STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED In the present case, Sato did then and there,

willfully, feloniously and unlawfully defrauded Manolita

PENAL LAWS Gonzales, who was already then blind, to sign and
1. INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA thumbmark a special power of attorney in favor of his
GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG VS daughter, making her believe that the document was only
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES about her taxes. Falsification of documents was employed
G.R. No. 181409; February 11, 2010 by Sato, making it a complex crime.
Therefore, the complex crime of estafa through
FACTS: falsification of documents by Sato does not fall under the
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the absolutory cause of Article 332, making him criminally
duly appointed administratix of petitioner intestate estate of liable.
her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales filed a complaint
for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a
Japanese national. The Information stated that Sato did then PENAL LAWS
and there willfully, feloniously, and unlawfully defraud 2. ELVIRA YU OH VS COURT OF APPEALS
Manolita Gonzales, who was already then blind and 79 years G.R. No. 125297; June 6, 2003
old, to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney in
favor of Wendy Sato, his daughter, making her believe that FACTS:
said document involved only her taxes. The accused knew Petitioner Elvira Yu Oh purchased pieces of
fully well that the documents authorized his daughter to sell, jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc., a
assign, transfer, or dispose of to any person or entity of her company engaged in jewelry trading. Due to her failure to
properties all located at Tagaytay City. pay the purchase price, Solid Gold filed a civil complaint
Sato moved to quash the Information, claiming that against her.
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his Later on, Solid Gold’s General Manager, Joaquin
relationship (mother-in-law) to the person allegedly Novales III, and Yu Oh entered into a compromise
defrauded was an exempting circumstance. The trial court agreement to settle the civil case wherein petitioner shall
granted the motion for quashal. The petitioner appealed but issue a total of 99 post-dated checks in the amount of
was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before P50,000 each and the balance of over P1 Million to be paid
the Court of Appeals but was dismissed, sustaining that the on the due date of the 99th post-dated check. Petitioner
death of Sato’s wife did not extinguish his relationship by issued 10 checks at P50,000 each drawn against her account.
affinity between him and his wife’s mother, Manolita. However, said checks were dishonored by Equitable
Hence, this petition. Banking Coporation (EBC) for the reason “Account
This Court affirmed that there is still a relationship Closed”. Dishonor slips were issued for each check that was
by affinity between Sato and the deceased Manolita returned to Novales.
Gonzales despite the pre-death of his wife. But the petition Novales filed 10 separate criminal cases charging
still had merit with regard to the scope of Article 332 of the petitioner with violation of BP Blg. 22 or the Bouncing
RPC. Checks Law. The RTC found the accused guilty sentencing
her to a penalty of 1 year of imprisonment for each count
STAT CON ISSUE: or a total of 10 years. Petitioner appeald to the Court of
Whether or not complex crimes fall under the absolutory Appeals but the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
cause of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, extenuating the RTC. Hence this petition.
Sato of his criminal liability
STAT CON ISSUE:
HELD: Whether or not RA 7691 or BP Blg. 22 is a penal law and
No, complex crimes do not fall under the shall be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the
absolutory cause of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to
address specific crimes against property, namely, theft, HELD:
estafa/swindling, and malicious mischief. It limits the No, RA 7691 is not a penal law and shall not be
responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him given retroactive effect.
from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the As defined by this Court, penal law is an act of the
offended party. However, the provision’s language plainly, legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes
categorically, unmistakably, and exclusively applies only to penalties for its violations. It also defines crimes, treats of
simple crimes of theft, estafa/swindling, and malicious its nature, and provides for its punishment.
mischief. It does not apply to the same crimes but are In the case at bar, RA 7691 is a substantive law and
complexed with another crime, such as estafa through not a penal law as nowhere in its provisions does it define a
falsification of public documents. crime neither does it provide a penalty of any kind. With
this, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which states that
“penal laws shall be given retroactive effect insofar as they Therefore, the preventive suspension pendente lite
favor the person guilty of a felony” does not apply in the is not a penalty
present case.
Therefore, RA 7691 is not a penal law and shall not
be given retroactive effect.

STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS

PENAL LAWS 1. HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN VS CITY OF
3. GERARDO R. VILLASENOR VS MANDALUYONG
SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 135087; March 14, 2000
G.R. No. 180700; March 4, 2008
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City
FACTS: issued a Resolution authorizing then Mayor Benajamin
The Quezon City Manor Hotel went ablaze Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the
resulting in the death of 74 people and injuries to scores of property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and
others. Investigation into the tragedy revealed that the hotel Sto. Rosario Streets in Mandaluyong City. The intended
was a veritable fire trap. purpose of expropriation was the expansion of the
Petitioners faced criminal charges for the crime of Mandaluyong Medical Center.
multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and for Mayor Abalos wrote Suguitan a letter offering to
violation of Section 3 of RA 3019. They were also charged buy his property, but the latter refused to sell. Consequently,
administratively with gross negligence, gross misconduct, the herein respondent filed a complaint for expropriation
and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service in with the RTC. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss on the
connection with the Manor Hotel inferno. following grounds: that the power of eminent domain is not
During the pendency of the criminal case, special being exercised in accordance with law; that there is no
prosecutor Loeulla Mae Oco-Pesquere filed a motion for pubic necessity to warrant expropriation of subject
suspension pendente lite of petitioners. Petitioners opposed property; that the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate
the motion, contending that they had already been the said property without just compensation; that the City
suspended for 6 months relative to the administrative case of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for the
based on the same facts and circumstances. They posited payment of the property being expropriated; that
that any preventive suspension that may be warranted in the expropriation of Suguitan’s property is but a ploy of Mayor
criminal case was already absorbed by the preventive Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use. The trial
suspension in the administrative case because both criminal court denied Suguitan’s motion.
and administrative cases were anchored on the same set of On November 14, 1995, the trial court issued an
facts. order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate
The motion was denied and the court granted the possession of Suguitan’s property upon. Mont after, the city
prosecution’s motion for suspension for a period of 90 days. assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a
Hence this petition writ of possession. Petitioner asserted that respondent can
only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by
STAT CON ISSUE: means of an ordinance and not by a mere resolution.
Whether or not the preventive suspension pendente lite
imposed upon the petitioners is a penalty STAT CON ISSUE:
Whether or not a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for
HELD: the filing of expropriation proceedings
No, the preventive suspension pendente lite
imposed upon the petitioners is not a penalty. HELD:
The preventive suspension under Section 13 of No, a resolution is not a sufficient antecedent for
R.A. 3019 is merely a measure of precaution so that the the filing of expropriation proceedings.
employee who is charged may be separated from office for For a local government unit to exercise the power
obvious reasons. Preventive suspension is distinct from of eminent domain, the following requisites must be
suspension as a penalty. While the former may be imposed established:
on a respondent during the investigation of the charges 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
against him, the latter may be meted out to him at the final council authorizing the local chief executive to
disposition of the case. exercise the power of eminent domain;
In the case at bar, the preventive suspension 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for
granted by the Court against the petitioners, being public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
procedural in nature, will only last for 90 days, not the entire the poor and the landless;
duration of the criminal case like petitioners seem to think. 3. There is payment of just compensation; and
 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made the Documentary Stamp Tax, which took effect on January
to the owner of the property sought to be 15, 1994). Philacor filed a petition for review before the CTA.
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. On September 23, 2005, the CTA en banc affirmed
An examination of the applicable law will show that an the resolution of April 6, 2004 of the CTA Division. It
ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint reiterated that Philacor is liable for the DST due on two
with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the transactions – the issuance of promissory notes and their
power of eminent domain is already being exercised. subsequent assignment in favor of Philacor.
The exercise of rights of eminent domain, whether On November 18, 2005, Philacor filed the present
directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is CTA decision.
that the authority must be strictly construed. No species
of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and STAT CON ISSUE:
none is guarded by the Constitution and the laws more Whether or not petitioner is liable for the documentary
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. stamp tax
When the legislature interferes with that right, and for
greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an HELD:
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law NO. Philacor, as an assignee or transferee of
should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. the promissory notes, is not liable for the assignment
or transfer of promissory notes as this transaction is
not taxed under the law.
Neither party questions that the issuances of
promissory notes are transactions which are taxable under
STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS the DST
2. PHILACOR CREDIT CORPORATION VS Section 180. Stamp tax on promissory notes,
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE bills of exchange, drafts, certificates of deposit, debt
G.R. No. 169899; February 6, 2013 instruments used for deposit substitutes and others not
payable on sight or demand. — On all bills of exchange
FACTS: (between points within the Philippines), drafts, or
Philacor is a domestic corporation organized certificates of deposits, debt instruments used for deposit
under Philippine laws and is engaged in the business of substitutes or orders for the payment of any sum of
retail financing. Through retail financing, a prospective money otherwise than at sight or on demand, on all
buyer of a home appliance – with neither cash nor any promissory notes, whether negotiable or non-negotiable
credit card – may purchase appliances on installment except bank notes issued for circulation, and on each
basis from an appliance dealer. After Philacor conducts renewal of any such note, there shall be collected a
a credit investigation and approves the buyer’s documentary stamp tax of twenty centavos on each two
application, the buyer executes a unilateral hundred pesos, or fractional part thereof, of the face value
promissory note in favor of the appliance dealer. The of any such bill of exchange, draft certificate of deposit,
same promissory note is subsequently assigned by the debt instrument, or note. Under the undisputed facts
appliance dealer to Philacor. and the above law, the issue that emerges is: who is
Revenue Officer Mejia examined Philacor’s liable for the tax? o Section 173 of the 1997 National
books of accounts and other accounting records for Internal Revenue Code (1997 NIRC) names those who
the fiscal year August 1, 1992 to July 31, 1993. Philacor are primarily liable for the DST and those who would
was assessed a deficiency income tax, a deficiency be secondarily liable:
percentage tax, and a deficiency documentary stamp tax. Section 173. Stamp taxes upon documents,
instruments, and papers. — Upon documents,
Philacor protested the Pre-Assessment Notices. It instruments, and papers, and upon acceptances,
alleged that the assessed deficiency income tax and assignments, sales, and transfers of the obligation, right,
deficiency percentage tax was erroneously or property incident thereto, there shall be levied, collected
computed when the BIR failed to take into and paid for, and in respect of the transaction so had
account the reversing entries of the revenue accounts or accomplished, the corresponding documentary stamp
and income adjustments, such as repossessions, write-offs taxes prescribed in the following sections of this Title, by
and legal accounts; thus, the total income reported was the person making, signing, issuing, accepting, or
not equal to the actual receipts of payment from the transferring the same, and at the same time such act is
customers. As for the deficiency DST, Philacor claims done or transaction had: Provided, that wherever one
that the accredited appliance dealers were required by law party to the taxable document enjoys exemption from
to affix the documentary stamps on all promissory notes the tax herein imposed, the other party thereto who is
purchased until the enactment of RA 7660(An Act not exempt shall be the one directly liable for the tax
Rationalizing Further the Structure and Administration of
 Philacor did not make, sign, issue, accept or issuance of the promissory notes, but merely to their
transfer the promissory notes. The acts of making, assignment. On the face of the documents, the parties
signing, issuing and transferring are unambiguous. The to the issuance of the promissory notes would be the
buyers of the appliances made, signed and issued the buyer of the appliance, as the maker, and the appliance
documents subject to tax, while the appliance dealer dealer, as the payee. o Nor can the CIR justify his
transferred these documents to Philacor which likewise position that Philacor is liable for the tax by citing
indisputably received or "accepted" them. Acceptance," Section 42 of Regulations No. 26, which was issued by
however, is an act that is not even applicable to the Department of Finance on March 26, 1924:
promissory notes, but only to bills of exchange. Under Section 42. Responsibility for payment of tax on
Section 132 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (which promissory notes . — The person who signs or issues
provides for how acceptance should be made), the act a promissory note and any person transferring or using
of acceptance refers solely to bills of exchange. Its a promissory note can be held responsible for the
object is to bind the drawee of a bill and make him payment of the documentary stamp tax.
an actual and bound party to the instrument. Further, The rule uses the word "can" which is
in a ruling adopted by the BIR as early as 1955, permissive, rather than the word "shall," which would
acceptance has already been given a narrow definition make the liability of the persons named definite and
with respect to incoming foreign bills of exchange, not unconditional. In this sense, a person using a
the common usage of the word "accepting" as in promissory note can be made liable for the DST if he
receiving: or she is: (1) among those persons enumerated under
The word "accepting" appearing in Section 210 the law. Such interpretation would avoid any conflict
of the National Internal Revenue Code has reference to between Section 173 of the 1997 NIRC and Section 42
incoming foreign bills of exchange which are accepted in of Regulations No. 26 and would make it unnecessary
the Philippines by the drawees thereof. o This ruling, to for us to strike down the latter as having gone beyond
our mind, further clarifies that a party to a taxable the law it seeks to interpret. However, we cannot
transaction who "accepts" any documents or instruments interpret Section 42 of Regulations No. 26 to mean
in the plain and ordinary meaning of the act (such as that anyone who "uses" the document, regardless of
the shipper in the cited case) does not become primarily whether such person is a party to the transaction, should
liable for the tax. In the same way, Philacor cannot be be liable, as this reading would go beyond Section 173
made primarily liable for the DST on the issuance of of the 1986 Tax Code — the law that the rule seeks
the subject promissory notes, just because it had to implement. Implementing rules and regulations cannot
"accepted" the promissory notes in the plain and amend a law for they are intended to carry out, not
ordinary meaning. supplant or modify, the law. 31 To allow Regulations
Revenue Regulations No. 9-2000 26 interprets No. 26 to extend the liability for DST to persons who
the law more widely so that all parties to a transaction are not even mentioned in the relevant provisions of
are primarily liable for the DST, and not only the any of our Tax Codes, particularly the 1986 Tax Code
person making, signing, issuing, accepting or transferring (the relevant law at the time of the subject transactions)
the same becomes liable as the law provides. It provides: would be a clear breach of the rule that a statute must
SEC. 2. Nature of the Documentary Stamp Tax and always be superior to its implementing regulations.
Persons Liable for the Tax – As Philacor correctly points out, there are
(a) In General. — The documentary stamp taxes under provisions in the 1997 NIRC that specifically impose
Title VII of the Code is a tax on certain transactions. the DST on the transfer and/or assignment of
It is imposed against "the person making, signing, documents evidencing particular transactions. We can
issuing, accepting, or transferring" the document or safely conclude that where the law did not specify that
facility evidencing the aforesaid transactions. Thus, in such transfer and/or assignment is to be taxed, there
general, it may be imposed on the transaction itself or would be no basis to recognize an imposition
upon the document underlying such act. Any of the
parties thereto shall be liable for the full amount of the
tax due: Provided, however, that as between themselves,
the said parties may agree on who shall be liable or how STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS
they may share on the cost of the tax. (b) Exception. 3. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
— Whenever one of the parties to the taxable VS KUDOS METAL CORPORATION
transaction is exempt from the tax imposed under Title G.R. No. 178087; May 5, 2010
VII of the Code, the other party thereto who is not exempt
shall be the one directly liable for the tax. FACTS:
On April 15, 1999, respondent Kudos Metal Corporation
o But even under these terms, the liability of Philacor filed its Annual Income Tax Return (ITR) for the taxable
is not a foregone conclusion as from the face of the year 1998. - Pursuant to a Letter of Authority dated
promissory note itself, Philacor is not a party to the September 7, 1999, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
served upon respondent three Notices of Presentation of procedure for the proper execution of the waiver, which the
Records. Respondent failed to comply with these notices, BIR must strictly follow.
hence, the BIR issued a Subpeona Duces Tecum dated The BIR cannot hide behind the doctrine of
September 21, 2006, receipt of which was acknowledged by estoppel to cover its failure to comply with RMO 20-90 and
respondents President, Mr. Chan Ching Bio, in a letter dated RDAO 05-01, which the BIR itself issued. As stated earlier,
October 20, 2000. - Respondent filed three waiver of the the BIR failed to verify whether a notarized written
defense of prescription. authority was given by the respondent to its accountant, and
