The Last Post-Cold War

Socialist Federation
 Federalism Studies
Series Editor: Søren Dosenrode

The end of the Cold War profoundly altered the dynamics between and within
the various states in Europe and the rest of the World, resulting in a resurgence
of interest in the concept of federalism. This shift in balance has been further
fuelled by the increase in the number of conflicts arising from the disaffection of
the diverse ethnic or religious minorities residing within these states (e.g. Sudan,
Iraq). Globalization is forcing governments not only to work together, but also
to reconsider their internal roles as guarantors of economic growth, with regions
playing the major part.

Federalism Studies offers academics a complete and in-depth understanding of

federalism and intergovernmental relations in historical, theoretical and comparative
contexts. Intended to be international and interdisciplinary in scope, the books in
the series are designed to build a common framework for the constructive analysis
of federalism. Contributions are welcome on topics which explore federalism as a
theory; as a political system and as a form of conflict management.

Also in the series

Iraqi Federalism and the Kurds

Learning to Live Together
Alex Danilovich
ISBN 978 1 4094 5111 2

Federalism beyond Federations

Asymmetry and Processes of Resymmetrisation in Europe
Edited by Ferran Requejo and Klaus-Jürgen Nagel
ISBN 978 1 4094 0922 9

The EU and Federalism

Polities and Policies Compared
Edited by Finn Laursen
ISBN 978 1 4094 1216 8

The Ashgate Research Companion to Federalism

Edited by Ann Ward and Lee Ward
ISBN 978 0 7546 7131 2
 The Last Post-Cold War
Socialist Federation
Ethnicity, Ideology and Democracy in Ethiopia

Semahagn Gashu Abebe

University of Connecticut, USA
© Semahagn Gashu Abebe 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Semahagn Gashu Abebe has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work.

Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company
Wey Court East 110 Cherry Street
Union Road Suite 3-1
Farnham Burlington, VT 05401-3818
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www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:

Abebe, Semahagn Gashu.
The last post-cold war socialist federation : ethnicity, ideology and democracy in
Ethiopia / by Semahagn Gashu Abebe.
pages cm.—(Federalism studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4724-1208-9 (hardback)—ISBN 978-1-4724-1209-6 (ebook)—ISBN
978-1-4724-1210-2 (epub) 1. Federal government—Ethiopia. 2. Ethiopia—Politics
and government—1991– 3. Ethnicity—Political aspects—Ethiopia. 4. Ethnic groups—
Political activity—Ethiopia. 5. Ethiopia—Ethnic relations—Political aspects.
6. Democratization—Ethiopia. I. Title.
JQ3756.S8A34 2014
320.463’049—dc23
2014015822

ISBN: 9781472412089 (hbk)

ISBN: 9781472412096 (ebk – PDF)
ISBN: 9781472412102 (ebk – ePUB)

Printed in the United Kingdom by Henry Ling Limited,

at the Dorset Press, Dorchester, DT1 1HD
 Contents

List of Acronyms vii

Table of Statutes ix
Acknowledgementsxi

Introduction1

1 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 7

2 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 47

3 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 69

4 Development of Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional

Movements in Ethiopia 93

5 The Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic

Federalism in Ethiopia 123

6 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination in the

Ethiopian Ethnic Federal System and its Implications 153

7 The Implications of Party Ideology in the Structure and

Function of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federal System 189

8 The Role of Party Ideology in the Democratisation and

Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia 235

Concluding Remarks 253

Bibliography259
Index275
 This book is dedicated to the memory of the countless Ethiopian men
and women who paid the ultimate price to bring about political change
during the last half century.
 List of Acronyms

ANDM Amhara National Democratic Movement

APAP Action Professionals' Association for the People
CCI Council of Constitutional Inquiry
CSOs Civil Society Organizations
CUD Coalition for Unity and Democracy
EHRCO Ethiopian Human Rights Council
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front
ELM Eritrean Liberation Movement
EPLF Eritrean Liberation Front
EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democracy
EPRP Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
ETA Ethiopia Teachers Association
EWLA Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association
FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
HoF the House of Federation
MLLT Marxist-Leninist League Tigray
NEBE National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
OFDM Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
ONC Oromo National Congress
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO Oromo People’s Democratic Organization
PDRE People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
SEPDM South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement
SNNPR Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regions
TPLF Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
WPE Workers’ Party of Ethiopia
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Table of Statutes

Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949.

Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
Constitution of India, 1949.
Constitution of Soviet Socialist Republic, 1977.
Spanish Constitution, 1978.
Swiss Federal Constitution, 1999.
The Articles of Confederation the United States, 1781.
The Belgian Constitution, 2007.
The Constitution Act of Canada, 1867.
The Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia, 1955.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Acknowledgements

First, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Almighty God for granting
me the opportunity and the strength to complete this book. Secondly, my deepest
appreciation and utmost gratitude go to my mentor Professor Dr Peter Tobias Stoll
for his relentless guidance throughout my university studies as well as during the
preparation of the manuscript. I am also indebted to his dedication in providing
me with the necessary assistance and insightful comments on the draft of the
manuscript. I would also like to extend my words of appreciation to the German
Academic Exchange Service for providing the financial assistance needed to
fund my studies at the University of Goettingen. I am also indebted to the staff
and students of the Institute of International and European Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Goettingen for creating such a friendly environment in which I felt
at home while in Germany.
The publication of this book would not have been possible without the direct
and indirect support extended to me by several institutions. In particular, I would
like to express my thanks to the Bank of Ireland for financing my post-doctoral
fellowship work at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of
Ireland, Galway. In addition, I would like to take the opportunity to thank the
Irish Centre for Human Rights for granting me a post-doctoral research fellowship
dedicated to the preparation of the manuscript of this volume. My appreciation also
goes to the Center for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism at McGill University for
offering to me the O’Brien Fellowship in Residence that was partly dedicated
for further work on the manuscript. Thanks are also due to Scholars at Risk for
its commendable work in assisting threatened scholars to find hosting research
institutions. I am also grateful to Ashgate Publishing for bringing my work to
fruition through the printing and distribution of this book.
It is my privilege to extend my deep gratitude and thanks to my colleagues,
friends and members of family who have been at my side during the challenging
times of my study and research. I am particularly indebted to the moral as well
as technical support graciously extended by my colleagues, including Tsegaye
Regassa, Birru Gebeyehu, Oliver Ückert, Worku Yifru, and Johannes Jürging.
In addition, I extend my thanks to my friends Kifle Alemneh and Dr Hailu
Defabachew for their friendship and advice and for making my five-year stay
in Goettingen more than enjoyable. My special thanks are also extended to my
close friends Hailu, Beshir and Alemaw for their moral and spiritual support. I
am deeply indebted to members of my family whose understanding and love has
been instrumental in my life. In particular may I extend my special gratitude to my
brother Dr Nurelign Gashu Abebe and his wife Meskrem, my sister Melke and her
xii The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

husband Dereje and my other sister Martha. I would also like to thank Bethlehem
Hailu and Eskedar Addisu for their uninterrupted encouragement and inspiration
during the process of completing the manuscript. My appreciation also goes to
members of the Ethiopian community in Goettingen, Galway and Montreal whose
social contacts greatly helped me to maintain the Ethiopian cultural and spiritual
life. I am deeply grateful to Professor Theodore M. Vestal and Professor Solomon
Gashaw for their generous and insightful review notes about the book. I also
must extend my thanks to Dermott Barrett in Dublin for his professionalism and
advice and his dedication in copy-editing and proofreading the final manuscript to
a tight deadline. Lastly, I express my heartfelt thanks to all my family members
and friends whose names have not been mentioned here, but have always been
besides me during days of happiness and challenges in my life.
 Introduction

What path should a country follow in its transition from autocracy to democracy?
This has been the thorny question puzzling new states of Africa and other
developing countries that could not convincingly undertake democratic transition.
Although the majority of the African states have a ‘legion of ethnic groups’,
many of the newly-formed states installed a centralised constitutional form of
government following the example of the former colonial powers, mainly France
and the United Kingdom. Though a federal system of government is prescribed
as a pragmatic remedy for multicultural societies in Africa, political leaders
have often rejected the idea for fear of worsening the existing ethnic tensions in
these countries. Federal or decentralised forms of government have been largely
considered a threat to national cohesion and unity. Earlier attempts to adopt a
federal system of government in Central and East Africa were largely a failure.
The Nigerian federal system, the long-standing federal system in Africa, has also
undergone different traumatic experiences.
Nevertheless, the renewed interest in federal systems of government that
was manifested after the fall of the Berlin Wall has made its own impact across
Africa. In addition to the Nigerian federal system, currently there are other such
systems in Africa that are designed to address ethnic and religious diversities. One
of the countries which adopted the most radical version of ethnic federalism is
Ethiopia. After the overthrow of the military socialist government (1974–91) by a
violent armed struggle in 1991, reform measures were undertaken to establish an
ethnic-based federal system as a complete departure from the historical centralised
system of the past. After the adoption of the 1995 constitution, Ethiopia is officially
designated as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Since its inception,
there have been a number of normative and empirical studies conducted on the
Ethiopian federal system. In particular, comparative studies of the Ethiopian
federal system have been made in relation to other multicultural federations such
as Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, India, South Africa and Nigeria.
Though such kinds of comparative studies are significant in terms of providing
research outputs to create a better understanding of the Ethiopian federal system,
the remarkable ideological differences between multicultural federations in other
countries and the Ethiopian ethnic federal system significantly undermines the
relevance of such studies. Making a comparative study of the Ethiopian federal
system in light of democratic federal systems and analysing such a study only from
formal constitutional perspectives does not sufficiently explain the origin, structure
and function of the Ethiopian ethnic federal system. Not only are the foundations
and principles governing the Ethiopian federal system unique compared to other
2 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

multicultural federations, but it also needs to be remembered that the system is

not largely regulated along the lines of formal constitutional principles. Instead,
the federal system in Ethiopia is mainly regulated by the policies of the ruling
party rather than by the merits of the constitution. Considering the significance of
informal party policies in regulating the federal system, approaching the Ethiopian
model from the perspective of the fundamental Marxist ideological principles
maintained by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)/Ethiopian Peoples’
Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF) provides a deeper insight into the
structure and function of the existing ethnic federal system in the country. Most
of the ideological perceptions pursued by TPLF/EPRDF are akin to the former
socialist federations and the Marxist organisation of the state.
Despite the fact that the Ethiopian federal system has developed some
new constitutional and ideological principles different from that of the former
socialist federations mainly due to the ending of the Cold War, it is fundamentally
a socialist federal system based on the Stalinist notion of ‘the right to self-
determination of nationalities’ and Marxist-Leninist organisational principles of
the state. The book assesses the structure and functioning of the Ethiopian federal
system from the perspective of the basic ideological considerations that are
harboured by the ruling regime to regulate the federal system. The most important
hypothesis advanced in this study is that the ideological convictions of TPLF/
EPRDF are by far the most significant factors in shaping the origin, structure,
operation and dynamics of the federal system. The fundamental ideological
concepts of TPLF/EPRDF that have been used to structure and govern the
federal system are the right to self-determination of nationalities, revolutionary
democracy, developmental state doctrines and by-party rules on gimgemma (party
evaluation), democratic centralism as well as neo-patrimonialist mobilisation of
party membership and support.
The most potent ingredient of the Marxist ideology of the Ethiopian revol-
utionary movement is ‘the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination’
up to and including secession that was introduced into the students’ movement at
the end of the 1960s. The students’ movement appealed to this doctrine directly
from the principles applied to structuring the former USSR system of government.
In order to demonstrate the relevance of the Stalinist paradigm to Ethiopia, elites
had to exaggerate the development stage of the various ethnic groups in the
country. The radical student groups not only considered Ethiopia akin to Tsarist
Russia as a ‘prison house of nationalities’ but also sought to ‘resolve’ the problem
through Stalinist principles of self-determination either on the basis of autonomy,
federal relations with other nations or complete secession. Particularly, some of the
radical ethno-regional movements began capitalising on the notion of ‘question of
nationalities’. Most importantly, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF),
the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF) applied the doctrine of the right to self-determination to promote their
respective ethno-regional demands. After TPLF/EPRDF gained control of state
power in 1991, it immediately translated its political programme into practice by
 Introduction 3

incorporating the ‘self-determination of nationalities’ rhetoric into the transitional

charter and later into the federal constitution.
The other bedrock principle that TPLF/EPRDF implemented to maintain
political hegemony in controlling the federal system is the principle of
revolutionary democracy. Revolutionary democracy constitutes the core ideology
of the ruling elite and the key concept to the comprehension of Ethiopian political
discourse in the last two decades. The party’s conception of democracy is not
the liberal ‘bourgeois’ principles that is based on individual participation and
diversity of political views. Without having a clear perspective on TPLF/EPRDF’s
concept of revolutionary democracy, it will be a futile attempt to grasp the
challenges of Ethiopia’s transition to democracy and the functioning of the federal
system. Studying the various aspects of revolutionary democracy sheds light on
the backsliding of the democratisation process and the tightly controlled federal
system in the country.
While it is officially claimed to be a system regulated by the principles of the
constitution, in real terms the system is regulated by the ideals of revolutionary
democracy. Consequently, the Ethiopian administration is governed by two
parallel systems. On the one hand, the federal system is formally regulated
by certain constitutional principles such as transparency, accountability of
government, vertical and horizontal separation of powers, protection of human
rights and the establishment of democratic institutions. On the other hand, the
system is practically regulated by the merits of revolutionary democracy that
do not recognise popular sovereignty, independence of institutions and equality
of citizens. Contrary to the principle of popular sovereignty, revolutionary
democracy recognises popular participation in the light of implementing policies
that emanate from the elites at the top of the party structure rather than from a
bottom-up approach. The Ethiopian federal system can be best understood when
it is studied against the de facto ideological principles of revolutionary democracy
rather than the de jure principles provided under the constitution.
The other most important ideological rhetoric regulating the political discourse
in Ethiopia is the doctrine of a developmental state. This ideology is a new form of
policy that has been advanced by TPLF/EPRDF since 2006. It is aimed at boosting
legitimacy of the regime on the ability of the ‘developmental state’ to deliver roads,
schools and exaggerated rates of gross domestic product (GDP) growth. After the
2005 general election fiasco, the regime vigorously emphasised the concept of the
developmental state. The merits of this vision are simply a more articulated version
of the economic objectives of revolutionary democracy. In the last few years, the
aggressive application of the model has realised numerous implications for the
country’s political discourse as well as the democratisation and federalisation
process. The doctrine has now become the most significant policy instrument the
government has resorted to, to secure legitimacy. Many of the news bulletins and
documents released by the state media have wholly focused on ‘developmental
issues’. Matters related to democracy, maladministration, economic challenges of
the public and other crucial problems in the Ethiopian society have been censored
4 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

from the media coverage. The implementation of the developmental state doctrine
has further narrowed down the political space by granting unlimited power to the
government to interfere and control the social, economic and political activities of
the people. Due to the central role of the developmental state rhetoric in regulating
the political discourse of the country in general and the federal system in particular,
it is significant to study the implications of the model in regulating the country’s
constitutional system.
The other ideological mechanism used by TPLF/EPRDF to shape the
country’s political discourse and intergovernmental relations is through the
application of the principle of Leninist democratic centralism. The impact of this
principle in shaping the Ethiopian federal system is immense, though it has not
been properly analysed by scholars studying the Ethiopian constitutional system.
By its nature, democratic centralism is contrary to the ideals of democratic
governance. While democracy requires leaders to abide by the decisions or
interests of the public, democratic centralism demands the public to abide by the
policies forwarded by the top elite who claim to know what is best for society.
According to the essences of democratic centralism, if any member of the party
attempts to challenge the decisions of the party, it amounts to factionalism and
serious measures will be taken.
Though the application of democratic centralism has enabled TPLF/EPRDF
to be efficient in terms of ensuring discipline within the party structure, the
wider application of the system has brought about different implications to
the democratisation process in the country. Apart from being used to maintain
discipline within the party, democratic centralism is one of the major principles
currently used to regulate government structure and intergovernmental relations.
The principle is responsible for undermining the separation of powers principle,
the significance of official channels of government and the accountability of the
system. Though there are legislative, executive and judicial organs within the
Ethiopian constitutional system, the separation of powers principle has been
undermined due to the party’s principle of democratic centralism.
The system of gimgemma is also one of the important mechanisms used by
TPLF/EPRDF to control federal and regional state apparatus. It refers to a forum
of peer evaluation by party members. In gimgemma, every member’s party or
governmental activity is evaluated during regular meetings of relevant party
or government employees. Though gimgemma has proved to be an efficient
mechanism to maintain party discipline and unity, it has far-reaching implications
on the function of the federal system. Primarily, it is not clear how gimgemma is
compatible with the principles of accountability, transparency and due process
that are recognised under the constitution. The scope and role of gimgemma has
overshadowed the role of democratic mechanisms of accountability which are
recognised under the constitution.
The other ingredient which has seriously undermined Ethiopia’s federal
system is neo-patrimonial and rent-seeking patterns largely emanating from the
policies maintained by TPLF/EPRDF. Trends of neo-patrimonial and political
 Introduction 5

corruption are observed within the Ethiopian political system. In the political
sphere, since TPLF/EPRDF has the power to legislate any law or policy without
any mechanism available to check its power, the political leaders act beyond
public accountability and control. Over the years, the patrimonial party network
has resulted in increasingly rent-seeking trends in the political, economic and
social relations of the country. Since TPLF/EPRDF has a total monopoly of the
political space and economic resources of Ethiopia, rent-seeking behaviour has
become widespread. Due to the fact that party members of the federal and regional
governments are becoming clients, their relationship with the party is largely
driven by economic considerations rather than a commitment to a system of party
policy or accountability. Such relationships have led to the degeneration of the rule
of law, accountability, transparency and formal political institutions.
This book explores the implications of the application of the ideological
principles of TPLF/EPRDF in shaping the structure and function of the Ethiopian
federal system. It particularly addresses the impact of each ideology on national
consensus, the protection of human rights, the rights of minority groups, the
separation of power principles and the relationship between the federal and
regional governments. The book furthermore explores the impact of the ideological
principles on the democratisation process and the building of institutions such as
parliamentary democracy, the judiciary, the media and civil society organisations.
The book consists of eight chapters. The first two chapters deal with the
general theories and experiences of federalism and federal systems while the
rest of the book deals with the analysis of the Ethiopian federal system. The
first chapter looks at theories of federalism as well as other related concepts
such as the features of the federal system, its advantages and disadvantages. It
particularly deals with issues such as the theoretical foundations of federalism,
federalism as a distinctive discipline as well as the definitions and features of
federalism forwarded by prominent scholars of federalism. The advantages
of adopting a federal system of government as well as some of the pitfalls of
adopting federalism are also discussed. The first chapter also addresses the
conceptual framework of ethnicity, ethnic groups and minority groups, including
the modes of accommodating ethnic diversity.
Chapter 2 examines the structures and features of socialist federations. The
former socialist federations were established fundamentally on the entrenched
ideology of ‘the right to self-determination of nations and nationalities’ and the
Marxist organisation of the state. Though the relevance of such systems has
largely faded away, the impact of such ideology is deeply rooted in the formation
and function of the Ethiopian ethnic federal system. In light of this relevance,
the chapter attempts to highlight the fundamental features of socialist federations
with a view to comprehend the ideological background of the Ethiopian federal
system.
The book, from Chapter 3 onwards, focuses on the various perspectives of the
Ethiopian federal system. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the historical background of
Ethiopia’s ancient civilisation and the development of a constitutional legal system.
6 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

It takes a close look at the history and ethnic diversity of the country along with the
various constitutions which were enacted over the years. Chapter 4 illustrates the
development of ideological radicalism and ethno-regional movements in Ethiopia.
It addresses the origin and development of ideological radicalism in the Ethiopian
political discourse and the development of the major ethno-regional movements
such as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigrayan People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF) is discussed at length. Chapter 5 of the book deals with
the fundamental ideological principles governing ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.
This chapter especially provides an extensive treatment of the major ideological
principles governing the Ethiopian ethnic federal system. Ideological principles
such as the right to self-determination of nations and nationalities, the principle
of revolutionary democracy, the newly introduced developmental state model,
democratic centralism, gimgemma and the neo-patrimonial party organisation are
all put under the spotlight.
Chapter 6 deals with the various implications of the principle of the right to
self-determination of ‘nations and nationalities’ in the functioning of the Ethiopian
federal system. Chapter 7 provides an insight into the implications of the various
ideological principles such as revolutionary democracy, democratic centralism,
gimgemma and the doctrine of the developmental state in the structure and the
function of the Ethiopian federal system. In particular, it focuses on the role of
ideological manoeuvring in terms of affecting the relations between the central
and the regional governments along with the impact on the separation of powers
and checks and balances between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary
branches of the state.
The last chapter emphasises the role of the ideological concepts of TPLF/
EPRDF in terms of building an effective democratic system of government. It
looks at how the ideological principles followed by the regime undermined
prospects for the development of civil society groups, multiparty democracy
and an independent media. The final section provides concluding remarks and a
summary of recommendations that are relevant to rectify the adverse impact of the
application of ideological perceptions of TPLF/EPRDF on the democratisation
and federalisation of the Ethiopian political system.
 Chapter 1
Federalism and the
Accommodation of Diversity

One of the prominent features of modern federalism is its use in managing cultural
diversity. The five long-standing democracies with complex cultural and linguistic
diversity (Belgium, Canada, India, Spain and Switzerland) are all federal states.
Federalism in these countries is a pragmatic compromise between the divergent
linguistic and religious groups which history has thrown together. Since
multicultural federations have their own features and structures distinct from other
territorially-defined federations, they deserve special theoretical and empirical
treatment. This chapter discusses the conceptual, theoretical and structural issues
of federalism and the accommodation of diversity, particularly concepts and issues
on ethnicity, minority rights and modes of accommodating ethnic diversity as well
as the opportunities and challenges of ethnic federal systems.

Definition and Theories of Federalism

The term federalism is derived from the Latin word fedus, which means an
alliance or pact among individuals or collectives aiming at the promotion of
both individual and common interests (Burgess 2006: 5–6). The term federation
was also treated as synonymous with confederation when it was first used. Both
terminologies were defined as a loose alliance of independent states whose main
purpose was military and whose common objectives rested upon the good faith of
its members (Karmis and Norman 2005: 6). Although federal arrangements have
been observed throughout recorded history, federal theory is a relatively recent
phenomenon that developed in the sixteenth century in response to the rise of
strong central states (Karmis and Norman 2005: 25). One of the first classical
theorists who advanced the idea of federalism and is often regarded as the father
of modern federalist thought is Johannes Althusius (1557–1630). In Politica
Methodice Digesta, he argued for autonomy of his city Emden against its Lutheran
provincial lord and against the Catholic emperor. However, the ideas he promoted
cannot be analysed in terms of the modern theory of federalism, which distinctly
associates federalism with self-rule and shared rule of the central and peripheral
units. Althusius’s argument for federalism stresses that there is no self-sufficiency
by any person or group and that there is a need for association ‘first of villagers
and then larger commonwealths embracing wide areas for political association and
communication’ (Friedrich 1968: 32).
8 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

For Montesquieu, federalism is a convention by which several small states

agree to become members of a bigger one, which they intend to establish (Friedrich
1968: 55). His definition was made in the context of defending the republican form
of government against the monarchy. Jean-Jacques Rousseau similarly advocated
Europe to be united as a federation and viewed this as a way of addressing the
conflicts and wars that characterised Europe at the time. He asserted that, ‘if there
is any way of reconciling these dangerous contradictions, it was to be found only
in such a form of federal government as would unite nations by bonds similar
to those which already united their individual members, and placed the one no
less than the other under the authority of the law’ (Friedrich 1968: 6). Similarly,
Immanuel Kant holds that the right of nations shall be based on a pacific federation
among free states rather than a peace treaty or an international state (Kant 1975).
Later, such classical discussions of federal theory took a radical turn with the
American invention of a new type of federal system in the late eighteenth century.
Attracted by the invention of federalism by the Americans, many political thinkers
wrote in detail about the characteristics and significance of a federal arrangement.
The essentials of American federalism were amplified by a series of articles that were
issued in Federalist papers during the inception of the American federal invention.
Proudhon was a writer who analysed the inherent features of federalism.
According to him, a federal contract is ‘a system in which the contracting parties
not only undertake bilateral and commutative obligations, but, in making the pact,
reserve for themselves more than they abandon’ (Proudhon 2005: 177). In other
words, he defended the American federal system as a contract between the centre
and states where the two tiers of government give and take some rights and duties.
Such classical theories were the basis of contemporary theories of federalism.
The theories of federalism that developed after World War II are more amplified
and are principally focused on the institutional relations between central and
constituent units as well as institutional and comparative approaches to federalism.
Some of the most influential contemporary theories of federalism were developed
by theorists such as Elazar, King, Riker, Watts and Wheare, each of whom defined
and explained the concept of federalism in a different way.

Table 1.1 Definition of federalism by contemporary scholars of

federalism

Daniel J. • Federalism basically means self-rule plus shared rule that involves
Elazar some kind of permanent contractual linkage that provides for
power-sharing and supplements (Elazar 1987: 12).
• An alternative form of democratic republicanism that
accommodates the diversity inherent in a democracy, or a response
to Jacobin (simple majorities democracy) and Westminster
(parliamentary democracy), equally rejecting the premises and
practical consequences of both as an effective means of giving
democratic expression (Elazar 1996: 2).
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 9

William H. • Federalism is a political organisation in which the activities of

Riker government are divided between regional and central government
in such a way so that each level of government has some activities
on which it can make final decisions (Riker, 1975: 101).
• According to him, a federal arrangement is when there is allotment
of power between the centre and the periphery and there is some
exclusive power granted to each level of government in which the
other cannot intervene.
Kenneth C. • Defined federalism in the light of comparative differences of the
Wheare association embodied in the modern constitution of the United
States and other associations such as the Austro-Hungarian
Empire (1867–1918), the German Empire (1871–1918) and the
Constitution of the Union of South Africa (1909).
• In all these associations of states, the general government is
dependent upon the regional governments, while in the case of the
United States, the general and regional governments co-ordinate
with each other (Wheare 1964: 12).
• The essential feature is not that the distribution of powers is
designed in such a way that the regional governments are the
residual legatees under the constitution but rather, that whoever
has the residue, neither the general nor the regional, is subordinate
to the other.
• He concludes, ‘the test I apply for federal government is simply this:
does a system of government embody predominantly a division of
powers between general and regional authorities, each of which,
in its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the others and independent
of them? If so, the government is federal’ (Wheare 1964: 32–3).
Ronald Watts • Defines federalism in terms of the different forms of federations
and federal political systems.
• Primarily, he defines a federation as a compound polity of
constituent units and the general government in which each
possesses powers delegated to it through a constitution, empowered
to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise of a significant
portion of its legislative, administrative and taxing powers, and
directly elected by its citizens (Watts 1998: 121).

Basic Features of Federations

Federalism is a system of government with features that distinguish it from

unitary or other forms of political arrangements. Some of the peculiar features of
federalism include the existence of a freely entered contract among the constituent
units and a clear separation of powers between the centre and the periphery.

Federalism as a Constitutionally Agreed Contract

Federation is basically a foedus, or an agreement that is freely and mutually

entered into. According to scholars, a federation can only exist when there is
a deep commitment to federalism by the central and regional governments.
10 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

A federal system of government is a mutual consent among the various constituent

parts or as Trudeau notes, ‘federalism is by its very essence a compromise and a
pact’ (Trudeau 2005: 221). He further noted, ‘federal constitutions grow out of the
idea that free people can freely enter into lasting yet limited political associations
to achieve common ends and protect certain rights while preserving their
respective integrities’ (Trudeau 2005: 221). Elazar asserts that federalism is based
on a particular kind of constitutional framework visible in the division of power
between the confederal or federal government and the constituent governments and
such a framework of power is legitimate when it is constitutionally guaranteed as
the principal characteristic of federal democracy (Elazar 1987: 33). According to
Elazar, consensual legitimacy is necessary for a constitution to have real meaning
and for the federal project to have a lasting legacy.

Distribution of Powers in Federations

A major characteristic of federalism is the distribution of power between the centre

and the peripheries (non-centralisation). Although federations have often been
characterised as decentralised political systems, what distinguishes them from
decentralised unitary systems is not just the scope of decentralised responsibilities,
but the guarantee of autonomy for the constituent governments in the constitution.
There are three different approaches to the specificities of power distribution
between central and regional governments. The first approach is to confer a list of
exclusive powers on the federal government while leaving the residual powers to the
constituent states.1 The second approach involves identifying a list of jurisdictions
of the federal and constituent states respectively with an additional clause that
accords residual powers to the federal government.2The third approach is to draw
up two lists dealing with federal jurisdictions and concurrent jurisdictions, while
all residual powers are left to the states.3

Democracy and Federations

One of the thorny issues in the study of federations is the question as to whether
federations should necessarily be democratic. What is most important is whether
federalism is possible without popular democracy and its concomitant institutions
such as political parties and regular elections, among others. Different writers
argue that democracy is a prerequisite for the establishment of a federal system.
They analyse the relationship between federalism and democracy from different
perspectives. Wheare takes an unambiguous position on the relationship between
democracy and federalism:

1 The Ethiopian constitution is an example of such type of distribution of powers.

2 Typical instances of such an arrangement include Belgium and Canada.
3 This is specifically the case in Australia, Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the
United States.
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 11

It may be possible in theory to conceive a federal government in which general

and regional governments are dictatorships and yet each remains strictly within
its own sphere, but it is difficult to imagine such a federal government coming
into existence in the realm of practical politics or continuing to exist for any
length of time. Dictatorship with its one party government and its denial of free
elections is incompatible with the working of the federal principle. Federalism
demands forms of government which have the characteristics usually associated
with democracy or free government. There is a wide variety in the forms which
such government may take, but the main essentials are free election and a party
system, with its guarantee of a responsible opposition (Wheare 1973: 8).

Elazar explains the relationship between democracy and federalism by defining

federalism as an alternative form of democratic governance. According to his
analysis, federalism is a form of democratic republicanism that accommodates the
diversity inherent in a democracy and is an alternative to Jacobin and Westminster
democracy models (Elazar 1996: 2). Ostron similarly stresses that failure to include
some degree of democratic control would make federalisms indistinguishable
from feudalisms (Ostron 1973: 205). Some scholars exclude federations that do
not have democratic rule. According to this argument, only those countries that
have democratic systems as well as having weathered external and internal crises
in the post-World War II period without a major change in their political systems
are considered to be federations (McBeath and Helms 1983: 24). According to
a study, from 20 federal nations in the world, only six of them fit the definition
of democratic federalism: Australia, Austria, Canada, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Switzerland and the United States. Each has a democratically elected
government and has been stable for at least the last generation (McBeath and
Helms 1983: 24).
King presents different justifications to explain why one cannot characterise
federalism as democratic. His primary argument is that since the voting population
of the different territorial units in federations are always of equal voice, votes
of citizens in some territories will have greater force than those of citizens in
other states (King 1982: 82). He also dismisses the idea of an intrinsic relationship
between federalism and democracy, claiming that historical federations such as
Switzerland and the United States had no Bill of Rights until recently and many
of the territorial units remained in the union not by agreement but by military
force (King 1982: 82).4 Despite the fact that some federations might have evolved
without some features of democracy, King’s assessment on the relationship
between federalism and democracy fails to clarify whether federations could
survive without the modern parameters of democracy such as free elections, a
multi-party system and protection of human rights. Instead of assessing the
viability of federations in the absence of major democratic principles, King’s

4 Here one can make reference to the fierce civil wars waged in Switzerland or the
United States for the federal cause.
12 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

criticisms are based largely on power imbalances between the constituent units
and the lack of democracy during the origin of some of the federations.
Despite differences in perspectives on the relationship between federalism and
democracy, the constitutions of many of the federal states claim to be democratic
and prominent democratic states that appeared in history are federal in form. In
the constitutional system of Germany, for instance, democracy is a fundamental
principle of state (staatsfundamentalnormen) inherent in the very existence of
the system. Article 20 of the Basic Law provides that the Federal Republic of
Germany is a democratic and social federal state. The same provision provides
that all state authority is derived from the people through elections. In other words,
in Germany’s political system, sovereignty of the people (Volkssouveränität) is the
most important element of the democratic nature of the federal system.
In other federal systems, the existence of democracy as a basic element in the
federal system is not clearly stipulated in their constitutions. For instance, the
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation does not specifically contain a provision
on democracy, but the various principles enshrined in the constitution and the
democratic culture that has been practised in the country are clear indications that
affirm it as a democratic federal state. The unprecedented commitment shown by
the founding fathers of the United States constitution towards democratic values
is another instance that illustrates that a working federal system is inconceivable
without some commitment to democracy.
Generally, a close observation of successful federations in the world indicates
that democracy continues to be the fundamental principle of federal systems,
ensuring state continuity and survival. In fact it is generally accepted that federal
arrangements are more likely to succeed in states with established traditions of
democracy and rule of law (Ghai 2000: 16). The disintegration of federations in
the socialist camp in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall is clear evidence
that proves that although it may be possible to maintain federal state arrangements
for a while by coercive force, a sustainable federal polity is inconceivable without
commitment to genuine democracy.

Types of Federations

Federations take various forms that depend on the purpose of their existence.
Some forms of federation are developed in proportion to the nature of their origin,
while other types are formulated in relation to the respective distribution of power
between the centre and the constituent units and the relative power and size of the
constituent units.
Federal systems may evolve through holding-together and coming-together
federations:
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 13

Holding-Together Federations Coming-Together Federations

• Emanates from the quest of • Independent states may come

unitary states to alleviate threats of together to form collaborations for
secession by territorially clustered different purposes such as security
minorities. or economic prosperity.
• Grant some sub-units particular • Such ‘coming-together’ federations
domains of sovereignty, such as are arranged to constrain the
language and cultural rights, while centre and prevent majorities from
maintaining a broad scope of action overriding a sub-unit.
for the central government. • This type of federation is generally
• Federations such as Belgium, based on the consent of entities
Ethiopia, India and Spain were that recognise the advantages of
all political systems with strong coming together. Some examples
unitary features before they became of federations formed through such
decentralised federal governments. a process are Australia, Switzerland
and the USA.

Symmetrical versus Asymmetrical Federations

Federations can also be classified as asymmetrical and symmetrical.

Asymmetrical Federalism Symmetrical Federalism

• Constituent states have different • A system whereby the constituent

powers and competencies, depend- states exercise the same powers and
ing on their respective roles in enjoy the same representation.
the federation due to economic, • The best example of such form of
political, population or geographic federation is the United States.
size.
• Examples: Canada, Belgium, Spain.

Co-operative versus Competitive Federations

Federations can also be classified as co-operative or competitive, depending on the

relationship between the central and regional governments.
14 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Co-operative Federalism Competitive Federalism

• The relationship between the federal • Competition between regional

government and the constituent or sub-national units with each
units is based on co-operation rather other (horizontal competition) and
than on competition. between national and sub-national
• A typical case is the German federal governments (vertical competition).
system. • Dual federalism is a practice that
prevails in the United States federal
system, which assumes that the two
levels of government are separate
and co-sovereign.

Forms of Federal Arrangement

Different forms of federal arrangements have been developed in different political

systems.

• Federation: The first and most common form of federation is the one
which is the invention of the 1787 United States Constitution, where a
clear-cut division of power is given to the federal and the constituent states.
Federations normally involve territorial division of authority, typically
entrenched in the constitution which neither a sub-unit nor the centre can
unilaterally alter.
• Federal arrangement: This is the other form of federal polity. In this
case, the states are not formally federal but in some way introduce federal
principles into their political systems to accommodate diversities in society
(Elazar 1987: 44).
• Union: It is a polity that deliberately unites what were formerly separate
countries or peoples by common consent (Elazar 1987: 47).
• Confederations: An alliance of independent sovereign states working
together for a common purpose. The passage from the American
Article of Confederation to the 1787 American Constitution led to the
conventional distinction between confederation and federations (Karmis
and Norman 2005: 5). The common way of distinguishing between
federations and confederations is that the latter is a ‘loose’ union, in
contrast to the former (Karmis and Norman 2005: 5). In other words,
confederations have weaker centres than federations.
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 15

Advantages and Pitfalls of Federations

Similar to other systems of government, federalism has its advantages and

poses its own challenges. The justifications for adopting a federal system of
government vary from one system to another. For some, a federation is a way
of forging strong government to defend against foreign aggression, while for
others it is the only political formula available to hold together a country that is
ravaged by ethnic and religious conflicts. Despite its success in creating political
moderations, federalism has its own loopholes that emanate from the nature
of the system itself and partly due to specific challenges peculiar to different
federal arrangements. The following section assesses the various advantages and
the challenges of federations.

Advantages of Federal Systems

Different scholars have noted the various advantages of federations. Daniel Elazar
summarises the advantages of federal arrangements in different political contexts
prevalent in countries that have adopted the federal system of government as a
response to real situations:

Federal forms have been applied to a widening variety of relationships ranging

from federalism in support of group pluralism and individual liberties in the
United States, to federalism in support of local liberties in Switzerland and
federalism on a linguistic basis in India, to federalism as a means of gaining
mild decentralisation in Venezuela. Federal arrangements to accommodate
ethnic differences are becoming widespread in Canada, Belgium, Spain and the
United Kingdom (under other names) as well as Malaysia and Nigeria. In every
case, these developments have emerged as practical responses to real situations
(Elazar 1987: 10).

The obvious advantage of adopting a federal system is in its application as a

pragmatic solution to specific political problems prevalent in different countries. For
the various countries identified by Elazar, the justifications for adopting the federal
system of government are numerous, ranging from decentralising power between
central and regional units to the accommodation of ethnic and linguistic diversity.
Other scholars limit the goals of a federal system to protection of individual
rights against encroachment on the part of the central government or against
the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Alemante 2003: 57). MacPherson also identifies
three different advantages of having a federal polity. According to him, it is
a system of government which is based on compromise of powers; it helps
to reconcile past historic tension and promotes tolerance, trust and respect
in society (MacPherson 1994: 10–11). Karmis and Norman enumerate the
advantages of federal systems in relation to military and economic benefits.
They maintain that a federal system helps small, homogenous units by providing
16 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

a centre for facilitating their social and economic activities as integral parts of a
larger political unity and removing internal barriers to trade (Karmis and Norman
2005: 8).
Federations have the advantage of providing political groups to negotiate
on their political differences. They create a political platform for continued
negotiation and bargaining on major social, economic and political issues between
stakeholders involved in the federal process (Lalande 1978: 44). Such continued
political dialogue in federations promotes and transforms the state of permanent
tension that exists between the groups into peace and stability (Lalande 1978: 44).
Some scholars associate the advantages of federal systems with keeping in check
the tyranny of business interests that may dominate the political platform through
economic monopoly (Kymlicka 2005). In general, the numerous advantages
of federations identified by different scholars are diverse, extending from the
older federal polities that were established for defence purposes, to the modern
federations that are important institutions of democracy to promote the rights and
liberties of individuals and minority groups.

The Pitfalls in Building a Federal System

Despite the fact that federalism has numerous advantages, it also has challenges
and pitfalls. The most serious challenge for the stability of federations is the
absence of a common sense of nationality, especially in countries with several
religious and ethnic groups. According to some scholars, federalism has not proved
to be a particularly good device for integrating diverse nationalities into a single
political system (Elazar 1987: 169). Some scholars even warn that the federal
system will rather reinforce existing social cleavages (Schuck 2006: 10–11). This
happens when the system concentrates too much on accommodating differences
and ignores building on traditions and values of the people (Schuck 2006: 11).
In other words, federalism poses risks when a country focuses on differences,
diversity or grievances, rather than on nourishing a comprehensive, shared sense
of identification and belonging (Schuck 2006: 11).5
Federalism is also inherently unstable (Ostrom 1973: 230–31). One source
of instability is the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces that exist
in societies (Bryce 1991). The existence of a high level of political controversy
is another source of instability. As Ostrom (1973) notes, a highly federalised
political system will be prone to recurrent stalemates involving complicated
relationships between the two layers of government (p. 231). Federalism is
also criticised for its inability to address the differences in society that cannot
be captured in territorial terms (MacPherson 1994: 11). Since federalism is
premised on territorial considerations, it can’t save federal nations where ethnic

5 The case of Czechoslovakia is usually cited as an example where disintegration

partly happened due to failure of the system to think in terms of shared history, values and
aspirations for the future.
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 17

configurations do not follow clear territorial boundaries (MacPherson 1994: 11).

Ethnic federal structures always create minorities in the territory which might be
subject to exploitation (Schuck 2006: 11). Federations are also considered to be
costly, wasteful and inefficient due to a duplication of services and overlapping
of jurisdictions (Ostrom 1973: 231). It is clear that a highly federalised political
system will require larger expenditures of time and effort on public decision-
making than a unitary system of government (Ostrom 1973: 231). Scholars warn
that it is not the ‘magic’ answer to every problem of human conflict (Burgess 2006:
3) because of the various pitfalls outlined above.

Conditions for Forging a Successful Federation

Although the success and failure of federations are largely relative, with no
standard conditions used for all forms of federations, there are certain central
features that may contribute to the success or failure of federations. The basic
ingredients for successful federations are largely those principles that have
contributed to establishing some of the outstanding federal systems that have
realised a sustainable political community. One of the major factors that contribute
to the success of federations is related to their origin. It is believed that federations
that emerge out of painful political bargaining and consensus rather than coercion
sustained by the threat of power are successful (Burgess 1993: 6). This is because
federalism is largely an attempt to find a national compromise between divergent
interest groups which history has thrown together. This compromise must be
based fundamentally on the will of the people (Trudeau 1968: 224). Almost all
successful federal systems have not been imposed from the outside but have
developed ingeniously in ways that suited the entities involved (Elazar 1987:
247). Federations that emerge out of political bargaining are also more likely to be
considered legitimate by their citizens and more likely to survive than those that
result from coercion. Thus, the primary determinants of success for a federation
are consensus and negotiation of the various political forces.
In discussing the need for political compromise, Wheare highlights defence,
economic, geographic or national factors (Wheare 1973: 35). He further stresses
that in order to be under a single independent government, the political actors must
agree to entrust independent regional governments with certain exclusive matters
(Wheare 1973: 35). Elazar (1987) refers to such a requirement as a ‘political
culture’ that rests upon some basic commitment to power-sharing. Some scholars
link the forging of a successful federation with charismatic political leadership
that helps to engender a federal political culture (Schuck 2006: 12). Elazar refers
to this quality of leadership as an ‘elite of government by a single strong man’
(Elazar 1987: 247).
The presences of certain factors (e.g. a common colonial heritage and a
common language) are also necessary requirements for the success of federations
(Ostrom 1973: 173). The availability of resources is an important dimension in the
successful application of federal principles, particularly in poor countries (Elazar
18 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

1987: 246). The size of the constituent units has also been identified as another
important factor. According to Wheare (1973), there must be reasonable balance,
which will ensure that all the units can maintain their independence. Elazar (1987)
emphasises that the constituents in a federal system must be fairly equal in terms
of population and wealth or at least balanced geographically or numerically. It
has also been asserted that federations with several units have a better chance of
success than those comprising of just a few units.6 The balance of power between
the centre and the states could also be affected by the system of government in
each federal state, especially in relation to the executive-legislature relationship.7

Conceptual Framework on Ethnicity and Group Rights

In the study of ethnicity and accommodation of diversity, various interrelated

concepts and terminologies are applied that sometimes appear to be overlapping.
Concepts such as ethnicity, ethnic group, nation, nationalism and minorities
are some of the concepts that are frequently used in the study of multicultural
federalism and the accommodation of diversity. Clarifying the meaning and
cross-cutting relations of the concepts is essential to understand the challenges
of multi-ethnic societies in general and the nature of multicultural federations
in particular.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups

The concepts of ethnicity and ethnic group have a long history which derives from
the Greek word ethnos which is translated as people of the same race that share
a distinctive culture. Although many scholars have attempted to define the term
ethnicity or ethnic group, there is no consensus on its meaning and scope. Many
of the definitions associate ethnicity and ethnic groups with the perception of the
group having common descent or origin. According to the definition provided by
Max Weber, the concept of ethnic group refers to ‘the subjective belief of the group
members in their common descent combined with culture’ (Schaefer 2008: 457). In
the same line of argument, Yinger (1994) defines ethnic group as ‘a segment of a
larger society whose members are thought by themselves or others to have a common

6 The case of Cyprus is usually cited as illustrative of such a problem. Due to the
existence of only two territories that divide the country into two (Greek and Turkish)
communities, political bargaining has long been elusive.
7 ‘The different forms of this relationship, as exemplified by the separation of
powers in the presidential-congressional structure in the United States, the fixed-term
collegial executive in Switzerland and the executive-legislative fusion with parliamentary
arrangements in Canada, Australia, Germany (with some modifications), Belgium, India,
and Malaysia have shaped not only the character of politics and administration within the
shared institutions, but the nature of inter-governmental relations’ (Watts 1994: 126).
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 19

origin and to share important segments of a common culture and to participate in

shared activities’ (p. 3). Pogge (1997) similarly argues that ‘to constitute an ethnic
group, a set of persons must satisfy three conditions: communality of descent,
communality of continuous culture and closure’ (p. 193–4).
Hutchinson and Smith (1996) have defined an ethnic group as ‘a part of human
population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or
more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity
among at least some of its members’ (p. 6–7). Other scholars define ethnicity in
relation to its political dimension. According to Ghai (2000), ‘when markers
such as language, race, religion, and colour cease to be mere means of social
distinctions and become the basis of political identity and claims to a specific role
in the political process of power, ethnic distinctions are transformed into ethnicity
(p. 4)’. Such political discourses of ethnic movements are marked by the promotion
of unifying symbols such as language, religion, genealogy, music, literature and
history (Wilson 1996: 437). According to such an argument, ‘as long as culturally
and politically aware social groups can create a believable narrative of common
descent in confrontation with other groups, ethnicity will be maintained, revived
or created’ (Schaefer 2008: 458).

Approaches to Understanding Ethnicity

Different approaches have been used by social scientists to understand the nature
of ethnicity as a factor in human life and society. The two major approaches to
ethnicity are primordialism and instrumentalism. The primordialist school of
thought argues that ethnicity is something given at birth and is fixed or permanent.
Proponents of this approach argue that peoples’ ethnic identities have genetic
foundations and that the motivation for ethnic and kinship affiliation comes
from these socio-psychological forces internal to the individual and related to
primordial human needs for security (Geertz 1973, Smith 1981). Many of the
proponents of primordialism do not agree with the assertion that ethnicity is
largely organised to attain some political and economic goals. Rather, they claim
that the manipulation of ethnicity to attain political, economic and cultural goals is
a modern manifestation (Fishman 1980: 84).
Instrumentalists diverge significantly from the primordialist conception of
ethnicity. The instrumentalist approach argues that ethnicity should be regarded as
a type of political resource for competing interest groups (Hutchinson and Smith
1981: 33). They generally view ethnicity as ‘a social construct that emphasises the
sharing of cultural and linguistic characteristics and kinship roots for the purpose
of group mobilisation’ (Messay 2001: 268). They argue that ethnicity should be
regarded as a type of political resource for competing interest groups (Hutchinson
and Smith 1981: 33). Proponents of this approach view ethnicity as a characteristic
that can be changed, constructed and manipulated to gain specific political or
economic ends (Eriksen 2001: 45).
20 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Instrumentalists blame the use of ethnicity for achieving political purposes

as a source of conflict. Instrumentalisation of ethnic identities to achieve some
form of political and economic gains has been observed in many of the nationalist
movements, especially in countries where resources are scarce. There seems to be a
consensus today that the primordial approach does not capture the essence of ethnic
identities and cannot explain why ethnicity remains a source of political action
in its interaction with others and changes according to circumstances (Eriksen
2001: 45). It is now widely accepted that although ethnicity has some natural and
historical traces, it is largely constructed for the purpose of manipulation of the
group for the wider political agenda against other groups. This has been the case
behind many of the most violent ethnic conflicts and acts of genocide that took
place in various parts of the world.

Nations and Nationalism

In the study of the accommodation of ethnic diversity, concepts such as nation

and nationalism have their own significance. The dictionary definition of a
nation portrays this entity as a ‘country’ or ‘the body of inhabitants of a country
united under a single independent government; a state’ (Yinger 1994: 10). Many
historians date the rise of nations to the time of the French Revolution and the rise
of the idea of popular sovereignty that transformed passive subjects into active and
self-governing citizens (Hutchinson 1994: 1). In particular, the rise of the nation
as a global political norm has occurred in the last two centuries in relation to the
rise of great industrial revolutions that are synonymous with the rise of modernity
(Hutchinson 1994: 1). However, the term ‘nation’ could have different meanings
depending on the context. It may be synonymous with state, political entities
such as non-self-governing territories as defined in the UN Charter, representing
a people belonging to the same ethno-linguistic group, a culturally homogenised
population living in an existing state or a community of peoples composed of
one or more nationalities and possessing a defined territory and government
(Pamir 1997).
There are different meanings proposed by scholars of different orientations.
Marxists define the concept of nation as ‘a historically evolved, stable
community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up
manifested in a community of culture’ (Stalin 1953: 307). In relation to ethno-
regional political discourse, the term nation refers to an ethnic group with ‘a
strong desire for sovereignty over a territory or a large group of people that have
a common cultural identity that distinguishes them from other groups’ (Bunce
2004: 420). This is largely the interpretation of the concept used by secessionist
ethno-regional movements.
Nationalism refers to a concept that takes pre-existing traditions, memories
and symbols and gives them political significance (Özkirimli and Grosby 2007:
528). There are basically two forms of nationalism. On the one hand, ‘eighteenth
and nineteenth century European nationalism was a unifying force which brought
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 21

together people of diverse backgrounds by subordinating their ethnic identities to

the larger territorial unit dominated by the secular state’ (Pamir 1997). This aspect
of nationalism is derived from the dominant ideology that idealises the secular state
and deprecates the maintenance of any linguistic, religious or other sentiments
that might conflict with loyalty to it. This form of nationalism is termed civic
nationalism (or liberal nationalism) which defines ‘the nation as an association
of people who identify themselves as belonging to the nation, who have equal
and shared political rights and allegiance to similar political procedures’ (Nash
2001: 24).
In civic nationalism, membership to the community does not rest on ethnic
background but on ‘economic well-being and the maintenance and preservation of
a nation’s juridical-political creed’ (Kymlicka 1994: 24). However, this does not
mean that culture is removed from civic conceptions of ‘nationalism but means
that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of his race or colour’
(Kymlicka 1994: 24). The aftermath of the decolonisation process and the creation
of nation states in Asia and after the Second World War followed a pattern of civic
nationalism, despite the ethnic heterogeneity of the former colonies.
The other form of nationalism largely applicable in plural society is allegiance
to one’s ethnic or cultural values (ethnic nationalism). Ethnicity becomes a form of
nationalism when it assumes a political dimension that challenges the legitimacy
of the state in question. It enters the political scene when the nation or the political
leaders claiming to speak on behalf of the nation demand expanded sovereignty on
behalf of the national community (Pamir 1997; Hutchinson 1994: 1). This form of
nationalism has now become ‘the preeminent form for modern claims to political
autonomy and self-determination’ (Calhoun 1993: 213). Ethnic nationalism aims
at preserving national unity based on common descent such as blood, race, history,
language and religion (Pearson 1999: 91–2). ‘Nationalist political demands take
the form of recognition of the minority language as an official language, expanded
representation of members of the nation in economic leadership posts or creation
of a separate representative assembly’ (Hutchinson 1994: 421).

Minority Groups

The other concept that has received scholarly attention as well as political
consideration in the last few decades is the concept of minority groups. At present,
there is no universally agreed definition of minority group. Sociologists, other
scholars in different fields of study and human rights activists define ‘minority
group’ in different ways. The anthropologists Wagely and Harris broadly define
minority group as ‘a subordinate segment of the society that is a self-conscious
unit brought together by the special traits or special disabilities their members
share and membership to this unit is transmitted by the rule of descent or by
choice or necessity’ (Yinger 1994: 21). Lous defines minority groups by bringing
discrimination into a sharper focus. According to Lous, ‘minority is a group of
people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out
22 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal
treatment, who therefore regard themselves as objects of discrimination’ (Yinger
1994: 21).
Nevertheless, the definition of minority groups advanced by United Nations
Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti has emerged as the most widely cited
among international lawyers and policymakers. He defines minority group as:

a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, and in a non-
dominant position whose members – being nationals of the state – pose ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the
population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards
preserving their culture, traditions, religions and language (Capotorti 1977).

Although the definition has been developed to interpret Article 27 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or to fully understand
the complexity of the term ‘minority group’ in international instruments, its
impact has gone beyond the UN system. The definition of Capotorti asserts that
the concept of a minority group is only applicable to ethnic, religious or linguistic
groups, excluding other forms of minorities. It says that the distinguishing factors
of a minority group are non-dominance and numerical inferiority. The meaning
of numerical inferiority and non-dominance is to be established by comparing the
minority group to the entire population of a state in relation to political power,
economic, cultural or social status (Pejic 1997: 671).
Despite significant improvements in the development of international human
rights instruments for the effective protection of minority rights, a legally binding
and comprehensive definition that may be applicable to member countries of the
United Nations has not emerged. For instance, the United Nations Minorities
Declaration of 1992 vaguely refers to minorities that are based on national or
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity and simply provides that states
should protect their existence. Other minority characteristics such as disabilities or
sexual orientation have not yet attained the status of ‘minority group’ in the strict
sense of the term.

Ethnic Conflicts and Modes of Accommodating Ethnic Diversity

Until recently, the nation-state model has been largely considered as the only
stable way of forming states. The post-World War II development of the regime
of human rights has been largely based on the assumption of a nation-state as a
merging of the territory of a state with a nation whose members are united by
ties of history, culture and commitment to a common future (Ghai and Cottrell
2008: 91). The principal basis of rights and obligations in a nation-state is
citizenship where all citizens are equal before the law and enjoy the same rights.
In the context of nation-state, ‘the sovereignty of the people is expressed through
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 23

the state, which provides a common regime of laws, the machinery for justice,
democratic rights in elections and the protection of the rights of individuals (Ghai
and Cottrell 2008: 91). In such a system, a citizen’s linguistic, religious, and
cultural affiliations are irrelevant to his or her relationship to the state.
Until recently, there has been considerable consensus on the view that ethnicity
reflects the conditions of traditional societies that lack modern state institutions.
It was expected that ‘industrialisation, urbanisation and the spread of education
to reduce ethnic consciousness view continued ethno-cultural conflicts as a
transient phenomenon, which will pass in due course’ (Ghai and Cottrell 2008:
91). During the early post-World War II decades, most western social scientists
were advancing the view that ethno-cultural identities would soon disappear in the
modern state (Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 91). They thought that once a prosperous
democracy and economic development was firmly established, the strength of
political mobilisation of ethno-cultural identities would fade away. Even Marxists
had predicted that socialism would signify an end to the ethnic tension and
consciousness that existed in pre-socialist societies (Herther-Spiro 2007: 325).
Generally ‘assimilation of minorities into a large integrated whole was viewed as
inevitable’ (Jalali and Lipset 1992: 585).
Despite these expectations, the last few decades affirm that ethnic
nationalism has become more vibrant than ever. Assimilationist tendencies
proved unworkable, as there is little evidence to suggest that ‘the achievement
of democracy, economic prosperity and personal tolerance leads to the abetment
of ethno-cultural mobilisations’ (Kymlicka 2001: 82–3). On the contrary, ethno-
cultural demands have increased throughout the world. In fact, it is now argued
that ‘the achievement of democratisation, prosperity and tolerance has gone hand
in hand with increased ethno-cultural mobilisation’ (Kymlicka 2001: 82–3). Due
to such developments ‘the nation-state model has come under considerable attack
in recent decades, with the very system that privileges the culture or language of
the majority and marginalises that of other communities being challenged’ (Ghai
and Cottrell 2008: 91). In such systems, ‘the exclusion of minority groups or their
under-representation in the institutions of the state, limited opportunities in the
economy, social discrimination, and lack of access to the legal system and the
denial of justice, have become grounds for mobilisation’ (Ghai and Cottrell 2008:
91). Individual citizen-based rights have evolved into group or collective rights,
‘such as rights to: autonomy, language, special measures, separate electoral laws,
representation in the government and proportionality in public services’ (Ghai and
Cottrell 2008: 92).
Due to such increasing ethnic mobilisations and resistance to the nation-state
model, ethnicity has become a major source of conflict in the world, having caused
the death of ten million people since World War II (Wilson 1996: 433). Ethnic
conflicts have wreaked havoc in most parts of the world in the last few decades.
The new postcolonial countries continue to experience the effects of ethnic
polarisation and ethnic passions have engulfed regions of the world that until
recently were believed to have solved the ‘nationality’ problem (Jalali and Lipset
24 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

1992: 585–6). Ethnic conflicts have already threatened most former communist
countries that were created after the political fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union. In addition, ‘due to the movements for autonomy in Canada, the
United Kingdom, Spain, and France as well as the strivings for a more formally
pluralistic society in the United States, ethnic and racial cleavages have become
part of the political landscape of many western countries’ (Jalali and Lipset 1992:
586). The challenges of accommodating diversity are even more complex in the
multi-ethnic societies of Asia and Africa.
It is now widely accepted that ‘ethnicity contributes to conflicts because of
the emotions related to long-standing resentment towards different ethnic groups
or fear-driven security dilemmas that lead ethnic groups to resort to violence as a
means of protecting the existence of the group’ (Bakke and Wibbels 2006: 11). In
addition, ‘ethnic identifications and mobilisations that instigate conflicts are also
driven by the desire for psychological security and self-esteem and for material
gain’ (Bakke and Wibbels 2006: 11). The desire to have security and acquire
material gain is particularly strongest when common social goods are threatened
(Wilson 1996: 437). Political leaders use the opportunity to stir up hostility among
the groups in order to acquire political power (Wilson 1996: 437). In order to tap
the loyalty of the followers, ethnic entrepreneurs emphasise their common family
characteristics and the threat from non-members (Wilson 1996: 437). Ethnic
groups are particularly convenient bases for generating mass political support for
ethnic entrepreneurs ‘because they provide loyalty, as ethnic leaders represent
not only the political and economic well-being but the psychological identity and
self-esteem of the society’ (Wilson 1996: 437). Due to such complexities, ethno-
nationalist movements are an important part of the dynamics of ethnic-related civil
wars in different countries (Wimmer and Min 2010: 88).
Due to the difficulties associated with the challenges of accommodating ethnic
diversity, historically there have been basically three responses to ethnic diversity:

At one extreme is repression, which has all too often taken the form of genocide
and forced ethnic cleansing. Next is exclusion and marginalisation, where
minority groups simply exist without meaningful participation in the economic
or political life of the larger society. Next is assimilation. Here the dominant
society puts strong pressures on minority cultural groups to abandon their own
values, beliefs, languages, and traditions and adopt those of the wider society
if they wish to be regarded as full citizens. Minority cultures and languages
will be subordinated, sometimes by force, at other times by persuasion (Simeon
2008: 57).

For a long time, many of the western states were engaged in assimilationist and
repressive policies to arrest politically-motivated ethnic mobilisations. After such
policies proved to be unworkable, they attempted to distance themselves from the
issue by claiming the neutrality of the state to cultural rights and appealing to the
civic state model (Arel 2001: 72). Many of the classical theorists of federalism
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 25

did not break with the monistic language of identity which claims: ‘you have to
identify either with your own group or with all of human kind’ (Karmis and Norman
2005: 10). Mill’s famous quotation on ‘free institutions are next to impossible in a
country made up of different nationalities’ still plays an important role and partly
explains the huge challenges of multicultural societies in building sustainable
democratic polities and maintaining unity (Karmis and Norman 2005: 12).
In the last few decades, although the notion of the nation-state still plays a
key role in nation-building processes, ‘attempts to suppress minority nationalism
have been abandoned as unworkable and counter-productive’ (Kymlicka 2001:
31). Moreover, new theoretical discourses on the accommodation and relevance of
ethnic and linguistic diversity have emerged. Some of the theories even perceive
ethnic mobilisation as an appropriate base for state formation. Greertz (1973)
claims that ‘in modernising societies, where the tradition of civil politics is weak,
primordial attachments tend to be repeatedly, in some cases almost continually,
proposed and widely acclaimed as preferred bases for the demarcation of an
autonomous political unit’. Similarly, Seyoum (1997) in his optimist argument on
ethnic diversity in Africa asserts that if properly guided, ethnicity could serve in
mobilising resources to achieve favourable goals of African human society such
as social justice, political change and economic development.
The contemporary scholarly and political discourse on ethnicity has shifted
towards accommodation of ethnic diversity. According to some scholars, even in
liberal democracies the hope is that the protection of basic individual rights would
be sufficient to accommodate ethno-cultural minorities have begun to comprehend
the relevance of protecting cultural rights (Kymlicka and Cohen-Almagor 2000:
89). Scholars have provided extensive analysis on how the protection of minority
rights in western democracies is consistent with the liberal values that are rooted
in individual freedoms. Kymlicka and Cohen-Almagor reiterate that recognition
of ethno-cultural minorities in already established western liberal democracies is
not only necessary but is not inconsistent with the values of a liberal democracy.
According to this liberal view, learning to live with the public expression and
institutionalisation of ethno-cultural diversity is a key precondition for a stable
and just democracy (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001). Schaefer argues that in plural
societies, ‘equality can be achieved not by eliminating group differences, but
by ensuring equality among different groups which is not only consistent with
individual freedom, but can actually promote it’ (Schaefer 2008: 908).
Due to historical perceptions of state building, accommodating multiculturalism
is still the most serious problem multi-ethnic states face although there have been
significant developments towards the theoretical discourse on accommodation of
ethno-regional demands. Nation-building in these countries is still a daunting task
since the common idiom asserts that ‘without the generation of impersonal norms
dissolving primordial loyalties (lineage, common dialect, tribal religion, etc.) no
modern nation can emerge’ (Messay 2001: 375). The problem is very complex in
26 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

developing countries with hundreds of ethnic groups living within their boundaries.8
The challenge is ‘to find how to accommodate the national and ethnic differences
in a stable and morally defensible way’ (Kymlicka 1995: 27). Different scholars
have forwarded different approaches on how cultural and religious minority rights
may be protected and preserved. The approaches include different arrangements
such as territorial autonomy, non-territorial federalism, veto powers, guaranteed
representation in central institutions, land claims, affirmative action, reservations
and language rights (Schaefer 2008: 909). The sections that follow assess some of
the most prominent modes of accommodating multicultural diversity in different
parts of the world including multicultural federalism, consociationalism and the
principle of the right to self-determination.

Federalism as a Response to Challenges of Accommodating Linguistic Diversity

The historical development of federalism has never been associated with the
accommodation of linguistic diversity. The history of federalism or federations has
been largely linked to non-national entities and to the processes of nation-building
within the liberal-democratic model (Requejo 2001: 45). Despite the historical
association of federations with territorially-defined powers of the central and
regional units, the last few decades have witnessed the emergence of federalism as
a way of accommodating ethnic diversity in plural societies. Due to the political
events in various parts of the world in the last few decades, new attention has been
given to the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of federal solutions as a
means of resolving political problems (Watts 1998: 117).
The wider application of federalism as a method of accommodating ethnic
diversity can be viewed against the backdrop of ongoing scholarly debate on the
relevance and convenience of federalism as a technique of addressing ethno-
regional demands. Some scholars prefer ‘scholarly caution’ to the relevance
of federations as a means of quelling ethnic conflicts in plural societies. Such
scholars’ claims that studies on the history of federalism show less receptiveness
to pluralism since there are more ‘monistic’ than ‘pluralistic’ theories of federalism
(Karmis and Norman 2005: 9). It is particularly argued ‘adopting older traditions
of federal theory to deal with identity-related claims in contemporary societies is
considered as a way to use these political arrangements to address issues that they
were not originally designed to do’ (Karmis and Norman 2005: 9). According to
this assertion, federalism is considered to be a model that is historically unrelated
to any regulation of cultural pluralism (Requejo 2005: 311). Others moreover argue
‘federalism may be more of a curse for intrastate peace and stability as federal
arrangements provide regional groups with the opportunity to collect resources
and to create a network of institutions to mobilise more radical demands’ (Bakke
and Wibbels 2006: 6).

8 For instance, Nigeria has 250 while Ethiopia has around 80 ethnic groups.
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 27

Other scholars present federalism as a compromise for societies where the

sense of national identity leads people to require the right to distinct statehood
and the difficulties of living alone (Trudeau 2005: 222). According to Elazar
(1987), ‘the new states in Africa and Asia that come to grips with the multi-ethnic
issue can be accommodated only through the application of federal principles
that combine ethnicity and consent’. Kymlicka (2006a) similarly argues, where
national minorities are regionally concentrated, federalism can provide extensive
self-government for national minority groups. But his argument is only relevant
in the western European context where the conditions for such an arrangement
are well-developed. Kymlicka’s argument is that ‘the successful protection of
ethno-cultural rights in the west is possible largely due to the existence of peace
and individual security, democracy, protection of individual rights and economic
prosperity’ (Kymlicka 2006: 36–7). Even though Kymlicka does not categorically
reject the possibility of building successful multination federalism in the developing
world, he admits that it is a riskier proposition in the rest of the world than in
the west (Kymlicka 2006: 47). Although the exact federal design is not specified,
researchers increasingly argue that ‘federalism can peacefully accommodate
heterogeneous interests by decentralising key policies and providing a stake for
decentralised elites in the maintenance of the existing state’ (Bakke and Wibbels
2006: 4).
In addition to the scholarly support rendered to federalism as a means of
accommodating ethnic and linguistic diversity in plural societies, there has also
been empirical evidence which shows that federalism is a useful device to reduce
ethnic conflicts in many countries, from economically advanced countries like
Switzerland to developing ones such as India. In combining regional self-rule and
shared governance, federalism has increasingly become a compromise between
regional groups that seek self-determination and the central government that seeks
firm control. Despite the success of multicultural federations in the context of
western societies, the experiences from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia still raise
questions on the efficacy of federalism in curbing conflict. The most important
factors that enabled the federal systems in the west to be successful are largely
due to the existence of some favourable conditions. In most western countries,
there is a single dominant ethno-national group forming a clear majority of the
population and the accommodation of the minority groups within the status quo
is not complicated. Many countries such as those in Africa not only have a large
number of ethnic groups but do not have a clear majority by a single group,
which has complicated the process of accommodation of ethnic diversity. Even
in cases where there is a clear-cut majority such as is the case in Rwanda, a stable
political order that checks ethnic animosity has not been achieved due to a lack of
institutional mechanisms designed to accommodate ethnic diversity.
The other challenge of building a vibrant federal system in poor countries is
the absence of economic and democratic developments that may help to dilute
linguistic differences. Well-developed democracy, protection of human rights
and an advanced economic system that have enabled multicultural states in the
28 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

west to establish working federal systems are largely absent in many Asian and
African states. Due to such challenges, there are disagreements about whether the
installation of federalism following the introduction of political liberalisation and
democracy in the multi-ethnic societies of Africa and Asia exacerbates or causes
political conflicts among various ethnic minorities (Bermeo 20002: 96). The
much-debated issue is whether federal systems and federations in the long-term
encourage integration or emphasise regional interests and autonomy inducing
political divisiveness (Watts 1998: 131). Fear of division has prompted some
states to devise new constitutional arrangements. For instance, South Africa and
Britain are hesitant to adopt fully-fledged federations or to increase devolution
(Watts 1998: 131).
Despite all of the uncertainties due to the resurgence of actual or perceived
identity-related claims of different groups, multicultural federalism continues
to be adopted as an appropriate system to accommodate linguistic-related group
demands in the third world. In Africa, in addition to the long-standing Nigerian
federal system, other federal systems designed to address ethnic and religious
diversities have evolved. Notable trends of federalism, in various forms, have
been manifested in different countries of the continent. After the overthrow of
the military socialist government (1974–91) by violent armed struggle in 1991,
measures have been undertaken to establish an ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.
The new structure is a complete departure from the historical centralised
system of government in Ethiopia. After the adoption of the 1995 constitution,
Ethiopia is officially a Federal Democratic Republic. The federation consists of
nine federations that are largely organised in ethnic lines. By granting ‘nations,
nationalities and peoples’ the right of self-determination up to succession, the
Ethiopian federal system is a unique one compared to all other existing federal
arrangements. Moreover, after a historic negotiation of various political forces
in Republic of South Africa, a constitution was agreed in 1996 that recognises
decentralised system of government addressing concerns of minority groups.
Recently, the Republic of Kenya has adopted a new constitution that grants wider
autonomy to local governments. All such systems of federalism are designed to
address ethno-regional claims in the respective constituencies.
Multicultural federations have their own distinctive features. They have
different structures from other territorial federations such as in Australia or
the United States due to the political significance of decentralisation and local
autonomy in multicultural federations. In multi-ethnic federations, ‘a region is
expected to provide ethnic or cultural homogeneity; more emphasis is given to
self-rule than shared rule and there is a greater regional representation at the federal
level’ (Ghai, 2000: 12). In other words, due to the quest by ethnic groups for
specialised self-administration, regional autonomy is granted to such groups with
wider discretions than is normally practiced in other forms of federations. Such
special treatment of ethnic minorities is usually accommodated by asymmetrical
arrangements that result in differential treatment being granted to minority ethnic
groups. Even so, there is no single federal formula prescribed for divided societies.
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 29

It is thus argued that in order to understand the conditions under which federalism
works, states need to take into account federal arrangements relevant to their
circumstance or ethnic diversity (Bakke and Wibbels 2006: 8).

Consociationalism as a Mode of Political Bargaining in Divided Societies

Consociationalism is the other response to ease political deadlock in divided

societies. According to Lijphart (2008), the nation-building path to divided societies
is consociational democracy. He points out that it can be a meaningful response
to divided societies if the requirements for its establishment are present. In order
to achieve a working consociational arrangement, ‘the elites should be able to
accommodate the divergent interests and demands of subcultures and to transcend
cleavages and to join in common effort with the elites of rival subcultures and
show commitment to the maintenance of the system for its cohesion and stability’
(Lijphart 2008: 32). The political consociationalism among the various political
forces is conducted through ‘stable coalition, proportional representation and
achieving compromise on particular concessions’ (Nordlinger 1972: 20).
Nevertheless, there are serious concerns about whether such consociationalism
works in every multicultural society or if it is only possible in the context of western
societies. Until recently, consensual democracy has been successfully used in
different European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland
to accommodate various political, religious and linguistic groups. There is serious
doubt if consociationalism is a workable proposition in non-European contexts.
According to Horowitz, ‘the main political parties in European countries are not
organised along ethnic lines and their competition for class, religion or cantonal
differences and hostilities toward members of other groups are less intense than in
the deeply divided societies of Asia and Africa’ (Horowitz 1985: 570–71). Due to
such low intensity of the cleavages, Horowitz questions whether the moderation
and fluidity that characterise European cleavages are produced by consociational
arrangement or are due to the relative low intensity and fluidity of the European
conflicts that make consociational relations possible (Horowitz 1985: 570–71).
Furthermore, Horowitz contends ‘dependence on elite conciliation makes
consociationalism less effective in Third World countries where elite politics is
primarily reactionary and polarised’ (1985: 570–71).
In addition to the serious ethnic cleavages that are found in regions such as
Africa, the economic under-development and dictatorships dominating the African
political landscape does not give much space for workable power-sharing. Despite
this, Lijphart consistently argues that consociational democracy is the panacea for
divided societies anywhere. The absence of concrete examples that suggest that
his recommended solution can take root in non-western soil renders his theory
doubtful. There have been practical failures in Africa to forge coalitions. After
the crisis in Kenya following the 2007 elections and in Zimbabwe after the 2008
elections, the power-sharing arrangements that were forged by contending political
parties have had limited success. The coalition survived for a while in Kenya but
30 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

failed to bring about lasting peace to the country’s political turmoil since there is
serious polarisation between the contending elites. Such failures attest the view
that consociationalism requires the presence of a culture of democracy, political
negotiation and institutions that can arbitrate or take responsibility when there is
a political stalemate (Horowitz 1985: 596). Due to such challenges of forming a
consociational democratic model in the African context, Horowitz argues that the
most important approaches to dealing with ethnic conflict in such societies are
instead through distributive or structural policy (Horowitz 1985: 596).

The Right to Self-Determination and Secession as a Response to

Ethno-Regional Demands

The granting of the right to self-determination to territorially-defined ethnic

groups is another response to ethno-regional demands, which has national and
international undertones. The principle was used in response to ethno-regional
claims in socialist countries. The right to self-determination has been one of
the most important principles of international law that has been used to liberate
peoples that were subjected to foreign domination. Nevertheless, whether self-
determination incorporates the right to secede from the existing state remains
contentious. The debate is particularly intense in federal systems where there is
continual pull and push between centrifugal and centripetal forces. The section
that follows addresses the scope and application of the right to self-determination
in international law and the relevance of secession in federations.

The Scope of the Right to Self-Determination under International Law

The origin of the principle of the right to self-determination has a long history.
The notion of self-determination can be traced to the American Declaration of
Independence and later to the French Revolution (Brilmayer 1991: 179–80).
Despite its long history, the concept never had a clear meaning. It was only after the
end of World War I that the principle of self-determination received more attention
and application. When President Woodrow Wilson first formulated the right at
the Conference of Versailles in 1919, his aim was to propagate the right to self-
determination in order to secure peace in Europe by creating new and ethnically
homogenous nation states out of the defeated German-Austro-Hungarian and
Ottoman Empires (Kumbaro 2001: 8; Wilson 1995–96: 40). In the meantime,
the right to self-determination became the key motto of the Russian Revolution
of 1917. Lenin used the principle to draw support from the various nations that
were incorporated into the Tsarist Empire. The right to self-determination was
not designed as a permanent structure since Lenin had no enthusiasm to apply the
principle while he was in power (Page 1950: 353; Brilmayer 1991: 181). However,
due to the aggressive use of the principle by Stalin after Lenin’s death, the meaning
and ideological background of self-determination developed by Lenin had its own
context and impact in the development of the concept.
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 31

Later, when the anti-colonial movement in the Third World succeeded in

dismantling colonial structures in different parts of the world, the United Nations
was forced to adopt the principle of the right to self-determination to advance the
decolonisation process (Brilmayer 1991: 181). Article 1(2) and 55 of the Charter
of the UN provides that one of its purposes is ‘to develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples’.
The concept of self-determination was later reiterated in the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1961, which was
principally developed to accommodate the legitimacy of the colonised peoples’
struggles for sovereign statehood. The declaration proclaims the necessity of
bringing colonialism to a speedy and unconditional end through guaranteeing all
peoples the right to self-determination and freely determining their political status
and pursuing their economic, social and cultural development. Once again, the
principle of the right to self-determination made its appearance in the Declaration
of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States, in accordance with the Charter in 1970.
In all circumstances, the UN repeatedly has stressed that it is necessary to avoid
any formulation of the principle which might be interpreted as widening its scope
and making it applicable to peoples who already formed part of an independent
state, as this could disintegrate existing national entities (Pamir 1997). The usage
of self-determination by the UN has consistently rejected secessionist tendencies
in member countries. The right to secession from an existing member state of
the United Nations does not exist in the instruments of the UN or in the practice
followed by the organisation, since to invoke it is believed to disrupt the national
unity and territorial integrity of member states. Despite that, self-determination
has been used for a long time in light of colonial domination; the usage has been
transformed from referring to the nation-state to address the right of sub-groups in
member countries of the United Nations.
According to Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, people
can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development. The right is normally fulfilled in the context of internal
self-determination through a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and
cultural development within the framework of an existing state. Thus, as far as sub-
national groups are concerned, the scope of the rights to self-determination merely
means to participate together with the rest of the population in the government
of the state without forming an independent state (Wilson 1995–96: 464). All the
provisions in the UN instruments limit the scope of self-determination rights of
minority groups to rights of internal autonomy rather than secession.
In a related development, the Canadian Supreme Court has pronounced on
the scope of self-determination in international law in an advisory opinion on
whether Quebec has a right to secede from Canada under international law. The
court's general conclusion was that international law does not specifically grant
32 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

components of sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their
parent state unless the constitution of a state expressly allows secession. The ruling
of the court is another showcase that affirms that the principle of the right to self-
determination under international law does not necessarily incorporate the right
to secession.
Although the long-standing position of the UN towards the application of
the right to self-determination is mainly in the provision of internal autonomy to
minority groups, a new principle of international law has recently been developed
and this principle asserts that secession from a sovereign state may be possible
when there is ‘extreme operation’ in a given state. There is, however, no consensus
and clarity as to what constitutes ‘extreme operation’. Some commentators argue
that the right to self-determination may ground a right to unilateral secession in a
circumstance derived from an interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the Declaration of
Friendly Relations, which reads:

Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or

encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of self-determination
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging
to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. Every state shall
refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.9

By interpreting this article, it is argued that if peoples within existing states are
treated in a grossly discriminatory fashion by an unrepresentative government,
they can claim self-determination without necessarily being constrained by
arguments on territorial integrity (Kumbaro 2001: 22).
In addition to such a broad interpretation, the UN and its member states have
been supporting and extending the application of the principle to full independence
from the state, using secession as a mode of implementing self-determination.
This approach has been applied to the cases of East Timor, Eritrea, Kosovo and
Southern Sudan. There are different reasons why international actors translate
self-determination into separation from the existing state. One of the arguments
is that a people finding itself completely blocked from the meaningful internal
exercise of its right to self-determination is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise the
right via external self-determination or secession (Kumbaro 2001: 22). In addition
to this ‘blockage’ of internal self-determination as a factor to support secession,
the other most important factor that has been applied to extend the scope of self-
determination is when such movement is accompanied by serious violence and

9 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning International

Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 33

when there is, as Falk asserts, ‘the play of geopolitical forces rather than solely the
relative merits of the moral and legal case’ (Pamir 1997). Such new developments
have shaped the emerging customary law on the right to secession in pursuit
of self-determination where such exercise is internally impossible (Kumbaro
2001: 30).
Such an open-ended way of interpreting the right to self-determination has
serious implications. Primarily, it encourages the revival of self-determination
mobilisations that were dormant for the greater part of history. In other words, as
the person who was a leading politician and Secretary of State during the time of
President Woodrow Wilson put it, the phrase ‘self-determination is simply loaded
with dynamite: it will raise hopes which can never be realised’ (Lansing 1921: 87).
In addition to this, there are numerous complex issues raised if the application of
self-determination is extended to every aspect of ethno-nationalist mobilisation:

There is much confusion as to who has right to self-determination, where the

limits of national sovereignty and unity lie, whether and when the territorial
integrity of nation states should remain unconditionally unchallenged, what are
the main overriding criteria for self-determination and independent statehood?
Are there any legal distinctions between the rights of those minorities which
belong to a group which already has a state (e.g., Albanians in Kosovo, Turks
in Cyprus, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Serbs in Bosnia, Hungarians in
Transylvania) and those which do not (e.g., the Kurds or the Chechens)? Does
the right to self-determination include the right to secession and independent
statehood? When should the international community recognise the rights of
peoples to decide on its own international status, and when should the territorial
unity of the nation state be protected (Pamir 1997: 7).

