EN BANC

[G.R. No. 166471, March 22 : 2011]

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, PETITIONER, VS. LA TRINIDAD

WATER DISTRICT, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition[1] challenges the 1 October 2004 Judgment [2] and 6 November 2004 Order[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in
Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878.

The Facts

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the

Cooperative Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic water services
in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet.

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC's application. LTWD
claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
Section 47 states that:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or

agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any
portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said
district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be
subject to review by the Administration.

In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC's
application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, [4] the NWRB held that LTWD's
franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found
that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks
system. NWRB stated that:
With respect to LTWD's opposition, this Board observes that:

1. It is a substantial reproduction of its opposition to the application for water permits

previously filed by this same CPC applicant, under WUC No. 98-17 and 98-62 which was
decided upon by this Board on April 27, 2000. The issues being raised by Oppositor had
been already resolved when this Board said in pertinent portions of its decision:

"The authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is not Exclusive. While Barangay
Tawang is within their territorial jurisdiction, this does not mean that all others are
excluded in engaging in such service, especially, if the district is not capable of
supplying water within the area. This Board has time and again ruled that the
"Exclusive Franchise" provision under P.D. 198 has misled most water districts to
believe that it likewise extends to be [sic] the waters within their territorial boundaries.
Such ideological adherence collides head on with the constitutional provision that "ALL
WATERS AND NATURAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE STATE". (Sec. 2, Art. XII) and
that "No franchise, certificate or authorization for the operation of public [sic] shall be
exclusive in character".

xxxx

All the foregoing premises all considered, and finding that Applicant is legally and
financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system; that the said
operation shall redound to the benefit of the homeowners/residents of the subdivision,
thereby, promoting public service in a proper and suitable manner, the instant
application for a Certificate of Public Convenience is, hereby, GRANTED. [5]

LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002 Resolution, [6] the
NWRB denied the motion.

LTWD appealed to the RTC.

The RTC's Ruling

In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the NWRB's 23 July 2002 Resolution
and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled TMPC's CPC. The RTC held that Section 47
is valid. The RTC stated that:

The Constitution uses the term "exclusive in character". To give effect to this provision,
a reasonable, practical and logical interpretation should be adopted without disregard to
the ultimate purpose of the Constitution. What is this ultimate purpose? It is for the
state, through its authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and
maintain ultimate control and supervision over the operation of public utilities. Essential
part of this control and supervision is the authority to grant a franchise for the
operation of a public utility to any person or entity, and to amend or repeal an existing
franchise to serve the requirements of public interest. Thus, what is repugnant to the
Constitution is a grant of franchise "exclusive in character" so as to preclude the State
itself from granting a franchise to any other person or entity than the present grantee
when public interest so requires. In other words, no franchise of whatever nature can
preclude the State, through its duly authorized agencies or instrumentalities, from
granting franchise to any person or entity, or to repeal or amend a franchise already
granted. Consequently, the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit a franchise that is
exclusive on its face, meaning, that the grantee shall be allowed to exercise this
present right or privilege to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, the grantee cannot
set up its exclusive franchise against the ultimate authority of the State. [7]

TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November 2004 Order, the RTC denied
the motion. Hence, the present petition.

Issue

TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as
amended, is valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to
a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,[8] the Court held that, "What one cannot do
directly, he cannot do indirectly."[9] In Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino,
[10]
 quoting Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[11] the Court held
that, "This Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal maxim that those that
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."[12] In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[13] the Court held that, "No one is
allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly." [14]

The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the
operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive
in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other
entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
(Empahsis supplied)

Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
(Emphasis supplied)

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are
clear -- franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall
such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of
the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. In Security Bank and Trust Company
v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61,[15] the Court held that:

Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same
according to its clear language. As we have held in the case of Quijano v.
Development Bank of the Philippines:

"x x x We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and
unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court had
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called
for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or
construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and
unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that
its mandate is obeyed."[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc.,[17] the Court

held that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall
not be exclusive."[18] In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications
Commission,[19] the Court held that, "Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an
exclusive `franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization' to operate a public
utility."[20] In National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that,
"Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by this Court such that in
most, if not all, grants by the government to private corporations, the interpretation of
rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee." [22] In Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission,
[23]
 the Court held that, "The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive
in nature."[24]

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do
directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot
create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of
Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA)
to create franchises that are exclusive in character.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)
created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of
LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.
Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or

agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any
portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of
said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution,
however, shall be subject to review by the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform
to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that
do not conform to it.

