MARTEX TRADING (PTY) LTD T/A BUILDERS MERCHANTS BOTSWANA v.

LLOYD 1998 BLR 201 (HC)

Citation1998 BLR 201 (HC)

Court High Court, Lobatse

Judge Dibotelo J

JudgmeCnt February 16, 1998

CounselC. Camp for the plaintiff.

P. Amoah for the defendant.

Annotations None

[zFNz]Flynote

Contract - Contract of employment - Term of contract - Term stipulating repatriation of employee to

1998 BLR p202

condition - Whether plaintiff entitled to damages for breach - Whether term of contract repugnant and
obnoxious to spirit A of section 33(1)(a) and (2) as read with section 38 of Employment Act (Cap. 4
7:01).

Practice and procedure - Plea - Confession and avoidance - Defendant acknowledging receipt of
P30,000.00 but alleging that it was an ex gratia payment - Duty on defendant to adduce evidence
contradicting allegations of plaintiff - Plaintiff in replication putting in issue allegations contained in
defendant's plea - Failure to adduce evidence to prove these allegations on a balance of probabilities -
Whether plaintiff's claim to succeed - Rules of the High Court (Cap. B 04:02) (Sub. Leg.), Ord. 20, r. 4(2).

[zHNz]Headnote

The plaintiff on 1 December 1992 entered into a contract of employment with the defendant in terms of
which he was employed as Chief Buyer. In their agreement clause 12 (b) provided that the plaintiff
would pay the cost of C shipping or transportation of the defendant's goods and personal belongings to
his place of recruitment in the United Kingdom, up to a maximum of 30 per cent of the total one way air
fare of the employee and his family and that the freight costs for transporting personal effects of the
defendant when he leaves Botswana would only be paid by the employer if the employee would not
return to Botswana to take up other employment until after a continuous period of not less than six
months from the termination of employment. The defendant's contract was D not renewed and he was
duly paid an amount of P30,000.00 and his goods and personal belongings were shipped to the United
Kingdom and on 7 November 1994 he left for the United Kingdom. On 5 January 1995 the defendant
returned to Botswana and started working for a different company as managing director. The plaintiff
therefore instituted an action against the defendant that in terms of the agreement the defendant was
liable and indebted to them in the sum of P30,000.00. In his plea the defendant admitted that he was
paid P30,000.00 by E the plaintiff as freight costs on repatriation but he alleged that it was an "out right
ex gratia" payment agreed between the parties and mutually accepted as non-refundable. He also
alleged that a portion of the P30,000.00 freight costs he admitted receiving was his entitlement under
the contract and the balance was ex gratia payment in recognition of his loyalty and contribution to the
plaintiff and that this amount was non- refundable. F The defendant further alleged in his plea that the
proviso to clause 12 (b) of the employment contract was void as it was repugnant and obnoxious to both
the spirit and purport of section 33(1)(a) as read with section 38 of the Employment Act (Cap. 47:01).

Held: (1) in this action the provisions of section 38 should be read together with the provisions of section
33(1)(a) and (2) of the Employment Act and applied to clause 12 (b) of the contract of employment.
Section 33(1)(a) and G (2) makes it mandatory for the employer to pay the cost of repatriation of an
employee and that those provisions had been incorporated in clause 12 (b) of the contract of
employment. What section 38 means is that an employer is prohibited from providing in the contract of
employment that the employer would not be liable to pay the cost of repatriation of the employee or
that the employer would only be liable to pay a certain percentage at the termination of the contract.
Although section 33(1)(a) provides for payment of the cost of repatriation of the H employee it did not
provide for the employer bearing the cost of repatriation or transportation of the personal belongings
and goods of the employee to his place of recruitment; and that the parties could incorporate conditions
in the contract of employment as to how the personal belongings of the employee would be transported
when the contract came to an end. Those

