CHAPTER IV

THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION

Requisites of a valid search warrant

UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36
G.R. No. 129651               October 20, 2000

FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.

On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in
activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a
former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit stating:
1 

1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter

referred to as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active
management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of
canned sardines without issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the
Internal Revenue Code.

2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:

(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;

(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the canned
sardines processed by UNIFISH;

(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and buys from
UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases;

(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho delivers
to the different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;

(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by checks drawn
payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments are also not receipted
(sic);
 (6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had withdrawn
from the corporation;

3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho’s direction is the
sale of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense
that UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is
enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its
processing of canned tuna for export. These tax exemptions are granted by the government
on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the processing of tuna for export and that it
is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local customers.

4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax
exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as
containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally
to other food processing companies.

5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING
CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being
controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH;
[a]t that time, PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being
perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.

6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH
AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes
Street, Mandaue City. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts,
sales invoices, delivery receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting
records (such as ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and check disbursements books)]
are kept and may be found is best described in the herein attached sketch of the
arrangement of the office’s furniture and fixture of the corporation which is made an integral
part hereof and marked as Annex "A",

7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations
and he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No.
2338.

On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the
BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application
sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.

After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. The first is docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 FOR:
2 

VIOLATION OF SECTION 253" ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

Plaintiff, FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

- versus -

UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,

Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City

x-------------------------x

(with sketch)

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

G R E E T I N G S:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic)
probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the
tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o
Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and
control, the following:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash

Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-
mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.

(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge

The second warrant is similarly docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF
3 

SEC. 253" ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost identical in
content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It consisted of only one
page.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

Plaintiff,
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
- versus -

UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and

Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City

x-------------------------/

(with sketch)

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

G R E E T I N G S:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic]
probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the
tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin
Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his
possession, care and control, the following:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash

Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

 6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-
mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.

(sgd.)

MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge

Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant, which was docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-80
4 

FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263" (hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except
for the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant ("Section 238 in
relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery
receipts and/or sales invoices"), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-
2.

On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine
National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They
seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said
search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.

On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of Justice. The
records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.

On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28 of
the Cebu RTC.

The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:

a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof
shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent documents and
papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).

The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2) the
Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.

The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying the
motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the Department
of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to post bail; a
Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on the merits, or
after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the case of Lai vs.
Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:

Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other remedies
available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for certiorari) from
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same should not have been
granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by
respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional release; 2. They
can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the
fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as
amended by P.D. 911);
3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash the information in the tri
al court. (Rule 117, Rules of Court).
4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgment of the court after the case shall have been tri
ed on the merits.

x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the
case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial wi
thout prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Motion. In the event that an
adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal
step.

xxx

In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search Warrants
without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court
committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the Search Warrants
did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of probable cause; and
for having allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the properties were taken, to us,
are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, but instead thru an
appeal. 5

In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.

As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and documents
listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for Reconsideration. An examination
of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in their Reply, after
respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners’ failure to attach them to the Petition.

Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its credit, it
did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been decided
without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential to the
resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case, we 6 

held that the submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes
substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a
certified true copy of "material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition], and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto" along with the petition. So should it be in this case,
especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The
rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used
only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their
aim could be defeated. 7

The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the resolution
denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the case of "Lai vs.
Intermediate," cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in "220
SCRA 149." The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by petitioners, appears to
8 

have been taken from the case of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap,
however, is inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash a complaint for qualified theft,
not a motion to quash a search warrant.

The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman, where we held that the issuing judge’s disregard of
9 

the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which
may be remedied by certiorari:

Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that certiorari is
available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions "has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de
Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted
whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders the
warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the order complained of is a
patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the
existence of the remedy of appeal.

Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy
remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her personal
property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had been
improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief,
certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.

This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of
Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII, which also involved a special civil action for certiorari:
10  11

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional requirement
that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this
requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No.
L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying
with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion".

In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search
warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged
that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the corporation
thus resulting in the paralysis of its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy
that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.

We now proceed to the merits of the case.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.12

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a
13 

description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen.
Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect." The warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full
length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. 14

Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants
A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for
the same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners
also dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally,
they claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects,
according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence. 15

Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched

Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias
Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City" while the body of the same warrant states the address
as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City." Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently
state the address of petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."

The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of
"the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized." The rule is that a description of a
16 

place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
17  18 

designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Thus,
19 

in Castro vs. Pabalan, where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the
20 

petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court

"admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."

In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu
City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of
petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where
the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this case.

Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants

Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1 and
A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against "Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy." Search Warrant A-
2, on the other hand, was directed against "UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing
Corporation."

These discrepancies are hardly relevant.

In Miller v. Sigler, it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, from
21 

which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant
to name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for
the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to
name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate
the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly
inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be
searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the
place to be searched. 22

Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying
the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared
unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises,
because of inconsistencies in stating their names. 23

Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place

In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.

Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same
crime (violation of "SEC. 253" of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that
Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the warrant
was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in
the names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place
to be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two warrants
authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in
issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed
revoked by the former.

The alleged absence of probable cause

Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search
warrants.

Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 24

In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. Asking of
25 

leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant. 26

The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere
27 

suspicion or belief.
28

It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, namely,
Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish.
Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this
contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination:
Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?

A. No.

Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?

A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.

Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?

A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead of the
legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.

Q. From where did you get that information?

A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment. 29

The above portion of the transcript shows that Labaria’s knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of
petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by Abos.
Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the
issuance of the search warrants. 30

The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labaria’s deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners’ alleged illegal practices was apparently
obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed
by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place where the
documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located:

Q Do you know Frank Uy?

A Yes.

