FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioner, v. HON. EVANGELINE C. CASTILLO-

MARIGOMEN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 101 AND ANTONIO L.
TIU, Respondents.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court over public
respondent's Order2 dated May 19, 2015 which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss
premised on the special and affirmative defenses in his Answer, and public
respondent's Order3 dated December 16, 2015 which denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-10666-CV entitled "Antonio
L. Tiu v. Antonio F. Trillanes IV."

The Facts

Petitioner, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed Proposed Senate

Resolution No. 826 (P.S. Resolution No. 826) directing the Senate's Committee on
Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations to investigate, in aid of
legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey Makati City
Hall II Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall
Building at the average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, and related
anomalies purportedly committed by former and local government officials. 4

Petitioner alleged that at the October 8, 2014 Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee
(SBRS) hearing on P.S. Resolution No. 826, former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto
Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped former Vice President Jejomar Binay
(VP Binay) acquire and expand what is now a 350-hectare estate in Barangay
Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to as the Hacienda Binay, about 150
hectares of which have already been developed, with paved roads, manicured lawns,
a mansion with resort-style swimming pool, man-made lakes, Japanese gardens, a
horse stable with practice race tracks, an extensive farm for fighting cocks, green
houses and orchards.5

According to petitioner, Mercado related in said hearing that because VP Binay's wife
would not allow the estate's developer, Hillmares' Construction Corporation (HCC),
to charge the development expenses against VP Binay's 13% share in kickbacks
from all Makati infrastructure projects, HCC was compelled to add the same as
"overprice" on Makati projects, particularly the Makati City Hall Parking Building. 6

Petitioner averred that private respondent thereafter claimed "absolute ownership"

of the estate, albeit asserting that it only covered 145 hectares, through his
company called Sunchamp Real Estate Corporation (Sunchamp), which purportedly
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with a certain Laureano R.
Gregorio, Jr. (Gregorio, Jr.), the alleged owner of the consolidated estate and its
improvements.7

Petitioner further averred that private respondent testified before the SBRS on the
so-called Hacienda Binay on October 22 and 30, 2014, and at the October 30, 2014
hearing, the latter presented a one-page Agreement 8 dated January 18, 2013
between Sunchamp and Gregorio.9 On its face, the Agreement covered a 150-
hectare property in Rosario, Batangas and showed a total consideration of P400
Million, payable in tranches and in cash and/or listed shares, adjustable based on
the fair market value. The Agreement likewise ostensibly showed that Gregorio is
obligated to cause the registration of improvements in the name of Sunchamp and
within two years, to deliver titles/documents evidencing the real and enforceable
rights of Sunchamp, and the latter, in the interim, shall have usufruct over the
property, which is extendible.

Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during
gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, and in reply
to the media's request to respond to private respondent's claim over the estate, he
expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the documents, private
respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the
actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay. 10

On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages 11 against
petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-10666-CV, for the latter's alleged
defamatory statements before the media from October 8 to 14, 2014, specifically his
repeated accusations that private respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay.

Private respondent alleged that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in various

businesses primarily in the agricultural sector, and that he has substantial
shareholdings, whether in his own name or through his holding companies, in
numerous corporations and companies, globally, some of which are publicly listed.
He averred that because of petitioner's defamatory statements, his reputation was
severely tarnished as shown by the steep drop in the stock prices of his publicly
listed companies, AgriNurture, Inc. (AgriNurture), of which he is the Executive
Chairman, and Greenergy Holdings, Inc. (Greenergy), of which he is the Chairman,
President and Chief Executive Officer. To illustrate this, private respondent alleged
that on October 7, 2014, the price of a share of stock of Greenergy was P0.011 per
share and the volume of trading was at 61 Million, while on October 8, 2014, the
price dropped to P0.0099 per share (equivalent to a 10% reduction) and the volume
of trading increased by more than seven times (at 475.7 Million), with the price
continuing to drop thereafter. Similarly, private respondent alleged that on October
8, 2014, AgriNurture experienced a six percent (6%) drop from its share price of
October 7, 2014 (from P2.6 to P2.45) and an increase of more than six times in the
volume of trading (from 68,000 to 409,000), with the share price continuing to drop
thereafter. According to private respondent, the unusual drop in the share price and
the drastic increase in trading could be attributed to the statements made by
petitioner, which caused the general public to doubt his capability as a businessman
and to unload their shares, to the detriment of private respondent who has
substantial shareholdings therein through his holding companies.