In addition to such complex issues surrounding the application of self-

determination to independence from the existing state, the inconsistent approaches
to self-determination by the UN and other international actors have undermined
the pillar principle of state sovereignty entrenched under the UN charter. Such
inconsistent approaches have been recently applied in a selective manner, in terms
of recognising newly self-proclaiming states seceding from the mother state.
Although there are a number of movements struggling for self-determination in
different parts of the world, only a few movements have received attention and
recognition from the UN or the major western powers. It is only if these groups can
assert their right through force and have their appeal coincide with the geopolitical
interests of major powers that their right to self-determination will amount to
independence from another sovereign state.
The cases of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the last few years
are important instances that indicate how geopolitical factors influence the
materialisation of independence rather than the genuineness and strength of the
claims for self-determination. The case of Kosovo is in line with the geopolitical
interests of the United States and the European Union, while the cases of Abkhazia
34 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

and South Ossetia are in line with the interests of the Russian Federation. The
precedent of recognising Kosovo by a number of countries as a sovereign state has
strengthened the new precedence of subjective interpretation of the right to self-
determination by a number of countries. In supporting the independence of Kosovo,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered a legal opinion that asserts that the
independence of Kosovo is not in ‘violation of international law’. In a move that
appeared to express its dissatisfaction with the way the western powers handled
the case of Kosovo, Russia immediately recognised the sovereignty of Georgia’s
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia.
Such selective and unsystematic application of self-determination by major
international actors will have far-reaching consequence in restructuring the world
map. The precedence has a serious and devastating impact in reviving self-
determination demands of legions of ethnic groups that are living within states
whose borders were delimited by the former colonial powers. There are already
dozens of political movements in Africa demanding self-determination. After
Eritrean independence, western powers and the UN have diligently supported the
separation of Southern Sudan. Although there are real historical and political factors
that justify the independence of Southern Sudan, the inconsistent approaches in the
UN on the right to self-determination and the major powers’ handling of the case
of Southern Sudan is encouraging for other pending independence movements
elsewhere in Africa.

The Right to Secession and Federations

The question as to whether secession is part of the right to self-determination of
national groups and whether democratic constitutions should enshrine secession
clauses is central to the debate among political and constitutional scientists.
The debate revolves around supporting or rejecting secession as part of the
constitutional and political discourse of states. There are basically three theories in
favour of secession (Bronaugh 2000). The first is the nationalist theory of secession
that holds that a territorially concentrated group may secede if it is a nation and
when the majority of members of the nation want to secede. The second theory of
secession, called choice theory, holds that any geographically-defined group may
secede if the majority of its members choose to do so. The third theory is called the
just cause theory of secession, which holds that a group has a right to secede only
if it has ‘just cause’ or if it is a victim of systematic and continuing discrimination
or exploitation, or if its territory had been illegally incorporated into the larger
state against its will. Despite the various theories and justifications of secession,
there are a number of pressing concerns in regard to the right to secession.
The relevance of a secession clause in federations and the existence of the right
to secession in federations are debatable. Only a few ‘federal states’ have included
recognition of the secession right in their constitutions: the former USSR,10 the

10 Article 72 in the revised Constitution from October 7, 1977 to 1991.

 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 35

former Yugoslavia,11 the Constitution of the Malaysian Federation,12 St Kitts-

Nevis,13 and Ethiopia.14 Many scholars of federalism argue that federalism and the
secession right do not go hand in hand as once the secession right is established,
it is no longer possible to talk of a federal constitution (Harbo 2008: 133).
Edward Freeman remarked over a century ago that a federation was ‘essentially
a perpetual union and that a federal constitution could not more than any other
constitution, contain provisions for its own dissolution’ (Burgess 2008: 133). In
addition, constitutional recognition of a right to secede would be a cure worse than
the disease, as sub-units holding a right to secede intensify their separatist agenda
rather than seeking political solution in the federal union (Sunstein 1991). This is
because any dissatisfied sub-unit could threaten to leave the federation unless its
demands are met (Sunstein 1991).
Other scholars defended the position that the secession right is not federal by
stressing the various political implications of secession. According to Harbo, if
secession is legally recognised in a federal polity, it could weaken the federal
system by giving political coercion to the federal units and it could have negative
consequences on the fundamental federal principles of co-operation and solidarity
or ‘federal loyalty’ (Bundestreue) among the entities (Harbo 2008: 134). Harbo
further argues that if the constitution provides a right to secede, not only will
each federal unit be vulnerable to threats of secession coming from other units
but the possibility of secession could be an element of uncertainty for economic
development and unity of the system as a whole. In conclusion, he contends that
a federal polity that acknowledges the right to secession demonstrates that it is
generally failing, such as the former USSR and Yugoslavia (Harbo 2008: 134).
In the same line of argument, Sunstein strongly rejects the idea of inclusion of
secession in the constitution of federations, stressing the concomitant complexities
and risks:

Whether or not secession might be justified as a matter of politics or morality,

constitutions ought not to include a right to secede. To place such a right in a
founding document would increase the risks of ethnic and factional struggle;
reduce the prospects for compromise and deliberation in government; raise
dramatically the stakes of day-to-day political decisions; introduce irrelevant
and illegitimate considerations into those decisions; create dangers of blackmail,
strategic behaviour, and exploitation; and, most generally, endanger the prospects
for long-term self-governance. Constitutional recognition of a right to secede
accomplishes the relevant goals at great risk to the fundamental task of creating
healthy, long-term constitutional structures (Sunstein 1991: 634).

11 Constitutions of 1945–46 and 1963–91.

12 Constitution of 1957–65.
13 A Constitution until 1983.
14 Constitution of 1994 to present.
36 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Wheare approaches the issue of secession in federations from a different

perspective. He maintains that ‘the essential requirement of a federal government
is that there should be no right of secession from the federal state by the regional
governments and if such an action is permitted, it means that the general government
is subordinated to the regional governments or vice versa and implies the end of the
federal union’ (Wheare 1964: 91). Wheare contends that recognition of secession
as a rule weakens the government and places the weapon of political coercion in
the hands of government, which may use it for its own ends (Wheare 1964: 91).
He further states ‘governments claiming to be federal and simultaneously granting
the right to secede are those in which the exercise of the right is least likely to be
permitted’ (Wheare 1964: 92).
King similarly rejects the inclusion of a secession clause in a federal constitution
and admits the possibility of secession in federations. He asserts that ‘due to the
contractual nature of federalism, states may have the right to separate when the
contractual agreement cannot be fully implemented, but federations should not
give an express provision for session’ (King 1982: 108). In other words, he argues
it is not whether federal constitutions allow secession or disallow it, but if the
structure of these governments is heavily weighted against it (King 1982: 109).
This is the case in the socialist federations of Yugoslavia, USSR and Ethiopia
where there have been formal constitutional provisions allowing secession, while
the systems lacked any meaningful internal self-administration. In such countries,
‘whether or not the union republics really wish to secede, the fact is that they
have no effective means to do so, due to the dominant power of the communist
party and severe restrictions on the free flow of information’ (King 1982: 110).
According to King, a formal provision opening up the prospect of secession would
be inconsistent with the pretention of federalism (King 1982: 112). King further
asserts that ‘federations, like non-federations, may be torn apart but it is unlikely
that the constitutional provision formally admitting the possibility of secession
would on its own have had much effect either way’ (King 1982: 112). Moreover,
he contends that ‘the incorporation of secession in the constitution may be out
of appearance and false regard for ideological consistency or as frank admission
of immediate or looming defeat for the prospect of continuing union’ (King
1982: 112).
Secession is also criticised because of its problematic practical applications.
Secession or partition is rarely an adequate solution, because ‘most regions of a
country are ethnically heterogeneous and partition can involve a costly process of
exchanging populations or dividing land and natural resources that will result in
the loss of many human lives and continuing border conflicts’ (Jalali and Lipset
1992: 602). In an attempt to cope with such challenges, Canadian and Swiss
federations have drawn up guidelines on procedures of secession and the role of
stakeholders. The Supreme Court of Canada held that if a part of Canada declared
the wish to secede; all parties had to enter into negotiations over this claim and
held that secession is not a unilateral act available only to the seceding region.
Such bargaining among the various stakeholders in the modification of the federal
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 37

system has also been incorporated under the Swiss Constitution. Article 53 of the
constitution provides that ‘any modification of the number of the Cantons or of
their status is subject to the assent of the population concerned, of the Cantons
concerned and of the Swiss people and of the Cantons at large’.
The most plausible argument today in relation to secession is that a well-
functioning nation will not face serious secession threats and sub-units will invoke
the right only in the most extraordinary circumstance (Sunstein 1991: 24). After
the disintegration of the USSR and other Eastern European federations, there have
not been any serious scholarly arguments in favour of secession as a constitutional
right in federations.

Justifications for Adopting a Multicultural Federal System

An ethnic or multicultural federal system of government as a means of

accommodating ethnic diversity has become significantly important in the last
few decades due its power-sharing characteristics. Many studies suggest that this
model of federalism is the most effective means of forging accommodation of
linguistic diversity (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004: 469). There are now numerous
multicultural federations in different countries where one or more sections of the
country have a cultural or linguistic homogeneous community different to the
rest of the country. In Canada, there is the Quebec issue, in Belgium the case of
Flemish, in Spain the Basque region, while the federations in Nigeria and India are
designed to forge consensus among the numerous ethnic, religious and linguistic
groups. Although there might be different circumstances under which countries
adopt multicultural federations, each of these systems is aimed at accommodating
linguistic diversity through multicultural federations. The underlying factor for the
formulation of such multicultural or ethnic federations is the realisation that the
suppression of ethnic identities, particularly when there are inter-ethnic tensions,
provides only short-term solutions to the tensions (MacPherson 1994: 110).
Scholars note that ‘the efficacy of federations lies in its infinite capacity to
accommodate and reconcile the competing and sometimes conflicting array of
diversities in divided societies’ (Burgess and Gagnon 1993: 7). Granting autonomy
to ethnic minorities is ‘a compromise or a balance between those who want a tight,
unitary system of government and those who prefer separation, since multicultural
federations are characterised by tolerance, respect, compromise, bargaining and
mutual recognition’ (Ghai 2000: 24). Nevertheless, ‘accommodation does not
mean elimination of all conflicts but mitigation of violent conflict and the lessening
of conditions that might provide incentives for violence in the future’ (Amoretti
and Bermeo 2004: 475).
Another important argument for adopting a multicultural federation is the
ethno-nationalist argument, which comes from the idea of ethno-nationalism
that ‘proclaims the distinctiveness of a particular people and their right to self-
rule in their homeland’ (Alemante 2003: 68–9). The ethno-nationalist principle
38 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

requires political communities to be defined in such a way that political or

cultural boundaries allow ethnic communities to live in accordance with their
customs, traditions and languages (MacPherson 1994: 110). By devolving power
to territorially concentrated ethnic groups, ‘federalism provides a framework in
which culture and language may be publicly expressed and nurtured’ (Alemante
2003: 72). Granting autonomy to linguistic groups ‘satisfies demands for
autonomy on key issues, localises potential conflicts, promotes unifying identities
and reduces opportunities for the central government to exploit minority regions’
(Hale 2004: 165–6). Such recognition is the ‘central exercise in establishing a
positive environment of trust and confidence-building among the citizens of multi-
ethnic federal states’ (Hale 2004: 165–6). By doing so, ‘multicultural federalism
provides an effective strategy for promoting national unity and political legitimacy
by helping to quell ethnic nationalism, thereby promoting state legitimacy and
political stability’ (Hale 2004: 83).
Furthermore, multicultural federalism is also justified for what is referred to as
the democratic argument. Proponents of this argument hold that ‘ethnic federalism
offers the best institutional framework for aggregating the interests of the members
of an ethnic group and promoting democratic governance’ (Hale 2004: 165–6).
This approach is consistent with the long-standing belief that ethnic homogeneity
is a precondition for building a democratic system of government. The democratic
argument has existed since the time of John Stuart Mill’s theory, which asserts that
‘it is a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government
coincide with those of nationalities’ (Mill 1991). According to this argument,
granting ethnic or linguistic groups territorial autonomy will help to create the
ethnic homogeneity that may be needed for promoting democratic governance.
Multicultural federations are also justified for their ability to entertain cultural
diversity and equality. In modern systems, it has been recognised that ‘intercultural
diversity contributes to the richness of people’s lives as a community’ (Kymlicka
1996: 126). Due to this recent approach, many of the democratic countries in the
west have come to recognise immigrant minority rights and cultures as an asset
rather than as a threat.
A multicultural federation is also used as a means of promoting equality on
the premise that all citizens be treated with genuine equality (Alemante 2006: 74).
Due its sensitivity and responsiveness to the volatile emotions associated with
feelings of subordination that result from lack of esteem for one’s culture and
language, an institutional framework that allows ethnic groups to manifest their
cultures and languages publicly and equally eases feelings of ethnic mistrust and
suspicion that trouble ethnically-divided societies (Alemante 2006: 74; Kymlicka
1996: 108).
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 39

Challenges of a Multicultural Federal System

As has been seen in the preceding sections, multicultural federalism is largely

recommended for countries that have numerous ethnic or linguistic groups
demanding political accommodation of their culture or language. However,
whether a federal political system in which ethnic groups are granted autonomy
promotes state survival or collapse remains debatable. Despite the promising
advantages and increasing tendencies towards adoption of multicultural federalism
as a mechanism of accommodating ethnic diversity, the adoption of such a system
has various pitfalls and challenges. Different scholars have singled out the thorny
issues surrounding adoption of ethnic or multicultural federalism. According to
Kymlicka, the most important challenge of multicultural federalism is the threat
of secession:

The very success of federalism in accommodating self-government may simply

encourage national minorities to seek secession. The more that federalism
succeeds in meeting the desire for self-government, the more it recognises
and affirms the sense of national identity amongst the minority group, and
strengthens their political confidence. When national minorities become
politically mobilised in this way, secession becomes more feasible, even with
the best-designed federal institutions (Kymlicka 2005: 286).

This is because the ‘constitutional recognition of a national minority has

the potential to strengthen the national identity of the group and weaken the
group’s attachment to the bigger state’ (Norman 2001: 93). The recognition and
strengthening of ethnic rights seems to open endless claims for independence that
endanger the unity and stability of the country. According to this interpretation,
ethnic federalism in some instances creates the opportunity for the minority
group to mobilise under a single purpose and pose serious challenges to the
central government.
Scholars also warn that ‘institutionalising the federation along ethnic lines is
more likely to promote primordial nationalism that may increase the likelihood
of inter-ethnic violence and civil war’ (Smith 2000: 345). Moreover, structuring
states solely based on ethnic lines reinforces ethnicity and gives rise to divergent
and conflicting versions of nationalism. The expression of ethnic identity was cited
as one of the factors for the downfall of the Yugoslav federation that resurfaced in
two ways (MacPherson 1994: 106).15
The other challenge for political systems that are based on ethnicity is that
ethnicity can easily be manipulated by ethnic leaders. Such an institutional

15 First, in the population at large there was increasing expression of ethnic identities
(as opposed to Yugoslav identity) and a growing perception of social and economic
problems in an ethnic context. Secondly, local and regional politicians intensified the use of
ethnicity to revisit current grievances and past hatreds (MacPherson 1994: 106).
40 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

arrangement strengthens ethnic differences and provides resources for political

entrepreneurs to play the ‘nationality card’ to promote secessionist activity since
nationalism is an inexpensive and powerful tool to be used by elites (Hale 2004;
Proudhon 2005). Many of the ethnic conflicts that have taken place around the world
are due to the manipulation of ethnic issues as a way of instigating violence and
conflict.16 Ethnic entrepreneurs particularly politicise already existing inequalities,
which do not have a political dimension in unitary states (Bakke and Wibbels
2006: 13). Due to such perception of inequalities by various ethnic groups, elite
entrepreneurs usually present their group as being at a disadvantage vis-á-vis the
federal system and accordingly incite conflict and instability. Claims of inequality
particularly create havoc in poor countries where resources are scarce and there
are no strong institutions that are needed to arbitrate disputes.
Multicultural federal arrangements ‘potentially become painful exercises in
gaining political consensus among the various contending groups and lack of
consensus often leads to political stalemates and inefficiency’ (Simeon 2008:
8). Since any decision-making process has to strike a balance between the vital
interests of the different groups, it is particularly challenging and difficult to find
a balance, which is acceptable to all the concerned groups (Majeed et al. 2008: 8).
While there is a need to satisfy the desires and aspirations of national minorities,
the pitfalls involved must be noted (Alemante 2003: 96).

Factors Essential for Forging a Successful Multicultural Federal System

Although there are no generally accepted rules for the forging of a successful
multicultural federal system, there are conditions that will help to establish it.
Scholars stress that federal arrangements that have been negotiated in a democratic
and participatory way have a better chance of success than those that are imposed
(Ghai 2000: 18). On the need for consensus on forging federations, Amoretti and
Bermeo argue, ‘federations cannot be the result of force or coercion imposed from
above and sustained by the threat of military power. Federalism is an attempt to
find a national compromise between the divergent interest groups which history
has thrown together’ (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004: 471). The bargaining is largely
a continual process to be conducted at every stage of the federal project, since
there are different divergent political interests in multicultural federations where
consensus and political negotiation need to serve as the pillars of the system.
The ability of the system to create a broader sense of nationalism over local
cleavages helps multicultural federations to be sustainable. To build a sustainable
multicultural federal system, ‘the federation should create a national image over
loyalty to local nationalism’ (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004: 471). ‘Federalism is
bound to fail if the nationalism it cultivates is unable to generate a national image,

16 The genocide that took place in Rwanda and other conflicts in the rest of Africa or
the dissolution of Yugoslavia are results of manipulation of ethnicity by the elite.
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 41

which is immensely more appealing than regional ones’ (Amoretti and Bermeo
2004: 471). In addition to strong national identities, ‘multicultural federations
can only survive if they are modelled to reflect the significant element of shared
or overreaching identities and values’ (Siemon and Conway 2001: 361). ‘To
achieve a wider nationalist aspiration, resources must be diverted into the areas
of national flags, anthems, education, arts as well as other policies that promote
national patriotism’ (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004: 471). In order to achieve wider
nationalist aspirations, ‘both the minority and the majority groups accept the
system in such a way that the former maintain their loyalty to the larger group,
while the latter accepts the institutionalisation of diversity’ (Siemon and Conway
2001: 361). Moreover, ‘the evolution of civil societies is essential to maintain
multicultural federations since they play an indispensable role in presenting and
shaping public opinion on different national issues’ (Siemon and Conway 2001:
361). Particularly, ‘elections systems that promote inclusiveness, political parties
that can attain cross-regional support as well as linkage between the party system
at central and regional levels are helpful in bridging the gap between the various
groups in multicultural societies’ (Siemon and Conway 2001: 361).
The other factor needed to achieve a successful federation is to achieve a
moderate stance on the concept of sovereignty of the central government and
regional powers. The problem of China with respect to Tibet and Spain in relation
to the Basque region is related to the claim to indivisibility of sovereignty the
states adhere to (Ghai 2000: 16). It is also argued that autonomy is more likely
to be negotiated and to succeed if there are several ethnic groups rather than two
(Alemante 2003: 17). When there are two groups at the negotiation table, deadlock
is likely to occur, as in the case of the negotiation between Greeks and Turks in
Cyprus. What appears to be the appropriate approach to words forging successful
multicultural federations is ‘transformation of bipolarity into multi-polarity of the
regions, since bigger units tend to be powerful and are more likely to become the
constituencies of territorial conflict’ (Amoretti 2002: 10).
The existence of established democracy and the rule of law are also critical
factors for forging a successful federation (Ghai 2000: 16). In view of this,
‘successful protection of ethno-cultural rights in the west is largely due to the
existence of peace and individual security, democracy, protection of individual
rights and economic prosperity’ (Kymlicka 2006: 36–7). Such an argument raises
concerns about the success of multicultural federalism in a non-western context.
In his concluding remark on comments related to the Ethiopian federal system,
Kymlicka underlines that ‘due to the absence of conditions that helped the west
to adopt a successful multicultural federal system, ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is
likely to remain a fragile experiment for some time to come’ (Kymlicka 2006: 58).
Despite such concerns and the absence of a functioning democracy, the rule
of law and the protection of human rights in poor countries such as Ethiopia
and Nigeria, these countries have embarked on installing a multinational federal
arrangement to accommodate their ethnic, cultural and religious diversities.
Due to the absence of critical factors needed to forge multicultural federations
42 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

in developing countries, scholars argue that an effective way of accommodating

ethnic diversity in developing countries should be a balanced approach (Kymlicka
2006: 58). In particular, ‘multi-ethnic countries in Africa need to adopt a federal
system, taking into various factors such as national unity and security, historical,
geographic, economic and financial factors as well as the wishes of the people’
(Kymlicka 2006: 97).

Multicultural Federalism and Democracy

The viability of democracy in multi-ethnic societies has always been a

controversial issue. There are two different schools of thought on the relationship
between democracy and ethnicity. On the one hand, there is a well-established
political philosophy that asserts that it is difficult to achieve and maintain a
stable democratic system in plural societies (Arel 2001: 65). According to this
argument, ‘cultural questions related to identity cannot be made to fit into the
usual liberal democratic approach to individual political rights, pluralism, liberty
and equality’ (Requejo 2001: 111). Such arguments are basically extensions of the
long-standing theory that asserts that the division of society into different ethnic
groups constitutes a formidable obstacle to a stable and viable democracy, since
the middle of the nineteenth century (Jalali and Lipset 1992: xxx).
The pessimist school of thought that asserts that a multinational population
cannot generate a united public opinion, which is a necessary condition for the
maintenance of a representative government, traces its roots back to the time of
J.S. Mill. The latter argues that democracy is next to impossible in multi-ethnic
societies, especially when the ethnic groups are linguistically differentiated from
each other (Mill 1991). The theory further asserts that although democracy does
not require a completely homogeneous society, it requires a minimum of social
and political unity and consensus. According to this assumption, since unity and
consensus in multi-ethnic societies is generally below this necessary minimum
requirement, it is unlikely to take root in such situations.
Similarly, Horowitz identified the challenges of division in multi-ethnic
societies to forge social cohesion needed for building democratic governance:

In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine

who will be included and who will be excluded. Since the lines appear
unalterable, being in and being out may quickly come to look permanent. In
ethnic politics, inclusion may affect the distribution of important material and
non-material goods, including the prestige of the various ethnic groups and
the identity of the state as belonging more to one group than another. Again
and again in divided societies, there is a tendency to conflate inclusion in the
government with inclusion in the community and exclusion from government
with exclusion from the community (Horowitz 1993: 18).
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 43

Such scholarly analysis and the enormous empirical evidence from different war-
torn countries suggest that unprecedented ethnic division in divided societies is
indeed a major obstacle to establishing a stable democracy. When the division
is based on ethnicity, the challenge to establish a democratic order is more
complicated as one scholar noted, ‘Ethnicity represents the dark fears of liberal
democracy. If liberal democracy is the child of modernity, ethnicity represents the
stranglehold of tradition. If democracy is all about choices, ethnicity stands for
absence of choice. If democracy is predicated on reasoned deliberation, ethnicity
stands for closure of reason’ (Yadav 2007: 1).
Although the impact of the pessimist approach is still dominant, there is also
the optimistic school of thought that asserts that democracy and stability are still
possible in multinational societies. The proponents of the optimist school of thought
have diverse views on how democracy can be achieved in multi-ethnic societies. In
his ground-breaking book, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977), Arend Lijphart
asserts that it is difficult, but not impossible, to achieve and maintain a stable
democratic government in plural societies. His proposition for achieving a stable
democracy in plural societies is through what he calls consociation (proportional)
democracy, which refers to a government formed by elite consensus designed
to turn fragmented political culture into a stable democracy (Lijphart 1977: 25;
Lijphart 2008: 43). The theory is basically an alternative to democracy of majority
rule. The consensus is achieved through recognition of significant segments of the
plural society and their representation in a grand coalition government to rule the
country.
Lijphart stresses that democracy is possible in deeply divided societies if
the type of democracy is consociational and characterised by ‘a grand coalition
government representing all major linguistic and religious groups, cultural
autonomy of these groups, proportionality in political representation and civil
service appointments and a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and
autonomy’ (Lijphart 2008: 43). In consociational democracy, the role of elites that
represent the various ethnic and linguistic groups is indispensable. The most salient
feature of the consociational model is that it focuses only on the multinational states
in the west such as Belgium, Canada, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands. It is
largely argued that the kind of multiculturalism found in most of these countries is
religious and ideological, in contrast to the multiculturalism found in non-western
societies that are largely classified as ‘primordial’ loyalties which are divided by
language and race. There seems to be no clear data that suggest that consociation
theory can work well in non-western contexts.
Mark R. Beissinger proposes the possibility of building democracy in
multicultural and multi-ethnic societies. He argues that ethnic identities can work
positively in building democracy rather than weakening it (Beissinger 2008:
96) . His argument is based on an empirical study of successful post-communist
democracies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and how ethnic nationalism was
crucial in the transition to free self-government (Beissinger 2008: 96). According
to Beissinger, diverse sets of cases suggest that ‘institutional choices are crucial
44 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

factors in determining whether ethnic diversity and national identity work for
or against democratic consolidation, rather than the diversity itself’ (Beissinger
2008: 96). Jalali and Lipset similarly maintain that ‘ethnic cleavages do not
necessarily lead to violence, as they can be a source of democratic strength and
renewal’ (Jalali and Lipset 1992: 664). They argue that the fact that interethnic
relations are more peaceful in the west than in the Third World does not result
from differences in ethnic groups in the different regions (Jalali and Lipset 1992:
664). The differences rest rather ‘in the nature of western political structures that
have incorporated multiple-ethnic expressions and channelled ethnic conflict into
more peaceful and constructive directions’ (Jalali and Lipset 1992: 664).
Despite the controversies on the relationship between democracy and ethnic
diversity, it has been suggested that some form of democratic rules are essential
to the building of a successful multicultural federal system. At the very least, the
minimum levels of democracy, such as popular election to state organs and the
rule of law need to be practised in plural societies (Hale 2004: 167). Unless the
multicultural federations are accompanied by a corresponding democratisation
process, the federal polity faces the unsavoury prospect of instability and
disintegration like the former socialist federations in the Soviet Union and former
Yugoslavia, the failure of which to implement a genuine federation was the single
most important factor in their downfall (Ghai 2000: 23). The next chapter deals
with the fundamental principles of socialist federations that have different features
in form and content from other forms of multicultural federations. Not only has
the legacy of socialist federations left its own imprint in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union but also it has significantly shaped the fundamental ideology
behind Ethiopia’s ethnic federal arrangement.

Summary

The historical development of federalism has never been associated with the
accommodation of linguistic diversity. The history of federalism or federations has
been largely linked to non-national entities and to the processes of nation-building
through the agreement of sovereign units. Despite the historical association of
federations with territorially defined powers of the central and regional units,
the last few decades have witnessed the emergence of federalism as a way of
accommodating ethnic diversity in plural societies.
In addition to the scholarly support rendered to federalism as a means of
accommodating ethnic and linguistic diversity in plural societies, there has also
been empirical evidence, which shows that federalism is a useful device to reduce
ethnic conflicts in many countries. In combining regional self-rule and shared
governance, federalism has increasingly become a compromise between regional
groups that seek self-determination and the central government that seeks firm
control. In multi-ethnic federations, a region is expected to provide ethnic or
 Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity 45

cultural homogeneity; more emphasis is given to self-rule than shared rule and
there is a greater regional representation at the federal level.
Despite its advantages, multicultural federal arrangements have their own
pitfalls. The most serious challenge for the stability of federations is the absence
of a common sense of nationality, especially in countries with several religious
and ethnic groups. The existence of a high level of political controversy between
the regional and central political powers is another source of instability for
multicultural federations. Scholars stress that federal arrangements that have
been negotiated in a democratic and participatory way have a better chance
of success than those that are imposed. To rectify the adverse implications of
adopting a multicultural federal arrangement, scholars argue that the ability
of the system to create a broader sense of nationalism over local cleavages
helps multicultural federations to be sustainable. In addition, the existence of
established democracy and the rule of law are also critical factors for forging a
successful multicultural federation.
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 Chapter 2
Socialist Federations and the
Accommodation of Diversity

In addition to the federal systems that have flourished in democratic societies,

there were also socialist federations that played a role in the development of a
unique prototype of federal system. This chapter deals with the various features
of socialist federations that help to comprehend the structure and ideology of
the Ethiopian ethnic federal system that is largely shaped by the structure and
philosophy of former socialist federations. The chapter mainly focuses on the
origin, development as well as the ideological foundation and principles of
socialist federations. Socialist federations mainly attempted to address ethnic-
related political demands in a radical and unprecedented manner that distinguished
them from the principles applied in democratic federations.

The Origin and Development of Socialist Federations

Historically, socialist federates were established in the former Union of Soviet

Socialist Republic (USSR), Czechoslovakia and the former Yugoslavia. Although
the ideal form socialist federation that served as a model for other socialist
federations is the one implemented in the former USSR, the other models have
their own peculiarities in managing ethnic diversity.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)

The first socialist federation that emerged in history was in the Soviet Union, the
federal organisation of which became the model for the creation of other socialist
federations. The adoption of a socialist federation in Russia was closely linked
to the dilemma of Lenin and other leaders of the October Revolution that pushed
the class-based socialist ideology while responding to the mounting grievances
of non-Russian ethnic groups incorporated into Tsarist Russia. Since the former
Russian Empire had been made up of numerous ethnic groups, the distinct regions
were insisting for self-government (Gronski 1929: 159).
Since the introduction of the communist movement in Russia at the beginning
of the twentieth century, there were discussions on the role of the non-Russian
groups in restructuring the former Tsarist regime. Initially, the communist groups
did not favour federalism because they regarded ethnic problems as ‘manifestations
of class conflicts which were certain to vanish in an advanced socialist society’
48 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

(Saxer 1992: 607). In line with the typical Marxist-Leninist perspective, the
Russian communists believed that only a highly centralised form of government
that overrides racial and ethnic differences ensures the establishment of a system
that ensures dictatorship of the proletariat. The policy was made based on the
teachings of Karl Marx that argues ‘proletariat were best served through a unitary
form of government rather than a federal structure’ (Plawker 1991–92: 171).
From a theoretical perspective, ‘the practice of federalism is undoubtedly in sharp
conflict with pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist theory, which postulated working
class loyalty over bourgeois nationalism, unitary party control and centralised
administration’ (Hodge 1979–80: 527).
The support for a wider right to nationalist groups was not in principle
consistent with the Bolsheviks’ commitment to democratic centralism but because
it was the best way to address grievances related to inequality treatment of the non-
Russians (Hodnett 1967: 471). The doctrine of self-determination was primarily
a tactic used in the struggle with Tsarism rather than an enduring principle, since
the mainstream Marxist block adhered to the ideal that ‘a worker has no country’.
Thus socialist federalism, which was emphatically rejected by Marx, Engels
and Lenin, emerged as the post-revolutionary rhetoric to promote the ideals of
the October Revolution (Aspaturian 1950: 25). The Bolsheviks were therefore
forced to accept federalism as a means of balancing the unprecedented demand
for independence from the various republics on the one hand and their ambition
to control all political power through the application of democratic centralism.
According to Lenin and his comrades, socialist federalism was not an end in itself,
but only a necessary and temporary form of arrangement that would terminate
once a communist state structure is built. Federalism in Russian was thus solely
aimed at preventing further separation and maintaining the fragile state together
(Aspaturian 1950: 26). In other words, the federal structure was adopted ‘to
placate national sentiment and thereafter to contain it and eventually destroy it’
(Gleason 1990: 5). The creators of the Soviet Constitution were confronted with
the reconciliation of the principle of the rule of the proletariat with the principle of
the freedom and self-determination of nationalities (Gronski 1929: 159).
The theoretical foundations of the Soviet Federation were laid down by
V.I. Lenin. Considering the fact that the Tsarist Empire was dubbed by Marx
‘the prison house of peoples’, Lenin proclaimed his slogan on the right to self-
determination of nationalities in the hope of gaining support for the revolution
from the non-Russian peoples of the empire (Hazard 1984: 1184). Immediately
after the revolution, Lenin signed decrees authorising the Finns, the Byelorussians,
the Ukrainians and the Baltic peoples to secede from the unitary state though they
were part of the Russian Empire (Hazard 1984: 1184).
Though the ideal of federalism was inherently incompatible with Bolshevism,
its adoption was a tactical concession rather than a principled position. ‘The main
purpose of Lenin’s federalist formula was mainly to disarm national tensions
and to provide a valid justification for the rejection of separatism and created the
image of voluntary federation’ (Rakowska-Harmstone 1992: 523). The intention
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 49

was to preserve the unified structure of a federal arrangement rather than a policy
that permitted secession of the non-Russian territories. It was rather a temporary
arrangement to compromise between a relatively strong central power headed
by the Bolsheviks and weak peripheral group (Gleason 1990: 19). In order to
achieve their objectives, Lenin and his colleagues attempted to fit together two
incompatible political ideas: the practice of absolutism with the idea of federalism
(Gronski 1929: 159). The full meaning and duration of the concept of the Soviet
socialist federation was far from clear during the time of the revolution. According
to some observers, Lenin envisaged a limited future for Soviet federalism while
others suggested that the regional autonomy would last for the entire period of
the transition to the achievement of ‘full communism’ or until the state in general
withered away (Hodnett 1967: 472, 480).
The first Soviet federalism was declared with the signing of the Treaty of
Union among the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and
the other republics in 1922 (Aspaturian 1950: 26). With the promulgation of the
first Constitution of the USSR on 31 January 1924, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) that consisted of 15 republics was formed.1 A distinctive ethnic
group having its own distinct culture, language and religion (Plawker 1991–92:
173) dominated each republic. Over all, the Soviet Union recreated a multinational
state made up of some 126 registered nationalities and 170 languages (Sakwa
1998: 237).The constitution declared that each constituent republic preserved its
sovereignty and had the right to secede from the federation.
The Soviet federal structure had few elements in common with other forms
of federations applied elsewhere. Although the Soviet Constitution embraced
all of the basic characteristics of a federal state, ‘it was apparently a document
to be neither served nor observed’ (Aspaturian 1950: 46). It was rather full of
contradictions. The contradictions begin with the ideological principles enshrined
in the constitution. On the one hand, ‘the Soviet Federal System aimed at centrally
directed planning while it declared a complete national self-determination that
included the right to secession’ (Aspaturian 1950: 33). Such economic structure in
socialist federations raises the question of the general compatibility of socialism
and federalism (Aspaturian 1950: 47). Socialism presupposes central centrally
directed economic planning, while federalism requires regional units to have a
role in the management of their economic affairs.
In addition, despite the theoretical conviction on the part of the Soviet
Constitution granting the right to self-determination, the autonomy of the
republics was largely controlled by the central government and the communist
party structure. Due to such contradictory aspects of the Soviet Federal System,
some observers argue that Soviet federalism was nothing more than a device
designed to satisfy the deep-rooted desire for national expression and it was for

1 The USSR was made up of 15 republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia,

Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russia, Tadzhikstan,
Turkmenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
50 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

this reason that lip service only was paid to federalism, whereas the dictates of
Marxian philosophy were relentlessly pursued (Aspaturian 1950: 34; Uibopuu
1979: 183).
The structure of the Soviet federal arrangement is unique compared to other
forms of multicultural federations. The structure was more complicated than the
structure of other federations in relation to how the central government related
to its member states (Knapp 1984: 1219). The complexity was mainly due to the
great variety of nations and nationalities (over 130 altogether) living in the USSR,
some of which consisted of tens of millions of people while others only consisted
of a few thousand nationals. Due to such complexities, the Soviet Federation has
created several levels of national self-management regional autonomies (Knapp
1984: 1219). The highest level of autonomy was granted to the Union Republics,
each of which consisted of ‘a sovereign Soviet socialist state which has united
itself with other Soviet republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’.2
A union republic independently ‘exercises state power within its territory’
and was outside the limits of the direct jurisdiction of the central government.
Republics enjoyed legislative autonomy in matters of internal self-administration
within the framework of the Union Republic and within the limits laid down by
the Constitution of the Union Republic. But the republics were not ethnically
homogeneous. Other nations and nationalities resided alongside the majority
nation, whose national sovereignty was expressed through the sovereignty of the
Union Republic. Union republics also had their own constitutions and supreme
state authorities. The other form of autonomy was ‘national territorial autonomous
regions and autonomous areas’, which possessed only administrative autonomy.
Within the Soviet Federal system, the two houses were called the Soviet of the
Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. Republics enjoyed legislative autonomy in
matters of internal self-administration within the framework of the Union Republic
and within the limits laid down by the Constitution of the Union Republic.
The former was elected on the basis of constituencies with an equal number of
inhabitants and without any regard to the internal division of the federation. The
latter was composed of 32 deputies from each union republic, 11 deputies from
each autonomous republic, 5 deputies from each autonomous province and 1
deputy from each autonomous area. Both houses of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR federation had equal rights and competence since every matter had to be
discussed in and approved by both houses.
Despite the unprecedented rights granted to ‘nations and nationalities’
on paper, the Soviet Federation in reality denied the ethno-regions the right to
national self-determination. Primarily, by retaining the appointment and dismissal
of local party and state officials in ethno-regions, the centre was able to ensure
that it had the loyalty of the local political leadership. Secondly, as part of central
policy, the central government remained committed to a redistribution policy of
federal resources from the centre to the regions (Smith 1995: 159). In addition, the

2 See Art. 76 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution.

 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 51

centrally planned economic policy seriously undermined the role of the republics
in initiating and implementing economic and socials policies.

Czechoslovakia

The other experiment in socialist federation was the former Czechoslovakia. The
country was created in 1918 out of the remnants of the disintegrating Austro-
Hungarian Empire. Following the change of regime in February 1948, the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia seized power and the country was declared
a people’s republic until 1960. After the political change, the political relations of
the country fell under the influence of the former Soviet Union. When the 1960
Constitution of Czechoslovakia was promulgated, the state structure changed the
name of the country from the Czechoslovak Republic to the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic. Later during the adoption of the Constitutional Law of Czechoslovak
Federation in 1969, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was transformed into a
federal state. The federal arrangement had two units comprising of the Czech and
the Slovak autonomous regions.
Except for its two federal units, the Czechoslovak federation exhibited many
of the features of the socialist federations. Each Republic enjoys legislative
autonomy in ‘matters of internal self-administration within the framework of the
Union Republic and within the limits laid down by the Constitution of the Union
Republic’ (Knapp 1984: 1217). But the federal arrangement could not manage the
polarisation between the Czech and Slovak people. Its history has been marked by
consistent efforts on the part of Slovak nationalities to gain greater independence,
as the Czechs viewed the Slovaks as a lesser part of the Czech nation. The Slovak
republic demanded more autonomy from the federal government leading to the
fragility of the federation. They specifically argued for secession which was
categorically rejected by Czech politicians. Finally, the Declaration of Sovereignty
adopted on 17 July 1992 proclaimed the sovereignty of the Slovak people that
brought about the subsequent end of the Czechoslovak federation.

Yugoslavia

The other remarkable attempt to formulate socialist federation was exercised

in former Yugoslavia. It was created out of a meeting of six republics of the
Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia in 1948.3 The ruling
federal elite led by Tito attempted to achieve cohesion in a plural society through
ideological and organisational tools such as the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.
Despite being officially referred to as federal, the state was organised according
to a communist party model in which centralisation was the main principle ruling
the country. ‘The monopoly of power by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

3 It was composed of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Slovenia, and Montenegro, as well as two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.
52 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

(LCY) leadership in political decision-making made federalism a mere facade and,

the power struggle between political elites in republics and the LCY to preserve
their power speeded up political disintegration of the federation’ (Janjić 1993:
104). Particularly, there were different demands from the constituent units for
more power and economic independence in the 1960s and 1970s. As a response
to these demands, the 1974 constitution granted more power to local communities
and increased the role of the regions in managing the economy.
Since the federal system was tightly attached to the political leadership rather
than to the institutions, Tito’s death in 1980 had serious consequences for the
political, economic and social life of Yugoslavia. After this time, the relationship
among the various ethno-regional groups deteriorated. Since 1991, the different
constituents forming the Yugoslav Federation declared independence, bringing the
federation to an end. Despite different economic and political justification have
been forwarded for the demise of the former Yugoslav federation, the fundamental
cause of such unprecedented disintegration is related to the inherent undemocratic
nature in the origin and function of the federal system that instigates nationalist
sentiments without creating the appropriate institutional and political channels
that transform the political confrontations to accommodation.

Fundamental Features of Socialist Federations

Socialist federations had their own salient features as opposed to other democratic
federations. The characteristics of such federations extend from the origin, structure
and function of the system. In order to fully realise the operation and limitations
of socialist federations, it is imperative to comprehend the ideological backdrop
in the origin of socialist federations and the features these socialist federations
manifested. In all cases of the formation of socialist federations, they emerged in
countries where Marxism-Leninism became a state ideology. In these countries,
the communist party as a vanguard party responsible for realising dictatorship of
the proletariat, controlled political, social and economic life of the society.
The system of socialist federations fundamentally operated ‘within the context
of a socialist economic basis, the political monopoly of the communist party,
a leadership cult and the universal application of the principle of democratic
centralism’ (Sakwa 1998: 174).In other words, the ideology was used as ‘a social
integrator and acted as a supra-national unifying force over and above national,
religious and ethnic divisions’ (Sakwa 1998: 176). All the socialist federations were
formed in such ideological context where authoritarian communist political parties
that are not democratically accountable to the people controlled political power.
Contrary to democratic federations that emanated from the negotiations of the
various centripetal and centrifugal political forces, socialist federations emerged
out of the control of political power by a certain groups. Due to the formation of
the federations without a political negotiation, they were ‘institutionalized unitary
state that carried the seeds of its own destruction because it gives the component
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 53

nation and nationalities the forms, but not the substance of national existence and
political power’ (Rakowska-Harmstone 1992: 523).
One of the unprecedented ideological exercises manoeuvred by communist party
leaders is their radical assertion on the mechanisms of addressing ethno-regional
demands. In socialist countries, ‘the ethnic factor represented the principal and
decisive motive for the origin of federations’ (Knapp 1984: 1214). Proponents of
socialist federations assumed that the fundamental means of resolving the nationality
problem was through providing cultural autonomy to the various ethnic groups.
According to the claim of the political leaders, the most ideal form of addressing
ethno-regional demands is through the creation of ethnically defined autonomous
regions. In order to address culture related demands, socialist federations had
developed the principle of ‘the right to self-determination of nationalities’ and
empowering local elites. By providing local autonomy to cultural groups, the goals
of federations in former socialist federations were two-fold (Bruce 2004: 427). One
was a pragmatic recognition of the local language and the other goal was more of
‘deepening central control over the periphery through administrative policies that
secured the economic and political hegemony of the party’ (Bruce 2004: 427). It
was assumed that the achievement of a high level of socio-economic development
across the board would pave the way for a state-wide shift of identities from local
to purely ideological, embracing national identity and ideology (Bruce 2004: 427).
The application of the doctrine of self-determination of nationalities however had
brought about a threat to maintain the territorial unity of the state.
The approach is quite different from other multicultural federal arrangements. In
democratically structured multicultural federations, though linguistic and cultural
rights are protected, ethnic groups are not necessarily granted with autonomous
regions.4 Despite the claim of decentralisation and autonomy, socialist federations
were characterised by the absence of separation of powers and the centrality of
communist party structures in controlling regional administrations. In all the case
studies where socialist federations practiced, there were glaring contradictions
between the constitutional rhetoric and practical application. The constitutions
of socialist federations provide a wider regional autonomy to the various ethnic
groups while centralisation is in reality the features of such federations. Socialist
federations manifested the following basic features that differentiate them from
other forms of democratic federations.

The Doctrine of the Right to Self-determination of Nationalities up to Secession

One of the fundamental features of socialist federations is the ‘sovereignty of

nations and nationalities that presupposes the equality of nations and the right
of nationalities to self-determination’ (Knapp 1984: 1216). The state structure of

4 A typical instance of multicultural federation is Switzerland, where each linguistic

group is not necessarily granted with a single autonomous region: rather the German,
French and Italians have cantonal autonomy in the 26 cantons in the country.
54 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

socialist federations created sovereign or autonomous administrative units for the

linguistic groups living as homogeneous ethnic communities in a certain territory.
The emergence and application of the structure is closely linked with the Leninist
theory of the ‘right to self-determination of nationalities’ that developed during the
time leading up to the October Revolution. Despite the clear contradiction of self-
determination of nationalities to the unitary notions of Marxist ideology, Lenin
and his colleagues were forced to compromise due to the prevailing conditions
during the time and to secure their political advantage.
Lenin argued that ‘the more closely the democratic system of a state approaches
complete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will be the striving for
secession in practice’ (Gleason 1990: 30). He also believed that ‘those who strayed
would eventually return, being drawn by the attractive and compelling nature of
the Communist Party’s commitment to self-determination’ (Plawker 1991–92:
174). Lenin first adopted the principle of self-determination of nationalities as
early as 1903. At first, Lenin tried to define national self-determination ‘in such a
way that it excluded the right of secession and independence on the part of the non-
Russian nationalities’ (Aspaturian 1950: 21). But when he realised his stand did not
conform to the prevailing conditions, he quickly reversed his position by holding
a bold and unqualified stand on full national self-determination (Aspaturian 1950:
21). He thus consistently argued that ‘national self-determination of nationalities
cannot be interpreted fully without the sense of political self-determination that
incorporates the right of secession and the formation of an independent state’
(Aspaturian 1950: 21).5 But he was firmly in the opinion that the right to self-
determination granted to republics had a transitional character until substantial
socio-economic development is achieved.
Based on Lenin’s theory of self-determination, the constitution of the USSR
provided the constituents with the right to secede freely from the union. In order
to safeguard the inviolability of that right, the constitution also gave any single
republic the right of veto in matters relating to the amendment of the clause of
secession. Despite such rhetoric, the power of republics was largely controlled by
the Communist Party directed from the central government. The only purpose of
the rhetoric of secession was to serve as an ideological bromide to lull the various
republics into believing that the union was a voluntary amalgamation (Aspaturian
1950: 27, Gecys 1953: 107). Despite such an unprecedented right to secession,
any attempt to assert this right would be regarded an act of counter-revolution
(Aspaturian 1950: 27).

5 According to Aspaturian (1950) the immediate aim of the national self-determination

policy was ‘to prove to the non-Russian nationalities that the Bolsheviks were different
from other political groups, to recruit intellectuals of the minority nationalities into the
Bolshevik camp, to encourage secessionist movements among the oppressed nationalities
to rise up against the empire and to prepare the groundwork for a future structuring of the
administration of the empire after the revolution (p. 23).
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 55

Despite the mythical nature of the rights of secession under the Soviet
constitution, the constitution had also provided for the procedures of secession.
The Law on Secession allowed the peoples of a union republic to secede by means
of a referendum. But the procedures lay down for the exercise of the secession is
very frustrating and impractical. Since the federal system was largely controlled
by the Communist Party, there had never been a clear procedure on the process of
conducting the secession from the central government. It was only with the coming
into force of the Law of Secession of 3 April 1990 that detailed procedures came
into effect. According to the procedure laid down under the Law of Secession,
the decision to conduct a referendum was to be ratified by the Supreme Soviet
of a Republic based either on its own will or on the request made by the 10 per
cent of permanent residents who had a right to vote according to the laws of the
USSR. Such a procedure could not have any real value since a Union Republic
Supreme Soviet had been merely a rubber-stamping body implementing the will
of the Communist Party and other all-union entities (Plawker 1991–92: 179).
In addition to the fact that the conservative makeup of the Supreme Soviet
makes it extremely difficult to conduct a referendum, in a country where fear and
paranoia were essential elements of society, the legally required one tenth of a
republic’s population would not come forward on to support the initiative (Plawker
1991–92: 179). In view of the difficulties to put the secession right into practice,
it can be argued that the Law on Secession was merely designed to prevent any
realistic attempt at seeking secession from the Soviet Union in a legal manner
(Plawker 1991–92: 182). Due to procedural complexities, there had never been
any peaceful separation of the former republics from the Soviet Union or other
socialist federations within the limits of self-determination and secession under
their sham constitutions.
The self-determination rights of nationalities that emerged as a tactical move
to mobilise political force against the Tsarist regime had brought about lasting
implications for the USSR itself and to other countries that followed the Soviet model
of addressing ethno-regional demands in their territories. Primarily, the principle
lacked conceptual clarity in the sense that the theoretical analysis forwarded by
the articulators of the concept did not provide a convincing explanation as to what
self-determination constituted, how to identify ‘nationalities‘ from other forms of
groups and how the principle could be enforced in practical terms. Rather the whole
political drama ignited to heat up the October Revolution that had brought about
disastrous consequences by stirring an illusionary sense of ethnic nationalism that
significantly created the suspicion and conflict of the various ethnic groups.
The theoretical assertions about the independence of ‘nations and nationalities’
were also devoid of any meaningful aspect. Although socialist federalism advocated
the right to secede, the system neither granted real powers to the nationalities
nor abandoned its autocratic nature of the past regime (Saxer 1992: 609). Despite
the endless propaganda of socialist federations in terms of addressing the
‘national question’, these countries never found a satisfactory way of integrating
its multinational community into an effective polity. The ethnically modified
56 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

façade in socialist federations rather created ‘the conducive political condition

for the creation of new states due to the fact that the successor units already
existed as internal quasi-nation-states, with fixed territories, namely, legislatures,
administrative staffs, cultural and political elites, and the constitutionally enshrined
right to secede from the Soviet Union’ (Brubaker 1994: 61).
Rather the radical measures undertaken to address ethno-regional demands in
socialist federations brought about societal divisions and disintegration. In socialist
federations ‘ethnic heterogeneity was institutionalized and ethnic nationality
became the organization of public life’ (Brubaker 1994: 51). Primarily, ‘the policy
brought about divided loyalty between ethnic nationalism and citizenship since
the system codified nationhood and nationality as fundamental social category
sharply distinct from statehood and citizenry’ (Brubaker 1994: 49). In socialist
federations, ‘ethnic nationality was not only a statistical category; it was more
of an obligatory and legal category that constitutes a key element of individual’s
legal status’ (Brubaker 1994: 53). As such, ‘it was registered in internal passports
and other personal documents and recorded in almost all bureaucratic encounters
and official transactions’ (Brubaker 1994: 53). Ethnic nationality was determined
by based on decent rather than residence.
By passively tolerating but actively institutionalising the existence of multiple
nations and nationalities as constitutive elements of the state and its citizenry,
members of the community forced to have a divided loyalty to either notion.
Depending on the ethnic origin of individuals, their social status and political
orientation, they tend to have more loyalty either to their specific nationality or
to the wider state structure. The polarisation of the political structure helped the
emergence of extreme centripetal and centrifugal forces that had not any intention
to compromise. As a result of institutionalisation of ethnic sentiments without
having a function institutional set up those moderate extreme polarised groups,
socialist federations’ ended up with disintegration that created a dozen of small
independent states.

Indigenisation and Empowering of Local Elites

The other most significant trait of socialist federations is the empowering of the local
elites and co-option with the central party and political structure. The application
of the self-determination rights of nationalities in former socialist federations had
resulted in the creation of homelands for the various ethnic groups that empowered
local elites. Nationalities policies regulate such matters as ‘ethnic representation
in political organs, access to employment, education and careers, cultural self-
expression, demography and economic parity’ (Raffas 2012: 144). Local elites in
the ethnically structured homelands granted power to exercise self-administration
of local political, social and economic affairs as far as the local elite live up to the
guidelines and expectations of the central government and party structure.
The policy of empowering local elites began in former USSR with the
‘nativisation’ program orchestrated in 1920s. The nativisation policy aimed at
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 57

promoting local culture and language. The promotion of native languages was
accompanied by the promotion of the speakers of those languages (Slezkine
1994: 33). According to the policy of korenizatsiia (nativisation), ‘the affairs of
all ethnic groups at all levels-from union republics to clan soviets-were to be run
by the representatives of those ethnic groups’ (Slezkine 1994: 33). In the least
developed republics, ‘the nativisation policy aimed at helping each republic to
build its own ‘national’ intelligentsia staffing the scholarly and popular institutions
that preserved and developed national culture’ (Remington 1989: 150). The
nativisation program resulted in the emergence of large educated strata and local
political elites in the republics and autonomous regions. The policy involved the
preferential recruitment of ‘nationals’ to party, government, judicial, trade union
and educational institutions (Slezkine 1994: 33). In the 1960s and 1970s, the central
state and party structure was highly encouraging the recruitment of members of the
indigenous nationality to responsible positions in all sectors of the party-state that
undermined the role of the Russians (Remington 1989: 150). The ‘extraordinarily
stimulation and maintenance of nationalism through the construction of ethno-
federal state structure while failing to provide a national basis to the regime proved
to be the Achilles heel of Soviet power’(Sakwa 1998: 279).
As part of the process of nativisation policy, Stalin ordered the registration of
national identity in the internal passports. ‘The internal passport system forced
people to state their nationality and fostered an ethnicised sense of national identity
that might otherwise have been eroded’ (Sakwa 1998: 279). The nationality of the
person was determined by ‘the nationality of either parent or a child at the age of
sixteen could choose either nationality of his parents or thereafter it was almost
impossible to change’ (Sakwa 1998: 242). By doing so ‘the system erected rigid
boundaries between ethnic groups and inhibited the development of a common
sense of nationality’ (Sakwa 1998: 242).
The power of local elites closely linked with their relations with the central
authority. If the national leaders ‘provide orderly satisfaction of central economic
goals and prohibits ideologically threatening political diversions, then the locality
is left to pursue its own interests in the cultural sphere’ (Gleason 1990: 97). In
particular, ‘for the mobilization of the public to realize the policies of the central
government, the central leadership identified, cultivated, and promoted to positions
of nominal influence within the republics a stratum of local political and economic
leaders from the local population’ (Gleason 1990: 96). Within a national republic,
membership of the nationality usually conferred a definite advantage in obtaining
official positions and appointments in higher-educational institutions (Sakwa
1998: 251). The strategy attempted ‘to achieved inter-ethnic peace not so much
by removing the root causes of ethnic grievances but by eliminating mobilisation
opportunities for independent ethnic protest’ (Roeder 1991: 199).
The nativisation programme fundamentally created a patron–client relationship
between the central and the regional governments. A purge from the party structure
was considered by the cadre as a threat to access to these rewards and cadres
58 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

did not want to abandon a prosperous life. Such system of patronage undermined
public accountability to rule of law:

To succeed in this context, the successful national leader must develop his
political resources while he routinely understates them to the centre. Central
leader often turn a blind eye to minor corruption until a succession crisis or
external event make a confrontation inescapable. Then central leaders find that
public charges of corruption provide the best method for disestablishing a local
leader. First they embarrass him politically, replace him with a more compliant
leader, and then continue to expose the scandal until his personal entourage is
also displaced. Such charges, though they are often no doubt true and damning
their own right, serve as a useful pretext for periodic renewal of cadres in the
outlying areas (Gleason 1990: 98).

Local elites were empowered in exchange for the transfer of their client service to
the power centre of the communist party. ‘The local leadership was given relatively
free rein to run their republics as long as they managed to contain nationalist
deviations within acceptable limits and to perform reasonably well economically’
(Roeder 1991: 197). During Stalin’s leadership in particular, ‘Soviet federalism
provided a legitimising cover for the rule of the central government, facilitated
by the recruitment of local nationals to administer the centre’s policies’ (Hodnett
1967: 460). Due to the co-option policy perused by the central government, the
nationality elites have divided loyalties to Moscow and to their homeland (Gleason
1990: 97).
In the ethnic homelands, ‘political entrepreneurs played a critical role in the
mobilisation of protest, the politicisation of ethnicity, and in many cases even the
creation of ethnic identities’ (Roeder 1991: 202). Ethnicity virtually ‘became a
condition for success in local politics, since the positions of status within homelands
were often reserved for specific minorities’ (Roeder 1991: 209). The indigenous
cadre ‘was given an institutionalised monopoly on the public expression of ethnic
identity and in defining the ethnic markers that distinguished nationality’ (Roeder
1991: 202). Due to such reasons ‘cadres thus had a strong incentive to resist the
articulation of agendas that might be subversive of existing federal institutions’
(Roeder 1991: 205).
A major responsibility of the cadre assigned by the authorities in the central
government is ‘to block the emergence within the ethnic community of counter-
elites that might challenge Soviet institutions’ (Roeder 1991: 207). In view of this,
‘professionals such as writers, artists or architects who sought to disseminate their
work under the cultural monopoly of the regime were required to join the official
unions for their respective professions rather than having their own independent
associations’ (Roeder 1991: 209). The cadre ‘prohibited independent association
and deprived incipient dissident movements by threatening, imprisoning or
executing exemplary figures’ (Roeder 1991: 209). Since the army of cadres from
the top to the bottom structures demanded high levels of material rewards, gradually
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 59

it became more difficult to provide the larger material rewards necessary to ensure
their continuing loyalty and support (Roeder 1991: 214). When the system could
not offer the financial and economic demands of cadres in the ethnically modified
regions, the elites began mobilising secessionist tendencies that facilitated the
disintegration of the former socialist federations.

Separation of Powers and Rule of Law in Socialist Federations

One of the unique features of socialist federations is the fact the principles of
separations of powers and rule of law are problematic. Although the distribution
of powers in socialist federations resembled very closely those in conventional
federations superficially, the principles of checks and balances as we know in
democratic systems are alien to former socialist federations (Aspaturian 1950:
28). In socialist federations, there was no formal separation of powers between
the three major structures of power where executive and legislative powers
were merged (Sakwa 1998: 107). Opposed to the concept of supremacy of the
constitution in democratic systems, the constitutions in former socialist federations
were not designed to serve as a fundamental and supreme law of the land. Socialist
federations did not also clearly stipulate the relationship between the vanguard
party, and governmental structure as well as the mechanisms of power sharing
between the central government and the regional units. Socialist federations lacked
proper separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judiciary organs
of the state. The highest legislative body in the socialist federations is nominally
granted to elected representatives of the people while real political and policy
decisions are made at the party and government networks.
Constitutions of socialist federations provided for the list of competencies of the
central government and regional units. Not only the powers granted to the central
government were exceedingly significant compared to the autonomy of regional
governments but also the negligible powers granted to the latter had never been
put into practice. Despite the constitutions grant the right to self-determination
including the right to secede and wider autonomy to the regional units, the centre
retained the power to determine the boundaries as well as power over settlement all
matters if secession was to be effected. The long list of affairs which were placed
within the competence of the central government indicated that all the most vital
and important branches of legislation and administration belonged to the federal
government. The regional governments were only permitted to handle matters of
secondary importance and local interest (Gronski 1929: 162). They were largely
given exclusive control over affairs of government such as agriculture, health,
justice, internal affairs, education and social security (Aspaturian 1950: 28). But
they were not permitted to raise taxes or to dispose of their own revenues and the
central government adopted a budget for the whole nation and allocated a share to
each region (Sakwa 1998: 241).
The system of state organs in socialist countries was not based on the traditional
character of division of state power or checks and balances; rather, it was based
60 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

on the principle of the unity of the state power based on democratic centralism. In
socialist systems, the whole mechanism of the state was hierarchically structured
such that it culminated in a single apex represented by the supreme state power
organ which had more powers than the legislatures:

Socialist Federations embody, as the supreme representative organs of the people,

the entirety of the state power in a socialist state. This concentration of the state
power in a single supreme organ, however, does not imply any elimination
of boundaries between individual jurisdictions, such as between legislation
and administration, or between administration and judicature. Naturally, these
boundaries exist and are strictly respected. However, they are not the boundaries
of the different state powers, but the boundaries between different jurisdictions,
based on the division of labor or the division of tasks within a uniform state
mechanism (Knapp 1984: 1221).

Despite all the rhetoric about the separation of powers in socialist federations
the Soviet Union, for instance, ‘real executive power was largely controlled by
extent in small and interlinked the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the presidium
of the Council of Ministers, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and
Central Executive Committee of the Federation’ (Sakwa 1998: 118; Gronski 1929:
165). The bureaucracy in socialist federations was a single chain without leaving
any room for the emergence of independent civil service that survived change of
government. Particularly in former Soviet Union, ‘governmental practice did not
distinguish between the permanent bureaucracy responsible for the implementation
of policies and the politicians who established the policies’ (Sakwa 1998: 117).
The centralisation of the socialist system had also been manifested in terms of
the economic policies of the central government. In order to equalise levels of
economic development between the regional units, the central government imposes
a centrally planned economic policies and centralised allocation of resources. The
role of the regional governments in terms of policy incitation and implementation
was very limited.
Though former socialist regimes adhere to collective leadership and decision
making process in the executive organs, cult of leadership was also an inalienable
part of the political process. After Lenin’s death in 1924, leadership cult emerged
in the soviet political system though the cult of leadership was in conflict with
the formally collectivist nature both of the Bolshevik political system and of
the ideology of Marxism (Sakwa 1998: 150). After the death of Lenin, Stalin’s
personality cult dominated the Former Soviet Union. The leadership cult was also
manifested other socialist federations such as Yugoslavia where the leadership of
Marshal Tito was detrimental in structuring and maintaining the socialist federal
structure. The concentration of power within the central government and the
Communist Party as well as the leadership cults practiced led to the conclusion that
‘the Soviet-style federations were not at all a normal type of federation since they
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 61

did not provide the opportunity for the participation of members of the federation
in the federal power’ (Gronski 1929: 166).
The structure of socialist federations did not have the institutional mechanisms
to achieve a balance between diversity and maintain national unity. Rather, ‘the
centralised rule of the communist party acted as a substitute for a genuinely viable
state system that could have forged unity out of diversity’ (Sakwa 1998: 242). On
the one hand ‘expressions of national sentiments have been a sensitive matter in
Soviet politics because of the party's fear that minority nationalism, if allowed free
rein, would ultimately weaken the unity of the multinational state’ (Remington
1989: 150) . On the other hand, policies of former socialist federations on the rights
of nationalities encourages people to identify themselves in terms of their ethnic
origin and regional constituencies have the power to use indigenous language
and culture in government institutions. But ‘the limits of acceptable expression
of national self-awareness are subject to change, depending both on Moscow's
general line and on its interpretation by local party leaders’ (Remington 1989:
150). When the local elites engaged in promoting broader local autonomy, the
central party and government authorities may purge the local leadership claiming
they are ‘narrow nationalists’. When some groups express their critical views on
the ethnicised political environment that undermines national cohesion and human
dignity, the pretext to purge such groups is on the framework of ‘chauvinism’.
The other fundamental feature of socialist federations was the lack of genuine
democracy. Although terminologies such as democracy and individual rights
were available in the vocabulary of socialist legal systems, they simply meant
attachment to the official party network and any deviation from the official party
positions is constrained. ‘The concepts of the rule of law, constitutionalism, and
separation of powers, democracy, and limited government were entirely foreign’
(Saxer 1992: 606). Not only were opposition parties not allowed to operate in
such systems but also independent civil society groups and other democratic
institutions were repressed. Since such systems lacked the basics of federal
systems expressed in political bargaining and consensus as well as genuine
democracy, all the prototype socialist federations have been dismantled except
that some of the features of socialist federations are still maintained in countries
such as Ethiopia. The participation of the public in the decision making process
of the former socialist federations was merely for formal rhetoric, which were not
intended to articulate social interests but to further the cohesion of the one-party
state (Sakwa 1998: 143).
The absence of the practical application of the rule of law was the fundamental
feature of former socialist federations. Though the concept of the rule of law
seemed to be distinctive from the widely accepted principles in the liberal
conceptions, socialist federations had incorporated different principles of rights
and freedoms. The 1936 USSR constitution like western-style constitutions has
a long list of political rights. The 1977 Soviet Constitution had also guaranteed
political and civil rights, as well as rights to employment, rest and leisure, health,
old age, disability and sickness benefits, housing, education, cultural benefits,
62 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

sexual equality and family protection. However, the practical significance of civil
and political rights recognised in the constitutional texts were minimal. Due to the
absence of real accountability for the rule of law, there were neither legal limits
on the state's power nor protected individual and republic freedoms (Saxer 1992:
619). This was partly due to the fact that the pioneering former USSR was largely
a continuation of the authoritarian Tsarist Russia. According to an author who was
closely following developments during the Russian revolution:

In the Russian tradition law has always been the instrument of ruling elites.
For the Tsar the law was a tool through which to control his empire. Legal
power was exercised through what was commonly known as the ukase, a
proclamation or decree having the force of law. This legacy has been worsened
by the supervening years of Soviet rule. For the Tsar’s Soviet successors the
law has been a device for the arbitrary exercise of total power as well as for
social engineering, essentially for turning a particular social and economic
theory into reality. In sum, whether Tsar or commissar, Russia’s rulers have
historically stood above the law, changing or ignoring it at will to meet their
own immediate political or ideological needs; law as a replacement for
arbitrary (Gronski 1929: 14).

In view of the backdrop of such repressive tradition, it is not surprising that the rule
of law never took hold and the Communist Party continued to exercise authority
arbitrarily and secretively (Gronski 1929: 15). In addition, the role of the security
apparatus in former socialist federations was also immense. In order to arrest any
dissent in the society, the systems had a highly organised security network that
controls social, economic and political life of the public at each level.
Primarily, the concept of judicial independence was unknown in socialist
federations’. In particular, the Soviet constitutional practice recognised no role for
an independent judiciary. This is mainly due to:

The ambiguous role of law in the former Soviet Union (as well as in other
former communist regimes), derived from the belief that both the ‘state’ and
‘law’ would wither away with the development of a self-governing and self-
regulating communist society. At first the system was defined as a ‘dictatorship
of the proletariat’ in which the proletarian state would have to consolidate itself
for a short time while it carried out the unpleasant task of eliminating bourgeois
and capitalist opposition. This entailed a massive consolidation of the state
and necessarily made any laws regarding personal inviolability redundant. The
institutions of the class dictatorship were unregulated, since they were destined
to disappear, and were considered mere epiphenomena to the overriding struggle
between the proletariat and its enemies (Sakwa 1998: 126).

Nevertheless, socialist legal systems did not abandon the western concept of
the rule of law altogether. Particularly, ‘western-style legal structures (based on the
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 63

German and French models) were considered efficient methods of furthering the
dominance of the state and the Communist Party as well as a means of impressing
western intellectuals with their preoccupation of liberality’ (Gronski 1929: 16).
Despite its western structure, the entire purpose of the legal system was ‘to harness
citizens in service to the policies of the party’ (Gronski 1929: 17). In particular,
Stalin preferred to deal with the enemies of his regime through separate legislation
that bypassed with ‘extralegal’ procedures establishing the legacy of masking
totalitarianism with false constitutional rhetoric’ (Gronski 1929: 16).
Socialist federations were also known for the enormous gap between the de
jure and de facto practice of the system. The promises that were provided under
the constitution and other party documents were in complete contradiction with
the administrative centralisation practised by the regimes (Gronski 1929: 166).
The problem with respect to the Soviet-style constitutional arrangement was that
the constitution did not serve as a document that needed to be practised. The
constitution in such systems was kept as ‘a mirror of changing reality rather than an
ideal presentation of arrangements that were non-existent’ (Aspaturian 1950: 41).
In both theory and practice, there was no such thing as constitutional supremacy in
the Soviet-style federations. The idea of federalism was thus practically nullified
by the system of centralisation exercised by the party and the state machinery.
As Hodge (1979–80) underlines, ‘Union legislative power is unbounded, union
control of the economy is total, union constitutional pre-eminence is complete,
union supervision of institutions is unqualified, and union direction of the armed
forces is unilateral and unrestrained’ (p. 542). In former socialist federations,
‘though federalism had in reality been rapidly disappearing, the myth of federalism
has been officially sponsored and encouraged in socialist federations’ (Aspaturian
1950: 47). The media and other channels of communication relentlessly deliberate
on the importance of federalism and the protection of the cultural rights of nations
and nationalities while the reality was that all state machinery was controlled the
central government and the communist party structure.

Patron-Client Party Structure and the Principle of Democratic Centralism

The other fundamental feature of the socialist federations was that although the
constitutions of these countries appeared to be responsive to minority rights, the
vanguard party was in tight control of the whole system. The regional units only
had the right to exercise cultural and linguistic rights rather than having proper
autonomy. The communist parties occupied a singular role in countries where
the Soviet-style federal arrangement had been adopted. The party system was ‘a
highly effective mechanism for retaining a monopoly on power but lacked the
flexibility to adapt to more complex ways of governing’ (Sakwa 1998: 102).
In former communist regimes, the party claimed to know what was in its best
interests of the people;
64 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

The Party countenances no opposition to its dictates; it recognizes no competition;

and it furnishes the single thread that knits together the entire Union into a
compact, highly-centralized system, characterized by rigid Party discipline. In
practice, local political liberties cannot develop, since the actual power belongs
to the All-Union Communist Party and no reflection of the federal structure
of the Soviet Union is to be found in the structure of the Party itself (Gecys
1953: 106).

Membership to the communist parties in theory was open to any citizen but there
were various screening processes and the recruitment to membership of the party
became an extended system of co-optation (Sakwa 1998: 86). Appointment to
different government positions ‘did not take place through open advertisement or
competitive recruitment but through this system of extended co-optation’ through
the party network system (Sakwa 1998: 91–5).
Though ‘the party did not formally take over the functions of the state, its
monopoly over political power and administration made it a unique organisation
that became a ‘state-party’, without which the whole system would collapse’ (Sakwa
1998: 100). Despite ‘the party stressed the duties associated with membership
rather than the privileges; there were advantages in terms of the opening up of
career opportunities and other benefits’ (Sakwa 1998: 86). By applying the
methods of co-option, the central government was able to ensure the loyalty of
the local political leadership by retaining the power to appoint and dismiss local
party and state officials in the regional governments. Despite the recognition of
an ethnic federal system that granted wider power to nations and nationalities,
the communist leaders had the view that the ethnic federal structure constitutes
only a transitional step to democratic centralism that ensures the unification of the
different nationalities into a single and democratic state (Lenin 1927–45: 145).
Such systems could only function as long as the party decision-making process
was highly centralised to enable the survival of the federations. When the party in
power weakened, the system itself correspondingly weakened and disappeared.
In former socialist federations, the party played a significant role in formulating
and implementing social and economic policies. The ‘party was the ultimate
decision-making body acting as the ‘ideological constitution’ of the country in
which the key theoretical principles were outlined and out of which detailed
policies were developed’ (Sakwa 1998: 98). The party ‘demanded effective
centralism of power particularly in areas of setting and maintaining an ideological
line, in personnel appointments, and in broad policy guidance and coordination’
(Remington 1989: 147). Political leaders were assigned by the party to mobilise
‘the population for the various campaigns that were launched from time to time’
(Sakwa 1998: 92). The decisions of the central government ‘were usually enacted
through the relevant soviet or governmental machinery and thus gained the force
of law’ (Sakwa 1998: 98). Local government officials are expected to implement
policies of the central government and they learn ‘to live with the interference of
party officials in their work’ (Sakwa 1998: 98). Such imposition of a monolithic
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 65

federal structure across the federation ensures fundamental uniformity in

formulation and implementation of policies at all levels of the administrative
apparatus (Gecys 1953: 105).
The communist parties in socialist federations, which led by the principle of
‘democratic centralism’, outlawed any deviation from the official party positions.
It became the pivotal principle of state organisation. Initially, democratic
centralism emerged as ‘an approach to party discipline that permits party members
to have freedom of criticism as long as this does not undermine the unity of
action decided on by the party’ (Lenin in Sakwa 1999: 16). Article 3 of the 1977
USSR constitution provided about democratic centralism as ‘The Soviet state is
organized and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, namely the
electiveness of all bodies of state authority from the lowest to the highest, their
accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies to observe the
decisions of higher ones’. Democratic centralism as the key principle governing
the organisation of the communist party was formulated by Lenin as one of the
fundamental principles of party organisation. The 1986 Rules listed the five key
elements of democratic centralism:

(a) the election of all leading bodies, from the lowest to the highest;
(b) periodical reports of party bodies to their organisations and to higher bodies;
(c) strict party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority;
(d) the obligatory nature of decisions by higher bodies for lower bodies; and
(e) collective spirit in the work of all organisations and the personal responsibility
of every communist for the fulfilment of his [or her] party assignments (Sakwa
1998: 91) .

The most important purpose of democratic centralism is ‘to prevent the mass
of the party membership controlling its own leadership’ (Sakwa 1998: 91). All
party bodies are subordinated to the decisions of party leaders and some issues
are kept off the agenda and firmly controlled the emergence of any faction within
the party structure (Sakwa 1998: 91). Democratic centralism justified the unity
of the party though ‘guaranteeing that lines of communication within the party
remained vertical, from top to bottom, rather than horizontal, between like-minded
individuals, groups or committees’ (Sakwa 1998: 91) .
The principle democratic centralism practiced in former socialist federations
was cognizant of popular participation. The regimes always ‘stressed the principle
of direct participation in the belief that the division of between the rulers and the
ruled could be transcended’ (Sakwa 1998: 139). But the purpose of such public
participation was not conducted in recognition of the sovereignty and decision
making power of the people. Rather popular participations in local party and
government channels were conducted to inculcate communist ideology and the
various polices of the regime. The people have the right to give comments on
the issues raised in meetings and discussions but the decision is ultimately made
by party leaders. At every juncture total and uncritical obedience was demanded
66 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

from anybody living in the system. Though the existence of a party with great
and undefined powers that gives the impression that the system is well ordered
superficially, from the perspective of the formal constitution, arbitrariness was the
hallmark of the entire socialist federations (Sakwa 1998: 83).
There had been an attempt made in Czechoslovak communist party to break
the vicious captivity of democratic centralism. In 1968 the communist party tried
to broaden the definition of its leading role in the party’s Action Programme
accepting that ‘its authority derived not from the once-and-forever act of taking
power but that it was based on performance and had to be fought for and won
daily’ (Sakwa 1998: 101). But the attempt was crushed by the Soviet Union. Later
attempts were made to reform the democratic centralism decision making process
during the internal renewal (odnowa) of the Polish party in 1980–81 and by the
reforms of Gorbachev in the former USSR (Sakwa 1998: 102).
The structure of socialist federations created a unified government and party
system that constrained the political space for local governments. In such systems,
‘the imposition of a monolithic party structure at federal and regional level ensured
fundamental uniformity in thought and action upon all levels of the federation’
(Aspaturian 1950: 39). Primarily, ‘the presence of the one-party system rendered
any constitutional principles of separation of powers meaningless’ (Aspaturian
1950: 45). In such circumstances, ‘a party which enjoyed a political monopoly in
the state could carry any measure it considered necessary through both chambers
of the legislative body’ (Aspaturian 1950: 45) As Aspaturian commented on the
role of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, ‘the Party countenances no
resistance to its dictates; it recognises no competitors; it operates in Moscow and
all local centres of power with remarkable uniformity’ (Aspaturian 1950: 48). The
decision making process being held behind the scene, the contending decisions
making centres with the party and government circles together with the absence
of strong institutions that hold government officials accountable made the regimes
fragile though their outer appearance seems to be stable and strong.
Finally, due to the undemocratic nature of socialist federations, the USSR,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were all disintegrated. The only socialist federal
structure that transcended the political dynamics of the post-Cold War scenario is
the Ethiopian ethnic federal system. It is to be seen whether the federal structure
in Ethiopia will overcome the turmoil inherent in such form of federal structure or
encounters the fate of former socialist federations.

