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Grimshaw The Idea of Female Ethic

Lectura de ética

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133 views9 pages

Grimshaw The Idea of Female Ethic

Lectura de ética

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Laura
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
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43 The idea of a female ethic JEAN GRIMSHAW (Questions about gender have scarcely been central to mainstream moral phil: ‘osophy this century. But the idea that virtue isin some way gendered, that the standards and criteria of morality are diferent for women and men. is one that has been central tothe ethical thinking of great many philosophers. Isto the eighteenth century that we can trace the beginnings of those ideas of a ‘Yemale ‘ethic’, of feminine’ nature and specifically female forms of virtue, which have formed the essential background toa great deai of feminist thinking about ethics. ‘The eighteenth century. in indusrializing societies, saw the emergence of the concern about questions of femininity nd female consciousness that was import antly related to changes in the social situation of women. Increasingly, for middle class women, the home was no longer also the workplace. The only route to security (of @ sort) for a woman was a marriage in which she was wholly ‘economically dependent. and for the unmartied woman. the prospects were bleak indeed. At the same time, however, as women were becoming increasingly dependent on men in practical and material terms, the eighteenth century saw the beginnings of an idealization of family life and the married state that remained influential throughout the nineteenth century. A sentimental vision of the sub: ‘ordinate but virtuous and idealized wife and mother, whose specifically female victues both defined and underpinned the ‘pivat’ sphere of domestic ie, came todominate a great deal of eighteenth and nineteenth-century thought ‘The idea that viewe is gendered Is central for example, to the philosophy of| Rousseau. n Fie, Rousseau argued that those characteristics which would be faultsin men are virtues in women. Rousseau's account ofemale virtues is closely related t his idealized vision of the rural family and simplicity of ie which alone could counteract the evil manners of the city. and itis ony, he thought, as wives, find mothers that women ean become virtuous, But their virtue is also premised ‘on their dependence and subordination within marriage: for a woman to be Independent, according to Rousseau, o for her to purse goals whose aim was not the welfare of her family, was for her to lose those qualities which would make her estimable and desirable I was above all Rousseau’s notion of virtue as ‘gendered’ that Mary Wel stonecraft attacked inher Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Virtue, she argued, should mean the same thing fora woman as fr a man, and she was a biter rite ofthe forms of femininity to which women were required to aspire, and which, she thought. undermined thei strength and dignity as human belngs. Since the aor PART VII ~ CHALLENGE AND CRITIQUE time of Wollstonecraft. there has always been an important strand in feminist thinking which has viewed with great suspicion, or rejected entiely, the idea that there ate specifically female virtues, There are very good reasons for this suspicion. ‘The dealizationoffemale vetue. which perhaps reached its apogeein the effusions of many nineteenth-centary male Victorian writers such as Ruskin, has usually been premised on female subordination. The ‘virtues’ to which it was thought ‘that stomen should aspire often reflect this subordination ~ a classic example Is the ‘virtue’ of sellessness, which was stressed by a great numberof Vietorian wets Despite this welLfounded ambivalence about the idea of ‘emale virtue’, however, many women inthe nineteenth century. including a large number who ‘were concerned with the question of women's emancipation, remained attracted to the idea, not merely that there were specifically female virtues, but sometimes that women were morally superior to men, and to the belif that society could bbe morally transformed through the influence of women, What many women envisaged was, as It were, an extension throughout society ofthe “emale values ofthe private sphere of home and family, But. unlike many male writers, they used the idea of female virtue as a reason for women's entry into the ‘publi’ sphere rather than as a reason for their being restricted to the ‘private’ one. And ina context where any sort of female independence was so immensely dificult to achieve. itis easy to se the attraction of any view which sought to re-evaluate And affirm those strengths and vitwes conventionally seen as ‘Feminine The context of contemporary feminist thought i ofcourse very diferent. Most ofthe formal barriers tothe entry of women into spheres other than the domestic have been removed, and a constant theme of feminist writing inthe lst twenty ‘years hasbeen a eriiqueof women's restriction to the domestic roleor the ‘private’ ‘phere. Despite this, however, the idea of ‘a female ethic’ has remained very important within feminist thinking. A number of concerns underlethe continued interes within feminism In the dea of a “Temale ethic’. Perhaps most important fs concer about the violent and destructive consequences to human ie and to the planet of those fel of aetiity which have been largely male-dominated. such as war, politics, and capitalist economic domination. The view that the Frequently destructive nature of these things isa least in part due to the fact that they are male-dominated isnot of course new: it was common enough in many arguments for female sffeage atthe bepinning