Denying that he is a "dummy," private respondent alleged that he possesses the

requisite financial capacity to fund the development, operation and maintenance of
the "Sunchamp Agri-Tourism Park." He averred that petitioner's accusations were
defamatory, as they dishonored and discredited him, and malicious as they were
intended to elicit bias and prejudice his reputation. He further averred that such
statements were not absolutely privileged since they were not uttered in the
discharge of petitioner's functions as a Senator, or qualifiedly privileged under
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code,12 nor constitutive of fair commentaries on
matters of public interest. He added that petitioner's statement that he was willing
to apologize if proven wrong, showed that he spoke without a reasonable degree of
care and without regard to the gravity of his sweeping accusation.

Claiming that petitioner's statements besmirched his reputation, and caused him
sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and social
humiliation, private respondent sought to recover P4 Million as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the amount of
P500,000.00.

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,13 petitioner raised the following Special and
Affirmative Defenses:

First, petitioner averred that private respondent failed to state and substantiate his
cause of action since petitioner's statement that private respondent was acting as a
"front," "nominee" or "dummy" of VP Binay for his Hacienda Binay is a statement of
fact.14

Petitioner asserted that private respondent was unable to prove his alleged
ownership of the subject estate, and that Mercado had testified that VP Binay is the
actual and beneficial owner thereof, based on his personal knowledge and his
participation in the consolidation of the property. Petitioner noted that the titles
covering the estate are in the names of persons related to or identified with Binay.
He argued that the one-page Agreement submitted by private respondent hardly
inspires belief as it was unnotarized and lacked details expected in a legitimate
document such as the technical description of the property, the certificates of title,
tax declarations, the area of the property and its metes and bounds, schedule of
payments, list of deliverables with their due dates, warranties and undertakings and
closing date. He also pointed out that while the total consideration for the
Agreement was P446 Million, the downpayment was only P5 Million. With a yearly
P30 Million revenue from the orchard, petitioner questioned why Gregorio would
agree to part with his possession for a mere one percent (1%) of the total
consideration.15 Petitioner likewise disputed private respondent's supposed claim
that Sunchamp had introduced improvements in the estate amounting to P50
Million, stressing that it took over the estate only in July 2014 and that it did not
own the property and probably never would given the agrarian reform issues.
Petitioner claimed that it was based on the foregoing and the report of his
legal/legislative staff that he made his statement that private respondent is a front,
nominee or dummy of VP Binay.16

Second, petitioner posited that his statements were part of an ongoing public debate
on a matter of public concern, and private respondent, who had freely entered into
and thrust himself to the forefront of said debate, has acquired the status of a public
figure or quasi-public figure. For these reasons, he argued that his statements are
protected by his constitutionally guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of
expression and of the press.17

Third, petitioner contended that his statements, having been made in the course of
the performance of his duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary
immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. 18
Citing Antero J Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,19 petitioner argued that the
claim of falsity of statements made by a member of Congress does not destroy the
privilege of parliamentary immunity, and the authority to discipline said member lies
in the assembly or the voters and not the courts.

Petitioner added that he never mentioned private respondent's two companies in his
interviews and it was private respondent who brought them up. Petitioner pointed
out that private respondent only had an eight percent (8%) shareholding in one of
said companies and no shareholding in the other, and that based on the records of
the Philippine Stock Exchange, the share prices of both companies had been on a
downward trend long before October 8, 2014. Petitioner described the Complaint as
a mere media ploy, noting that private respondent made no claim for actual
damages despite the alleged price drop. This, according to petitioner, showed that
private respondent could not substantiate his claim.20

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint and for the award of his
Compulsory Counterclaims consisting of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.21

Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion (to Set Special and Affirmative Defenses for
Preliminary Hearing)22 on the strength of Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
which allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on any of the grounds for
dismissal provided in the same rule, as may have been pleaded as an affirmative
defense in the answer.23

Private respondent opposed the motion on the grounds that the motion failed to
comply with the provisions of the Rules of Court on motions, and a preliminary
hearing on petitioner's special and affirmative defenses was prohibited as petitioner
had filed a motion to dismiss.