Summary

Socialist federations that were established in the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republic (USSR), Czechoslovakia and the former Yugoslavia had unique features
opposed to other multicultural federations. Lenin first introduced the model in
order to mobilise the non-Russian political groups to the revolutionary movement
against the Tsar Empire. The characteristics of socialist federations extend from
 Socialist Federations and the Accommodation of Diversity 67

the origin, structure and function of the system. In all cases of the formation of
socialist federations, they emerged in countries where Marxism-Leninism became
a state ideology. In these countries, the communist party is a vanguard party
responsible for realising dictatorship of the proletariat, controlled political, social
and economic life of the society. Proponents of socialist federations assumed
that the fundamental means of resolving the nationality problem is through
providing cultural autonomy to the various ethnic groups. According to the claim
of the political leaders, the ideal form of addressing ethno-regional demands is
through the creation of ethnically defined autonomous regions. The approach is
quite different from other multicultural federal arrangements. Despite the claim
of decentralisation and autonomy, socialist federations were characterised by
absence of separation of powers and the centrality of communist party structures
in controlling regional administrations. In all the case studies where socialist
federations practiced, there were glaring contradiction between the constitutional
rhetoric and practical application. The constitutions of socialist federations provide
a wider regional autonomy to the various ethnic groups while centralisation is in
reality the features of such federations.
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 Chapter 3
Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution
and History

In the last two chapters, the general perspectives of federalism and federations as
well as the salient features of multicultural federations in democratic and socialist
contexts were discussed. The theoretical and comparative discussions provide a
framework for assessing the fundamental issues pertinent to the Ethiopian federal
system that has been operational since the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution.
Many of the general principles of federalism that were discussed in previous
chapters have direct or indirect relevance to the study of the Ethiopian federal
system. Constitutional principles such as self-rule and shared-rule, separation of
powers and checks and balances and the relationship between democracy and
federalism are relevant to the assessment of the horizontal and vertical separation
of powers under the Ethiopian Constitution and the relationship between the
federalisation and democratisation processes.
In addition, the discussions on ethnicity, modes of accommodation of ethnic
diversity and the advantages and challenges of multicultural federations have direct
implications for the Ethiopian federal project that has been formulated to address
the long-standing ethno-regional demands persistent in the last four decades.
The discussion on the structure and function of socialist federations also has a
significant role in understanding the nature of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism. Such
comparative examination helps in the analysis of the ideological fundamentals of
the Ethiopian federal system vis-á-vis the ideological principles pursued by the
other federations.
Based on the general framework that has been laid down in the last two
chapters, the remaining sections of the book are devoted to the discussion of the
structure and function of the Ethiopian federal system. The study mainly analyses
the ideological fundamentals governing the ethnic federal system presently in
operation in Ethiopia. To grasp the proper origin and development of many of
the ideological principles that govern the system, it is imperative to deal with
the historical and political background of the Ethiopian state. This is because
the developments of federations in the various political systems have their own
historical and political backgrounds. In the case of the United States, federalism
was developed as a response to colonial domination, whereas in countries such as
Canada, South Africa and India, among others, federalism is designed to address
internal linguistic and cultural diversity.
The origin and development of the ethnic federal system in Ethiopia is
directly and indirectly related to the various historical and political developments
70 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

that had been prevalent in the past. In order to comprehend the origin, nature
and function of the Ethiopian model, it is important to describe the political and
historical background that led to the restructuring of the Ethiopian state from an
absolute monarchy (later socialist unitary) state to a decentralised federal system.
In considering this objective, this chapter outlines the fundamental historical and
political developments in the making of Ethiopia, including the constitutional
developments and the various implications of contradictory interpretations
of Ethiopian history. The discussion begins with the contemporary political
dispensation that began 1991 and the origin as well as features of the 1995 federal
constitution. After the discussion on the current status quo, the chapter provides
insight into the historical and constitutional development that led to the emergence
of the current political and constitutional rhetoric.

Ethnic and Religious Diversity and Political Changes in Ethiopia

The famous Italian scholar, Carlo Conti-Rossin, described the Ethiopian Empire
in his book Historia di Ethiopia in 1928 as Un museo di popoli or ‘Museum
of peoples’, signifying its linguistic and religious diversity in the country. The
three language groups of the Afroasiatic that are spoken in Ethiopia are known as
Cushetic, Omotic, and Semetic. Ethiopia has always had a fast-growing population,
as well as ethnic and religious diversity. The population of the country according
to the 2007 census was well over 73 million. According to the population growth
projection released by Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian
population reached over 86 million as of July 2013. Of this, 43,715,971 are males
and 42,898,015 of them are females. The census has also identified the existence
of more than 80 ethnic groups in the country.1 Out of these, 10 ethnic groups had a
population of 1,000,000 and above. The Oromo comprised the largest ethnic group
with 25.4 million people, followed by the Amhara with 19.8 million. Each of the
other ethnic groups comprised of less than five million people.2
Spatial distributions of the population by region show significant variations.
The percentage share of the regions ranges from the smallest proportion of 0.5 per
cent in the Harari region to the largest at 36.6 per cent in the Oromia region. The
largest population size was observed in the Oromia region with 26,993,933 people
recorded as of 28 May 2007. The second and third largest proportion of population
was in the Amhara (17,221,976) and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples

1 The number and composition of ethnic and religious groups enumerated in this
section is based on the Population and Housing Census conducted by the Central Statistical
Agency of Ethiopia in 2007.
2 Some of the larger populated ethnic groups included Somali (4.5 million), Tigrie
(4.4 million), Sidama (2.9 million), Guragie (1.8 million), Welaita (1.7 million), Hadiya
(1.2 million), Afar (1.2 million) and Gamo (1.1 million). All other ethnic groups consisted
of less than one population each.
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 71

Region (SNNPR) (14,929,548) respectively. The population in the three largest

regions accounted for more than 80 per cent of the total population. The Orthodox
and Islamic religions are the most dominant religions in the country (43.5 per cent
and 33.9 per cent respectively). Other religion groups include Protestant (18.5
per cent), Roman Catholic (0.7 per cent), traditional (2.7 per cent) and other (0.6
per cent).3
For generations, Ethiopians have been celebrating their diversity and harmonies
revealed through inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages and living together
without any strife. However, after the emergence of the educated elite groups to
the Ethiopian political platform since the 1960s, the religious and ethnic diversity
in the country has been used as an instrument of achieving political dominance
through inciting violent conflicts. The Ethiopian nation building agenda since the
beginning of the twentieth century until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974
was characterised by highlighting the significance of the Ethiopian nationalism at
the expense of weakening the culture and language of other diverse ethnic groups
that had been incorporated into the Ethiopian state.
The form of nation building that promoted the Amharic language and northern
culture created dissent among elites from the various minority groups in the
country. Particularly, due to the impact of the widespread Marxist ideological
orientation among university students since the 1960s, revolutionary groups started
to promote the Stalinist notion of ‘the right to self-determination of nationalities’
and demanded political change in the country. Many of the Marxist parties that
emerged during the heyday of the revolutionary organised their ideology by
emulating the ‘national question’ political strategy used by Lenin to overthrow the
Tsar regime. Although the political and economic realities in Ethiopia were well
far behind the situation in Tsarist Russia, the young students did not waste their
time to assess the relevance of the Soviet ideology to address the political demands
in Ethiopia.
University students organised demonstrations and public meetings that aimed
at bringing about radical political change in Ethiopia. The regime of Haile Selassie
was overwhelmed by the widespread political and social upheavals that rocked the
country. However, the regime had not the willingness and the capacity to respond
to the political demands raised by the students and some groups of the military. At
the end, I Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed and the military took over political
power in 1974. Immediately after it took political power, the military regime
undertook landmark political measures that ended the exploitative land tenure
system and declaring socialism as a state ideology. The military regime was also

3 Regional distribution of the population by religious composition shows that the

Orthodox faith followers were predominant in Tigray and Amhara regions as well as in the
Addis Ababa city administration. The Islam population was significantly larger in Affar,
Somali and Harari regions and the Dire Dawa city administration. Similarly, Protestants
were found to be larger in the Gambella and SNNP regions.
72 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

in favour of addressing the ‘question of nationalities’ rhetoric that was advanced

by university students.
However, the measures undertaken by the military regime to respond to the
political demands in addressing cultural and language rights were slow and did
not satisfy the demands of radical political forces that promoted wider political
measures that permit the right to self-determination of ethnic groups including
the right to secession. In particular, Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF),
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
organised armed struggle that waged a sustained warfare for 17 years until
the final overthrow of the regime in 1991. After the protracted civil war that
destabilised the country for almost two decades, rebellion forces led by EPLF and
TPLF took control of political power in the country. Subsequently, Eritrea became
independent in 1993 while a new political dispensation that focused on promoting
ethnic related political demands took priority in the Ethiopian political landscape.

1991 – A New Dispensation in Restructuring the Ethiopian State

A historical dispensation, which was a complete opposite to the regime, began

to unfold in 1991. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), under its
umbrella organisation, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF), assumed state power in May 1991. The swift control of state power
happened with the blessing of the United States Government in a bid to prevent
the kind of chaos that had devastated Liberia and Somalia during the time (Lyons
1996: 122). When the new forces entered the capital, there were mixed feelings
among the public. On the one hand, there was a huge sense of hope for change,
especially among the ethno-regional political forces hoping for an end to what they
call ‘ethnic exploitation’, democratisation of the Ethiopian state and prospects of
economic development. On the other hand, there were also huge uncertainties,
since the public knew little about TPLF and its policies. Some of the measures
undertaken by TPLF/EPRDF reflected the same pattern of marginalising prevalent
in Ethiopian politics. The Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) of the deposed Derg
regime was immediately abolished, top-level former government officials were
dismissed and the army was disbanded. Largely, the fall of the military regime
was not only seen as the fall of a regime, but as the collapse of the modern state
formation that had been in the making since the late nineteenth century (Andreas
2010: 8).
The revolution was a complete reversal of the centralisation stance and sense
of unity that had crystallised for decades. In 1991, different nationalist movements
had organised and marched under the banner of their own cultural or national
identity and in the name of the right to self-determination (Andreas 2010: 8). The
National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation in July 1991 was organised
as the foundation for a transitional period after the regime change. However,
the conference had excluded many of the political groups from participation
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 73

(Solomon 1993: 150; Alemante 1992: 205). The conference largely included
selected individuals and over 20 political organisations handpicked by TPLF/
EPRDF (Aalen 2002: 7; Lyons 1996: 123).
Although the conference was acclaimed as ‘a dramatic shift of political
power from the centre to new politicians from hitherto marginalised regions’, a
precondition for the organisations to be allowed to take part was that they had to
be ethnically-based parties (Lyons 1996: 123). Those who were encouraged to
participate were predominately ethnic-based groups, which were either already
in existence or organised immediately prior to the conference.4 Multi-national
organisations or other ethnic-based organisations that might pose a threat to the
new status quo were systematically excluded from the process. The remnants of
the student movement, the Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRP)
and the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (Meison) were not invited to attend the
conference. Furthermore, ‘the intellectual community of Addis Ababa, with its
large Amhara contingent, was likewise excluded from positions of responsibility
and influence in the new government’ (Young 1996: 537).
Although the weakness of the opposition parties has contributed to the failure
of the transitional process in breaking Ethiopia’s traditional authoritarian system,
a major setback was due to tighten control of the process by TPLF/EPRDF. The
latter carefully managed the conference and kept participation and the eventual
outcome firmly under its control (Lyons 1996: 123). In light of this, ‘the outcome
of the transitional conference, the transitional charter, is therefore more a result
of an agenda predetermined by the EPRDF and partly by the OLF, rather than
a pact between all the organisations that participated at the conference’ (Lyons
1996: 123).
The principles incorporated in the charter largely reflected the political
programme that had been advocated by TPLF/EPRDF. The charter accepted the
rights of all of Ethiopia’s nationalities to self-determination, including secession
and established local and regional councils based on nationality. The basis of
the new language and administrative policy was ethnic identity and affiliation.
Accordingly, the country was divided into 14 administrative regions called kilil.
The conference had also established ‘an 87-member Council of Representatives
(COR), in which the largest number of seats was held by the TPLF/EPRDF,
including the key portfolios of Defence and Foreign Affairs, while the OLF
received four lesser cabinet posts’ (Lyons 1996: 123).
The most serious shortcoming of the conference was its disregard of
multinational organisations in general and pan-Ethiopian nationalism in particular.
A crucial aspect of decentralist and balanced federalist ideologies is that the
federal bargain should be based on a covenant, where the various political forces
in the country voluntarily agree to make arrangements for power-sharing and the
devolution of power. In light of this principle of federalism, there are two major

4 Among the 27 parties that participated at the conference, 19 of them were ethnic-
based.
74 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

political forces that need be considered in the Ethiopian context, namely pan-
Ethiopian nationalism versus ethnic nationalism. Disregarding this fundamental
reality, the transitional charter was devoted solely to the ‘right of nationalities’ and
overlooked pan-Ethiopian nationalism that had been in the process of crystallisation
in previous decades. Although the multinational organisations that were denied
participation in the conference hardly represented the various dimensions of
pan-Ethiopian nationalism, their marginalisation signified the intention of TPLF/
EPRDF not to include any pan-Ethiopian sentiment in the restructuring process
of the Ethiopian politics. TPLF/EPRDF did not want to consider accommodating
multinational parties mainly because the success in defeating the Derg was
assumed to be considered as a sign for the correctness of its policy of putting
nationality at the forefront of the struggle (Young 1996: 536).
The policy measures undertook by TPLF/EPRDF directly or indirectly aimed
at weakening the pan-Ethiopian nationalism sentiment. The most significant factor
for undermining Ethiopian-nationalism is the sense of abhorrence developed
towards Ethiopian nationalism among the ethno-nationalist groups, which was
used as the single most important weapon for mobilising ethnocentric militant
groups such as EPLF and TPLF. Ethiopian nationalism was portrayed as an
undercover tool for Amhara operations. It was assumed by TPLF that the ‘backbone
of neftagya (Amhara dominance) had been broken’ with the defeat of the Derg.
There was also the erroneous assumption that those who supported pan-Ethiopian
nationalism were only in the Amhara nefeteya group, which wanted to advance its
access to power. However, as it has been observed during the 2005 elections, the
pan-Ethiopian sentiment remains alive and extends beyond the Amharic-speaking
community. The huge support available to the Coalition for Unity and Democracy
(CUD) party during the election campaigns and on voting day was a significant
part of the marginalisation of concerns of those who favoured pan-Ethiopian
nationalism. Despite this reality, the ruling elite and their supporters consider the
public movement of 2005 as an expression of ‘Amhara’ sentiment to the new
power status quo.

The Origin and Design of the Ethiopian Federal System

It is important that as we put our vision to the country, we should do so directly,

knowing that people out there want to be part of the process and will be
responding, because in the end the drafting of the constitution must not be the
preserve of the 490 members of this assembly. It must be a constitution which
they feel they own, a constitution that they know and feel belongs to them. We
must therefore draft a constitution that will be fully legitimate, a constitution that
will represent the aspirations of our people (Ramaphosa 1995).

These were the words of Cyril Ramaphosa who was entrusted with the most
challenging task of leading the constitutional drafting body in the Republic of
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 75

South Africa. The South African constitution-making process is one of the recent
constitution-making processes that proved the need for intense negotiation on the
issues and the willingness to make concessions among the stakeholders. Although
there were divergent issues raised by the various negotiating groups during the
process of making the South African Constitution and deadlocks at times, through
intense negotiations, the parties overcame the deadlock and agreement was
ultimately reached on the final terms of the document.
The South African Constitution is a rare achievement in the light of the
difficulty of creating a legitimate constitution within deeply divided societies. In
such countries, it is not uncommon to find a multitude of political parties who claim
to have diverse constituencies, which largely relate to specific religious, political
or ethnic groupings. Such societies are ‘characterised by a lack of preconditions
of national homogeneity that facilitate unified action, struggling over their shared
identity as well as lack of capability to act together on the basis of their civil
commonalities and write a liberal and identity-neutral Constitution’ (Lerner 2004:
3). Due to such polarisation, it has been challenging to find a political solution to
the divergent interests of the various groups and make the process inclusive of all
the political groupings.
The primary step necessary to design an enduring constitution in such divided
societies is launching an inclusive constitution-making process. This is because
a constitution will be considered legitimate only if it enables the vast majority
of the polity’s members to identify with it and to relate to the document as their
own (Lerner 2004: 12). In deeply divided societies, the involvement of political
groups in the constitution-making process not only determines the legitimacy of
the process and the contents of the constitution, it may also be the key factor in
determining whether the country will undergo democratic transition and attain
long-lasting stability. In addition to this, the involvement of various political
groupings in the constitution-making process and its inclusiveness must be
manifest through the participation of public and civic society groups.
The legitimacy of origin of federal constitutions is particularly crucial. Since
the formation of a federation is a foedus, implying an agreement or contract
that is freely and mutually entered into, the origin of federations should always
be consensual. A federal system of government is a mutual consent among the
various constituent parts or, as Trudeau notes, ‘federalism is by its very essence a
compromise and a pact’ (Trudeau 2005: 221). It has been established that ‘federal
constitutions grow out of the idea that free people can freely enter into lasting
yet limited political associations to achieve common ends and protect certain
rights while preserving their respective integrities’ (Elazar 1987: 33). According
to Elazar (1987), ‘consensual legitimacy is utterly necessary for a constitution to
have real meaning and be lasting, as constitutions become meaningful instruments
only by consent’ (p. 164). Amoretti and Bermeo (2004) also maintain, ‘Federations
cannot be the result of force or coercion imposed from above and sustained by the
threat of military power. Federalism is an attempt to find a national compromise
76 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

between the divergent interest groups which history has thrown together; but it is
a compromise based on the will of the people’ (p. 471).
In light of such fundamental principles on the origin and design of democratic
federal constitutions, the Ethiopian constitution-making process has serious
limitations. Although the federal system of government as a means of addressing
ethno-regional demands in the country has been a long-standing political agenda in
the Ethiopian political discourse, the process and design of the federation is subject
to controversy. A republican intellectual movement that was operating against the
Italian invasion of 1936–41 was the first movement to advocate a federal approach
to accommodate the diversity of Ethiopia’s constituent regions (Bahru 2007:
175). Later, the students’ movement that took the ‘question of nationalities’ to the
forefront in the 1960s also sought ‘the right to self-determination of nationalities’
expressed through a federal system of government as a political remedy to identity
related demands. Many contemporary scholars and political groupings are also
largely in favour of a federal system of government.
The disagreement among Ethiopian political groups and scholars is about the
origin, structure and function of the federal system. As pointed out earlier, the
yardstick for measuring the legitimacy of a federal polity is the political process
that led to the formation of the system. The transitional process that commenced in
1991 was a complete departure from the past that utterly disregarded pan-Ethiopian
sentiments that were solidly apparent in Ethiopian political and social domain
(Solomon 1993: 150). Rather, the constitution-making process that subsequently
occurred was largely dominated by pro-diversity political forces that did not have
any political willingness to accommodate the concerns and interests of those
political groupings that were aligned to national unity. This is because the basis
upon which the new constitution crafted was a total break with the past, ‘owing
to the multiplicity of historical narratives, is contested, and where revisionist
historiography becomes dominant among the makers – as a consequence of which
the past is doomed to be thrown away’ (Tsegaye 2010: 87). Due to the rejection of
achievements of the past, the new elite that came to power totally monopolised the
constitution-making process.
Despite such major deficit, the transitional government established a
constitutional commission to prepare a draft for submission to a specially elected
constitutional assembly; the constitution-making process was largely dominated
by TPLF/EPRDF and other ethno-regional political forces. The fundamental step
in the drafting process of a democratic constitution is that the drafting body must
be comprised of all the political groupings that have a stake in the process. In
the Ethiopian context, there are at least two competing interests without which
any constitution-making process would not be successful. One is the sentiment
towards the territorial integrity and unity of the country while many linguistic
and cultural groups are concerned with cultural survival and equality. A real
constitution-making process would not be successful unless these two political
groupings are fairly represented in the constitution-making body. Unlike the South
African constitution-making process that incorporated diverse political groups,
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 77

the Ethiopian constitution-making process was largely dominated by the forces

that ensured their hegemony through the threat of violence. Notable in the drafting
process was the absence of major political forces, most importantly the political
forces that supported pan-Ethiopian nationalism. Exclusion of such political forces
during the formation of the transitional government denied them the opportunity
to contribute their share during the drafting process. This historical fallout has
seriously undermined the legitimacy of the current political status quo.
Despite the absence of major political forces in the constitution-making process,
the drafting of the constitution was undertaken by a constitutional commission and
presented to the Council of Representatives. Lengthy discussions were conducted
on the provisions of the constitution before the Council subsequently adopted it.
As evidenced by the minutes of the council’s deliberations, the leaders of the new
regime tried their best to defend the principles incorporated in the constitution
especially, the unlimited ‘rights of nationalities’ as a cure to the country’s age-old
problems. Despite the widespread concerns of the right to self-determination that
permits secession, only a few people were represented in the Council to voice this
concern. Many of the views aired during the deliberations mirrored the Stalinist
notion of ‘right of nationalities to self determination up to secession’. Contrary
views were discouraged and victimised under the pretext of an ‘attempt to bring
the nefteya (Amhara dominance) regime back’.
After the adoption of the draft by the Council, it was distributed for public
deliberations. However, the public turnout was very low, especially in urban areas
such as Addis Ababa. Some sources note that only 5 per cent of the population took
part, while others argue that no more than 30 per cent of the citizenry participated
throughout the country (Aalen 2002: 20). While TPLF/EPRDF claimed that there
was widespread public turnout in rural areas, there is no evidence to confirm
whether the limited public turnout was genuine and free or an illustration of
the same manipulations of the public sentiment that were apparent during the
communist system, which TPLF/EPRDF replaced. In addition to this, despite
various attempts to initiate public discussion, there was little participation and
open debate, particularly on the issues related to the right to self-determination and
secession (Paul 2000: 286).
There were various reasons for the low turnout and lack of interest among
the public. The exclusion of real political forces from the process resulted in a
lack of interest among the public. There was serious doubt about whether the
new victors were ready to open dialogue or if it was simply a political exercise
to institutionalise the political programme of TPLF/EPRDF. In addition to this,
‘poverty, the lack of communication and transportation systems, and a political
tradition that worked against political participation, rendered participation in the
constitution-making process difficult’ (Benomar 2003: 11). As the history of the
country is characterised by repression and authoritarian tendencies, its society is
deeply suspicious of political leaders. Due to the absence of a democratic political
culture, even if the gesture of the new leaders to conduct free public discussions
78 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

was assumed genuine, there was no favourable political climate to support such a
democratic process.
The other flaw related to the constitution-making process is related to the
adoption of the draft constitution. In principle, a body that represents all the
stakeholders in the country must do adoption of a constitution. Unfortunately,
such fundamental procedures were not upheld during the making of the Ethiopian
Constitution. Since opposition parties withdrew from the election of the
Constitutional Assembly process due to claims of intimidation orchestrated by
the regime, the election took place against the background of a dubious electoral
process that lacked transparency and public participation. At the end, with the
exception of a few independents from Addis Ababa and some unaffiliated delegates
from the frontier regions, TPLF/EPRDF candidates won 484 out of 547 seats of
the Constituent Assembly (Lyons 1996: 130).
The deliberation process in the Constitutional Assembly was not lively. It
was a monotonous and uninspiring process whereby more than 90 per cent of
the members of the assembly directly or indirectly promoted similar political
views. Many dissenting opinions could not be aired, since the representation was
unfairly tilted towards the emerging status quo. Only a few representatives elected
from Addis Ababa were able to use the limited opportunities available to air their
concerns relating to the need for democracy in the constitution-making process
and the dangers of the new political trend directing against the territorial integrity
and unity of the country. Finally, except a few objections raised, the overwhelming
TPLF/EPRDF block easily ratified the draft (Lyons 1996: 130). In particular, due
to the total monopolisation of the process by TPLF/EPRDF and its allies, all major
contested issues such as land ownership and the creation of an ethnic-based federal
system were approved without any serious debate (Merera 2003: 127).
As the whole constitution-making process was dominated by TPLF/EPRDF,
the fundamental principles of the constitution are a direct reflection of the
ideological conceptions of the elites of this vanguard party. The making of the
new constitution was simply viewed as an attempt by TPLF/EPRDF to influence
the making of Ethiopia in line with its own image and to ensure its hegemonic
position in the new Ethiopian state structure (Merera 2003: 127). The fundamental
principles of the constitution that were most controversial, such as federalising the
centralised state based on the principle of ‘right of nations and nationalities to self-
determination including secession’ were brought into the constitutional realm due
to the political conviction of those who had the military upper hand, rather than
through wider public consensus.
The chairperson of the constituent assembly, Negasso Gidada, later made a
public admission that the process was flawed. The former president expressed
his regret about the speech he made during the endorsement of the constitution in
1994. In his speech made in November 2009, the former president expressed regret
for misleading the public by declaring that the process of drafting the constitution
and selection of the assembly’s members was transparent and democratic as
well as involved the participation of all political forces. He further clarified that
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 79

the constitution-making process was undemocratic and devoid of any public

participation and officially apologised to the public for his involvement in such a
hollow process.
The flawed nature of the process had direct implications for the legitimacy
of the constitution in general, and of the federal system it was meant to create
in particular. The constitution as it stands now suffers from a lack of legitimacy
directed from two significant political groupings. The constitution in general
and the part of the constitution that prescribes unprecedented rights to ‘nations
and nationalities’ could not enjoy wider legitimacy even from the most ardent
ethnocentric circles such as Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogden National
Liberation Front (ONLF) due to lack of real application of the constitutional
principles. Although such political forces initially supported the new political
changes, they abandoned the process after realising that it was not genuine.
On the other hand, the constitution and the institutions it attempts to create do
not have the support of pan-Ethiopian nationalists. The makers of the constitution
consider this group as counter-revolutionary, rather than as a potential force that
can help to counterbalance the trends of division in the country. TPLF/EPRDF
excluded this force from the beginning, risking further confrontation. The fact that
pro-unity forces, especially strong among urban intelligentsia and people from
the north, have developed a sense of neglect by the system and this perception
has resulted in serious confrontations. In addition to the various demonstrations
and oppositions made against the current regime since it came to power in 1991,
the 2005 general election clearly confirmed that the pan-Ethiopian political force
is not dead, as had been assumed by the ethnocentric forces. The political force
that mobilised around the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) party during
the election showed its dissatisfaction with the whole political process and the
restructuring of the state in the last 15 years.
Due to the serious setbacks during the time of designing the constitution,
its contents and the application of constitutional principles have not brought
legitimacy and consensus to the political system of the country. There are still
wider gaps among the various political forces on the major political issues facing
the country. Bringing constitutional legitimacy is the most crucial step that needs
to be undertaken to move the Ethiopian political process towards the next phase.
The challenge is how this legitimacy could be achieved after two decades of
application of the ideology of TPLF/EPRDF. Some scholars argue for ‘redemptive
constitutional practice, conducted through the instrumentality of constitutional
fidelity’ to bring about legitimacy to the constitutional system (Tsegaye 2010: 115).
According to this argument, the absence of original legitimacy in the making of
the constitution could be counteracted by aggressive implementation and fidelity
to constitutional ideals.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such an approach would redeem the constitution
and render it legitimate. In the first place, the regime has not shown any meaningful
commitment to implement the ideals of the constitution in the last two decades. In
fact, the regime has been seriously eroding the constitutional system by narrowing
80 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

down the political space and suppressing political dissent in the country. There
is no any indication that there will be commitment to the constitutional ideals,
at least in the short-term. In addition to this, even if the constitutional principles
are applied aggressively, the constitution is unlikely to earn legitimacy due to the
absence of consensus on some of the major principles enshrined in it.
The most likely option available to restore the legitimacy of the constitution
is through renegotiating of its terms among the various political forces. Such a
process would accommodate the ideals and concerns of both pan-Ethiopian and
pro-diversity forces in the country and would develop a national ideology upon
which the country’s political, social and economic policies would be built. The
fierce negotiation that was held among the political parties in South Africa during
the making of their new constitution is the most relevant experience for Ethiopia.
Notwithstanding the challenges, this is the only option available to bring about a
political system that accommodates the various political interests in the country
while maintaining national unity. If such a political opening for renegotiating the
terms of the constitution is not achieved, the country will continue to suffer from
political polarisation and instability in the coming decades.

Basic Features of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE)

Constitution and State Structure

Although the constitution-making process lacked the participation of major political

forces and the public, the principles incorporated in the constitution are, in many
ways, a break with the past. The most striking feature of the FDRE Constitution is
its complete departure from the past, by making the transformation from a strong
centralised monarchical (later socialist) state, to a highly decentralised federal
state. This approach rejects the patriotic narrative, based on historic Ethiopian
nationhood and replaces it with an idea of Ethiopia as a multi-ethnic state. The
other important feature of the constitution is its unprecedented emphasis on
ethnic identity. The preamble of the constitution begins with ‘we the nations,
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia’ as opposed to the common phrase ‘we the
people’. The way the preamble to the constitution begins gives the impression that
the Ethiopian state was non-existent and it just emerged like the United States or
the Swiss Federation that was formed through the coming together of different
independent entities.
As the Ethiopian state predates the formation of the new political dispensation,
coupled with the illegitimate nature of the coming into force of the new constitution,
attempting to portray the new structuring as a ‘coming together’ form of federation
seems invalid. This is because for the materialisation of a ‘coming together’ form
of federation, the constituent units needed to have independent existence before
joining the federation. In Ethiopia, although the military regime was overthrown,
the country was not disintegrated and independent governments were not formed.
Even the temporary control of Tigray by TPLF before the end of the civil war was
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 81

not absolute and it did not renounce being part of the Ethiopian state. In the light
of this, it is not clear how the assertion of the constitution that claims ‘nations,
nationalities and peoples’ forming the new constitution could be valid.
The other way of defining Ethiopian federalism is that it is a ‘holding together’
form of federalism designed to maintain the disintegrating polity. Although
this is the appropriate way of characterising the Ethiopian federal system,
the fact that the centre was non-existent to accommodate the interests of the
periphery, characterising the Ethiopian polity as a ‘holding together’ federation
is problematic. When the new government came to power in 1991, the central
government had already been dismantled. In countries where a ‘holding together’
process was conducted, it is the centre that devises or negotiates with minority
groups to balance divergent interests of unity in diversity.
Due to the absence of the appropriate characteristics of ‘coming together’
or ‘holding together’ forms in the Ethiopian federal process, it is difficult
to characterise it under one of these forms. In both circumstances, there is an
assumption of political negotiation rather than imposition. In addition to this, in
the former case, there have to be independent entities that come together to form
the new federal system while in the latter case, there has to be a strong centre
that accommodates the rights of minority groups. The federalisation process in
Ethiopia is rather a political decision imposed by the political forces that came to
power through force.
The other unique feature of the Ethiopian federal system is in relation to
popular sovereignty. Under the constitution, state sovereignty is not attributed to
the ‘Ethiopian people’ as it is commonly stated in liberal constitutions but rather
to ‘nations, nationalities and people’. The attribution of sovereignty to nations,
nationalities and peoples, means the constitution is a product of consensus among
the constituent ethnic groups inhabiting the Ethiopian territory. This implies that
Ethiopians should first identify themselves with one of the ethnic groups in the
country before they claim Ethiopian nationality.
On the other hand, contrary to the granting of sovereignty to ‘nations,
nationalities and peoples’, members of the lower house are designated in the
constitution as representatives of the ‘Ethiopian people as a whole’ rather than the
nationalities. A similar provision is found under Art. 38(1) of the German Basic law.
However, the wording of the German constitution on members of the Bundestag
is consistent with the preamble of their constitution, which states, the ‘German
people’ and presupposes the existence of one people in Germany. In view of such
a need for consistency between representation of the members of parliament and
the body that has the highest sovereignty, the expression ‘members of the house
are representatives of the Ethiopian people as a whole’ seems to be inconsistent
with the sovereignty that is granted to nations and nationalities elsewhere in the
constitution. Since the constitution does not grant sovereignty to the Ethiopian
people as a unit, it is not clear how members of the House of Representatives could
represent the Ethiopian people as a unit. If the constitution is to hint that there is
82 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

‘one Ethiopian people’, this would lead one to argue that Ethiopia is a nation-state,
which defies the very foundation of the constitution itself.
The other major principle that is recognised under the constitution is the right
to self-determination. Art. 39 of the constitution grants every ‘nation, nationality
and people’ the unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to
secession. The rights granted to nations, nationalities and peoples extend to the
full measure of self-government and the right to speak, write and develop their
language. The constitution recognised equality of all languages while maintaining
Amharic as a working language of the federal government.5 Although the
constitution provides the right to self-determination to all ethnic groups in the
country, it only establishes nine regional states.6 The 14 regions defined earlier
during the transitional period were reduced to 9, following the merger of the
southern regions into one in 1994. Under the new structure, only a few ethnic
groups have enjoyed full territorial self-rule.7 Most ethnic groups are blended and
their right to self-rule is limited. Although the constitution stipulates that regional
states are delimited on the basis of settlement, language, identity and consent
of the people, they are structured mainly along language and ethnic lines. The
constitution also grants asymmetrical powers to all the constituent units with the
same formal relationship to the federal government. In reality, however, the social,
economic and political capacity and leverage of the constituent units is different
from the others, making the Ethiopian federation de facto asymmetrical.
The constitution recognises the principles of constitutionalism and constitutional
supremacy, human rights, secularism, transparency and accountability of
government as the basic pillars of the constitutional system. It also recognises
human rights provisions extensively. Although the constitution grants wider
individual freedoms and rights, it is silent on the relationship between group and
individual rights and it does not provide principles on the balancing of the two
categories of rights. A set of economic, social policy objectives, and directive
principles that serve as the conscience of the system are also incorporated under
the constitution. Furthermore, the establishment of non-partisan institutions such
as the Auditor General, the National Election Board, Population and Census
Commission is also recognised.
The constitution establishes a parliamentary system of government with a strong
executive body composed of a prime minister, council of ministers, and ministries
who operate under a parliament and a president who has a ceremonial role. Federal

5 Art. 5, FDRE Constitution.

6 According to Article 47 FDRE Constitution, member states of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia are the state of Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia,
Benishangul/Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, Gambela peoples and
the Harari people.
7 It is only the relatively homogenous states of Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, Afar and
Somali that properly enjoy territorially-defined ethnic self-rule. All the other ethnic groups
are blended by combining two or more ethnic groups.
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 83

legislative power is granted to a 550-member House of Representatives while

the upper house, the House of Federations, is composed of representatives of
‘nations, nationalities and peoples’. This chamber has a number of roles, including
interpretation of the constitution and deciding on any issue of self-determination
including secession. Unlike the experience of other federal systems, the upper
house does not have any role in the law-making process. Under the Ethiopian
constitution, both federal and state governments have parallel legislative,
executive and judicial powers. The constitution expressly enumerates exclusive
powers of the federal government and assumes that all other residual powers are
competencies of the regional governments. The only concurrent powers provided
under the constitution are taxation competencies.
Unlike other federal systems, the constitution is silent on the relationship
between federal law and state law. Due to this gap, there are two views on this
subject. One is the view that argues for the application of a federal supremacy clause
by default and settling the conflict of laws in favour of the federal government.
The other view asserts that the principle of ‘supremacy of the nations, nationalities
and peoples’ provided under the preamble of the constitution makes it is difficult
to claim that federal law is supreme over state law since the regional governments
are largely expressions of the sovereignty of ‘nations and nationalities’ (Assefa
2007: 329). The constitution is also silent on whether states are obliged to effect or
execute federal laws. The current practice in this respect is the execution of federal
law by federal agencies, while there are some delegations in relation to certain
powers such as taxation (Assefa 2007: 356). The majority of the federal laws
are largely executed through informal relations between the federal and regional
offices or through the democratic centralism party structures (Assefa 2007: 357).
In general, the principles that are incorporated under the FDRE Constitution
provide mixed impressions. In terms of the aspirations of that constitution in
protecting human rights, it has incorporated principles of high standards that are
consistent with international human rights treaties. Other fundamental principles
of the constitution, such as the right to self-determination granted to ‘nations,
nationalities and peoples’ as well as the state structure that denies courts the power
to interpret the constitution have made the constitution akin to that of former
socialist federations such as the former USSR and Yugoslavia.

Constitutional Development in Ethiopia until 1991

Since Ethiopia is a country with an ancient civilisation, its constitutional

development has a comparatively longer history. For centuries, customary and
religious laws served as the constitution of the ancient monarchy. Ser‟ata Mangist
(System of Government) was the first constitutional document that was used to
regulate the responsibilities of government during the Axumite Kingdom and later
periods. The document largely deals with the various responsibilities of the crown,
religious leaders and high-ranking military officials. The other legal document that
84 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

had been used to regulate legal relations in the country since the fourteenth century
is Fetha Negest (Justice of Kings). The Fitha Negest was a volume that deals with
the function of the various parts of society, including the monarch and religious
authorities, and the traditions and rules that they needed to adhere to. The first part
of Fetha Nagast deals with ecclesiastical matters whereas the second part deals
with secular matters such as the relationship between kings and their subjects. The
law served as a source of law for criminal sanctions until the promulgation of the
modern penal law.
The Ethiopian Empire did not have a formal written constitution during its
long history. However, ‘Under the imperative to create a modern state that would
have the financial resources and institutional strength to withstand the challenges
from Europe, Haile Selassie embarked on a policy of centralisation unprecedented
in the history of the country’ (Bahru 2008: 329). The first step in his process of
modernisation was the promulgation of the first written constitution in 1931. It
asserted the emperor’s status, reserved imperial succession to the line of Haile
Selassie, and declared that ‘the person of the emperor is sacred, his dignity
inviolable, and his power indisputable’. This is because ‘the promulgation of
the constitution was made against the backdrop of a continued struggle between
centralism and regionalism, respectively represented by the new elite and the
nobility’ (Bahru 2007: 141). The constitution that legitimised absolute monarchy
was also partly intended for foreign consumption in portraying Ethiopia as a
modern state (Bahru 2007: 141).
However, the constitution did not grant democratic rights to ordinary citizens or
ensuring government accountability to the people. Although the constitution was
aimed at legalising the divine and absolute power of the emperor, it transformed
the traditional Ethiopian feudal system into a modern system. It introduced a quasi-
representative body in the form of two deliberative chambers that consisted of the
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. However, the people did not elect members
of both houses and ministers were also individually appointed and personally
responsible to the emperor (Markais and Asmelash 1967: 199).
Taking into consideration the various developments locally and internationally,
Haile Selassie granted the revised constitution in 1955. Two of the basic motives
that inspired the constitutional reform were the same that had inspired the
experiment of the 1931 constitution, namely ‘concern for Ethiopia’s international
image, and the centralisation of governmental authority in the hands of the
emperor’ (Markais and Asmelash 1967: 244). It was also aimed at ‘rectifying the
new condition created by the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia’ (Bahru 2007:
206). In two important respects, the revised constitution represented a departure
from the past: introduction of universal suffrage and provisions for an elected
Chamber of Deputies (Bahru 2007: 206). The emperor retained the prerogative to
appoint the senate since political parties were not allowed. The provisions in the
constitution that guaranteed personal freedoms and liberties, including freedom of
assembly, movement, speech and the due process of law, were largely far from the
realities of Ethiopian life (Ofcansky and LaVerle Berry 2004). Even if the people
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 85

wanted to exercise their rights, the absolute power that the emperor wielded,
coupled with support from a few insiders, would not have allowed the translation
of these rights into practice.
When the military regime came to power 1974, the 1955 Constitution was
suspended and a provisional declaration was made that reiterated socialism as
the state ideology. The military regime ruled the country without any formal
constitution until it declared one in 1987. The constitution of the People’s
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) of 1987 organised the state according to
the socialist state structure legitimatising the power of the military into a civilian
form. The enactment of the constitution neither engaged the public nor brought
about any meaningful democratic transition. Since the constitution was declared at
a time when the country was undergoing a civil war, the lifetime of the constitution
was relatively brief. In May 1991 the combined force of the Tigrayan People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)
forced the military regime out of power. After TPLF took power under its cover
organisation, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF),
it declared a transitional charter and in 1995 the Constitution of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopian (FDRE) was enacted.

A Brief History of Ethiopia until 1991

In many respects, Ethiopia is indeed a country of contradictions. Although the

country is known around the world in relation to the famine that occurred there in
the 1980s, it has also enjoyed many remarkable achievements in its long history.
Not only is Ethiopia the only country in Africa that has never submitted to colonial
conquest, but also its 3,000 years of recorded history stretch back to the tenth
century bc when Ethiopia’s Queen of Sheba visited the biblical King Solomon of
Israel, who has a prominent story in the bible (Bahru 2007: 7). From this legend
‘emerged the Solomonic dynasty which has served as a symbol of Ethiopian unity,
defender of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the independence of the Habesha
from foreign threats’ (Paul 2000: 176). In addition to this, Ethiopia’s ancient
history has also been elevated by the discovery in 1974 of Dinknesh (Lucy), which
is the oldest known human fossil dating back some 3.2 million years.
Ethiopia is also renowned for its successive kingdoms and empires which were
largely dominated by the Tegeregna and Amharic-speaking people of northern and
central Ethiopia (Bahru 2007: 7). One of the remarkable aspects of the country’s
history relates to the Axumite kingdom that ruled over most of northern Ethiopia
and the Arabian coastline from the first to the seventh century ad (Bahru 2007:
8). The Aksum Empire that dated from 100 to 700 ad was notable for a number
of achievements, such as developing its own alphabet and the Ge’ez and giant
obelisks that are still visible to this day around the town of Axum in Tigray. In
addition to these achievements, one of the Axum emperors, King Ezana, converted
86 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

to Christianity in the early fourth century ad, and subsequently introduced the
Christian religion to the country (Bahru 2007: 8).
Following the collapse of the Axum kingdom in the eighth century, political
power shifted further to the south. By the tenth century, the centre of state power
had moved to the Zagwe dynasty that had its capital in Lasta (Solomon 1993:
141). The lasting legacy of the Zagwe is clearly evident in the construction of
numerous monolithic churches in Lalibela. The Cushitic-speaking Zagwe dynasty
came next, but was short-lived (1150–1270) since the dynasty was soon replaced
by the Solomonic Dynasty that traced its origins to King Solomon of Israel
through Queen Sheba and to the House of David and ultimately to Jesus Christ.
The Solomonic dynasty ‘ruled Ethiopia from 1270 when Yekuno Amlak overthrew
the last ruler of the Zagwe dynasty and built a powerful kingdom which matched
and in some respects surpassed its Axumite predecessor in military might and
territorial extent’ (Bahru 2007: 9). The Solomonic dynasty was later weakened as
a result of a series of events that unfolded in the sixteenth century. The first of these
events was the ascendency of Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim, better known as Ahmed Gragn,
a warrior who mobilised the Muslim population of Afar and Somali against the
Christian kingdom. The Solomonic kingdom suffered a series of defeats between
the years 1529–43 at the hands of Gragn (Bahru 2007: 9). The end of the conflict
with Ahmed Gragn was immediately followed by the extensive expansion of the
Oromo tribe towards central, northern and western Ethiopia (Bahru 2007: 8). The
Christian kingdom, weakened by Ahmed Gragn’s invasion, was in no position to
check this significant population movement.
Weakened by the war against Ahmed Gragn coupled with the expansion
of the Oromo, the Christian kingdom established a permanent central capital
in Gondar departing from the tradition of establishing temporary capitals. The
Gondarian period (1640–1770) is known for its construction of impressive castles
and churches. The relatively peaceful period of the Gondarian was interrupted by
protracted warfare for control of the throne by regional warlords. From 1769 to
1855, a period that has come to be known in history as Zemene Mesafint, or the Era
of Princes, the monarchy was rendered nominal and the authority of the central
state was weakened (Solomon 1993: 142). Real power came to reside in the hands
of regional lords, signifying the importance of regionalism in historic Ethiopian
imperial politics. Even so, the wars and conflicts of Zemene Mesafint did not have
an ethnic dimension but were purely power rivalry for regional dominance.
When the process of ending the Era of the Princes and the creation of a modern
Ethiopia started under Tewodros in 1855, historic Ethiopia had been under feudal
anarchy for over 80 years and central authority existed only in name (Bahru 2007:
11). It was only Tewodros who subdued regional lords one after another, ending
the anarchy of Zemene Mesafint and was crowned as Tewodros II (Bahru 2007:
27). After Tewodros defeated all the regional warlords, he established the first
national army and initiated a land reform programme. Although he was one of the
best visionary leaders the country ever had, his reforming ideals were criticised
for not only being vague but also for lacking consistency and method (Bahru
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 87

2007: 31). In addition to the fundamental problems in enforcing these historical

changes, Tewodros was confronted with internal and external opposition to his
reforms, thus making it difficult for him to realise his ambitious vision. Internally,
he was in fierce confrontation with the nobility and the clergy whose power was
threatened by the reforms launched by him. He was not also on good terms with
foreign powers such as the British. Finally, in 1868, due to massive internal
opposition and the British expedition that came to secure the release of imprisoned
British missionaries and diplomats, Tewodros took his own life when he realised
that his defeat was imminent.
Emperor Yohannes IV succeeded Tewodros II in 1872 after serious bloodshed
was caused in his quest to inherit the throne. Yohannes followed a substantially
different policy from that of Tewodros. While Tewodros’s policy was meant to create
a centralised unitary state, Yohannes’s vision was driven by the establishment of
a loosely united Ethiopia (Bahru 2007: 60). Thus, when Yohannes came to power,
he adopted a less confrontational stance towards the church and the powerful
principalities, devolving power to the regional aristocrats who recognised his
status as the negus negast (king of kings). Although he followed a liberal policy
of recognising the authority of regional powers, Yohannes had always been under
pressure to arrest regional challenges, especially from the Shewa and Gojam
provinces. The reign of Yohannes was also marked by increasing international
interference, notably by European powers and by Egypt. Finally, Yohannes was
killed in 1889 while he was repulsing an attack directed by the Sudanese Mahdist
army in Gondar
King Menelik of Shewa crowned himself as Emperor Menelik II immediately
after the death of emperor Yohannes in 1889. His coronation marked the end
of the regional power rivalry among the nobility of Tigray, Gojam, Gondar and
Shewa, since the latter emerged as the undisputed winner. The fact that Shewa had
weaker states to the south helped it to expand and control resources, while it was
less affected by the wars during the periods of Zemen Mesafint contributed to its
emergence as an uncontested power (Merera 2003: 61). Menelik II’s reign is the
most remarkable and controversial in the history of the Ethiopian monarchy. There
were a number of accomplishments achieved during Menelik’s reign. In 1896, he
secured a major victory against the Italian colonialists at the battle of Adwa. The
victory was not only referred to as the first victory of black people against a white
army; it also sent a message of hope to black people under oppression throughout
the world, signifying victory over white domination as being possible.
Although Menelik is highly credited for his victory at Adwa against Italian
aggression that ensured Ethiopian independence and symbolised the heroism of
black people, his agreement with the Italians to occupy Eritrea through the treaty
concluded in 1900 is considered as the most serious shortcoming of the victory at
Adwa (Bahru 2007: 84). In addition to this, after he had dealt with this potentially
disastrous external threat, he embarked on the expansion of his kingdom into the
south and conquered much of the territory that was inhabited by different ethnic
groups such as Oromo, Sidama, Gurage, Wolayta and others. The incorporation of
88 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

a significant number of diverse ethnic groups, which presently inhabit the larger
part of the state and collectively outnumber the highlanders, has created a complex
situation and has generated serious controversies (Markakis 1973: 361).
The process of expansion took the forms of peaceful submission and armed
resistance (Bahru 2007: 61). In some instances local chiefs were maintained to
be used effectively in a system of indirect rule by making them balabats and
gultegnas (traditional land holding titles) while in other instances where there
had been resistance to the marching Ethiopian army, fierce battles and subsequent
punishments followed (Markakis and Nega 2006: 29). Since a host of these
ethnic groups had not developed a class structure similar to that of the northern
highlanders, the vast land mass in the south was distributed among the aristocracy
and soldiers from the north (Markakis and Nega 2006: 29). By 1906, when the
conquests in the south were completed, Ethiopia’s current geographical structure
was completed.
The two sets of historical circumstances dealing with Eritrea and the expansion
to the south have continued to be controversial and have led to the emergence
of different radical political movements since the 1960s, which have fuelled
contradictory interpretations of the achievements of the reign of Menelik:

The imperial period and the formation of the modern state are interpreted
in starkly different terms. The legacy is a source of considerable pride for
Ethiopian nationalists, particularly Christian highlanders, but is viewed as
internal colonialism by those the empire subjugated. Some historians consider
Ethiopia a truly “multi-ethnic national society” that emerged from centuries
of interaction and acculturation between ethnic groups. Others characterise
the state formation as a colonial process by which an Abyssinian settler class,
in alliance with foreign powers, colonised a large part of the current country
(International Crisis Group 2009: 2).

Some argue that the expansion of the kingdom was purely an act of occupation
and colonisation of independent kingdoms in the south (Seyoum 2006). On the
other hand, Menelik is praised by many as the father of the modern Ethiopian
state. Not only do such assertions justify the measures taken by the emperor as a
nation-building strategy, they also refute the assertion that the expansion was fully
conducted by sheer force and that it was only an act of Amhara elites (Solomon
1993). According to the latter argument, after the end of the nineteenth century,
the measures undertaken by emperor Menelik were to create a modern, unitary
government based on an inclusive national culture (Andreas 2010: 6). But many
of the proponents of such a view admit that although the expansion to the south is
largely portrayed as an Amhara episode, the Tigray, Oromo and other ethnic groups
also participated in the process (Herbert 1993: 160). In addition to this, they further
argue that the emperor was not always harsh in terms of the incorporation process
rather; he followed a devolutionary approach (Bahru 2008: 329). Menelik is
also admired for his modernisation process. He endeavoured to establish the
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 89

first ministerial offices in 1907 and the first modern school, communications and
transport facilities.
The process of centralisation and modernisation that was initiated by Menelik
II continued with much vigour during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie’s
long reign from 1930 to 1974. Haile Selassie is mainly credited for the series of
measures he took to modernise the socio-political structure of the country. From
the moment he came to power, reforms in tax, customs, the military, currency
and the elimination of the gabar system that was exploitative to the peasantry
were implemented (Bahru 2007: 110). It was also during this time that Ethiopia
witnessed a number of new communications, transport and education facilities.
Genuine efforts were made in particular to expand education despite some people
questioning its distribution (Aaron 1996: 373). The spread of modern education
was aimed at training skilled personnel for the growing bureaucracy and the
dissemination of ideas intended to promote change (Bahru 2007: 109). Following
Ethiopia’s independence from the occupation by Italy in 1941, Haile Selassie
began to use western models for establishing government departments, the civil
service, financial structures, professional army and police forces, schools, and
universities (Paul 2000: 183). This was mainly due to the fact that the emperor was
compelled by the people’s expectations on the modernisation of the economic,
political and social sectors (Alemante 1992: 207).
One of the transformations was concerning the restructuring of the old
administrative units. In line with this restructuring, the largest of these administrative
units were the provinces (teklay ghizats), of which there were 14 in the mid-1960s
with each under a governor general appointed directly by the emperor. Each
province was subdivided into sub-provinces (awrajas), districts (weredas), and
sub-districts (mikitil weredas) (Ofcansky and Berry 1991: 65). Some observers
view the measures towards modernisation undertaken by the emperor as the result
of the emperor’s conscious effort to weaken the traditional elite through a modern
bureaucracy and army (Merera 2003: 71). In fact, such measures of modernisation
seriously weakened the traditional role of regional powers, though it is doubtful to
conclude that such efforts were only aimed at weakening regional powers.
The other legacy of Haile Selassie was his inability to relieve the majority of
the peasantry from severe exploitation by the ruling class and change the latter’s
failure to recognise the diversity in the country. The traditional Ethiopian land
holding system was characterised by rest (land right by geological descent) and
gult (land right given in the form of salary for some accomplishment) largely
continued to be practised during the time of Haile Selassie. In such a feudal
landholding system, the peasantry had to pay different kinds of tributes to the
ruling class in the form of tax, tithe (asrat), dergo (supply of provisions for visiting
officials, collecting firewood for lords and surplus labour) (Bahru 2007: 87). It
was considered as the worst form of exploitation that continued for centuries in
the country and was even characterised as being far worse than slavery (Bahru
2007: 92).
90 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Although the regime of Haile Selassie was known to have initiated different
land reform policies, they were cosmetic and largely rejected by regional nobility.
The regime’s inability to change the land ownership system was instrumental in
inciting students from the 1960s onwards with their agitation being framed around
the famous revolutionary slogan ‘land to the tiller’. This slogan, among others,
subsequently led to the downfall of the age-old feudal system and nationalisation
of land by the military regime in 1975. Haile Selassie’s regime is also criticised for
‘its failure to appreciate the ethnic and linguistic diversity in the country and the
national question’ (Keller 981: 354). In the process of modernisation, the imperial
regime accused of being failed to acknowledge the existing diversity in the
country and the Amharic language and orthodox Christian values were promoted
as national values (Markakis and Nega 2006: 83).
Above all, Haile Selassie’s efforts at modernisation were trapped between two
divergent elite groups. The first group that was unhappy with the modernisation
process was the regional nobility whose power was eroded due to the various
measures of centralisation undertaken by the emperor. Since the modernisation
process did not have a broad social base and largely ignored the traditional
elite, the emperor’s system of government and centralisation was considered a
threat to regional hereditary rulers (Andargachew 2005: 39). On the other hand,
the emerging elite viewed the regime as lagging behind in terms of important
measures needed for social change. As Messay puts it, ‘the new educated elite
saw its ambition being increasingly thwarted by a closed aristocracy stubbornly
defending its traditional privileges. Although modern education was praised and
encouraged, educated people did not participate in the formulation of policies; they
were simply asked to serve a regime that excluded them politically’ (Messay 2006).
Generally, while the traditional nobility saw Haile Selassie’s absolutist drive as a
power grab and an infringement on its hereditary rights, the educated Ethiopians,
on their part, increasingly viewed Haile Selassie’s measures as undemocratic and
his style of government as an outmoded system inconsistent with the times.
Due to such divergent outlooks of the two groups towards the system, Haile
Selassie’s legacy is as controversial as the legacies of his predecessors. Some praise
and give him credit as having been dedicated to continuing the centralisation and
modernisation policies that had been begun by Menelik. For others, Haile Selassie
was responsible for extremely weakening regional powers by establishing an
absolute, centralised state. In particular, ethno-nationalist groups view the regime
of Haile Selassie as being responsible for the repression of the various ethnic
groups under Amhara domination. Finally, when the contradictions that exist in
the various groups could no longer be managed in the traditional administrative
system, signs of rebellion began to show in the early 1960s and they culminated in
the overthrow of the imperial regime in September 1974. The military regime that
took over political power declared socialism as its ideology and it dismantled the
feudal political and economic structure. However, the regime’s way of handling
the political questions in the country led to the emergence of different rebellion
groups that engaged in military warfare to oust the regime. At the end, rebellion
 Introduction to Ethiopian Constitution and History 91

forces that staged campaigns from the Eritrean and Tigray regions succeeded in
overthrowing the military regime in May 1991.

Summary

In many respects, Ethiopia is a country of contradictions. Although the country

is known around the world in relation to the famine that occurred in the 1980s, it
has also enjoyed many remarkable achievements in its long history. Not only is
Ethiopia the only country in Africa that has never submitted to colonial conquest,
but also its 3,000 years of recorded history stretch back to the tenth century bc
when Ethiopia’s Queen of Sheba visited the biblical King Solomon of Israel,
who has a prominent story in the bible. Ethiopia has always had a fast-growing
population, as well as ethnic and religious diversity. For generations, Ethiopians
have been celebrating their diversity and harmonies revealed through inter-ethnic
and inter-religious marriages and living together without any strife.
The process of centralisation and modernisation that was initiated by Menelik
II and continued with much vigour during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie’s
long reign from 1930 to 1974 had brought about a controversial political debate
on the state structure of the country. The form of nation building that promoted
the Amharic language and northern culture created dissent among elites from
the various minority groups in the country. Particularly, due to the impact of the
widespread Marxist ideological orientation among university students since the
1960s, revolutionary groups started to promote the Stalinist notion of ‘the right to
self-determination of nationalities’ and demanded political change in the country.
The military regime that removed the age-old feudal system in 1974 declared
socialism as its ideology though the political measures undertaken by the regime
did not satisfy ultra nationalist groups. The claim that the rights of ‘nations
and nationalities’ was not protected and the movement for secession in Eritrea
strengthened the struggle against the military regime. After years of civil war,
the military regime was removed from power by nationalist groups led by EPLF
and TPLF.
A historical dispensation, which was a complete opposite to the past, began to
unfold in 1991. Different nationalist movements had organised and marched under
the banner of their own cultural or national identity and in the name of the right to
self-determination. The transitional charter adopted in 1991 recognised the right to
self-determination of ‘nations and nationalities’. Later, Art. 39 of the constitution
of FDRE grants every ‘nation, nationality and people’ the unconditional right to
self-determination, including the right to secession. In the last two decades, the
country’s political discourse revolves around the relevance of the secession clause
and the mechanism of accommodating minority rights consistent with maintaining
national unity and integrity.
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 Chapter 4
Development of Ideological Radicalism and
Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia

The revolutionary rhetoric that began in university campuses since the end of the
1960s has brought about a lasting legacy in terms of shaping the country’s political
discourse and state structure. The ambitious vision of the student groups to liberate
the peasants from the yoke of feudalism and ensuring the rights of ‘nations and
nationalities’ opened up lasting leftist political tendencies that preoccupied the
Ethiopian political framework in the last four decades. The ideological principles
the ruling Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) currently pursues
are largely the result of the radical ideological movement of the students. The
most significant ideological rhetoric of the students’ movement that has become a
constitutional doctrine is the right to self-determination of nations and nationalities
incorporated under Art. 39 of FDRE constitution. The doctrine had been evolved
during the revolutionary students’ movement of the 1960s and 70s. In view of
the significance of the students’ movement in opening a new political culture to
the Ethiopian politics, the study of the development of the radical ideological
orientation greatly assists in the understanding of the current constitutional rhetoric
advanced by the ruling party. The chapter provides insight into the development
of the ideological radicalism and major ethno-regional movements in the country.

Lack of Social Transformation and Emergence of Ideological Radicalism

in Ethiopia

Like most other countries, Ethiopia’s state-building strategy was characterised

by a highly centralist process, accompanied by subjugation. The intention was
to establish a form of Ethiopian nationalism that transcended a narrower ethnic
affiliation. In this respect, Ethiopian nationalism resembles nation-building
projects undertaken elsewhere. What makes the Ethiopian case different is the
fact that the process failed to bring about the desired result. Instead, it backfired
and complicated the country’s political problems. The notion of ‘nationalism
was unable to transform itself and incorporate new notions of nationalism based
on cultural, political, and social equality of its members’ (Solomon 1993: 155).
Despite the ‘state’s determination to impose inclusive nationalism, the state’s
limited power and the poor penetration of its economic and social institutions
did not permit entrenchment of an inclusive culture’ (Andreas 2010: 7). In other
94 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

words, ‘the problem with Ethiopia’s effort at modernisation relates to its failure to
equate modernity with the revival of tradition’ (Messay 1999: xxiii).
After Emperor Haile Selassie widely expanded education throughout the
country following the end of the Italian occupation 1941, a new educated
generation that questioned the legitimacy of the archaic feudal order emerged. On
the other hand, the old elite that were largely dependent on traditional economic
relations did not welcome the modernisation process that threatened to make them
irrelevant. The partial, slow and shallow modernisation of the socio-economic
system satisfied neither the nobility nor the new intelligentsia. Rather, there was a
growing contradiction between the traditional elite and the emerging modern elite.
The traditional elite felt threatened by the emergence of the modern elite while the
new intelligentsia was impatient with the pace of the modernisation programme.
Since ‘Haile Selassie’s progressive ideals lagged behind the expectations of the
nascent elite who were produced by the very process he initiated, frustration of the
progressive forces gradually led to dissidence, and finally to undisguised hostility
towards the aging emperor whose ideas and methods of ruling had not undergone
much change through the decades’ (Solomon 1993: 146). According to Clapham,
there were two critical points where the project of Ethiopian state formation was
clearly failing. The first was ‘the failure of political integration in Eritrea and the
second was the failure of integration in much of southern and western Ethiopia …
which was subjected to a system of social, political and economic exploitation’
(Clapham 2000: 6).
When the new elite could not see the necessary political changes coming as fast
as it expected, it decided to use force to bring about the desired changes. The first
radical move to bring about political change in the country was attempted in 1960
by the renowned brothers Mengistu and Germame Neway through a coup d’état.
‘Although the attempted coup d’état was crushed, it was aimed at restoration of
Ethiopia to its former glory in light of the backwardness of the country, even
compared to newly-independent African states’ (Bahru 2006: 213). This incident
did not pressure the emperor to take the necessary reforms. But ‘after the attempted
coup, the emperor continued ruling in the old way and subsequently focused on
rewarding those who had defended his throne instead of resolving the lingering
problems’ (Bahru 2006: 214). Even so, the attempted coup played a significant role
in terms of raising the political consciousness of the public, especially students
(Paul 2000: 178).
The regime’s reluctance to implement policy reforms invited a very radical
Marxist ideology into the political discourse that led the country into the pitfall that
it still finds itself in today. Beginning from the end of the 1960s, university students
began openly challenging the legitimacy of the monarchy and the repressive land
tenure system. The students’ movement was largely dominated by the leftist Marxist
ideology that was simplistically used to diagnose Ethiopia’s plight and provide the
remedy (Paul 2000: 178). Marxism ‘was embraced as a creed rather than a system
of thought to help interpret the Ethiopian reality’ (Bahru 2006: 23). The most
Marxist radical stance of the student movement was directed towards the land issue
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 95

and addressed the most sensitive issues such as the ‘question of nationalities’ that
attacked the traditional culture associated with the Ethiopian state.
The radicalisation process was largely achieved through group mobbing held
around the universities rather than through an in-depth analysis of the country’s
situation or the theories appropriate to the situation. Many scholars who were part of
the movement reiterate that the radicalisation of the students’ movement was largely
due to a shallow understanding of Marxism-Leninism. The students lacked critical
discussion and a proper assessment of the situation that led to the assumption that
all the blame for the underdevelopment of Ethiopia was the fault of the monarchy
and the nobility (Tecola 2009). Hezkias (1996) notes, ‘there was not much debate
about these concepts’ relevance to the Ethiopian situation or about the operational
problems involved in implementing them. Although the term “nationalities issue”
grated on many people’s ears, they acquiesced to it because it was the paradigm of the
day’. It is believed that since the deep analysis of the Ethiopian political, economic
and social situation requires deep scholarly work that the student movement was
incapable of producing, the students resorted to Marxism which provided ready
answers to the questions they raised (Andargachew 2005: 70). In other words,
by resorting to Marxism that had nothing to do with the prevalent situation in the
country, the students wanted a short cut solution to the country’s problems.
Due to a radical move that was more intense than in any other African state,
the implication of Marxist ideology in terms of shaping the country’s political
discourse has been devastating. Not only has the impact been instrumental in
overthrowing the historical imperial rule but it has also dominated most of the
social, economic and political policies of the country in the last four decades.
The far-reaching consequence of this ideology on political discourse is still
evident in the land tenure system and the doctrine of the ‘self-determination right
of nationalities’ that has characterised the country’s political landscape since the
adoption of the ethnic federal system in 1991. Particularly, the students’ radical
position on the ‘right to self-determination of nationalities’ heralded a new era in
the Ethiopian political discourse since Ethiopia was considered as a nation that did
not face major challenges in terms of ethnic tension and prior movements had not
threatened the integration of state (Solomon 1993: 149) .
By applying the Stalinist notion of self-determination, the student groups
simplistically attempted to classify the ‘Amhara nation’ or the nefteya as the
oppressor and all the other ethnic groups as the oppressed. Nevertheless, such
classification raised different issues such as ‘Who are the dominating Amhara
people? How is membership in this group defined? What is the Amhara culture? Is
Amhara domination a code word that disguises other grievances or does it signify
supremacy of one population over another, as the term implies’? (Hizkias 1996).
Although proponents of ‘self-determination rights of nationalities’ were aware
of the fact that the vast majority of the Amhara people are as poor, powerless
and exploited as any other non-Amhara groups such as the Oromos, Gurages, or
Sidamas, they used the proposition to advance their narrow nationalist agenda. In
fact, the level of poverty among Amhara peasants is in some cases worse than that
96 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

of the ‘subjugated peoples’ of southern Ethiopia such as the Kaffa and Adere, who
were ‘outsiders’ to the state system (Hizkias 1996). The historical fact is that ‘the
presumed Amhara supremacy did not change the fundamental characteristics of
the relationship between the peasants of the north and the state’ (Hizkias 1996).
Ethno-nationalist groups are quick to reiterate that the ‘oppressed’ Amhara
are not their enemy. However, such an assertion is neither true nor sensible since
the ‘Amhara oppressors’ rhetoric is still applicable.1 In particular, in the last
two decades, this rhetoric has negatively contributed in shaping the attitude of
other ethnic groups towards the Amharic-speaking population and towards elites
in particular. Due to the magnitude of the propaganda used to demonise the
Amharic-speaking population, people from the south of the country who had not
visited the presumed Amhara region believed that Amharas were better off than
themselves.2 Frequent use of the term nefteya in the last two decades long after
the feudal system expired has to some extent developed a new meaning used by
ethno-regional forces to intimidate their political opponents. The contemporary
application of Amhara as oppressor or nefteya rhetoric refers to people who
support Pan-Ethiopian nationalism and opposes the ethnic politics orchestrated by
TPLF/EPRDF. This context explicitly applied during the 2005 general elections.3
The other contestable aspect of the students’ categorisation of ‘Amhara as the
oppressor’ rhetoric is whether the Amhara or Amharic-speakers were consciously
mobilised ethnically to dominate and exploit other ethnic groups.4 This important

1 There are different questions related to such dichotomy: who is the oppressor or the
oppressed among the Amhara people? How can we dissect the society? If it is believed that
the enemy was the oppressor, dominating political power during the feudal system or the
Derg, why is it that they still consider the present generation of Amharas as the oppressor
or heirs of oppression?
2 Some years back, a colleague originally from the southern region, who had never
been to the north, went to Bahir Dar for field work. He saw the farmers who were in the city
for the weekend market and he was touched by the level of poverty and told this author that
he had never imagined poverty in the north to be on such a scale.
3 In one of the live television debates leading to the 2005 elections, Abadula Gemeda,
the speaker of the House of Peoples Representatives, denounced opposition leaders saying,
‘you are here to bring back the nefetyna era of your fathers’. Later when the Coalition
for Unity and Democracy (CUD) won by an unprecedented margin in Addis Ababa and
elsewhere in the country during this election, TPLF/EPRDF engaged in propaganda
claiming that ‘the nefeteya era is coming back again’. The first decision that was made by
the regime was the immediate reversal of the transfer of the capital of Oromia regional state
from Adama to Addis Ababa.
4 In this regard, the following questions need to be asked: Was there consciously
organised Amhara nationalism at the time or at least at the level of the ruling class? Did the
ruling class make a conscious effort to institute the hegemony of Amhara nationalism? Was
it using the language and culture at its disposal to expand its interest like the Americans or
British were doing to expand their influence by ensuring the hegemony of their language
or culture?
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 97

question needs to be addressed if the pre-1991 status quo is to be characterised

as Amharic nationalist hegemony. Historical accounts have revealed that despite
the fact that the ruling class spoke Amharic and that Amharic dominated other
languages and cultures, there was no conscious ethnically motivated mobilisation
to consolidate Amhara. Scholars even argue that the term Amhara does not
necessarily imply a distinct ethnic category. According to one author, Amhara was
a small region in Wollo province that spoke Amharic and when soldiers from this
region were recruited into the army of Yekuno Amlak around 1270, the language
spread into the court and elsewhere (Solomon 1993: 143).
Due to the absence of the ethnic aspect of the Amhara mobilisation, there is
no intra-Amhara ethnic consciousness. Rather, people identify themselves with
their place of birth in the various regions designated as Amhara regional state. Not
all people who speak Amharic as their mother tongue consider themselves as a
single ethnic group or as having a single ethnic consciousness. The only common
denominator of all the regions of Gojam, Gondar, Shewa and Wollo is the Amharic
language. The people largely associate themselves with specific regions such as
‘Gojame, Gondere, or Wolloye’ rather than with the ethnic connotation of the term
Amhara. The people who are referred to as Amharas largely refer to themselves
more as Ethiopians, rather than as members of a specific ethnic group. It was after
the enactment of the post-1991 political setup that all Amharic speaking people in
the various districts structured under a single regional government. After 23 years of
experimentation with ethnic segmentation, there are not significant visible signs of
an emerging Amhara nationalism that overrides their Ethiopian nationalist affiliation.
There was rather a history of rivalry and warfare between the regions of
Gondar, Gojam, Wollo and Shewa sub-groups. In the past several centuries,
each of them had formed various alliances with other ethnic groups such as the
Oromos, the Gurages, and the Tigray to fight other Amharas (Hizkias 1996). The
Shewan ruling class that was considered as the most oppressive segment by ethno-
nationalist groups did not itself have any ethnic nationalist sentiment let alone
the notion of the four regions having a single identity. The Shewan ruling class
was largely insensitive and indifferent to other regions which were presumed to
be Amhara. Absence of such a unified Amhara nationalism made it difficult to
characterise the former feudal regime as an Amhara or Shewan Amhara regime. It
is rather more plausible to describe the system as using the language and culture
at its disposal to further its dominance, without necessarily being motivated by
ethnic consciousness. If a ‘national operation’ had occurred as argued by ethno-
nationalists, not only the rulers of the Amhara but also the Amhara people in
general would have been in a better social condition than people from the other
ethnic groups.
Due to such fault-lines in the questionable categorisation of the Amhara as
oppressor and all other communities as oppressed, the country’s political discourse
since the 1960s has been dominated by radical ethnic ideology. Not only was the
anti-Derg struggle largely conducted under the banner of ethnic nationalism, but
also after the change of regime in 1991, ethnic politics became the pillar of political
98 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

discourse in Ethiopia. This has made the country’s political environment very
unpredictable and polarised. However, as long as ethno-regional forces control
political power and assume that things are going well, the deep-seated ethnic
dynamics will not be revealed. As was clearly revealed during the 2005 election
related crisis, ‘ethnicity’ is the final card to be used by ethnic entrepreneurs when
they believe their power is threatened.
The unprecedented radicalisation of the students was largely due to the cultural
backwardness of the feudal system and the students’ lack of appropriate knowledge
and experience in political change. Many scholars associated the radicalisation
process with the cultural backwardness of the feudal system that would not allow
any social and political transformation, along with the country’s separate destiny
compared to other African countries. According to Andargachew (2005), the
radicalisation of the students’ movement was due to the cultural backwardness
of the educated elite inherited form the feudal social and religious system (p. 82).
According to his assertion, in the feudal culture, individuals were concerned about
their own selfish interests and the religious education system appreciated verbal
rehearsal rather than scientific study and questioning.
Other authors associate the radicalisation process with the blockage of social
mobility and the frustration of the students under the regime of Emperor Haile
Selassie (Paulos 2006: 2, Messay 2006). Still others assert that the radicalisation
process was because Ethiopia underwent a different process after the defeat of
Italian colonialism at Adwa in 1896 (Bahru 2006: 84). In other words, although the
country’s independence has been a psychological boost for successive generations,
its isolation has helped to create fertile ground for the emergence of a radical and
merciless movement which has not existed in other parts of the continent. In the
absence of an established democratic culture that could domesticate radicalism,
the students saw revolution rather than negotiation as the only option available
to bring about change. Since the modern institutions that were introduced into
the rest of Africa by colonisers were totally non-existent in Ethiopia due to its
isolated independent experience, the magnitude of the radicalisation process has
been unparalleled in comparison to political movements elsewhere.
The radical Marxist movement that captivated the attention of the majority
of the students’ group did not accommodate any alternative political options
relating to the country’s problems. During that time, aware of the danger of the
Leninist idea of self-determination, some students had proposed Ethiopianism
as a revised nationalism to counter the increasingly radicalised position (Messay
2006). Minority sections of the students’ movement were also convinced that
liberalism provided the necessary solution for democratic society in the country
(Messay 2006). However, the radical Marxism-Leninist group silenced sections
of the students’ movement which were committed to Ethiopian nationalism and
doubtful of the appropriateness of the Marxist approach to the Ethiopian situation
during that defining moment. The most serious implication of the radicalisation
process was the ‘question of nationalities’ and the Marxist social and economic
policies that translated into constitutional principles in the last four decades.
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 99

The ideology could not however fully answer the ‘national question’ or bring
about a lasting solution to the outstanding problems of the country. It has rather
continued to present new realities and political questions by freezing societal
transformation and creating never-ending ethnic claims that have further polarised
communities.
Since the generation that initiated the student movement is still dominating
political and intellectual activities, it is almost taboo to criticise the students’
movement and its inexperienced approach to political transformation. There
are only a few dissenting voices from the scholars who were part of the student
movement that admitted that the student movement’s course of action missed
its target. Commenting on the self-depreciation aspect of the student movement
captivated by Marxist-Leninist ideology, Professor Messay notes ‘by depicting the
Ethiopian society as a backward and obsolete feudal system, the Marxist-Leninist
analysis gave a highly demeaning and gruesome picture of Ethiopia. Is it surprising
if, as a result of this reading, Ethiopian students and intellectuals became prey to
what an Ethiopian scholar, Hagos Gebre Yesus, called “national self-hatred and
nihilism”’ (Messay 2006). Professor Tecola Hagos similarly revisits the pitfalls
of the radicalisation process and its impacts as ‘we all end up with our rough-
shod treatment of a subject matter, which should have been examined carefully
and debated thoroughly with serious scholarship, which resulted in a series of
mediocre leaders and the chaotic systems of government of the last 30 years’
(Tecola 2009).
In light of the unprecedented damage this radicalisation process has brought
about, a new generation of scholars need to dissect this ideological plundering
in the last four decades and come up with a new national ideology intended to
engender democracy, prosperity and stability in the country. This is because it
has been proved that analysing Ethiopian multi-nationalism or under-development
from a Marxist point of view is neither workable nor realistic. The radical Marxist-
Leninist orthodoxy has been rather the main tool used for breeding repressive
regimes in the country. The emperor was supplanted by a totalitarian military
regime which was superseded by another repressive regime that is firmly committed
to Marxist ideals, despite the formal rhetoric of supporting democratic ideals. In
addition to this, since those countries that attempted to resolve their political and
economic perils in terms of Marxist ideology largely collapsed, there is not any
reasonable theoretical or empirical evidence that suggests that the country needs
to maintain this ideology.

