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Search Warrant RULE 126

William Yao et al vs. People, Petron et al ( As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere
unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the
sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause
confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be considered as
trademark infringement. Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient
to establish probable cause )
G.R. No. 168306 June 19, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:
Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS Corp. engaged in the refilling,
sale and distribution of LPG products. NBI agent Ritche filed two applications for search
warrant with the RTC Cavite against petitioners or alleged violation of Section 155, in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known IP Code

The two applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that per information, belief, and
personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually

● producing, selling, offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel
cylinders owned by, and bearing the trade names, trademarks, and devices of Petron
and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights of the said entities.

NBI conducted an investigation and found the MASAGANA not authorized to use [PETRON
and Shellane LPG cylinders and its trademarks and tradenames or to be refillers or
distributors of [PETRON and] Shellane.

After conducting the preliminary examination on Oblanca and Alajar, and upon reviewing
their sworn affidavits and other attached documents, Judge Melchor RTC CAVITE found
probable cause and correspondingly issued Search Warrants 2 & 3.

Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Oblanca and several NBI operatives
immediately proceeded to the MASAGANA compound and served the search warrants on
petitioners. Articles were seized.

petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash Search Warrants 2 & 3 There is no
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant and the conditions for the issuance of
a search warrant were not complied with;

RTC dismissed Motion to Quash and denied motion to return items. MR denied by RTC. CA
affirmed RTC, MR denied. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether probable cause existed in justifying the issuance of Search Warrant?
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Held: YES
Extant from the foregoing testimonial, documentary and object evidence is that Oblanca and
Alajar have personal knowledge of the fact that petitioners, through MASAGANA, have been
using the LPG cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and SHELLANE without permission from
Petron and Pilipinas Shell, a probable cause for trademark infringement.

As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a

registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or
services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the
buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark infringement.

Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to

establish probable cause.

It should be borne in mind that the determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of the rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after
trial on the merits. As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability,
not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown
trial.

The fact that Oblanca and Alajar used different names in the purchase receipts do not
negate personal knowledge on their part. It is a common practice of the law enforcers such
as NBI agents during covert investigations to use different names in order to conceal their
true identities.

Search Warrant:
Probable Cause
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides with more
particularity the requisites in issuing a search warrant, viz:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a finding
of probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant means

● such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.
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The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or information
personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. The applicant
or his witnesses must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense being complained of.
Reliable information is insufficient.

Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and
his witnesses.

As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a

registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or
services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the
buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark infringement.

Form and Manner of Questioning by Judge

Sec 5 Rule 126 Crim Pro;

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record.- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on
the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and fast rule governing how a judge

should conduct it is axiomatic that the

his investigation,

examination must be probing and exhaustive, not

merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma

The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own
inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.

After perusing the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the preliminary examination, we found
the questions of Judge Sadang to be sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and
perfunctory. The testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar were consistent with each other and their
narration of facts was credible

For instance, he required

● the NBI agent to confirm the contents of his affidavit,
● inquired as to where the test-buys were conducted and by whom,
● verified whether PSPC and PETRON have registered trademarks or tradenames,
● required the NBI witness to explain how the test-buys were conducted and to
describe the LPG cylinders purchased from Masagana Gas Corporation,
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Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who
conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his
witnesses, the findings of the judge deserves great weight.

The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded
We find no compelling
the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.
reason to disturb Judge Sadangs findings herein

Particularly Describing the Place to be Searched

The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be

searched is sufficient if

● the officer with the warrant ascertain

can, with reasonable effort,
and identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community

Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.

Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be

searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officers prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant.

The search warrants in question commanded any peace officer to make an immediate
search on MASAGANA compound located at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece
Martires, Cavite City. It appears that the raiding team had ascertained and reached
MASAGANA compound without difficulty since MASAGANA does not have any other
offices/plants in Trece Martires, Cavite City

Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was no
need to particularize the areas to be searched because, as correctly stated by Petron
and Pilipinas Shell, these structures constitute the essential and necessary
components of the petitioners business and cannot be treated separately as they
form part of one entire compound.

The compound is owned and used solely by MASAGANA. What the case law merely
requires is that, the place to be searched can be distinguished in relation to the other
places in the community. Indubitably, this requisite was complied with in the
instant case.
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Indicate with particularity the items to be seized

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow;

Or A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized, when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by

which the warrant officer may be guided in making

the search and seizure;

Or when the things described are limited to those which

bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described
required to
therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is
be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow

Thelaw does not require that the things to be seized

must be described in precise and minute details as
to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities; otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of
things they are looking for.

Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so
invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and
those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a
class or specie would suffice.

Measured against this standard, we find that the

items to be seized under the search warrants in
question were sufficiently described with
particularity. Additionally, since the described items
are clearly limited only to those which bear direct
relation to the offense, i.e., violation of section 155
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of Republic Act No. 8293, for which the warrant was

issued, the requirement of particularity of
description is satisfied.
Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.

The articles to be confiscated were restricted to the following: (1) LPG cylinders bearing the
trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE; (2) Machines and equipments used or intended to be
used in the illegal refilling of GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders. These machines were also
specifically enumerated and listed in the search warrants; (3) Documents which pertain only
to the production, sale and distribution of the GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders;

OWNERSHIP OF SEIZED ITEMS

Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA from that of the

law does not require that

petitioners, the effect will be the same. The

the property to be seized should be owned by the

person against whom the search warrants is
directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or

possession of the property sought to be seized.

Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a
separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the search warrants is still valid.

CORP. CODE
It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an
entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers.

However, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons, or in the case of two corporations merge them into one.[46] In
other words, the law will not recognize the separate corporate existence if the corporation is
being used pursuant to the foregoing unlawful objectives.

This non-recognition is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
entity or disregarding the fiction of corporate entity. Where the separate corporate entity is
disregarded, the corporation will be treated merely as an association of persons and the
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stockholders or members will be considered as the corporation, that is, liability will attach
personally or directly to the officers and stockholders.

As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of MASAGANA, are utilizing the latter in
violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus, petitioners
collectively and MASAGANA should be considered as one and the same person for liability
purposes. Consequently, MASAGANAs third party claim serves no refuge for petitioners.
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People vs. Cesaro Delos Reyes ( Even a cursory reading of the transcript will show that
most of the questions propounded on Tan by the Judge were leading questions, and
that those which were not leading were merely based on or related to the answers
earlier given to the leading questions. By asking such leading questions, the Judge
thereby supplied the answers to her questions )
G.R. No. 140657. October 25, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.

Facts:
SPO3 Benjamin applied for a search warrant with the RTC of Manila, against Cesar Reyes
aka itlo. In support of his application, Nuguid submitted his affidavit and that of Alexis Tan, a
housewife. Nuguid and Tan also testified in support of the application.

After the court conducted examination of the said witnesses, it issued on even date Search
Warrant 98 authorizing the search of the house allegedly under the possession and
custody of one Cesar Reyes alias Cesar Itlog, at No. 2600 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila

The policemen conducted a search not only of the house at No. 2600 Oroquieta Street,
Sta Cruz, Manila, which turned out to be the house of respondent Cesar delos Reyes, but
also of the car and motorcycle owned by the latter, the car and the motorcycle happened to
be parked near the house.

As per the receipt of the property signed by Nuguid, the search of the house, the car and the
motorcycle yielded the following: crystalline substances contained in the transparent plastic
bags which were seized in the respondents house, car and motorcycle tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride

Two Informations were filed with the RTC of Manila, against the respondent for violation of
RA 6425. The respondent filed a motion to quash the informations on the following
grounds:

● (a) as shown by their testimony before the trial court, applicant Nuguid and his
witness Tan had no personal knowledge of the factual allegations in their affidavits
which were appended to the application for a search warrant;

● his house, car and motorcycle on the ground that he was not there when the search
was conducted and that no barangay officials were present as required by Section 7,
Rule 126 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

RTC denied motion, MR same. CA reversed decision quashing the warrant. MR by PHL
denied hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the judge personally examined by asking searching Q & A?

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Held:NO.
The Judge allowed and even egged on Nuguid to examine Tan and elicit facts and
circumstances from her relating to the alleged purchase of shabu from the respondent.
What is so worrisome is that Nuguid, besides being the applicant, was the same police
officer who asked Tan to buy shabu from the respondent and the one who, along with other
officers, arrested the respondent.

That Nuguid propounded comparatively fewer questions on Tan is beside the point.
By allowing Nuguid himself to examine Tan, the Judge thereby compromised her
impartiality.

ex parte
A search warrant proceeding is independent of any criminal case. It is

and non-adversarial. Hence, the Judge acting on an

application for a search warrant is not bound to
apply strictly the rules of evidence.
The Judge is allowed, at all times, from propounding leading questions on the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce. Indeed, the Judge is allowed to propound leading

for instance, the witness is a child or is

questions if,

suffering from mental illness, or if the questions are

preliminary or clarificatory, or when there is
difficulty in getting direct and intelligent answers
from the witness who is ignorant.
But it can hardly be justifiably claimed that, by propounding leading questions only on the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, the Judge thereby conducts probing and
exhaustive examination. After all, a leading question is one which suggests to the witness
the answer which the examining party desires. By propounding leading questions, the
Judge thereby puts the words or answers in the mind of the witness to be echoed
back.

It bears stressing that the determination of the existence of probable cause must be made
by a detached and neutral Judge. If he resorts to propounding leading questions to

the Judge may

the applicant and his witnesses to determine probable cause,

be perceived as being partial, or even in cahoots

with the officers engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime
A search warrant is not thereby rendered invalid; nor is a finding of probable cause
proscribed merely because the Judge propounded leading questions on the applicant and
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the witnesses he produces. The entirety of the questions propounded by the court and
the answers thereto must be considered and calibrated by the Judge.

The Judge allowed and even egged on Nuguid to examine Tan and elicit facts and
circumstances from her relating to the alleged purchase of shabu from the respondent. What
is so worrisome is that Nuguid, besides being the applicant, was the same police officer
who asked Tan to buy shabu from the respondent and the one who, along with other
officers, arrested the respondent.

That Nuguid propounded comparatively fewer questions on Tan is beside the point. By
allowing Nuguid himself to examine Tan, the Judge thereby compromised her impartiality

The questions propounded on Nuguid by Judge Lorenzo were not searching and probing,
but merely superficial and perfunctory.

The records show that in his application for a search warrant, Nuguid described the place to
be searched as the house located at No. 2600 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, under
the name of Cesar Reyes alias Cesar Itlog.

However, the Judge ignored this inconsistency and did not bother to inquire from Nuguid
why he applied for a search warrant of the premises at No. 2600 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila, when the house where Tan had apparently purchased shabu from the
respondent was located at No. 2006 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
A search warrant must

(a) be based on probable cause;

(b) contain a particular description of the place to be searched; and

(c) must describe the items or property to be seized.

Probable cause comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious
man to rely upon and act in pursuance thereof.

It bears stressing that the requirement of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least, under severe circumstances, the lack of a more specific
description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the
Judge that the described items are to be found in a particular place. Probable cause
must first focus on a specific location.

The mandate of the Judge is for him to conduct a full and searching examination of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In the absence of a rule to the
contrary, the determination of probable cause cannot be delegated by the Judge, in
part, or in whole, regardless of the qualifications of the person on whom reliance is placed.
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People vs. Annabelle David ( what

was done was to substitute for the place
that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that
the executing officers had in their mind.”; “This should not have been
done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different
from that stated in the warrant )
G.R. No. 129035. August 22, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:
Federico and accused-appellant Annabelle were placed under surveillance after the
police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that they were engaged in selling
shabu SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto applied for a search warrant before RTC of Manila
to authorize them to search the premises at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.

Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report of SPO2 Teneros. It stated that
Dante of 1726 Lallana St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be one
of Federico Veronas runners in the illegal drugs operations, allegedly sought the assistance
of SPO2 Teneros for the arrest of Verona. The search warrant was subsequently issued
by Judge Bayhon authorizing the search of shabu and paraphernalia at No. 122 M.
Hizon Street, Caloocan City.

Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant, was resting
inside the second floor masters bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M.
Hizon Street, Caloocan City, when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if somebody
forcibly opened the front door. Eight policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and
conducted a search for about an hour. Accused-appellant inquired about their identities
but they refused to answer.

It was only at the police station where she found out that the team of searchers was led by
SPO2 Teneros. The police team, along with Barangay Chairwoman and Kagawad enforced
the warrant and seized the following The police team also allegedly seized the amount of
P180,000.00, a Fiat car, jewelry, set of keys, an ATM card, bank books and car documents.

Accused-appellant filed a motion to quash the search warrant asserting that she and
her live-in partner Federico Verona had been leasing an apartment unit at No. 120 M.
Hizon Street, District 2, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, since 1995 up to the present as
certified by the owner of the apartment unit. On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty, after which, trial on the merits ensued.

Trial court denied the motion to quash and upheld the validity of the search warrant. Hence
tha case at bar.

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the search was grossly infirm as the
subject search warrant authorized the police authorities to search only No. 122 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City. However, the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City.
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Issue: Whether the issuance of search warrant was valid AT A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM
THAT DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT?

Held: NO!
The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It turned out that No. 122 M.
Hizon St., Caloocan City was a concrete two-storey residential building with steel-barred
windows and a terrace

On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting of three apartments
enclosed by only one gate marked on the outside as No. 120. The different units within No.
120 Hizon St. were not numbered separately.

For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a particular
description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The

description of a place to be searched is

rule is that a

sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with

reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community
In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that even a description of the place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended. The description of the building in the application for a search warrant in
Veloso as well as in the search warrant itself refer to the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo,
City of Manila, Philippine Islands which was considered sufficient designation of the
premises to be searched.

The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different from those in
Veloso. At first glance, the description of the place to be searched in the warrant seems to
be sufficient. However, from the application for a search warrant as well as the search
warrant itself, the police officer serving the warrant cannot, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended precisely because it was wrongly described as No.
122, although it may have been located on the same street as No. 120.

Even the description of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to that house located at
No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St.

The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to
avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in
refusing to nullify the actions of the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their alleged

The controlling subject of search

knowledge of the place.

warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself

and not the place identified by the police.
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It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon St. as the subject of the
actual search. However, as indicated in the witness affidavit in support of the application for
a search warrant, No. 122 M. Hizon St. was unmistakably indicated.

Inexplicably, a few days after the search warrant was issued by the court and served at No.
120 M. Hizon St., SPO2 Teneros informed Judge Bayhon in the return of search
warrant that the warrant was properly served at 122 M. Hizon St. as indicated in the
search warrant itself.

SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that he thought the house to be
searched bore the address 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St.
But as this Court ruled in Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion,thus:

“The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store, which was the
place indicated in the warrant, even if they really intended it to be the subject of their
application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified
by the police”

“In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to
be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and
what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had
written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing
officers had in their mind.”

“This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers
to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually
searched although not that specified in the warrant[was] exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.”

Exclusionary Rule
All told, the exclusionary rule necessarily comes into play, Consequently, all the items
seized during the illegal search are prohibited from being used in evidence. Absent these
items presented by the prosecution, the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime
charged loses its basis.

As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this
exclusionary rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from
its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence.

Things not included in the S.W.

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On another note, we find disturbing the variety of the items seized by the searching team in
this case. In the return of search warrant, they admitted the seizure of cellular phones,
money and television/monitoring device items that are not within the palest ambit of
shabu paraphernalia, which were the only items authorized to be seized.

What is more disturbing is the suggestion that some items seized were not reported in the
return of search warrant, like the Fiat car, bankbooks, and money. In an attempt to justify the
presence of the car in the police station, SPO2 Teneros had to concoct a most incredible
story that the accused-appellant, whose pregnancy was already in the third trimester, drove
her car to the police station after the intrusion at her house even if the police officers had
with them several cars.

A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake

a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime

Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are:

(1) probable cause is present;

(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;

(3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;

(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and

(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
citizen.

Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating
and degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without, however,
going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity
are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
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Frank Uy & UniFish vs. BIR et al ( The search warrant is severable, and those items not
particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant )
G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000
KAPUNAN, J.

Facts:
certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the BIR that petitioners Unifish Packing Corp and Frank Uy
were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit.

Frank Uy, is selling by the thousands of cartons of canned sardines without issuing receipt.
This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. Labaria, Assistant
Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from RTC
Cebu. The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.

After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. The 1st, Search Warrant 93 VIOLATION OF SECTION 253. 2nd,
similarly docketed S.W. 93, almost identical in content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the
portions indicated in bold print.

Judge Gozo issued a third warrant S.W. 80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to
SEC. 263 Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2 Except for
the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant

On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of PNP
searched the premises of the Unifish. . They seized, among other things, the records and
documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by LAbaria with
RTC Cebu.

BIR filed against petitioners a case before DOJ. petitioners filed motions to quash the
subject search warrants with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC. But was denied, MR also denied
CA dismissed petition MR denied. Hence the case at bar.

Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in
Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom
Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued.

That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime,
for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also
dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants.

Issue: Whether the issuance and contents of Search Warrant are valid?
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Held:YES
Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched

Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin
Ho alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the same warrant
states the address as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. Parenthetically, Search
Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes St.,
Mandaue City.

In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be
found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any
difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1,
therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect
that would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.

Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two

warrants

Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants
A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy.
Search Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,
and Unifish Packing Corporation. These discrepancies are hardly relevant.

Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued NOT for search of the persons owning or
occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by
them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of
the owner or occupants of the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names.

Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place

In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-
2.

Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the
same crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears,

Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to

however, that

correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as

well as to include Unifish Packing as a party against whom the warrant was issued.

Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the
names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the
place to be searched.
 17

The alleged absence of probable cause

In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive,
not merely routine or pro forma.

The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a
valid search warrant.

The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or
doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief.

It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses,
namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of
Unifish. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree
with this contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria,

The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal
activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied
by Abos. The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias
deposition but is supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged
illegal practices was apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish.

In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade
the payment of taxes, and described the place where the documents supposedly evidencing
these schemes were located

Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company
records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the
contention that this witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he
testified. The contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.

The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made by the
judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries
to be sufficiently probing.
 18

Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized

Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject
warrants and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno, Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, and Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought
to be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these
documents from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description
thereof.

The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is

acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to
be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate
a general description in a warrant.

Theuse by the issuing judge of the terms multiple

sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash
register books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts, production record
books/inventory lists, stock cards, sales records, job order, corporate financial records, and
is therefore unacceptable considering the
bank statements/cancelled checks
circumstances of this case.

As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase &
sales invoices, however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that
the serial markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so
precisely because they are unregistered.

Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is
not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that
no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.

The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not
render the entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure
of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the
warrants remain valid.
 19

The search warrant is severable, and those items

not particularly described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant.
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to
petitioners.

Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also
taken by the enforcing officers:

belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the

The things
warrants, like those not particularly described, must be ordered
returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the constitutional provisions
regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must
be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder.

The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in
the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative
to such violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the
things to be seized.

As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the
present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated affirming the Order of
the Regional Trial Court, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the
validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with
respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal
Revenue is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises
and belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices.
 20

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional
and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants
 21

Personal Property to be Seized

People vs. Raul Nuez ( SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters,
improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet
containing P4,610 inside appellants dresser. The group also confiscated a
component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted
carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu )
G.R. No. 177148 June 30, 2009
QUISUMBING, J.

Facts:
operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna police conducted a search in the house of Raul R.
Nuez based on reports of drug possession. Upon arriving at appellants house, Brgy.
Capt. Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer
Pagkalinawan showed Nuez the warrant.

SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners,
tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet containing P4,610
inside appellants dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric
planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion
that they were acquired in exchange for shabu

Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which
appellant signed.

RTC convicted appellant. CA affirmed RTC’s decision hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the things seized are in accordance of the S.W.?

Held:NO
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the
authorities. In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only.

By the principle of ejusdem generis,

● where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words

of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar
nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the
context of the statement which would repel such inference.
 22

Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted.

Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric
planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by
the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In
seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined
for themselves which items in appellants residence they believed were proceeds of the crime
or means of committing the offense. This is, in our view, absolutely impermissible.

The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly
limit the things to be taken to those, and only
described in the warrant is to
those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they
should seize.

A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a

fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime.

Besides, any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained thereby was deemed waived when no objection was raised by
appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or
impliedly
 23

Eric Ong vs. CA & People ( the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure )
G.R. No. 132839 November 21, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.

Facts:
Respondent Judge Ariston of RTC 17 Ilocos Norte issued search warrant 17 against private
respondent Eric. On the basis of the search warrant, the PNP stationed in Laoag searched
the house of Ong, resulting in the confiscation of several firearms, parts of firearms
and ammunitions including five live ammunitions for caliber 9 mm.

Subsequently, finding that a prima facie case exists against private respondent, an
information was filed against him in the RTC 15 Loag. private respondent filed with RTC 17
in Batac a Motion to Recall the search warrant and to release seized items. RTC 17
granted motion to recall and to release seized items.

Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Norte filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent

Judge's order on the ground that the RTC Branch 17 has no more jurisdiction to act on
the Motion to Recall because there is already a pending criminal case against private
respondent arising therefrom filed in another court. MR denied.

CA reversed decision the criminal case was being heard had jurisdiction over a motion
questioning the validity of the search warrant. MR denied hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the court hearing the criminal case has the jurisdiction to decide W.O.N to
grant to motion to recall?

Held: YES.
It should be advisable that whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or
Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the
service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated
with the criminal case for orderly procedure.

The later criminal case is more substantial that the Search Warrant proceeding, and the
Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude
evidence unlawfully obtained.
 24

Erle Pendon vs. CA et al ( Search Warrant No. 181 issued by Judge Demosthenes
Magallanes NULL and VOID; 2) ordering the return of the items seized by virtue of the
said warrant to herein petitioner )
G.R. No. 84873. November 16, 1990. FIRST DIVISION
MEDIALDEA, J.

Facts:
First Lieutenant Felipe of PC filed an application for a search warrant, alleging That he was
informed and verily believes that KENNETH SIAO who may be found at KENER TRADING
located at Rizal Street has in his possession NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding
motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line
accessories.

application was subscribed before Judge Magallanes of MTC Bacolod City and supported
by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L. Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR
and Abaja. Judge Magallanes issued Search Warrant 181 commanding the search of the
property described in the warrant.

Subsequently, constabulary officers stationed in Bacolod City conducted a search of the

premises described in the search warrant and seized the following articles, to wit: 1) 272
kilos of galvanized bolts, V chuckle and U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2 feet angular bar. The
receipt was signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Sergeant and marked "from Kenneth Siao"

A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed against Kenneth Siao with the
office of the City Fiscal by the NAPOCOR. Kenneth Sia has already relinquished control of
the company over to Petitioner. office of the City Fiscal recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against Siao and the filing of a complaint for the same violation against
petitioner.

Case was raffled to Branch 47 of the same court presided over by respondent Judge
Jocson. Before his arraignment, an application for the return of the articles seized and
Quashal of the warrant by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 on the ground that the said
search warrant was illegally issued.

respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the application for the quashal
of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity of the issuance thereof. MR
denied. CA dismissed petition, finding probable cause. MR denied hence the case at bar?

Issue: Whether the search warrant was validly issued?

Held: NO!
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge
must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with.
 25

The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The
records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to
subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes.

The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had
personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the
possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be
issued. Mata v. Bayona

"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.’

"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own
inquiry on the intent and justification of the application."

Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses presented by the
applicant can hardly satisfy the same requirement. The public respondent prosecutor
admitted in his memorandum that the questions propounded were pre-typed.

The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti-fencing law.
The four (4) questions propounded could hardly support a finding of probable cause.

The first question was on the personal circumstances of the deponents. The second
and third were leading questions answerable by yes or no. The fourth question was
on how the deponents knew about their answers in the second and third questions.

There was also no statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought to be seized were
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any
knowledge that a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were
the proceeds thereof.

Searching Questions
[T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his
witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long
as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one
authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with
certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
 26

The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It
may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination
or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required
information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.

questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant’s witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general
manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.

Things to be seized described with PARTICULARITY

The law requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity.
The items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive
assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so
general that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading,
the premises searched.

Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioner’s petition before respondent Court of Appeals and
which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and selling
scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles.

Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under the list of
personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s
sought to be seized were:

a) the subject of an offense;

b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and
c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense

1) declaring Search Warrant No. 181 issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and
VOID; 2) ordering the return of the items seized by virtue of the said warrant to herein
petitioner; and 3) permanently enjoining respondents from using in evidence the articles
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 in Criminal Case No. 5657
 27

Harry Stone Hill vs. Jose Diokno

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
CONCEPCION, C.J.

Facts:
Grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and
seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

The ff reasons:

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;

(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and

(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law

Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by resolution dated June 1962, the
writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned since said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners.

it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

But, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Hence the Case at bar.
 28

Issue:
1. Whether the search warrant is null and void?
2. Whether the evidence seized in petitioner’s residence may be used against him?

Held:
1. YES. Whether the search warrant is null and void?
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.

The Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and

(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

The same were issued upon applications stating that the;

“Natural and juridical person "violation

therein named had committed a

of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,

Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In
other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said

applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed

were abstract.

As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto
a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.
 29

It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws

This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted

to outlaw the so-called general warrants. that the things to be

seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.

2nd Issue: NO Whether the evidence seized in petitioner’s residence may be used against
him?

Moncado vs. People's Court, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence
against petitioners must be abandoned.

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege.

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.

if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there
is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence
of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
of evidence to establish a probable cause.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature
thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution
 30

Angel Nasiad et al vs. CTA ( petitioners may not invoke the Constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure they lack legal standing )
G.R. No. L-29318 November 29, 1974 2nd Div.
FERNANDO, J.

Facts:
It is undoubted that there was a raid conducted on a vessel owned by a certain Jose Lopez.
followed thereafter in the afternoon by the seizure of certain documents found in the hotel
room of the charterer, one Tomas Velasco, both of whom are third parties.

As noted in the appealed decision, the issue submitted "for resolution is the legality of the
seizure made by the Collector of Customs of Davao of the 1,408 sacks of copra and 86
sacks of coffee allegedly owned by the petitioners On board the ship and seizure of
documents inside the hotel. "Petitioners claim that the food stuff in question were
purchased in Kiamba, Lumatin, and Lumasal, all in the province of Cotabato.

Inasmuch as the said goods were not imported and of foreign origin, they are not legally
subject to seizure and forfeiture. They likewise contend that the forfeiture made by the
Collector of Customs of Davao was invalid because the said forfeiture was based on
documents and papers which were illegally seized by agents of the Government through
violence and intimidation

Issue: Whether the search and seizure carried out on board the ship and hotel are valid

Held:YES
They have no personality to contest the searches and seizures complained of, since at the
time the searches and seizures were allegedly conducted, the vessel belonged to Jose G.
Lopez and was chartered by Tomas Velasco, and the hotel room was occupied by said
Velasco and his wife, and so petitioners not being parties-in-interest over the so-called
Indonesian documents and effects ..., petitioners may not invoke the Constitutional right
against unlawful search and seizure

There is force and substance to the contention that Stonehill v. Diokno is inapplicable. As
was so clearly pointed out in the opinion rendered by the then Chief Justice Concepcion:
"Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
 31

Jose Burgos Sr. et al vs. Chief of Staff ( subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice )
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
ESCOLIN, J. En Banc

Facts
petition for certiorari is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued by respondent Judge
Ernani Cruz. under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,

business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively,
were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question. It is contended by petitioners, however, that the above mentioned
documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon
which a warrant may validly issue

Issue: Whether the issuance of S.W. was valid?

Held NO!
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar,
the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.

Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or
has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing
is a
the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..."
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause.
 32

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
the Constitution requires no less than personal
witnesses he may produce;
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of
prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts,
lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court
 33

Search Warrant Issuance

Elizalde Malaloan et al vs. CA

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994
REGALADO, J. En Banc

Facts:
Lt. Absalon filed with the RTC Caloocan an application for search warrant. The search
warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms ) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview,
Quezon City.

RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant. members of the CAPCOM, armed with
subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to. According to
CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive
documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search.

Petitioners presented a Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally
Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court. RTC Q.C. denying the prayer for the
quashal of the search warrant, validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same
falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b)
of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing
court (National Capital Judicial Region);

CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence the case at bar. The application for the search warrant, it
is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal
actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been
issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.

Issue: Whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the
search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction.

Held: YES.
No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no
such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.

In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and
although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return
thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does not become functus officio
but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled.

On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at 10
days but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be
enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described
therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
 34

We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the
territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a
constitutional question.

It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the
exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be
used as evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without
precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was
anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.

Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:

1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue
search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search
warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances
that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give
due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing
the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be
filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed
waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is
pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the
warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose.

Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion
to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies.

In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by

the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be
subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the
same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property
 35

seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the
criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is
charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with
concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will
try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary
jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Search Warrant merely a process

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery.

It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because
of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on
search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally
issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.

Invariably, a judicial process is defined as

● a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law;

● also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs,
warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers.
 36

Warrantless Searches
Consented Search

People vs. Kagui Malasugui ( Consented search When one voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from
later complaining thereof. )
G.R. No. L-44335 July 30, 1936
DIAZ, J. En Banc

Facts:
Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, was found lying on the ground, with
several wounds in the head. He died as a result of this wound shortly afterward in the
Cotabato Hospital. The death of Tan Why was imputed to the herein accused who was
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide

He was convicted of said crime and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The accused appealed
therefrom and assigns five errors as committed by the lower court, which may be briefly
summarized as follows:

● In having denied his petition for the return of the articles taken from him during the
search of his person, without the corresponding judicial warrant;

When Tan Why was found on the morning in question, he was still alive and able to answer
laconically "Kagui" asked who had attacked him. whereupon Lieutenant A. Jacaria ordered
his immediate arrest The accused was arrested

and after he had been brought to Lieutenant Jacaria said lieutenant asked him for the
bracelets and he then voluntarily and without protest produced what now appear in the
record.

He was later searched, without opposition or protest on his part, and it was discovered
that he also had the pocketbook containing P92 in bills, Tan Why's identification card and
a memorandum of amounts with some Chinese characters. In one of the pockets of his
pants was found some change, making the total amount of money found in his possession
P92.68.

The appellant had to be searched after he had voluntarily produced the bracelets Exhibit A
and placed them on Lieutenant Jacaria's table, because, upon being asked if he had any
thing, he tremblingly answered in the negative.

The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly
and through intimidation taken from him the bracelets.

Issue: Whether the CONSENTED SEARCH WAS VALID?

 37

Held: YES.
There is nothing of record to corroborate the appellant's imputation to said two officers; and
it is unbelievable that they so acted because they were induced by no other motive than to
comply with their duties as agents of authority.

The appellant permitted them to search his person and to take from him the articles in
question to be used as evidence against him in due time; at least, he neither made any
objection nor even muttered a bit of protest.

Consequently, his contention that he was subjected to the rigor of an unreasonable search
to dispossess him of his effects without judicial warrant, and that the court should have
ordered their return to him when he so formally requested before the trial, is unfounded.

When one voluntarily submits to a search or

consents to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The
right to be secure from unreasonable search may,
like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.
 38

Danilo Villanueva vs. People ( No Valid Consented Search; It Must be Voluntary,

Intelligent, Specific and Unaccompanied by duress and Coercion; Accused Aquitted )
G.R. No. 199042 November 17, 2014
SERENO, CJ 1st Div.

Facts:

Petitioner Danilo was charged with violation of RA 9165. Witnesses testimonies reveal that a
Complaint was filed by Resco against Danilo for allegedly shooting the former along C-3
Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter, Resco together with witnesses
officers proceeded to the house of Danilo Villanueva abd brought him to police station.

They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him. They invited him to the
police station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic
sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants.

RTC Caloocan convicted Danilo. CA affirmed RTCs decision. MR denied by CA. Hence the
case at bar.

Issue: Whether the warrantless search of drugs was valid?

Held: NO.

WAIVER OF ILLEGAL ARREST

Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. The circumstances
that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none of the
exceptions that would make the warrantless arrest lawful.

Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the

irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is
considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest.
 39

warrantless search conducted is not among those

allowed by law.

A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal

search. Records have established that both the arrest and the search were made without
a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his
he is not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest
arrest,
the legality of the search.

The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a
moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There
could not have been a seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found
inside the left pocket of accused-appellant’s pants.

Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While this type may seemingly fall under the
consented search exception, we reiterate that "consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence."

Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion.

In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket. The
testimony of the police officer on the matter is clear The evidence obtained is not
admissible.

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit
of the poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant
with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution:

"Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding." Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of
accused appellant cannot be sustained. This being the case, we see no more reason to
discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the confiscated drug.
 40

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest

People vs. Victor Cogaed ( No Valid warrantless arrest incidental to a lawful arrest and
none compliance of the requirements of a Stop & Frisk Search; Acquited
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
LEONEN, J. 3rd Div

Facts:
Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan of La Union ce Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI
Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text
message from an unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be
transporting marijuana" from Barangay Lunoy to the Poblacion of San Gabriel La
Union

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect. A passenger jeepney
from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who
were carrying marijuana. Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later
identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.

Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a
favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue
bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.

Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and Dayao and brought them to the police station. Cogaed and
Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags inside the station. at the police station
PO3 Campit requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. At the police station,
Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head. The bags were also opened,
but Cogaed never knew what was inside. A total of 17K grams were collected from
Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.

Both were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs RA 9165. case was raffled to
RTC San Fernando La Union. Dayao’s case, 14 years old, dismissed exempt from criminal
liability. Cogaed’s case ensued. RTC found Cogaed guilty.

trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time
was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was about
to do so or that had just done so.

Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered illegal.
However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed
"waived his right to object to such irregularity" when "he did not protest when SPO1
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag." CA affirmed RTC.
Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches . Hence the case at bar
 41

Issue: Whether there is a valid Search incidental to a valid arrest?

Held: NO! Accused Acquitted

Search incidental to a lawful arrest.

There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of
Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant.
Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that;

● a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and

● the search conducted within the vicinity and
● withinreach by the person arrested

is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest.
For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful
arrest.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the
instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the
arrest was made.

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
 42

At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur:

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and

(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

Both elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within
plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at
that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not
have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

"stop and frisk" search

On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime. The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer.

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not
comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal,
about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney
driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated
by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s
basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with
a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. CA, one of the earliest cases adopting
the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the
suspicious circumstances as probable cause

probable cause was defined as "a

For warrantless searches,

reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

 43

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to

warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged."

It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a

"genuine reason" to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception.
it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A

genuine reason must exist, in light of the police

officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers were initially informed about a place
frequented by people abusing drugs. When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a
man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner. The suspicion
increased when the man avoided the police officers.

These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs.
These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and]
investigate."

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant.

The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed.
Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to
Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
 44

"stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:

● (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies
the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and

● (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer.

The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an
informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio
City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant
pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police
apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag.
The bag contained marijuana leaves.

This court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and
seizure. It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence
obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was
acquitted.

No valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did
not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated.

Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive

environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private
space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is
● specific
● knowing,
● intelligent, and
● free from any coercion.

In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. coercive atmosphere created by the
presence of the police officer can be discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac
during cross-examination:
 45

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right

1. police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.

2. The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his
or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search.

3. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the
person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights.

4. There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to
privacy requires no less.

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures]
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the
exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
 46

Stop and Frisk Search Terry Doctrine

Romeo Posadas vs. CA & People ( US Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the
purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest.; Smith and Wensson )
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
GANCAYCO, J.

Facts:
in the morning Pat. Ursicio et al both members of the Integrated National Police of Davao
were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within
the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag
and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith
& Wesson revolver two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear
gas) grenade,3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.

They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the
same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in RTC Davao City

RTC found accused guilty. CA affirmed RTCs decision hence the case at bar. Hence, the
herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or
search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner
are inadmissible in evidence against him.

Issue: Whether such seizure without a warrant was valid?

Held: YES!
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed,
the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the
basis of a probable cause.