of the twentieth century. In some ‘contemporary feminist thinking ths has been linked toa view that many forms ‘of aggression and destruction are closely linked to the nature of ‘masculinity’ and the male psyche. Such beliefs about the nature of masculinity and about the destructive nature of male spheres of activity are sometimes linked to ‘essentialist belies about male and female nature, Thus for example, inthe very inflential work of Mary Daly. all the havoc wreaked on human life and the planet tends to be seen as an undifferentiated result ofthe unchanging nature of the male psyche. and ofthe ‘ways in which women themselves have been ‘coloniaed’ by male domination and brutality. And contrasted with this havoc, in Daly’s work. is a vison of an 492 43 > THE IDEA OF A FEMALE ETHIC uncorrupted female psyche which might rise like @ phoenix from the ashes of, ‘male-dominated culture and save the worl, Not all versions of essentials are auite as extreme or vivid a5 that of Daly: but i s not uncommon (among some supporters ofthe peace movement for example) to find the bele that women are ‘naturally’ les aggressive. more gentle and nurturing. more co-operative, than Such essentialist views of mele and female nature are of course problem if ‘one believes that the ‘nature’ of men and women ie not something that is monolithic or unchanging, but i, rather. socially and historically constructed. ‘And a great deal of feminist thinking has rejected any form of esentaism. But if fone rejects the idea that any diferences between male and female values and prortes can be ascribed to a fundamental male and female ‘nature. the question then arises as to whether the idea ofa female ethic’ can be speed out in away that avolds esentalist assumptions. The attempt todo this ls elated to a second ‘major concern of feminist thinking. This. concern can be explained as follows ‘Women themselves have constantly tended to be devalued or ineriorzed (Ire quently at the same time as being idealized). But this devaluation has not simply been of women themselves ~ their nature, abildes and characterises. The ‘spheres of activity with which they have particulary been associated have aso been devalued. Again, paradoxically. they have also been idealized. Thus home, family the domestic virtues, and women’s role inthe physical and emotional care of others have constantly been praised to the skies and seen as the bedrock of social ile. At the same ime, these things are commonly seen as a mere ‘backdop to the more important’ spheres of male activity, to which no self-respecting man could allow himself to be restricted: and as generating values which must always, take second place ifthe confit with values or priontes from elsewhere, ‘The second sort of approach tothe Idea ofa female ethic’ results then, both {com a ertque of essetilism, and Irom an attempt to see whether an alternative approach to questions about moral reasoning and ethical priorities can be derived {or a consideration of those spheres fife and activity which have been regarded as paradigmaticaly female. Two things in particular. have been suggested. The frst Is that there are sn fact common or typical diferences inthe ways in whlch ‘women and men think or reason about moral issues, This view of couse. is not new. It has normally been expressed, however in terms ofa dfieney on the part ‘of women; women ate incapable of reason. of acting on principes: they are emotional. intuitive, too personal. and so forth. Perhaps, however. we might recognize diference without ascribing deficiency: and maybe a consideration of female moral reasoning can highlight the problems inthe male forms ofeasoning ‘whieh have been seen asthe norm? ‘The second important suggestion can be summariaed as follows. It starts from the assumption that specific socal practices generate thet own vision of what i ‘goo! or what is to be especially valued, theie own concerns and prortes. and their own ctiteria for what isto be seen as a "virtue. Perhaps, then, the social Dractices, especially those of mothering and caring for others. which have tra- ditionally been regarded as female, can be sen as generating ethical priorities 493 PART VII * CHALLENGE AND CRITIQUE and conceptions of virtue’ which should not only not be devalued but which can also provide a corrective to the more destructive values and priorities of those spheres of atvity which have been dominated by men, Tn her influential book In A Diferent Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (z982) Carol Gilligan argued that those who have suggested that ‘women typically reason differently for men about moral issues are right; what fs wrong is their assumption of the inferiority or deficiency of female moral reasoning. The starting point for Giligan's work was an examination of the work ‘of Lawrence Kohlberg on moral development in children, Kohiberg attempted to ‘lenify'stagesin moral development. which could be analysed by a consideration ofthe responses children gave to questions about how they would resolve a moral dilemma, The ‘highest stage. the stage at which. in fact, Kohlberg wanted to say that a specifically moral framework of reasoning was being used, was that at ‘hich moral dilemmas were resolved by an appeal to rules and principles, logical decision about priorities, n the light of the prior acceptance of such rules or principles. Fora general consideration of Kohiberg's work, see Article 41. MORALITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT) ‘A much quoted example of Kobberp’s method, discussed in detail by Gilligan Is the case of two eleven-year-old chikiren. ‘Jake’ and "Amy". Jake and! Amy were ‘asked to respond tothe following dilemma: a man called Hein has a wife whois

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