1998 BLR p203

conditions could include the amount to be paid by the employer and the restrictions regarding payment
to the A employee for repatriation of goods and terms under which payment would be effected by the
employer. In the instant case therefore it was quite proper for the contract of employment to make
provision in clause 12 (b) that the plaintiff would only pay for the cost of repatriating the goods and
personal belongings of the defendant if the defendant would not return to Botswana to take up other
employment within six months of the termination of the contract. Consequently clause 12 (b) of the
contract of employment was not null and void nor was it repugnant B and obnoxious to the spirit of
section 33(1)(a) and (2) and section 38 of the Employment Act nor was it unreasonable or contrary to
public policy.
(2) The defendant's plea was one of confession and avoidance. It was therefore the duty of the
defendant to prove the allegations in his plea on a balance of probabilities, the defendant however did
not adduce any C evidence inter alia to demonstrate that contrary to the allegations of the plaintiff the
P30,000.00 he received was ex gratia payment. As soon as the plaintiff put in issue the allegations in the
plea it became the duty of the defendant to adduce evidence to prove those allegations on a balance of
probabilities and this the defendant failed to do.

[zCIz]Case Information

Case referred to: D

National Chemsearch (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd. v. Borrowman and Another 1979 (3) S.A. 1092.

ACTION for damages for breach of contract arising from an agreement in a contract of employment that
the defendant failed to adhere to. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment. E

C. Camp for the plaintiff.

P. Amoah for the defendant.

[zJDz]Judgment

Dibotelo J.:

In April 1995 the plaintiff issued a writ of summons against the defendant for payment of P30,000.00
together F with interest and costs of suit. In its particulars of claim annexed to the writ of summons the
plaintiff alleges that on 1 December 1992 it entered into a contract of employment with the defendant
in terms of which the plaintiff hired the services of the defendant as Chief Estimator/Buyer. The plaintiff
has annexed a copy of the contract of employment marked "A" (Agreement) to the particulars of claim.
G

The plaintiff alleges as follows in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the particulars of claim:

"4. In terms of clause 12 (b) of the Agreement plaintiff agreed to pay the cost of shipping of
defendant's personal effects to the defendant's place of recruitment when the defendant left Botswana
up to a maximum of 30% of the total one H way airfare for the defendant, his wife and minor
dependent children if any, such costs only to be paid when the defendant left Botswana providing he
was not returning to Botswana to take up other employment.

1998 BLR p204

DIBOTELO J
 5. The Agreement terminated on 30th November 1994 and, pursuant to clause 12 (b) of
the Agreement, Plaintiff paid A Defendant the sum of P30,000.00 in respect of the repatriation of
Defendant's goods, personal belongings and Christopher's air fare and insurance."

The plaintiff then proceeds to aver that on 5 January 1995 the defendant returned to Botswana and took
up employment and therefore that in terms of the agreement the defendant is liable and is indebted to
plaintiff in the B sum of P30,000.00. It is this amount of money which the plaintiff is claiming from the
defendant together with interest and costs.

In response to paragraph 4 of the particulars of claim the defendant avers in paragraph 2 of the plea
that the freight cost paid to him by the plaintiff was an "outright ex-gratia payment which was agreed
between the parties C and conclusively understood as such and mutually accepted and acted upon as
non-refundable payment which the plaintiff is not entitled to reclaim." The defendant alleges further in
paragraph 3 of the plea that the proviso to clause 12 (b) of the employment contract is void as it is
repugnant and obnoxious both to the spirit and purport of section 33(1)(a) read with section 38 of the
Employment Act; that it is contrary to public policy as it D denies the public and private sectors in this
country the service of experts conversant with and responsive to the needs of Botswana.

The defendant then proceeds to plead, inter alia, as follows:

"4. AD PARAGRAPHS 5 [sic.]

The defendant admits receiving payment in the sum of P30,000.00 for freight costs a
portion of it being the E defendant's entitlement under the contract of employment and the balance
being an ex gratia payment and the agreement between the parties was that the whole sum was a
payment made in recognition of the defendant's loyalty and contribution to the plaintiff and as such
non-reclaimable.

5. By way of further answer and without prejudice to paragraph 3 above the defendant
states: F

(a) that the plaintiff having so acted has waived any right it had to reclaim the sum
of P30,000.00 paid to the defendant and

(b) that in any event the payment of P30,000.00 having by agreement of the parties
being [sic.] made outside the terms of the contract of employment is not recoverable in terms of clause
12(b) of the said contract." G

Lastly the defendant admits in his plea that he returned to Botswana in January 1995 and took up other
employment but denies that he is liable to the plaintiff in the sum of P30,000.00 or any other sum of
money.

