PEOPLE VS.

ESTRADA

G.R. No. 130487. June 19, 2000 *

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law;   Under the classical theory on which our penal code is
mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will; man, therefore,
should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will
appears unimpaired.—The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is
criminally liable for a felony committed by him. Under the classical theory on
which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human
free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to
choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act
(delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with
freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
Same; Exempting Circumstances; Insanity; In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all
acts are voluntary.—In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes
that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. The moral and
legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the
normal condition of a person. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by
other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal
liability.
Same; Same; Same; If the court finds the accused insane when the alleged
crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his
confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released
without danger—An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he
has acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane
when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall
order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be
released without danger. An acquittal of the accused
_______________

* EN BANC.

700
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is
followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution.
Same; Insanity; Words and Phrases; In the eyes of the law, insanity exists
when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act—the
accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.—
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability. The accused must be “so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent.” He must be deprived of reason and act without
the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Same; Same; Evidence; To ascertain a person’s mental condition at the time
of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within
a reasonable period both before and after that time.—Since the presumption is
always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance
must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment
of its execution. To ascertain a person’s mental condition at the time of the act, it
is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a
reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required. Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity
as a defense. Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the
unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A person’s thoughts,
motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine
whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Same; Same; It is highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and
sit on the Bishop’s chair while the Bishop is administering the Holy Sacrament
of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral.—In the case at bar, there
is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the time he
killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely
discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From
the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan attached to the Information, there are certain
circumstances that should haves placed the trial
701
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his
mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane
person to go up to the altar and sit on the Bishop’s chair while the Bishop was
administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked
cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without
sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar,
during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness.
Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He
nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address system,
uttered words to the faithful which no rational person would have made. He then
returned to the Bishop’s chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
Same; Same; Arraignment; The question of suspending the arraignment lies
within the discretion of the trial court; The test to determine whether the
proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused,
even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial.—The question of
suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court. And the
test to determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the
question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have
a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus: “In passing on the
question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused
person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not
every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to
justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the
accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or
gives; and it is obvious that under a system of procedure like ours where every
accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so particular as it used
to be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself.”
Same; Same; The fact that the accused was able to answer the questions
asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough
to stand trial and assist in his defense—the trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of
determining the state of a person’s mental health.—The fact that accused-
appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not
conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his
702
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition

that “effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto.” It is not clear whether accused-
appellant was of such sound mind as to fully understand the charge against him.
It is also not certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea of “not
guilty” was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial court “because of his
refusal to plead.” The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity
of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some
other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of
a person’s mental health. To determine the accused-appellant’s competency to
stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the
examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latter’s history of
mental illness.
Same;   Same;   An intelligent determination of an accused’s capacity for
rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive
diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through observation of
his overt behavior.—Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure speaks of a “mental examination.” The human mind is an entity, and
understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large
degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. Thus, an intelligent
determination of an accused’s capacity for rational understanding ought to rest
on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than
laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or
psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetence be
determined by the trial court. By this time, the accused’s abilities may be
measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon him.
Same;   Same;   Where the crime was committed almost 6 years earlier, a
medical finding alone at this late hour may make it impossible to evaluate the
accused’s mental condition at the time of the crime’s commission for him to avail
of the exempting circumstance of insanity.—If the mental examination on
accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have served a
dual purpose by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at
the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical
findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of the crime served
as one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused.
703
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

The crime in the instant case was committed way back in December 1,
1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may
make it impossible for us to evaluate appellant’s mental condition at the time of
the crime’s commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellant’s
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to
participate in his trial meaningfully.
Same; The trial court, by depriving the accused who invokes insanity of a
mental examination, effectively deprives him of a fair trial.—By depriving
appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant
of a fair trial. The trial court’s negligence was a violation of the basic
requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said
court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica, we ordered that the joint decision
of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper
proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder and
one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of “guilty” to all three charges
and was sentenced to death. We found that the accused’s plea was not an
unconditional admission of guilt because he was “not in full possession of his
mental faculties when he killed the victim”; and thereby ordered that he be
subjected to the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of
insanity at the time of commission of the crime.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, Br. 44.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-

appellant by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in
Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D.  We nullify 1