On August 25, 2003, the BIR issued a Preliminary to indicate the date of acceptance and the receipt by the
Assessment Notice for the taxable year 1998 against the respondent of the waivers. Having caused the defects in the
respondent. This was followed by a Formal Letter of waivers, the BIR must bear the consequence. It cannot shift
Demand with Assessment Notices for taxable year 1998, the blame to the taxpayer. To stress, a waiver of the statute
dated September 26, 2003 which was received by of limitations, being a derogation of the taxpayers right to
respondent on November 12, 2003. Respondent challenged security against prolonged and unscrupulous investigations,
the assessments by filing its Protest on Various Tax must be carefully and strictly construed.
Assessments on December 3, 2003 and its Legal Arguments As to the alleged delay of the respondent to furnish
and Documents in Support of Protests against Various the BIR of the required documents, this cannot be taken
Assessments on February 2, 2004. Believing that the against respondent. Neither can the BIR use this as an
governments right to assess taxes had prescribed, excuse for issuing the assessments beyond the three-year
respondent filed on August 27, 2004 a Petition for Review period because with or without the required documents, the
with the CTA - On October 4, 2005, the CTA Second CIR has the power to make assessments based on the best
Division issued a Resolution canceling the assessment evidence obtainable.
notices issued against respondent for having been issued
beyond the prescriptive period. It found the first Waiver of
the Statute of Limitations incomplete and defective for
failure to comply with the provisions of Revenue STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS
Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90. The waiver failed 4. MAPULO MINING ASSOCIATION VS HON.
to indicate the date of acceptance. Such date of acceptance FERNANDO LOPEZ
is necessary to determine whether the acceptance was made G.R. No. L-30440; February 7, 1992
within the prescriptive period. The fact of receipt by the
taxpayer of his file copy was not indicated on the original FACTS:
copy. The requirement to furnish the taxpayer with a copy This is a petition under Section 61 of the Mining Act (C.A.
of the waiver is not only to give notice of the existence of NO. 137), as amended by R.A. No. 4388, for review of the
the document but also of the acceptance by the BIR and the 24 March 1969 decision of then Secretary of the
perfection of the agreement. Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
The subject waiver is therefore incomplete and (DANR), Hon. Fernando Lopez, in DANR Case No. 3359
defective. As such, the three-year prescriptive period was entitled Mapulo Mining Association and E.V. Chavez &
not tolled or extended and continued to run. - Section 203 Associates versus Projects & Ventures, Inc., 1 affirming the
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) 5 July 1968 Order of the Director of the Bureau of Mines,
mandates the government to assess internal revenue taxes Hon. Fernando S. Busuego, Jr., which dismissed petitioners'
within three years from the last day prescribed by law for adverse claim against private respondent's Application For
the filing of the tax return or the actual date of filing of such Lease of Mining Claims over certain mineral lands located
return, whichever comes later. Hence, an assessment notice at Taysan, Batangas, principally on the ground that said
issued after the three-year prescriptive period is no longer claim was filed one (1) day after the expiration of the period
valid and effective. within which to do so pursuant to Section 72 of the Mining
Act.
STAT CON ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of estoppel can be applied in In 1940, Eliseo Chavez and his wife, Lucia B.
this case Mercado, located a limestone mining claim (then known as
the San Jose Placer Claim) over a piece of registered private
HELD: land situated at Barrio Mapulo, Taysan, Batangas with an
No area of 12.4469 hectares. The said land is covered by
We find no merit in petitioners claim that Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-174(0-510). On
respondent is now estopped from claiming prescription 6-12 and 18-27 March 1943, the lease survey of the placer
since by executing the waivers, it was the one which asked claim was undertaken by then Assistant Mineral Land
for additional time to submit the required documents. Surveyor of the Bureau of Mines, Mr. Julian Lagman; on 5
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied in this July 1943, then Director of Mines, Hon. Quirico A.
case as an exception to the statute of limitations on the Abadilla, approved the survey plan (Pla-163) prepared by
assessment of taxes considering that there is a detailed the former. Under a temporary permit to extract minerals
issued to them by the Director of Mines on 3 February 1943, petitioners are guilty of laches in filing their adverse claim
spouses extracted and mined limestone from the land. only on 29 August 1967.
Subsequently, the Mineral Lands and On 25 July 1968, petitioners moved for a
Administrative Division of the Bureau of Mines declared as reconsideration of the Order but the same was later denied.
abandoned this claim of Mr. Chavez due to his failure to
comply with requirements. Thereafter, the Mapulo Mining STAT CON ISSUE:
Association, petitioner herein, relocated the area through 1. Whether or not there was valid and sufficient
Antonio Chavez on 16-22 December 1963 and registered it publication of the notice of private respondent's
as the Mapulo Placer Mining Area with the Office of the application for a mining lease over its claims; and
Mining Recorder (Register of Deeds) of Batangas on 22 2.) Assuming that there was, whether or not petitioners'
January 1964. On 4 February 1964, the Mapulo Mining Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to such application was
Association filed an application for a mining lease, which seasonably filed.
was docketed as PLA-V-1136. On 26-30 November 1963
and 1-4 December 1963, petitioner E.V. Chavez & HELD:
Associates located mining claims known as "Chavez I" and The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the then
"Chavez II" inside private agricultural lands belonging to Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of 24 March
several individuals. On 5 December 1963, the 1969 in DANR Case No. 3359 affirming the Order of the
corresponding declarations of location were registered in then Director of the Bureau of Mines of 5 July 1968 in
the Office of the Mining Recorder of Batangas. An Mines Administrative Case No. V-417 is SET ASIDE and
application for mining lease over the claims was filed on 25 the Adverse Claim and/or Opposition filed by petitioners is
August 1967. REINSTATED. REASONING:
Upon the other hand, on 6-10 June 1966, private
respondent Projects & Ventures, Inc. (PROVEN) located 1.) The Court agrees with the petitioner stating that
mining claims known as "BAT 40, 41, 60, 22, 23, 38, 37, 44, there was no publication of the notice in a
57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 39, 42. 58, 59, 43, and 24" over an area newspaper published in the municipality or
embraced by petitioners' mining claims. On 2 August 1967, province in which the mining claim was located.
petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines an application for
an order of lease survey of the "Mapulo Placer Claim," Section 72 of the Mining Act provides, inter alia, that: Upon
"Chavez I" and "Chavez II" mining claims. This application receipt of the application, and provided that the
was denied on the ground that said claims are in conflict requirements of this Act have been substantially complied
with the claims of the private respondent. On 29 August with, the Director of the Bureau of Mines shall publish a
1967, petitioners filed an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition notice that such application has been made, once a week for
to the Issuance of Mining Lease dated 28 August 1967. a period of three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette
Private respondent, on 20 October 1967, filed a and in two newspapers, one published in Manila either in
Motion to Dismiss petitioners' adverse claim on the ground English or Spanish, and the other published in the
that the same was filed one (1) day late. On 20 November municipality or province in which the mining claim is
1967, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending located, if there is such newspaper, otherwise, in the
that: (1) Section 72 of the Mining Act, as amended, requiring newspaper published in the nearest municipality or
the publication of the notice of mining lease application in province. . . .
the provincial newspaper, has not yet been complied with There was no publication, however, of the notice in
and so, therefore, there is no publication deadline to speak a newspaper published in the municipality or province in
of; (2) the issues of the Official Gazette dated 7, 14 and 21 which the mining claim was located, i.e., in Batangas. It is
August 1967, where private respondent's notice of not denied that at that time, there were two (2) weekly
application was inserted, were actually released to the public newspapers in Batangas, namely the People's Courier and
only on 5, 19 and 29 September 1967, respectively; (3) The Batangas Reporter. All that respondent Director of
private respondent's mining claims were located in violation Mines could say in his challenged Order of 5 July 1968 is
of Sections 28(d) and 60 of the Mining Act as the same had that "We are not aware of the publication in Batangas of
already been previously located by other parties; and (4) such newspapers." This non-awareness does not mean that
private respondent's declarations of location are fraudulent the newspapers do not in fact exists; besides, the petitioners
as they are mere table locations, no actual location having presented him with certifications issued by the Circulation
been performed. Manager of the People's Courier (Exh. "5") and the Editor
On 5 July 1968, the Director of Mines dismissed of The Batangas Reporter (Exh. "4") attesting to the
petitioners' adverse claim on the ground that: (1) the existence of said periodicals. And even granting for the sake
publication of private respondent's notice of filing of of argument that these two (2) local newspapers do not
applications for lease in a provincial newspaper is not exist, the fact remains that there was still no publication of
necessary; (2) with respect to the publication in the Official the notice in a newspaper published in the nearest
Gazette, what is controlling is not the date of the actual municipality or province. Petitioners maintain that
release but rather the date appearing thereon; and (3) publication in a newspaper published in the municipality or
province where the claims are located, if there be such a telecommunications system throughout the Philippines. For
newspaper, or in a newspaper published in the nearest equipment, machineries and spare parts it imported for its
municipality or province, is mandatory. The Court agrees business. PLDT paid the following (a) compensating
with petitioners that the publication requirements tax,advance sales tax and other internal revenue taxes. For
prescribed in Section 72 of the Mining Act are mandatory similar importations, PLDT paid value-added tax (VAT).
and that substantial compliance therewith is not enough.
Such mandatory character is obvious from the Section itself. On March 15, 1994, PLDT addressed a letter to the BIR
It is evident that the newspaper first mentioned refers to a seeking a confirmatory ruling on its tax exemption privilege
periodical published in Manila and circulated in the under Section 12 of R.A. 7082, which reads:
Philippines while the second refers to a local newspaper.
Publication in one does not mean that the applicant can Provision: Sec. 12.The grantee . . . shall be liable to pay the
dispense with publication in the other. Otherwise, it would same taxes on their real estate, buildings, and personal
have been absurd, nay ridiculous, for the law to require property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or
publication in both newspapers in addition to publication in corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law
the Official Gazette. The legislature certainly abhors to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee, . . . shall pay a
absurdity. Corollarily, courts should not give a statute a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross
meaning that would lead to absurdity. 39 Besides, Section receipts of the telephone or other
72 imposes upon the Director of Mines the duty, "[u]pon telecommunications businesses transacted under this
receipt of the application, and provided that the franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns, and the
requirements of this Act have been complied with," to said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise
publish the notice in the Official Gazette and in the said two or earnings thereof: The BIR responded : The "in lieu of
(2) newspapers. The language of the mandate is undeniably all taxes" provision under Section 12 of RA 7082 clearly
clear and unequivocal. It should be taken to mean exactly exempts PLDT from all taxes including the 10% value-
what it says: . . . added tax (VAT) prescribed by Section 101 (a) of the same
It is the rule in statutory construction that if the Code on its importations of equipment, machineries and
words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or spare parts necessary in the conduct of its business covered
ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature by the franchise, except the aforementioned enumerated
must be determined from the language employed, and, taxes for which PLDT is expressly made liable.
where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room
for construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, sec. 51). In view thereof, this Office . . . hereby holds that PLDT, is
The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of exempt from VAT on its importation of equipment,
the legislature apart from the words (Hondoras vs. Soto, 8 machineries and spare parts . . .needed in its franchise
Am. St., Rep. 744). The reason for the rule is that the operations.
legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of
words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed Armed with the foregoing BIR ruling, PLDT filed on
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute December 2, 1994 a claim for tax credit/refund of the VAT,
(50 Am. Jur. p. 212). Considering then that there was no compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and other taxes it
publication in a newspaper published in the municipality or had been paying "in connection with its importation of
province where the subject claims are located — Batangas various equipment, machineries and spare parts needed for
— despite the existence of two (2) weekly newspapers its operations".
therein, it is clear that there was non-compliance with
Section 72 of the Mining Act and that public respondents CTA granted PLDT’s petition.
acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
publication in the Philippines Herald, El Debate and the Petitioner’s claim: The BIR Commissioner excepts. He
Official Gazette was sufficient. submits that the exempting "in lieu of all taxes" clause
covers direct taxes only, adding that for indirect taxes to be
included in the exemption, the intention to include must be
specific and unmistakable. He thus faults the Court of
Appeals for erroneously declaring PLDT exempt from
STATUTES GRANTING PRIVILEGES payment of VAT and other indirect taxes on its
1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE importations. To the Commissioner, PLDT's claimed
VS PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE entitlement to tax refund/credit is without basis inasmuch
TELEPHONE COMPANY as the 3% franchise tax being imposed on PLDT is not a
G.R. No. 140230; December 15, 2005 substitute for or in lieu of indirect taxes.

