THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143976. April 3, 2003.]

Spouses OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, petitioners, vs. Hon.

ARTURO G. TAYAG as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 79, Malolos, Bulacan; and the NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

[G.R. No. 145846. April 3, 2003.]

Spouses OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, petitioners, vs. Hon.

BASILIO A. GABO JR. as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan; and the NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

Walter T. Young for petitioners.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners sought to set aside the two rulings of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan. The first one was issued by Branch 79 in Civil Case No. P-
410-M-2000, which annulled the writ of execution issued by the Municipal Trial
Court of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, ruling that the respondent National
Housing Authority (NHA) was able to perfect its appeal on time despite the non-
payment of appellate docket fees; that respondent NHA as government-owned
corporation is exempt from filing a supersedeas bond to stay the execution;
that with the perfection of the appeal, the MTC lost jurisdiction to issue and
enforce the writ of execution. The second ruling being contested was rendered
by Branch 11 in Civil Case No. 512-M-2000, which partly affirmed the Decision
of the MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, holding that petitioners were
entitled to the right of possession of the disputed property and to the award of
damages, but that the grant of rental was baseless.

The Supreme Court found the petitions unmeritorious. It held that the
National Housing Authority, a government-owned and controlled corporation, is
exempt from paying appellate docket fees when it sues or is sued in relation to
the governmental function of providing mass housing. In this case, it was in its
performance of this governmental function to provide mass housing that the
NHA was sued by petitioners. The Court further ruled that the MTC acted
without jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the writ of execution. According to
the Court, the Rule does not mandate the dismissal of the appeal as a
consequence of the nonpayment of the required fee. Under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, parties perfect an appeal from the judgment of the MTC to the
RTC by filing a notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Here,
when the NHA filed a Notice of Appeal two days before the appeal period
lapsed, it perfected its appeal and the MTC thereby lost its jurisdiction. Anent
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 the filing of the supersedeas bond, the Court held that it would be unnecessary
to ask NHA to file a bond because to do so would be to indirectly require the
government to submit the bond. When the State litigates, it is not required to
put up a bond for damages or even an appeal bond because it is presumed to
be always solvent. As to the award of rent, the Court found no cogent reason to
disturb the RTC's pronouncement that there was no evidence on record to
support the said award.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; DOCKET FEES; NATIONAL HOUSING

AUTHORITY IS REQUIRED TO PAY LEGAL FEES EXCEPT WHEN IT SUES OR IS
SUED IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION OF PROVIDING MASS
HOUSING; CASE AT BAR. — Created by virtue of PD No. 757, the NHA is a
government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. As a
general rule, however, such corporations — with or without independent
charters — are required to pay legal fees under Section 21 of Rule 141 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the other hand,. the NHA contends that it is
exempt from paying all kinds of fees and charges, because it performs
governmental functions. It cites Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico , which holds
that the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned and controlled
corporation, is exempt from paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in
relation to its governmental functions. We agree. People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations declares that the provision
of mass housing is a governmental function. While it has not always been easy
to distinguish governmental from proprietary functions, the Court's declaration
in the Decision quoted above is not without basis. Indeed, the characterization
of governmental functions has veered away from the traditional constituent-
ministrant classification that has become unrealistic, if not obsolete. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz avers: "[I]t is now obligatory upon the State itself to promote
social justice, to provide adequate social services, to promote a rising standard
of living, to afford protection to labor, to formulate and implement urban and
agrarian reform programs, and to adopt other measures intended to ensure the
dignity, welfare and security of its citizens. These functions, while traditionally
regarded as merely ministrant and optional, have been made compulsory by
the Constitution." In addition, the NHA is mandated by PD No. 757 to develop
and implement a comprehensive, integrated housing program for the greatest
number of people. Thus, to be able to perform its governmental functions, the
housing agency is vested with sovereign powers. Such powers include, among
others, the exercise of the right of eminent domain or the right to acquire by
purchase privately owned lands for purposes of housing development,
resettlement, and related services and facilities. Furthermore, under the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992, the NHA, in cooperation with other
government units and agencies, is mandated to identify and acquire lands for
socialized housing for the underprivileged and the homeless. Notably, it was in
its performance of this governmental function to provide mass housing that the
NHA was sued by petitioners. TDCAHE

