can be exercised only during the term when the public officer is, by law,
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are invested with the rights and duties of the office.
within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies
for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. Thus, government workers A. SOURCES OF POWERS AND AUTHORITY
cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure • Under our political system, the source of governmental authority is found in
concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private the People. Directly or indirectly through their chosen representatives, they
industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. create such offices and agencies as they deem to be desirable for the
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially administration of the public functions and declare in what manner and by what
voluntary basis. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where persons they shall be exercised. Their will finds its expression in the
properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the Constitution and the laws.
terms and conditions of employment. And this is affected through statutes or • The right to be a public officer, then, or to exercise the powers and authority
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining of a public office, must find its source in some provision of the public law.
agreements. • In the absence of a valid grant, public officials are devoid of power. A public
official exercises power, not rights. The Government itself is merely an agency
Trade Unions of the Philippines v. NHC, [173 SCXRA 33]: The workers or through which the will of the State is expressed and enforced. Its officers
employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees' therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging
organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act.
and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied.
Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in the public [Villegas v. Subido, 1969]
and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary • But once the power is expressly granted, it will be broadly construed in line
to law shall not be abridged" There is no impediment to the holding of a certification with the doctrine of necessary implication.
election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor
Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an B. CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS AND DUTIES
original charter. Statutory implementation of the last cited section of the Constitution is
found in Article 244 of the Labor Code --- “Employees of the government corporations i. MINISTERIAL
established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain • Official duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative
collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and
have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law”. designated facts. Where the officer or official body has no judicial power
or discretion as to the interpretation of the law, and the course to be
VI. AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLIC OFFICER pursued is fixed by law, their acts are ministerial only.
• General Rule: Performance of duties of this nature may be properly
Authority of public officers consists of those which are: delegated to another.
(1) expressly conferred by law;
• Exceptions:
(2) incidental to the exercise of the powers granted; and
o (1) Delegation is expressly prohibited by law; or
(3) necessarily implied
o (2) The law expressly that the act be performed by the officer in
person.

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ii. DISCRETIONARY • A supervising officer merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
• Acts which necessarily require the exercise of reason in the adaptation of himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act modify or replace them.
shall be done or the course pursued. When the law commits to any officer
the duty of looking into facts and acting upon them, not in a way which it Legazpi v. Minister of Finance [115 SCRA 418]: The delegation of legislative power
specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature, the function is thru the issuance of rules and regulations to carry out a national policy declared by the
discretionary (e.g. quasi-judicial acts). Batasan has its own virtues as a restrained way of conferring law-making authority to
• General Rule: A public officer cannot delegate his discretionary duties to the Executive during an emergency. It is limited, restricted, subject to conditions and
another. temporary. It is obviously the simplest remedy to cope with an abnormal situation
o Rationale: In cases where the execution of the office requires resulting in the least violence to revered democratic republican processes
exercise of judgment or discretion by the officer, the constitutionally established.
presumption is that he was chosen to because he was deemed
fit and competento exercise such judgment. VII. SALARY AND PERQUISITES
• Exception: The power to substitute another in his place has been
expressly granted by law. COMPENSATION SALARY
• in reference to the remuneration of • personal compensation to be paid to
C. AS TO THE OBLIGATION OF THE OFFICER TO PERFORM HIS POWERS AND public officers means pay for doing the public officer for his services,
DUTIES all that may be required of the and it is generally a fixed annual or
official, whether it is in the form of a periodical payment depending on
i. MANDATORY fixed salary or wages, per diems, the time and not on the amount of
• Powers conferred on public officers are generally construed as fees, commissions, or perquisites of the services he may render
mandatory although the language may be permissive, where they are for whatsoever character. • Distinguished from wages in that
the benefit of the public or individuals. • Distinguished from honorarium salary is given to officers of higher
which is something given not as a degree of employment than those to
ii. PERMISSIVE matter of obligation but in whom wages are given.
