RULE 110

ZALDIVIA VS REYES
● The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11,
1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was
not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime
had already prescribed.

● The mere filing of complaint to the fiscal’s office does not interrupt the running of prescription on offenses punishable
by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that
the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.

**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription
is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

PANAGUITON VS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

● It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

● Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time
petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ
issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond
petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995,
only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.

● Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

● The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before
the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been
charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

CRESPO VS MOGUL
● It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case
that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has
authority to do so and Courts that grant the same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and
subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that
his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. However, such authority is not without any limitation.
The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary
of Justice. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

● The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by
the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused
is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. In order to avoid such a
situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded
by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review
from the action of the fiscal, when the information has already been filed in Court.

● The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
 it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter
if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

● In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action
of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

RULE 112
QUISAY VS PEOPLE
MAXIMO VS VILLAPANDO

RULE 113
LIM VS FELIX
● If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation
are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.

● The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the
existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not
possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent
Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of
arrest.

● We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence.
However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these
should be before the Judge.

● The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of
each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The
Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge
must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the
complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case
so require.

● We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the
evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each
case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no
evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.

● Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification
and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause.

RULE 114
LAVIDES VS CA
● Where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from
filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need
for the arraignment of the accused. The trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under
Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear
before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence
of the accused at the arraignment is required.
 ● On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between:
(1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and

(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released
on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
● It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only
after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the
trial court's order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be
present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under
Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to
him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the
notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."

● Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on May 23, 1997 was also
invalid. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval
of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the arraignment of
petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his
arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.

LEVISTE VS CA
 Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.
o Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the
following rules:
 E) After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or
any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
 F) After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5);

 A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding
will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. However, judicial discretion has
been defined as “choice.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of
discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-
finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on
the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that
“upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”

 After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right
to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such
discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in
fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards
approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the
language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail
bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-
wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.

RUIZ VS PICHAY
● Section 17 (a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which governs
the approval of bail bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judge's territorial jurisdiction is instructive, to wit:
Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the
 accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also
be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

● The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is arrested in the same province, city or
municipality where his case is pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality other
than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending
or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province
or city. In the second situation, the accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where his case
is pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city or municipality where he was
arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

● However, in the instant case, the case where Judge Pichay approved Paran's bail bond and issued release order
was not pending before his sala. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, although accused Paran was detained at the
Station Detention Cell, Parañaque City Police Station, he was nevertheless arrested at his residence in Quezon
City. Considering that Paran was arrested in Quezon City, he could also file his bail application before any branch
at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and in the absence of any judge thereat, then before any branch of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Paran could have also filed his bail application before the MTCC, Trece
Martires City, where his case was pending.

PADUA VS PEOPLE
● The general rule, therefore, is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, from the moment an accused is placed under arrest, or
is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the
Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

● In the instant case, in four (4) Informations, petitioners were charged with estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315
of the RPC. For Criminal Case No. 7012, the alleged amount defrauded was One Hundred Thirty Thousand Euros
(€130,000.00) or equivalent to Eight Million Eight Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P8,840,000.00); for Criminal
Case No. 7013, the alleged amount defrauded was Six Million Six Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty-Three Pesos and Ninety Centavos (P6,648,253.90); for Criminal Case No. 7014, the alleged amount defrauded
was Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00); and for Criminal Case No. 7016, the alleged
amount defrauded was Six Million Six Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Three Pesos and Ninety
Centavos (P6,648,253.90).

● Before the passage of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10951,23 amending the penalty for estafa, Article 215 of the RPC
imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the
amount is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount swindled exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years.

● With the amendment of Article 315 of the RPC, in view of the recent enactment of R.A. 10951,24 the imposable
penalty now for estafa is as follows:

SEC. 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689,
and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
herein below shall be punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but does not exceed
Four million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000): but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
 "2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is
over One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred
thousand pesos (P2,400,000).
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if
such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred
thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
"4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed Forty thousand
pesos (P40.000) x x x." (Emphasis ours)

● Here, applying paragraph 2(a),25 Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 10951 - in Criminal Case No. 7014,
considering the amount allegedly defrauded by petitioners amounted to P2,600,000 which exceeded two million
four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but not more than P4,400,000.00, the imposable penalty will be prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. In Criminal Case Nos. 7012, 7013 and
7016, where the amounts allegedly defrauded all exceeded P4,400,000.00, the imposable penalty shall be in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00). However, the law also
provides that the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

● Clearly, in the instant case, petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right as they have not been charged with a
capital offense. Estafa, under Art. 315 of the RPC as amended by R.A. 10951, which petitioners have been charged
with, has an imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which is still bailable.

● Respondents, however, posit that the right to bail, whether as a matter of right or discretion, is subject to the
limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived
of his liberty. As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, they claimed that it cannot be posted
before custody over the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary
surrender. Considering that petitioners have neither been arrested, nor have they surrendered, as in fact they
remain to be at large, respondents claimed that they cannot be entitled to bail.

● In Miranda, et al. v. Tuliao, the Court pronounced that "custody of the law is required before the court can act upon
the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused."

● Indeed, a person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.
A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that
court. However, applying also the same pronouncement in Tuliao, the Court also held therein that, "in adjudication
of other reliefs sought by accused, it requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law
over the body of the person." Thus, except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.

● In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioners were at large when they filed, through counsel, their Omnibus
Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam wherein they asked the court to quash the warrant of arrest and fix the amount
of the bail bond for their provisional release pending trial. However, albeit, at large, it must be clarified that
petitioners' Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) is not an
application for bail. This is where the instant case begs to differ because what petitioners filed was an Omnibus
Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail). They were neither applying for
bail, nor were they posting bail.