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 2. ID.; ID.; APPEALS FROM MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT TO THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT; NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL. — We agree with the RTC that,
insofar as appeals from the MTC to the RTC are concerned, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure do not mandate the dismissal of an appeal as a consequence of
the nonpayment of the required fee. Martinez v. Court of Appeals holds that in
such appeals, "the failure to pay the appellate docket fees does not
automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal being
discretionary on the part of the appellate court." While that case was governed
by Sections 20 and 23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court
on January 11, 1983 to implement the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (BP
Blg. 129), the present Rules lead to a similar conclusion.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPELLATE COURT HAS A DIRECTORY, NOT A
MANDATORY, POWER TO DISMISS AN APPEAL FOR NON-PAYMENT OF
APPELLATE DOCKET FEE. — Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, parties
perfect an appeal from the judgment of the MTC to the RTC by filing a notice of
appeal within the fifteen day reglementary period, as provided under Section 4
of Rule 40 and Section 9 of Rule 41. Fontanar v. Bonsubre is a case in point. It
holds that in appeals from the MTC to the RTC, failure to pay the appellate
docket fee within the fifteen-day reglementary period bestows on the appellate
court a directory, not a mandatory, power to dismiss an appeal. The Court
ratiocinated as follows: ". . . [T]his Court restated the importance and real
purpose of the remedy of appeal as an essential part of our judicial system and
advised the courts to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of a
right to appeal with the instruction that every party-litigant should be afforded
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed
from the constraints of technicalities. Rightly so, for the payment of the
appellate docket fee is not a requirement for the protection of the prevailing
party, and non-compliance therewith within the time prescribed causes no
substantial prejudice to anyone."
4. ID.; ID.; APPEALS FROM REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND FROM COURT OF APPEALS TO SUPREME COURT; PAYMENT OF
APPELLATE FEES IS MANDATORY. — On the other hand, the cases cited by
petitioners involve appeals — not from the MTC to the RTC — but from the RTC
to the CA and from the CA to the SC, for which the payment of appellate fees is
indeed mandatory according to the Rules. We quote Manalili v. Arsenio and De
Leon: "Appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. Corollary to this
principle is that the appeal must be exercised strictly in accordance with
provisions set by law. ". . . [T]he payment of the appellate docket fee is not a
mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without
which the decision or final order appealed from would become final and
executory as if no appeal was filed at all."
5. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; STAY
OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; POSTING OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS NOT
NECESSARY WHERE THE STATE IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. — There is a
rationale for requiring a losing party to file a supersedeas bond in order to stay
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 the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case. Such bond is
required to assure the payment of damages to the winning party in case the
appeal is found frivolous. In the present cases, the posting of a supersedeas
bond is not necessary to stay the execution of the MTC Order. When a case
involves provable rents or damages incurred by a government-owned or
controlled corporation, the real party in interest is the Republic of the
Philippines. When the State litigates, it is not required to put up a bond for
damages or even an appeal bond — either directly or indirectly through its
authorized officers — because it is presumed to be always solvent. Thus, it
would be unnecessary to ask the NHA to file a bond because to do so would be
to indirectly require the government to submit the bond. And the State is not
required to file a bond for the obvious reason that it is capable of paying its
obligation. In any event, the NHA has already paid the appellate docket fees
and filed the supersedeas bond as ordered by the RTC, albeit late.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONABLE AMOUNT OF RENT CAN BE DETERMINED