• Statutory provisions define the time and mode in which public officers will appreciation for services rendered.
discharge their duties, and those which are obviously designed merely to
secure order, uniformity, system and dispatch in public business are
generally deemed directory. If the act does not affect third persons and is CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING COMPENSATION OF PUBLIC
not clearly beneficial to the public, permissive words will not be construed OFFICERS
as mandatory. 1. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall
be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
D. AS TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE OFFICER TO HIS SUBORDINATES after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such increase. [Sec.10, Art. VI]
i. POWER OF CONTROL 2. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President
• It implies the power of an officer to manage, direct or govern, including and Vice- President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased
the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
the performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment for that of after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase
the latter. was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source. [Sec. 6, Art.VII]
ii. POWER OF SUPERVISION 3. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
• Supervisory power is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
which does not include any restraining authority over such body. continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. [Sec. 10, Art. VIII]
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4. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, • It may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government
double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor [Tantuico v. Domingo (1994)]
accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office,
or title of any kind from any foreign government. [Sec. 8, Art. IX-B] RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT AND INDEMNITY
5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of • When a public officer, in the due performance of his duties, has been
government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or expressly or impliedly required by law to incur expenses on the public account,
controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of not covered by his salary or commission and not attributable to his own neglect
the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their or default, the reasonable and proper amount thereof forms a legitimate
positions. [Sec. 5, Art. IX-B] charge against the public for which he should be reimbursed.
• Within the same limits, the officer is entitled to be indemnified by the public
BASIS OF RIGHT against the consequences of acts which he has been expressly or impliedly
• The relation between an officer and the public is not the creation of contract, required to perform upon the public account, and which are not manifestly
nor is the office itself a contract. Hence, his right to compensation is not the illegal and which he does not know to be wrong.
creation of contract. It exists as the creation of law and belongs to him not by
force of any contract but because the law attaches it to the office. Sevilla v. Gocon [423 SCRA 98]: The conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest
• The right to compensation grows out of the services rendered. After services of the service is penalized under Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
have been rendered, the compensation thus earned cannot be taken away by Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws by
a subsequent law. suspension. The suspension is for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for
• As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation the first offense. HOWEVER, petitioner has already reached the compulsory age of
if he has not rendered any service. [Acosta v. CA, 2000] retirement during the pendency of this case. He is no longer in the government service.
Thus, it would be more appropriate to impose on him a fine equivalent to his salary for
SALARY NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT six (6) months, instead of a suspension. This penalty is allowed under Section 19 of
• The salary of a public officer may not, by garnishment, attachment or order of the same Rules.
execution, be seized before being paid to him and, appropriated for the
payment of his debts. VIII. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
• The salary check of a government officer or employee does not belong to him
before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time, the check belongs to IN GENERAL
the government as public fund and may not be garnished. The functions and • The liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or is co- extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. Public officers in
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific respect of the persons to whom their duty is owing, are divdided into 2 classes
objects, as appropriated by law. [De la Victoria v. Burgos, (1995)] – those whose duty is owed solely to the public and those who duty is owed
in some degree to the individuals. An individual has no cause of action against
Right of a de facto officer to salary – Where there is no de jure officer, a de facto a public officer for a breach of duty owed solely to the public. [DE LEON]
officer, who in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties • A public officer is not liable for the injuries sustained by another as a
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an consequence of official acts done within the scope of his authority, except as
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the otherwise provided by law. [NACHURA]
office. • A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his
official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
RIGHT TO RETIREMENT PAY negligence. [Sec. 38(1), Chapter 9, Book I, Admin. Code]
• Given to government employees to reward them for giving the best years of • However, under Sec. 24 of the Local Government Code, local governments
their lives in the service of their country. Retirement laws are liberally and their officials are expressly not exempt from liability for death or injury to
construed in favor of the retiree [Profeta v. Drilon (1992)]. persons or damage to property.

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THREE-FOLD RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS A. KINDS OF DUTIES
A public officer is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for wrongful
act or omission: a. Ministerial: duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative
a. Civil Liability: if the individual is damaged by such violation, the official shall, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated
in some cases, be held liable civilly to reimburse the injured party facts. Where the officer or official body has no judicial power or discretion as
b. Criminal Liability: if the law has attached a penal sanction, the officer may to the interpretation of the law, and the course to be pursued is fixed by law,
be punished criminally. The mere fact that an officer is acting in an official their acts are ministerial only.
capacity will not relieve him from criminal liability.
