Witness: _____________________

Print: _____________________
Witness: _____________________
Print: _____________________
Witness: _____________________
Print: _____________________

:[First Name]-[Middle Name]: [Last Name]

c/o [Adderess]
[City], [State][Zip]

[Court County] county )

)
the State of [Court State] ) Asseveration
)
united States of America )

L.S. ___________________________
only in capacity as beneficiary to the Original Jurisdiction
NOTICE OF SURETY ACT AND BOND
________________________________
Re: [Court Case Number(s)]

KNOW ALL MEN, BY THESE PRESENTS, I, :[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last Name],

Principal, Titled Sovereign, living-soul, neutral, non-combatant, surety, guarantor, a free man upon the free soil of
this Republic of Arizona, both public and private, foreign and domestic, state that I am not a corporation, am a living
being, of legal age, competent to testify, have personal first hand knowledge of the truths and facts herein being true,
correct, complete, certain, not misleading.

I, :[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last Name], of my own free will and accord, in the presence of Almighty
YHVH, in capacity as beneficiary to the Original Jurisdiction, in good conscience, do willingly undertake to act as
surety, to pledge and provide private bond, in the amount of twenty one Dollars in Silver coinage, minted by the
American Treasury (at the legal and lawful Spot Price of Silver to 1 ratio prescribed by law) united states of America,
Lawful coin dollars of the united states of America, personally held in My ownership and possession.

This bond is to the credit of the private party listed hereon, :[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last Name], in
capacity as beneficiary to the Original Jurisdiction, by his appellation, as full faith and credit guarantee to any Lawful
Bill in Redemption, duly presented under Seal in Lawful specie money of account of the united States of America,
Original Jurisdiction, to wit, and pursuant and in parity to the cost- expense ratio of Florida senate bill 70 on file with
this state as international law.

The Bill of Redemption is a tender as set-off for any alleged contract, agreement, consent, assent purportedly
held, as an obligation or duty against :[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last Name]so as to cause an imputed disability,
or presumption against the capacity, Rights and powers of :[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last Name]. The specific
intent of the bond, under seal, is to establish, by My witness, the good credit in Lawful money specie of : :[First Name]
[Middle Name]-[Last Name].

I, :[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last Name] do make this surety, pledge, bond, under My seal, as full faith
and credit guarantee, to any Lawful Bill, duly presented, to Me, under Seal, under penalties of perjury, in Lawful
money of account of the united States of America, in the matter of correct public judicial/corporate actions in the
forum of Original Rules, Original Jurisdiction, for the benefit and credit of the peculiar private party listed above and
their heirs and assigns. Principal further demands that the court take mandatory judicial notice under rule 201(d) of Texas
Business and Commerce Code, Section 1.202 (stated as foreign law outside of the Republic of Arizona) regarding
admissibility of third-party documents, Section 1.203 & 2.103(a)(2) requiring "good faith" and "honesty in fact," Section
1.103 providing for the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant, of principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, etc., and Section 2.302 providing equitable remedies for
unconscionability.

The intent of the bond, under Seal, is to establish, by My witness, the good credit, in the sum certain amount
of at least twenty one dollars in silver coinage, which carries no debt obligation worldwide, minted by the American
Treasury, united states of America, Lawful specie dollars of the united states of America, available to bond the actions
of the private party listed above, and further, in reservation of Rights under common law and customs of the united
states of America, Original Jurisdiction, Original Rules, has, before this assembly of Men, a bond in tender of twenty
one Dollars Silver, Coinage Act of A.D. 1792, Bond of Identity and Character as proof positive, competent evidence,
:[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last Name] cannot be bankrupt, the causa debendi, not cessio bonorum, or a forma
pauperis, dolus trust [ALL CAP NAME]

The life of this bond covers a period of two (2) years from the date entered below unless the plaintiff enters
a true bill of particulars and all related causes of action and your advice of counsel (who do you work for?) and
information with testamentary documentation under the penalties of perjury per 26 USC 6065 into evidence in the
case of the peculiar private party listed above, in which case the life of this bond will be extended for a period of two
(2) years after such documentation is presented under the penalties of perjury per 26 USC 6065 in the case of the
peculiar private party listed above, whereby, by the signature Jurat and Seal of Albert-Daniel: Lopez, in capacity as
beneficiary of the Original Jurisdiction, surety, guarantor, herein confirms, attests, and affirms this bond. All
assumptions and presumptions have to be proven in writing, signed and sealed before three witnesses as a valid
response, if any.