NOT BY MERE JUDICIAL NOTICE BUT BY SUPPORTING EVIDENCE. — Indeed,
courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a
disputed property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts,
in determining the amount of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation
of land values without considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a
court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its action on
the evidence adduced by the parties. In Herrera v. Bollos, the trial court
awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC, this
Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by
mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence: ". . . . A court cannot take
judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial
notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must 'allow the parties to
be heard thereon.' Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of
the premises in question without supporting evidence." In the instant cases, the
RTC has already declared that there is no evidence on record to support the
MTC's award of rent. We find no cogent reason to disturb this pronouncement.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J : p

The National Housing Authority (NHA), a government-owned and

controlled corporation, is exempt from paying appellate docket fees when it
sues or is sued in relation to its governmental function of providing mass
housing. It is likewise exempt from filing a supersedeas bond that will stay the
execution of a forcible entry case. In order to have some bases for fixing the
reasonable amount of rent in a forcible entry case, courts must rely on the
evidence presented by the parties.
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 The Case
Before us are two (2) consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside two rulings of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The first one is the July 19, 2000 Order 1 issued by
Branch 79 in Case No. P-410-M-2000, annulling both the May 23, 2000 Order 2
and the May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution 3 issued by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The dispositive portion of this assailed
RTC Order reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the [O]rder of the [t]rial [c]ourt dated May 23,
2000 is hereby annulled.
"The [W]rit of [E]xecution issued by the clerk of court of the
Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte Bulacan is also annulled.
"Prohibiting the [t]rial [c]ourt from enforcing the [W]rit; and
commanding the Municipal Trial Court to transmit the records of the
case to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan together with the Money
Order of [t]wo hundred [p]esos Annex 'I' and 'I-2' as appellate docket
fee and the alleged Supersedeas Bond per [Annex] 'A', 'A-1', 'A-2' to 'A-
3' of the OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CLARIFY (with manifestation) filed
by Petitioner NHA received by this [C]ourt on July 17, 2000 although
dated July 14, 2000." 4

The second ruling being contested is the October 23, 2000 Decision 5 of
Branch 11 in Civil Case No. 512-M-2000, which modified the February 1, 2000
Decision 6 of the MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The challenged RTC
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as defendants are ordered to vacate plaintiffs' property and return the
possession thereof to the latter and to pay plaintiffs, jointly and
severally P20,000.00 for attorney's fees and P20,000.00 for litigation
expenses and to pay the costs are concerned." 7

Since the parties were the same and the issues related, the two Petitions
were consolidated by this Court in its Resolution of October 17, 2001. 8
The Facts
Petitioners are plaintiffs in a forcible entry/ejectment case docketed as
Civil Case No. 263-94 in the MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, entitled
"Spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo v. Triad Construction and Development
Corporation and National Housing Authority." In its February 1, 2000 Decision, 9
the MTC ordered the NHA to vacate the disputed land; to return possession
thereof to petitioners; to pay rental for its use and occupation at the rate of P10
per square meter per month; and to shoulder the attorney's fees, the litigation
expenses and the costs of suit. cCaEDA

The disputed parcel of land was part of the Bagong Silang Resettlement
Project (BSRP) of the NHA. The NHA contended that the property was part of
the Tala Estate and was among the 598 hectares reserved by the government
for its housing resettlement site, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843
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 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.

In June 1994, the NHA offered for bidding the development of certain
portions of the BSRP. It eventually contracted with the Triad Construction and
Development Corporation ("Triad") for the development of parts of the site.
These were then developed and subdivided into smaller lots that were
allocated, awarded and distributed by the NHA to qualified beneficiaries.