c. Administrative Liability: such violation may also lead to imposition of fine, b. Discretionary: Acts which necessarily require the exercise of reason in the
reprimand, suspension or removal from office, as the case may be. adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether
the act shall be done or the course pursued. When the law commits to any
LIABILITY OF SUPERIOR OFFICERS FOR ACTS OF SUBORDINATES officer the duty of looking into facts and acting upon them, not in a way which
• A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the it specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature, the function is
wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance of his discretionary (e.g. quasi-judicial acts).
subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific
act or misconduct complained of [Sec. 38(3), Administrative Code] Mendiola v. People [207 SCRA 85]: Every public officer acting in discharge of his
official duties is entitled to the presumption that such acts are done in good faith. So
LIABILITY OF SUBORDINATE OFFICERS long as the requirements to receive documents (IN THIS CASE: certificates of partial
• No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him occupancy) under the law are fullfilled/adhered to, the public officer has the ministerial
in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for duty to issue whatever the document being requested
wilful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public
policy and good customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan [268 SCRA 332]: There is no denying that the
superiors. [Art. 39, Chapter 9, Book I, Admin. Code] disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as "out of the ordinary," did not comply with
certain auditing rules and regulations. But this deviation was inevitable under the
NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of time to observe all
THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR TO PUBLIC OFFICERS auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact that the MARCOS
• GR: Neither the principle of command responsibility (in military or political Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance" with the directive that he forward
structural dynamics) nor the doctrine of respondeat superior (in quasi delicts) to the President's Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely
applies in the law of public officers. cannot escape responsibility for such omission. But since he was acting in good faith,
o The negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, and not criminal.|
in the absence of evidence of the latter’s own negligence [Reyes v.
Rural Bank of San Miguel (2004)] B. PRESIDENT
• Exception:
o (1) The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, Estrada v. Desierto, [353 SCRA 452]: For the president to be deemed as having
necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner
[In the Matter of the Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the
favor of Noriel] Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation on top of all these, the press
o (2) Department Heads or any superior officers may be liable for the release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as
acts of his subordinates, if such superior officers actually authorized president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the
by written order the specific act or misconduct of the latter. presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had
resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
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C. LEGISLATORS F. LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF SUBORDINATES

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan [356 SCRA 636]: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to Chan v. Sandiganbayan, [466 SCRA 190]: An accountable officer is liable for amount
order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation unremitted by a person under his supervision under the principle of command
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support responsibility.
under its Section 13. In issuing the preventive suspension, the Sandiganbayan merely
adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence G. PERSONAL LIABILITY
in which the Court has upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of
public officials and employees indicted before it. In Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, the Tabuena v. CA, [3 SCRA 413]: a public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not
Court reiterated that, “The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad
indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective faith (Art. 27, N.C.C.; 43 Am. Jur., 86, 89-90). A different rule would sanction the use
officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non- of public office as a tool of oppression.
career service." The imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the
validity of the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing. The law H. REMEDIES
does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan [303 SCRA 309]: It bears stressing that the exoneration
of petitioners in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the
D. JUDGES complaint against them. The preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the
investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other. The first
Dantes v. Caguioa, [461 SCRA 236]: where the law violated is so elementary, like involves the determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; the second relates
Rule 71 which provides the scope of a judge’s authority to punish for contempt and the to the administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds. Accordingly, we hold
procedure to be followed, for a judge not to know it or to act as if he does not know it that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the complaint filed by the Provincial
constitutes gross ignorance. Auditor against petitioners, nor the Sandiganbayan in allowing trial to proceed, despite
the pendency of petitioners' motions before the auditor.
In Re: Raul M. Gonzalez, [160 SCRA 771]: A public officer who under the Constitution
is required to be a member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by IX. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
him and who may be removed from office only impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, A. Expiration of term
during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any • GR: Upon the expiration of the officer’s term, his rights, duties and authority
other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office. as a public officer must ipso facto cease.
• XPN Unless he is authorized by law to hold over.
E. QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICERS • Where an office is created, or an officer is appointed, for the purpose of
performing a single act or the accomplishment of a given result, the office
Philippine Racing Club v. Bonifacio, [109 SCRA 233]: As a rule, a public officer, terminates and the officer’s authority ceases with the accomplishment of the
whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally liable to one injured as a purposes which called it into being.
consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in the
line of his official duty. In order that acts may be done within the scope of official Paredes v. Abad [56 SCRA 522]:
authority, it is not necessary that they be prescribed by statute, or even that they be TERM OFFICE TENURE OF OFFICE
specifically directed or requested by a superior officer, but it is sufficient if they are done • the time during which the officer the period during which the incumbent
by an officer in relation to matters committed by law to his control or supervision, or that may claim to hold the office as of actually holds office.
they have more or less connection with such matters, or that they have more or less right and fixes the interval after
connection with such matters, or that they are governed by a lawful requirement of the
department under whose authority the officer is acting.
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which the several incumbents shall seasonably assailed the constitutionality of the said law. Meanwhile, pending appeal,
succeed one another. petitioner Canonizado was appointed and assumed the Office of Inspector General of
• It is a fixed and definite period of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The
time to hold office, perform its respondents alleged that petitioner's appointment constituted abandonment of his claim
functions and enjoy its privileges for reinstatement since the offices of NAPOLCOM and Inspector General of the IAS are
and emoluments until the expiration incompatible.
of said period.
It is held that there is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and
B. Resignation Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible with each other. However, the rule does
• the act of giving up or the act of a public officer by which he declines his office not apply where there was no discharge of functions of the two offices simultaneously;
and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent and that acceptance of a second position pending appeal does not constitute
in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and abandonment. He had the right to live during the pendency of his appeal and naturally
relinquish the office and the acceptance thereof by competent lawful authority the right to accept any form of employment. Prohibiting petitioner from accepting a
[Ortiz v. COMELEC (1988)]. second position during the pendency of his petition would be to unjustly compel him to
bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which under no circumstances can
Requisites be attributed to him.
a. Intention to relinquish a part of the term
b. Act of relinquishment C. Abandonment
c. Acceptance by the proper authority, either expressly or implied • Voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder of all right, title, or claim
thereto with the intention of not reclaiming it or terminating his possession
Forms of resignation and control thereof.
a. Where a law requires that resignation is to be made in any particular form, that
form must be substantially complied with. Requisites
b. Where no such form is prescribed, no particular mode is required, but the a. Intention to abandon
resignation may be made by any method indicative of the purpose. It need not b. Overt act by which the intention is carried into effect
be in writing, unless so required by law. A written resignation, delivered to the
board or officer authorized to receive it and fill the vacancy thereby created, is Distinguished from Resignation
prima facie, but not conclusive evidence of the intention to relinquish the office. • While resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a
voluntary relinquishment through non-user. Non-user refers to a neglect to
Note: Courtesy resignation cannot properly be interpreted as a resignation in the legal use a privilege or a right or to exercise an easement or an ofice [Municipality
sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official’s intention to surrender his of San Andres, Catanduanes v. CA (1998)]
position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the
appointing power [Ortiz v. COMELEC (1988)] What may Constitute as Abandonment
a. Abandonment may result from acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful
Revocation of Resignation removal [Canonizado v. Aguirre (2001)].
• A resignation can be validly withdrawn before the public official is notified of b. An officer or employee shall be automatically separated from the service if
its acceptance [Republic v. Singun (2008)]. he fails to return to the service after the expiration of one- year leave of
• Art. 238 of the RPC makes it an offense for any public officer who, before absence without pay. Also, officers and employeees who are absent for at
acceptance of his resignation, abandons his office to the detriment of the least 30 days without approved leave (AWOL) shall be dropped from the
public service service after due notice [Civil Service Rules].