Upon your failure of response required under the three (3) day grace period under Truth In Lending,
Regulation Z of response and rebuttal of this Notice of Surety Act and Bond, point for point, from receipt, UCC §1-
204, you are in default/ are hereby collaterally estopped from any further adversarial actions against the peculiar
private party listed above, and for good cause not limited to the laws of collateral estoppel, coercion, fraud and want
of subject matter jurisdiction, the peculiar private party listed above demands that the cause(s) be vacated, dismissed
and the accounts be immediately discharged with prejudice. A failure of response or rebuttal under the penalties of
perjury is your assent to this Notice of Surety Act and Bond without recourse and that a fault exists, UCC §1-201(16),
creating fraud through material misrepresentation that vitiates all forms, contracts, testimony, agreements, etc.
expressed or implied, from the beginning, UCC §1-103 on which you rely, and there is no longer permission by
consent or assent for any demand of payment being ordered or levied against the peculiar private party listed above,
and the peculiar private party listed above further demands that the record be expunged and the records and facts of
the above attached captioned case be turned over to the FBI, Secret Service and any other interested federal agencies
for their investigation of violations of federal law and any interlocking agencies thereto, et al. Failure to comply
pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act will negate your remedies. No third party intervenors are allowed.

NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO AGENTS

NOTICE TO AGENTS IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS
Teste Meipso
Done this the ____________ day of the ______________ month, anno Domini, in the year of our Mighty One,
YHVH, two thousand eighteen.

X________________________________________No Dolus
Certification Mark by:[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last
Name], only in capacity as beneficiary of the Original
Jurisdiction, Pursuant to: at Lee County, Florida and “The Law
of Land Warfare” file #549875, book 3681, pages 3945-3949
and book 3681, pages 3956-3958, 3963-3964 and 3969-3970.
Also applicable rule #74, 75 and 79 to “knowingly
communicate or correspond without proper authority. . .”,
ET AL.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

[Court County] county ]
] ss:
[Court State] state ]

:[First Name] [Middle Name]-[Last Name] , known by Me or made known for Me by proper identification
and duly sworn, Certified, Verified, and Exemplified, pursuant to 1 Stat 122, 2 Stat 298 this the ______________ day
_______________ (month), anno Domini, in the year of our Mighty One, YHVH, two thousand eighteen.

X_________________________________________
Notary Signature

Witness: _____________________
Print: _____________________
Witness: _____________________
Print: _____________________
Witness: _____________________
Print: _____________________
NOTES: For a major case, as dealing with the IRS, file the silver bond under the UCC-1, get the
file number from that and put it into the document. If you send this registered mail insert the
registered mail registration number on the silver bond as well. These numbers can then be used for
commercial reference by the other parties in the case.

Insert the word “Seal” written in gold ink on the front right corner of each page and the back right
hand corner of the last page. Insert the word “By:” in red below the Seal followed by your name
written in red in each place. If your name is copyrighted, place the © symbol to the right of your
strawman name.

To use a third party server, call the “Courier” section in your phone book and find the cheapest
process server in your area.

The first silver bond is made for one person for another. The next silver bond is made for a
person for himself (not another living soul).

The silver bond can be used in a variety of ways: It can be used to get a person out of jail, with
one person doing the bond of another. In this case, serve the document to the bailiff via a third
party server. You can find third party servers by looking under couriers in the phone book. Use
the cheapest one. Another way to use it is for your strawman, where Bob Bondholder is the
same as Jack Patriot Keepsrights. Observe the mixed case and full caps in the document
accordingly. It can be used to pay off cars, discharge student loans, can be proof of financial
responsibility in a legal case, etc.

It has been used successfully to get one person out of jail and all of the charges were dropped.
The bond I have comes from an entirely different direction. The courts cannot accept silver
tender as payment and they will refuse to put anything they do under the penalties of perjury and
this should blow up their case every time.

For further information, contact

CESTUY CESTUI
CESTUI, CESTUY, an Anglo-French word, meaning ii that person, which appears in the legal
phrases cestui que trust, use, or vie. It is usually pronounced as cetty. Cestui que trust means
literally the person for whose benefit the trust is created. The cestui que trust is the person
entitled to the equitable, as opposed to the legal, estate. Thus, if land be granted unto, and to the
use of A. in trust for B., B. is ccutui que trust, and A. trustee. The term, principally owing to its
cumbersomeness, is being gradually superseded in modern law by that of beneficiary. Cestui que
use (sometimes cestui a que use) means the person for whose benefit a use is created (see
TRUST). Cestui que vie is the person for whose life lands are held by another (see
REMAINDER).

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE - External evidence or evidence that is inadmissible or not

properly before the court, jury, or other determining body.