Development of Ethno-Nationalist Movements in Ethiopia

As has been discussed in the preceding section, the radicalisation of the students
in Ethiopia is the defining moment in terms of shaping new ideological concepts,
including the issue of ethnic nationalism. Nevertheless, there are other views on
the emergence of ethnic nationalist political movement in Ethiopia. According to
100 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

some authors, the ethnic nationalist perspective emerged long before the coming
of the students’ movement in the 1970s. Adherents of this view depict emperor
Tewodros’s unification move in the middle of the nineteenth century as having an
ethnic dimension (Yonatan 2008: 233). According to this account, Tewodros was
the first Ethiopian ruler who explicitly recognised the ethnic factor in his project of
empire building and consciously challenged the supremacy of the Oromo princes
over the Abyssinian kingdom.
Tewodros’s letter to Queen Victoria was the evidence cited for backing such
an assertion. In this letter, Tewodros requested military assistance and indicated
that ‘… By His power I drove away the Gallas. But for the Turks, I have told them
to leave the land of my ancestors. They refused. I am going to wrestle with them’
(Yonatan 2008: 233). The mention of ‘Gallas’ in the letter – instead of reference to
the Oromo Yejju dynasty – is considered by some authors to have an ethnic rather
than a regional dimension. However, it is not appropriate to associate mention of
the term ‘Galla’ as carrying ethnic connotations as it appears that he was referring
to obstacles to his ambitions to centralise and restore the past glory of the Ethiopian
state. Primarily, since Tewodros emerged out of the Zemene Mesfint, which was
characterised by a regional power struggle rather than ethnic strife, it is unlikely
that he made the statement in light of ethnic consciousness. In addition, the most
glaring evidence, which indicates his statement was not ethnically motivated is
his strong marital and social bonds with the Yejju dynasty, which was largely an
Oromo oligarchy. As Bahru aptly observes, the struggle against the Yejju dynasty
by Tewodros or other regional warlords was ‘dictated less by ethnic and religious
considerations than by self-interest and regional aggrandisement’ (Yonatan 2008:
234). It is thus unrealistic to associate the reign of Tewodros with the dawn of an
era of ethnicity in Ethiopian power struggles.
The other thesis on the commencement of ethnic mobilisation in Ethiopia is
associated with the Italian occupation. According to some sources, the Italians
introduced ethnicity into the political domain to disenfranchise the non-Amhara
majority (Ofcansky and Berry 1991, Eskinder 2011). Although such a historical
incident is an important precedent, which has the potential to revive ethnic
nationalist feelings in the Ethiopian power struggles, the fact that the Italian
occupation was brief and the application of Italian racial colonial rule was not
widely practised, such an incident cannot be characterised as the defining moment
in the introduction of ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia.
Although ethnic feelings were manifested in light of the centralisation process
of both the Menelik and Haile Selassie regimes, there was no politically motivated
ethnic mobilisation before the emergence of the students’ movement and the
rhetoric of the ‘question of nationalities’ that later became the breeding ground
for the emergence of ethno-regional political organisations. Neither Tewodros,
Yohannes, Menelik nor Haile Selassie tried to organise their power in purely
ethnic ways since there was no common consciousness of being Amhara, Tigray
or Oromo in the Ethiopian historical dispensations (Andargachew 2005: 190).
As historical accounts reveal, it was largely regionalism that played an important
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 101

role in shaping power struggles before and in the aftermath of Zemene Mesafint.
As Markakis argues, ‘in the process of power distribution in Ethiopia, ethnicity
constitutes an intervening variable interacting with class to determine a pattern
of allocation which has remained relatively stable for some time; a condition
that accounts for the relative stability of the political process, and the relative
absence of politically aggressive ethnic manifestations in the modernising sector’
(Markakis 1973: 370).
The historical precedence that initiated many of the ethnic movements thus
related to the failure in the centralisation and modernisation process that took place
during the reign of Emperor Menelik and later Emperor Haile Selassie (Markakis
1973: 370). As Joireman puts it, ‘previous Ethiopian regimes, eager to foster pan-
Ethiopianist feeling and break down the opposition posed by organised ethnic
groups, have tried to downplay the issue of ethnicity’ (Joireman 1997: 388). Such
measures were justified by arguments to achieve modernisation and the need to
establish unified identity (Paul 2000: 184). It is well documented that the expansion
of the Ethiopian state to the south or the undermining of hitherto autonomous
provinces in the north resulted in the imposition of the Amharic language and
violations of cultural autonomy. In addition to this, the Haile Selassie’s regime
was dominated by the Amhara nobility and the civil service was largely consists
of Amharic speaking elites. Obviously, such trends placed the various ethnic
groups at a disadvantage. Since ‘the Amharic language was the state language, it
deprived non-Amharic speakers of being part of the dominant political, economic
and cultural group of the nation’ (Solomon 1993: 144). They either had to learn
the Amharic language and culture or risk being marginalised. This is one of the
grievances of the various ethnic groups which led to the emergence of a devastating
ethno-regional movement.
Although the process created misery for the various ethnic groups, the
assumption was that to produce national unity, it was necessary to have one
language and this was a widely shared assumption at the time (Cohen 2006:
167). Due to such a policy, ‘the Amharic-speaking elite, which was largely urban
and of mixed origin rather than only the Amhara, became a dominant section of
society’ (Cohen 2006: 167). Despite the inclusive approach used to accommodate
individuals who were able to integrate into the core culture, ‘the historical
hegemony of the Amharic language and the subsequent preoccupation combined
with a form of domination often regarded as ethnic in character’ (Cohen 2006:
167). The elites that led ethnic parties perceived Amharic not only as a means
of communication, but also as a symbol of Amhara domination and the eventual
extinction of their ethnic identity (Cohen 2006: 167).
Such resentment opened the way for a more radical stance on the issue of
ethnicity. Until the late 1960s, ‘even the radical intelligentsia in Ethiopia was
inclined to regard the nationality issue as contrived and shying away from the
serious consideration of its political implications’ (Markakis and Nega 2006: 84).
Many of the students also expressed the view that ‘it was inaccurate to say the
government of the time was strictly Amharic because it comprised people from
102 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

various ethnic backgrounds’ (Balsvik 2005: 282). Later, the introduction of the
radical ethnic nationalism in the Ethiopian political discourse coincided with the
discussion of the issue by university students in the 1960s, which was largely
influenced by Marxist ideals (Solomon 1993: 149, Eskinder 2011). After the
publication of the so-called ‘question of nationalities’ during 1969 in the student
paper, Struggle, the Ethiopian left wing groups began to be preoccupied with the
question of nationalities. This was exacerbated by ‘conditions that sparked off
ethno-regional conflicts that were created in 1974 when the absolutist regime of
Haile Selassie was overthrown and state institutions were weakened’ (Alemseged
2004: 598). Furthermore, the takeover of power by the military created auspicious
circumstances for ethno-regional mobilisation (Alemante 2003: 62).
Although the ‘national question’ was genuinely taken up by the majority of the
students in order to resolve the country’s problems, it created a defining moment in
the creation of ethnic mobilisation by some groups in the student movement. These
groups, although they appeared to be part of the movement, used the opportunity
to mobilise their own ethnic nationalist organisations that later broke away from
the mainstream student movement. According to some sources, ‘the ethnicisation
that was begun by Eritrean students spread first to Tigrayan and then to Oromo
students, thus forcing the student movement to find a solution to the national
problem’ (Messay 2006). After the national question became the epicentre of
the students’ movement, students specifically from Eritrea, Tigray and Oromia
gradually began to distance themselves from the mainstream Marxist view on the
national question and stuck to the primacy of the national struggle over the class
struggle and focusing on the colonial thesis.
Ethno-regional groups then came up with their own interpretation of history
to provide a strong basis for ethnic mobilisation. From the point of view of the
elites from the south, the expansion of Menelik to semi-autonomous ethnic groups
like the Oromo, Sidama, Wolita, Somali and other groups was characterised as
an act of colonisation. Based on this colonial thesis, the ethno-regional forces
such as Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) claim that the struggle for freedom is
the dismantling of the colonial empire and the accession to independence. They
entirely dismiss the bond between the Oromo people and other communities in the
country. In addition to this, the movement that led to the separation of Eritrea from
Ethiopia was also characterised through the presentation of Eritrea as a colony
of Ethiopia.
From the perspective of Tigrayan elites, the reign of Menelik II was the
starting point for the undermining of historical Tigray nationalism and autonomy.
The argument even goes further and some writers of Tigray origin claim that the
subsequent death of Emperor Yohannes IV at Metema was a sabotage orchestrated
by the ‘Shewan Amhara’ led by Menelik (Geebrekidan 2006). According to this
thesis, Tigray autonomy was further undermined by the sweeping centralisation
measures undertaken by Emperor Haile Selassie, coupled with the imposition of
Amharic as the language of instruction in schools and public offices.
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 103

To support their ethno-regional demands, proponents of ethnic nationalism

attempted to portray most of the rebellions against the regime of Haile Selassie
as being ethnically motivated. Many ethnic nationalists portray the Raya-Azebo
revolt of 1928, the Woyane rebellion of Tigray in 1943, the Bale revolt of 1964
and the uprising in Gojjam in 1968 as responses to centralisation (Kidane 1997:
120–21). However, it is questionable to characterise the various uprisings against
the regime of Haile Selassie as movements for self-determination or opposition to
centralisation. According to reliable historical accounts, none of these rebellions
was a direct response to the centralisation trends or were motivated by ethnic
nationalism. According to Bahru, the major causes for the rebellions were
administrative inefficiency, corruption, the imposition of high taxes or opposition
to confiscated lands rather than a politically motivated move against Amhara
rule (Bahru 2007: 215). This, however, does not mean that the elites did not try
to use the opportunities caused by the conflicts to further their opposition to the
centralisation trends of Haile Selassie.5
The development of ethnic mobilisation in Ethiopia needs to be thus seen
in light of the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity. Although there had been
legitimate political demands related to the development of ethno-regional
movements in Ethiopia, the real driving force behind all such ethnically motivated
political movements was largely associated with the use of ethnic-related claims
as an instrument for furthering political objectives in the control of political and
economic powers. According to the instrumentalist approach, although there
were real primordial traits such as language and culture that serve as a basis for
ethnic mobilisation, manipulation of ethnic differences by elites for the control of
resources was the key factor in ethnic mobilisation. Despite the fact that ethnic
movements in Ethiopia initially directed their struggle against the status quo which
was apparently unjust, the means ethnic nationalists employed to achieve their
goal and the system they installed after they gained control of state machinery
reveals that their agenda was not as such to bring justice to the people they claimed
to represent.

Major Ethno-Regional Movements in Ethiopia

After the radicalisation of the students’ movement in the 1960s, a number of ethno-
regional movements emerged. The most prominent ethno-regional movements
emerged in Eritrea, Tigray, Oromo and in Somali communities. This section
narrates the major ethno-regional organisations that have greatly altered the course
of the country’s political landscape.

5 ‘In the case of the 1943 Tigray uprising, sections of the nobility tried to take
advantage of the situation to reassert their hereditary privileges and their region’s former
political centrality while the animosity in Gojam was partly due to the Shewan origin of the
regional governor’ (Bahru 2007: 215).
104 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Eritrean Separatist Movement

The Eritrean region, known as the Mereb Melash before the institution of Italian
rule in the 1880s, had been historically Ethiopia’s northernmost province (Bahru
2007: 181). It is the natural extension of Tigray Province inhabited mainly by
a Tigrigna-speaking Christian population (Markakis and Nega 2006: 78). ‘The
Eritrean highland society was an integral part of the Abyssinian feudal structure,
as the governor paid tribute to the prince (ras) of Tigray, who was in turn subject
to the authority of the king of kings of Abyssinia’ (Tronvoll 2009: 23). However,
the coming of the Italians into the Red Sea coast to expand their colonial ambition
divided the country into two. It controlled Eritrea, consolidated its military control
during the 1880s, and delineated its borders with Ethiopia. Italian rule continued
until 1941, when the Allied Forces defeated Italian forces and declared Eritrea a
British Protectorate.
Following Italy’s forced renunciation of its colonies by the Paris Peace
Conference of 1946, two competing groups emerged in Eritrea. One supported
the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia while the other favoured independence (Bahru
2007: 182). ‘The unionists constituted the largest political grouping in Eritrea
while the Independence Bloc was a conglomeration of different groups united
only by their opposition to the unionists’ (Bahru 2007: 182). The Four Power
Inquiry Commission established by the World War II Allies could not agree
on a future course for Eritrea. Unable to resolve the Eritrean question, the
commission finally passed it on to the United Nations in 1948 (Bahru 2007:
183). The UN appointed a commission of five men from various countries who
made different recommendations. Some of them recommended independence;
others recommended a federation with Ethiopia while others still recommended
complete union (Bahru 2007 :183). Finally, the UN General Assembly resolution
of 2 December 1950 adopted by a vote of 47 to 10, provided that Eritrea should be
linked to Ethiopia through a loose federal system having internal self-government.
The Eritrean constitution, prepared by the UN in consultation with Emperor
Haile Selassie I was adopted by the Eritrean Assembly on 10 July 1952 .The
Act of Federation was ratified by the emperor on 11 September, and British
authorities officially relinquished control on 15 September 1952. According to
the constitution, the federal government was to control foreign affairs, defence,
foreign and interstate commerce, transport and finance, while control over
domestic affairs (including police, local administration and taxation) was to be
exercised by an elected Eritrean assembly. Eritrea had its own administrative and
judicial structure and its own flag. ‘After an election held for the Assembly, the
Unionists won the larger number of seats and were able to form a government
with the support of their Muslim allies, while their opponents declared themselves
willing to co-operate’ (Markakis 1988: 53).
However, as was later observed, the Ethiopian system was not institutionally
capable of managing this new order. It was rather ‘an auspicious start, complete
with a model constitution, elections, a free press and a budding trade-union
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 105

movement – all in stark contrast to the feudal regime across the border in Ethiopia’
(Markakis 1988: 53). Thus, Ethiopian interference in the affairs of Eritrea
immediately gathered momentum. In August 1955, Tedla Bairu, who was the chief
executive elected by the assembly resigned, claiming he was being pressured by
the emperor. In addition to this, ‘Amharic became the official language in place of
Arabic and Tigrinya and the use of the Eritrean flag was terminated’ (United States
Institute of Peace 1999).
Finally, in November 1962, the Eritrean Assembly voted unanimously to
change Eritrea’s status to that of a province of Ethiopia. There appears to be
controversy over the role of the Ethiopian government in the dissolution of the
federation. According to an eyewitness who was present during the voting process,
the Eritrean Assembly unanimously voted for the unification of Eritrea with
Ethiopia of its own free will (Dawit 2009). In addition to this, some scholars of
Eritrean origin have also maintained that the federation was abolished by Eritrean
social and political forces rather than by Ethiopians (Tekeste 1997). On the other
hand, others contend that despite the fact that some unionist members of the
Assembly genuinely supported the decision; the Ethiopian government may have
played an important role in the decision behind the scenes. This is because the
‘Ethiopian regime viewed an autonomous Eritrea that enjoys a higher degree of
democratic and civil liberties as a dangerous anomaly in the oppressive political
climate prevalent in Ethiopia’ (Bahru 2007: 219).
The dissolution of the federation became the defining moment for the
mobilisation of opposition to the Ethiopian regime. The extinction of the
federation consolidated internal and external opposition that had been brewing for
some time. Before the formal dissolution was announced, liberation organisations
were being established. Four years earlier, in 1958, a number of Eritrean exiles had
founded the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) (Ofcansky and Berry 1991: 52).
Muslim elites soon dominated the movement and it re-established a new faction,
the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) that emerged in 1961 under the leadership of
a veteran shefta, Idris Awate (Tekeste 1997: 149). Beginning in 1961, the ELF
began an armed struggle and by 1966 it challenged imperial forces throughout
Eritrea (Ofcansky and Berry 1991: 52).
However, ‘ELF was heavily Muslim in membership and orientation, and its
promotion of an “Arab Eritrea”, alienated Christian Eritreans who were becoming
increasingly disenchanted with the Ethiopian regime’ (Clapham 2001: 9). After
some time, divisions developed between Muslims and Christians within ELF
and many splinter groups such as Eritrean Liberation Forces, Peoples Liberation
Forces led by Osman Saleh Sabby and Salfi Nesenet Eritrea (Front for Eritrean
Independence) led by Isayyas Afawarki emerged (Bahru 2007: 220). These
three groups merged in 1972 to form the Eritrean Liberation Front and Popular
Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF) (Bahru 2007: 220). After a year, Christians within
the movement formed the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front).
To enforce the independence movement, a new identity and interpretation of
history started to emerge among the Eritrean elite in addition to EPLF applying
106 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

different tactics of intimidation and persuasion to mobilise support. ‘Prior to the

1960s, Eritreans had very little conception of their own identity following their
experiences under Italian rule and the subsequent mobilisation of opinion on
the future of the territory from the 1940s onwards had merely accentuated their
divisions’ (Clapham 2001: 9). However, later on a new history was written that
emphasised the fact that Eritrea had nothing to do with Ethiopia, which is denying
their Ethiopian heritage (Bahru 2007: 257–8). Despite all the manoeuvring in the
last half century, the claimed Eritrean nationalism remained amorphous (Clapham
2001: 10).
According to Clapham, rather than the existence of strong ‘Eritrean nationalism’
that motivated the secession process, it was the leadership and organisation of
EPLF, its insistence on a unifying ideology, its promotion of a national myth, its
disciplined and centralised hierarchy of command that helped make the secession
agenda a reality (Clapham 2001: 10). The Derg’s decision to pursue a policy of
confrontation after it came to power in 1974 had also escalated repression in
Eritrea and further alienated the intelligentsia (Markakis and Nega 2006: 147). By
1980, the EPLF, with help from the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, crushed ELF,
achieving a political hegemony in Eritrea (Tronvoll 2009: 25). Although there had
been attempts to resolve the problem in Eritrea through peaceful negotiations, the
offer of regional autonomy could not satisfy the demands of the EPLF leaders
(Bahru 2007: 257). After years of bloodshed, the collaboration between Eritrean
and Tigrayan forces managed to oust the military junta. The EPLF entered Asmara
on 24 May 1991 and the Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE) was established.
A UN-monitored referendum on independence was conducted in April 1993. It
was claimed that 99.8 per cent voted ‘yes’ to independence which paved the way
for the formal declaration of independence on 24 May 1993.

Tigrayan Nationalist Movement

Compared to the nationalist movements that emerged in the country, the

nationalist movement that evolved in Tigray has been the most influential in terms
of shaping the Ethiopian political discourse. The nationalist movement was not
only instrumental in the downfall of the military junta in 1991; it also played
a significant role in orchestrating the radical ethnic federal system in Ethiopia
which is unparalleled by any of the ethno-regional organisations that emerged
in Ethiopian political history. In addition to this, the legacy of the movement
spearheaded by Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) is still prevalent on the
Ethiopian political landscape.
In light of such political dynamics, there are interesting and complex questions
that need to be asked in this regard: What was the root cause of the rise of such
a sweeping nationalist movement in Tigray? Why was it more successful in
mobilising the Tigrayan peasantry than other Ethiopian nationalist movements?
What are the motives and the implications of TPLF in expanding its ideology and
influence beyond the Tigray border? Answering these questions is a challenging
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 107

task, since there are different conflicting opinions on the subject and TPLF’s
decision-making process is highly secretive. In particular, the contrasting views
provided by members and supporters of TPLF are a clear departure from other
independent sources writing on the subject.
The most important step that helps clarify the entire nationalist movement in
Tigray is to review the various historical roles of Tigray in Ethiopian political
discourse and the development of Tigray nationalism. This is important because,
at least as a psychological impetus, TPLF’s rise is directly and indirectly linked
to the historical circumstances that led to the decline of the hegemony of Tigray
as a source of power in Ethiopian politics. It is believed that this legacy is an
enduring source of pride for Tigrayans, including TPLF leaders (Young 1996:
352). As Messay (1999) indicated, ‘The Axumite legacy has always inspired
the Tigrayans’ provincialism which fed on its rebellious attitude to Amhara
domination and centralisation as well as to the recovery of the province under
TPLF as “restoration drive”’.
Following the collapse of the Axumite kingdom in the eighth century, largely
due to the rise of other forces, power shifted to the south. The Axum Empire
was replaced by the rise to power of the Agaw, a Cushitic-speaking people that
inhabited pockets of northern Ethiopia. It was subsequently replaced by a very
prominent Solomonic dynasty that came to rule Ethiopia from 1270 when Yekuno
Amlak overthrew the last ruler of the Zagwe dynasty. Such historical circumstances
greatly reduced the significance of the north as a source of power in favour of
Shewa province in the south. After the downfall of Axum, there had never been
any significant historical circumstances that could revive the impressive political
legacy of Tigray until the second half of the nineteenth century when Yohannes IV
briefly came to the throne.
Since the nineteenth century, ‘there was a decisive power split between the
Tigrayan and Shewan ruling classes, making the latter a junior partner in the
political and cultural domain of the Ethiopian state’ (Solomon 1993: 141). The
deteriorating power of Tigray and the emergence of Amharic as the official state
language forced the Tigrayan nobility and petty bourgeoisie to fiercely compete
with their Amhara counterparts (Young 1999: 532). The power struggle between
Amhara and Tigrayans gradually created antagonism between the two groups. This
historical antagonism was clearly manifested on different occasions, including
the time of the students’ movement. As one study revealed, during the students’
movement, ‘Tigrayans and Amharas reflected the strongest antagonism towards
each other due to the perception that the Amharas had won the historical struggle
for political hegemony’ (Balsvik 2005: 281).
The rebellion of King Menelik against the reign of Yohannes IV in the second
half of the nineteenth century and the untimely death of the Emperor at the
battle of Metema created a sense of desperation among the Tigrayan ruling elite.
Some Tigrayan writers claim that the subsequent death of Emperor Yohannes IV
at Metema was a sabotage orchestrated by the Shewan Amhara led by Menelik
(Gebrekidan 2006: 63). The rise of Menelik to power had a sweeping effect in
108 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

undermining the short-lived revival of Tigray under Yohannes IV. Menelik and
subsequently Haile Selassie’s regimes further reduced the historical regional
autonomy of the provinces due to their sweeping centralisation policies. In
addition to this, Menelik’s agreement with Italy to control Eritrea seem to have
created a bitter legacy, marginalising Tigray in economic and political terms,
while challenges related to environmental degradation and periodic famine
increased Tigray’s resentment towards the central government (Paul 2000: 178).
Additionally, the Haile Selassie regime not only constitutionally barred any hope
of returning the right of the crown to the north but also a modern bureaucracy was
emerging that aimed at weakening the traditional regional power.
Nevertheless, the impact of the centralisation process was by no means unique
to Tigray. As Young notes, ‘Tigrayans resentment may have been more intense
than in other parts of Ethiopia but it was by no means unique’ (Young 1996: 533).
All the people and nobility in Gojam, Gondar and Wollo were also forced to
subdue to Shewa. Tigray was rather considered as the only region that was largely
spared from the encroachment of centralisation from the centre (Bahru 2008: 329).
It was only after the 1943 rebellion that the autonomy of the Tigray region was
taken away until it was restored in 1947 (Bahru 2008: 337). Compared to the
impact on Tigray, the centralisation process was more painful to other regions such
as Gojam. Haile Selassie attempted to weaken Gojam by appointing governors
directly from Shewa and he murdered the renowned patriot Belay Zeleke as the
emperor perceived him to be a threat to his sweeping centralisation process. This
action was painful for the elites of Gojam and created a sense of hostility towards
the centre. However, perceiving this action as an intentional act of retaliation or an
act meant to weaken Gojam would be inaccurate. The action should be interpreted
in the general context of centralisation at the time and the power struggle that
had been persistent in the country’s long history. Nevertheless, in Tigray, the
centralisation process was perceived as an identity-related process.
There were two basic differences between Tigray and other regions whose
power were undermined by Haile Selassie. The first difference is that other regional
ruling elites accepted this phenomenon as part of a historical power struggle while
the transfer of power to Shewa was not perceived in the same way in Tigray. The
other difference relates to economic and natural resources. As Markakis notes,
‘the inhabitants of Tigray’s impoverished and famine-stricken province have
long resented and resisted the domination of the Amhara in the Imperial State’
(Markakis 1994: 218). Compared to other regions, Tigray was highly affected by
environmental degradation which made life unbearable for ordinary Tigrayans
(Bahru 2007: 259, Markakis and Nega 2006: 95–6, Alemante 2003: 63). Due to
this problem, many of the peasants were forced to leave their villages and settle in
relatively fertile areas in the south and west of the country or in the capital, Addis
Ababa. Despite the same backward feudal centralised system being imposed
across Ethiopia, these additional factors worsened and complicated the situation
in Tigray.
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 109

Due to the factors specific to Tigray, the centralisation and modernisation move
was more painful to the region and perceived by the ruling elites of Tigray as an
intentional act by the Shewan Amhara to undermine Tigray’s historical autonomy.
This view has been well articulated by many scholars of Tigrayan origin. Such
claims transformed the hitherto purely regional power struggle into an ethnic
one, thus creating strong Tigrayan nationalism. Claims by different scholars from
Tigray make one thing clear that the shift of power from north to south has created
a deep-rooted sense of desperation and hatred towards the ruling class of Shewa.
Aregawi Berhe, one of the dominant figures of TPLF, asserts ‘Generations of
Tigreans grew up with deep feelings of desperation due to the neglect of Tigray
in the 1900s up to the revolution of 1975 which was generally perceived as a
deliberate and systematic policy of the Showa-Amhara ruling class in order to
weaken and demoralise the Tigrayans’ (Aregawi 2004: 573). Many Tigrayan elites
also accuse Menelik of having sold out Eritrea in order to weaken Tigray (Kinfe
2001: 237, Alemseged 2004: 597). According to professor Kinfe ‘Haile Selassie
shared Menelik’s view of keeping Tigray a humiliated and weak buffer between
Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia’ (Kinfe 2001: 231).
To substantiate the new ethnic dimension of the power struggle, elites argue
that Tigray had been neglected intentionally in terms of economic development. It
is alleged that heavy taxation was levied on the people and hundreds of thousands
of Menelik’s army deliberately went without food provisions, while plundering
the villages of Tigray. It is also argued that there were no institutions such as
schools and colleges or industries in Tigray compared to other regions. Such a
presentation of the regional power struggle as being purely an ethnic one by the
hereditary rulers of Tigray and later by the students is probably the single most
important factor that helped to mobilise the ethnically nationalist movement that
not only realised the revival of Tigray as a hegemonic power in the post-1991
Ethiopian political dispensation but also played an indispensable role in shaping
the contemporary Ethiopian political discourse.
In reality, the underlying fact is that the feudal system did not have an efficient
economic policy of development for the country and all Ethiopian regions were
more or less as backward and under-developed as Tigray. The most marginalised
regions were the lowland areas and other communities in the south. As noted by
Markakis, ‘primary schools are fairly spread throughout the highlands while the
nomadic and pastoral groups are barely represented’ (Markakis 1994: 379). In a
survey conducted in 1966 about first-year university students, 55 per cent were
Amhara while 25 per cent were Tigrayans, which indicates a major representation
of Tigrayans in the University (Markakis 1994: 379). Tigrayans and Amhara were
said to be over-represented in the university compared to other ethnic groups
during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie I (Balsvik 2005: 279). According
to some sources, in the late 1960s over 80 per cent of university students were
Amhara or Tigrayans (Asefa 1993: 152). In the industry sector, major industrial
centres were in Addis Ababa, Asmara and Dire Dawa and not in Shewa, Gondar or
Gojam which are considered as ‘Amhara’ regions (Bahru 2007: 200). Compared
110 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

to other regions, Tigray also remained outside the direct control of the central
government (Bahru 2007: 146). The historical evidence suggests that there was not
a special situation in Tigray in terms of expansion of education or other economic
infrastructure.
Though historical documents do not prove that any special problems arose
in Tigray, the most important factor in the rise of a strong nationalist movement
was that the centralisation process of Menelik and Haile Selassie was being
presented as ethnically motivated rather than as part of a traditional and historical
regional power struggle that was prevalent throughout the history of the country.
The rise of Tigray nationalism and its subsequent success in controlling Ethiopian
politics since 1991 is largely due to a change of strategy by Tigray elites in
dealing with the fierce traditional regional power struggle. The various attempts
of the Tigrayan ruling elites to revive Axumite hegemony through the age-old
traditional mobilisation of the provincial power base in the country could not
be successful. After some time, the ruling elites realised that a simple regional
power struggle strategy would not bring the desired result. Although there had
only been a language difference between the Tigray and Amhara community, the
Tigrayan nationalists had to create an ‘Amhara oppression’ discourse to mobilise
their forces. Professor Kinfe noted that elders started to tell the youth how the
Shewa Amhara humiliated Tigray and through this, a sense of desperation was
passed from generation to generation (Kinfe 2001: 230). The self-determination
movement orchestrated by TPLF was thus mainly intended to attain ‘lasting space
in Ethiopian power politics’ (Aregawi 2004: 576). This is a classical example of
African ethnic entrepreneurs orchestrating ethnic differences as a mechanism to
mobilise public support and control of power that could not be achieved otherwise.
In order to promote the nationalist narrative, Tigray elites presented all
rebellions against the central government as resistance to Shewan dominance.
The first of these notable rebellions was the uprising of 1943 that was known
as the Woyane rebellion. The elites tried to present the uprising as a response to
Amhara supremacy while historical accounts attribute the cause of the uprising
purely to local problems. Professor Gebru Tareke argues ‘the peasants rebelled
against the state not particularly because it was controlled and dominated by the
Shewan Amhara but primarily because it was oppressive’ (Joung 1996: 531).
Bahru also notes ‘the uprising was against administrative inefficiency, corruption
and the imposition of high taxes, although the ruling elites took the advantage and
presented it as a rebellion against Amhara domination’ (Bahru 2007: 215).
In essence, the Woyane rebellion was not different from the rebellions
that erupted in Gojam and Bali, having been motivated by economic policies.
According to historical accounts, ‘the Bale uprising of 1963–70 had a more
pronounced ethnic dimension (Oromo and Somali) than the Woyane rebellion’
(Bahru 2008: 337). Despite the non-ethnic features of the rebellion, ‘the Woyane
revolt entered the mythology of the TPLF, demonstrated the combativeness of the
peasants, and the need for effective leadership if the Amhara regime was to be
successfully challenged’ (Young 1996: 533). The uprising and its subsequent crash
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 111

by force continued to fuel much stronger resentment and resistance to the central
authority. Significant ‘sections of the nobility in Tigray tried to take the advantage
of the Woyane rebellion to reassert their hereditary privilege and their region’s
former political centrality’ (Bahru 2008: 215).
The strong Tigray nationalism was later reinforced by the ‘question of
nationalities’ rhetoric of the Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s. Despite
that most of the multinational parties that emerged in the 1970s were committed
to the implementation of the ‘question of nationalities’ to all ‘oppressed’
ethnic groups, Tigray students started recruitment for an exclusively Tigrayan
organisation working for national self-determination for the Tigray region. They
utterly rejected the class-based approach of the student movement, opting only to
struggle for national self-determination (Young 1996: 534). Furthermore, ‘socialist
indoctrination was replaced by Tigrayan nationalism appealing to martyr-emperor
Yohannes, the treachery of Menelik and the patriots of Woyane’ (Paul 2000: 187).
The first Tigray nationalist organisation was Mahber Gesgesti Bihere Tigray
(MAGEBT) or Tigrayan National Organisation (TNO) that was created in 1974
followed by the establishment of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in
February 1975 (Aregawi 2004: 58). The objectives of TPLF aimed at realising the
‘self-determination’ right of the Tigray region. Although some authors contend
that the position of TPLF on whether national self-determination for Tigray meant
secession and independence or only regional autonomy within the Ethiopian
framework remained unclear, there is sufficient evidence that suggests that the
initial move was for secession (Aalen 2002: 39). The TPLF manifesto of 1976
clearly states that TPLF was fighting for the independence of Tigray from Ethiopia.
However, drop-out members of TPLF such as Aregawi argue that independence
from Ethiopia was only promoted by a few ultra-nationalist groups within TPLF
rather than a programme adopted by the party (Aregawi 2004: 591).
Despite the persistence of the doubts about whether TPLF was committed
to secession or not, the party later took the path of accommodating Tigray
nationalist endeavours within the limits of a decentralised Ethiopia. It is argued
that the position of secession was abandoned following the establishment of a
Marxist-Leninist League Tigray (MLLT) in 1986 (Assefa 2007: 72). Even if the
circumstances as they stand now do not show that there is a quest for the secession
of Tigray, the possibility could not be completely ruled out in a political system
whereby secession is a constitutional right. If TPLF assumes that there is any
‘evidence of the oppression’ of the Tigray people or loss its grip in power, there is
still a possibility for the creation of an independent Tigray.
Apart from its practical aspect, the perception of the policy of secession as
an ideological tool seems to be largely associated with the degree of military
and political success of TPLF. During the early days of the struggle, since it was
very unthinkable to defeat the Derg and to gain control of the whole of Ethiopia,
TPLF mainly aimed at liberating Tigray and forming an independent republic.
Nevertheless, the weakening of the Derg and the unprecedented military gains
starting from the mid-1980s enabled TPLF to articulate the ‘self determination’ of
112 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Tigray within Ethiopia as the total defeat of Derg became imminent. According to
some commentators, ‘this move is because the best means for the TPLF to retain a
leading position in Ethiopia, where Tigrayans constitute a small proportion of the
country’s population, is to maintain an ethnic-based coalition with elements of the
numerically superior Oromo and the historically dominant Amhara’ (Young 1996:
538). To achieve total control of Ethiopia, TPLF established a cover party called
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989 as a multi-
ethnic umbrella organisation. Finally, TPLF in collaboration with EPLF ousted the
military junta in May 1991 and took charge of state power, effectively restoring
the dominance of the Tigrayan elites in Ethiopian power politics.

The Oromo Nationalist Movement

The other most important ethno-nationalist movement in Ethiopia comes from the
Oromo nationalists who claim to promote the interests of the largest ethnic group.
Like the other ethno-regional movements, the claims of Oromo nationalists are
shrouded in different myths and realities. As to the origin of the Oromo, many
historical records address the migration of the Oromo to northern Ethiopia from
the south in the sixteenth century and its aftermath (Young 1996: 538). According
to some sources, between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, the Oromo formed
the Berentu and Borana federations when they began their migratory expansion in
different directions (Keller 1995: 624). This process was facilitated by a unique
administrative system known as gada, which is a classic example of a traditional
African form of democracy. According to the gada system, ‘legislative, executive
and judicial functions were independent of one another, albeit integral components
of the system of governance’ (Keller 1995: 624). However, the significance of the
gada system had been on the decline even before the various Oromo kingdoms
were incorporated into the central Ethiopian kingdom. In addition to this, the gada
system was converted into monarchical institutions when the Oromos transformed
from a pastoral to an agrarian way of life (Bahru 2007: 18).
In the mid-sixteenth century, the Oromo began their sweeping march towards
the northern Christian kingdom whose political and military organisation had
already been weakened by the Muslim assault. After the migration, the Oromos
were able to control sizeable areas that are presently designated Oromia region
and beyond. The famous Oromo kingdoms that emerged in the Gibe region were
Limmu, Ennarya, Jimma, Gomma, Gumma and Gera (Bahru 2007: 19). However,
‘dispersion and adaptation to varied ecological conditions and mingling with other
ethnic groups resulted in considerable differences among the numerous Oromo
communities’ (Markakis 1994: 231). Entering deeper to the northern part of
Ethiopia, the Oromo groups ‘adapted by changing their mode of economic life,
their political and social organisation, and their religious adherence’ (Ofcansky
and Berry 2004: 110). Depending on the society they came across, the Oromo
adopted Christianity or Islam as well as following a pastoral or sedentary way
of life.
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 113

After Menelik II embarked on his expansionist policy in the beginning of the

twentieth century, the various Oromo kingdoms fell under the central government
through force and co-option. According to the version circulated by nationalist
organisations such as OLF, the independent Oromia nation was divided into
different religions and regions by the autocracy of Menelik.6 Such an assertion
contradicts historical facts indicating that the Oromo kingdoms were already
divided even before they were conquered and co-opted into the Ethiopian state. It
is recorded that the expansion of Menelik resulted in forceful eviction of peasants
from their land and the denial of their cultural and linguistic rights. Such unfair
treatment of the indigenous community has always been a source of Oromo
resentment of the central authority.
Despite localised and sporadic resistance to the confiscation of lands and the
humiliating acts undertaken by the highlanders, organised resistance by the Oromo
is of recent historical significance. Signs of resistance to central rule began as early
as 1936. According to Keller, the objective of the Western Oromo Confederacy of
1936 was independence from Ethiopia, when 33 chiefs signed a document that
expressed a desire for their region to become a League of Nation protectorate
(Keller 1995: 625). That move did not translate into practice and when Haile
Selassie returned to his throne, all hopes for an independent Oromo nation-state
were lost (Keller 1995: 625). It was in the mid-1960s that the Oromo organised
a qualitative leap forward in their struggle. The origins of the major quest for
Oromo self-identity can be traced back to the setting up of the Mecha and Tulama
self-help association in January 1963 (Bahru 2007: 261). The main objective of
Mecha-Tulama was equal citizenship rather than appealing for the secessionist
approach of Oromo nationalists (Bahru 2007: 261). By late 1966, Haile Selassie’s
regime, threatened by Mecha and Tulama’s popularity led to the arrest of the
leadership and the banning of the association (Bahru 2007: 261).
Later in 1971, an Oromo underground organisation named as the Ethiopian
National Liberation Front (ENLF) was formed, though it was not effective
(Bahru 2007: 262). Afterwards, ‘political organisations such as Maison and
Ichat were associated with the Oromo nationalist movement due to the fact that a
considerable proportion of the rank and file were from the educated Oromo elite’
(Bahru 2007: 262). In 1973, Oromo dissidents formed the Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF), an organisation dedicated to the ‘total liberation of the entire Oromo nation
from Ethiopian colonialism’.7 Although the ideological ideals of OLF had been
influenced by the self-determination rhetoric that was advanced during the student
movement, it had reached a different historical interpretation of the relationship
between Oromo and the rest of Ethiopia. As a result, ‘OLF dismissed all the self-
determination controversies between the radical and moderate student groups
as episodes of a struggle for power among northerners which had nothing to do

6 See official programme of OLF posted at http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/

OromiaBriefs.htm.
7 According to Bahru, OLF came to existence in 1976 (Bahru 2007: 262).
114 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

with the Oromo’ (Solomon 1993: 149). It rather contended that since the Oromo
people had been colonised by a ‘backward’ African empire called Abyssinia, the
only political solution was independence in accordance with the United Nations’
principle of self-determination of peoples.
Nevertheless, the nationalist movement orchestrated by OLF has never been
successful due to various factors. Despite the fact that OLF has been conducting
low-level guerrilla warfare since its inception, it has been unsuccessful. One of
the factors for its failure is related to the blanket conviction by OLF which argues
that Oromia is not part of Ethiopia and that it was only annexed through Ethiopian
colonial conquest. This assertion is controversial and unrealistic. Oromo and non-
Oromo elites dispute the characterisation of the Oromo cause as a colonial one.
According to Merera, there are different historical accounts that do not justify the
Oromo question as a colonial one. Not only have the Oromo people become attached
to other ethnic groups through intermarriage but also the Oromo themselves
became increasingly involved in the making of the Ethiopian empire (Merera
2003: 102–3).8 It is also questionable whether a backward Ethiopian state could
make colonies during the period in question and this denies the role of the Oromos
in shaping modern Ethiopia. Thus, as Messay notes, ‘the works of intellectuals of
Oromo origin clearly show how they combine vilification and utopia to create the
“Oromo” nation … inherent in the thesis of Abyssinia’s colonisation of Oromia
and the myth of democratic Oromia before the colonisation both testify to the
invention of Oromia as an imagined community’ (Messay 2006).
The other most important factor contributed for the failure of the struggle waged
by OLF is its artificial construction of ‘Oromo nationalism’, which is contrary to
the reality of diversity within the Oromo community. The heterogeneity of the
Oromo is expressed in terms of economic life, religion, form of administration
and social relations. It is clearly indicated ‘… the Oromo barely regard themselves
as a community, and they have never had a sense of collective identity based on
a popular memory. Their various clans, such as the Booran, Guji, Arsi, Tulama,
Selale, etc., do not share a pan-Oromo collective memory’ (Alem 2004: 110).
Rather, the Oromo, like many of the ethnic groups in the country, are largely
shaped by regional, religious and cultural traits of the region in which they
have settled.
Though there has been an effort to create a collective Oromo national
consciousness, it has been weakened by internal divisions such as ‘western Oromo
in the Wellega area – mostly Protestant farmers; strongly Amharised northern
Oromos in Showa; small pastoralists in the south, practising animal husbandry;
conservative Muslims of the Hararghe region and the agro-pastoral Borena on
the Kenyan border’ (International Crisis Group 2009: 26). Such regional and
religious diversity within the Oromo community is partly responsible for the lack

8 He cites great Ethiopian warriors such as Ras Gobena, Ras Mekoonon, Fitawrari
Gebeyehu, Fitawwrari Habte-Gorgis, Dejazmach Balcha as well as Haile Selassie himself
as having Oromo decent.
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 115

of success of the movement waged by OLF over the last several years. The only
visible common denominator among the Oromo, despite its numerous dialects, is
the rich and powerful language. It is the single most important bond uniting the
Oromo, who are otherwise diverse.
The other critical factor that makes OLF a weak organisation in terms of
forging alliances with other political parties is the way it tries to seek a solution for
the ‘national question’ of the Oromo. For OLF, the way forward is establishing an
independent state of Oromia in the Horn of Africa. Such a vision is unrealistic for
various reasons. The first relates to the impossibility of drawing an international
border for the Oromo republic. The boundary demarcation to be implemented in
case of secession is not as easy as it has been in the case of Eritrea where the
boundary was clearly demarcated by the colonialists (Merera 2003: 104). The area
now structured as the regional state of Oromia is also home to different ethnic
groups and there are different ethnic groups that border the region. The separation
of Oromia practically means the Ethiopian state will cease to exist.
In addition to this, the quest for an independent Oromia does not have
grassroots support. Ordinary Oromos are concerned more about the protection
of their rights particularly protection of their language and culture as well as
economic development rather than separation or aspiration to an independent state.
Furthermore, the secessionist agenda is contrary to the egalitarian and inclusive
Oromo culture that assimilates other people instead of marginalising them. Due
to such unique factors, the need for independence among the Oromo community
is largely absent as opposed to, for instance, the huge public support the EPLF
enjoyed on the separation of Eritrea. Absence of such public support for separation
among the Oromo, due to the various cultural and social attachments with the rest
of Ethiopia, makes OLF’s vision for independence unlikely to be realised.
Recognising such challenges, former radical Oromo nationalists resorted to
resolving the Oromo people’s problems within the Ethiopian political framework.
Among such notable figures, Dr Negasso Gidada, a former OLF and TPLF/EPRDF
member joined Unity for Democratic and Justice (UDJ), a multinational political
party. The move has largely symbolised as an important shift of paradigm in parts
of the Oromo nationalist movement and other narrow ethnic political groupings.
Other Oromo nationalist parties like Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
(OFDM) founded by veteran politician Bulcha Demekesa and Oromo National
Congress led by Dr Mererea Gudina have taken a different direction from that of
OLF in terms of realising the rights of the Oromo people within a united Ethiopia.
These parties are committed to seeking solutions to their claims within a federal
Ethiopia rather than outside the federation. Such an approach is not only in touch
with the reality on the ground but has also increasingly alienated OLF.
Many Oromo elites are now calling for a paradigm shift on the part of OLF,
arguing that an independent Oromia would not be feasible. Even OLF seems to
have softened its hard position on ‘self-determination’ moving to a more liberal
accommodation of diversity. In the last few years, the extremist Oromo nationalists
within OLF have been marginalised or dropped, thus creating changes in strategy.
116 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Due to such changes, the OLF leaders are now talking about ‘democratising
Ethiopia’ rather than secession. Both the reformed OLF and the newly established
Oromo Democratic Front (ODF), founded former OLF leaders, have announced
that they have renounced the secession agenda and they are working towards a
democratic and federal Ethiopia.

The Nationalist Movement in the Ogaden

Probably the most challenging ethno-regional movement that continues to fuel

political crisis for the central government comes from the Somali region of the
country. As will be discussed subsequently, compared to other ethno-regional
movements, the dynamics of the Somali region is more complicated and continue
to pose a threat to stability in the country as well as in the Horn of Africa. This is
due to the fact that the effective administration of the Somali region by the central
government is comparatively recent and not well organised. In addition to this,
‘ridden by clan rivalries and destabilised by conflicts in neighbouring Somalia,
the Ogaden region is Ethiopia’s most under-developed periphery whose under-
development is exacerbated by its remoteness, harsh climate, lack of infrastructure
and chronic instability’ (International Crisis Group 2009: 28).
The relationship between the Ogaden and highland Ethiopia goes back to
the middle of the sixteenth century when the well-known Somali Imam, Ahmed
Ibrahim, better known as Ahmed Geragn, led a devastating invasion to the north.
Despite the defeat of Geragn by the central government, Ethiopia had no effective
control of the region until the end of nineteenth century. Emperor Menelik II,
having defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in the north in 1896, marched
on the east by occupying the Ogaden. However, in 1935, the Ogaden was once
again controlled by part of Italian East Africa. Although Ethiopia was liberated in
1941, the Ogaden remained under British administration until 1948. But in 1945,
‘Haile Selassie, fearing the possibility of British support for a separate Somali
state that would include the Ogaden, claimed Italian Somaliland a “lost province”’
(Ofcansky and Berry 2004: 70). Finally, the whole Ogaden region was restored to
Ethiopia in 1954 (Bahru 2007: 181).
After Somalia became independent in 1960, there were conflicts with Ethiopia
over the Ogaden. In 1977, the Somali government of Mahammad Siad Barre
launched an attack on Ethiopia to annex the Ogaden area as part of his vision to
establish ‘Greater Somalia’. In the process, ‘Somalia used the Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF) to take advantage of the Derg’s political problems to
attack the Ogaden’ (Ofcansky and Berry 2004: 70). Despite the initial success of
the Somali invasion advancing hundreds of kilometres into the Ethiopian territory,
the advancement was checked and repelled by the Ethiopian military.
After the end of the 1977–78 conflict, a more permanent conflict emerged
with the establishment of Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in 1984 that
aimed at advancing the secession of the Ogaden. Like many of the ethno-regional
movements in the country, ONLF characterises the case of Ogaden region as a
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 117

colony of Ethiopia and it has clearly indicated in its programme that it strives for
‘self-determination’ of the Ogaden people. Since its inception, the organisation
has been waging an armed struggle against the central government. Although it
has not materialised, the military regime attempted to resolve the Ogaden problem
by declaring autonomous administration to the region in 1987.
The other significant attempt that was made to accommodate the demands in
the Ogaden was during the change of regime in 1991. Believing that the change of
regime could result in the realisation of its ambition, ONLF joined the transitional
government in Ethiopia. Later, the region obtained a self-administration status
when the Somali Regional State was created in 1993. Shortly after, ONLF
realised that the rhetoric of self-determination advocated by TPLF/EPRDF was
restrictive. Due to such complete control of the political space by TPLF/EPRDF
and its satellite parties, ONLF left the political process and resumed fighting in the
region. In recent years, ONLF attacks have intensified widely, thus receiving the
attention of international media and human rights organisations.
Compared to other ethnic nationalist movements, the Ogaden case is
complicated and continues to be challenging to any form of government that may
come to power to Ethiopia. Due to their strong cultural or social attachment to
the centre, other ethno-nationalist movements, whether the Oromo or Tigray, will
attempt to manipulate ethno-regional demands to control the centre rather than
pure independence from the Ethiopian state. The case of the Ogaden is completely
different. Since effective control of the region was not largely realised, ethnic
Somalis remain marginalised in terms of assimilating and establishing attachment
to mainstream Ethiopian culture. As such, they have not made any meaningful
effort to achieve their rightful place at the centre. Few attempts were made by
past Ethiopian regimes to integrate Ogaden inhabitants but a profound feeling
of marginalisation has prevailed among the Somali population (Ofcansky and
Berry 2004: 27). Furthermore, years of TPLF/EPRDF’s heavy-handed military
and political interventions have alienated substantial parts of the Somali region
(Ofcansky and Berry 2004: 27).
The fact that Somalis are an ethnically and religiously homogenous community
that could facilitate elites to mobilise dissent to the centre, it possesses an
unprecedented threat to stability in the region. The existence of stateless Somalia
next door is also a challenge to seek a permanent solution to the problems in the
region. Above all, since the rallying force in Somali communities is the clan, it
may be challenging to undertake negotiation with a unified Somali political group.
As it has been observed in the past, agreement of the government with certain
groups in the region will spark automatic dissent from others. The role of Islamic
fundamentalism should not also be overlooked. As has been seen in Somalia,
Islamic fundamentalist groups may attempt to control the region in case there is a
loophole or weakening of the central government in Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian government has been attempting to forge a peaceful agreement
with dissident groups in the region. The most recent report on the peace agreement
between ONLF and the Ethiopian government was in October 2010. However,
118 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

there seems to be a split within the ranks of the rebel group between those who
are against and in favour of the peace agreement. As is the case with many rebel
groups, such as OLF who consistently split in different directions, it is difficult to
ascertain which ONLF group has the military and political hegemony.
In addition to this, the centralist tendencies of the regime in Addis Ababa
make the reliability of such peace agreements uncertain. Since TPLF/EPRDF is
in firm grip of the regions using various mechanisms, if the new faction of ONLF
that joined the legal process pushes its ambitious political agenda further, it is
unlikely that TPLF/EPRDF will tolerate such a drive for power. As things stands
now, TPLF/EPRDF seems to be neither ready nor interested in negotiating with
political forces that want to be independent of its influence. Unless comprehensive
and special attention is paid to alleviate the grievances of the public in the region
as well as pulling the elites of the Ogaden towards central power politics, the
Somali region will remain the most important ethno-regional problem that will
continue to pose a security threat to Ethiopia and the surrounding region.

The Derg’s Response to the ‘Question of Nationalities’ and the

Armed Struggles

After the Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed in 1974, a Provisional Military
Administrative Council (PMAC) known as the Derg in Amharic assumed political
power and declared socialism its ideology. It soon dissolved parliament, suspended
the constitution and banned all strikes and demonstrations (Bahru 2007: 236). The
measures that had been taken during the 1974 revolution were a complete departure
from the Ethiopian traditional polity. Particularly, the termination of rural land
ownership and private ownership of urban lands symbolised a permanent end to
the age-old feudal era. In addition, ‘the Derg also pursued a contradictory policy
regarding nationality issues, ranging from signaling support for self-determination
to an absolute rejection of any compromise on nationalities issues’ (Solomon
2007: 150).
A special committee that had six policy options to deal with the problem made
the first attempt in 1975 with the preparation of a position paper on the issue of
nationalities. The political options suggested included ‘granting self-determination
to all the provinces, returning the former autonomy of Eritrea with or without
Assab, granting a single federal autonomy to Tigray and Eritrea together and
another federation for the rest of Ethiopia, providing a federal structure to major
cultural groups such as Oromo, Tigray and Sidama or creating a federal structure
based on the existing provinces’ (Solomon 2007: 152). However, the Derg did not
consider any of the submitted suggestions. On 20 April 1976, the ‘Programme
of the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia’ (NDR), which was aligned
to the political momentum of the time was announced. The first issue the NDR
addressed was the ‘self-determination of the nationalities’. Reflecting the Marxist
view of nationalities that was prevalent during the time, the National Programme
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 119

reiterated the right to self-determination of all nationalities and equality of the

history, culture, languages and religion, as well as granting regional autonomy
to each nationality deciding on matters concerning its internal affairs (Merera
2003: 82).
On paper, the NDR Programme was a radical proposal that reflected the
rhetoric of the Marxist view that was prevalent at the time. The purpose of such a
programme was to secure the support of the intellectuals and student leaders who
had been major proponents of such issues and to show how the military government
was more progressive than the regime it had replaced. Despite its commitment to
the right to self-determination, the Derg engaged in a confrontational stance with
dissident groups. As it was later discovered, the revolution had missed its target
and could not bring about the desired change and development in the country.
Contrary to the hope of many scholars and students who made the revolution a
reality, the Derg pursued harsh measures against political dissents including
ethno-regional movements.
In terms of the devolution of power, the military regime remained as centralised
as the imperial system. Ethnic nationalists, despite the fact that they supported some
of the measures taken by the Derg in dismantling the age-old feudal land tenure
system, were dissatisfied with the way the regime tried to address the ‘national
question’. The complete closure of political space by the Derg and the weakening
of multinational political groupings reinforced ethno-regional movements namely,
the Tigrayan Liberation Front (TPLF), Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)
and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). According to the assessment of ethno-
nationalists, ‘the Derg rule was essentially a continuation of the imperial period
when it comes to the issue of ethnic oppression’ (Berhanu 2010: 9).
Despite the escalation of ethno-regional movements, the Derg continued with
its own approach to addressing the ‘question of nationalities’. As a response, it
established the Institute of Nationalities in 1983 to study the ethnic composition of
Ethiopia and to draft a constitutional design for local administration (Young 1996:
534). Despite such moves, the Derg established the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia
(WPE) and enacted a new constitution that established the People’s Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). The 1987 constitution formally ended military rule,
but the power of the WPE, which operated according to the Leninist principle of
‘democratic centralism’, remained unchallenged by the constitutional provisions.
To diffuse demands for ethnic self-determination, the government created
24 administrative and five autonomous regions in Eritrea, Assab, Dire Dawa,
Tigray and the Ogaden. The self-governing regions were granted the power
to promulgate laws in so much as the enacted laws were not contrary to those
passed by the National Assembly. The difference between the autonomous regions
and the administrative regions lay in the legislative powers of the two types of
regions. The former could enact legislation without requiring approval from the
central government, as long as the legislation was consistent with the law of the
national Shengo while the administrative regions had to secure prior approval
from the same source. Each administrative and autonomous region could establish
120 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

a directly elected regional Shengo (parliament), which could, in turn, elect its
own administration executive. Nevertheless, all the regional leaders were to be
appointed by the centre. Furthermore, the powers enjoyed by these regions were
strictly delegated and did not have any constitutional guarantees.
The Derg regime had the opportunity to forge alliances with the various
political forces during the first few years after it came to power. At that time, many
of the youths who later became militants were part of multinational organisations
trying to address the question of nationalities within the Ethiopian state without
necessarily opting for secession. The fierce measures taken by the military junta
helped these groups to mobilise a radical armed rebellion. Through portraying the
Derg as a brutal government, TPLF and EPLF were able to generate significant
support from their constituency by various and often dubious methods.
In light of the increasing strength of the rebel groups, it became clear that there
was little hope of resolving the confrontation peacefully. On the one hand, the
position of the Derg was rigid and inflexible. Even more importantly, despite the
rebel groups’ public appeal for a peaceful resolution to their problems, they were
not interested to forge any meaningful concession in view of their radical position
that was aimed at controlling power. It was unlikely that they would accept any
concession short of controlling state power in Ethiopia and Eritrea. In particular,
‘both the Derg and the opposition, principally TPLF, had ruled out possibilities
of negotiation and compromise, thus indicating that the confrontation could only
be resolved through the total defeat of the one and the total victory of the other’
(Bahru 2007: 331). Finally, as soon as the Cold War ended, EPLF and TPLF were
able to dismantle the military regime in mid-1991 and take control of the state.

Summary

The ideological principles the ruling Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Front

(EPRDF) currently pursues are largely the result of the radical ideological movement
of the students. The most significant ideological rhetoric of the students’ movement
that has become a constitutional doctrine is the right to self-determination of
nations and nationalities incorporated under Art. 39 of FDRE constitution. The
doctrine had been evolved during the revolutionary students’ movement of the
1960s and 70s. The reluctance of Haile Selassie’s regime to implement policy
reforms invited a very radical Marxist ideology into the political discourse that
led the country into the pitfall that it still finds itself in today. Beginning from the
end of the 1960s, university students began openly challenging the legitimacy of
the monarchy and the repressive land tenure system. The students’ movement was
largely dominated by the leftist Marxist ideology that was simplistically used to
diagnose Ethiopia’s plight and provide the remedy. Due to a radical move that was
more intense than in any other African state, the implication of Marxist ideology
in terms of shaping the country’s political discourse has been devastating. Not
only has the impact been instrumental in overthrowing the historical imperial rule
 Ideological Radicalism and Ethno-regional Movements in Ethiopia 121

but it has also dominated most of the social, economic and political policies of the
country in the last four decades.
The far-reaching consequence of this ideology on political discourse is still
evident in the land tenure system and the doctrine of the ‘self-determination right
of nationalities’ that has characterised the country’s political landscape since the
adoption of the ethnic federal system in 1991. In particular the students’ radical
position on the ‘right to self-determination of nationalities’ heralded a new era
in Ethiopian political discourse since Ethiopia was considered as a nation that
did not face major challenges in terms of ethnic tension in the pat. Although the
‘national question’ was genuinely taken up by the majority of the students in order
to resolve the country’s problems, it created a defining moment in the creation of
ethnic mobilisation by some groups in the student movement. The emergence and
development of nationalist political organisations such as the Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo
Liberation Movement is closely related to the radicalisation of the students’
movement in the 1970s.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Chapter 5
The Fundamental Ideological Principles
Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian federal system developed new constitutional and ideological

principles different from former socialist federations, mainly due to the ending of
the Cold War. However, it is fundamentally a socialist federal system established
based on the Stalinist notion of the right to self-determination of nationalities, along
with Marxist-Leninist state and party organisational principles. The ideological
fundamentals of the Ethiopian federal system resemble that of former socialist
federations in both rhetoric and practice. Although there have been comparative
studies made on the Ethiopian federal system from the perspective of democratic
multicultural federations, such studies may not provide an accurate picture of the
structure and function of the system.
Studying Ethiopia’s federal system and the democratisation process from
a formal constitutional and institutional perspective provides an inaccurate
impression of the system. This is in contrast to the impression that could be
revealed through a study of the system from the perspective of its governing
ideological principles. The most important hypothesis advanced in this book is
that the ideological convictions of Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)/
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) are by far the most
influential factors that shaped the origin, structure, operation and dynamics of
Ethiopia’s federal system, as opposed to the formal constitutional principles.
This chapter provides an insight into the merits of TPLF/EPRDF’s ideological
conceptions and policies that shaped the Ethiopian federal experiment. The most
important ideological fundamentals of TPLF/EPRDF that are used to structure
and govern the federal system are the principle of the right to self-determination
of nationalities, revolutionary democracy, developmental state doctrine and by-
party rules on gimgemma (party evaluation), democratic centralism and neo-
patrimonialist mobilisation of party membership and support.

Salient Features of Socialist Federation Relevant to Ethiopia’s Ethnic

Federal System

Though the Ethiopian federal system was adopted in the post-Cold War political
context when the former socialist federations had crumbled, the stamp of socialist
federations and the Marxist ideology are the hallmarks in the design and operation
of the Ethiopian ethnic federal system. This is largely due to the unprecedented
124 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

impact of Marxist ideology in political movements that has been in the political
discourse for over the past half a century. The impact of the Marxist-Leninist
ideological orientation has been characterised by ‘the premium placed on
organisation, the pervasiveness of communist economic policy and the perception
of the national question’ (Bahru 2008: 332).
Not only did the Ethiopian federal system inherit the famous Leninist ‘right
to self-determination of nationalities’ ideological dogma since the time of the
students’ movement but other Marxist principles of party organisation and control
are still deeply entrenched. In addition to the wider practice of the traditional
Marxist ideological weapons such as democratic centralism, the TPLF/EPRDF
has put forward revised ideological versions such as revolutionary democracy and
developmental state doctrines. These ideological weapons have been largely used
to control the federal system in various ways and largely override the principles
adopted in the constitution.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are fundamental features of socialist
federations that make them unique vis á vis democratic multicultural federations.
The fundamental principle of socialist federations is sovereignty and equality of
nations and their right to self-determination. The Ethiopian federal system has
directly adopted this principle. The Ethiopian constitution provides that state
sovereignty is granted to ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ and it grants nations
the right to self-determination, including secession. In the same manner as the
former soviet federation that attempted to provide home zones to the various
ethnic groups, the federal units in Ethiopia are structured with the aim of providing
home states to the major ethnic groups in the country.
The other fundamental feature of the socialist federations is that though their
constitutions appear to be responsive to minority rights, the vanguard party
is in tight control of the whole system, granting regional units only the right to
exercise cultural and linguistic rights rather than providing proper autonomy. In
this respect, there is a strong similarity between the federal system of the former
socialist federations and that of Ethiopia in terms of the centralisation of power
by a vanguard political party. TPLF/EPRDF is currently the vanguard party that
controls political, economic and social activities throughout the country, playing a
similar role to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the former USSR
federation. The only difference between the former socialist federations and the
Ethiopian system in this respect is that while the former socialist federations did
not permit multi-party systems, the Ethiopian federal system formally allows
multi-party democracy while the country is practically a one-party state. TPLF/
EPRDF itself or its affiliate parties that are under its firm control directly govern
all the regions in the Ethiopian federal system.
In the system of socialist federations, the principle of unity and diversity was
expressed on the one hand while unity of the country was largely determined by
the unity of the federal government. Despite the fact that socialist constitutions
granted the right to secede and wider autonomy to the regional units, the centre
retained the power to determine the boundaries as well as power over ‘settlement
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 125

of matters’ if secession was to be implemented. Furthermore, as part of central

policy, the centre remained committed to a redistribution policy of federal resource
allocation from the centre to the regions. In addition to this, the centre was able
to ensure the loyalty of the local political leadership by retaining the power to
appoint and dismiss local party and state officials in the ethno-regions.
Similarly, although the Ethiopian federal system grants the right to self-
determination including secession to ethnic groups, the powers of regional units
granted under the constitution is indirectly taken over by the central government
through party centralism. This is because all regional units are governed by TPLF/
EPRDF and the party is run by the principle of democratic-centralism. Although
regional governments have their own legislative and executive organs that could
make their own independent decisions, the laws and policies they implement
emanate from the central party structure, making the regional government
structures extensions of the central government.
Socialist federations also lacked proper separation of powers between the
legislative, executive and the judicial organs of the state. The system of state
organs in socialist countries was not based on the traditional tripartite character
of division of state power or checks and balances; rather, it was based on the
opposite principle of the unity of the state power of the working people based on
the rules of democratic centralism. In this system, the whole mechanism of the
state was hierarchically structured in such a way that it culminated in a single
apex represented by the supreme state power organ, which had more powers
than the legislatures. This kind of power structure is also true in the Ethiopian
federal structure. The Ethiopian constitution makes it clear that the House of
Peoples Representatives is the highest decision-making organ while the executive
power is granted to the prime minister and the council of ministers. Though the
Ethiopian constitution provides for the establishment of an independent judiciary,
the court does not have significant authority to check the power of the legislature
or the executive. There is not any constitutional mechanism in Ethiopia that
checks the power of the legislature or the executive as was the case in former
socialist federations.
The other fundamental feature of socialist federations is the lack of genuine
democracy. Although terminologies such as democracy and individual rights are
available in the vocabulary of socialist legal systems, they simply mean attachment
to the official party network and any deviation from the official party position is
constrained. Opposition parties are not allowed to operate in such systems while
independent civil society groups and other democratic institutions are repressed
or prohibited. The lack of democracy in the Ethiopian federal system is similar to
the former socialist federations where the democratic system does not function in
practice. Despite the fact that the Ethiopian federal constitution adopted principles
of democracy such as competitive elections and multi-party systems, in practical
terms, the country is ruled by what TPLF/EPRDF calls ‘revolutionary democracy’,
which is basically a Marxist-oriented democratic perception.
126 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

History of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)

The origin and development of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic

Front (EPRDF) is closely linked to the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF).
Despite not being taken seriously by the military regime in the first few years of
the movement’s struggle, TPLF became a formidable resistant movement in the
mid-1980s asserting control over different localities in the Tigray province. At
the end of that decade when it became clear that the military regime was in its
last days, TPLF made a strategic change from narrow Tigrayan independence to
control over the Ethiopian polity. TPLF realised that the only conceivable avenue
to rule Ethiopia ‘would be achieved through maintenance of an ethnic-based
coalition with elements of the numerically superior Oromo and the historically
dominant Amhara’ (Young 1996: 538).
Establishing a ‘broad based party’ that claims to have a political programme
in the name of the entire Ethiopian people was a crucial step for TPLF to translate
its military gains into a political dominance. For achieving its goal, TPLF created
EPRDF in 1989 when the rebel group was proceeding to Addis Ababa to overthrow
the military regime. Apart from TPLF, other smaller parties, namely the Ethiopian
People’s Democratic Movement, a pan-Ethiopian based organisation which later
changed its name to the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM),
established in 1981, and the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO),
created by the TPLF in 1990, became members of the coalition. The latter was
established by former soldiers of the Derg captured by the TPLF and the Ethiopian
Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement (EDORM) that consisted of Derg
military officers who had joined the new coalition. Later, in 1994, the South
Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM), a collection of numerous
ethnic parties in the south, joined the front.
After the fall of the Derg, the four parties in the coalition controlled the
political power of the four major regions in the country namely, Oromo People’s
Democratic Organisation (OPDO) in Oromia, the Amhara National Democratic
Movement (ANDM) in Amhara Regional State, the Southern Ethiopian People’s
Democratic Front (SEPDF) in Southern Regional State and the Tigray People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray. In addition to this, there are TPLF/EPRDF
affiliated parties in other regions such as Afar, Somali, Gambella, Benishangul-
Gumuz and Hareri regional states. Though such affiliated parties are not formally
member parties of EPRDF, they are de facto members, since they are closely
monitored by EPRDF party structures.
The coalition within EPRDF is among unequal parties whose military, political
and popular base is unparallel. Among the four parties, TPLF is the senior and the
dominant party in the group. Apart from being the creator of the new front, TPLF
dominates the armed forces and shapes the political programmes of the other
parties. It is believed that ‘ANDM, OPDO and SEPDF leaders have built their
careers on personal links with TPLF/EPRDF mentors rather than having genuine
broad-based support in their constituencies’ (International Crisis Group 2009: 16).
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 127

The imbalance of power that was apparent during the formation of the collation
largely continued after the front controlled political power in the country. The
senior–junior relationship in the front has far-reaching consequences in affecting
the balance of power in the federal system. Due to the allegation that the other
member parties are a creation of TPLF and the continued unbalanced relations,
these parties continue to suffer from deficits of legitimacy in their respective
regional constituencies.

Background of Development of TPLF/EPRDF’s Ideological Conceptions

In a modern democracy, the role of political parties as vehicles of political change

is irreplaceable. Political parties that rule a country for many years play a pivotal
role in shaping the destiny of a nation. It is widely recognised that ‘democracy
has a chance to flourish if parties are properly and democratically organised,
offer the people clear choices of policy and goals, uphold constitutional values,
pursue their objectives with dedication and professionalism and seek to honestly
represent public interest and public opinion’ (Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 154). On the
other hand, as has been witnessed from the experience of many countries, political
parties that do not adhere to democratic principles can subvert the fundamental
principles of the constitution and become an instrument of manipulation and
control (Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 155). If parties are not run democratically by the
constitutional system, the political system will become corrupt with the destiny of
the country being determined by a few individuals (Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 155).
In light of this background, a close study of the ideological merits and polices
of TPLF/EPRDF is relevant in assessing the dynamics and impediments of
Ethiopia’s transition to democracy and functioning of the federal system. Since
1991, the destiny of the country seems to be closely linked to this organisation and
its ideological ideals. Due to the fact that the party is responsible for the adoption
of the highly controversial ethnic federal system and the innumerable impacts of
Marxist party policy and structure used to control all political, social and economic
institutions in the country, closely analysing its policies and ideological conceptions
is significant if one is to comprehend how the federal system is functioning.
The ideological polices of TPLF/EPRDF have far-reaching consequences in
shaping the country’s political discourse. The ideological principles perused by
the vanguard party are mainly aimed at preserving the hegemony of the party
in decades to come. These policies define the country’s federal and democratic
experiment in the last two decades. Some of these ideologies and policies include
self-determination rights of nations and nationalities, revolutionary democracy,
democratic centralism, party evaluation (gimgemma) and client–patronage
relationships in the party and government channels.
The fall of the Berlin wall was detrimental in terms of redefining the Marxist
ideological stance of TPLF/EPRDF. Until the fall of communism in 1990, TPLF/
EPRDF was planning to impose the Stalinist style of Enver Hoxha’s Albanian
128 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

communist system that was praised by TPLF leaders as the undiluted version of
communism. However, the international course of events that challenged the very
survival of the communist system elsewhere forced TPLF/EPRDF to change its
earlier extreme version. According to Gebru Aserat, former veteran member of
TPLF, the last TPLF/EPRDF conference held in 1991 just before it came to power
discussed the changes in the international balance of power and decided that the
vanguard communist party within EPRDF, which was considered as the leading
organ of the rebel movement, be suspended (Gebru 2011). TPLF/EPRDF was also
forced to take pragmatic measures in response to demands by international and
national stakeholders. Policy measures such as recognition of international human
rights conventions and the adoption of a free market economy are the results of
changes of the international political events. Such pragmatic measures of the
party were largely dictated by the new global circumstances since there was no
convenient environment for the implementation of Albanian-style communism.
Though TPLF/EPRDF found itself in a dilemma due to changes of events
in the world since 1989, it was not ready to undertake any paradigm shift in
terms of abandoning its socialist ideology. This is primarily because leaders
of the party have developed deep suspicion towards liberal values due to their
unwavering commitment to Marxism-Leninism, which characterised capitalism
as an instrument of exploitation of the masses by the bourgeoisie classes. Liberal
democracy is also unfamiliar territory for TPLF/EPRDF, which would invite a
competitive political system for which the party is unprepared. In addition, the
view of TPLF/EPRDF leaders of liberal values has prevented them from acquiring
more experience of the ideals of democracy and the mechanisms necessary to
adopt them in the Ethiopian context. Above all, the Marxist style of governance is
considered as a very convenient system in order to stay in power longer without
having any real competition.
The reported response of the late prime minister Meles Zenawi around 1992
on a question related to a change of ideology is an indication that TPLF/EPRDF’s
conception of democracy equates to socialism. When asked if he had abandoned
the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, the prime minister responded, ‘One should
not abandon democracy to achieve socialism, because we are convinced that if
socialism is not democratic, it is not going to be socialism at all’ (Tordoff 1993:
215–16). Though the prime minister’s reported speech was cited as indicating that
Meles had abandoned Marxism since ‘western aid mattered more than ideology’,
a close reading of the quotation speaks otherwise. The prime minister is indirectly
saying that since socialism is democratic, there is no need to abandon it. It is
clearly an indication that there has never been a real desire on the part of the
regime to abandon its old Marxist ideology despite the change of events at the
global level.
After managing to overcome its period of uncertainty and having consolidated
its power base, TPLF/EPRDF began to search for a new ideological formula that
would strike a balance between accommodating or evading the third wave of
democracy that was sweeping across the world and, at the same time, maintain the
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 129

Marxist-oriented policies that worked efficiently during the days of the rebellion.
This balance was needed due to the fact that, on the one hand, for years the party
was preparing itself to implement an Albanian-style socialist system, a vision
which suddenly crumbled with the downfall of communist bloc. On the other
hand, the world was moving towards democracy, something for which they were
totally unprepared but could not ignore.
The difficulties of balancing communist and liberal ideals could be traced from
the discussion held between Meles Zenawi and Professor Huntington in 1993.
The questions forwarded by the prime minister and the professor’s responses are
quite telling in terms of the quest for an ideology that would suit the time. The
discussion was held in 1993 when the professor was in Ethiopia on assignment to
assess the prospects for democracy in Ethiopia. Meles Zenawi asked the professor,
‘Professor Huntington, I have read your book The Third Wave. According to your
analysis, countries become democratic after they have become wealthy. Ethiopia
is an extremely poor country, very far from having a high level of economic
development. Does that mean that democracy is impossible in this country?’
(Tronovoll 2009: 470). Professor Huntington responded by saying that the ‘overall
balance of economic, social, and other conditions in Ethiopia was not favourable to
democratisation and the development of a “western- style democracy”’ (Tronovoll
2009: 470).
The professor further advised Meles Zenawi that ‘conceivably, some other type
of democratic system could be created in Ethiopia that depends overwhelmingly
on the extent to which political leaders want to create an Ethiopian democracy
since political regimes are created not by preconditions but by political leaders’
(Tronovoll 2009: 470). Professor Huntington clearly indicated that in ‘the Ethiopian
situation, where there is no large middle class, the EPRDF that had broad appeal
and a peasant base could play the role of the dominant party’ (Asnake 2009: 72).
The professor moreover underscored that the building of a dominant party system
under the TPLF/EPRDF served two key purposes. First, it would provide the
political stability needed for economic development and attract foreign investment
and secondly, the presence of smaller opposition political parties that compete
in elections but can never form a government either individually or collectively
would provide ‘democratic legitimacy’ for EPRDF’s rule and facilitate the flow
of foreign aid (Asnake 2009: 72–3). The discussion between the professor and
Meles as well as the policies subsequently pursued by TPLF/EPRDF is a clear
indication that TPLF/EPRDF was in need of a new ideology that conformed to the
new international political changes. The discussions seemed to be instrumental
in terms of defining the post-1991 ideological conception of TPLF/EPRDF
that has been structured in accordance with the prescriptions forwarded by the
good professor.
The view that democracy in poor countries could not take root seems to have
emboldened TPLF/EPRDF to abandon a liberal democracy model in Ethiopia and
pushed it to stick to its old Marxist ideology with some modifications. Thus, TPLF/
EPRDF reinvented ‘revolutionary democracy’ as the ‘other type of democratic
130 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

system’ that is noted by Professor Huntington in his discussion with Meles

Zenawi. Revolutionary democracy could be considered as the new invention of
TPLF/EPRDF that is used to maintain hegemonic power as well as providing the
party with a veneer of democratic pretention in the eyes of western donors. This
explains the mention in TPLF/EPRDF’s strategy document about the adjustment
to the ‘new international reality’ that should be made ‘without undermining the
pillars of our revolutionary democracy’ (TPLF/EPRDF’s Strategies 1996).
The other most important ideological dogma that has been maintained by TPLF/
EPRDF is the right to self-determination of nationalities that has been nurturing
rebellion movements in Ethiopia since the students’ movement of the 1960s.
When TPLF/EPRDF took over political power, it made clear that the principle
would become the official government policy. Unlike its socialist agenda, the self-
determination policy of TPLF/EPRDF was not challenged by the international
community or affected by the fall of the Berlin wall. That is because of the
growing international tendency for the need to protect of rights of minorities. The
right to self-determination of nations and nationalities thus became the pillar of the
constitution enacted in 1995.
After the election crisis of 2005, the developmental state doctrine suddenly
emerged as the most important policy used to reclaim political legitimacy of
TPLF/EPRDF. There have also been other additional ideological tools used by
the TPLF/EPRDF to command hegemony in the country. One of these ideological
mechanisms is the democratic-centralism principle that demands absolute loyalty
from the members of TPLF/EPRDF to party policies. TPLF/EPRDF also has
a hectic Gimgemma (evaluation) method used to maintain hegemony, root out
unwanted members and spread fear among the ranks of the party members and
government officials. All these ideological principles maintained by TPLF/
EPRDF have been instrumental in shaping the origin, structure and function of
the Ethiopian federal system. At present, the ideological principles are the most
important mechanisms that are governing the federal system far more importantly
than the constitutional principles or democratic institutions.
Most of TPLF/EPRDF’s ideological dogmas discussed in the preceding
sections trace their origins to the leftist ideological orientation which are referred
to as a cult system. According to studies, a leftist oriented party and state structure
resembles a type of cult in terms of controlling the minds of the people through
intense and continues propaganda. Such political cults have the characteristics
of excluding intellectual sustenance outside the group’s own ideological fortress,
the group’s beliefs are being immune to falsification, an authoritarian inner party
regime, accruing personal power and engaging in wealth accumulation of group
members, leaders alive or dead are deified and the group becomes central to the
personal identity of members, who find difficult to imagine a life outside their
organisation (Tourish 1998).
In this kind of repressive organisational structure, the ideological ideals
are entrusted to one vanguard party that is the nucleus of every decision and
subsequently comes under the control of few party leaders. In such cult systems,
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 131

‘the vanguard party approach leads to the belief that the party has a level of insight
into society’s problems unmatched by anyone else’ (Tourish 1998). In such Marxist
party structures, ‘the party organisation at first substitutes itself for the party as
a whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organisation; and
finally, a single “dictator” substitutes himself for the Central Committee’ (Tourish
1998). The leaders of the party usually come up with policy ideals, they present
them for discussion and party meetings approve them, later establishing them as
party policy.
All the features of the ideological cults of the leftist party organisations
have been witnessed in Ethiopia since the emergence of the radical ideological
tendencies in the 1960s. Since TPLF/EPRDF was developed in the context of
the students’ movement that was dominated by Marxist ideals, it is the heir to the
leftist ideological practices that were advanced by the students’ groups during the
1970s. Though the international dispensation, as well as the country’s demands
significantly changed since the end of the Cold War, the Marxist ideological
principles and methods of control have been firmly maintained in the Ethiopian
political landscape.

The Merits of the Fundamental Ideological Principles of TPLF/EPRDF and

their Implications

As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, there are fundamental rhetorics

maintained by TPLF/EPRDF that have directly and indirectly dominated the
structure and functioning of the Ethiopian system of government. The following
section highlights the development of the ideological concepts, their features and
the implication for the functioning of the federal system.

The Doctrine of the Right to Self-determination of Nationalities

The most significant Marxist-oriented ideology of the Ethiopian revolutionary

movement is the right of nations to self-determination up to and including
secession. This radical doctrine was first introduced into the students’ movement
at a gathering in the Christmas Hall of Addis Ababa University in November 1969
(Bahru 2008: 333). The article, which was written by Walelegn Mekonnon was
the watershed that shaped the leftist ideology on the national question that later
literally served as a manifesto of the students’ movement. In the article, Walelegn
argued that the so-called Ethiopian nationalism advanced was non-inclusive,
representing only the Amhara and Tigre cultures and language rather than reflecting
the various nations residing in the country (Balsvik 2005: 277). The declaration
made by Walelegn was simply a call for the dismantling and restructuring of the
Ethiopian state. Other sources assert that ‘the so-called “national question” was
subtly brought into the students’ movement by liberation movements in Eritrea’
(Balsvik 2005: 278). It was after the radical movement accepted the Eritrean cause
132 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

as a case of self-determination that it applied the principle to all nationalities in

Ethiopia (Bahru 2008: 333). Eritrean elites are thus prominently instrumental in
pushing the principle of ‘right to self-determination, including secession’ to centre
stage in Ethiopian politics (Merera 2003: 168).
Despite the fact that the assertion on the right to self-determination of
nationalities required close analysis and the formulation of solutions to the alleged
problems, the majority of the students during the time were not willing to listen to
any other option since they were in a hurry to achieve their objectives. Few asked
the crucial questions such as, ‘what are the nationalities and nations of Ethiopia?
How did they evolve over time and what was the nature of their mutual interaction
or should the principle pushed to its extreme form of secession?’ (Bahru 2008:
278). In order to demonstrate the relevance of the Stalinist paradigm to Ethiopia,
elites during the 1970s had to exaggerate the development stage of the various
ethnic groups in the country (Andargachew 2005: 140). When confronted with
the question that the ethnic groups in Ethiopia did not meet the requirements of
the ‘nations and nationalities’ concept of Stalinism, militant student groups used
to answer that the various ethnic groups could not have achieved the ‘nation and
nationalities’ status because their development to this level was obstructed by
Amhara interference. Since the radical students’ groups considered the Ethiopian
situation akin to the Bolshevik characterisation of Tsarist Russia as a ‘prison of
nationalities’, they sought to ‘resolve’ the problem through Stalinist principles
of self-determination, having different forms of autonomy that might include the
right to independence (Asnake 2009: 63).
Contrary to the apparent radical and naïve move undertaken by Walelegn and the
likes, the articles published by the Ethiopian students’ organisations in Europe and
North America on the national question were more detailed and offered a theoretical
but cautious approach in many respects (Balsvik 2005: 278). Most importantly, the
articles published by such student organisations used to refer to ethnic diversity
in Ethiopia as ‘regionalism’ rather than the controversial term ‘nationalities’
(Balsvik 2005: 278). The definition rendered to the ‘national question’ by the
radical nationalist groups not only failed to take into consideration the specific
situations prevalent in the country by applying foreign concepts hypocritically,
but also adopted a distorted version by arguing for the primacy of the question
of nationalities over the class struggle against the feudal system. According to
some authors, ‘though other forms of analysing the Ethiopian problems in terms
of class, elite exploitation, or even regionalism would have gone a long way in
explaining the country’s situation, they were highly discouraged during the time’
(Hizkias 1996). Though there had been groups during the students’ movements that
were against applying the concept of the national question to the Ethiopian socio-
political situation, their voice was silenced by accusations of being reactionary.
Most importantly, Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) used
the doctrine of right to self-determination to promote their ethno-regional
demands. Though all of these organisations were promoting the doctrine of the
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 133

right to self-determination, there was confusion over which version of the right
to self-determination was advanced by some of these organisations. EPLF and
OLF largely relied on international law that allowed people the right to self-
determination in colonial cases while they were also pushing for the Stalinist
version of self-determination. TPLF on the other hand, consistent with the merits
of Stalinist ‘self-determination of nationalities’, pursued its struggle against the
operation of the central government in Tigray, including the possibility of secession
if the suppressions are continued. By applying the ethno-nationalist agenda, TPLF
mobilised a strong resistant movement that able to dismantle the power of the
military regime. According to one scholar, TPLF had three reasons to weaken the
multi-ethnic parties and encourage others to engage in ethnic political discourse.
These reasons are ‘to marginalise and contain most of the multi-ethnic parties
which were led by Amhara elite, to weaken EPRP and the Meison parties which
had popular support, as well as maintaining ethnic hegemony through divide and
rule policy’ (Merera 2003: 88).
Finally, TPLF controlled state power under the umbrella organisation called
EPRDF in 1991 and immediately translated its political programme into practice
by first incorporating the ‘the right to self-determination of nationalities’ in the
transitional charter and then in the federal constitution. By doing so, it claimed
that it was proud of exercising the just cause of the ‘question of nationalities’ for
which the students paid a dear price. Post-1991 Ethiopia is largely shaped by this
ideological doctrine that has acquired constitutional status. As a scholar noted, ‘in
the absence of any critical re-examination of the doctrine, Ethiopia has virtually
become a laboratory for testing the doctrine irrespective of the disastrous lessons
learned from the Soviet and Yugoslav experience’ (Bahru 2008: 334).