Q Why do you know him?

A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.

Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?

A Hernan Cortes St.

Q What is it being engaged of?

A It is engaged in canning of fish.

Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business dealings that
he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q How is it done?
A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making his
authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells these products
thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole Philippines. He makes it appear that
it is the company which is selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he does not issue any
invoices.

Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?

A Thru delivery receipts.

Q Is the delivery receipt official?

A No. It is unregistered.

Q For how long has this been going on?

A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.

Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?

A August, 1993, last month.

Q How did you happen to know about this last month?

A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did not go
directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company for the goods that he
sold.

Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?

A White Gold and Gaisano.

Q How did you know this fact?

A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last three
years. I was the Operating Chief.

Q Until now?

A No. I was separated already.

Q When?

A August, 1993.

Q How does he do this manipulation?

A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to his
customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the company.
Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or whatever?

A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction.  It is not for the public, not for the BIR but
1âwphi1

it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and him. It is not made to
be shown to the BIR.

Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?

A Yes.

Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?

A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.

Q Based on what?

A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.

Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts, sales
records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your affidavit, which are only for
the consumption of the company?

A Yes, not for the BIR.

Q Where are they kept now?

A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic) of the
whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all the confidential
transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers and notebooks.

Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?

A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.

In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the records
from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the receipts. The second girl
prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the stocks.

This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people are
stored in this place which is marked as "C".

Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina because
according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?

A Yes.

Q But how can you enter the bodega?

A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go straight
there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening the door.

Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by Gina?

A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.

Q Where are they now?

A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).

Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me, especially this
one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for the months of January,
February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in these xerox copies which appear
in the ledger being shown to the BIR?

A As far as I know, it did not appear.

Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January, what
does it show?

A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his customers.

Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the BIR?

A As far as I know, it does not reflect.

Q What are these xerox copies of checks?

A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment of
sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection.

Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?

A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned tuna for
export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I know, they profit
more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil are sold to another company.

Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?

A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.

Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but instead
they are selling it locally?

A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt was the
delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.

Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling (sic) it?
A Yes, at a profit.

Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by this?

A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging materials. When
you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that advantage of that
exemption, they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia Farms.

Q Do you have proof to that effect?

A No, but we can get it there.

Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since according to
you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept by Gina? Are you sure
that these documents are still there?

A Yes. I have received information.

COURT: Alright. 31

Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company records, and
even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this witness
did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the deposition
clearly demonstrate otherwise.

The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the inquiries made by the judge
were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness’ affidavit. We find such inquiries to be
sufficiently probing.

Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized

Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject warrants
and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno, Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, and Asian Surety & Insurance
32  33 

Co., Inc. vs. Herrera. 34

In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."

This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth by the
Constitution since:

x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major
object: the elimination of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those
in Stonehill:

The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-
70 in this manner:

"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and
securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
communications; accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."

The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized.

xxx

In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, to wit:

"x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures’ may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the correct interpretation of
this constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities."

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer may
be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to
any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove
the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant
should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding
the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of
sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign
remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.

In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be seized, i.e.,
"Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss,
Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger,
etc." was held to be "an omnibus description" and, therefore, invalid:
x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in several motions filed for
early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has
paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents,
employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the
government itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to the charges for which the
warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old.

In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity, especially
since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. The
issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said
photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or
a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things
to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general
description in a warrant. The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of
35 

accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records,
provisional & official receipts," "production record books/inventory lists, stock cards," "sales records,
job order," "corporate financial records," and "bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore
unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case.

As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase & sales invoices,"
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of these
documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered. Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
36 

general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other
more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to
give a particular description of the contents thereof. Although it appears that photocopies of these
37 

unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be
impractical to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents
thereof, to the minutest detail.

The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery
receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search
warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the
whole warrant. In United States v. Cook, the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the
38 

following pronouncement:

x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415
(1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described books
and myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that only
the books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged
that the warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the
defective portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly described.

Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately,
must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The
invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books x x
x. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the
defects concerning other articles.

xxx

x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state courts
that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge should sever the
infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488
F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite particularity in
the warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly
consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly
described prohibits the Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court from
considering illegally obtained evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not
particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in the Government who would be
tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary description. As the leading commentator has
observed, "it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause and
which did particularly describe certain items were to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant
and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search for other items as well." 2 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §4.6(f) (1978).

Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to petitioners.

Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken by the
enforcing officers:

1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,

2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,

3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,

4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,

5. One (1) bound gate pass,

 6. Surety Agreement. 39

In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and
Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.

The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the
constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under
a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder. In Tambasen vs. People, it was held:
40  41 

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond
the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The
evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may
not be made and that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]);
Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]).
The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and
property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such
usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).

Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized
from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing
subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in
the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected right of
an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]).
Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People
v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts
it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble
the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."

The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the
penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to such
violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be seized.

As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the present
proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.
42

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May
1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the
seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but
REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau
of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject
premises and belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE EDMAR CFASTILLO, JR. G.R. No. 204419,

November 7, 2016
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 204419, November 07, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. EDMAR P. CASTILLO, SR., AS

PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, APARRI, CAGAYAN
AND JEOFREY JIL RABINO Y TALOZA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA,** J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court dated
November 12, 2012 of petitioner People of the Philippines as represented by Second
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, that seeks to reverse and set aside
the Regional Trial Court's (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan) Joint Resolution1 dated May
14, 2012 quashing Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually dismissing Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against
private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza.

The facts follow.