Several factors are relevant to determining whether the alleged introduction of extrinsic
evidence constitutes reversible error:

(1) whether the extrinsic material was actually received, and if so, how; (2) the length of
time it was available to the jury; (3) the extent to which the jury discussed and considered
it; (4) whether the material was introduced before a verdict was reached, and if so, at what
point in the deliberations it was introduced; and (5) any other matters which may bear on
the issue of . . . whether the introduction of extrinsic material [substantially and
injuriously] affected the verdict. Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir.'86),
quoted in Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.'93) (noting that "none of these
factors should be considered dispositive"). When assessing prejudice claims in juror
misconduct cases, this court also places great weight on the nature of the extrinsic evidence
introduced. See Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1190-91; Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406-07; Marino, 812 F.2d
at 506.

'[R]eversible error commonly occurs where there is a direct and rational connection
between the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion, and where the misconduct
relates directly to a material aspect of the case.' Marino, 812 F.2d at 506

res judicata
: (rayz judy-cot-ah) n. Latin for "the thing has been judged," meaning the issue before
the court has already been decided by another court, between the same parties.
Therefore, the court will dismiss the case before it as being useless. Example: an Ohio
court determines that John is the father of Betty's child. John cannot raise the issue
again in another state. Sometimes called res adjudicata.

Collateral Estoppel Defined

The federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res
judicata [claim preclusion] and collateral estoppel [issue preclusion]. Under
collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to
its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a
different cause of action involving a party to the first case.
The collateral estoppel bar is inapplicable when the claimant did not have a 'full
and fair opportunity to litigate' the issue decided by the other court. Thus, a
claimant can file a federal suit to challenge the adequacy of state procedures.

The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the idea that 'every person asserting a
federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a
federal district court, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim
arises.' Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980) (holding that the state law of
collateral estoppel applies in civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1983). This is so even if 'the state court's decision may have been erroneous.' Id.
at 101.

Ordinarily, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the

party seeking to use it, or else it is waived. See, e.g., Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).

The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a federal proceeding is

governed by state law. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908,
914-15 (9th Cir.'93), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2675 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1738.

In California, there are four criteria for application of collateral estoppel: (1) the
prior conviction must have been for a serious offense so that the defendant was
motivated to fully litigate the charges; (2) there must have been a full and fair trial
to prevent convictions of doubtful validity from being used; (3) the issue on
which the prior conviction is offered must of necessity have been decided at the
criminal trial; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior trial. Ayers, 895 F.2d at 1271 (upholding
use of collateral estoppel to prevent a defendant from bringing a S 1983 action
alleging he had been illegally arrested). In Ayers, the court held that suppression
rulings in the original criminal proceeding met these criteria. Id.

With the exception of federal habeas corpus review of state convictions under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 2254, the determination of federal constitutional questions in state
court systems may not be reviewed or repeated in the federal systems. The Court
in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 104 (1980) said that '[t]he federal courts have
traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel,' excepting only 'a federal writ of habeas corpus, the purpose of which is
not to redress civil injury but to release the applicant from unlawful physical
confinement.'

The Supreme Court has said that claimants are not always entitled to vindicate
federal rights in federal court. For example, in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 92
(1980), a criminal defendant moved to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded collateral estoppel
barred a subsequent Sec. 1983 suit asserting the same Fourth Amendment
violation. Id. at 105. 'There is . . . no reason to believe that Congress [through
passage of Sec. 1983] intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an
unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court
simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather
not have been engaged at all.' Id. at 104.

Doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel:

'Only a final judgment that is 'sufficiently firm' can be issue preclusive.' Luben
Indus. v. U.S., 707 F.2d 1037, 40 (9th Cir.'83). To ascertain the 'firmness' of a
judgment, courts look to various factors, including whether the decision was
tentative, whether the parties were fully heard, whether the court supported its
decision with a reasoned opinion, and whether the decision was subject to appeal
or was actually reviewed on appeal. Luben, at 1040 (quoting Restatement(2d) of
Judgments S 13 cmt. g (1982)). Luben affirmed the district court's determination
that an interlocutory order issued by another judge in the same district was not
'sufficiently firm' because 'it could not have been the subject of an appeal. ' Id.

Prior litigation by the same parties on a different cause of action has a collateral
estoppel effect only as to those issues litigated and determined in the prior
action. (7 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed.1985) Judgment, section 253, p.691.) The
party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden to show from the record of the
prior action that the asserted issue was previously litigated and determined.
(Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 257-58.)

In Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, a prior unlawful
detainer was resolved by a stipulated judgment. The appellate court rejected the
collateral estoppel defense, saying, 'Here, the unlawful detainer action was
resolved by stipulated judgment which made no mention of a relinquishment by
the Pelletiers of claims arising from a retaliatory eviction. The retaliation defense
was not fully and fairly litigated in an adversary hearing, and thus was not
conclusively established.' (Id. at p.1557.)

California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d
658, 64, 67 held that 'a stipulated judgment may properly be given collateral
estoppel effect, at least when the parties manifest an intent to be collaterally
bound by its terms.' (Id. at 664, emphasis added.) The court held on the particular
facts that 'by specifically stipulating to the issue of liability, the parties intended
the ensuing judgment to collaterally estop further litigation on that issue.' (Id. at
664-65, fn.2.) By so limiting its holding the CSAA court avoided any conflict with
the rule recognized in an annotation it cited, (1979) 91 A.L.R.3d 1170, 174, that a
consent judgment is not usually given preclusive effect in subsequent litigation
on a different cause of action, unless the parties manifest an intent in the consent
judgment to give it such preclusive effect. (CSAA, supra, 50 Cal.3d at 664-65, fn.
2.) That general rule is based on reasoning that 'the parties to a consent judgment
generally intend merely to put an end to the litigation at hand.' (91 A.L.R.3d at
1174.) It is supported also by comment e to section 27 of the Restatement Second
of Judgments, at 257: 'In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent,
or default, none of the issues is actually litigated. Therefore, the rule of this
Section does not apply with respect to any issue in a subsequent action. The
judgment may be conclusive, however, with respect to one or more issues, if the
parties have entered an agreement manifesting such an intention.' 'In such a case
the effect results not from the rule of this Section but from an agreement
manifesting an intention to be bound.' (Rest.2d Judgments, section 27, reporter's
notes, p.269.)

A prior stipulated or consent judgment is subject to construction as to the

parties' intent, and if sufficiently ambiguous may be interpreted in light of
extrinsic evidence. (United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Johansen (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d
824, 837-39; see Larsen v. Beekmann (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 185, 91; Ellena v.
State of California (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 245, 61.)

Another line of authority states that a party consenting to judgment against him
admits those elements of the litigation 'which appears upon its face to have been
so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto' (Code Civ.Proc., section 1911) and may suffer collateral estoppel effect
unless the parties expressly reserved or withdrew that issue from the prior
judgment. (In re Marriage of Buckley (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 927, 35; Ellena v. State
of California, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at 261.) For example, where the defendants in
a foreclosure action withdrew a defense of fraud and consented to a judgment,
they 'necessarily admitted the validity of the instruments' and were precluded
from collaterally litigating their claim they were induced by fraud to execute the
instruments (Wittman v. Chrysler Corp. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 586, 91); where an
ex-husband consented to a prior judgment for alimony after raising a defense that
his obligation was terminated by the wife's remarriage, he was precluded from
relitigating whether her remarriage terminated the obligation. (Avery v. Avery
(1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 525, 529-30.)

Collateral estoppel does not apply to an issue which could not have been raised
in the prior proceedings. (See Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 871-
72 ['different historical transaction']; Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d 251, 255
[limited nature of issues which may be asserted in unlawful detainer; cross-
complaints generally not allowed].)

A prior judgment, arrived at by stipulation with no issues actually litigated, does

not preclude another action, because the face of the judgment does not show the
parties so intended. (See Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93
Cal.App.3d 256, 263-64 [a judgment by stipulation does not cover matters not in
the stipulation; failure to include sufficiently comprehensive language in
compromise offer allowed additional relief to be granted against party who
believed compromise amount excluded court costs].)
Silver Bond Songs (just for fun) composed by Walter Chek

“Silver Bond Blues”(Sung to Heartbreak Hotel)

I’m the district court judge,

And I don’t know what to do,
I got a silver bond sent to me,
And had to set the people free,
And I really got the screw,
I got the silver bond,
I got the silver bond blues,
I can’t even collect a dime,
And I’m trying to get this song to rhyme,
I got the silver bond,
I got the silver bond blues.

Repeat

“Silver Bond”(sung to Silver Bells)

Silver Bond,
Silver Bond,
The people who use it are singing,
Silver Bond,
Silver Bond,
The patriots out there are cheering,
Silver Bond,
Silver Bond,
Justice in courts is nearing,
Silver Bond,
Silver Bond,
Court Jesters are fearing,
Silver Bond,
Silver Bond,
The bells of freedom are ringing,
Silver Bond,
Silver Bond,
The IRS conscience is searing,
Silver Bond,
Silver Bond,
FRN notes are disappearing

Repeat