OXFORD Sixth Edition COGNITION Scott Sinnett | DanielSmilek | Alan KingstoneSixth Edition COGNITION Scott Sinnett | DanielSmilek | Alan Kingstone OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESSOXFORD ‘Osford University ress isa department of the Univesity of Oxford. Ie farthers the University’s objective of excellence in researeh, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is registered trade mark of (Oxford Univesity Pres in the UK and in certain other countries. 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Library and Archives Caneda Cataloguing in Publication Smilek, Daniel 1974 {Cogaiton) Cognition / Scot Sinnett, Daniel Sie, Alan Kingstone sisth edition Revision of Cognition / Daniel Smilek, ott Sinnett, Alan Kingstone. — Fifth edition. — Don Mils, Ontario, Canada, + Oxtord University Pres, [2013] Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 978-0-19-901970-0 (hardback) 1. Cognition —Testhooks. 2. Cognitive psychology—Texthooks 1. Kingstone, Alan, 1941- author TL. Sinnet, Scot, author II. Tile 1V. Tile: Smile, Daniel, 1974. Cognition BFSILS65 2016 153 €2016-900528-0 Cover image: Tom Battie, Chris Clark, SGI [MSIScience Photo Library (Oxford University Press is committed to our environment. ‘Wherever possible, our books ae printed on paper which comes from responsible sources, Printed and bound in the United States of America 1234-19 1817 16Brief Contents aus N 10 11 12 13 Introduction 3 Cognitive Neuroscience 23 Perception 51 The Varieties of Attention 87 Memory Systems 125 Memory Traces and Memory Schemas 163 Imagery 201 Concepts 239 Language 263 Problem-Solving 305 Reasoning, Judgment, and Choice 339 Intelligence and Creativity 375 Consciousness 405Contents From the Publisher ix List of Boxes xvi List of Figures xvii Listof Tables xxi Preface to the Sixth Edition xxiv 4 Introduction 3 Case Study: What Is Cognition? 4 Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing 5 Information Theory 6 Models of Information Processing 9 Ecological Validity 13 Metacognition and Cognitive Psychology 25 ‘The Range of Cognitive Psychology 17 Cognitive Neuroscience 23 Case Study: Head Office 24 The Brain as the Organ of the Mind 26 ‘The Relationship between Mind and Brain 28 Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience 30 Perception 51 Case Study: An Unusual Perceptual Experience 52 The Physiology of Visual Perception 53 ‘The Ventral Pathway and Object Recognition 56 Context and Feedback Effects in Perception 61 ‘The Dorsal Pathway and the Relation between Perception and Action Interactions Between the Ventral and Dorsal Pathways 76 Multimodal Perception 79 The Varieties of Attention 87 Case Study: A Total Wreck 88 James's Description of Attention 89 Selective Attention 89 70Contents Dual Tasks and the Limits of Attention 99 Task Switching 107 Sustained Attention 109 Overt Visual Attention 121 Memory Systems 125, Case Study: What Was That Movie...? 126 Understanding Memory Systems 127 The Modal Model of Memory 128 Working Memory 131 Divisions of Long-Term Memory 134 Further Developments in Memory Systems Theory 142, Connectionist Models of Memory 147 Aging and Memory Disorders 149 Memory Traces and Memory Schemas 163 Case Study: When Memory Fails 164 Introduction 265 The Trace Theory 265, Schema-based Thearies af Memory 172 Scripts 182 Autobiographical Memory 183 Levels af Processing 187 Two Approaches to Memory Research 90 Imagery 201 Case Study: Time~Space Synesthesia and Number Forms 202, Memory and Imagery 203, Synesthesia and Eidetic Imagery 220 Mental Rotation 217 Egocentric Perspective Transformations 227 Controversy over the Nature of Mental Imagery 228 Cognitive Maps and Mental Models 229 Auditory Imagery 232 Concepts 239 Case Study: Grasping a New Concept 240 ‘The Classical Approach 240 Learning Complex Rules 244 Wittgenstein’s Analysis of Concepts 246 Rosch and Prototypicality 247 Embodied Cognition 251 Conceptual Modules 257 Language 263 Case Study: Reading in the “Olden Days’ 264 The Structure of Language 266 Transformational Grammar 268 viiContents 10 a1 13 ‘The Innateness Hypothesis 272 Communication and Comprehension 260 The Social Context of Language 285 Language, Cognition, and Culture 291 Problem-Solving 305 Case Study: Vaccinating in the Wake of Wakefield 506 Insight Problems and the Gestalt Theory of Thinking 307, Current Approaches to Insight Problems 315, Functional Fixedness and the Design of Tools 320 The Flexibility-Rigidity Dimension 321 Artificial Intelligence Approaches to Problem-Solving 324 Thinking Aloud as a Method for Studying Human Problem-Solving 329 Can Computer Programs Experience Insight? 330 Solving Problems in Science 331 Reasoning, Judgment, and Choice 339 Case Study: The (Inifamous Hockey Stick 340 Reasoning 342 Judgment and Choice 357 Ecological Rationality 366 ‘Training in Statistical Reasoning 368 Intelligence and Creativity 375 Case Study: A Child Prodigy 376 The Concept of inteligence: Historical Background 376 General inteligence (g) 379 The Flynn Effect 382 Sternberg’s Theory of Successful intelligence 385 Howard Gardner and the Theory of Multiple Intelligences 389 Expertise 393 Creativity 395 Consciousness 405 Case Study: Blindsight 406 Distinguishing among Different Levels of Consciousness 407 Unconscious Perception 409 Consciousness and the Grand Illusion 415, Meta-consciousness 419 Consciousness and the Brain 423 Deficits of Consciousness 429 Phantom Limbs and Consciousness 432 Glossary 438 References 450 Photo Credits 491 Index 492From the Publisher ‘hat do we know, and how do we know it? What is the relation between the mind and the brain? How does memory work? What is intelligence? How do we learn language, acquire concepts, and solve problems? These are just a few of the fundamental questions that frame the sixth edition of Cognition, the essential text for introductory courses in cognitive psychology. Building on the strengths of previous editions, the sixth edition maintains its clear, straightfor- ward style and continues to provide fascinating research examples; in addition, it offers a student-friendly reorganization of key material and a new chapter on consciousness. Accompanied by a robust suite of ancillaries, Cognition is a well-rounded, current, and comprehensive text that is both accessible to students and a pleasure to teach from. Cognition, sixth edition, retains all the hallmarks of previous editions: * broad, balanced treatment of major theories and controversies; * clear, focused writing that makes even the most difficult concepts accessible with- out oversimplifying; * historical perspectives on key issues and phenomena; and * abundant citations of both classic and current research from Canada and around the world.From the Publisher Highlights of the Sixth EditionFrom the Publisher xi Information Theory Engaging Pedagogy Themed boxes draw attention to important points and encourage students to reflect act ively on what they are learning.xii From the Publishereearias ‘Case Study Wrap-Up Im the Know: Review Questions Key Concepts Sueeceer Purther Reading Links to Other Chapters From the Publisher xiiixiv From the Publisher Supplements Cognition, sixth edition, is supported by an outstanding array of ancillary materials, all available on the companion website: www.oupcanada.com/Cognition6e For the Instructor © An instructor's manual includes comprehensive chapter overviews, topics for classroom discussion and debate, recommended readings, web links, media sugges- tions, homework assignments with sample answers, suggestions for research paper topics, and a sample syllabus. © A test generator offers a comprehensive set of multiple-choice, true/false, shart- answer, and fill-in-the blank questions classified according to skill level, with page references that indicate where to find relevant material in the text. © PowerPoint slides summatize key points from each chapter and incorporate figures, tables, and images from the textbook. © Animage bank provides access to all photos, figures, and tables found in the text, so that they may be incorporated into classroom materials. For the Student * A student study guide offers additional review questions linked to each chapter; selfgrading practice quizzes, including a practice mid-term exam and final exam- ination quia; an answer key for review questions and quizzes with page references to help students find the answers in the text; key terms and definitions; and study tips for mid-terms and final exams. Dashboard for Cognition Cognition, sixth edition, includes access to Dashboard, an online learning and assessment platform that delivers a simple, informative, and textbook-specific experience for instruc- tors and students. Dashboard includes tools to track student progress in an intuitive, web- based learning environment. It features a streamlined interface that connects students and instructors with the functions used most frequently, simplifying the learning experience to save time and put student progress first. DISCOVERY + Dashboard includes Discovery Lab, created by Carolyn Ensley, Department of Psychology, LAB Wilftid Laurier University, which offers a wide variety of interactive experiments, exercises,From the Publisher xv and animations—including five experiments nevr to this edition—designed to help students understand important concepts and principles. Discovery Lab brings cognition topics to life, allowing students to act as researchers and test subjects by giving them the ability to partic pate in experiments and to analyze and share results, Throughout the text, students will find icons that dizect them to visit Discovery Lab online, where they will find activities related to what they are learning about in the text. OXFORD Dyan els Se ero ad eee Welcome Adrian, tothe Dashboard 0 accompany Discovery Labs for Cognition, 6. rom ete you can accessyou" slabs go erect to assignments ans ‘quazes. and communicate with your instructor and your ‘Gasemates. Cle or touch oe ofthe burton aboveTo ‘2cces ect ks tthe ask you wish to perfor, A Final Word of Thanks We gratefully acknoviledge the contributions of the following individuals whose efforts and thoughtful review comments and suggestions have helped to shape this bookand its ancillaries: Kelly Arbeau, University of Alberta Robert Cassidy, Concordia University Gillian Dale, Brock University ‘Todd Ferretti, Wilfrid Laurier University Deanna Friesen, York University Sandra Hessels, Concordia University Dan Hufnagle, University of Calgary Karin Humphreys, McMaster University Jason Ivanoff, Simon Fraser University Patricia McMullen, Dalhousie University Harvey H.C. Marmurek, University of Guelph Jean Paul Minda, Western University Penny M. Pexman, University of Calgary Michael Picard, University of Victoria Catherine Plowright, University of Ottawa Gillian Rowe, University of TorontoList of Boxes CASE STUDIES Chapters Whatis Cognition? 