MASINSIN vs.

ALBANO
G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994

FACTS:
Sps. Masinsin instituted petition for certiorari, prohibition and relief from judgment as well as declaratory
relief asking to order MTC of Manila Branch X to cease and desist from further proceeding the demolition of the
disputed property. Case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by private respondent against petitioners on July 1,
1985 where the MTC ruled in favor of private respondents. The judgment became final and executory since no
appeal has been filed.

On August 22, 1985, an appeal was filed by the petitioners for a petition for certiorari before the RTC of
Manila Branch 22 which was then dismissed. Another complaint for annulment of judgment lease contract and
damages was filed by the petitioner before the RTC of Manila Branch 41 asking nullification of the ejectment case.
Complaint was dismissed for res judicata. Execution was filed the MTC for the enforcement of its decision.

Petitioners deposited with the CA the sum of Php 3000 but on March 11, 1987, the CA affirmed the order of
the lower court. Demolition order was issued and the demolition was begun. Before the completion of the demolition
a restraining order was issued by the RTC of Manila branch 19 following a petition by certiorari filed by the
petitioners. However, such petition was then dismissed as well.

Petitioner assailed again the MTC decision in a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Manila Branch 25.
Trial court dismissed the petition. Thus, petitioners filed this case in the SC. They contend that the MTC of Manila
has lost its jurisdiction when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority development by the NHA
on December 1, 1987.

RULING:
Petition is without merit. The resolution issued by the NHA on December 1, 1987 specifically excludes the
disputed property from the area of priority development for the project of NHA. Moreover, there is an evident
deliberate intent from the petitioners to delay the execution of a decision that has long been final and executory by
filing different pleadings on different courts.

They have filed four times with the assistance of counsel to try and nullify the decision before different
branches of court. ANY ACT WHICH VISIBLY TENDS TO OBSTRUCT, PERVERT, IMPEDE, AND DEGRADE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY A LAWYER IS A CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND
WARRANTING CONTEMPT.

Petition is dismissed and counsel is censured and warned that a similar act in the future will be dealt with
most severely.

HUEYSUAN-FLORIDO vs. ATTY. FLORIDO

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his
eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer “by manufacturing, flaunting
and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution.

Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido, the complainant, averred that she was the legitimate spouse of the
respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido, the respondent, but because of the estranged relation, they lived
separately. They have two children whom the complainant has the custody. Complainant filed a case for the
annulment of her marriage; meanwhile there, was another related case pending in the Court of Appeals.

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence in Tanjay City,
Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed
complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his
motion for temporary child custody. Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not
received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but
respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two
dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their
children to respondent. The complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated
January 18, 2005[from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender
custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Florido was liable for making false court resolution.

RULING:
Yes. A lawyer who used a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals is presumed to have participated in
its fabrication. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel.

The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a
client’s cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.

SANTOS vs. PAGUIO

LIBIT vs. OLIVA

FACTS:
Judge Domingo Panis in Pedro Cutingting v. Alfredo Tan ordered the NBI Director to conduct an
investigation to determine the author of the falsified Sheriff’s return in said case. As a result of which, the NBI
charged respondents Attys. Edelson Oliva and Florando Umali for obstruction of justice.

The case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. In view of NBI’s report that Umali’s
signature in the complaint in the civil case was not his, the case was dismissed with respect to him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Code of Ethics

RULING:
Yes. After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the
Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the
Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal
respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party.

In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he
shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT.
His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.
MONTEREY vs. ARAYATA
61 Phil 820

FACTS:
Atty. Arayata drew up in his favor deed of sale of a land, stating therein that the person who executed the
document and sold the land to him was his father who is already dead. He appears to Notary public Montoya to
legalize said document. However, in the course of investigation, he alleged that it was his uncle who signed the
deed of transfer and ratified it before Montoya.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Arayata’s acts constitute malpractice and unprofessional conduct meriting for him a
disciplinary action.

RULING:
The acts committed by Atty. Arayata relative to the deed of sale and his statements to notary Montoya with
regards to said document, constitute malpractice and unprofessional conduct, meriting for him a disciplinary action
mitigated by the circumstance the he was the heir and complainant has no direct interest. He was suspended for
one month.

