Case Digest: G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.
85 Phil 522
Gregorio Perfecto, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Bibiano Meer, Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required plaintiff-appellee to
pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After
paying the amount, he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance
contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason
that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946
amount to a diminution thereof.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature approves an
amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges
thereafter appointed", salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed
by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated,
to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913,
taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected
from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which
must be deemed to have been transplanted here; and second, when the Philippine
Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off
the judges’ compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on
judicial salaries really impairs them.
Case Digest: G.R. No. L-6355-56. August 31, 1953. 93 Phil 696
Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Saturnino
David, as Collector of Internal Revenue,defendant-appellant.
Facts: This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the
appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice
Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on
his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice
Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on
his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and
legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in the case
of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a
judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. It is further
held that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted
in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
Case Digest: G.R. No. 78780. July 23, 1987. 152 SCRA 284
David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo, and Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., petitioners, vs.
Commissioner Of Internal Revenue and The Financial Officer, Supreme Court Of The
Philippines, respondents.
Facts: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches
52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the
constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance
in office and the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges
is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as
affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution that they have adopted.
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He
filed a special civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed
him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he
was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the
premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the
candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and
the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle
or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible
propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition
invoked by the COMELEC.
HELD:
The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable
only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The
COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition,
categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by
principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the
Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement
to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should
be in consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC
for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the
candidate’s constitutional rights
Ignominy- a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and
obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. This aggravating circumstance is
applicable when the crime committed is against chastity
(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One)
People vs. Torrefiel
Facts:
December 17, 1942, 5:00 p.m. Torrefiel and Ormeo were on their way to the USSAFE
headquarters inthe mountains. They passed by Eady’s residence and talked to him at
the balcony to ask for khakis. Eady had none except what he had on.
Ceferina Cordero also came to the balcony and inquired about their mission. She
scolded Torrefiel andOrmeo because all their belongings have been looted by USSAFE
soldiers. Torrefiel threatened her with slapping; brought out revolver. Eady and
Cordero were charged with being fifth columnists as they refused to give aid to them.
Subsequently they were taken to the USSAFE headquarters.
Torrefiel took charge of Eady and Ormeo took charge of Cordero. Their hands were
free but wereblindfolded. Cordero called to Eady every now and then to know if he
was following. After a while Eadydid not respond anymore so they stopped to wait
for them. Torrefiel had taken the wrong way so he went back to a guardhouse and
left Eady there. He tried to find a way to overtake Ormeo and Corderobut was
unsuccessful. At the guardhouse, he discovers Eady had escaped. Torrefiel followed
a different route enabling him to find Ormeo and Cordero. Ormeo rushed back to the
guardhouse upon discoveringthat Eady had escaped; Cordero was left with Torrefiel.
As Cordero was about to urinate, Torrefiel pushed her and carried her to a log and
laid her on it andraped her. Torrefiel began to unbutton his pants and wound cogon
leaves around his genitals. It wasvisible to Cordero as her blindfold had fallen down
a little. Pressing her neck so she would remain silent,Torrefiel proceeded to have
intercourse with her. Ormeo, taking advantage, also had sex with her. Thesoldiers
desisted from bringing Cordero to their headquarters and returned her to their house.
A servantinformed Cordero that Eady had gone away. Upon Eady‘s return, Cordero
informed him that she wasabused by Torrefiel.
Issues:
1) WON witness is credible, and WON rape was committed.
2) WON there are any aggravating circumstances.
Held/Ratio:
1) YES to both.
a. The court sees no incongruity between the affidavit and testimony of complainants.
The testimonysufficiently proves Torrefiel‘s guilt.
i. Cordero recognized Torrefiel by his voice even though she was blindfolded because
it was falling.
ii. Back at Eady‘s house, the soldiers‘ roaming inside the house is proven by the sound
oftheir footsteps.
b. Exertion of force or violence is implied in the term “rape”. Pushing down the victim
proves force. Although for Ormeo, use of force may still be doubted. Cordero was
not hostile towards him after crime.
2) YES.
a. Trial Court erred in accepting the aggravating circumstance of NOCTURNITY –this
was entirelyunexpected as the ordeal started early in the afternoon.
b. IGNOMINY is present. The novelty of the act of winding cogon grass on his genitals
before raping the victim augmented the wrong done by increasing its pain and adding
moral disgrace thereto.