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with
the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much
indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such
an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
 47

The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information

This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men
repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they apparently
conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced
officer, the behaviour of the men indicated that they were sizing up the store for an armed
robbery.

When the police officer approached the men and asked them for their names, they mumbled
a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and frisked him.
Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and found
another weapon. In the prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the
defense of illegal search and seizure was put up.

US Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal
behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest."

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures has not been violated.
 48

Rizaldy Sanchez vs. People ( NO VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH, SEARCH

INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST, STOP & FRISK AND PLAIN VIEW; Hence
ACQUITTED )
G.R. No. 204589 November 19, 2014
MENDOZA, J. 2nd Div

Facts:

Acting on the information that Jacinta Marciano, was selling drugs to tricycle drivers,
Police officers was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to conduct an
operation. While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the
house of Jacinta.

After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the
house. The group chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to
alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.

SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box. Rizaldy agreed.
While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained
a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was a regulated drug, the
group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the police
station.

RTC convicted Rizaldy. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe
that Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous drug and such suspicion was
confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying. CA affirmed RTCs decision, It
concluded that the confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic from Sanchez
was pursuant to a valid search. MR denied. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the warrantless search was valid?

Held: NO.
An assiduous scrutiny of the factual backdrop of this case shows that the search and seizure
on Sanchez was unlawful.

After going over the records of the case at bench, the Court finds some facts of weight and
substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court
which cast doubt on the guilt of Sanchez. CA confused the search incidental to a lawful
arrest with the stop-and-frisk principle, a well recognized exception to the warrant
requirement.
 49

SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry stop- and-frisk search is
entirely different from and should not be confused with the search incidental to a
lawful arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The distinctions have been made clear in Malacat v. CA;

“In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can
be made -- the process cannot be reversed.”

A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It bears

emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is

lawful arrest must precede the search of

beyond cavil that a

a person and his belongings; the process cannot be

reversed.

Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There

was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search . Arrest is defined under
Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.

Under Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest. Even casting aside the petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of
this case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was effected by the
police operatives upon the person of Sanchez before conducting the search on him.

It appears from the above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta that after they caught up with
the tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted from it; that he noticed Sanchez
holding a match box; and that he requested Sanchez if he could see the contents of the
The arrest of
match box, to which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him.
Sanchez was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of
the shabu inside the match box.
 50

WARRANTLESS ARREST
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the warrantless
search and seizure must be struck down as illegal because the warrantless arrest was
unlawful. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules
on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person,

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to
operate, two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (

2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to
Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.

Sanchez was merely seen by the police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug
peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such
acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.

On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for
its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed and
the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
apprehended has committed it. These elements would be lacking in the case at bench.

It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of
Section 5 have been complied with in this warrantless arrest. When the police officers
chased the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu
from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the
tricycle.

Probable cause in warrantless search has been held to signify a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
 51

The police officers in this case had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did
inside the house of the known drug dealer.

Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the drug dealer was
conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to warrant the police officers
to draw a reasonable suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu from her and
possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In other words, there was no
overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of
shabu. Verily, probable cause in thiscase was more imagined than real.

TERRY SEARCH
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" search in the case at bench.

Elucidating on what constitutes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the
Court in People v. Chua wrote:

A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
should
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer
properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct,
in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,

It nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him.

The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police
officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to

be held has weapons (or It should

contraband) concealed about him.

therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure

should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
 52

In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a reasonable suspicion

justifying a Terry stop-and-frisk search had been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In
Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,

a policeman chanced upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who appeared to be

"high" on drugs as he was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying
manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when approached
and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet,
it contained marijuana.

The Court held that the policeman had sufficient reason to accost Manalili to
determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with
the fact that the area was a haven for drug addicts.

The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1 Amposta
as sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on
Sanchez.

Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were
innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of an
experienced and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu in his possession, or
that he was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer.

There was even no allegation that Sanchez left the house of the drug dealer in haste or that
he acted in any other suspicious manner. There was no showing either that he tried to evade
or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he attempted to flee when the police officers
approached him. Truly, his acts and the surrounding circumstances could not have
engendered any reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officers that a criminal
activity had taken place or was afoot.

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in
plain view. The Court disagrees.

The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:

(1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;

(2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and

(3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
 53

Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the
subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception.

First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested.

Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered, and

Third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a
match box being then held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to
the police officers.

In the light of the foregoing, there being no lawful warrantless arrest and warrantless search
and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized from Sanchez is inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the accused must be acquitted and exonerated from the criminal
charge of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

PROCEDURE

Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from procedural infirmity. Under
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question the CA
judgment,final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review on certiorari,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.16 By filing
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Sanchez therefore clearly availed himself of
the wrong remedy.

Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for certiorari as a
petition for review under Rule 45, in accordance with the liberal spirit and in the interest of
substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed within the reglementary period for
filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.

The case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence, there is ample justification to
treat this petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature
of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and the character of
the relief sought.18 Here, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," the petition
actually avers errors of judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which are the appropriate
subjects of a petition for review on certiorari.
 54

Check Point Search

People vs. Rodelio Exala et al

G.R. No. 76005. April 23, 1993.
BELLOSILLO, J 1st Div

Facts:
at a police
A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Restituto B. Bocalan was stopped
checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection regarding
unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. With Bocalan were his co-accused.
a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there
were firearms inside. They answered in the negative.

Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He
noticed a black leather bag measuring about one (1) foot wide and two (2) feet long with
its sides bulging. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened.

He found what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana, napakaraming marijuana!"

At this juncture, the three (3) remained motionless in their seats and appeared petrified with
fear. They were brought to the police station that same night for further investigation.

Thereafter, Rodelio C. Exala et al were charged for violation of RA 6425. Bocalan was held
guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment. Others were convicted as
accomplices and received lighter penalties. Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only
by this Court, is now before Us assailing his conviction; hence, We deal only with him in this
appeal.

Bocalan further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against
him since it was obtained through a warrantless search.

Issue: Whether the seizure of drugs was in accordance of a valid warrantless search?

Held:YES
Stop & Search
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a
warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already
been upheld by this Court. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these
checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions.
 55

some probable
If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of
cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the
commission of an offense.

However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the general
rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and
belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a
lawful arrest.

The case before Us is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a

military or police checkpoint. The checkpoint in the instant case was established in
line with "Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to search for unlicensed
firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing
through it.

He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that
moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and
nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang.

The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar
apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal,
provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive search
that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the
prohibited stuff. Significantly, there was no sign of any protest or objection to the
search. The accused remained silent even after their arrest.

Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the
absence of any protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on
their professed innocence but also confirms their acquiescence to the search. Clearly
then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. In one
case

We held, When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof The right to be secure
from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly"

The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of
the prohibited drug in their possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was
made while a crime was committed.
 56

Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful
transportation of marijuana. 11 Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not
require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for
dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug. The law simply provides thus
 57

Plain View

People vs. Mari Musa ( Plain view no applicable to drugs found in kitchen )
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
ROMERO, J. 3rd Div

Facts:

Leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND based at Calarian, Zamboanga instructed Sgt. Amado

to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City.
Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place.

So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a
NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer
had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the appearance of
Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.

Next day buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, After
receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado
Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and
inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back
towards his companions and raised his right hand.

Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere
in the kitchen. RTC convicted Mari hence the case at bar. appellant next assails the seizure
and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM
agents found in the appellant's kitchen.

Issue: Whether the plain view search and seizure of drugs at the kitchen was valid?

Held: NO!.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room.
Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents
searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen.

Theplastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain

view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents
had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic
bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of
the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in
this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more
evidence.
 58

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the
kitchen, they
appellant what the bag contained.

When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker
v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM
agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the
bag had they not forcibly opened it.

Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic

what may be said to be

bag because it was within their "plain view,"

the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic

bag and not the marijuana.
The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag
clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.

We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does
not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the
damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that
the appellant sold marijuana

Warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a

suspect's lawful arrest

may
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest,

extend beyond the person of the one arrested to

include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control.
 59

Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the

right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt.

Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application
of the doctrine:

“ What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused.

The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be

● a warrant for another object,

● hot pursuit,
● search incident to lawful arrest, or
● some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused

-------- And permits the warrantless seizure.

Extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it

Of course, the
is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.

The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied

● where apolice officer is not searching for evidence against the

accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view"
doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is
not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.

Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
 60

People vs. Salanguit

G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19, 2001
Mendoza, J 2nd Div

Facts:
Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in RTC Dasma Cavite to search the residence of
accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He
presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was
able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant.

The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Judge
Espanol. a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the
residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.

Police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the
house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house.

They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-
appellant refused to sign it.

After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station. RTC
convicted Accused hence the case at bar. Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on
the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant
pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine among other things

Issue: Whether the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant
pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine?

Held:
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
in evidence.35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.36 The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in
seizing the marijuana in this case.
 61

Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu
first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view
doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found.

As has been explained:

What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.

The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused -and permits the
warrantless seizure.

Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is

immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain
view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.

The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a
search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control.

The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a
weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.

The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether
prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its
recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been
recovered from the cabinet,

Apparent Illegality of the Evidence ( halatang halata

na illegal )
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify
their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa39 in which we declared inadmissible
the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in
plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents.
 62

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when

he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.

In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the
form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the
contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor
was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered.

Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a
warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the
marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation
of the drug must be upheld.
 63

Mcdonald vs. US ( Moreover, when we move to the scene of the crime, the reason for
the absence of a search warrant is even less obvious. When the officers heard the
adding machine and, at the latest, when they saw what was transpiring in the room,
they certainly had adequate grounds for seeking a search warrant.
335 U.S. 451 December 13, 1948
Justice DOUGLAS

Facts:
Petitioners were tried without a jury in the District Court for the District of Columbia on an
indictment in four counts, charging offenses of carrying on a lottery known as the numbers
game in violation of 22 D.C. Code, They were found guilty on all counts.

Petitioner McDonald, who had previously been arrested for numbers operations, had been
under police observation for several months prior to the arrest. During this period and while
he was maintaining a home in the District of Columbia, he rented a room in the
residence of a Mrs. Terry, who maintained a rooming house in the District.

His comings and goings at this address were under surveillance by the police for about two
months. They had observed him enter the rooming house during the hours in which
operations at the headquarters of the numbers game are customarily carried on.

On the day of the arrest three police officers surrounded the house. They did not have a
warrant for arrest nor a search warrant. While outside the house, one of the officers thought
that he heard an adding machine. Believing that the numbers game was in process, the
officers sought admission to the house.

After searching the rooms on the ground floor, they proceeded to the second floor. The door
of an end bedroom was closed. But one of the officers stood on a chair and looked through
the transom. He observed both petitioners in the room, as well as numbers slips,
money piled on the table, and adding machines. He yelled to McDonald to open the
door and McDonald did so. Both petitioners were arrested,

Issue: Whether machines and papers should have been suppressed as evidence and
returned to petitioner McDonald due to unlawful search?

Held: YES.
Moreover, when we move to the scene of the crime, the reason for the absence of a search
warrant is even less obvious. When the officers heard the adding machine and, at the latest,
when they saw what was transpiring in the room, they certainly had adequate grounds for
seeking a search warrant.

This is not a case where the officers, passing by on the street, hear a shot and a cry for help
and demand entrance in the name of the law. They had been following McDonald and
keeping him under surveillance for two months at this rooming house.

The prosecution now tells us that the police had no probable cause for obtaining a
warrant until, shortly before the arrest, they heard the sound of the adding machine
coming from the rooming house. And there is vague and general testimony in the record that
 64

on previous occasions the officers had sought search warrants but had been denied
them. But those statements alone do not lay the proper foundation for dispensing
with a search warrant.

Where, as here, officers are not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling
reasons to justify the absence of a search warrant. A search without a warrant demands
exceptional circumstances, as we held in Johnson v. United States, supra. We will not
assume that where a defendant has been under surveillance for months, no search warrant
could have been obtained.

We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high
function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a
magistrate between the citizen and the police.

It follows from what we have said that McDonald's motion for suppression of the evidence
and the return of the property to him should have been granted.
 65

Prosecution of offenses p.10

Juris. Over the subject matter v. juris over person of accused
Jurisdiction and Venue

Angelina Lopez et al vs. Jdg. Cesar Paras et al ( it would appear that if the private
document subject of the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the
act of falsification the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause
damage was committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Angeles )
G.R. No. L-25795 October 29, 1966
DIZON, J. En Banc

Facts:
petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as administrator of the intestate estate Sps. Mejia & Lazatin and
others entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad Lazatin for the development and
subdivision of three parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate. Subsequently
Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra Development
Corporation.

Petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in CFI Q.C. for the rescission of said contract
for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra
Development Corporation, in turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a
complaint against petitioners for an alleged violation of the provisions of Art. 172 in relation
to those of Art. 171, par. 4, of the RPC.

After conducting a preliminary examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal of

Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information charging petitioners with the
crime of falsification of a private document upon the allegation that

they made it appear in the contract mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was
the "guardian" of the minor George L. Mejia and that Angelina M. Lopez was similarly the
"guardian" of the minor Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they
were not the guardians of said minors on the date of the execution of the document.

Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal of Angeles reinvestigated the case
to give them an opportunity to present exculpatory evidence.

And after the conclusion of the reinvestigation the parties charged moved for the
dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no
jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged
false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city.

Fiscal's continued failure to act on the motion to dismiss the case, petitioners filed a motion
to quash. judge denied said motion to quash and reset the arraignment of all the
defendants. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and decide the allged
falsification of private document?
 66

Held: NO.
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed
not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. Thus,
under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have
original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction.

It is clear that petitioners are not charged with having used a falsified document, in violation
of the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

The charge against them is that of having falsified a private document by knowingly and
willfully stating therein that Aurora M. Villasor and Angelina M. Lopez were the "guardians" of
their minor brothers George and Alexander, respectively, when in fact they knew that, at the
time they made such written statement, it was Carolina M. de Castro who was the judicial
guardian of said minors.

In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners — a claim supported by the record — that
Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora M. Villasor signed the private document wherein they are
alleged to have made a false statement of fact, the first within the territorial jurisdiction
of Makati, and the second within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City, both within
the province of Rizal.

We now come to consider the question of when and where is the offense of falsification of a
private document deemed consummated or committed. Upon this point, We have ruled

clearly and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that the crime of
falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Article
304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is

consummated when such document is actually

falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person,
whether such falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was
intended.
 67

Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it would appear that if the private document
subject of the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the act of falsification
was
the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause damage
committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Angeles

And that whether the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal
use for which it was intended, or was signed by the other contracting party within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in no wise a material or essential element of
the crime of falsification of the private document,

Nor could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the City Court of Angeles has, no
jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond question.

DEMURRER vs. MOTION TO QUASH

Respondents, however, contend that the motion to quash filed by the defendants necessarily
assumes the truth of the allegation of the information to the effect that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City and that they may not be allowed
to disprove this at this early stage of the proceedings.

This is not exactly the law on the matter at present. The law MENTION ABOVE is applicable
to a demurrer — now obsolete — to an information.

The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is manifestly
broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects apparent upon the face
of the complaint or information but extends to issues arising out of extraneous facts,
as shown by the circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2 of
said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability,
insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the determination
of which a preliminary trial is required.

Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles over the criminal offense charged
being patent, it would be highly unfair to compel the parties charged to undergo trial in said
court and suffer all the embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense charged in the
information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within
the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, said court is hereby restrained and
prohibited from further proceedings therein. Costs against the private respondents.
 68

People vs. Jdg. Nathanial Gorospe & Parulan ( Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad
check, may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and
damage may arise independently in separate places
G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan is an authorized wholesale dealer of petitioner SMC
in Bulacan. He was charged with Violation BP 22 before RTC of Pampanga and also for
Estafa. Trial court ruled that judgment is hereby rendered dismissing these cases for lack of
jurisdiction.

2 check were involved, each the subject of different penal laws and with different basic
elements:

1. Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank in the sum of P86K in

favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The
check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga,
where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer, who then
deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando
Branch,

SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of
funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is
the subject of the charge of BP 22

2. Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB check P11K in favor of SMC, which was
received also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for
the spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to
the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the
Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn deposited the check with the SMC
depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga.

MC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the
drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the
prosecution for Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art 315 par. 2d of RPC

Issue: Whether the court of Pamgpanga has jurisdiction over the 2 criminal cases?

Held: YES.
Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in
Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically provides:
 69

SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted —

(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential
elements of the offense.

For BP 22, elements of deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An essential
element of that offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds. makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check a special
offense punishable thereunder

In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing
offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province
has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking
cognizance of the Case will exclude the others.

Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing offense.

Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places
(People vs. Yabut, supra).

In thisdeceit took place in San Fernando,

case,

Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in

Bulacan where the check was dishonored by the
drawee bank in that place (See People vs. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction
may, therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.

Deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga , ESTAFA

Par. 2d
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely drawn
thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. "What is of
decisive importance is the delivery thereat. The delivery of the instrument is the final act
essential to its consummation as an obligation"

For although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan,
that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor
was not the person who could take the check as a holder, that is, as a payee or
indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto.

The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person
who takes it as a holder, which means "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in
possession of it, or the bearer, thereof"
 70

Thus, said representative had to forward the check to the SMC Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga, which was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat who, in turn,
deposited it at the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. The element of
deceit, therefore, took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where the rubber check was
legally issued and delivered so that jurisdiction could properly be laid upon the Court
in that locality.

The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix or
determine the place where they were executed.

What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument
is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.

An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is revocable (Ogden,
Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And the issuance as well as the delivery of the
check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of
a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof"

Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from
one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto. Thus, the penalizing clause of the
provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: "By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check,"

Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of the worthless
checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Bulacan, conferring upon a court in that
locality jurisdiction to try the case.

In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be

continuing in nature.

It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance and that the
Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act
of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check The case, therefore, could
have been filed also in Bulacan.

Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the

offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga.
FAMILY COURTS ORIG & EXCLUSIVE JURISDIC.

People vs. Jdg. Theresa Yadao et al

G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012
ABAD, J
 71

Facts:
Combined forces of PNP killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang2
along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal
Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out
between the police and those who were slain.

After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers
involved, including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson et al. On review, however, the Office of
the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the police
officers involved before the Sandiganbayan

Upon respondents’ motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the
RTC of Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher.

The parents of two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing that they were minors.
Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the informations to show such minority
and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the assignment of
the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for recall was
denied.

Prosecution filed an omnibus motion before Branch 81, praying for the re-raffle of Criminal
Case to the family courts in view of the changes in the two informations. Judge Yadao
issued an order, denying the prosecution’s motion for re-raffle to a family court on the
ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applies only to living minors?

Held: No

The prosecution points out that, although this Court’s October 7, 2003 Resolution directed a
re-raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the prosecution in the meantime amended
the informations to reflect the fact that two of the murder victims were minors. For this
reason, the Executive Judge should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to
Section 5 of R.A. 8369.

The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family
courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the
victim is a minor
72
 73

Lutgarda Cruz vs. CA et al ( Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law
requires the court to resolve )
G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002
Carpio, J 3rd Div.

Facts:
City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Document before the Manila RTC. Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the
City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the
sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other
surviving heirs.

After trial on the merits , the trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner on the
ground of reasonable doubt, on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the
surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan.

petitioner filed MR assailing the trial courts ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Trial Court denied MR. Petitioner asserts that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction
over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is outside the trial courts territorial jurisdiction.
Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the civil aspect of the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of Manila RTC
even subject property is in Bulacan?

Held: YES.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire
criminal jurisdiction.

1. The court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter.

2. The court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed.
3. The court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through
falsification of a public document.

The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over
the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the courts
authority.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused,
and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily
exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve.
 74

One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime.
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability x x x includes
restitution.

The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless
reserved by the offended party. In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the
civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action.

Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on
reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial court had
jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if
the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.
 75

Jose Miranda et al vs. Virgilio Tuliao ( Cusody of the law vs. Jurisdiction over the
person)
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners.
petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. Miranda is still
at large.

Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a

Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court.

new Presiding Judge Anghad, took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the
Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan

Issue: Whether the court must acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to grant
motion to quash?

Held: NO

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail,
but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where
the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of
the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
 76

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person.

Custody of the law

● Required before the court can act upon the application for bail,
○ But is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accuse

● accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender

● signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law

● literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused

● acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.

One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person

● such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before

arraignment to quash the warrant.

one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law,

● such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.

BAIL
Application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the
custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we held that [t]he purpose of bail is to secure
ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.

There is, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the
jurisdiction of the court.

This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are:
 77

motions to dismiss on
(1) in civil cases, the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are
included;

(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack

of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and

● The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.

(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.

● Third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process
forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

in criminal cases,
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far,

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is

deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, EXCEPT in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of
the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person.

Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody
of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of
the law.
 78

The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused
who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under
the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor
a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to
quash a warrant of arrest:

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications
for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest

Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the

neither jurisdiction over the

processes of the court even though there is

person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the

special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first

submit himself to the custody of the law.

 79

Adherence of Jurisdiction

People vs. Lorenzo Paderna ( It is now a settled rule of law that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action, 3 and that once acquired, jurisdiction is retained until the case is finally
terminated )
G.R. No. L-28518 January 29, 1968
CASTRO, J. En Banc

Facts:
Appellant Lorenzo Paderna was prosecuted in CFI Negors Occidental for unlawful
possession of four packs of untaxed imported cigarettes known locally as "blue seal"
cigarettes. After trial, the court found Paderna "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Republic Act 4097"

He then appealed to the CA where he moved to quash the information on the ground that
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try the case. He contended that Republic Act 4097,
which punished the unlawful possession of untaxed article with a "fine of not less than ten
times the amount of the specific tax due on the articles found but not less than two hundred
pesos nor more than five thousand pesos and . . . imprisonment of from four months and
one day to four years and two months, had been amended by Republic Act 4713

and that the penalty for the same offense was reduced to a fine of not less than fifty pesos
nor more than two hundred pesos and imprisonment of not less than five days nor more than
thirty-days, if the appraised value . . . of the article does not exceed five hundred pesos."

The result is that the case was now cognizable only by the city court of La Carlota City,
this, according to the appellant, for the reason that criminal statutes should be given
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused.

Upon the other hand, the Solgen contended that the CFI of Negros Occidental, having
validly acquired jurisdiction under Republic Act 4097, could not thereafter be divested of it.

Issue: Whether the jurisdiction of CFI Negros over the case was divested upon the
enactment of RA 4713?

Held: YES. Since it was filed after the enactment of RA 4713

It is now a settled rule of law that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action, 3 and that once acquired, jurisdiction is
retained until the case is finally terminated.

In this respect, the Solicitor General is correct. But the Solicitor General nonetheless has
overlooked the important and cogent fact that both the commission of the offense and the
filing of the information in this case took place after the enactment of Republic Act 4713 on
June l8, 1966.
 80

Thus, the offense is alleged to have been committed on July 25, 1966; the information was
filed by the city attorney on August 8, 1966. Consequently, jurisdiction over this case should
be determined under the provisions of Republic Act 4713. Since the penalty provided by this
latter statute is a fine of not less than P50 nor more than P200 and imprisonment of not less
than 5 nor more than 30 days because the value of the cigarettes does not exceed P500,
this case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city court of La Carlota City.

To begin with, what the appellant should have filed is a motion to dismiss this case, not a
motion to quash the information. The rule that objection to the jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings is not waived by a failure to file a motion to quash,
does not mean that a motion to quash based on that ground may be filed at any stage of the
action.

Under the rules of a motion to quash an

criminal procedure,

information may be filed only before the defendant

enters his plea. 2 Nevertheless, we will brush aside this technicality, and treat
the appellant's motion as one to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
 81

Angelina Alonto vs. People

G.R. No. 140078 December 9, 2004
AZCUNA, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Private complainant Violeta Tizon testified that she was engaged in the business of buying
and selling jewelry. Sometime in September 1990, private complainant's aunt, Flordeliz
Bernardo, introduced petitioner to her. petitioner purchased several pieces of Singaporean
jewelry worth P100,000,

As partial payment for the jewelry purchased in the first two transactions petitioner issued
BPI chekcs P12k. When presented for payment at Interbank, it was dishonored by reason of
"account closed.

Petitioner was charged with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. 22. RTC rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty of three (3) counts of violation of B.P. 22. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.

Issue: Whether RTC has lot its jurisdiction over the case by the enacment of RA 7691,
Judicial Reorganization Act?

Held: NO
This supposition is erroneous. In this Court's Administrative Circular No. 09-94, dated June
14, 1994, the guidelines state that as a consequence of the amendment, the Regional Trial
Courts no longer have original jurisdiction over offenses where the offense is punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of the fine.

When the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, acquired jurisdiction over the case, hearings
were conducted on May 4, 1993, June 9, 1993, August 4, 1993, and August 24, 1993.

The effectivity of R.A. No. 7691 on April 15, 1994 did

not divest the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 85, of its jurisdiction over Criminal Cases
It has been ruled that where a court or tribunal has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to hear the case until its final determination is
not affected by new legislation vesting such jurisdiction in another tribunal,

The exception being where

● the statute expressly so provides or

● is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment,

A situation that does not obtain in this case.

 82

Delima vs. Juanita Guerrero et al ( subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law
in the manner and form prescribed by law. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425,
will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the RTC)
G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
VELASCO, JR., J

Facts:
Inquiries at the Senate and the house about the proliferation of dangerous drugs at NBP led
to the filing of complaints with the DOJ against De Lima

Petitioner, through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the
Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors
and the Secretary of Justice. petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her.

Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari
assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her. Petitions are
pending before the CA.

In the absence of a restraining order issued by the CA, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the
conduct of the preliminary investigation recommended the filing of Informations against
petitioner De Lima. three Informations were filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-
accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City.

One of the Informations raffled off to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge. This
Information charging petitioner for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section
26(b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash one of the reasons is the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged against petitioner. She claimed that:

● Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery a
felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the
former Sec. of Justice with Salary Grade 31

● For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information is a
violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try
the case considering that the acts described in the Information were intimately
related to her position as the Secretary of Justice.

However respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order finding probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima. Hence the case at bar.
 83

Issue:Whether the RTC has the jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165
averred in the assailed Information.?

Held: YES! NOT Sandigan

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law
in the manner and form prescribed by law. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will
reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the RTC.

The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related
cases is apparent in the following provisions

Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the
existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving
violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the
population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.

For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original
jurisdiction" is a clear indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with
such "exclusive original jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance
and resolve a criminal prosecution for violation of RA 9165.

As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta, such deduction is

unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive
original jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law but to segregate from
among the several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and
hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)."

to the
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred

Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a

position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of
whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.

The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special anti-
graft court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution

It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to

hear drug-related cases. Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by
public officers is not determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were
committed "in relation to their office."

In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the
laws governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise be
considered.
 84

In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to
"exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an exception,
couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD
1606, as amended by RA 10660.

While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of
Direct Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the
other allegations in the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading.

The latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as "a
global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances,"
necessarily involves various component crimes, not the least of which is the bribery and
corruption of government officials.

As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on solicitation of money in the

Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery, form "part of the
description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP."

Yet, some justices remain adamant in their position that the Information fails to allege the
necessary elements of Illegal Drug Trading. Justice Carpio, in particular, would cite cases
supposedly enumerating the elements necessary for a valid Information for Illegal Drug
Trading.

However, it should be noted that the subject of these cases was "Illegal Sale" of

a crime separate and distinct from

dangerous drugs --

"Illegal Trading" averred in the Information against

De Lima.

With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized and
defined in RA 9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of Illegal
Sale-a mere component act-in the prosecution for Illegal Trading.

Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs over
violations of RA 9165. As previously stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are 232,557 drugs
cases pending before the RTCs. On the other hand, not even a single case filed before the
Sandiganbayan from February 1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with violations of the drugs law.

Instead, true to its designation as an anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases filed before the
Sandiganbayan involve violations of RA 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" and malversation. With these, it would not only be unwise but reckless to allow the
tribunal uninstructed and inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs cases to hear and
decide violations of RA 9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the accused.
 85

MOTION TO QUASH

Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in the
release from detention and restore the liberty and freedom of petitioner.

The RTC has several options if it dismisses the criminal case based on the grounds raised
by petitioner in her Motion to Quash.

Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible alternative actions
when confronted with a Motion to Quash:

1. Order the amendment of the Infonnation;

2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or

3. Deny the Motion to Quash.

The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is meritorious.
Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should the Information be
deficient or lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can order the amendment
of the Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which states:

SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If the motion to quash is based on an

alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or
the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of the
Information, the prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order
sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither bar another prosecution or
require the release of the accused from custody

In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to take is to dismiss the
petition and direct the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash and undertake all the
necessary proceedings to expedite the adjudication of the subject criminal case.
 86

Warrant of Arrest

In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion
to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or
jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court required the respo

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or

(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining
probable cause.

we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the
accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing.

He simply personally reviews the prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
 87

Yusuke Fukuzume vs. People ( Info was filed before RTC of MAkati; estafa, as defined

was
and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,

consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the

latters house in Paranaque; Judgment void for lack of jurisdiction
without prejudice o the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction )
G.R. No. 143647 November 11, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Facts:
Private complainant Javier Yu., is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum

scrap wires. He went to the house of herein accused-appellant in Paranaque

Yusuke since the latter has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires from Furukawa Electric
Corporation.

Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa
but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications
purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel that these scrap wires
are with NAPOCOR, and that Furukawas authorized representatives are allowed to
withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires

Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap

wires from Fukuzume.

When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was
nowhere to be found. Hence, Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to
NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization
letter issued by Furukawa claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these
documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR.

Yu asked Fukuzume the refund of the money he paid him but the latter failed to comply with
his undertaking. Yu filed a complaint before the NBI. Fukuzume was charged with estafa In

an Information filed before the RTC MAKATI.

RTC found Fukuzume guilty CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence the case at bar. herein
petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds; RTC MAKATI has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Issue: Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged?

Held: No
We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
 88

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by
the RTC of Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu was given in Makati.

Article 315,
Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under

paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was

consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the
latters house in Paranaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum
scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume
committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense
took place in the said city.

Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be
set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate
charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of
the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that
an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal.

Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon
the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law.

While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark
case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which
rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the
factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from
the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.
 89

Affidavit vs. Testimonies

With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence, he gave
Fukuzume the amount of P50K at Intercon.

However, We agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified, during his direct
examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the
latters house.

Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering
that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being
almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that

for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
 90

Victor Agustin vs. Fernando Pamintuan et al ( Libel filed before RTC baguio; wrong
venue; Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the
alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant
may have been actually residing in another place.
G.R. No. 164938. August 22, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.

Facts:
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City filed four separate Informations charging the
petitioner, a Philippine Daily Inquirer columnist, with libel. Agustin then filed a Motion to
Quash the Informations, on the sole ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
offenses charged. Informations did not contain any allegation that the offended party,
Anthony de Leon, was actually residing in Baguio City,

Private complainant De Leon, through counsel, opposed the motion, alleging that he was a
bona fide resident of the Baguio Country Club located at the Country Club Road, Baguio
City. Trial court denied the motion to quash. Agustin forthwith filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with a plea for an injunctive relief before CA

CA dismissed petition hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether RTC baguio has jurisdiction over the case?

Held:NO
In this case, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing
in Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous
articles were printed and first published in Baguio City.

It cannot even be inferred from the allegation the offended party was the Acting General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community
that the private respondent (complainant) was actually residing in Baguio City.

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual
residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency;
no particular length of time of residence is required.

However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea
of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a
place where he had a house therein.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element The

of jurisdiction.

jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is

determined by the allegations in the complaint or
Information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
 91

One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not

Where one may have or own

render such person a resident therein.

a business does not of itself constitute residence

within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of
business in a place is not conclusive of residence
there for purposes of venue.
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely
formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended
party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly
committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest
jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed

While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the
petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state
that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is
entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in
another place.

Thus, the rules on venue in Article 360 of the RPC are as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where he Actually resided at the time of
the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense.
 92

Experience has shown that under the old rule, the offended party could harass the accused
in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant places.

To obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action from written defamation, the
complaint or Information should contain allegations as to whether the offended party was a
public officer or a private individual at the time the offense was committed, and where
he was actually residing at that time; whenever possible, the place where the written
defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.
 93

Remedy to enforce Jurisdiction in Criminal Action

Hold Departure Order p.17 Syllabus

Jaime Sevilla vs. Jdg Borreta ( Judge Issued HDO on basis of Contempt of court, in the
nature of Crim proceeding; But remedial and civil in nature. It is for the enforcement
of a duty. It is auxiliary to the main case as it proceeds out of the original case; SC
GAVE WARNING )
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1836 July 14, 2004
QUISUMBING, J.

Facts:
Mrs. Sevilla filed a Motion for Execution and Issuance HDO alleging that Dr. Sevilla
failed to remit P72,000 for, the total amount of accumulated unpaid support, as ordered by
the court, nor has he shown any intention to obey the said order.

Sevilla thru counsel immediately filed a MR, HDO no factual nor legal basis and was a clear
infringement of his client's constitutional right to travel. complainant paid P72,000.

But Judge refused to lift the HDO. Complainant further contend issuance of the HDO
violated Circular No. 39-97, providing that an HDO can only be issued in criminal cases.
Noteworthy, judge lifted HDO.

herein complaint was filed. Complainant contends that the issuance of the HDO is a
clear manifestation of respondent's incompetence and ignorance of the law. Judge, in
his comment, contends that complainant's refusal and/or erratic failure to give support, may
give rise to an action for contempt of court which is in the nature of a criminal action
and was punishable by imprisonment – his basis for his issuance of the HDO

Issue: Whether contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal case hence HDO valid?

Held: NO!
Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal proceeding, but contempt under Rule 71 of

is a special civil action

the Rules of Court that cannot be
converted to a criminal case.
Indeed, contempt is in the nature of a criminal action, but only with regard to its
procedural aspect. A contempt proceeding is sui generis. While it has elements of both a
civil and a criminal proceeding, it is NOT a criminal proceeding even though the
contemptuous act involved could be a crime. It is remedial and civil in nature. It is for
the enforcement of a duty. It is auxiliary to the main case as it proceeds out of the
original case.

It is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must
be initiated by the issuance and service of a new process. Contempt under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court is a special civil action that cannot be converted into a criminal action.
 94

EXTRADITION p. 18

Sec. Justice vs. Ralph Lantion & Mark Jimenez

G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000
MELO, J.

Facts:
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Drilon, representing PHL signed in Manila
the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America". The Senate, by way of Reso 11 expressed
its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty.

On June 18, 1999, DOJ received from the DFA USA containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jimenez to US. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand
Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of
Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.

Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United
States with violation US code.

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two
[2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

On the same day, petitioner issued DO. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of PD 1069.

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through

counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S.

private respondent also requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of, or
access to, the request of the US Gov. and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a
period of time to amplify on his request. DOJ denied request.

private respondent filed with RTC NCR a petition against DOJ Sec. DFA Sec. for
mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively)

And prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing
an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director
of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the
United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction
 95

Trial Court ordered petitioner to refrain from conducting further proceedings in connection
with the request of the US and maintain Status Quo. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing?

Held: YES.
the evaluation process by DFA is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee.

By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual

extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the

the evaluation procedure is akin to a

process. In this sense,

preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same

result — the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged.

Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
(Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing
pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well.
Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3,

Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights,
granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other
supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the
right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not
convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:

The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the
authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent
legal force;
 96

2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and
identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and
the time and place of the commission of these acts;

3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and

4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
pertinently provides

(1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements
of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents
to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge
of the case.

The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the
accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting
State

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be
granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is
politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under
non-military penal legislation."

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its
supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver
the same to the Secretary of Justice who shall immediately designate and authorize an
attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069).

The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of
the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines
whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query
presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings?

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of
Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are
forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
 97

Secretary of Justice has the ministerial

Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the
duty of filing the extradition papers.

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by
itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say
that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions.

Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in

contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial
power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves:

(a) taking and evaluation of evidence;
(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and
(c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved

Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the
determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-
judicial authority
 98

EXCEPTION TO JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW

Serafin Tijam et al vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY ( e Surety is now barred by laches

from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done
heretofore in the case with its active participation; already stated, the action was
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 1948, that is, almost fifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time. )
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
Dizon, J

Facts:
On July 19, 1948, Plaintiffs filed a civil against the respondent for recovery of money.
Respondent filed a Surety bond before the court for the amount.

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's
bond, gainst which the Surety filed a written opposition.

On January 1963, Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was
issued without the required summary hearing. Court denied the motion.

Surty filed appeal before CA. Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises
the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. CA affirmed CFI’s decision.

After which Surtey filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that
appellees action was filed in CFI. a month before that date RA 296 had already become
effective,

Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed
P2,000.00,

CFI herefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the
Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the
case. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether CFI has jurisdiction over the case?

Held: No. Exception

However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which shall
forthwith be set forth. We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore
in the case with its active participation.
 99

As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising
the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of
the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
 100

Christofer Tejones vs. Gironella et al ( petitioner is now estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court after he had voluntarily submitted himself to its
jurisdiction )
G.R. No. L-35506 March 21, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J

Facts:
Respondent Purisima Elvena filed a complaint before the Provincial Fiscal of Abra after
conducting the prescribed preliminary investigation, filed an information with the CFI of Abra.
Petitioner was arrested but was later released upon the approval of the bail bond which he
filed. the petitioner was arraigned and pleaded "NOT GUILTY."

upon the motion of the defense counsel

On Aug. 1970,

and with the consent of the Provincial Fiscal and

private prosecutor, CFI of Abra remanded the case to the Municipal Court
of Tayum, on the belief that it is the latter court and not the Court of First Instance
which had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

petitioner was convicted of simple trespass to dwelling, and filed a notice of appeal with CFI
of Abra. Respondent Judge Gironella dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction. He ruled that since the case fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
municipal court and the court of first instance, appeal must be to the Court of Appeals.

Hence the case at bar. Petitioner's main contention that the Court of First Instance
committed grave abuse of discretion in earlier remanding the case for trial to the Municipal
Court considering that it first acquired jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of the other
court; hence, the proceedings of the Municipal Court were illegal and its sentence was null
and void.

Issue: Whether CFI of Abra acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts?

Held: NO.
The facts of the case reveal that this case was first lodged with the CFI. However, after
the case was set for trial but before the reception of evidence, the defense counsel moved
that the case be transmitted to the Municipal Court "on the ground that it falls within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court,"

The motion was granted. Trial proceeded after the accused was re-arraigned before then
Acting Judge Francisco Valera. Throughout the entire proceedings, the petitioner never
questioned the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. It was only after the petitioner was
adjudged guilty by said court and after his appeal to the Court of First Instance of
Abra had been denied that he moved to set aside the decision and to declare the
proceedings null and void.
 101

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction

In the case just cited , by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because
the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court.

petitioner is now estopped from

It is, therefore, clear that the

assailing the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court after

he had voluntarily submitted himself to its
jurisdiction.
 102

Prosecution of offenses by the PUBLIC PROSECUTORS

State Pros. Ringcar Pinote vs. Judge Roberto Ayco

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944 December 13, 2005
CARPIO MORALES, J.

Facts:
Judge Ayco allowed the defense in Criminal Case 71 for violation of Section 3 of PD 1866
to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence
of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case.

State Prosecutor Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart
Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on the said
dates.On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case Pinote refused to cross-
examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he
maintaining that the proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence
were void.

Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation he restating why he was not present and
reiterating his position that Judge Aycos act of allowing the defense to present evidence in
his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be
coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be
stricken off the record.

Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have waived its
right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.

Hence, present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco
(respondent), for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious
Misconduct.

OCA citing Section 5, Rule 110 finds respondent to have breached said rule and
accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Issue: Whether Ayco committed grave abuse of authority when he allowed the two witness
to be examined without the presence of Prosecutor Pinote?

Held: YES.
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the prosecutor.
 103

Thus, as a all criminal actions shall be

general rule,
prosecuted under the control and direction of the
public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are

no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in

writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court.

Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until
the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the
authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not
merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness.
 104

Control of Prosecution
Non-interference to the Prosecutors p. 20
EXEMPTIONS

Anthony Reyes vs. Pearl Bank ( executive function, one that properly pertains at the
ultimately, to the Secretary of
first instance to the public prosecutor and,
Justice,who may direct the filing of the corresponding information
or move for the dismissal of the case.
G.R. No. 171435 July 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:
Treasurer of Bank filed a complaint for falsification by private individuals of commercial and
private documents before the DOJ & President of bank filed a complaint before SEC for
accounting of loans.

WINCORPs acts of stating and making it appear several Confirmation Advices, Special
Powers of Attorney and Certifications that PEARLBANK was the borrower of funds from the
lenders/investors of WINCORP constituted falsification of commercial and private
documents.

DOJ Task Force on Financial Fraud issued a Review Resolution recommending the filing
of Informations for falsification of commercial and private documents against
petitioners.

Informations for Falsification of Commercial and Private Documents were filed against
petitioners before MTC Manila. Petitioners filed MR of Reso of Prosecutor Rances
contending there was lack of probable cause and that there existed a prejudicial question.
MR denied by Prosec.

WINCORP parties Ong et al, appealed before the DOJ Sec raising prejudicial question.
Usec Guiterrez resolved the appeal reversing the Resolutions of Prosec Rances. Thus, the
Office of the DOJ Secretary ordered the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor to move
for the withdrawal of the Informations from the MTC

DOJ reversed Usec’s decision, no prejudicial question involved, since the existence of an
outstanding obligation on the part of PEARLBANK under its Credit Line with WINCORP was
irrelevant and immaterial to the falsification cases. Hence the Case at bar.

Issue: Whether the DOJ has the authority to determine probable cause for an information to
be filed against petitioner?
 105

Held: YES
To emphasize, the determination of probable cause for the filing of information in court is an
executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the
filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case.

Ultimately, whether or not a complaint will be dismissed is dependent on the sound

unless made with grave

discretion of the Secretary of Justice. And

abuse of discretion, findings of the Secretary of

Justice are not subject to review.
For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in

conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave

the

the Department of Justice ample latitude of

discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for
the prosecution of supposed offenders.

courts do not reverse the Secretary

Consistent with this policy,

of Justices findings and conclusions on the matter

of probable cause except in clear cases of grave
abuse of discretion.
The restraint exercised by this Court in interfering with the determination of probable cause
by the prosecutor, unless there is grave abuse of discretion, is only consistent with the
general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, none of which are
obtaining in the case now before us.

In the present case, petitioner was not able to convince this Court to deviate from the
general rule of non-interference.

PROBABLE CAUSE

In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
He relies on common sense.
 106

What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief

that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial.

These findings of probable cause fall within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor or fiscal in
the exercise of executive power, which the courts do not interfere with unless there is
grave abuse of discretion.

Thedetermination of its existence lies within the

discretion of the prosecuting officers after
conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an
the decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not
offended party. Thus,
is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal.

He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or
substance or without any ground. Or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint
in his view is sufficient and in proper form.
 107

INTERVENTION OF OFFENDED PARTY IN CRIMINAL ACTION RULE 110 Sec 16 p.20

Jose Ramiscal vs. Sandigan et al ( AGFOI does not have a legal right to intervene in the
criminal cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of
such members to have access to the records of AFP-RSBS; As gleaned from the
Informations in Criminal Cases for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
offended party is the government; PETITION TO INTERVEN DENIED)
G.R. Nos. 140576-99 December 13, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.

Facts:
Cong Antonino of Cotobato filed a "Complaint-Affidavit" with the Ombudsman. She alleged
real estate transactions involving the Magsaysay Park
that anomalous
at General Santos City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the
government had been entertained into between certain parties.

She then requested the Ombudsman to investigate the petitioner, Ret. Gen. Ramisical then
President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System ( AFP-RSBS ).

after the requisite preliminary investigation Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan
against the petitioner et al for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019

Pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates
filed a "Notice of Appearance" as private prosecutors in all the aforementioned
cases for the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI). The notice of
appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-request of Retired
Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members
thereof.

Petitioner Ramisical opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as
private prosecutors, contending that the charges brought against him were purely public
crimes which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus, no civil
liability had arisen.

He argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, "an offended party
may be allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor only in those cases where
there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense charged."

He further averred that AGFOI, as an organization, has a distinct personality of its own,
apart from the individual members who compose it. Hence, it is of no moment if some
members of AGFOI are or have been members and beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS
Sandigan denied his plea for the denial of the appearance of the law firm.

Issue: Whether the clients of Private prosecutor were an offended party which gave rise to a
civil liability hence the latter may intervene for the prosecution of the same?
 108

Held: NO
The AGFOI and/or Commodore Aparri and/or Brig. Gen. Navarro Are Not the Offended
Parties in the Informations filed Before the Sandiganbayan

Even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-
RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have a legal right to intervene in the criminal
cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of such
members to have access to the records of AFP-RSBS.

Neither are such members entitled to intervene therein simply because the funds of the
AFP-RSBS are public or government funds. It must be stressed that any interest of the

members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds or property is merely inchoate

and incidental. Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical
personality separate and independent of its members/beneficiaries.

As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, the offended party is the government, which was allegedly deprived
by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes,
based on the actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the
AFP-RSBS.

Such party must be one who has a legal right:

● a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to
recourse under the substantive law,

● to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand
and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities

Such interest must not be a mere

● expectancy,
● subordinate or
● inconsequential.

The interest of the party must be personal; and not

one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and unrelated party.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the

offended party may also be a private individual

whose person, right, house, liberty or property was
 109

actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the

accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts
complained of.

For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, any party, including the
government, may be the offended party if such party sustains undue injury caused by

government is to be
the delictual acts of the accused. In such cases, the

represented by the public prosecutor for the

recovery of the civil liability of the accused.
However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is underpriced by a
public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal the correct amount of capital gains
and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing undue injury to the government, the
offenders thereby commit two crimes –

(a) falsification of public document defined in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; and

(b) violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, a special penal law.

Theoffender incurs civil liability to the government as

the offended party for violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019, but not for falsification of public document under
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the
payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the correct
amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the government, And the petitioner and his co-
accused pocketed the difference between the correct amount of taxes and the amount
entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may be considered the offended party entitled
to intervene in the above criminal cases, through the Government Corporate Counsel
 110

When to make Reservation of Civil Liability/ Separate civil action

reservation of a separate civil

Jaimie Gosiaco vs. Leticia Ching et al (

action against the juridical person on whose behalf

the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the
reservation of a separate civil on natural persons )
G.R. No. 173807 April 16, 2009
TINGA, J.

Facts:
petitioner Jaime Gosiaco invested P8M with ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The
money was loaned to ASB for a period of 48 days with interest at 10.5% which is
equivalent to P112,000.00.

In exchange, ASB through its Busi. Dev. Operations Manager Ching issued DBS checks for
P8M and P112K respectively, both signed by Ching. upon presentment, the checks were
dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for
insufficiency of funds.

Petitioner informed respondents, through letters but to no avail petitioner filed a

criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 before MTC against the private respondents.
Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large.

Ching denied liability and claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted
that she did not have knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks. Such
responsibility, she claimed belonged to another department.

Petitioner moved that ASB and its president, Luke Roxas, be impleaded as party defendants

but denied. MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it

did not absolve her from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of
RTC reversed
ASB, was civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks.
MTC, Ching not civilly liable, subject obligation fell squarely on
ASB. CA affirmed RTC, amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made
to ASB and not to Ching.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Ching is civilly liable?

Whether a reservation on the civil liability of ASB is allowed?
 111

Held: 1st issue: NO

The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can
only be held civilly liable when he is convicted.

We are not inclined through this case to revisit so recent a precedent, and the rule of stare
decisis precludes us to discharge Ching of any civil liability arising from the B.P. Blg.
22 case against her, on account of her acquittal in the criminal charge.

2nd Issue: Whether a reservation on the civil liability of ASB is allowed?

Held: Yes.

We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead ASB in the B.P. Blg.
22 case, or any other corporation for that matter, even if the Rules require the joint trial of
both the criminal and civil liability.

A basic maxim in statutory construction is that the interpretation of penal laws is strictly
construed against the State and liberally construed against the accused. Nowhere in B.P.
Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as an accused or
defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the litigation of the civil
aspect thereof.

Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable

obligations against a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of

nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the

procedure. Technically,

reservation of a separate civil action against the

juridical person on whose behalf the check was
issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of
a separate civil action against the natural person charged with
violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced
check.

In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check in

stands independent of the civil liability

behalf of a corporation

of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil Code.

B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused this criminal liability of the signer of the check in behalf of the
corporation with the corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the
complainant to recover such civil liability not from the corporation, but from the
person who signed the check in its behalf.
 112

Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory
of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount
represented from the check.

The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful act of signing the check
despite the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the civil liability attaching to the
corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check or the consideration for its
execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct. The confusion is traceable
to the singularity of the amount of each.

If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil
action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is only the civil liability of the
signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action against
the signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute.

It follows that the actions involving these liabilities should be adjudged according to their
respective standards and merits.

In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine whether or not the signatory
had signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the bank
account, while in the civil case the trial court should ascertain whether or not the obligation
itself is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory, proceed
independently and simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive on one or the other.

Subsidiary Liability ONLY ONF FELONIES under RPC not Special Laws

It might be argued that under the current rules, if the signatory were made liable for the
amount of the check by reason of the B.P. Blg. 22 case, such signatory would have the
option of recovering the same amount from the corporation. Yet that prospect does not
ultimately satisfy the ends of justice.

If the signatory does not have sufficient assets to answer for the amount of the checks
distinct possibility considering the occasional large-scale transactions engaged in by
corporations the corporation would not be subsidiarily liable to the complainant, even if it
in truth the controversy, of which the criminal case is just a part, is traceable to the original
obligation of the corporation.

While the Revised Penal Code imposes subsidiary

civil liability to corporations for criminal acts
engaged in by their employees in the discharge of
their duties, said subsidiary liability applies only to
felonies,
 113

And not to crimes penalized by special laws such as B.P. Blg. 22 .

And nothing in B.P. Blg. 22 imposes such subsidiary liability to the corporation in whose
name the check is actually issued. Clearly then, should the check signatory be unable to pay
the obligation incurred by the corporation, the complainant would be bereft of remedy unless
the right of action to collect on the liability of the corporation is recognized and given
flesh.
 114

Independent civil liability p.21

SafeGuard Security et al vs. LAURO TANGCO et al ( respondents cause of action is

based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused
by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer )
G.R. NO. 165732 December 14, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Facts:
Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank Katipunan to renew her time deposit per advise of
the banks cashier. She was carrying a licensed firearm in her bag. When she about to
surrender her firearm to Pajarillo, the later shot her causing her death.

Pajarillo thought she was about to rob the bank and kill him. He neutralized Evangaline so
not to accomplish the alleged bank robbery.

Lauro Tangco husband, together with his six minor children filed with RTC QC a criminal
Respondents reserved their right to file a
case of Homicide against Pajarillo.
separate civil action in the said criminal case. RTC convicted Pajarillo of
Homicide. CA affirmed decision.

Meanwhile respondents filed with RTC Marikina for damages against Pajarillo for
negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

On Jan 1998, RTC Marikina ruled in favor of respondents. Safeguard as employer of

Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. CA affirmed decision of RTC
Marikina but Safeguard only subsidiarily liable.

CA held applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under
the Revised Penal Code. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether SafeGuard is Jointly and Solidarilly liable?

Held:YES!!!!
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action
 115

Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on
January 14, 1998.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender, i.e.,

(1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and

(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those

● (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code; or

● (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission or under both causes.

It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of action. The nature of a cause
of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in
the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. The source of the obligation sought to
be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.

Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already
final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case.

It would have been entirely different if respondents cause of action was for damages arising
from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
 116

respondents cause of
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint,

action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,

when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the
employer either

● in the selection of the servant or employee, or

● in the supervision over him after selection or both.

The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict
committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and
supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome
only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under
Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence
 117

Effect of Death of the Accused/Conviction on Civil Action

People vs. Rogelio Cardova ( we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished
his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification; statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription )
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
ROMERO, J.

Facts:
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest.
Supreme Court in its Reso dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.

However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas'
civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. SolGen expressed
his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. Hence the case at bar?

Issue: Whether death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?

Held: YES. ONLY TO DELICT

People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative.

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it
final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which
is final and executory?
 118

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute?

● Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is

only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is
confirmed

as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony
upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
defendant."

This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after
the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one

term final judgment employed in the

positive conclusion: The

Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall.

CIVIL LIABILITY FROM OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGATION

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established
was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on sources of obligations other than delict.

Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the
criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal. The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability

Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
 119

People vs. JAIME AYOCHOK ( death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore )
G.R. No. 175784 August 25, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts:
The RTC found Ayochok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
Ayochok was committed at NBP. The case was directly elevated to us for automatic
review.

However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo which modified the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Pro. on direct appeals from the RTC to the
Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, was transferred to the CA

CA affirmed decision of RTC. Ayochok, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Court of Appeals conveying his intention to appeal to us the Decision of CA. However, in a
letter dated February 2010 Assistant Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of
Corrections, informed us that Ayochok had died on January 15, 2010 at PGH.

Given Ayochoks death, we are now faced with the question of the effect of such death on
the present appeal.

Issue: Whether death of Ayochoks extinguished the criminal and civil liability?

Held: YES. BUT CIVIL LIABILITY FROM OTHER SOURCES, NOT EXTINGUISHED
Guidelines in People v. Bayotas
1. the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
xxxx
e) Quasi-delicts
 120

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery

therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused ,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the

statute of limitations on the civil

civil action. In such case, the

liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal

case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Clearly, in view of a supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on

Ayochoks appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged has become irrelevant
since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas ven
assuming Ayochok had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by
his death

Consequently, the appealed Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00949 finding Ayochok guilty of Murder, sentencing him to imprisonment, and
ordering him to indemnify his victim had become ineffectual.
 121

Jimmy Go vs. Alberto Looyuko ( death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the
delict )
G.R. No. 147923 October 26, 2007
VELASCO, JR., J.

Facts:
Petitioner Go and respondent Looyuko were business associates. Respondent is the
registered owner Noahs Ark Group of Companies. Go was the business manager or
chief operating officer of the group of companies.

the business associates had a falling out that spawned numerous civil lawsuits. these
actions are Civil Case No. 67921 and Criminal Case No. 98-1643 from which arose several
incidents which eventually became subject of these consolidated petitions.

Criminal Case No. 98-1643, filed People of the Philippines v. Alberto T. Looyuko, an
Affidavit Complaint before the Makati City RTC charging respondent with Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of RPC

Meanwhile, during the pendency of these petitions, respondent Looyuko died.

Issue: Whether criminal and civil liability of respondent were extinguished by his death?

Held: Criminal YES. Civil YES BUT ONLY ARISING OUT OF DELICT
It is an established principle that the death of the accused pending final adjudication of the
civil liability directly
criminal case extinguishes the accused’s criminal liability. If the
arose from and is based solely on the offense committed, then the civil
liability is also extinguished.

In the case at bar, the civil liability for the recovery of the CBC stock certificates
covering 41,376 shares of stock or their value does not directly result from or based solely
on the crime of estafa but on an agreement or arrangement between the
parties that petitioner Go would endorse in blank said stock certificates and give
said certificates to respondent Looyuko in trust for petitioner for said respondent to sell
the stocks covered by the certificates.

civil liability survives and an action for recovery

In such a case, the
therefore in a separate civil action can be instituted either against
the executor or administrator or the estate of the accused.
 122

On the other hand, Sec. 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment
and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict.

However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or
which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other
sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against
said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the
deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
 123

Acquittal of accused:
Accused not the Author of the Crime or Guilt no proven beyond reasonable doubt

Nissan Gallery vs. Purificacion Felipe ( A person acquitted of a criminal charge,

however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in
criminal prosecution )
G.R. No. 199067 November 11, 2013
MENDOZA, J. Not part of Syllabus

Facts:
Purificacion issued the said check because her son, purchased a Nissan Terrano SUV from
Nissan due to discount. Term of the transaction was Cash-on-Delivery and no down
payment was required. The SUV was delivered on May 1997 but Frederick failed to pay
upon delivery. Despite non-payment, Frederick took possession of the vehicle.

Since then, Frederick had used and enjoyed the SUV for more than four (4) months without
paying even a single centavo of the purchase price. This constrained Nissan to send him two
(2) demand letters, on different dates, but he still refused to pay. Nissan, through its
retained counsel, was prompted to send a final demand letter.

he asked his mother, Purificacion, to issue the subject check as payment for his obligation.
Purificacion acceded to his request. Frederick then tendered her postdated check in the
amount of ₱1M. But check was dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP PAYMENT."

A demand letter was served upon Purificacion, through Frederick, who lived with her. The
letter informed her of the dishonor of the check and gave her five (5) days from
receipt within which to replace it with cash or manager’s check. But it went unheeded.
Nissan filed a criminal case for violation of BP 22 against her before MeTC

MeTC acquitting Purificacion of the charge, but holding her civilly liable to Nissan. RTC
affirmed decision. CA reversed decision, No civil liability could be adjudged against her
because of her acquittal from the criminal charge. It was Frederick who was civilly
liable to Nissan.

Issue: Whether purification is civilly liable though not criminally liable under BP 22 since gult
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt?

Held: Yes.
Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not sufficiently
established.

Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil liability arose, which was the making
or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her acquittal from the
criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt and it did not relieve her of the
corresponding civil liability. The Court cannot agree more when the MeTC ruled that:

A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the
quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater
 124

than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be
completely free from civil liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did
not commit the offense.

If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly
liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that
the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.

If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean
that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

This rule more specifically applies when

(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence

is required;

(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and

(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted.

The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in

the
● final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist or

● where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the
necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed.

On the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability will
depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists
 125

BP 22
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22,
it is explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a
reservation to file such separately is not allowed

Purificacion was charged with violation of BP 22 for allegedly issuing a worthless check. The
essential elements of the offense of violation of BP 22 are the following:

(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;

(2) The Knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.

Here, the first and third elements were duly proven in the trial. Purificacion, however, was
acquitted from criminal liability because of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact
of notice of dishonor. Purificacion, however, was acquitted from criminal liability because
of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact of notice of dishonor.

Of the three (3) elements, the 2nd element is the hardest to prove as it involves a state
of mind.

Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds

which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written
notice of dishonor and that within five (5) days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay
the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.

Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not sufficiently
established.
 126

Mary Rodriguez vs. Jdg. Ponferrada ( In any of these instances, the private
complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the
sole function of the public prosecutor.[8] None of these exceptions apply to the
instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the
estafa suit )
G.R. Nos. 155531-34 July 29, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Assistant City Prosecutor Montojo of Q.C. Prosecutors Office issued her Reso 02 there
being PROBABLE CAUSE to charge respondent for ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph
2(d) and for Violation BP 22 it is respectfully recommended that the attached Information be
approved and filed in Court. As a consequence thereof, separate informations were
separately filed against herein [p]etitioner before proper [c]ourts, for Estafa and [v]iolation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

Upon payment of the assessed and required docket fees by the private
[c]omplainant informations for [e]stafa cases against herein [p]etitioner were likewise filed
and raffled to RTC branch 104. informations for BP 22 against herein [p]etitioner were filed
and raffled to MeTC Q.C. Branch 42.

Petitioner through counsel filed in open court before the [p]ublic [r]espondent RTC Judge,
an Opposition to the Formal Entry of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor. RTC court
during the said hearing allowed and noted the Formal Entry of Appearance of Atty.
upon payment of the legal fees pursuant
Solomon as private prosecutor.
to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

MR by accused denied. RTC held that the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is deemed instituted, exceptions of civil actions filed separately are
not present.

RTC ruled, Considering that the offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the
estafa cases prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the MeTC the RTC allowed the
private prosecutor to appear and intervene in the proceedings. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the private prosecutor is barred from intervening in the estafa case?

Held NO.
Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime,
Except in the following instances:

(1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil
liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and

(2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil
indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right
to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted.
 127

In any of these instances, the private complainants interest in the case disappears and
criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor.[8] None of these
exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from
intervening in the estafa suit.

Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two
distinct criminal offenses:

● Estafa and
● violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

The Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each of
these two penal proceedings.

However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a
bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other
criminal action.

While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes
recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise from a single set of facts, only
one civil liability attaches to it.
 128

Amendment vs. Substitution

Claudio Teehankee Jr. vs. Madayag (Now, an objective appraisal of the amended
information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature
of the offense originally charged was not actually changed; Instead, an additional
allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied
to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. It consequently
follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the
second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be
demanded by the accused
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992
REGALADO, J.

Facts:
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information 2 for the crime of
frustrated murder. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to
file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could
be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.

Consequently, private prosecutor Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file
an amended information and to admit said amended information. amended information,
reads:

unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen
Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.

Petitioner filed an opposition thereto. trial court issued the questioned order admitting the
amended information. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended
information constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a change in the nature
of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated murder to consummated murder.

He argues that there being a substantial amendment, the same may no longer be allowed
after arraignment and during the trial.

Petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of a

preliminary investigation thereon. Such refusal respondent judge ordered that a
plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.

Issue: Whether the amended information involves a substantial amendment, hence a

preliminary investigation is required again?

Held:NO
We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for the
orders of the trial court.
 129

frustrated murder is but a stage

Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that
in the execution of the crime of murder, hence the former is
necessarily included in the latter.

It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying

be alleged in both
circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation,
an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning
and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the
informations filed for both.

This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of
consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the

What is involved here is not

original and the amended information.

a variance in the nature of different offenses

charged, but only a change in the stage of execution
of the same offense from frustrated murder to
consummated murder.
Petitioner would insist, however, that the Additional allegation on the fact of death of the
victim Maureen Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment which may no
longer be allowed after a plea has been entered. The proposition is erroneous
and untenable.

As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or
substance, may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge and,
thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court.
 130

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments,

● new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction;

● an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from
that charged in the original one;

● additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so
as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and

● an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as
to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused.

The test of whether an amendment is only of form and

an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment has
been said to be whether or not a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be equally
available after the amendment is made
Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein
petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the
death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper
penalty for the crime.

That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the
prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may
adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the
amended information for murder.

amended
Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the
information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is
allowed even during the trial of the case.

This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice
and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.
 131

Revised Rules of Crim Pro

Section 14. Rule 110 Amendment or substitution

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which

● downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or

● excludes any accused from the complaint or information,

can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all
parties, especially the offended party. (n)

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a)
 132

The 1st paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint,
while the 3rd paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.

It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information
may be made before or after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in the following
respects:

Amendment of Info Substitution of Info

● involve either formal or substantial ● involves a substantial change from

changes, the original charge

● effected without leave of court ● must be with leave of court as the

before plea has been entered original information has to be
dismissed

● Amendment is only as to form, ● another preliminary investigation

No need for another preliminary is entailed and the accused has
investigation and the retaking of to plead anew to the new
the plea of the accused; information;
● refers to the Same offense ● Substitution requires or
presupposes:
○ charged in the
original ○ New information
information or involves a
different offense
○ to an offense which
necessarily includes or is which does not include or is not necessarily
necessarily included in the included in the original charge, hence the
original charge, accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

● Hence Substantial Amendments to

the information after the plea has
been taken cannot be made over
the objection of the accused, for
if the original information
would be withdrawn, the
accused could invoke double
jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the 1st

paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the 3rd paragraph
thereof, the rule is that:

● where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and
amendment of the information is sufficient;
 133

● Otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and
different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
 134

SSGT. JOSE vs. Afable Cajigal & People ( no change in the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The
averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those
already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any
change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any
qualifying circumstance )
G.R. NO. 157472 September 28, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
An Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner upon arraignment,
petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial.

However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued
another Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct
and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having
qualified the crime to Murder.

Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
Homicide and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of
the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the
original Information for Homicide,

On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to
be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground
that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case
had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the
Resolution of the Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy. judge denied the Motion
to Quash.

Issue: Whether the change of offense to Murder in the Information constitutes double
jeopardy?

Held: NO. only formal amendments was done

Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,

In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a
formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in
Teehankee.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the
only change made was in the caption of the case ; and in the opening paragraph or
 135

preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by
the word Murder.

There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense

charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The
averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already
alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act
imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance.

Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from Homicide to
Murder as purely formal.

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the
rights of the accused.

The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.

Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of

the amended Information are identical with those of
the original Information for Homicide, there could
not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the
case; neither would there be any possible prejudice
to the rights or defense of petitioner.
 136

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION p.24 - 25

Alvarez Arao Yusop vs. Sandigan ( no showing that petitioner was notified of the
charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As earlier noted, he had not been named as a
respondent; His name did not even appear in the caption of its January 15, 1998
Resolution which recommended the filing of charges against the accused; "the right
to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at
the time of entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the accused does invoke it
before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is
not waive
G.R. No. 138859-60 February 22, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.

Facts:
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda, Ombudsman-Mindanao
required Benjamin Arao et al, within ten days from receipt thereof, to submit their counter-
affidavits and other pieces of controverting evidence.

Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Reso recommending the prosecution of "the

petitioner Alvarez, although he

aforenamed respondents" including

was not one of the original respondents, for violation of Arti

269 ( unlawful arrest ) and RA 3019 Sec 3a. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved
the recommendation

Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Order of Arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before RTC. On the same day, he
filed a "Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary
Investigation." Sandigan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court.

On the scheduled arraignment petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded
preliminary investigation. Sandigan rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment.

Issue: Whether Sandigan commited committed grave abuse of authority in denying petitioner
PI?

Held:YES
While petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, the case against him should not be
dismissed.
 137

Preliminary investigation
Inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.

The Court explained that the rationale of preliminary investigation is to "protect the
accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal
trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly
summary proceeding by a competent officer.

The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense
punishable by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court.

Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3-a of RA of 3019. Such offense is punishable
with, among other penalties, imprisonment of six years and one month to fifteen
years. Under the aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised version, he is entitled
to a preliminary investigation.

It is undisputed, however, that before the Information against petitioner was filed, no
preliminary investigation had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the Ombudsman
admitted that "petitioner was denied of his right to preliminary investigation."

We find no basis for the Sandiganbayan's ruling that petitioner "had not given timely
notice nor any statement of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of
the Information."

First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri.
As earlier noted, he had not been named as a respondent. His name did not even appear in
the caption of its January 15, 1998 Resolution which recommended the filing of charges
against the accused

In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "the right to preliminary investigation is
to invoke it before or at the time of
waived when the accused fails
entering a plea at arraignment. " Conversely, if the accused does invoke it
before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is
not waive

Bail Bond
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary
investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules Crim Pro,

"an application for or admission to bail; shall not bar the accused from;

● challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or
 138

● questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,

Provided that he raises them before entering his plea

We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or
technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to
due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted.

Dismissal of Case Unjustified

Petitioner also prays that the cases against him be dismissed for lack of preliminary
investigation.We disagree.

In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or even the old
Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to quash. Furthermore, it
does not
has been held that responsibility for the "absence of preliminary investigation
go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings."

"If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea,
invite the attention of the court of their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the
case to the inferior court so the the preliminary investigation may be conducted."

In sum, Criminal Case No. 24524 must be suspended with respect

to petitioner even if the case is already undergoing trial, because "to reach any
other conclusion here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and
to bail were effectively obliterated to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and
effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point.

The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 24524 shall be SUSPENDED in regard to
petitioner until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to
costs.
 139

Alicia Ricaforte vs. Leon Jurado ( It bears stressing that Magno was decided after a full-
blown trial, and the proof needed to convict the accused was proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which was not established in that case; On the other hand, herein
case is still in the preliminary investigation stage which is merely inquisitorial, and it
is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. )
G.R. NO. 154438 September 5, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Facts:
Respondent Jurado operates and manages a rice mill in Bulacan. Ruby Aguilar
procured rice from him and in payment thereof gave him two Far East Bank checks P431K
each which were both issued by Petitioner Ricaforte and when presented for payment
were dishonored.

Respondent filed a Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Ricaforte with the
Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

Petitioner’s defense was she willingly lent her checks to Aguilar on condition that these
checks will be replaced with Aguilar's own checks once her new checkbook is issued to her
by Metrobank. In accordance with the arrangement, Aguilar issued two replacement checks.

Petitioner demanded from respondent the return of her checks but respondent refused, thus
she was constrained to request her bank to issue an order of stop payment. Aguilar
executed an Affidavit corroborating petitioners defense.

That the sequence of events showed that indeed petitioners checks were not intended as
payment to respondent because petitioner had no obligation to respondent; that the
checks were not issued to account or for value; thus, there can be no finding of prima facie
evidence of the charges against him relying

Assistant City Macaren dismissed the complaint for Estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 for
insufficiency of evidence. Respondent appealed the dismissal of his complaint to DOJ.
Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution modifying the Reso of the City Prosecutor and
directing him to file an information against petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. CA
affirmed decision of DOJ

Issue: Whether there is probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of BP 22?

Held:YES
We are in accord with the Justice Secretary's finding that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by petitioner

The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of the
check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The Court has
since said that a "check issued as an evidence of debt, although not intended for
encashment, has the same effect like any other check" and must thus be held to be "within
the contemplation of BP 22
 140

A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the
parties evidence. It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness,
credence is given to the finding and determination of probable cause by the Secretary of
Justice in a preliminary investigation.

Herein case is still in the preliminary investigation stage which is merely

inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.

It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no

purpose except that of determining whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty.
It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for
the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

We are in accord with the Justice Secretary's finding that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that at the time she issued the subject checks, she has substantial funds in
the bank to cover the value thereof. This is evidentiary in nature which must be
presented during trial more so in the light of the bank certification that there were no
sufficient funds to cover the checks when presented for deposit/payment.

The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of

funds. Such knowledge isd for insufficiency of funds. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a
conviction.
 141

5. ROLITO GO vs CA et al (In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was
not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process;NO ARREST
WARRANT; DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE EXCEPTION OF VALID WARRANTLESS
ARREST; Preliminary investigation needed; )
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
FELICIANO, J.

Facts:
Victim, Eldon Maguan, was driving along Wilson St. heading towards P. Guevarra St.
Petitioner entered Wilson St. where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the
opposite or "wrong" direction.

Petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car,
walked over and shot Maguan inside his car which Maguan died in the hospital as a result.
Police learned that Go had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting.

Police were able to identified Go and launched a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after, Go
went to San Juan police station accompanied by 2 lawyers and was arrested there. The
provincial prosecutor asked Go to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of RPC for
him to undergo preliminary investigation (to determine whether there was probable cause
for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan).

However, Go refused thus the trial for the murder of Maguan ensued. No bail was
recommended for Go. Go contended that there was no valid arrest warrant issued against
him thus a preliminary investigation is required before the prosecutor should file a complaint
in court.

Prosecutor granted the prayer of Go. However, RTC judge recalled such orders. Hence
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court

Issue: In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed:
● first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan
Police in respect of petitioner Go?; and

● second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary

investigation?
 142

Held:1st. whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan
Police in respect of petitioner Go? No

Does not fall under the exceptions. He was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he
went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly
perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that
he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an

Maguan and accordingly none

eyewitness to the shooting of

had the "personal knowledge" required for the

lawfulness of a warrantless arrest.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense
which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and
space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."

petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the
implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty
of a crime.

2nd issue: whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation?
No.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a
preliminary investigation be conducted.

When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter
should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether
there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.

Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that
Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions
of Article 125 of the RPC, arrest without a warrant, as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a
preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions.
 143

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary
investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August
1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails
to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains
entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began

In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already
before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a
preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.

Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in

abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
accorded to petitioner.
It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on
hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably
could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable
cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what
he was entitled to by way of procedural due process.

Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without
preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that
filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and
screaming," in a manner of speaking .