FACTS:
PLDT is a grantee of a franchise under Republic Act (R.A.) STAT CON ISSUE:
No. 7082 to install, operate and maintain a
Whether or not "in lieu of all taxes " clause found in Section operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country in
12 of PLDT's franchise (R.A. 7082) covers all taxes, whether relation to Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869.
direct or indirect. The Secretary of Justice opined that the authority
of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or
HELD: gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or game
NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS; STATUTES GRANTING played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts
TAX EXEMPTIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED to a legislative franchise for the purpose.
STRICTLY AGAINST THE TAXPAYER AND On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed a Petition
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXING for Prohibition to prevent PAGCOR from managing
AUTHORITY. — Time and again, the Court has stated that and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota games on the
taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception. Accordingly, ground that the act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis
statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed in either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favour On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR entered into an
of the taxing authority. To him, therefore, who claims a agreement with BELLE and FILGAME wherein the latter
refund or exemption from tax payments rests the burden of parties would provide all the required facilities and
justifying the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken requirements for the establishment and operation of jai-alai.
and too categorical to be misinterpreted. . . . It cannot be On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed a
overemphasized that tax exemption represents a loss of Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity
revenue to the government and must, therefore, not rest on of the agreement stating that PAGCOR is without
vague inference. When claimed, it must be strictly construed jurisdiction, authority, legislative franchise, or authority to
against the taxpayer who must prove that he falls under the enter into such agreement for the operation and
exception. And, if an exemption is found to exist, it must establishment of jai-alai games.
not be enlarged by construction, since the reasonable A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico S. Sandoval
presumption is that the state has granted in express terms II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction.
all it intended to grant at all, and that, unless the privilege is A Petition in Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri
limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal
extended beyond dispute in ordinary cases. because it is not included in PAGCOR’s scope.
The clause "in lieu of all taxes" in Section 12 of RA Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor, and
7082 is immediately followed by the limiting or qualifying intervenor Zubiri are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity
clause "on this franchise or earnings thereof", suggesting as the members of the House of Representatives.
that the exemption is limited to taxes imposed directly on Respondent questions the locus standi or the
PLDT since taxes pertaining to PLDT's franchise or standing of the petitioners to file the petition at bar as
earnings are its direct liability. Accordingly, indirect taxes, taxpayers and as legislators because the operation of jai-alai
not being taxes on PLDT's franchise or earnings, are outside does not involve the disbursement of public funds.
the purview of the "in lieu" provision. If we were to adhere
to the appellate court's interpretation of the law that the "in
lieu of all taxes " clause encompasses the totality of all taxes STAT CON ISSUE:
collectible under the Revenue Code, then, the immediately Whether or not petitioners have a locus standi or legal
following limiting clause "on this franchise and its earnings" standing to file the petition
would be nothing more than a pure jargon bereft of effect
and meaning whatsoever. Needless to stress, this kind of HELD:
interpretation cannot be accorded a governing sway YES
following the familiar legal maxim redendo singula singulis As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is without an
meaning, take the words distributively and apply the “oven ready” legal support. A party suing as taxpayer must
reference. Under this principle, each word or phrase must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
be given its proper connection in order to give it proper preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
force and effect, rendering none of them useless or taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where
superfluous. there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or
that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
STATUTES GRANTING PRIVILEGES invalid or unconstitutional law. The record shown under
2. RAOUL B. DEL MAR VS PAGCOR their agreement is barren of evidence that the operation and
G.R. No. 138298; November 29, 2000 management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves
expenditure of public money. The Court also holds that as
FACTS: members of the House of Representatives, petitioners have
PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of legal standing to file the petition at bar. The operation of jai-
Justice as to whether or not it is authorized by its Charter to alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the
legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise. Hence, manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 o
powers of Congress are being impared, so as the powers of Considering that he has four minor children (all
each of its members. attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no
other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not
DECISION: Petitioners have legal standing to file the declared owning a family home, his alleged income
petition cannot be considered lucrative. o respondent Ong is not
qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing
NOTES: The states issue is only a “procedural issue” business or trade. The appellate court dismissed the
questioning when can taxpayers file a suit. The substantive Republic’s appeal: o It may appear that the respondent has
issue concerns whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise no lucrative employment. However, it is of judicial notice
includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai. It was ruled that the value of the peso has taken a considerable
that PAGCOR DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT to plunge in value since that time up to the present. If
operate jai-alai because: • It was not stated under its scope. we consider the income earned at that time, the ages
• In accordance with its historical creation, there is a of the children of the respondent, the employment of
separate Executive Order which controls the operating of his wife, we can say that there is an appreciable
Jai-Alai (controlled by the Romualdezes) in Manila. Petitioner’s arguments: The only pieces of
PACGOR’s franchise was never given a franchise to operate evidence presented by Ong to prove that he qualifies
jai-alai. • Tax treatment between jai-alai operations and under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
gambling casinos are distinct from each other. • PAGCOR Naturalization Law, are his tax returns for the years
is engaged in the business affected with public interest. 1994 to 1997, which show that Ong earns from
P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually. This declared
income is far from the legal requirement of lucrative
income. It is not sufficient to provide for the needs of
STATUTES GRANTING PRIVILEGES a family of six, with four children of school age
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KERRY o none of these tax returns describes the source of
LAO ONG Ong's income, much less can they describe the lawful
G.R. No. 175430; June 18, 2012 nature
Respondent’s arguments: Ong submits that his tax
FACTS: returns support the conclusion that he is engaged in
Respondent Ong filed a petition for naturalization. lucrative trade
He is a Chinese citizen registered as a resident alien and
possesses an alien certificate of registration and a native- STAT CON ISSUE:
born certificate of residence from the Bureau of Whether or not Ong’s income, as evidenced by his tax
Immigration. He has been continuously and permanently returns, can be considered lucrative, and hence be granted
residing in the Philippines from birth up to present. He naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines.
married Griselda Yap who is also a Chinese citizen. They
have four children who were all born and raised in the HELD:
Philippines. No, Ong’s income cannot be considered lucrative.
Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Revised
“businessman business manager" since 1989, earning an Naturalization Law requires that for a person to be
average annual income of P150,000.00. However, when naturalized as a Filipino citizen, he must comply with the
he testified, he said that he has been a businessman requirements found in the said provision stating that “He
since he graduated from college in 1978. He did not msut own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than
specify or describe the nature of his business. He 5,000, Philippine currency, or must have some known
presented a health certificate to prove that he is of sound lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.” The
physical and mental health and has no criminal record or qualification of “some known lucrative trade, profession, or
pending criminal charges. The trial court held : From the lawful occupation” means not only that the person having
evidence presented by [respondent], this Court believes the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
and so holds that [respondent] possesses all the life. It must be shown that the employment gives one
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided an income such that there is an appreciable margin of
for by law to become a citizen of the Philippines. his income over his expenses as to be able to provide
The Republic, through the SolGen, appealed to the for an adequate support in the event of unemployment,
CA : o faulted the trial court for granting Ong's petition sickness, or disasbility to work and thus avoid one’s
despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known becoming the object of charity or public charge. A lucrative
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as income is the existence of an appreciable margin of one’s
required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the income over his expenses. In determining the existence of a
Revised Naturalization Law o respondent Ong did not lucrative income, the courts should only consider the
prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business applicants income.
 In the case at bar, respondent Ong did not testify the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general
as to the nature of his business. He failed to provide rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They
documentary evidence like business permits, registration, extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all
official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
his proprietorship or participation in a business that would rather than the exception.
testify to his lucrative income. Instead, he only relied on his The exception provided for in section 168 of the
general assertions to prove his possession of “some known old Tax Code should be strictly construed. The Court also
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation”. General ruled that it is a basic rule of interpretation that words and
assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is phrases used in the statute in the absence of a clear
required of an applicant for naturalization. legislative intent to the contrary, should be given their plain,
Therefore, Ong’s income cannot be considered ordinary and common usage or meaning.
lucrative and hence shall not be granted naturalization. Cans and tetrapaks are not used in the manufacture
of CENVOCO's finished products which are coconut,
edible oil or copra meal cake. Such finished products are
packed in cans and tetrapaks. There is no error in allowing
EXCEPTIONS AND PROVISOS the sales taxes paid on the containers and packaging
1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE materials of the milled products should be credited against
VS COURT OF APPEALS, CENTRAL the miller's tax due thereon
VEGETABLE MANUFACTURING CO.
G.R. No. 107135; February 23, 1999
EXCEPTIONS AND PROVISOS
2. GEOLOGISTICS, INC. VS GATEWAY
FACTS: ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
Private respondent Central Vegetable Oil G.R. Nos. 174256-57; March 25, 2009
Manufacturing Co.,Inc.(CENVOCO) is a manufacturer of
edible oil and coconut, copra meal cake and such other FACTS:
coconut related oil subject to the miller tax of 3%. - In1986, Petitioner Geologistics, Inc., formerly known as
CENVOCO purchased a specified number of containers LEP International Philippines, Inc., is a domestic
and packaging materials for its edible oil from its suppliers, corporation engaged in the business of freight forwarding
and paid the sales tax due thereon. - After an investigation and customs brokerage who instituted an action for the
by the Revenue Examiner, CENVOCO was assessed for recovery of sum of money against respondent Gateway
deficiency miller's tax in the total amount of P1,575,514.70. Electronic Corporation (respondent Gateway) before the
CENVOCO wrote petition era letter requesting for RTC. Respondent First Lepanto-Taisho Insurance
reconsideration, contending that the final provision of Corporation (respondent surety) filed a counter-bond in the
Section168 of the Tax Code does not apply to sales tax paid amount of P5 million to secure the payment of any
on containers and packaging materials, hence, the amount judgment that petitioner could recover from respondent
paid therefor should have been credited against the miller's Gateway. The RTC rendered a decision ordering the
tax assessed against it. - Petitioner, through a letter, defendant to pay the plaintiff Geologistics. Petitioner filed a
reiterated the validity of its assessment. motion for execution pending appeal which was opposed by
Dissatisfied, CENVOCO filed a petition for review respondent Gateway. The motion alleged the following
with the Court of Tax Appeals, which came out with a "good reasons" to execute the RTC decision pending
decision in favor of CENVOCO. Petitioner appealed to the appeal: Gateway was guilty of fraud, the appeal was
Court of Appeals. - The assailed decision was affirmed in interposed to delay the case, imminent danger of gateway's
toto. insolvency and that the counterbond could be the subject of
execution. The RTC granted the motion for execution of
judgement pending appeal on the ground that gateway
STAT CON ISSUE: admitted its principal obligation to the petitioner and the
Whether or not petitioner can invoke section 168 of the case had been pending for a long time. The surety
Tax Code to exempt it from the deficiency miller’s tax LEPANTO filed a motion to set aside the order of the RTC
and to quash the writ of execution but it was denied, a writ
HELD: of execution was issued and was implemnted by the sheriff.
NO. Both respondents filed a separate Rule 65 petitions
The law relied upon by the BIR Commissioner as before the Court of Appeals. In the petition for certiorari,
the basis for not allowing CENVOCO's tax credit is just a prohibition and mandamus (with urgent prayer for the
proviso of Section 168 of the old Tax Code. issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
The restriction in said proviso, however, is limited preliminary injunction .
only to sales, miller's or excise taxes paid "On raw materials Respondent Gateway's petition was initially
used in the milling process." - The Court ruled that under dismissed by the appellate court, but upon motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court ordered its
reinstatement and the issuance of a temporary restraining STATUTES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
order (TRO) against the enforcement of the RTC's Decision
Respondent surety's petition for certiorari, sought
1. RE: APPLICATION FOR SURVIVORSHIP
the nullification of the RTC orders , the quashal of the writ
of execution, the issuance of a TRO and a writ of PENSION BENEFITS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT.
preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the NO. 9946
A.M. No. 14155-Ret., November 19, 2013
writ of execution and the return of the garnished amount to
respondent surety.
The court of appeals granted both the Respondents
petitions and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by FACTS:
This case involves a judge, Manuel K. Gruba, of the Court
the respondent Hence petition for certiorari by the
respondent. of Tax Appeals 1 who died while in service. He died at the
age of 55 years, two (2) months, and six (6) days. He died
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9946, which
STAT CON ISSUE: substantially amended the benefits provided in Republic Act
No. 910.
Whether or not there is a sufficient ground exists warranting
the discretionary execution of the RTC decision
The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba, Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba
(Mrs. Gruba), applied for retirement/gratuity benefits under
HELD:
Republic Act No. 910.
There is none.
The rule on execution pending appeal, which is
now termed discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section In a Resolution dated September 24, 1996, this Court
approved the application filed by Mrs. Gruba. The five-year
2 of the Rules of Court, must be strictly construed being an
exception to the general rule. Discretionary execution of lump sum retirement benefit under Republic Act No. 910
was remitted to the Government Service Insurance System
appealed judgments may be allowed upon concurrence of
effective June 26, 1996.
the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion by the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there
must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No.
910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946. Republic Act No.
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. The
yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good 9946 provided for more benefits, including survivorship
reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of such pension benefits, among others. The law also provides a
retroactivity provision which states:
urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing
SEC. 3-B. The benefits under this Act shall be granted to all
party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed
those who have retired prior to the effectivity of this Act:
later. Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is
an exception to the general rule, the existence of good Provided, That the benefits shall be applicable only to the
members of the Judiciary: Provided, further, That the
reasons is essential. In granting petitioner's motion for
execution pending appeal, the RTC gave weight to the fact benefits to be granted shall be prospective.
that the case had been pending since 1997 and the alleged
admission of liability on the part of respondent Gateway,
STAT CON ISSUE:
The grounds cited by the RTC in allowing the
(1) whether Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba;
discretionary execution of its decision cannot be considered
"good reasons." The alleged admission by respondent (2) whether the heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to the 10-
year lump sum gratuity benefits under Republic Act No.
Gateway of its liability is more apparent than real because
the issue of liability is precisely the reason the case was 9946; and
(3) whether Mrs. Gruba is entitled to survivorship pension
elevated on appeal. The exact amount of respondent
benefits under the same law.
Gateway's liability to petitioner remains under dispute even
if, as claimed by petitioner, the evidence on record indicates
HELD:
that respondent Gateway's obligation is almost a certainty.
Precisely the appeal process must be allowed to take its First two issues in favor of the heirs of Judge Gruba.
However, we deny theapplication for survivorship pension
course all the way to the finality of judgment to determine
once and for all the incidents of the suit. benefits of Mrs. Gruba.

Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in

favor of the retiree because their objective is to provide for
the retiree's sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when
he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes
of the law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being No. 626, as amended, or the Law on Employees’
of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, Compensation. More than 10 years after the death of her
retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in husband, that she learned of the benefits under P.D. No.
favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts 626 through the television program of Ted Failon, who
are resolved in favour of the retiree to achieve their informed that one may claim for Employees Compensation
humanitarian purpose. Commission (ECC) benefits if the spouse died while
working for the company. Petitioner filed with the SSS her
When Mrs. Gruba applied for benefits under Republic Act claim for funeral benefits under PD 626.
No. 9946, she was not claiming additional gratuity benefits.
She was invoking the second paragraph of The SSS denied the claim of petitioner for funeral
benefits ruling that the cause of Juanito’s death was not
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic work-connected, absent a causal relationship between the
Act No. 9946, thus: aSIUpon the death of a Justice or Judge illness and the job. Petitioner appealed her claim to the
of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has Executive Director of the ECC. The Medical Services
retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of Group of the SSS was ordered to review the claim of
death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to petitioner, and affirmed the denial of the petition.
receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice The case was elevated to the Employees’
or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not Compensation Commission, which rendered a decision
died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such dismissing the appeal. It ruled that petitioner failed to show
retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or by substantial evidence that her husband’s cause of death
remarriage. was due to, or the risk of contracting his ailment was
increased by his occupation and working conditions.
According to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946, Commission also declared that petitioner’s claim has
survivorship pension benefits are given to surviving spouses prescribed.
of retired judges or justices or surviving spouses of judges
or justices who are eligible to retire optionally. This means The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition.
that for the spouse to qualify for survivorship pension, the It ruled that petitioner’s filing of her claim for SSS benefits
deceased judge or justice must (1) be at least 60 years old, shortly after Juanito’s death did not suspend the running of
(2) have rendered at least fifteen years in the Judiciary or in the prescriptive period for filing EC claims. It interpreted
any other branch of government, and in the case of the aforementioned ECC Resolutions to mean that a
eligibility for optional retirement, (3) have served the last claimant must indicate the kind of claim filed before the
three years continuously in the Judiciary. running of the prescriptive period for filing EC claims may
be interrupted.
Mrs. Gruba could have been entitled to survivorship
pension benefits if her late husband were eligible to
optionally retire at the time of his death. However, we are
faced with a situation where the justice complied only with STAT CON ISSUE:
two of three requirements for optional retirement. He was 1. Whether the claim of petitioner had prescribed.
only 55 years old, and the law required the age of 60 for 2. Whether the illness of petitioner’s husband,
eligibility for optional retirement. myocardial infarction, can be considered as work-
related under ECC Resolution No. 432