On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan
issued Search Warrant No. 45, which reads, in part, as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath SPO1
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RONEL P. SATURNO of the Regional Intelligence Division based at Regional Office 2,

Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City, the applicant herein, and his witness that there is
probable cause to believe that a Violation [of] R.A. 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous
Drug, has been and is being committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe that JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street, Maura, Aparri,
Cagayan has in his possession or control the following items, to wit:

SHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS you are hereby ordered to make

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

an immediate search at any time of the day or night but preferably at daytime at the
afore-stated residential place of JEOFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO and its premises and
forthwith seize and take possession of the above-described items to immediately bring
him, thereafter, to the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance with Section 12, Rule
126 of the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012, at Gattaran, Cagayan.2
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was conducted by
elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and officers of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing residue of suspected
methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private respondent Rabino located
in Aparri, Cagayan. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for qualitative examination, the
test gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.3 chanrobleslaw

Thus, an Information4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private respondent
Rabino for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which reads as
follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri, [P]rovince of Cagayan,
and within, the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any legal authority thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his control and custody one (1) big zip-lock transparent
plastic sachet containing two (2) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance, one sachet with traces of said substance gave POSITIVE results
to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
Shabu, a dangerous drag, while the other sachet gave negative results to said tests,
the said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited for any person to
possess or use any dangerous drug regardless of the quality of the purity thereof,
unless authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881, the case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6,
Aparri, Cagayan, presided by respondent Judge Castillo.

Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private respondent
Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired
Evidence with the following grounds: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the place to be
searched; No compelling reason for MTC Gattaran to issue warrant

xxxx

No probable cause to issue Search Warrant

xxxx

No searching question elicited from deponent

x xx x

No particularity in the places to be searched

xxxx
Irregularity in the implementation of the search

x x xx

Suppression of Evidence Just and Proper5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its Joint
Resolution dated May 14, 2012, which partly reads as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years, which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of six (6)
years. A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for
and to issue Search Warrant No. 45. As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null and void.
[Corollary] thereto, all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.

With the foregoing conclusion, any further discussion on the grounds relied upon by the
accused to buttress his motion and the opposition interposed by the public prosecutor
are deemed mere surplusage.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. Search Warrant No.
45 is hereby ordered QUASHED. Consequently, all evidence obtained in the execution of
Search Warrant No. 45 are likewise ordered SUPPRESSED. There being no more
evidence to support them, the Informations in the above-captioned cases are hereby
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.6 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same court in its
Joint Order7 dated September 24, 2012.

Hence, the present petition.

The issue and arguments raised by petitioner are as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012 was issued by respondent
Judge Castillo with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or is
patently erroneous. It is respectfully submitted that the Municipal Trial Court of
Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue Search Warrant No. 45 earlier mentioned
to search and seize the shabu stated therein in Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within
the same second judicial region in violation of R.A. 9165, notwithstanding the fact that
the power to hear and try the offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.
Private respondent, on the other hand, in his Comment8 dated January 25, 2016, claims
that the petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He also
argues that the petition should have been filed by the State, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B,
Sagucio. Lastly, private respondent insists that the petition does not show that the
assailed Joint Resolution of the RTC was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This Court finds merit to the petition.

Before proceeding with the discussion on the substantial issue raised in the petition,
certain procedural issues have been pointed out by private respondent that need to be
tackled. According to the private respondent, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
filed by petitioner before this Court must be struck down as it violates the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts. Private respondent further argues that petitioner did not provide
any compelling reason that would merit the direct filing with this Court of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. It is also averred that the petition should have been filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General and not the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
because the petition is in the nature of an appeal and the former is vested with the
power of representing the people before any court.

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1) any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding.9 Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an
act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross.10 On the other hand, a remedy is considered
"plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of the judgment the acts of the lower court or agency.11 Its principal office is
only to the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.12
chanrobleslaw

The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by petitioner in
questioning the quashal of the search warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge that ordered the said quashal. In his allegation that
the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the proper courts authorized to
issue a search warrant, petitioner has shown that the quashal of the search warrant
was patently and grossly done. In any case, the Court had allowed even direct recourse
to this Court13 or to the Court of Appeals14 via a special civil action for certiorari from a
trial court's quashal of a search warrant.15 The general rule is that a party is mandated
to follow the hierarchy of courts. Howevever, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.16 In this case, since the pivotal issue
raised by petitioner involves an application of a rule promulgated by this Court in the
exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution17 regarding the jurisdiction of
courts in the proper issuance of a search warrant, this Court deems it proper to resolve
the present petition.

As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such
technicality can be relaxed in the interest of justice. The Court has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in
keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must
always be avoided.18 It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of
justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in
more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.19 In certain cases, this Court even allowed
private complainants to file petitions for certiorari and considered the said petitions as if
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,20 this
Court ruled that an exception exists to the general rule that the proper party to file a
petition in the CA or Supreme Court assailing any adverse order of the RTC in the
search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to
assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of
the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC)
to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The
Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu
of the OSG: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the
Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there
appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition
will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the
Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and
will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the
Solicitor General.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However,
in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of
the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this case,
the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the
issues raised by the parties.21 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions filed by private
complainants and deemed them as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, there is
no reason to disallow the petition herein filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a
search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in
the affirmative.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge
must examine, in writing and under oatn or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.22 Necessarily, a motion to quash a search
warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place
searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search
warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.23 chanrobleslaw

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search wan-ant and eventually
dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the seerch warrant was issued by the
MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The
Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. It
is therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by the private respondent in
his motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone, the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the
accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as
it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when
any of its elements are found to be wanting.

This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant.
Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known,
or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same
judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the
Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant
to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri,
Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search
warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said
application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for
compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly
complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court
issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant
may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense
committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally
issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to
be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain cases
when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even
though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the
requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated

November 12, 2012, of petitioner People of the Philippines is GRANTED. Consequently,
the Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Aparri,
Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial
Court of Gattaran, Cagayan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No. 11-
10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400

G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.

CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN,
MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals.   Said judgment dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to
1

invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court
dated February 9, 1996.   as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for
2

reconsideration.   Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of
3

illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:

1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I.

Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December
15, 1995,  4
 2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant,
and

3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five
(5) days "to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that
said amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."

The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.

1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search
warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who
had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety
Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan.

2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against
Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1,
immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4)
Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and
effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts,
sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and
P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in
the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents
upon order of the court on respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly
are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and
one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search
warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c)
blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and
(f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.

3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was
made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects
including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing
that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.

4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not

guilty to the offense charged; **" and on the same date, submitted their
"Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence
Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;

5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated

comment on petition for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular
inspection of the premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge and
the following facts had been established as contained in the order dated
January 30.1996 ** to wit:

1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1

which is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store;

2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the building

as it is correspondingly called only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and
4;"
 3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety
Store;

4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from

Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;

5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own
respective doors used for ingress and egress.

There being no objection on the said observation of the Court,

let the same be reduced on the records.

SO ORDERED.

6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order duly granting the

motion to quash search warrant**;  5

7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to

dismiss** ;

8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a

motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing
the search warrant**;

9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for
reconsideration** ;

10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order denying the motion
for reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed
extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.

Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the
Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division
of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case
for lack of merit.

The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:  6

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place
described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge
through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to by the
People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The place
searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing,
was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and separate from, and in no way
connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in
the search warrant.

2. The public prosecutor's claim — that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla
relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular
place to be searched — was effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who
pointed out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who
made it and not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge
(Bacalla, who) instead **directed them to search Abigail Variety Store
Apartment 1207** in the Order **dated December 15, 1995" — this, too, being
the address given "in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14,
1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader." The
untenability of the claim is made more patent by the People's admission,
during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said
sketch was in truth "not attached to the application for search warrant ** (but)
merely attached to the motion for reconsideration."  7

Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations
of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.:  8

d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from
the place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason
why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella
and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED
CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being RAIDERS and
who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to
OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say TAGALOG with Honorable Judge
who issued the Search Warrant the words "KATABI", or
"KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang
papasukin namin" or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking
POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth even to
WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS "RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or
"BEHIND" or "NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they
are going to raid."**.

3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of
the place (herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said
occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time.
The search was thus done in violation of the law.  9

4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required
by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours
from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.  10

5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search

warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Paño (139
SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court
in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule that
whenever a search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof
and a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result of
the search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed consolidated with the
criminal case for orderly procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than
the search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case
has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully
obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
 6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in
light of "Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court.

7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the
special civil action of certiorari.

The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of
Appeals the following errors, to wit:

1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the

proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latter's
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be searched;"

2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not attached
to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence** to the contrary;"

3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"

4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished

by the tardiness by which the return is made;"

5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute

for appeal although the circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall
within the exceptions to that rule;" and

6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the

validity of the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without
informing petitioner thereof."

The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was
validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually
residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically
described in the warrant.

The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the
search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to
be seized. It claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the
place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments
behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually
effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be
searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects
should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind — the first of four (4)
separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" — was not what the
Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in
the search warrant.

The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the
premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they
wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge
reproduced in the search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-
F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the
search was made more particular — and more restrictive — by the Judge's admonition in the
warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described."

Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct
places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4)
separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure
and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a
person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is
independent of the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door.
Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of
the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store
(Number 1).

However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the
store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla
understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received
the warrant — which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises herein
described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" — thus literally excluding the apartment units at
the rear of the store — they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to
have simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched — clearly
indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in
support of their application — was sufficient particularization of the general identification of
the place in the search warrant.

The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of
Staff, AFP,   allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
11

intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to
the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.

Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for
seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued — No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was
made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City" because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address
(No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive
material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was
obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two
warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the
search warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units
C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph of
Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge
intended to be searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up
the ambiguity caused by the "obviously typographical error," the officer executing the
warrant could consult the records in the official court file. 
12

The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical
error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the
search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on
the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the
warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of
minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge
issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had
written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This
should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched —
although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they
applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this
case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair
game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support
of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well
as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of
choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would
open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police
officers conducting the search.

The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's
finding of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the record however
shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between
Judge Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the identities
of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla.   In Judge Casanova's view, said
13

inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the
determination of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.

The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause
before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the
trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant — which, of course, is the
only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof — was not that which the police
officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually
subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant.
In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's
Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 — the first of the four (4) apartment units at
the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the private respondents were then
residing.

It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that: 
14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
 shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the things to be seized.

it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on
probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too,
that it particularly describe the place to be searched,   the manifest intention being
15

that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.

There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement
necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained
in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.  16

In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to
be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building
housing the store and the residential apartment units — the place to be searched being
plainly marked — was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the
search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein
petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the
tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused
to receive "evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present
before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the
correctness of the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are void because the
place set forth in the search warrant is different from that which the officers actually
searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway the premises searched were
precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.

Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a
search warrant has been "issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal case,"
the "proper recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the
issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the
warrant is afterwards filed.   In support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid
17

down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals   concerning "possible conflicts of

18

jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is
pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of
personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second
guideline reads: 19

2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main
criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be
filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper
recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for
the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and
the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another
court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder
seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time
in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the
remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does
so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus
Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy
guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal
case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property
seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since
two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation,
a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a
motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.

In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the
criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch
80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search
warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could
have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after
the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to
suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3
above quoted in accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted within
its competence.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September
11, 1996 — which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the
Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 — is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby
AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626

G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:

With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law
enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of
failing to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests.
Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.

Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried
marijuana packed in plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak" placed in a traveling bag, which are
prohibited drugs.

Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. 1

The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their
testimonies, the court a quo found the following:

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with
a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt.
Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren
Quirubin.

Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of
December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building
along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group,
made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building
while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its
front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the
same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed
out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office
for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana
leaves.

Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that
said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.

After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report,
the prosecution rested its case.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the illegality
of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant's constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.

The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged
illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid
pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.

In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the
incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she
had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross
the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt.
Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.

During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman
and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she
added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.

After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Comment and/or
Objection to Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of the items seized
as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.

Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from
Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.2

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for
the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for
applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated
and described.

2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the
NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same
would be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.
 3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of
accused-appellant violated the latter's constitutional rights.

4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the
evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.

These submissions are impressed with merit.

In People v. Ramos,  this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
3

strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the
Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same
time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to
issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. 4

Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.  This exclusionary rule was
5

later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:

Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the
houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional
provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such,
it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of
restraint.
6

Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which
allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be
strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law.
To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and
deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.7

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court  and by prevailing jurisprudence;
8

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search; 9

6. Stop and Frisk;  and

10

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 11

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers
to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It
likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched.12

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to
search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the
items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the
items will be found in the place to be searched.13

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be
present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as
evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed.

In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause
to effect a warrantless search and seizure.

In People v. Tangliben,  acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a

14

surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons
who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous
drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was
acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He
acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night
of his arrest.

In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant
regarding Aruta's alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip.
Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as
their "business address". More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and
surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a
crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.

In People v. Malmstedt,  the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
15

were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search
warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations
also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of
such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a
search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to
the detriment of society.

Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police
officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta's identity was
priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched
aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the
other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.

In People v. Bagista,  the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles
16

coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received
from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant
would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-
appellant's belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there
was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said
search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a
search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are
exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,  the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of
17

the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching
the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs.
He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he
appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in
his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that
the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually
"high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this
area was a haven for drug addicts.

In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting
the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which,
when taken together with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the
warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.

In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a
reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13,
1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named "Benjie" that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in
the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the
evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a
traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law
enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When
asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her traveling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When
they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought
to the NARCOM office for investigation.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before
the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information
they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed,
to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend
Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence
any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.

Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential
information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be
bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the
following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, the particular crime he
allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the
lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13
and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court
hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinada's
constitutional right.

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accused-appellant must
have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

x x x           x x x          x x x
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit
one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was
not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was
singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant
were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on
record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing
a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor
tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable
cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-
appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2)
of the Constitution.

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil
that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first
undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search
and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law. 18

As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin  where, this Court observed that:
19

. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of
the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable
cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and
seizure of accused-appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in "plain view"
under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by
the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain
its contents.

Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search of a
moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant
was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was
accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,  applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas
20

v. Court of Appeals.  In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were
21

accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that
could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to "stop and frisk"
accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when
apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from
the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication
of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant
was committing a crime.

The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De
Gracia.  In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being used as
22

headquarters by the RAM during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of
armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open the door
despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the
building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing
circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probable
cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be
consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her
constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself
to search and inspection citing People v. Malasugui  where this Court ruled:
23

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or
premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:

Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa,

what happened after that?

A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and

confronted her with our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if
we can see the bag she was carrying.

Q What was her reaction?

A She gave her bag to me.

Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside. 24

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's contention for the Malasugui case is
inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest
thereby making the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.  On the 25

contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in
the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which
accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized
from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.

Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing
over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,  where 26

this Court held:

[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the
package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the
warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's testimony.

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened
next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two
chairs that he carried, what did you do next?

A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the
two chairs.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, we believe that appellant — based on the transcript quoted above — did not voluntarily
consent to Bolonia's search of his belongings. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is
thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore,
considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate
consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty." (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held
in People v. Barros:27

. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on
the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object" —

. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact
that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount
to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770).
 As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin (supra):

x x x           x x x          x x x

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act

of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not
a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights."  (Emphasis supplied)
28

To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly
illustrated in People v. Omaweng,  where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
29

PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:

Q — When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A — When we saw that traveling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the
contents.

Q — And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A — He said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings" (sic).

Q — When he said that, what did you do?

A — We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q — When you said that, what did he tell you?

A — He said "you can see it".

Q — And when he said "you can see and open it," what did you do?

A — When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings
(sic) that was contained in the bag.

Q — And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?

A — When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the
contents and showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod
smelled it, he said it was marijuana. (Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized
as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had
been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the
maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court." He
willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle
and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.

In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the
police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured
only if accused-appellant's name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain,
as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.

This argument is untenable.

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

. . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(Emphasis supplied)

Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only
those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not
be made. 30

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without
too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be
searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently
ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-
appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner
bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory
Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to
particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The
above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible.  (Emphasis supplied)
31

While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the
trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless
search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the
instant case for the following reasons:

1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of
"not guilty" and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction.  The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search
32

and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend
this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to
object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.

It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,  which stated:

33

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid

warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused
person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an
arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting
of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning the legality or
constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We
do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it,
waiver of the former — an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making
impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of
a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right
against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people.
In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the
admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellant's objection to the
admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the
circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred
from his conduct before or during the trial. (Emphasis supplied).

In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant
considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance
of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in
evidence.