During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for
arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's
vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of
preliminary investigation.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record
concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the
Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then
be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record,
to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.
 144

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into
the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the
Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute
important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a

preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such
preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof.
The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be
SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. - When a person is lawfully arrested without
a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information
may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been
conducted in accordance with existing rules.
 145

People vs. Edilberto Gomez ( the court, "instead of dismissing the information, should
conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. )
G.R. No. L-29086 September 30, 1982
RELOVA, J.

Facts:
Prosecuting officers certified under oath that they had conducted a preliminary
investigation of the case in accordance with law. Four (4) informations were filed by the
prosecuting fiscals before CFI charging Edilberto et al with the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of public/official documents.

The corresponding warrant of arrest for each of the accused was accordingly issued and the
accused subsequently filed their bond for provisional liberty.

Accused in the four (4) cases, thru their counsel, filed a MOTION TO DECLARE
INFORMATIONS AND WARRANTS OF ARREST null and void on the ground that the
prosecution failed to observe the provisions of Section 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the
New Rules of Court regarding preliminary investigation and prayed the court to cancel
the warrants of arrest issued.

CFI granted such motions, dismissed the case. Hence the case at bar.

Issue:
1st: Whether PI was conducted?
2nd: Whether a case should be dismissed in the absence of a preliminary investigation?

Held:
1st: Whether PI was conducted? YES!!!
The government prosecutors certified under oath that they had conducted a preliminary
investigation in said case in accordance with law, and on the basis thereof, then Judge
Carmelo Alvendia issued the corresponding warrant of arrest against all the accused.

It was District Judge Gregorio Montejo who conducted the preliminary investigation and,
finding the existence of a prima facie case, ordered the arrest of the defendant.

2nd Issue: Whether a case should be dismissed in the absence of a preliminary

investigation? NO!
But then, assuming that the informations did not contain the requisite certificates regarding
the Fiscal's having held a preliminary investigation, the omissions are not necessarily
fatal.
 146

Theabsence of preliminary investigations does not

affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do
they impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective.

If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea,
the court, "instead of
invite the attention of the court to their absence,
dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation,
order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior
court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted."

The defendants in these cases did not question the validity of the informations on the ground
of defective certifications or the right to preliminary investigations before they entered the
plea of not guilty. They filed the motion to declare informations and warrants of arrest
null and void only after more than one (1) year thereafter.

when they entered a plea of not guilty, they

Consequently,

thereby waived all objections that are grounds for a

motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction or failure of the information to
charge an offense. Thus, they waived the right to a preliminary investigation
when they failed to invoke it prior to, or at least at, the time of the entry of their
plea in the Court of First Instance.
 147

PI May be Initiated and concluded by different investigating prosecutors p.26

Ceferino Paredes et al vs. Sandigan et al ( Originally Axalan conducted PI of the

complaint and was deputized; Then due to the retraction of Statements of Sansaet,
Gay Maggie reinvestigated; is similar to the trial of a case by one judge who, without
being able to finish the hearing, ceases from office for one reason or another and by
necessity the decision is rendered by another judge who has taken over the conduct
of the case.)
G.R. No. 108251. January 31, 1996
MENDOZA, J.

Facts:
cases originated in a complaint filed Vice Mayor Teofilo Gelacio,of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur against Gov. Paredes et al.

In his complaint Gelacio alleged that MCTC clerk of court Honrada, in conspiracy with
petitioner Paredes et al certified as true a copy of a Notice of Arraignment of the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes showing that an arraignment had been held in Criminal
Case No. 1393 and issued a certification dated March 24, 1986 to that effect when in truth
no arraignment had been held in that case.

A P.I. of the complaint was conducted by prosecutor Axalan who had been deputized to
assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao

Prosecutor Axalan submitted his resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao. On
the basis of the evidence of the parties, Gay Maggie Balajadia-violan, Graft Investigation
Officer of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, recommended that petitioners and Atty.
Sansaet be charged with Falsification of Public Documents.

Office of the Special Prosecutor, approved the filing of three informations for
falsification of public documents against Paredes et al. Petitioners moved to quash the
informations, denied by the Sandigan. Petitioners next moved for a reinvestigation of the
cases. They complained

(1) that the resolution, recommending the filing of the cases, was not prepared by Public Prosecutor
Axalan, who had conducted the preliminary investigation, but by GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, who
allegedly had no hand in the investigation

Sandiganbayan nonetheless directed the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the

cases. Special Prosecution Officer Montemayor recommended denial of petitioners' motion.
Accordingly the Sandiganbayan set the cases for trial. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Axalan who had originally conducted the PI, should have filed the resolution
of the PI not Gay Maggie, hence violation of the constitutional right of due process?
 148

Held: NO.
Petitioners' contention has no basis in fact.

It appears that the preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by Teofilo Gelacio was
initially conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan who had been deputized to assist
the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao in the investigation of graft cases.

Axalan prepared a resolution. The records do not show what his recommendation was. What
is clear, however, is that no action had been taken on his recommendation in view of
the fact that Atty. Generoso Sansaet, one of the respondents in the cases, retracted
an earlier statement he had given to the effect that petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 1393 before the case was dismissed.

This new
Atty. Sansaet now claimed that no arraignment had been held after all.
development required the reopening of the investigation (in fact
Paredes, Jr. and Honrada were required to comment on the retraction), the reevaluation of
the evidence, and the preparation of a new resolution.

Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, was designated to conduct the investigation and prepare a
report, which she did.

Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the recommendations of Violan and Querubin.

Accordingly three cases were filed against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan,

There is thus no basis for petitioners' claim that the resolution was prepared by one

similar to
who did not take any part in investigation. What happened here is

the trial of a case by one judge who, without being

able to finish the hearing, ceases from office for one
reason or another and by necessity the decision is
rendered by another judge who has taken over the
conduct of the case.
Such an arrangement has never been thought to raise any question of due process. For
what is important is that the judge who decides does so on the basis of the evidence in
record. It does not matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that case from the
beginning.
 149

Jinggoy Estrada vs. Ombudsman et al ( Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-

respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave
abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the
27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request )
G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015
Carpio, J

Facts:
Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB 13 & 97, filed by the
NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder
as defined in RA No. 7080 & for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 be conducted
against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9
January 2014.

Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the
Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings Request Section
3[b], Rule 112 and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’

Ombudsman issued the assailed Order denying request. Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen. Estrada]to be furnished all the filings of
the respondents.

Further to quote the rule in furnishing copies of affidavits to parties under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman [Section 4 of Rule II of Administrative Order No.
07 issued on April 10, 1990]:

a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall
require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.

b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondents to submit, within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on
the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-
affidavits.

It can be gleaned from these aforecited provisions that this Office is required to furnish [Sen.
Estrada] a copy of the Complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents; and this
Office complied with this requirement.

It is to be noted that there is no provision under this Office’s Rules of Procedure which
entitles respondent to be furnished all the filings by the other parties, e.g. the
respondents. Ruby Tuason, Dennis Cunanan, Gondelina G. Amata and Mario L.
Relampagos themselves are all respondents in these cases.

Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
the respondents are only required to furnish their counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence to the complainant, and not to the other respondents.
 150

Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada
and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section
3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada asked for a judgment before SC declaring that (a) he
has been denied due process of law, and as a consequence thereof,

Office thereafter reevaluated the request and granted it by Order dated 7 May 2014 granting
his request. Copies of the requested counter-affidavits were appended to the copy of the
Order dated 7 May 2014 transmitted to Senator Estrada through counsel.

Hence the case at bar

Issue: Whether jinggoy is entitled to be furnished all the filings by the other parties during
PI?

Held: NO.

Ombudsman’s denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estrada’s Request did not
constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s
constitutional right to due process. First. There is no law or rule which requires the
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of his co-
Sen. Estrada, however,
respondents violates his constitutional right to due process.
fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his
co-respondents.

Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section
4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estrada’s claim.

What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for

● the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the
supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-
affidavit is issued to the respondent.

This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his
witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits
 151

At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what

4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant

Section

and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-

respondents.
Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting
affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the
Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s
Request.

Second, Section 4(b) states that "the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the respondent"
to submit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavits
mentioned in Section4(a).

Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the affidavits of the
complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in the immediately succeeding
Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have "access to the evidence on
record" does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of Section 4(a
and b) of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with
the "affidavits and other supporting documents" submitted by "the complainant or supporting
witnesses."

Thus, a respondent’s "access to evidence on record" in Section 4(c), Rule II of the

Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting documents of
"the complainant or supporting witnesses" in Section 4(a) of the same Rule

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right

to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to
submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant
and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine
or cross-examine.
 152

Nace Buan vs. Farncisco Matugas (RAPE; CA states in its decision that there is an
absence of lewd designs; wisdom or error of judgment on the part of the Secretary of
Justice in arriving at his conclusions of fact and law which is proper in an appeal
cannot legitimately be the subject of review in a petition for certiorari before the CA;
exclusively within the ambit of the prosecutor's powers to determine whether
probable cause exists and which crime to prosecute for )
G.R. No. 161179 August 7, 2007
GARCIA, J.

Facts:
petitioner was a regular employee of the provincial government of Surigao del Norte where
respondent, Francisco Matugas, was then the provincial governor. respondent asked
petitioner to accompany him to Manila, allegedly on the pretense that the trip was
work-related.

Once inside the room the hotel room Governor came out of the comfort room allegedly
without any shirt. Then, without any warning, he suddenly grabbed petitioner by her
shoulder as he passed by the chair she was seated on, embraced and kissed her, prompting
her to resist by pushing and elbowing him, causing him to lose his balance and immediately
desisted.

Petitioner nevertheless decided to immediately resign from her work at the Provincial
Government. Almost six years later, petitioner finally gathered enough courage to execute
and file an affidavit-complaint against the respondent before the Prosecutor , Pasay City

Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause prompting petitioner to file an
appeal with DOJ. Sec of Justice reversing the findings of the City Prosecutor and
holding that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof.

CA reversed and set aside DOJ’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the criminal
information for Attempted Rape filed against the respondent. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether CA can reverse and set aside a decision of the Secretary of Justice and
substitute its own judgment?

Held: NO!
The power to reverse and set aside partakes of an appellate jurisdiction which the CA
does not have over judgments of the Secretary of Justice exercising quasi-judicial
functions.

There is a whale of a difference between the CAs power of review in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction and its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari as that filed

Certiorari power is limited to questions

by the respondent.

of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion only.

 153

Wisdom or error of judgment on the part of the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his
conclusions of fact and law which is proper in an appeal cannot legitimately be the

subject of review in a petition for certiorari before the CA because the

decision of the Secretary of Justice is not
appealable to the CA.

We thus agree with the observation of Justice Brawner that the only issue rightfully
presented before the CA was whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the City Prosecutor, dismissing the
complaint, and directing the filing of an information for attempted rape against the
herein respondent.

This is, as it should be for the determination of probable cause, a

function that, by law, pertains to the public prosecutor.

Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,

the appellate court is precluded, under the principle of separation of powers, from
usurping the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
executive branch, the Department of Justice.

Probable Cause
We may also be well reminded that the purpose of preliminary investigation is to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.

A finding of probable cause need only rest on evidence showing that more likely than not
a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect.

While probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect
to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

It is exclusively within the ambit of the prosecutor's powers to determine whether

probable cause exists and which crime to prosecute for. Should it be determined later
on after a full-blown trial where a full account can be made of the incident, that not all
it is then for the trial court to acquit
the elements of attempted rape exist,
respondent or convict him for a lesser crime necessarily included
therein such as acts of lasciviousness or unjust vexation.

But the Secretary of Justice has the discretion to determine for which crime he should
prosecute for.
 154

It is understandable for the prosecutor to ordinarily

aim high. It has a valid reason. There are many instances when, for
example, an information for murder is filed and the trial court finds it to be only homicide due
to the failure of the prosecution to prove certain qualifying circumstances.

These are instances when the prosecution deems it prudent to play safe because had it
only filed an information for homicide and facts come out during trial that could
qualify the crime to murder, there would be nothing that can be done to change the crime
charged, lest a violation of due process or double jeopardy results. The same logic applies in
the present case. It is for the trial.

Again, to quote Justice Brawner in his dissenting opinion:

[W]hen the majority states in its decision that there is an absence of lewd designs on the part of the
petitioner, it exercises a power properly the province of an investigating prosecutor. And when it argues that the
crime committed is acts of lasciviousness or perhaps merely unjust vexation, it plays a role not given to it by the
rules governing the Judiciary.

For lewd designs is a state of the mind not discernible by a simple reading of the dry, lifeless pages of
[petitioner's] complaint affidavit or [respondent's] counter-affidavit: it is a creature whose being, or lack thereof,
must be threshed out in a full-blown trial wherein parties are given the opportunity to give their testimony in open
court and the opponent given the chance to cross-examine, under the watchful eye of the trial judge who
observes with an adept eye the truthfulness of the witness' avowals.

court to decide whether lewd design exists.

 155

PI Procedure
Clarificatory hearing p.26

Aurora Sales vs. Benjamin Adapon et al ( Aurora is based in the States; investigating
prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the petitioner's criminal complaint for
falsification simply because of her non-appearance at the clarificatory hearing )
G.R. No. 171420, October 05, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Aurora a US immigrant who has resided in said country since 1980 and
respondents Benjamin et al are among the eleven (11) siblings of the late Spouses Pedro &
Severino Adapon. Upon their demise, Spouses Pedro et al left a parcel of land located in
Rosario, Batangas with a total area of 1,3M sqm

Sales, represented by her son Adelfo filed a complaint against her siblings, including herein
Benjamin and other heirs of the late Spouses Pedro for nullification of various certificates
of title emanating from TCT No. T-6905 and recovery of properties covered by the void
certificates.

In her complaint, Sales alleged that during her absence and without her knowledge and
consent, the subject property was subdivided several times and most of it were parceled out
among the defendants in varying areas and registered in their names.

Benjamin et al filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint, attaching thereto a Deed of
Extra-judicial Settlement Among Heirs, executed in Makati, by and among the eleven (11)
children of the late Spouses Pedro and Severina Adapon, including herein private
respondent.

Sales executed an affidavit subscribed and sworn to before Vice-Consul in New York
claiming that the deed of extra-judicial settlement is a falsified document. She claims that
she did not sign the subject deed, thus, she disowns the purported signature appearing on
top of her name in said document, the same having been placed there without her
knowledge or consent. Aurora authorized Jerico B. Sales, her son-in-law, for the
purpose of instituting the criminal proceedings against petitioners.

Prosecutor Cuevas issued a Resolution dismissing the instant complaint on the ground
that it is impossible for him to proceed with the preliminary investigation without the
appearance of private respondent who will be subjected to some clarificatory
questions on certain matters. MR denied

Aurora filed an appeal Petition for Review before DOJ. DOJ granted appeal Prosecutor is
directed to file the corresponding information for use of falsified document under Article 172,
par. 3, RPC. CA reversed decision due to grave abuse of discretion Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the physical presence of petitioners is required for clarificatory hearing by
the Prosecutor to determine Probable Cause?
 156

Held: NO

In view of the foregoing, the investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the
petitioner's criminal complaint for falsification simply because of her non-appearance at the
clarificatory hearing.

To start with, her personal presence was excusable because of her advanced age and the
distance of her place of residence at the time USA, from the Province of Batangas, the
venue of the proceedings.

Secondly, the records already contained sufficient evidence upon which the
investigating prosecutor could make a finding of probable cause.

Thirdly, she was represented in the proceedings by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales,
whom she had constituted as her agent for purposes of pursuing the criminal case
agent expressly authorized for that
against the respondents. Being her
special purpose, Jerico could competently respond to the
investigating prosecutor's clarificatory questions in a manner
legally binding on her.

Fourthly, had the investigating prosecutor sincerely considered her personal presence as

absolutely necessary in the determination of probable cause,he should have

granted her request to have her deposition taken
instead. Such power was within his discretion as the investigating prosecutor.
And, lastly, the investigating prosecutor's requiring her personal presence at the

unnecessary and superfluous in

clarificatory hearing was probably

view of his failure to specify the matters still needing

to be clarified.
As earlier mentioned, the documents submitted by both parties in the proceedings were
already sufficient for the determination of whether or not probable cause existed against the
respondents. If the clarificatory hearing was geared towards the determination of the
existence of probable cause,12 the nonspecification of the matters to be inquired into during
the clarificatory hearing indicated that no more matters needed to be clarified from the
petitioner herself.

Preliminary Investigation
 157

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for
an individual the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly
jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other.

Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not a mere formal or
but a substantive one, forming part of due process in
technical right
criminal justice.

As can be seen, the most important purpose of the preliminary investigation is to

determine whether or not a crime has been committed, and whether or not the
respondent is probably guilty of the crime.

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
The term does not mean actual or positive cause; nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief.
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether or not there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. That it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged is enough.

complainant for falsification appeals the adverse decision promulgated by CA, which
annulled and set aside reso by DOJ that had directed the filing against the respondents of
the information for violation of Article 172

It is error to dismiss a criminal complaint for falsification on the basis alone that the
complainant, already residing abroad, did not herself submit to the clarificatory hearing, and
the investigating prosecutor did not state the matters that still required clarification, if the
records already contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to charge
the respondents therewith.

On the other hand, it is a sound judicial policy for the courts to refrain from interfering in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation, and to just leave to the DOJ the ample latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause for the prosecution of offenders.
 158

Consistent with this policy, the courts do not review and reverse the Secretary of Justice's
findings and conclusions on probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of
discretion, that is, when the Secretary of Justice has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent
and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law.

As such, the Court upholds the DOJ's executive determination of probable cause in the
absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
 159

Review of Resolution By DOJ p.27

DOJ Circular 70

Leonardo Flores vs. Raul Gonzalez & Eugene Lim ( Reliance on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. Thus, the trial court may make an
independent assessment of the merits )
G.R. No. 188197 August 3, 2010
NACHURA, J.

Facts:
petitioner Leonardo filed a complaint-affidavit against private respondent Eugene for estafa
before the City Prosecutor of Cebu City. The complaint alleged that, during the pre-
incorporation stage of Enviroboard Manu. Inc, Lim tricked Flores and the other EMI
incorp. to purchase two compact processing equipments, in Great Britain for the
manufacture of Fiber Boards.

Unknown to Flores, Lim was connected with Bendez International Corporation (Bendez),
the exclusive distributor of Compak. Flores, et al. discovered the distributorship
agreement between Bendez and Compak. Upon further investigation, they learned that the
purchase price of the CP14 was only P38M, they paid P60M per the Letter of Credit

Lim filed his counter-affidavit denying all the accusations against him. City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. MR by Flores denied. Flores filed
a petition for review with the DOJ Sec.

DOJ Sec. dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no showing of any
reversible error on the part of the handling prosecutors. MR by Flores granted by DOJ,
City Prosecutor hereby directed to file an information for other deceits defined and
penalized under Ar 318 of RPC before the MTC, May 31, 2006 Reso

Pursuant to the said directive Prosecutor filed with MTCC Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
an Information against Lim for the crime of Other Deceits. case was docketed and was
raffled to Branch 4.

*Lim filed MR agains May 31, 2006 Reso , DOJ Sec granted Lim’s MR City Prosecutor is
hereby directed to withdraw the information, if any had been filed in Court, and report the
action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. March 2007. Flores filed
a petition for certiorari before CA.

Accordingly, City Prosecutor filed with the MTCC a Motion to Withdraw Information.

MTCC denied Motion to Withdraw Information.

CA finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in issuing his
March 22, 2007 Reso. Hence the Case at bar.
 160

Issue: Whether the judge erred in denying the motion to withdraw information as ordered by
DOJ?

Held: NO!

As jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC, this jurisdiction is not lost despite
a resolution by the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the
case, notwithstanding the deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the accused and
further proceedings, and not even if the Secretary of Justice is affirmed by the higher courts.

Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the appellate courts, since it is mandated
to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or
disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of

the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. Thus, the trial
court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the

● affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the

Information;

● the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce
before it;

● or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the
motion is filed by the public prosecutor.

The trial court should make its assessment separately and independently of the
evaluation of the prosecution or of the Secretary of Justice. This assessment should be
embodied in the written order disposing of the motion to dismiss or the motion to withdraw
the information.

This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to Withdraw
Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it correctly did so. In view of the above
disquisitions, and while the disposition of the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice
acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause against Lim may be

e MTCC is not bound to dismiss the case or

persuasive, th

to withdraw the Information.

 161

petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals

For these reasons, the
has effectively become moot and academic upon the issuance by
the MTCC of its June 20, 2007 Resolution ( denying motion to withdraw ).

The March 6, 2008 Decision and the May 28, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
affirming the Secretary of Justice will really make no difference anymore.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02726 is declared MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Consequently, the
assailed Decision dated March 6, 2008 and the Resolution dated May 28, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in the said case are SET ASIDE.
 162

Rufina Caliwan vs. Mario Ocampo et al ( Instead of filing a petition for certiorari,
petitioner could ventilate her defenses before the Metropolitan Trial Court during the
trial of the case. In the event that the Metropolitan Trial Courts decision is adverse to
her cause, she could avail of the remedy of appeal as provided in Section 21 of the
1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure)
G.R. No. 183270 February 13, 2009
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:
petitioner Rufina filed a complaint for attempted murder, multiple serious physical injuries,
slander by deed, grave threats, and grave oral defamation against respondents Mario et
al. As counter-charges, respondents filed complaints for grave threats, against petitioner.

Charges and counter-charges being interwoven were consolidated and investigated jointly.
In Reso. the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaint
filed by petitioner for lack of evidence, and recommended that petitioner be charged
with light threats and slight physical injuries

Two separate Informations for light threats and slight physical

injuries were filed against petitioner before MeTC Pasay. Petitioner
appealed to DOJ, which issued a Reso finding a prima facie case and/or probable
cause for the offense of light threats against Mario et al and consequently ordered the
filing of corresponding informations against the respondents.

DOJ also ordered the dismissal of the rest of the charges, as well as the withdrawal of
the Informations for light threats and slight physical injuries against petitioner.

Motion for Withdrawal of Information was filed seeking the withdrawal of the Informations
charging petitioner with light threats and slight physical injuries. MeTC denied motion

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before RTC and was granted. MTWI is
granted. CA reversed RTCs decision and reinstated MeTC denying the MTWI court a quo
was ordered to proceed with the trial of the case with dispatch. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether MeTC erred in denying the MTWI as resolved by DOJ?

Held: NO
The June 6, 2006 Order of the MeTC is an interlocutory order. Similar to an order denying a
motion to dismiss, an order denying a motion for withdrawal of information is interlocutory as
it does not finally dispose of the case nor does it determine the rights and liabilities of the
parties as regards each other.

The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court being interlocutory and the case
falling under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Regional Trial Court erred
in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari despite the clear prohibition in Section 19.
 163

Instead of filing a petition for certiorari, petitioner could ventilate her defenses before the
Metropolitan Trial Court during the trial of the case. In the event that the Metropolitan Trial
Courts decision is adverse to her cause, she could avail of the remedy of appeal as provided
in Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure

The charges against petitioner are light threats and slight physical injuries, to which the
applicable rule is the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Section 19 thereof
provides:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the
court;

Interlocutory order
Is one that does not finally dispose of the case and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court.

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and
the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy.

Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental issue and do not terminate or finally dispose
of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits.

The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court is an interlocutory order. Similar to an
order denying a motion to dismiss, an order denying a motion for withdrawal of information is
interlocutory as it does not finally dispose of the case nor does it determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties as regards each other.
 164

we do not find abuse of discretion, much more

DOJ vs. Teodulo Alaon (
grave abuse of discretion, by the Secretary of Justice when he took
cognizance of BBBs letter and treated it as a petition for review
from the provincial prosecutors resolution )
G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014
PEREZ, J.

Facts:
Private complainant AAA, 17 years old, filed a complaint against Alaon 73 years old.
charging him with the crime of rape occurring on three separate but successive occasions.
Alaon denied the charges.

Prosecution Office of Daet, Camarines Norte found probable cause to indict Alaon for
three (3) counts of rape under Article 266-A RPC in relation RA 7610.

Acting favorably on Alaon’s MR Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the offense from

rape to acts of lasciviousnessAn Information against Alaon was filed before the RTC for
acts of lasciviousness.

DOJ Sec. Datumanong directed the Provincial Prosecutor to:

● (1) forward the entire records of the case for automatic review, and

● defer the filing of the Information for acts of lasciviousness against Alaon, or, in the
event an Information has been filed in court, move for suspension of proceedings
against Alaon, in order not to render the automatic review moot and academic.

Directive was based on a letter of BBB, AAAs mother, narrating what happened to AAA
who is said to be suffering from an intellectual disability.

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Estrellado requesting the withdrawal of the Information for
Acts of Lasciviousness before RTC in compliance with DOJ Sec. directive mistakenly
assuming that Alaon filed a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice.

RTC acting on the letter of Prosecutor Estrellado, suspended the proceedings. Alaon filed a
Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Set Case for Arraignment with a prayer to lift the
RTCs suspension of proceedings. RTC granted motion to set case for Arraignm.

Estrellado filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings which Alaon opposed. RTC issued an
Order denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings,

5 years later 18 March 2008, DOJ Usec. Peneda, reinstated the previous charge of rape
against Alaon and directed the filing of an Information against him for three (3) counts
of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.

Alaon filed petition for certiorari before CA and was granted 25 March 2009. Held DOJ,
finding grave abuse of discretion in its issuance. Hence the case at bar.
 165

Issue:
1st Issue: Whether DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting BBB’s letter as an
appeal by way of petition for review from the prosecutor’s resolution at PI stage?

2nd Issue: Whether Alaon was accorded due process in reinstating the crime of Rape by
Usec. Pineda?

Held:
1st Issue: Whether DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting BBB’s letter as an
appeal by way of petition for review from the prosecutor’s resolution at PI stage? NO.

There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justice’s power of review over the actions of his
subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in the
Secretary of Justice’s authority of supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and
agencies under him, subject only to specific guidelines.

we do not find
Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates,
abuse of discretion, much more grave abuse of discretion, by the
Secretary of Justice when he took cognizance of BBBs letter and
treated it as a petition for review from the provincial prosecutors
resolution.

It cannot be said that in this case, there was an absence of a petition for review. There was
in fact an appeal from the prosecutors resolution, although not as described in the
an appeal
National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal. There was, tersely put,
that the Secretary of Justice had ample power to act upon. ]

2nd issue: Whether Alaon was accorded due process in reinstating the crime of Rape by
Usec. Pineda? NO!

Nonetheless, we agree with the appellate courts

holding that Alaon was deprived of his right to
procedural due process, as he was not given an opportunity to be
heard on the letter-appeal of private complainants mother.
 166

The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of both substantive

and procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial
proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions,
acts as a quasi-judicial officer.

Even at the stage of petition for review before the Secretary of Justice, the requirements
for substantive and procedural due process do not abate. What Alaon eventually
learned is that the records of I.S. No. 2002-10728 were with the Secretary of Justice for his
review.

Alaon cannot be charged with notice that the Secretary of Justice had treated the letter of
BBB as a petition for review. Notice in this case, as a function of an opportunity to be
heard, a component of procedural due process, was not met.

Once the Secretary of Justice decided to treat the letter of BBB as an appeal, he should
have required Alaon to comment thereon. Even if the letter did not comply with the
requirements for an appeal under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal,

Secretary of Justice was duty-

indeed, precisely for such reason, the

bound, as the one hearing the case, to afford Alaon,

respondent therein, an opportunity to be heard to
satisfy procedural due process.
On this score, the DOJ abused its discretion when it rode roughshod over Alaon’s rights as it
accommodated private complainant.

We affirm the appellate courts issuance of the special writ of certiorari, annulling the 18
March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103816 annulling and setting aside the 18 March 2008 Resolution of petitioner
Department of Justice in I.S. No. 2002-10728 is AFFIRMED.
 167

Esmael Orquinaza vs. People & Erida et al ( designation by the police officer of the
offense as sexual harassment when she referred the case to the Office of the
Prosecutor is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to
assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be
charged. That is precisely the purpose of the preliminary investigation )
G.R. No. 165596 November 17, 2005
Puno, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Respondent Edelyn Arida, together with her witness, Julio executed a sworn statement
before the Calamba City Police Station regarding the alleged act of petitioner of kissing her
and touching her breasts while she was taking a nap inside the Calamba Model Makers
factory.

Arida was an employee of Calamba Model Makers while petitioner was its General Manager.
SPO4. Manaig referred the case of sexual harassment to the City Prosecutor of Calamba for
evaluation and proper disposition.

On February 13, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Paderayon issued a subpoena ordering
respondent Arida and petitioner to appear at the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor
for preliminary investigation. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss before City Prosecutor
for it does not contain allegations to constitute the crime of sexual harassment.

Assistant City Prosecutor Paderayon issued a resolution finding that there was no
transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, but grabbing complainant's breasts and
kissing her is punishable under another law for acts of lasciviousness.

Thus, he filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) an information charging
petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. Judge Wilhelmina issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner.

Petitioner filed with the court an omnibus motion praying that information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor was for
sexual harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness. He claimed to have been deprived
of his right to due process. Motion denied MR also denied

RTC affirmed MTCC hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the P.I. for sexual harassment was valid when prosecutor found probable
cause for filing information for acts of lasciviousness rathr than Sexual harassment?
 168

Held: YES.
Police report of Arida submitted by the Calamba City Police to the Office of the Prosecutor
for the conduct of the preliminary investigation. Clearly, Arida's statement contains all the
allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 of RPC

The offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness, under any of the following
circumstances:

(a) using force or intimidation,

(b) the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
(c) offended party is under 12 years of age.

Petitioner had the opportunity to refute all the allegations made by Arida when the Assistant

The conduct of
City Prosecutor required him to submit his counter-affidavit.

another preliminary investigation for the offense of

acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise
because the complainant would only be presenting
the same facts and evidence which have already
been studied by the prosecutor.

The Court frowns upon such superfluity which only

serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of
the criminal complaint.
The designation by the police officer of the offense as sexual harassment when she referred
the case to the Office of the Prosecutor is not conclusive as it is within the competence
of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the
appropriate offense to be charged. That is precisely the purpose of the preliminary
investigation

It is a means to allow the parties to present their affidavits and counter-affidavits before the
prosecutor to enable the latter to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground to indict
the accused and to help him prepare the information to be filed in court.

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is

sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only

means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information.
 169

This function is lodged with the public prosecutors. The Court said in the similar case of
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan:

The preliminary designation of the offense in the directive to file a counter-affidavit

and affidavits of one's witnesses is not conclusive. Such designation is only a conclusion of
law of Deputy Ombudsman Domingo.

The Ombudsman is not bound by the said qualification of the crime. Rather, he is
guided by the evidence presented in the course of a preliminary investigation and on
the basis of which, he may formulate and designate the offense and direct the filing of
the corresponding information.

In fact, even the designation of the offense by the prosecutor in the information itself
has been held inconclusive, to wit:

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble
of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. x x x it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the
information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the
Information.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO

Finally, it is worthy to state that even if it were necessary to conduct another preliminary
investigation for the charge of acts of lasciviousness, the lack of such preliminary
investigation would still not be a ground to quash the information against the accused.

The Court has often held that the lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash
or dismiss a complaint or information. Much less does it affect the court's jurisdiction.

The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The remedy of
the accused in such case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary
investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted.

The court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order
the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
 170

Mario Crespo vs. Leodegario Mogul & People ( Fiscal filed an information charging
Crespo for estafa; pending review before the DOJ for the information. Petitioner was
arraigned; Afterward Catalino Macaraig USEC. reversed the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused; Judge denied motion; once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court )
G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
GANCAYCO, J. En Banc

Facts:
Assistant Fiscal Proceso De Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Crespo in Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment
on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with DOJ Sec. of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information

In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied
the motion. MR also denied. CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court.

On March 22, 1978 then Usec. of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and

fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the

directed the

information filed against the accused.

A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April
1978 with the trial court attaching thereto a copy of Use. Macaraig. Judge denied the
motion and set the arraigniment

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and lifted the restraining
order Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether he Judge erred in denying the motion of DOJ to dismissed the case for lack
of evidence?

Held: NO
Action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject
to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe
and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice

It has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently
the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
 171

While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.

Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court
is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.

A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has
the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of law.
 172

Paul Roberts et al vs. CA et al ( PEPSI COCLA; Judge issued warrants of arrest pending
the resolution of DOJ regarding finding of probable cause to file a information; The
rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the court)
G.R. No. 113930. March 5, 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J.

Facts:
Several thousand holders of 349 Pepsi crowns in connection with the Pepsi Cola
Number Fever Promotion filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor QC complaints
against the petitioners, Officials if Pepsi. The complaints respectively accuse the
petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of the following crimes: (a) estafa

After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor, Gerona, released on 23 March

1993, a Joint Resolution where he recommended the filing of an information against the
petitioners and others for the violation of Article 318 RPC.

On 6 April 1993, City Prosecutor Candido approved the recommendation. information for
estafa attached to the Joint Resolution was approved by Casabar Chief of the Prosecution
Division, upon authority of the City Prosecutor of QC and was filed with the RTC Crim
Case 98 April 12 1993.

On April 14, 1993 petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a motion for the
reconsideration of the Joint Resolution.

(a) there was neither fraud in the Number Fever Promotion nor deviation from or
modification of the promotional rules

b) the complainants failed to allege, much less prove with prima facie evidence,

On 15 April 1993, the petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review wherein, for the
same grounds adduced in the aforementioned motion for reconsideration. On that
same date, the petitioners filed in Crim Case 98 Motions to Suspend Proceedings and
to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they had filed
the aforesaid Petition for Review.

Acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State Prosecutor De Guia issued a 1st Indorsement,
directing the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to inform the DOJ whether the petitioners
have already been arraigned, and if not, to move in court for the deferment of further
proceedings in the case and to elevate to the DOJ the entire records of the case, for
the case is being treated as an exception pursuant to Sec 4 of Department Circular. 7 dated
25 January 1990.

Crim Case 98 was raffled to Branch 104 of the RTC QC private prosecutor Julio filed an
Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest.
 173

Petitioner Paul filed a Supplemental Urgent Motion to hold in Abeyance Issuance of

Warrant of Arrest and to Suspend Proceedings asserted that the petition for review was
an essential part of the petitioners right to a preliminary investigation.

Respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying the petitioners Motion
to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold In Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest. CA issued
TRO to maintain the status quo. Court of Appeals then issued a resolution denying the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

counsel for the private complainants filed a Manifestation informing the court that the
petitioners petition for review filed with the DOJ was dismissed in a resolution dated 23 July
1993

Petitioner filed a MR before DOJ but was dismissed hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, the
motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest
and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have
been resolved?

Held: YES

Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to
suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:

“This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice
may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable
of administering justice.

The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of
the aforementioned motions at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion
to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for
review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor.

Before that time, the following pronouncement in Crespo did not

yet truly become relevant or applicable:

There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor.

It merely advised the DOJ to, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court.

Arrest warrant
 174

We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the

Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the
same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence.

However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals
bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.

Judge shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Unfortunately, in Criminal Case 98, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing
on 12 April 1993 with the trial court.

As found by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 July 1993, a copy of the Joint
Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as
revealed by the certification of Branch Clerk of Court Gibson Araula, Jr., no affidavits of the
witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were
found in the records of Crim Case 98

Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993
directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the
information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof.

He did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutors finding of
probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he
merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest after June 21, 1993.

It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But
then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty
cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.

DOJ also committed grave abuse when it dismissed the Petition for review simply because it
thought that a review of the Joint Resolution would be an exercise in futility in that any
further action on the part of the Department would depend on the sound discretion of the trial
court,
 175

POWER OF PROSECUTOR TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Rosalinda Punzalan et al vs. Dencio Dela Pena et al ( Secretary of Justice did not commit
Court will not
grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the CA;
interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination )
G.R. No. 158543. July 21, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Dela Pena and Rainier Punzalan et al got into an altercation. Alex Toto Ofrin one of the
member of Rainier’s group kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed
because he was able to run. The group chased him.

While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas family driver, who was
carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in
order to scare them. Michael Plata wrestled with Dela Pena for the gun.

Gun accidentally went of hitting Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Dela Pea, Cagara, and Plata
left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.