_______________

1 The decision was penned by Judge Crispin C. Laron.

704
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

the proceedings in the court   a quo   and remand the case for proper
disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant
Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of murder for the
killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information
reads:
“That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being
then armed with a butcher’s knife, with intent to kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and
committed in a holy place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the
said weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to “Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive
Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound” as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr.
Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of
said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, December 29, 1994.”2
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant’s counsel, the
Public Attorney’s Office, filed an “Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital.” It was alleged that accused-appellant could not
properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a
mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined
at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City.
He prayed for the suspension of his arraign-
_______________

2 Records, p. 1.
705
ment and the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital. 3

The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu
proprio,   propounded several questions on accused-appellant. Finding
that the questions were understood and answered by him “intelligently,”
the court denied the motion that same day. 4

The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by

the court on accused-appellant’s behalf. 5

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas
Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City who issued the
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto
Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco,
one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4)
Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victim’s sister. The prosecution established
the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John’s Cathedral,
Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of
Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people. At
11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the
altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front rows. While the
Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and
walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishop’s
chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the
Bishop’s chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who
was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan
approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishop’s
chair. Gripping the chair’s armrest, accused-appellant replied in
Pangasinense: “No matter what will hap-
_______________

3 Id., pp. 13-14.
4 Id., p. 16.
5 Id., p. 19.
706
pen, I will not move out!” Hearing this, Santillan moved away. 6

Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security

guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-appellant and told
him to vacate the Bishop’s chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at
the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap accused-
appellant’s hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again,
Mararac tapped the latter’s hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to
strike again when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his
back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left
throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to
stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

up and around him. He got up, went to the microphone and shouted:
“Anggapuy nayan dia!” (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the
Bishop’s chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding,
slowly dragged himself down the altar. 7

Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic

outside, received a report of a commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing
to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red
stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the center
of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the
knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his
hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief,
Dagupan City, who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral,
went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-
appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with
each other, Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-
appellant. The police came and when they frisked appellant, they found
a leather scabbard tucked around his waist.  He was brought to the police
8

station and placed in jail.

_______________

6 TSN of January 19, 1995, pp. 4-5.

7 Id., pp. 6-10; Exhibit “E,” Records, pp. 6-7.
8 TSN of January 20, 1995, pp. 3-13; Exhibit “G,” Records, p. 5.
707
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the
hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died of
“cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab
wound.”  He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just
9

below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy reported
the following findings:
“EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. 1.

Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 1/2” x 1 1/2”
penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
2. 2.

Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2” x 1/4” x 1/2”. The edge of one side of
the wound is sharp and pointed.
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

INTERNAL FINDINGS

Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the left lung. The
left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut.”10
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of
court, filed a “Demurrer to Evidence.” He claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression
by the victim when he tapped accused-appellant’s hand with his
nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to
calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind. 11

The “Demurrer to Evidence” was opposed by the public prosecutor.

He alleged that the accused “pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound
mind”; that after he made the first stab, he “furiously continued stabbing
and slashing the
_______________

9 Exhibit “B,” Records, p. 36.

10 Exhibit “A,” Records, p. 35.
11 Records, pp. 45-48.
708
victim to finish him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place
where a religious ceremony was being conducted”; and the plea of
unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order
of January 6, 1995. 12

On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F.

Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector Valdez
requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the
city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine
whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other
institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with
appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to
climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see his family. 13

As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment

to the jail warden’s letter. He reiterated that the mental condition of
accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless a
competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to determine
whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not. 14

In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the
“Demurrer to Evidence.”  Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration.
15

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26,

1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a “Motion to Confine Accused
for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.” Appellant’s counsel
informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal
behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and
cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not
been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of
not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while asleep;
that once, while they
_______________

12 Id., pp. 51-52.
13 Id., p. 49.
14 Id., p. 56.
15 Id., pp. 62-63.
709
were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste
matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among
the inmates. Appellant’s counsel prayed that his client be confined at the
National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General
Hospital.   Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, dated
16

February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden,
Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge informing him of
appellant’s irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order
for the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-
appellant.  The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to
17

Inspector Llopis from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an association

of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the president,
secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of
appellant’s unusual behavior and requested that immediate action be
taken against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail.
18
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the

order denying the “Demurrer to Evidence.” The court ordered accused-
appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996. 19