After being served with the plea, the plaintiff replicated and in its replication the plaintiff denies the
allegations H contained in the defendant's plea and then proceeds to aver that sections 33(1)(a) and 38
of the Employment Act (Cap. 47:01) as amended place no statutory duty upon an employer for the
repatriation of goods, personal belongings and insurance of the employee; and further that
consequently clause 12(b) of the agreement is not void for being repugnant and/or obnoxious to section
33(1)(a) and

1998 BLR p205

DIBOTELO J

38 of the Employment Act or as being contrary to public policy or due to unreasonableness. A

Order 20 of the High Court deals with pleadings in general and in terms of Order 20, rule 4 (2)a
defendant is required, inter alia, to confess and avoid to every allegation in the statement of claim and
at the commencement of the trial it became clear that the defendant's plea was one of confession and
avoidance and the duty of B adducing evidence was therefore on the defendant who gave sworn
evidence and did not call any witnesses. The defendant was not cross-examined by counsel for the
plaintiff and no witnesses were called to testify on behalf of the plaintiff. Before briefly summarising the
evidence of the defendant, I should point out that the record shows that the parties held a pre-trial
conference and that discovery affidavits containing lists of documents C were filed. However, no
documents were produced as exhibits at the trial.

In his evidence the defendant told the court that he signed a two year contract of employment with the
plaintiff on 1 December 1992 in terms of which he was employed as Chief Buyer and he confirmed that a
copy of the contract he signed is annexed to the particulars of claim marked "A" and further that under
the contract his place of recruitment was New Castle On Tyne in the United Kingdom. The defendant
arrived in Botswana in 1979 and D he was previously employed by a company called I.T.M. which was
taken over by the plaintiff in 1989 when he continued in employment under the plaintiff until he signed
a new contract on 1 December 1992. When his contract ended in November 1994 he had been in the
employment of the plaintiff for eight years. E

The defendant testified that in terms of the contract, the plaintiff was to pay the costs of his repatriation
and repatriation of his goods from Botswana to U.K. at the end of the contract and that the costs of such
repatriation were based on the percentage of his air fare. On 3 August 1994 the defendant received a
letter from the plaintiff F informing him that his contract would not be renewed when it expired and he
said although he was not given reasons for non-renewal of the contract in the letter, he inferred that his
contract was not being renewed because the plaintiff could no longer afford his salary. According to the
defendant the letter of 3 August 1994 informed him of the benefits he was to receive and those benefits
included the cost of his repatriation and freight costs for the shipment of his furniture and household
goods to the United Kingdom and the total amount he was G to receive was P4,100.00 calculated on a
percentage of his air fare. The defendant was dissatisfied with the amount he was to receive and he
raised a query. As a result of this query a meeting was arranged with the management of the plaintiff at
which the defendant sought clarification pertaining to the benefits he was to receive at the end of the
contract.
Following his meeting with the management of the plaintiff the defendant received another letter from
the plaintiff H dated 17 August 1994 and in paragraph 4 of that letter he said he was informed that :

"It is proposed that BMB pay you P30,000.00 at the end of August. This will be to cover
repatriation costs including repatriation of goods and personal belongings, Christopher's airfare and
insurance. This is

1998 BLR p206

DIBOTELO J

the total package and if you can make savings on these costs the benefits will go to you." A

The defendant testified that he replied to the letter of 17 August 1994 seeking certain clarifications and
that in his reply he accepted conditions stipulated in paragraph 4 of that letter. He said in his reply he
informed the plaintiff that he would not make any savings on the amount of P30,000.00. This amount
was duly paid to the defendant B and his goods and personal belongings were shipped to the United
Kingdom on 15 September 1994 and his wife left Botswana on 18 October 1994. The defendant did not
produce the letter of 17 August 1994 as part of his evidence.