As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael
Plata for Attempted Homicide and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of
Firearm.

In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Pea filed several counter-charges for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries against the Punzalans,
including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Pea against Rainier and Randall
Punzalan and fourteen others

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City
dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan,
holding that Cagara failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast
dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were
uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and, hence, were not actionable.

The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others

was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor because
complainant Dela Peas claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of
Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier against the latter.
 176

Dela Pea and Cagara separately appealed to the DOJ. Justice Sec. Tuquero issued a
Resolution modifying Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor: by ordering, among
others

1. that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be

downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation;

2. that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be
downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and

3. that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex Toto Ofrin be downgraded to Other
Light Threats.

City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to file information

Petitioners et al filed MR. Sec. Justice set aside Resolution and directed the withdrawal of
the Informations against the movants.

He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case should be dismissed
because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered without malice as Rosalinda
was then in a state of shock and anger.

Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Pea against Rainier, the Secretary held
that the allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the
added that Dela
Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. He
Pea failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his companions
intended to kill him.

The appealed resolution is REVERSED. The resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside
and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the separate
informations. Respondents filed MR but denied. respondents filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA & set aside insofar as it directed the withdrawal of informations for slight oral
defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the respondents
Alexander Toto et al. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against
petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and against petitioners Randall and
Rainier Punzalan for Attempted Homicide?
 177

Held:No!
Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.

Supervision and control includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to
approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.

The determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is
vested with discretion in the discharge of this function. Thus, the question of whether or not
to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and,
ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.

The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted
homicide against the other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.

First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory remarks
were uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor. The investigating prosecutor found
that no sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution
affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.

As to the charge of attempted homicide, against Rainier et al, Justice Secretary resolved
to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a countercharge. The DOJ in a
Resolution dated had already directed that Dencio Dela Pea be likewise investigated for the
charge of attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred making
him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan.

This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of herein
respondent Dencio Dela Pea should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the
shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of herein petitioner Rainier Punzalan.

Secretary of Justice did not

In the case at bar, therefore, the

commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the

finding of the CA. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v.
Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary
Guingona that the
investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause
for the filing of information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to
review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.
 178

Insp. Rodolfo Samson et al vs. Sec. Teofisto Guingona et al ( we do not interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause
for the filing of information against an offender )
G.R. No. 123504. December 14, 2000
Pardo, J 1st Div.

Facts:
One night, patrolmen of the Central Police District Command posted at the intersection of
Scout Reyes Street and Mother Ignacia Street flagged a taxicab, with Datu Gemie
Sinsuat as passenger. Instantly, the patrolmen shot Datu Sinsuat in different parts of the
body, inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds, causing his death.

PNP-Criminal Investigation Service and the heirs of Gemie Sinsuat filed with DOJ a
complaint for murder against Rodolfo Samson et al for the killing of Datu Gemie Sinsuat, a
son of a politician from Cotabato.

After investigation, Prosecution Atty. Emmanuel Velasco filed with the RTC an information
for murder against petitioners and other police officers. Petitioners filed with the trial court a
Very Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Existence of Probable Cause (with Prayer
to Hold the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest)

Trial court ruled that it was premature to discuss the merits of evidences for the purpose of
the issuance of a warrant of arrest considering that these exhibits were not presented during
the preliminary investigation of the case and accused were not furnished copies of the same.

The trial
court ordered the reinvestigation of the case with respect to
petitioners.

Thus Court finds that at the time of the filing of the information for murder against
accused Samson, et al based on the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
and Reso. issued by Prosecutor Velasco Court finds no probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against accused P/Sr. Insp. Rodolfo Samson

Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice or his Assistant Prosecutors is

ordered to investigate this case

Petitioners filed with the SC the instant petition to enjoin respondents from further
proceeding with the reinvestigation of the case or from resolving the same. Hence the
case at bar.

Issue: Whether the SC may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting a reinvestigation
of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial court for determination of
probable cause?

Held: NO.
 179

Petitioners plea for injunction to restrain the reinvestigation of the criminal case against them
is not legally permissible.

As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary or final,
to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will injunction not lie when
the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. However, in
extreme cases, we have laid the following 10 exceptions.

Petitioners have not shown that the case at bar falls within any of the recognized exceptions
above set forth. Petitioners only rely on the probability that a reinvestigation may result in the
remand of the case to the court and the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

We find petitioners plea for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order utterly without

we do not interfere in the conduct of

merit. As a rule,

preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and

leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the
filing of information against an offender.
 180

Victor Uy vs. OMB et al ( One cannot be expected to respond to collateral allegations or

assertions made, or be bound by developments that transpired, in some other
different although related proceedings, except perhaps under situations where facts
are rendered conclusive by reason of judgments between the same parties ------ a
situation that does not obtain in the present case )
G.R. Nos. 156399-400 June 27, 2008
BRION, J. En Banc

Facts:
The Ombudsman filed on 4 April 2001 with the Sandiganbayan an Information charging
former Pres Erap, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, et al with the
crime of Plunder,

The case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan Case No. 26. n the course of the
proceedings, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion seeking,
among others, the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Victor Jose Tan Uy alias
Eleuterio Tan,

The Ombudsman alleged that no warrant of arrest had been issued against the accused
John Doe who was designated in the Information as Eleuterio Tan. In order not to frustrate
the ends of justice, a warrant of arrest should issue against him after he had been identified
to be also using the name Victor Jose Tan Uy living in Cebu City.

The petitioners response was a Petition to Conduct Preliminary Investigation filed with
the Ombudsman. The petitioner argued that:

1. he was not subjected to a preliminary investigation or to any previous inquiry to

determine the existence of probable cause against him for the crime of plunder or
any other offense, and

2. dictates of basic fairness and due process of law require that petitioner be given the
opportunity to avail himself of the right to a preliminary investigation since the
offense involved is non-bailable in character.

In a parallel Manifestation and Motion[14] dated 11 April 2002 filed with the Sandiganbayan,
The petitioner also asked for the suspension of the criminal proceedings insofar as he
is concerned; he likewise moved for a preliminary investigation.

Ombudsman opposed the petitioners Manifestation and Motion with a refutation of the
petitioners various claims. Ombudsman denied also denied petition for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.

It rejected the petitioners claims, reasoning out that the petitioners requested preliminary
investigation had long been terminated and the resulting case had already been filed with
the Sandiganbayan in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure; hence, the
petitioners remedy is to ventilate the issues with the Sandiganbayan.
 181

Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, granted the petitioners motion and directed the
Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation with respect to the petitioner.

It also held in abeyance until after the conclusion of this preliminary investigation action on
the Ombudsmans motion to amend the Information to insert the petitioners name and to
issue a warrant for his arrest.

Ombudsman complied with the order of Sandigan requiring the petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit, the affidavits of his witnesses, and other supporting documents. Attached to the
Ombudsmans Order were the Complaint-Affidavit in OMB-0-00-1756 and the NBI Report in
OMB-0-00-1720 pertinent portions of which read:

2.1. As may easily be gleaned from the documents served upon me with the 08
August 2002 Order, I am not among the respondents named or included in either I.S.
No. 2000-1829 or OMB-0-00-1720. Neither has there been any mention of my name in the
Complaint-Letter dated 14 November 2000 of Carlos Caacbay, Deputy Director for Special
Investigation Services or in any of its supporting documents.

Ombudsman thereafter issued an order requiring the attendance of Rodenas and the
petitioner in a clarificatory hearing. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion, arguing that
considering the thrust of his counter-affidavit, there is no need for a hearing because there is
nothing that would require clarification as to matters stated in his counter-affidavit and there
is also no point for a clarificatory hearing on the complaints-affidavits given the
patent want of probable cause as against him.

The petitioner did not personally attend the clarificatory hearing. Rodenas did not also show
up. The petitioner then filed a Motion to Resolve the case

At this point, the Ombudsman issued the first of the orders assailed in the present petition; it
found probable cause to charge the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. MR denied
by Ombudsman. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman complied with the basic requirements of due process and
the prevailing rules and jurisprudence on preliminary investigation.

Held: NO.
Mindful of these considerations, we hold that the petitioners right to due process has been
violated.

A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial.

In light of the due process requirement, the standards that at the very least assume great
materiality and significance are those enunciated in the leading case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations.
 182

This case instructively tells us - in defining the basic due process safeguards in administrative
proceedings - that the decision (by an administrative body) must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them; it should not, however, detract from the
tribunals duty to actively see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy.

We firstly note that the question of the petitioners entitlement to a preliminary investigation
apart from the earlier preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in OMB 20
and OMB 56 has been fully settled by the Sandiganbayan Resolution of June 19, 2002.
None of the parties questioned this ruling which, in its material points, provides:

1. The preliminary investigation conducted in OMB-0-00-1720 and OMB-0-00-1756

which led to the filing of the above-entitled case never mentioned the name of herein
movant Jose Victor Tan Uy. Instead, the preliminary investigation involves one Eleuterio
Tan a. k. a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan with address at Brgy. Bagbaguin, Valenzuela City

As declared by the prosecution itself, Brgy. Bagbaguin, Valenzuela, Metro Manila

certified that Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan is non-existent within the jurisdiction
of their barangay.

2. The claim of the prosecution that movants address at No. 2041 M. J. Cuenco
Avenue, Cebu City was not indicated because the said address was not yet discovered by
the investigation panel during the preliminary investigation was rebutted by the movant.

Movant was able to show that his address at Cebu City was made known during the hearing
before the Impeachment Court on December 22, 2000. Yet, despite knowledge of the
movants address, no subpoena or copies of the complaints-affidavits had been served upon
him at said address by the prosecution.

We understand the clamor of herein movant that while the prosecution did not give him the
opportunity to present his side, it already formed a conclusion that he and Eleuterio Tan are
one and the same person.

We quote this ruling as it contains the premises that justified the holding of the
Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary investigation specifically for the petitioner. To restate
the Sandiganbayan reasoning in simple terms: the petitioner was never identified in the
previous preliminary investigation

This notwithstanding and quite inexplicably, the identification documents despite the fatal
infirmity the Sandiganbayan found in the first preliminary investigation - were once again not
given to the petitioner in the subsequent Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary
investigation to inform him of his alleged links to the charges under the complaint-
affidavits.
 183

Based on the records of what actually transpired at the Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary

investigation, we can glean the Ombudsmans intent to either confront and identify the
petitioner through Ma. Caridad Manahan-Rodenas, or at least to introduce the Rodenas
sworn statement and the identification documents into the preliminary investigation records
through her own personal appearance.

For these purposes, the Ombudsman specifically called the petitioner and Rodenas to a

unfortunately did not result in either

clarificatory hearing that

of these possibilities; the petitioner did not personally attend the

hearing and Rodenas herself failed to show up.

At the same time, the Ombudsman was forced, upon the insistence of the petitioners
counsel, to consider the inquiry submitted for resolution based on the records then
existing. Thus, the Ombudsman still failed to establish in the Sandiganbayan-
ordered preliminary investigation the direct link between the individual identified by
aliases and the petitioner.

Unfortunately for the Ombudsman, the holding of the clarificatory hearing, in which Rodenas
and the petitioner were the invitees, is replete with implications touching on the existence of
probable cause at that stage of the proceedings. To be sure, the prosecutor Ombudsman
cannot be faulted for calling the clarificatory hearing as it is within his authority to do so.

Reasonable opportunity to controvert evidence and ventilate ones cause in a proceeding

requires full knowledge of the relevant and material facts specific to that proceeding.

One cannot be expected to respond to collateral allegations or assertions made, or be

bound by developments that transpired, in some other different although related
proceedings, except perhaps under situations where facts are rendered conclusive by
reason of judgments between the same parties ------ a situation that does not obtain in
the present case

The rule closest to a definition of the inter-relationship between records of a preliminary

investigation and the criminal case to which it relates is Section 8 (b), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides that

The record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a

prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case; the court, on its own initiative or on
motion of any party, may order the production of the record or any of its parts when
necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or when it is introduced as an
evidence in the case by the requesting party.

This rule, however, relates to the use of preliminary investigation records in the criminal
case; no specific provision in the Rules exists regarding the reverse situation ( Records of
Criminal case may be used for preliminary investigation )
 184

We are thus guided in this regard by the basic due process requirement that the right to
know and to meet a case requires that a person be fully informed of the pertinent and
material facts unique to the inquiry to which he is called as a party respondent.

Under this requirement, reasonable opportunity to contest evidence as critical as the

identification documents should have been given the petitioner at the Sandiganbayan-
ordered preliminary investigation as part of the facts he must controvert; otherwise, there is
nothing to controvert as the burden of evidence lies with the one who asserts that a probable
cause exists.
 185

Ernesto Tabajura & Dayrit vs. People & Afable ( affidavit of Mauro V. de Lara on which
the court a quo based its findings of probable cause was hearsay because it was not
sworn before Judge Adriatico MTC is DIRECTED to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 99-
29037 and 99-29038 for lack of probable cause and to quash the warrants of arrest
against petitioners for having been irregularly and precipitously issued. )
G.R. No. 175162 October 29, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Respondent Daisy Dadivas-Afable simultaneously filed two criminal complaints
against petitioners for Grave Coercion and Trespass to Dwelling. Petitioners denied the
allegations against them

Respondent was a former employee of Miladay Jewels, Inc., a company owned by the
Dayrits and who was then being administratively investigated in connection with
missing jewelries. Despite several summons to appear, respondent went on AWOL.

Judge Calixtro Adriatico MTC Meycauayan, Bulacan, conducted the preliminary

examination he issued an Order dismissing the complaints for lack of probable
cause. The Court believes and so holds that the instant complaints are merely leverage to
the estafa case already filed against private complainant herein Daisy Afable by the Miladay
Jewels.

Respondent filed MR alleging that when she filed the complaints for grave coercion and
trespass to dwelling on 17 September 1999 against petitioners, no information for estafa has
yet been filed against her.

Judge Adriatico issued an Order reversing his earlier findings of lack of probable cause. This
time, he found probable cause to hold petitioners Dayrits for trial and to issue warrants of
arrest,

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that the alleged affidavit of Mauro
V. de Lara on which the court a quo based its findings of probable cause was hearsay
because it was not sworn before Judge Adriatico; that De Lara did not personally appear
before the investigating judge during preliminary investigation. Petitioners MR denied.

before the court a quo could render a resolution based on said clarificatory hearings
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court with prayer for
issuance of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. RTC
granted petition.

RTC rendered a decision denying the petition for annulment of the 2 May 2000 and 14 July
2000 Orders of the Municipal Trial Court. It found that after conducting clarificatory hearings,
the court a quo finding probable cause.

stubborn facts remain that whatever defects, or shortcomings on the parts of the respondent
Judge was cured when he conducted clarificatory examination on the dates earlier
mentioned in this Order.
 186

Court of Appeals denied the petition for review on the ground that petitioners resorted to the
wrong mode of appeal; i.e., instead of an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed a petition for
review. MR denied hence the case at bar

Issue: Whether the Judge erred in issuing a warrant of arrest based solely on the unsworn
statement of Mauro De Lara who never appeared during the preliminary examination?

Held: YES
In the instant case, respondent directly filed the criminal complaints against petitioners
for grave coercion and trespass to dwelling before the Municipal Trial Court. The
penalty prescribed by law for both offenses is arresto mayor, which ranges from 1
month and 1 day to 6 months Section 9, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court applies,

If filed with the Municipal Trial Court

When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment

order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge
is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue
summons instead of a warrant of arrest.

Clearly, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the assailed 2 May
2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders finding probable cause to hold petitioners liable for trial
and to issue warrants of arrest because it was based solely on the statement of witness
Mauro De Lara whom Judge Adriatico did not personally examine in writing and under
oath; neither did he propound searching questions. He merely stated in the assailed 2
May 2000 Order that he overlooked the said statement of De Lara;

Nevertheless, without conducting a personal examination on said witness or propounding

searching questions, Judge Adriatico still found De Laras allegations sufficient to establish
probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of the requirements imposed by no less than the
Constitution.

When the investigating judge relied solely on the affidavit of witness De Lara which was not
sworn to before him and whom he failed to examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, he deprived petitioners of the opportunity to test the veracity of the allegations
contained therein.

Worse, petitioners arguments that De Laras affidavit was hearsay was disregarded by the
investigating judge despite the fact that the allegations therein were completely rebutted by
petitioners and their witnesses affidavits,

The procedure described in Section 6 of Rule 112 is mandatory because failure to follow the
same would amount to a denial of due process. The issuance of warrants of arrest is not
mandatory. The investigating judge must find that there is a necessity of placing the
petitioners herein under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.[30]
Perusal of the records shows no necessity for the immediate issuance of warrants of arrest.
Petitioners are not flight risk and have no prior criminal records.
 187

Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch 11, is DIRECTED to dismiss Criminal
Cases Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 for lack of probable cause and to quash the warrants of
arrest against petitioners for having been irregularly and precipitously issued.

Constitutionally mandated
It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon finding of
probable cause personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and particularly
describing the person to be seized.

To determine the existence of probable cause, a preliminary investigation is conducted. A

preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

A preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or

information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day without regard to the fine.

Thus, for cases where the penalty prescribed by law is lower than 4 years, 2 months and 1
day, a criminal complaint may be filed directly with the prosecutor or with the Municipal Trial
court. In either case, the investigating officer (i.e., the prosecutor or the Municipal Trial Court
Judge) is still required to adhere to certain procedures for the determination of probable
cause and issuance of warrant of arrest.
 188

Richard Cambe vs. OMB ( also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen.
Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe's signatures
explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to
transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-
controlled NGOs )
G.R. Nos. 212014-15 December 6, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. En Banc

Facts:
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal
pillaging of public funds sourced from PDAF of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010 in the
total amount of P517M.

The charges are contained in two (2) complaints both before the Ombudsman., namely;

1. Complaint for Plunder filed by the NBI and Atty. Levito D. Baligod
2. Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 filed by the Field
Investigation Office of the Ombudsman

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator - in this
case, Sen. Revilla - with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in
exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the
PDAF.

Pending resolution of the Ombudsman cases, Sen. Revilla and Cambe separately moved for
the suspension of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints, which were,
however, denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order.

Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe
et al for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Petitioners filed MRs

Specifically, Sen. Revilla, in his motion for reconsideration,76 pointed out that the
Ombudsman's use of the counter-affidavits, which documents he prayed to be furnished with
in his denied Motion to be Furnished, was a grave violation of his constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process.

Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration for lack
of merit. Consequently Informations were filed by the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan charging: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, et al (1) count of Plunder and all the
petitioners (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019

Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, finding probable cause ssued the corresponding

warrants of arrest against them.

Issue: Whether findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld?

Held: YES.
For Cambe Motion to Suspend Proceedings.
 189

Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which
denied his motion to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of
Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints against him. The
Court disagrees.

Administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's
audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of
Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them.

In Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan, this Court explained that:

[T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for
impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2)
criminal, and (3) administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked separately,
alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the
subject of all three kinds of remedies.

this Court particularly declared that "[t]he criminal case filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the
COA."

In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating its March 14,
2014 Joint Order which denied Cambe's motion to suspend proceedings.

Court now proceeds to resolve the main substantive issue anent the presence of
probable cause against all petitioners.

Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the
Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only in
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.

Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term
does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief.

In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of
probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused]
are required, not absolute certainty.

It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a

"merely an inquisitorial mode of

preliminary investigation which is

discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis

 190

to believe that a crime has been committed and that

the person charged should be held responsible for
it.

Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules
of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings."

In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that "probable
as long as
cause can be established with hearsay evidence,
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,"
and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta ( rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another ) at this stage of the
proceedings is improper.

Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse
its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Sen. Revilla, Cambe

Probable Cause Against Sen. Revilla

Finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on
record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements
signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the identified
JLN-controlled NGOs,

All these documents - even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla - directly implicate him
for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office
as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines.

In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica),124 this Court observed that

defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation." It is
through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to
practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the
years.

In particular, the Ombudsman details that "the NGO endorsed by the legislator would be
among those organized and controlled by Napoles. In fact, these NGOs were specifically
set by Napoles for the x x x purpose of having the PDAF funds released.

"The projects are authorized as eligible under the DBM's menu for pork barrel allocations.
[However,] [i]t bears noting that the NGO is directly endorsed by the legislator [and that] [n]o
public bidding or negotiated procurement [took] place."
 191

As such, there was a defiance of Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB)

Resolution No. 012-2007 which states that:

4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically earmarks an amount for

projects to be specifically contracted out to NGOs, the procuring entity may select an NGO
through competitive bidding or negotiated procurement under Section 53[(j)] of the [IRR-A].

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were
forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of
forgery] should be ventilated in a full-blown trial.

The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct
an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity.

Probable Cause Against Cambe

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe. he above-discussed
pieces of evidence are all equally significant to establish probable cause against Cambe.
There is no dispute that Cambe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide,
being his Chief of Staff.

By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen.
Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe's
signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as
the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds
allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs.

Moreover, Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF
money for himself and for Sen. Revilla. As recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one who would
go to Napoles's office and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount of
P224,512,500.00 representing Sen. Revilla's "commissions" or "kickbacks" coming from the
PDAF scam. The cash would come either from Luy's vault or from Napoles herself.167 In
simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles.

For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be no valid objection against the
appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistleblowers' testimonies as evidence to
establish probable cause against Cam be at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no
right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits ,of his co-respondents. Thus, this Court
holds that Cambe should likewise stand trial for the crimes charged, and his petition in G.R.
Nos. 212014-15 be dismissed.
 192

Inquest

Ernesto San Agustin vs. People ( There was an illegal Arrest; Inquest void;
Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to a preliminary investigation before an
Information may be filed against him for said crime )
G.R. No. 158211. August 31, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
While Victim RICARDO TAN and Witness ANTONIO were selling their wares of kitchen
utensils along the highway of La Huerta, Paraaque City, Victim TAN was mistaken as a
snatcher by two tricycle drivers. Victim was turned-over to Subject SAN AGUSTIN and
other Subjects at the Barangay Hall of La Huerta, Paraaque City.

GERONIMO witnessed that Victim was beaten by Subjects and locked-up at the Barangay
jail so he decided to inform the wife of the Victim (Complainant). When Complainant went to
the Barangay Hall on the same day and inquired on the whereabouts of his husband, noone
knew even San Agustin the whereabouts of Ricardo Tan.

Up to date, Victim, never resurfaced nor his whereabouts located. Record at the NBI central
file of Subject SAN AGUSTIN revealed that he has several cases of homicide, murder
and multiple murder

Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal complaint and filed the same with NBI charging the
petitioner, Brgy Chairman of Barangay La Huerta, Paranaque City, with serious illegal
detention alleging that the petitioner detained her husband Vicente Tan, on June 19, 2002,
without lawful ground therefor

petitioner received a subpoena from Ferdinand Chief of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of
the NBI, requiring him to appear before said office in order to give his evidence in connection
with said complaint and to bring with him the barangay logbook.

The petitioner complied with the subpoena and presented himself at the NBI with the
barangay logbook. However, the petitioner was placed under arrest and prevented from
going back home.

NBI Director stated that the basis for the arrest of the petitioner was:

Subject SAN AGUSTIN was subpoenaed to appear before the NBI to controvert
allegations filed against him for kidnapping by Ms. Luz Tan. He was enjoined to come with
his Counsel and bring the logbook of the Barangay. When Subject appeared at the NBI, he
presented at once the logbook of the Barangay. It was noted at the said logbook that there
was no entry on June 19, 2002 that Victim RICARDO TAN was arrested or transmitted to
any law enforcement agency or proper authority.
 193

State Prosecutor Elizabeth L. Berdal conducted an inquest investigation on June 27,

2002 and came out with a Resolution, on the same day, affirmed by the Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor, finding probable cause against the petitioner for serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

an Information was filed before the RTC Paranque City charging the petitioner with
kidnapping/serious illegal detention with no bail recommended. On July 1, 2002, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that he was illegally arrested
and subjected to an inquest investigation

hence, he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. He also prayed that he be
released from detention and that, in the meantime, the NBI be ordered to refile the complaint
against him with the Office of the Paraaque City Prosecutor and for the latter to conduct a
preliminary investigation.

The RTC issued an Order directing the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation within a
non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days. The petitioner opposed the reinvestigation
contending that the prosecutor should conduct a regular preliminary investigation
since the inquest investigation was void. He refused to submit a counter-affidavit.

petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with CA. CA denied Petition hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether there was a valid warrantles arrest?

Held: NO
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested without a
warrant of arrest against him for kidnapping/serious illegal detention. As correctly ruled by
the Court of Appeals:

Furthermore, warrantless arrest or the detention of petitioner in the instant case does not fall
within the provision of Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has been committed and he has probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
 194

Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to a preliminary investigation before an Information

The inquest investigation

may be filed against him for said crime.

conducted by the State Prosecutor is void because under

Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an inquest investigation is
proper only when the suspect is lawfully arrested without a warrant:

We also agree with the absence of a

Court of Appeals that the

preliminary investigation does not affect the

jurisdiction of the trial court but merely the
regularity of the proceedings. It does not impair the
validity of the Information or otherwise render it
defective.

Neither is it a ground to quash the Information or

nullify the order of arrest issued against him or
justify the release of the accused from detention.

court should suspend proceedings and order a

However, the trial
preliminary investigation considering that the inquest investigation
conducted by the State Prosecutor is null and void

In sum, then, the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in ordering the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation which is merely a
review by the Prosecutor of his records and evidence instead of a preliminary investigation
as provided for in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

However, we do not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no need for
the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation since the crime charged under the
Information filed with the MeTC was arbitrary detention under Article 124, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four months and one day to two
years and four months.
 195

Whether or not there is a need for a preliminary investigation under Section 1 in relation to
Section 9 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure depends upon the
charged in the complaint filed with the
imposable penalty for the crime
City or Provincial Prosecutors Office and Not upon the imposable penalty
for the crime found to have been committed by the respondent after a preliminary
investigation.

In this case, the crime charged in the complaint of the NBI filed in the Department of
Justice was kidnapping/serious illegal detention, the imposable penalty for which is
reclusion perpetua to death.

Order of RTC ordering the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation is SET ASIDE. RTC
is directed to ORDER the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. MeTC
ordered to suspend the proceedings.
 196

Vicente Ladlad et al vs. Emmanuel Velasco et al ( joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting

officers states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to
Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have
conducted as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other )
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
CARPIO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
The Beltran Petition

Following the issuance by PGMA of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February

2006 declaring a State of National Emergency, police officers arrested Beltran while he was
en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Beltran was
arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the
crime for which he was arrested.

1st: On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of
Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a
speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006,

The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to
have been present at the rally. The inquest prosecutor indicted Beltran and filed the
corresponding Information with the MeTC.

2nd: authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame he was subjected to a second
inquest, with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion. A panel of
State prosecutors from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The inquest was
based on two letters, of Yolanda Tanigue and Rodolfo Mendoza both from CIDG.

CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, San Juan, and several others as leaders and
promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was
supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a tactical alliance.

DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and
San Juan as leaders/promoters of Rebellion. Beltran moved make a judicial determination
of probable cause against him. RTC denied motion

Issue: Whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid?

Held: NO
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are
proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when such
warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:
 197

The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers states that the officers arrested
Beltran, without a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the
inquest prosecutor could only have conducted as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to
Sedition and no other.

Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest

proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void

None of Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran
had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had
committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw
and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest
officer is to determine if the arrest of the detained person was made in accordance with the
provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of
Circular No. 61 which provides:

Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in
accordance with the Rules, he shall:

a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

b) note down the disposition on the referral document;

c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and

d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action.

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or Provincial
Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the order of
release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve
upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the charge
sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting
evidence.

For the failure of Beltrans panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in
relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltrans inquest void.
[19] Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the trial
court to make a judicial determination of probable cause, which effectively took the place of
such proceeding.
 198

Francisco Larranaga et al vs. CA & People ( Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest
investigation but to a regular preliminary investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot
be invoked to justify petitioners inquest investigation; NO valid warrantless arrest )
G.R. No. 130644. October 27, 1997
Puno, J 2nd Div

Facts:
It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP authorities went to CCA to arrest
Francisco Juan Larranaga. The, police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that
Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17, 1997 for
perliminary investigation.

On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted
by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be
given a regular preliminary investigation. Motion was denied by the city prosecutor on
the ground that Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled
only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in
person.

Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to CA assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. However, Larranagas effort to stop the
filing of a criminal information against him failed. prosecutors had filed an information
with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, no bail

Supplemental Petition impleading the RTC to prevent petitioners arrest filed before the CA.
CA dismissed Petition. OSG ordered to file a comment

it is within petitioners constitutional and legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary investigation
rather than a mere inquest be conducted before resolving the issue of whether or not to file informations against
him. He asked that x x x the petition be given due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary
investigation. He further recommended that x x x during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from
detention.

Issue: Whether Paco is entitled to regular preliminary investigation?

Held: YES.
Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary
investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioners inquest
investigation

Records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested. For one, the petitioner was not
arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he
would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on
September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a
warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed some two (2) months before.
It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to
section 3 of Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a
 199

capital offense kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest
and incarceration as in all probability he would not be allowed bail.

Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense
case should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor.

As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, the right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right;
it is a substantive right. A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously
conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected
from any material damage.
 200

Mandamus to Compel Fiscal to include all person responsible for offense

Jesus Guiao vs. Albino Figueroa ( When the fiscal chose to ignore his legal
duty to include the said Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as accused in the
criminal case, and to follow the procedure outlined in the rules by which said persons
may be discharged in order that they may be utilized as witnesses for the
prosecution, it became proper and necessary for the competent court to require him
to comply therewith. )
G.R. No. L-6481 May 17, 1954
LABRADOR, J. En Banc

Facts:
In the trial of Pp vs. Atilano Gopez, it was learned that Manalo and Dizon were present at the
scene of the crime when Felix lampa was murdered.

In view of the testimonies given by Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo in said Criminal case
No. 1273, the lower court ordered a reinvestigation of the case and suspended its trial, with
a view to including as accused all persons who might be guilty of the crime.

After the reinvestigation an amended information was filed, and two new
accused were included, namely, Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. But Porfirio Dizon
and Emiliano Manalo were not included.

In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, a motion for
contempt was filed against the fiscal, but this motion was dismissed on the ground that if the
fiscal committed an error of judgment, or even an abuse of discretion, the recourse against
him was not an action for contempt but one of mandamus.

In his answer to the petition for mandamus, the provincial fiscal admits the substance of the
testimonies of Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as above indicated. did not include
Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as co-accused because they are indispensable
witnesses for the prosecution aside from the fact that they are the least guilty."

Lower court granted the mandamus. it is the duty of the fiscal to include all the persons who
are responsible for the crime, and that if any or some of them are the least guilty, the
determination of this fact rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and not upon the
fiscal

Issue: Whether a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information

persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein, but whom the fiscal
believes to be indispensable witnesses for the State?
 201

Held: YES
In short, Act 2709 has laid down four principles, namely,

(1) that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense be included in the
information charging that offense;

(2) that even if it is necessary to utilize any of the above persons as State witness, he shall
nevertheless be included as accused;

(3) that fiscals have no discretion in excluding from prosecution persons who appear
responsible for a crime, but that if it becomes necessary to do so, the procedure provided
in the law must be followed; and

(4) that the exclusion of accused from prosecution, in order that they may be used as State
witnesses, is lodged in the sound discretion of the competent court, not in that of the
prosecuting officer.

In the case at bar, there is no question that Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo participated
either as principals or accomplices in the kidnapping and murder of Felix Lampa, and that
the only reason why the fiscal excluded them from the amended information is because
he thought it more convenient, or perhaps more expedient, to do so.

When the fiscal chose to ignore his legal duty to include the said
Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as accused in the criminal case, and to follow the
procedure outlined in the rules by which said persons may be discharged in order that they
may be utilized as witnesses for the prosecution, it became proper and necessary for the
competent court to require him to comply therewith.

One minor point needs to be considered, and that is the point raised in the brief of the
Solicitor General that the petitioner-appellee Jesus Guiao has no right to institute the action
of mandamus, because he has no clear right to the performance of the alleged legal duty by
the provincial fiscal. We find no merit in this contention.

Every person accused of a crime has a positive interest in the

inclusion of all his co-conspirators; a right to demand that all of them be
accorded equal treatment and be made to suffer the penalties imposed by law.

Without deciding the question as to whether or not any private citizen may demand
compliance by the fiscal with the provisions of section 1 of Rule 106, requiring him to file the
information "against all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense," we hold that
the other accused have an interest in the inclusion of their two other companions in the
commission of the crime, because they are jointly and severally liable with them for
indemnities that may be imposed upon them for the offense they may have committed
together.

Felix De Castro Jr. et al vs. Emiterio Castaneda et al ( MANDAMUS lie on Prosec And that
it is prima facie shown by the affidavits of Catalino Malanum and Laureano Pasag that
 202

they are responsible for the commission of the same offense with which the appellees
had been charged granting the writ prayed for )
G.R. No. L-15139 April 28, 1961
PADILLA, J. En Banc

Facts:
the appellees De Castro et al filed a petition for mandamus in CFI Pampanga averring that
the appellant assistant provincial fiscal, then special counsel, subscribed and filed an
information charging them fishing with the use of poison based upon the affidavits
subscribed and sworn to by Catalino and Pasag

the appellees filed a motion in court praying that the appellants be ordered to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case and thereafter to include in the information all persons who
appear to be responsible therefor. CFI ordered a reinvestigation of the case. MR by
appellant denied.

At the reinvestigation conducted by the appellants, the appellees asked them to include
Catalino Malanum and Laureano Pasag as additional defendants; that in the latters'
affidavits it appears that they had actively and directly taken part in the commission of the
offense with which the appellees had been charged;

Appellants had refused to grant the appellees' request and by that refusal had
"unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from their office;" and that they "have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law," and praying that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the
appellants to include Catalino Malanum and Laureano Pasag as defendants

Appellants defense; upon the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation, falls
within the exclusive prerogative of the prosecuting officer; that after carefully weighing the
evidence the appellants believed that there was no sufficient evidence to hold Catalino
Malanum and Laureano Pasag except the appellees.

Issue: Whether a writ of mandamus will lie to compel fiscal to include Catalino & Pasag?

Held:YES!
Court, relying upon the doctrine laid down in Guiao vs. Figueroa, rendered judgment
holding that the power of the prosecuting officer to determine the persons probably guilty of
the commission of an offense and to include them in the information to be filed in court
cannot extend to the point of encroaching upon the prerogative of the court; hat
persons who appear responsible for the commission of a crime should be included in
the information

that if it is necessary to utilize any of the defendants as a witness for the prosecution, the
provisions of the law for his discharge from the information should be followed;
 203

And that it is prima facie shown by the affidavits of Catalino Malanum and Laureano Pasag
that they are responsible for the commission of the same offense with which the appellees
had been charged granting the writ prayed for and ordering the appellants to include
Catalino Malanum and Laureano Pasag as defendants in the information filed by the
appellant provincial fiscal in criminal
 204

Benjamin Aquino vs. Herminio Mariano & Adriano ( The conclusion is therefore inevitable
that the filing of a mere MOTION to include or to amend the information in the
criminal case to achieve the same purpose as prayed for in the petition for mandamus
is not only an adequate remedy but even a plainer, speedier, and more adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law than mandamus )
G.R. No. L-30485 May 31, 1984
RELOVA, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Rizal Provincial Fiscal Benjamin filed an information in Pasig Rizal entitled Ppl vs. Adriano et
al for estafa thru falsification of official and/or public documents. Lucio Adriano one of
the defendants instituted a petition for mandamus in CFI praying for an order
directing Fiscal Aquino to include as defendants in the information ll persons of whom he
found a prima facie case as stated by him particularly, Comm. Antonio Noblejas Land Reg.
Comm.

Mandamus case was assigned to respondent Judge Mariano granting the petition
for mandamus, hence the case at bar. petition for review by certiorari praying that the
decision of respondent CFI be set aside and declaring that herein petitioner cannot be
compelled to include former Commissioner Antonio Noblejas as one of the accused

Issue: Whether proper remedy of private respondent Adriano, Jr., an action for mandamus?