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel
presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident 20

physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General

Hospital, and accused-appellant’s medical and clinical records at the said
hospital.  Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the
21

BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered
from “Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—
_______________

16 Id., pp. 92-93.

17 Exhibit “16,” Records, pp. 95 and 96.
18 Exhibit “15,” Records, p. 94.
19 Records, p. 75.
20 TSN of November 26, 1996, pp. 2-28.
21 Exhibits “1” to “14,” Records, pp. 50, 107-128.
710
schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;”   and after four (4) 22

days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and

mental condition.   The medical and clinical records consisted of the
23

following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer,

Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring
accused-appellant for admission and treatment after “a relapse of his
violent behavior;”  (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH;
24

 (3) the consent slip of appellant’s wife voluntarily entrusting appellant

25

to the BGH;  (4) the Patient’s Record;  (5) the Consent for Discharge
26 27

signed by appellant’s wife;   (6) the Summary and Discharges of

28

appellant;  (7) appellant’s clinical case history;  (8) the admitting notes;
29 30

  (9) Physician’s Order Form;   (10) the Treatment Form/medication

31 32

sheet;  and (11) Nurses’ Notes.

33 34

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the
prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.
_______________

22 Exhibit “1,” Records, p. 50.

23 TSN of November 26, 1996.
24 Exhibit “2,” Records, p. 107.
25 Exhibit “3,” Records, p. 113.
26 Exhibit “4,” Records, p. 114.
27 Exhibit “5,” Records, p. 115.
28 Exhibit “6,” Records, p. 116.
29 Exhibits “7” and “14,” Records, pp. 117 and 1
30 Exhibit “8,” Records, pp. 118-119.
31 Exhibit “9,” Records, pp. 120-121.
32 Exhibit “10,” Records, pp. 122-123.
33 Exhibit “11,” Records, p. 123.
34 Exhibits “12” and “13,” Records, pp. 124-127
711

The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and P100,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.”35
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME

CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS
PLEA OF INSANITY.
II

THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH OF
ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY,
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.”36
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally
liable for a felony committed by him.  Under, the classical theory on
37

which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is
human free will.  Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely
38

free will to choose between good and evil.   When he commits a 39

felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have

been done voluntarily,  i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.
40 41

_______________

35 Records, p. 204.
36 Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 1, Rollo, p. 36.
37 Article 4, Revised Penal Code.
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

38 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Bk. I, pp. 37-38 [1981 ed.].

39 V. Francisco, The Revised Penal Code, Bk. I, p. 4 [1958].
40 Please see Guevara’s Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 5th ed., pp. 5-6 [1957].
41   Article 3, Revised Penal Code;   see also   Reyes,   supra,   at 39-40;   People v. Renegado,   57 SCRA 275, 286
[1974]; United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, 495 [1910].
712
Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful
acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. 42

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that

every person is of sound mind   and that all acts are voluntary.   The
43 44

moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.   This 45

presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of

these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability. 46

The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:

“ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liabil-ity.—The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.”
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane
when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the
court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment
until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused
does not result in
_______________

42 Francisco, supra.
43 Article 800, Civil Code.
44  United States v. Gloria, 3 Phil. 333, 335 [1904]; also cited in Guevara, 5th ed., p. 6; see also Francisco, supra, at
32.
45 People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; see People v. Renegado, supra.
46 People v. Renegado, supra.
713
his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution. 47

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete

deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.  The accused must be 48

“so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.”  He must 49

be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because

there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation
of freedom of the will. 50

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes

insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and
positive evidence.  And the evidence on this point must refer to the time
51

preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its

execution. 52

To ascertain a person’s mental condition at the time of the act, it is

permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a
reasonable period both before and after that
_______________