The Merits of Revolutionary Democracy and its Implications

The other bedrock principle of TPLF/EPRDF used to maintain political hegemony

in controlling the federal system is the doctrine of revolutionary democracy. It
constitutes the core ideology of the ruling elite and has been key to the comprehension
of Ethiopian political discourse during the last two decades. Without having a
clear perspective on revolutionary democracy, grasping Ethiopia’s struggle in
transition to democracy and the functioning of the federal system will be a futile
attempt. Studying the various aspects of revolutionary democracy sheds light on
the backsliding democratisation process and the tightly controlled federal system
in operation in Ethiopia.
However, due to the lack of appropriate literature and the study of the
origin, meaning and scope of the doctrine, it is hardly possible to grasp its full
essence. According to some sources, the concept of revolutionary democracy
was first introduced during the October revolution of 1917 (Izvestia 1917: 10).
The concept was developed as an alternative approach to liberal ideology for
Lenin’s revolutionary project (Batch 2011: 641). After the October Revolution,
other socialist revolutions that took place in poor countries were referred to as
134 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

‘revolutionary democracy’. Political movements in pre-capitalist societies that

had not achieved their revolution yet were referred to as undertaking revolutionary
democracy en route to Socialism. The fundamental aspect of revolutionary
democracy is that leaders of the Marxist-Leninist party are supposed to have
superior knowledge of the nature of social development (Vestal 1999).
The application of revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia is closely linked to
the Marxist orientation of TPLF. The genesis of the first version of revolutionary
democratic ideology goes back to July 1985 when TPLF established the Marxist
vanguard party, the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) (Aregawi 2010).
Revolutionary democracy was believed to be a mechanism to facilitate the
transition to socialism. It is asserted that the notion of revolutionary democracy
was drawn by MLLT from Lenin’s Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and the
Proletarian Dictatorship (Vaughan 2011: 622). The meaning and scope of the
notion of revolutionary democracy has been constantly shifting, depending
on the political goals TPLF/EPRDF needed to achieve in relation to various
dispensations. Until 1991, the understanding of revolutionary democracy was as
a means of achieving socialism through establishing a government that ensured
dictatorship of the proletariat.
However, the concept of revolutionary democracy advanced by TPLF/
EPRDF in the post-1991 political dispensation was quite different from the one it
advanced prior to this period. Due to changes in the course of international events
in 1990 and the public’s perceived hatred of socialism, TPLF/EPRDF decided
that revolutionary democracy could accept multi-party democracy. Surprisingly,
revolutionary democracy, the onetime ideology supposed to serve as a transition
to socialism, suddenly emerged as a means to achieve multi-party democracy
and a capitalist system in Ethiopia. Apparently, owing to the end of the Cold
War, revolutionary democracy attempted to merge Marxism-Leninism with a
new understanding of liberal democracy (Gebru 2011). In other words, ‘TPLF
pragmatically used Marxism-Leninism in the arduous struggle for power and
once power was achieved it shifted to liberal democracy to consolidate it’ (Merera
2003: 119). Despite the official adoption of a multi-party democracy and liberal
economic policies, TPLF/EPRDF paradoxically maintained the revolutionary
democracy ideological doctrine based on democratic centralism and the leadership
of a vanguard party (Batch 2011: 643).
There has never been a clear definition of revolutionary democracy given in
any of the documents released by the TPLF/EPRDF. Despite the absence of any
official definition and analysis, different scholars have attempted to explain the
concept from various perspectives. The primary aspect of revolutionary democracy
is that since its origin during the period of struggle, it has always been defined
negatively initially in opposition to ‘liberalism’ and recently to ‘neo-liberalism’
(Batch 2011: 644). According to Tronvoll (2009), the major consideration behind
revolutionary democracy is that ‘liberal democracy is a misfit under the social,
economic and political conditions prevailing in Ethiopia’ (p. 459). Professor
Abbink explains revolutionary democracy as a ‘derivation from Marxist and
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 135

ethno-regional ideology that aims at collective mobilisation of the people led

by the party from above, since the vanguard party was convinced that it has the
solution to everything’ (Abbink 2006: 195).
Human Rights Watch (2010) analyses revolutionary democracy as, ‘individual
rights are subordinate to broader societal and governmental concerns; collective
rights are privileged over individual ones and unlike liberal democracy that relies
on elected representatives, the population is to be continually engaged in the
decision-making process’ (p. 14). According to a statement from the US embassy
in Addis Ababa, ‘revolutionary democracy reflects an approach to governance
and development that, while arguably FOR the people, is neither OF, or BY, the
people, instead, it is a top-down approach through which political, economic, and
even social activity must be either directed or condoned by the government (and
ruling party)’.1
Revolutionary democracy particularly engages in ‘convincing rural Ethiopians
of what is in their best developmental and governance interest and providing the
structures to implement that until the people can do it for themselves’.2 In this
regard, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn was quoted as saying that ‘due to
poor education and illiteracy, the Ethiopian public is too underdeveloped to make a
well-reasoned, informed decision, and so revolutionary democracy is the political
bridge by which the “enlightened leaders” can lead the people to democracy’.3
Political participation under revolutionary democracy is thus restricted ‘to debate
for the purpose of clarification and persuasion required in order to reach consensus;
but once consensus is achieved, the community speaks with one voice, and dissent
is ruled out, thus constricting the space to demand accountability from authorities’
(Yilmaz and Venugopal 2008: 13).
According to the various documents released by the party, revolutionary
democracy has various economic, political and social objectives that are a mixture
of socialist and capitalist values. The most important objective of revolutionary
democracy is basically making the concept the governing outlook in society
through winning successive elections without interruption (TPLF/EPRDF’s
Strategies 1996). It assumes that if revolutionary democracy is defeated, ‘enemies’
such as those who advance liberal values may acquire hegemony and the country’s
development will be obstructed. In other words, revolutionary democracy aims
at making such ideology the governing force in the country so that those who
support liberal democracy may not have the chance to achieve power. The TPLF/
EPRDF document dogmatically states that if the Front’s goals do not materialise,
‘the people will suffer from endless poverty and crises and there will be no single
and united country called Ethiopia; the only available alternative for the survival
of Ethiopia as one country is the realisation of revolutionary democracy’ (TPLF/
EPRDF’s Strategies 1996).

1 Wikileaks cable 09ADDISABABA1770.

2 Wikileaks cable 09ADDISABABA1770.
3 Wikileaks cable 09ADDISABABA1770.
136 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

As a system of maintaining hegemonic power in the country, revolutionary

democracy has other peculiarities. Primarily, ‘revolutionary democracy divides
society into different classes namely traditional communist classes of the
peasantry, the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the comprador class while the
enemy of revolutionary democracy is “imperialism” and nations that practice free
market capitalism’ (Vestal 1999). In addition to this, revolutionary democracy
considers its opponents as ‘chauvinists’, ‘narrow nationalists’, or ‘secessionists’.
Revolutionary democracy also divides society into friends and enemies. While
the peasants and the proletariat are considered as supporters of revolutionary
democracy, the national bourgeois and others who are seen as not benefitting from
the proceeds of revolutionary democracy such as the intelligentsia are labelled
opponents (TPLF/EPRDF’s Strategies 1996). Revolutionary democracy has also
categorised businessmen into ‘rent collectors’, who are strictly controlled and
‘value creators’ who are favoured (Paulos 2007: 277).
Due to its partisan outlook in terms of protecting the rights of citizens,
revolutionary democracy does not equally stand for both the rights of the people
and the ruling class (Paulos 2007: 277; Vestal 1999). Revolutionary democracy
rather reiterated that rights be allowed for the progressive forces of revolutionary
democracy, and the ‘enemies’ of the people should be restricted from them (Asnake
2009: 71). According to revolutionary democracy, the rights of ‘the ruling classes’
will only be protected where they are relevant to the protection of the rights of the
masses (Vestal 1999). In other words, if the rights of the masses clash with those of
the ruling class, then the rights of the ‘oppressors’ will have to be suppressed and
the rights of the oppressed shall prevail. Despite the fact that a typical democratic
system assumes equality of citizens and that the same principle has been
incorporated under the Ethiopian constitution, the assumption of revolutionary
democracy that dissects society into friends and enemies substantiate the argument
that the regime does not recognise the fundamental ideals of democracy.
The other characteristic of revolutionary democracy is that it does not permit
the existence of any independent institution in the country or the real separation
of powers, since all institutions of government are considered as ideologically
entrenched state apparatus. In accordance with the principle of revolutionary
democracy, political power needs to be centralised under one regime. In addition
to making all government organs such as the parliament and executive instruments
of revolutionary democracy, institutions such as the judiciary and the military,
which are expected to be neutral institutions, are not exempted. The objective
of revolutionary democracy with respect to the military and the judiciary, for
instance, is that they need to be neutral in appearance since this is what a multi-
party system dictates, but to maintain their revolutionary democracy character
through ‘indirect’ ties (TPLF/EPRDF’s Strategies 1996). The hidden agenda of
revolutionary democracy indicates that all the rhetoric on institutional independence
or protection of rights recognised under the constitution are ‘intended to avoid
conflict with “the imperialists” by creating a facade of democracy, the protection
of human rights and free market capitalism’ (Vestal 1999).
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 137

In addition, revolutionary democracy tightly controls vital democratic

institutions such as the electoral board and the media that are needed for development
of democratic federalism (Asnake 2009: 73). Revolutionary democracy does not
also tolerate civil society organisations, which are critical of the policies and
practices of the regime (Asnake 2009: 73). As it has been practised in the last two
decades, revolutionary democracy has been instrumental in terms of controlling
all levels of administration down to the lowest administrative units at the Woreda
and sub-kebele level and using them to protect the interest of the regime. Due to
such conviction, no other political party or civil society groups are practically
allowed to operate in rural areas except the ruling regime. The regime assumes
that the peasantry is the pillar of revolutionary democracy and once it loses the
power base, it would be the end of revolutionary democracy (Vestal 1999).
The most potent objective of revolutionary democracy in a post-Cold War
political context is to neutralise internal and external threats to the power of TPLF/
EPRDF. In the last two decades, revolutionary democracy has been effectively
used to eliminate internal divisions and external opponents (Batch 2011: 644). As
a means of rooting out internal dissent, revolutionary democracy was effectively
used during the internal split within TPLF in 1985 and 2001 (Batch 2011: 655).
The tenets of revolutionary democracy have also been used to attack opposition
parties. In particular, TPLF/EPRDF used revolutionary democracy against
opposition parties during the 2005 and 2010 elections by accusing them as enemies
and anti-democratic forces (Batch 2011: 655). Not only internal dissidents or
domestic opposition parties are targeted by using revolutionary democracy, but
also international organisations and non-governmental organisations critical of the
regime have been victims (Batch 2011: 655). The regime particularly characterises
international organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch as neo-liberalist policy advocates due to their role in exposing the serious
human rights violations committed by the regime.
The economic objective of revolutionary democracy is benefitting the
peasantry as a pillar of revolutionary democracy, by preventing the selling and
exchange of land, controlling major economic sectors and having a decisive
role in controlling the economy (TPLF/EPRDF’s Strategies 1996). Furthermore,
revolutionary democracy paves the way for the unrestricted role of the state in
leading, coordinating and being involved in all economic activities (Paulos 2007:
277). To achieve its economic objectives, TPLF/EPRDF gives higher salaries
and better training to its workers, infiltrates trade unions and helps companies
affiliated with TPLF/EPRDF to invest in economic sectors that do not have direct
state influence (Vestal 1999). In the last seven years, the economic objectives of
revolutionary democracy seem to have been transformed into the full-fledged
developmental state policy that has captivated the entire political and economic
activities in the country.
In general, revolutionary democracy, a notion that has been developed by
TPLF/EPRDF, seems to have been evolved as a form of a socialist democracy that
attempts to accomplish socialist ideals under the façade of democracy and in the
138 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

context of a free market economy. As noted by a study released by the International

Crisis Group, ‘revolutionary democracy attempts to reconcile the TPLF socialist
legacy with global capitalism by arguing that prosperity requires the leadership of
a strong party that can mobilise the people’ (International Crisis Group 2009). All
the available evidences suggest that the ruling elite have maintained its original
Marxist ideology with some modifications. Nevertheless, ‘It is questionable how
such a Marxist approach could advance the country’s interest in a post-Cold War
world where communism and Marxist-Leninist regimes have faded away’ (Vestal
2009).
Due to the entrenched Marxist ideals that are included in the concept of
revolutionary democracy, it has become increasingly difficult to reconcile that
concept with the ideals of democracy and freedom that are recognised under the
constitution. In the past two decades, ‘revolutionary democracy has appropriated
the liberal tools to legitimise the survival of the TPLF/EPRDF leadership, having
both structures and practices revolutionary and liberal’ (Batch 2011: 646). The
government has vigorously attempted to indoctrinate revolutionary democracy
into the public, civic associations and schools since 2005. The doctrine of
revolutionary democracy after the 2005 general elections has been used for the
‘merger of the party with the state, government and the entrepreneurial class and
effectively making non-members and non-supports of the regime dysfunctional
and marginalised’ (Batch 2011: 652).
Currently, revolutionary democracy is the single most important principle that
regulates the Ethiopian federal structure. Although the federal system is formally
regulated by the principles of the constitution, in real terms, the system is regulated
by the ideals of revolutionary democracy. In practice, the Ethiopian federal system
is governed by two parallel systems. On the one hand, the system is formally
regulated by the constitutional principles such as transparency, accountability of
government, vertical and horizontal separation of powers, protection of human
rights and the establishment of democratic institutions. On the other hand, the
system is practically regulated by the merits of revolutionary democracy that
do not recognise popular sovereignty, independence of institutions and equality
of citizens. Contrary to the principle of popular sovereignty, revolutionary
democracy recognises popular participation in the light of implementing policies
that emanate from the elites at the top of the party structure rather than from a
bottom-up approach.
In terms of the founding of democratic institutions, the constitution
provides for the establishment of an independent electoral commission and an
independent judiciary. Revolutionary democracy, on the other hand, maintains
that the aforementioned institutions are duty bound to implement the ideals of
revolutionary democracy rather than having their own independent existence.
In relation to the protection of human rights, the constitution provides for the
protection rights of citizens without any form of discrimination. According to
revolutionary democracy, citizens are classified in various categories and the
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 139

protection of rights is enforced in a partisan fashion favouring the working class

rather than the ruling class or those who may be against the status quo.
In light of the divergent principles recognised under the constitution and
revolutionary democracy, there are two ways of assessing the Ethiopian
constitutional system. The most common method of studying the constitutional
system is to look at it from a formal perspective. This is done through analysing
the system in relation to the formal constitutional principles governing its practice.
Nevertheless, this methodology is relevant in systems where the only principles
that regulate the system are those that are formally provided under the constitution
or other laws. In the Ethiopian context, analysing the system from such formal
perspective provides a shallow and misleading picture.
The Ethiopian federal system can be best understood when it is studied in
light of the de facto ideological principles of revolutionary democracy rather than
the de jure principles provided under the constitution. Based on this assumption,
it is argued that closely analysing the Ethiopian system in accordance with the
ideals of revolutionary democracy provides a clearer picture of how the system is
functioning and why the country’s transition to democracy has been constrained.
Subsequent chapters discuss the impact of revolutionary democracy in terms of
shaping federal state structure, intergovernmental relations and how the ideology
stifled the democratisation process in the country.

The Developmental State Model and its Implications

The other most important principle that has been regulating the political discourse
in Ethiopia is the doctrine of the developmental state. The doctrine is a new form of
policy that has been advanced by TPLF/EPRDF, particularly since 2006. The model
aims at boosting legitimacy of the regime on the ability of the developmental state
to deliver roads, schools and exaggerated rates of gross domestic product (GDP)
growth. Though revolutionary democracy has its own economic dimensions, after
the 2005 general election fiasco, the regime vigorously emphasised the concept of
the developmental state. The merits of this form of administration are basically a
more articulated version of the economic objectives of a revolutionary democracy.
In the last few years, the aggressive application of the model has had numerous
implications for the country’s political discourse as well as the democratisation
and federalisation process. The doctrine has now become the most important
policy the government has resorted to in an attempt to secure legitimacy. The
developmental state rhetoric is now in full swing in light of the huge foreign
land-lease deals, exaggerated growth figures, the mega-dam building and the
road construction (Abbink 2011: 598). Much of the news pieces and documents
released by the state media have focused on developmental issues. Other issues
related to democracy, maladministration, economic challenges and other relevant
issues have been entirely excluded from the media coverage.
The model has an international undertone. The term ‘developmental state’
referred to the phenomenon of state-led macroeconomic planning where the state
140 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

had autonomous political power as well as control over the economy (Caldentey
2008: 27). The model is particularly associated with the leading role played by the
government in promoting industrialisation in Japan and other Asian countries such
as Korea, Malaysia and Singapore (Caldentey 2008: 27). The strategies involved
in achieving economic development include ‘the active use of subsidies, tariffs,
infant industries and other protectionist measures such as distribution of monopoly
rights, development of national capacities through research, development,
education, training, stimulus to foreign technology acquisition and public–private
cooperation practices’(Caldentey 2008: 31).
The inherent backdrop to the theory is that neo-liberal ideals do not work
unless some degree of economic development is primarily achieved. According to
this assumption widespread poverty and the absence of a democratic civic culture
render neo-liberalism incompatible with the realities of poor countries. Democratic
reform is only to be undertaken after some degree of economic development has
been achieved. Countries such as Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia had
followed this model before they opened up their systems to a wider democratic
political space. For some time, they were largely repressive regimes that focused
only on economic development while being less accountable and transparent. It
was only after they had reached some degree of economic development that they
undertook democratic reforms.
TPLF/EPRDF seems to be attempting to imitate the developmental state
model to bring about economic transformation in Ethiopia. It is believed that
TPLF/EPRDF developed the model combining the work of economists such
as Mushtaq Khan, Dani Rodrik, Howard Stein, and Joseph Stiglitz on the key
role of the state in achieving economic development and the Chinese economic
success (Vaughan 2011: 623). Before the doctrine was adopted as a state policy
in Ethiopia, it first appeared as a scholarly work by the late prime minster. The
preliminary draft of Meles Zenawi’s change of policy was presented in advance at
a development forum organised by the Initiative for Policy Dialogue in 2006. In
his draft thesis, ‘African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings’ (2006),
the late prime minister indicates that the neo-liberal paradigm is not working in
Africa and argues that the best way to achieve development is the paradigm of the
developmental state where the state will have strong power and involvement in
directing the political economy of the country (Meles 2006: 10). Meles argued that
it is difficult to bring about development in the typical time frame of an election
term and that there has to be continuity of policy if there is to be sustained and
accelerated economic growth. Though many of the South-East Asian countries
implemented the developmental state model through restricting democratic rights,
Meles argued that it is possible to achieve developmental state ideals without
being repressive. He cited the grand coalitions in Japan and in the Scandinavian
countries that stayed in power democratically for longer periods.
As the neo-liberal market economy is labelled negatively as rent-seeking or
anti-democratic, TPLF/EPRDF claim to have resorted to the developmental state
as the only means of economic development in the country (Batch 2011: 650).
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 141

Under the version of the developmental state doctrine developed by Meles Zenawi,
the party and the state become the principal investor and decision-maker in
economic matters while the private sector only plays an intermediary role between
the two actors (Batch 2011: 651). Though the monograph presented by the late
prime minister claims that it does not represent the policy of the government, the
paradigm shift to developmental state has already been implemented in full swing
across the country and it has become the official state policy since 2006. The
shift of paradigm to developmental state has brought about radical political and
economic measures. Not only has the regime undertaken a number of measures
that stifle democratic development such as new laws that restrict the operation of
civil society groups and the media as well as anti-terrorism law, other fundamental
economic measures related to land lease and private sector investment have been
undertaken.
The increasing use of the developmental state model reached a defining
moment when TPLF/EPRDF won the May 2010 general election by more than
99 per cent of the vote. After that election, TPLF/EPRDF virtually controls
almost all-political, social and economic life in the country. There has been a
total monopoly of the whole system by a single political force, while independent
voices in the country are silenced. Citizens have also increasingly been co-opted
into TPLF/EPRDF state and party machinery for jobs or networks to improve
their livelihoods. In addition to this, the model has suffocated state structures and
intergovernmental relations of the federal system by narrowing down the political
space needed for the accommodation of diverse political interests.
In addition to the huge impact the developmental state paradigm has had on the
functioning of the federal system, there are different issues to be raised in relation
to the relevance of the model and its possibility in bringing about economic
transformation in the Ethiopian context. The primary concern about the use of
the model in the Ethiopian context is whether lasting economic development can
be achieved through a model that rules out the democratisation process. Though
Meles Zenawi argued that the developmental state model is not necessarily
undemocratic, the experience of the countries that implemented the model, as well
as the restriction of the political space in the last few years in Ethiopia, clearly
indicate that the developmental state model in Ethiopia is implemented through
repressive means.
The developmental model, which is aimed at bringing about economic
development through undermining democratic values is in direct contradiction with
the widely accepted view that the most important tool for economic development
is the existence of a democratic system of government as ‘democracies not only
out-perform dictatorships when it comes to long-term economic growth, but also
outdo them in several other important respects … And they produce more equitable
societies. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, ultimately produce economies that
are as fragile as their political systems’ (Rodrik 2010). As evidence, proponents
of the democratic model argue that the few countries that developed spectacularly
during the past 50 years were under democracy rather than under dictatorship
142 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

(Przeworski 2004: 21). In most cases, not only are authoritarian governments
unable to bring about economic development, or even if they bring about some
changes, there is no guarantee such economic promises are sustainable and the
gains of economic development may be consumed by the high level of corruption
due to the absence of an efficient system of transparency and accountability.
According to scholars, the myth of ‘stability’ of dictatorships is not also a
reality, ‘because they rule by force, they are highly vulnerable to any visible signs
of dissent … Since in dictatorships policies depend on the will, and sometimes
the whim, of a dictator, they exhibit high variances of economic performance.
Some generate miracles, some disasters, and many generate both’ (Przeworski
2004: 21). This has been recently seen during the Arab revolutions in North
Africa. Though the former repressive regimes in Tunisia and Egypt were fairly
achieving high levels of economic development, their vulnerability was exposed
when democratic change swept through these nations.
Alternatively, scholars recommend turning instead to up-and-coming
economic superpower countries like Brazil, India, South Africa, and Turkey,
which have already accomplished their democratic transitions and are unlikely
to regress (Rodrik 2010). These countries achieved economic development
without necessarily denying democratic rights. The best possible avenue for
Ethiopia is the one where economic development and democracy should go
hand in hand. In addition to this, the developmental state that aims at bringing
economic development through encircling democracy seems to be outdated since
the waves of democracy at the international level have a significant impact on
people under repression. Due to the development of the internet and other forms of
mass communication, the public has been informed of international developments
that initiate reforms in their own countries. The Jasmin revolution that ousted the
Tunisian president Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Gaddafi and other
Middle East countries has heralded a new era of democracy. Though both Ben
Ali and Mubarak had brought about significant economic developments through
repressive regimes, growing public consciousness of democracy has resulted in
the downfall of entrenched regimes. These are indications that the old style of
grip on power in the name of achieving economic development does not work in a
technologically developed and interlinked world.
It is also doubtful if this model could work in the Ethiopian context where
an ethnic federal system is in place and there are diverse political interests.
Due to the fact that Ethiopia has been following an ethnic federal system to
accommodate diversity, the system could not function properly in the absence of
genuine democracy. Since TPLF/EPRDF has adopted a federal system that grants
ethnic groups the right to self-determination including secession, arresting ethno-
regional demands on the pretext of achieving development has the potential to
ignite political instability in the country. The federal system that has been adopted
in Ethiopia by its nature functions by consensus and the opening of the political
space to various political groups. When we assess the success of the Asian tigers
that brought about economic success through the developmental state model,
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 143

they were more or less unitary states without complicated heterogeneity as is the
case in multinational countries such as Ethiopia. In countries such as China, it
is not challenging to maintain stability because of the high degree of linguistic
homogeneity and cultural unity. Even in the case of China, without democratic
transformation, the lack of institutionalised mechanisms for voicing and organising
dissent will eventually produce conflicts that will overwhelm the capacity of the
regime to suppress (Rodrik 2010).
In the African or Ethiopian context, a complicated ethnic and religious
diversity needs accommodation through political consensus. In such countries, the
appropriate political means that need to be undertaken is a democratic system of
government. However, this does not mean that there exist the necessary conditions
that enable these countries to build a full-fledged democracy. Since a high level
of poverty and illiteracy are deeply entrenched in sub-Sahara African countries, a
well-developed democratic system is not a short-term objective in these countries.
The myth that asserts that repressive regimes are much better in bringing about
change is a more disastrous option for Africa. Due to the untold repression the
people suffer in many parts of Africa, conflicts and frequent change of regimes
have occurred in the last few decades. In light of this, the Ethiopian developmental
state rhetoric that imitates the Chinese model has the potential to ignite conflict
leading to instability, which could seriously affect economic development and
stability of the country. The future of Ethiopia therefore lies in building a system
where democracy and development co-exist.
In addition to this, despite the absence of a democratic system in the Asian
countries that pursued the developmental state model, these governments had some
credibility among the middle class who brought about economic transformation.
This is because the developmental state model requires a highly qualified
bureaucracy and civil service that discharge its responsibility efficiently. In China,
for instance, the government has been able to mobilise elites under nationalist
rhetoric by mobilising the people to reassert China’s traditional position of
dominance in the world. Due to the strategy of raising Chinese nationalism, when
the Chinese government opened up its free market system, millions of Chinese
came back to their homeland to invest and work there, displaying a high sense of
nationalism.
In the Ethiopian context, the regime in power does not have the confidence
of the middle class, the technocrats as well as among Ethiopians in the Diaspora.
Significant proportions of expatriates could not be convinced to come back to their
country to help the development endeavours due to the huge political deficit. The
commitment of the most educated elite is unlikely to be mobilised without some
degree of political consensus and freedom in the country. In addition to this, the
regime has a bad record in terms of crediting pan-Ethiopian nationalism, which is
also an essential component to bring about consensus in the country on the notion
of the developmental state model. The economic policy pursued by the regime
also lacks the framework needed for achieving the developmental state model.
The Ethiopian political and economic environment operates as a centrally planned
144 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

economic system rather than adhering to the principles of the developmental state
paradigm. Rather than helping to create a conducive investment environment
for the private sector, the regime continues to rely heavily on party-affiliated
companies and public enterprises to achieve its developmental objectives.
The way the regime attempts to mobilise public support is only through
requiring absolute loyalty to its policies without leaving any room for manoeuvring.
According to studies, non-TPLF/EPRDF members or non-supporters are
reportedly more likely to be transferred to undesirable posts and to be bypassed
for promotions and there is lack of transparency in staffing decisions (United
States Department Human Rights Report 2010). In such a restrictive political and
economic environment, it is not clear how the doctrine of the developmental state
can achieve the ideals of economic prosperity.
In addition to the absence of the essential factors needed to implement the
developmental state model in the Ethiopian context, the international situation
that enabled Asian countries to achieve economic prosperity through the
developmental state model has been significantly altered. During the time of the
Cold War, due to the fact that western countries were wary of the expansion of
communism, they were generous in terms of providing assistance and facilitating
investment opportunities in the regions where they had geopolitical interests.
The developmental state model in these countries could not have brought about
the desired result had it not been for the helping hand of western powers that
were determined to stop the expansion of communism. This situation has been
dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War. Not only the geopolitical
interests have greatly lessened but also the economic crisis in many of the western
countries has restricted the lending hands of the west.
The only economic miracle under the so-called developmental state model
after the end of the Cold War is China. However, as has been indicated earlier,
the degree of homogeneity and the cultural harmony in the country has enabled
the regime to bring about economic development without opening up the political
space. In many respects, the case of China is an exception rather than the norm.
Due to China’s exceptional situation, scholars warn that it is dangerous to draw
too many conclusions from such specific instances since they are rare and there
is nothing to show others to generate them (Przeworski 2004: 20). In addition
to this, despite China’s impressive economic achievements, it has become clear
that economic development cannot be maintained without democratic reform in
the end.

The Principle of Democratic Centralism and Its Implications

The other effective mechanism used by TPLF/EPRDF to shape the country’s

political discourse and intergovernmental relations is through use of the principle
of Leninist democratic centralism. The impact of this principle in shaping the
Ethiopian federal system is immense, though it has not been properly analysed by
scholars studying the Ethiopian constitutional and political system. The principle
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 145

is a mechanism used by the Marxist ‘vanguard’ party to enforce discipline and

to prevent factionalism, while discouraging any independent thinking among the
members. According to studies, the principle was initially developed by Lenin in
1921 to silence diverse opinions in society and reinforce absolute control:

Democratic centralism purported to combine two opposing forms of party

leadership: democracy, which allows for free and open discussion, and central
control, which ensures party unity and discipline. At the 10th Congress of the
All-Russian Communist Party (1921), the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Ilich Lenin
declared that the party was not a debating society in which all opinions were
tolerated and freely expressed; it was a “vanguard” party whose role as leader
of the revolution demanded extreme discipline and a high level of organisation.
Unrestrained discussion, he insisted, would produce intraparty disagreements
and factions and prevent the party from acting effectively. On the other hand,
absolute control by a centralised leadership would discourage new ideas from
lower-level party members. Therefore, Lenin argued, free discussion within the
party should be tolerated and even encouraged up to a point, but, once a vote was
taken, all discussion had to end. The decision of the majority should constitute
the current party “line” and be binding upon all members.4

In other words, democratic centralism allows the expression of ideas to

a certain point and after the vanguard party had reached a decision, all party
members including the society have the obligation to abide by those decisions.
After a policy or decision is made by the top leadership of the party, all the people
living in that country, let alone members of the party, have to abide by it. The
public has no role in contributing its views on the subject since the vanguard party
is assumed to act always in the interests of the masses. To enforce the principle
of democratic centralism, the vanguard party applies the following ingredients:
‘(1) all directing bodies of the party, from top to bottom, shall be elected; (2) party
bodies shall give periodical accounts of their activities to their respective party
organisations; (3) there shall be strict party discipline and the subordination of the
minority to the majority; (4) that all decisions of higher bodies shall be absolutely
binding on lower bodies and on all party members’ (Commission of the Central
Committee of the C.P.S.U: 1939: 198).
By its nature, democratic centralism is contrary to the ideals of democratic
governance. While democracy requires leaders to abide by the decision or interest
of the public, democratic centralism requires the public to abide by the policy
forwarded by the top elite who claim to know what is best for the society. In
democratic centralism, if any member of the party attempts to challenge the
decision, it will amount to factionalism and serious measures will be taken. The
internal discussion held within the party cannot also be considered as democratic

4 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/691998/democratic-centralism (accessed
on April 5, 2010).
146 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

since the leaders view any dissent from the members as a violation of the unity
of the party that may result in demanding the dissidents cease their action or face
expulsion from the party (Tourish 1998). Thus, any discussion that may be made
on the subject will only amount to awareness creation and ways of implementing
the decision of the all-knowing elite at the top rather than having any opportunity
to revise the policy.
The importation of the principle of democratic centralism into the Ethiopian
political sphere is closely linked with the radicalisation of the students’ movement
in the 1970s. As a product of the leftist movement in Ethiopia, TPLF/EPRDF
inherited the organisational principle of democratic centralism and Maoist
conceptions of mass political mobilisation from its TPLF founders (International
Crisis Group 2009: 7). During the periods of armed struggle, TPLF/EPRDF’s
political and military organisation was firmly structured, based on democratic
centralism, which was instrumental in building a strong rebel army.
Consistent with the Leninist conception, the democratic centralism used by
TPLF/EPRDF, allows party members to have the right and obligation to discuss
the agendas presented freely, to oppose, support and provide critical comments
(Paulos 2007: 285). At the end of any TPLF meeting, democratic centralism
requires the majority decision to be accepted by the minority. After a decision is
made, members have no right to mobilise others against decisions passed by the
party (Paulos 2007: 285). By demanding absolute loyalty, democratic centralism
has enabled a few individuals to have absolute power and dominance while the
ordinary members are left only to follow orders and preventing them from asking
question or correcting the mistakes in the organisation.
The application of democratic centralism is one of the tools used by TPLF/
EPRDF to maintain control and discipline among the regular members of the
party. Democratic centralism has proved particularly to be an efficient mechanism
that has helped TPLF/EPRDF to control its members to the lowest level. Since
the party has structures extended to the lower kebele administration, democratic
centralism has enabled the party to extend its control over all aspects of life in the
country. The kebele administrations are controlled by cadres of the TPLF/EPRDF
rather than being representatives of the community (Yilmaz and Venugopal 2008:
12). This has resulted in TPLF/EPRDF being the most organised and efficient
party in terms of its structural organisation. Compared to the opposition parties
that have poor organisational structures, democratic centralism has helped TPLF/
EPRDF to use its party channels as instruments of policy execution as well as
extending repression to the grassroots level.
Democratic centralism has also been instrumental in crushing political
opponents. Such mechanisms have been particularly applied by TPLF to uproot
oppositions, restrict flow of information and force the majority to accept its policy
decisions. The principle was effectively used to dismiss powerful party figures
from TPLF in 2001. Though the root cause of the split within TPLF was largely on
policy difference in the leadership, the difference was finally settled through the
aggressive use of the principle of democratic centralism. Veteran members of TPLF
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 147

were dismissed from the party after being accused of violating the democratic
centralism principle of the party. Those who opposed the leadership were labelled
factionalists and dismissed from the party since the party’s internal rule provides
that those who do not accept the majority decision should be excluded.
Though the application of democratic centralism has enabled TPLF/EPRDF
to be efficient in terms of ensuring discipline within the party structure, the
wider application of the system has brought about different implications to
the democratisation process in the country. Apart from being used to maintain
discipline within the party, democratic centralism is one of the major principles
currently regulating government structure and intergovernmental relations. The
principle is also responsible for undermining the separation of powers principle
and the significance of official channels of government and accountability of
the system.
In order to exercise checks and balances in a democratic system of
government, there has to be a reasonable distance between the various organs
of government. Though there are legislative, executive and judicial organs in
the Ethiopian constitutional system, the separation of powers principle has been
undermined due to the extensive application of the party’s policy of democratic
centralism. Since members of the parliament representing TPLF/EPRDF are tied
to democratic centralism, there is no effective way the parliament can control
the executive wing. Any opposition to the party’s official position can result in
serious measures being taken since it amounts to factionalism. The impact of
democratic centralism is particularly devastating in a system where opposition
parties are excluded from the political process. In a parliament that is dominated
by a single political party, virtually every decision is made by the regime and
largely enforced by tightly controlled party and government apparatus through
the principle of democratic centralism.
The aggressive use of democratic centralism has also blurred the separation of
government and party structure. Democratic centralism has seriously undermined
the clear distinction between party and government apparatus in the country
(especially in lower administrations). As far as a government official is loyal to
party policies, the authority of the public or government officials in controlling
the activities of the public official is very limited. Due to this misplaced system of
accountability, cases where the local community tries to hold the kebele or Woreda
administration accountable for services delivered are rare or nonexistent (Yilmaz
and Venugopal 2008: 12). Measures will only be taken against the public official if
the central organ of the party gives the green light to that effect. According to the
World Bank, ‘the centralised character and ideological underpinnings of the party
result in the accountability of local level party cadres to be upward and the flow of
information to be downward’ (Yilmaz and Venugopal 2008: 12).
Democratic centralism has also undermined the application of the constitutional
principles of accountability and transparency. In a system that is firmly controlled
by the principle of democratic centralism, government business is discussed and
decisions are made at party meetings that precede meetings of state bodies. In such
148 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

systems, a few political party leaders make major decisions while the passing of
decisions in government institutions is being a formality. Much of the political
decision-making occurs outside the council of ministers and the parliament thus
inhibiting the development of a formal democratic structure (Abbink 2006: 174,
Merera 2003: 150). The decision-making process of the system is largely secretive
and restricted to a tiny politburo or the executive body (Clapham 2005).
The application of democratic centralism across the system has also seriously
undermined the authority of the regional governments. Despite the fact that the
constitution provides numerous powers to regional governments, they are largely
expected to act in accordance with the party position whether a policy is relevant
to the region or not. Regional governments are largely expected to endorse
central government policies due to their obligation to abide by the party rules.
The principles of democratic centralism govern the patron–client relationship
between the TPLF/EPRDF, regional members and affiliated parties (Paulos 2007:
285). Due to the existence of strong centralism mechanisms, regional authorities
are keener to keep their party connections rather than be accountable to regional
institutions or the public. The political fate of the regional authorities is largely
determined by the party organ at the centre rather than regional government
or party apparatus. This has created patron–client relations between the centre
and regional government machineries. In light of the significance of democratic
centralism in regulating the Ethiopian federal system, the principle has to be used
as an important benchmark to assess the functioning of the system.

Gimgemma (Party Evaluation) System and its Impacts

The system of gimgemma is also one of the important mechanisms used by

TPLF/EPRDF to control federal and regional state apparatus. This practice was
originally initiated by TPLF during the armed struggle to evaluate the mistakes
and progress of their military strategies. The process mainly refers to a forum
of peer evaluation of party members. In the gimgemma, every member’s party
or governmental activities are evaluated in regular meetings of relevant party or
government employees. Some gimgemma are pre-planned and conducted regularly
while others are arranged as an alleged misconduct or when the party considers it
has lost popular legitimacy (Aalen 2002: 87). The gimgemma process is a time-
consuming endeavour that may take weeks or months, thus seriously affecting
government work (Paulos 2007: 282). The process of gimgemma is not also open
and transparent, it involves intimidation, and its outcome largely depends on the
intentions of the political cadres leading the sessions (Paulos 2007: 282).
Gimgemma has been aggressively used in both government and party structures
for several years in the past. However, the application of gimgemma in the civil
service seems to have been seriously reduced in the last few years due to changes
of policy intended to confine the process to party structures. Nevertheless, since
there is no clear demarcation between government and party structure in present
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 149

day Ethiopia, as gimgemma is still an important way of controlling government

employees. Since many of the office holders as well as a substantial number of
the civil servants are co-opted into the membership of TPLF/EPRDF, they are
subjected to gimgemma under the party cell organised under each government
department.
Gimgemma has various objectives. Primarily, the ruling party uses the system
to maintain its control in the regions down to kebele level as a system of public
evaluation of policy performance (Paulos 2007: 282). The system ‘enhances
central political domination over regional parties and the country’s bureaucratic
apparatus by encouraging conformity, killing incentives to innovation and
flexibility and discouraging challenges to the status quo’ (Paulos 2007: 282).
Fearful of gimgemma, regional party officials are not able to air the concerns and
interest of the local population. They prefer to endorse official party policies rather
than attempting to respond to local political and economic concerns. Any act of
opposing TPLF/EPRDF party programmes and policies results in expulsion and
makes politicians insecure (Paulos 2007: 282). The use of gimgemma to maintain
loyalty has thus undermined the regional governments’ rights to autonomy and
stifled prospects of full-fledged intergovernmental relations.
Gimgemma also has some corrective and punitive aspects in terms of purging
out corrupt and inefficient officials. On various occasions, the mechanism has been
used to identify corrupt government party officials and hold them accountable.
Even so, there are also claims that the scope of application of gimgemma in
fighting corruption is not broad. Largely, it is applied to root out spoiled officials
at lower levels, leaving top government officials untouched. It has been largely
observed that officials who display low performance are tolerated because of their
allegiance to the top political leadership (Paulos 2007: 282).
Though gimgemma has proved to be an efficient mechanism to maintain
party discipline and unity, it has a far-reaching implication on the federal system.
Primarily, it is not clear how it is compatible with the principles of accountability,
transparency and due process of law principles that are recognised under the
Ethiopian constitution. In a democratic system of government, accountability and
transparency are generally implemented through checks and balances; rule of law,
establishing democratic institutions and independent media. The scope and role
of gimgemma has overshadowed prospects of development of such democratic
mechanisms of accountability in Ethiopia.
For government and party officials, accountability to the party policy is far
more significant than being accountable to constitutionally established institutions.
It is only when an individual loses his credibility in the eyes of party officials or
the party system that he faces the justice system. As far as a member of the party is
loyal to party policies, the law does not have any force on him. Even if a court of
law or any formal institution gives orders to apply the law, there is no mechanism
to enforce it practically. The decision of a court only becomes efficient in cases
of officials who would have fallen from party grace, in which case treatment of
such officials is in sharp contrast to their earlier privileges. By making the formal
150 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

institutional system subordinate to the party evaluation system, the system of

gimgemma has tremendously weakened the role of constitutional principles and
institutions to regulate the activities of government officials. In such a system
where the party evaluation system overrides the formal institutional system,
principles of the rule of law, accountability, checks and balances and effective
intergovernmental relations are unlikely to take root in the country.
In addition to this, the gimgemma process highly affects the rights of individuals.
According to the principles of due process of law apparently enshrined in the
Ethiopian constitution, a person shall not lose his liberty, property or life without
the proper due process of law. The principle of due process of law safeguards
the individual from undue deprivation of his rights by any government official
or group. In the process of gimgemma, the person does not have proper rights to
defend himself, no independent court, no public hearing and there is no objective
law used to justify decisions. In particular, when gimgemma is applied against
government employees, it clearly contradicts the rights of civil servants enshrined
under the civil service law. Thus, gimgemma deserves a close scrutiny in view of
the tremendous role it plays in shaping the Ethiopian federal system.

The Impacts of Neo-Patrimonial Party Networks and Rent-Seeking Trends

The other ingredient that seriously undermines Ethiopia’s federal system is neo-
patrimonial and rent-seeking patterns largely emanating from the ideological
principles maintained by TPLF/EPRDF. In such systems, real power and real
decision-making lie outside formal institutions. The neo-patrimonialist state is the
most serious problem that has hindered democratic transformation in Africa. Neo-
patrimonialism gives rise to a ‘“hybrid” state where real decision-making power
about state functions lies outside of the formal institutions and decisions about
resources are made by powerful politicians and their cronies who are linked by
informal, personal and clientelist networks that exist outside of the state structure’
(Nawaz 2008: 1).
Such trends of neo-patrimonialism have been observed in the Ethiopian
political system. Primarily, in the political sphere, since TPLF/EPRDF has the
power to legislate any law or policy without any organ checking its power, the
political leaders act beyond public accountability and control. In addition to
this, ‘due to political insecurity and contested legitimacy, a network of political
and economic control was built up by the party from its circle of trusted people,
loyalists and former comrades in the armed struggle’ (Abbink 2006: 174). In the
system, major political decisions are made in the inner circle while the formal
institutions are simply a façade that are solely used to formalise decisions that are
made behind the curtain.
In the last few years, this neo-patrimonial party network has resulted in
increasingly rent-seeking trends in the political, economic and social relations in
the country. Since TPLF/EPRDF has a total monopoly of the political space and
economic resources in the country, rent-seeking behaviour has become widespread.
 Fundamental Ideological Principles Governing Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 151

In the economic sphere, TPLF/EPRDF monopolises productive resources such

as land and capital, industries such as telecommunications and banking, as well
as public utilities that increase rent-seeking behaviour. In addition to controlling
government resources, the ruling political party owns and manages businesses
engaged in manufacturing and service industries that receive preferential access
to land leases and credit (United States Department Human Rights Report 2010:
36). This has forced citizens to co-opt into the status quo for survival and obtain
access to economic benefits. Since access to employment or benefits directly or
indirectly requires loyalty to party policies, people are increasingly attempting
to obtain favour in the eyes of the power holders rather than developing their
competence or commitment to the rule of law or integrity.
The rent-seeking trend is exacerbated by the appointment of less competent
individuals such as junior elementary school teachers and school-leavers who
are often enthusiastic to become members of TPLF/EPRDF for the apparent
economic advantage (Vaughan 2006: 186). The less competent individuals are
particularly attracted to the rank and file of the party structure due to rent-seeking
motives rather than because they are convinced by the TPLF/EPRDF policies.
From the beginning, their motive for joining the party is not ideological affiliation
or commitment to public service. When such individuals are assigned to some
positions, they immediately engage in corruption and due to lack of competence,
they render poor public services. Due to such neo-patrimonial patterns, there is
a higher turnout in the lower bureaucracy of the system that is characterised by
endless gimgemma processes that bring about neither a political breakthrough nor
an efficient public service.
Since party members at federal and regional government level are largely clients
of the party, their attachment largely is regulated by economic considerations
rather than commitment to a system of accountability. This in turn has led to the
degeneration of the rule of law, accountability, transparency and development of
formal political institutions. Thus, the rent-seeking trend developed by the neo-
patrimonial network orchestrated by the ruling party is an important point of
reference if one is to comprehend the functioning of the Ethiopian federal system.

Summary

The Ethiopian ethnic federal project is fundamentally a socialist federal system

established based on the notion of the right to self-determination of nationalities
along with Marxist-Leninist state and party organisational principles. The
ideological fundamentals of the Ethiopian federal system resemble that of
former socialist federations in both rhetoric and practice. Not only did the
Ethiopian federal system inherit the famous Leninist ‘right to self-determination
of nationalities’ ideological dogma since the time of the students’ movement
but other Marxist principles of party organisation and control are still deeply
entrenched. There is also a strong similarity between the federal system of the
152 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

former socialist federations and that of Ethiopia in terms of the centralisation of

power by a vanguard political party. As it was in former socialist federations,
TPLF/EPRDF is currently the vanguard party that controls political, economic and
social activities throughout the country, playing a similar role to the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union during the former USSR federation. Similar to other
socialist federations, although the Ethiopian federal system grants the right to self-
determination including secession to ethnic groups, the powers of regional units
granted under the constitution is indirectly taken over by the central government
through party centralism. This is because all regional units are governed by
TPLF/EPRDF and the party is run by the principle of democratic-centralism. In
addition to the wider practice of the traditional Marxist ideological weapons such
as democratic centralism, the TPLF/EPRDF has put forward revised ideological
principles such as revolutionary democracy and developmental state doctrines that
have been largely used to override the principles of democracy and federalism
adopted in the constitution.
 Chapter 6
The Principle of the Right to
Self-determination in the Ethiopian Ethnic
Federal System and its Implications

After the institutionalisation of the ethnic federal system in Ethiopia, ethnicity

suddenly became an issue in political, social and economic relations in the country.
The right to ‘self-determination of nations, nationalities and peoples’ that includes
the right to secession is a fundamental principle that has been entrenched under the
Ethiopian constitutional system. Due to such an unprecedented move, the principle
has become the single most important source of controversy in modern Ethiopian
political discourse. Although the incorporation of the principle has its own merits
in terms of protecting the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic groups, it has also
become a source of societal division and mistrust.
In addition to being a source of political polarisation, there are diverse
practical issues that have been raised about the relevance and the applicability of
the principle such as what should be the role of ethnicity in the Ethiopian political
dispensation? What is the relation between rights of citizenship and ethnic identity?
How can the country promote national unity without suppressing ethnic-related
demands? How can the system check unwanted outcomes of ethnic politics such
as racism and discrimination? How should it structure regional units? Should they
be organised solely along linguistic lines or should they be a combination of other
factors such as economic, geographic or administrative considerations? How can
Ethiopia build democracy in an ethnically charged political environment? Has the
way the current constitution tried to address the issue of ethnic identity stabilised
or galvanised it? What is the alternative approach to the existing status quo? Such
perplexing issues are crucial in terms of assessing the impact of the right to self-
determination in political and social transformation in Ethiopia.
In the light of the significance of such issues, this chapter assesses some of the
outstanding political issues that are involved in the application of the principle
of self-determination and its implications. The first part of the chapter deals with
the controversies involved in the adoption of the principle of self-determination
and the factors responsible for adoption of the ethnic federal system. The next
sections deal with the various implications of the principles of self-determination
and secession on citizenship, structuring regional units as well as the need for
consensus on the meaning and scope of self-determination among the political
forces in Ethiopia.
154 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

General Background

Although the impact of the right to self-determination of peoples became prominent

in nation-building discourses after the end of World War I, it has never been a
constitutional principle that attracted scholarly discussions. Its first use after the
end of World War I was largely aimed at dismantling and weakening the defeated
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman-Turk empires. After the establishment of the
United Nations (UN) in the aftermath of World War II, not only has the principle
become part of the charter that established the organisation, but also other UN and
regional human rights instruments. Initially, the UN used the principle to support
the aspirations of people who had been under foreign domination. In that sense,
the right to self-determination has been instrumental in the decolonisation process
that freed African, Asian and Caribbean countries from colonial domination. After
the completion of decolonisation, the UN extended the application of the principle
of the right to self-determination to minority groups that aspired to internal self-
administration within the territory of member countries.
Since the UN system is highly sensitive to state sovereignty, the application
of self-determination is largely used in terms of the granting of internal self-
administration to minority and indigenous groups. This has been the fundamental
jurisprudence of the UN. In the last few decades, the UN and western powers have
been directly and indirectly extending the right to self-determination to include the
right to secession from a sovereign state when there is serious violation of the rights
of a group or when there is conflict that is a threat to regional and international
stability. In the last two decades, a number of new states have been established
out of former states such as East Timor, Kosovo, Eritrea and Southern Sudan.
Such international developments have been used to develop new principles of
international law in relation to the interpretation of the right to self-determination.
The principle of the right to self-determination is not only discussed in terms
of principles of international law. It has also been a major principle in former
socialist federations. During the Russian Revolution of 1917, the right to self-
determination entered into the political discourse in a bid to mobilise support from
non-Russian nationalities against the Tsarist Empire. Lenin and his colleagues
invented the principle as a tactical instrument to get the support of non-Russian
nationalist groups in the class struggle against the Russian feudal system. When
Lenin used the principle, it was only to serve as a temporary strategy to support
the enduring class struggle. However, due to the premature death of Lenin in 1924,
the Bolshevik political leadership fell under Stalin that led to the introduction of a
radical version of the right to self-determination. Later, the Stalinist approach was
transplanted in the socialist federations of former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
Despite the rhetoric of self-determination maintained by such systems, the
only rights of minority groups protected by the right to self-determination of
nationalities were cultural and linguistic. Since such federations emerged out of
restructuring made by communist parties that came to power through violence,
they lacked the minimum requirements of democracy and political consensus. Due
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 155

to the absence of the basics of political bargaining and consensus, these federal
arrangements disintegrated at the end of the Cold War.
Despite the change in international political dispensation with the fall of
the Berlin wall, TPLF/EPRDF decided to retain the Stalinist principle of self-
determination that includes the right to secession in restructuring the Ethiopian
state. Presently, the Ethiopian Constitution stands as the only constitution in the
world that has maintained the Stalinist notion of the right to ‘self-determination
of nationalities’ dogma. The incorporation of this ideological dogma has brought
about unprecedented implications in protecting minority rights, democratising the
Ethiopian polity and ensuring the country’s survival and social cohesion.

Addressing Ethno-regional Demands under the FDRE Constitution

Immediately after the collapse of the former socialist federations, Ethiopia came
up with a constitutional provision that prescribes ‘every nation, nationality or
people’ having the unrestricted right to self-determination up to secession’ (Art.
39.1, FDRE Constitution). By adopting such rhetoric, the political discourse since
the change of regime in 1991 has attempted to pacify ethnic-related demands
through the adoption of an ethnic federal system. Seen retrospectively, the ethnic
federal system is simply an extension of the unfinished business of addressing the
‘national question’ that was initiated by the students’ movement in the 1960s and
1970s. As a Marxist party that emerged out of the radical students’ movement,
TPLF/EPRDF’s political ideology is entrenched in the ‘right to self-determination
of nationalities’, including the right to secession.
TPLF’s ‘right to self-determination’ claim was initially advanced for the Tigray
people against perceived Amhara repression. Later, when it became apparent that
the movement would defeat the military regime with the help of EPLF, the right to
self-determination that was initially designed for Tigray was generously extended
to other ethnic groups by establishing different satellite parties that represented
the major ethnic groups in the country. After TPLF/EPRDF came to power, it
initiated a formal constitutional-making process to show the world that the country
was emerging from its repressive culture and transforming into a democracy.
Although TPLF/EPRDF was forced to incorporate liberal human rights principles
in the constitution apparently due to the end of the Cold War, major ideological
conceptions of the party such as the right to self-determination of nationalities
were not presented for negotiation. The constitution incorporated the political
programme of TPLF/EPRDF on the ‘right to self-determination up to secession’
as the pillar of the political discourse.
In light of this ideological background, the constitution vests power in
ethnic groups by entrusting sovereignty ‘to the nations, nationalities and
peoples of Ethiopia’. Nations and nationalities have been granted the right of
self–determination including the right to secession. Accordingly, every ‘nation,
nationality and people’ in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government
156 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that
it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal governments. In
addition to this, the constitution endows ‘nations, nationalities and people’ the
right to speak, to write and develop their own language and to express, develop
and promote their culture and preserve their history. For the implementation of the
self-determination rights of nationalities, the country has been restructured into
nine regional states that are largely organised along linguistic lines.
The constitution has also laid down the procedures to be followed during
the implementation of the right to self-determination or secession. The initial
procedure for demanding self-administration or secession is that the demand
be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the legislative council
of the ‘nation, nationality or people’ concerned. In other words, each ‘nation,
nationality or people’ must have its own council that may approve the demand for
self-administration or secession. The challenge with respect to this requirement is
that many of the 80 nationalities in the country do not have their own council to
approve such right to self-administration or demands of secession. For instance, in
Benishangul-Gumuz regional states, a demand by the Benishangul (or Berta) elite
to have their own council was not entertained for political discussion either in the
regional council or in the House of Federations, since the Benishangul people did
not have their own council to approve the demand (Berhanu 2009: 8). A similar
problem has occurred in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP)
regional state where there are multitudes of ethnic groups that are striving for the
exercise of their ‘right to self-determination’.
After the demand to self-determination or secession is approved by the
concerned council, the federal government must organise a referendum which
must take place within three years from the time it received the concerned council’s
decision for secession. When the demand for secession is supported by a majority
vote in the referendum, the federal government transfers its powers to the council
of the ‘nation, nationality or people’ who would have voted for self-determination
or secession. When division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law, the
concerned nation or nationality shall have its own regional state or it may secede
from the country. In addition, a separate law has been enacted to determine the
powers and duties of the House of Federations and to elaborate the scope of the
rights related to self-determination.

Factors behind the Adoption of an Ethnic Federal System in Ethiopia

There are different justifications for promoting a multicultural federal system in

countries where one or more sections of the country has a culturally or linguistically
homogenous community different from the rest of the country. In Canada, there
is the Quebec issue, in Belgium the case of the Flemish, in Spain the Basque
region, while the federations in Nigeria and India are designed to forge consensus
among the numerous ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. The most important
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 157

factor for adopting multicultural federations is the ethno-nationalist argument that

is rooted in the principle of ‘the distinctiveness of a particular people and their
right to self-rule in their homeland’ (Alemante 1992: 68–9). In addition to the
ethno-nationalist approach, multicultural federations are also formed to promote
equality and achieve democracy and economic development (Alemante 1992: 68).
In the Ethiopian context, there are three interrelated factors that have motivated
the political actors to adopt an unprecedented ethnic federal system entrenched in
the Stalinist notion of the right to ‘self-determination of nationalities’.

A Response to Ethno-regional Demands

Menelik’s expansion to the south in the nineteenth century, the control of Eritrea
by Italians and the disenfranchisement of Tigray as a source of political power
have all resulted in a new form of power relations in the Ethiopia. In addition to
this, the lethal force used to subdue the kingdoms in the south and the subsequent
mistreatment of the people who had their own culture, language and administration
have effectively marginalised the communities in the south. The military officials
of the feudal regime took over the land of the people and made them tenants. In
the same way, the consolidation of power by Menelik and later by Haile Selassie
seriously weakened the traditional autonomy of regional lords in Tigray, Gojam,
Gondar and Wollo.
The move to a dominant political discourse created discontent with the elite
in the north and south of the country leading towards shaping the ethno-regional
demands that started to take on an ethnic dimension in the 1970s. Despite the
nationalisation of land following the 1974 popular revolution that greatly
undermined the economic power of ‘neftegna’ (the land occupation) system that
subjugated the people in the south, culture-related claims were not fully addressed
by the military regime. Due to the absence of political willingness and the lack of
an appropriate understanding of the complexities of the ethno-regional demands
by the military regime throughout the 1970s and 1980s, struggles for ‘self-
determination’ were conducted by dissident organisations. The ethno-regional
claims were complex, particularly in the northern part of the country. Eritrean
dissidents were claiming that Eritrea was an independent country since time
immemorial and the dissolution of the federation with Ethiopia by the emperor
in 1962 was considered as re-colonisation of Eritrea by the Ethiopian regime.
Immediately after the dissolution of the confederation, secessionist groups such as
the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and later EPLF (the Eritrean People Liberation
Front) emerged.
In Tigray, the ethno-regional discontent began after the death of Yohannes IV
who was an Ethiopian emperor of Tigray origin in 1889. Despite an attempt to
install the emperor’s son as heir to the throne, Menelik II swiftly claimed the
emperorship, permanently ending the significant comeback of Tigray to political
hegemony since the end of the decorative golden era of the Axumite Empire,
which was dominant from the first to the seventh century ad. In many ways, the
158 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

era of Menelik was a defining moment for the start of Tigray’s discontent towards
Shewan dominance in the south. The sweeping centralisation process of Haile
Selassie further reduced the autonomy of regional governments, including that
of Tigray.
In addition to this, despite the similarity of culture, the emergence of Amharic
as the uncontested national language was considered as an imposition that greatly
reduced the significance of Tigray in the country’s power politics. Tigrayan elites
resisted the Shewan domination in different ways until it finally culminated in
the emergence of Tigray People’s Liberation Movement (TPLF) to represent
regional demands that had crystallised over time. TPLF ultimately emerged as
the uncontested militant group with the aim to ‘rectify the historical grievances’
directed against the Tigrayan people. In the southern part of the country, the
Oromo, Somali and other diverse ethnic groups were against the assimilationist
tendencies although there had never been a strong ethno-nationalist movement
from the southern regions challenging the status quo. Finally in 1991, ethno-
regional rebellion groups, mainly EPLF and TPLF managed to oust the military
regime in Ethiopia. The subsequent military victory of ethno-nationalist groups
in 1991 and the unprecedented federal arrangement that grants nations the ‘right
to self-determination’ including secession is partly linked with ethno-regional
demands that dominated the Ethiopian political discourse for so long.
Proponents of the current political status quo further argue that the federal
system has successfully addressed the historical ethno-regional demands of the
various ethnic groups. In a keynote speech in December 2010, the late Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi argued that the ethnic federal experiment had successfully
accommodated ethnic diversity in the country:

Our federal system has allowed us to introduce a democratic system of

governance that is fast maturing and consolidating. It has enabled all the peoples
of Ethiopia to maintain and celebrate their individual identities while at the
same time constituting the bigger family of Ethiopians. It has empowered all the
peoples of Ethiopia to manage their local affairs autonomy and to mobilise all
their local affairs autonomously and to mobilise all their resources to improve
their livelihoods and develop their communities while at the same time becoming
active participants’ in common national affairs. It has allowed us to design our
governance system to fit the circumstances of each locality and thus serve the
people better while consolidating our common democratic governance (Forum
for Federations 2010).

In addition to the political leaders who justify the existing federal status quo,
there are also scholars who view the federal system as a successful project in terms
of addressing ethno-regional demands. Andreas (2010) argues, ‘federal system
enabled the survival and establishment of legitimate political authority that helped
ethnic groups to join together and form a legitimate political order for peaceful
mutual cooperation’ (p. 9). The federal system is also viewed as a restoration of
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 159

historical Ethiopia’s de facto federal arrangement that had been prevalent before
the centralisation process by Menelik (Assefa 2007: 252).
The federal system has registered a significant achievement in terms of
protecting the linguistic and cultural rights of the various ethnic groups by
allowing regional governments to determine their own language and develop their
culture. Local administrations are now controlled by the local elites who speak
the language of the people. Nonetheless, the historical inequality has not yet been
properly addressed. Many groups that were incorporated or conquered by Menelik
II in the late nineteenth century remain on the margin of the polity, the economy
and administration (Abbink 1997: 164–5).
Although ethno-regional political demands need to be properly accommodated
in the country, the way ethno-regional political forces present the historical
dispensation that created modern Ethiopia and the approaches they used to
address the issues, is questionable. The interpretation by ethnic nationalists of the
expansionist and centralisation process by Menelik II and Haile Selassie I is that
there was an ethnically organised group called ‘Amhara’ which attempted to impose
its culture and language on other groups to ensure its ethnic supremacy. Given the
backward nature of the feudal system and the power rivalry between the various
ethnic groups in Ethiopia in the past, it is not uncommon to find suppression of the
rights of different ethnic groups. The harsh exploitation of Ethiopian peasants by
the feudal lords was not ethnically motivated; rather it was a result of greed and
the backward nature of the feudal system that inflicted numerous horrors on the
Ethiopian poor, including the Amhara who were considered as a privileged ethnic
group in the past. The historical centralisation process in the past should also be
judged in accordance with the standards of the time and not by contemporary ideals
of democracy and human rights. Accusing the feudal leaders such as Menelik II
and Haile Selassie I of not protecting human rights or granting ‘self-determination
rights’ during that historical period and the political context they lived in is rather
an act of hypocrisy.
Even though there is no evidence that suggests that the Amhara group conducted
the domination on other ethnic groups based on ethnic motivation, the concerns
of the ethnic groups need to be addressed. In light of such concerns, the move
taken by framers of the constitution to address such injustices is commendable.
But reducing every problem in the country to ‘question of nationalities’ and
presenting ethnic federalism as the ‘magic solution’ to all past problems is a result
of misinterpretation of the history of the country, which was largely shaped by a
conservative perception of the Marxist–Leninist principle of self-determination.
The other paradox with respect to understanding ethno-regional demands in
the Ethiopian context is that the most violent rebellion did not emerge from the
south where there was extreme marginalisation, along with cultural and economic
isolation. Rather, it emerged from the north that always had a better autonomous
administration. As Abbink noted, ‘the ultimately successful revolt came from a
core Abyssinian area of the empire, Tigray, which had always had a large amount of
autonomy and leverage rather than from the southern nationalist groups’ (Abbink
160 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

1997: 165). Due to the better autonomy and privilege Eritrea and Tigray provinces
enjoyed during the feudal regime, the success of EPLF and TPLF could not only
be explained by the seriousness of ‘ethno-regional’ related demands in the regions.
In addition to the claim for more autonomy for their respective regions, the
elites from Tigray and Eritrea had an additional incentive to reassert the historical
hegemony of the north. As these regions had influential kingdoms in the past,
the military campaign of EPLF and TPLF waged against the central government
was motivated by the need to reclaim their past glory, rather than to address the
linguistic and regional grievances claimed by the regions. The motivation to
reclaim political power may have helped the two groups to be more determined
during the struggle than other ethno-regional movements. The use of coercion and
brainwashing tactics employed by TPLF and EPLF to mobilise forces might also
have contributed to the mobilisation of force that not only defeated the military
regime but also permanently changed the course of history in the country.

The Impact of Marxist-Leninist Ideology and Stalinist Dogma of Question

of Nationalities

In the last four decades, leftist ideology has played an important role in shaping the
country’s political discourse and system of government. The students’ movement
that adopted the Marxist ideological mantra since the 1970s believed that socio-
political changes in the country could only be realised under the direction of Marxist
ideology. The most abused leftist ideology that was maintained by the students’
movement and ethno-regional movements was the ‘question of nationalities’ and
the ‘self-determination rights of nationalities’. There were, however, differences
within the leftist student group on the ‘question of nationalities’. For the pan-
Ethiopian left, the solution to the national question is not secession. This view is in
line with the precedence of class struggle over ethnic differences. This section of
the students’ movement maintained that the solution is to eliminate the root causes
of ethnic oppression and establish a polity that is based on equality and class
solidarity of all ethnic groups (Berhanu 2010). The alternative political discourse
proposed by this group was ‘Ethiopianism’:

Aware of the danger of the Leninist idea of self-determination, some students

proposed Ethiopianism as a renovated nationalism. Ethiopianism transcended
both Imperial Ethiopia and ethnic loyalty through the assertion of equal rights
and the promotion of national integration; it defined Ethiopia as the integrated
unity of free and equal citizens. Moving on the offensive, groups of students,
including some activist students, denounced the Leninist approach as a
promotion of tribalism and national divisions (Messay 2006).

The radical leftist group on the other hand was dedicated to the Leninist right
to self-determination of nationalities as a political solution to the long-standing
ethnic related demands in the country. Nevertheless, there had been a split within
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 161

the radical leftist group on the approach to resolve the ‘national question’. Although
the major leftist parties of the time such as EPRP and Meison were advancing
the priority of class struggle over the doctrine of ‘question of nationalities’ and
recommended the solution to ethno-regional claims without necessarily resorting
to secession, they left the political landscape to the ethno-nationalist movement
who asserted the ‘national question’ to be the leading motto of the political
struggle. This radical group, which adhered to the leftist ideology, emphasised
the significance of the ‘national question’ over any other problems in the country.
According to Aregawi, arguments such as ‘Marx’s stand on the Irish national
question – that it had to be resolved if the British proletariat were to advance to
socialism – was invoked to justify the question of nationalities in Ethiopia having
primacy over the class struggle’ (Aregawi 2004: 580). The commitment to the
‘question of nationalities’ was also varied among the rank and file of leading ethno-
regional parties. On the one hand, Eritrean, Oromo and Somali elites promoted
their cause as ‘colonial’, asserting that Ethiopia had colonised Eritrea, Oromo and
Somali regions, while other elites, particularly TPLF, promoted the ‘oppression of
nations and nationalities’ by the Amhara nation and demanded ‘self-determination’
within the scope of the Stalinist dogma.
In addition to this, the leftist ideology had also impacted the policies of the
military regime as this ideology was overwhelmingly supported by the students’
movement. However, measures undertaken by the Derg to address ethno-regional
claims could not satisfy the ambitions of the rebels and that eventually led to its
overthrow. When the military regime was overthrown in 1991, the new leaders
were those who internalised the radical Marxist Leninist ideology of the 1960s and
1970s. It could be argued that the unprecedented pursuing of the Marxist rhetoric
among the Ethiopian elites had served as a fertile ground for the ascendency of
‘the right to self-determination’ doctrine among student groups and later for the
adoption of the doctrine under Ethiopia’s constitution. The ideological antecedents
of TPLF/EPRDF’s ethnic federalism project can be traced to this Marxist Leninist
ideology and its conception of ‘the national question’.
The drafting and adoption of the 1995 constitution meant a transformation
of the political programme of TPLF/EPRDF into a constitutional ideal, claiming
that it was the only solution to the country’s problems. The Ethiopian federal
model is structured on the soviet model, which was powerfully influenced by the
Stalinist theory of nationalities. Some scholars draw parallels between the pre-
revolutionary period in Russia and Ethiopia, both of which had an imperial and
orthodox Christian heritage that might have seriously affected Marxist-oriented
policies in Ethiopia (Clapham 2006: 236). In addition to the ethno-regional claims
that were the core of the political upheavals in the past, the impact of leftist
ideology in shaping the existing Ethiopian political discourse and the existing
federal arrangement is immense. Even two decades after the advent of the new
constitutional system that claims to have resolved ‘question of nationalities’ in the
country, there has not been any attempt to moderate this ideological commitment
in terms of the global and domestic political developments.
162 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Instrumentalising of Ethno-Regional Demands

The above two factors alone could not explain the unprecedented emphasis on
ethnic identity in the Ethiopian political discourse and the subsequent imposition
of ethnic federalism on the country. Despite the existence of a strong political
context conducive to the recognition and adoption of ethnic-based federalism in
the country, such ethno-regional grievances could not explain the circumstances
that led to the victory of ethno-regional political forces in restructuring the country
along ethnic lines. Instrumentalisation of ethnic-related claims to control resources
in the country has immensely contributed to the restructuring of the Ethiopian
political discourse in terms of ethnic identity.
According to the instrumentalist approach to ethnic mobilisations, instrument-
alising ethnic-related demands is a social, political and cultural construct of ethnic
mobilisation for specific and different interests to serve a particular or multiple
objectives. According to this view, ethnic groups are a product of the situation and
not of history. ‘What mobilises its members to take collective action is concern
for its future prospects rather than an atavistic attachment to the past’ (Markakis
1994: 236). Access to state power is considered as essential for the welfare of
the group since such access has never been equally available to all the people
(Markakis 1994: 236). According to the study conducted in sub-Saharan Africa,
there is a correlation between the degree of ethnic favouritism and the ethnic group
in control of government power (Rainer 2010). Largely, ‘dissident groups seek
to restructure the state in order to gain access to its power or, failing that, to gain
autonomy or independence’ (Markakis 1994: 217).
Such instrumentalisation of ethno-related demands have been manifested in
Ethiopia. As Messay (2006) rightly noted, ‘Ethnicity as a maximising factor in
the struggle of elites for the control of power finds a perfect confirmation in both
the origin of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia and Ethiopia’s experiment with ethnic
federalism’. The instrumentalisation of regional interests was part of the traditional
power struggle between the centre and the periphery. Whenever the regional lords
felt insecure, they mobilised their population against the central power, claiming
that they were repressed or marginalised. Since ‘ethnic mobilisation is a rewarding
strategy in Ethiopia’s political discourse, numerous conflicts, both political
and violent, were sparked by decentralisation, routinely described as “ethnic
conflicts”, but they were more often the result of rivalry over state resources than
of irreconcilable ethnic differences’ (International Crisis Group 2003: 24–5).
The establishment of ethno-regional organisations such as EPLF, TPLF, OLF
and ONLF and the subsequent victory of ethno-regional forces as well as the
enactment of ethnic federalism and separation of Eritrea could not be explained on
the simple premise that the ethnic-nationalist movements were solely conducted
by ethno-regional organisations that strove for self-determination for their
respective ethnic groups. Although there was cultural domination in Ethiopia’s
long history, the most significant factor that motivated these organisations to
flourish and mobilise their people was the sweeping centralisation process that
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 163

was implemented by Haile Selassie and the Derg, which eroded the power base of
local elites who could not compete for the control of resources at the centre. As the
natural endowment in the Horn of Africa is meagre and unevenly distributed, ethno-
regional parties fought over this meagre resource (Markakis 1994: 218). In order
to mobilise their respective constituencies, ethno-regional political organisations
had to present ‘Amhara’ as the cause of all the problems in their regions. Thus,
the development of mobilisation of ethno-regional forces in Ethiopia was mainly
a strategy used to acquire a share in socio-economic relations as part of the power
struggle that was long prevalent in the country:

The use of ethnic criteria to reinforce a political goal is what explains the deep
contradiction of ethnic movements in Ethiopia. Whether we take the Eritrean,
Oromo, Tigrean, or other ethnic movements, all trace their emergence back to
the imperial regime, which they defined as the imposition of Amhara culture
and interests in a tightly centralised political system. The democratic solution
would have been decentralisation together with the recognition of Ethiopia as a
multiethnic country. Ethnic movements did not opt for such a solution; instead,
they brandished self-rule and group rights. The definition of ethnic groups as
nations and nationalities means that they revert back to the nation-state model
that they had previously rejected in the name of multiethnicism. Only the goal
of capturing state power by amplifying cultural incompatibilities can explain the
reversal (Messay 2006).

In the case of TPLF particularly, the most important factor that enabled the
movement to successfully dismantle the age-old central authority and ‘Amhara
dominance’ was the glory of the region in ancient times, especially the Axumite
empire that became obsolete with the transfer of central power to Shewa in the
south. By reasserting their hegemony in the post-1991 political landscape, the
Tigrayan elites under the hegemony of TPLF aimed at ‘killing two birds with one
stone’. On the one hand, they attempted to resolve the much celebrated ‘questions
of nationalities’ in the country through the mobilisation and solicitation of support
from the various ethnocentric elites whose linguistic and cultural rights were
undermined by the centralisation policies followed by past Ethiopian leaders.
Even so, the real driving force behind TPLF was its commitment to reassert its
past glory through the instrument of ethnic-related political demands. The most
important objective in the introduction of ‘self-determination to nationalities’
by TPLF was fundamentally to dismantle what Tigrayan elites perceived as the
‘Shewan Amhara’ structure rather than an ideological commitment to the doctrine
to self-determination.
The other indication of such an instrumentalist approach by TPLF was that if
primordial sentiments exclusively motivated the armed struggle, then the victory
of the TPLF should have led to the secession of Tigray or the implementation of
a real system of decentralisation and self-rule (Messay 2006). As Young (1996)
notes, the ethnic federal system seems to have been used as the best means for
164 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

the TPLF to retain a leading position in an Ethiopian state where the Tigrayans
constitute a minority (p. 532). Messay (2006) similarly elaborated the strategy of
TPLF as follows:

Both to mobilise the Tigrean people so as to overthrow the dominance of the

Amhara elite and to establish a federal system that favours it, the TPLF had
to fracture Ethiopia along ethnic lines, thereby speaking of the country as an
ensemble of nations and nationalities. So fractured, the political struggle
becomes focused on self-rule and the control of regional states, leaving the
federal government to the TPLF.

The other justification presented to further the argument that TPLF used the
doctrine of the national question and self-determination to further its interests is
the commitment of the party to the equality of nationalities. If TPLF firmly stood
for ethno-regional rights, it could have made genuine efforts to find a negotiated
consensus on the political disparities among the various political groups in the
country. In addition to this, if it genuinely believed that every ethnic group
should manage its own affairs, a regime that grants unprecedented rights to
ethnic groups on paper could not have any reason to interfere in the routine
internal affairs of regional states and restrict their autonomy. The absence of real
commitment to the federal system strengthens the argument that TPLF is merely
institutionalising the principle of ‘divide and rule’ and protecting its position
(Aalen 2002: 47).
However, such instrumentalisation of ethno-regional political demands
to further other socio-political goals is by no means restricted to TPLF. The
mobilisation of ethnic claims by ELF and EPLF in Eritrea, OLF and ONLF in
Oromia and Ogaden regions respectively, is related to using justifiable ethno-
regional claims to create local autonomy where ethnic entrepreneurs control social
and economic resources. The relentless political and military campaigns waged
to separate Eritrea from Ethiopia for three decades only transferred the Eritrean
people from ‘Amhara’ colonisers to homegrown dictators. This clear evidence
which affirms the premise that leaders of such ethnocentric parties primarily aimed
to control resources rather than respond to genuine public demands. As Lyons
studied the behaviour of ethno-regional political parties during the transitional
period two decades ago in Ethiopia, ‘too many political organisations acted in ways
that suggested their commitment to democracy was in part instrumental’ (Lyons
1996: 127). In other words, it could be argued that although political leaders did
not invent the nationalities problem in Ethiopia, they ‘distorted it, inflated it out of
proportion and exploited it’ (Hizkias 1996).
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 165

Critics on the Adoption of the Ethnic Federal System in Ethiopia

Compared to the advantages and justifications for the adoption of ethnic federalism
in Ethiopia, its critics and pitfalls are unprecedented. The accommodation of
ethnic-related claims and the adoption of the ethnic federal system continued to be
the most controversial political issue in the country:

Ethnic-based federalism is the most controversial EPRDF policy. Celebrated

by some as the panacea for holding multi-ethnic Ethiopia together, it is decried
by others as a dangerous concept that will eventually dismember the country.
Behind the controversy are contested definitions of citizenship and of what
it means to be Ethiopian. For nationalists, the policy is a deliberate ploy to
undermine national identity, pride and self-esteem flowing from the exceptional
history and continuity of the Abyssinian Empire and Ethiopian state. They see
the constitutional granting of self-determination to ethnic groups as a deliberate
step backward from the nation-building process (International Crisis Group
2000: 22).