Held NO.
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that can be resorted to only in cases of extreme
necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief where
there is no other clear, adequate and speedy remedy.

Before a writ of mandamus may be issued, it is obligatory upon the petitioner to exhaust all
remedies in the ordinary course of law. He must show that the duty sought to be performed
must be one which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office.

Thus, if appeal or some other equally adequate remedy is still

available in the ordinary course of law, the action for mandamus
would be improper. In the case at bar, private respondent Adriano, Jr.
did not request Fiscal Aquino to include in the information Comm. Noblejas
as one of the accused

Had he done so and the same was met with a denial, Adriano, Jr. could have
appealed to the Secretary of Justice who may reverse petitioner and designate another
to act for the purpose. That way, the filing of a simple motion with the Fiscal to include or to
amend the information is much more speedy and adequate than a petition for
mandamus
 205

As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his brief for the petitioner:

... By just presenting the motion, there will be

● no need of paying any docket fee and the numbering of another case;
● there will be no issuance and service of a summons or of an order equivalent
thereto;
● there will be no more raffles to determine the sala of the court to which the case
will be assigned; and
● there will be no pre-trial all of which necessarily consume time.

At least, there is no prohibition in the rules against this procedure. After all, a motion
is defined as 'every application for an order not included in a judgment' (Sec. 1, Rule 15, of
the Revised Rules of Court).

The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the filing of a mere motion in the
criminal case to achieve the same purpose as prayed for in the petition for mandamus is
not only an adequate remedy but even a plainer, speedier, and more adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law than mandamus.

Another substantial argument in favor of filing only a motion in the criminal case
instead of the petition for mandamus is that it will avoid multiplicity of suits which modern
procedure abhors.

Otherwise stated, before filing the present action for mandamus in the court below, private
respondent Adriano, Jr. should have availed of this administrative remedy and his failure to
do so is fatal

To place his case beyond the pale of this rule, it must be shown that his case falls — which it
did not — within the cases where, in accordance with this Court's decisions, the aggrieved
party need not exhaust administrative remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the
law
 206

Rule 110 Sec. 8 p.30 Complaint or Info shall State

Designation vs. Allegation

People vs. Eduardo and Edwin Valdez ( Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute
a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of
law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances
constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
informations )
G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012
BERSAMIN, J. 1st Div ( Not part of Syllabus )

Facts:
Office of the City Prosecutor of Q.C. charged the two accused in the RTC with three counts
of murder alleging:

qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength x x x x

x x by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his head, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death,

Accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder by RTC Q.C. CA affirmed
RTC. accused came to SC to seek acquittal. PO2 Valdez assails and contends that the
State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Issue: Whether the allegations in the information constituting treachery were sufficient to
qualify the offense to murder?

Held: NO!
Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of homicide
due to the failure of the informations to allege the facts and circumstances constituting
treachery.

And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging
the attendance of treachery.

The sufficiency of allegations of the facts and

the

circumstances constituting the elements of the

crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present
obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the
crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk
to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of

which is particular to a crime committed.
 207

Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or

qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates

theactual need for the State to specifically aver the

factual circumstances or particular acts that
constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the
liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to
defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined

NOT from the caption or preamble of the

information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which
are mere conclusions of law,

But by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint

or information.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.

The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused

“with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by
then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their
bodies “which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]”

Did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery
attended each of the killings.
 208

It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and
specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make.
Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are
other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose.

Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing
alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular
acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were
missing from the informations
 209

Aver acts or omission constituitng offense

Negative exception

U.S. vs. Silvestre Pompeya ( If the statute exempts certain persons, or classes of
persons, from liability, then the complaint should show that the person charged does
not belong to that class )
G.R. No. L-10255 August 6, 1915
JOHNSON, J. En Banc

Facts:
undersigned fiscal charges Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of
Iloilo on the subject of patrol duty in the following manner:

"That on or about March 20 of the current year, 1914, in the jurisdiction of the
municipality of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, the said accused did willfully,
illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive fail to render service on patrol duty ;
an act performed in violation of the law.

accused was sentenced by the justice of the peace of Iloilo to a fine of P2 and
payment of the costs of the trial, from which judgment said accused appealed to CFI.

Upon arraignment he presented the following demurrer: "The defendant, through his
undersigned attorneys, demurs to the complaint filed in this case on the ground that the acts
charged therein do not constitute a crime. Defendant presented the following argument:

"The municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is unconstitutional because it is

repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens.".

Judge Powell sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of said complaint.
prosecuting attorney appealed to this court. It appears from the demurrer that the defendant
claims that the facts stated in the complaint are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

In his argument in support of said demurrer it appears that the real basis of said demurrer
was the fact that the ordinance upon which said complaint was based was unconstitutional,
for the reason that it was contrary to the provisions of the Philippine Bill which guarantees
liberty to the citizens of the Philippine Islands.

Issue:
1st: Whether he facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under
the said law?

2nd: Whether said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving
citizens of their rights therein guaranteed?
 210

Held: 1st: Whether he facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action
under the said law? NO!

It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of the municipality to call upon
persons, imposes certain conditions as prerequisites:

(1) The person called upon to render such services must be an able-bodied male resident of
the municipality;
(2) he must be between the ages of 18 and 55, and
(3) certain conditions must exist requiring the services of such persons.

A complaint based upon such a law, in order to be free from objection under a demurrer,

person charged belongs to the class of

must show that the

persons to which the law is applicable.

For example, under the Opium Law, certain persons are punishable criminally for having
opium in their possession. All possessors of opium are not liable under the law. A
complaint, therefore, charging a person with the possession of opium, without
alleging that he did not belong to the class which are permitted to
possess it, would be objectionable under a demurrer, because all persons are not
liable.

The complaint must show that the one charged wit the possession of the opium was not
one of the persons who might legally possess opium.

Suppose, for another example, that there was a law providing that all persons who
performed manual labor on Sunday should be punished, with a provision that if such labor
should be performed out of necessity, the person performing it would not be liable.

In such a case, in the complaint, in order to show a good cause of action , it would be
necessary to allege that the labor was not performed under necessity. In other words, the
complaint, in order to be free from objection raised by a demurrer, must show that the
person accused of the crime, in the absence of proof, is punishable under the law.

One who performed labor under necessity would not be liable. The complaints, in the
foregoing examples, in the absence of an allegation which showed that the party
accused did not belong to the exempted class, would not be good.

In the absence of such negations, the courts would be unable to impose the penalty of the
law, because, perchance, the defendant might belong to the exempt class. The complaint, in
a criminal case, must state every fact necessary to make out an offense.
 211

The complaint must show, on its face that, if the facts alleged are true, an offense has been
committed. It must state explicitly and directly every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute an offense. If the statute exempts certain persons, or classes of persons,
from liability, then the complaint should show that the person charged does not
belong to that class.
 212

People vs. Edgar Legaspi ( Thus, the Rules now require qualifying as well as
aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the Complaint
or Information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proved
during the trial. And this principle is applicable in all criminal cases, not only in cases
were the aggravating circumstance would increase the penalty to death.)
G.R. No. 136164-65. April 20, 2001
MELO, J. En Banc

Facts:
Accused-appellant Edgar Legaspi was charged with the crimes of rape and robbery in two
separate Informations filed with RTC National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Malabon.
he Informations respectively read as follows:

Rape
accused while armed with a bladed weapon, with lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with HONORATA

Robbery
with intent to gain and by means of force, violation and intimidation, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and divest cash money in the amount of
P500.00 to the damage and prejudice of the said HONORATA ONG Y GUEVARRRA in the
aforementioned amount of P500.00.

Accused-appellant was finally arraigned accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial
thereafter ensued, trial court, as earlier mentioned, found accused-appellant guilty of rape
aggravated by dwelling and nighttime, and of robbery aggravated by dwelling; and
thereupon, imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death for the rape, and an
indeterminate penalty of six months to nine years for the robbery.

Issue: Whether the appreciation of aggr. Circumstances of nighttime and dwelling by RTC
were correct?

Held: NO!
However, a cursory examination of the Information filed against accused-appellant would
show that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling are not specified therein.

Now, at the time the trial court rendered its decision, the non-allegation of generic
aggravating circumstances in the information was immaterial, since the rule then prevailing
was that generic aggravating circumstances duly proven in the course of the trial could be
taken into account by the trial court in determining the proper imposable penalty even if such
circumstances were not alleged in the information

Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the
Information, resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death upon accused-
appellant.
 213

The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that
due to their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the
penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.

Thus, the Rules now require qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be

expressly and specifically alleged in the Complaint or Information, otherwise the
same will not be considered by the court even if proved during the trial.

And this principle is applicable in all criminal cases, not only in cases were the
aggravating circumstance would increase the penalty to death.

With this, the Court gives fair warning to prosecutors that henceforth, they must prepare
well-crafted informations that allege the circumstances qualifying and aggravating the crimes
charged, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court in determining the proper
imposable penalty.

Police Blotter

We thus have on record Honoratas positive identification of accused-appellant as her

assailant. Coupled with the oft-quoted doctrine that entries in police blotters, though regularly
done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth
stated in such entries since they are usually incomplete and inaccurate.

we hold that any discrepancy in the police blotter entry and the open court testimony of
Honorata does not affect her credibility.

It must also be remembered that the entry in the police blotter was made at 6:30 on the
morning of February 12, 1997, only a few hours after the rape and robbery. At that time,
Honorata may not have yet fully recovered from the traumatic ordeal she had gone through,
resulting in an inaccurate entry in the police blotter. Besides, minor lapses are to be
expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall
 214

Complaint or Information Rule 110 p.30

Sec. 9 Rule 110 Cause of Action Negative Allegation

People vs. Leonito Macagaling ( Indeed, such lack of positive identification is virtually
equivalent to the non-production of the real firearm in court and is analogous to the
situation in People vs. Caling, supra, where the rifle allegedly involved in the case was
not presented in evidence )
G.R. Nos. 109131-33 October 3, 1994
REGALADO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
During the fiesta in San Pedro Romblon, Leonito Macagaling point and then fire a gun at his
own nephew, Dennis Macagaling. Anita pleaded to Leonito saying, "Don't, Leonito," but
the latter pointed the gun at the temple of Dennis and shot him point-blank.

Pfc. Roque Fesalbon was at the barangay tanod outpost near the plaza. Hearing a gunshot,
he immediately went out to investigate and, on his way, he saw Teotimo Fameronag fall
down on the floor of the plaza. He proceeded to the place of the incident and saw Dennis
Macagaling lying on the floor while Leonito Macagaling was holding a firearm.

Leonito refused to hand over his gun but he later relented. Together with Pfc. Sofronio
Fabregas, Fesalbon arrested Leonito and took him to the latter's house which was near the
scene of the incident. Fesalbon inspected the gun which he had retrieved from Leonito and
found five empty shells and one live bullet. The serial number of the gun had been erased.

two separate informations were filed against accused-appellant Leonito Macagaling for the
crimes of murder and homicide and for an additional charge of illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition.

Assisted by counsel de parte, appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. lower court
rendered its Convicting respondent with instead of Murder, Homicide ( same as the other,
Homicided ) and illegal possession of firearms.

Issue: Whether the offense of illegal possession of firearm proved?

Held: NO.
It is a curious fact that although the incident took place on May 2, 1991, the information in
Criminal Case No. 1834 for illegal possession of the gun was filed only on October 29, 1991.
Pfc. Fesalbon testified thereon on May 29, 1992 and yet, although the firearm was in the
possession of the police for more than a year, there was no attempt to ensure its positive
identification through standard police procedure of which Pfc. Fesalbon, as a police
investigator, could not have been unaware.

For that matter, the efforts exerted to obtain evidence proving that appellant was not a
licensed holder of the firearm was lackadaisical at best
 215

This is the prosecution's only evidence to prove the allegation in the information that
appellant's possession of a firearm was "without legal authority therefor," again through the
bare testimony of Pfc. Fesalbon:

Q — You made mention that you conducted an investigation after taking Exhibit D (sic, should be E) from the
accused, did you find out whether that gun is licensed or not?

A — Yes, sir.

Q — What did you find out?

A — I found out that the gun has no license.

Q — Do you mean to tell this Honorable Court that the accused Leonito Macagaling is not a firearm licensee of
your town?

A — Yes, sir.

This is all. Nor did the witness deign to explain how he arrived at his conclusion. No other
evidence was presented on this serious charge which, in its aggravated form could, at the
least, be punished by reclusion perpetua due to the proscription against the death penalty.*

Yet, despite the opportunity and intervening time to do so, not even a certification that
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder was obtained from the Firearms and
Explosives Office or the local command of the PNP. And this brings us to the question of
the necessity and the quantum of evidence for proving a negative allegation in an
information, in this case the lack of a firearms license or permit.

The evidentiary rule on negative averments in the 1940 Rules of Court 54 as adopted in the
1964 Rules of Court 55 in criminal cases was as follows:

Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal case. — In criminal cases the burden of proof as
to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. A negative fact alleged by the prosecution
need not be proved unless it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged.

As applied to prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, the present
rule on proving the negative fact of lack of a license actually harks back to the case of
People vs. Quebral, where we find this passage clarifying the seemingly contentious
pronouncements on the matter:

The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative averment, like,
for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law, inheres in the
offense as an essential ingredient thereof, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
same

In view, however, of the difficult office of proving a negative allegation, the

prosecution, under such circumstance, need do no more than make a prima facie case from
the best evidence obtainable.
 216

It is, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that negative fact, and failure to
prove it is a ground for acquittal.

It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could be
invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal
possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm,

But We are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the
offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the
prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged", the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the
firearm used by appellant in committing the offense was not properly licensed.

We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the
prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the accused in an
information, which allegations must perforce include any negative element provided by the
law to integrate that offense.

In fine, since all that can be deduced is that appellant was in possession of the gun
only on that occasion for a transitory purpose and for the short moment coeval
therewith, it cannot be concluded that he had the animus possidendi which is required for
the offense charged.

The highly unsatisfactory identification of the gun, coupled with the intervening time between
its retrieval from appellant to its presentation in the court below, increases our misgivings on
whether it was in fact the weapon involved.

Indeed, such lack of positive identification is virtually equivalent to the non-

production of the real firearm in court and is analogous to the situation in People vs.
Caling, supra, where the rifle allegedly involved in the case was not presented in evidence.
We held that such failure effectively closed the door to any proof of the negative fact that no
license or permit therefor had been issued to the accused therein.

In either case, the offense is committed not on the basis of ownership but of possession of
the firearm without the requisite license or permit, and this disposes of appellant's
objection on this score. What, however, is of greater concern to the Court is whether the
prosecution has discharged the burden of proof on this charge.

Corollarily, the inquiry should be whether there was sufficient identification of the firearm
presented in the trial court and, more importantly, whether there was sufficient evidence to
establish the negative allegation that appellant possessed the gun "without legal authority
therefor."
 217

Sec 13 Rule 110

Duplicity of offense

People vs. Pedro Flores Jr. ( the informations in Criminal Case Nos. U-9184 and U-9185
are hereby declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional right of
accused-appellant Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias "Pesiong," for Rape to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the cases against him
are hereby DISMISSED )
G. R. No. 128823-24 December 27, 2002
CARPIO-MORALES, J. En Banc

Facts:
On December 5, 1996, private complainant Filipina L. Flores 11 years old at the time, and
her younger sister Catherine were left to the care of their father, herein accused-appellant, at
their family residence in Urdaneta. their mother Marcelina L. Flores having departed for
Singapore to work as an overseas contract worker.

1st count: After partaking of supper on the night of December 9, 1996, accused-appellant
asked Filipina to accompany him to the comfort room situated outside their house, she
acquiesced because her mother had told her to always obey her father.

He ordered Filipina to remove her short pants, threatening her with death if she disobeyed,9
and made her lie down. He then removed his short pants and brief and, against her will, he
inserted his finger and later his penis into Filipina’s vagina where she later felt hot fluid.

Accused-appellant thereafter wiped Filipina’s vagina and his hand, threatened to kill her if
she reported what he did,

2nd Count: Nineteen nights later as Filipina lay asleep in their house, she was awakened
when accused-appellant touched her right foot.13 Armed with a knife. Accused-appellant
thereupon removed his short pants and brief and went on top of her chest during which she
tried to push him away but failed

Accused-appellant then inserted his finger into Filipina’s vagina for some time,16 wiped his
hands, and then inserted his penis for a long time as he was sucking her breast. Filipina felt
accused-appellant’s semen drop into her private organ where she noticed the presence of
blood and a bit of whitish substance.

Filipina, accompanied by Norielyn, a relative, and a tricycle driver-neighbor, reported the

matter to the PNP here she gave a statement. On the same day, she, still accompanied by
Norielyn, submitted herself to a medical examination

The complaints against accused-appellant filed on February 3, 1997 read as follows:

“ willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness
FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, all against her will.”
 218

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape and sentenced
her to death in both cases. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was denied the constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him?

Held: YES.
This right has the following objectives:

1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make the defense;

2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution
for the same cause;

3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had.

The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape under Article 33530 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. No. 7659

Article 335. When and how rape is committed.--- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse between a
man and a woman under the circumstances enumerated in the penal code. T

complaint or information must

hus, to sustain a conviction, the

allege that the accused had carnal knowledge of or

sexual intercourse with the private complainant. In the
criminal complaints at bar, however, no such allegation was made.

The allegation that accused-appellant did "sexually

abuse" Filipina does not suffice
In the recent case of People v. Lito Egan alias Akiao32, this Court ruled that "although the
prosecution has proved that [the therein private complainant] Lenie was sexually abused, the
evidence proffered is inadequate to establish carnal knowledge."
 219

Hence, sexual abuse cannot be equated with carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse.34 The
allegation in the instant criminal complaints that accused-appellant "sexually abuse[d]" the
private complainant cannot thus be read to mean that accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge or sexual intercourse with the private complainant.

This Court is aware of the rule in case there is a variance between allegation and proof as
etched in Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.

The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between allegation and
proof. The recital of facts in the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge
rape, "sexual abuse" not being an essential element or ingredient thereof.

Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any

offense for that matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the
charge is the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

For every crime is made up of certain acts and intent which must be set forth in the
complaint or information with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant), and circumstances.

In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

NOT EVEN INCLUDED IN RA 7610 CHILD ABUSE ACT

From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that the phrase "sexually abuse" in
the criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the requirement that the complaint must
contain a specific averment of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the
phrase "sexual abuse" is not used under R.A. No. 7610 as an elemental fact but as an
altogether separate offense.

They are void for being violative of the accused-appellant’s constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
 220

Amendment of Information

People vs. Elberto Tubongbanua ( PINATAY YUNG LAWYER na boss nya; due to rank,
age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment; affect only
the range of penalty )
G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. En Banc

Facts:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. One night,
accused stabbed victim inside the kitchen of her apartment which caused her death.
Accused’s alleged that it was self-defense since the victim tried to stab the accused so not to
tell her husband about her so called illicit affair with a client.

Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended
Information.

That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different parts of her body with the use of a deadly
weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act
with insult or in disregard of the respect
was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and
due to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.

Aggravating circumstances of “with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the

offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex” were included as
amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its
evidence

RTC of Pasig found accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the RPC and is sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death.

CA affirmed with modifications the RTC. As regards the aggravating circumstances of

dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim, these circumstances were included
as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence.
The same should not be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding
the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank,
age or sex.
 221

Held: YES.
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal,
not a substantial, amendment.

These amendments do not have the effect of

charging another offense different or distinct from
the charge of murder as contained in the original
information. They relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect
any substantial right of appellant.
Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party
on account of rank, age or sex. Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed
waived.

There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed
her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately intended to offend
or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for the
murder was his grudge against the victim and not because she was a lawyer and his
employer. Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact
that she is a woman when he killed her.
 222

Rule 110 Sec. 14 vs. Rule 119 Sec. 19

Honorato Galvez & Diegovs. CA et al ( Be that as it may, it is quite plausible under

Section 14 of Rule 110 that, instead of an amendment, an information for homicide

may also be dismissed before the accused pleads, to

give way to the filing of a new information for murder )
G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
REGALADO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and Diego
were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin and seriously wounding Levi Vinculado
et al.

The cases were raffled to the sala of Judge Felipe N. Villajuan of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan. Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and were
subsequently released from detention.

Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment and

Subsequent Proceedings to enable him "to review the evidence on record and determine
once more the proper crimes chargeable against the accused," which was granted by
Judge Villajuan.

Atty. Belo, counsel for the private respondents filed a petition for change of venue to
safeguard the lives of the victims and their witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of
justice. Prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases.
Judge Villajuan granted motion cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of
the court.

On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein
petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder , and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms which were subsequently
raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of Branch 10, RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, No
bail.

Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein petitioners. Petitioners filed before Judge
Villajuan MR order to withdraw original motion. There after a Motion to Quash the new
informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos.

At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners, Judge Pornillos issued an order
denying the motion to quash and, at the same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be
entered for petitioners when the latter refused to enter their plea.

Prior to the arraignment Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended. Hence the case at bar
 223

Issue: Whether the Judge VillaJuan acted correctly in dismissing the original
informations rather than ordering the amendment thereof?

Held: YES
Be that as it may, it is quite plausible under Section 14 of Rule 110 that, instead of an
an information for homicide may also be dismissed before
amendment,
the accused pleads, to give way to the filing of a new information
for murder.

we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the withdrawal

In any event,
of the original informations, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the court in granting the motion and, more importantly, in consideration of the fact that

withdraw was filed and granted before

the motion to

herein petitioners were arraigned, hence before they

were placed in jeopardy.
Thus, even if a substitution was made at such stage, petitioners
cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil
sought to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the
simple reason that no first jeopardy had as yet attached.

It is true that Section 11, Rule 119 is virtually a restatement of Section 14, Rule 110,
providing as it does that:

"SEC. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. -

When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall
commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information."
 224

Rule 119 is the rule specifically governing the trial

stage where evidence is necessarily being presented, hence the trial court is now in a
better position to conclude that manifestly the accused cannot be convicted of the
offense charged or of one that it necessarily includes.

of the court to motu proprio order

It would primarily be the function

the dismissal of the case and direct the filing of the

appropriate information
We do not discount the possibility of either the prosecution or the defense initiating such
dismissal and substitution at that stage, although, from a realistic point of view, that would be
a rare situation.

This provision, therefore, is more directly and principally directed to the trial
court to invest it with the requisite authority to direct by itself the dismissal and
refiling of the informations therein contemplated.

Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural

governance for the prosecution, of offenses. Section 14 thereof,
quoted infra, provides in its second paragraph the procedure and requisites for the
substitution of a defective information by the correct one

Both Rule 119 & 110 the permissible stage for

effecting that substitution is "at any time before
judgment,"

It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or dismissal

entered before the accused is placed on trial and
before he is called on to plead is not equivalent to
an acquittal, and does not bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
It is not a final disposition of the case. Rather, it partakes of the nature of a nonsuit or
discontinuance in a civil suit and leaves the matter in the same condition in which it was
before the commencement of the prosecution.

Notice of hearing of the on motion to dismiss not needed

 225

Considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not
yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted
before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and
hearing thereof.

absence of notice and hearing does

Contrary to petitioners' submission, the
not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the
motion.

"Theorder of the court granting the motion to dismiss

despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of
service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of
jurisdiction over the case.
It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such
cases is either

● to have the order set aside or

● the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to
appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari."

In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public
prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. And, if after such
re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise
cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall
likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

It is not denied that in the present case, the court

granted the motion of respondent prosecutor for the
suspension of the proceedings until the re-
investigation thereof shall have been terminated.

Thereafter, the prosecutor arrived at a finding that petitioners should have been charged with
murder, frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms. This prompted him to file an ex
parte motion to withdraw the original informations for homicide and frustrated homicide.

Although the motion did not state the reasons for the withdrawal of the informations,
nevertheless the court in the exercise of its discretion granted the same, as a
 226

consequence of which a new set of informations was thereafter filed and raffled to
another branch of the court.
 227

FORUM SHOPPING

Artemio Torres Jr. vs. Edgardo & Nelia Aquinaldo ( . Besides, a certificate of non-forum
shopping is required only in civil complaints under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure )
G.R. No. 164268 June 28, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Respondent-spouses filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor Manila complaint against
petitioner Artemio Jr. for falsification of public document. They alleged that titles to their
properties were transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres
through a forged Deed of Sale

Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification
of public document against Torres which was filed before MTC Manila. Torres MR denied.
On appeal, DOJ Sec. reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered
the withdrawal of the information. MR filed by Aguinaldo was denied.

A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed which the MTC granted. Petitioner has not been
arraigned. Aguinaldo filed before CA petition for certiorari which was granted, resolutions of
DOJ reversed and set aside, finding probable cause reinstated. Torres MR denied. Hence
the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Aguinaldo committed forum shopping and such certificate of non forum
shopping required?

Hled: NO
Respondent-spouses are not guilty of forum shopping. The cases they filed against
petitioner are based on distinct causes of action. Besides, a certificate of non-forum
shopping is required only in civil complaints under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.

In People v. Ferrer, we held that such certificate is not even necessary in criminal cases and
distinct causes of action.
 228

Carmelita Lim & Vicarville Corp vs. Benjamin Vianzon & Valentin Garcia et al
( On this issue, we hold that private respondents were not mandated to disclose the
status of the criminal cases. This is so because, as asserted by private respondents,
there is no identity of the causes of action, issues and reliefs prayed for in the
criminal cases and the civil case )
G.R. No. 137187 August 3, 2006
TINGA, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Petitioner Lim filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Balanga, Bataan against Valentin Garcia for Falsification and Perjury. Lim alleged that
Garcia willfully and deliberately asserted a falsehood in an affidavit he had submitted to the
Register of Deeds.

Garcia allegedly stated falsely that he had lost his owners duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title. Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution recommending the filing
of criminal charges against Garcia and dismissing the charges filed by the latter against
petitioner Lim,

Private Respondents Garcia and wife filed a Complaint before the RTC for Delivery of
The Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title and Damages involving the same TCT
subject of the criminal case. Private respondents principally prayed for the annulment of
the alleged Deed of Sale which petitioners claim to be the basis for their custody of the TCT

petitioners filed before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1 a Motion to Dismiss raising
the following grounds: a) private respondents violated the rule against forum-shopping.
Trial court denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss. MR also denied

an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor against Garcia before the MuTC,
Bataan, for Violation of Article 183 RPC.

Issue: Whether there is a need to obtain a certificate of no-forum shopping

Held:NO
On this issue, we hold that private respondents were not mandated to disclose the status of
the criminal cases. This is so because, as asserted by private respondents, there is no
identity of the causes of action, issues and reliefs prayed for in the criminal cases and the
civil case.

The subject matter in I.S. 984 is whether criminal actions for Falsification and Perjury should
be instituted against Garcia. The principal issue in I.S. 095 is similarly whether a criminal
complaint for Falsification and Use of A Falsified Document should be filed against Carmelita
Lim, Villamon Fernandez and Corazon Rueda.

The principal issue raised in Civil Case No. 6779 is the validity of the alleged Deed of Sale
which petitioners claim to be the basis for their custody of the subject transfer certificate of
title.
 229

Forum-shopping exists when

The elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another.

Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)

1. identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests
in both actions;

2. identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and

3. identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that
any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful would amount to res ad judicata in the other case.

What is pivotal in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused
the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs, in the process creating possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different courts and/or administrative agencies upon the same issues.
 230

Tresita Villaluz vs. Rolando Ligon ( No forum shopping, different causes of action,
identities of parties and relief prayed for; One in Civil and other is Criminal )
G.R. No. 143721. August 31, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Petitioner Teresita and respondent Rolando were engaged in several businesses. Villaluz
borrowed sums of money from Ligon secured by postdated checks amounting to ₱1,5M
which later bounced for the reasons "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds/Account Closed.
Demands were made on Villaluz but she failed to pay her debt prompting Ligon to institute
criminal proceedings for violation of BP 22 before RTC Manila

During the hearing of said cases, Villaluz asked for the settlement of their controversy and
Ligon, as the First Party, and Villaluz, as the Second Party, executed a Memorandum of
Agreement with the following terms:

WHEREAS, the SECOND PARTY has acknowledged her aforesaid total outstanding obligation of ONE
MILLION NINE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,900,000.00) in favor of the FIRST PARTY and has
committed to pay the same on or before 31 December 1990;

WHEREAS, on account of the aforesaid settlement agreement, the FIRST PARTY has agreed to effect
or cause the dismissal of the aforementioned criminal cases against the SECOND PARTY;

In accordance with said agreement, Villaluz issued a check dated December 31, 1990 in the
amount of ₱1,900,000.00 which again bounced upon presentment for the reason that it was
drawn against a closed account. Ligon made several demands on Villaluz but to no avail.

Thus, Ligon, through his lawyer, sent Villaluz demand letters dated March 5, 1991 and July
1, 1991 which were allegedly duly received by her. Since no payment was made, Ligon
instituted on April 2, 1992 a complaint against Villaluz with the RTC of Makati, for the
recovery of ₱3,2M

RTC rendered a decision ordering Villaluz to pay the amount prayed for plus interest. Villaluz
through counsel, filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to Admit Answer which were both
granted by the court. Villaluz filed a Motion to Dismiss Case on the Ground of Forum
Shopping and a Motion to Cite Atty. Paulino E. Cases, Jr. in Contempt of Court.

The trial court denied the said motions. RTC ruled in favor of Ligon ordering Villaluz to the
former the sum of ₱3,2M. MR by Villaluz denied. She went to the CA and claimed that the
trial court erred: in not dismissing the case on the ground of forum shopping;

CA denied the petition ruling that the motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping
should have been filed within the time for but before filing of an answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim. MR also denied hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Ligon committed forum shopping?

 231

Held: NO!
Respondent did not commit forum shopping. There is forum shopping when, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion, other than by appeal or
certiorari in another.

There can also be forum shopping when a party institutes two or more suits in different
courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the
same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a
party’s chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.

It is an act of malpractice because it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades
the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets.

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important
question to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final
judgment in one case will result to res judicata in another.

test is to see whether

Otherwise stated, to determine forum shopping, the

in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of

parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs
sought

Here, the two cases involved are the instant civil case for collection of sum of money where
petitioner is the defendant, and the B.P. Blg. 22 cases where petitioner is the accused.
Clearly, there is No identity of parties for in the criminal case, the plaintiff is the State
with Ligon only as a complaining witness. In the case at bar, Ligon himself is the
plaintiff.

There is also a difference in the causes of action. In the instant case, the cause of
action is petitioner’s breach of contract as embodied in the Memorandum of
Agreement, while in the criminal case, it is the violation of B.P. Blg. 22

There is also a difference in reliefs sought because in the civil case, what is sought is
the enforcement of the terms in their MOA, while in the criminal case, it is the
punishment of the offense committed against a public law.
 232

As we explained in Go vs. Dimagiba, civil liability differs from criminal liability. What is
punished in the latter is not the failure to pay an obligation but the issuance of checks that
subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds.

The issuance of worthless checks is prohibited because of its deleterious effects on public
interest and its effects transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. In the present civil case, no
such transcendental public interest exists.
 233

People vs. Norma Ferrer ( Administrative Circular No. 04-94 concerns only the subject
of additional requisites for civil complaints, petitions and other initiatory pleadings
filed in courts and other agencies; the criminal cases filed against appellant in
different courts appear to have distinct causes of action involving different offended
parties who are said to have all been victimized by appellant )
G.R. No. 121907. May 27, 1997
Vitug, J 1st Div.

Facts:
An information for "Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale was filed against appellant Norma
Ferrer information, filed before RTC Dagupan. 3 other informations were filed with the same
court, charging the same appellant with the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
subdivision 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code. The four cases were tried jointly.

Trial court convicted accused for illegal recruitment on a large scale but acquitted accused
for estafa for failur of prosecutor to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant avers that former Assistant Prosecutor Gregorio Domagas, in filing eight different
estafa and illegal recruitment cases against her in different branches of the RTC and the
MuTC in Dagupan City, has openly violated the Supreme Court's Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, dated 08 February 1994, on forum-shopping.

Issue: Whether there was forum shopping?

Held: NO!
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 concerns only the subject of additional requisites for civil
complaints, petitions and other initiatory pleadings filed in courts and other agencies.
Paragraph 1 thereof is explicit; it states:

"The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the
original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or
complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief."
(Underscoring supplied.)

Parenthetically, the criminal cases filed against appellant in different courts appear to have
distinct causes of action involving different offended parties who are said to have all been
victimized by appellant.
 234

Validity of Information

Girlie Quisay vs. People ( In finding probable cause, ACP Dela Cruz had written
authority; But the filing of Information, he has none; THE aside from the bare and self-
serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file
the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. )
G.R. No. 216920 January 13, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued Pasiya or resolution finding
probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of RA 7610. Consequently, a
Pabatid Sakdal or Information was filed before the RTC charging petitioner of such crime.

Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of
authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC.

petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned by Assistant
City Prosecutor Estefano Dela Cruz and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor
Edgardo Hirang. while the Pabatid Sakdal was penned by ACP De La Cruz, without
any approval from any higher authority , albeit with a Certification claiming
that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor
in filing the said Information.

In this regard, petitioner claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal
would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or
approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against
her. As such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional
defect that cannot be cured

In its Comment and Opposition, the OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor,

SACP Hirang, was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant to

OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 . Further, it maintained that the Pabatid
Sakdal was filed with the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in the
Certification in the Information itself.

RTC denied motion to quash for lack of merit. MR by petitioner denied. CA affirmed the RTC
ruling. MR also denied. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the finding of probable cause and filing of information were authorized by the
City Prosecutor as mandated by law?
 235

Held: NO! PASIYA ONLY AUTHORIZED DELA CRUZ TO SIGN

In Relation to Sakdal/information
Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before
the RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of
Makati or any of the OCP Makati' s division chiefs or review prosecutors.

All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others, that
"DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may
nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig" - which
translates to "and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and
approval of the City Prosecutor."

The Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that
despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers
filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they
obtained prior written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving

Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was
authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC
by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had
authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating
him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati.

Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya
approved by designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid
Sakdal approved by the same person or any other authorized officer in the OCP-Makati.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash
as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer
who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal
must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the
Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information against petitioner
Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.
 236

In Relation to Resolution of of Finding Probable

Cause
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of
a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts,

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor,

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor

without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior
written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective
and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 11 7 of the same Rules, to
wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or

information on any of the following grounds:

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

instructs that the filing of an

In this relation, People v. Garfin firmly

Information by an officer without the requisite

authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional
infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver,
acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such
ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City
Prosecutor the power to "[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective

have the necessary information or

jurisdictions, and

complaint prepared or made and filed against the

persons accused,
 237

He may indeed delegate his power to his

subordinates as he may deem necessary in the
interest of the prosecution service.
The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this provision that the City
Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs
or review prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance,
other action, and any information recommended by any prosecutor for approval, without
necessarily diminishing the City Prosecutor's authority to act directly in appropriate cases.

By virtue of the foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang,
Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William
Celestino T. Uy as review prosecutors for the OCP-Makati

In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime
charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review
prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.
 238

John Labsky Maximo and Panganiban vs. Francisco Villapando Jr. ( St. Francis Condo; An
Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot
be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case because
there is a defect in the Information; There is no point in proceeding under a defective
Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction )
G.R. No. 214925, April 26, 2017
PERALTA, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Respondent Villapando is the assignee of Enhanced Electronics of Condo unit 2821 at the
Legazpi Place in Makati City. Petitioners Maximo and Panganiban are Directors of ASB
Realty, Now St. Francis Square, developer of the said condominium unit.

Villapando filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City a complaint against
Maximo and Panganiban for Violation of Secs 17, 20, & 25 of P.D. No. 957 Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree.

The said criminal complaint for Violation of Sections 17, 20 and 25 was dismissed by the
OCP-Makati in its Resolution on the ground that prior to the estimated date of completion of
the condominium unit, ASB encountered liquidity problems and instituted a petition for
rehabilitation with SEC which showed good faith on the part of ASB.

