SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 30, 1988 203
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
*
No. L-80040. September 30, 1988.
ISMAEL AMORGANDA and TRINIDAD G.
AMORGANDA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ESTANISLAO SAYCON, and CLARA SAYCON,
respondents.
Civil Procedure; Motion for Reconsideration; Delay of two (2)
calendar days in the filing of the motion for reconsideration founded
on a strong compelling reason.·Saturday, 8 August 1987, however,
was not an official holiday so that the petitioners motion for
reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period. But a
strong compelling reason, i.e., the prevention of a grave miscarriage
of justice exists in this case that would warrant a suspension of the
Rules and excuse the delay of two (2) calendar days in the filing of
said motion for reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; There is no indication that petitioners was
motivated by a desire to delay the proceedings or obstruct the
administration of justice.·One other reason for suspending the
Rules and allowing the petitioners to appeal is that there is no
indication that, in filing the motion for reconsideration on Monday,
10 August 1987, instead of Saturday, 8 August 1987, counsel for the
petitioners was motivated by a desire to delay the proceedings or
obstruct the administration of justice. His mistaken belief that
Saturday is a legal holiday appears to be pardonable since the
courts of justice do not hold office on Saturdays. Anyway, the delay
of two (2) calendar days·one of which was a Sunday·in the filing
of the motion for reconsideration did not prejudice the cause of the
private respondents, or that said private respondents suffered
material injury by reason of the delay.
Same; Action; PetitionersÊ complaint while at first blush would
appear to be one for forcible entry and damages, the action is in
reality one for specific performance.·While the herein petitionersÊ
complaint in the trial court alleges that they were dispossessed of
the leased fishpond by the lessors, herein private respondents, by
means of force, stealth and intimidation, so that the complaint
would appear, at first blush, to be one for forcible entry and
damages, the action is, in reality, one for specific performance, i.e.,
to compel the private respondents, as lessors, to comply with their
obligations under the lease contract and return the possession of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
the leased
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
premises to them, and for damages due to their (private
respondentsÊ) unjust occupation of the land. Such action is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation and comes within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of regional trial courts.
Same; Same; Same; The action is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the regional trial court.·Since the present action is
to compel the private respondents to perform their part of the
contract of lease „to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the con
tract,‰ the action is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
regional trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No merit in the claim that the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources has exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.·We also find no merit in the claim of the private
respondents that the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In Pitargue vs.
Sorilla, the Court ruled: „x x x The vesting of the Lands
Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate
public lands, x x x must not be understood as depriving the other
branches of the Government of the exercise of their respective
functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders
and quell breaches of the peace by the police, and the authority on
the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions
arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation
and disposition.‰
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals. Javellana, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Marcelo G. Flores for petitioner.
Leo B. Diocos for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
**
Review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the
respondent appellate court on 17 July 1987, in CA-G.R. SP
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
No. 09614, entitled: „Estanislao Say con, et al., petitioners,
versus Hon. Eleuterio E. Chiu, etc. et al., respondents,‰
which set aside, for being null and void, the order issued by
Judge
_______________
** Penned by Justice Luis A. Javellana with the concurrence of
Justices Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Jaime M. Lantin.
205
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 30, 1988 205
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
Eleuterio E. Chiu on 23 April 1986 in Civil Case No. 8794
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, restraining
the defendants therein, now private respondents, from
cultivating, taking possession of, gathering the fishes and
shrimps or other products thereon, or committing acts of
interference or disturbance in the plaintiffsÊ possession of
the fishpond in question, and directed the dismissal of said
Civil Case No. 8794.
The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows:
On 30 July 1977, herein private respondents, spouses
Estanislao and Clara Saycon, leased to herein petitioners,
spouses Ismael and Trinidad Amorganda, a fishpond
located at Cabalulan, Manipis, Tanjay, Negros Oriental,
which „land is a part or portion of PLA No. 2086 containing
an area of SEVEN (7) hectares, more or less, Âin the name
of Pedro Saycon, lessorsÊ deceased father,Ê ‰ for a period
often (10) years from said date. Rentals in the amount of
P3,000.00 a year for the entire lease period were duly paid
to and received by the lessors. On 30 January 1981, the
lease period was extended for two (2) years, to expire on 30
July 1989. Again, rentals for the extended period were paid
to and received by the lessors. Then, on 20 December 1982,
the lessors, in consideration of another advance rental on
the fishpond, again agreed to extend the lease period for
another eight (8)1 years from 30 July 1989 and terminating
on 31, July 1997.