47  See People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106, 121 [1996]; People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 100 [1937]; United States v.
Guendia, 37 Phil. 345-346 [1917].
48  People v. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325, 333 [1980]; People v. Renegado, supra; People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292
[1960]; People v. Formigones, 87 Phil 658, 661 [1950] quoting Guevara’s Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th
ed., pp. 42-43 citing the Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting Article 8, par. 1 of the old Penal Code of
Spain.
49 People v. Torres, 3 CAR 9 (2s) 43, cited in Padilla, Criminal Law, Bk. I, pp. 340-341 [1987].
50   People v. Renegado,   supra,   at 286;   People v. Puno,   105 SCRA 151, 158-159 [1981];   People v.
Formigones, supra, at 661.
51 People v. Renegado, supra, at 286; People v. Puno, supra, at 158.
52  People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106, 117 [1996]; People v. Puno, supra, at 158; United States v. Guevara, 27 Phil.
547, 550 [1914].
714
time.   Direct testimony is not required.   Neither are specific acts of
53 54

derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.  Circumstantial 55

evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind

can only be known by overt acts. A person’s thoughts, motives, and
emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether
these conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 56

In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was

afflicted with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of
direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that
appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

Crisanto Santillan   attached to the Information, there are certain

57

circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that
appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties
when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go
up to the altar and sit on the Bishop’s chair while the Bishop was
administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a
jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for
appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab
the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the
Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to
flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and,
over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful which no
rational person would have made. He then returned to the Bishop’s chair
and sat there as if nothing happened.
_______________

53  People v. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841, 845 [1961]; People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 91 [1937] citing Wharton, Criminal
Evidence, p. 684.
54 Id.
55 People v. Bonoan, supra, at 93-94.
56 People v. Bonoan, supra, at 93; People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106, 117 [19961.
57 Exhibit “E,” Records, pp. 6-7.
715
Accused-appellant’s history of mental illness was brought to the court’s
attention on the day of the arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant
moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that his client
could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental
condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12,
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
“Sec. 12 Suspension of arraignment.—The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
1. (a)

The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such
case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose.
2. (b)

x x x.”
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof
he appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition of such
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against him
and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court
must suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination of the
accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order such
confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of
his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the arraignment of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself a felo
de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor
can he give an intelligent plea thereto. 58

The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion

of the trial court.  And the test to determine
59

_______________

58 Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated, p. 322 [19981].

59 In the landmark case of United States v. Guendia, 37 Phil. 337, 345 [19171, it was declared that:
“x x x [W]hen a judge of first instance is informed or discovers that an accused person is apparently in a present condi
716

whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of

whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have a
fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
“In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused person on the
ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or
exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such suspension.   The test is to be found in the
question whether the accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or
gives; and it is obvious that under a system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal
counsel, it is not necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no advocate
but himself.”60
In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused’s “present
insanity” or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is separate and
distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the
act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the defendant’s
mental condition at the time of the crime’s commission. “Present
insanity” is commonly referred to as “competency to stand
_______________

tion of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter, and if it be found that by reason of
any such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of his counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to
suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. If,
however, such investigation is considered unnecessary, and the trial proceeds, the court will acquit the accused if he be
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

found exempt from criminal responsibility by reason of imbecility or lunacy. In such case an order for his commitment to
an asylum should be made pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 8 (1) of the Penal Code [now par. 2, Article
12 (1)].”x
60 United States v. Guendia, 37 Phil. 337, 345 [1917]; also cited in Francisco, Criminal Procedure, p. 330 [1996] and
Herrera, Remedial Law, vol. 4, pp. 384-385 [1992].
717
trial”   and relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal
61

proceeding in light of the defendant’s present inability to participate

meaningfully and effectively.  In competency cases, the accused may
62

have been sane or insane during the commission of the offense which
relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found
incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time
as he may be found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a
defense; it merely postpones the trial. 63

In determining a defendant’s competency to stand trial, the test is

whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense
in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his
counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed.  This 64

test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally as a statutory

recognition of the rule at common law.  Thus: 65

_______________

61   Pizzi, “Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems,” 45 Univ. of
Chicago Law Review 21-22 [1977]. The term “present insanity” was used in the case of Youtsey v. United States, 97 F.
937 [1989] to distinguish it from insanity at the time of commission of the offense.
62  21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, Sec. 97 [1981 ed.]; LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, p. 333, 2d ed. [1986]; del
Carmen,   Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, pp. 395-396, 3rd ed. [1995]; Ferdico,   Criminal Procedure for the
Criminal Justice Professional, pp. 55-56, 7th ed. [1999].
63 Id.
64 21 Am Jur 2d, “Criminal Law,” Sec. 96; see list of cases therein; see also Raymond and Hall,, California Criminal
Law and Procedure, p. 230 [1999].
65 Id.; see also LaFave and Scott, supra, at 333; Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, 430 [1954]. Long
before legislation on competency to stand trial, the case of Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 [1899] recognized that a
federal court had the same wide discretion established by the common law when the question of present insanity was
presented—United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972, 982 [1964].
718