4 Chapter ® Grasping a New Concept 240 Chapter2 Head Office 24 Chapter9 — Reading in the "Olden Days’ 264 ‘Chapter 3 An Unusual Perceptual Experience 52 Chapter10 Vaccinating in the Wake Chapter4 ATotal Wreck 88 of Wakefield 306 Chapters What Was That Movie...?. 126 Chapter 11 The [Infamous Hockey Stick 340 Chapteré When Memory Fails 164 Chapter a2 AChid Prodigy 375 Chapter7 — Time-Space Synesthesia and Chapter 33 Blindsight 406 Number Forms 202 CONSIDER THIS 2.2 William James (1842-1910) 12 2.2 ‘Mind Reading’ 38 3.2 Perceiving Causes in Object Movement 68 3:5 Gibson's Views on the Perception of Surfaces 76 Mental images and Real Pictures 225 The Downside of Categories 249 The Evolution of Language 276 Self-Control and Problem-Solving 323 Paradoxes, Reasoning, and Recursion 350 3.4 Identifying Objects by Common ‘CondhioratReazonig) 454 Movement 78 ‘An Ancient Parallel to Sternberg’s Theory 4.2 Are You Resistant to Dual-Task Hinnaligence sp Interference? 103 S.1 The Battle of the Species 130 43.5. Beyond Human Consciousness 424 43.5. Brain Imaging Reveals Consciousness in 5-4 Memory and the Internet 151 a Patient Diagnosed as Being in a Vegetative 6.4 implanting False Memories 182 State 434List of Boxes xvi THINK TWICE a Distracted Driving 10 8.5 Warm Hands, Warm Heart? 257 2.2. The Ethics of Brain Imaging 42 9.3 An Exercise in Writing 292 4.3 Do You Make Errors? 105 20.1 Can You Solve This Problem? 311 5.3 The Sense of Smell 139 aa.5 Assessing Your Own Reasoning Abilities 365 6.1 Do We Necessarily See What's in Front 32.3. Creative Thinking 399 of Our Eyes? 169 7. Can Anyone Become a Synesthete? 215 23.2 Can You Find Your Blind Spot? 418 23.4 Is Consciousness a Unitary Entity? 429 COGNITION IN ACTION 1.3 Cognitive Ethology 37 7.2 VideoGames and imagery 220 2.3 Thc Implicit Association Test 44 8.2 Do Experts Embody Information 3-1 The Moon Illusion 63 Differently? 252 aa DéaVe 98 9.2 Defictsin Reading 288 4.4 Eye Movements In Sports: The Quiet 9.4 Lovely Keys and Sturdy Bridges 298 fe 119 30.2 Problem-solving with Red Green! 315 5.2 Can Amnesiacs Lean? 137 34.3 Is There a Hot Hand in Basketball? 359 6.2 An Exceptional Memory 176 31.4 Whata Pain! 361 6.3 Context-Dependent Learning 180 32. Can Colour Help Us Solve 6.5 Sleep, Memory, and False Problems? 385 Memory 382 413.1 Backward Masking and the Brain 410 (oA Le Chapters 19 Chapteré 196 Chaptersa 371 Chapter2 46 Chapter7 254 Chaptera2 400 Chapters 83 Chapters 259 Chapter 13 435 Chapt aa Chapters 301 Chapt 158 Chapter 10 335,List of Figures a a2 13 1 15 16 17 25 2.6 27 2.20 as A“PreCog" from Minority Report 4 There is a lot of information in our world 6 Hyman's data showing mean reaction times for one subject 7 The flow of information to the brain takes time to occur & Dichotic listening 8 Broadbent's filter model 9 Waugh and Norman's model of information processing 11 Introspection vs experimental method 22 William James 22 Brown-Peterson classic result 15 J. Gibson (1904-79114 Darth Vader vs Luke Skywalker 14 Neisser’s perceptual cycle 15 Balconies on The Future, @ building in New York City 16 ‘Some examples of the range of cognitive psychology 17 Muhammad Ali, Ronald Reagan, and Margaret Thatcher 24 {21 Lithograph of Phineas Gage’s injury; (b} Tomography scan of Eduardo Leite’s injury 25 Gabrielle Giffords 25 Aphrenological chart 26 Ratin amaze 27 ANecker cube 29 Different brain sizes 31 Eyemovements 32 Traditional illustration of language comprehension and production 33 Split-brain operations 35 Event-related potentials: Differences in neural activity for remembered versus forgotten items 36 az 245 2.26 287 Ba 32 35 36 37 38 3.20 gat az Bas 334 Positron emission tomography (Per) 37 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (ma) 39 Magnetoencephalography (EG) an Magnetoencephalograph scanner ai Diffusion Tensor imaging (OT) a3 Lesions in left hemisphere of Gabrielle Gitfords brain 47 The basic anatomy of the eye 55 The ventral whet’) and dorsat Cwrnere’) pathways involved in visuat processing 55 The Hoffding function 56 A tractor made from two geans cylinder and rectangle} for an annual fall fairnear Fergus, Ontario 58 Objects with different degrees of complexity represented by a varying number of geons 59 Prototypical patterns 60 Aset of distortions of a prototype 61 The real white circies) and perceived (green circles) distance and size of the moon according to the apparent- distance theory 63 Do you see a face, orjust a bunch of fruit, vegetables, and flowers? 64 The principles of similarity (a) and proximity (b) 64 The principles of symmetry (a) and parallelism (0) 65 The stimuli used by Peterson and Gibson (1993) 66 Does this dress look white and gol, orblue and black? 67 Do the two dresses in this comic look different? 683.a7 3.20 Bat 3.22 3.23 324 3.26 3.27 aa 43 44 A sequence of computer displays showing a bar moving from left to right and then hitting a circle of balls, which disperse 69 Judgment of the orientation of a slot simulated close to the body (Panel A) and the orientation of a card as itis moved towards the siot (Panel 8) 70 Changes in grip aperture over time as patient VK and two control participants reached to take hold of anobject 71 Brick walkway, Distillery District, Toronto 73 Topological breakage at the intersection of two converging textures. 74 ‘The irregular (left) and regular (right) textures used by Gibson (1950) 74 Photo taken from the side window of, a car travelling ona highway 75 Light is reflected differently from rough and smooth surfaces 76 ‘The circles that participants in the study by Witt and Proffitt (2005) had to choose from when judging actual baseball size 77 The relation between players perceptions of softball size (y-axis) and their batting averages 77 ‘The principle of common movement 79 Participants were shown two dises moving towards each other and crossing paths. 81 Data from Yamamoto and Kitizawa (2001) 82 After the Ottawa bus-train collision 88 The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex 92 ‘The sequence of displays in the peripheral cueing paradigm (Panel A)and the pattern of response time data (Panel 8) 94 [An example of the displays typically ‘employed in the central cueing as 46 ar 48 a9 410 aaa 432 433 414 435 4.36 4a7 4.38 ass List of Figures xix paradigm, showing the target, appearing inthe cued (valid location (Panel A) and the pattem of response time data for cued and uncued trials as a function of cue-target SOA (Panel B) 96 Asymmettical crosses and inattentional blindness 97 Example of a flanker task 97 Alatent bottleneck 302 ‘The dual task impairs brake reaction time for most people, but not for supertaskers 103 ‘An example of a sequence of displays in the sustained attention to response task (SART) 104 ‘An action stip: putting a plastic coffee lid ona porcelain mug 105 An example of a sequence of displays and the results of an attentional blink study reported by Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005) 106 Performance ina vigllance task over four segments af a twa-hour watch period 112 A modern eye-tracking system ‘An example of eye movement behaviour when reading an extended passage 113 ‘Asample of saccades from Figure 4.24 with direction of motion identitied by arrows 114, Recorded eye movements (b) white viewing a photograph of a face (a cover a three-minute period 136 A scene from the Distillery District, Toronto (a), and the eye fixations (black dots) ofa participant (b) asked to view the image and describe the people 117 The eye fixations of an individual asked to view the image in order to later describe the location of the scene 118 ua ‘The scan paths and fixations of good and poor putters 120 Drew Barrymore (Lucy Whitmore) and Adam Sandler (Henry Roth] ing First Dates. 126List of Figures 56 87 5.8 5.45 5.16 5.7 5.18 5.19 5.20 s.2a 6a 62 6s 64 Some of the many memory systems that memory researchers investigate 228 Participants in Sperling's (1960) sensory memory experiment were briefly flashed a matrix of nine letters 129 Typical results from Sperling's experiment 129, ‘Tesuro Matsuzaws and Ayuma, one of the participants in this intriguing sensory memory experiment 130 Working memory model 133 ‘The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 154 Percentage of personal memories fordifferent time periods 136 Henry Gustav Molaison (HM 1926-2008) 137 Ahippocampus looks like a sea horse 137 Patient KC/NN 138 Fame judgment task (full versus divided attention) 140 Inclusion versus exclusion task (full, versus divided attention) 140 Meyer, Schvaneveldt, and Ruddy’s priming procedure 145, Fragment of a semantic network 146 ‘Some properties of gang members 148 Aconnectionist model of the information in Figure 516 149 Google search engine 51, Young and old meeting 52 Korsakaft’s syndrome, or Wemnicke- Korsakaff encephalopathy 153 355, Jennifer Thompson and Ronald Cotton 164 The mystic writing pad 165 Brown and Kulik’s model of flashbulb memories 167 Flashibulb memories: The Challenger explosion 168 Alzheimer's disease 65 69 6.10 6a 6.32 6.33 7a ce 7 78 7s 76 a 79 7.40 yan 7az 7s Flashbulb memories: Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, New York City 370 Properties of flashibulb memories 172 Professor A.C. Aitken 176 Results of Loftus and Palmer's experiment 177 One-week follow-up of Loftus and Palmer's experiment 177 Percentage of autobiographical memories in different decades 185 Depth of processing 188. Ebbinghaus's forgetting curve 291 ‘The rate at which knowledge of Spanish is lost 193 ‘An example of a time space 202 An example ofa number form 202 Paivio's dual-coding theory 203, Recall performance of the four groups in Paivio's (1965) study 205 The results of an experiment on synesthesia: congruent and incongruent number-colour matching and memory 211 ‘The effects of hypnotically induced synesthesia 213, The sequence of displays in the study reported by Cui et al. (2007) and the relationships between colour word identification and vividness of imagery 217 Which pairs are drawing the same object? 