ROMARICO G.
VITUG,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA
FAUSTINO-CORONA
G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990
SARMIENTO, J.
Facts:
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking
for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock
and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate in the sum of P667, 731.66, plus interests,
which he claimed were personal funds. On April 12, 1985, Rowena
Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same
funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal
partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was
allegedly no ground for reimbursement
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property
having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement
executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970.
The trial court upheld the validity of this agreement and
granted "the motion to sell some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug,
the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of
Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667, 731.66."
The Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the
herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not
comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805
of the Civil Code," and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation
inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article
133 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether the conveyance in question is one of mortis causa,
which should be embodied in a will.
Ruling:
The conveyance in question is one of mortis causa, which
should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal,
solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person
disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with
duties to take effect after his death." In other words, the bequest or
device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies subject
of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal
funds.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one
party, and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been
acquired during the existence of the marital relations. Neither is the
survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly,
it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no
conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other. They did not
dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were
conjugal, it cannot be said that one spouse could have pressured the
other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary
to law its operation or effect may be violative of the law. For
instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a
mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in
fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be
assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has been
imputed and established against the agreement involved in this case.
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship
agreement had been executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as
held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills,
donations, and conjugal partnership.