On May 19, 2015, public respondent issued the Order 24 denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss premised on the special and affirmative defenses in his Answer. The
Order, in pertinent part, states:
FIRST ISSUE: The Complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Whether true or false, the allegations in the complaint, would show that the same
are sufficient to enable the court to render judgment according to the prayer/s in the
complaint.

SECOND ISSUE: The defendant's parliamentary immunity.

The defense of parliamentary immunity may be invoked only on special

circumstances such that the special circumstance becomes a factual issue that would
require for its establishment the conduct of a full blown trial.

With the defense invoking the defendant's parliamentary immunity from suit, it
claims that this Court has no jurisdiction over the instant case. Again, whether or
not the courts have jurisdiction over the instant case is determined based on the
allegations of the complaint.

xxxx

Subject to the presentation of evidence, the complaint alleged that the libelous or
defamatory imputations (speech) committed by the defendant against the plaintiff
were made not in Congress or in any committee thereof. This parliamentary
immunity, again, is subject to special circumstances which circumstances must be
established in a full blown trial.

xxxx

FOURTH. Whether or not a motion to dismiss was filed to prevent a preliminary

hearing on the defendant's special and affirmative defenses.

xxxx

Said 'answer with motion to dismiss' of the defendant did not contain any notice of
hearing and was not actually heard. To the mind of the Court, the use of the phrase
'with motion to dismiss' highlights the allegations of special and affirmative defenses
which are grounds for a motion to dismiss. Thus, absent any motion to dismiss as
contemplated by law, the preliminary hearing on the special and affirmative
defenses of the defendant may be conducted thereon.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in public respondent's
Order25 dated December 16, 2015. Public respondent held that:
xxxx

To reiterate the ruling in the assailed order, parliamentary immunity is subject to

special circumstances which must be established in a full blown trial.

In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that the defamatory statements were made in
broadcast and print media, not during a Senate hearing. Hence, between the
allegations in the complaint and the affirmative defenses in the answer, the issue on
whether or not the alleged defamatory statements were made in Congress or in any
committee thereof arises. It would be then up to the Court to determine whether the
alleged defamatory statements are covered by parliamentary immunity after trial.
Petitioner subsequently filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, assailing public
respondent's May 19, 2015 and December 16, 2015 Orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In ascribing grave
abuse of discretion against public respondent, petitioner reiterates the special and
affirmative defenses in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, and asks that the assailed
Orders be nullified, reversed and set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the
Complaint.

In his Comment,26 private respondent points out that the petition violates the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He contends that petitioner cannot invoke
parliamentary immunity as his utterances were made in various media interviews,
beyond the scope of his official duties as Senator, and that the constitutional right to
free speech can be raised only against the government, not against private
individuals.

Private respondent asserts that his Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as
petitioner's imputations, as alleged therein, were defamatory, malicious and made
public, and the victim was clearly identifiable. According to him, petitioner's claim
that his imputations were statements of fact, covered by his parliamentary immunity
and not actionable under the doctrine of fair comment, are irrelevant as his motion
to dismiss, based on failure to state a cause of action, hypothetically admitted the
allegations in the Complaint. At any rate, he argues that truth is not a defense in an
action for defamation.
Private respondent further contends that he is not a public figure as to apply the
doctrine of fair comment, and that it was petitioner who brought up his name, out of
nowhere, at the October 8, 2014 SBRS hearing. He asserts that contrary to
petitioner's claim, the Courts, not the Senate, has jurisdiction over the case. Finally,
he avers that because failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter are determined solely by the allegations of the complaint, a
preliminary hearing is unnecessary.

The Court's Ruling

Hierarchy of courts should have been observed

In justifying his direct recourse to the Court, petitioner alleges that there is a clear
threat to his parliamentary immunity as well as his rights to freedom of speech and
freedom of expression, and he had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law that could protect him from such threat. Petitioner argues
that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and direct filing with
the Court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time. Petitioner asserts that the case
encompasses an issue which would require an interpretation of Section 11, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court is not persuaded.