2. MARIA OBRA VS SSS HELD:

G.R. No. 147745; April 9, 2003 1. NO, the claim of petitioner for funeral benefits under
P.D. No. 626, as amended, has not yet prescribed.
FACTS:
Juanito Buena Obra, husband of petitioner, worked as a The general rule of prescription in the case at bar is
driver for 24 years. He was employed at Jollar Industrial governed by P.D. No. 626, or the Law on Employees’
Sales and Services, Inc. as a dump truck driver from 1980 to Compensation. Art. 201 of P.D. No. 626 and Sec. 6, Rule
1988. On June 1988, he suffered a heart attack while driving VII of the 1987 Amended Rules on Employees’
a dump truck inside the work compound, and died Compensation both read as follows:
thereafter.
“No claim for compensation shall be given due course
Petitioner Maria Buena Obra immediately filed her unless said claim is filed with the System within three years
claim for death benefits under the SSS law, and started from the time the cause of action accrued.”
receiving her pension in November 1988. However, she was
The exceptions are found in Board Resolution 93-
unaware of other compensation benefits due her under P.D.
08-0068 and ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and
Disposition of Employees Compensation Claims. Board this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations,
Resolution 93-08-0068 states: shall be resolved in favor of labor.
“A claim for employee's compensation must be Claims falling under the Employees’ Compensation
filed with System (SSS/GSIS) within three (3) years from Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a
the time the cause of action accrued, provided however, that any social legislation designed to afford relief to the working
claim filed within the System for any contingency that may be held man and woman in our society.
compensable under the Employee's Compensation Program (ECP)
shall be considered as the EC claim itself. The three-year 2. Yes, the illness of petitioner’s husband, myocardial
prescriptive period shall be reckoned from the onset of infarction, can be considered as work-related under
disability, or date of death. In case of presumptive death, the ECC Resolution No. 432.
three (3) years limitation shall be counted from the date the Under the law on employees' compensation, death
missing person was officially declared to be presumptively is compensable only when it results from a work-connected
dead.” (emphasis supplied) injury or sickness. In the instant case, the cause of
Petitioner’s claim for death benefits under the SSS petitioner's husband's death was myocardial infarction and
law should be considered as the Employees’ Compensation it must be considered work-connected. While it is true that
claim itself. This is but logical and reasonable because the myocardial infarction is not among the occupational
claim for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS diseases listed under the Amended Rules on Employees'
is of the same nature as her claim before the ECC. Compensation, the Commission, under ECC Resolution
Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which No. 432 laid down the conditions under which cardio-
Employees’ Compensation claims are filed. vascular or heart diseases can be considered as work-related
and thus compensable.
Section 4(b)(2), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of
Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of the Employees Petitioner’s husband falls under the second
Compensation Claims also provides for the conditions condition of ECC Resolution No. 432 which states that the
when EC claims filed beyond the three-year prescriptive strain of work that brought about the acute attack must be
period may still be given due course. Section 4(b)(2) states of sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours
the condition for private sector employees, requiring that a by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal
claim for Medicare, sickness, burial, disability or death relationship.
should be filed within three (3) years from the occurrence Petitioner's husband was driving a dump truck
of the contingency. within the company premises where they were stacking
It is true that under the proviso, the employees’ gravel and sand when he suffered the heart attack. He had
compensation claim shall be filed with the GSIS/SSS within to be taken down from the truck and brought to the
a reasonable time as provided by law. It should be noted workers' quarters where he expired at 10:30 a.m., just a few
that neither statute nor jurisprudence has defined the limits minutes after the heart attack, which is much less than the
of “reasonable time.” Thus, what is reasonable time 24 hours required by ECC Resolution No. 432. This is a
depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each clear indication that severe strain of work brought about the
case. acute attack that caused his death.

In the case at bar, we also find petitioner’s claim to As a final note, the Court finds it necessary to
have been filed within a reasonable time considering the reiterate that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social
situation and condition of the petitioner. We have ruled that legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide
when the petitioner filed her claim for death benefits under meaningful protection to the working class against the
the SSS law, her claim for the same benefits under the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies
Employees’ Compensation Law should be considered as resulting in the loss of income. Thus, as the official agents
filed. The evidence shows that the System failed to process charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by the
her compensation claim. Under the circumstances, the Constitution, the ECC and the SSS should adopt a
petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the lapse committed liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding
by the System. It is the avowed policy of the State to claims for compensability especially where there is
construe social legislations liberally in favor of the some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection
beneficiaries. This court has time and again upheld the with the illness or injury, as the case may be. It is only
policy of liberality of the law in favor of labor. this kind of interpretation that can give meaning and
substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as
Art. 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines reads embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states
as follows: that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of the Labor Code including its
ART. 4. Construction in favor of labor. – All doubts in implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of favor of labor.
 intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children.
However, petitioner, being married at the time the
3. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed
MICHELLE P. LIM the petitions with her husband. The Court cannot make its
G.R. Nos. 168992-93; May 21, 2009 own legislation to suit petitioner.
At the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
FACTS: petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by
Petitioner Monina Lim was married with Primo herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We
Lim but were childless. Minor children, whose parents were have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s
unknown, were entrusted to them. Petitioner and Lim decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex.
registered the children to make it appear that they were the Section 7, Art. III of RA 8522 reads:
children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P.
Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared “x x x (c) The guardian with respect to the ward
for the children as if they were their own, sent them to after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of
exclusive schools, and they used the surname “Lim.” his/her financial accountabilities.
In 1998, Primo died. Petitioner then married an Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in
American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. the following cases:
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
the birth of a child. She filed separate petitions for adoption son/daughter of the other; or
of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband, other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
Michael, and Olario gave their consent to the adoption (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
executed in an affidavit. other. x x x”

The trial court dismissed the petitions on the The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
ground that the petitioner should have filed the petition provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the
jointly with her new husband. Joint adoption by the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
husband and wife is mandatory under Section 7(c), Article of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
III of RA 8552 and Art. 185 of the Family Code. The trial situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level
court that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses
under Sec. 7 (c), Art. III of RA 8552. to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses. The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
STAT CON ISSUE: exceptions enumerated in Section 7. The fact that Olario
Whether the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed gave his consent to the adoption does not suffice. There are
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect certain requirements that Olario must comply being an
the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be American citizen.
adopted. It is true that when the child reaches the age of
emancipation, emancipation terminates parental authority
HELD: over the person and property of the child, who shall then be
No, the rule on joint adoption should not be relaxed in qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However,
favor of petitioner. parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold adoption. even if emancipation terminates parental
the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of
consideration. Every reasonable intendment should be the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child.
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
compassionate objectives of the law. The main purpose of adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological
adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of the parents are entitled.
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally,
in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose.
The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
4. THE COCA-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION not attend the March 15, 1995 hearing. The formal
VS CLARITA P. GACAYAN investigation was concluded, and petitioner dismissed
G.R. No. 149433; December 15, 2010 respondent for fraudulently submitting tampered and/or
altered receipts in support of her petty cash reimbursements
FACTS: in gross violation of the company’s rules and regulation.
Petitioner The Coca Cola Export Corporation is
engaged in the manufacture, distribution and export of Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
beverage base, concentrate, and other products bearing its non-payment of service incentive leave, sick leave and
trade name. Respondent Clarita P. Gacayan began working vacation leave with prayer for reinstatement, payment of
with petitioner in 1985. She was holding the position of backwages as well as for damages and attorney’s fees, against
Senior Financial Accountant at the time her employment petitioner with the NLRC. Labor Arbiter Reyes ruled in
was terminated in 1995 favor of petitioner and dismissed respondent’s complaint
for lack of merit. respondent appealed the Labor Arbiter’s
Employees of Coca-Cola were allowed decision to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the ruling of
reimbursement of meal and transportation expenses the Labor Arbiter.
incurred when the employee worked overtime for at least
four hours on weekends or holidays, and for at least two The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
hours on weekdays. It was in connection with this company Resolutions of the NLRC. It ruled that the penalty of
policy that respondent Gacayan, then a Senior Financial dismissal was too harsh and directed petitioner to
Accountant, was made to explain the alleged alterations in immediately reinstate respondent to her former position.
three (3) receipts which she submitted to support her claim
for reimbursement of meal expenses, to wit: 1) McDonald
Receipt dated October 1, 1994 for P111.00; 2) Shakey’s STAT CON ISSUE:
Pizza Parlor Receipt dated November 20, 1994 for P174.06; Whether petitioner dismissed respondent on the basis of a
and 3) Shakey’s Pizza Parlor dated July 19, 1994 for P130.50. just or authorized cause. Commented [SYOP1]: Not sure about this
Petitioner issued a memorandum to respondent
informing her of the alteration in the date of the HELD:
McDonald’s receipt, and requiring her to explain said No, petitioner did not dismiss the respondent on the basis
alteration. Respondent stated that the alteration may have of a just cause.
been made by the staff of McDonald’s. upon verification The Labor Code mandates that before an employer
with the Branch Manager of McDonald’s, the receipt was may validly dismiss an employee from the service, the
actually issued for a meal bought on Oct. 2, 1994 and not requirement of substantial and procedural due process must
on Oct. 1, 1994. be complied with. Under the requirement of substantial due
Another memorandum was sent to respondent process, the grounds for termination of employment must
requiring her to explain why her Nov. 21 claim for be based on just or authorized causes. Article 282 of the
reimbursement of meal expense should not be considered Labor Code enumerates the just causes for the termination
fraudulent since her Shakey’s Pizza Parlor Receipt contained of employment. In termination cases, the burden of proof
a handwritten alteration for extra mojos. Respondent claims rests on the employer to show that the dismissal was for just
that she ordered a “buddy pack and an extra mojos,” but cause. Otherwise, an employee who is illegally dismissed
that the delivery staff brought a wrong receipt which did not "shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
correspond to the food she ordered. She asked the delivery rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
staff to alter the receipt and sign for its authentication. The inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
Assistant Manager also denied that the delivery staff made monetary equivalent computed from the time his
the alteration. compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement."
Petitioner also informed respondent of another
Shakey’s Pizza Parlor Receipt with an alteration containing The Court finds that respondent’s dismissal from
“w/ CAV 50% only.” Respondent claimed that she shared employment was not grounded on any of the just causes
the meal with another employee. Said employee, however, enumerated under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. The term
denied that she ordered and shared the food covered by the “trust and confidence" is restricted to managerial
receipt. It was also discovered that the receipt was issued for employees.” Respondent was the Senior Financial
food purchased on July 17, 1994 and not for July 19, 1994. Accountant. She provides support in the form of financial
analyses and evaluation of action plans to assist
Petitioner invited respondent to a hearing and management in strategic and operational decision-making.
formal investigation to give her an opportunity to explain
the issues against her. She was also given the option of The basis for terminating the employment of
bringing a lawyer at the hearing. However, respondent did respondent was for gross violation of the company’s rules
and regulations. no mention was made regarding petitioner’s
alleged loss of trust and confidence in respondent. Neither granted Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and
was there any explanation nor discussion of the alleged (unregistered) emancipation patents (EPs).
sensitive and delicate position of respondent requiring the
utmost trust of petitioner. Respondents filed a complaint for ejectment
against petitioners for non-payment of rentals before the
It bears emphasizing that the right of an employer Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
to dismiss its employees on the ground of loss of trust and (DARAB), alleging that petitioners failed to pay and remit
confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily. For loss of the agreed lease rentals to respondents since 1994. Among
trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, it the named defendants were Avelino Santos and Pedro
must be substantial and founded on clearly established facts. Bernardo, who were already deceased at the time of the
Loss of confidence must not be used as a subterfuge for filing of the complaint. Thus, the actual tillers were already
causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; it must be the successors of Avelino and Pedro. However, no
genuine, not a mere afterthought, to justify earlier action amendment to implead the real parties-in-interest was made
taken in bad faith. Because of its subjective nature, this to the complaint. notwithstanding the non-amendment of
Court has been very scrutinizing in cases of dismissal based the complaint and the absence of a formal substitution, the
on loss of trust and confidence because the same can easily heirs of Avelino and Pedro appeared and participated in the
be concocted by an abusive employer. proceedings.
The alleged infractions of respondent could hardly Regional Adjudicator Manalang issued a Decision
be considered serious misconduct. The employer’s right to in favor of respondents which severed and extinguished the
conduct the affairs of its business, according to its own tenancy/agricultural leasehold relationship existing between
discretion and judgment, is well-recognized. The only the plaintiffs-landowners and the defendants. The Decision
criterion to guide the exercise of its management explained that with the exemption of the subject properties
prerogative is that the policies, rules and regulations on from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
work-related activities of the employees must always be fair Program (CARP), petitioners could only retain their status
and reasonable and the corresponding penalties, when as agricultural lessees if they complied with their statutory
prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and to obligations to pay the required leasehold rentals when they
the degree of the infraction. fell due. Since all the petitioners failed to prove that they
complied with their rental obligations to respondents since
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee 1994, the Regional Adjudicator held that they could no
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to longer invoke their right to security of tenure.
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, The petitioners filed two separate notices of appeal,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent one by the first group, and another by the second group
computed from the time his compensation was withheld which included the two decedents Pedro and Avelino. The
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. notices of appeal were not signed by a lawyer.
After a finding of illegal dismissal herein, we apply Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
the foregoing provision entitling respondent Clarita P. and an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
Gacayan to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and/or partial implementation of the decision against non-
and other privileges and full backwages. appealing defendants.
Except with respect to the decedents Avelino and
Pedro, whose signatures were held to be forged, the
Regional Adjudicator gave due course to the appeal. Thus,
5. REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM a writ of execution was issued against the non-appealing
ADJUDICATION BOARD VS COURT OF defendants and the deceased defendants. Both the
APPEALS petitioners and the respondents moved for reconsideration.
G.R. No. 165155; April 13, 2010
Respondents reiterated that the Regional
FACTS: Adjudicator should not have given due course to the appeal
Respondents are co-owners of several parcels of land because it did not adhere strictly with Section 2, Rule XIII
primarily devoted to rice production consisting of 58 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. On the other hand, the
hectares. Petitioners are in actual possession of the said land petitioners who were included in the writ of execution,
as tillers. According to respondents, petitioners are including the heirs of Avelino and Pedro, now represented
agricultural lessees with the obligation to pay annual lease by the DAR-Legal Counsel Atty. Go, pointed out that
rentals. On the other hand, petitioners aver that they are Pedro’s signature was not forged, since what appears
farmer-beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27, who have been thereon is actually the name of his widow, Pilar. As for the
signature of Avelino, which was executed by his widow,
Jovita, the same was an innocent error since she did not
know which name to write, having been unaided by counsel. Rule I
Regional Adjudicator Manalang allowed the appeal of the GENERAL PROVISIONS
heirs of the two decedents and nullified the writ of
execution as regards them in an Order. Section 2. Construction. – These Rules shall be
liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the agrarian
Respondents moved for reconsideration, which reform program and to promote just, expeditious, and
was denied. Respondents thus filed a petition for certiorari inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian cases,
before the CA. They argued that the DARAB no longer had disputes or controversies.
any jurisdiction to reverse the portion of its Decision. They
also insisted that both notices of appeal were infirm for xxxx
failure to state the grounds for an appeal and for containing Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. – The Board and
forged signatures. its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound
The CA held that the Notice of Appeal of the by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed
second group bearing the signatures of deceased Avelino in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide
and Pedro was a product of forgery, and thus had no legal all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most
effect. It found the two Notices of Appeal lodged by the expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to
first and second groups to be mere scraps of paper as they ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice
failed to comply with the mandate of Section 2, Rule XIII and equity.
of the "1997 DARAB New Rules of Procedure" (actually, it Guided by the foregoing principles, the Court found
should have been the 1994 DARAB New Rules of that the Notices of Appeal substantially complied with all
Procedure) that is required under the 1994 DARAB Rules. Under Sec.
2 of Rule XIII on Appeals, “[t]he aggrieved party may
appeal to the Board from a final order, resolution or
STAT CON ISSUE: decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:
1. Whether the two Notices of Appeal are "mere a) That errors in the findings of fact or conclusions of laws were
scraps of paper" for failure to state the grounds committed which, if not corrected, would cause grave and
relied upon for an appeal. irreparable damage and injury to the appellant x x x x”
2. Whether the real parties in interest were the Both Notices of Appeal stated that the petitioners
decedents Pedro and Avelino were appealing the decision "on the grounds of questions of
fact and of law," which we find sufficient statement of the
ground for appeal under Section 2(a), Rule XIII of the
HELD: DARAB Rules. While the notices omitted to state that "the
1. No, the two Notices of Appeal are not “mere scraps decision would cause grave and irreparable damage and
of paper.” injury to the appellant," we find such punctilious fidelity to
the language of the DARAB Rules unnecessary. By
The defects found in the two notices of appeal are appealing the Decision of the Regional Adjudicator, the
not of such nature that would cause a denial of the right to petitioners were already manifesting that they will be
appeal. Placed in their proper factual context, the defects are damaged by the assailed decision. Requiring a literal
not only excusable but also inconsequential. application of the rules when its purpose has already been
served is oppressive superfluity.
There is nothing sacred about the forms of
pleadings or processes, their sole purpose being to facilitate It must be stressed that the purpose of the notice
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending of appeal is not to detail one’s objections regarding the
parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules should appealed decision; that is the purpose of the appellants’
be construed liberally. Dismissal of appeals purely on memorandum.
technical grounds is frowned upon because rules of
procedure should not be applied to override substantial 2. No, the real parties in interest, at the time the complaint
justice. Courts must proceed with caution so as not to was filed, were no longer Pedro and Avelino.
deprive a party of statutory appeal; they must ensure that all A real party in interest is defined as "the party who
litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
and just ventilation of their causes, free from technical or the party entitled to the avails of a suit. The real parties
constraints. If the foregoing tenets are followed in a civil in interest, at the time the complaint was filed, were no
case, their application is made more imperative in an longer the decedents Avelino and Pedro, but rather their
agrarian case where the rules themselves provide for liberal respective heirs who are entitled to succeed to their rights
construction, thus: under our agrarian laws.
 Since respondents failed to correct their error (they Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the
did not amend the erroneous caption of their complaint to CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc promulgated its assailed
include the real parties-in-interest), they cannot be insulated Decision denying petitioner's Petition for Review for lack of
from the confusion which it engendered in the proceedings merit. It held that petitioner's right to assess respondent for
deficiency taxes for the taxable year 1999 has already
This Court has ruled that formal substitution of prescribed and that the FAN issued to respondent never
parties is not necessary when the heirs themselves attained finality because respondent did not receive it.
voluntarily appeared, participated, and presented evidence
during the proceedings.
STAT CON ISSUE:
Whether the right of petitioner to assess respondent for
taxable year 1999 is barred by prescription.