The unprecedented political dispensation that emerged in 1991 has greatly

altered the political debate and restructuring of the country, since the whole
political discourse has been a complete departure from the centralisation process
that was in the making until 1991. Ethnicity, in particular, ‘suddenly became
the predominant explanation for many of the things that went wrong in society’
(Hezkias 1996). TPLF/EPRDF has ‘oscillated between the idea that ethno-
linguistic groups can be objectively and externally identified and its experience
that they must be mobilised in their own language and culture to assert their
collective rights’ (International Crisis Group 2009: 23). It is believed that ‘this
unique formalisation of communal identity as the basis for formal citizenship in
Ethiopia has vast political implications and is a vexing source of political conflict
and instability, raising pressing questions about the proper place for politicised
ethnicity’ (Smith 2007: 573).
A number of critiques have been forwarded against the restructuring of the
Ethiopian state along ethnic lines. Much of it is not against the adoption of a
federal system as such but against its inherent principles. Although the diverse
political groups in the country agree that atrocities committed in the past against
different ethnic groups need to be rectified, the way the ethnic federal structure was
introduced, the motives behind it and whether there is real political commitment to
apply the principles of federalism in the country, are open to speculation.
The most worrisome aspect of the trend is the way the country’s rulers
attempted to redefine ethnic relations in the country. As noted by Hezkias, the
transplantation of ‘the right to self-determination and secession’ into the Ethiopian
political discourse is primarily contrary to the country’s political reality:
166 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Close observation of the Ethiopian situation makes one wonder whether the
preoccupation with ‘the nationalities question’ and its prescribed remedy of
‘national self-determination’ are products of an ideological framework rather
than an outgrowth of the country’s realities. Instead of the reality on the ground
determining the model of theoretical framework to be used in diagnosing,
understanding, and dealing with it, an ideologically dictated theoretical
framework seems to have been imposed on the reality, which is then forced to
conform with the framework. As the saying goes, if the only tool you have is a
hammer, then you think everything else is a nail (Hezkias 1996).

In addition to the absence of a reality that demands the introduction of a radical

ideology in the country, scholars warn that the unprecedented focus on ethnic
differences could initiate polarisation of societal bonds. As Ghai noted ‘if political
parties see their primary role to be that of aggregating and articulating narrow
sectional interests, like ethnicity or tribalism, they will divide the country rather
than integrate it’ (Ghai 2008: 155). The narrow nationalist approach advanced by
the regime has also ‘the potential to spread ethnic clientelism with all the vices
of favouritism, nepotism, corruption and anti-competitiveness’ (Messay 1999:
379). Due to such threats of ethnic fragmentations, Messay (1999) warns that ‘the
direction in which Ethiopia is currently pushed is only another exercise in inviting
adventures whose consequences cannot be predicted except for their inevitable
preciousness’ (p. 379). As Eshetu Chole is quoted saying at the dawn of the new
dispensation in 1992, ‘in the past we emphasised unity at the expense of diversity,
and we have paid dearly for it. Let us hope that now we will not move to the other
extreme and emphasise diversity at the expense of unity’.
The other criticism against the current federal arrangement is in relation to the
process by which the federal system has been adopted. In principle, the process
of institutionalising federalism comes out of democratic mobilisation rather
than imposition from above (Kymlicka 2006: 55). In the Ethiopian context, the
political change was not participatory and the federal project was imposed by
TPLF/EPRDF. The whole political and institutional measures so far undertaken
are largely the political interests of a single political group. The nominal peace
conference that was held in the summer of 1991 could only attract like-minded
political organisations that were against the status quo of the past that was in the
making since late in the nineteenth century. For the victors, there was no serious
need to accommodate the views of those who were firmly aligned to the state
formation efforts made in the past and who perceived the new political dispensation
as against the interests and territorial integrity of the country.
The lack of consensus in the new dispensation apparently continues to manifest
itself in different forms. The most formidable challenge to the new status quo was
manifested during the 2005 general elections. During this election, there were
different forces against the status quo forging alliances with the Coalition for
Unity and Democracy (CUD) party. Although the regime presented the movement
behind CUD as forces that sought to resurrect the feudal system, there has never
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 167

been any serious political or scholarly discourse that rejects the accommodation
of ethnic diversities in the country. The fierce opposition seems to be directed
towards the way ethnic-related claims are institutionalised and use of the claims
as a ‘divide and rule’ strategy and its outcomes. By attempting to humiliate groups
that question the legitimacy of the existing federal arrangement, the regime has
blocked a meaningful political debate on the issue that could lead to alternative
adjustments of the federal system.
Furthermore, the application of the principle of self-determination to all forms
of ethnic groups in the country is contrary to the general norm of multicultural
federalism. In democratic societies, the decision to accord federal or quasi-federal
forms of autonomy to national minorities is the gradual result of democratic
mobilisation by specific national groups (Kymlicka 2006: 55). In the Ethiopian
context, the right to self-determination has been accorded to ethnic groups that
had not politically mobilised and asked for the right (Kymlicka 2006: 55). After
the imposition of the right to self-determination across the board, the regime
is attempting to persuade all ethnic groups to identify themselves as ‘nations’,
‘nationalities’ or ‘peoples’.
The other concern is related to the assumption that federalism could resolve
many of the long-standing problems related to ethnicity in the country. Nevertheless,
historically, federalism has not fully resolved the complex problems associated
with ethnicity (Cohen 2006: 169). In terms of the inherent challenges associated
with the federal system itself, prescribing an ethnic federal system as a solution to
most of the country’s historical challenges has further complicated the means of
resolving ethno-regional demands. It is not even properly identified whether the
real problems facing the country is ethnicity or other historical, cultural or political
problems. As Hezkias observes, ‘if we are not agreed on what the phenomenon
is we might be wasting our energy by focusing on the wrong problems or by
prescribing a remedy for a problem that has not been diagnosed correctly and doing
so could even run the risk of making the situation worse instead of remedying it’
(Hezkias 1996). What makes such an argument relevant is that after half a century
of rhetoric on the ‘question of nationalities’, the country has faced other pressing
problems such as globalisation, environmental degradation, population growth,
corruption, realising food security and dictatorship, to mention a few.
The ethnic federal system is also accused of legitimising division rather than
engendering social cohesion. As Getachew (2010) noted, ‘instead of promoting
equality, tolerance and prosperity among all and for all, proponents of ethnic
nationalism are bent on the destructive policy of spreading animosity and disrespect
among various cultural communities in Ethiopia leading them to mutual distrust,
and, at times, to violence and conflicts’. The Ethiopian federal system is accused
of ‘encouraging the divisive aspects of ethnicity by forcing individuals to examine
their own ethnicity more closely and to align themselves more explicitly with the
formulations of ethnicity established by the federal system’ (Cohen 2006: 170).
Moreover, the ethnic federal system adopted in Ethiopia is susceptible to the
threat of secession. It has been established that ‘the more federalism succeeds
168 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

in meeting the desire for self-government, the more it recognises and affirms
the sense of national identity amongst the minority group, and strengthens
their political confidence in secession’ (Kymlicka 2005: 286). According to this
argument, rather than cooling down ethnic political claims, ethnic federalism may
present an opportunity for the minority group to mobilise under a single purpose
and pose more and more challenges to the central government. As the experience
of multi-ethnic federations such as former Nigerian and contemporary Belgian
federal formations revealed, larger ethnic groups carved under a single constituent
unit pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. In the same way, the
Ethiopian approach, which attempts to provide a ‘mother state’ to each ethnic
group, poses a potential danger to the territorial integrity of the country. The ethnic
federal arrangement has reinforced ethno-regional demands rather than cooling
them down which strengthened threats of secession and fragmentation. The
ever increasing claims for wider autonomy by ethno-regional groups have been
observed in the last two decades. Due to the application of ethnicity as a source of
political identity: ‘citizens who may not be aware of their ethnicity are forced to
regroup under a banner purporting to be a distinct people’ (Alemante 2003: 86).
The young generation that grew up in the new TPLF/EPRDF political formulation
has raised numerous ethnically-related demands, although the regime claims to
have resolved the ‘question of nationalities’. The existing federal arrangement has
also been criticised for being only designed to maintain the hegemony of Tigrayan
elites (Merera 2003: 119). It is believed that the Amhara domination of the state
has been replaced by Tigrayan domination, especially in the army, the security
and top bureaucracy (Alemante 2003: 68). Due to public perceptions of Tigrayan
dominance in the system, the new federal arrangement is simply viewed as a
divide and rule mechanism used by TPLF to stay in power.
The other criticism against the system is related to its performance in terms of
putting the rhetoric into practice. The regime claims that the federal system has
built a single ‘political community’ of unity in diversity and there is consensus
in the country on the policies of the regime, which was revealed by a 99.6 per
cent win by TPLF/EPRDF in the general election of 2010. On the other hand,
international human rights institutions, opposition groups and many scholars argue
that the regime is becoming increasingly authoritarian and the federal system is
not properly working, as it is firmly controlled by the central government.
The other serious criticism about the ethnic federal model is its ideological
backdrop. Though there are legitimate causes to adopt a constitutional system
that addresses the long-standing political stand-off in relation to minority rights
in Ethiopia, the model the Ethiopian regime preferred to use is the failed Stalinist
model adopted at a time when the former socialist federations were disintegrating.
When TPLF/EPRDF came to power in 1991, despite the fact that the Cold War
world was coming to an end, it was neither willing nor ready to adapt to new global
developments. The reason for commitment by TPLF/EPRDF to the dying Stalinist
approach was that the regime leaders were highly socialised to the doctrine and
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 169

they assumed that the ideology would help them to root out any opposition to
their rule.
The elites of TPLF/ EPRDF have almost internalised the concept of ‘self-
determination’ as a religious creed since the time of the students’ movement in
the 1970s. During the time of the armed struggle, all the political programmes
and processes including the doctrine on the rights of nationalities were shaped
by Marxism and related concepts. This was the only ideology leaders of TPLF/
EPRDF knew until they came to power in 1991. Since they were not ready for
any eventual changes in the international political dispensation, it was difficult for
them to adapt to the downfall of the communist ideology elsewhere. Thus, the only
option they had was to undertake a political restructuring in accordance with the
Stalinist ideology they were well-versed in, rather than attempting to take political
risks by adapting to the new face of the world.

Pitfalls in the Application of the Right to Self-determination and Secession

The fiercest criticism directed against the federal system adopted in Ethiopia is
related to the right to self-determination and the inclusion of the secession clause
in the constitution. The first official opposition to the inclusion of the secession
clause was reflected during the discussion of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Assembly held in 1994. The minority members of the council reflected the
concerns related to the incorporation of such a clause. They argued that although
there had been exploitation of different ethnic groups in the past, the Ethiopian
people had a common history and heritage and the secession clause would weaken
this bond. Many sectors of society were also susceptible to the secession right as
a hidden motive to destroy the Ethiopian state (Berhanu 2009: 9). Such criticism
came from pan-Ethiopian nationalists as indicated by a former political figure:

When they [the EPRDF] came to power, the Derg and the Amhara were the
declared enemies. They declared the right to self-determination in order to
achieve popular support in the regions. This is a sort of divide and rule, a method
of a minority governing a majority. In a democracy, this is impossible. Article 39
of the Constitution does not benefit the people, but was created to serve certain
political aims (Aalen 2003: 44).

Even those who claim to have supported the secession clause such as Oromo
nationalists doubt TPLF/EPRDF’s motive in inserting the secession clause. Such
nationalists, especially after OLF and TPLF/EPRDF parted company, argue that
TPLF has used this article as a rallying point for the traditionally marginalised
non-Amhara ethnic groups such as the Oromo and the Somalis and to marginalise
the unionist Amhara.
Some groups on the other hand overlooked the inclusion of the secession clause
into the constitution, doubting its applicability in real terms. These observers argue
170 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

that due to the complex procedures for secession and doubts about its practicability,
the right to secede does not exist in practice, or if it exists it is only symbolic
(Yoanatan 2006: 430). According to this view, the constitutional pledges for the
right to self-determination or secession is more of rhetoric than an achievable
promise for most ethnic groups due to the long and complex procedures, which
seem difficult to fulfil (Berhanu 2009: 9). Such critics question the relevance
of the secession clause in terms of the seriousness of the regime that struggles
to implement modest rights of minority groups, let alone the right to secession.
According to such a view, the right to self-determination and secession has been
adopted for rhetorical and ideological purposes and the central federal government
seems reluctant to relinquish its grip on regional governments
The fact that the constitution does not require any ground for secession or
institute stringent procedures for secession does not mean that the secession
clause is not a serious undertaking. Although the regime is opposed to the
exercise of the right to secession, with the ‘constitutionalisation’ of secession,
the implementation of the right to secession is kept alive (Yontan 2010: 210).
Although TPLF/EPRDF may be against secession in practice, the incorporation of
secession in the constitution has created real threat by radical nationalist groups.
Even long after the departure of TPLF/EPRDF, the impact of the clause in the
country’s future political discourse is immense. There is a credible fear that the
constitutional clause may strengthen the political demand of the minority groups
to the extreme because of the contradiction in theory and practice. The secession
clause may encourage division rather than unity and people may be forced to think
of differences, rather than finding common ground to resolve political differences.
In practice, the constitutional rhetoric on self-determination and secession has
become an incentive for various ethno-regional movements to demand a separate
self-administrative constituency and separate regional state that has resulted in
bloody conflict, displacement and ethnic hostility (Berhanu 2009: 9).
As Berhanu (2009) aptly commented, the rhetoric provided under the
constitution has created some unrealistic optimism:

The Ethiopian federal experience matches the ex-Soviet Union constitution

that gave copious promises of self-determination including independence
for its ethnic republics but responded with ruthless force when the rights
were requested. To some extent, the same may be true in Ethiopia’s federal
constitution, which is rich and overflowing in freedom vocabularies but the
actual performance is very far and opposite to the declarations. But the danger
could be very great in situations which official pronouncement provokes and
makes cognisant parochial ethnic consciousness by reckless advertisement of
the right to secede, whereas official actions are going in opposite and extreme
directions of subjugation and curtailment of ordinary rights and freedoms which
of course reinforce and justify the demand for secession (p. 7).
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 171

In addition to the raising of hopes that do not match the reality, there is also
ambiguity in relation to the process of application of the right to self-determination
and secession. It is not clear whether both rights are equally available to ‘nations
and nationalities’ or if they are applicable to one after the other. There are different
views on this institutional dilemma. Some assert that it is only after an ethnic
community acquires a regional state of its own and consequently establishes a
legislative council that it can initiate a process for secession (Yonatan 2006: 425–6).
The supporting constitutional provision towards this view is that the demand for
secession has to be made by the legislative council of the concerned nation and
nationality. Other scholars do not agree with this view. According to them, it is not
necessary for an ethnic community to establish a state of its own in order to have
a legislative council (Yonatan 2006: 426). This argument further asserts ‘as long
as a certain ethnic group has established a self-governing administration, there is
nothing in the constitution that prohibits it from leaving the federal state without
first acquiring the status of a regional state’ (Yonatan 2006: 426).
The application process of the right to self-determination has created confusion
since it lacks clarity about what criterion is applicable to grant regional autonomy
and other lesser forms of autonomy. In some instances, some ethnic groups who
have significant population and geographic size are not granted self-administrative
autonomy, while other ethnic groups with insignificant populations or geographic
size have been endowed with wider autonomy of self-administration.1 Furthermore,
while some of the minority groups have been endowed with their own regional
government, others have been forced to share political power with other minority
groups. A typical case is the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional
State.2 In the structure of the Ethiopian federal system, a demographic minority
does not mean it is always politically disadvantageous. Some minority ethnic
groups have wider rights than those that have bigger population or geographic
size, due to their elites’ role in the making of the new system or their strong client
service to the regime.
In addition to this, the self-determination rights granted to small minority
groups may also result in perpetual marginalisation of such groups rather than
benefiting them. In particular, minority ethnic groups in the periphery, despite
being granted territorial autonomy, do not have the economic and political
freedom to exercise the rights provided under the constitution. Their economic
and social opportunities may be limited as the existing political landscape restricts

1 Smaller minority groups such Harari or Silte have been granted autonomous
administrative rights, while the request for regional administration from bigger minority
groups such as Sidama or Wolayta has been neglected.
2 In this region, there are about 56 minority groups. Though the ethnic groups in the
region have various languages and historical backgrounds, the regime merged all these
groups under a single regional state that has suffocated the rights of minority groups.
All these ethnic groups could not enjoy self-determination rights as prescribed under the
constitution while other minority groups have been treated differently.
172 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

such minority groups in the small area allocated to them. The new territorial self-
determination confined them to one corner, thus limiting the exchange of capital,
labour and experience. Furthermore, since the influence of minority groups at the
central level is limited; bigger political parties may ignore their plight.
One of the other challenges to the application of self-determination or the
granting of self-administration to dominant ethnic groups is the creation of new
minorities. Historically, there have been intermarriages and movement of people
from one place to the other in the country. With the establishment of ethnically
defined regions, the population that does not speak the language of the new
administration has become a minority. Such people are nowadays referred to as
‘northerners’ in Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali regional states
where they are treated as ‘newcomers’. Due to the widespread marginalisation, the
rights of such people have been seriously restricted.3
In addition to the federal constitution that attempts to place every form of ethnic
identity under ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’, the constitutions of the regional
states clearly provide that the region belongs to only specific ethnic groups. The
constitution of the Oromia Regional State provides that ‘sovereign power in
the region resides in the people of the Oromo nation’.4 In similar fashion, the
constitution of the regional state of Gambella provides that the founding members
of the regional state are Anywar, Nuer, Majangir, Opo and Komo nationalities.
That means that other people who do not belong to the Staatsvolk in the regions
are considered to be foreigners. Although there are thousands and millions of non-
indigenous people living in Oromia and Gambella regional states, the constitution
of regional governments deliberately excludes a significant portion of the
population from political participation in the regions.5
Such a structural deficit has resulted in the exclusion of minority groups from
political representation. At present, people who do not belong to the dominant
ethnic group in the regions are not properly represented in regional, zonal or woreda
political institutions. The usual pretext forwarded to exclude such people from
local political representation is that the people do not speak the local language.
However, a close analysis of specific cases indicates that the real justification behind
the discrimination is the apparent primordial blood ties the individuals have with
the region rather than merely language or cultural attachment. There is a tendency
to exclude people who are perceived to be outside the dominant ethnic group in
the region even in cases where they speak the indigenous language. Thus, the
principle of the right to self-determination of nations and nationalities has resulted
in the creation of new minority groups that have increasingly become second-class

3 In Harari region for instance, unless a person is an Oromo or Harari, that person is
not eligible for public office.
4 Art 8, Constitution of the Regional State of Oromia, Proclamation No 46/2001.
5 The only appropriate mechanism used to accommodate ‘minorities within minorities’
is in the Amhara regional state. In the region, minority groups such as Oromo and Agaw are
granted a wider local autonomy which has no parallel experience in other regional states.
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 173

citizens in their own country and being subjected to internal displacement. There
have been cases whereby thousands of people of Amhara origin were displaced
from Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, SNNPR, Oromia and Somali regional states
in the last two decades. The plight of such groups has been worsened by the fact
that many of the regional constitutions have failed to provide specific principles
for the protection of minorities living within their boundaries.
Due to such structural policy problems in the protection of minority rights, a
number of violations of the rights of minority groups, including various ethnic
conflicts, have been recorded in the last two decades. Not only have minority
groups not been allowed to be administered by political leaders of their choice,
but their request for more independent self-rule has been met with government
violence. Even though the constitution has allowed ethnic groups to mobilise
themselves for ‘self-determination’ and the regime has actively encouraged local
elites to do so, a series of claims for recognition of separate status for ethnic or
language groups and sub-groups has either rejected or deferred (Vaughan 2006:
188). Although such ethnic-related demands have been initiated due to the active
encouragement as part of TPLF/EPRDF’s official policy, the regime has been
actively suppressing minority groups’ demands in different parts of the country.
The measures undertaken by the regime in the last few years seems to be
‘attempting to repack the evils into a Pandora’s Box’ (Vaughan 2006: 188).
Suppression for self-administration has been particularly directed to the aspirations
of the Oromo, Somali, Sidama and Agnuak nationalist groups. In addition to the
continued attacks perpetrated on members and supporters of OLF, serious violation
of minority rights have been occurring in the Ogaden region of the country.
Due to the armed resistance waged by the dissident ONLF, there is continued
confrontation and violation of rights in this Somali-speaking region. Furthermore,
in the Gambella regional state, there has been violence in relation to demands
for a more regional autonomy. There has also been violation of rights in SNNPR
and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. In addition to such serious violation of
minority rights in the last two decades, there have been widespread ethnic conflicts
due to resource and border issues among the various ethnic groups.6 Due to such
ethnic-related conflicts, an estimated 300,000 to 350,000 people were internally
displaced in late 2010 (Norwegian Refugee Council 2011).

The Implications of Ethnic Political Discourse on Common Citizenship,

Individual Rights and Multiple Identities

Due to the complicated nature of ethnic politics, an ethnically-defined political

system creates different challenges. Primarily, ‘the worrying aspect of ethnicity
is that it overshadows common humanity and sense of citizenship since people’s

6 By a very conservative estimate, several thousand people were killed in inter-ethnic
conflicts in Ethiopia between 1991 and 2005 (see International Crisis Group 2009).
174 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

ethnic consciousness tends to reduce their concern for human rights or public
morality’ (Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 11). In countries where ethnic identity is
institutionalised, the social bondage binding society is eroded and replaced by a
narrow ethnic identity. Since ethnic politics assumes differences, it does not give
much attention to common humanity and history. As the American president Barack
Obama stated in his historic speech in Ghana, ‘We all have many identities – of
tribe and ethnicity; of religion and nationality. But defining oneself in opposition
to someone who belongs to a different tribe, or who worships a different prophet,
has no place in the twenty-first century’.7
In addition to this, the concept of ethnic rights remains ‘ambiguous and
legally fuzzy’ (Abbink 1997: 171). Since the definition of ethnic groups and the
distinctions between people based on ethnic criteria is difficult, inconsistent and
confusing, making such a fluid concept the basis of a political system is risky as,
‘ethnic communities rise and fall, persist and dissolve, change and resurge. Ethnic
and identity [are] malleable and overlap with other important social identities
based on locale or region, religion, gender, class, citizenship, etc. Consequently,
individuals possess multiple identities’ (Hezkias 1996).
Since the beginning of the advancement of ‘the question of nationalities’ by the
student groups in Ethiopia, proponents of ethno-national struggles seem to have
overlooked the complexities of ethno-nationalist mobilisation and the dangers of
‘the more politicised ethnicity becomes, the more it dominates other expressions
of identity, eclipsing class, occupational and ideological solidarities’ (Aregawi
2004: 581). The neglect of the unprecedented implications of ethnic politics to
democracy, national unity and integration has brought about various challenges in
the Ethiopian political future. The ascendancy of ethnic politics in the Ethiopian
political discourse has three implications for the country’s democracy. First, ‘with
the ascendancy of ethnic nationalism, collective rights have taken primacy over
individual rights. Secondly the competing ethnic nationalisms have given rise to
competing demands on the state. Thirdly, the ascendancy of ethnic nationalism has
led to a situation where one ethnic group is pitted against another’ (Merera 2003:
114). Due to the unprecedented emphasis on ethnicity in the Ethiopian federal
system, scholars argue:

Ethiopian system, besides being imposed, is deliberately established to

encourage ethnicisation. Whereas other countries, such as Nigeria and India
used federalism as a devise to dilute ethnicity so as to safeguard national unity,
all the practices and constitutional provisions in Ethiopia tend to strengthen
ethnic identity to the detriment of national integration (Messay 2009).

Primarily, ethnicisation of the political process in Ethiopia has been made in a

way that disregards multiple and cross-cutting identities prevalent in the country.

7 President Obama blasted identity politics as a cancer in the African body politics in
2009 during his speech in Accra, Ghana.
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 175

Despite the controversy surrounding the making of modern Ethiopia, there has
been a cultural, historical and social tie that bound the country during its long
history. According to scholars, ‘the chances for stable democracy are enhanced
if individuals have cross-cutting affiliation to a variety of groups that pull them
in different directions’ (Lijphart 1968: 349). On the contrary to such fundamental
political thought, the new political dispensation was introduced in circumstances
that reversed the achievements of the past and an attempt was made to initiate
new patterns of identity formation. It is commendable to accommodate different
ethnic-related demands, but the way ethnic politics was introduced in Ethiopia is
intended to invent ethnic identity consciousness afresh or as Messay put it ‘ethnic
identities that used to be weak are restructured’ (Messay 2009) . By doing so,
the discourse of ethnicity in Ethiopia has become strongly politicised, ‘more so
than ever before, and has created realities which did not previously exist’ (Abbink
1997: 161).
Contrary to the traditional application of the principle of the right to self-
determination only to groups who clearly showed interest for such a right, the
Ethiopian federal system gives the right to every ethnic group including to people
who have not shown any interest in such rights or who have not developed any
ethnic or linguistic group identity consciousness (Kymlicka 2006: 56). This is
particularly apparent in raising ethnic consciousness in social, economic and
political relations among the elite and, as such, relations become more ethnic-
oriented and the bias and prejudice against one another’s ethnic group increases. For
instance, the most important historical factor for social and political mobilisation
in the present-day Amhara region was provincialism rather than ethnicity. But
the new regime categorised the whole region under a single ‘Amhara’ identity,
disregarding glaring sub-regional patterns. In the same manner, the mobilisation
of people in SNNPR according to their ‘ethnicity’ was orchestrated by EPRDF
instead of deriving from the political claims of the people’ (Vaughan 2006: 188).
The other challenge of political systems that are based on ethnicity is the fact
that ethnicity can be easily manipulated by ethnic leaders. Such an institutional
arrangement has strengthened ethnic differences and provided resources for political
entrepreneurs to play the ‘nationality card’, thereby promoting secessionist activity
(Hale 2004: 165–6). Due to the pressure of ethnic entrepreneurs, ‘an ethnically
modified system would accord legitimacy to inauthentic claims invented by self-
appointed ethnic entrepreneurs that do not reflect the real identities or interests of
members of ethno-cultural minorities’ (Kymlicka 2001: 347). Since ‘nationalism
is an easily accessible and powerful tool to be discarded by politicians’, many
of the ethnic conflicts that have taken place around the world occurred due to
manipulation of ethnic issues as a means of instigating violence and conflict
(Trudeau 2005: 224).8 This is mainly because ‘members of an ethnic community
tend to support their ethnic leaders regardless of their morality, effectiveness and

8 The genocide that took place in Rwanda and other conflicts in the rest of Africa or
the dissolution of Yugoslavia are a result of manipulation of ethnicity by elites.
176 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

conduct, for they may think that leaders from their ethnic community will bring
development to their area, and that leaders who are of a different ethnicity will not’
(Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 11).
Instigation of conflict by ethnic entrepreneurs has been observed in Ethiopia in
the last two decades in relation to the proliferation of hundreds of ethnic political
parties who are more concerned with finding political space where others will
not compete with them.9 It has been documented that ‘local politicians and party
officials from all ethnic groups and from both government and opposition have
incited their followers to engage in conflict with competing groups’ (International
Crisis Group 2009: 24). In fact, ‘most elites of the ethno-regional groups now carved
out seem to want to grab political power regardless of the consequences of ethnic
mobilisations’ (Abbink 1997: 173). For instance, in the process of the redefinition
of internal borders in SNNPR, ‘the general public is not concerned whether they
belong to one particular geographical unit or the other, rather the inclusion of areas
within a particular geographical unit gained political significance for local elites and
could be used to create a political constituency’ (Cohen 2006: 174).
The other danger of ethnically defined federal arrangement in Ethiopia is its
close ties with primordialism. Scholars warn that ‘institutionalising the federation
along ethnic lines is more likely to promote primordial nationalism, which in
politically unstable polities increases the likelihood of inter-ethnic violence and
civil war’ (Karmis and Norman 2005: 345; Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 11). There
is evidence to suggest that the use of ethnic identity as an organising principle
is breeding a sense of distrust and racism and narrow nationalism in Ethiopia
(Alemante 2003: 86). In particular, ‘the move towards equalitarian ethnic
pluralism has inevitably increased ethnically inspired hostility between previously
dominant and dominated ethnic groups, as all are forced to adjust to new terms of
inter-ethnic and inter-regional relationships’ (Alem 2004: 110). At present, deep-
rooted racism and polarisation is in the making, thus dwarfing a sense of collective
identity in the country. One writer summarises such worrying developments in a
post-1991 Ethiopian political platform:

In the current situation people are being pitted against each other. Neighbours,
who have coexisted peacefully for decades, if not centuries, are being encouraged
by official government policy to emphasize their ethnic differences so that
ethnically homogeneous political structures can be created. Age-old relationships
between peoples, intermarriages, cultural interactions and continuities, are in
peril of being disrupted or wrenched apart (Hezkias 1996).

Since there is not a clear and objective criterion to be set to determine who is in
or who is out in that specific group, the trend has opened the door for discrimination

9 A typical example of this is the separation of Wolayta from Siemen Omo Zone and
the Silte from Guarge that were orchestrated by few urban elites who wanted to control state
resources without facing competition from elites from other groups.
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 177

and abuse. Even if people are legally residing in one of the regions in the country,
they are denied participation in government because they do not belong to the
Staatsvolk (Alemante 2003: 95). The members of some ethnic groups even assume
that their areas are intended for their exclusive habitation and force people from
other ethnic groups to leave their land (Cohen 2006: 173). In addition, those who
are assumed to belong to the same ethnic group are fighting against each other,
based on more specific local mobilisation.10
The ethnicised political environment has also had an impact on common
nationalism and the preservation of individual rights. Due to such fragmentations,
a ‘sense of common nationality is dying away rapidly and the emphasis on ethnicity
as an absolute value has traumatised those who consider themselves to be above
and beyond tribal allegiances’ (Levine 2007: 7). The fragmentation has also been
expanded into economic and social relations. Normally, business or economic
partnerships are devoid of ethnic undertones as the major driving force is believed
to be profit. In the Ethiopian context, it is not uncommon to find many companies
in the banking, insurance and other major investment areas being organised along
ethnic lines. Ethnicising the whole political apparatus has also resulted in ethnic
conflicts in different parts of the country in the last two decades.11
Furthermore, a system that advances group rights will eventually face a conflict
between protection of group rights and individual rights. The liberal approach to
this dilemma is that group rights are tolerated and promoted as far as the practices
are compatible with values of a liberal society. In liberal societies, group rights are
only protected as far as they are consistent with the protection of individual human
rights. The challenge appears to be daunting in countries such as Ethiopia where
group rights have become the bedrock principle of the constitutional system.
Though it recognises individual rights, the Ethiopian Constitution takes a radical
position that grants unprecedented political power to ethnic groups. Since state
sovereignty resides with ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ rather than with the
Ethiopian people collectively, a person needs to identify himself or herself to one
of the ethnic groups to be considered as an Ethiopian national. In other words,

10 After the introduction of the federal system in Ethiopia, there has been fierce
competition among elites in the various regions by dividing each other local identities such
as being Wollega, Gogam or Adwa.
11 ‘Some of the most severe were between Amhara settlers and Anuak in December
2003 in Gambella, where the federal army apparently sided with the highlanders. In the
Somali region after 2000, several hundreds were killed in repeated fighting between the
Sheikash, a small clan that sought to establish its own district, and Ogaden sub-clans. A
border dispute between the Guji and Gedeo exploded into large-scale fighting in 1998 over
control of Hagere Mariam district. Land disputes triggered by administrative boundary
changes incited a confrontation between the Guji and Boran in June 2006, causing at least
100 deaths and massive displacement. Some 70,000 fled the border area between Oromiya
and Somali after conflict erupted between Boran and Garri over a borehole. By a very
conservative estimate, several thousand people were killed in inter-ethnic conflicts in
Ethiopia between 1991 and 2005’ (International Crisis Group, Ethiopia 2009: 25).
178 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

persons who might have mixed ethnic background or who are not interested in
being identified as members of one the ethnic groups in the country do not have
any citizenship rights. By making the right to citizenship being closely attached
with identification with ethnic identity, the constitution basically undermines
individuals’ right of citizenship.
The impact of ethnic politics is particularly sweeping for people who have
mixed ethnic identities. For people who live in urban areas or for people who come
from a mixed background ‘ethnicity has little relevance and is instead a threat to
the formation of a united Ethiopian society’ (Cohen 2006: 172). These people
who are sometimes referred to as ‘ethnic Ethiopians’ strongly reject identification
with any particular ethnic group and express their opposition to the current drift
towards consideration of the ethnic factor. In particular, members of the urban
educated middle classes who identify themselves as Ethiopians rather than with a
particular ethno-nationality feel degraded when the system obliges them to confess
allegiance to a particular national group. Due to the absence of a system that
accommodates their identity, the large group of persons with mixed origins and
the growing urban population are largely left out of the political process. Unless
reform measures are undertaken, a political system that persistently ignores or
violates the rights of individuals will face a political crisis sooner or later, since
the claim of protecting group rights without making any substantial effort in the
protection of individual rights is neither real nor achievable.
Due to the complexities in the structure of the regional units, people with
mixed backgrounds largely could only live freely in urban centres such as in Addis
Ababa and Dire Dewa that have ‘self-administration’ status that is not based on
the ‘national self-administration’ rights reserved for ethnic groups. Despite the
firm conviction in Ethiopian nationalism among people of diverse ethnic origins,
ethno-regional politicians perceive such people as counter revolutionaries who
want to bring back the past status quo. The situation is very complex in terms
of the high degree of assimilation and intermarriages among the various ethnic
groups in the country.
In the Ethiopian political dispensation, it is also debatable why the system
identified ethnicity as the only basis for political organisation in a country where
there are other identities that are as dominant as ethnic identities. Making ethnicity
supreme relegated other competing identities such as class, gender, regionalism
and religion to a meaningless secondary role. As Yonatan (2006) notes, ‘it would
be a historical blunder to view the country’s political malaise in the framework of
the question of nationalities only, thereby, implying the assumption that ethnicity
had been the sole rallying point in the political history of the Ethiopian state’
(p. 377).
One of the most important identities manifested in Ethiopia is related to
religious diversity. After the rise of political Islam elsewhere in other parts of the
world, it is gradually gripping the minds of members of the Ethiopian Muslim
community. Increasingly, many Muslims are now more and more identifying
themselves as Muslims rather than Oromo, Amhara or Tigray. For such people,
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 179

Muslims in ‘other’ ethnic groups are more important and closer to them than non-
Muslims within their own ethnic groups. Muslims are increasingly claiming their
rightful places in the country’s political structure. However, even in regions that
are predominantly Muslim such as Afar or Somali, the federal system singled out
ethnic identity over religious identity as the basis for political institution. The
other religious identity that is on the rise in Ethiopia relates to the charismatic
Protestant churches. The fast growth of such communities in Ethiopia has a cross-
cutting impact among the various ethnic groups, as these Christians give priority
to their religious values over their ethnic identity.
The other significant identity that has been important in Ethiopian history
is regional or provincial identity. The people living in regions such as Amhara,
Oromia and Tigray have strong regional sub-provincial identities. Despite their
bond of linguistic affinity, they strongly identity themselves with the regions
they have historically inhabited.12 In addition, there are also diverse sub-regional
identities within the regions. This historical identity has been disregarded in
the design of the Ethiopian federal system. Not only is the disregarding of such
regional peculiarities an act of discrimination but designing the Ethiopian federal
system with such regional and sub-regional identities could have also averted most
of the challenges of ethnic fragmentation and polarisations the federal project
has encountered.
In summary, by singling out ethnic identity as the only identity that deserves
political recognition, the Ethiopian federal design has compromised on the rights
of individuals, people with mixed ethnic backgrounds, religious and regional
identities. Consideration of such identities in the restructuring of the Ethiopian
federal system would not only positively contribute to reducing the adverse
impact of ethnic politics but would facilitate the building of a single political
community that is attached in many social fabrics. Thus, Ethiopian political
leaders need to rethink the foundation of the Ethiopian ethnic federal design and
re-engineer it with new principles that guarantee individual rights and cross-
cutting identities that may bring about stability to a country that has a fragile
political and economic system.

The Need for Consensus on Modes of Accommodating Ethno-regional

Demands in Ethiopia

Viewed against the complications related to the application of the ethnic federal
system in Ethiopia, the prime responsibility of the ruling regime and opposition
political groups is to work on bringing about consensus on the accommodation
of ethnic diversity. One of the most important factors that enabled many of the
democratic systems to survive is the fact that they worked through political

12 Regional identities such as Gojjam, Gondar, Wollo and Shewa, Wollega Borena
Adwa or Tenben, and others are important.
180 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

consensus. It is widely believed that ‘no democratic state can exist without some
degree of agreement on matters of fundamental consensuses’ (Lijphart 1968: 78).
Such negotiation and bargaining is particularly the hallmark of federal polities.
Whether we take the American or Swiss federal systems that have endured for
hundreds of years, the major building block of the systems is the attempt made
by the founding fathers to accommodate the interests and concerns of different
sections of society and of the political groupings.
Founding an enduring federal system is unsustainable if it has been established
without having the basic consensus, since federation is an agreement that is freely
and mutually consented to by different political groups. As Ghai (2000) reiterated,
‘successful autonomy arrangements which have been negotiated in democratic
and participatory ways have a better chance of success than those which are
imposed’ (p. 8). However, the achievement of such consensus in deeply divided
societies is a challenge. In such societies, ‘members not only cannot agree on the
nature, criteria and limits of justice but find the very discussion of them yet another
source of tension’ (Parekh 2000: 85). Despite all the challenges, the only option
available for such countries to move forward is through discussions to agree on
a minimum structure of authority and an accumulation of common interests and
values (Parekh 2000: 85).
To achieve such consensus, the constitution-making process has far-reaching
significance in post-conflict countries. The success of the constitution-making
process in such countries defines the future of the stability of the country. In many
post-conflict countries in Africa however, the constitution-making processes were
largely controlled and manipulated by those who wielded the gun as a political
weapon. This is fundamentally what happened in the Ethiopian context. The
deformity during the transitional period was repeated during the process of the
drafting and designing of the new constitution since the change of regime in
1991(Harbeson 2005: 147–8).
The scarcest commodity in the Ethiopian political market is consensus among
the various political groupings. It has now become clear that ‘the country’s
fascinating and remarkable experiment in ethnically-based federalism will
depend on compromise among different actors with different views and interests’
(Clapham 2006: 240). This is because there are diverse issues that are dividing
major political groups in the country:

It is not uncommon to see Ethiopians agreeing on nine out of ten issues but end up
without doing anything because they could not reach a consensus. Politics became
a zero-sum-game. The prevalent political trend among Ethiopians is ‘if you are
not with me you are against me’, and thus there are no compromises and meeting
each other half way. Political allegiance must be complete (Clapham 2006: 240).

The disagreement among the various political spectrum ranges from issues dealing
with what constitutes the major problems of the country, the country’s history,
the form of government needed, to the mode of addressing ethno-regional claims
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 181

and the national symbols of the country. There are also serious tensions emerging
over control of political power and economic resources among the different
ethnic groups.13
There seem to be different positions between the ruling elite and the opposition
parties on the need for national consensus and reconciliation. The major opposition
groups argue that the only option available to take the country’s political discourse
forward is reconciliation and consensus. Although the opposition groups agree
on the need for consensus in the country, there seems to be no well-articulated
alternative to the status quo. According to the regime, on the other hand, there is
already consensus on the structure and the democratic transition of the country. It
even argues that the 99.6 per cent win in the parliamentary seat by TPLF/EPRDF
in the 2010 general election demonstrates the existence of consensus among the
Ethiopian people on federal and democratic transition.
The major factor that has prevented national consensus among the political
groupings is the absence of political culture among the leftist political groupings
that emerged after the 1974 revolution. Before the absolute rule of Haile Selassie,
consensus and negotiation among the regional powers was not uncommon. The
agreement that was made between Emperor Yohannes IV and King Menelik at
Boru Meda in 1878 on power-sharing between the two rivals is a good example
of such traditional power-sharing in the past. However, Haile Selassie’s sweeping
centralisation process has seriously weakened this culture of negotiation, while the
arrival of the military regime cemented its extinction. Post-1991 rhetoric is also
largely characterised by exclusion of the groups who do not agree on the current
state structure.
The introduction of extreme Marxist ideology in the mainstream political
culture has been one of the major factors responsible for the absence of any serious
negotiation between political forces. The Marxist ideology and its political structure
are rooted in the application of democratic-centralism that requires utmost loyalty
from the subjects and any political forces. Due to such rigidity, the military regime
missed different opportunities to undertake consensus until its downfall in 1991.
The incoming TPLF/EPRDF, whose policies are heavily shaped by leftist ideology,
in the same way follows the utmost form of democratic centralism with a tendency
to either control all or lose every aspect of the political spectrum. Under the existing
status quo, dissent is considered a threat rather than an expression of democracy.
Due to such ideological commitment and rigidity of the leaders, in the last two
decades, the country has lost at least two opportunities that could have helped it to
forge consensus on major political issues dividing the country.14

13 Besides the common conflict for water and grazing land, during the 2005 general
elections, winning or losing the election was associated with certain ethnic groups. Even
the Public Prosecutor filed genocide charges against opposition leaders claiming that they
attempted to commit genocide against a specific ethnic group.
14 The changes of regime in 1991 as well as the huge public participation during the
2005 general elections have been wasted.
182 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

In the Ethiopian context, there is a fundamental need for consensus between

two contending groups that resulted largely from an interpretation of the
country’s history in terms of pro-Ethiopian nationalism and ethnic nationalism.
Since the inception of the Marxist-oriented ‘question of nationalities’ during the
students’ movement in the 1960s, Ethiopian nationalism has been at war with the
increasingly reiterated narrow ethnic nationalism. The labelling began at the outset
by a university student named Walleligne, who claimed ‘there is no Ethiopian
nationalism as such. It is a fake nationalism. Anyone speaking in the name of
Ethiopian nationalism is simply an Amhara chauvinist that is trying to reinstate
the old order’.
Since the post-1991 political status quo is structured based on attacking the
spirit of pan-Ethiopian nationalism, the ethnic nationalists increasingly intensified
their offensive against those groups of society who have strong Ethiopian sentiment.
There is a clear position taken by the contemporary rulers of the country that they
do not have any regard for Ethiopian nationalism and the leaders publicly declare
that Ethiopian history is only hundreds of years old. The late Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi was quoted as saying that the Ethiopian flag is just a piece of garment,
which was viewed as being degrading to Ethiopian nationalism. There has also
been extended propaganda claiming that talking about Ethiopian unity is aimed
at bringing back the Neftegna system, although that political force has been out
of power for a very long time. For ethnic nationalists, pan-Ethiopian nationalism
is simply ‘Amhara chauvinism’ which has no support among the general public.
Although there are intentional policies devised by the government to weaken
the sense of Ethiopian nationalism, the latter appears to be still strong although it
has undergone transformation as it has survived numerous crises and challenges
in the past (Solomon 1993: 139). The strength of Ethiopian nationalism was
particularly revealed during the 2005 general elections. The Coalition for Unity
and Democracy Party’s (CUD) strong showing in Addis Ababa and other important
regional cities during the election suggests that the CUD’s ‘one Ethiopia’ message
has resonance beyond the ranks of the Amhara community’ (Harbeson 2005:
156). Although pan-Ethiopian nationalism is well accepted beyond the traditional
‘Amhara box’, advocates of the existing status quo attempt to discourage the
revival of pan-Ethiopian nationalism, labelling it a disguise to return to the pre-
1991 epoch of ethnic domination.
Currently there appears to be deep suspicion between the two political camps.
On the one hand, ethno-regional political parties discredit Ethiopia’s history and
the notion of unity, while extreme pan-Ethiopian nationalists pay scant attention
to linguistic and cultural diversity and dismiss the current ethnic federal project
as a ‘divide and rule’ tactic to disintegrate Ethiopia and maintain the hegemonic
position of Tigrayans. This difference between the two forms of nationalism
extends to the divergent view on the role of ethnic and Ethiopian nationalism.
For proponents of ethnic nationalists, a person first identifies himself or herself
with their ethnic identity before embracing Ethiopian nationality. This premise is
symbolised in the preamble of the constitution that reiterates that it is a contract
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 183

between ‘nations and nationalities’ and not necessarily among the ‘Ethiopian
people’. It is a clear indication of the intention of the makers of the constitution
that there are no ‘Ethiopian people’ as persons only become part of the Ethiopian
polity when they identify themselves with one or the other ethnic groups in the
country. Thus, for such ethnic nationalists, Ethiopian nationalism is not necessarily
above ethnic nationalism. On the other hand, pan-Ethiopian nationalists argue that
the country needs to develop a common Ethiopian nationalism that is well above
ethnic identities, since Ethiopian nationalism could serve as a countervailing force
against narrow ethnic nationalism (Solomon 1993: 139).
There are different moderate and hard line versions in each category.
Among the ethnic-based political groups, some of them maintain the old and
more extreme position of secession as a solution to the ethnic problems of the
country. There are also other moderate, ethnic-based political groups that wish to
address ethnic-based concerns, particularly those related to the implementation
of genuine federalism within the context of Ethiopia as a political community.
The pan-Ethiopian nationalist group has also two faces. On the one hand, there
are political moderates who are uncomfortable with identity politics but feel that
the solution to the country’s problems can be addressed within the framework of
political accommodation, and those that reject the claims of ethnic oppression by
ethno-nationalists and any kind of ethnic-based political engagement, including
ethnic federalism.
Despite the disparities between the two groups, there are positive developments
in the rhetoric of ethno-nationalist groups. On the one hand, the announcement
made by the OLF faction to abandon its secessionist agenda in January 2012 was
an important step towards narrowing the gap between pan-Ethiopian and ethnic
nationalist political groupings. Another Oromo nationalist group formed by
veteran OLF leaders named as the Oromo Democratic Front (ODF) announced in
March 2013 that it is committed to struggle for democratising Ethiopia rather than
resorting to its former secessionist rhetoric.
In addition to this, the regime’s tactic to divide the pan-Ethiopian and ethnic
nationalist political groupings has created suspicion among the political groupings.
Opponents of the secessionist doctrine or Ethiopian nationalists are depicted by
the regime as ‘chauvinists’ while ethnocentric groups are labelled as ‘narrow
nationalists’. Ethnic-nationalist groups such as the OLF are accused by the regime
of supporting the right to secession, which does not stand for a strong union
of peoples. TPLF/EPEDF argues that OLF prefers ‘either a powerless central
government and an all-powerful regional government or the disintegration of the
country so that they can rule over their region in the name of their nationality’
(TPLF/EPRDF’s Strategies 1996). On the other hand, according to TPLF/EPRDF,
pan-Ethiopian nationalist parties such as CUD are chauvinists who do not want the
protection of the self-determination of nations and nationalities.
In light of such deeper mutual suspicion, the most important political consensus
needed in the country is to balance the pan-Ethiopian and ethnic nationalist
political interests in the country. Since the idea of creating a political community
184 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

on the basis of particular identities within the process of forging a larger political
identity on the basis of citizenship is not an easy task, consensus requires careful
negotiations between these contending claims until the right balance is achieved.
The task ahead for the new builders of Ethiopian nationalism seems to be ‘creating
a notion of nationalism that transcends the old and accommodates the new’
(Solomon 1993: 150).
Some scholars argues that achieving this consensus, ‘with material advance
and fulfilment of the constitutional aspiration to create a single, living political
community and an integrated economy, Ethiopians will also come to feel the need
for an animated, particularistic sense of their common Ethiopian identity’ (Andreas
2010: 12). But it is doubtful how this could achieve the desired result of national
unity without prior consensus among the political forces on major political issues.
Emergence of ethnic conflict in the heart of Europe and elsewhere indicates that
economic development does not necessarily pacify ethnic differences. In addition
to this, a significant economic development that enables Ethiopians to get out of
ethnic barracks and embrace Ethiopian identity is unlikely to be achieved in the
near future.
Despite such realities, the regime seems to be convinced in recent times that
it will bring ‘common values’ through mobilisation of the resources for economic
development under the guise of the developmental state model. The government
has been engaged in the construction of roads, huge hydroelectric dams and
railways as well as aggressively using its media to propagate the developmental
model among the public. On the other hand, the regime has further narrowed down
the political space to opposition groups, the media and civil society groups in the
post-2005 political discourse.
The most acceptable platform on which to address the political crisis in the
country is to narrow the gap between the two contending versions of nationalism.
The challenges should be primarily addressed through ensuring that citizens
have an ‘overarching loyalty’ to the federation as a whole in addition to loyalty
towards their own sub-unit. In the light of this, there is a need for a new version
of Ethiopianism that combines ethnic and national identity. This new proposed
version of Ethiopia does not mean having ‘a single culture, or a single religion and
a single God, or speaking a single language among others’ (Tecola 2010).
As scholars of federalism argue, to achieve an inclusive federal policy
‘resources must be directed to such things as national flags, anthems, education,
arts councils and broadcasting corporations. The territory must be bound together
by a network of railways and airlines’ (Fidler 1991: 10). There have been recent
attempts by the regime to build national images through different mechanisms
such as holding an annual flag day and a day of nations and nationalities where the
various communities of the country meet to share their experience and cultures.
Although the approach is commendable, such occasions are widely viewed
as propaganda tactics by a regime that lacks legitimacy which are intended to
show the workability of the federal system. If such measures are accompanied by
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 185

endorsement from various political groupings, they could breed a wider national
image over ethnic national tendencies.
Similarly, there is a need for consensus on the history of the country among
the divergent political forces. At one extreme, pan-Ethiopian nationalists contend
that the Ethiopian state has some 3,000 or more years of history while ethno-
regional political groups argue that the country’s history is a little over 100 years
and dates from the late nineteenth century. Ethno-regional forces discredit past
achievements as colonial or ethnic operations by the Amhara. In contrast, pan-
Ethiopian nationalists, although they accept the misdeeds of the past, view past
attempts by different feudal emperors as nation-building efforts. Due to such
divergent outlooks, ethno-centric and pan-Ethiopian nationalists have released
their own historical versions, neither of which gives an appropriate picture of the
past. The interpretation has largely contributed to a lack of consensus on major
issues in the country. In order to bring about sustained peace and stability to the
nation, there is a need for an appreciation of the shared history that will serve as
the foundation of the new system formed to create political consensus.
There is also a deep ideological gap among the political elites that has been
an obstacle to meaningful consensus in the country. Although many of the
political figures in the opposition party were part of the students’ movement
that took Marxism as a religious dogma, they seem to have embraced values of
liberal democracy, while the ruling elite remains deeply entrenched in its Marxist
orientation. After the end of the Cold War, as the ruling elite could not maintain
an official communist ideology, there seems to have been an attempt to revive
Marxism under the guise of ‘revolutionary democracy’. In addition, although the
regime formally endorses democratic values such as a multi-party system, free and
fair elections, independent media and freedom of citizens to express themselves
freely and form their own associations, there has never been any meaningful
evidence to suggest that the regime has conviction and commitment towards such
political endeavours.
In light of the absence of a governing national ideology in the political market,
there are different uncertainties about the future of the country, given the sharp
divisions on major political issues. If the ruling elite are weakened because of
internal cracks or external pressures, the direction the country could take creates
concern, given the abject poverty in the country and ethnicisation of the political
discourse in the last two decades:

If this multi-ethnic federal state experiment fails, no one knows what the future
holds. Whether a nationwide consensus on some other form of (federal) state
could be forged is unknown and, at this point, unknowable. In the absence of a
nationwide consensus on a successor form of state, the collapse of the Ethiopian
state per se, as happened from late eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century,
cannot be ruled out altogether. Alternatively, the military may once again seize
power. All that can be concluded provisionally is that the viability and durability
of ethnic federalism is indeterminate. Contingent events will shape the outcome
186 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

of the politically fragile ethnic federal experiment. For now, the stability of the
infant political system is dependent on the dominant front (EPRDF) (Alem
2004: 1150).

Despite the consequences, the regime is increasingly becoming repressive,

without sparing any political space for other political forces, while opposition
groups are increasingly becoming desperate due to the marginalisation tendencies
of the regime. More and more political groups are dropping out of the peaceful
political discourse and resorting to violent means to achieve their objectives. A
political crisis that may happen in such a situation may once again throw the
country into a cycle of violence that may dismantle the whole social fabric.
To calm down the volatile situation, the ruling regime and the opposition groups
need to find political solutions to the country’s political stand-off by reaching
consensus on major political issues, such as the role of ethnic identity in political
discourse, interpreting the country’s history, agreeing on major democratic values
and establishing democratic institutions. This consensus will enable the political
forces to develop a democratic multicultural federal system that balances ethno-
regional claims, while preserving national unity and stability.

Summary

The right to ‘self-determination of nations, nationalities and peoples’ that includes

the right to secession is a fundamental principle that has been entrenched under the
Ethiopian constitutional system. Due to such an unprecedented move, the principle
has become the single most important source of controversy in modern Ethiopian
political discourse. Although the incorporation of the principle has its own merits
in terms of protecting the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic groups, it has
also become a source of societal division and mistrust. The incorporation of this
ideological rhetoric is closely related to the political program of TPLF/EPRDF. As
a Marxist oriented party that emerged out of the radical students’ movement, TPLF/
EPRDF’s political ideology is entrenched in the ‘right to self-determination of
nationalities’, including the right to secession. TPLF’s ‘right to self-determination’
claim was initially advanced for the Tigray people against perceived Amhara
repression. Later, when it became apparent that the movement would defeat the
military regime with the help of EPLF, the right to self-determination, which, was
initially designed for Tigray, was generously extended to other ethnic groups by
establishing different satellite parties that represented the major ethnic groups in
the country.
The constitution of 1995 incorporated the political programme of TPLF/
EPRDF on the ‘right to self-determination up to secession’ as the pillar of the
political system. The constitution vests power in ethnic groups by providing
sovereign power ‘in the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia’. Nations
and nationalities have been granted the right of self-determination including the
 The Principle of the Right to Self-determination 187

right to secession. Accordingly, every ‘nation, nationality and people’ in Ethiopia

has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to
establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable
representation in state and federal governments. The federal system has registered
a significant achievement in terms of protecting the linguistic and cultural rights
of the various ethnic groups by allowing regional governments to determine their
own language and develop their culture. Nevertheless, the ethnic federal structure
is criticized in the way the ethnic federal structure was introduced, the divisive
nature of the structure and the motives behind it as well as whether there is real
political commitment to apply the principles of ethnic federalism in the country.
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 Chapter 7
The Implications of Party Ideology in the
Structure and Function of Ethiopia’s
Ethnic Federal System

In addition to the ethnicisation of the political landscape in Ethiopia during

the past two decades, the Marxist-oriented ideological concepts maintained by
TPLF/EPRDF have seriously affected the structure and function of the federal
system. In democratic federations, relations between the central and regional
governments as well as between the horizontal relations of the legislatures and the
executive and judicial organs of government are largely regulated by the principles
incorporated under the constitution. In the Ethiopian federal system, not only
does the constitution fail to provide adequate checks and balances but also the
system is largely regulated by ideological policies pursued by the regime rather
than the merits of the constitution. In addition to this, some of the constitutional
principles dealing with the structure of the state are heavily influenced by leftist
ideological perceptions.
This chapter discusses the structure of the Ethiopian federal system and the
impact of ideologically motivated party policies that seriously affect the formal
constitutional system. The separation of powers between the central and regional
governments as well as the various organs of the central government are largely
influenced by the leftist orientation of TPLF/EPRDF. The most widely exploited
ideological principles that regulate relations between the federal and regional state
structures include ideals of revolutionary democracy, democratic centralism and
the party evaluation mechanisms. This chapter addresses the ideological principles
which are the major policy instruments that have regulated the state structure
rather than the constitutional provisions in Ethiopia.

Vertical Separation of Power under the Ethiopian Federal System

One of the salient features of federations is the division of power between the
centre and the constituent units. For this relationship to be viable, it is essential that
the competencies of shared-rule and self-rule be balanced and there are effective
institutions and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation among all units, but
especially between the regional units and the centre. In other words, each organ
needs to have some kind of exclusive power in which the other will not interfere.
There appear to be three general trends in the distribution of power between the
190 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

centre and the regional units in structuring federations. The first approach is through
conferring a list of exclusive powers to the federal government and leaving the
residual powers to the constituent states. A second approach involves identifying
a list of jurisdictions pertaining to the federal and constituent states respectively
with an added clause that accords residual powers to the federal government. The
third trend is to draw up two lists of powers for federal and concurrent jurisdictions
while all residual powers are left to the states. Following the second approach, the
constitution of Ethiopia enumerates the competencies of the federal government
while leaving the residual powers to the regional governments.

Competencies of the Federal Government

In line with the experiences of other federations, the Ethiopian federal constitution
provides for different competencies to be made available to the central government.
The powers of the central government are enumerated under the constitution
while the ‘residual competencies’ are said to be left to the states. In addition to
the typical competencies of central government like defence, foreign relations and
fiscal powers, the constitution stipulates that a number of key areas be allocated
to the federal government, which, in effect undermines the claim that the states
maintain residual powers.
The powers of the federal House of Peoples Representatives provided under
Art.55 of the constitution further elaborate the law-making competencies of the
federal government including formulating policy, establishing national standards,
defence, enacting laws on the utilisation of land and natural resources as well as
other important provisions. The federal government also has wider powers in the
area of taxation. The sweeping powers governing taxation that have been granted
to the central government have seriously affected the balance of power between
the centre and the regional governments.
In addition to the extensive taxation powers of the federal government, the
power of the central government in relation to implementing ‘national policy
principles and objectives’ provided under chapter ten of the constitution enable it
to formulate economic, cultural and social policies that have significant impact on
the autonomy of the states. The challenge is apparent in light of the fact that the
regional states have also been empowered to ‘formulate and execute economic,
social and development policies and strategies’. Due to the multiplicity of
competencies, the role of each level of government on such economic and social
policy issues is far from clear. Despite the apparent conflict of interests, there have
not been conflicts in practice since the centre and the regional states are for the
time being administered by a single political party.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 191

Competencies of Regional Governments

The Ethiopian constitution allocates various jurisdictions to the regional units that
consist of nine member states.1 In principle, all the federal units have symmetrical
powers and duties despite their disparity in terms of economic development and
population size. The constitution confers a list of exclusive powers on the federal
government leaving residual powers to the constituent states. Since the federal
government already takes many of the key powers up, the exclusive powers
granted to the regional governments are mainly of an administrative nature.2
The powers and duties of the regional units are exhaustively enumerated under
regional constitutions that largely have a structure and principles similar to the
federal constitution.3
In terms of revenue collection, regional states have exclusive tax jurisdiction
on state and private enterprises, collecting fees for land usufructory rights, private
farmers’ income from transport services and other powers of taxation that have
limited financial output. Art. 95 of the federal constitution outline the basic
principle for the sharing of revenue between the federal government and the states.
Despite the constitutional right to levy taxes, the regions do not have the right
to change their tax bases as a means to increase their revenues. The tax level
is largely standardised and harmonised all over the federation and is set by the
Ministry of Finance.
The limited role of the regions in the area of tax collection has in turn affected
the independence of the regions in terms of exercising their autonomy. The
narrow tax base of the states has made the regional governments depend heavily
on federal financial assistance, since tax sources that yield limited amounts of
revenue have been allocated to the states (Solomon 2008: 1670). But ironically
some scholars view such dependency as a blessing in disguise that may help to

1 According to Art. 47(1) of 1 FDRE constitution, member States of the Federal

Democratic Republic of Ethiopia are: The State of Tigray, The State of Afar, The State of
Amhara, The State of Oromia, The State of Somalia, The State of Benishangul/Gumuz, The
State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, The State of the Gambela Peoples
and The State of the Harari People.
2 Regional governments have powers such as to establish a state administration that
best advances self-government, to enact and execute the state constitution and other laws;
to formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans
of the State; to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws;
to levy and collect taxes and duties on revenue sources reserved to the States and to draw
up and administer the State budget; to enact and enforce laws on the State civil service and
their condition of work; to establish and administer a state police force, and to maintain
public order and peace within the State (FDRE constitution, Art. 52(2).)
3 For instance, Art. 50 of Gambela, Art. 47 of Ormiya and Art. 47 of SNNPR state
constitutions have the same wording enumerating all the powers of the regional governments
assigned to them under the federal constitution.
192 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

discourage secessionist tendencies arising when there is a sense of viability and

independence (Yoanatn 2008: 443).
The other fundamental feature of the competencies of regional power under
the Ethiopian constitution is related to the adoption of constitutions by regional
governments. Despite the relative obscurity of state constitutions, they have
helped the regions in defining the powers and duties of government at regional
level. Historically, state constitutions are characteristics of ‘coming together’
forms of federation such as in the United States and Switzerland. The constitutions
of the states helped regional units to maintain their specific historical and cultural
heritage. In ‘holding together’ forms of federations, states do not usually have
their own constitutions. Powers and duties of federations are largely determined
by other forms of legislation based on the federal constitution. In cases where
regional constitutions are permitted, the federal constitution provides specific
principles to be incorporated by the regional constitutions or in cases where there
is no regional constitution federations have laid down major principles that need to
be followed by the states.4 The provision of such basic requirements helps to keep
the integrity and predictability of the federal system compared to having regional
constitutions that complicate the efficiency of the entire system.
Since the constitutions of the regions under the Ethiopian federation have been
enacted without being fully absorbed into the federal constitutional system, this
has brought about certain difficulties. As diverse forces – without any counter-
balancing centripetal force – dominate the federation, the existence of state
constitutions has further strengthened secessionist tendencies and is used to
repress minorities within their borders. The fact that the regional governments are
structured entirely based on ethnic identity, state constitutions are literally used to
legitimise who is first and who is second citizen in the regions.5
The other challenge of having regional constitutions in such an ethnically
modified federation is that they are made without institutional mechanisms that
interpret or apply constitutional principles. Neither ordinary courts of law nor
constitutional courts that interpret and enforce constitutional rights and principles
exist in the country. In addition to this, the federal constitution fails to provide
guidelines to be followed by regional constitutions. In the absence of such
institutions, state constitutions may be used to deepen repression, discrimination
and division.
The status of regional constitutions in relation to federal laws is not clear
since the supremacy of federal law over the law of the states has not been fully
established under the federal constitution. The fact that the constitution does not
provide principles on how conflicts between the two levels of government are to
be resolved or what recourse regional governments may have when their power

4 In this regard, the Nigerian and Indian constitutions lay down principles on the
organisation of state structures.
5 Such discriminatory concepts are clearly incorporated in the constitutions of
Oromia, Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 193

is compromised by an act of the central government has further weakened the

position of the regions. Furthermore, the fact that regional governments do not
have any power in influencing the lawmaking process in the centre, as is the
practice in many federations, exposes the federal nature of the Ethiopian structure
to doubt.

Intergovernmental Relations and the Role of Party Ideology

Intergovernmental relations are an inevitable feature of functioning federations.

Depending on the relationship between the central and regional governments,
federations can be classified as cooperative or competitive. As has been indicated
earlier, in the Ethiopian context, the relationship between the two levels of
government is regulated by different rules that are written and unwritten. The
political relationship between the regional and federal governments is regulated
by both formal structures defined in the constitution and various proclamations
and practices outside the legal framework that are more or less formalised (Aalen
2002: 70). In other words, the federal system has a de jure intergovernmental
relationship that is largely regulated by formal constitutional and legal principles.
On the other hand, the relationship between the central and regional governments
is largely regulated by TPLF/EPRDF’s de facto informal party ideology. In the
sections that follow, the parameters of de jure and de facto power relationships
between the two levels of government is analysed, along with the ways the party
ideology has been used to undermine the constitutional system.

The Loopholes in De jure Intergovernmental Relations in Ethiopia’s

Federal System

Since the structures and functions of the Ethiopian federal system have been largely
governed by ideologically motivated principles, the formal intergovernmental
relationships became victims of the ideological convictions of the party. In normal
circumstances, there are a number of constitutional intergovernmental issues
that may arise when divergent political powers control the centre and regional
governments. One of the cases whereby an intergovernmental relationship arises
is in the determination of the secession clause of the constitution. According to
the Ethiopian constitution, after the council of the respective region approves
the request for secession, the federal government has to organise a referendum
within three years and the secession will be effective after some procedural issues
are settled. For such procedures to be implemented, there shall arise a situation
whereby the determination of the results of the referendum, implementing
the secession process, delimiting the boundary for the newly-formed state and
resource division would result in sharp conflict. Until now, since the regime
claims that rights of peoples have been properly respected and a single political
group has controlled the entire political system, there has not yet been any serious
constitutionally initiated demand for secession.
194 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

The other instance whereby serious intergovernmental relationships may

arise is in the case of border disputes between the regional governments. The
constitution provides that where the concerned states fail to reach an agreement
on border related issues, the House of Federations shall decide such disputes on
the basis of settlement patterns and the wishes of the peoples concerned (Art.
48, FDRE constitution). Due to the non-alignment between the primordial ethnic
boundaries and the administrative boundaries, there have been border conflicts
between the various regions in the country that required the intervention of the
central government.6 In this respect, the House of Federations has undertaken a
referendum to decide on some of the boundary-related conflicts between different
regions. However, when a situation arises that allows different political groups to
control the various regional structures, border issues would be one of the daunting
tasks that need to be addressed through complex intergovernmental relations.
In relation to the exclusive powers granted to the federal government,
numerous intergovernmental relations may also arise. The most significant
intergovernmental relations arise in relation to the powers granted to the federal
government is formulating and implementing the country’s policies, strategies
and plans in respect of overall economic, social and development matters. The
constitution suggests that not only the economic and social policies adopted by
the federal government are to be implemented in the regions, but also that the
regions need to take into consideration the federal guidelines in formulating their
own policies.
Until now, issues relating to demarcating the scope of the two levels of
government in terms of economic and social policies have not been raised since
all the regions as well as the central government are administered by a single
party and the relationship between the federal and state governments is conducted
largely along informal party structures. Challenges would arise when different
political parties would come to power at the centre and periphery. In order to
address such challenges, there has to be a clear provision that guides this complex
intergovernmental relationship in terms of policy formulation and implementation.
Discussing the experience of other federations in this regard is worthwhile.
Under the German constitution, the federation shall have the right to legislate
on matters if and to the extent that the establishment of equal living conditions
throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity
renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest.7 In all other cases, the
Länder have the power to formulate economic and social policies. The German
constitution has also made it clear that the duty of the Länder is to implement federal
laws. In the case of Ethiopia, in the absence of any specific rule on the role and
duty of the regions to formulate policy issues and implement federal laws, it is very

6 The House of Federations has attempted to resolve border conflicts between Somali
and Oromo regional governments through referendum though the result of the referendum
could not resolve the problem.
7 Art. 72 (2), German Basic Law.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 195

ambiguous how such economic and social policy matters should be implemented by
the regions. The other instance whereby intergovernmental relations arise is in the
case of establishing national standards. The constitution provides that the federal
government is responsible for establishing and implementing national standards
and basic policy criteria for public health, education, science and technology (Art.
51(3) and Art. 55(2)(f), FDRE constitution). But the role of regional governments
in the setting as well as the implementation of such standards is far from clear. The
role of the federal and regional states also needs to be amplified in cases where the
former executes its role of regulating inter-state commerce.
The other important area of intergovernmental relationship that has received
attention in the last few years relates to security matters. The constitution allows
deployment of federal defence forces to arrest a deteriorating security situation
within the requesting state when its authorities are unable to control it (Art. 51(14),
FDRE constitution). The intervention of the federal government in the regions
has been elaborated in separate legislation.8 According to the proclamation, there
are three ways that federal government intervenes to address security issues.
The first case of federal intervention is based on the request of regions when
the security situation is beyond their control. The other cases that induce federal
intervention is when an act of violation of human rights is deemed to have been
committed in violation of the provision of the human rights principles stipulated
in the constitution and laws and when the law enforcement agency and the
judiciary are unable to arrest such violation. Though the need may arise for the
federal government to intervene in such time of crisis, such scenarios had not
been envisaged under the constitution. In addition, granting such wider power
to the central government by an ordinary legislation has undermined the powers
of the regional units granted under the federal constitution and raises issues of
unconstitutionality. Since the commission of ‘human rights violation’ in a given
regional state is left to the interpretation of the federal government, the power to
intervene gives the federal government the power to take measures whenever it is
convinced there has been ‘violation of human rights’.
Furthermore, the proclamation allows the intervention of the federal
government in the regions when ‘the constitutional order’ is endangered. The legal
basis for this intervention seems to be the power granted to the House of Federation
to order federal intervention if any state endangers the constitutional order
(Art. 62(9), FDRE constitution). The proclamation prescribes what constitutes
‘endangerment of the constitutional order’ to incorporate cases of armed uprising;
resolving conflicts between regions or nations, or between nationalities or people
of different regions that resort to non-peaceful means; disturbance of peace and
security of the federal government. When the said acts are committed, the House
of Federations may order the council of ministers to investigate the matter or the
council of minister may, by its own initiative, investigate the matter and submit

8 Such powers are provided under Pro. No 359/2003, A Proclamation to provide for a
System for the Intervention of the Federal Government in the Regions.
196 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

its report to the House of Federation. After examining the report, if it finds it
necessary, the House of Federation authorises the federal government to intervene.
The measures to be taken by the federal government in such cases of
intervention include giving directives to the prime minister to deploy the federal
police or national defence force, depending on the seriousness of the problems to
arrest the danger as well as to decide to set up a provisional administration that
is accountable to the federal government by suspending the state council and the
highest executive level of the region. The wider scope of the intervention by the
federal government totally sweeps away the pillar of the very federal system that
grants sovereignty to ‘nations, nationalities and people’. This is a typical case,
which indicates that the whole exercise of the federal system is designed to give
regional governments the power only to address their cultural or linguistic rights
rather than addressing their rights to self-determination.
There are also issues of intergovernmental relations in the enactment of laws
and judicial powers. According to the constitution, the federal government is
responsible for the enactment of labour, commercial and penal codes. However,
the states may enact penal laws on matters that are not specifically covered by
the federal penal legislation. In judicial matters, there are two cases whereby
intergovernmental relationships come into play. The first is in relation to the
role of regional courts in exercising federal jurisdiction. According to Art. 80 of
the federal constitution, regional supreme courts exercise the jurisdiction of the
federal high court while regional high courts shall exercise the jurisdiction of the
federal first-instance court. In addition to this, the Federal Supreme Court has the
power of cassation over any final court decision containing a basic error of law.
This power of cassation is applicable to the final decisions of the supreme courts
of the regions. But there is no appellate jurisdiction to the federal courts against
the final decision of state courts. It is dubious how the Federal Supreme Court has
such power of cassation without any appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of
regional courts.
There are also a number of intergovernmental issues to be raised in terms of
‘political, economic, social and cultural’ objectives of the government that are
provided for under Art. 88–92 of the FDRE constitution. These rights extend
from the power of the government to achieve equitable distribution of wealth,
provide special assistance to the least advantaged ‘nations, nationalities and
peoples’, access to public health and support for cultural heritage. On the other
hand, regional governments also have such policy objectives. Unless the scope
of the federal government and regional governments in the implementation of
such policy objectives is clearly specified, conflict may arise relating to interests
between the two levels of governments.
One of the bedrock principles of the constitution is to allow ‘nations and
nationalities to develop their own language, to express and promote their own
culture and preserve its history’. On the other hand, Art. 91(1) of the constitution
provides that the federal government shall have the duty to support the growth
and enrichment of cultures and traditions that are compatible with fundamental
 The Implications of Party Ideology 197

rights, human dignity, democratic norms and ideals. As clearly indicated under
this provision, the government supports only those cultures that are supposed
to be compatible with fundamental rights, indirectly endorsing the concept of
multiculturalism in democratic societies that reiterates the belief that the rights of
cultural groups are tolerated as far as they are compatible with the international
fundamental rights of individuals. The Ethiopian constitution’s claim of protecting
cultures that are compatible with fundamental human rights suggests that the
tolerance of cultures is only applicable to cultural values that are consistent with
liberal principles. Such an argument implies that the federal government may
intervene within the regions that abuse the right of non-indigenous communities in
the name of ‘rights of self-determination’. Nevertheless, there has never been any
significant intervention made by the federal government on the abuse of culture-
related rights by regional governments. If the federal government chooses to do
so, complex intergovernmental relations may arise in the case of such culture-
related matters.
The other important intergovernmental relationships that arise relates to
federal assistance and revenue sharing. In principle, the central government and
the regions are supposed to bear all their respective financial expenditures (Art. 78
(1), FDRE constitution). There are only a small number of taxation areas which
the two tiers of government jointly administer.9 It is, however, not clear whether
each of the governments will exercise their powers on various tax layers or if it
is legislating the share of the two governments in jointly adopted law (Solomon
2008: 139). A proclamation that was enacted before the adoption of the constitution
made it clear that the revenues that are jointly administered by central and regional
governments shall be levied and collected by the central government and shared
with the regional governments (Solomon 2008: 141). But the constitution provides
that the federal government may grant to states emergency, rehabilitation and
development assistance and loans and it has the power to inspect and audit the
utilisation of these grants. In this respect, the most important area of dependence
of the regions to the central government is in relation to federal grants.
The central government uses its total grip on revenue and public expenditure
to control regional policies. It transfers grants to the regions using a formula
that takes into consideration the size of population of each region and its level
of development. Due to the disagreements that have been raised frequently
in the allocation of grants by the regions, the House of Federation has had to
revise the sharing formula on several occasions. Due to the fact that the federal
government controls most of the areas of taxation, the regions are increasingly
dependent on the central government financially and this indirectly undermines

9 The Federal Government and the States shall jointly levy and collect profit, sales,
excise and personal income taxes on enterprises they jointly establish, on the profits of
companies and on dividends due to shareholders, on incomes derived from large-scale
mining and all petroleum and gas operations, and royalties on such operations (Art. 98,
FDRE constitution).
198 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

their right to self-administration. The revenue sharing or the grant system used by
the federal government obliges states to strictly follow the political and economic
programmes of the federal government that helps the central government to control
the policymaking process both at national and regional levels (Paulos 2007: 357).
Due to such dependency, none of the regional governments has the freedom to
set their regional development priorities because their spending decisions are
overwhelmingly influenced by the central government’s programme priorities.10
Due to such complexities, budgetary and taxation areas will continue to be among
the areas where complicated intergovernmental relations will develop in the future
when various political forces participate in the central and regional politics of
the federation.
In addition to such de jure intergovernmental relations, a federal institution
that facilitates intergovernmental relations has been established. This institution,
designated as The Ministry of Federal Affairs, serves as a focal point in
creating a good federal–regional relationship and cooperation, based on mutual
understanding and partnership – thereby strengthening the federal system. The
establishment of this office is formalising the hitherto informal intervention of the
federal government into the affairs of regional governments through various ways.
Until the reforms of 2001, the advisers assigned from the centre were virtually
running the regional governments and hindering genuine self-administration. The
peripheral areas of Afar, Somali, Gambella and the Benishangul-Gumuz regions
have been governed by parties with stronger TPLF/EPRDF influences. Despite the
fact that the role of the federal government in providing assistance to the regions
has been more formalised in recent years, there is still a need for a transparent
and accountable intergovernmental relationship that protects the competence and
sovereignty of the regional governments.
Some of the powers granted to the Ministry of Federal Affairs also overlap
with the powers granted to the House of Federation and the regions themselves.
The most important overlap of jurisdictions is in relation to the settlement of
disputes. The FDRE constitution provides that if the states could not resolve their
disputes by themselves, the House of Federation shall make decisions on the
dispute. The same role has been granted to the Ministry of Federal Affairs. In view
of the conflicting jurisdictions, the roles of the Ministry of Federal Affairs need to
be exercised without prejudice the role of the regions and the House of Federation.

