PRESIDENTIAL AD-HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, etc. v.
HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et al.
G.R. No. 135715. April 13, 2011, Second Division, (Carpio-Morales, J.)
Facts:
President Ramos issued a Memorandum Order No.61 directing the Committee to include in its
investigation, inventory and study all non-performing loans which shall embrace both behest and
nonbehest loans. The Committee reported that the Philippines Seeds, Inc. was one of the 21
corporations
which obtained behest loans. In his instructions, handwritten on the cover of the aforementioned
report,
President Ramos directed Committee Chairman Magtanggol C. Guingundo to proceed with
administrative and judicial actions against the 21 firms in this batch with positive findings as soon as
possible. The Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI and
the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philip pines who approved the loans for the violation of
par. E & G of Sec.3 of R.A. 30 19. In its Resolution, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription. Relying on the case of People vs. Dinsay, a case decided by the C.A.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in holding that
the prescriptive period in this case should be counted from the date of the grant of the behest loans
involved and not from the date of discovery of the same by the Committee.
RULING:
Petition granted.
We agree with the Ombudsman that Sec. 15 of Art. 11 of the Constitution apply to civil actions
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal actions such as the complaint against the respected
firms. This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. The upshot of the
discussion is the prosecution of offense arising from, relating or incident to or involving ill-gotten wealth
contemplated in Sec.15 Art.11 of the Constitution may be barred by prescription. The applicable rule in
the computation of the prescriptive period is Sec.2 of Act. No.326 in the special law violated. It stated
that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day
it was committed. In the case at bar, the Ombudsman forthwith dismissed the complaint without even
requiring the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and solely on the basis of dates the alleged
behest loans were granted or the dates of the commission of the alleged offense was committed. Since
the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal actions should commence from
the discovery of the offense, the Ombudsman clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
outright the case.