218 Time taken to mentally rotate an object as a function of angular rotation 239 ‘The map of the island used ina mental image scanning experiment 222 Results from the mental image scanning experiment of Kossiyn etal. 221 ‘The museum floor plan used in the 2004 experiment of Rinck and Denis 222 Grid used in the Podgorny and Shepard experiment 22293 o4 95 20 92 The pattern of squares used in Farah’s experiment 223 The duck/rabbit and chef/dog stimuli 224 Viewpoint 225 The picture plane Areversible figure 227 Is this the relationship between the sun and an observer at dawn and at noon? 231 Brain areas active during auditory imagery 233 Steve Jobs 240 ‘The Bruner cards 242, A finite state grammar Capoeira 252 Biological concepts ane the brain: results from the Farah & Rabinowitz (2003) experiment involving a brain- damaged individual 259 A page from McGuffey’s Second Eclectic Reader 264 Reading Lesson IV from McGuttey’s Second Eclectic Reader 264 Alesson on intonation from McGufey's Sixth Eclectic: Reader 265 Native speakers of Chamicuro Widely spoken languages of the world 267 A tree diagram of the relationship between two elements experienced wihile listening to music 268 Afinite state grammar 269 Derivation of a sentence using a tree diagram 270 ‘The relationship of the proportion of complex sentences in teacher speech to comprehension scores 279 The comprehension task 279 Speech disfluencies of lecturers in the natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences 284 226 244 266 A simple model of word reading 289, 9.44 9.35 9.16 10.4 10.2 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.10 ao.aa 10.13 10.34 aaa a2 a3 List of Figures xxi Agrapheme-phoneme conversion path to reading 289 Adual route model of word reading 289 The man is at the chair's back 299 ‘The relationship between language and space 300 Andrew Wakefield 306 Abi-stable figure 307 Sultan performing a problem-solving task 309 The altar window problem 309 Find the area of the square plus the strip 310 The nine-dot problem 312 Maier's two-string problem 323 Feeling-of-warmth ratings as a function of time spent solving the problem 314 RedGreen 315, Insight with and without sleep: results of an experiment by Wagner etal. 319 Effect of pre-utilization on functional fixedness as a function of age 320 Aportion of the Go-Moku playing surface 326 ‘Amaze in which you must get from ‘the start (S) to the goal (G) 327 Solution for the three-ring version of the Tower of Hanoi problem 328 Northern hemisphere temperatures (°C) from 1400 to 2995 as reconstructed by Mann et al Participants’ judgments of the quality of neuroscientific findings as 2 function of (a) whether the results ‘were interpreted to imply that the death penalty is or is not a deterrent to crime and (b) participants’ own views regarding the death penalty (for or against) 341, Differences in acceptance rates for four different types of syllogism 345 340List of Figures 1.4 ans 126 a7 aaa 42.2 323 12.4 325 126 33.2 33.2. ass 33.4 33.6 Moment-to-moment judgments of pain from two patients undergoing colonoscopy 361 Relationship between the height of parents and their children 364 The three-question CRT 365, Problem space for the Keren cain problem 368 kim Ung-Yong 376 ‘Spearman's two-factor theory of intelligence 378 Items similar to those on the Raven Progressive Matrices test 380 388 391 Anierarchy of responses toa brick 397 Prefrontal leucotomy 408 Assembly-line worker U-shaped development ‘The brain mechanisms involved in backward masking when a mask is presented 40 ms after the onset of an initial stimulus 412 ‘An original image arid ¢ slightly allered version of it 415 How objects would have to vary in size in order to be equally discernible for an observer who is focusing on the dot in the centre 437 ‘A demonstration of the blind spot 418 Changes in electrical potentials over time associated with eye movements, 13.10 a3.at a3.a2 33.43 33.44 33.45 (£06) and muscle movements (EMG) from an individual who is (from top) awake with eyes closed (WEC): in astate of lucid drearning, and in non-lucid rapid eye movement sleep (REM) 422 AA stimulus presentation demonstrating binocular rivalry 424 Changes in brain activation as measured by IMR| in the fusiform face area (FFA| and the parahippocampal place area (PPA) during binocular rivalry of superimposed images of a face andahouse 425 Two different scenarios of flash suppession (left side versus right side) 426 Each coloured dot represents a study showing activation associated with changes in conscious experience 428 A clock and a house drawn by an individual with visual hemi- neglect 430 Ascraper against the sky 431 The Penfield homunculus 432 The phantom limb mirror box 433 Brain imaging results demonstrated similar activity patterns between Sharleen and conscious controls when instructed to imagine walking around the house or playing tennis 434List of Tables ana ana 32a a3.a Different levels of concept of objects 250 Four forms of sylogistic reasoning 342 Relationship between a symptom and a disease in a sample of 100 cases 362 Example of Binet and Simon's items 378 ‘The relationship between memory systems and consciousness 407Preface to the Sixth Edition ith this sixth edition of Cognition we believe we have written a textbook that will W please students and instructors alike. In zesponse to feedback from the community, we have introduced a new chapter on consciousness and made significant changes to both the structure and the presentation of the memary chapters. In addition, after combing the text for outdated or non-essential material, we have incorporated a number of recent stud ies that will bring readers up to speed on the latest developments in the study of human cognition, Acknowledgements We are supremely grateful to Oxford University Press in general, and to our developmental editor, Tamara Capar, and editor, Sally Livingston, in particular. We would also like to thank. the reviewers whose thoughtful comments and suggestions helped to shape this edition Finally, and most importantly, we thank our wives, Cindy Sinnett, Shelley Smilek, and Erica Levy, for their incredible support and encouragement. Without their efforts, this book would not have been possible, and without their patience, we mightall now be single. We dedicate this book to them and to our children. Scott Sinnett, Daniel Smilek, and Alan Kingstone January 2016COGNITIONCase Study: What ls Cognition? 4 Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing 5 Information Theory 6 Mo 4s uf Information Processing 9 Ecological Validity 13 Metacognition and Cognitive Psychology 15, Range of Cognitive Psychology 17 To identify the concepts associated v beginning with information processing vith the fi ‘of cognition, fo outline the essentials of information theory. To dis tinguish among different mode processing approach to cognition. s of the information To explain the advant processing approach s and limitations of the information To review experimental evidence for the information-processing approach. To identity different research methods in cognitive psychology.CASE STUDY What Is Cognition? The year is 2054, and you are sleeping peacefully when suddenly, out of nowhere, Captein John Anderton and three associate members of the ‘“PreCrime’ police force cresh through your skylight, yank you out of your bed, put you in handcuffs, and place you under arrest. Why? A small group of “PreCogs'—mutated individuals with pre-cognitive abilities working for the PreCrime Unit have looked into the future and witnessed you committing a horrfie murder later that morning. For the past six years, the PreCogs’ visions have allowed the PreCrime Unit to artest “killers” before they have had the chance to kill. And directly as a result of these PreCog visions, depicted in the futuristic movie thriller Minority Repor: the city of Washington, DC. has been freedom to choose what they do, or are they fated to carry out certain actions? With respect to cognition, the scenario also raises the question of whether any one person's perception—whether a PreCog's vision of the future or an ordinary human's perception of the present ‘or memory of the past—can be accepted as an accurate and truthful (ie, veridicall reflection of the world But we are getting ahead of ourselves. First we should consider why the mutant visionaries are called “PreCogs. Well, pre obviously means “before” or ‘prior to” And cog is short for “cognitive,” the adjective formed from the noun cognition—a word that, as we shall see, has an extraordinarily rich and wonderfully complex set of meanings. homicide-free for six years. Even though it has no basis in re- ality. the Minority Report scenatio raises 2 number of tundamental questions, including the classic phil- osophical question of free will vs determinism: da people have the Asa starting point, let's look at the way the word cognition is understood in everyday life. Although sci- entific psychology usually seeks torefine the’common- sense” assumptions of folk psychology, a quick look at the concepts typically associated with cognition may give us an idea of the range of topics that cogni- tive psychology might cover. {ole psychology an umbrella term for vorlous assumptions ana tnearies bosed on the everyday behaviour of ourselves and others FIGURE. | A*PreCog’ from Minority Report[Introduction 5 For example, The New Oxford American Dictionary underscores a key point: that cognition is the mental defines cognition as “the mental action or process of action of knowing. How we come to know is the do- acquiring knowledge and understanding through main of cognition and the focus of this textbook. thought, experience, and the senses.” This definition Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing The study of human cognition has advanced in three stages (Van Kleeck & Kosslyn, 1993). ‘The first stage, from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, was one of rapid progression pro- pelled by the methods of traditional psychophysics (the scientific investigation ofthe rela- tionship between sensation and stimulus) and experimental psychology. The