In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,[25] the Court held that, "It is basic
that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution." [26] In Sabio
v. Gordon,[27] the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is
the `basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform.'" [28] In Atty.
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,[29] the Court held that, "The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for
being unconstitutional."[30] In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance
System,[31] the Court held that:

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any

norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract."[32] (Emphasis supplied)

To reiterate, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. They uniformly command that "nor shall
such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." This constitutional prohibition is
absolute and accepts no exception. On the other hand, PD No. 198, as amended, allows
the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character.
Section 47 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency x x
x unless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents
thereto x x x subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a
glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently
unconstitutional.

Section 47 gives the BOD and the LWUA the authority to make an exception to the
absolute prohibition in the Constitution. In short, the BOD and the LWUA are given the
discretion to create franchises that are exclusive in character. The BOD and the LWUA
are not even legislative bodies. The BOD is not a regulatory body but simply a
management board of a water district. Indeed, neither the BOD nor the LWUA can be
granted the power to create any exception to the absolute prohibition in the
Constitution, a power that Congress itself cannot exercise.

In Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala,[33] the Court categorically declared Section

47 void. The Court held that:

Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of

CPCs for the reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab
initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 -- the constitution in force when
P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973
Constitution reads:

"SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the

operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so requires. The State shall encourage
equity participation in public utiltities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in the capital thereof."

This provision has been substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution, including the prohibition against exclusive franchises.

xxxx

Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public
utilities, is clearly repugnant to Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution,
it is unconstitutional and may not, therefore, be relied upon by petitioner in support
of its opposition against respondent's application for CPC and the subsequent grant
thereof by the NWRB.

WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

The dissenting opinion declares Section 47 valid and constitutional. In effect, the
dissenting opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can create indirectly franchises that
are exclusive in character; (2) the BOD can create directly franchises that are exclusive
in character; (3) the LWUA can create directly franchises that are exclusive in
character; and (4) the Court should allow the creation of franchises that are exclusive
in character.

Stated differently, the dissenting opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can violate
indirectly the Constitution; (2) the BOD can violate directly the Constitution; (3) the
LWUA can violate directly the Constitution; and (4) the Court should allow the violation
of the Constitution.

The dissenting opinion states that the BOD and the LWUA can create franchises that are
exclusive in character "based on reasonable and legitimate grounds," and such creation
"should not be construed as a violation of the constitutional mandate on the non-
exclusivity of a franchise" because it "merely refers to regulation" which is part of "the
government's inherent right to exercise police power in regulating public utilities" and
that their violation of the Constitution "would carry with it the legal presumption that
public officers regularly perform their official functions." The dissenting opinion states
that:

To begin with, a government agency's refusal to grant a franchise to another entity,

based on reasonable and legitimate grounds, should not be construed as a violation of
the constitutional mandate on the non-exclusivity of a franchise; this merely refers to
regulation, which the Constitution does not prohibit. To say that a legal provision is
unconstitutional simply because it enables a government instrumentality to determine
the propriety of granting a franchise is contrary to the government's inherent right to
exercise police power in regulating public utilities for the protection of the public and
the utilities themselves. The refusal of the local water district or the LWUA to consent to
the grant of other franchises would carry with it the legal presumption that public
officers regularly perform their official functions.

The dissenting opinion states two "reasonable and legitimate grounds" for the creation
of exclusive franchise: (1) protection of "the government's investment," [35] and (2)
avoidance of "a situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of
public utilities in poor and remote areas." [36]

There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The

Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President,
Congress, the Court, the BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow the
Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution.
This rule is basic.

In Social Justice Society,[37] the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield
obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed."[38] In Sabio,[39] the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest
law of the land. It is `the basic and paramount law to which x x x all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid,
however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.'"[40] In Bengzon
v. Drilon,[41] the Court held that, "the three branches of government must discharge
their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the
Constitution."[42] In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections,[43] the Court held that, "The
three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which
it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to [the
Constitution's] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."[44]

Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the
plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution.
This rule is basic.

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,[45] the

Court held that, "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not
repugnant to the Constitution."[46] In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of
Social Welfare and Development,[47] the Court held that, police power "is `the power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to
the constitution.'"[48] In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,[49] the
Court held that, "police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not repugnant to
the Constitution."[50]

There is no question that the effect of Section 47 is the creation of franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 47 expressly allows the BOD and the LWUA to create
franchises that are exclusive in character.