The defendant also testified that after he was told in August 1994 that his contract would not be
renewed, he wrote to several companies seeking employment and in October 1994 he met a former
colleague and employee C at I.T.M.. The two agreed to start a company in Botswana in which the
defendant would be the Managing Director. The defendant left for the United Kingdom on 7 November
1994. He told the court that during Christmas of 1994 his partner contacted him and told him his
permits had been transferred to their new company called Tractor and Empliments Centre (Pty.) Ltd.
which traded as Contract Building Supplies. On 5 January 1995 the D defendant returned to Botswana
and started working for the new company as Managing Director. As I indicated earlier in this judgment
at the end of his evidence-in-chief, the defendant was not cross-examined and he did not call any
witnesses. When the defendant concluded his evidence counsel for both parties then made
submissions. E

Dr. Amoah, counsel for the defendant, submitted that this action fell under both the common law and
Employment Act (Cap. 47:01). Learned counsel submitted that clause 12 (b) ofthe contract of
employment restrained the defendant's freedom to trade and that in his view that was not permissible
under the common law unless it could be demonstrated that such a restraint was reasonable. He
submitted that clause 12(b) of the F contract of employment contained a trade restrictive covenant and
was therefore in his view null and void. To support his submissions learned counsel cited authorities
including the case of National Chemsearch (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd. v. Borrowman and Another 1979 (3) S.A. 1092
in which he said it was held that the employer's restraint of trade on the employee had to be shown to
be reasonable otherwise it would be unenforceable. Dr. Amoah G maintained that it was contrary to
public interest to provide in the contract that the defendant should not return to Botswana to take up
other employment until after six months from the termination of his employment. Learned counsel also
referred to section 33(1)(a) of the Employment Act which he said gave the defendant the right to be
repatriated to his place of recruitment at the plaintiff's expense at the end of the contract and that this
statutory H provision could not be taken away in the contract of employment. In the submission of Dr.
Amoah clause 12(b) of the contract of employment was null and void because, it sought to take away
from the defendant the right that was conferred on him by section 33(1)(a) as read with section 38 of
the Employment Act.

1998 BLR p207

DIBOTELO J

Mr. Camp, counsel for the plaintiff, submitted that clause 12(b) of the contract of employment does not
restrain A trade and that clause 12 (a) of the contract deals with the air tickets for the repatriation of
the defendant to his place of recruitment whilst clause 12(b) of the contract deals with freight costs of
the defendant's furniture and personal belongings. Learned counsel submitted that what clause 12 (b) of
the contract of employment meant was that if the defendant returned to Botswana to take up other
employment the plaintiff was not liable for the B freight costs for the transportation of the defendant's
goods and personal belongings to the defendant's place of recruitment at the end of the contract.
According to Mr. Camp clause 12(b) of the contract did not prohibit the defendant from coming to
Botswana as long as he did not take up employment and learned counsel further submitted that the
P30,000.00 was for freight costs as had been admitted by the defendant in the pleadings. C Counsel for
the plaintiff also submitted that although section 33(1)(a) of the Employment Act made provision for
payment of travelling costs of the defendant, in his view the Employment Act did not place any
obligation on the employer to pay for the transportation of the employee's goods and personal
belongings to the employee's place of recruitment. D

According to Mr. Camp there was no evidence that the plaintiff waived its right to claim repayment of
P30,000.00 freight costs or that the letter of 17 August 1994 novated the contract of employment
because in his view, the fact that the plaintiff agreed to pay more than what was originally offered after
the defendant had made representations did not mean that there was a new agreement and the onus of
proving the new agreement was E on the defendant which in the submission of learned counsel the
defendant had failed to discharge.

In his plea the defendant has challenged the validity of clause 12(b) of the employment contract and
clause 12 (a) has also been referred to as well as sections 33(1)(a) and 38 of the Employment Act (Cap.
47:01). Clause 12 (a) and (b) of the contract of employment state: F

"12 AIR FARES AND REPATRIATION

(a) For overseas recruitment employees, the employee, his wife and minor dependent
children shall be entitled to an air ticket at the most economical rate available from NEW CASTLE ON
TYNE, the point of recruitment, to the place of employment and back to the place of recruitment on the
following conditions: G

(i) The air tickets [sic.] back to the place of recruitment is only payable in the event
that the employee is permanently leaving the employment of the employer;

(ii) The air tickets [sic.] back to the place of recruitment is only payable in the event
that the employee leaves Botswana and does not take up employment elsewhere in Botswana. For the
purposes of this paragraph H 'leaves Botswana' or like shall mean where the employee is absent from
Botswana for a continuous period of not less than 6 months.

(b) The cost of shipping the personal effects of an overseas recruited employee from his
place of recruitment to his place of employment

1998 BLR p208

DIBOTELO J

in Botswana and back to the place of recruitment when the employee leaves Botswana
will be born [sic.] by the A employer up to a maximum of 30% of the total one way air fare for the
employee, his wife and minor dependent children , if any.