second stage, under way by the mid-1970s, was fuelled by computational analysis and marked the arrival of cognitive science. The third phase, which began in the mid-1980s, has incorporated evi- dence from neuropsychology and animal neurophysiology, and most recently an ever- increasing array of imaging techniques that allow us to observe the brain in action, Foundational to all of cognitive psychology is the idea that the world contains informa- tion that is available for humans to process, The importance of this idea cannot be overstated. Cognitive psychology sees humans not as passive receivers and transformers of signal information, but as active selectors of information from the environment. Only some of the information is selected for processing because our nervous systems are able to handle only so ‘much information atany one time, and only some of the information is responded to because our head, eyes, hands, feet, etc, cannot be in two places at the same time. Because informa- sion theory plays a central role in cognitive psychology, it’s essential to have a firm grounding init. Well begin with an introduction to the basic concept and the classic models. ‘The amount of information provided by a given event can be quantified in terms of bits (short for “binary digits”), Imagine a situation in which one of two equally likely events is about to occur: coin toss, for instance, You are uncertain of the outcome until the coin falls, but when it does it gives you one bit of information: either heads or tails. Every time the number of equally likely outcomes doubles, the number of information bits you receive increases by one. A common illustration of this process is the old guessing game in which I think ofa number and you try to guess it by asking me questions (Garner, 1962, p. 5). The umber of information bits in play corresponds to the number of questions you need to ask. Your best strategy is to redce the number of possibilities by half with each question. For example, ifthe number I'm thinking of is between 1 and 8, you need to ask at most three questions. First, ask it's above 4. Ifthe answeris “yes, then askif t's above 6. Ifthe answer is “yes” again, then ask if its above 7. Ifthe answer is “yes? then the number is 8; if t's “no,” then the number is 7. Every day we take in and act on information in countless ways. As we drive down the street we take in information about location, direction, the traffic, the weather, the people on the sidewalk. When we're learning a new computer system we try to under- stand and remember the procedures and commands that welll need to use later. And stimulus An entity inthe external vironment that con be (ceved by an observer oe bit Shor for binary digit the most basic unit of information. Every event that occu in situation with to equally thely outcomes provides one “bit of informationCognition every time we count our change we rely on our knowledge of how to add and subtract. To many people, these everyday activities—attending, comprehending, remembering, manipulating numerical information—fall under the general heading of “thinking” To psychologists, they are aspects of information processing—the subject matter of cogni tive psychology. Information Theory Basic to the concept of information processing is the idea that information reduces uncer- tainty in the mind of the receiver. The amount of information provided by a given message is proportional to the probability that that particular message will occur. If you greet a friend with the query “How are you?” and receive the reply “Absolutely awful—T must have picked up a flu bug” rather than a standard “Fine, thanks? the former reply is much more informative than the latter because itis much less probable. The idea underlying information- processing theory is that the information provided by a particular message is not deter ‘mined solely by its content, but rather by the whole array of possible messages of which this FIGURE 2.2 | There is a lot of information in our world1| Introduction 7 particular message is just one. To put it more succinctly, the amount of information a mes- sage conveys is an increasing function of the namber of possible messages from which that particular message could have been selected. In other words, information theory posits that the information provided by a particular message is inversely related to the probabil- ity of its occurrence: the less likely itis, the more information it conveys. Limitations on Information Processing The classic experiments by Hick (1952) and Hyman (1953; illustrated in Figure 1.3) demon- strate thatittakes time to translate a visual signal tocither a key-press ora verbal response. ‘The amount of time it takes for information to flow through the nervous system is one limitation on information-processing capacity (see Figure 1.4), but the amount of visual information that a person can process at any one time has limits as well. The more informa- tion a visual signal conveys, the longer it takes for the viewer to make an appropriate response, Thus, in addition to a time limitation, the nervous system has a capacity limita- tion for the amount of information that it can handle within a fixed period of time. Experimental paradigms using simultaneous auditory messages suggest a similar con- clusion. In an early experiment, Webster and Thompson (1953) had airport control-tower op- erators listen to recorded voice transmissions simulating messages from pilots. pilotto-tower communication consisted of the aircraft’ call signal and a sequence of three unrelated words. For example, typical message might be “Tower, this is BA 427, Pencil, Beard, Camera, over” or “Tower, this is WW 618, Rage, Wire, Coffee, over.” The call signals (BA 427, WW 618) were drawn from a sct of 10 possible signals, whercas the word messages (.g., “Pencil, Beard, Cam- era’ were drawn from a set of 1152 possibilities. Clearly, the amount of information (in a technical sense) conveyed by each call signal was much less than that contributed by each word message because the traffic controllers had a fairly good idea of what the call signal would be, but almost no idea of what the word message would be. Although they were able to identify the cal signals from two airplanes arriving simultaneously, they could not identify more than one of two simultaneous word messages (Figure 1.5). 700 600 500 400 ‘Mean reaction time (ms] 0” i 2 3 4 Average stimulus uncertainty FIGURE «.5 | Hyman’s data showing mean reaction times for one subject, Hyman used small lights as stinul, and subjects gave vocal responses. The three experiments varied stimulus uncertainty by using [a) cifferent numbers of stimuli, (b) different stimulus frequencies, and {c) different stimulus sequences. Copyright 81953 by the American Psychological Asseciaion Adapted with permission Hyman, Ray Stimulus injormation 25 a determinant of reaction time. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 5: 185-96, 1955 Use of [APA information dees no imply endorsement by APA. information theory The neon) thane information provided by 3 sarselarevetie merely elated t the probaity ofCognition FIGURE 2.4 | The flow of information to the brain takes time to occur Based on: research yale edulysm/images/77 alarticies-synesthesia-brainjpg, FIGURE 1.5 | Dichotic listening In dichotic listening, asin the instance of an air traffic controller, two different messages are received simultaneously Based on’ htttipentautrgs briecu/teeiab/2/aechove jog1| Introduction 9 ‘This finding suggests that there are limits to the nervous system's capacity for infor- mation processing, When two messages arrive simultaneously, the amount of interfer- ence between them depends on the amount of information they convey. The limit is, as Broadbent (1957) would say, one of information rather than stimulation. For example, Hyman showed that people respond faster to an expected stimulus than to one that is unexpected. Models of Information Processing Cognitive psychologists have suggested several models ofthe relationships between differ- ent cognitive processes. We will consider two classic models here. Broadbent’s Filter Model Studies of human attention have focused on the limitations of the capacity to process infor- mation and the selective processes that are used to deal with those limitations. How much control do we have over which information we select and which we reject? What are the costs and the benefits of expecting one particular type of information rather than another? The first complete theory of attention was Broadbent's (1958) filter model (Figure 1.6) The idea behind it—that information processing is restricted by channel capacity—was originally suggested by Shannon (1948) and Shannon and Weaver (1949). Broadbent (1958) argues convincingly that the whole nervous system can be regarded. asa single channel with limits to the rate at which it can transmit stimulus information. Overloading of this limited capacity channel is prevented by a selective device or filtes, which allows only some of the available incoming information to enter the system. Preced- ing the filter isa capacity-free sensory buffer or temporary store. ‘When two or more signals or messages occur at one time, they enter the sensory buffer together. The buffer then extracts such simple stimulus characteristics as colour (vision), voice (hearing), or spatial location. The filter operates by selecting messages that share some basic physical characteristic (¢g,, location in space) and passing them along to the limited capacity system that is responsible for the analysis of “higher-order” stimulus attri- butes, such as form and meaning. Meanwhile, any messages that were not selected are held, in parallel (i, simultaneously), in the sensory buffer, where they are subject to decay with the passage of time. — FILTER Input channels Selection an the ‘basis of physical characteristics only FIGURE 2.6 | Broadbent's filter model filter model Atneory based on the ‘des that information processing resvicted by ‘channel capacity ‘channel capacity The macimar amount ofinformation thatcan be transmittes by an information processing ‘sevice.10 Cognition This filter theary represented a strong account of the data on attention that were avail- able at the time (cf. Broadbent, 1956; Cherry, 