Canonizado v. Aguirre [351 SCRA 659]: Petitioners, Commissioners of the National
Police Commission, with the effectivity of the law, were removed from office and in their Floresca v. Quetolio (82 Phil. 128): Petitioner's refusal to go back to his old post and
stead appointed respondents Aguirre, Adiong and two other generals. Petitioners his subsequent acceptance of other employments, without any pretense on his part that
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he simultaneously continued to perform the functions of justice of the peace, clearly It exists where:
show deliberate abandonment of the latter office. a. There is conflict in such duties and functions, so that the performance of the
duties of one interferes with the performance of the duties of the other as to
Lameyra v. Pangilinan (322 SCRA 117): Petitioner's basic contention was that he was render it improper from consideration of public policy for one person to retain
unlawfully terminated from the service without just cause and as an act of political both.
harassment by the respondent Mayor of Famy, Laguna. Petitioner claimed that he was b. One is subordinate to the other and is subject in some degree to its
not given due process before respondent terminated his employment, and that the Civil supervisory power for obviously in such a situation, the design that one acts
Service Commission erred in refusing to consider the new evidence submitted with his as a check on the other would be frustrated.
motion for reconsideration. Respondent, on the other hand, pointed out that the basis c. The Constitution or the law itself declares the incompatibility even though
for the petitioner's separation was his absence without official leave, and that the there is no inconsistency in the nature and functions of the offices.
affidavits which he submitted before the Civil Service Commission cannot be
considered "newly discovered evidence" as they were all along readily available to him Zandueta v. de la Costa [66 Phil. 615]: When a judge of first instance, presiding over
and were no longer admissible at a late stage to set aside the judgment. a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid
appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the
same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of
The Supreme Court found merit in the instant petition. The Court was not convinced which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First
that the certification of the personnel officer that petitioner did not report for work from Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and
July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995 constitutes such substantial evidence in light of the receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be
petitioner's submission that said personnel officer precisely prevented him from signing entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his
the log book, that he had been replaced by one Leynes in July, 1995, and that he had new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been
been asked to submit his resignation which he refused to do. Under these disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither
circumstances, it is believed that, in equity, and in proper compliance with the can he claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by said new
requirements of due process, petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to prove appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.
his contention that the termination of his services was illegal.
Sangguniang bayan of San Andres v. CA [284 SCRA 276]: The Supreme Court held
D. Acceptance of incompatible office that while it agreed with respondent court that the resignation was not valid absent any
acceptance thereof by the proper authority, it nonetheless held that private respondent
General Rule: One who, while occupying one office, accepts another office Antonio has effectively relinquished his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to
incompatible with the first ipso facto vacates the first office. his voluntary abandonment of said post. Indeed, the following clearly manifest the
intention of private respondent to abandon his position: (1) his failure to perform his
Exceptions: function as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, (2) his failure to collect the
a. Where the public officer is authorized by law to accept the other office (ex corresponding remuneration for the position, (3) his failure to object to the appointment
officio capacity). of Aquino as his replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan, (4) his prolonged failure to
b. If the public officer accepts a forbidden office, the holding of the second initiate any act to reassume his post in the Sangguniang Bayan after the Supreme Court
office is absolutely void. had nullified his designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Rationale: It is contrary to the policy of the law that the same individual should On the other hand, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had effected his
undertake to perform inconsistent and incompatible duties. intention: (1) his letter of resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan, (2) his assumption
of office as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his
When Incompatible duties and functions as member of said Sanggunian, and (4) his receipt of the
Incompatibility is to be found in the character of the offices and their relation to each remuneration for such post.
other, in the subordination of one to the other and in the nature of the functions and
duties which attach to them
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E. Removal b. With respect to officers exercising quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions
• ouster of an incumbent public officer before the expiration of his term. It (e.g. members of the SEC), they may be removed only on grounds provided
implies that the office exists after the ouster. Another term used is dismissal by law to protect their independence.
[De Leon]. c. With respect to constitutional officers removable only by means of
• It is the forcible and permanent separation of the incumbent from office impeachment, and judges of lower courts, they are not subject to the
before the expiration of his term [Ingles v. Mutuc (1968)]. removal of the President.

Modes of Removal Salazar v. Mathay [73 SCRA 275]: position being primarily confidential, petitioner
Removal from office may be express or implied. cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation
a. Appointment of another officer in the place of the incumbent operates as a of her security of tenure. Primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit
removal if the latter was notified [De Leon]. system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the
b. The transfer of an officer or employee without his consent from one office to Constitution.
another, whether it results in promotion or demotion, advancement or
reduction in salary, is equivalent to his illegal removal or separation from the Dario v. Mison [176 SCRA 84]:
first office. [Gloria v. Court of Appeals (2000)] • At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from
c. Demotion to a lower position with a lower rate of compensation is also abolition of office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization
equivalent to removal if no cause is shown for it. [De Guzman v. CSC carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In
(1994)] the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of
removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional
Limitations mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and
a. Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. No officer or employee of the simply because the Constitution allows it.