These freight costs will only be paid when the employee first joins the employer and
when he leaves Botswana, providing he is not returning to Botswana to take up other employment." B

The relevant sections of the Employment Act for the purposes of this action are sections 33(1) and (2)
and 38 which provide as follows:

"33. (1) Every employee who has been brought to the place of employment by the employer . . .
shall have the right to be C repatriated at the expense of the employer to his place of recruitment in
the following cases-

(a) at the expiry of the period of time for which the contract of employment was made;

(b) on the termination of the contract of employment by reason of the inability of the
employer to fulfil the contract; D

(c) on the termination of the contract of employment by reason of the inability of the
employee to fulfil it owing to sickness, accident or his rejection after medical examination under section
47;

(d) on the termination of the contract of employment by the employer for just cause,
whatever that cause may be; E
 (e) on the termination of the contract of employment by agreement between the parties,
unless the contract otherwise provides; or

(f) on the termination of the contract of employment by order of court under section
158(c), unless the court otherwise directs. F

(2) Where the family of the employee has been brought to the place of employment by the
employer or by any person acting on behalf of the employer, the family shall be repatriated at the
expense of the employer in the event of the employee being repatriated . . ."

"38. Where a contract of employment. . . provides for conditions of employment less favourable
to the employee than the G conditions of employment prescribed by this Act, the contract shall be null
and void to the extent that it so provides."

Clause 12 (a) of the contract of employment reproduced above in my view imposesa duty on the
employer to pay the cost of the repatriation of the employee and his family to the employee's place of
recruitment at the end H of the contract. Clause 12 (a) of the contract of employment also incorporates
the provisions of section 33(1)(a) and (2) of the Employment Act which impose a duty on the employer
to repatriate at the employer's expense the employee and his family to the employee's place of
recruitment at the end of the contract. In the present case it is not disputed that the

1998 BLR p209

DIBOTELO J

expenses for repatriating the defendant and his family to the defendant's place of recruitment were
paid by the A plaintiff and accordingly there is no conflict between clause 12 (a) of the contract and
section 33(1)(a) and (2) of the Employment Act. One of the questions that have to be resolved however
is whether clause 12(b) of the contract of employment is in conflict with section 33(1)(a) or section 38 of
the Employment Act which would make that clause null and void to the extent that it conflicts with
those sections of the Employment Act. B

Clause 12(b) of the contract of employment provides that the costs of shipping or transportation of the
defendant's goods and personal belongings from his place of employment in Botswana to his place of
recruitment in the United Kingdom shall be paid by the employer up to the maximum of 30 per cent of
the total C one way air fare of the employee and his family and that these freight costs for transporting
personal effects of the defendant when he leaves Botswana will only be paid by the employer if the
employee is not returning to Botswana to take up other employment. The employment contract has
defined the phrase "leaves Botswana" to mean being absent from Botswana for a continuous period of
not less than six months. The defendant contends that clause 12 (b) of the contract of employment is in
conflict with section 38 of the Employment Act which D states that "where a contract of employment . .
. provides for conditions of employment less favourable to the employee than the conditions of
employment prescribed by the Act the contract shall be null and void to the extent that it so provides."
In this action the provisions of section 38 should be read together with the provisions of section 33(1)(a)
and (2) E of the Employment Act and applied to clause 12 (a) of the contract of employment. Section
33(1)(a) and (2) of the Employment Act makes it mandatory for the employer to pay the cost of
repatriation of an employee and his family to the place of the employee's recruitment and in my view
the provisions of section 33(1)(a) and (2) of the Employment Act have been incorporated in clause 12 (b)
of the contract of employment. Subject to the F exceptions which are stipulated in section 33 of the
Employment Act, in my view what section 38 means in the context of this case by way of example is that
an employer is prohibited from providing in the contract of employment that the employer will not be
liable to pay the cost of repatriation of the employee and his family to the employee's place of
recruitment or that the employer will only be liable to pay a certain percentage of the cost G of such
repatriation to the place of recruitment at the termination of the contract.