1953; Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953; Webster & ‘Thompson, 1953, 1954). A classic example comes from Broadbent (1954), who asked his participants to listen to three pairs of digits. One member of each pair arrived at one ear at the same time that the other member of the pair arrived at the other ear. For instance, if the sequence was “73~42-15” the participant would hear “7, 4, 1” in the left ear, and simultaneously “3, 2, 5° in the right ear. The pairs were separated by a half-second inter- val, and the participants were asked to recall the digits in whatever order they wished. ‘They were able to recall 65 per cent of the lists correctly, and in almost every case the correct responses followed the same pattern: participants would recall all the digits presented to one ear, followed by all the digits presented to the other ear (e.g., “741-325” or “325-741"). Ina second condition, participants were asked to recall the items in the sequence in which they were presented. Since the participants were hearing two Distracted Driving ‘Are you a good driver? Can you manoeuvre your vehicle through traffic while drinking a coffee and listening to the radio? We suspect that most of you would say "yes" (many people overestimate their driving skills). Are you also aware that many jurisdictions have recently made itilegal to use @ cell phone while driving? Do you think such legislation is needed? Before you answer, let's consider another question. Is it safe to drive with a blindfold over your eyes? Every time You take your eyes off the road, whatever the reason, you are essentially putting a blindfold on. That's why texting while driving is so dangerous. You might think that just talking on your phone would be no problem, since you can still keep your eyes on the road, but you would be wrong. Obviously, reading a text requires you to physi- ccally move your eyes away from the road to look at the screen; this is an overt attention shift, But the same thing happens whena conversation directs your attention away from the road, even if your eyes don't move. The only dif ference is that this attention shift is covert (we will dis- cuss the distinction between overt and covert attention in more detail in Chapter 4}, The truth is that any distraction ‘can compromise your ability to use the information that your eyes take in: you might look but fil to see To demonstrate this, Strayer, Drews, and Johnston (2003) placed participants in a driving simulator and asked them to complete a driving course, keeping pace with the traffic, staying in their own lanes, and braking for obstacles. What they found was that conversing on 2 cell phone led to significantly poorer driving perfor- mance. Amazingly, it made no difference if the phone was hands-free (Strayer & Johnston, 2003}! In a subse- ‘quent experiment the sme authors (2003) used an eye tracker to register where the eyes were looking and for how long. It showed that drivers who were engaged in 2 cell phone conversation were roughly half as likely as the phone-less control group to remember details from the course (eg, billboards), even though their eyes had rested on those details for the same length of time, In the past 10 years, literally hundreds of studies have followed up on this foundational work. For two sobering examples see Strayer et al [2023, 20141, who report on, among other things, the profound detri- mental effects not only of texting but even of using a Siri-like speech-to-text system while driving. In short using a cell phone while driving can be deadly even if you never take your eyes off the road, because it can affect what you see.1 [Introduction 42. the same time, one in cach ear, they were allowed to report either member of the pair first, but were required to report both digits before continuing through the sequence (eg, either “73~42-15" or “37-24~51"). In this condition participants were able to report only 20 per cent of the lists correctly. Broadbent interpreted this difference in recall performance to mean that the ears function as separate channels for information input. The different physical locations for the two mes- sages are initially entered and preserved in the short-term sensory buffer. Selective attention, represented by the filter, operates to determine which channel is recalled first. Switching atten- tion between ears requites time. Performance s poorer for recall by presentation arder because more attentional switching is required. Meanwhile, as attention is switching between locations (ears), the information in the sensory buffer continues to decay, and thus becomes less and less available with the passage of time. In the first condition, where participants recalled all the items from one ear and then all the items from the other ear, only one switch of attention was required—from one input location to the other, In the second condition, where participants had torecalltheitemsin the order of presentation, atleast three switches ofattention were required — for example, from left to right, from right to left, and once more from left to right. Waugh and Norman’s Model of Information Processing Figure 1.7 comes from an carly but still important paper by Waugh and Norman (196s). The flow of information is indicated by the arrows. Upon being stimulated, we may have an experience called a primary memory, a concept derived from the highly influential Amer- ican psychologist William James (1890/1983). This is noteworthy because the approach that James relied on for many of his major insights and hypotheses was one that few if any cognitive psychologists today would use: introspection (see Box 1.2). Primary memory consists of the “immediately present moment" (James, 1890/1983, p. 608), and is thus also known as “immediate memory.’ The arrow labelled “rehearsal” refers to the fact that pri- may memories tend to be quickly forgotten unless they are repeated, as you might repeat a telephone number to yourself after looking it up. Whereas primary memory belongs to the present, secondary memory belongs to the past. Stimulus Rehearsal Secondary memory Forgotten FIGURE 1.7 | Waugh and Norman's model of information processing Copyright © 3965 by te Amencan Prychologien Association Adapted with permission. Waugh. fC. & Norman A, (96s, Primary memory. Psychological Review, 72. pp. 89-104, Use of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA introspection Leokinginware” to cserve one's own thoughts and feelings. primary memory Wat we are aware ofn the “immediately present ernory” oF “short-term memory” secondary memory rowed acauired at an tater time that is stored indefinitely, and is absent from awareness: also calles Tong-term memory"12 Cognition (ita Mees Waugh and Norman (1965) noted that James's distinction between primary and Subjective Objective ¢ secondary memory was based on intro- Individual houghts/ Group data iy ‘neniory wes based on ints perspectives averaged specie erie, Sanh evideace UF Non-statistical Statistical ee ° cog © psychology. However, the subjective re- SRR ineospacanve ports of participants are often used in expetinental method conjunction with more objective evidence such as that provided by well-designed eam experiments (Jack & Shallice, 2001; see Figure 1.8). Experimental evidence for the Brown-Peterson task _primary-secondary memory distinction came from analysis of the Brown—Peterson Anexperimentaiporaom task (J. Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959)—one of the most widely used experi- Ambien sustecs are mental tasks in memory research. In the typical Brown-Peterson experiment, partici- (guna set of ems and ienarumoe Subects pants are given a set of items to remember (eg, the letters B, QR), and then a number immediate bean from which they immediately begin counting backward by threes. Thus a participant counting backward by ; aoe as . coun beware” given the number “107” would start counting ("104, 101, 98, ...” and so on) and after a and, after a specific specific interval (say, 6, 9, 12, 15, or 18 seconds), would be asked to recall the specified fiscoeaiieny items (in this case, the letters B, Q, R). Because the interval is filled with the counting exercise, the participant is presumably prevented from rehearsing the letters and there- fore unable to retain them in his or her primary memory. An unfilled interval, by con- trast, would allow the participant to rehearse the items and keep them in primary DISCOVERY J memory. Waugh and Norman's analysis showed that participants’ ability to recall letters LAB declined as the number of interfering items increased (Figure 1.10). William James (1842-1910) Students of literature might know of William James as your recollection of earliest infancy?}; intraduced the older brother (by a year) of Henry James, the _ the idea of “the stream of consciousness", pointed out famous American realist novelist of manners and the importance of personal psychology, yet today William is widely rec- habit in human life ognized as one of the most eminent psychologists the and warned against world has known. Born in New York to a wealthy family the “psychologist’s with liberal ideals and wide interests, James studied fallacy” whereby re- medicine at Harvard, where he later taught. His searchers too often two-volume, 1200-page masterwork, The Principles allow their own per- of Psychology (1890), exemplifies James's holistic sonal experience and thinking, embracing not only psychology, physiology. views to intrude on and philosophy, but @ wealth of personal observation, their rational under- introspection, and opinion. For example, James de- standing of the phe- scribed the infant's perception of the observed world nomena they are “as one great blooming, buzzing confusion’ (is that analyzing FIGURE 2.9 | William James1 08 06 04 Proportion correct 02 o 4 8 12 6 20 Distractor duration (seconds) FIGURE 2.20 | Brown-Peterson classic result Copyright © 3959 bythe American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Peterson, LR, & Peterson, M3, 1959), Short-term retention of individual verbal tems. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58. 