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law • Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they
[Sec. 2(3), Art IX-B, Constitution]. are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
b. Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
liability [Office of the President v. Cataquiz (2011)]. efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation
c. Removal not for a just cause, or non- compliance with the prescribed actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
procedure constitutes a reversible error and entitles the officer or employee to o And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be
reinstatement with back salaries and without loss of seniority rights. that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation
or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
Elements of Removal for Cause security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition"
a. The cause is a legal cause, i.e. determined by law and not the appointing takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio.
power o There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of
b. As a general rule, the cause must be connected to the functions and duties nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by
of the office the existence of ample funds.
c. The cause must be of a substantial nature as to directly affect the interest of
the public F. Impeachable officials
d. The removal must be after due process
IMPEACHMENT
Extent of President’s Removal Power • Method of national inquest into the conduct of public men.
a. With respect to non-career officers exercising purely executive functions • It is the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or
whose tenure is not fixed by law (i.e. members of the Cabinet), the President misconduct as provided in the Constitution [Corona v. Senate (2012)].
may remove them with or without cause and Congress may not restrict such
power.
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• Purpose: To protect the people from official delinquencies or malfeasances. G. Forfeiture
It is primarily intended for the protection of the State, not for the punishment
of the offender. i. 1987 Constitution Art. X, sec. 3
o The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
a. President structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
b. Vice-President mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
c. Members of the SupremeCourt different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
d. Members of the Constitutional Commissions resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
e. Ombudsman and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, operation of the local units.
but not by impeachment. (Sec. 2, Art. XI, Constitution).
ii. R.A. No. 7160, secs. 69-75
GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT
a. Culpable violation of the Constitution By Whom Exercised
b. Treason • The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the
c. Bribery registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official
d. Graft and corruption subject to such recall belongs.
e. Other high crimes, or
f. Betrayal of public trust. Initiation of the Recall Process
(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters
PROCEDURE of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall
• The House of Representatives has the sole power to initiate all cases of belongs.
impeachment while the Senate sits as a court for the trial of impeachment (b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and
cases. municipality which shall be composed of the following:
• No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more (1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members
than once within a period of one year. [Sec. 3, Art. XI, Constitution] of the municipalities and component cities;
(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay
The term “to initate” refers to: members in the city;
a. The filing of the impeachment complaint, coupled with (3) Legislative District level. - In case where sangguniang panlalawigan
b. Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint (i.e. referral to the House members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the
Committee on Justice) [Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003)]. district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are
elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and
JUDGMENT (4) Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay
• Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from members in the municipality.
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the (c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to in a public place and initiate a recall proceedings against any elective official in the
prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. [Sec. 3, Art. XI, local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials
Constitution] shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the
members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called
for the purpose.

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(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be Limitations on Recall
validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once
number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the during his term of office for loss of confidence.
election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
or his representative, and in the presence of a representative of the election.
petitioner and a representative of the official sought to be recalled
and, and in a public place in the province, city, municipality, or Expenses Incident to Recall Elections
barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the COMELEC • All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by the COMELEC.
through its office in the local government unit concerned. The For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General
COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall cause the Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for
publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a the conduct of recall elections.
period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20) days,
for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the Perez v. Provincial Board [113 SCRA 187]: When confirmation of petitioner's
petition and the required percentage of voters. nomination as Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija was by-passed by the Commission on
(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly Appointments upon adjournment sine die of Congress on May 18, 1972, the President
authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of designated him as acting provincial fiscal. Petitioner, however, took his oath and
candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of assumed office as such only after his appointment was again by-passed during the
candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be sixth special session of Congress. Thereafter, the Provincial Board, which had opposed
recalled. the confirmation of petitioner's appointment, passed are solution ordering the Provincial
Treasurer to stop payment of petitioner's salaries as acting provincial fiscal.