On 5 January 1986, however, the lessors, herein private
respondents Estanislao and Clara Saycon, harvested
bangus and shrimps from the fishpond without the
knowledge and consent of the lessees, herein petitioners
Ismael and Trinidad Amorganda. Consequently, the
petitioners filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft
against the private respondents before the Provincial Fiscal
of Negros Oriental. The complaint was docketed as I.S.
Case No. 86-F and 2
is still pending preliminary
investigation therein.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
Then, on 27 February 1986, the private respondents,
allegedly with the aid of armed men, forcibly entered the
leased fishpond and prevented the petitioners and their
workers from entering the premises. As a result, the
petitioners filed a
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 24.
2 Id., p. 45.
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
complaint against the private respondents before the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, docketed therein
as Civil Case No. 8794, to compel the private respondents
to return the leased premises to them and for damages in
the amounts of: (1) P25,000.00 every three (3) months or
P100,000.00 a year, until possession of the fishpond is
restored to the lessees; (b) P20,000.00, as moral damages
and P10,000.00, as exemplary damages; (c) P10,000.00, as
attorneyÊs fees and P500.00 per appearance in court of
counsel; and (d) such other actual expenses and damages
as may be proved during the trial. The petitioners further
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
immediately issued restraining the private respondents,
their agents or persons acting in their behalf, from
cultivating, taking possession of, or committing acts which
would disturb3 or interfere with petitionersÊ possession of
said fishpond.
Finding the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to be sufficient in form and
substance, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
order on 4 March 1986, directing the private respondents,
defendants therein, to refrain from cultivating, taking
possession of, gathering fishes, shrimps and other products
from the land in question until further orders, and set the
application for
4
preliminary injunction for hearing on 13
March 1986.
On 26 March 1986, the private respondents filed their
Answer to the complaint, alleging that the private
respondent Estanislab Saycon is not the true owner of the
property which he had leased to the petitioners, but the
government of the Philippines, because it reverted to the
government after the license of Pedro Saycon, late father of
private respondents Estanislao Saycon, was cancelled and
all improvements existing in the area forfeited in favor of
the government; that the petitioners have no right
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
whatsoever to the fishpond because their earlier rights
were lost upon the cancellation of the license of said Pedro
Saycon and the area declared open for disposition to any
interested party and qualified applicant; that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of disputes
relative to possessory rights over the fishpond in question,
which belongs
_______________
3 Id., p. 18.
4 Id., p. 26.
207
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 30, 1988 207
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR);
that the herein petitioners failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before resort was made to the
courts; and that the petitioners have no cause of action
since the fishpond in question had been forfeited in favor of
the government and petitioners are not applicants for 5
permit to operate or lease the same from the government.
On 23 April 1986, the trial court granted the application
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
„restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the defendants,
their agents, servants, and/or any person acting in their
behalves from cultivating, taking possession of, gathering
the fishes and shrimps or other products thereon, or
committing acts of interference or disturbance in the
plaintiffsÊ possession‰ of the fishpond in question upon the6
filing of an injunction bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
The private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration 7
of the order, but their motion was denied on 11 June 1986.
Consequently, the private respondents filed a petition
with the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) to annul and set aside the order of 23 April 1986
on the grounds that: (1) the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the case since the complaint filed is in the nature of
recovery of possession and should have been filed in the
Municipal Court of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where the land
is situated, in accordance with Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court; (2) there is no cause of action because „(w)hen the
BFAR issued an Order confiscating the fishpond in favor of
the Government and declaring the contract of lease
between Saycon and the Amorgandas to be null and void,
the rights of the Amorgandas for (to) possession over the
fishpond was (were) not anymore existing; they might have
some rights for sum of money from the Say cons. The
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
respondents have no right whatsoever to step in the shoes
of the government; and (3) non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies in that the action should have
been filed with the
_______________
5 Id., p. 27.
6 Id., p. 35.
7 Id., p. 38.
208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
8
BFAR before resort was made to the courts.