295-8 Ure. APA information does nat imply endorsement Waugh and Norman (196s) pointed out that primary memory makes it possible for us to immediately and accurately recall our most recent experiences. Por example, we are able “to recall verbatim the most recent few words in a sentence [we are] hearing or speaking” (p. 102), provided that no distraction intervenes. Although we take primary. memory for granted, itis extremely important to us. Ecological Validity In standard information-processing models such as Broadbent's or Waugh and Norman's, a lot of interest is focused on the processing required to make a stimulus meaningful. How- cever, such models may not say very much about the information available in the stimulus itself. Other psychologists, such as |. Gibson (1904-79) (Figure 1.11), took more interest in the richness of the information provided by the environment in which people find them- selves. Gibson (1950, 1966) argued that the stimuli used by information-processing psy- chologists in their experiments were often impoverished in comparison with the information available in the real world. He argued for the development of an ecological approach to perception that would describe environmental stimulation at the appropriate level. Gibson believed that the meaning of objects and events can be perceived through ‘what he called their affordances, which he defined as ‘simply what things furnish, for good cor ill” (2966, p. 285): thus food affords the possibility of eating, stairs afford the possibility of climbing, ice affords the possibility of skating, and so on. Of course, knowledge of those affordances is not innate: we have to learn what can (and can') be done with items in the ‘world, Thus Gibson’s theory is one of information pickup, in which learning means becom ing progressively more attuned to what the environment affords us. By contrast, Neisser (1976, p. 21) proposed a cyclical model of cognition in which the perceiver possesses a schema that represents what he or she expects to find in the en- vironment and that directs his or her exploration of it. In the course of that exploration, [Introduction 43 ecological approach Atom of psychological inquiry that reflects ‘eonditionsin the real wort affordances The potential functions or uses of stem (1a, objects and events) inthe real wort information pickup The process whereby we perceive information ‘iecty schema An expectatin concerning wat we ae ely 19 find as we explore the word [plural schemas or schemata14 Cognition however, the perceiver encounters not only the expected information but also some that is unexpected (Figure 1.12). This unexpected information is capable of modifying the schema so as to increase the accuracy with which it represents the environment. Thus the perceptual cycle (Figure 1.13) begins with a schema that brings the perceiver into contact with new information that he or she can use to correct the schema, and so on. To see how this perceptual cycle might work, consider Figures 1.142 and 1.14. Halper (1997) noticed a building in Manhattan with balconies that ap- peared to tilt upward. Obviously, it would be absurd to build balconies like that, so what was going on? In terms of the perceptual cycle, we might describe the process as follows, Our schema is our cognitive model of the environment, constructed over time through our interactions with that environment. Our schema provides us with a set of general expectations and assumptions re garding what we are likely to find in the environment, although we need not be aware of them. One of our expectations is that balconies will be either square or rectangular (j.e,, bounded by right angles). We automatically im- pose this expectation on the buildings in Figures 1.14a and 1.14b. Asa conse quence we perceive the balconies of the building in the foreground to be FIGURE 4.21 | J.J. Gibson (a904-79) tilting upward, as they would have to be if they were rectangular. When we Gibson's theory of visual perception explore this building from a different angle, our expectations may even lead Sree tatvecc mosey teenies Us to perceive the balconies as tilting downward, as in Figure 1.14c. Ifwe con sccountsol the way perception and tinue to explore the situation, however, we can come to understand it. In fact, atternion function eg. Broaaoents “the balconies are parallelograms vertically perpendicular to the face of fMertheory, the building” (Halper, 1997, p. 1322), as can be seen in Figure 1.14d. Now perceptual cycle “The process whereby our schemas guige our exploration of FIGURE 1.22 | Darth Vader vs Luke Skywalker Unexpected events force us to adjust our expectations of the environment. As expectations change, we must change our schemas, Here’s one small example: Darth Vader never said “Luke, |am your father’ [pethaas the most famous line associated with the Star Wars series). What he actually said was "No, | am your father." Time for a schema adjustment1 | Introduction 15 Object available information Modifies Samples Schema Exploration Directs FIGURE 1.23 | Neisser's perceptual cycle Based on: huwi org/images/imageaos.i our schema for buildings has been modified to include the possibility that some balconies will be built at angles that are other than right. In general, the perceptual cycle allows us to become increasingly sophisticated in our dealings with the environment. The relative virtues of laboratory-based and ecological approaches to cognitive re- search have been hotly debated (eg, Anderson & Bushman, 1997; Chayter & Schmitter Edgecomb, 2003; Loftus, 1991; Neisser, 1978; Schmuckler, 2001; Kingstone, Smilek, Ristic, Friesen, & Eastwood, 2003). Kingstone, Smilek, and Eastwood (2008) have recently outlined —_—__- an approach that may resolve this dispute. Cognitive ethology (see Box 13) offers concrete cognitive ethology and specific suggestions for carrying out studies in the real world in a way that will com- Anew reseach approach plement laboratory-based research. loath: toooratory- based studies, Metacognition and Cognitive Psychology vunmctnns tut eogrihe proces Metacognition is the term for knowledge about knowledge—that is, knowledge about the __ work understanding of our way that cognitive processes work. The study of cognitive psychology can be seen asa pro. °"”“20"t¥= processes cess of developing our metacognition (Rebok, 1987). We all begin in pretty much the same place, with a common-sense understanding of cognition, and our goal in studying cogni- ‘ive psychology is to develop this understanding further. Sometimes that means changing our beliefs about how cognition takes place, or giving them up altogether. Often it means accepting some uncertainty regarding what we can assert about cognition at a particular point. Cognitive psychology is nota complete body of knowledge, butan actively developing16 Cognition FIGURE 1.24 | Balconies on The Future, a building in New York City area of inquiry (ee Figure 1.15), What it offers is not so much a set of definitive answers as a series of hypotheses about the way the mind works. The next chapter will review some of the better-known approaches tothe field. ‘The biggest challenge for beginners in cognitive psychology may be to get over the feeling that thinking about thinking is an impossibly abstract skill. In fact, you probably already have a pretty elaborate way of thinking about thinking. As you work through this book, try to relate the concepts and hypotheses you encounter to the ones you already have. Of course, this means that you will need to work out what you think at this point. You may discover that some of your own ideas offer interesting alternatives to the theories that cog- nitive psychologists have already developed. When that happens, you are becoming a cog- nitive psychologist yourself. Try to think of ways of testing your hypotheses. As many1| Introduction 47 Cece ta Research into human cognition, like research in general. often begins when cognitive researchers notice some- thing interesting in the world, They then design and run lab-based experiments that control for everything except the factor or variable in question. When all the experiments have been done, they conclude that they have a funda- ‘mental explanation of the mental process that causes the real-world phenomenon they wanted to understand. A new research approach, called cognitive ethol- ay, recognizes that this standard research approach operates on the flawed assumption that cognitive pro- cesses, like off-the-shelf tools, always do the same job regardless of the situation (Kingstone, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2008}, This is patently untrue. By the mid- 3970s it had become very clear that most statements about cognition were true only if particular laboratory conditions were met; when those conditions were not met, the relationships between factors became unpre~ dictable. “If A then B" in the lab does not necessarily mean “If A then B" in the world. So, for example, memory experiments found that what research subjects remembered depended on factors such as (a) what processing they performed on the stimulus materials, (b} what stimulus materials they expected to receive, (c) what materials were actually presented, (d) what they were doing before their memory ‘was measured, and (e) how their memory was measured. The take-home messages were multiple: that cognitive processes vary, that they are affected by what is happen- ing elsewhere within the cognitive system: and therefore that they depend crtically on the specific situational con- text in which the subject is embedded, ‘The fact that cognitive processes are fluid, adapting to the situation and goals of each individual, means that many of our psychological theories could be flawed if not downright wrong, It also means that the justifica- tion behind traditional lab-based cognitive research— the assumption that we can isolate and test the same mental process in ciferent environmentsmay no longer hold, and that we need to broaden the ways in which, we do our work, Cognitive ethology proposes the following alterna- tive approach: 4. Carefully observe and describe behaviour as it naturally occurs 2, Then move it into the laboratory and gradually simplify relevant factors. 