The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 34

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and
civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary
rule is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This
approach is based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will
the wrong be repressed." 35

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government. 36

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED
and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUBEN MONTILLA y

GATDULA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 22,
1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:

That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of
Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver twenty-eight (28)
kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in violation of
the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and prejudice to the public
interest.1
cräläwvirtualibräry

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not
guilty from appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte.2 Trial was held
on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of
the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty of death on
appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.3 cräläwvirtualibräry

It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at
around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran,
Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both
members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmarias.
Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total
weight of 28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the
arrest of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed
them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier,
whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay
Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It
was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the
latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place.4 cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He
claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he
traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any luggage.
His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a
prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to
Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting
and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.

He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he

was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of
the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's
testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly worked as a
supervisor,5 although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any document
to prove her alleged employment.

In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was
legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an
objective and exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversible error
in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower
court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be
attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently
self-serving in nature.

1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the
basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried
marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of
Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."

Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is
supposedly corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's
fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, that informant was a vital
personality in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting
testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.

The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof,
as amended, is as follows:

SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.

Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of
the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this
Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed.

Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some
of the various modes of commission6 being the sale, administration, delivery,
distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of
Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive
scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these who
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."
Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified therein,
or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving away,
distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.

As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive
acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered,
and transported marijuana. The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be
committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that an indictment would
suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more modes
specified therein. This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways of
committing the offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and
the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness.7 In appellant's
case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported
marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs,
appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute, hence,
appellant's asseverations must fail.

The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer
should have been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his
presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's
constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him. These
assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising the primacy of
appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in this instance
was justified and cannot be faulted as error.

For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative
of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which
testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally
taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed with by the
prosecution,8 more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of law
enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal presumption.
Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide
their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police.9 Moreover, it is up to
the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to
dictate that course.10 Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive
process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below,11 but
which remedy was not availed of by him.

2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an
unlawful warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact
that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities
had already been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival
from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the
requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and
seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once
again, the Court is not persuaded.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent
which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision.12 Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable
search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an
absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches;13 (2) searches of moving
vehicles,14 (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;15 (4) consented searches;16 (5)
searches incidental to a lawful arrest;17 and (6) "stop and frisk" measures18 have been
invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian
informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at
Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June
20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be
beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too
sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search
warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records
do not reveal that he knew him by name.

While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject
of the warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not
know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the
barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of
the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance
wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with,
or were being brought by someone separately from, the courier.

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a
warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was
still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which
there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for
obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident
and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the
police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry
points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding
the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter
inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and
the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he would
do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for,
as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source
in past operations. Moreover, experience shows that although information gathered and
passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly
and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster, such tip-
offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the
courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies,
it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of
the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of
judicial chambers.

3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant

invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the
consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under
that provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting

police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense.19 On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with
the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).20 These instances have been
applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional
view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which
must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference
to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent
man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.21 cräläwvirtualibräry

Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for
the propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless
arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and
jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or
quantum,22 and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet,
even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept,
probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the
existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of,23 or an apparent state of
facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent
and prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime.24 cräläwvirtualibräry

Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at
least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court
which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded
belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt
thereof.25 It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of
the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent
for trial," or where "a probable cause exists."26 It should, therefore, be in that sense,
wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally
authorized.

In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the
informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to
him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant
was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he
was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects.
Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and
requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which
appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag
yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they
brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.

Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a
carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since
that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being
illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view.
Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since
the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in
appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd
under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at
the risk of eventually losing the quarry.

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point
prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by
themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and
reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then
actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his
arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both
justified.

Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence.
To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as
policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that
they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the traveling bag.
Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the
law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to
a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof.

After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be
waived either expressly or impliedly.27 Thus, while it has been held that the silence of
the accused during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the
search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of the
law,28 the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously
performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced
or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his
right.29
cräläwvirtualibräry

4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly
and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from
(him) were the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in
court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks
seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted that
the prosecution presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence those 28
bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the
same were contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and
proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist
for examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs
taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence,
satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.

Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1

Talingting who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of
the traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him
where he had come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus
confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion can therefore
be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite
from Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the
crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of
appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.

Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that
he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities here could
possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 743830 which defines certain
rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the
duties of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and providing
corresponding penalties for violations thereof.

Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower
court will not necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed
anything during his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the
nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him
which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more
importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by
the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the
documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence
in the court below.

5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on
appellant. As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the
Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or
marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs
carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present
case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be
observed in the application of said penalties.

As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63
must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the
proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the court  a quo, it was
never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be
imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a
conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already
concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code,31 the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was
also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.

It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty
where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second
paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a
minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.32 While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the liability of the
offender, these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the
law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the
offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that situation, obviously the
rules on the graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's
case, there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence,
the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias,
Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-
appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all
other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. RACHO, GR No. 186529, August 3, 2010

G.R. No. 186529               August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant
Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant
for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the
appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellant’s name, together with his physical description. He
also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.

On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on
board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white
striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant
alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier.
Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would
bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached
him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately
denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope
slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. 5

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen
was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with
appellant’s name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated
sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 6

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous
drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:

"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any permit or license from the
proper authorities to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW."7

"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused
did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of
5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport
the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to
inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that
no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police
officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to
Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for
investigation.9

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment 10 convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5,
Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11

Hence, the present appeal.

In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers
that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the team’s
failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails,
for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He
questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the
poisonous tree.

The appeal is meritorious.

We have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a
hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the case.13

Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of
shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the
circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search
and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and
thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.

It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.  This Court is
1avvphi1

clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them
necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused
shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 14

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we
find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized
from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.

The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with
his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that
appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived
his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellant’s
warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. 15

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or
not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. 16

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions,
namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial

question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. 19

The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in
the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the
apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of
shabu.20 Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to
the lawful arrest.