● The subject Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) is distinct
and separate from an application for bail where custody of law is required. A motion to quash is a consequence of
the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that it is
the very issue. Its prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court which is also as an exception
to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.

● Thus, in filing the subject Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail),
petitioners are questioning the court's jurisdiction with precaution and praying that the court fix the amount of bail
because they believed that their right to bail is a matter of right, by operation of law. They are not applying for bail,
therefore, custody of the law, or personal appearance is not required. To emphasize, custody of the law is required
before the court can act upon the application for bail but it is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought
by the accused, as in the instant omnibus motion to quash warrant of arrest and to fix bail.
● Indeed, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court
by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. However, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody
of the law. Nevertheless, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
himself to the custody of the law.

● Furthermore, while we stand by the above pronouncements in Tuliao, there is a need to elucidate that insofar as
the requirement that accused must be in the custody of the law for purposes of entitlement to bail, We must also
distinguish, because bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.

● The constitutional mandate is that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.32 However, bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The
accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment" before conviction. However, if the accused is charged with an offense and the penalty of which is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — "regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution" — and when
evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.

● Clearly, bail is a constitutional demandable right which only ceases to be so recognized when the evidence of guilt
of the person charged with a crime that carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death is
found to be strong.34 Stated differently, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or death.

● When the grant of bail is discretionary, the grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. Judicial
discretion in granting bail may indeed be exercised only after the evidence of guilt is submitted to the court during
the bail hearing.36 It is precisely for this reason why an accused must be in the custody of the law during an
application for bail because where bail is a matter of discretion, judicial discretion may only be exercised during bail
hearing. However, where bail is not a matter of discretion, as in fact it is a matter of right, no exercise of discretion
is needed because the accused's right to bail is a matter of right, by operation of law. An accused must be granted
bail if it is a matter of right.

● Thus, an accused who is charged with an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as in
this case, they must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a matter of right. Here, considering that estafa
is a bailable offense, petitioners no longer need to apply for bail as they are entitled to bail, by operation of law.
Where bail is a matter of right, it is ministerial on the part of the trial judge to fix bail when no bail is recommended.
To do otherwise, if We deny bail albeit it is a matter of right, We will effectively render nugatory the provisions of the
law giving distinction where bail is a matter of right, or of discretion.

● It must be emphasized anew that bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal
prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed
innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion that bail
is required to punish a person accused of crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of
admission to bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give
them a trial. The spirit of the procedure is rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial, with all the safeguards,
has found and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted this conditional privilege, the individuals wrongly accused
could be punished by the period or imprisonment they undergo while awaiting trial, and even handicap them in
consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a defense. Hence, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in
assuring his presence at trial.

● Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is the reason precisely why the
probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor to be taken into consideration in granting or denying
bail, even in capital cases. However, where bail is a matter of right, prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted
from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of probability
that the accused will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an
amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be
subject, of course, to the constitutional provision that "excessive bail shall not be required." The recourse of the
judge is to fix a higher amount of bail and not to deny the fixing of bail.
 ● To recapitulate, in the instant case, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash
Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) wherein it is not required that petitioners be in the custody of the law, because the
same is not an application for bail where custody of the law is required. Moreover, to reiterate, when bail is a matter
of right, the fixing of bail is ministerial on the part of the trial judge even without the appearance of the accused.
They must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a matter of right. However, it must be further clarified that
after the amount of bail has been fixed, petitioners, when posting the required bail, must be in the custody of the
law. They must make their personal appearance in the posting of bail. It must be emphasized that bail, whether a
matter of right or of discretion, cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender, or personal appearance. This is so because if We allow the
granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail
will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven
guilty. Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him since flight is indicative of guilt.

PEOPLE VS ESCOBAR
● Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained but "whose
guilt has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental
right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:
The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded
to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she]
enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before
any court, as required under specified conditions.93 (Citations omitted)

● Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is "not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional Trial Court.
However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment—"regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution"—and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong,
then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.

● In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced to reclusion perpetua. Escobar's
bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.

● Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
- No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.

● The Regional Trial Court denied Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals
overturned this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata.

● In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged." This doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same claim
between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment. It likewise bars the re-litigation of
the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness
of judgement. It "exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public
tranquillity."

● Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

● Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.

● But even if petitioner's arguments] were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or the criminal
law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman.
● An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not give rise to res
judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to contemplate "res
judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will still not apply. Double jeopardy requires that the accused
has been convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his
express consent. Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been
convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.

● Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's Second Bail Petition cannot
be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.

● Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements:

○ The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
○ The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
○ The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
○ There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.

● In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an interlocutory order. A final judgment
"leaves nothing else to be done" because the period to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has already ruled
on the case. In contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a
case, the court decides on a point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy.

● An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action"; in other
words, something else still needs to be done in the primary case—the rendition of the final judgment. Res judicata
applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order
even if this order is not appealed.

● A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter—whether accused is entitled to provisional
liberty—and is not a final judgment on accused's guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is
summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s] unnecessary thoroughness" and does not try the merits of the case.
Thus:

Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
the evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable
minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
hearing. (Emphasis in the original)

● Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying bail is an interlocutory order." The merits
of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.

● Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying Escobar's First Bail Petition did
not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not attained finality. Since res judicata has not
attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision, the Regional Trial Court should have taken cognizance
of Escobar's Second Bail Petition and weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt against him.