“[I]t is not enough for the x x x judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place, and [has]
some recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”66
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1)
whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel
with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2)
whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his
relation to it.  The first requisite is the relation between the defendant
67

and his counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer
coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the
defendant   vis-a-vis   the court proceedings,   i.e.,   that he must have a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceed-ings. 68

The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the

protection of the accused, rather than of the public.  It has been held that 69

it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just

defense for his life or lib-erty.  To put a legally incompetent person on
70

trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional

rights to a fair trial  and due process of law;  and this has
71 72

_______________

66 Dusky v. United States, 362 US 402, 4 L ed 2d 824, 825, 80 S Ct 788 [1960]. This is commonly referred to as the
“Dusky Standard”—LaFave and Scott, supra, at 334-335, Note 26.
67 LaFave and Scott, supra; see also Notes: “Incompetency to Stand Trial,” 81 Harvard Law Review, 454, 459 [Dec.
1967].
68 LaFave and Scott, supra, at 334.
69 State v. Swails, 223 La 751, 66 So. 2d 796, 799 [1953].
70 In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 360, 61 P. 1120, 1121 [1900]; State v. Swails, supra; see also Weihofen, Mental Disorder
as a Criminal Defense, p. 429 [1954].
71 Pate v. Robinson, 383 US 375, 15 L ed 2d 815, 822, 86 S Ct 836 [1966].
72 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, Sec. 95 [198 ed.]; Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940-946 [CA6 1899]; Drope
v. Missouri,
719
several reasons underlying it.  For one, the accuracy of the proceedings
73

may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot

comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is
relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position
to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal
case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify
in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which
rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result.   Second,   the
fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is

expected to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the
dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent
defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner
which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant
remains passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the
functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an
adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent
participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction
between an individual and his community and becomes an invective
against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant
knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is greatly
dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An
incompetent defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his
conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be
frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who
cannot comprehend its significance. 74

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should

be ordered rests generally in the discretion of
_______________

420 U.S. 162, 43 L ed 2d 103, 113-114, 95 S Ct 896 [1975]; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 815, 15 L ed 2d 815,
822, 86 S Ct 836 [1966]; see also Weihofen, supra, at 429-430.
73 Notes: “Incompetency to Stand Trial,” 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454 [1967].
74 Id., at 457-459; see also LaFave and Scott, supra, at 334-335.
720
the trial court.  Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be
75

evidence or circumstances that raise a “reasonable doubt”  or a “bona 76

fide doubt”   as to defendant’s competence to stand trial. Among the

77

factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendant’s irrational

behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous
confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the defendant, and
psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in
a particular case. 78

In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of

the arraignment on the ground of accused’s mental condition, the trial
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on
appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared:
“x x x
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on the accused,
and he (accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he answered,
in Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”79
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked
by the trial court is not conclusive evidence
_______________

75 21 Am Jur 2d, “Criminal Law,” Sec. 103 [1981 ed.].

76 The term “reasonable doubt” was used in Drope v. Missouri, supra at 118; see also LaFave and Scott, supra, Note
34, at 335-336.
77  In Pate v. Robinson, supra, at 822, the court used the term “bona fide doubt” as to defendant’s competence; see
also LaFave and Scott, supra, Note 34, at 335-336.
78 21 Am Jur 2d, “Criminal Law,” Sec. 104 [1981 ed.]; Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 118; Pate v. Robinson, supra, at
822.
79 Order dated January 6, 1995, Records, p. 16.
721
that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense.
Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition
that “effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.” It is not clear
whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to fully
understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea
was made intelligently. The plea of “not guilty” was not made by
accused-appellant but by the trial court “because of his refusal to
plead.” 80

The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of
accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or
some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of
determining the state of a person’s mental health. To determine the
accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant
case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant,
especially in the light of the latter’s history of mental illness.
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in

the judge’s mind of accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial,
subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution
rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge
informing him of accused-appellant’s unusual behavior and requesting
that he be examined at the hospital to determine whether he should
remain in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial judge
ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellant’s counsel filed a
“Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Examination.” Attached to this motion was a second letter by the new
Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the
members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite
the two (2) attached letters,  the judge ignored the “Motion to Confine
81