Maximo instituted a Complaint for Perjury, Incriminating Innocent Person and Unjust
Vexation against Villapando The complaint was assigned to ACP Evangeline Viudez-
Canobas. Panganiban also filed a Complaint Perjury and Unjust Vexation against
Villapando was assigned to ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.

ACP Canobas issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Villapando for the
crime of perjury, dismissed the complaints for unjust vexation and incriminating innocent.
Approved SACP Christopher Garvida .

Accordingly, an Information for Perjury was filed against Villapando before METC Makati
signed by ACP Canobas and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.

Villapando filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Canobas Resolution before
alleging that the Information was filed without the prior
the OCP-Makati
written authority of the City Prosecutor. Pending reso of motion, warrant of
arrest was issued against Villapando. Villapando filed a Motion to Quash Information
alleging that the person who filed the Information had no authority to do so.

Meanwhile ACP Vermug found probable cause also against Villapando hence he filed a
motion to amend info. To included Panganiban as a complainant. Court granted Motion.
 239

Resolution finding probable cause against him, did not bear the
approval of the City Prosecutor of Makati, Feliciano Aspi. METC denied
the Motion to Quash, stating that filing of the Information was with the prior authority of the
City Prosecutor constitutes substantial compliance with the rules.

RTC affirmed MeTCs decision presumption of regularity exists in the filing of the information
on the basis of the certification of ACP Canobas and ACP Vermug, Jr., coupled with the
approval of the resolution by SACP Garvida, stating that the filing of the Information was with
the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.

CA reversed RTCs decision. MR of both parties denied hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the filing of Information had the authority of the City Prosecutor of Makati as
mandated by law?

Held:NO.
Maximo and Panganiban argued that the Information bears the certification that the filing of
the same had the prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor who is the officer
authorized to file information in court.

In the cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v. Paqueo, this Court had
already rejected similarly-worded certifications uniformly holding that, despite such
certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the
same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior
written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

We are constrained not to accord the presumption of regularity in the performance of

official functions in the filing of the Amended Information . We scoured the
records of the case and We did not find a copy of the purported Office Order No, 32
allegedly authorizing the Assistant City Prosecutor to sign in behalf of the city prosecutor.

The said Office Order No. 32 is not a matter of judicial notice, hence, a copy of the same
must be presented in order for the court to have knowledge of the contents of which. In the
absence thereof, We find that there was no valid delegation of the authority by the City
Prosecutor to its Assistant Prosecutor.

We certainly cannot equate the approval of the

Assistant City Prosecutor to that of his superior.
Clearly, we see nothing in the record which
demonstrates the prior written delegation or
authority given by the city prosecutor to the
 240

assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the

information.
inescapable result is that the
For the lack of such prior written authority, the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in
the Information. It is for the same reason that there is no point in compelling petitioner to
undergo trial under a defective information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction

Furthermore, We find untenable the argument of Maximo and Panganiban that the
issuance of the Order dated February 21, 2012, bearing the signature of the City Prosecutor,
denying Villapando's Partial Motion for Reconsideration, in effect, affirmed the validity of the
Information filed.

firmly instructs that the filing of an

The case of People v. Garfin,

Information by an officer without the requisite

authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional
infirmity which cannot be cured by

● silence,
● waiver,
● acquiescence, or
● even by express consent.
 241

Validity of Information

People vs. Jdg. Zeida Aurora Garfin & SABALLEGUE ( Regional State Prosecutor are as
follows: b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city
fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised within his
region; The power of administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the
department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies.
Regional Prosecutor no power to delegate )
G.R. No. 153176. March 29, 2004
PUNO, J 2nd Div.

Facts:
information contains
private respondent was charged with violation of SSS Act. The
a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino which
states:

I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been conducted by the
undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance with law and under oath as officer of the
court, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense has been committed, that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and that the filing of the information is with the prior
authority and approval of the Regional State Prosecutor.

Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-
trial. Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city
prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.

trial court granted the motion to dismiss The Information will readily show that it has not
complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor. MR filed by
People.

Contending that as a special prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to

handle SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the
information involving violations of the SSS law without need of prior approval from the city
prosecutor.

Letters of commendation from Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo and Secretary
Hernando Perez were offered as proof to show that State Prosecutor Tolentinos authority to
file the information was recognized.

Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is
no longer required. It is contended that the Regional State Prosecutor has already directed
the city or provincial prosecutor to inhibit from handling SSS cases. Trial court denied MR.
hence the case at bar.
 242

Issue:
1st: Whether the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar?

2nd: Whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor
in the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as an
objection before arraignment?

Held: 1st Issue: YES!

Under PD No. 1275, the powers of a Regional State Prosecutor are as follows:

b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city

fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised within his region.

The power of administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the

department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to
insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without
interference with day-to-day activities;

This is distinguished from the power of supervision and control which includes
the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; direct the performance of
duty

TheRegional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only

with the power of administrative supervision. As
he has no power to direct the city and provincial
administrative supervisor,
prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases.

At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state
prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.

Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those cases, the special
prosecutors were acting under the directive of the Secretary of Justice. They were appointed
in accordance with law.

Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional state prosecutor granted the power to appoint a
special prosecutor armed with the authority to file an information without the prior written
authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor.

In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the Secretary of
Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases
filed within his territorial jurisdiction.
 243

They were appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional state
prosecutor granted the power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file
an information without the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No. 1275 provides the manner by which special
prosecutors are appointed,

2nd Issue: whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state
prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not
raised as an objection before arraignment? NO!!!

Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority or approval
by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an infirmity in the information
that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.

Since lack of jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even
after arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss
based on this ground.

the objection to the respondents actuations goes to the very foundation of the jurisdiction. It
is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of the filing
officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by

law while jurisdiction over the case is invested by the
act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the
complaint or information.

Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, like a violation of the SSS
Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked
with the filing of the information.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court held that it is a fundamental principle
that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the
same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by amendment. In that case, the (PCGG)
conducted an investigation and filed an information with the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging him with graft and corruption.

The petitioner sought to quash the information on the ground that the crime charged did not
constitute a Marcos crony related crime over which the PCGG had authority to investigate
 244

and file an information. The Court found that the crime alleged in the information was not
among those which PCGG was authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No.
1 and 14 of then President Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null
and void.

Of similar import is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[47] where we ruled that the

information having been filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was
fatally flawed. We noted that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form, but a
defect that could not be cured.
 245

Roman Cruz Jr. vs. SandiganBayan ( FAILED TO PROVE MARCOS CRONY;

PETITIONER GSIS PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 94595 February 26, 1991
GANCAYCO, J. En Banc

Facts:
On January 10, 1989, an information was filed by the PCGG Chairman, Mateo Caparas, with
the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. and certain other individuals as
follows:

the said accused, being then the President and General Manager and the Vice
President and Treasurer, respectively of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
xxx

Said information was filed after a preliminary investigation was conducted by Fiscal Freddie
Gomez of the respondent PCGG, based on a complaint, various affidavits and counter-
affidavits and exhibits submitted to him.

petitioner filed a motion to quash the information. At the hearing of the motion to quash
respondent PCGG informed the court that it will file an amended information.
Respondent PCGG filed an amended information which reads as follows:

That on or about May 16, 1983, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused ROMAN A. CRUZ, a subordinate and
close associate of former President Marcos

Petitioner filed his comment and opposition to the amended information and a
supplementary motion to quash. respondent court issued a resolution denying the motion to
quash. MR by petitioner denied. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the jurisdiction of amended information that was filed against petitioner full
under the category of criminal actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth filed against a member
of the family of President Marcos, relatives, subordinates or close associates, who took
undue advantage of their office or authority as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive
Order No. 1?
 246

Held:NO.
Other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the
foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG
to investigate and prosecute the same in accordance with Section 2(b) of Executive Order
No. 1.

Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly
authorized investigating agencies as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the
Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants, and the state prosecutors.

Thus for a penal violation to fall under the jurisdiction of the respondent PCGG under
Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1, the following elements must concur:

(1). It must relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth;

(2). Of the late President Marcos, his immediate family relatives, subordinates and close
associates;

(3). Who took undue advantage of their public office and/or used their power, authority,
influence, connections or relationship.

A reading of the information and the amended information that was filed by the PCGG
in this case shows that petitioner is charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 3019
as amended, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Amended information that was thereafter filed against petitioner contained substantially the
same allegations with the only amendment that petitioner was identified as "a subordinate
and crony/associate of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos," and with the additional
allegation of "taking undue advantage of his public office and by using his relationship to
said former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,

Consequently, the amended information that was filed against petitioner does not fall under
the category of criminal actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth filed against a member of the
family of President Marcos, relatives, subordinates or close associates, who took undue
advantage of their office or authority as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order
No. 1.

What the petitioner is actually charged with is for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
Moreover, an examination of the complaint filed with respondent PCGG, as well as the
affidavits, counter-affidavits and exhibits submitted at the preliminary investigation show that
there is no evidence at all that this alleged violation is crony related, committed by petitioner
by taking advantage of his public office, and was committed in relation with the ill-gotten
wealth being sought to be recovered aforestated.

There is, therefore, no evidence in the hands of the respondent PCGG to justify the
amendment of the information.
 247

It is a fundamental principle that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of
authority to file the same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by an amendment.

Another preliminary investigation must be undertaken and

thereafter, based on evidence adduced, a new information should
be filed.

Consequently all the actions respondent PCGG had taken in this case including the filing of
the information and amended information with the respondent court should be struck down.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned resolutions of the respondent
court dated August 7, 1989 and May 15, 1990 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE,
and another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the case S.B. Criminal Case No.
13342 and permanently enjoining public respondents from further proceeding with the said
case. The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Honorable
Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the same, for appropriate action.

Concurrent jurisdiction of OMB and PCGG

And even upon the passage of Republic Act No. 6770 known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989 whereby under Section 15(l) the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, this Court held in Cojuangco that this authority of the
Ombudsman is "not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of
the government."

Thus, this Court held "that the authority of the PCGG to conduct preliminary investigation of
ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed before February 25, 1986," is
maintained
 248

Santiago Turingan et al vs. Jdg. Aurora Garfin ( Same as Grafin & Saballegue; neither a
directive from the Secretary of Justice designating him as special prosecutor for SSS
cases nor the written approval of the Information by the city prosecutor. In
accordance with Garfin, the Information suffered from a jurisdictional defect.
Respondent Judge Garfin correctly dismissed the case against Apolinar for lack of
jurisdiction )
G.R. No. 153284 April 17, 2007
Corona, J 1st Div.

Facts:
Criminal Case 82 arose from an Information charging Apolinar for violation of RA 8282 for
non-remittance of social security and employees compensation premiums of his workers.
The Information, signed by state prosecutor Tolentino,

Prior to his arraignment, Apolinar moved for the quashing of the Information on the ground
that state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to sign it.

Tolentino opposed Apolinars motion. He contended that he was clothed with the authority to
investigate, file the necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases in view of his
designation as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V under Regional Orde 24-A
dated July 14, 1997.

Judge Garfin dismissed criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. MR by Tolentino denied hence
the case at bar.

Issue: Whether State Prosecutor Tolentino had the authority to file the information against
Private respondent Apolinar despite the absence of a written authority or approval of the
provincial or state prosecutor is similar to that in People v. Garfin?

Held: NO!
People v. Garfin & Saballegue, same state prosecutor Tolentino charged Serafin Saballegue
also for violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of RA 8282. The
certification accompanying the Information (which was identical to the certification in the
Information against Apolinar) was also signed by Tolentino. The case was also raffled to the
sala of respondent Judge Garfin.

In the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor
Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the
information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case 97 was
filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information
constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not
err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
 249

In this case, state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to file the Information in Criminal
Case 82 because there was neither a directive from the Secretary of Justice
designating him as special prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of the
Information by the city prosecutor. In accordance with Garfin, the Information suffered
from a jurisdictional defect. Respondent Judge Garfin correctly dismissed the case
against Apolinar for lack of jurisdiction.
 250

Francisco Malabanan vs. Sandigan ( Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of an
offense when it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged, although proved, or if
it is proved, although not charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof )
G.R. No. 186329 August 2, 2017
SERENO, CJ. 1st Div

Facts:
Abusama M. Alid (Alid) was the Assistant Regional Director DA Cotabato City. Malabanan
on the other hand, was the Program Director of the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Rice
Program of DA.

On 27 July 2004, Alid obtained a cash advance of P10K to defray his expenses for official
travel. He was supposed to attend the turnover ceremony of the outgoing and the incoming
Secretaries of the DA and to follow up, on 28 to 31 July 2004, funds intended for the GMA
Rice Program. The turnover ceremony did not push through, however, and Alid's trip was
deferred.

On 22 August 2004, Alid took PAL from Cotabato City to Manila attended the turn over
ceremony at the DA Central Office in Q.C. on August 23. Following day took a flight from
Manila to Cotabato City per another ticket issued in exchange for the PAL Ticket.

Alid instructed his secretary to prepare the necessary papers to liquidate the cash advance.
n his Post Travel Report, he declared that his official travel transpired on 28 to 31 July
2004.

He likewise attached an altered PAL Ticket in support of his Post Travel Report. The date
"22 AUG 2004" was changed to read "28 JULY 2004", and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-
Cotabato" appearing on the PAL Ticket was altered to read "Davao-Manila-Cotabato."

He further attached an undated Certificate of Appearance signed by Malabanan as Director

of the GMA Rice Program. The document stated that Alid had appeared at the DA Central
Office in Quezon City from 28 to 31 July 2004 for the turnover ceremony and to follow up the
status of the funds intended for the GMA Rice Program.

During post-audit, discrepancies in the supporting documents were found and investigated.
Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Alid and Malabanan before the
Sandiganbayan with falsification of public documents in SB 72

In SB 73 Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor charged Alid with falsifying the PAL Ticket. The
Information stated

Upon arraignment, both Alid and Malabanan entered pleas of "not guilty."While the cases
were pending before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite, praying for their preventive suspension pending trial.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the suspension pendente lite of Alid and
Malabanan for 90 days.
 251

MR by accused denied. Sandiganbayan proceeded with the criminal cases and

eventually rendered a Decision falsification of a

convicting Alid of

private document for altering the PAL Ticket.

Alid filed MR by denied. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Alid may be convicted for falsification of PRIVATE DOCU. even if the the
Information charged him for falsification of PUBLIC DOCU?

Held: NO.
Sandiganbayan convicted Alid of falsification of a private document for altering the PAL
Ticket. We disagree with that conviction for two reasons.

First, a conviction for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article

172 violates the right of Alid to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
his Information charged him only with falsification
against him given that
of documents committed by a public officer under Article 171.

Second, for falsifying a commercial document, the penal provision allegedly violated by
Alid was paragraph 1, and not paragraph 2, of Article 172.

Right to Be Informed of the Nature

and the Cause of Accusation

At the outset, we note that the appeal of Alid is grounded on two points: (1) that he was not
the one who altered the plane ticket; and (2) that he had no intent to cause damage.

He has not raised the defense that his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him has been violated.

However, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole matter for

the review of any question, including those questions not raised by
the parties. In this case, a review is necessary because the conviction was made in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights.

One of the fundamental rights of an accused person is the right to be "informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him." This means that the accused may not be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the Information.

Even if the prosecution successfully proves the elements of a crime, the accused may not be
convicted thereof, unless that crime is alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed
against the latter .
 252

Pursuant to this constitutional right, Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
commands:

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. - When there
is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged,
or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of an offense when it is both charged and
proved. If it is not charged, although proved, or if it is proved, although not charged, the
accused cannot be convicted thereof.

In other words, variance between the allegation contained in the Information and the
conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a conviction for either the offense charged or the
offense proved unless either is included in the other.

As to when an offense includes or is included in another, Section 5 of Rule 120 provides:

Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. -

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.

And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

Here, it cannot be overlooked that there is a variance between the felony as charged in the
Information and as found in the judgment of conviction. Applying the rules, the conviction
of Alid for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2, Article 172 is valid
only if the elements of that felony constituted the elements of his indictment for
falsification by a public officer under Article 171.

Guillergan v. People declares that the falsification of documents committed by public officers
who take advantage of their official position under Article 171 necessarily includes the
falsification of commercial documents by private persons punished by paragraph 1 of Article
172. To reiterate, the elements of Article 171 are as follows:

1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.

2. The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.

 253

3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under
Article 171.

In turn, paragraph 1 of Article 172 contains these requisites:

1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his or her official position.

2. The falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.

3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under
Article 171.

In Amora, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the accused construction contractor was absolved even if
he had admittedly falsified time books and payrolls. The Court appreciated the fact that he
did not benefit from the transaction and was merely forced to adjust the supporting papers in
order to collect the piece of work he had actually constructed. On that occasion, we
explained at length the nuanced appreciation of criminal intent in falsification of documents,

This Court is well aware that falsification of documents under paragraph 1 of Article 172, like
Article 171, does not require the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person as an
element of conviction. But, as early as People v. Pacana,

Here we find that, similar to Amara, Jr. and Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
there is no moral certainty that Alid benefitted from the transaction, with the government
or any third person sustaining damage from his alteration of the document.

WHEREFORE, the Rule 65 petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 are hereby
DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Rule 45 Petition for Review in G.R. No.
198598 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan are
REVERSED and SETASIDE, and a new judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING
petitioner Abusama M. Alid
 254

Amendment to include Venue

Virgina Dio vs. People & Desmond ( petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned;
thus, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies. If the information is defective,
the prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend it before it may be quashed )
G.R. No. 208146, June 08, 2016
LEONEN, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Private respondent Timothy Desmond is the Chair and CEO of Subic Bay Marine
Exploratorium, of which petitioner Dio is Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors.
Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel.

(2) separate Informations, were filed The Information criminal case 08;

then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the
offended partyx x x x x x

in Criminal Case 09;

then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the x
xxx

She also moved to quash the Informations, arguing that the "facts charged do not
constitute an offense. Trial court denied motion. Dio moved for partial reconsideration which
the court granted on the ground that the Informations in the said cases fail to allege
publication. Informations filed against the accused are thereby QUASHED and
DISMISSED.

CA affirmed RTC Informations do not substantially constitute the offense charged. However,
it found that the trial court erred in quashing the Informations without giving the
prosecution a chance to amend them pursuant to Rule 117, Sec 4 RoC.

Dio filed MR but denied hence the case at bar. Dio stresses that "venue is jurisdictional in
criminal cases." Considering that libel is limited as to the venue of the case, failure to allege
"where the libelous article was printed and first published" is a jurisdictional defect

Issue: whether an information failure to establish venue is a defect that can be cured by
amendment before arraignment?
 255

Held: YES.
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court states

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on

an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.

The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or
the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the
amendment.

This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is
an arbitrary exercise of power.

In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule
117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies. If the information is defective, the prosecution
must be given the opportunity to amend it before it may be quashed

Aside from obiter dictum in jurisprudence, petitioner provides no legal basis to reverse the
Court of Appeals' determination that the defective informations may be amended before
arraignment. Although the cases petitioner cited involved defective informations that failed to
none involved the
establish the jurisdiction of the court over the libel charges,
amendment of an information before arraignment. Thus, these cannot
be controlling over the facts of this case.

When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be cured by

amendment, courts must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend the
information.’

A defect in the COMPLAINT filed before the fiscal is not a ground to

quash an information.

Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed
before the fiscal and the complainant's capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.

However, for quashal of an information to be sustained, the defect of the information must be
evident on its face, For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor's lack of
authority to file it, the lack of the authority must be evident on the face of the information.
 256

REGARDING EMAIL

Whether emailing or, as in this case, sending emails to the persons named in the
Informations who appear to be officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay
Marine Exploratorium is found is sufficiently "public," as required by Articles 353 and
355 of the RPC and by the Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be
properly raised during trial.
 257

Amendment to specify Venue

Condrado Banal vs. Jdg. Delia Panganiban & Winternitz ( We find that the original
information is sufficient in form. Allowing the amendment does not alter the defense
of the accused. Indeed, it only states with precision that which is already contained in
the original information )
G.R. No. 167474 November 15, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Complaint was filed by respondents, Ma. Teresa G. Winternitz et al as officers of Welbilt
Construction Corp and Wack Wack Cond. Corp. against petitioner Conrado R. Banal III for
his articles entitled House of the Rising Sun and Heist Cold Beer which appeared in
petitioners Breaktime column in the August 1, 2000 and August 12, 2000 issues of the PDI
respectively

6 informations for libel were filed in the RTC of Makati City, entitled Pp vs. Banal, Except for
the name of the parties and the article written, the six informations are similarly worded

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. he filed a Motion to Quash the six informations on
the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged. He argued that
the informations failed to allege the actual residence of the complainant at the time of the
commission of the offense or the place where the allegedly libelous article was printed and
first published.

RTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction. 6 infos
do not meet the requirement that the information must allege that the libelous article is
printed and first published in Makati City or that the offended party is a resident of Makati
City.

Respondents’ MR granted, failure to specifically allege that the libelous articles were printed
and first published in Makati was merely a formal defect and can be cured by amendment.
CA affirmed RTC. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether failure to allege in information residence of offended party may be cured by
an amendment?

Held: YES.
Paragraph 3, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code states:

X x x x Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides

The portion of the original information reads:

is published in English in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and of general
circulation in the Philippines and abroad,.
 258

Thus, it was clearly stated in the information that the newspaper is published in Makati City
but circulated throughout the country, which allegation accordingly vests jurisdiction over the
offense charged in the RTC of Makati City.

Moreover, the amendment in the informations was one of form. Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave

of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.

After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave
of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

In the instant case, the amendment was done after petitioners arraignment and with prior
leave of court. The amendment which states, That the libelous article above-quoted was

3817
printed and first published in the City of Makati, more particularly at

Mascardo street, Makati City and/or at 1098 Chino

Roces Avenue (formerly Pasong Tamo) corner
Yague and Mascardo Streets, Makati City, s merely
formal.

An amendment is only in form

When it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.

In the case of People v. Casey, we laid down the test in determining whether an amendment
is a matter of form or substance, thus:

● whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available

after the amendment is made
● whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other.

We find that the original information is sufficient in form. Allowing the amendment does not
alter the defense of the accused. Indeed, it only states with precision that which is already
contained in the original information.
 259

Ramon Albert vs. Sandigan & People ( we hold that the inclusion of gross inexcusable
negligence in the Information, which merely alleges manifest partiality and evident
bad faith as modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
is an amendment in form )
G.R. No. 164015 February 26, 2009
CARPIO, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
SPO II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused
Sayson et al before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3e RA 3019. A HDO was
issued by the Sandigan against petitioner and his co-accused.

The Information alleged:

X x x x x x bad faith and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of
duty, x x x x

petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

1. the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law;

2. the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
3. the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases and to a
speedy trial were violated; and
4. the resolution dated 26 February 1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not supported by evidence.

Sandigan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of not guilty. Motion to Lift Hold Departure
Order and to be Allowed to Travel granted. Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to
Dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with
respect to petitioner.

SPO who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the
indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause. However, the
Ombudsman disapproved the Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case.

MR denied. Prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the
2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with the
intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The Amended
Information reads:

X x x x x xmanifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x x

The scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003

Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is
substantial and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment.
 260

Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's Motion to Admit Amended Information. At the

outset, the Sandiganbayan explained that gross neglect of duty which falls under
Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from gross inexcusable negligence under Section
3(e),

However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of the
information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the
event that the accused had not yet undergone a permanent arraignment.

And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely provisional, then the
prosecution may still amend the information either in form or in substance. MR by petitioner
denied hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the amendment of Information was formal?

Held: Yes.
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be amended,

in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave
of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Petitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the
information may be made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish between a plea made
Since petitioner already
during a provisional or a permanent arraignment.
entered a plea of not guilty during the 13 March 2001 arraignment,
then the information may be amended only in form.

The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the
Information may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. Petitioner contends that replacing gross neglect of duty with gross inexcusable
negligence is a substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his rights.

The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty. The amended information, on the
other hand, alleges that petitioner acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or
gross inexcusable negligence.
 261

Simply, the amendment seeks to replace gross neglect of duty with gross inexcusable
negligence. Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA 3019
specifically, gross neglect of duty is under Section 3(f) while gross inexcusable negligence is
under Section 3(e) of the statute the question remains whether or not the amendment is
substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.

In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase gross neglect of duty
from the Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the
same is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused.

, gross inexcusable negligence would be

As a replacement

included in the Information as a modality in the

commission of the offense. This Court believes that the
same constitutes an amendment only in form.

In Sistoza v. Desierto, the Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, but specified only manifest partiality and evident bad faith as the modalities in the
commission of the offense charged. Gross inexcusable negligence was not mentioned in the
Information.

Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is committed by dolo or culpa, and
although the Information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing
the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof
thereof

In Cabello v. Sandiganbayan where an accused charged with willful malversation was

validly convicted of the same felony of malversation through negligence when the
evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.

The Court held Cabello v. Sandiganbayan that a conviction for

a criminal negligent act can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of
a willful offense upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense.

Thus, we hold that the inclusion of gross inexcusable negligence in

the Information, which merely alleges manifest partiality and
evident bad faith as modalities in the commission of the crime
under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in form.
Arraignment
 262

An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an
accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he
enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an
arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily
 263

Dennis Gabionza vs. CA & People ( Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment
prejudiced his rights is untenable. We fail to see how his original defenses would be
rendered inapplicable by the amendment, nor the prosecution's theory in anyway
altered by the same. Petitioner failed to adduce any evidence in support of his
allegation that the amendment would adversely affect his rights )
G.R. No. 140311. March 30, 2001
BELLOSILLO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
an Information was filed against petitioner accusing him of violating RA 1161 (The Social
Security Law) Petitioner was arraigned on 7 December 1993. On 10 February 1998 or
about four (4) years after he was arraigned, the public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Amend Information, to change the material dates stated in the Information from
January 1991 to May 1993 to January 1991 to May 1992.

Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the proposed amendment was substantial in
nature, hence to allow the same would be a violation of his right to be informed of the cause
and nature of the accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice defenses that were
otherwise available to him.

Trial court granted the motion and allowed amendment of the Information, ruling that the
amendment pertain only to matters of form. Petitioner’s MR denied. CA affirmed decision.
Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the amended information changing the dates, consider only as formal
amendment?

Held: Yes.
The proper procedure for the amendment of an Information is governed by Sec. 14, Rule
110, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure -

Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
leave of court at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form,
by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused x x x x

After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be allowed, as to
matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The
test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint or
Information is when a defense under the Complaint or Information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Complaint or the Information
as amended.
 264

On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that
can be made at any time. Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as:

1. it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription;

2. it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged;
3. it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to
require the accused to undergo any material change or modification in his
defense;
4. it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher
penalty;and,
5. it does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment

In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of
substance. The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form,

unless time is a material ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary to state in the
Information the precise time the offense was committed unless time is a material factor.[13]
It is sufficient that the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual
date at which the offense was committed as the Complaint or Information will permit.

Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his rights is untenable. We fail to
see how his original defenses would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment, nor the
prosecution's theory in anyway altered by the same. Petitioner failed to adduce any evidence
in support of his allegation that the amendment would adversely affect his rights.
 265

Jose Leviste vs. Jdg. Elmo Alameda et al ( The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in
Buhat v. CA and Pacoy v. Cajigal, wherein the amendment of the caption of the
Information from homicide to murder was not considered substantial because there
was no real change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged as alleged
in the body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were
already clearly embedded in the original Information; None of these peculiar
circumstances obtains in the present case. )
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
charged with homicide for the
Petitioner was, by Information of January 16, 2007,
death of Rafael de las Alas before RTC of Makati

private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor,
an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow
the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct reinvestigation to
determine the proper offense.

RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007 deferring petitioners arraignment
and allowing the prosecution to conduct a re-investigation to determine the proper offense.
MR by petitioner denied.

set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via
supplemental petition before the appellate court. CA dismissed petitioners petition, hence,
his present petition

Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to
Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela which the trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order of
May 21, 2007, it finding that the evidence of guilt for the crime of murder is not strong.

trial court, went on to try petitioner under the Amended Information. the trial court found
petitioner guilty of homicide. Petitioner filed an appeal to CA but denied

Issue: Whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to
ask for a preliminary investigation?

Held: YES. P.I. Needed, But, Re-Investigation was conducted equivalent to P.I.

The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA and Pacoy v. Cajigal, wherein the
amendment of the caption of the Information from homicide to murder was not considered
substantial because there was no real change in the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying
circumstances were already clearly embedded in the original Information.
 266

Buhat pointed out that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use of
superior strength, while Pacoy states that the averments in the amended Information for
murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for
homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the present case.

Considering that another or a new preliminary

investigation is required, the fact that what was
conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation
does not invalidate the substantial amendment of
the Information.

There no substantial distinction between a

is

preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since

both are conducted in the same manner and for the same
objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of
murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first
motion.
 267

Marcelo Lasoy & Banisa vs. Jdg. Zenarosa & People ( First information is valid inasmuch
as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the
purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against
them, is reasonably complied with; An information is valid as long as it distinctly
states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. )
G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero accused
Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law
to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug, in violation of said law.

Case was assigned to Judge Salazar & Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty.
On the same date, both accused applied for probation under PD 986 as amended.

Plaintiff People thru Assistant City Prosecutor Aurora Ramos filed two separate motions,
first, to admit amended Information, and second, to set aside the arraignment of the
accused, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996.

it alleged:

in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for transportation and
delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of Forty-Five (45) pieces of dried marijuana fruiting
tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila.

Motion to admit denied by court , as this court has already decided this case on the basis
that the accused was arrested in possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late
at this stage to amend the information.

Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused granted. It alleges;

The amended Information reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other,
not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of
42.410 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law
 268

Second information raffled to Zenarosa. Both accused filed a Motion to Quash. Trial court
denied accused's motion to quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information. MR by accused denied.

Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order based on the following ground: Double Jeopardy

To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present:

(1) a valid complaint or information;

(2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

Issue: Whether first information is valid?

Held: YES!!!

FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings addressed
to the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and received by Prosecutor Querijero, of forty five
pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already in bricks) and weighing approximately 45KG.

In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer it is stated that the accused were caught with
approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops. For some unknown reasons,
however, the Information filed against the accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e.,
42g

The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information under which
the accused were arraigned invalid?

First information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the
crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the
nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the

offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
 269

In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence
may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law,
the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the
language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the
crime defined by law.

Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,Section 6, shows on its face that it is
valid.

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed.

SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial courts point of view that the accused
cannot claim their right against double jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the
tampering, we hold that while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no hard
evidence thereof.

Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty
and convicted under the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and
the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the setting aside of the decision
dated 16 July 1996.

The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be

the subject of another inquiry.

In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, the Court affirming the finality of a decision in a
criminal case, citing Section 7, Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, stated:

Upon motion of the accused, A judgment of conviction may, be modified or set

aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction] becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the

Indeed, the
information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having
attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact
that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
 270

In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an accused's
right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of
evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the

● trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or

● where the trial was a sham.

Respondent People of the Philippines argues, citing the case of Galman v. Sandigan. We do
not agree with the respondent as the trial in the Galman case was considered a mock trial
owing to the act of a then authoritarian president.

The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, it bears repeating that
the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where
they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the
amendment of the information and seek to try again accused for the same offense without
violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of the
prosecution and at the time when the accused had already been convicted is contrary to
procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.
 271

People vs. Ricardo Bacomo ( Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, does not bar
substantial amendments that are beneficial to the accused . Consistent with the
constitutionally enshrined rights to be informed of the nature of charges and to be
accorded due process, the rule aims to protect the accused from prejudicial
machinations that change the game midstream. )
G.R. No. 129254. July 22, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:
Bencebeis Pakay Aguilar was walking towards his house inside the PSC Compound, Puerto
Princesa City. Ricardo Janairo was walking towards Aguilar. When the two met at a certain
point near Aguilars house, Janairo suddenly stabbed Aguilar with a blade and immediately
ran away.

Aguilar died at the hospital due to the mortal wounds he sustained. Previous to said incident,
the two men had figured in an altercation. Janairo had asked permission from Aguilar, who
was the guard on duty at the PSC gate, if he could bring a tricycle inside the compound. The
request was denied by the latter. An exchange of words followed and ended with Janairo
making a threat: Babalikan ka namin.

charging appellant with murder allegedly committed as

An Information was filed
follows.Upon his arraignment appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
hereafter, Counsel de Parte Perfecto de los Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration
praying for reinvestigation, insisting that the charge should be changed to
homicide.

During the pre-trial, Lower court denied motion. Subsequently, the assistant city
prosecutor filed a Motion to downgrade the crime charged from murder to homicide.
Noting the conformity of the wife of the deceased, the court a quo issued an Order
amending the Information by crossing out the phrase with treachery and evident
premeditation.

Arraigned again, pleaded not guilty. Ricardo Janairo appeals decision of RTC Puerto
Princesa City, which convicted him of homicide. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the amendment after arraignment to change the offense from Murder to
Homicide was valid?

Held: YES.
By implication, amendments as to substance are precluded after the accused has entered a
plea. The amendment made here was undoubtedly a matter of substance, for the nature of
the crime was altered from murder to homicide. Nonetheless, the Court sustains the
validity of the proceedings.
 272

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, does not bar substantial amendments that
are beneficial to the accused. Consistent with the constitutionally enshrined rights to be
informed of the nature of charges and to be accorded due process, the rule aims to protect
the accused from prejudicial machinations that change the game midstream.

In this case, the amendment benefited the appellant. The amendment did not prejudice
him or deprive him of defenses available before the amendment.

Moreover, appellant not merely consented to the amendment; in fact, he sought it. Indeed,
the defense counsel had filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, praying that the charge of murder
be changed to homicide. Objection to the amendment of an information or complaint must be
raised at the time the amendment is made otherwise appellants silence would be deemed
consent on his part to the amendment.
 273

Josefino Draculan & Durian vs. Jdg. Donato (The amendment or the filing of a new case
where there had been a mistake in charging the proper offense after the dismissal of
an existing one, spoken of and therein provided for apply, only to an original case
where no judgment has as yet been rendered. Much less does the said section apply
to an appealed case such as the instant proceeding )
G.R. No. L-44079 December 19, 1985
CUEVAS, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
On June 25, 1973, the Chief of Police of San Isidro, Isabela filed with the Municipal Court of
the said place, a complaint for Less Serious Physical Injuries against Florencio Miguel.

Tried after pleading not guilty upon arraignment, accused Miguel was convicted as
charged. Miguel appealed to CFI assigned to respondent Judge. Upon a review of the
evidence made by the provincial fiscal's office, petitioners found that accused-
appellant Miguel should have been charged with "Direct Assault Upon a Person in
Authority"

In view thereof, petitioners' office, then conducted a new preliminary investigation and upon
a prima facie showing that direct assault was actually the crime committed by accused-
appellant Miguel. petitioners filed with the respondent court a Motion to Dismiss the
appeal Less Serious Physical Injury case.

Simultaneously, a new information for Direct Assault was filed against Miguel.
Petitioners' motion was denied and so with their motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial. Hence the case at abr

Issue: Whether the amendment of information at the appeal stage before RTC is valid?

Held: NO!
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 5 which provides:

Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the defendant.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
 274

The above section contains two parts:

1. authorizes the amendment of an information or complaint, in substance or form,

without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads, and thereafter, only
as to matters of form. The other provides that,

2. if it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or
information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense,
provided the defendant would not be placed in double jeopardy.

The amendment or the filing of a new case where there had been a mistake in charging the
proper offense after the dismissal of an existing one, spoken of and therein provided for

only to an original case where no judgment has

apply,

as yet been rendered. Much less does the said section apply
to an appealed case such as the instant proceeding.

The reason is obvious and that is because the right to amend or to file a new complaint or
information charging the proper offense after the dismissal of the original complaint or
information, is subject to the rule on double jeopardy, which petitioners in the instant case
miserably missed,

the appeal must now be disposed of on the basis of the evidence presented and admitted in
the municipal court. No trial de novo is necessary but the parties may merely submit and/or
be required to file their respective briefs or memoranda.

In the case at bar, the original charges was that of less serious physical injuries.
Whether the new charge for direct assault with less serious physical injuries is by way of
amendment or through a new information is immaterial since in both instances accused's
former conviction would be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the second offense.

