Puertas, Ailen Rose L.

1081-19
Section 2C

Case 1. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR 139465 (Jan. 18, 2000)

FACTS: This case involves the Extradition case of Mike Jimenez to the United States.
Sometime on June 18, 1999, Department of Justice (DOJ) received a request from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to Commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax,
Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of
Another. Jimenez requested the Secretary of Justice to furnish him copies of the extradition
request from the U.S. government, praying that he be given ample time to comment
regarding the extradition request against him after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the meantime. However, the Secretary
of Justice denied the Jimenez’s request on account that it is premature to furnish him of the
copies since the same is still pending for evaluation of the Department. Jimenez filed a case
of mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition against the Secretary of Justice before the with
the RTC presided by Hon. Ralph Lantion a to enjoin the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary
of DFA, and NBI from performing any acts directed to his extradition, for it will be a
deprivation of his rights to due process. RTC ruled in favour of Jimenez.

ISSUE: Is the right to due process of an individual in case of Extradition proceeding be

upheld in lieu of the RP-Extradition Treaty between US and PH?

RULING: Yes.

The constitutional right to due process secures to everyone an opportunity to be

heard, presupposing foreknowledge of what he may be up against, and to submit any
evidence that he may wish to proffer in an effort to clear himself. Where the liberty of a
person is at risk, and extradition strikes at the very core of liberty, invocation of due process
rights can never be too early. The constitutionally mandated duties of our government to
the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations
to the government of another state.

In this case, Jimenez does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. Thus, Jimenez must be afforded of his right to due process.
Puertas, Ailen Rose L.
1081-19
Section 2C

Case 2. Vinuya v. Romulo (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)

Facts: Petitioners are members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock and non-profit
organization, established for providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces
in the Philippines during WWII. According to the petitioners, during WWII, the Japanese
army attacked villages and systematically raped women as part of the destruction of the
village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were
publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women
and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by
Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners
have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and
mental and emotional suffering. Petitioners claimed that since 1998, they have requested
the assistance of the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG in filing a claim
against Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the
“comfort women” stations in the country. However, officials from the Executive
Department declined, and took position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
the compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace
treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Issue: Did the respondents commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the
petitioner’s claim for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

Ruling: No.

According to the Constitution, the executive department has the exclusive

prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioner’s claims against Japan. The question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its national against a foreign
government is a foreign relation matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed
by our Constitution not to the courts but to political branches.

In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the
Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department
via the instant petition for certiorari.
Puertas, Ailen Rose L.
1081-19
Section 2C

Case 3. Vinuya Vs. Romulo, August 13, 2014

FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration case seeking to reverse the decision of Court
dated April 28, 2010 which ruled in favour of the Executive Officials. The petitioners argued
that our constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the
foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by
international human rights and international conventions of which the Philippines is a party;
that the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring
petitioners’ claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy powers of the Office of the
President in isolation from the rest of the constitutional protections that expressly textualize
international human rights; that the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to
promote international humanitarian law as incorporated into the laws of the land through
the Incorporation Clause.

ISSUE: Was the court erred in their previous decision of not granting the claims of the
petitioner?

RULING: No.

The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the
Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive
Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of
foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, the Court cannot direct the
Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign
relations with Japan in a certain manner.
Puertas, Ailen Rose L.
1081-19
Section 2C

CASE 4. Province of North Cotabato vs GRP, GR No. 183591, 14 Oct 2008

FACTS: At the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities
in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte. In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an
"all-out-war" against the MILF. On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.

ISSUE: Does the signing of the MOA would bind the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law.

RULING: No, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines cannot do so.

In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually been used
as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws
as having an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.

That the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and
international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it
a binding character under international law.
Puertas, Ailen Rose L.
1081-19
Section 2C

CASE 5. LIBAN vs. GORDON, GR No. 175352, January 18, 2011

Facts: Here the petitioners Dante V. Liban, et al., are officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed a petition to declare Respondent Richard J. Gordon
as having forfeited his seat in the Senate who is then the Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. The trial Court held that respondent did not
forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, as "the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." However, the said decision was declared void since the
PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation" and consequently
ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation."

The respondent filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration. He raises the
following grounds as the basis for his motion: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding
such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not have standing to file the
instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be
considered obiter. Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue;
therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question.

In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court sustain the
constitutionality of its Charter contending that it was never a party to the instant
controversy, RA No. 95, as amended was never an issue in this case and that PNRC’s
structure is sui generis; it is a class of its own. While it is performing humanitarian functions
as an auxiliary to government, it is a neutral entity separate and independent of government
control, yet it does not qualify as strictly private in character.

ISSUE: Can the Court rule on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute which is under
international law?

RULING: No. the Court cannot rule on the matters of constitutionality of PNRC statute.

Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be
reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using
the latter to negate the former. The Court must recognize the country’s adherence to the
Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty
obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law.

It must be emphasized that the PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian

law, as opposed to local law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was
improper for the Court to have declared certain portions of the PNRC statute as
unconstitutional. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian
organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian
assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion,
Puertas, Ailen Rose L.
1081-19
Section 2C
gender, social status, or political affiliation. They enjoy a special status as an important ally
and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its
commitments under international law. The Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize
its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was
never raised by the parties.

CASE 6. Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia,

G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

FACTS: On 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." On July
1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)
counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a)
of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7)
counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong.
Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ
then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.

The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent.
That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Private respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of
the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest
void.The DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari praying that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. The Supreme Court rendered a Decision
granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against
private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
respondent presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in
the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail which was granted. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it
was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail.

Puertas, Ailen Rose L.
1081-19
Section 2C
RULING: Yes. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. The significant events show
that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.

On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental
rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to
a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that
Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to
life, liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must
be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect
for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies
in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to
due process under the Constitution.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that
in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only
by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a
party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided
that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
Puertas, Ailen Rose L.
1081-19
Section 2C

CASE 7. JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 123755.

June 28, 1996

Facts: Private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo ran for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the
1995 elections with Petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, contesting his candidacy on
the ground of disqualification for not yet being a Philippine citizen. Comelec granted Lee’s
petition and cancelled Frivaldo’s certificate of candidacy. The Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until the elections. So, his candidacy continued and
subsequently got the highest number of votes, with Lee being second. The above-decision,
however, was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc which led to the proclamation of Raul Lee
as the elected Governor of Sorsogon that took place on 8:30PM of June 30,1995.

On July 6, Frivaldo petitioned for the annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for
his own proclamation alleging that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D.
725 was granted; thus, on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more
legal impediment to his proclamation as governor. December 19, the Comelec nullified Lee’s
proclamation. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec En
Banc. Hence this present petition.

Issue: Is Juan G. Frivaldo still disqualified to hold a public office?

Ruling: No, he was not anymore disqualified in this case.

Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by

naturalization or by repatriation. In this case, Frivaldo made use of PD NO. 725 or the
Repatriation Law to re-assume his citizenship, wherein at the very day the term of office of
governor began on June 30, 1995 , he was declared as a Filipino Citizen hence qualified to
be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. Moreover, under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, one of the
requirements of an elective local official, not of a candidate, must be that he is a citizen of
the Philippines, with no specification as to any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship.
In sum, Juan Frivaldo was therefore already qualified to govern Sorsogon.