_______________

80 See Second Order of January 6, 1995, Records, p. 19.

81  The two (2) attached letters were submitted as part of appellants evidence and were admitted by the trial court
without objection from the public prosecutor—Exhibits “15” and “16,” Records, pp. 94-96.
722
Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.” The
records are barren of any order disposing of the said motion. The trial
court instead ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence. 82

Dr. Gawidan testified that the illness of accused-

appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a “lifetime illness” and
that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses.   After 83

accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never

returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up. 84

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel

manifested that accused-appellant was waiving the right to testify in his
own behalf because he was “suffering from mental illness.”   This 85

manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after the
crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial
court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-
appellant’s state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment
and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced
him to death!
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
speaks of a “mental examination.”  The human mind is an entity, and
86

understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a

large degree upon emotional and
_______________

82 Order dated September 18, 1996, Records, p. 75.

83  TSN of November 26, 1996, p. 27. In People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106, 116-117 [1996], “schizophrenia” was
defined as a “chronic mental disorder,” and that a “paranoid type of schizophrenia” was characterized by unpleasant
emotional aggressiveness and delusions of persecution by the patient—quoting Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine
and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860 and Noyes’ Modern Clinical Psychiatry, 7th ed., pp. 380-381.
84 Id.
85 See Order dated May 5, 1997, Records, p. 184.
86 The rule on suspension of arraignment for mental examination of the accused’s mental condition first appeared in
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The 1917 case of U.S. v. Guendia did not mention “mental examination.”
723
psychological appreciation.   Thus, an intelligent determination of an
87

accused’s capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper

and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen
can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or
psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of
incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time, the
accused’s abilities may be measured against the specific demands a trial
will make upon him. 88

If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly

and properly made, it may have served a dual purpose  by determining 89

both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the
offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of
insanity made immediately after the commission of the crime served as
one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused.   The crime in the 90

instant case was committed way back in December 1, 1994, almost six
(6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it
impossible for us to evaluate appellant’s
_______________

87 Notes: “Incompetency to Stand Trial,” 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 470 [1967].

 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

88  Id.; Gunther v. United States, 215 F. 2d 493, 496-497 (D.C. Cir. 1954)—While expert psychiatric judgment is
relevant to determine a defendant’s competence to stand trial, it is not controlling. Resolution of this issue requires not
only a clinical psychiatric judgment but also a judgment based upon a knowledge of criminal trial proceedings that is
peculiarly within the competence of the trial judge; see also United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972, 976-977 (W.D.
Mo. 1964).
89  See Pizzi, “Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts; Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 Univ. of
Chicago L. Rev. 21, 38, Note 84 [1977]—dual purpose examinations are the customary practice in the U.S.
90  People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106 [1996]—the medical examination was conducted 1 1/2 years after the crime’s
commission; People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 82 [1937]—the examinations were conducted 1 to 6 months after the
crime; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 [1922]—the medical exam was conducted immediately after commission of the
crime.
724
mental condition at the time of the crime’s commission for him to avail
of the exempting circumstance of insanity.   Nonetheless, under the 91

present circumstances, accused-appellant’s competence to stand trial

must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial
meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court
effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial court’s negligence
was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this
reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In People
v. Serafica,   we ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be
92

vacated and the cases remanded to the court   a quo   for proper
proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of
murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of “guilty”
to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the
accused’s plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he
was “not in full possession of his mental faculties when he killed the
victim”; and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary
medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of
commission of the crime. 93

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D convicting
accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is
vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a
proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his
competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
 PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA

SO ORDERED.
          D a v i d e ,
Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbin
g,   Purisima,   Pardo,   Buena,   Gonzaga-Reyes,   Ynares Santiago   and   De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
_______________

91 See People v. Balondo, 30 SCRA 155, 160 [1969].

92 29 SCRA 123 [I960].
93 Id., at 129.
725

     Vitug, J., On official leave.

Judgment reversed, case remanded to trial court.
Note.—The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved,
for there is a presumption that acts penalized by law are voluntary.
(People vs. Medina, 286 SCRA 44 [1998])
——o0o——