On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they were the owners and
exclusive possessors of a portion of the land that had been awarded by the
NHA to Triad. They argued that the NHA intruded on, occupied and developed
their property despite their protests.
Upon receipt of the February 1, 2000 Decision of the MTC, the NHA filed a
Notice of Appeal 10 with the same court on February 24, 2000. The NHA,
however, did not pay the appellate docket fees within the reglementary period.
Consequently, petitioners filed with that court a Motion for the immediate
issuance of a writ of execution and demolition. 11 They contended that because
of the NHA's failure to pay the appellate docket fees within the prescribed
period, the MTC Decision became final.
After a hearing on the Motion, the MTC promulgated an Order on May 23,
2000, authorizing the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of petitioners:
"For failure of the National Housing Authority to comply with the
requirements laid down under Section 5 of Rule 40 as regards the
payment of docket fee and for its failure to comply with Section 19 of
Rule 70 in regard to the payment of the supersedeas bond, the
execution of the judgment rendered in this case has become a
ministerial duty of the court in view of the mandatory nature of said
requirements.
"Let therefore, a writ of execution be issued immediately against
the defendants." 12

Thereafter, the Writ of Execution 13 was actually issued by the MTC on

May 30, 2000. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff 14 served a Notice of Garnishment
of NHA's funds in the Landbank of the Philippines. The bank, however, refused
to release the garnished amount.
On June 9, 2000, the NHA filed a Motion to set aside the Writ of Execution
and the Notice of Garnishment. 15 The Motion was, however, denied by the MTC
in its June 23, 2000 Order. 16
The NHA paid the appellate dockets fees only on June 29, 2000 — four
months late. It simultaneously filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus and Injunction 17 before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, assailing the
MTC's May 23, 2000 Order and May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution.
Acting on the NHA Petition, RTC Executive Judge Danilo A. Manalastas
issued a 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order. 18 Thereafter, the case was
assigned to RTC Branch 79, which issued the first assailed July 19, 2000 Order
annulling the Writ. After declaring that the NHA had been able to perfect its
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 appeal on time, the RTC ordered the MTC to transmit the records of the case for
appropriate appellate proceedings.
Upon transmittal of the records from the MTC, the case was raffled to RTC
Branch 11, which issued the second assailed October 23, 2000 Decision. This
Decision was appealed by the NHA to the Court of Appeals (CA). The appeal,
docketed as CA-GR No. 61981, is still pending resolution.
Rulings of the RTC
The NHA was able to perfect its appeal on time despite its nonpayment of
appellate docket fees, according to the ruling of RTC Branch 79. The NHA as a
government-owned corporation was presumed to be always solvent and thus
exempt from filing a supersedeas bond, which would stay the immediate
execution of a forcible entry case. With the perfection of the appeal, the MTC
lost jurisdiction to issue and enforce the Writ of Execution.

Partly affirming the MTC, RTC Branch 11 held that petitioners were
entitled to the right of possession of the property and to the award of damages,
but that the grant of rental was baseless.

Hence, this recourse. 19

Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
I

"Whether or not the Order of Respondent Judge Gabo deleting

the payment of rentals for the use and occupation of the lot in question
is in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence on the matter" 20
II

"Whether or not NHA perfected its appeal to the RTC Bulacan

despite failure to pay the docket/appeal fee within the 15 day period
provided for in Section 5, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
III
"Whether or not the NHA being a government corporation is
exempt from the posting of the supersedeas bond to stay execution as
provided for in Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
IV
"Whether or not RTC Bulacan was correct in annulling the Order
dated May 23, 2000; the Writ of Execution and the Notice of
Garnishment issued by MTC, Bulacan" 21

These issues can be more clearly restated thus:

(1) Is the failure of the NHA to pay the appellate docket fee within the
fifteen-day reglementary period a ground to dismiss its appeal?
(2) Is the NHA exempt from filing the supersedeas bond in order to
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 stay the execution of the MTC judgment?