The power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is not exclusive to
this Court.27 The Court shares the jurisdiction over petitions for these extraordinary
writs with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. 28 The hierarchy of
courts serves as the general determinant of the appropriate forum for such
petitions.29 The established policy is that "petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals," and "[a] direct invocation of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition."30 The parties, therefore, do not have an unfettered discretion in
selecting the forum to which their application will be directed. 31

Adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts ensures that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated role in an effective and efficient manner. 32 This
practical judicial policy is established to obviate "inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction," and to prevent the congestion of the Court's docket. 33 The
Court must remain as a court of last resort if it were to satisfactorily perform its
duties under the Constitution.34

After all, trial courts are not limited to the determination of facts upon evaluation of
the evidence presented to them.35 They are likewise competent to determine issues
of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive
issuance in relation to the Constitution. 36

It is true that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and this
Court has allowed a direct application to this Court for a writ of certiorari when there
are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time.37
However, the issue of what parliamentary immunity encompasses, in relation to a
lawmaker's speech or words spoken in debate in Congress, has been addressed as
early as 1966 in the case of Nicanor T. Jimenez v. Bartolome Cabangbang,38 where
the Court succinctly held:
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned
publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein"-that is
to say, in Congress used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of

their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced
in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in
the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such,
at the time of the performance of the acts in question. (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours.)39
In Jimenez, a civil action for damages was filed against a member of the House of
Representatives for the publication, in several newspapers of general circulation, of
an open letter to the President which spoke of operational plans of some ambitious
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) involving a "massive political
build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense Jesus Vargas to prepare him to
become a presidential candidate, a coup d'etat, and a speech from General Arellano
challenging Congress' authority and integrity to rally members of the AFP behind
him and to gain civilian support. The letter alluded to the plaintiffs, who were
members of the AFP, to be under the control of the unnamed "planners," "probably
belong(ing) to the Vargas-Arellano clique," and possibly "unwitting tools" of the
plans.

Holding that the open letter did not fall under the privilege of speech or debate
under the Constitution, the Court declared:
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said
communication is not absolutely privileged. (Emphasis ours.)
Albeit rendered in reference to the 1935 constitutional grant of parliamentary
immunity, the Jimenez pronouncement on what constitutes privileged speech or
debate in Congress still applies. The same privilege of "speech or debate" was
granted under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, with the latter Charters
specifying that the immunity extended to lawmakers' speeches or debates in any
committee of the legislature. This is clear from the "speech or debate" clauses in the
parliamentary immunity provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions which
respectively provide:
Section 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the session of the Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place.40 (Emphasis ours.)

Section 9. A Member of the National Assembly shall, in all offenses punishable by

not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his
attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the same; but the
National Assembly shall surrender the Member involved to the custody of the law
within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a recess or its next session,
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. A Member shall not
be questioned or held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Assembly or in any committee thereof.41 (Emphasis ours.)

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.42 (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, settled jurisprudence provides sufficient standards and guidelines by which
the trial and appellate courts can address and resolve the issue of parliamentary
immunity raised by petitioner. The Court is, thus, unconvinced that petitioner has
presented an "exceptionally compelling reason" 43 to justify his direct application for a
writ of certiorari with this Court.

Even assuming arguendo that direct recourse to this Court is permissible, the
petition must still be dismissed.

Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the

parliamentary speech or debate" privilege

Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private

respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-
called Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in
plenary and committee hearings in the Senate. 44 With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is
evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under
Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part
of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not
spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be successfully
contended that they were made in the official discharge or performance of
petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the
legislative process.

The Speech or Debate Clause under the 1935 Constitution "was taken or is a copy of
sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States." 45 Such immunity
has come to this country from the practices of the Parliamentary as construed and
applied by the Congress of the United States. 46

The U.S. Supreme Court's disquisition in United States v. Brewster47 on the scope of
the privilege is of jurisprudential significance:
Johnson thus stand as a unanimous holding that a Member of Congress may be
prosecuted under a criminal statute provided that the Government's case does not
rely on legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts. A legislative act has
consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation
to the business before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry
only into those things generally said or done in the House or the Senate in the
performance of official duties and into the motivation for those acts.
It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many activities
other than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
These include a wide range of legitimate "errands" performed for constituents, the
making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing
Government contracts, preparing so-called "news letters" to constituents, news
releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress. The range of these related
activities has grown over the years. They are performed in part because they
have come to be expected by constituents, and because they are a means of
developing continuing support for future elections. Although these are
entirely legitimate activities, they are political in nature, rather than
legislative, in the sense that term has been used by the Court in prior cases. But it
has never been seriously contended that these political matters, however
appropriate, have the protection afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Careful
examination of the decided cases reveals that the Court has regarded the protection
as reaching only those things "generally done in a session of the House by
one of its members in relation to the business before it," Kilbourn v.
Thompson, supra, at 204, or things "said or done by him, as a representative, in the
exercise of the functions of that office," Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 ( 1808).