HELD:
PRESCRIPTION Yes, the right of petitioner to assess respondent for taxable
1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE year 1999 is barred by prescription.
VS BASF COATING
G.R. No. 198677; November 26, 2014 It is true that, under Section 223 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1997, the running of the Statute of Limitations
FACTS: provided under the provisions of Sections 203 and 222 of
Respondent was a corporation which was duly the same Act shall be suspended when the taxpayer cannot
organized under and by virtue of the Philippine laws on be located in the address given by him in the return filed
August 1, 1990 with a term of existence of 50 years. In a upon which a tax is being assessed or collected. In addition,
joint special meeting, majority of the members of the Board Section 11 of Revenue Regulation No. 12-85 states that, in
of Directors and the stockholders representing more than case of change of address, the taxpayer is required to give a
two-thirds (2/3) of the entire subscribed and outstanding written notice thereof to the Revenue District Officer or the
capital stock of herein respondent corporation resolved to district having jurisdiction over his former legal residence
dissolve the corporation by shortening its corporate term to and/or place of business. However, this Court agrees with
March 31, 2001. Subsequently, respondent moved out of its both the CTA Special First Division and the CTA En Banc
address in Las Piñas City and transferred to Calamba, in their ruling that the above mentioned provisions on the
Laguna. suspension of the three-year period to assess apply only if
the BIR Commissioner is not aware of the whereabouts of
Respondent submitted 2 letters to the BIR Revenue the taxpayer.
District Officer of Revenue District Office (RDO). The first
letter was a notice for respondent’s dissolution, and the In the present case, petitioner, by all indications, is
second was a manifestation indicating the submission of well aware that respondent had moved to its new address in
various documents supporting respondent's dissolution. Calamba, Laguna, as shown by the documents which form
part of respondent's records with the BIR. The documents,
Thereafter, in a Formal Assessment Notice (FAN), all of which were accomplished and signed by officers of the
petitioner assessed respondent the aggregate amount of BIR, clearly show that respondent's address is at Calamba,
₱18M representing deficiencies in income tax, value added Laguna. The CTA also found that BIR officers, at various
tax, withholding tax on compensation, expanded times prior to the issuance of the FAN, conducted
withholding tax and documentary stamp tax, including examination and investigation of respondent's tax liabilities
increments, for the taxable year 1999. The FAN was sent by for 1999 at the latter's new address in Laguna.
registered mail to respondent's former address in Las Piñas
City. Despite the absence of a formal written notice of
respondent's change of address, the fact remains that
The Chief of the Collection Section of BIR petitioner became aware of respondent's new address as
Revenue Region No. 7, RDO No. 39 issued a First Notice shown by documents replete in its records. As a
Before Issuance of Warrant of Distraint and Levy, which consequence, the running of the three-year period to assess
was sent to the residence of one of respondent's directors. respondent was not suspended and has already prescribed.
Respondent filed a protest letter citing lack of due In a number of cases, this Court has explained that the
process and prescription as grounds. After 180 days had statute of limitations on the collection of taxes primarily
lapsed without action on the part of petitioner on benefits the taxpayer. In these cases, the Court exemplified
respondent's protest, the latter filed a Petition for Review the detrimental effects that the delay in the assessment and
with the CTA. The CTA Special First Division granted the collection of taxes inflicts upon the taxpayers.
Petition for Review, and cancelled and set aside the Prescription in the assessment and in the collection
assessment worth P18 Million for taxable year 1999. of taxes is provided by the Legislature for the benefit of
both the Government and the taxpayer; for the was still unsigned and her incentives were put on hold by
Government for the purpose of expediting the collection of Syhunliong.
taxes, so that the agency charged with the assessment and
collection may not tarry too long or indefinitely to the Rivera sent two text messages to a BANFF official
prejudice of the interests of the Government, which needs cellular phone held by Lumapas. She filed before the
taxes to run it; and for the taxpayer so that within a National Labor Commission a complaint against
reasonable time after filing his return, he may know the Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, incentive pay, gratuities
amount of the assessment he is required to pay, whether or and tax refund. Pending resolution of the labor case,
not such assessment is well founded and reasonable so that Syhunliong filed a complaint for libel on April 16, 2007.
he may either pay the amount of the assessment or contest Rivera filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the
its validity in court. text message merely reflected the stress she suffered due to
In BPI v. CIR, it was held that the statute of the delay in the release of her salaries, benefits, and
limitations on the assessment and collection of taxes is incentives. Further, the facts charged in the information did
principally intended to afford protection to the taxpayer not constitute the crime of libel as the elements of malice
against unreasonable investigations as the indefinite and the making of the defamatory imputation for public
extension of the period for assessment deprives the taxpayer consumption were wanting.
of the assurance that he will no longer be subjected to The RTC denied the Motion to Quash. It explained
further investigation for taxes after the expiration of a that the privileged character of a communication merely
reasonable period of time. Thus, in CIR v. B.F. Goodrich does away with the presumption of malice. The CA directed
Phils., Inc., this Court ruled that the legal provisions on the dismissal of the information for libel filed against Rivera.
prescription should be liberally construed to protect
taxpayers and that, as a corollary, the exceptions to the rule
on prescription should be strictly construed. STAT CON ISSUE:
1. Whether Syhunliong filed the complaint within the
It is true that taxes are the lifeblood of the prescriptive period as provided in the RPC
government. However, in spite of all its plenitude, the 2. Whether the text message of Rivera falls within the
power to tax has its limits. Such collection should be made purview of a qualified privileged communication.
in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the
very reason for government itself.
HELD:
In balancing the scales between the power of the 1. No, Syhunliong failed to file the complaint for libel
State to tax and its inherent right to prosecute perceived within the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90
transgressors of the law on one side, and the constitutional of the RPC.
rights of a citizen to due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws on the other, the scales must tilt in Syhunliong raised five issues before this Court, but
favor of the individual, for a citizen’s right is amply the Court’s resolution of the same would be a superfluity in
protected by the Bill of Rights under the Constitution. the light of Rivera’s unrefuted averment that prescription
had set in before the complaint for libel was instituted. In
Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, the Court stressed the reason
behind and the character of prescription of penal offenses:
PRESCRIPTION "Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act
2. RAMON A SYHUNLIONG VS TERESITA of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the
RIVERA offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution.
G.R. No. 200148; June 4, 2014 The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and
grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a
FACTS: certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; x x x that
Private complainant Ramon Syhunliong was the President from henceforth[,] he may cease to preserve the proofs of his
of BANFF Reality and Development Corporation and innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence[,]
owned interests in construction, restaurant, and hospital it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally
businesses. Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of construed in favor of the defendant, not only
BANFF. Citing personal and family matters, she tendered because such liberality of construction belongs to
her resignation, but continued working until the completion all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very
of turn over papers to her successor, Jennifer Lumapas. existence of the statute, is a recognition and
notification by the legislature of the fact that time,
Rivera called Lumapas to request for payment of while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence,
her remaining salaries, benefits, and incentives. Lumapas has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in
informed her that her benefits would be paid but her check which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of
 these views, it must be remembered that delay in person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's
instituting prosecutions is not only productive of claims.
expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in
the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds
lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text message
the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged
that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be communication.
vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of
grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself,
to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to
secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can
be obtained."
In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that
Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera more than one
year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
Lumapas. Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is STATUTES
April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not alter the fact
that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period
1. IN RE: APPLICATION OF MARIO GUARINA
provided for in Article 90 of the RPC.
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR
Although the general rule is that the defense of G.R. No. L-1179; January 8, 1913
prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the
lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been FACTS:
waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this Relying upon Sec. 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant Mario
rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as Guariña seeks admission to the bar without taking the
that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
by law, for the State not having then the right to prosecute, office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue
The applicant formerly took the prescribed
punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the defendant
examination but failed to pass. He received an average of
subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty,
71%, which is four points short of the passing 75%.
the court must so declare.
It is contended that under the provisions of the
2. Yes, the text message of Rivera falls within the purview
above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be
of a qualified privileged communication.
admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed
The rule on privileged communication means that examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
a communication made in good faith on any subject matter accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now
in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of
which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having Batanes. In view of the of the fact that the amendment was
a corresponding duty. inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates
In order to prove that a statement falls within the without examination, the clause "may be licensed to practice
purview of a qualified privileged communication under law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without and
Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) examination" should be construed so as to mean "shall be
the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, licensed to practice law in the Philippine Islands without an
or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had examination." It is contended that this mandatory
an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own construction is imperatively required in order to give effect
or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to
furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice. STAT CON ISSUE:
Whether the word “may” in Sec. 2 of Act No. 1597 is to
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely
Rivera of either the delay or denial of the latter's claims for as permissive and conferring discretion
payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong.
Rivera expressed through the subject text message her HELD:
grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best Permissive.
 It is well settled that in statutory interpretation the The Act of the Commission in so far as it is in
word "may" should be read "shall" where such construction conflict with or in any wise repugnant to the various Acts
is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the of Congress dealing with the same subject matter must be
legislator. held to be void and of no effect.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, Section 9 of the Act of Congress placed it beyond
1907, is as follows: the power of the local Legislature to deprive this court of
the jurisdiction or power theretofore granted to it; leaving
SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act however, to local legislative authority the right to confer
Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act additional jurisdiction, or to change the practice and
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special method of procedure. The above-cited provisions of Act
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended No. 190, in force at the time when the Act of Congress was
to read as follows: enacted, conferred upon this court the power and
1. x x x Provided, That any person who, prior to the jurisdiction to deny admission to candidates for the bar
passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have unless, in addition to other prescribed conditions, they
held, under the authority of the United States, the satisfy the court that they possess the necessary learning in
position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the the law, by passing an examination prescribed by general
Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of rule. It seems clear, therefore, that the Commission, while
the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine it was undoubtedly authorized to modify the provision
Islands, or the position of Attorney-General, Solicitor- requiring the holding of examinations under general rules
General, Assistant Attorney-General, assistant had no authority to deprive this court of its power to deny
attorney in the office of the Attorney-General, admission to any candidate who fails to satisfy it that he
prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, assistant possesses the necessary qualifications for admission to the
prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, city bar of the Philippine Islands.
attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or courts will presume that it was the intention of the
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one
to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an which should change the prior law no further than may be
examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in
and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said question. The construction should be in harmony with this
court." assumption whenever possible.
We are of opinion that giving the statute a To construe the word “may” it as mandatory would
mandatory construction is precluded by the provisions of bring it in direct conflict with the Act of Congress,
the Act of Congress enacted July 1, 1902, which confirm and we conclude therefore, despite the contentions of
and secure to this court the jurisdiction theretofore the applicant as to the apparent intention of the
conferred upon it. Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus legislator, that it should be given its permissive and
conferred upon this court by the Commission and not its mandatory effect, and that the true intention of
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the
and restricted, and in a case such as that under court to admit to the bar without examination the officials
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," mentioned in the Act in any case wherein the court is
as used in Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a otherwise satisfied that they possess the necessary
permissive effect. But any Act of the Commission which qualifications.
has the effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon
the Commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority. 2. ACOSTA VS ADAZA
Prior to the passage of this Act the power and G.R. No. 168617; February 19, 2007
jurisdiction of this court in relation to the admission of
candidates to the bar of the Philippine Islands had been FACTS:
fixed by the provisions of the Organic Act (No. 136) and Cecille S. Abalos filed two complaints-affidavits before the
the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); and as we Office of the City Prosecutor against petitioner Bernadette
understand these provisions this court was vested thereby L. Adasa for Estafa. Respondent alleged that petitioner,
with authority, and charged with a duty to pass upon the through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in
"moral character" and the "qualifications and ability" of all the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge
candidates for admission to the bar. and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter,
petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the rule
checks. as gathered from the context.
Petitioner admitted in a counter-affidavit admitting
that she received and encashed the two checks issued in
favor of respondent. However, she recanted in her STAT CON ISSUE:
Supplemental Affidavit and said that it was a Bebie Correa 1. Whether the word “may” implies that the Secretary
who received and encashed the checks. The Office of the of Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal
City Prosecutor found probable cause against petitioner. notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been
Two separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner. arraigned.
The instant petition pertains to only Criminal Case No. 2. Whether Sec. 7 of DOJ Circ. No. 70 applies only to
8782. appeals from original resolution of the City
Prosecutor.
The trial court ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation, which affirmed the
finding of probable cause. Petitioner entered a plea of not
guilty during her arraignment. Petitioner filed a Petition for HELD:
Review before the DOJ. The DOJ reversed and set aside 1. No.
resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and directed
the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction,
against petitioner. in this case, an administrative rule of procedure, is that when
a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of need not be resorted to. Since Section 7 of the subject
said resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss
have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after
7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary.
has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a Petitioner’s reliance to the statutory principle that "the last
petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice in order of position in the rule or regulation must prevail" is
cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or not applicable. In addition to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ
even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Circular No. 70 needs no construction because, as correctly
Respondent claimed Section 12 thereof mentions observed by the Court of Appeals, there is no irreconcilable
arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of the conflict between Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular
petition for review before the DOJ. No. 70.
The DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration, It is noteworthy that the principle cited by
opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of petitioner reveals that, to find application, the same
DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not presupposes that "one part of the statute cannot be
precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even reconciled or harmonized with another part without
where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This nullifying one in favor of the other." In the instant case,
is due to the permissive language "may" utilized in Section however, Section 7 is neither contradictory nor
12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain an irreconcilable with Section 12. Section 7 pertains to the
appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the action on the petition that the DOJ must take, while Section
accused has been arraigned. 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the
disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.
Meanwhile, a “Motion to Withdraw” filed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor was granted by the trial court True indeed is the principle that a
and dismissed the Criminal Case No. 8782. contemporaneous interpretation or construction by the
officers charged with the enforcement of the rules and
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight
CA. The CA granted respondent’s petition and opined that by the court in the latter’s construction of such rules
Section 12 should not be treated separately, but should be and regulations. That does not, however, make such a
read in relation to Section 7. The two provisions, taken construction necessarily controlling or binding. For equally
together, simply meant that when an accused was already settled is the rule that courts may disregard
arraigned when the aggrieved party files a petition for contemporaneous construction in instances where the
review, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take law or rule construed possesses no ambiguity, where
cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong
but instead dismiss or deny it outright. The appellate court reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has
added that the word "may" in Section 12 should be read as previously given the statute a different interpretation.
"shall" or "must" since such construction is absolutely
 To give the second sentence of Section 12 in Petitioner questioned the authority of the BEE to
relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would issue the subject Resolution, and the constitutionality of said
not only subvert the avowed objectives of the Circular, that Resolution. Sec. 3 of RA 184 mandated the Board to
is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, recommend proper measures for the maintenance of good
but would also render its other mandatory provisions - ethics and standards in the practice of electrical engineering
Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory. in the Philippines. The same is supported by Sec. 6(a) of PD
223. Petitioner argues that PRC and BEE have only
Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and visitation powers as stated in the said provision.
void as the same was improvidently conducted. Again, this
contention is without merit. Records reveal that petitioner’s The RTC as affirmed by the CA, decided that the
arraignment was without any restriction, condition or board had the authority to promulgate the questioned
reservation. In fact she was assisted by her counsels Atty. resolution pursuant to Section 3, RA no.184. That the latter
Arthur Abudiente and Atty. Maglinao when she pleaded to law is not limited to the power of inspection and visitation
the charge. Moreover, the settled rule is that when an as petitioner contends. It includes the power to formulate
accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived policies and programs as may be necessary to improve the
the right to preliminary investigation and the right to practice of a profession.
question any irregularity that surrounds it. This precept is
also applicable in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases
of review of such reinvestigation. In this case, when
petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she STAT CON ISSUE:
effectively waived the reinvestigation of the case by the whether the Board of Electrical Engineers in the light of
prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result thereof to the provisions of R.A. No. 184, had the authority to issue
the DOJ Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the the questioned resolution
petitioner, the DOJ Secretary can no longer entertain the
appeal or petition for review because petitioner had already HELD:
waived or abandoned the same. The Board issued the resolution as a means
purportedly to upgrade the knowledge and skills of electrical
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, engineers.
the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due
course and must dismiss the same. Section 3, of R.A. No. 184, mandates the Board to
recommend to the PRC the adoption of “measures as may be
2. NO. deemed proper for the maintenance of good ethics and standards in the
practice of electrical engineering in the Philippines. . .”
A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no
qualification given by the same provision to limit its Moreover, Section 6(a) of P.D. No. 223 gives the
application to appeals from original resolutions and not to various professional boards the power “[t]o look from time
resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the rule stating that to time into the conditions affecting the practice of the
"when the law does not distinguish, we must not profession or occupation under their respective jurisdictions
distinguish" finds application in this regard. and whenever necessary, adopt such measures as may be deemed
proper for the enhancement of the profession or occupation and/or the
maintenance of high professional, ethical and technical standards. . .”
For said purposes, “the members of a Board may
3. PHILIPPINE REGISTERED ELECTRICAL personally or through subordinate employees of the
PRACTITIONERS, INC. VS JULIO FRANCIA, JR. Commission conduct ocular inspection or visit industrial,
G.R. No. 87134; January 20, 2000 mechanical, electrical or chemical plants or works, hospitals,
clinics and other engineering works...”
FACTS:
Petitioner is an organization composed of professional On this point, petitioner now insists that the
electrical engineers, associate electrical engineers, assistant authority of the Board is limited to the conduct of ocular
electrical engineers, and master electricians. It is represented inspections. But nothing in said provision in any way
in this case by several of its officers and members. They imposes such an interpretation. The Board in fact may
assailed the constitutionality of Resolution No. 1, Series of even do away with ocular inspections, as can be
1986 issued by the Board of Electrical Engineering (BEE), gleaned from the use of the word "may", implying that
adopting guidelines for the implementation of Continuing the conduct of ocular inspections is merely directory
Professional Education (CPE) Program for Electrical and not mandatory. For sure, conducting ocular
Engineers. It requires every electrical engineer to earn credit inspections is only one way of ensuring compliance with
units of CPE before his license could be renewed. laws and rules relative to the professional practice of
electrical engineering. But it certainly is not the only way.
 We are, therefore, constrained to concede to the Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the
Board the existence of the power to issue the assailed same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222
resolution, in pursuance of its mandates under R.A. 184 and of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule
P.D. 223. 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards
a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted
and maintained.
4. GAUDENCIO GUERRERO VS RTC OF ILOCOS
NORTE
G.R. No. 109068; January 10, 1994 HELD:
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and
FACTS: endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous social
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private institution. This is also embodied in Art. 149, and given flesh
respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:
was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the
parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family
alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
compromise. The complaint does not allege that the parties complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the same compromise have been made, but that the same had
failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact
apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not
file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this apply to cases which may not be the subject of
ground in his answer. compromise under the Civil Code.