3, Test to find out whether lab findings predict, as well as explain, real-world phenomena. psychologists have observed (eg,, Kuhn, 1989), testing of hypotheses based on personal observation is one of the ways in which scientific knowledge develops. The Range of Cognitive Psychology Cognitive psychology provides tools for the analysis of many problems. Throughout this book you will find both concrete, practical examples of the application of cognitive psy- chology and discussions of the social and emotional aspects of cognition. The study of those topics has been greatly influenced by cognitive psychology, but they have not always been covered in cognition texts. Now cognitive psychology has developed to the point that itis integral to most other forms of psychology, and it's important to be aware of how it may be applied, both in other areas of psychology and in life generally.18 Cognition FIGURE 1.15 | Some examples of the range of cognitive psychology Summary In this chapter we have introduced several of the key concepts covered by the term cogni- tion, beginning with information processing, Central to the information-processing ap- proach to cognition i the idea that the information provided by a particular message is not determined solely by the message itself, ht rather by the whole array of possible messages of which this particular one is just one instance. The less likely its that a particular signal will occur, the more information it will convey and the more time it will take to process. Hickand Hyman have produced experimental evidence using visual stimuli to support the notion that people respond more slowly to less likely signals. The slow reaction times sug- gest that there are limits to the amount of information that the nervous system can handle ‘within a fixed period of time, whether the information signal is visual or auditory. To pre- vent overloading of our capacity to process information, we select only some of thei] Introduction 19 available signal information to process, espond to, and remember. In other words, we are not merely passive receivers of information from our perceptual world: we are active selec- tors of information. Several classic models dominate the study of information processing, First, Broad: bent’ filter model is based on the idea that information processing is restricted by the cap- acity of the channel that is the nervous system. When multiple messages arrive at the same time, Broadbent's model suggests that a filtering device chooses among them on the basis of common physical characteristics. By contrast, Norman and Waugh’s model distinguishes between primary and secondary memory. Primary memories are created in the immedi- ately present moment and tend to be quickly forgotten unless they are rehearsed or re- peated, We will extend our exploration of memory to more recent concepts in Chapter 6. Also noteworthy is Gibson's ecological approach to information processing. His theory of information pickup focuses on the wealth of information available through the stimulus itself, rather than the processing required to make a stimulus meaningful. In this model, earning is less about the processing of information and more about becoming attuned to ‘what the environment affords us One thing these varied models have in common is their reliance on the standard lab based research approach, which assumes that the same mental processes can be isolated and tested in different environments. An alternative research approach is cognitive ethology, which acknowledges that cognitive processes are fluid, adapting to the situation and goals ofan individual. Whichever approach is employed, the study of cognitive psychology can be understood as a matter of metacognition—in other words, “thinking about thinking” CASE STUDY Case Study Wrap-Up We began this chapter with a scenario in which the PreCogs' perceptions of the future led to your arrest for amurder thatyou had yet to commit. In the context of that scenario we raised the question of how veridi- cal cognition can be. Can the PreCogs' vision be taken as an accurate reflection of something that was actu- aly going to occur? Or is there some uncertainty in play? Based on what we have seen in this chapter, and. what we will see in the chapters that follow, it seems that cognition always involves some element of un- certainty. Indeed, much of the research discussed in this chapter was designed to come to arips with this apparent fact. From the beginning, researchers recog- nized that there was a connection between the amount of information conveyed by any given event and the probability of that event: the less likely the event, the more information it conveys, Furthermore, because people are limited in the amount of informa~ tion they can process at any one moment in time, a lot of information is going to be lost ‘And there's the rub. There is no single reality for ary ‘of us, What we see, what we atlend to, what we think about, and what we remember is a complex combina- tion of the situation within which we receive informa- tion and the actions that we perform on the basis of that information; and these actions of course will re- flect who we are, Thus my cognition in a given situation will almost certainly be different from yours. So, can the PreCogs’ visions be trusted? Could the PreCrime Unit have made a grave error when they arrested you?20 Cognition In the Know: Review Questions 1, Cognitive psychology draws heavily on the idea that humans are information processors What are some advantages of this approach? What are some limitations? 2. Folk psychology and introspection are two possible sources of knowledge about cognition, based on everyday observation and persanal reflection, respectively. How valuable do you think they are? How does the knowledge derived from those sources relate to the knowl- edge produced by the controlled studies of researchers like Hick, Hyman, and Broadbent? Key Concepts What follows here is a list of some of the most influential ideas in the area we have just re- viewed, which made their first appearance above in boldface: a similar lst will be included in each of the chapters to follow. Some concepts are quite general and not associated with any particular psychologist. Others are accompanied by the names of the psychologists with wham they are identified. If any of the names or concepts seem unfamiliar, reread the ap- propriate section of the chapter. You should be able to define each concept and discuss the research that is relevant to it Brief definitions are included in the margins where the terms are introduced, as well as in the Glossary at the end of the book affordances information theory bit introspection Brown-Peterson task metacognition channel capacity perceptual cycle cognitive ethology primary memory (Waugh and Norman) ecological approach schema filter model (Broadbent) secondary memory (Waugh and Norman) folk psychology stimulus Information pickup Links to Other Chapters affordances Chapter 10 tn vivo and in vitro methods) Chapter 8 (prototypicality) Chapter 12 (ecological rationality) Chapter 12 (practical intelligence) ecological approach and ecological validity Chapter 4 (inattentional blindness) Chapter 5 (involuntary semantic memories} metacognition Chapter 6 (elaboration and distinctiveness) Chapter 10 {feeling of knowing) Chapter 6 (ecological approaches to perceptual cycle memory) Chapter 4 (attention capture and Chapter 8 {criticisms of classical concept inattentional blindness) research) Chapter 7 (images as anticipations)1| Introduction primary memory schema Chapter 3 (pattem recognition) Chapter 4 {task switching) Chapter 6 (levels of processing) Chapter 13 (schema theories, Bartlett. body schema, phantom limbs, scripts) Further Reading Aristory of early developments in cognitive psychology can be found in Chapter 14 of Benjafield (2005). For a particularly well-informed anaiysis of those developments, see Mandler (2002). Analyses of folk psychology—people’s beliefs about how the mind works—include Rips and Conrad (1989) and Felibaum and Miller (1996), Additional elaboration on folk psychology can be found in D’Andrade (1987) and Vendler (3972). Stich (1983) is a classic critique of folk psychology. For a more appreciative survey of the pervasiveness and variability of folk psy- chology see Lillard (2998) Wie review the large literature on metacognition at various places in this book. Flavell {1979) is a good place to start: he was one of the pioneers in this area. For a more recent perspective see Sternberg (1998) Winograd, Fivush, and Hirst (1999) is a collection of papers presented in appreciation of Neisser’s contribution to ecologically valid studies. Benjaffeld, J, 2008]. A history of psychology. Toronto: Oxford University Press. D’Andrade, R. (1987). folk model of the mind. In D. Holland & N. Quinn (Eds), Cultural models {language and thought (pp. 112-148). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Fellbaur. C.. & Miller, G.A. (1990). Folk psychology or semantic entallment? Psychological Review 97: 565-570. Flavell, J. (1979), Metacognition and cognitive monitoring, American Psychologist 34: 906-911 Lillard, A. (2998). Ethnopsychologies: Cultural variations in theories of mind. Psychological Bulletin 123: 3-32 Mandler, G. (2002). Origins of the cognitive (rlevolution. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 38: 339-353. Rips, LJ, & Conrad, FG. (1989). Folk psychology of mental activities. Psychological Review 96: 187-207. Sternberg, R.J. (2998). Metacognition, abilities, and developing expertise. instructional Science 26, 327-240. Stich, S. (1983). From folk psychology to cognitive science: The case against belief. Cambridge, Mass. Mir Press. Vendler, Z. (1972). Res cogitans: An essay in rational psychology. ithaca, NY: Cotnell University Press. Winograd. E.. Fivush, R.. & Hirst, W. [Eds.). (1999). Ecological approaches to cognition. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. atCognitive Neuroscience Chapter Case Study: Head Office 24 The Brain as the Organ of the Mind 26 The Relationship between Mind and Brain 28 Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience 30 To examine the key issues in the localization of function debate. To outline the theoretical issues surrounding the relationship between the mind and the brain. To explain approaches to studying that relationship. To identify the advantages and limitations of the various methods used to localize cognitive processes in the brainCASE STUDY Head Office Let's take a moment to think about our heads and all they do for us, First of all, the head houses the nose and mouth, both of which are crucial to life itself For the purposes of cognitive psychology, however, eyes and ears are equally important, for they are what en- able us to see and hear the world around us. The sim- ple fact that the head is centred at the top of the body ‘means that it is ideally situated for the reception of information from the environment, which ultimately leads to perception and behaviour. These are all fairly ‘obvious observations. Less obvious. perhaps. is the significance of the fact that your head is hard—really hard. Why is that so important? Your brain knows why: because itis the star of the show that is your life, and it needs all the protection it can get Although it accounts for only about 2 per cent of your body weight, your brain manages to claim about 20 per cent of al the blood supply in your body. if you didn't have a brain you wouldn't have a thought, and without thought there is no cognition. Yet we aften take the brain for granted—at least until something goes wrong, You may know someone whose life has been changed profoundly because of a brain disease or in- jury. If not, you almost certainly know of some pram- inent person who has suffered a brain injury, whether asaresult ofa stroke, a tumour, or some kind of trauma. For instance, consider the boxer Muhammad Al One Of the most famous athletes in the world, as a fighter he would “float like a butterfly and sting like a bee” {to borrow his own phrase), and he commanded as much respect for his quick intelligence and verbal skills as for his abilities in the ring. Now this mast beloved and dignified man is barely able to move or speak. Or con- sider Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the two most powerful people in the Western world in the 1980s (Figure 2.2). By the time of his death in 2004, Reagan had lived with Alzheimer’s disease for a decade, Similarly Thatcher fought 2 decade-long battle with dementia before her death in 2023, Virtually everyone who has ever taken an introduc~ tory psychology course will know the name of Phineas Gage, a young railroad foreman who in 1848 survived an explosion that drove an iron bar through his head. Although he was said to have suffered bouts of depres: sion, drinking problems, and a general change in per sonality, it now seems that in fact his cognitive abilities and character were remarkably unaffected (Macmillan, 2002). As amazing as the Gage story is, it appears to have been replicated in Brazil in August 2012. Eduardo Leite was working on a construction site when a fall- ing 2.8-metre iron bar pierced his hard hat, entered his skull, and came out between his eyes (see Figure 2.2). FIGURE 2.2 | Muhammad Ali, Ronald Reagan, and Margaret Thatcher2 | Cognitive Neuroscience FIGURE 2.2 | (@) Lithograph of Phineas Gage's injury; (b) Tomography scan of Eduardo Leite’ injury The surgery to remove the bar took five hours. Although itis stl too soon to be certain, doctors report that Leite shows few if any cognitive deficits Almost as recent is the story of US Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. On the morning of 8 January 2010 she was holding a “Congress on your corner’ session, meeting and answering questions from members of her Arizona constituency, when suddenly a gunman appeared and shot her along with more than a dazen FIGURE 2.3 | Gabrielle Giffords other people. The bullet ente ‘above her ear and ripped through her brain. But she ‘was not killed. Surgeons removed part of her skull to, allow the injured brain to swell without pressure on the regions that are critical for life functions. Fast forward to five months after the shooting, As the swelling subsided, the surgeons replaced the part of the skull that had been removed, and 180 days after, the shooting Giffards was released from hospital. Her cognitive abilities are not yet what they were before 1d Giffords’ head just she was shot’ in particular, she stil has some difficulty speaking, Walking is also difficult, and her right arm is paralyzed, Nevertheless, she marked the third anniver- sary of the shooting by going skydiving, Let's pause here for a moment and ask why it was Giffords’ language abilities that were compromised vents, rather than, say, her ability to remember pa: What might this tell us about the relationship between forms of cognition and the brain? One thing it suggests is that specific cognitive mechanisms are associated with specific brain areas. The area of research con- cerned with this relationship is cognitive neuroscience’ a combination of cognitive psychology and neuro- science that seeks to discover the brain mechanisms that give rise to mental functions such as language, memary, and attention. This is an ambitious goal, and one that cannot be reached via any single research ap- proach. In fact, cognitive neuroscience is both defined and fuelled by its interdisciplinary emphasis 2526 Cognition ‘modules Dierentpartsor the brain, each of whichis responsible for particular cognitive operations phrenology “The study ofthe shape, size, and protrusions of the cranium inn sttemptte lscover te relationships between partsot the bain and venous mentat ‘activities and abies, localization of function “The idea that there isa Steet correspondence between specific cognitive functions and specite parts cf the brain. The Brain as the Organ of the Mind ‘This chapter will introduce several ways of investigating the relationship between the brain and behaviour, First, though, it's important to note that cognitive neuroscientists assume that the brain is composed of specific parts or modules (Podor, 1983), each of which is re- sponsible for particular cognitive operations. Whether itis completely modularisa matter of debate, and there have been differences of opinion over the number of modules that may exist (eg, Pinker, 1997; Sperber, 2002). However, there is general agreement on the basic principle, and once we begin to speculate about how many modules there might be, its only a short step to wondering which cognitive functions each of them might be responsible for. Efforts to determine which parts of the brain are specialized for which cognitive opera- tions go backat leastas far as Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) and his student |G. Spurzheim (4776-1832). Gall and Spurzheim promoted phrenology. Phrenological charts like the one in Figure 2.4 purport to show where various psychological functions are located in the brain. Although Gall and Spurzheim’ theories are not taken seriously today, their underly- ing premises still deserve consideration: ‘Their argument reduced to three basic principles: (1) The brain is the sole organ of the mind. (2) Basic character and intellectual traits are innately determined. (3) Since there are differences in character and intel- lectual traits among individuals as well as differences in various intellectual capacities within a single indi- vidual, there must exist differentially developed areas in the brain, responsible for these differences! Where there is variation in function there must be variation in the controlling structures (Krech, 1962, p. 33). Galland Spurzheim's method for locating fanctions inthe brain ‘was highly speculative. They believed that the more highly devel- oped a function was, the larger it would be, and that the larger the function, the more clearly it would manifest itself as a protrusion on the skull, On the basis of these assumptions they reasoned that they could divine a person's strengths and weaknesses by examin- ing the shape of his or her skull. Their theory hada powerful impact on nineteenth-century cultural practices, and many people were ing to pay for phrenological advice (Sokal, 2001). The weakness of the phrenologists’ method is now obvious. Still, their underlying hypothesis—that specific functions are localized in specific parts of the brain—has guided much subsequent research (eg, Gardner, 1983; Sarter, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 1996), even though notaall those involved have agreed that there is a direct correspondence between specific cognitive functions and specific parts of the brain. A landmack in the history of the localization of function de- bate was the work of Shepherd Ivory Franz. (1874-1933). Franz was FIGUREa:4 | A phrenological.chart. an expert in the technique of ablation, whereby parts of the cortex2 | Cognitive Neuroscience (the outer layer of the brain, which plays a significant role in cognitive functions such as memory, attention, perception, and language) of an animal are destroyed and the conse- quences for behaviour are observed. If functions were localized in the cortex, then the effect of ablation should depend on the area destroyed. However, this was not what his observations showed. Franz and his student Kar! Lashley (1890-1958) studied the effects of ablation of the frontal lobes in rats. Instead of opening up the animal’s skull, they would make small holes in it and then observe the effect of the lesions on the retention of a simple learned maze habit; only later would they examine the animal's brain to see "precisely where the lesions had occurred” (Bruce, 1986, p. 38). Their results persuaded them that as long as sufficient tissue remained after the operation, the location of that tissue was irrelevant. Franz (1912) concluded that “mental processes are not due to the independent activities of individual parts of the brain, but to the activities of the brain as a whole” and that “it would appear best and most scientific that we should not adhere to any of the phrenolog- ical systems" (p. 328). Lashley subsequently published a work that becamea classic in the area of localization of function, called Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence (1925). This research developed further the procedures he had learned from Franz. Lashley lesioned the cortex of rats in different places and to different degrees. He reasoned that “if there were reflex paths transversing the cortex ... then surgery would destroy them” (Weidman, 1994, p. 166). Lashley (1929, p. 74) observed the ability of rats to learn or remember tasks such as finding their way through mazes of differing difficulty, and found that performance in simple mazes was not greatly affected by limited brain damage (Figure 2.5). However, performance declined as Fg FIGURE 2.5 | Ratina maze 27