The Party Ideology and De facto Intergovernmental Relations

Compared to the formal de jure intergovernmental relations that have been

discussed in the preceding sections, de facto intergovernmental relations are

10 Such lack of the role of the regions in the formulation of the much acclaimed five
year Development and Transformation plan for 2010–15 is an apparent indication. The
regime at the centre has adopted the plan and approved by it the parliament without any
meaningful participation of the regions.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 199

highly shaped by the ideological principles followed by TPLF/EPRDF which have

unprecedented implications in the functioning of the Ethiopian federal system.
There are a number of ideological tools used by TPLF/EPRDF to influence the
autonomy of the regions. Looking at the role of inter-party relations in shaping
the scope of decentralisation and the balance of power between the centre and the
periphery in federations, it could be argued that since the Ethiopian federal system
is formulated and run by a single political group, the intergovernmental is entirely
influenced by the ideological ideals of the party in power rather than the principles
enshrined in the constitution.
This situation contradicts the very fundamentals of a democratic federal
system of government. Except in the case of former socialist federations where the
central party controlled the activities of the regional units, diverse party interests
coexist in democratic federations. In many of the federations, an effective federal
system has been achieved partly due to the degree of decentralisation of the party
system while in the case of the former socialist federations; a single political group
controls the centre and the periphery. Similar to the former Soviet experience, the
monopoly of power by a single party at federal and regional levels is evident in the
Ethiopian governing structure. The TPLF/EPRDF model of devolution of power
to the regions has resemblance to that of the former Soviet Union ‘since it involves
a strong vanguard party which reaches from the executive body in the national
capital down to the smallest of villages through a well-organised party network
that extends from the federal to the regional, from the regional to the Woreda, and
from the Woreda to the kebelle and sub-kebelle levels’ (International Crisis Group
2009: 15).
The complex relationships within the ruling party and its ideology are thus the
major source of the centralised and patronage relationships existing between the
federal and regional governments. Some of the features and ideological concepts
of TPLF/EPRDF relating to the formation of the party included the dominance of
TPLF in the coalition, the secretive and centralised decision-making process in
the party, the ideals of revolutionary democracy and the party evaluation system.
EPRDF is a party that consists of four parties that administer the four regional
governments. The Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) administers
Oromia, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) in Amhara
Regional State, the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF) in
Southern Regional State and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) which
operates in Tigray. Of the four parties, TPLF is the senior and dominant one
within the group. ANDM, OPDO and SEPDM leaders have ‘built their careers
largely on personal links with TPLF/EPRDF mentors rather than having their
own political base’ (International Crisis Group 2009: 16). Due to the creation of
the affiliated and member parties of EPRDF largely by TPLF, these parties do
not enjoy wider legitimacy in their respective regions. Since the legitimacy of
these local officials (except in Tigray where there is better legitimacy for TPLF)
is virtually non-existent in the respective regions, the local officials depend for
their survival on their submissive relationship with the centre by which they have
200 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

to obey instructions that come from the TPLF’s party network. This client–patron
relation has greatly affected relations between the centre and the periphery, which
have been monopolised by the central government dominated by TPLF.
The unequal relationships within the EPRDF coalition helped TPLF to become
the determinable force in regulating federal and regional power politics. According
to studies, ‘since the ruling party at federal level is Tigray-dominated, Tigrayan
interest is pursued and the Tigray regional state maintains an exceptional position
in the federation while the governments of other federal units remain weak and
practically ineffective’ (Aalen 2002: 46). Due to such an unprecedented monopoly
of the system by TPLF, some argue that ‘the application of ethnic identity as an
ideological principle under the constitution is an age-old strategy of divide and
rule by the Tigrayan elite who would otherwise not have wider support in view
of their minority background that represents only six per cent of the Ethiopian
population’ (Aalen 2002: 47).
The principle of democratic centralism is the major ideological concept that has
shaped intergovernmental relations between the central and regional governments
in Ethiopia. It has been observed in the last two decades that the principle that
governs the patron–client relationship between the TPLF/EPRDF, regional
members and affiliate parties has severely hampered a genuine democratisation
process in the country (International Crisis Group 2009: 17, Paulos 2007: 285).
Despite the fact that the constitution provides numerous powers to regional units,
due to the entrenched system of democratic centralism maintained by TPLF/
EPRDF, regional governments are expected to act in accordance with the party
position irrespective of the relevance of the policy to the region. Such application
of democratic centralism has brought about uniformity of policy from top to
bottom within the government structure:

Local and national government officials from opposite ends of the country all
seem to speak from the same script when it comes to the partisan administration
of government services, whether regarding identification cards, teacher training,
university entrance, or fertilizer and the safety net. This consistency indicates
a systematic government campaign to compel support for the ruling party and
convey that those who sympathize with the political opposition should expect
nothing from the government (Human Rights Watch 2010: 66)

Apart from being used to maintain discipline within the party, democratic
centralism is one of the major tools currently being used to regulate
intergovernmental relations. The principle is responsible for undermining
the separation of powers principle and the significance of official channels of
government as well as the accountability of the system. The aggressive use of
democratic centralism has significantly blurred the separation of government and
party structure at federal and regional levels. Since there is not a clear distinction
between party and government apparatus in the country (especially in lower
 The Implications of Party Ideology 201

administration), democratic centralism has made formal federal and regional

government relations irrelevant.
In the process of ensuring democratic centralism, members of TPLF/EPRDF
are allowed to express their views in meetings, but once decisions are reached,
they are obliged to implement those decisions. As has been found out by the
International Crisis Group, ‘these decisions are transmitted to party officials and
state administrators and must be adhered to’ (International Crisis Group 2009: 16).
The centralised decision-making process is evident in the structure of the decision-
making process itself within TPLF/EPRDF. The highest decision-making organ in
the party is the General Assembly of the organisation that is held every two years.
The other important-decision making organ is the 180-member council. In reality,
the real power of the organisation lies with the 36-member Executive Committee
of TPLF/EPRDF, which is responsible for the initiation and implementation of
policies. Major policy discussions are usually discussed and approved in this
committee before they enter into the formal government decision-making system.
The policy adopted at the Executive Committee level will easily pass to the
Council of Ministers and then to the parliament without any challenge. There is
not a need to get the consent of the states in the adoption of the policy, since there
is not any legal requirement to that effect. In addition to this, due to the fact that
many of the Executive Committee members are at the same time senior officials
of the regional governments, the consent or interest of the region is assumed to
be indirectly incorporated (International Crisis Group 2009: 16). Not only does
the policy initiative that passed from the Executive Committee reach the federal
legislative process easily, the regional councils will also be immediately instructed
through the party channel to adopt a similar policy. Through the entrenched
party structure, regional states immediately adopt the policy of the central
government. With the strengthening of the central government and the adoption
of identical plans of governance by all the regions, questions are being raised
about the meaning of ethnic-based federalism in the country (Medhane and Young
2003: 400).
The regime does not recognise its dominance of the power of regional
governments. The late prime minister Meles Zenawi defended the relationship
between the federal and regional governments in policy matters as ‘what the federal
government does is to set the national framework for development and that national
framework for development is articulated on the basis of consultation at all levels
and within that common framework the various regions are free to devise their
own development strategies’ (Forum for Federations 2010). Despite such rhetoric,
regional governments do not have any discretion to reject the policy adopted by
the federal government or the right to devise their own policy framework. In many
cases, the regional councils adopt federal policy decisions even without altering
the words in federal policy documents. After the policy decisions at federal and
regional levels are finalised, each local administration is required to implement
the policy. According to studies, kebele local administrations have particularly
202 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

become a useful method of control and political repression.11 Since the kebele
administrations are controlled by cadres of the governing party, ‘the chairman and
leaders closely follow the TPLF/EPRDF, rather than being representative voices
of the community’ (Yilmaz and Venugopal 2010: 12).
The other important tool that has been used to stifle regional autonomy
is the doctrine of revolutionary democracy. In accordance with the precepts of
revolutionary democracy, political power needs to be centralised under one organ.
Revolutionary democracy reflects an approach to governance and development in
a top-down approach through which political, economic and even social activity
must be directed either by the government or by the ruling party. Since revolutionary
democracy does not permit the existence of any independent institution in the
country or any real separation of powers, all institutions of government do not
have their own independent existence. Revolutionary democracy in principle
does not also tolerate an autonomous regional government that departs from the
agenda set by the central government or party structure. As things currently stand,
it seems unthinkable to have any real intergovernmental relations between the
central and regional governments as far as the merits of revolutionary democracy
are entrenched in TPLF/EPRDF party structures that have been superimposed on
the constitutional system.
The other mechanisms the ruling party uses to maintain its control in the
regions all down to kebele level is the gimgemma, which implies public evaluation
of politicians and bureaucrats by the party officials. To realise loyalty at local
level, the most effective mechanism used by the central TPLF/EPRDF party
structure has been using gimgemma at every level of party channel. Fearful of
gimgemma, regional party officials are not able to articulate the concerns and
interests of the local population or the region. They prefer to endorse official
party policies rather than attempting to respond to local political and economic
concerns. It is widely known that ‘any act of opposing TPLF/EPRDF party
programmes and policies results in expulsion from party membership, discourages
challenging the status quo, and makes lower-level politicians and office holders
insecure’ (Paulos 2007: 282). The aggressive use of gimgemma to maintain loyalty
has undermined the regional governments’ autonomy and stifled the prospect of
healthy intergovernmental relations.
The newly adopted developmental state model has also contributed in terms
of affecting the intergovernmental relations between the central and regional
governments. The doctrine assumes a government-led economic development
strategy that leads to total monopoly of the entire political and economic system
by a single political force. The aggressive application of the model in the last few
years has further narrowed down the limited political space by granting unlimited

11 ‘Citizens must go to kebele officials for a whole range of administrative functions,

including any kind of government documentation. In some cases, citizens must seek
kebele permission to repair their homes. If the kebele authorities do not consider a citizen
favourably, daily life can become extremely difficult’ (Human Rights Watch 2010: 15).
 The Implications of Party Ideology 203

power to the federal government to interfere and control social, economic and
political activities in the country. Due to such unprecedented control by the
government, much of the economic, social and political activities in the country
has forced citizens to be co-opted into the TPLF/EPRDF state and party machinery
for jobs or to improve their livelihoods.
In addition to this, the aggressive use of the developmental model rhetoric
has suffocated state structures and the intergovernmental relations of the federal
system by narrowing down the political space needed for the accommodation
of diverse political interests in the country. The recent practices and measures
undertaken in relation to ensuring development in the country have been observed
in terms of curbing some of the constitutional autonomy of regional governments.
In the last two years, the federal government has taken over much of the power
of the regions to administer the land through the pretext of delegation of some
of their rights to the federal government. At present, the federal government is
increasingly controlling agricultural and industrial plots of land in the regions
through a dubious process and the land is being distributed to foreign companies
by the central government.

Horizontal Structure of the Ethiopian Federal System and the Role of

Party Ideology

One of the salient features of federations is the application of the separation of

powers between the legislative, executive and judicial organs of state as well as
checks and balances maintained among the three branches of state. In presidential
systems such as in the United States, there exists strict separation of powers while
the separation of powers in parliamentary systems of government is blurred due to
the unity between the legislature and executive branches. In many of the countries
that adhere to the parliamentary form of government, to compensate the fusion of
power between the legislature and the executive, there is a strong constitutional
court or supreme court that keeps the balance of power within the limit.
In addition to this, the existence of freedom of the press and civil society
groups enables ordinary citizens to hold the state accountable for its actions. Due
to the high degree of transparency in democratic systems, public opinion plays an
important role in checking the authority of the state since government officials are
highly sensitive to public opinion. The role of opposition parties is also significant
in keeping the powers of government within the limits of the law. In exceptional
cases, federal democracies employ public referenda to control the power of
government. Such practice is very much integrated into the constitutional system
of some of the federations such as Switzerland.
Due to the fact that the country was not colonised, Ethiopia created modern
institutions earlier than many African countries. The first parliament in Ethiopia
was constituted in 1931 during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I. The
first constitution had provided for the establishment of a bicameral system of
204 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

parliament, namely Yeheg Mewesegna (the Senate) and Yeheg Memriya (Chamber
of Deputies). However, the parliament was shortly suspended at the beginning of
the Italian invasion in 1936 and it was reconvened after liberation in November
1942 (Markakis and Asmelash 1967: 203). The parliament acquired some
ceremonial prominence during this period, largely because of the Emperor used
it as a platform from which to address the nation (Markakis and Asmelash 1967:
203). At first, there was no election campaign to elect members of parliament;
rather the members of the Senate were elected directly by the monarch from the
noblemen and other prominent people. Similarly, the Chamber of Deputies was
constituted through indirect election with the electors mostly drawn from the
landed gentry.
After the revised constitution was adopted in 1955, members of the Chamber of
Deputies were elected by universal suffrage while members of the Senate continued
to be directly nominated by the emperor. The role of the parliament was largely
minimal since final legislative proposals only came to effect if the emperor concurred.
In other words, ‘the parliament was not a partner in the process of making decisions
but a body which had the right to scrutinise and comment on proposed decisions and
to give its approval’ (Markakis and Asmelash 1967: 212). Since the legislative and
executive powers were bestowed in the person of the emperor, development of the
principle of separation of powers was largely inhibited. The parliament was finally
dissolved in 1974 with the downfall of the monarchy.
After suspending the constitution, the Derg (the military junta) ruled the country
in the name of the Provisional Government up to the time when a constitution
was reintroduced in 1987. The Derg was both an executive and legislative organ
that provided and directed the activities of government departments. Later,
a new parliament was introduced through the constitution of 1987 and named
the National Shengo (Assembly). According to the constitution, the Shengo was
the supreme organ of state power in the country with the guidance of Marxism-
Leninism. According to the constitution, the term of the Shengo would be five
years. Organs of the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia, mass organisations, military units
and other bodies, nominated candidates to the national Shengo. After the fall of
the military regime in 1991, a Transitional Charter established an 87-member
transitional parliament which served as the legislative organ and was extended
until 1995. Finally, the FDRE constitution provided for the establishment of
two federal houses: the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of
Federation. Subsequent sections discuss the structure and functions of these two
houses as well as the implications of the ideological concepts of the TPLF/EPRDF
on these functions.

The House of Peoples’ Representatives and the Impact of Party Ideology

Under the FDRE constitution, the highest authority in the federal state is the
House of Peoples’ Representatives, which consists of 550 members who are
elected directly by the people for a term of five years. By making the House the
 The Implications of Party Ideology 205

highest decision-making organ in the political system, the constitution adheres

to the principle of parliamentary supremacy that reiterates the dominance of the
parliament over all other government institutions. This principle of parliamentary
democracy is practiced in countries such as the UK, Finland, New Zealand and
the former USSR. The superior position of the popularly elected legislature and
its majority rule has been a central principle for democratic revolutionaries since
the notion was first appended to the English constitution (Ginsburg 2003: 1).
The emergence of the parliamentary democracy system is historically due to ‘the
early proponents of democracy supported parliamentary sovereignty since they
saw threats to liberty from the traditional sources such as the ancient regime, the
monarchy, and the church’ (Ginsburg 2003: 1).
Though the concept of parliamentary supremacy has been instrumental in
terms of promoting democracy in different parts of the world, the darker side
of parliamentary sovereignty was portrayed during World War II, whereby a
‘popularly elected government’ committed untold horrors against its citizens. Due
to such horrors, post-war constitutional developments challenged the concept of
parliamentary sovereignty by creating a constitutional court that protected citizens
from excessive power which led to the rise of limited government in parliamentary
democracies. Nowadays, modern democratic states accept this idea of limited
government or constitutionalism. Though the concept of checking the power of the
parliament through judicial organs is not applicable in countries such as Finland
and the UK, the existence of a strong democratic tradition and rule of law protects
citizens from excessive power by the government. Other parliamentary systems
such as Germany have avoided the so-called concept of ‘supremacy of parliament’
though the parliament is the most important organ of their political system.
Though the backdrop to the concept of parliamentary supremacy being
incorporated into the Ethiopian system seems to mirror the traditional British
parliamentary system, the most likely incentive for adopting such form of
legislative system is closely linked to the revolutionary democracy ideal of TPLF/
EPRDF that does not recognise the separation of powers principle. Such a concept
of the supremacy of the legislature is a well-known principle in the Marxist model
of state formation. Particularly, the notion of ‘supremacy of the legislature’ is a
mechanism devised by Stalinist constitutional theorists to weaken checks and
balances. In this kind of theory, real separation of powers is unthinkable and
even considered as the ‘hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie’. In such systems, what is
advocated is a division of labour rather than a division of power.
The adoption of the supremacy of the parliament under the Ethiopian constitution
has had a variety of implications within the political system of the country.
Primarily, the concept has eroded the separation of powers principle and resulted
in the emergence of a strong and dictatorial executive that enjoys parliamentary
supremacy. Since members of the ruling party dominate the parliament and
the members are controlled by a strong principle of democratic-centralism, the
executive is able to act without restraint in the absence of strong parliamentary
oversight or other systems of judicial review. Due to the unprecedented monopoly
206 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

of the parliament by a single political group, the laws submitted by the executive
organs to parliament ratified without any scrutiny.
The regime uses different methods to control the parliament. The primary
method used by TPLF/EPRDF begins with the electoral system itself. The electoral
system is referred to as a ‘first past the post’ system whereby the candidate who
receives the highest vote wins the election in the constituency. An absolute
majority is not needed in this kind of electoral system. Due to the absence of
proportional representation according to the votes each party receives in elections,
the representation of the smaller parties in parliament has increasingly become
difficult. The votes of minority groups in various parts of the country are usually
wasted due to this monopolised electoral system. Since TPLF/EPRDF has vast
networks throughout the country and the elections are largely rigged, the majority
of candidates elected to the seats in the House of Peoples Representatives are those
from the ruling regime.
The other factor that has seriously limited the role of parliament in controlling
the executive organ of government is the strong principle of democratic
centralism maintained by TPLF/EPRDF. In principle, members of the House of
Representatives are governed by the constitution; the will of the people; and their
conscience (Art. 54(4), FDRE constitution). This constitutional principle is in line
with the precepts of democratic constitutions such as in Germany.12 The principle
enables members of parliament to have the freedom to act according to their
conscience and avoid being unduly manipulated by anybody, including their own
party. However, in parliamentary democracies, party discipline is a mechanism
used by political parties to keep their members functioning as a cohesive group
rather than as a collection of disparate individuals. It encourages party loyalty
among members who may be tempted to act individually. The application of
party discipline is stronger in parliamentary than presidential systems because the
executive organ in parliamentary systems requires majority party cohesiveness for
its survival.
Despite the widespread practice of using party discipline in parliamentary
democracies, its application is largely without prejudice to the rights of the
members enshrined under the constitution. Party discipline requires members to
vote strictly along party lines in very crucial policy matters. In other cases, members
of parliament are free to vote without being dictated. There are mechanisms used
by parliamentary groups to determine when party discipline is required and when
it is not. In the UK, party members of parliament issue a ‘three-line whip’ when the
party requires members to vote in a certain way. Defying the whip is regarded as a
serious breach of party discipline and offenders may have the whip withdrawn or
be excluded from the parliamentary party. But this does not affect members’ rights
to sit, speak or vote in the house. A ‘two-line whip’ allows members to be absent

12 In the German system, this right of parliamentarians is widely known as ‘Freie
Mandat’ (free mandate) by which members of the Bundestag are not obliged to vote in line
with party policy.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 207

by prior arrangement, and for a ‘one-line whip’ attendance is merely requested and
members are permitted to decide many matters in their own personal judgements.
The FDRE constitution provides that members of parliament are governed
by the constitutional will of the people and their conscience. However, in light
of the ironic principle of democratic centralism applied by TPLF/EPRDF, their
constitutional right has been seriously compromised. Assessment of the actual
practice in the last several years proves that members of parliament are more
accountable to the party rather than to the electorate or to the constitution. As
Young properly noted, ‘elected representatives often appear more as functionaries
of the national government and the EPRDF rather than genuine representatives of
local peoples’ (Young 1996: 539). Interviews with a number of parliamentarians
revealed that before any major agenda is tabled before the parliament, the ruling
party whip within the parliament assembles and informs them about the party
lines and that they are expected to vote along these lines. Members do not dare to
challenge the instructions of the vanguard party. Rejecting or seriously questioning
the proposals submitted by the executive body would amount to disloyalty to the
party programme (Paulos 2007: 308).
The total submission of the members of the House to the manipulation of the
ruling party is partly due to the economic dependence of the parliamentarians on
the regime and their low level of education. Compared to the life they had in rural
Ethiopia, most of the members usually consider coming to Addis Ababa for a five-
year term as a privilege. They use the opportunity to enrol for further education,
create connections and involve their family in different activities so that they do
not go back to the rural areas after completion of their term. They are not willing
to lose this advantage by challenging party discipline. For members of parliament,
being subjected to the party evaluation system and subsequent expulsion from the
party would mean losing their means of survival (Paulos 2007: 308).
Due to the aggressive application of the strict democratic centralism principle,
members of parliament representing TPLF/EPRDF simply see themselves as
employees of the ruling party without having any meaningful participation. They
do not even bring up pressing problems existing in their own constituencies.
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that complete control of the House by
the ruling party is made in the absence of formidable opposition to fill in the
gap. According to the official results of the May 2010 general elections, TPLF/
EPRDF won over 99 per cent of the parliamentary seats. In the light of such an
unprecedented monopoly of the parliament by a single political group, the role of
members of parliament in terms of controlling the government is crucial. As far as
the application of the Leninist-oriented democratic centralism, the emergence of a
democratic parliamentary system remains to be a distant promise.
208 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

The Role of Party Ideology in the Structure and Function of the House
of Federation

Federal legislatures are normally bicameral to the extent that some hold that
bicameral federal legislatures are by definition a characteristic feature of
federations (Watts 2010: 2). Though there are some federations that do not have
a second chamber, it could be argued that the major effective federations have
a second chamber.13 In federations, the lower chamber structure is based on the
population in each of the units while the upper chamber usually represents and
protects the interests of regional units and enables them to participate in the
governance of the central authority. Though most federations have established
bicameral federal legislatures, ‘there has been an enormous variation among them
in the method of selection of members, the regional composition, the powers of the
second chambers, and consequently of their roles’ (Watts 2010: 2).
In terms of the distribution of regional representation in the composition
of federal second chambers, equality of state representation is the norm (Watts
2010: 7). However, the actual practice varies.14 The basis of the memberships is
sometimes equal representation of the units, and sometimes what matters is the
size of the population. The senate in Switzerland and in the United States consists
of two delegates from each unit having the same number of votes in the senate
irrespective of the regional variations. The representatives in these countries are
elected directly by the people of the concerned regional unit and the senate has
significant law-making powers without which no law can be approved. In Canada,
the representation of the upper house is based on population density and the
electoral system of the members is closely linked to the prime minister. The upper
chamber of Canada has law-making power together with the lower house. In the
German and Indian systems, members of the upper houses (the Bundesrat, and the
Rajya Sabha, respectively) are appointed or elected directly by the governments of
each German Bundesland and the Indian state. In the Indian upper house, the states
are not represented equally but on the basis of their population. The same holds for
the German Bundesrat although less populated states still have a stronger voting
power than would be the case in a system based purely on population size. The
German constitution provides a minimum and maximum number of Bundesrat
members from each Land. The Bundesrat plays a significant role in legislations
that directly and indirectly affect the Länder. Legislations that affect the interests
of the Länder cannot be approved without the agreement of the Bundesrat while

13 Some federations such as the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and the small
island federations of Comoros in the Indian Ocean, Micronesia in the Pacific and St Kitts
and Nevis in the Caribbean do not have a second chamber.
14 There is equal representation of regional units in the United States, Australian,
Argentinean, Brazilian, Mexican, Nigerian, Pakistani, Russian and South African second
chambers.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 209

in other forms of legislation enacted by the Bundestag, the role of the Bundesrat
is limited.
The Ethiopian experience has some features similar to those found in other
federations as well as peculiarities in organising the upper house, which has
different powers. But in the formation of the House of Federation, ideological
concepts seem to play a significant role. As has been reiterated in the previous
chapter, ‘the right to self-determination of nationalities’ is the guiding principle
of the constitutional system. Since the fundamental principle of the constitution
is the ‘sovereignty of nations, nationalities and peoples’, the upper house is also
organised in accordance with this principle. Unlike the case of other federations,
the House of Federation is not a body that represents the regional units rather it
represents ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ (Art. 61(1), FDRE constitution). The
constitution further provides that at least one member and each ‘nation, nationality
and people’ in the House of the Federation or nationality shall be represented by
one additional representative for each one million of its population.15
Such an application of ideological concepts to formulate the upper house has
left regional governments without any representation at the federal level and the
people who are living outside their ‘mother state’ are not represented in the House
of Federation. The assumption is that representatives of specific ethnic groups in the
house represent all the people belonging to that ethnic group even if the people are
living outside ‘the mother state’. It is not clear, for instance, how an Amhara living
in Gambella is to be represented in the House of Federation by the representatives
that represent the Amhara regional state. Since the interests and problems of people
living in the Amhara region and those living in Gambella are completely different,
it is not clear how the representatives from other regions represent the interests of
people living in another regional state. It is also not clear how the representatives
from other regional governments have the right to intervene in the affairs of other
regional states to represent the people living outside their constituency. Ironically,
some ethnic groups living outside their ‘mother region’ are granted representation
in the House of Federation. The typical instance is the special representation of
the Oromos living in Amhara regional state. Some writers note that an exception
might be made based on the assumption that ‘indigenous ethnic communities that
are demarcated outside their homeland constitute a distinct “nation, nationality or
people” that deserves separate representation’ (Yonatan 2008: 458). However, in
the context of complex ethnic fragmentation in the country, it is not an easy task
to determine whether a group constitutes ‘a nation, nationality and people’ in the
context of diverse ethnic-related demands.
In addition to this, contrary to the claim that the members of the House of
Federations represent ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’, the members in practice
act as representatives of regional interest. Not only are members of the House of
Federation are elected by regional councils but also much of the issues discussed

15 According to the official website of the House of Federation, there are now 69
‘nations and nationalities’ represented in the house.
210 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

are related to regional interests such as federal grants rather than rights of ‘nations
and nationalities and peoples’ as such. It is also not clear what procedures regional
councils follow to select the representatives to the House. Unlike members of the
House of People’s Representatives who theoretically governed by the constitution,
their conscience and the will of the people, there is not a principle that governs
the decision and voting process of the members of the House of Federation.
In such circumstances, ‘there is credible assumption that the member whose
accountability lies with the regional government or council receives instructions
from the respective region thus becoming a de facto representative of the states’
(Yonatan 2008: 454).
Most importantly, the upper house has not been granted the power to participate
in the law-making process. This has made the House weak in terms of promoting
the interests of regional governments or the highly acclaimed rights of ‘nations
and nationalities and peoples’. In addition to this, though much of the powers
granted to the House require some degree of impartiality in terms of interpreting
the constitution and executing other powers, many of the members of the House
are high executive officers of the regional governments, which are administered
by TPLF/EPRDF. Due to the fact that TPLF/EPRDF and its ally parties govern all
the regional councils, the members of the House of Federation are consequently
members of the ruling party. In such circumstances, institutional independence
in the function of the House of Federation is unthinkable. Rather, the house is
another stage that rubber-stamps the policies and decisions tightly regulated by the
democratic centralist tradition of TPLF/EPRDF. Due to the entrenched control of
the house by a single political force, it simply reflects the ideals that prevail at the
centre rather than regional interests.

The Role of Party Ideology in Shaping a Dominant Executive Organ

Despite the widespread conviction for the separation of powers among the three
governing organs within the modern state structures, the executive branch of
government is the most powerful organ of the state in terms of assuming wider
responsibility compared to the other two branches. The nature and structure of the
executive branch is important because the effective running of the country depends
on it and it is necessary to regulate and make accountable the exercise of executive
powers (Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 193). In democratically elected governments, the
prime minister and his team face different constraints on their powers. The party
may remove the prime minister from power or the parliament may oust him by a
vote of no confidence. In addition to this, the media, public opinion and pressure
groups also play an important role in curbing the power of the prime minster and
the executive.
The role of the executive branch in the Ethiopian context has always been
the overriding organ of government that controls much of the political discourse.
Traditionally, the Ethiopian emperor had unlimited legislative, executive and
judicial powers. Despite the adoption of the separation of powers principle under
 The Implications of Party Ideology 211

the various constitutions adopted so far in the country, the pattern of dominance of
the executive branch over the other two still characterises the Ethiopian polity. The
administrative organs emerged as modern government departments when Menelik
II established the first ministerial offices in 1907. Later in 1943, two imperial
orders set up 11 ministries and the office of the prime minister. Nevertheless, the
council of ministers was not a council in the strict sense of the word since the
emperor maintained his prerogative powers (Bahru 2007: 203). By an order of
1966, the prime minister was empowered to select his team, despite the fact that
a final decision as well as the appointment of all ministers was reserved to the
discretion of the emperor (Bahru 2007: 204).
The monopoly of power of the emperor had greatly limited the transformation
of the executive to undertake different reforms that might have averted the 1974
revolution, which plunged the country into chaos. After the 1974 revolution, the
Provisional Military Administrative Council (Dreg) controlled the momentum.
The revolution, which intended to reverse this authoritarian tendency, was not
successful in many respects. Except for the drastic measures that abolished the
repressive land tenancy, imperial power and change of ideology, the revolution
did not play any significant role in curbing the autocracy of executive power. The
serious atrocities committed during the military regime were largely due to the
absence of a meaningful control over the executive power.
Under the 1987 constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
(PDRE), executive power was granted to the Council of Ministers. However,
the PDRE constitution seems to have anticipated a mixed system whereby the
president of the republic is not only the head of state but is also responsible for
controlling the activities of the Council of Ministers. This approach is similar
to the French mixed system whereby executive power is not entirely left to the
council of ministers and the prime minister since the president has significant
executive powers. Despite the anticipation of the 1987 constitution to formulate
the executive in such a way, the actual application of the principle is doubtful
since in practice the executive power was entirely monopolised by the president of
the republic.
The rulers who came to power in 1991 inherited all the political traditions of
repression that were prevalent in the country. The ‘basic power structure remained
the same with executive power being extended to the lower local administration,
the kebele which is arguably the Derg’s most lasting and important innovation’
(Harbeson 2005: 147). The executive organs at lower levels of government
have served as both an apparatus for public service and important institutions of
repression, providing the central government unprecedented abilities to assert
control at the grassroots level. The TPLF/EPRDF did not abolish the suppressive
local administrative system but rather managed to co-opt it and turn the use of the
system in its favour.
Under the 1995 FDRE constitution, the highest executive powers of the
federal government are vested in the prime minister and in the council of ministers
(Art.72, FDRE constitution). The constitution grants extensive powers to the
212 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

executive, particularly to the prime minister. The prime minister is endowed

with quite extensive powers akin to those of presidents in presidential systems.
Such unprecedented powers make the power of the prime minister in Ethiopia
uncontrolled and unchecked by the executive, legislature, judiciary and other
federal or regional institutions. Though the repressive political culture of the
country has made the executive more powerful over other organs of government,
the major factor that shaped the power of the executive branch under the current
Ethiopian federal structure is related to the ideology pursued by TPLF/EPRDF.
As has been indicated in the preceding sections of the book, in order to
maintain its dominance on the country’s political landscape, TPLF/EPRDF has
used ideological mechanisms such as revolutionary democracy, developmental
state, democratic centralism and party evaluation systems to shape the structure
and the function of the federal system. The fact that such ideological principles are
aimed at ensuring the hegemony of a single party has led to the emergence of an
executive body that has an absolute dominance over the economic, political and
social life of the country. Each of the ideological concepts has contributed their
own role in terms of shaping the existing dominance of the executive branch.
One of the most significant doctrines that have been used to strengthen the
arm of the executive is revolutionary democracy. The hallmark consideration of
revolutionary democracy is that it does not permit the existence of independent
institutions in the country or any real separation of powers since all institutions
of government are considered as parts of a single state apparatus and political
power needs to be centralised within one entity. In addition to making all
government organs such as the parliament and the executive wing as instruments
of revolutionary democracy, other institutions such as the judiciary and the
military are not exempted. Ideals of revolutionary democracy presuppose the
existence of complex administrative machinery that aims at regulating the socio-
economic activities down to the lowest administrative level. This doctrine has
literally paralysed the separation of powers principle slightly envisaged under
the constitution. As long as revolutionary democracy remains in the grip of the
Ethiopian political landscape, the emergence of proper checks and balances over
the executive branch of the state are unlikely to materialise.
The emergence of the developmental state model in the last few years has also
been instrumental in terms of paralysing the separation of powers principle among
the three branches of the state. Primarily, the developmental state doctrine has
narrowed down the political space by granting unlimited power to the government
to interfere and control social, economic and political activities in the country.
In the pretext of executing development projects in health, education and power
economic sectors, the government has controlled major economic activities in
the country. To eliminate civil society groups and activists that challenge the
authoritarian tendencies of the regime, the government has enacted new laws that
provides a wider governmental power to crack down dissent. The new laws that
have been enacted since 2007 relating to terrorism, land lease, civil society and
 The Implications of Party Ideology 213

other measures have increasingly placed the executive branch of the government
beyond any control.
Democratic centralism is the other important principle that contributed to the
dominance of the government and its machinery. It has been one of the tools used
by TPLF/EPRDF to maintain control and discipline among the rank and file of
its members. In particular, democratic centralism has proved to be an efficient
mechanism in TPLF/EPRDF’s quest to control its members at the lower levels
of government institutions. Since the party has facilities that extend to the lower
kebele administrations, democratic centralism has enabled the party to control every
aspect of life in the country. Many people in positions of power from the federal to
the local community level are appointed because of loyalty to the party and they
are expected to follow the party policy, abiding by the principle of democratic
centralism. The application of a strict principle of democratic centralism is also
the key factor that helped the prime minister and his associates to dominate the
executive and the cabinet. Since members of the cabinet and other government
officials are bound by democratic centralism, they do not have any right to deviate
from the policy forwarded from the central party machinery. Due to this utilisation
of the strict principle of democratic centralism, real power ultimately lies in the
hands of a few party leaders or in the hands of a single person.
The evaluation system used by TPLF/EPRDF is also an important factor that
has made official institutional accountability irrelevant. ‘The gimgemma system
enhances central political domination over the country’s bureaucratic apparatus
by encouraging conformity, killing incentives for innovation and flexibility and
discouraging challenges to the status quo’ (Paulos 2007: 282). To enforce loyalty at
every level of government, the most effective mechanism has been using periodic
gimgemma at every level of party and government channel. Though gimgemma
is instrumental in combating corruption and incompetency, such informal and
non-transparent procedures of evaluation are largely used to uproot individuals
perceived as not supporting the status quo. Gimgemma has fundamentally
undermined legal accountability in the bureaucracy and the application of merit
to evaluate the performance of the civil service. This has seriously compromised
the formal institutional control system. In a political environment that applies
such a ruthless and largely arbitrary system of accountability, the emergence of an
executive organ with unlimited powers is an obvious outcome.
The applications of such ideological conceptions to sideline the principle of
separation of power has resulted in a very cumbersome executive organ and paved
the way for the emergence of a prime minister who is depicted as an all-knowing
personality on the country’s political landscape. The late prime minister Meles
Zenawi in particular ‘became the unchallenged intellectual and ideological guide of
the party and the government, and, as a result, has accumulated a disproportionate
share of power in the Ethiopian state as there appear to be few mechanisms to
ensure his accountability’ (Medhane and Young 2003: 401). As President Obama
remarked during his first visit to Africa 2009, Ethiopia needs strong institutions
rather than strong men:
214 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Development depends upon good governance. That is the ingredient which has
been missing in far too many places, for far too long. That is the change that can
unlock Africa’s potential. And that is a responsibility that can only be met by
Africans … . In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions
are the key to success – strong parliaments and honest police forces; independent
judges and journalists; a vibrant private sector and civil society. Those are the
things that give life to democracy, because that is what matters in peoples’ lives
… Africa doesn’t need strongmen; it needs strong institutions (The Huffington
Post 2011).

The application of dubious ideological instruments together with over-

reaching political machinery has created a situation whereby real decisions are
made within the informal party structure rather than through the formal political
institutions that have become increasingly a facade. Studies suggest that there are
two track structures in the Ethiopian system of governance. Primarily, ‘there are
formal structures of democratic institutions largely to portray a democratic face of
the regime to western donors while the real and powerful system of governance
is the inner and powerful party structure that keeps tight control at all levels
and makes sure that no one can use these democratic institutions efficiently to
challenge its power’ (Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen 2002: 230). Due to such
tight party structures, decisions are largely made in the inner circle behind closed
doors restricted to the few party leaders (Assefa 2007: 265, Clapham 2005).
In line with Marxist-Leninist governance, issues discussed and decisions
are made in TPLF/EPRDF party meetings that precede meetings of state bodies
(Vaughan and Tronovell 2003: 35). Due to the undue impact of party apparatus in
such Marxist systems, ‘accountability, transparency and representativeness could
not be transferred to the sphere of formal politics’ (Aspen 2006: 70). What may
express the degree of secrecy of the system is the late prime minister’s response in
parliament to the question posed to him on how many Ethiopian troops were killed
during the 2006 intervention in Somalia. He responded that ‘since TPLF/EPRDF
has no tradition of publicly declaring the loss of life in battles, it is not necessary
to state the number’. The response was delivered to the parliamentary body which
is supposed to control his power.
The secretive party decision-making network has led to the development
of a multifaceted network of political and economic power that has become
increasingly unaccountable to the formal constitutional institutions:

In conditions of political insecurity and contested legitimacy, a network of

political and economic control was built up by this party from its circle of
trusted people, loyalists, and former comrades in the armed struggle. Thus a
selective hold on politics and economics in Ethiopia was established. There is a
new, party-affiliated business class, and the non-party-affiliated business people
regularly complain of unfair and non-transparent competition and preferential
treatment. Most of the political decision-making seems to occur outside the
 The Implications of Party Ideology 215

cabinet of ministers and the parliament, as is evident at crucial moments.

(Abbink 2006: 174).

Due to such secretive party structure, the state of party-state separation has
become vague and many people including members of TPLF/EPRDF confuse the
differences in many instances. It has been witnessed that ‘the administrative and
political structures overlap and intervene in such a way that the local administrative
units (kebelle, woreda and zone levels) are not neutral and independent bodies, but
work hand in hand with the ruling party’ (Tronvoll 2001: 701).
Though there have been some attempts made to separate the party–state relations
after the 2001 ‘bonapartism’ renewal process that was held among the rank and file
of TPLF/EPRDF, the separation of party and state structures is still far from clear.
Since 2001, there has been an attempt to bring the party machinery into government
accountability including officially appointing heavyweight TPLF/EPRDF insiders
who were working behind the scene. In addition to this, the commitment made
to reform had resulted in the unprecedented opening up of the political space to
the opposition during the 2005 general elections. However, TPLF/EPRDF seems
alarmed by the huge support granted to opposition forces; it has retreated to its
previous secretive party channels as a major decision-making body in a post-2005
scenario. Since 2005, the influence of the party is felt everywhere, especially in
government departments with more intensity than it was before. In the past few
years, the existence of party networks in every government department has created
a complex party–state relationship. Many government employees are increasingly
accountable to the party officials in the department rather than to the government
machinery, since the party network may pass decisions on the rights and duties of
the employees.
TPLF/EPRDF has also practically used the civil service as a party apparatus.
Current and past regimes attempted to manipulate the civil service to
advance their own political agenda rather than committing the civil service to
professional integrity and quality service. The tendency of compromising the
competence of the civil service in favour of political loyalty greatly undermines
the effectiveness of the civil service. According to a Human Rights Watch study,
the civil service has become highly politicised since 2005, ‘Civil servants are
subject to propaganda meetings ostensibly to learn about government policy,
but in reality this is part and parcel of a process of indoctrination and ultimately
a request or threat to join the EPRDF’ (Human Rights Watch 2010: 28). As a
result, TPLF/EPRDF has produced an army of civil servants who are determined
to show absolute loyalty to the party rather than to their job prescriptions or to
the public at large:

The government has created a class of local administrators and civil servants who
have benefited enormously from educational and administrative opportunities
provided from above by the state/party/government. In addition to education, the
government has recently provided markedly increased local government salaries.
216 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

The loyalty and concern of administrators and civil servants is, unsurprisingly,
focused sharply upwards towards the system which has benefited them, rather
than downwards in the public service of their constituents, who may often seem
largely irrelevant to their rise to influence (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 43) .

Due to the ideologically structured government, civil servants and other

professionals are recruited in contradiction to the civil service law that provides
that the only criterion to fill a vacancy is the qualification of the person. In the last
few years, the trend of compromising quality for loyalty has been on the increase
in the various government departments, especially at lower levels. Despite the
fact that the government does not admit the politicisation of the civil service, an
interview made with civil servants at federal and regional levels revealed that the
most important factor in joining the civil service is loyalty to the ideology of the
ruling party while qualifications have a secondary importance.
In light of the preceding paragraphs that highlight the role of TPLF/EPRDF’s
party structure and ideology in the control of the executive organs, it can be
argued that the most important factor that contributed to the development of an
autocratic executive organ is the ideological concepts entrenched in the political
system. Due to the application of ideological instruments such as revolutionary
democracy, the developmental state model, democratic centralism, and gimgemma
as well as the secretive decision-making practice in the party, TPLF/EPRDF has
been able to establish executive organs that control the entire political apparatus
of the country and increasingly excluded formal institutions of the state. In order
to ensure checks and balances as well as limited government, TPLF/EPRDF
needs to reform its ideologically motivated concepts that deviate from the spirit
of the constitution and replace them with democratic principles that allow the
emergence of appropriate checks and balances as well as a government that
operates within the limits of the law. By doing so, a system of accountability and
transparency in the decisions of government organs could be ensured. This would
also create a system which does not depend on personalities but is rather based on
efficient institutions.
Rather than focusing on the fundamental ideological parameters that have
prevented the emergence of an effective system of separation of powers in the
country, different scholars have come up with different theses as to how the
unprecedented dominance of the executive could be curbed. Some observers
argue that there has to be constitutional limits to the term of the prime minister in
Ethiopia to discourage a tendency of autocracy and abuse of power due to a long
tenure. The question is usually raised in relation to the constitutional limitation of
the power of the president who has no real power and leaving the power of the
prime minister without limitation under the Ethiopian constitution. According to
this argument, the absence of limitation of the term of office of the prime minister
has created a dominance of personalities in the executive. But the argument is
fundamentally erroneous in relation to the nature and function of the parliamentary
system of government. It is not clear how the term of office of a prime minister in
 The Implications of Party Ideology 217

a parliamentary system of government could be constitutionally limited. In such

systems, the party that wins the majority of seats in parliament forms a government
and the leader of the party will automatically assume the position of prime mister.
There has never been any practice of constitutional limitation to the term of the
prime minister since he is not a politician that is directly elected by the public,
unlike in the case of the president.
A well-functioning parliamentary democracy has various ways to curb the
authoritarian tendencies as well as the longer tenure of a prime minster. In the
first place, political parties are organised in accordance with democratic principles
that allow the full participation of the members and party officials. In democratic
systems, the activities of the party are transparent and there is a high degree of
accountability due to the application of various rules regulating the activities
and roles of political parties. Some constitutions even provide clear principles
that regulate the internal accountability of parties. In this respect, the German
constitution provides that activities of political parties that seek to undermine or
abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal
Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional (Art.21(2), Basic Law of Germany).
When political parties are found engaging in such undemocratic activities, the
Federal Constitutional Court rules on the legality of their actions. The court has
banned political parties on two occasions due to their undemocratic practices.16
In addition to the existence of a constitutional mechanism that would limit the
dominance of a single group or person in the political discourse, the possibility of
one party or person staying in power beyond a reasonable time limit in democratic
societies is unlikely to happen. Since the public will regularly need changes, there
will always be different parties in power through free and democratic elections.
When a single party stays in power for two or three terms in democratic countries
such as the UK, it is unlikely that a single prime minister will remain in office
during that time. Either the democratic electoral system will allow the opposition
to win the elections or the ruling party continues to win the elections and the party
itself will take measures to curb absolute power.17
As long as there is a free political space that properly regulates the activities
of political parties and the parties have real internal democracy, the absence of
term limits of the prime minster under the constitution will not be a real issue. In
the Ethiopian context, the most important factor that hampers the development
of a vibrant multi-party system is the undemocratic nature of the political party
ruling the country rather than the absence of a term limit for the prime minster.
The ruling TPLF/EPRDF is a party that came to power through the barrel of the
gun rather than through free and democratic elections. To such parties, power is
not to be abandoned for the sake of public opinion or support. In addition to this,

16 The Socialist Reich Party was banned in 1952 and the Communist Party in 1956.
17 For instance, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were forced to leave leadership of the
party when the Labour party signalled that the majority of members of the party did not
want them anymore.
218 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

as far as TPLF/EPRDF adheres to the principles of revolutionary democracy and

the system of democratic centralism, a democratic multi-party system is unlikely
to emerge in the country since such principles are by their nature antithetical to a
democratic system of government.
In democratic parliamentary systems, there are also other mechanisms used
to curb the power of the executive and the prime minster. The first is the vote
of no confidence rendered by parliament. When the parliament perceives that
the executive is not doing its job properly, it conducts a periodical vote of no
confidence to ensure the accountability of the executive. Despite the fact that
there are provisions in the Ethiopian constitution granting powers to the House
of Peoples’ Representatives to question and investigate the executive’s activities;
there is no specific provision on the possibility of a vote of no confidence. The
adoption of such a rule may help to uphold the accountability of the executive
and the prime minster. The other most important constraint to the power of the
prime minster and the executive organs is the independence of the media. Since
the media is considered as the ‘fourth branch of government’ in democratic
countries, they closely scrutinise the activities of the government. They are the
most effective mechanism that helps to form public opinion on government
performance. A government that is seriously criticised by the media will finally
resign or lose elections. In the Ethiopian context, the repressive measures taken by
the government have completely silenced critical voices of the media. At present,
the government is literally functioning without any independent media scrutiny.
The other most important mechanism used to control the executive is through
judicial review mechanisms. In democratic systems, the existence of judicial power
to review the decisions of the executive organs is an important mechanism that
curbs abuse of power. In the Ethiopian case, the complicated nature of the power
of interpreting the constitution and the lack of independence of the judiciary have
seriously undermined the power of the judicial organs to control the executive
bodies. Empowering the judicial organs to review the activities of administrative
agencies in Ethiopia will greatly contribute in checking the ever expanding powers
of administrative organs. The most relevant reform option to control the executive
branch is not basically to limit the term of office of the prime minister or to install
presidential systems of government. Rather, the most important measure that needs
to be undertaken is to reform the ideological fundamentals of state structures in
Ethiopia and replace them with democratic principles that promote accountability,
transparency and the emergence of efficient political institutions.

The Role of Party Ideology in Weakening the Judicial System in Ethiopia

The judiciary is one of the fundamental institutions of any democratic constitutional

system. Courts of law are mainly responsible for upholding the supremacy of the
law by declaring void laws or administrative acts that are inconsistent with the
constitution. It is therefore crucial to have an independent and competent judiciary
to ensure the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution. Judicial organs
 The Implications of Party Ideology 219

would play a significant role in maintaining rule of law in Ethiopia. The country’s
modern judicial organs and legal norms are a recent phenomenon and weak.
In the past, religious and customary laws largely shaped and regulated social
relations within Ethiopian society. In particular, Ethiopia had a long history of
using religious laws as legal norms due to the close attachment between church
and state. The most remarkable traditional codified law in Ethiopia has been the
Book of Kings, the Fetha Negast. This ‘codified religious law is full of Biblical
and Christian wisdom, as well as juridical principles that regulate everyday life,
including dealing with crimes and judicial procedures’ (Strauss 2009: xxxviii).
Although the Fetha Negast had been in place since the sixteenth century, it was
only formally incorporated into the legal system of Ethiopia in 1908 by Emperor
Menelik II (Aberra 2000: 194).
For the first time, the 1931 constitution provided that judges were appointed
to administer justice in conformity with the laws of the country. Later, the modern
hierarchies of law emerged after the enactment of Proclamation No. 2 of 1942 that
established Supreme, High, Provisional and Regional Courts (Scholler 2005: 48).
Thereafter, Imperial Order No. 1 of 1943 gave the Minister of Justice the power
to propose persons for appointment as judges and judicial officials to the emperor,
who in turn was responsible for the appointment of judges, making arrangements
for the establishment of courts throughout the country, and organising and
supervising the administration of justice. Once again, the 1955-revised constitution
reaffirmed the emperor’s power to appoint judges and entrusted him with the last
appellate jurisdiction.
After the traditional imperial power was ended in 1974, the inclination
towards Marxism resulted in the diminishing of significance of the courts of law.
Due to such neglect of the justice system, many of the measures undertaken by
the military regime (Derg) against its political opponents were made outside the
judicial system through unlawful detentions and summary executions. The rhetoric
on independence of the judiciary that was provided under the 1987 Ethiopian
constitution did not also bring about any significant change in the development of
a strong judicial organ, despite that there had been some improvements at least at
the Supreme and High Court levels (Canadian International Development Agency
2008: 103) . Under the constitution, it is stipulated that judicial authority was
vested in the Supreme Court, Courts of Administrative and Autonomous Regions,
and other courts to be established by law. It also set the Supreme Court as the
highest judicial organ and gave it supervisory power over all other courts in the
country. Since the military regime did not consider the judicial system a threat due
to its limited role, there was relatively little development of the judicial system
in terms of an increase in the number of lawyers trained in Ethiopia and former
socialist countries (Tilahun 2004).
When the military regime was overthrown in 1991 by TPLF/EPRDF, public
optimism was very high in the hope that there would be a breakthrough in terms
of upholding the rule of law and ensuring the independence of the judiciary. In
keeping with this optimism, a transitional charter was immediately adopted by
220 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

the new rulers of the country that recognised the protection of all individual rights
enshrined under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The charter also
provided that the courts should be free from any interference from the government.
Later, the 1995 constitution of the FDRE provided for the independence of the
judiciary and supreme federal judicial authority was vested in the Federal Supreme
Court. The constitution further prescribed for states to establish regional courts
of various jurisdictions in Supreme, High and First-Instance Courts. Although
it is not referenced in the constitution, some regional states such as Amhara,
Tigray, Oromia and SNNPR have established Social Courts (Kebele Courts) that
handle small claims and minor disputes. The Constitution of Ethiopia permits the
adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family matters in accordance with
religious or customary laws with the consent of all parties involved in the case.
Sharia Courts, applying Islamic laws, are the only religious courts that have been
officially established in the country. Other customary/traditional courts are not yet
widely established by law, despite their constitutional recognition.
Despite the institutional development of the judiciary over the last several
decades, it faces a number of constraints. There has been mainly a prevalence of
repressive culture in the country. Ethiopia is still ‘a paternalistic society whose
institutions from the smallest, the family, to the largest unit, the state are pervaded
by authoritarian values of obedience’ (Alemseged 2009: 176). The Ethiopian
judicial system is trapped in this authoritarian past, which has not been rectified
despite the emergence of formal modern institutions in the country. As a study
reiterates, ‘A long history of centralized governmental authority and a judiciary
subjugated to the executive branch has fostered a weak judicial branch with
reduced capacity to exercise genuine independence, as well as a reticence of other
branches to treat the judiciary as either truly independent or co-equal’ (The World
Bank 2004: 19).
Due to the authoritarian tradition that has been entrenched, there are serious
claims of interference by executive organs in the activities of the judiciary. Many
judges have admitted the existence of government interference in civil and
criminal cases and instances of delicate political cases being assigned to perceived
pro-government judges (Canadian International Development Agency 2008:
117). Since 2005, ‘judges have fled the country, alleging government interference
and they were reportedly arrested, threatened, intimidated, pressured to resign,
transferred to remote locations or removed from active judicial duties’ (Canadian
International Development Agency 2008: 117). In addition, ‘there are cases in
which judges were allegedly transferred, taken off active judicial duty or had
their salaries discontinued in order to pressure them into resignation’ (Canadian
International Development Agency 2008: 129). Due to such interference and
influence by government organs in the activities of the judiciary the competence
of the courts to uphold the principles of the rule of law in general and to protect
human rights values in particular have been seriously undermined.
Next to the entrenched repressive culture, the most important factor that
undermined the democratisation of the Ethiopian polity in general and the
 The Implications of Party Ideology 221

establishment of an independent judicial system in particular was the introduction

of leftist ideology in the 1970s that has been firmly maintained by the current
administration. The leftist Marxist political ideology that was introduced in Ethiopia
is characterised by controlling all political space, discouraging the establishment
of independent political and civil society groups, limiting civil liberties and
freedom and controlling the media. Since TPLF/EPRDF is fundamentally a
Marxist party that emerged out of the political movement of the 1970s, its guiding
ideology reiterates that the judiciary is an organ responsible for implementing
‘revolutionary democracy’. In other words, its policy towards the judiciary is
shaped by the mainstream Marxist ideological point of view that asserts that the
existence of an independent judiciary is an instrument of oppression used by the
bourgeois class and it needs to be controlled by the vanguard party.
Based on the fundamental Marxist view of TPLF/EPRDF towards an
independent judiciary, there have been different mechanisms used to maintain
control of the judiciary by the regime since it came to power in 1991. TPLF/
EPRDF attempts to promote its policy of controlling the judiciary through
various ideologically motivated mechanisms. The primary mechanism applied
is in relation to the appointment of judges. The FDRE constitution provides
that the president and vice-president of the Federal Supreme Court shall be
appointed upon recommendation by the prime minister and regarding other
federal judges, the prime minister shall submit candidates selected by the Federal
Judicial Administration Council to the House of Peoples’ Representatives for
appointment. Despite that there are no standardised principles concerning the
appointment of judges, the involvement of the executive in the appointment
of judges needs to be treated with caution. Unless there are safeguarding
mechanisms, the undue involvement of the executive in the selection of judges
will affect the independence of the judiciary particularly in countries where the
principle of checks and balances has not been developed:

The principle of judicial independence requires that the power of appointment

of judges should not be vested exclusively in the executive government. This is
because if the executive government enjoys an exclusive privilege in selecting
judges, a risk always exists of misuse of the power of appointment. Sometimes
political or other considerations may prevail over the merit criteria for
appointments. Thus by facilitating nepotism and political favouritism the quality
of the judiciary might be weakened. Judges who obtain their position as a result
of executive discretion or favour could be obligated to serve the interests of their
appointing authority in a manner which might undermine judicial independence
(Colvin 1987: 239–40).

As another scholar pointed out ‘allowing government officials to appoint

the judges who will watch over them is arguably akin to allowing the foxes to
appoint those who will guard the hen house’ (Law 1996: 799). To avoid such
undue political involvement of the executive in the appointment of judges,
222 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

different countries use various mechanisms. In Germany, the selection of judges

of the Constitutional Court is made entirely by the two houses of parliament
while special committees are formed to select judges for lower courts. In India,
the president in consultation with the judges of supreme and high court appoints
judges as the president may deem necessary while in South Africa there is a special
independent commission responsible for the selection of judges. Despite the fact
that the head of the executive in democratic countries has a say in the appointment
of judges, that role is limited and there are rigorous controlling mechanisms.
For instance, in the United States, the president has only the power to nominate
judges to the Federal Supreme Court and the nomination has to pass through tight
Senate hearings.
In the case of Ethiopia, the legislative organ suffers from various limitations
and it is entirely under the control of the executive due to lack of participation of
the opposition parties in parliament. The parliament is literally a rubber stamp
of the executive body that approves whatever proposals are submitted to it by
the executive organ. In such a system, it is unlikely that the house challenges
the nomination of judges forwarded by the prime minister.18 Unless there is an
independent process of recruitment and appointment of judges, the judiciary will
occupy a weak position that will not protect citizens from the unlimited powers
of the government. In addition to this, TPLF/EPRDF controls the appointment
of judges through the Judicial Administrative Council, an organ responsible for
this purpose. Members of parliament who at the same time hold high government
positions, or are influential figures within the ruling party are members of the
commission. Through domination of the council by political authorities, the
selection process of judges is usually weighed against political considerations
rather than against building an independent judicial organ.
The other influence of the vanguard party in the function of the Judicial
Administrative Council is through inserting vague provisions in the law that
deals with the criteria for selection judges. According to the criteria set in the
law, the selection of judges is made based on principles such as ‘loyalty to the
constitution and having good conduct’. Some of these standards are subjective and
open the door to political manipulation. In particular, the requirement ‘loyal to the
constitution’ is far from clear and are used to entertain political considerations.
Does it mean that people who are critical of the merits of the constitution are
not loyal to the constitution? What is the objective standard applied to identify
the existence of loyalty? Who determines the standard? In principle, any law-
abiding citizen living in the jurisdiction of the state is presumed to be loyal to the
constitution. Unless this loyalty is rendered doubtful through an act of treason or
any other unconstitutional act, a democratic government should not have such a
requirement for its own citizens.

18 According to the election result of May 2010, EPRDF and its affiliate parties
controlled 545 out of the total 547 parliamentary seats.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 223

There have been attempts to moderate some of the criteria of recruiting

judges recently. According to a new legislation, the appointee needs to be the
one ‘who is loyal to the constitution; confirms in writing that he is loyal to the
constitution and has never participated directly or indirectly in activities that
violate the constitution’. The rule indicates that the government is suspicious of its
citizens. It is inappropriate to demand citizens to confirm that they are loyal to the
constitution. They are presumed to be loyal to the constitution unless it is proved
otherwise. This is clearly a rule that seriously undermines the rights of citizens
recognised under the constitution. The regime applies such dubious standards
to exclude candidates that may have independent outlooks and those who may
not be twisted easily when there is a need to use the judiciary to attack political
opponents and crackdown dissent.
The second part of the criteria is also far from clear. It is not apparent how it
is to be proved that a person is involved in activities that violate the constitution.
If this is to be measured in light of any criminal conviction, since the case of
criminal conviction has been separately provided as a requirement to select
judges, there is no need to repeat it here. If proof of ‘participation in activities that
violate the constitution’ is to be provided by an organ other than an appropriate
ruling made by a court of law, the evidence will likely be produced by an organ
that has political partisanship. The application of such vague requirements is
aimed at filtering out unwanted applicants that are perceived to be unfriendly to
the existing political status quo. In an interview, some lawyers who had applied
for judicial posts indicated that they do not know why they were not selected
for the post though they felt that their relative distance from the party in power
and its machineries might have been the reason. Rather, many of their colleagues
who were less competent and whose conduct was questionable were appointed as
judges in mysterious circumstances. According to research conducted:

His [the candidate’s] educational and personal background of applicants

(behaviour, reputation and suitability) is checked through a process that is not made
public. The current appointment process is criticized in many quarters, including
by the judges themselves, for not being efficient, effective or transparent. There
are no clear selection criteria available to the candidates and the public, beyond
the general ones cited earlier. Loyalty to the Constitution is a subjective criterion
that can easily be abused. Especially if with some background checks are being
done by the police or security services. Many believe that criteria unrelated to
candidates’ merits are applied: that is, that candidates are hand-picked by court
Presidents and that support letters issued by the Executive on the basis of political
affiliation play a role in the Judicial Administrative Commission’s decisions.
There is nothing sinister per se in the Executive suggesting worthy candidates. It
is quite a different matter, however, if candidates are, to all intents and purposes,
recruited by the Executive and submitted to the JAC with an expectation that they
will automatically be recommended for appointment (Canadian International
Development Agency 2009: 16).
224 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

The other method of control of the judiciary by TPLF/EPRDF is exercised

through controlling the budget and administration of the support staff of courts.
The constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary in planning and
managing its budget. In actual fact, however, the Supreme Court prepares the
budget and submits it to the Ministry of Finance (The World Bank 2004: 21). Such
a process invites direct interference and manipulation of the executive in the state
of affairs of the judiciary. An instance of such interference occurred in 2002 when
the Ministry of Finance rejected a salary increase for judges that had already been
negotiated (The World Bank 2004: 21). There are also other problems related to
the institutional independence of the judiciary and individual judges. The judiciary
does not have the power to administer its own staff or determine qualifications,
functions and the recruitment of the supporting staff. These functions are controlled
instead by the Civil Service Commission (The World Bank 2004: 21).
In addition, the judiciary remains fragile since the level of incentive and
working conditions for judges are poor compared to the financial rewards private
practitioners receive. Due to lack of proper incentives, the level of corruption
in the judiciary has been on the increase. In recent times, there have also been
complaints made by judges on the interference of the court administration in the
management of some cases. Due to such administrative grievances, there has been
high turnover of judges that has forced the regime to appoint new and inexperienced
people. Therefore, it can be argued that the structural problems relating to the
independence of the judiciary are mainly derived from the ideological concepts of
TPLF/EPRDF that not only reject the existence of an independent judicial organ
but also want to use the judiciary as a political weapon to strike at its political
opponents through various control mechanisms.

The Role of Party Ideology in the Adjudication of Constitutional Issues

Judicial review or constitutional adjudication is the doctrine under which

legislative and executive actions are subject to review by the judiciary. It is one of
the main characteristics of democratic constitutional systems. Despite debates on
the role of courts in reviewing legislation made by the parliament, judicial review
has become an important mechanism for controlling parliamentary dictatorships.
The most challenging critique against the doctrine of judicial review comes from
counter-majoritarians that state ‘when unelected judges use the power of judicial
review to nullify the actions of legislators, they act contrary to “majority will”’
(Bickel 1962).
According to this view, the theory of parliamentary sovereignty based on ‘the
Rousseauian concept of the general will whereby the people were supreme, and
their general will as expressed through their republican representatives could not
be challenged’ (Ginsburg 2003: 1). This theory, combined with the critical position
of the judiciary during the French Revolution led to a long tradition of distrust of
judges (Ginsburg 2003: 1). There are still isolated critical voices against systems
of judicial review. In recent times, the Bush v. Gore decision by the United States
 The Implications of Party Ideology 225

Supreme Court in 2000 has led to a spate of articles decrying the inconsistency
of democracy with judicial review and calling for constitutional interpretation
outside the courts (Friedman 2002: 155). Seen against the dominant theory of the
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, some countries such as Great Britain and
the Netherlands do not grant their courts a final say as to the validity of lawfully
enacted legislation. In the Netherlands, the constitution expressly forbids the
courts to rule on the question of constitutionality of primary legislation. However,
in the last few decades, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy in such countries
has been undermined due to the supranational application of European law as well.
Particularly, Post World War II constitutional developments started to
challenge the concept of parliamentary sovereignty by creating a constitutional
court that protected citizens from excessive power and that has led to the rise of
limited government. Judicial review has now become an institutional mechanism
that facilitates popular control over governments that claimed to have majority
support. Modern democratic states accept the idea of limited government or
principles of constitutionalism. Today ‘judicial review has expanded beyond its
homeland in the United States and has made strong inroads into those systems
where it was previously alleged to be an anathema: from France to South Africa to
Israel, parliamentary sovereignty has faded away’ (Ginsburg 2003: 3).
The legal systems of democratic countries developed two main forms of
judicial review systems. One is the American common law system and the
other is the continental European civil law system. In the common law system,
judicial review is conducted by ordinary courts of law while the continental
civil law system largely provides for the establishment of constitutional courts
that are specifically delegated to adjudicate on constitutional issues. There are
also other forms of determining the constitutionality of enacted legislation. In
some exceptional cases there is a review made by a political body rather than a
judicial body. This system prevailed in England and the Netherlands where there is
absolute legislative supremacy. There is also a mixed system of review whenever
courts review one type of legislation and a political organ examines another type
of legislation. That is the method of review adopted in Switzerland where federal
statutes can be reviewed only through the political process established by the
Swiss Constitution, whereas the judiciary can control cantonal laws.
In countries with a federal system of government, there are different
approaches to constitutional adjudication. In India, the Supreme and High
Courts have different powers to review an act of government including
parliamentary legislation. Despite the absence of original jurisdiction for the
Canadian Supreme Court on reviewing acts of parliament, a special power has
been granted under Art.53 of the Supreme Court Act to exercise judicial review.
In Spain, constitutional adjudication is entrusted with a special Constitutional
Court. In the same way, the Belgian Constitutional Court has been granted
different powers to review acts of government. The South African constitution
of 1996 grants explicit power of constitutional adjudication to the Constitutional
226 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Court. The Russian Federation has also established a Constitutional Court to

adjudicate various constitutional issues.
In the Ethiopian context, the power to adjudicate constitutional issues is
granted to the second chamber. Article 83 of the constitution states that the House
of Federation (HoF) shall decide all constitutional disputes. The House is supposed
to be aided by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI), which investigates
constitutional disputes submitted to it and prepares recommendation for the
House. During the drafting of the constitution, the Constitutional Assembly had
originally proposed for the establishment of a constitutional court, which would
have had the power to review the constitutionality of parliamentary and executive
action (Mgbako et al. 2008: 267). But the proposal was dropped at a later stage of
the constitutional drafting process.
Formally, the justification behind the granting of power of adjudication over
constitutional issues to the upper house is related to the concept of supreme rights
of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ envisaged under the constitution. According
to the major argument that was circulated during proceedings of the Constitutional
Assembly, since the constitution is a political contract made between ‘nations,
nationalities and peoples’, the constitution needs to be interpreted by the ‘nations
and nationalities’ themselves (Constitutional Council Minutes Vol. 15: 11–12).
The argument against judicial review was also advanced in view of the doctrine
of parliamentary supremacy that reiterates that entrusting the constitutional
adjudication powers is unacceptable since judges are without any public
representation. According to some observers, ‘the Constitutional Assembly may
have feared “judicial activism” or creation of a “judicial dictatorship” that would
override the will of the “nations and nationalities” if the judiciary were charged
with constitutional interpretation’ (Mgbako et al. 2008: 268). Some members of
the constitutional assembly had also argued that since the Ethiopian people had no
trust in the judiciary under Haile Selassie and the Derg regimes, it was unwise to
assign courts the task of conducting judicial reviews.
The argument that has denied courts of law the right to interpret the constitution
in Ethiopia appears to be made in line with the classical doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy in accordance with the Rousseauian concept of public will. However,
there is an outstanding difference between countries such as the United Kingdom
and the Ethiopian constitutional system in terms of applying the concept of
parliamentary supremacy. The comparative analysis of the Ethiopian case vis-á-
vis the United Kingdom or the Netherlands does not provide a full picture of the
constitutional adjudicative mechanism in Ethiopia. In the United Kingdom, despite
the fact that there is distrust of the judiciary to interpret the constitution, there has
not been any other organ entrusted with that power while in the Ethiopian case, the
power is entrusted with the House of Federations, which is a political institution.
The most relevant case for a comparative assessment of the Ethiopian system
of constitutional adjudicative mechanism is the experience of former socialist
federations. The most likely model for the transplantation of the Ethiopian
constitutional adjudication approach is from former socialist countries which
 The Implications of Party Ideology 227

were largely entrenched in the Marxist-Leninist concepts of law and the separation
of powers principle that asserts, ‘the legislature is conceived to be the supreme
expression of the will of the people and beyond the reach of judicial restraint’
(Hazard, Butler and Maggs 1984: 320). Elaborating the basics of power dynamics
in socialist countries, Ludwikow (1988) notes:

The supremacy of the legislative bodies was recognized as the fundamental

premise of the socialist legal theory. As Lenin claimed, “the representation
of the people is a nullity if it does not have full power”. It was assumed that
the legislative body was responsible for maintaining the constitutionality of
State actions and that constitutional review could not be exercised by extra-
parliamentary bodies. Constitutional control was usually reserved for internal
organs of the legislative bodies which, like the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR or the Council of State in Poland, exercise many of the powers of
the parent body (p. 90).

Proponents of the socialist legal system assert that ‘the right to judicial review
is used by monopolist cliques to obtain a declaration of “unconstitutionality” to
the laws running counter to their interests’ (Vyshinsky 1948: 340). According to
another author of socialist legal systems, ‘constitutional control of statutes by
extra-parliamentary bodies, particularly judicial and quasi-judicial is a reactionary
institution and, because of that, there is no room for it either in a socialist State
or in a State of people’s democracy, which trusts the people’s justice and the will
of the people’ (Ludwikowski 1988: 92). Due to an entrenched doctrine, Marxist
political systems generally vest the power to conduct constitutional reviews
into parliamentary bodies while purposefully weakening the judiciary. Based
on this ideology, in the USSR, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the
Nationalities, the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet have power to rule on the
constitutionality of their own legislation. Other former socialist countries, such
as Romania and Hungary had also adopted the principle of political rather than
judicial control of constitutionality of laws (Ludwikowski 1988: 94). Similarly,
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China has similar
power to interpret the constitution and supervise its enforcement. In general, in
socialist legal systems, control is exercised either by the central legislative body
or by the special organs composed of deputies and extra-parliamentary experts on
constitutional law.
In the light of such ideological arguments behind the development of the
constitutional adjudication system, the most likely model that has shaped the
Ethiopian system of constitutional adjudication relates to the Marxist ideological
background of TPLF. As indicated elsewhere, TPLF emerged as a guerilla
organisation with a strong Marxist background. From its inception, ‘TPLF was a
political party that was formed to work as the vanguard party entrusted to undertake
measures for the hardline Enver Hoxha regime in Albania’ (Aregawi 2004:
592). As a result, many of the principles incorporated into the 1995 constitution
228 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

emanated from TPLF’s strong Marxist background. In particular, ‘the effects of

TPLF’s Marxist influences are still apparent in Ethiopia's system of non-judicial
constitutional review’ (Mgbako et al. 2008: 282).
Thus, despite the official argument for granting the constitutional adjudication
power to the upper house is to preserve the rights of ‘nations and nationalities’
and sovereignty of the parliament as is the case in some democratic systems,
the background of TPLF/EPRDF and the ideological environment in which the
constitution was drafted are the major justification behind the constitutional
adjudication power being granted to the House of Federation. In line with the
mainstream Marxist view, the leaders of TPLF/EPRDF consider the judiciary with
suspicion and the ideological position of the party is to have ‘popular judges’ who
are affiliated with the ideology of the party in power (Assefa 2007:405). This is the
major reason why the constitution failed to establish an independent constitutional
court or the ability to grant judicial power to ordinary courts of law.
This approach has had a number of implications and raises different questions.
The first issue relates to the independence of the House of Federation, which is
composed of representatives of ‘nations, nationalities and people’ and whose
members are selected by state councils. The regional governments may themselves
elect representatives to the House of Federation or they may hold elections to
have the representatives elected by the people directly. Normally, members of the
House continue to be selected by the regional governments. At present, TPLF/
EPRDF controls the major regional governments of Amhara, Tigray, Oromia,
SNNPR and other affiliated parties in other regions. Since all the government
systems in the regions are dominated by TPLF/EPRDF, the people selected for
membership in the House of Federation are from TPLF/EPRDF or from affiliated
parties in regional governments. Obviously, a House organised in this partisan
way is unlikely to declare an act of government or the laws enacted by the lower
house unconstitutional.
The Constitutional Inquiry Council, which is responsible for preparing legal
opinion to the House, is not also an independently functioning institution. The
chairperson and deputy chair of the council are the president and deputy presidents
of the Supreme Court who are appointed through the nomination of the prime
minister. Despite the fact that the House of Peoples’ Representatives elect six of the
legal professionals in the council, since the House is entirely dominated by TPLF/
EPRDF, the selection of the legal professionals seems to be in line with singling
out individuals who are sympathetic to the regime. The other three members of the
council represented from the House of Federation are also directly related to the
regime since the ruling party dominates the House.
The absence of an independent judicial organ responsible for the interpretation
of the constitution has seriously undermined the principle of checks and
balances in the system. Since the parliamentary system by its nature has fusion
of power between the legislature and the executive, the appropriate mechanism
to counterbalance this dominance of the executive is through effective judicial
scrutiny. In the Ethiopian situation, the absence of strong opposition, independent
 The Implications of Party Ideology 229

media and civil society has exacerbated the problems of authoritarian tendencies
within the system.
The granting of the power of constitutional adjudication to a political organ has
also created confusion on the role of courts in implementing and interpreting the
constitution. Creating such confusion in relation to interpreting the constitution
is an apparent feature of authoritarian regimes to evade accountability and
supervision:

A regime that wishes to thwart effective judicial monitoring and popular

policing of its actions has an incentive to sow confusion by deliberately setting
up competing courts that send conflicting messages about the legality of
government conduct. This trick of institutional design not only undermines the
focal potential of any specific court’s rulings, but also increases the likelihood
that at least one court will side with the regime, thus further diminishing the
ability of the courts to coordinate action against the regime (Law 2008: 797).

Due the confusion about the role of the courts in the interpretation of the
constitution, judges are increasingly shying away particularly from applying
the human rights provisions of the constitution for fear of facing the question of
interpretation.
The existing approach to the constitutional adjudication system has blocked
a vibrant constitutional system that responds to the dynamics of change in the
country. Because of this, the establishment of an independent organ entrusted
with the power of interpreting the constitution is indispensable. There are two
alternatives in this regard. The first option is to grant the power of interpretation
to ordinary courts of law to interpret the constitution with the final jurisdiction
to interpret the constitution to be entrusted to the Supreme Court. Despite the
relevance of this approach in theory, there are practical challenges in the Ethiopian
context. The fact that the judiciary in Ethiopia is weak and lacks credibility; it
undermines the role of the judiciary having constitutional interpreting power. The
problems associated with the existing judicial system might also have an impact
on this approach. The fact that the prime minister plays an important role in the
appointment of judges, a lack of transparency in the appointment of judges, a
lack of independence and the weak allocation of budgets have all weakened the
effectiveness of the judiciary. Empowering ordinary courts of law to interpret
the constitution with all their challenges may further complicates the role of the
judiciary rather than ensuring supremacy of constitutional principles. The most
likely alternative seems to be to establish an independent constitutional court that
will be responsible for the adjudication of constitutional matters. This approach
is not only consistent with the tradition of the various continental legal systems
that have constitutional courts to interpret the constitution but also organising a
constitutional court will help the system to be free from the problems associated
with ordinary courts of law.
230 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

However, the most challenging problem is whether the mere establishment

of a constitutional court in the present political set-up in Ethiopia will make a
difference in terms of safeguarding the ideals of the constitution. A constitutional
court or any other independent institution that functions properly requires a
political environment where principles of constitutionalism, democratisation and
the prevalence of the rule of law are entrenched. In particular, the dominance
of the Marxist style of governance and ideology in the last two decades has
made institutions mere instruments of suppression rather than playing the role
of protecting the rights of citizens and checking the power of the state. Thus,
the mere establishment of a constitutional court without prior democratisation of
the system and without changing the guiding ideology of the system will only
provide another source of despair for citizens who are already fed up with the
dysfunctional institutions so far established.

Non-amendable Constitution?

One of the principles that are incorporated in a typical constitution relates to the
procedure of its amendment. Different constitutions have different amendment
procedures. There are two types of amendment procedures. Some constitutions
have rigid procedures while others have flexible models that have their own
merits and demerits. More stringent amendment procedures help to make
constitutional commitments stable and assist in creating a higher legal system
that will stand above and limit ordinary legislation. Since there are always risks
associated with constitutional reform, constitutional mistakes are more difficult
to correct than ordinary policy mistakes (Rasch and Congleton 2006: 540). The
demerit of rigid constitutional amendment procedure is that a rigid constitution
cannot accommodate demands as a result it leads to a revolutionary as the only
possible method of change (Rasch and Congleton 2006: 540). On the other hand,
a flexible constitution is the one which can be amended like an ordinary law of
the country with a simple majority of parliament. Such less stringent amendment
procedures allow constitutional mistakes to be readily corrected and institutional
experimentation to be conducted. Flexible constitutions may also help to avoid
violent revolution that may arise due to the rigidity of the constitution. On the other
hand, flexible constitutions may be a source of instability since the government
may change its content easily.
In terms of the various experiences of constitutional amendment procedures,
the Ethiopian case seems to be rigid and complex. The constitution provides
for various rules on the amendment of the constitution. Primarily, the House of
Peoples’ Representatives, the House of Federation, and Regional Councils have
the power to initiate constitutional amendments (Art. 104, FDRE constitution).
Either of the two federal houses may initiate a constitutional amendment proposal
if supported by a two-thirds majority while if one-third of the regional councils
support the proposal with a simple majority, it is sufficient to initiate a constitutional
amendment procedure.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 231

However, the roles of the public and other concerned organs in the constitutional
amendment procedure are not clear. In the constitution, a phrase reads, ‘the
proposal shall be submitted for discussion and decision to the general public and
to those whom the amendment of the constitution concerns’. Discussion of the
proposal by the public may be helpful to realise the participation of the public
in the process and it may be helpful to identify the major issues that concern the
people. What is not clear is the role of the people in the ‘decision’ on the proposal.
Since the proposed amendment has to be made by the decision of the federal and
state legislative organs, the role of the public in the decision seems to be out of
context and contradictory to the procedure of constitutional amendment envisaged
in the constitution. If the public has the right to participate in the decision of the
amendment proposal, there has to be clear procedure on how the referendum
process takes place and the requirements to that effect.
In terms of amending the constitution, there are two procedures to be followed.
In relation to provisions of the constitution that deal with individual rights and
freedoms and the initiation of constitutional amendment, it shall be made when all
the state councils and two thirds of each of the federal houses approve the proposed
amendment (Art. 105(1), FDRE constitution). In this process, each of the state
councils effectively has veto power. In relation to protecting rights and freedoms
enshrined under the constitution, the existence of such stringent procedures
guarantees the protection of the rights of citizens. However, the application of the
veto power granted to the regions blocks any constitutional amendment proposal if
it is not supported by any of the regions. Even if all other regions that constitute 99
per cent of the total population agree on the constitutional amendment procedure,
a state as small as Harari can block the process. In terms all other constitutional
provisions, the necessary vote for amendment is made when the House of Peoples’
Representatives and the House of Federation, in a joint session, approve a proposed
amendment by a two-thirds majority vote and when two-thirds of the Councils
of the member States of the Federation approve the proposed amendment by
majority votes.
In both cases, the role of the regional councils in the amendment of the
constitution is unprecedented. Such stringent amendment procedures may be
helpful to preserve the sustenance of the constitutional system and the role of
minority groups. There are, however, many concerns that could be raised in relation
to the amendment procedure. Primarily, there is a discrepancy between the role of
‘nations and nationalities’ and regional councils in the constitution. The preamble
of the constitution reiterates that the makers and owners of the constitution are
‘nations, nationalities and people’ and they are endowed with the right to self-
determination, including the right to secede from the Ethiopian state. Contrary
to this assumption, the amendment procedure grants the right to amendment of
the constitution to regional councils rather than to ‘nations and nationalities’.
Since each of the nationalities does not have their own state councils, all the
232 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

nationalities cannot participate in future amendments of the constitution.19 Either

the constitution should hold a consistent principle with respect to ‘rights of nations
and nationalities’ in terms of making and amending the constitution or since
state councils do not necessarily represent each nationality, the constitution may
alternatively include other zonal and woreda councils in the process of amending
the constitution.
The complexity of the amendment procedures has implications for the surging
of political tensions in the country. On the one hand, there are calls from different
opposition parties and other groups for the amendment of some of the pillars of
the constitution that are related to the organisation of the federal system and the
secession clause. On the other hand, the regime does not have the intention to
initiate any constitutional amendment process. In fact, the regime perceives any
call for constitutional amendment as an effort at dismantling the constitutional
system. On one occasion, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi commented in
parliament that the opposition parties that call for amendment resemble the Nazi
Party in Germany that changed the constitution after it came to power.20
The most important factor for such political deadlock is the lack of consensus
on the major political issues among the various political groupings of the country.
Since the constitution is drafted and ratified by few political forces that have a
religious-like belief in ‘the rights of nations and nationalities’, while a significant
number of political groups are not comfortable with such a principle to be the
building block of the constitution. The constitution aims at binding any government
coming to power to preserve the secession clause by making the amendment
procedure almost impossible.
If the political forces that strongly oppose parts of the constitution and its
legitimacy come to power, obviously they may change the constitution. However,
the chance of making such changes according to the amendment procedures
provided in the constitution is unlikely to materialise due to the complexities.
In such difficult circumstances, the new government would have to resort to
revolution and that would result in the suspension of the constitution. Such a type
of revolution is not new in the country. When the military regime came to power, it
suspended the 1955-revised constitution and came up with its own version which
was in complete departure from the past. In the same way, TPLF/EPRDF ousted
the military government and installed its own constitution in 1995 by suspending
the 1987 constitution.
There is no guarantee that the current political dispensation may not be
reversed. Because there has never been any serious attempt to implement the

19 A typical example is the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region that
consists of 56 nationalities that are represented in the regional council. Since the State
Council is staffed with the interests of different groups, it is not possible to claim that each
nationality has the opportunity to make its own decision in the referendum since each has
limited votes.
20 Capital, Vol. 13, No. 634, 6 February 2011.
 The Implications of Party Ideology 233

principles of the constitution and build democratic institutions, there is now a

sense of desperation among the political groups and the public towards the status
quo. In addition to this, the enactment of various laws and government measures
that apparently contradict the principles of the constitution and the fact that there
is not a constitutional court that safeguards the constitutional principles has made
the system stagnant and devoid of any dynamism. Unless there is consensus on
major constitutional issues in the country as well as a genuine implementation of
the constitutional ideals as witnessed in the past, any rigid amendment procures
are unlikely to preserve the status quo.