(3) Was it proper for RTC Branch 11 to delete the rentals awarded by
the MTC?
Ruling of the Court
The Petitions are unmeritorious.
First Issue:
Payment of Appellate Docket Fees
Created by virtue of PD No. 757, 22 the NHA is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter. As a general rule, however, such
corporations — with or without independent charters — are required to pay
legal fees under Section 21 of Rule 141 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
"SEC. 21. Government Exempt. — The Republic of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities, are exempt from paying
the legal fees provided in this rule. Local governments and
government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees." 23

On the other hand, the NHA contends that it is exempt from paying all
kinds of fees and charges, because it performs governmental functions. It cites
Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico , 24 which holds that the Public Estates
Authority (PEA), a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt
from paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its governmental
functions.
We agree. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Court of
Industrial Relations 25 declares that the provision of mass housing is a
governmental function:
"Coming now to the case at bar, We note that since 1941 when
the National Housing Commission (predecessor of PHHC, which is now
known as the National Housing Authority [NHA] was created, the
Philippine government has pursued a mass housing and resettlement
program to meet the needs of Filipinos for decent housing. The agency
tasked with implementing such governmental program was the PHHC.
These can be gleaned from the provisions of Commonwealth Act 648,
the charter of said agency.
"We rule that the PHHC is a governmental institution performing
governmental functions.
"This is not the first time We are ruling on the proper
characterization of housing as an activity of the government. In the
1985 case of National Housing Corporation v. Juco and the NLRC (No. L-
64313, January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172), We ruled that housing is a
governmental function."

While it has not always been easy to distinguish governmental from

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 proprietary functions, the Court's declaration in the Decision quoted above is
not without basis. Indeed, the characterization of governmental functions has
veered away from the traditional constituent-ministrant classification that has
become unrealistic, if not obsolete. 26 Justice Isagani A. Cruz avers: "[I]t is now
obligatory upon the State itself to promote social justice, 27 to provide adequate
social services to promote a rising standard of living, 28 to afford protection to
labor to formulate and implement urban and agrarian reform programs, and to
adopt other measures intended to ensure the dignity, welfare and security of its
citizens. . . . . These functions, while traditionally regarded as merely ministrant
and optional, have been made compulsory by the Constitution." 29
In addition, the NHA is mandated by PD No. 757 to develop and
implement a comprehensive, integrated housing program 30 for the greatest
number of people. 31 Thus, to be able to perform its governmental functions,
the housing agency is vested with sovereign powers. Such powers include,
among others, the exercise of the right of eminent domain or the right to
acquire by purchase privately owned lands for purposes of housing
development, resettlement, and related services and facilities. 32

Furthermore, under the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, the
NHA, in cooperation with other government units and agencies, is mandated to
identify and acquire lands for socialized housing for the underprivileged and the
homeless. 33
Notably, it was in its performance of this governmental function to
provide mass housing that the NHA was sued by petitioners.
Perfection of the Appeal
We agree with the RTC that, insofar as appeals from the MTC to the RTC
are concerned, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure do not mandate the dismissal
of an appeal as a consequence of the nonpayment of the required fee.
Martinez v. Court of Appeals 34 holds that in such appeals, "the failure to
pay the appellate docket fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of
the appeal, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate
court." While that case was governed by Sections 20 35 and 23 36 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on January 11, 1983 to implement the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (BP Blg. 129), the present Rules lead to a
similar conclusion.

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, parties perfect an appeal from
the judgment of the MTC to the RTC by filing a notice of appeal within the
fifteen day reglementary period, as provided under Section 4 of Rule 40 and
Section 9 of Rule 41:
Rule 40 —
"SEC. 4. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — The perfection
of the appeal and the effect thereof shall be governed by the provisions
of Section 9, Rule 41.

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 Rule 41 —
"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal, effect thereof. — A party's
appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon filing of
the notice of appeal in due time.

xxx xxx xxx

"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over
the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other party."

Fontanar v. Bonsubre 37 is a case in point. It holds that in appeals from the

MTC to the RTC, failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the fifteen-day
reglementary period bestows on the appellate court a directory, not a
mandatory, power to dismiss an appeal. The Court ratiocinated as follows:
". . . [T]his Court restated the importance and real purpose of the
remedy of appeal as an essential part of our judicial system and
advised the courts to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of a right to appeal with the instruction that every party-litigant should
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition
if his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. Rightly so, for
the payment of the appellate docket fee is not a requirement for the
protection of the prevailing party, and non-compliance therewith within
the time prescribed causes no substantial prejudice to anyone."