The herein petitioners in due9
course filed their comment
with the Court of Appeals, and on 17 July 1987, the
respondent appellate court issued the decision in question,
declaring null and void the order of the regional trial court
of 23 April 1986, for the reason that the complaint is one
for recovery of possession over which the regional trial
court has no jurisdiction, and directing the trial court to
dismiss Civil Case 10
No. 8794 of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental.
On 10 August 1987, the petitioners filed, by registered
11
mail, a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the
respondent appellate court denied the motion 12
for having
been filed beyond the reglernentary period.
Hence, the present
13
recourse. The Court gave due course
to the petition.
The petitioners raise two (2) issues, to wit:
(1) whether or not the petitionersÊ motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the respondent
appellate court had been filed out of time and the
said decision, is already final and executory; and
(2) whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental has jurisdiction over the case.
On the procedural issue, it appears that counsel for the
herein petitioners received a copy of the decision of the 14
Court of Appeals on 24 July 1987. Pursuant to the rules,
he had fifteen (15) days from said date, or up to 8 August
1987, within which to appeal therefrom or file a motion for
its reconsideration, Counsel fur the petitioners, however,
filed the motion for reconsideration only on 10 August
1987, or two (2) days after the expiration of the
reglementary period. Counsel for the petitioners, in
explaining the delay, claimed that the last day for filing the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
motion for reconsideration, 8 August 1987, fell on
_______________
8 Id., p. 39.
9 Id., p. 44.
10 Id., p. 53.
11 Id., p. 4.
12 Id., p. 63.
13 Id., p. 67-A.
14 BP 129. Sec. 39; Interim Rules and Guidelines, Sec 19 (a).
209
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 30, 1988 209
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
a holiday, a Saturday, so that he filed the motion for
reconsideration on Monday, 10 August 1987, the day
following a holiday and Sunday.
Saturday, 8 August 1987, however, was not an official
holiday so that the petitionersÊ motion for reconsideration
was filed beyond the reglementary period. But a strong
compelling reason, i.e., the prevention of a grave
miscarriage of justice exists in this case that would
warrant a suspension of the Rules and excuse the delay of
two (2) calendar days in the filing of said motion for
reconsideration.
The private respondents have admitted to have
unilaterally terminated the lease contract executed
between them and the petitioners, and prevented the latter
from entering the fishpond, subject matter of the lease
contract, despite the fact that the lease between them is to
expire only on 31 July 1997, and that rentals have been
paid to private respondents by the petitioners up to said
date. Their (private respondents) excuse is that they have
lost their right over the land since said land, which had
been previously leased to their late father, Pedro Saycon,
had been forfeited in favor of the government.
Indeed, the private respondents have lost whatever right
they may have had over the fishpond in question after said
land had been forfeited in favor of the government. In his
Order, dated 11 April 1985, the Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) categorically
stated that the heirs of Pedro Saycon, among them the
private respondent Estanislao Saycon, „have no more leg to
stand on, much less anymore personality to15 assert any
right over the area under OFP. No. F-234-B.‰ That being
the case, what right had the private respondents to enter
the fishpond and exclude the petitioners therefrom? The
fact that the Director of the BFAR, in his Order of 11 April
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
1985, had ordered that any occupant thereon should vacate
the premises did not give the private respondents license to
renege on their obligation under the contract of lease and
eject the petitioners from the land. As correctly stated by
the trial court in its order dated 23 April 1986, „(t)he Order
of the BFAR (Exhibit ÂLÊ) relied upon by the
_______________
15 Rollo, p. 33.
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
defendant (private respondent herein) is of no moment, for
the government is not a party in this case. The said Order
would become material and relevant only when the
government takes legal 16
action against any possessor of the
fishpond in question.‰
Besides, the private respondents who appear to be guilty
of coercion, stand to unjustly profit from their fraudulent
and deceitful act at the expense of the petitioners who may
not be able to recover the rentals advanced by them to the
private respondents.
One other reason for suspending the Rules and allowing
the petitioners to appeal is that there is no indication that,
in filing the motion for reconsideration on Monday, 10
August 1987, instead of Saturday, 8 August 1987, counsel
for the petitioners was motivated by a desire to delay the
proceedings or obstruct the administration of justice. His
mistaken belief that Saturday is a legal holiday appears to
be pardonable since the courts of justice do not hold office
on Saturdays. Anyway, the delay of two (2) calendar days·
one of which was a Sunday·in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration did not prejudice the cause of the private
respondents, or that said private respondents suffered
material injury by reason of the delay.17
In Lagunzad vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said, and
we quote.