Summary

The impacts of ideologically motivated party policies have seriously affected the
formal constitutional system in Ethiopia. The separation of powers between the
central and regional governments on the one hand and the various organs of the
central government on the other are largely influenced by the Marxist orientation
of TPLF/EPRDF. The most important ideologically motivated principles that
regulate relations between the federal and regional state structures include ideals
of revolutionary democracy, democratic centralism and the party evaluation
mechanisms. The relationship between the central and regional governments is
largely regulated by TPLF/EPRDF’s de facto informal party ideology. There are a
number of ideological tools used by TPLF/EPRDF to influence the autonomy of
the regions. The complex relationships within the ruling party and its ideology are
the major source of the centralised and patronage relationships existing between
the federal and regional governments.
The relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial organs in the
Ethiopian federal system is also regulated by the ideology of the ruling TPLF/
EPRDF. The House of Peoples Representatives and the House of Federations are
largely run by informal principles of democratic centralism and the members of
the Houses are elected from a single political group. The rubber-stump features of
the Houses have led to the emergence of a dominant executive organ that controls
economic, social and political activities in the country. The judiciary is also largely
a victim of the ideological merits of the ruling elite. Not only recruitment and
appointment of the judges is made in a secretive and politicised process but also
the independence of the judiciary has been seriously undermined. The Marxist
ideological orientation of TPLF/EPRDF has also resulted in the absence of an
efficient judicial review mechanism that guarantees the rule of law and protection
of human rights in the country.
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 Chapter 8
The Role of Party Ideology in the
Democratisation and Protection of
Human Rights in Ethiopia

In one of his interviews, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said that one of
the achievements of his government in the last two decades was the building of a
‘federal and democratic system’ in Ethiopia (Forum for Federations 2011). Two
decades ago, Alemseged Gebreamlak, a former TPLF official and member of the
Constitutional Assembly had also argued that the ‘federal system of government
cannot function properly without viable democracy’ (Minutes of the Constitutional
Assembly 1994). Alemseged was apparently defending the nomenclature of the
new Ethiopian state structure that was dubbed ‘federal and democratic’ under
Article 1 of the FDRE constitution during deliberations on the draft constitution
in the Constitutional Assembly. In fact, compared to past regimes, TPLF/EPRDF
rendered much rhetoric to democracy and the protection of human rights.
However, numerous researches suggest that Ethiopia’s transition to democracy
has been either stalled or backsliding, particularly since 2005. Fundamentally,
there are serious contradictions between the claim to constitutional democracy
and the actual reality where democratic freedom and fundamental rights have been
curtailed. There are at least three basic criteria that can be used to measure the
extent of democratisation in Ethiopia. The criteria include whether political power
emanates from the people through proper representation, protection of civil and
political rights as well as the realisation of social and economic rights (Pausewang,
Tronvoll and Aalen 2002: 7). Measured against these requirements, the process
of democratisation in Ethiopia falls short of these standards. There has been
neither free and fair elections in the country nor were there legal and institutional
mechanisms put in place to safeguard the civil and economic rights of citizens.
Considering the blockage of democratisation and the protection of human rights in
the country, the argument is not on whether there is democracy and protection of
rights. Rather, the burning question is why the country has not been able to emerge
out of its totalitarian past.
The contention is that the ideological concepts relentlessly followed by the
ruling party are currently the single most important factors that have stifled
democratisation. This chapter highlights to what extent the ideological position
of the regime dubbed ‘revolutionary democracy’ and other Marxist-oriented
ideological concepts have undermined the democratisation process and the
protection of human rights. The implications of Marxist ideology that strives to
236 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

control all levels of institutions from top to bottom are evident in the building of
democratic institutions, civil society groups, media and electoral systems and in
the protection of human rights. In view of such entrenched ideological perceptions,
though the Ethiopian democratisation process has numerous challenges related to
a culture of repression, the major impediments that have currently prevented this
process from taking root in the country are largely related to the leftist ideological
tendencies of the regime.

Challenges of Transition to Democracy and Protection of Human Rights

in Ethiopia

The transition to democracy and establishment of democratic institutions in

Ethiopia has lagged behind even by African standards. At least some of the
emergent African elites have been exposed to the ideals and practices of peaceful
political discourse such as political demonstration and political association under
colonialism while their Ethiopian counterparts lack that experience (Bahru 2007:
84). Despite its dire consequences, the colonial system bequeathed to some African
countries positive legal and social entities such as relatively better judicial systems
and freedom of expression compared to the negligibility of such institutions within
the Ethiopian context. Not only Ethiopia had a closed feudal system for hundreds
of years but also the 1974 revolution destroyed the existing social fabric and
replaced it with an alien Marxist dogma. Since the days of the revolution, which
did not necessarily bring about the desired changes, the country has gone through
social and political turmoil without any significant breakthrough in dealing with
its totalitarian past.
There are different explanations put forward for the country’s extended
transition to democracy. One of the fundamental reasons for the lagging behind
of democratisation is the absence of a democratic culture in the country’s long
history. The greater part of the country’s history was under traditional feudal rule
that was characterised by absolute loyalty which legitimised the exploitation of the
peasant. Under the feudal system, ‘the Ethiopian social fabric was characterised
by gross inequality between the largely aristocratic elite consisting of landowners,
lords, nobles, the royal family, government officials, and elements of the clergy
and the impoverished peasantry’ (Solomon 2009). Under this feudal system,
‘there was a pattern of social interaction which sustained a strictly hierarchical
stratification of society, where the individual was compelled by a large, invisible
but rigid system of collective sanctions to obey the “orders from above”’ (Vaughan
and Tronvoll 2003: 33). Such patriarchal order was and remains visible in every
aspect of Ethiopian life, including food and dining (Mesfin 2010: 99–100).
The feudal political system in the past was largely structured in a way that the
king was at the top of the hierarchy followed by the nobility and then by soldiers
(Paul 2000: 176). In this feudal system, democratic culture and political debate
were absent. Instead, strict social segregation and loyalty were the hallmark of
 The Role of Party Ideology 237

the social fabric. As Abbay notes, ‘Ethiopia is still a paternalistic society where its
institutions from the smallest, the family, to the largest unit, the state, are pervaded
by authoritarian values of obedience. Orders, however offensive, are implemented.
Loyalty is held in higher esteem. Such proclivity to complete subservience is the
result of people’s powerlessness’ (Abbay 2009: 176).
Though there were some democratic cultures in Ethiopian communities such
as the gada system of the Oromo, its impact in terms of shaping the country’s
political culture was limited. The gada system did not survive migrations of
the Oromo to the northern highlands in the sixteenth century and had its own
limitations, particularly in terms of excluding women from political participation.
There have also been elements of democracy in some of the cultural practices in
social associations such as the council of elders, mutual aid organisations and
procedures to deal with conflicts and crime (Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen 2002:
3). Though such cultural traits still prevail in much of Ethiopia, they have been
seriously weakened due to the leftist ideology that requires complete conformity
to Marxist ideals, modernisation and lack of institutional support. The remarkable
sense of patriotism that has passed from generation to generation particularly in
terms of repelling foreign invaders did not contribute much to limit changing the
country’s repressive political culture.
Although some form of modern democratic principles were promoted during
the time of Haile Selassie, there has not been serious commitment to their
implementation as they are alien concepts to the Ethiopian polity. Such modern
principles that were introduced included signs of liberal tendencies such as
constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system of government. Later, the
opening up of space for political participation that occurred during the 1974
revolution ended up with bloodshed. The political chaos of the 1970s including
the adoption of communism as a departure from the retarded feudal state was
illustrative of the absence of a political culture rooted in the country. During
the upheavals of the revolution, due to lack of democratic culture to look up to,
the young students attempted to fill the vacuum through resorting to Marxists
ideology. The deep-seated authoritarian tradition of the country was conducive
to the emergence of repressive Marxist parties. Through the institutionalisation
of the undemocratic tradition of Marxism coupled with the mentality of youth as
shaped by feudal traditions, a new culture of wiping out political opponents was
also introduced. Particularly, the cold-blooded killings that occurred at end of the
1970s further discouraged people from participating in political activities. Due
to the terrors perpetrated by the military regime, the favourite saying among the
public has been ‘keeping politics and electricity from a distance’.
Though there has been significant political change since 1991, there has not
been a clear-cut departure from the traditional feudal and Marxist authoritarian
past. As Abbink points out in relation to the crackdown on political dissent in
2005, ‘Ethiopian political culture is not yet free from its historical heritage of
authoritarianism, elite rule and patronage and, in this context, a change of
government and the ousting of the reigning party stand a small chance in post-
238 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

1991 Ethiopia’ (Abbink 2006: 193). As was the case before, TPLF/EPRDF leaders
are also loyal to the Ethiopian repressive tradition (Merera 2003: 145). By sticking
to the old style of governance, the new regime failed to utilise the opportunity
to install a new political culture that transform the country from the traditional
repressive order to a modern democratic society.
The other major challenge to Ethiopia’s democratisation process is abject
poverty and a high rate of illiteracy. As a scholar noted, ‘poverty means that people
consume less. They also live shorter lives, have more children, see more of them
die, and are more likely to suffer from collective violence’ (Przeworski 2004: 20).
Poverty and ignorance makes voting rights meaningless for people who are largely
preoccupied with day-to-day survival (Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen 2002: 8).
According to a recent Multidimensional Poverty Index, 90 per cent of Ethiopians
are poor (UNDP Human Development Report 2010). Due to such a high rate of
poverty and illiteracy, the Ethiopian social structure is characterised by a lack of
a strong and economically rooted middle class and this derails the transition to
democracy. The poor social and economic conditions in the country have made the
making of democratic rule increasingly difficult.
Nevertheless, the most significant impediment to the democratisation of the
Ethiopian polity is related to the introduction of leftist ideology in the 1970s that has
been firmly maintained by the current rulers of the country. Since the introduction
of this ideology, it continues to play a role in stifling democratic transition in the
country in various ways. This leftist political ideology is premised on absolute
control of political space. It discourages the establishment of independent political
and civil society groups, limits civil liberties and freedom and controls the media.
The major leftist ideological aspects that have shaped the Ethiopian political
structure include the right to self-determination of nations and nationalities, the
principle of revolutionary democracy, a developmental state model, democratic
centralism and strict party evaluation mechanisms.
The major ideological bottleneck that has hindered the development of a
democratic system devoted to the protection of human rights in the country is
the principle of revolutionary democracy maintained by the TPLF/EPRDF.
The major consideration of revolutionary democracy is ‘liberal democracy is a
misfit under the social, economic and political conditions prevailing in Ethiopia’
(Tronvoll 2009: 459). The TPLF/EPRDF’s version of democracy asserts that ‘it is
not the liberal “bourgeois” variety, based on individual participation, a diversity
of interests and views and plural representation’ (Tronvoll 2009: 459). According
to revolutionary democracy, ‘individual rights are subordinate to broader societal
and governmental concerns; collective rights are privileged over individual
ones and, unlike liberal democracy that relies on elected representatives, the
population is to be continually engaged in the decision-making process’ (Human
Rights Watch 2010: 14). According to revolutionary democracy, the participation
of the public in the decision-making process takes the form of informing the
public about the decision of the elite party leaders instead of having the people
being the sovereign decision-makers. Though there is a claim by the regime that
 The Role of Party Ideology 239

revolutionary democracy adheres to many of the fundamental democratic values

and political participation, it is restricted to debate for the purpose of clarification
and persuasion.
The other characteristic of revolutionary democracy is that it does not permit the
existence of any independent institution in the country or real separation of powers
since all institutions of government are considered as ideologically entrenched
state apparatus. In accordance with the merits of revolutionary democracy,
political power needs to be centralised within one administrative organ. This
kind of ideological perception is contradictory to the principle of democracy and
freedom under the constitution and has become a major obstacle to emergence
of accountable governance and independent institutions as well as realisation of
individual freedom.
In addition to the precepts of ‘revolutionary democracy’, the deep-rooted
Stalinist ideological commitment of TPLF/EPRDF to the ‘question of nationalities’
has also been an obstacle to the protection of human rights in the country. According
to TPLF/EPRDF, ‘the right of nations and nationalities’ is the basis to ensuring the
rights of individuals. In other words, ensuring the rights of ethnic groups is the basis
for ensuring human rights. From such a perspective, the rights of the individual
cannot be separated from group rights. This principle indirectly implies that group
rights have primacy over individual rights. Due to such an ideological perception,
individual rights and freedoms have been largely neglected. Particularly, the rights
of citizens that live out of their ‘homeland’ and individuals who do not want to
identify themselves according to ethnic categorisations have been subjected to
various forms of discrimination.
Consequently, the principle of the ‘self-determination of nations and
nationalities’ has been instrumental in shaping the Ethiopian political discourse
since the 1970s, along with the current federal structure. This principle, which
was introduced into the Ethiopian political space in the period leading to the 1974
revolution, has not lost its intensity in the last four decades. The doctrine has not
only become the major political contention spreading political polarisation but it
has also created uncertainties in terms of maintaining national unity and stability.
At the same time, it has encouraged ethnic entrepreneurship, suffocated citizens’
rights and is used to advance patron–client relations in party and government
structures. Since the principle places undue emphasis on differences, it has
infused the Ethiopian political discourse with suspicion, lack of consensus and
polarisation of political forces which have increasingly paralysed the opportunity
for the protection of individual rights, as well as dwarfing the development of
independent institutions.
In addition, the political space has further been restricted since the 2005 general
election through the reinvention of the ‘developmental state model’. This model
presupposes the wider role and competence of the government in controlling
social, economic and political measures to realise economic prosperity. Setting
aside whether the approach would realise faster economic development for this
impoverished nation, its impact on democratisation has been quite significant.
240 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

The developmental state approach is particularly responsible for the enactment

of different laws that restrict the activities of civil society groups, the press and
opposition parties.
There are also other leftist ideological mechanisms used by the regime to
maintain political control. One such ideological mechanism is the application
of the Marxist principle of democratic centralism. The increased application of
this principle has enabled the party to identify and dismiss individuals or groups
with dissenting opinions and maintain control at every level of government and
party channel. Federal or regional government officials, parliamentarians or other
government employees are all expected to display utmost loyalty to the central
party policy even where the party policy is contrary to public interest or the
officials’ conscience. In order to create a sense of insecurity within the rank of
the party, members are obliged to regularly undergo hostile evaluating routines
called gimgemma. As will be shown, these ideological principles are instrumental
in stifling the development of democratic institutions, an independent press, civil
society groups and protection of human rights, including fostering rigged elections
that have been taking place in the country since 1991.

The Role of Party Ideology in Weakening Democratic Institutions

in Ethiopia

Democratic institutions are vital to bring about democratic transformation. A poor

governance framework in post-conflict countries has the potential to undermine
the sustainability of peace and bring about lasting solutions to political problems
(IDEA 1998). Poorly designed democratic institutions may incite violence ‘since
the introduction of “democratic” politics can easily be used to mobilise ethnicity,
turning elections into “us” versus “them” conflicts’ (Samuels 2006: 9). Thus,
wisely crafted and properly empowered political institutions have tremendous
significance for countries in transition to realise a gradual but lasting building
of democracy.
As a country in transition, establishing independent political institutions has
been one of the major challenges to Ethiopia in its bid to successfully achieve
democratisation. During the monarchical system, Ethiopia was the only country
in Africa where ‘centralised political authority derives essentially from traditional
sources of legitimacy’ (Markakis and Beyene 1967: 13). Due to the entrenched
traditional feudal structure, there had never been any strong institutional
development in the country. Organised political activities began to emerge only
in the 1970s. However, most of the parties that were established at the time of
the 1974 revolution were largely Marxist parties that were not democratic in
nature. Finally, the military regime wiped out many of the opposition groups and
entrenched itself with a Marxist government. When the country was dragging out
of conflict in 1991, there had been expectations that it would simultaneously pull
itself out of its authoritarian past.
 The Role of Party Ideology 241

Despite the fact that critics argue that the measures undertaken by TPLF/EPRDF
on human rights and economic liberalism were only to please the international
diplomatic world and the donor community, the reforms made to incorporate
human rights and establish democratic institutions were promising. Nevertheless,
the major challenge in the institutionalisation of the Ethiopian polity is the gap
between rhetoric and practice. As a recent Human Rights Watch report reveals,
‘democracy’s technical framework will remain a deceptive and hollow façade so
long as Ethiopia’s institutions lack independence from the ruling party and there
is no accountability for abuses by state officials’ (Human Rights Watch 2010: 2).
In particular, the formal institutions are significantly weak while the informal
party decision-making organs are powerful since ‘the vital political decisions are
made in the informal sphere, behind the façade, in circles and networks of a neo-
patrimonial nature, impervious to what institutions like a parliament or a high
court say’ (Abbink 2006: 178). This is because the party does not have the political
will to establish institutions that have an independent and neutral existence.
The major factor behind the dwarfing of the democratisation process and the
formation of viable institutions in the country is closely linked to the ideological
perceptions maintained by the party rather than capacity-related challenges. As
argued in the preceding chapters, the central problem that prevented the country
from forming democratic institutions momentarily is the TPLF/EPRDF strategy
to stay in power through applying different ideologically motivated principles
that prevent the emergence of independent institutions that would challenge its
hegemony. All the principles that are held by the regime such as revolutionary
democracy, developmental state model and the application of Marxist democratic
centralism with a severe evaluation mechanism that harasses party members are
all responsible for the feebleness of democratic institutions. Since these principles
presupposes unilateral control of every political apparatus from top to bottom,
there is no room for the development of independent political institutions that are
largely viewed as threatening to the hegemonic power of TPLF/EPRDF.
Due to the ideology pursued by TPLF/EPRDF, the development of various
institutions has been largely undermined. The primary institution that has become
victim to its ideological vindication is the parliamentary system itself. Though
the adoption of a parliamentary system of government in divided societies such
as Ethiopia plays an important role in the manner of representation of the various
groups, the system could not bring about an effective parliamentary system in
the country. The parliament is dominated by the ruling TPLF/EPRDF while all
the other political forces are excluded from the political process. In addition, the
electoral system that enabled the regime to control the entire political space and the
strict party discipline used by TPLF/EPRDF significantly restricts the role of the
members of parliament in formulating policy and controlling the executive organ.
Despite the constitutional protection of the parliamentarians to act in accordance
with the constitution, their conscience and the interest of their constituency,
the voting trend in the parliament indicates that the members of parliament are
242 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

expected to display party allegiance irrespective of their conscience or their

loyalty to the constitution.
The fact that the House of Federation does not have a lawmaking power has
significantly limited the role of the regional governments in the decision-making
process. In addition to being dominated by the ruling party, the House has been
entrusted with the power to interpret the constitution and this enables the regime
to evade meaningful scrutiny by an independent constitutional court. The same
problem of independence and neutrality is observable with regard to the judicial
system. In addition to the significant role of the executive in the appointment and
administration of the judiciary, their role in the interpretation and implementation
of the constitution is very limited. Other institutions such as the Electoral Board,
the Human Rights Commission and Ombudsman are also criticised for not being
independent and credible.
In considering such a phenomenon, it could be argued that all these institutions
are directly or indirectly controlled by TPLF/EPRDF whose ideology does not
recognise the independent existence of democratic institutions. The absence of
independent institutions in turn has resulted in the absence of an accountable
and transparent system of government. Lack of transparency is evident at every
level of government in spite of the common reference by the TPLF/EPRDF
leadership to democratic jargons. Lack of accountability has resulted in public
distrust in the democratic institutions and has engineered a sense of fear among the
intellectuals, media and the public. Ethiopian officials often explain the problems
of democratisation by claiming that ‘this is much better than the Derg era’. Thus,
TPLF/EPRDF’s ideological position needs to be revised in order to facilitate the
development of independent institutions that guarantee the rights of citizens as
well as bringing about political stability in the country.

The Impact of Party Ideology on Multi-party Democracy in Ethiopia

The role of an effective and stable multi-party system is crucial for a viable
democracy. The chances for the development of a democracy depend on the
functioning of properly and democratically organised parties that provide the
people with clear choices of policy and goals and uphold democratic principles
(Ghai and Cottrell 2008: 155). In particular, political parties play a fundamental
role to mobilise public opinion and offer citizens a choice of policies (Ghai and
Cottrell 2008: 154). In plural societies where the salient social cleavages tend
to be translated into party system cleavages, the establishment of a multi-party
system is an inescapable step towards realising stability (Lijphart 1977: 146). The
multi-party system is, in particular, an important aspect of the federal system of
government. Scholars such as Ricker argue that ‘if a party system is genuinely
decentralised, or if the regional governments are run by parties that operate
independently of the party in power at the central level, this might enhance the
power of the regional governments and strengthen both their capability to run
 The Role of Party Ideology 243

regional affairs and genuinely represent regional interests at the central level’
(Riker 1964: 129). Political parties that are able to attain cross regional and
national support are important for maintaining the multi-national federal system
(Siemon and Conway 2001: 362).
Multi-party democracy is a new and problematic area of the Ethiopian
democratisation process. In the Ethiopian context, opposition to those in authority
has always been deeply antithetical to Ethiopian conceptions of governance, since
people who opposed the government have had no option of expressing their ideas
freely (Clapham 2005). Political parties had no firm roots in the past because of
systematic repression during previous regimes and the absence of a civic tradition.
Before the new political dispensation of 1991, there was no political and legal
framework that permitted the operation of political parties. The political opening
in 1991 has facilitated the flourishing of hundreds of political parties, many of
which are ethnic based. Though the number of parties has been on the increase
in the country, a genuine multi-party system has never been realised in Ethiopia.
There are different factors that explain the absence of multi-party democracy
in the country. One of the challenges to multi-party democracy is the repressive
political environment that has persisted from generation to generation. All the
governments that ruled the country for a long time followed the same pattern of
repression of the political opposition. During the Imperial period, the ‘divine’
nature of the throne, the emperor’s systematic cooption method together with
some serious measures against organised opposition discouraged political dissent.
Due to the criminalisation of dissent, leftist parties that emerged at the collapse
of the feudal system were forced to become clandestine organisations. When the
military regime controlled political power in 1974, it killed, imprisoned and forced
members of opposition groups to flee the country.
This repressive culture has systematically continued since the inception
of the new system in 1991. Currently, the most significant factor undermining
the development of multi-party democracy are the ideological perceptions
maintained by TPLF/EPRDF. The central issue for the absence of vibrant multi-
party democracy in the country is related to the leftist ideological tendencies of
TPLF/EPRDF. Even though the TPLF/EPRDF government is obliged to accept
formal opposition as a result of its need for external support and finance, it has
never regarded any opposition movement as legitimate, or as having any right to
oust it from power by peaceful electoral means (Clapham 2005). Officially, the
regime claims that it is committed to multi-party democracy as enshrined in the
constitution. On the other hand, TPLF/EPRDF has a long-standing vision to stay
in power through different ideological mechanisms and a total disregard for the
opposition’s legitimate right to take power via the ballot box (International Crisis
Group 2009: 7).
Though the TPLF/EPRDF is formally committed to a ‘stable multi-party
democratic system’, its decision-making, organisational principles and discourse
reflect the Marxist-Leninist philosophy that has guided the TPLF since its
foundation in 1975. In particular, the subverted precepts of revolutionary
244 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

democracy developed by EPRDF/TPLF do not allow equal rights for all groups.
According to revolutionary democracy, the opposition parties can compete for
political power, but if they ‘obstruct the masses from exercising their rights,
revolutionary democracy will use the constitution and other laws to punish them
and bring under control their illegal activities’ (Vestal 2009). Political opponents
are always presented by TPLF/EPRDF as anti-people and enemies of the country.1
The various party documents of TPLF/EPRDF indicate that the key to
development is a one party state. The vision that aimed at maintaining hegemony
is manifest in the various repressive measures taken against opposition party
members that include extra-judicial killings, imprisonment and intimidation.
Opposition parties are not allowed to operate in rural areas that are considered to
be within the power base of the regime, since rural Ethiopia is entirely controlled
by the regime. It is unlikely a strong opposition party could emerge without
engaging in political activity in rural areas where 85 per cent of the population
are residing. The ideological mechanism used by TPLF/EPRDF has also enabled
it to manipulate the country’s resources to the disadvantage of opposition groups.
Since the ruling party controls government resources, it uses them for advancing
party activities while the opposition parties do not have any means to conduct
advocacy work. During elections, ‘the ruling party uses vehicles, machinery and
staff from government offices for party activities and uses their power to create
obstacles to mobilisation by opposition parties’ (Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen
2002: 12). It is clear that elections conducted under such an ideological regime
will not meet the standards of liberal democracies (Tronvoll 2010: 460).
TPLF/EPRDF’s ideological principles, which have restricted the development
of a multi-party system, have also affected the relations that need to exist between
the centre and the periphery. In democratic federations, different political parties
have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process of the central
and regional governments. In the Ethiopian federal system, TPLF/EPRDF has
controlled all the regional state governments either directly through the member
parties or indirectly through affiliate parties. The firm control is largely through
the party’s Marxist-style democratic centralism, which undermines the federal
division of power and subordinates the regional governments to the central
government.
Since the repression through systematic party structure of TPLF/EPRDF
is intense, well educated and enlightened citizens are forced to shy away from
participating and supporting opposition parties. This has resulted in the flooding
of opposition parties with individuals who have the passion but lack the necessary
experience and knowledge to transform the political movement. The months

1 TPLF/EPRDF’s position on opposition parties is similar to what Kamuzu Banda

of Malawi had to say about opposition parties, ‘there is no opposition in heaven. God
himself does not want opposition – that is why he chased Satan away. Why should Kamuzu
have opposition?’ (Africa Watch Report 1990: 13). He is apparently equating the ‘political
kingdom’ with heaven.
 The Role of Party Ideology 245

leading up to the 2005 elections witnessed an unprecedented opening to political

mobilisation. The enthusiasm arose during the political opening created during the
2005 elections encouraged many scholars and elites to join the ranks of the various
opposition parties, thus sparking a huge sense of civic nationalism. Soon after
the elections, the artificiality of the opening was revealed when the government
cracked down on the opposition. After 2005, the educated elite decided to withdraw
from active politics although most of them are concerned about the exacerbation
of the political crisis in the country.
What makes the prospects of multi-party democracy gloomy in Ethiopia is the
absence of a constitutional system that oversights political parties such as TPLF/
EPRDF that have programmes and ideologies contrary to the principles of the
constitution. In Germany, before the war, the Nationalsozialismus (Nazi) party came
to power and started to erode the principles of the constitutional system. During
that time, there was no independent institution that checked the advancement of
the destructive ideology of the Nazi party. Finally, this dictatorship led the country
into disaster. After the end of the war, the German Basic law clearly provided that
internal organisation under which political parties had to conform to democratic
principles. Parties that, ‘by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents,
seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the
existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional pending
the ruling by The Federal Constitutional Court’ (Art. 21, Basic law of Germany).
On two occasions, the constitutional court ruled on the unconstitutionality of
political parties and the parties involved were banned from participating in the
political system. This has been the bedrock principle that prevents the emergence
of undemocratic political parties in Germany.
Similarly, a clear principle needs to be incorporated into the Ethiopian
constitutional system if democracy is to have a chance to flourish. Despite the
fact that all citizens, organs of state, political organisations, other associations as
well as their officials have the duty to ensure observance of the constitution and
to obey it, there is no clear system as to how this constitutional principle is to be
enforced in Ethiopia. This is particularly apparent in the absence of an independent
constitutional court that may safeguard the constitutional system. The ideologies
of the ruling party clearly undermine democratic transformation and tighten
political repression. For instance, the dogma of revolutionary democracy clearly
discriminates against citizens by creating divisions between enemies and friends
as well as by clearly declaring its suspicion of multi-party democracy and the
separation of power principles. Though such an ideology is in clear contradiction
with principles of the constitutions, there is no a system to address such gross
violation of the constitutional principles. Since the TPLF/EPRDF continues to be
the player as well as arbiter of the multi-party system, gross violations of the
constitutional system pass without appropriate accountability and scrutiny. One
of the measures that needs to be undertaken to develop a full-fledged multi-party
democracy in Ethiopia is to have a constitutional system that promotes freedom
246 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

of association and check the policies of political parties that undermines the
democratic system.

The Impact of Party Ideology on Development of Civil Society

Organisations (CSOs)

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have become now the most important
institutions to build a vibrant democratic society and create a bridge between
the government and the public. CSOs have played a significant role in the
transformation of the Ethiopian conflict- ridden political history into a civilised
and stable system of governance where the power of ideas reigns over the rule
of the gun. Ever since the occurrence of famine in the country in the 1970s, there
has been a steady increase in the number of CSOs in the country. There had been
also some professional and labour associations during the time of Emperor Haile
Selassie I. However, the regime change in 1991 led to the creation of significant
numbers of professional associations and trade unions. As of 2009, there were
4,700 organisations registered with the federal justice ministry and an estimated
7,000 NGOs are active across the country (International Crisis Group 2009: 20).
Despite the volume in the number of CSOs in the country, Ethiopian regimes
in the past and present encourage only CSOs that engage in activities related to
relief and rural development rather than those that engage in advocacy activities.
Government officials and accuse the CSOs of being mouthpieces of opposition
parties as well as criticising them for not engaging in major problems within the
country such as degradation and poverty (Paulos 2006: 15). To this effect, some
studies suggest that development projects run by many NGOs have done little to
improve the livelihood of communities (Dessalegn 2006: 108). The fact that the
CSOs are concentrated in Addis Ababa and are hardly seen in rural areas is cited
as an important problem (Paulos 2006: 26). Furthermore, CSOs are also accused
of working to please foreign donors as well as the government rather than focusing
on advocacy for democratic empowerment and the protection of human rights
(Paulos 2006: 26).
The increasing numbers of CSOs suddenly came to a halt in 2005 when
they received a serious blow in the aftermath of the elections. The government
crackdown on CSOs following the 2005 election crisis was largely due to the
increasingly assertive role of CSOs immediately before the election. Until 2005,
CSOs were not deeply involved in policy advocacy work due to the restrictive
political framework. Immediately before the election, due to the unprecedented
openness allowed by the regime, many CSOs were engaged in voter education
campaigns in many parts of the country. This resulted in the registration and high
turnout of voters for the election which helped the opposition during past elections
to command higher public support compared to the past. TPLF/EPRDF was not
happy about the role of CSOs that gave significantly increased support to the
opposition parties among the public.
 The Role of Party Ideology 247

After the election, TPLF/EPRDF came up with a new law that restricted the
role of CSOs in policy advocacy. The official justification provided by the regime
for the new law was to make CSOs more accountable and to prevent foreign
powers from meddling in the internal affairs of the country. The CSOs law that
was enacted in 2009 gives the government broad powers to oversee, sanction
and dismantle entities it considers troublesome. The law makes any work that
touches on human rights or governance issues illegal if carried out by foreign non-
governmental organisations and labels any Ethiopian organisation that receives
more than 10 per cent of its funding from sources outside of Ethiopia as a ‘foreign’
entity. By enacting such a rule, most local CSOs were prohibited from engaging in
advocacy, human rights, democratic governance and conflict resolution activities.
The law also allows the government agency to refuse registration or cancel a
charity or society on vague and dubious grounds.
Although the retrogressive political culture in the country has carried out its
role in terms of limiting the role of the CSOs, the most important factor that has
currently hindered the development of full-fledged CSOs is directly related to the
ideological philosophy of TPLF/EPRDF. The role of civil society groups or other
institutions in Ethiopia is determined not by what the constitutional system dictates
or what kind of role they aim to play in the country. It is rather shaped by the
ideological convictions of the TPLF/EPRDF, particularly its leadership. The late
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s perception of civil society groups is that ‘NGOs
can only lead to a fragile democracy which does not permit alternative paths to
develop. Instead, what Africa needs is a “paradigm shift” from neo-liberalism to
an agrarian democracy, where the NGOs would have minimal roles’ (Alemseged
2009: 180). The late Prime Minister further asserted that the ‘proliferation of
NGOs and domestic voluntary organisations is a form of pluralistic patronage
which can only lead to a fragile democracy’ (Alemseged 2009: 180).
Such perceptions with respect to CSOs are in line with the inherent ideological
conceptions of TPLF/EPRDF that determine the role and scope of CSOs. As
mentioned elsewhere in this book, revolutionary democracy as a prime philosophy
of TPLF/EPRDF aims at public mobilisation to bring about change in the country.
This is to be done through the vanguard party that does not give room to independent
institutions to develop. The recent rhetoric about the developmental state model
that has become state policy in the aftermath of the 2005 general elections has
further narrowed down the political space available to the functioning of CSOs by
providing the state with unprecedented power to regulate every facet of activity.
As far as the country’s political landscape is dominated by Marxist-oriented
ideological perversions, the emergence of a vibrant civil society that facilitates
public cohesion in a country that has diverse ethnic and religious groups remains
elusive.
248 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

The Impact of the Party Ideology on the Independent Media in Ethiopia

The mass media are often referred to as the fourth branch of government because
of the power they wield and the oversight function they exercise in democracies. In
the contemporary dispensation, the significant impact of the media has contributed
much in terms of holding government actions accountable and demanding the
transparency of the state. The role of the media is particularly irrepressible when
the other institutions of government such as the legislature and the judiciary are
weak or corrupted to facilitate abuse of power. In the Ethiopian context, when the
TPLF/EPRDF came to power in 1991, a national charter that recognised freedom
of speech was adopted and a law was issued on freedom of the press. Soon
after the issuance of the law, different newspapers, magazines and books hit the
market. Citizens welcomed the trend since the action taken to open up the sector
to independent media was a watershed moment, because it had been unthinkable
during the past regimes.
However, the distribution of the private press was limited to Addis Ababa and
other major cities compared to the role of the electronic media that is by far the
most important means of mass media in rural Ethiopia. Despite the call to open
up the electronic media to the private sector from the beginning, it took almost
a decade for a law to be enacted that regulates private electronic media to be
allowed. To date, the broadcasting proclamation is yet to be fully implemented.
Only a few FM private radio stations are permitted to operate in the capital city
Addis Ababa. Many of those established are allegedly pro-government or shy away
from issues they deem unpleasant for the government. Licences have never been
granted to private shortwave radio and television broadcasters that could reach the
general public in rural areas. The government provides various justifications for
the delays, although the real justification behind this is the threat posed to its grip
on power by the free media.
Since their inception, there have been different challenges facing the newly
emerged Ethiopian free media. Firstly, the lack of a solid political culture of
tolerance and dialogue is the main challenge to their newly embraced freedom.
As has been mentioned before, the country was totally intolerant and closed to
political dissent during the feudal and military regimes in the past. Against that
backdrop, the sudden – albeit limited – openings in the freedom of the press could
not continue smoothly. The newspapers that emerged during the first few years of
the new dispensation were showcases of bitter presentation on the various political
issues unresolved in the country. The various groups writing and publishing
their point of view lacked courtesy and largely attacked personalities instead of
addressing political issues. Secondly, although the new regime is credited with
pioneering openings for the private media, the public officials were neither ready
to tolerate the consequences of open criticism nor ideologically friendly to an
independent press. Signs of strain immediately emerged as serious critics of the
regime’s policies on the private free press began to be published.
 The Role of Party Ideology 249

The common accusation directed by the government to the private media is

that they were irresponsible and were political activists devoid of neutrality. This
accusation may have been partly true in light of the fact that the vocal newspapers
received their inspiration from the ideals of the opposition parties. However, the
major reason why they were perceived as affiliated to opposition parties seems to
have been associated with the substantial violation of human rights in the country
and public grievances that motivated them to publish news items critical of the
government rather than having a direct attachment to the opposition groups. Such
accusations of partisanship are also questionable considering the myth of the
notion of independence of the media. As far as the press operates within the limits
of the law, whether they function as political activists or supporters of government
is largely irrelevant. For instance, how could we justify the independence of the
Washington Post or New York Times? These newspapers are accused of showing
partisanship towards either liberal or conservative attitudes. The New York Times
is usually viewed as being part of the liberal press, while the Washington Post is
viewed as being conservative. The debate on their neutrality will always exist.
Such value judgement issues are left to the preference and judgement of the
readers rather than to regulation of the law.
Although the authoritarian state structure in the past was hostile to the
development of free press, presently, the real challenge to the development of
the free press in the country is the ambiguous ideals of the ruling party towards
democracy in general and the private media in particular. Though the fall of
the Berlin Wall set TPLF/EPRDF on a crossroads as to how it continues its
communist ideology, research on the policies of the regime revealed that the basic
Marxist structure of the party is still entrenched. This does not, however, mean
that formal commitments to a democratic system of government as well as the
protection of human rights, including freedom of expression, are not formally
promised. Apparently, out of opportunism, TPLF/EPRDF was forced to recognise
vocabularies of democracy and freedom that had never been included in its agenda
during the time of the armed struggle. To pursue a socialist ideology in disguise,
a new form of democracy dubbed ‘revolutionary democracy’ was invented.
Revolutionary democracy primarily purports that all institutions, including the
media, need to be controlled to advance socio-economic development.
Ideals of revolutionary democracy have obviously direct implications in the
emergence of democratic institutions, including a vibrant press. Due to such an
ideological sensitivity of the regime and an attitude that considers free media
unfriendly to the system, the Ethiopian press has suffered a series of measures
undertaken by the government. There have been frequent arrests and trials of
editors, reporters and publishers, and the subsequent closure of many publications,
often leading to journalists fleeing the country. The critical private media has
virtually disappeared following the crackdown on the opposition after the 2005
elections. In addition to this, the Amharic programmes on Voice of America and
Deutsche Welle reported that their broadcasts have been intermittently jammed
since 2007; the government ordered the local Sheger FM radio station to stop
250 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

re-broadcasting the former’s content (International Crisis Group 2009: 21). The
government has also blocked all political Ethiopian websites that are critical of
the government.
After six years of deliberation, the parliament adopted a new press law in July
2008. The new proclamation has some positive elements such clarifying many
of the issues related to the press that were hitherto too general to be understood
easily and has given recognition of freedom of information. Furthermore, the
law obliges government agencies to publish documents that are relevant to the
service of the agency. Clear principles on classified and non-classified information
and procedures to be applicable during requesting information from the relevant
government organ are also stipulated. If applied seriously, principles of freedom
of information help citizens to get information that will help them to hold the
government accountable for its actions. Nonetheless, there are also concerns
relating to the new law. One of the concerns relates to the scope of the defamation
clause. According to Art. 43(7) of the proclamation, the prosecutor is granted the
power to institute a case without being submitted if the defamation related to a
government official. It is feared that this provision may be abused by the state.
Otherwise, most of the worries of the private media towards the new press law
arise largely from the increasingly hostile approach by the government to the
private press rather than the provisions of the law as such.
The most disturbing and sweeping law that undermines freedom of the
press is the newly enacted Anti-Terrorism Proclamation adopted in 2009. This
proclamation in particular provides a broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism
that could be used to criminalise non-violent political dissent. The proclamation
provides that any form of support for acts of terrorism entails a serious criminal
penalty. Accordingly, whoever publishes or causes the publication of a statement
that is likely to be understood by some or all the members of the public as a direct
or indirect encouragement or other inducement for them to commit, prepare or
instigate an act of terrorism is punishable with rigorous imprisonment of up to 20
years. The proclamation further provides the intelligence agency with the power
to intercept communications by the person suspected of terrorism. Admissible
evidence in the case of terrorism in court includes hearsay or indirect evidence
or any form of evidence whose source is not to be disclosed. The police may also
arrest without a court warrant any person whom they reasonably suspect to having
committed or to be committing a terrorist act.
All the rules enshrined under this proclamation potentially violate presumption
of innocence, freedom of expression and association, right to privacy and the right
of peaceful demonstrations of citizens. The fear that the government may apply the
legislation to crack down on dissent has also been confirmed when the government
levelled different terrorism charges against many politicians, journalists and civil
society activists. Given the bad human rights record of the regime, it invoked
the provisions of the anti-terrorism law to crack down on the private media. In
fact, a number of newspapers have been closed down and threatened by the Anti-
 The Role of Party Ideology 251

Terrorism Law and many journalists have either fled the country or have been
charged and sentenced with harsh penalties.
In conclusion, it could be said that although free media is an independent
institution that is required to level the playing field, its development under the
existing revolutionary democratic ideological policy framework is unlikely to
be realised. Revolutionary democracy considers institutions such as independent
media as a threat to mass-based principles of democracy that attempt to control
every aspect of life in the country down to grassroots level. Unless such ideological
concepts are relaxed or reversed, the development of an independent and full-
fledged media in the country is unlikely to emerge.

Summary

The most significant impediment to the democratisation of the Ethiopian polity and
protection of human rights is related to the introduction of leftist ideology in the
1970s that has been firmly maintained by the TPLF/EPRDF. Since the introduction
of this ideology, it continues to play a role in stifling democratic transition in the
country in various ways. This leftist political ideology is premised on absolute
control of political space. It discourages the establishment of independent political
and civil society groups, limits civil liberties and freedom and controls the media.
The major leftist ideological aspects that have shaped the Ethiopian political
structure include the right to self-determination of nations and nationalities, the
principle of revolutionary democracy, a developmental state model, democratic
centralism and strict party evaluation mechanisms.
The major ideological bottleneck that has hindered the development of a
democratic system devoted to the protection of human rights in the country is the
principle of revolutionary democracy maintained by the TPLF/EPRDF. The major
consideration of revolutionary democracy is that liberal democracy is not relevant
to the social, economic and political conditions in Ethiopia. Rather, revolutionary
democracy asserts that the liberal ‘bourgeois’ democratic model that focuses on
individual rights does not protect rights of nations and nationalities. According to
revolutionary democracy, the participation of the public in the decision-making
process takes the form of informing the public about the decision of the elite party
leaders instead of having the people being the sovereign decision-making organ.
Unless such perceptions of revolutionary democracy, which are antithetical to
democratic governance, are rooted out of the Ethiopian political discourse, the
democratisation and protection of human rights endeavours in the country will
continue to be immensely challenging tasks.
This page has been left blank intentionally
 Concluding Remarks

The book provides an extensive analysis of the Ethiopian ethnic federal system
from the perspective of the ideological principles pursued by the TPLF/EPRDF.
Although the federal system is formally presumed to be regulated by the
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), the system
is informally structured and regulated by the ideological fundamentals of TPLF/
EPRDF. The major ideological concepts of the ruling regime have been largely
responsible for shaping and regulating the federal system during the last two
decades. The book mainly addresses how each of these ideological principles has
affected the functioning of the Ethiopian federal system.
Primarily, the various implications of the Stalinist notion of ‘the right to self-
determination of nationalities’ and the introduction of the ethnic political structure
is addressed in detail in the book. The introduction of this doctrine to the Ethiopian
political discourse has brought about different implications. It is debatable why
the system identified ethnicity as the only basis for political organisation in a
country where there are other identities that are as dominant as ethnic identity.
Although the country has different regional and religious identities, the federal
system only singled out ethnic identity as the only organising principle of the
state. The other concern is related to the assumption that federalism could resolve
all of the long-standing problems related to ethnicity. Since the country has other
social and economic problems to be addressed, adopting an ethnic federal system
as the alpha and omega of all sorts of problems within Ethiopia is not only an
act of hypocrisy but is also misleading. The federal system is also criticised in
relation to the actual performance of the system in terms of putting the rhetoric
into practice. Even though the federal system has granted various powers to the
regional governments, they are largely controlled by the central government.
The ethnicised political environment has also had an impact on common
nationalism and the preservation of individual rights. Due to the unprecedented
emphasis given to group- related demands, the Ethiopian federal system has
seriously undermined individual freedom and liberties. In addition, due to such
ethnic fragmentations, a sense of common nationality is dying away rapidly.
Since the federal system attempts to put all Ethiopians within their respective
ethnic groups, people who are not categorised in the ethnic structure have faced
numerous difficulties. Furthermore, the application of the principle of the right to
self-determination to all ethnic groups is contrary to the general norm applicable in
multicultural federations. In other multicultural federal systems, the right to self-
determination is granted only to groups who demand regional autonomy rather
than granting a blanket right to all groups. Furthermore, the absence of consensus
254 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

on the structure of the Ethiopian state has undermined the prospects of forging an
effective system of government. The disagreements among the various political
groupings ranges from issues dealing with what constitutes the major problems
of the country, the country’s history, the form of government needed, the mode
of addressing ethno-regional claims as well as the definition of national symbols.
In order to have a working federal system that embraces linguistic diversity and
national unity, there needs to be some degree of consensus.
The book also examines the impact of the ideology of TPLF/EPRDF in
the structure and functioning of the federal system. There is a formal de jure
intergovernmental relationship between the federal and the central government,
but the de facto intergovernmental relationship largely shaped by ideological
perceptions followed by TPLF/EPRDF has unprecedented implications in the
overall functioning of the system. There are a number of party ideology tools used
by TPLF/EPRDF to influence the autonomy of the regions. The devolution of
power to the regions has Leninist elements, which involve a strong vanguard party
extending from the centre to the smallest villages through a well-organised party
network. In this regard, the principle of democratic centralism is the major tool
that has been used to regulate the intergovernmental relations between the central
and regional governments. This principle governs the patron–client relationship
between the central party network of TPLF/EPRDF and the regional member
and affiliated parties. The aggressive use of democratic centralism has also
significantly blurred the separation of government and party structure at federal and
regional levels.
The other important ideological tool that has been used to stifle regional
autonomy is revolutionary democracy. In accordance with the precepts of
revolutionary democracy, political power needs to be centralised under a single
organ and any independent institution or real separation of powers should not be
permitted in the country. Rather, all institutions of government are considered as
ideologically entrenched state apparatus without having their own independent
existence. Revolutionary democracy in principle does not tolerate an autonomous
regional government that departs from the agenda set by the central government
or party structure. As things stands now, it seems unthinkable to have functioning
intergovernmental relations between the central and regional governments as
far as the merits of revolutionary democracy are superimposed over the entire
constitutional system. The other mechanisms used by the ruling party to maintain
its control in the regions is through the method of gimgemma, which implies
the public evaluation of politicians and party members. To achieve loyalty at
local level, the most effective mechanism used by the central TPLF/EPRDF
party structure is the application of gimgemma at every level of government and
party channels.
The newly adopted developmental state model has also contributed much
in terms of affecting formal intergovernmental relations between the central
and regional governments. The doctrine prescribes a government-led economic
development strategy that leads to a total monopoly of the whole system by a
 Concluding Remarks 255

single political force. The aggressive application of this model in the last few
years has seriously narrowed down the limited political space available to regional
governments due to the granting of unlimited power to the central government
to interfere and control social, economic and political activities. In addition to
this, the model has suffocated state structures and the intergovernmental relations
of the federal system by narrowing down the political landscape needed for the
accommodation of diverse political interests and views.
In the same manner, TPLF/EPRDF policies have been responsible for the
paralysis of the check and balance relations among the three branches of the
state. Despite the fact that the constitution has provided for the establishment
of legislative, executive and judicial organs, there have never been appropriate
checks and balances between the three organs of the state. Primarily, the ideology
of the regime has seriously paralysed the emergence of a functioning parliamentary
democracy. In principle, members of the House of Representatives are governed
by the constitution; the will of the people; and their conscience. However, in light
of the iron principle of democratic centralism applied by TPLF/EPRDF, the rights
recognised under the constitution have been largely sidelined.
An assessment of the actual practice in the last several years indicates
that members of parliament are more accountable to the party structure rather
than to the electorate or to the constitution. The total submission of members
of the House to the manipulation of the ruling party is also facilitated by the
economic dependence of the members on the regime and the fact that their level
of education remains low. Many of the members of parliament are not willing
to abandon the benefits they received for being supporters of the regime by
challenging party discipline or questioning any of the policies of TPLF/EPRDF.
Thus, members of the parliament representing TPLF/EPRDF simply consider
themselves as employees of the ruling party without having any independent
meaningful participation. The House of Federation which is organised as the
second house of the parliament is also an institution not only devoid of any
law-making power but also members of that House are largely high government
officials that directly receive instructions from the central party structure rather
than representing the interests of regional governments.
The absence of an effective checks and balances has resulted in the development
of an executive branch with unprecedented powers. The prime minister is endowed
with quite extensive powers akin to presidents in presidential systems. Though
the entrenched authoritarian culture has been instrumental in shaping the existing
repressive government, the ideology of TPLF/EPRDF is the primary instrument
used to manage unprecedented control of the system by the executive organ. The
applications of different deceptive ideological conceptions to sideline the principle
of separation of power has resulted in a very cumbersome executive organ and
has paved the way for the emergence of a prime minister who is depicted as an
all-knowing personality on the country’s political landscape. The application of
dubious ideological instruments together with over-reaching machinery has also
created a situation whereby real political decisions are made in the informal party
256 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

structure rather than in the formal political institutions that have increasingly
become a mere façade. Due to such an ideologically structured government
system, civil servants and other professionals are recruited in contradiction to the
civil service law that provides that the only criterion required to fill a vacancy is
the qualification of the person. In the last few years, the trend of compromising
quality for loyalty has been on the increase in the various government departments,
particularly at lower levels.
The ideological perception maintained by the regime has also seriously
undermined the independence of the judiciary. The 1995 FDRE Constitution
provides for the independence of the judicial organs and supreme federal
judicial authority is vested in the Federal Supreme Court. Since the doctrine of
revolutionary democracy is suspicious of the independence of a judiciary, the
judicial system is considered as a branch of the executive organ rather than having
its own independence existence. The fundamental measure undertaken by TPLF/
EPRDF to weaken the independence of the judiciary is related to the exclusion
of the competence of constitutional adjudication from judicial organs. In the
Ethiopian context, the power to adjudicate constitutional issues is granted to the
second chamber, the House of Federation. The most likely model for the Ethiopian
constitutional adjudication approach is from the former socialist countries which
was largely entrenched in the Marxist-Leninist concepts of law and separation
of powers principle that asserts, the legislature is conceived to be the supreme
expression of the will of the people and beyond the reach of judicial restraint. Due
to the Marxist ideological background of TPLF/EPRDF that rejects the possibility
of having independent institutions, the functioning of the judicial system has
also been affected by the interference of the government in the administration of
judicial organs, appointments and dismissals, as well as interference in politically
motivated criminal proceedings.
The ideological principles applied by TPLF/EPRDF have also stifled the
democratic transition process in the country in various ways. The ideology
introduced premised on the absolute control of political space, discourages the
establishment of independent political and civil society groups, limits civil liberties
and freedom and controls the media. Currently, the major ideological bottleneck
that has limited the development of a democratic system devoted to the protection
of human rights in the country is the principle of revolutionary democracy
maintained by the TPLF/EPRDF. According to this doctrine, individual rights are
subordinate to broader societal and governmental concerns; collective rights are
privileged over individual ones and, unlike liberal democracy that relies on elected
representatives, the population is to be continually engaged in the decision-making
process. The increased application of the principle has enabled the party to weed out
individuals or groups with dissenting opinions and maintain control at every level
of government and party channels. Due to the ideology pursued by TPLF/EPRDF,
the development of various democratic institutions responsible for the protection
of human rights has been largely undermined. In light such unprecedented control
of the system by TPLF/EPRDF and its perverse ideological concepts, a multi-party
 Concluding Remarks 257

democracy, an electoral system, the development of civil society organisations as

well as an independent media have been seriously curtailed.
To rectify the ideological pitfalls associated with the Ethiopian ethnic federal
system and to promote a working democratisation process in the country, a
number of constitutional and political reforms need to be undertaken. Primarily,
the ideologies maintained by TPLF/EPRDF, which formulate and regulate the
Ethiopian federal system, are those ideas that have been responsible for the
downfall of the former socialist federations. The ideological concepts such as the
right to self-determination of nations and nationalities, revolutionary democracy,
the developmental state, the Leninist democratic centralism and party evaluation
mechanism could not build a democratic and sustainable federal system of
government in the country. Since these principles posed a challenge to the
development of a democratic federal system, a new system needs to be rebuilt
based on the principles of democratic federalism that promotes the separation of
powers, uses checks and balances as well protecting democratic and human rights
in the country.
Since the principle of the ‘right to self-determination of nations and nationalities’
has conceptual as well as practical problems in relation to national unity, protection
of individual rights and societal coherences, the Ethiopian federal system need to
be rather structured based on the principles of equality, protection of cultural and
linguistic rights as well as promoting meaningful rights of self-administration.
There seems to be also a need to have consensus between the two contending
political groups that resulted largely from an interpretation of the country’s
history by pan-Ethiopian and ethnic nationalists. The two contending groups have
major differences on the interpretation of our history, ideological conceptions
and the accommodation of ethno-regional demands. Unless these contending
forces come to the middle ground to formulate a common national vision that
creates the political space to address the political demands of the various groups,
the possibility of democratising the Ethiopian state and maintaining its national
unity is at yet to be postponed for the unforeseeable future. In conclusion, it is
submitted that to achieve a democratic federal structure that promotes the rights of
minority groups in the country and maintains national unity as well as addressing
the democratic deficit of the system, the Ethiopian constitutional setup and the
ideological pillars of the political power of the regime need to deviate from the
Marxist-oriented state structure. This is because the soviet-style accommodation
of minority rights pursued by the regime is responsible for the disintegration
of the former socialist federations rather than bringing about national unity and
democratic transformation to Ethiopia.
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 Index

Aalen, L. 169 Canada 31–2, 208, 225

Abbay, A. 237–8 Capotorti, Francesco 22
Abbink, J. 134–5, 158, 215 centralisation of power 124–5
Abkhazia 33–4 China 143, 144
accommodation of ethnicity choice theory of secession 34
linguistic diversity 26–9 Chole, Eshetu 166
theory on 25 citizenship rights 177–8
accountability civic nationalism 21
and democratic centralism 147–8 civil service, manipulation and
and gimgemma 149–50 politicisation of 215–16
adjudication of constitutional issues civil society
223–30, 256 as essential to multicultural federations
Africa 41
coalitions in 29–30 ideology, impact of 247
federalism trends in 28 limitations placed on 246–7
Alem, H. 186 Clapham, C. 106, 180
Althusius, Johannes 7 co-operative federations 13–14
amendment of constitutions 230–33 coalitions in Africa 29–30
American federal system 8, 12, 208 Cohen, G. 167
Amhara people Cohen-Almagor, R. 25
as dominant section of society 101–2 coming-together federations 13, 80–81
‘as the oppressor’ rhetoric 95–7, 110 communism, response to fall of 127–8
Amoretti, U.M. 40, 75 communist party 64–5
Andargachew, T. 98 competencies, government
Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 2009 250 federal government 190
Asian countries, developmental state model regional governments 191–3, 191n2
in 142–3 competitive federations 13–14
Aspaturian, V.V. 54, 54n5, 66 confederations 14
asymmetrical federations 13 consensus
absence of 253–4
Bahru, Z. 84, 100, 103, 113 amendment of constitutions 232
Beissinger, Mark R. 43–4 among political groups 180–81
Belgium 225 as essential for federations 17
Berhanu, N. 170 Ethiopia, need for in 179–86
Berhe, Aregawi, 109 future of Ethiopia 185–6
Bermeo, N. 40, 75 on history of Ethiopia, need for 185
Beyene, A. 240 ideological gap between political elites
border disputes between regions 194 185
Brubaker, R. 56 multicultural federations, need for in 40
276 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

consociationalism 29–30, 43 democracy

Constitutional Inquiry Council, non- culture of, absence of 236–7
independence of 228 democratic centralism as contrary to
constitutions 145–6
adjudication of issues 223–30, 256 and economic development 141–4
adoption of Ethiopian 78 and federations 10–12
amendment of 230–33 ideology as impediment to 236–40,
concessions and negotiations, need for 256–7
74–5 impediments to in Ethiopia 236–40
and consensus in post-conflict institutions of as weakened by ideology
countries 180 137, 240–42
development of to 1991 83–5 lack of in Ethiopia 235
dissatisfaction of pan-Ethiopian lack of genuine in socialist federations
nationalists 79 61, 125
ethno-regional demands under multi-party, impact of ideology on
155–6 242–6
features of FDRE constitution and multicultural federations 41–4
80–83 political parties in 127
federal/state law 83 Democracy in Plural Societies (Lijphart)
federalism as based on 9–10 43
Germany 194 democratic centralism
group and individual rights 82 accountability and transparency
legitimacy of 75–6, 79–80 undermined 147–8
oversight of observance of 245–6 dominance over executive branch of
parliamentary government 82–3 government 213, 255
regional 192–3 Ethiopian federal system 125
secession clause in 169–70, 193 impact of 144–8
self-determination 82 as impediment to democracy 240
in socialist federations 63 and intergovernmental relations
South African 75 200–202, 254
Cottrell, J. 127, 242 neutralisation of opposition 146–7
coup d’etat in 1960 94 party discipline 206–7
courts, role of in interpreting constitution principle of 4
229 regional governments, authority of 148
cult of leadership in socialist federations and separation of powers 147
60–61 socialist federations 65–6
cultural objectives of federal government Derg, response to self-determination of
196–7 118–20
Czechoslovakia developmental state model
democratic centralism 66 aims of 139
as federation 51 application of in Ethiopia 139–44
Asian countries 142–3
de jure/de facto practices in socialist backdrop to theory of 140
federations 63 and civil society 247
intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia concern over use of 141–4
193–203 dominance over executive branch of
decision-making process 201–2, 214–15 government 212–13
decolonisation 31 ideology of 3–4
 Index 277

as impediment to democracy 239–40 history to 1991 85–91

intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia horizontal structure of system 203–33
202–3, 254–5 intergovernmental relations 193–203
international undertone to 139–40 Italian occupation 100
and nationalism 142–3 judicial review in 226–30
seen as solution 184 military regime 71–2
state’s role in economic development Ministry of Federal Affairs 198
140 narrow nationalist approach 165–6
discrimination due to ethnic federal nation-building in 93–4
system(s) 176–7 patron-client party structure 199–200
distrust due to ethnic federal system(s) political changes 1960–91 70–72
176–7 population of 70
process of adopting federal system
economic development 166
and democracy 141–4 reforms needed 257
seen as solution 184 security issues, intervention in regional
state’s role in 140 195–6
economic objectives of federal government vertical separation of powers in
196–7 189–203
economic relations, ethnicisation of 177 Ethiopian federal system
Elazar, Daniel J. 8, 11, 15, 17, 18, 27, 75 adoption of constitution 78
elections in multicultural federations 41 centralisation of power 124–5
Ethiopia 206 democratic centralism 125
elites domination of TPLF/EPRDF in
local, empowering of in USSR 56–9 constitution-making 76–8
traditional/modern, contradictions exclusion of pan-Ethiopian nationalism
between 94 77
entrepreneurs, ethnic 24, 40, 58, 98, 110, illegitimacy of constitution 79–80
164, 175–6, 239 lack of genuine democracy 125
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) limitations of constitution-making
132–3 process 76–9
Eritrean separatist movement 104–6 origin and design of 74–80
Ethiopia public discussion, lack of in creation
communism, response to fall of 127–8 of 77–8
coup in 1960 94 revolutionary democracy 125
criticisms of ethnic federal system self-determination, right to 77, 124
165–9 and socialist federations, features of
decision-making process 201–2 123–6
democracy, lack of in 235 Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary
ethnic groups in 70–71, 70n2 Democratic Forces (EPRDF)
ethnicity as instrument for dominance ideological principles of 2–5
71 Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary
ethno-regional demands under Democratic Front (EPRDF) 112
constitution 155–6 coalition within 126–7
ethno-regional movements in 103–18 history of 126–7
federalism in 28 legitimacy deficits 127
future of 185–6 undemocratic nature of 217–18
history of, consensus needed on 185 Ethiopianism 160
278 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

ethnic federal system(s) and nationalism, need for combination

challenges of 39–40 of 183–5
civil societies, need for 41 ethnicity
consensus, need for 40 accommodation of 25–9
criticisms of 165–9 approaches to 19–20
and democracy 41–4 as basis for system, motivation for 253
distrust and racism due to 176–7 defining 18–19
elections in 41 fading away of, expectation of 23
ethno-regional demands, response to in FDRE constitution 80
157–60 as form of nationalism 21
factors behind adoption of in Ethiopia instrumentalism 19–20, 103
156–64 manipulation of by ethnic leaders
features of 28–9 39–40, 175–6
government competencies 190 motivation for using in conflicts 24
group and individual rights 177–8 as motive for federation in socialist
ideological backdrop 168–9 federations 53
justifications for 37–8 political purposes, use of for 20, 71
lack of consensus in adoption 166–7 political systems based on, challenges
as legitimising division 167 of 173–9
manipulation of ethnicity by leaders primordialism 19, 176
39–40 responses to diversity in 24–5
mixed ethnic identity under 178 as source of conflict, increase in 23–4
multi-polarity, need for 41 theory on accommodation of 25
narrow nationalist approach 165–6 see also ethnic federal system(s)
nationality, sense of as dying away 177 ethno-regional demands
other dominant identities 178–9 consensus, need for in meeting 179–86
political, economic, social and cultural instrumentalising of 162–4
objectives 196–7 multicultural federation as response to
process of adopting 166 157–60
regional competencies 191–3, 191n2 ethno-regional movements
rule of law, need for 41 Eritrean separatist movement 104–6
secession as threat 39, 167–8 instrumentalist approach of 162–4
security issues, intervention in regional Ogaden nationalist movement 116–18
195–6 Oromo nationalist movement 112–16
self-determination 167, 169–73 Tigrayan nationalist movement 106–12
as solution to ethnicity problems 167 evaluation of party members. see
strategies and policies, development of gimgemma
194–5 executive branch of government
strong national identity, need for ideology as dominating 210–18, 255–6
40–41 prior to federation 210–11
success factors for 40–42
ethnic groups federal law in the constitution 83
defining 18–19 Federal Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). see
Ethiopia 70–71, 70n2 Ethiopia
representation of 209–10 federalism
ethnic nationalism 21 as accommodation of linguistic
development of movements 99–103 diversity 26–9
and nationalism, conflict with 182–4 Africa, trends in 28
 Index 279

as constitutionally agreed contract Gronski, P.P. 62

9–10 group and individual rights 177–8, 253
definition of 7, 8–9
and pluralism 26 Haile Selassie 84, 89–90, 94, 101, 108
theories about 7–8, 8–9 Harbo, F. 35
federations hierarchical structure of state in socialist
advantages of 15–16 federations 60
consensus and negotiation as essential history of Ethiopia, consensus needed on
for 17 185
democracy and 10–12 Hodge, W.C. 63
differences not related to territory 16–17 holding-together federations 13, 81
disadvantages of 16–17 Horowitz, D.L. 29, 42
distribution of powers in 10 House of Federation 255
features of 9–12 and ideology 208–10
forms of agreement for 14 and judicial review 226
instability of 16–17 non-independence of 228
nationality, absence of sense of 16 House of Peoples’ Representatives
as pragmatic solution to problems 15 and ideology 204–7
and secession rights 34–7 powers of 190
size of constituent units 18 human rights
successful, conditions for 17–18 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 2009 250
types of 12–14, 80–81 democratic institutions in Ethiopia
see also ethnic federal system(s) 241–2
Fetha Negest (Justice of Kings) 84 ideology as hindering protection of
feudal system 236–7 238–40
freedom of speech 248–51 limitations placed on civil society 246–7
Freeman, Edward 35 media independence 248–51
Hutchinson, J. 19, 20, 21
Gecys, C.C. 64
Geertz, C. 25 identity
Germany 12, 81, 194, 208, 245 ethnic and national combined, need for
Ghai, Y. 19, 127, 166, 180, 242 183–5
Gidada, Negasso 78 mixed ethnic 178
gimgemma national identity, strong, need for in
and accountability 149–50 federations 40–41
dominance over executive branch of regional 179
government 213 religious 178–9
impact of 148–50 ideology
individual rights 150 and adjudication of constitutional
and intergovernmental relations in issues 223–30
Ethiopia 202, 254 backdrop to socialist federations 52–3
system of 4 and civil society 246–7
Gleason, G. 58 communism, response to fall of 127–8
government, parliamentary 82–3 democratic centralism 206–7
party discipline in 206–7 democratic institutions of as weakened
government competencies by 240–42
federal government 190 development of TPLF/EPRDF’s
regional governments 191–3 127–31
280 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

dominance over executive branch of in federations 225–6

government 210–18 House of Federation 226
Ethiopia 168–9 lack of in Ethiopia 218, 256
gap between political elites 185 and self-determination 226
and horizontal structure of Ethiopian socialist federations 226–7
system 203–33 judicial system
and the House of Federation 208–10 courts, role of in interpreting
House of Peoples Representatives, constitution 229
impact on 204–7 ideology as weakening 218–24
human rights, hindering protection of independence of 62, 256
238–40 intergovernmental relations 196
as impediment to democracy 236–40, just cause theory of secession 34
256–7
and intergovernmental relations in Kant, Immanuel 8
Ethiopia 193–203, 254 Karmis, D. 15–16
media independence, impact on Keller, E.J. 113
248–51 Kenya 28
multi-party democracy, impact on King, P. 11–12, 36
242–6 Knapp, V. 60
need for new 99 Kosovo 33–4
party discipline in parliament 206–7 Kymlicka, W. 21, 25, 27, 39, 41, 167, 168
patron-client structure 57–8, 63–6,
199–200 law, federal/state
principles of Ethiopian revolutionary in the constitution 83
movement 2–5 ideology as weakening 218–24
studying, importance 127 intergovernmental relations 196
as weakening judicial system 218–24 prior to federation 219
see also radical Marxist ideology leadership cults in socialist federations
illiteracy 238 60–61
India 208, 225 leftist ideology. see ideology
indigenisation in socialist federations 56–9 legal systems in socialist federations 62–3
individual and group rights 150, 177–8, 253 legitimacy of constitutions 75–6, 79–80
information, freedom of 248–51 liberal nationalism 21
institutions, democratic, of as weakened by Lijphart, A. 29, 43
ideology 240–42 linguistic diversity 26–9
instrumentalism 19–20, 103 Lipset, S.M. 44
of ethno-regional demands 162–4 local elites, empowering of in USSR 56–9
intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia Ludwikow, R. 227
193–203, 254 Lyons, T. 164
internal passports in the USSR 57
Italian occupation 100 Macpherson, J.C. 15, 16–17
Markakis, J. 101, 108, 109, 162, 240
Jalali, R. 44 Marxist ideological principles of Ethiopian
Joireman, S.F. 101 revolutionary movement 2–5
judicial review impact of 160–61
common/civil law forms of 225 negotiation, lack of due to 181
critique of 224–5 see also ideology; radical Marxist
Ethiopia 226–30 ideology
 Index 281

Marxist Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) primordial 39

134 see also ethno-nationalist
media independence 218, 248–51 movements
Meles, Zenawi 128, 158, 201, 232, 247 nationalist theory of secession 34
Merera, G. 114 nationalities
Messay, K. 99, 107, 114, 160, 162, 163, and sovereignty 81–2
164, 166 see also self-determination of nations
Mill, John Stuart 38, 42 and nationalities
Ministry of Federal Affairs 198 nationality
minority groups absence of sense of in federations 16
defining 21–2 sense of as dying away 177, 253
marginalisation and exclusion of due to nations
self-determination 172–3 definition and meaning of 20
suppression and violation of rights of and sovereignty 81–2
173 see also self-determination of nations
mixed ethnic identity 178 and nationalities
Montesquieu 8 nativisation program in the USSR 56–9
multi-party democracy, impact of ideology Nazi party in Germany 245
on 242–6 negotiation
multi-polarity, need for in multicultural as essential for federations 17
federations 41 need for in Ethiopia 179–86
multicultural federations. see ethnic federal neo-patrimonialism
system(s) impact of 150–51
Muslim community 178–9 as widespread 4–5
Norman, W.J. 15–16
nation-building in Ethiopia 93–4
nation-state model as way of forming states Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
22–3 116–18
National Conference on Peace and peace agreement with government
Reconciliation 1991 72–4 117–18
National Democratic Revolution of Ogaden nationalist movement 116–18
Ethiopia (NDR) 118–19 Ogaden region 116–18
national identity, strong, need for in one-party system in socialist federations
federations 40–41 64–6
nationalism Ethiopia 242–6
definition and meaning of 20–21 Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
and developmental state model 142–3 artificial construction of nationalism
dissatisfaction of pan-Ethiopian 114–15
nationalists over constitution 79 colonial, cause of as 114
and ethnic nationalism, conflict with failure of struggle of 114–15
182–4 formation of 113
and ethnic nationalism, need for grassroots support as lacking 115
combination of 183–5 independence as unrealistic 115
ethnicity as form of 21 renouncing of secession agenda
exclusion of pan-Ethiopian from 115–16
federal system 77 self-determination 113–14, 132–3
forms of 20–21 solution sought in national framework
as overlooked and weakened 72–4 115
282 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

Oromo nationalist movement, emergence Provisional Military Administrative

and development of 112–16 Council (PMAC). see Derg
Ostrom, V. 11, 16, 17 public discussion, lack of in creation of
federal system 77–8
Pamir, P. 21, 33
pan-Ethiopian nationalism. see nationalism question of nationalities. see self-
Parekh, B. 180 determination of nations and
parliamentary government 82–3 nationalities
party discipline in 206–7
parliamentary sovereignty 205–6 racism due to ethnic federal system(s)
party discipline in parliamentary 176–7
democracies 206–7 radical Marxist ideology
party ideology. see ideology alternatives to, silencing of 98–9
party-state relations as unclear 215 ‘Amhara as the oppressor’ rhetoric
party structure, patron-client 57–8, 63–6, 95–7
199–200 criticisms of 99
patron-client structure domination of 97–9
Ethiopia 199–200, 254 emergence of 94–5
in socialist federations 63–6 impact of 95–6
USSR 57–8 reasons behind move to 98
peer evaluation of party members. see self-determination, right to 95–6
gimgemma see also ideology
Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia radicalisation of students’ movement 8,
(PDRE) 119 94–5, 98, 146
pluralism and federalism 26 Ramaphosa, Cyril 74–5
Pogge, T. 19 regional governments
political corruption as widespread 4–5 amendment of constitutions 231–2
political groups, consensus among 180–81 authority of 148
political ideology. see ideology border disputes 194
political objectives of federal government competencies of 191–3, 191n2
196–7 constitutions of 192–3
political parties creation of 119–20
in federations 217 gimgemma, use of 149
multi, absence of 242–6 intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia
role of in democracies 127 193–203, 254
poverty 238 security issues, federal intervention in
powers 195–6
distribution of in federations 10 regional identity 179
of government 190–93, 191n2 religious identity 178–9
press, freedom of 248–51 rent-seeking behaviour
prime minister impact of 150–51
as all-knowing personality 213–14 as widespread 4–5
limitation of term 216–17 revenue sharing 197–8
power of 212 revolutionary democracy
primordialism 19, 39, 176 adoption of 129–30
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph 8 application of in Ethiopia 134–9
provincial identity 179 and civil society 247
 Index 283

democratic institutions, control of by security issues, intervention in regional

137 195–6
development of concept 133–4 self-determination of nations and
division of society by 136 nationalities 2–3
dominance over executive branch of constitution of Ethiopia 82
government 212 creation and exclusion of minority
economic objective 137 groups due to 172–3
Ethiopian federal system 125 Derg’s response to 118–20
as impediment to democracy 238–9 development of in Ethiopia 131–3
independent institutions not allowed emergence and development of 154–5
by 136 Ethiopian federal system 77
intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia ethnic federal system(s) 167
202, 254 House of Federation 209–10
media independence 249–50 as impediment to democracy 239
multi-party democracy, impact on instrumentalist use of 164
243–4 under international law 30–34
neutralisation of threats by 137 issues raised about 153
objectives of 135 and judicial review 226
principle of 3 marginalisation as result of 171
separation of powers not allowed by and Marxist-Leninist ideology 160–61
137 National Democratic Revolution of
Riker, W.H. 9, 242 Ethiopia (NDR) 118–19
Rodrik, D. 141 Ogaden region 116–17
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 8 origin and development of 30–31
rule of law Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 113–14
absence of in socialist federations 61–2 pitfalls in application of 169–73
in multicultural federations 41 procedures for 156
process of application 171
Sakwa, R. 62, 65 radical Marxist ideology in Ethiopia
Schaefer, R.T. 25 95–6
secession reforms needed 257
constitutional clause 169–70, 193 regions in Ethiopia, creation of 119–20
and federations 34–7 secession rights 31–2
Ogaden region 116–17 selective and unsystematic application
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 115–16 of 33–4
procedures for 156 socialist federations 53–6, 154–5
process of application 171 Tigray People’s Liberation Front
and self-determination 31–2 (TPLF) 111
socialist federations 54–5 Tigrayan nationalist movement 110–12
sub-groups within nations, rights of and the UN 31–2
31–4 separation of powers
theories in favour of 34 as absent in socialist federations 53,
as threat in multicultural federations 59–60, 125
39, 167–8 and democratic centralism 147
Tigray People’s Liberation Front intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia
(TPLF) 111–12 193–203
Tigrayan nationalist movement 110–12 not allowed by revolutionary
second chambers 208–9 democracy 136
284 The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation

in other federations 203 Soviet Union. see Union of Soviet Socialist

prior to Ethiopian federation 203–4 Republics (USSR)
regional governments 191–3, 191n2 standards, national 195
vertical, in Ethiopia 189–203 state law in the constitution 83
Ser‘‘ata Mangist (System of Government) state’s role in economic development 140
83 students’ movement
Seyoum, H. 25 criticisms of 99
size of constituent units 18 democratic centralism 146
Smith, A.D. 19 radicalisation of 8, 94–5, 98, 146
social objectives of federal government and self-determination 131–2
196–7 Sunstein, C.R. 35
social relations, ethnicisation of 177 supremacy of the parliament 205–6
socialist federations Switzerland 12, 208
constitutions, purpose of in 63 symmetrical federations 13
de jure/de facto practices 63
democracy, lack of genuine 61 taxation 191–2, 197–8
democratic centralism 65–6, 125 Tecola, Hagos 99
ethnic factor as motive for federation Tewodros, Emperor 100
53 Tigrayan nationalist movement, history and
features of and Ethiopian federal emergence of 106–12
system 123–6 Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
hierarchical structure of state 60 creation of EPRDF 126, 133
ideological backdrop to 52–3 emergence of 158
indigenisation 56–9 establishment of 111
judicial independence as unknown ideological principles of 2–5
62 instrumentalist approach of 163–4
and judicial review 226–7 and judicial review 227–8
leadership cults 60–61 legitimacy deficits 127
legal systems in 62–3 National Conference on Peace and
local elites, empowering of 56–9 Reconciliation 1991 72–3
monopoly of communist party 64–5 patron-client party structure 199–200
origin and development of 47–51 and secession 111–12
patron-client party structure 63–6, self-determination, right of 111, 132–3
199–200 undemocratic nature of 217–18
regions, limited powers of 59–60 TPLF/EPRDF. see Ethiopia; Ethiopian
rule of law, absence of 61–2 Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
secession rights 54–5 Forces (EPRDF); ethnic federal
self-determination 53–6, 154–5 system(s); Tigrayan People’s
separation of powers as absent 53, Liberation Front (TPLF)
59–60, 125 transitional charter 72–4, 219–20
see also Union of Soviet Socialist Tronvoll, K. 134, 215–16, 236
Republics (USSR)
Solomon Getahun, A. 236 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
Somail region 116–17 formation of as federation 47–51
South Africa 28, 75, 225–6 internal passports 57
South Ossetia 33, 34 judicial independence as unknown 62
sovereignty and nations and nationalities leadership cult 60–61
81–2 local elites, empowering of 56–9
 Index 285

nativisation program 56–9 Walelegn, Mekonnon 131

patron-client relationship 57–8 Watts, Ronald 9
unions 14 Weber, Max 18
United Kingdom 226 Wheare, Kenneth C. 9, 10–11, 17, 18, 36
United Nations and self-determination 31–2 Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE) 119
United States federal system 8, 12, 208
Yinger, J.M. 18–19
Vaughan, S. 215–16, 236 Young, J. 108, 163, 207
vote of no confidence, absence of 218 Yugoslavia 51–2