On the other hand, the cases cited by petitioners involve appeals — not
from the MTC to the RTC — but from the RTC to the CA and from the CA to the
SC, for which the payment of appellate fees is indeed mandatory according to
the Rules. 38 We quote Manalili v. Arsenio and De Leon: 39
"Appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. Corollary to
this principle is that the appeal must be exercised strictly in
accordance with provisions set by law. . . .

". . . [T]he payment of the appellate docket fee is not a mere

technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without
which the decision or final order appealed from would become final
and executory as if no appeal was filed at all." 40

In the instant cases, when the NHA filed a Notice of Appeal on February
22, 2000 — two days before the appeal period lapsed — it perfected its appeal
and the MTC thereby lost its jurisdiction. The MTC therefore acted without
jurisdiction in issuing the May 23, 2000 Order and the May 30, 2000 Writ of
Execution.
Second Issue:
The Filing of a Supersedeas Bond
There is a rationale for requiring a losing party to file a supersedeas bond
in order to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case.
Such bond is required to assure the payment of damages to the winning party
in case the appeal is found frivolous.
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 In the present cases, the posting of a supersedeas bond is not necessary
to stay the execution of the MTC Order. When a case involves provable rents or
damages incurred by a government-owned or controlled corporation, the real
party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines. When the State litigates, it is
not required to put up a bond for damages or even an appeal bond — either
directly or indirectly through its authorized officers — because it is presumed to
be always solvent. 41

Thus, it would be unnecessary to ask the NHA to file a bond because to do

so would be to indirectly require the government to submit the bond. And the
State is not required to file a bond for the obvious reason that it is capable of
paying its obligation. 42 In any event, the NHA has already paid the appellate
docket fees and filed the supersedeas bond as ordered by the RTC, albeit late.
Third Issue:
The Award of Rentals
Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals, 43 petitioners argue that the MTC may take
judicial notice of the reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in
order to determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In that
case, however, this Court relied on the CA's factual findings, which were based
on the evidence presented before the trial court. In determining reasonable
rent, the RTC therein took account of the following factors: 1) the realty
assessment of the land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing
rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the trial court relied, not on mere judicial
notice, but on the evidence presented before it.

Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and
occupation of a disputed property. However, petitioners herein erred in
assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent, could simply rely on
their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. As we
have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must
still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
In Herrera v. Bollos, 44 the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a
forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that the reasonable
amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by
supporting evidence:
". . . . A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in
controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before
taking such judicial notice, the court must 'allow the parties to be heard
thereon.' Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of
the premises in question without supporting evidence. 45

In the instant cases, the RTC has already declared that there is no
evidence on record to support the MTC's award of rent. We find no cogent
reason to disturb this pronouncement.

Finally, the belated prayer of the NHA for the dismissal of the forcible
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 entry case cannot be granted, because it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA,
not to this Court. As a mere respondent in these appealed cases, the NHA is not
entitled to any affirmative relief. Besides, we would not want to preempt the
CA's action on the said appeal.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. See pp. 24-39 of the rollo in G.R. No. 143976; penned by Judge Arturo G.
Tayag.

2. Id., p. 51.
3. Id., pp. 52-54.
4. Assailed RTC Order, p. 16; page 39 of the rollo in G.R. No. 143973.
5. Penned by Judge Basilio Gabo, Jr.; see pp. 17-19 of the rollo in G.R. No.
145846.

6. Written by Judge Aznar D. Lindayag; pp. 20-30 of the rollo in G.R. No.
145846.
7. Id., p. 19.
8. October 17, 2001 Resolution; id., p. 111.