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the
search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make
the arrest at the outset of the search.21 Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to
determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable
cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 22

The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of

the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police
authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00
a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and
would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of
the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential
agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a
tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of
carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. 23 The team
then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was
marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of
the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given
by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives
rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a
valid warrantless arrest.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.24 We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.

The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta, 25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would
be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip,
the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in
Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where
two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the woman, "Aling
Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced
themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves. 28

The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao
City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud)
were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area.
Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian
asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with
a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted
themselves to await Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped
each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see
the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves. 29

In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less
5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a
sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary
surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description,
carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police
officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained marijuana
dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed
where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two
male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached
them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon
inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves. 30

In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no
adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal
design.

As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the
arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was
not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers
to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search
would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.

We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to
justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include
People v.

Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35 People

v. Valdez,36 and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the
warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that
would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a
crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the
other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. 38

Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with
the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting
team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the
informant not only the appellant’s physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain
that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be
there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant. 39

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated
item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding."

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier
mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 40

One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary
people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were
obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it
only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never
justifies the means.42

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED
for insufficiency of evidence.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant,
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his
release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to
serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.

The information filed against the accused alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without
being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the
purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)

The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence as follows:

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document
and testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of
suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25,
1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic container; "B-1-
a"—another plastic container; "C"—Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings:
Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of
accused with Pat. Daniel Obiña and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"—
Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"—Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obiña, "H"
Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V.
Galindo;"H-1"—date of of the request; "L"—Certificate of Field Test dated July 22,
1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses
of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obiño, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco,
Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.

Theresa Ann Bugayong—22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of
1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task
Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana
submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a
marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").

The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her
examination, she prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981
(Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three eliminations; microscopic examination,
the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of thin layer
chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo
Santiago, a representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.

The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obiña, 37 years old, married,
policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obiña
testified that he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He
was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job then
was among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and
apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-
NARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in
Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His
family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second
seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same
bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the
back of the seat of Obiña. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven
buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting
her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic)
nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to
go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of
the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain
camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the
ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that
there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached
Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline
Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina
intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her
he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana
inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at
home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right
hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the
police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.

At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the
presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obiña, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio
Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana
weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before
the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the
CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs
were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with
Pat. Obiña and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified
photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness
was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs.
"B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused and
pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and
time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled already. The
marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.

To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was
confiscated from the accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented
the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs.
"F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because
as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.

On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981

and underwent treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for
medical treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to
Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never knew the
accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same
Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic
bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside
her seat. Witness Obiña became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when
they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus
stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers
inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on
direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to
settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had
to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine
that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside
the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the
bag. He Identified his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981
which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.

Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981,
he was inside the Investigation Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty
Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Pat.
Daniel Obiña arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obiña reported to him that he apprehended Anita
Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The
marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote
tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic
wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white. Witness
Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings of Pat. Obiña
which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date
which was placed by Pat. Obiña after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected
marijuana.

After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he
interviewed apprehending officer Obiña and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl.
Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obiña (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed
accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated on
a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused
whether she was willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused.
Hence, no statements were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the
investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified
by Pat. Obiña, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat.
Obiña and the accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in
the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.

Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East
Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was
stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he
was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22,
1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a
kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted
a field test on this marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a
request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").

In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a
Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test
indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can
be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag
of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago,
the Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory.

The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married,
residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo
City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to
the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty
was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.

He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City
along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at
the said place, he saw Pat. Obiña alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obiña he approached
him and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obiña told him he apprehended a
certain woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus.
Pat. Obiña then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with
her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while
 Pat. Obiña sat behind the driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle
to police station. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police Station and
he was there when Pat. Obiña reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the
woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the
Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed the
taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obiña in the presence of Cpl.
Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang
Identified the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana
when it was brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not
well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and
bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri
bag of the accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obiña,
(Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.

While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to
Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He,
however, did not linger long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana
and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery
of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO-
21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature,
stands for Daniel Obiña. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution
rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)

Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:

CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE

OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.

II

CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF

THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.

III

APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS

WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT
CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)

The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep.
Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.

The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
 such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs.
Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.

The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only
delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of
probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not
err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.

The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is
unknown.

This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of
marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259,
267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and
seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except
the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.

The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.— A person lawfully arrested may be

searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a
warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being
an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having
had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence
against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only
planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's
findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.

Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of

policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records
why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).

The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obiña for no reason at all.

In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused
herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).

Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De
La Cruz, supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-74869. July 6, 1988.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IDEL AMINNUDIN y

AHNI, Defendant-Appellant.

The Solicitor General, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio,, for Defendant-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEIZURE BASED ON AN
INFORMER’S TIP, AT A TIME WHEN ACCUSED WAS NOT COMMITTING A CRIME,
ILLEGAL; EVIDENCE OBTAINED, INADMISSIBLE. — Where it is not disputed that the PC
officers had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin while he was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and seized the bag he was carrying, and that their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer
who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana, the
search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest
and warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of
Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained was
inadmissible.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO URGENCY COULD BE INVOKED IN PRESENT CASE TO

DISPENSE WITH OBTENTION OF ARREST AND SEARCH WARRANT. — The present case
presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant
to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there
was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing.
No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on
his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR WAS NOT COMMITTING A CRIME
WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED. — In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so
or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive
finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable
cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

AQUINO, J., Dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ARREST AT TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME IS LAWFUL;
SEARCH LIKEWISE LAWFUL.— I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he
was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not
"innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of
marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No.
6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a
warrant (Sec. 6-a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded
the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126,
Rules of Court).