The dissenting opinion explains why the BOD and the LWUA should be allowed to create
franchises that are exclusive in character -- to protect "the government's investment"
and to avoid "a situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of
public utilities in poor and remote areas." The dissenting opinion declares that these are
"reasonable and legitimate grounds." The dissenting opinion also states that, "The
refusal of the local water district or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other
franchises would carry with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly
perform their official functions."

When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio,[51] the Court held that,
"A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative
power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its
basic principles."[52] The effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it is void.

In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited,[53] the

Court held that, "This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution."[54] In Bengzon,[55] the Court held that, "The Constitution expressly confers
on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees." [56] In Mutuc,[57] the
Court held that:

The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to
the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the
legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions
with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes
must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or
formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in
deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts
of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this
basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental
measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.[58]

Sustaining the RTC's ruling would make a dangerous precedent. It will allow Congress
to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. In order to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition on franchises that are exclusive in character, all Congress has to do is to
create a law allowing the BOD and the LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in
character, as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Section 47 of Presidential Decree

No. 198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET ASIDE the 1 October 2004 Judgment and 6
November 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La
Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878 and REINSTATE the 23 July 2002
Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision of the National Water Resources Board.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama,
Jr., Perez, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, J., consistent with my position in Metropolitan Cebu.. v. Adala,
I concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I join the dissent of J. Brion.
Brion,  J., I dissent: see opinion.
Abad, J., see concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

EN BANC
 G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner, v. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and
DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action

for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 76911 has divested Regional
Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.

The antecedents are not disputed.

In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section
261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada
Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both
public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The
COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the
prosecution of the cases.

Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus

Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen,
Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows:

a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents

Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.

b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and
Ruben Magluyoan.

c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel
Chua only;

d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada

Amor only.

In an Order2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay,

as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases
to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases
with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty
in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent
portions of the Order read as follows:
[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged
for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under
Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but
not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus
disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.

Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as
Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the
Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal

ordinance committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an

imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and
other penalties including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature,
value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses
including damages to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the
cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed
six (6) years.

The two motions4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC

Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal
Department having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17
October 1997,5 the petitioner filed this special civil action. It contends that
public respondent has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No.
7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses because pursuant to Section
268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling in Alberto [sic] vs.
Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original
jurisdiction over election offenses.

On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the

Solicitor General to comment on the petition.

In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General

informs us that it is adopting the instant petition on the ground that the
challenged orders of public respondent are clearly not in accordance with
existing laws and jurisprudence.
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the
duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged
orders to appear for and defend him.

In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has
divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the
imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A.
7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with
its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then
conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with
imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial
Courts.

We resolved to give due course to the petition.

Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote.6 It reads as follows:

SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall have the
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal
will lie as in other criminal cases.

Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated
in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private
respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section, thus:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in

the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee,
or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special
forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-
military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who,
directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a
peace officer.

Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the
Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is imprisonment of
not less than one year but not more than six years and the offender shall not
be subject to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office
and deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides
as follows:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal

ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with

imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals7 that by virtue of the

exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by
specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty
prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are
punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision
correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained
by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided
for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of
B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the
Decree on Intellectual Property;8 and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,9 as
amended.

Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election

offenses also fall within the exception.

As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by

Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law
that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by
one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an
exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A.
No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is
merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of
repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified.
That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special
provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the
opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.

It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any,
to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the
principles of law,10 to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of
the system of the law itself,11 to be faithful to the law, and to maintain
professional competence.12 cräläwvirtualibräry

Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioners Law

Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his
reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for
Reconsideration13 he filed with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:

As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the
case of Alberto Naldeza vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009,
March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec.
265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under the Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The
Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on
offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions
stand together with the provisions that any election offense under the code
shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and
shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we
submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC
jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of exception to the general
provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691
does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite
its expanded jurisdiction. (Underscoring ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto -vs- Judge Juan
Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between
the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law
would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election
Code the Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the
Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on
offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions
stands together with the provision that any election offense under the code
shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and
shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We
submit that it is the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional
Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the
provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as
amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act No.
7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses
despite its expanded jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct
name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as
indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the
petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in
volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely
represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the
SCRA.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena
deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or
rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted
portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in
the decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates

that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August
1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-
1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said
cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply
with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of

his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

FIRST DIVISION
 G.R. No. 123871. August 31, 1998

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BANK

OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

As a general rule, a trial court that has established jurisdiction over the main action
also acquires jurisdiction over a third-party complaint, even if it could not have done so
had the latter been filed as an independent action. This rule, however, does not apply
to banks that have agreed to submit their disputes over check clearings to arbitration
under the rules of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation. In that event, primary
recourse should be to the PCHC Arbitration Committee, without prejudice to an appeal
to the trial courts. In other words, without first resorting to the PCHC, the third-party
complaint would be premature.