This was the dictum laid down in the case of People vs. Bonotan and which doctrine was
reiterated in the recent case of Tacas vs. Cariaso
 275

ARREST.
Bench Warrant vs. Ordinary Warrant

Sps. Raymund & Julie Minoso vs. Freddie Pamulag

A.M. No. P-05-2067 August 31, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:

Julie Ann is the private complainant in Crim Case 581 entitled Pp. vs. Desiree Espino for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, pending before MTCC. respondent called her by
phone and told her to proceed to MTCC.

Upon arrival, accused Desiree Espino greeted them. Respondent approached and told them
to follow him to the judges chambers. Thinking that he was the judge, complainants followed.
He sat on the judges chair while complainant Raymund greeted him Good Morning Judge.
Respondent did not say anything but appeared seemingly satisfied and elated.

He was addressed as Judge repeatedly about four (4) times by the complainant with nary
any resistance from the respondent. Respondent then tried to convince complainant (Mioso)
and accused to settle their case immediately and sign right away an amicable settlement, as
basis for dismissing the complaint.

Complainants claimed that by posing as the trial judge, and intervening in the settlement of
their case, respondent committed serious misconduct, usurpation of authority, conduct
unbecoming of a public officer and bias and partiality.

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the case be referred to the
Executive Judge of MTCC. Executive Judge Amalik after investigation, submitted his report,
The actions taken by the respondent defiled said Courts Chamber, as such is
considered and tantamount to conduct unbecoming of a Public Officer.

OCA submitted its Evaluation Report adopting the findings and recommendation of
Executive Judge Espinosa. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of usurpation of authority, partiality and conduct

unbecoming of a public officer, pretending to be a judge?
 276

Held: YES

Ministering the parties to an amicable settlement is a judicial function.

We sustain the findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Judge and the Court
Administrator that, indeed, respondent usurped the function of the judge by steering the
parties into an amicable settlement especially pressuring complainants to amicably settle in
favor of accused and that such acts also demonstrated partiality in favor of the accused in
the case which acts constituted conduct unbecoming of a public official.

As may be gleaned above, the functions of a Clerk of Court do not involve the use of
mental processes in the determination of law or fact nor do they involve discretion on
the use of judicial powers.

The functions are generally administrative in nature. Verily, leading the parties to an
amicable settlement is not a function of a clerk of court.

There is usurpation of judicial function when a person who is not a judge attempts to perform
an act the authority for which the law has vested only upon a judge.[9] Under Art. 2029 of the
Civil Code, the Court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon
some fair compromise. However, such amicable settlement by parties-litigants ought to
be tackled during the pre-trial conference.

Evident Partiality

More so, the partiality of the respondent towards the accused, Desiree Espino is but
apparent and clear, as shown by his assistance given to her, who being arrested on the
basis of a bench warrant, was able to file, process and have a bail bond approved that
morning, and was released, even knowing of the fact that his Presiding Judge will be
reporting that day, yet he have (sic) the bail bond processed and signed by the Pairing
Judge. He also admitted that he knew by the nature of a bench warrant issued, it is only the
issuing judge himself who can approve the release of the accused. All these circumstances
simply show his partiality to the accused.

Arrest warrant comes up through the law enforcement authorities for crimes they
reasonably believe the person of interest has committed to the judge for review and
approval.

Bench warrants[4] come from the judge’s bench (i.e. him or herself) directly and are
for failure to obey the court’s orders
 277

Warrantless Arrest Topic after MIDTERMS

Joey Pestilos et al vs. Moreno Generoso & People ( personal knowledge of a crime just

does not require

committed under the terms of the above-cited provision,

actual presence at the scene while a crime was

being committed; it is enough that evidence of the
recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case)
and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime)
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
BRION, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
3:15 am, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso at
Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the both reside. Atty. Generoso
called the Central Police District, Station 6 Batasan Hills Police Station. to report the
incident.

Acting on this report, SP02 Dominador Javier went to the scene of the crime and to render
assistance. SP02 Javier et al arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the
alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the
police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.
The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.

At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners
stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the
attack. In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no
valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime.

They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station . Thus, the
inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation
should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied
petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular P.I. same with MR.
 278

CA also dismissed petition, ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed
by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. MR by petitioner Denied. Hence the
case at bar.

Issue: Whether petitioners were lawfully arrested?

Held: Yes.
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings
against the petitioners should now proceed.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully
examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the
proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, and the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "

This constitutional mandate is identical with the 4th Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. The 4th Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke

andThe Great Charter of the Liberties of England

(Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.

The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to
proclaim certain liberties under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war. The declarations in
Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and
England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws. These court
rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then
existing in the Philippines.

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or
the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at
least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has
been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
 279

we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision

For purposes of this case,
applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone
changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in
its interpretation in our jurisprudence.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with
the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's
determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime. Hence, as
presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes
of Section 5(b ), the following are the notable changes:

1. the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting

immediacy

2. the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on

probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based

3. on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether
the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes
were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.
 280

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are:

1. an offense has just been committed; and

2. The arresting officer has probable cause to believe

3. based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be

arrested has committed it.

1st Req; Arresting officer has Probable cause

The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the
arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal
knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has committed
the crime.

The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get
one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable
cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."

The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the
arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information
acquired later

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar
to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent
persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the
particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.

In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al., the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
 281

Probable Cause Warrantless Arrest vs. P.Cause in

P.I. vs. P.C. judicial proceeding for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest

Purpose of a Preliminary Investigation

● to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should
be held for trial.

● In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, we defined probable cause as the existence of

facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

The finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the

respondent was based on the submitted documents of the
complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.

Probable cause in judicial proceedings

● Issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and

circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
offense has been committed by the person sought to be
that an
arrested.

● Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on
the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.

not yet tasked to review in

At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is
detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It
is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
 282

Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113

● based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to

be arrested has committed the These facts or

crime.

circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw

evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.

● A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled

with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief or reasonable ground of
suspicion, based on actual facts.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine
"probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is
influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their
possession.

In short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess
dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must
determine probable cause.

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed probable cause/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it

According to the Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying

facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the
actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene
of the crime.

Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could
still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances
at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or

circumstancesshould be made immediately after the commission of
the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
 283

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the
following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest:

1) the crime should have been just committed; and

2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to
be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge.

The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests.

Present Issue: Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure in the present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest.

Based on the police blotter entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the
alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan
Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15
a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place
less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that
the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the
crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside;

Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and,
notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny
their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different
version of what transpired.
 284

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have

personally observed less than one hour from the

time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime
until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we
deem it reasonable to conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless
arrests.
These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and
evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers'
personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make
the warrantless arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, the police officers in the present case saw Atty.
Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as
the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the
petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts
to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of

1. immediacy;
2. the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and
3. lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to
be arrested committed the crime.

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-

does not require actual presence at the

cited provision,

scene while a crime was being committed;

it is enough that evidence of the recent commission

of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
 285

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners'
second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.

An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to

the custody of the person making the arrest. Thus, application of

● actual force,
● manual touching of the body,
● physical restraint or
● a formal declaration of arrest is

Not required.
intention on the part of one of the parties to
It is enough that there be an
arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, SP02 Javier could not but have
the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02
Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the
petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect.

In other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the
petitioners had exhibited resistance.
 286

no valid warrantless arrest &

People vs. Gerrjan Acut ( Acut acquitted
warrantless search of moving vehicle; The foregoing circumstances show
that while the element of personal knowledge under Section 5 (b) above was present -
given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery incident and even
engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - the required element of
immediacy was not met; This is because, at the time the police officers effected
the warrantless arrest upon Manago's person, investigation and verification
proceedings were already conducted, which consequently yielded sufficient
information on the suspects of the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. )
GR No. 212340, Aug 17, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:
9:30 in the evening PO3 Antonio Din was waiting to get a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty
Parlor when two (2) persons entered and declared a hold-up. PO3 Din identified himself as a
police officer and exchanged gun shots with the two suspects.

After the shootout, one of the suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other boarded a red
Toyota Corolla. The plate numbers of the vehicles were noted by PO3 Din. After the
incident, PO3 Din received word from Barangay Tanod Florentine Cano (Cano), that the
robbery suspects were last seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os.

Upon verification of the getaway vehicles with the Land Transportation Office, the police
officers found out that the motorcycle was registered in Manago's name, while the red
Toyota Corolla was registered in the name pf Zest-O Corporation, where Manage worked as
a District Sales Manager

With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers, comprised of a team including
PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after
the robbery incident, by setting up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait.

At around 9:30 in the evening of even date, the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven by
Manago, passed through the checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop the vehicle.
The police officers then ordered Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a
thorough search of the vehicle.

As the search produced no contraband, the police officers then frisked Manago, resulting in
the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu. The police officers seized the
plastic pack, arrested Manago, informed him of his constitutional rights, and brought him and
the plastic pack to their headquarters. Upon reaching the headquarters, S/Insp. Ylanan
turned over the seized plastic pack to PO3 Joel Taboada, who in turn, prepared a request for
a laboratory examination of the same.

In his defense, Manago denied possessing the plastic pack recovered by the police officers.
He was just stopped by the police officers and after which showed his driver’s license to
them. Police officers confirmed his identity then brought him to the police station. Manago
 287

claimed that he requested for a phone call with his lawyer, as well as a copy of the
warrant for his arrest, but both requests went unheeded.

After he was dispossessed of his laptop, wallet, and two (2) mobile phones, he was then
photographed and placed in a detention cell. Thereafter, he was brought to the Cebu City
Prosecutor's Office where he was charged with, among others, illegal possession of shabu.

Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause
and/or Motion for the Suppression of Evidence. RTC denied motitions. RTC nevertheless
held that there was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle, considering that PO3
Din had probable cause to believe that Manago was part of the robbery, because the latter
was driving the getaway vehicle used in the March 15, 2007 robbery incident.

RTC convicted Manago. CA affirmed conviction of Mango in toto. It held that the police
officers conducted a valid hot pursuit operation against Manago, considering that PO3 Din
personally identified him as the one driving the red Toyota Corolla vehicle used in the March
15, 2007 robbery incident. MR by Mango denied. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest?

Held: NO

No valid warrantless arrest

The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under
Section 5 (b) above was present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007
robbery incident and even engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - the required element
of immediacy was not met.

This is because, at the time the police officers effected the warrantless arrest upon
Manago's person, investigation and verification proceedings were already conducted, which
consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects of the March 15, 2007 robbery
incident.

As the Court sees it, the information the police officers had gathered therefrom
would have been enough for them to secure the necessary warrants against
the robbery suspects. However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which -
considering the lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements
therefor.

Thus, there being no valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in
ruling that Manago was lawfully arrested.

In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise erred in
ruling that the incidental search on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said
search was made even before he was arrested and thus, violated the cardinal rule on
 288

searches incidental to lawful arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made.

No lawful warrantless search of a moving vehicle

A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military or
police checkpoints - as in this case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for
as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists

In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police officers had already conducted a
thorough investigation and verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a)
the identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where they reside; and (c) the ownership
of the getaway vehicles used in the robbery, i.e., the motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla.

As adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were already enough for said police
officers to secure the necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects.
Consequently, there was no longer any exigent circumstance that
would have justified the necessity of setting up the checkpoint in this case for the
purpose of searching the subject vehicle.

In addition, it is well to point out that the checkpoint was arranged

for the targeted arrest of Manago, who was already identified as the culprit of
it cannot, therefore, be said that
the robbery incident. In this regard,

the checkpoint was meant to conduct a routinary

and indiscriminate search of moving vehicles. Rather,
it was used as a subterfuge to put into force the capture of the
fleeing suspect.

Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt the legal requirement of -
Hence,
procuring a valid search/arrest warrant given the circumstances of this case.
the search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and on the person
of its driver, Manago, was unlawful.

In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search incidental thereto, including that of his
moving vehicle were all unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu seized from
him is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3
(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged, Manago must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal
liability
 289

Element of Immediacy
One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of
personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest
may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will
be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.

The clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which
these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame.

would have no time to base their

This guarantees that the police officers
probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of
the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay.

On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable
cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
 290

Martin Villamor et al vs. People ( ACCUSED Acquitted; Not caught in Flagratne Delicto;
Police were 15-20 meters aways from the compound surround compound was
surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see )
G.R. No. 200396 March 22, 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
at around 9:00 a.m Provincial Director Peñaflor received a call from an informant
regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes
specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor et al proceeded
to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report. Upon arrival at the target area, the team
parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by bamboo slats installed
two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside.

According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets, described
by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers placed in
"papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets.

When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers
and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to P1k a
calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco
Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed
against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting
bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng. RTC convicted Villamor
committing illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng. RTC held that petitioners were
seen by the arresting officers in the act of counting bets before the arrest was made
inside Bonaobra' s compound. The petitioners were also caught holding "'papelitos.

Villamor's participation in the illegal numbers game was that of a collector since he brought
bet money to Bonaobra while the latter was that of a coordinator, controller, or supervisor
after it was shown that he received the money from Villamor. CA affirmed RTC decision
hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether there was valid warrantless arrest?

Held: NO

The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a
valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a
warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar.

Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the
petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right.
 291

In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto,
or caught in the act of committing an offense. PD Peñaflor and his team of police officers
claim that petitioners were committing the offense of illegal numbers game when they were
arrested without a warrant. We are not persuaded.

Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even
without a warrant of arrest in the following instances:

1. Flagrante Delicto
2. Hot Pursuit
3. Escape from prison

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur,
namely "

(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and

(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid
warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established that petitioners had
just committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that
said act or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers.

Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned some 15 to
20 meters away from petitioners.

Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police

officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to
determine that a criminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante
delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter.

compound was surrounded by a

The police officers even admitted that the
bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see
what was happening inside the compound.
 292

It appears that the police officers acted based solely

on the information received from PD Peñaflor's
informant and not on personal knowledge that a
crime had just been committed, was actually being
committed, or was about to be committed in their
presence.
The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering
the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted
that from his position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called
"papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he
readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalias.

Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the
same does not satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the
search and seizure of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal
since there could be no valid search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence
seized from Bonaobra's house is inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree.

The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest
must be raised before arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right
to question the legality of the arrest especially when the accused actively participated
during trial as in this case. However, we have clarified that such waiver is only confined to
the defects of the arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an
illegal arrest. In People v. Racho

WHEREFORE, the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30457 which affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 43 in Criminal Case Nos. 3463 and 3464 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Martin Villamor y Tayson and Victor Bonaobra y Gianan are ACQUITTED and
are ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined
for any other lawful cause.
 293

Requisites of a Valid Warrant of Arrest.

Jdg. Emerito Agcaoili vs. Jdg. Adolfo Molina ( Jdg Molina Reprimanded, Warrant of arrest
based on hearsay not personal knowledge of complainant about the crime of Homi.; )
A.M. No. MTJ-94-979 October 25, 1995
KAPUNAN, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
The instant case was brought to this Court in connection with the order of complainant Judge
Emerito M. Agcaoili dated 9 August 1993 charging Judge Adolfo B. Molina with grave
ignorance of the law in relation to Criminal Case 35, entitled "People v. Rolando Anama," for
homicide. A directive was contained in said order to furnish this Court with a copy thereof
"for its information and appropriate action."

Complainant judge alleged that respondent, in conducting the preliminary investigation of the
above-mentioned criminal case, failed to exercise utmost care in the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against the accused, Rolando Anama, based as it was, merely on the statements
of two (2) witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the commission of the
offense charged.

From the affidavits of the affiants alone (Rollo, pp. 6-7), it is very clear that t hey
learned the killing of victim Virgilio Capa from a certain Wilma Anama.

Such action, complainant judge averred, was a clear violation of Sec. 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which requires that before a warrant of arrest is issued, "the judge must
personally determine the existence of probable cause from an examination under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses." Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that
probable cause exists, stated complainant judge. There must be something more
concrete.

Consequently, in the same order, complainant judge recalled the warrant of arrest and the
order directing its issuance and directed the NBI, through Regional Office 2, Ilagan, Isabela,
to conduct an investigation in order to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice.

Judge Antonino denied with finality the motion filed by Asst. Provin. Prosec. Unciano moved
for reconsideration of the 9 August 1993 order of then petitioner Presiding Judge Emerito
Agcaoili and dismissed the aforestated criminal case provisionally on grounds of absence of
probable cause against the accused.

Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be admonished to be

more careful in the determination of the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. Thus, opined the Office of the Court Administrator:

Issue: Whether Jdg. Molina’s issuance of Warrant of arrest complied with the constitutional
requirement?
 294

Held: NO!

Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a warrant of
arrest shall be issued only when the "municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary
investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing in the form of searching questions
and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice."

This is in conformity with the constitutional mandate that no "warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide latitude and unbridled
discretion in determining probable cause, an elementary legal principle must not be
compromised — hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable
cause.

. A witness can testify only to

The rules on evidence are explicit

those facts which he knows of his personal

knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception. Hearsay evidence, therefore, has no probative value whatsoever.
Yet, in the case at bench, respondent judge found probable cause and even issued an arrest
warrant on the basis of the testimonies of Mencelacion Padamada and Rosita Castillo which
were obviously hearsay.

We are as perplexed as complainant judge Agcaoili why Wilma Anama, who apparently
witnessed the alleged crime or has personal knowledge thereof, was not summoned by
respondent for investigation. She could have been the key to determining whether or not
Rolando Anama was the probable perpetrator of the grisly killing.

Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge and is not for the provincial
fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination.

Liberty, in any part of the civilized world is a basic human right, the curtailment of which must
be in strict conformity with the procedure laid down by law. It is, therefore, this constant
reminder which compels us to remain ever vigilant.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to comply with
the pertinent rules on the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
 295

Determination of Probable Cause for issuance of Warrant of Arrest

DIOSDADO ALLADO & Roberto Mendoza vs. Jdg. ROBERTO DIOKNO

( Jdg. Did not personally examined the evidence; No probable cause of issuing
warrant, Corpus Delicti of crime not found; Jgd permanently restrained form
conducting further proceedings )
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J. 1st Div.

Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law
U.P. are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their
profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard,
they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.

The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16
September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine
Constabulary, implicating them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of
one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national.

In that extrajudicial confession, Umbal claimed that he and his companions were met by
petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend
Van Twest who allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him.

Thus, on 16 June 1992, after placing him under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal, Ex-
policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio
Antonino abducted Van Twest. , Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby
armalite, after which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later
burned his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall
the exact date when the incident happened, but he was certain it was about a year ago.

A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC, armed
with a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto Barrios RTC Manila separately raided the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago.

Raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and
placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that
day were Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their possession several firearms and
ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.

After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives, Sr., Supt. Panfilo
Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred the case to the Department of Justice
for the institution of criminal proceedings against Petitioners et al for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of
authority. petitioners heard over the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding a
prima facie case against them and that an information had already been filed in court.
 296

Same day, the information was filed before RTC Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided
by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno. on even date, respondent judge issued the
assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. Petitioners filed with us the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order. We issued a TRO
enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and respondent judge from conducting
further proceedings on the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.

Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally contend that

respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in
"whimsically holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without determining the
admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his
findings," and in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that probable
cause exists when the certification is flawed."

Issue: Whether the issuance of warrant of arrest was based on probable cause?

Held: NO!

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order we issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose
Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, is made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued
against them is SET ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED from
proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati.

Did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his
witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts.

He merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly
insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we restate the procedure we
outlined in various cases we have already decided.

In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge

(a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or,

(b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.

In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate:

(a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the
provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination;
 297

(b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind

the judge. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him.
It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does
not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him.

By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report,

the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if

any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and,

(c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released.

Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant is made by the judge.

The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is a function of the
prosecutor.

In Lim v. Felix, 43 where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said —

[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the
evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All these should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes
depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory
or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be.

Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge
subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough.
 298

On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order
that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a
belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which
has just been committed.

This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial
judge, after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no
probable cause exists must Either

● call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or

● simply dismiss the case.

There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public
accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.

But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if
not abused, their discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they
should have armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for
mere belief is not enough.

They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence
of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling

, in a criminal
as its obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore

prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that

justice shall be done.
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate
interest of the government cannot be ignored.

Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the
hope that they will in the future reform and be productive members of the community rests
both on the judiciousness of judges and the prudence of prosecutors.

And, whether it is a preliminary investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains if the

respondent should be held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which
determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the bottomline is that there is a standard in the
determination of the existence of probable cause, i.e., there should be facts and
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and cautious man to
believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged.
 299

Not based on Probable Cause

In the Order of respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is expressly stated that "[t]his
court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable

However, we
cause exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued."

are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at

such ruling.
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.

We have painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find any support for his
conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the
evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable cause against petitioners.

The PACC relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly
confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one,
since the corpus delicti has
there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death
not been established, nor have his remains been recovered.

Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and
rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the next morning. This is
A human body cannot be pulverized
highly improbable, if not ridiculous.
into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber
tires in an open field.

Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse

is subjected to intense heat. 30 Thereafter, the remains undergo a
process where the bones are completely ground to dust.

In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were
exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremation.
Could it be that the government investigators did to the place of cremation but could not find
any? Or could it be that they did not go at all because they knew that there would not be any
as no burning ever took place?
 300

To allege then that the body of Van Twest was

completely burned to ashes in an open field with the
use merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to
gulp.
Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on 16 June 1992 which
culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him
before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.

26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of

prosecutors, counsel again manifested that "even then and even as of this time, I stated
in my counter-affidavit that until the matter of death is to be established in the proper
proceedings, I shall continue to pursue my duties and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van
Twest. "Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest
doubted the latter's death.

Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already dead
otherwise his obligation to his client would have ceased except to comply with his duty "to
inform the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of his
executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative," which he did not.

Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that the supposed death of
Van Twest who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice, a fact substantiated by
petitioners and never refuted by PACC, is a likely story to stop the international manhunt
for his arrest.

In this regard, we are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin 35 decided ninety-two
years ago where this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body
not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not
sufficiently proved.

Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there
probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived in the
meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a
warrant for their arrest — facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support
the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not
been met.
 301

Probable Cause of Prosecutor vs. That of Judge

Doris Ho vs. People ( Warrant of Arrest issued solely based on the recommendtaion
and resolution of Investigating prosecutor hence VOID; ince their objectives are
different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will support his own
conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for
trial
0
G.R. No. 106632. October 9, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J. En Banc

Facts:
On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief
prosecutor and investigator, Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando Narcisio et al for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019:

prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of
the government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not
the public officer profited or will profit thereby.,

Graft Investigation Officer Titus Labrador submitted his resolution respectfully

recommended that an information for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 as amended be
filed against respondent Rolando.

Acting on the foregoing information, the Sandiganbayan issued the now questioned
warrant of arrest against Petitioners Ho and Narciso. Petitioner Ho initially questioned the
issuance thereof in an Urgent Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest/Motion for
Reconsideration which was adopted by Petitioner Narciso.

They alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance
of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution
attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of
the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence.

Motion denied by Sandigan hence the case at bar. etitioners Ho and Narciso similarly
contend that a judge, in personally determining the existence of probable cause, must have
before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed by
the investigating prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest
warrant.

Issue: Whether the a judge may issue a warrant of arrest based soley on the resolution of
prosecutor without without having before him any of the evidence (such as complainants
affidavit, respondents counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted at the
preliminary investigation?
302
 303

Held: NO!
?
In explaining the object and import of the aforequoted constitutional mandate, particularly the
power and the authority of judges to issue warrants of arrest, the Court elucidated in Soliven
vs. Makasiar[9]:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall:

(1) Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or

(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

While affirming Soliven, People vs. Inting elaborated on what determination of probable
cause entails, differentiating the judges object or goal from that of the prosecutors 9 In Re of
issuance of warrant of arrest.

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the
Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge
and the Judge alone makes this determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It
merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have
to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutors certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits the transcripts of stenographic
notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which
are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives.

The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge.
The preliminary investigation proper -- whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial -- is the function of the
Prosecutor.
 304

The warrant issues not on the strength of the

We added,

certification standing alone but because of the

records which sustain it. Summing up, the Court said in Pp vs. Delgado:
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the
same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be
a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of these
should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judges personal examination of the report and its annexes
depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory
or exhaustive the Judges examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution.

In like manner, herein Respondent Sandiganbayan had only the information filed by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the thirteen-page resolution of the investigating officer and the
three-page memorandum of the prosecution officer, when it issued the warrant of arrest
against the petitioners.

Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in
determining probable cause.

In like manner, herein Respondent Sandiganbayan had only the

● information filed by the Office of the Ombudsman,

● the thirteen-page resolution of the investigating officer and
● the three-page memorandum of the prosecution officer, when it issued the
warrant of arrest against the petitioners.

The latter two documents/reports even had dissimilar recommendations -- the first indicting
only Petitioner Narciso, the second including Petitioner Ho. This alone should have
prompted the public respondent to verify, in the records and other documents
submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation, whether there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the Ombudsmans action charging both petitioners with
violation of Sec. 3(e) of Anti-Graft law.
 305

But in its initial justification of the issuance of the warrant, the Sandiganbayan simply said:

“But in this particular case we believe there is a prima facie case based on our
examination of the resolution because we believe, we think the Ombudsman will not
approve a resolution just like that, without evidence to back it up.”

In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld. Lest we
be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more

1st : As held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for
trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.

Judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their
findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to
their distinct objectives.

2nd: Since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of
the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will support his own
conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial.

However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence,
other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of
determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause
is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land.

Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the
litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution
finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to
enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to
issue a warrant of arrest
 306

Lastly: it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend
to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case
all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused.
 307

sufficient supporting
What is required, rather, is that the judge must have

documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,

counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to
make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.

The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on

the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent
Court did in this case.
In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of
the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to
the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have
approved their recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documents
from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People from
which to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Resolution is SET ASIDE. The
warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on May 20, 1992 in Case No.
17674 for the arrest of Petitioners Doris Teresa Ho and Rolando Narciso is hereby declared
NULL AND VOID.
 308

People vs. Rodolfo Yecyec et al ( General rule, if the information is valid on its face and
there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the
part of the public prosecutor, the court should not dismiss it for lack of "probable
cause," because evidentiary matters should first be presented and heard during the
trial; The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the
proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly
understood)
G.R. No. 183551 November 12, 2014
MENDOZA, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:

Calixto. Sison was the supervisor of Pioneer’s rubber processing plant, who was tasked,
among other things, with the acquisition of rubber coagulum and rubber cup lumps in
Talakag, Bukidnon.

Sison bought for Pioneer a total of 2,433 kilos of rubber cup lumps from its various suppliers
in Talakag, Bukidnon. Considering that Pioneer did not have any storage facility in Talakag,
Bukidnon, Sison placed the newly-purchased rubber cup lumps inside the fenced premises
which he rented out as his residence.

Later that day, Sison was approached by Avelino Sechico chairman of the FARBECO Multi-
purpose Coop. Accompanying Sechico were two police officers and several members of
FARBECO. When asked about their purpose, Sison was informed they wanted to verify if the
rubber cup lumps/coagulum he had bought earlier were the same as those that were earlier
stolen from FARBECO.

Upon inspection, the group informed Sison that six (6) tons of the rubber lumps/coagulum
that Edon sold to him were the ones earlier stolen from FABRECO.

On August 30, 2002, however, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sison was surprised
when respondent Rodolfo Yecyec (Yecyec), manager of FARBECO, arrived at his place on
board a "weapons carrier truck. demanded that Sison give them the rubber lumps/coagulum
he bought from Edon without any court order.

Immediately after Sison left, Yecyec, together with his men proceeded to destroy the fence
of Sison’s residence to gain entrance to the premises. Yecyec’s men followed him. Once
inside the fenced premises, Yecyec and his companions took the rubber cup lumps and
loaded them on to their truck.

Before Yecyec and his men could completely load all the rubber cup lumps inside the truck,
Sison arrived together with police officer Billy Dahug and barangay kagawad Marc Gumilac.
Startled when the police officer Dahug blew his whistle, Yecyec and his men hastily left the
premises on board their truck, leaving the left portion of the fence destroyed.

Pioneer, through Sison, thus filed an affidavit-complaint against the respondents before
PNP Acting favorably on the complaint, the Chief Police of the PNP of Talakag, Bukidnon,
filed a criminal complaint against the private respondents for Robbery with Intimidation of
 309

Persons before MCTC of Bukidnon. MCTC found probable cause to hold respondents liable
for Robbery with Intimidation of Persons.

While affirming the finding of probable cause by the investigating judge for the unlawful
taking, the Provincial Prosecutor found that the respondents should only be liable for
the lower offense of Theft. Thereafter, an Information was filed before RTC.

RTC arrived at the conclusion that the evidence on record failed to establish probable
cause absent two (2) of the essential elements of the crime of Theft and
dismissed the case. RTC explained If a person takes personal property from another
believing it to be his own, the presumption of intent to gain is rebutted and, therefore, he is
not guilty of Theft

CA affirming the dismissal of the charges against the respondents. while the use of force
may hold respondents criminally liable for some other crime like coercion, it would not hold
them guilty for the crime of theft or robbery, absent the element of intent to gain. Hence the
case at bar.

Issue: Whether the RTC judge was wrong in dismissing the case and should have
conducted its own investigation rather than dismissing the case outright?

Held: Yes.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, that is,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.24 Thus, in the oft-cited case of Crespo v. Mogul,

It is a cardinal principle thatall criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of
a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal.

Thus, for crimes cognizable by regional trial courts, preliminary investigations are usually
conducted.25 In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court discussed the purposes and
nature of a preliminary investigation in this manner:

The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the

inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a
formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary
proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose.

Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties'
evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief than an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason
of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a
result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no
double jeopardy attaches.
 310

The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the
determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial
function. The judicial determination of probable cause, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.

The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is a

If
necessity to place the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot

be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he

the judge should

or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so,

not override the public prosecutor’s determination

of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the
ground that the evidence presented to substantiate
the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient.
It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a
wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in
court, and the courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the
information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.

Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor
committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of probable
cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest
warrant should be issued against the accused.

In this case, there is no question that the Information filed against the respondents was
sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with Section
6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the
Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial basis to support
finding of probable cause against the respondents, albeit with the RTC and the CA having
varying opinions as to the application and interpretation of such basis.

Hence, as the Information was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or
arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA
erred when they overturned the finding of probable cause against the respondents.

It was clearly premature on the part of the RTC and the CA to make a determinative finding
prior to the parties' presentation of their respective evidence that the respondents lacked the
 311

intent to gain and acted in good faith considering that they merely sought to recover the
rubber cup lumps that they believed to be theirs.

It has long been settled that the presence or

absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense that may be best
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
In all, by granting this petition, the Court is not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt
or innocence of the respondents. The Court is simply saying that, as a

General rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error,
grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the court should
not dismiss it for lack of "probable cause," because evidentiary matters should first
be presented and heard during the trial.

The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper
scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Information
against the above-named respondents is hereby ordered REINSTATED. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, which is ordered to
proceed with the case with dispatch
 312

Judicial determination of probable cause

Janet Napoles vs. Sec. Delima et al ( Petition be dismissed. Napoles has been found
guilty of serious illegal detention with proof beyond reasonable doubt; Judge issued
warratn of arrest once he received information; not arbitrary; For one’s prompt
dispatch may be another’s undue haste)
G.R. No. 213529 July 13, 2016
LEONEN, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
case stems from a Joint Sworn Statement executed by Arturo Francisco Luy et al They
alleged that a family member, Benhur Luy, had been detained against his will since
December 19, 2012, transferred from place to place in a bid to cover up the JLN Group of
Companies’ anomalous transactions involving the PDAF.

Napoles, owner of the JLN Group of Companies, and her brother, Reynald Lim (Lim),
allegedly masterminded the "pork barrel scam" and the detention of Benhur Luy. Acting on
the Joint Sworn Statement, Sec. Leila M. De Lima directed the NBI Special Task Force to
investigate the matter.

This led to a "rescue operation” on March 22, 2013 to release Benhur Luy who, at that time,
was reportedly detained in a condominium unit at Pacific Plaza Tower, BGC. Lim, who was
with Benhur Luy at the condominium unit, was arrested by operatives of the National Bureau
of Investigation.

Recommendation addressed to Prosecutor General Claro Arellano requested the

prosecution of Lim and Napoles for serious illegal detention. Finding no probable cause
against Lim and Napoles, Asst. State Prosce. Navera recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for serious illegal detention. Prosecutor Navera believed that Benhur Luy
voluntarily stayed at Bahay ni San Jose for a spiritual retreat, as attested to by Monsignor
Josefino Ramirez and the five (5) Chinese priests residing in the retreat house.

In the Review Resolution dated August 6, 2013, Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and Chair
of the Task Force on Anti-Kidnapping Theodore M. Villanueva reversed the June 10, 2013
Resolution and recommended filing an information for serious illegal detention
against Lim and Napoles.

The Review Resolution was approved by Prosecutor General Arellano, and an

Information for serious illegal detention was filed before the RTC Makati against
Napoles and Lim, presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda. Recommending no bail for
Napoles and Lim, Judge Alameda issued a warrant for their arrest

Napoles filed before CA petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion to Delima.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion in the filing of the information in court and the issuance
of the arrest warrant, CA dismissed Napoles’ Petition for Certiorari. MR by Napoles denied

Napoles filed before this Court her Petition for Review on Certiorari with Application for
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
 313

Issue: Whether the issuance of warrant of arrest by Judge Alameda was valid?

Held: Yes! No Grave abuse of discretion on part of Judge

This Petition must be denied for being moot and academic.

Even before the filing of this Petition questioning the Review Resolution, an Information for
serious illegal detention has been filed against Napoles. Therefore, with the filing of the
Information before the trial court, this Petition has become moot and academic. The trial
court has then acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case, and the determination of the
accused’s guilt or innocence rests within the sole and sound discretion of the trial court. As
explained in Crespo v. Mogul

The proper remedy for Napoles was to proceed to trial and allow the exhaustive
presentation of evidence by the parties

During the pendency of this Petition, the main case from which the Petition for Certiorari
stemmed was decided by the trial court. Napoles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious
illegal detention.

Napoles has been found

All the more should this Petition be dismissed.

guilty of serious illegal detention with proof beyond

reasonable doubt, a quantum of evidence higher than probable cause.
Resolving whether there was probable cause in the filing of information before the trial court
and in the issuance of an arrest warrant would be "of no practical use and value."

we proceed with
In any case, despite the mootness of this Petition,

resolving the issues presented by the parties for the

guidance of the bench and the bar

The determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that for issuance of
an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is filed in court, the trial court acquires
jurisdiction and "any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court."

was no grave abuse of discretion in the filing of Information against Napoles. The Review
Resolution sufficiently explained that during the preliminary investigation stage, there was
probable cause to believe that Napoles and Lim, her brother, illegally deprived Benhur Luy of
his liberty:
 314

It is true that the Review Resolution reversed the initial finding of lack of probable cause
against Napoles and Lim. However, this in itself does not show grave abuse of discretion.

Neither was there grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the arrest warrant against
Napoles. That Judge Alameda issued the arrest warrant within the day he received the
records of the case from the prosecutor does not mean that the warrant was hastily issued.

officer cannot
"Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial

per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious

performance of functions. For one’s prompt
dispatch may be another’s undue haste.

Judge Alameda was under no obligation to review the entire case record as Napoles insists.
All that is required is that a judge personally evaluates the evidence and decides,
independent of the finding of the prosecutor, that probable cause exists so as to justify the
issuance of an arrest warrant.

Moreover, Judge Alameda did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the arrest
pendency of the Motions for Judicial Determination
warrant despite the
of Probable Cause filed by Napoles and Lim. Hearing these Motions would
be a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion[s], the judge
is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public
prosecutor and the supporting evidence.

In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.

We afford respondents the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.

Napoles failed to show capriciousness, whimsicality, arbitrariness, or any despotic exercise
of judgment by reason of passion and hostility on the part of respondents.