xxxx

xxx In stating that those things "in no wise related to the due functioning of the
legislative process" were not covered by the privilege, the Court did not in any sense
imply as a corollary that everything that "related" to the office of a Member was
shielded by the Clause. Quite the contrary, in Johnson we held, citing Kilbourn v.
Thompson, supra, that only acts generally done in the course of the process of
enacting legislation were protected.

xxxx

In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all con
duct relating to the legislative process. In every case thus far before this Court, the
Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part
of the legislative process - the due functioning of the process. xxx

xxxx

(c) We would not think it sound or wise, simply out of an abundance of caution to
doubly insure legislative independence, to extend the privilege beyond its intended
scope, its literal language, and its history, to include all things in any way related to
the legislative process. Given such a sweeping reading, we have no doubt that there
are few activities in which a legislator engages that he would be unable somehow to
"relate" to the legislative process. Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be
read broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the independence of the
Legislative Branch, but no more than the statutes we apply, was its purpose to
make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility.
In its narrowest scope, the Clause is a very large, albeit essential, grant of privilege.
It has enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity, but
that was the conscious choice of the Framers.

xxxx

xxx.The authors of our Constitution were well aware of the history of both the need
for the privilege and the abuses that could flow from too sweeping safeguards. In
order to preserve other values, they wrote the privilege so that it tolerates and
protects behavior on the part of Members not tolerated and protected when done by
other citizens. but the shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to
preserve the integrity of the legislative process. Moreover, unlike England,
with no formal written constitutional limitations on the monarch, we defined limits
on the coordinate branches, providing other checks to protect against abuses of the
kind experienced in that country. (Emphasis ours.)

xxxx
In Gravel v. United States,48 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Senator's private
publication of certain classified documents (popularly known as the Pentagon
Papers), which the latter had taken up at a Senate subcommittee hearing and placed
in the legislative record, did not constitute "protected speech or debate," holding
that it "was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate," and was "not
part and parcel of the legislative process." Explaining the scope of the Speech or
Debate Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court declared:
But the Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere. That
Senators generally perform certain acts in their official capacity as Senators does not
necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members of Congress are
constantly in touch with the Executive Branch of the Government and with
administrative agencies - they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the
administration of a federal statute - but such conduct, though generally done, is not
protected legislative activity. xxx

xxxx

Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or
debate in either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other
matters, they must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and
House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. xxx (Emphasis
ours.)
It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the
lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in
Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of the (legislative) process." 49 To
participate in or respond to media interviews is not an official function of any
lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process
of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and
legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation
in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," 50 outside the
ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987
Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke
parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint.
The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because
it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.

The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators and
Congressmen into "super-citizens"51 whose spoken words or actions are rendered
absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil action. The Constitution conferred the
privilege on members of Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for the
public good."52 It was intended to protect them against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing their decision-making prerogatives. 53 Such grant of
legislative privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose and plain
language. Indeed, the privilege of speech or debate, which may "(enable) reckless
men to slander and even destroy others,"54 is not a cloak of unqualified impunity; its
invocation must be "as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of
the legislative department."55 As this Court emphasized in Pobre,56 "the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to
protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people's representatives, to perform the functions of their office without
fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall."

Jurisdiction lies with the courts, not the Senate

Petitioner argues that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, and citing Pobre,
asserts that the authority to discipline a member of Congress lies in the assembly or
the voters and not the courts.

Petitioner's reliance on Pobre is misplaced. The statements questioned in said

disbarment case were part of a lawyer-Senator's privilege speech delivered on the
Senate floor professedly with a view to future remedial legislation. By reason of the
Senator's parliamentary immunity, the Court held that her speech was "not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court." The
questioned statements in this case, however, were admittedly made in response to
queries from the media during gaps in the Senate's plenary and committee hearings,
thus, beyond the purview of privileged speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI
of the Constitution.