The Case

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision
dated February 12, 1996 promulgated by the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-GR CV No.
44804; which affirmed the trial courts Order dated September 16, 1991, dismissing
petitioners third-party complaint against private respondent. 2

Facts of the Case

The facts are undisputed. Reproduced hereunder is Respondent Courts narration:

Hyatt Terraces Baguio issued two crossed checks drawn against Allied Banking Corp.
(hereinafter, ALLIED) in favor of appellee Meszellen Commodities Services, Inc.
(hereinafter, MESZELLEN). Said checks were deposited on August 5, 1980 and August
18, 1980, respectively, with the now defunct Commercial Bank and Trust Company
(hereinafter, COMTRUST). Upon receipt of the above checks, COMTRUST stamped at
the back thereof the warranty All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements
guaranteed. After the checks were cleared through the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (hereinafter, PCHC), ALLIED BANK paid the proceeds of said checks to
COMTRUST as the collecting bank.

On March 17, 1981, the payee, MESZELLEN, sued the drawee, ALLIED BANK, for
damages which it allegedly suffered when the value[s] of the checks were paid not to it
but to some other person.

Almost ten years later, or on January 10, 1991, before defendant ALLIED BANK could
finish presenting its evidence, it filed a third party complaint against Bank of the
Philippine Islands (hereinafter, BPI, appellee herein) as successor-in-interest of
COMTRUST, for reimbursement in the event that it would be adjudged liable in the main
case to pay plaintiff, MESZELLEN. The third party complaint was admitted [in] an Order
dated May 16, 1991 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 162. On July
16, 1991, BPI filed a motion to dismiss said third party complaint grounded on the
following: 1) that the court ha[d] no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and 2)
that the cause of action of the third party plaintiff ha[d] already prescribed.

On September 16, 1991, the trial court issued an order dismissing the third party
complaint. Defendant-third party plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of this order was
subsequently denied.3

Respondent Courts Ruling

Respondent Court affirmed the trial court thus:

x x x Appellants submission that the cause of action of the third party plaintiff against
the third party defendant accrued only when the complaint in the original case was filed
on March 17, 1981 is untenable. As earlier discussed, the defendant has a separate
cause of action (in respect of plaintiffs complaint) against a third party in the original
and principal case. Reviewing the third-party complaint below, that cause of action is
the supposed erroneous endorsement made by COMTRUST for which ALLIED BANK is
being held liable for damages by the payee-appellee. Without COMTRUSTs warranties
as a general endorser, ALLIED BANK allegedly would not have paid on the checks.
Should such warranties prove to be false and inaccurate, COMTRUST may be held liable
for any damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.

Based on the records the subject endorsement of COMTRUST was made in August
1980[;] and in the same period, ALLIED BANK paid on the subject checks. From that
moment, ALLIED BANK could have instituted an action against COMTRUST. It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the
computation of the period (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, p. 41, citing
Manresa). This is the moment when a cause of action may be deemed to accrue. Thus,
considering that the third party complaint was filed more than ten years from August
1980, specifically on January 10, 1991, the same can no longer be entertained.

Even granting arguendo that the lower court had jurisdiction over the third party
complaint and the cause of action thereof had not yet prescribed, the filing of the third
party complaint should nevertheless be disallowed considering that defendant has
already presented several witnesses and is about ready to rest its case because, then,
the allowance of the third party complaint would only delay the resolution of the original
case. (Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the Phil. vs. Tempengko, supra, p. 423).

A final word. We have noted the curious situation here where, instead of the payee
suing its bank, i.e., the collecting bank (which is COMTRUST), it opted to sue the
drawee bank (ALLIED BANK). It is, however, up to the trial court to rule on the
propriety of the latter complaint.4cräläwvirtualibräry

Not satisfied with the above ruling, petitioner filed the present petition before this
Court.5

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:6 cräläwvirtualibräry

I. The Respondent Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the cause of action
of the third-party complaint ha[d] already prescribed.