It was only at the pre-trial conference that the Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts
relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and with the negative word "No", the requirement is
respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must
B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a
brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge compromise have been made but that the same failed,
gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact
complaint" to allege that the parties were very close made, the case must be dismissed."
relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j),
complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a ground
towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, for motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members
respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
defect. compromise have been made."
Guerrero moved to reconsider the Order claiming As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in
that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and
family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a sisters" as members of the same family does not
compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice
precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also
motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New
defense in his answer. Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150
Respondent Judge denied the motion for of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration
reconsideration holding that "[f]ailure to allege that earnest of "members of the family", we find no reason to alter
efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for existing jurisprudence on the matter.
failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case." He warned that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts
case would be dismissed. On 29 January 1993, the 5-day towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
period having expired without Guerrero amending his
complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case.

5. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR, VS COMELEC

STAT CON ISSUE: G.R. Nos. 179431-32; June 22, 2010
FACTS: Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one additional seat each.
of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list
system of representation that manifested their intent to With the formal declaration that CIBAC was
participate in the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. entitled to an additional seat, the secretary general of
Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General
CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of
submitted a list of five nominees: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be
Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) formally sworn in to enable him to assume office. Nazareno
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could yet
Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance not be granted. The COMELEC en banc approved the
were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two as nominees and the substitution thereby with Cruz-
newspapers of general circulation. Gonzales and Borje as nominees for the party list CIBAC.
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC were
through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such.
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees,
whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed
Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office.
included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
Following the close of the polls, or on June 20,
2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson STAT CON ISSUE:
Benjamin Abalos, transmitting the signed petitions of more 1. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is a mandatory
than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the law.
withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang 2. Whether the COMELEC can issue implementing
and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground
members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not for the substitution of a party-list nominee not
among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC written in R.A. No. 7941, otherwise known as the
in its proclamation rally. Party-List System Act.
3. Whether the exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. No.
CIBAC filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting 7941 are exclusive.
as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the
proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The right of
CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be
thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List HELD:
Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have 1. YES.
garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names
formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same
entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation. shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes
whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be
validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, placed last in the list" – renders Section 8 a negative law, and
Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute
disposition and hearing. mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever,
be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain from
as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National Board doing the forbidden act, subject to certain exceptions stated
of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 to partially in the law itself, like in this case.
proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the Party-List System as having won in 2. NO.
the May 14, 2007 elections. The COMELEC en banc issued As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender
another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 proclaiming or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be
Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats unconstitutional. Under certain circumstances, the
and Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Legislature can delegate to executive officers and
administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate
IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the
must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of
that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set the three exceptions.
a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to
execute the law. When the statute itself enumerates the
exceptions to the application of the general rule, the
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The
an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly
enforcement of a law is administrative in nature. The warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none
of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even
to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a
to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the rule that an express exception excludes all others, although
law and amend a legislative enactment. it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule
to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs reason and justice.
must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states: “Section
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be
Legislature; substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is
2. It must be within the scope of the authority withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to
given by the Legislature; continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the nomination. x x x”
prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable. The COMELEC has neither the authority nor the
license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks
The provision of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues
clear. Legislature thereby deprived the party-list for that purpose should always accord with the law to
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or
the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain
COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Indeed,
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the administrative IRRs adopted by a particular
nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be department of the Government under legislative
read literally because its language is plain and free from authority must be in harmony with the provisions of
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the
meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency
When the law speaks in clear and categorical cannot amend an act of Congress.
language, there is no reason for interpretation or The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of
construction, but only for application. Accordingly, an Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A.
administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not No. 7941, because it has merely reworded and rephrased the
construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions statutory provision’s phraseology. The explanation does not
are clear and unambiguous. persuade. To reword means to alter the wording of or to
The legislative intent to deprive the party-list restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in
organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter a new form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the
the order of the nominees was also expressed during the original word or phrase is not altered. However, the
deliberations of the Congress. COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text
of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it established an
3. Yes entirely new ground not found in the text of the
provision. The new ground granted to the party-list
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination
instances in which the party-list organization can substitute already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of
another person in place of the nominee whose name has R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done.
been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the
nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing
his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated.
 days should only be granted for the most compelling reason
6. BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. VS which is not obtaining in the present case.
ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. 181182; April 10, 2013 Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, invoking a
FACTS: liberal construction of the Rules in its favor. The CA denied
Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) the Motion for Reconsideration and its supplement.
is a duly organized and existing domestic corporation
engaged in the selling of ready-to- wear (RTW)
STAT CON ISSUE:
merchandise. Respondent Elvira A. Villareal (Villareal), on
Whether petitioner is entitled to a liberal construction of
the other hand, is one of Boardwalk’s distributors of RTW
ruled in its favor.
merchandise.
Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint with the HELD:
MeTC for replevin against Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota No.
Tamaraw FX, for the latter’s alleged failure to pay a car loan “The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
obtained from the former. is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
The MeTC rendered its Decision favoring privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and
Boardwalk, adjudging that it has the right to the possession in accordance with the provisions of law.” This being so,
of the subject motor vehicle and for the latter to pay the “x x x an appealing party must strictly comply with the
costs of the suit. requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from
Respondent appealed to the Manila RTC, which the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict
reversed the MeTC Decision. Boardwalk filed a Motion for attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are
Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in a designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of
December 14, 2006 Order, which Boardwalk received on appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by
January 19, 2007. clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by
appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be
On February 5, 2007, Boardwalk through counsel left to the whims and caprices of appellants. x x x”
filed with the Manila RTC a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review, praying that it be granted 30 In this case, petitioner must comply with the
days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition for Review. following requirements laid down in Rule 42 of the Rules of
It paid the docket and other legal fees therefor at the Office Court:
of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC. On even date, The Petition must be accompanied by a
Boardwalk also filed a Notice of Appeal20 with the RTC Verification and Certification against forum shopping.
which the said court denied for being a wrong mode of Copies of the relevant pleadings and other material portions
appeal. of the record must likewise be attached to the Petition.
On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk filed through mail its The Rules require that the Petition must be
Petition for Review with the CA. The CA dismissed the accompanied by a Verification and Certification against
petition. It held that Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for forum shopping. If the petitioner is a juridical entity, as in
Extension and paying the docket fees therefor with the this case, it must be shown that the person signing in behalf
RTC. It should have done so with the CA as required by of the corporation is duly authorized to represent said
Section 125 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA held corporation. In this case, no special power of attorney or
that as a result of Boardwalk’s erroneous filing and payment board resolution was attached to the Petition showing that
of docket fees, it was as if no Motion for Extension was Lo was authorized to sign the Petition or represent
filed, and the subsequent March 7, 2007 filing of its Petition Boardwalk in the proceedings. In addition, petitioner failed
with the appellate court was thus late and beyond the to attach to the Petition copies of the relevant pleadings and
reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42. other material portions of the record.
The CA added that Boardwalk’s prayer for a 30-day This Court in several cases exercised leniency and
extension in its Motion for Extension was irregular, because relaxed the Rules. However, in this case, petitioner
the maximum period that may be granted is only 15 days committed multiple violations of the Rules which
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. A further extension of 15 should sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency.
Petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the
Petition within the reglementary period and paying the resident of 1906 Don Celso Tuazon, Valley Golf Brgy. De
docket and other lawful fees before the proper court. These la Paz, Antipolo City for four years and six months before
requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional. May 14, 2007 constitutes a material misrepresentation since
he was in fact a resident of Quezon City.
The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only.
The grant of another 15-days extension, or a total of 30-days Quizon filed a Supplement to the petition claiming
extension is allowed only for the most compelling reason. that Puno cannot validly be a candidate for a congressional
seat in the First District of Antipolo City since he indicated
More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides in his COC that he was running in the First District of the
that the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner Province of Rizal which is a different legislative district.
"upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the On June 5, 2007, Quizon filed this Petition for
payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful Mandamus alleging that the COMELEC had not rendered
fees." Undisputably, petitioner’s appeal was not perfected a judgment on the above-mentioned petitions and that the
because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay unreasonable delay in rendering judgment deprived him of
the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court his right to be declared as the winner and assume the
which is the CA. Consequently, the CA properly dismissed position of member of the House of Representatives.
outright the Petition because it never acquired jurisdiction
Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division
over the same. As a result, the RTC’s Decision had long
promulgated its Resolution, dismissing the Petition for
become final and executory. Disqualification and Cancellation of the Certificate of
To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one Candidacy of respondent Puno. Respondent is a resident of
the 1st District of Antipolo City, and is thus qualified to run
who seeks to avail of it must comply with the statute or
as a Member of the House of Representatives of the same
rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within
district.
the reglementary period specified in the law must be
strictly followed as they are considered indispensable Quizon filed a motion for reconsideration with the
interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the COMELEC En Banc which remains unresolved up to this
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period date.
set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, Petitioner asserts that the unreasonable delay in
hence failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final resolving the petition deprived him of his right to be
and executory. And, just as a losing party has the privilege proclaimed as the winning candidate since all votes cast in
to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also does favor of respondent are stray due to his invalid candidacy.
the prevailing party have the correlative right to enjoy the Accordingly, COMELEC must consider that only he and
finality of a decision in his favor. Amarante Velasco were the candidates in the said election
and since he received a higher number of votes than
True it is that in a number of instances, the Court Velasco, petitioner argues that he should be proclaimed the
has relaxed the governing periods of appeal in order to serve winning candidate.
substantial justice. But this we have done only in exceptional
cases. Sadly, the instant case is definitely not one of them.
STAT CON ISSUE:
Whether the 15-day period in Sec. 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code is mandatory

HELD:
7. FLORANTE S. QUIZON VS COMELEC No.
G.R. No. 177927; February 15, 2008
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
FACTS: that petitions to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
Petitioner Florante Quizon and private respondent Roberto candidacy should be resolved, after due notice and hearing,
Puno were congressional candidates during the May 14, not later than fifteen days before the election. In construing
2007 national and local elections. this provision together with Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 or
The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, this Court declared in
Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Salcedo II v. COMELEC that the fifteen-day period in
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against Puno. Section 78 is merely directory. Thus:
Quizon alleged that Puno is not qualified to run as candidate
in Antipolo City for failure to meet the residency If the petition is filed within the statutory
requirement prior to the day of election; and that Puno’s period and the candidate is subsequently declared
claim in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he is a by final judgment to be disqualified before the
election, he shall not be voted for, and the votes
 cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or the Comelec shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. The fifteen-day period in section 78 for
deciding the petition is merely directory.
(Emphasis supplied)
It has long been settled in Codilla Sr. v. De Venecia
that pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, a final
judgment before the election is required for the votes of a
disqualified candidate to be considered "stray."
In the absence of any final judgment of
disqualification against Puno, the votes cast in his favor
cannot be considered stray. As to the alleged irregularity in
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, it is important to
note that this Court has repeatedly held that provisions of
the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as
signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information
required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory
prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as
merely directory to give effect to the will of the people. In
the instant case, Puno won by an overwhelming number of
votes. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the
intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is
discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this case.
Petitioner has other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. After a resolution on
the petition for disqualification, a motion for
reconsideration may be filed before the COMELEC En
Banc as what was done by petitioner. Only then can
petitioner come before this Court via a petition for
certiorari. These rules of procedure are not without reason.
They are meant to facilitate the orderly administration of
justice and petitioner cannot take a judicial shortcut without
violating the rule on hierarchy of courts.