SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 106646. June 30, 1993.]

JAIME LEDESMA , petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RIZAL

COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION , respondents.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioner.

Meer, Meer & Meer Law Office for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; WHEN INTERRUPTED (ART.

1155, CIVIL CODE). — Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of an
action, involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for ling an action
on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by (a) the ling of
an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The effects of the last two instances have
already been decided by this Court, the rationale wherein should necessarily apply to
the first.
2. ID.; ID.; INTERRUPTED BY REASON OF WRITTEN EXTRAJUDICIAL DEMAND
BY CREDITOR. — The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditor was decided in Overseas Bank of Manila
vs. Geraldez, et al. in this wise: ". . . The interruption of the prescriptive period by written
extrajudicial demand means that the said period would commence anew from the
receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished
from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period . . . "A written extrajudicial
demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive
period . . . "That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo
vs. Organo, 90 Phil 483, 488, where it was ruled that the interruption of the ten-year
prescriptive period through a judicial demand means that 'the full period of prescription
commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the suspension.' When prescription is
interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned
from the cessation of the interruption . . ."
3. ID.; ID.; INTERRUPTED BY REASON OF WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
THE DEBT OF THE DEBTOR. — The interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor was dealt with in Philippine National
Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., thus: "Article 1155 of the Civil
Code provides that the 'prescription of actions is interrupted' inter alia, 'when there is
any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.' This simply means that the
period of prescription, when interrupted by such a written acknowledgment, begins to
run anew; and whatever time of limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual
of the cause of action is thereby negated and rendered ine cacious . . . The effect of
the interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the obligation, to make
prescription run again from the date of the interruption . . ."
4. ID.; ID.; ART. 1155 OF THE CIVIL CODE, PROPERLY INTERPRETED IN THE
CASES OF OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS
CORPORATION. — Article 1155 has twice been interpreted to mean that upon the
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 cessation of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period of prescription
commences to run anew. We are convinced and so hold that the correct interpretations
of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are re ected in and furnished by the doctrinal
pronouncements in Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways
Company, not only because they are later in point of time but because the issue is
squarely resolved in a decisive and logical manner therein.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO , J : p

Petitioner has led a motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of

March 24, 1993 which denied his petition for review on certiorari for failure to
su ciently show that respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error
in its questioned judgment.
On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
led Civil Case No. 38287 in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal against petitioner
to enforce the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement No. 7389 executed by them on April 1,
1974 but which petitioner had failed to comply with. As summons could not be served
on the latter, said case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981. On
December 2, 1988, private respondent bank instituted Civil Case No. 88-2572 in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 133, against petitioner on the
same cause of action and subject matter. prcd

Petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription was denied and

judgment was rendered in favor of private respondent by the court a quo ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent P168,000.00 with interest thereon of 12% per
annum from December 2, 1988 until full payment of the obligation, P16,800.00 as
attorney's fees, and costs of suit. Said judgment was a rmed by respondent Court in
CA-G.R. CV No. 29406 in its decision promulgated on January 7, 1992, 1 and petitioner's
motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution dated August 6, 1992. 2
Petitioner's petition for review on certiorari of the said judgment was denied in
our aforesaid resolution, hence its present motion for reconsideration, dated May 5,
1993. Contending that the second action led by private respondent bank had already
prescribed, petitioner invokes the rulings in Vda. de Nator, et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al. 3 and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al. 4 and invites us
"to give a second look at the apparently conflicting or divergent jurisprudence."
Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of an action,
involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for ling an action on a
written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by (a) the ling of an
action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The effects of the last two instances have
already been decided by this Court, the rationale wherein should necessarily apply to
the first.
The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditor was decided in Overseas Bank of Manila vs.
Geraldez, et al. 5 in this wise:
". . . The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial
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 demand means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of
the demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from
mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period.
xxx xxx xxx
"A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already
elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in
Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil 483, 488, where it was ruled that the interruption of
the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial demand means that 'the full
period of prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the
suspension.' When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time
for the prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption . . ."
The interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor was dealt with in Philippine National
Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 6 thus:
"Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the 'prescription of actions is
interrupted' inter alia, 'when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor.' This simply means that the period of prescription, when interrupted
by such a written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of
limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is
thereby negated and rendered inefficacious . . .
xxx xxx xxx
". . . The effect of the interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the
obligation, to make prescription run again from the date of the interruption . . ."
Based on the aforecited cases, Article 1155 has twice been interpreted to mean
that upon the cessation of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period of
prescription commences to run anew. Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that in case
of the ling of an action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled and continues to run
again, with only the balance of the remaining period available for the ling of another
action. This postulation of petitioner, if we are to adopt it, would result in an absurdity
wherein Article 1155 would be interpreted in two different ways, i.e., the prescriptive
period is interrupted in case of an extrajudicial demand and a written acknowledgment
of a debt, but it is merely tolled where an action is filed in court.
In Vda. de Nator, it was held that:
". . . The ling of the case with the CFI arrested the period of prescription
(Art. 1155 NCC), and the interruption of said period lasted until the time that the
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction became nal. 'When prescription is interrupted
by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned from
the cessation of the interruption' . . . The whole period during which the case
had been pending cannot be counted for arriving at the prescriptive period. In
other words, the running of the period of prescription in this particular case was
interrupted on August 6, 1953, when the case in the CFI was led and began to
run again on August 30, 1958, when the same Court had dismissed the case. As
the complaint was led with the CIR on December 5, 1958, the action has not
yet prescribed."
This case obviously appears to have made con icting statements since it proceeds
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 upon a certain premise but arrives at a different conclusion. Hence, we cannot agree
that the statements therein sufficiently support the thesis of petitioner.

The case of Fulton Insurance Company is not clear either on the matter of the
interruption of the prescriptive period where an action is led in court. It was there held
that:
"There are two school(s) of thought as to the legal effect of the cessation
of the interruption by an intervening action upon the period of prescription.
There is the view expressed and perhaps, not without reasons, that the full
period of prescription should start to run anew, reckoned from the date of the
cessation of the interruption. The contrary view is, that the cessation of the
interruption merely tolls the running of the remaining period of prescription,
deducting from the full period thereof the time that has already elapsed prior to
the ling of the intervening action. Nevertheless, all discussion on this point is
academic; considered in the light of either view, We nd that the second action
is not barred."
In the aforesaid case, the defendant therein moved for the dismissal of the
second case alleging that the ling of the rst case neither tolled nor interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period. This Court ruled that the ling of the rst action
interrupted the running of the period, and then declared that at any rate, the second
action was led within the balance of the period remaining. It concluded that the issue
of whether the ling of the action merely tolled or it actually interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period was moot and academic because, in either case, the second
action was still led within the prescriptive period. Consequently, the Fulton case
cannot also sustain the thesis of petitioner.
On the foregoing considerations, we are convinced and so hold that the correct
interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are re ected in and furnished by the
doctrinal pronouncements in Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways
Company, not only because they are later in point of time but because the issue is
squarely resolved in a decisive and logical manner therein. Petitioner's submission
would result in a bifurcated interpretation of Article 1155, aside from the irrational
conclusion that a judicial action itself cannot produce the same result on the
prescriptive period as a mere extrajudicial demand or an acknowledgment of the debt.
Accordingly, petitioner having failed to adduce any cogent reason or substantial
argument to warrant a reconsideration of our resolution of March 24, 1993, the present
motion is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C . J ., and Nocon, J ., concur.
Padilla, J., On leave.
Footnotes
1. Justice Segundino G. Chua, ponente; Justices Santiago M. Kapunan and Luis L. Victor,
concurring.

2. Rollo, 24.
3. 4 SCRA 727 (1962).

4. 21 SCRA 974 (1967).

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 5. 94 SCRA 937 (1979).
6. 177 SCRA 740 (1989).

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