The Court held in Pobre:

Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner
they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.
The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours.)57
Clearly, the Court's pronouncement that the legislative body and the voters, not the
courts, would serve as the disciplinary authority to correct abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity, was premised on the questionable remarks being
made in the performance of legislative functions, on the legislative floor or
committee rooms where the privilege of speech or debate may be invoked.
Necessarily, therefore, statements falling outside the privilege and giving rise to civil
injury or criminal responsibility will not foreclose judicial review.

Furthermore, it is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is

conferred by law.58 An action for damages on account of defamatory statements not
constituting protected or privileged "speech or debate" is a controversy well within
the courts' authority to settle. The Constitution vests upon the courts the power and
duty "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable."59 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, conferred jurisdiction
over actions for damages upon either the RTC or the Municipal Trial Court,
depending on the total amount claimed.60 So also, Article 33 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party,
and such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

In fine, petitioner cannot successfully invoke parliamentary nonaccountability to

insulate his statements, uttered outside the "sphere of legislative activity," 61 from
judicial review.

Preliminary hearing was not warranted

Petitioner argues that a preliminary hearing on his special and affirmative defenses
is necessary to allow him to present evidence that will warrant the immediate
dismissal of the Complaint.

The Court is not persuaded.

Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the

affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed.
Section 6, however, must be construed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule,
which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits deferment of such
resolution on the ground of indubitability. Thus, Section 6 disallows a preliminary
hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed because
such defenses should have already been resolved. 62

In this case, however, petitioner's motion to dismiss had not been resolved when
petitioner moved for a preliminary hearing. As public respondent stated in the
assailed May 19, 2015 Order, the motion did not contain a notice of hearing and was
not actually heard. Even so, a preliminary hearing is not warranted.

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner averred that private respondent
failed to state and substantiate his cause of action, arguing that the statement he
made before the media, in which he described private respondent as a "front" or
"dummy" of former VP Binay for the so-called Hacienda Binay, was one of fact.

By raising failure to state a cause of action as his defense, petitioner is regarded as

having hypothetically admitted the allegations in the Complaint. 63

The test of the sufficiency of the facts stated in a complaint as constituting a cause
of action is whether or not, admitting the facts so alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the plaintiff's prayer. 64 Inquiry is
into the sufficiency not the veracity of the facts so alleged. 65 If the allegations
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same should
not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be raised by the defendants. 66

Accordingly, in determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of

action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered. 67 The court
cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine
its existence.68 For the court to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a
denial of the plaintiff's right to due process.69

As this Court, in Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al.70 instructs:

The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative
defenses as raised in the answer under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court.
It has been held, however, that such a hearing is not necessary when the
affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action, and that it is, in
fact, error for the court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine the
existence of external facts outside the complaint. The reception and the
consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, has been held to be improper and impermissible. Thus, in a preliminary
hearing on a motion to dismiss or on the affirmative defenses raised in an answer,
the parties are allowed to present evidence except when the motion is based on the
ground of insufficiency of the statement of the cause of action which must be
determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and no
other. Section 6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action. The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and
considering evidence in connection with this ground. (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours.)
Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action

Private respondent filed his Complaint for moral and exemplary damages pursuant
to Article 33 of the Civil Code 71 which authorizes an injured party to file a civil action
for damages, separate and distinct from the criminal action, in cases of defamation,
fraud and physical injuries.

As defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, a libel 72 is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be

defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim
must be identifiable.73 Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is
defamatory,74 and every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. 75

The Civil Code provides that moral damages include mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury, and may be recovered in cases of libel, slander or any other form
of defamation,76 while exemplary damages may be recovered in addition to moral
damages, by way of correction or example for the public good, as determined by the
court.77

Measured against the foregoing requisites and considerations, including the scope of
parliamentary non-accountability, private respondent's Complaint, on its face,
sufficiently makes out a cause of action for damages.

In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that petitioner gave statements during
interviews by the media, describing him as the "dummy" of former VP Binay in
connection with the so-called Hacienda Binay. Private respondent averred that such
imputation, unprivileged as it was uttered outside of petitioner's legislative
functions, actually discredited him and tarnished his reputation as a legitimate
businessman, and caused him sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish and social humiliation. The statements, presumed to be malicious
and so described by private respondent, were also alleged to have been made public
through broadcast and print media, and identified private respondent as their
subject. Hypothetically admitting these allegations as true, as is required in
determining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, private respondent
may be granted his claim.78
The Complaint, therefore, cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action. As the RTC held, whether true or false, the allegations in the
Complaint are sufficient to enable the court to render judgment according to private
respondent's prayer.