II. The Respondent Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the filing of the
third party complaint should be disallowed as it would only delay the resolution of the
case.

On the other hand, private respondent argues that the trial court had no authority to
admit a third-party claim that was filed by one bank against another and involved a
check cleared through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC). To the mind of
the Court, this is the critical issue.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Critical Issue: Mandatory Recourse to PCHC

To buttress its claim, private respondent contends that petitioners remedy rests with
the PCHC, of which both Allied and BPI are members, in consonance with the Clearing
House Rules and Regulations which, in part, states:

Sec. 38 - Arbitration

Any dispute or controversy between two or more clearing participants involving any
check/item cleared thru PCHC shall be submitted to the Arbitration Committee, upon
written complaint of any involved participant by filing the same with the PCHC serving
the same upon the other party or parties, who shall within fifteen (15) days after
receipt thereof file with the Arbitration Committee its written answer to such written
complaint and also within the same period serve the same upon the complaining
participant, xxx.

Private respondent cites Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking
Corporation7 and Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals,8 which upheld the right of the
PCHC to settle and adjudicate disputes between member banks. In Banco de Oro, the
Court ruled:

The participation of the two banks, petitioner and private respondent, in the clearing
operations of PCHC is a manifestation of their submission to its jurisdiction. Secs. 3 and
36.6 of the PCHC-CHRR clearing rules and regulations provide:

Sec. 3. AGREEMENT TO THESE RULES. - It is the general agreement and understanding

that any participant in the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, MICR clearing
operations[,] by the mere fact of their participation, thereby manifests its agreement to
these Rules and Regulations and its subsequent amendments.
Sec. 36.6. (ARBITRATION) - The fact that a bank participates in the clearing operations
of the PCHC shall be deemed its written and subscribed consent to the binding effect of
this arbitration agreement as if it had done so in accordance with section 4 of (the)
Republic Act. No. 876, otherwise known as the Arbitration Law.

Further[,] Section 2 of the Arbitration Law mandates:

Two or more persons or parties may submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators
any controversy existing between them at the time of the submission and which may be
the subject of any action, or the parties of any contract may in such contract agree to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them. Such submission or
contract shall be valid and irrevocable, save upon grounds as exist at law for the
revocation of any contract.

Such submission or contract may include question arising out of valuations, appraisals
or other controversies which may be collateral, incidental, precedent or subsequent to
any issue between the parties. (Italics supplied.)

Associated Bank also disallowed a similar third-party complaint, ruling thus:

Under the rules and regulations of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC),
the mere act of participation of the parties concerned in its operations in effect amounts
to a manifestation of agreement by the parties to abide by its rules and regulations. As
a consequence of such participation, a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the courts
over disputes and controversies which fall under the PCHC Rules and Regulations
without first going through the arbitration processes laid out by the body. Since claims
relating to the regularity of checks cleared by banking institutions are among those
claims which should first be submitted for resolution by the PCHCs Arbitration
Committee, petitioner Associated Bank, having voluntarily bound itself to abide by such
rules and regulations, is estopped from seeking relief from the Regional Trial Court on
the coattails of a private claim and in the guise of a third party complaint without first
having obtained a decision adverse to its claim from the said body. It cannot bypass the
arbitration process on the basis of its averment that its third party complaint is
inextricably linked to the original complaint in the Regional Trial Court.

xxx

Clearly therefore, petitioner Associated Bank, by its voluntary participation and its
consent to the arbitration rules cannot go directly to the Regional Trial Court when it
finds it convenient to do so. The jurisdiction of the PCHC under the rules and
regulations is clear, undeniable and is particularly applicable to all the parties in the
third party complaint under their obligation to first seek redress of their disputes and
grievances [from] the PCHC before going to the trial court.

Finally, the contention that the third party complaint should not have been dismissed
for being a necessary and inseparable offshoot of the main case over which the court a
quo had already exercised jurisdiction misses the fundamental point about such
pleading. A third party complaint is a mere procedural device which under the Rules of
Court is allowed only with the courts permission. It is an action actually independent of,
separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint (s)uch that, were it not for the Rules
of Court, it would be necessary to file the action separately from the original complaint
by the defendant against the third party. (Italics supplied.)

Banco de Oro and Associated Bank  are clear and unequivocal: a third-party complaint

of one bank against another involving a check cleared through the PCHC is unavailing,
unless the third-party claimant has first exhausted the arbitral authority of the PCHC
Arbitration Committee and obtained a decision from said body adverse to its claim.