9. G.R. No. 143976; rollo, pp. 40-50.

10. Records, Vol. II, pp. 280-281.

11. Id., pp. 292-294.

12. G.R. No. 143976; rollo, p. 51.

13. Id., pp. 52-54.

14. Benjamin C. Hao; id., p. 55.
15. Records, Vol. II, pp. 364-367.

16. G.R. No. 143976; rollo, pp. 59-60.

17. Records, Vol. III, pp. 1-32.

18. Dated June 29, 2000; records, Vol. III, pp. 64-65.

19. This case was deemed submitted for decision on December 18, 2001, upon
receipt by this Court of respondents' Memorandum signed by Mario P.
Escobar, Ma. Magdalena T. de Leon-Siacon and Jose M. Manuel Jr. of the Legal
Department of the NHA. Petitioners' Memorandum, signed by Walter T.
Young, was received by this Court on November 26, 2001.

20. See Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 5; G.R. No. 145846; rollo, p. 116. Original
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 in upper case.
21. See Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 6-7; G.R. No. 143976; rollo, pp. 131-132.
Original in upper case.

22. Entitled "Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the
Existing Housing Agencies, Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes"; dated July 31, 1975.

23. Resolution Amending Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court, issued in
AM No. 00-2-01-SC.
24. 351 SCRA 280, February 6, 2001.

25. 150 SCRA 296, May 29, 1987, per Cortes, J.

26. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations,

150 SCRA 296, May 29, 1987.
27. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 10. "The State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development."

28. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 9. "The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation,
free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
improved quality of life for all."

29. I. Cruz, Philippine Political Law (1998), pp. 21-22.

30. "SECTION 1. Housing Program. Pursuant to the mandate of the New
Constitution, there shall be developed a comprehensive and integrated
housing program which shall embrace, among others, housing development
and resettlement, sources and schemes of financing, and delineation of
government and private sector participation . . . ."
"SEC. 2. Creation of the National Housing Authority. There is hereby
created a government corporation to be known as the National Housing
Authority, hereinafter referred to as 'Authority,' to develop and implement
the housing program above-mentioned. . . . ."
31. "SEC. 3. Purposes and Objectives. The Authority shall have the following
purposes and objectives:

(a) To provide and maintain adequate housing for the greatest possible
number of people;
(b) To undertake housing, development, resettlement or other activities as
would enhance the provision of housing to every Filipino;

(c) To harness and promote private participation in housing ventures in

terms of capital expenditures, land expertise, financing and other facilities
for the sustained growth of the housing industry."
32. "SEC. 6. Powers and Functions of the Authority. The Authority shall have
the following powers and functions to be exercised by the Board in
accordance with the established national human settlements plan prepared
by the Human Settlements Commission:
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 xxx xxx xxx

(d) Exercise the right of eminent domain or acquire by purchase privately

owned lands for purposes of housing development, resettlement and related
services and facilities; . . . ."

33. See Sections 8, 9 and 12 of RA No. 7279.

34. 358 SCRA 38, May 21, 2001, per Mendoza, J., citing Fontanar v. Bonsubre ,
145 SCRA 663, November 25, 1986; and Del Rosario & Sons Logging
Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, 136 SCRA 669, May 31, 1985.
35. "SEC. 20. Procedure for taking appeal. — An appeal from the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts or municipal circuit trial
courts to the regional trial courts, and from the regional trial courts to the
Intermediate Appellate Court in actions or proceedings originally filed in the
former shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered
the judgment or order appealed from."

36. "SEC. 23. Perfection of appeal. — In cases where appeal is taken, the
perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal
by any party."

37. Supra.
38. The payment of appellate fees within the 15-day reglementary period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal to the CA from a decision of the
RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 8,
Rule 42; an appeal from the CA to the Supreme Court is governed by Section
5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

39. G.R. No. 140858, November 27, 2001.

40. Id., pp. 6-7, per Panganiban, J.
41. Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328, April 30, 1957.
42. Ibid.
43. 272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997.

44. G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002.

45. Id., p. 8; per Pardo, J.

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