Defense of lack of cause of action requires a full-blown trial

In moving for the outright dismissal of the Complaint, petitioner averred that private
respondent failed to prove his alleged ownership of the subject estate. To establish
this, petitioner pointed to Mercado's testimony that former VP Binay is the actual
and beneficial owner thereof, the certificates of title covering the estate purportedly
in the names of persons related to or identified with former VP Binay, and the one-
page Agreement between Sunchamp and Gregorio which, according to petitioner,
hardly inspires belief because it was not notarized and lacked details expected in a
legitimate document, and because the transaction, which required Gregorio to give
up possession, entailed a measly downpayment of P5 Million, out of the P446 Million
total consideration, for an estate with a yearly P30 Million revenue from its orchard.

For these reasons, petitioner asserted that when he remarked before the media that
private respondent was acting as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy," he was
simply making a statement of fact which he had based on documents, reports and
information available to him, and which was never intended to be an insult or a
derogatory imputation.

Petitioner also argued that because private respondent had thrust himself into the
public debate on the so-called Hacienda Binay, he should be deemed a "public
figure" and the questioned statements consequently qualify for the constitutional
protection of freedom of expression.

Private respondent, however, has notably denied being a "dummy," and rebuffed
petitioner's claim that he had thrust himself into the public debate, alleging that it
was petitioner who brought up his name, out of nowhere, at the October 8, 2014
SBRS hearing.

Petitioner's Answer likewise repudiated private respondent's claim that the

questioned statements had brought about a steep drop in the share prices of two
listed companies he was managing, to the detriment of his substantial shareholdings
therein. Petitioner countered that said prices had been on a downward trend long
before he uttered the questioned statements; that he never mentioned said
companies in his interviews; and that far from substantial, private respondent only
had an 8% stake in one of the companies and none in the other.

A perusal of petitioner's defenses and arguments, as above outlined, at once reveals

that the averments were grounded on lack of cause of action. In fact, by pleading in
his Answer that private respondent failed to "substantiate" his cause of action,
petitioner effectively questioned its existence, and would have the trial court inquire
into the veracity and probative value of private respondent's submissions.

Distinguished from failure to state a cause of action, which refers to the insufficiency
of the allegations in the pleading, lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
the factual basis for the action.79 Petitioner, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,
clearly impugned the sufficiency of private respondent's basis for filing his action for
damages.
Section 6, Rule 16 allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative
defenses pleaded in the answer based on grounds for dismissal under the same
rule.80 The ground of "lack of cause of action," however, is not one of the grounds
for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, hence, not proper for resolution during a
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6 thereof.81

Furthermore, Aquino teaches that the existence of a cause of action "goes into the
very crux of the controversy and is a matter of evidence for resolution after a full-
blown hearing." An affirmative defense, raising the ground that there is no cause of
action as against the defendant, poses a question of fact that should be resolved
after the conduct of the trial on the merits.82

Indeed, petitioner, in asking for the outright dismissal of the Complaint, has raised
evidentiary matters and factual issues which this Court cannot address or resolve,
let alone at the first instance. The proof thereon cannot be received
in certiorari proceedings before the Court, but should be established in the RTC. 83

Thus, even granting that the petition for certiorari might be directly filed with this
Court, its dismissal must perforce follow because its consideration and resolution
would inevitably require the consideration and evaluation of evidentiary matters. The
Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot accept the petition for certiorari for that
reason.84

All told, for its procedural infirmity and lack of merit, the petition must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Public respondent's Orders dated May

19, 2015 and December 16, 2015 in Civil Case No. RQZN-14-10666-CV are affirmed
insofar as they are consistent with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), on leave.

Leonardo-De Castro,**Del Castillo, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

**
Designated Acting Chairperson, First Division. per Special Order No. 2540 dated
February 28, 2018.

1
Rollo, pp. 3-34.

2
Id. at 41-42-A.

3
Id. at 39-40.

4
Id. at 6-7.

5
Id. at 8.

6
Id.

7
Id. at 9-10.
8
Id. at 142.

9
Id. at 11-13.

10
Id. at 10-11.

11
Id. at 67-79.

12
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making
it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

13
Rollo, pp. 105-133.

14
Id. at 116.

15
Id. at 117-118.

16
Id. at 119.

17
Id.

18
Id. at 124.

19
613 Phil. 352, 360 (2009).
20
Rollo, pp. 127-128.

