70. People vs.

Sarcia - September 10, 2009

1. A complaint for acts of lasciviousness was filed against accused-appellant and upon review of the evidence by
the prosecutor the charge was upgraded to rape.
2. The prosecution alleged that accused-appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA who was then 5 years
old.
3. AAA was playing with her cousin and two other children in a neighbor’s house when accused invited her to the
backyard of the house and raped here. AAA’s cousin witnessed what happened.
4. The RTC found accused-appellant guilty and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as civil indemnity
of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.
5. The record of the case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review and then transferred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.

Accused-appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed the following defenses:

1. The inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin

ISSUES AND RULINGS:

Criminal Law; Evidence; As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses, which refer only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the accused.—Inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight
of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person
with perfect faculties or senses. The alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn the findings
of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant
who sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by
accused-appellant evidently deserve fulll faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5)
years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had
occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and
their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make
confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the
atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.

Same; Rape; The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor it
is an indication of deceit.—The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the
charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and the
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169641 - 599 SCRA 20
lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused. In People v. Coloma, 222 SCRA 255 (1993) we
even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victim’s father as understandable and not
enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that
show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is
not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently
justified by the complainant’s father in the latter’s testimony.

Same; Same; Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether “carnal
knowledge” took place.—Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no
proof that he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12
years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether “carnal knowledge” took place. Proof of force,
intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive
presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.

Same; Same; The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ is not
necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact of rape.—Accused-appellant harps on the
medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows: “negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which
means, in layman language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound.” The Court has consistently ruled that
the presence of lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence
does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. What is important is
that AAA’s testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.

Same; Rape; Evidence; Alibi; Denials; Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi.—
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants’ defense of denial and alibi. The shallow hypothesis put forward by
accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this
Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion: ...True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted
AAA’s family file the instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s] parents finally decided to file the
rape case because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously
[AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is after all true. AAA was barely 9
years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the testimony of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve foil credence. It is improbable for a girl of complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to
herself and her family had she not been truly subjected to the painfol experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of
tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it
were not true. Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the
rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter’s
transgressor punished accordingly. Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

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169641 - 599 SCRA 20
Same; Rape; Penalties; The penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of
age.—Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was the governing law at the time
the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed
when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this ease, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old
at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her
birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.

Same; Same; Same; In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the accused.—This Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot
agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised
Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means
that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place “in any
month and date in the year 1996.” Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape
was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In
assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on
the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.

Damages; The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature.—The Court
has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,
116 SCRA 81 (1982) we held: xxx Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. In
another case, this Court also explained: What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as
compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).

Same; The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity
and extent of injury caused to victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case.—
According to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages for the injury
caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature.
The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and
extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here,
the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date
of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.

Same; Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are increased when the
qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance with the prevailing
jurisprudence.—As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary
damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they
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may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to them
has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the
amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith
or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil
indemnity and moral damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise
be increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

Q: Can accused-appellant avail of the retroactive effect of RA 9344 with regard to automatic suspension of sentence?

Criminal Law; Children in Conflict with the Law; Since Republic Act No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who
has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also
not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has
been found guilty of a heinous crime.—Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the
offense charged. It reads: Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence.—Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need
of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after
considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the, Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law. The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as
to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in
conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish
between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with
the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

Same; Same; If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years.—While Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even
if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum
age of 21, thus: Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.—If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in conflict with the law has
reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child in accordance with this Act, to order, execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

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70. People vs. Sarcia - September 10, 2009
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Same; Same; A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections

(BUCOR), in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.—To date, accused-appellant is
about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344.
Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-
appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows: Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities.—A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made
to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with
the DSWD. The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition
measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law. People vs. Sarcia, 599 SCRA 20, G.R. No. 169641 September 10,
2009

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and
(2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the
case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.