Recognizing the role of the PCHC in the arbitration of disputes between participating
banks, the Court in Associated Bank further held: Pursuant to its function involving the
clearing of checks and other clearing items, the PCHC has adopted rules and regulations
designed to provide member banks with a procedure whereby disputes involving the
clearance of checks and other negotiable instruments undergo a process of arbitration
prior to submission to the courts below. This procedure not only ensures a uniformity of
rulings relating to factual disputes involving checks and other negotiable instruments
but also provides a mechanism for settling minor disputes among participating and
member banks which would otherwise go directly to the trial courts.

We defer to the primary authority of PCHC over the present dispute, because its
technical expertise in this field enables it to better resolve questions of this nature. This
is not prejudicial to the interest of any party, since primary recourse to the PCHC does
not preclude an appeal to the regional trial courts on questions of law. Section 13 of the
PCHC Rules reads:

Sec. 13. The findings of facts of the decision or award rendered by the Arbitration
Committee or by the sole Arbitrator as the case may be shall be final and conclusive
upon all the parties in said arbitration dispute. The decision or award of the Arbitration
Committee or of the Sole Arbitrator shall be appealable only on questions of law to any
of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region where the Head
Office of any of the parties is located. The appellant shall perfect his appeal by filing a
notice of appeal to the Arbitration Secretariat and filing a Petition with the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region xxx.

Furthermore, when the error is so patent, gross and prejudicial as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion, courts may address questions of fact already decided by the
arbitrator.9
cräläwvirtualibräry

We are not unaware of the rule that a trial court, which has jurisdiction over the main
action, also has jurisdiction over the third party complaint, even if the said court would
have had no jurisdiction over it had it been filed as an independent action. 10 However,
this doctrine does not apply in the case of banks, which have given written and
subscribed consent to arbitration under the auspices of the PCHC.

By participating in the clearing operations of the PCHC, petitioner agreed to submit

disputes of this nature to arbitration. Accordingly, it cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the trial courts without a prior recourse to the PCHC Arbitration Committee. Having
given its free and voluntary consent to the arbitration clause, petitioner cannot
unilaterally take it back according to its whim. In the world of commerce, especially in
the field of banking, the promised word is crucial. Once given, it may no longer be
broken.
Upon the other hand, arbitration as an alternative method of dispute-resolution is
encouraged by this Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, it also hastens
solutions especially of commercial disputes.

In view of the foregoing, a discussion of the issues raised by the petitioners is

unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 174813-15               March 17, 2009

NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING

JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR
VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon
City, Branch 86, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order
dated 2 October 2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.

The facts of the case are as follows.

On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of
acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel
and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family
Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-
123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.

On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking
Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been
filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases.

On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes
charged.

On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation
affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-
123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved
by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.

On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the
Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date,
the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even
date.

Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present
Petition for Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:

CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE
CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE
OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST
THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION? 2

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,

immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.3

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion
by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court.4

In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the
Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect,
petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond
the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters,
when refused.5 However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be
compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to
grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to
Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is
not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is
contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is a
Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in
Sanchez v. Demetriou7:

The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we
do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.

The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special
cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that
will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper
remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus,  not certiorari or
prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)

Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan
Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order of
the respondent Judge therein denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six
other persons for alleged rape and homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that
there was discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion of two other persons in the
Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom
the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if
there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in
that case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges
against said two other persons.

In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the
trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City
Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos
v. Orda, Jr.,9 we reiterated the doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul, 10 that
once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case
or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of
the trial court. Thus, we held:

In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public
prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary
to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to
dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the
action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or
the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in
compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not
out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of
its judicial prerogative.

Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have
"deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case." 11 Petitioners cite
the following portion of our Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12:

In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was,
therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to
consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it
had filed should stand.13
Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our Decision,
carefully cutting off the portions which would expose the real import of our pronouncements. The
Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for
Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded nonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly
thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis of a Resolution of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The dismissal of the case in
Montesa, Jr. was done despite the disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor’s Resolution by
the Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact that the
reinvestigation the latter ordered was still ongoing, since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We held that the judge should have waited for the conclusion
of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting on whether or not the case should be
dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, the
continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in Montesa, Jr. reads:

Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. In
Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:

Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's
motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers
the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such
resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.