Election on Recall Consequently, the treasurer disapproved petitioner's requisition for various office
• Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with the appropriate supplies while the Governor disapproved his salary vouchers. Hence, this petition,
local office of the COMELEC, the Commission or its duly authorized pending resolution of which the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the office
representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be of mayor of Cabanatuan City.
later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall
in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials. and forty-five (45) days The Supreme Court dismissed the petition holding that a petition instituted to establish
in the case of provincial officials. one's right to an appointive office is rendered moot and academic where his right to
• The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered said office has been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy to an elective
as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like office.
other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
H. Abolition of office
Effectivity of Recall
• The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election Requisites [Mendoza v. Quisumbing (1990)]:
and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the a. Abolition must be done in good faith
highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official b. Clear intent to do away with the office
sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him c. Not for personal or political reasons
is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office. d. Cannot be implemented in a manner contrary to law

Prohibition from Resignation Limitations

• The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign a. Except when restrained by the Constitution, the Congress has the right to
while the recall process is in progress. abolish an office, even during the term for which an existing incumbent may

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have been elected. Valid abolition of office does not constitute removal of the In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself
incumbent. ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall.
b. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
security of tenure of its members [Sec. 2, Art. VIII, Constitution]. done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in
c. The fundamental principle afforded to civil service employees against removal good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio.
“except for cause as provided by law” does not protect them against abolition There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
of the positions held by them in the absence of any other provision expressly positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds."
or impliedly prohibiting abolition thereof. [Castillo v. Pajo (1958)]
I. Death
Reorganization • The death of the incumbent of an office, which is by law to be filled by one
• Reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason person only, necessarily renders the office vacant. The public official cease
of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one’s to hold office upon his death and all his rights, duties and obligations
position through removal or abolition of an office. pertinent to the office are extinguished.
o However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make • Permanent disability covers both physical or mental disability.
the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of
good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio [United Claimant Association Malanyaon v. Lising [106 SCRA 237]:
of NEA v. NEA (2012)] ACQUITTAL DISMISSAL
• Reorganization is valid provided they are pursued in good faith Always based on the merits. Does not decide the case on the merits.
Defendant is acquitted because the Does not decide the case based on the guilt
Attrition evidence does not show that defendant's of the defendant.
• Reduction of personnel as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal in guilt is beyond reasonable doubt.
accordance with existing laws, death or transfer to another office [Sec. 2(a), Terminates the proceeding, either because
RA 7430 Attrition Law] the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show
that the offense was committed within the
De la Llana v. Alba [112 SCRA 294]: It held that the enactment thereof was in answer
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
to a pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary; that the complaint or information is not valid or
attendant abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause their incumbents to cease sufficient in form and substance, etc.
from holding office does not impair the independence of the judiciary and the security The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of
of tenure guarantee as incumbent justices and judges with good performance and clean the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the
records can be named anew in legal contemplation without interruption in the continuity defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the
of their service; that the provision granting the President authority to fix the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges survives the test of undue case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits.
delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly adopted therefor; that
the reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be carried out in accordance with If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial
the President's constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal,
the judiciary's commitment to guard constitutional rights. inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of
competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case the defendant may again be
prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Larin v. Executive Secretary [280 SCRA 713]: While the President's power to
reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganization itself
Loyao v. Caube [402 SCRA 33]: The Supreme Court dismissed the charges against
is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is
respondent Quisadio for lack of merit. With respect to respondent Caube, the Court
regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison,this court
ruled that the death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not
has had the occasion to clarify that: "As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out
preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.
in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
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Respondent Caube is an accountable officer entrusted with great responsibility. As an
officer of the court, respondent was obliged to conduct himself with propriety and
restraint. He cannot make use of his public office to oppress or to browbeat people into
paying their debts by resorting to such arbitrary and highhanded tactics. He is expected
to be a role model for other court employees — to be emulated in the performance of
his duties as well as his conduct as a civil servant. Regrettably, respondent Caube
abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him. However, respondent Caube's
death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any actions, be it criminal or civil,
against him for his malfeasance in office. The Court is, however, not precluded from
imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions against him. Respondent Caube's
misconduct is so grave as to merit his dismissal from the service, were it not for his
untimely demise during the pendency of these proceedings. However, since the penalty
can no longer be carried out due to the death of respondent Caube, this case is now
declared closed and terminated.

- End of Law on Public Officers -

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