„We cannot just ignore petitionerÊs plea for a review of his case in
this instance. There is not the slightest indication of malice on his
part or of a desire to delay the proceedings and to transgress the
rules on procedure. If at all, his was an honest mistake or
miscalculation worsened by some fortuitous occurrence which we
deem condonable under the circumstances. For we have, in many
cases granted relief where a stringent application of the
requirement of timeliness of pleadings would have denied a litigant
substantial justice and equity. Suffice it to note that the rules on
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
technicality were promulgated to secure not to override substantial
justice. As it should be in this case especially because the petition
appears also to be impressed with merit.‰
_______________
16 Id., p. 36.
17 G.R. No. 52007, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 199, 205.
211
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 30, 1988 211
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
The other issue raised by the petitioners is: whether or not
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental has jurisdiction
over the case.
The respondent appellate court, in its decision under
review, found that the regional trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case since the object of the complaint
was to recover possession of the land which the herein
private respondents had secured by means of force, threats
and intimidation. Said the appellate court:
„x x x It is quite obvious from the foregoing that the object of the
complaint is to recover possession of the property in question which
private respondents acquired as lessees thereof, but of which they
were deprived by petitioners by means of „force, threats and
intimidation.Ê The complaint thus alleges the facts which confer
exclusive jurisdiction in the Municipal Trial Court to try the case,
(Sec. 33(2), BP 129). The Honorable respondent Court being devoid
of jurisdiction over the main case, it was, likewise, without
jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction dated 23
18
April 1986.‰
We do not agree. While the herein petitionersÊ complaint in
the trial court alleges that they were dispossessed of the
leased fishpond by the lessors, herein private respondents,
by means offeree, stealth and intimidation, so that the
complaint would appear, at first blush, to be one for forcible
entry and damages, the action is, in reality, one for specific
performance, i.e., to compel the private respondents, as
lessors, to comply with their obligations under the lease
contract and return the possession of the leased premises
to them, and for damages due to their (private
respondentsÊ) unjust occupation of the land. Such action is
one not capable of pecuniary estimation and comes within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts.
Thus, Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides:
„Art. 1654. The lessor is obliged:
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
„(a) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in
such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended;
„(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary
repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use it has been
_______________
18 Rollo, p. 58.
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;
„(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the
contract.‰
19
In De Rivera vs. Halili, the Court said that the action to
compel the lessor to comply with his obligation „to
maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the
contract‰ is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
court of first instance now the regional
20
trial court.
In Lapitan vs. Scandia, Inc., the Court, speaking
through the eminent Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, also said:
„A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in
determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought like in the suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in
actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a
mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instants. x x x‰
Since the present action is to compel the private
respondents to perform their part of the contract of lease
„to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the
contract,‰ the action is within the 21
exclusive original
jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
The respondent Court of Appeals, therefore, erroneously
classified the present action as one for forcible entry and
_______________
19 G.R. No. L-15159, September 30, 1963, 118 Phil. 901.
20 G.R. No. L-24668, July 31, 1968, 133 Phil. 526, 528.
21 BP 129, Section 19 (1).
213
VOL. 166, SEPTEMBER 30, 1988 213
Amorganda vs. Court of Appeals
damages which is cognizable exclusively by the municipal
trial court. Accordingly, the decision appealed from should
be reversed and set aside.
We also find no merit in the claim of the private
respondents that the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) has 22exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
In Pitargue vs. Sorilla, the Court ruled:
„x x x The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to
administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, x x x must not be
understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of
the exercise of their respective functions or powers thereon, such as
the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by
the police, and the authority on the part of the courts to take
jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving,
directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.‰
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby RE
VERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
affirming the order issued by the trial court on 23 April
1986 in Civil Case No. 8794 of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental. With costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento
and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.·Motion for reconsideration should be filed within
fifteen days from notice of final judgment. (Macabingkil vs.
PeopleÊs Homesite and Housing Corporation, 72 SCRA 326).
··o0o··
_______________
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 166 12/1/19, 11:50 AM
22 G.R. No. L-4302, September 17, 1952, 92 Phil. 5, 1
214
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