The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case
never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter
disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the
Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No.
5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911. 14

As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to
establish a doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether
or not there is probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of
the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the
arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of
the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to
due process of law.15

In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners’ counsel, he tries to convince us that a
judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution only when there is
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where
there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to
Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners’ counsel states in the Memorandum:
6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9
pages which was attached to the URGENT PETITION did not point out any iota of grave abuse of
discretion committed by Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor of the sons
of the Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued by RJBAY is NULL and VOID in view of the recent
ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5,
1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states that:

"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the court’s bare denial of a motion to
withdraw information pursuant to the Secretary’s resolution is void." (Underscoring ours).

6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of
the OSG because of its falsity.16

This statement of petitioners’ counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our
Decision in Ledesma.17 The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the
statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides:

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice

In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the
correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's letter, the
information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive
discussion in the motion for reconsideration - all of which were submitted to the court - the trial judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based
solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our
repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the
motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the
absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely
ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's
recommendation.18 (Emphasis supplied.)

It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in violation of
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.

Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear that
the passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words "Underscoring ours"
after the text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the
original. Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar.

To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information is
void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a
Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment of the issues
presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening paragraph of Ledesma states:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause
based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case,
the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further
with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court,
however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate
such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having
already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.19 (Emphases supplied.) 1avvphi1 .zw+

Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Order
apparently states that there was no probable cause against petitioners:

WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and
acts of lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw informations is DENIED.

Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24, 2006 at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning.20 (Underscoring ours.)

Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no probable cause
against them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City Prosecutor should be
granted.21

Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of the word
"no" in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed Order states in full:

After a careful study of the sworn statements of the complainants and the resolution dated March 3,
2006 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, the Court finds that there was probable
cause against the herein accused. The actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and
acts of lasciviousness cannot be the basis of dismissal or withdrawal of the herein cases. Failure to
shout or offer tenatious resistance did not make voluntary the complainants’ submission to the
criminal acts of the accused (People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214, 2002). The complainants’
affidavits indicate that the accused helped one another in committing the acts complained of.
Considering that the attackers were not strangers but their trusted classmates who enticed them to
go to the house where they were molested, the complainants cannot be expected to react forcefully
or violently in protecting themselves from the unexpected turn of events. Considering also that both
complainants were fifteen (15) years of age and considered children under our laws, the ruling of the
Supreme Court in People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004 becomes very relevant.
The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals
would when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have
undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar
circumstances. The range of emotions shown by rape victim is yet to be captured even by calculus.
It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims (People v. Malones, G.R. Nos.
124388-90, March 11, 2004).

The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after the
alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in nature and
should be evaluated after full blown trial on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of
prejudgment against the accused.22
As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found probable
cause against the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the reasons for such
finding. Indeed, the general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or
the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where the inevitable conclusion
from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail. 23

In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion
to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters
involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in
the exercise of either.24 The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on
the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the
government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a
requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar. 25

Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding of
probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case. After
going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed
probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We decided to omit a detailed
discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that might result
should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of probable
cause.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the proceedings therein.
The Regional Trial Court is directed to act on the case with dispatch.

Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO* ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 568, dated 12 February 2009, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, designating Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio to replace Associate Justice Ma.
Alicia Austria-Martinez, who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness Program.

 The real name of the alleged victim is withheld per Republic Act No. 7610 and Republic Act
1

No. 9262, as held in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502
SCRA 419.

2
 Rollo, pp. 346-347.

3
 Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court.

4
 Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, 407 Phil. 619, 646 (2001).

5
 Angchangco v. The Honorable Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766, 772 (1997).

6
 Id. at 771-772

7
 G.R. Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993, 227 SCRA 627.

8
 Id. at 643.

9
 G.R. No. 158236, 1 September 2004, 437 SCRA 504, 514-515.

10
 G.R. No. L-53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462.

11
 Rollo, pp. 369-370.

12
 G.R. No. 114302, 29 September 1995, 248 SCRA 641.
13
 Id. at 650-651.

14
 Id. at 651.

15
 Id. at 650.

16
 Rollo, p. 370.

17
 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207 (1997).

18
 Id. at 235-236.

19
 Id. at 217.

20
 Rollo, p. 41.

21
 Id. at 13.

22
 Id. at 40-41.

 Olac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84256, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 321, 328;
23

Aguirre v. Aguirre, 157 Phil. 449, 455 (1974); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Hon. Calauag, 120
Phil. 338, 342-343 (1964).

24
 Angchangco v. The Honorable Ombudsman, supra note 5 at 771-772.

25
 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17 at 235-236.