Although section 33(1)(a) provides for payment by employer of the cost of repatriation of the employee
to the latter's place of recruitment, it does not in my view provide for payment by the employer for the
cost of repatriation or transportation of the personal belongings and goods of the employee to his place
of recruitment. If H I am correct in this view, it follows that the parties may incorporate conditions in
the contract of employment as to how the personal belongings of the employee will be transported or
shipped to the employee's place of recruitment when the contract comes to an end.

1998 BLR p210

DIBOTELO J

Those conditions could include the amount to be paid by the employer and the restrictions regarding
payment to A employee for repatriation of goods and terms under which payment would be effected
by the employer for the repatriation of the employee's goods. In my view in the present case therefore,
it was quite proper for the contract of employment to make provision in clause 12 (b) that the plaintiff
would only pay for the cost of B repatriating the goods and personal belongings of the defendant if the
defendant would not return to Botswana to take up other employment within six months after the
termination of the contract. In the premises I am of the view that clause 12 (b) of the contract of
employment is not null and void nor is it repugnant and obnoxious to the spirit of section 33(1)(a) and
(2) and section 38 of the Employment Act nor is it unreasonable or contrary to public policy. C

In his plea the defendant admits that he was paid P30,000.00 by the plaintiff as freight costs on
repatriation but he alleges that it was an ex gratia payment agreed between the parties and conclusively
understood as such and mutually accepted and acted upon as non-refundable payment. He also alleges
in the plea that a portion of the P30,000.00 freight costs he admits receiving was his entitlement under
the contract and the balance was ex D gratia payment which in terms of the agreement between the
parties was paid to the defendant in recognition of his loyalty and contribution to the plaintiff and that
this amount was not refundable. The defendant further avers in his plea that without prejudice to the
foregoing allegations that the plaintiff having acted in the manner it did, which presumably means in
paying P30,000.00 to the defendant one portion of which amount was allegedly his E entitlement
under the contract and another portion ex gratia payment in recognition of his loyalty and contribution
to the plaintiff, waived its right to reclaim the P30,000.00 and further that payment of P30,000.00 was
made outside the terms of the contract and was therefore non-refundable under clause 12 (b) of the
contract of employment. All these averments are in reply to the allegations in paragraph 5 of the
plaintiff's particulars of F claim, namely, that at the termination of the contract it paid the defendant
P30,000.00 in respect of repatriation of the defendant's goods, personal belongings, Christopher's air
fare and insurance.

In my view therefore, it is the duty of the defendant to prove the allegations in his plea on a balance of
probabilities and I now proceed to examine whether on the evidence the defendant has discharged that
burden. G The defendant testified in his evidence that he received a letter on 3 August 1994 from the
plaintiff informing him that his contract would not be renewed when it ended at the end of November
1994 and further that this letter informed him that the cost of his repatriation amounted to P4,100.00
which would be paid to him by the H plaintiff. He raised a query and a meeting was held between him
and officials of the plaintiff to deal with his query concerning the amount of P4,100.00. As a result of the
discussions he held with the officials of the plaintiff, he received another letter from the plaintiff dated
17 August 1 994 and in this letter the plaintiff offered him P30,000.00 to cover his repatriation costs
including the cost of repatriation of his goods and personal belongings.

1998 BLR p211

The defendant however, did not adduce any evidence to demonstrate, inter alia, that contrary to the
allegations of A the plaintiff, the P30,000.00 he received was ex gratia payment and that it had been
agreed between the parties that this money would not be refundable; that the money was not paid to
him in terms of the contract; that the defendant waived its right and how that right was waived to
reclaim the money. The defendant did not even adduce evidence to prove that one portion of the
P30,000.00 he received was his entitlement under the contract B and that the balance was ex gratia
payment in recognition of his loyalty and contribution to the plaintiff nor did he even attempt to
demonstrate in his evidence the amount to be apportioned to his entitlement under the contract or the
amount that comprised ex gratia payment. In short the defendant did not lead any evidence in support
of the allegations set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his plea which had clearly been put in issue by the C
plaintiff in its replication. In my view as soon as the plaintiff put in issue the allegations contained in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the plea it became the duty of the defendant to adduce evidence to prove those
allegations on a balance of probabilities and this the defendant has failed to do.

In the result the plaintiff's claim must succeed and judgment is granted against the defendant in favour
of the D plaintiff for:

(a) Payment of P30,000.00;

(b) Interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent a temporae mora; and
 (c) costs of suit. E

Judgment for the plaintiff.