21
Petitioner asked for P5 Million in moral damages, P1 Million in exemplary
damages, and P500,000.00 as attorney's fees.

22
Id. at 43-56.

23
Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - If no motion to dismiss has
been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded
as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a
preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

24
Supra note 2.

25
Supra note 3 at 39.

26
Rollo, pp. 212-245.

27
Aala, et al. v. Uy, et al., G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017, United Claimants
Association of NEA (UNICAN) et al. v. National Electrification Administration (NEA),
et al., 680 Phil. 506 (2012), citing Mendoza, et al. v. Mayor Villas, et al., 659 Phil.
409, 414 (2011).

28
Id.

29
Id.

30
United Claimants Association of NEA (UNICAN), et al. v. NEA, supra note 27 at
514.

31
Id. Aala, et al. v. Uy, et al., supra note 27.

32
Maza v. Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017, citing The Diocese of Bacolod,
et al. v. COMELEC, 751 Phil. 301, 329 (2015).

33
Aala, et al. v. Uy, et al., supra note 27. United Claimants Association of NEA
(UNICAN), et al. v. NEA, supra note 27 at 514.

34
Aala, et al. v. Uy, et al., supra note 27.

35
Maza v. Turla, supra note 32, citing The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC,
supra note 32.

36
Id.

37
Id. Aala, et al. v. Uy, et al., supra note 27.

38
124 Phil. 296 (1966).

39
Rollo, pp. 298-299.

40
Article VI on the Legislative Department.

41
Article VIII on The National Assembly.

42
Article VI on The Legislative Department.

43
The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC, supra note 32.

44
Rollo, pp. 10-11 and 119.

45
Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, et al., G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960.

46
Id.

47
408 U.S. 501 (1972).

48
408 U.S. 606 (1972).

49
U.S. v. Brewster, supra note 47.

50
Id.
51
Id.

52
Pobre v. Sen. Santiago, supra note 19 at 359, citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 US
367, 71 S. Ct. 783 (1951).

53
Pobre v. Sen. Santiago, supra at 365.

54
U.S. v. Brewster, supra note 47.

55
Pobre v. Sen. Santiago, supra note 19.

56
Id.

57
Pobre v. Sen. Santiago, supra at 360.

58
Tumpag v. Tumpag, 744 Phil. 423, 429 (2014).

59
Second paragraph, Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

60
Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7691, which amended Section 9(8) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdictional amount for RTC in Metro Manila was
adjusted to exceeding P400,000.00.

61
Tenney v. Brandhove, supra note 52.

62
California and Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Pioneer Ins. and Surety Corp., 399 Phil. 795,
804 (2000).

63
Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al., 755 Phil. 793, 810 (2015), citing Insular
Investment and Trust Corp. v. Capital One Equities Corp. et al., 686 Phil. 819, 847
(2012) and Evangelista v. Santiago, 497 Phil. 269, 290 (2005).

64
Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al., supra at 810, citing Insular Investment and Trust
Corp. v. Capital One Equities Corp. et al., supra at 847.
65
Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, et al., 745 Phil. 171, 180 (2014).

66
Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al., supra at 810, citing Insular Investment and Trust
Corp. v. Capital One Equities Corp., et al., supra at 847.

67
Id.

68
Id.

69
Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al., supra at 810.

70
Supra at 816-817.

71
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

72
Should be difamacion [Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Ago Medical &
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine, 489 Phil. 380, 393 (2005),
citing Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiang v. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669, 675 (1946)].

73
Lopez v. People, et al., 658 Phil. 20, 30 (2011).

74
Dr. Alonzo v. CA, 311 Phil. 60, 71 (1995).

75
Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol
Christian College of Medicine, supra note 72 at 394.

76
Articles 2217 and 2219 (7).

77
Articles 2229 and 2233.

78
Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al., supra note 63.

79
Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al, supra note 63 at 808, citing Dabuco v. Court of
Appeals, 379 Phil. 939, 944-945 (2000).

80
Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al., supra note 63.

81
Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al., supra at 809.

82
Id.

83
Banez, Jr. v. Judge Concepcion. et al., 693 Phil. 399, 412 (2012).

84
Id. at 414.