PRADO vs. ACOSTA

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES ASSOC.

ASA vs. CASTILLO

BANOGON vs. ZERNA

FACTS:
In 1926, a judgment favorable to Zerna was issued by a cadastral court. In 1957 or thirty one years later,
Banogon filed a motion to amend the 1926 decisions. An opposition was filed by Zerna in the same year. Banogon’s
counsel repeatedly failed to set for hearing and in 1971 or fourteen years later, Zerna filed for a motion to dismiss
which was granted by reason of Banogon’s filing being out of time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Banogon’s suit should prosper.

RULING:
No. He slept on his rights hence laches had set in. The Supreme Court also took time to remind lawyers to
judiciously study facts and laws so as to avoid the filing of improper cases such as this case where the filing of
motions and pleadings was way out of time. One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the
way some of them misinterprets the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do
not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. Lawyers do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts.
COBB-PEREZ vs. LANTIN
G.R. No. 22320 July 29, 1968

FACTS:
Basically, the spouses Perez were involved in a civil case where a simple money judgment was rendered
against them. To execute the judgment, the court levied upon shares of stock of the spouses. With the help of the
spouses’ counsels Attys. Baizas and Bolinas, they resorted to a series of actions and petitions for the sole purpose
of delaying the execution of the simple money judgment which has long been final and executory.

What they did was attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the execution
sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be
satisfied.

Example of the spouses’ modus operandi:

1. After the court issued a writ of execution against them, the spouses sought the issuance of preliminary
injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment.

2. Damaso Perez (husband) temporarily bowed out from the scene. Then here comes his wife Mercedez
Cobb-Perez who files a writ of preliminary injunction with the CFI of Rizal with full knowledge that the
court in Rizal had no jurisdiction over the matter because the case was originally filed in Manila.

3. Mercedez Cobb-Perez simultaneously filed with the CFI of Manila an urgent motion to lift the writ of
execution alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal
nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt.

4. Mercedez Cobb-Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the
issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the CFI of Manila (not the same Branch
which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with the still pending case in the CFI of
Rizal. This was denied.

5. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez was already prepared with another "remedy,"
as in fact on that day, he filed in connection with the original judgment (the money judgment) an "Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration” which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted
writ of execution. The foregoing motion was far from seriously seeking the reconsideration because in
the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent
Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone.) This was also denied by the court.

In the court’s final (as in final) judgment, the writ of execution against the spouses Perez was upheld, and in
addition, the Supreme Court assessed treble costs against petitioners, to be paid by their counsels. Attys. Crispin D.
Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so
far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Attys. Baizas and Bolinas should be made to pay treble costs.

RULING:
YES. Attys. Baizas and Bolinao contends that if there was delay it was because they happened to be more
assertive, a quality of lawyers which is not to be condemned. The court replied that a counsel's assertiveness in
espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the
court does not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. It is
the duty of a counsel to advise his clients if he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate.

Accordingly, should there be a conflict between his duty to his client and that to the Court, he should resolve
the conflict against the former and in favor of the latter, his primary responsibility being to uphold the cause of
justice.
CANLAS vs. CA
164 SCRA 160

FACTS:
The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for which he is the registered
owner. He secured loans from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of land for
the security of the same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the
properties in question after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private respondent filed a complaint
for injunction over the said foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land.

Two years after the filing of the petition, private respondent and L and R corporation entered into a
compromise agreement that renders the former to be insured another year for the said properties. Included in the
stipulations were the attorney’s fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private respondent however, remained to be
in turmoil when it came to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the attorney’s fees, more so the
redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and private respondent executed a document to redeem the
parcels of land and to register the same to his name.

Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels of land to his name but without prior notice,
the properties were already registered under the petitioner’s name. The private respondent calls for a review and for
the court to act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties consolidated by the
redemption price he paid for said properties. The private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the
Court of appeals which ruled over the same.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties.

RULING:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was
willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's
P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have tempered his
demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to
his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients."

The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The
petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not
speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money."

We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas
monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his liability for payment of the
properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer.
The parties must then set off their obligations against the other.