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless
arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court,
disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in
fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked
liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the
information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested
with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge
against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her
after a "thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted. 6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and
was carrying marijuana. 7 He was identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited
for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the
gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected
the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed
as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag
was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged
that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to
admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood
in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly identified and could have been any of
several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that
he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at
the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to
mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a
secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was
bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away
the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend
whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his
allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the
trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the
opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful
pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or
expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of
this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court’s conclusion that the
accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later
nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible
Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC
authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to
the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin’s
claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana
allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of
Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General
dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid
because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the
bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo
by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one
saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks
before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follow:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel
Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

"A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.

"Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?

"A Yes, sir, two days before June 25,1984 when we received this information from that
particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular
operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.

"Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25,1984 with
respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

"A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9.
For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
"COURT: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25,
1984, did you also receive any report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin?

"A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.

"Q What were those activities?

"A Purely marijuana trafficking.

"Q From whom did you get that information?

"A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for
security reason and we cannot identify the person.

"Q But you received it from your regular informer?

"A Yes, sir.

"ATTY. LLARIZA: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?

"A Marijuana, sir.

"Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin’s coming to Iloilo with marijuana was
received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?

"A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

"Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25, 1984 two days before?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that Aminnudin was coming?

"A Before June 23, 1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on
June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming.
Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already
consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.

"COURT: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
"A Yes, sir.

"Q Are you sure of that?

"A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

"Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on
June 25,1984?

"A Only on the 23rd of June.

"Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject
mentioned in your intelligence report?

"A No, more.

"Q Why not?

"A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.

"Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a
search warrant anymore?

"A Search warrant is not necessary." 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere

lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is
still a government of laws and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge
after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could
not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v.
Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can
be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that "search warrant was not necessary." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed,
as result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25
Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in
the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that the suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered
his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years
of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without
charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of
arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and
the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own
words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is
guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared
even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict
him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized
illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes’ felicitous phrase.
The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the
Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence
obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would
inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as
demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the
Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including
the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the
innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights
of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As
Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminal should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must
therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSE: and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea JJ. concur.

G.R. No. 91107             June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to

as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual
background of the case is as follows:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of
the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.

At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a
late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country,
scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and
Plate number AVC 902. 1

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province,
for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs. 2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set
up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that
they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the
front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the
same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which
did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue
of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed
that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to
accused's defense.

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his
lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish
in his pouch bag.

In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.  The
3

dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV
of Republic Act 6425, as amended.

SO ORDERED. 4

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.  However, where the search is made
5

pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6
 Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
7

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.  The required probable
8

cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.9

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused,  or where the accused was acting suspiciously,  and attempted to flee.
10 11 12

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,  the police authorities conducted a
13

surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was
apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together
as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed
inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to
act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:

The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion even by the king, has not
only found its niche in all our charters, from 1935 to the present; it has also received unvarying
recognition and acceptance in our case law.  The present Constitution  declares that —
1 2

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right, among others, "shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." 3

The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other government authority to a search
of his body, or his personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a legitimate arrest. 4

An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant of arrest. Even without a warrant,
an arrest may also be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person: 5

(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant."  And it has been held that the search may extend to the area "within his immediate
6

control," i.e., the area from which said person arrested might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. 7

Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also been held to be proper in
cases of "search of a moving vehicle,  and "seizure of evidence in plain view."  This was the
8 9

pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention
to Moreno v. Ago Chi;  Alvero v. Dizon,  Papa v. Mago,  and an American precedent, Harris v. U.S.
10 11 12 13

If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those
justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is
engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it
is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit
of the poisonous tree.  In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion,
14

is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."  But the right against an unreasonable search
15

and seizure may be waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly
decided not to invoke it. 16

There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing validity of these
established principles. However, the Court is divided as regards the ultimate conclusions which may
properly be derived from the proven facts and consequently, the manner in which the principles just
cited should apply thereto.

The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at odds. What is certain,
however, is that the soldiers had no warrant of arrest when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's
person and the things in his possession at the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the
soldiers could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or arrest nor a search warrant everytime
they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and) no judge would issue them one considering that
searching questions have to be asked before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to
the search, a warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in accordance with the
norms of the law. For Malmstedt had not committed, nor was he actually committing or attempting to
commit a crime, in the soldiers' presence, nor did said soldiers have personal and competent
knowledge that Malmstedt had in fact just committed a crime. All they had was a suspicion that
Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags; all they had was, in the words of
the Trial Court, "the hope of intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the Office of
the Solicitor General asserts, "information that most of the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera)
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs."

This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6, 1988 also by the First
Division.  There, Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was disembarking
17

from an inter-island vessel. The officers were waiting for him because he was, according to an
informer's report, then transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin's bag confirmed the
informer's report; the bag indeed contained marijuana. The Court nevertheless held that since the
PC officers had failed to procure a search warrant although they had sufficient time (two days) to do
so and therefore, the case presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search
of Aminnudin's person and bag, the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal;
and the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action subsequently instituted against
Aminnudin for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.

There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in which apparently different
conclusions were reached. It is needful to devote a few words to them so that the relevant
constitutional and legal propositions are not misunderstood.

In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988),  the accused boarded a "Victory
18

Liner" passenger bus going to Olongapo from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was
carrying at the back of the seat then occupied by Obiña, an INP member "on Detached Service with
the Anti-Narcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obiña's suspicion, and at the first opportunity, and
without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously looked into the plastic bag and noted that it
contained camote tops as well as a package, and that there emanated from the package the smell of
marijuana with which he had become familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at
Sta. Rita, and Claudio alighted, Obiña accosted her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a
policeman, and announced his intention to search her bag which he said contained marijuana
because of the distinctive odor detected by him. Ignoring her plea — "Please go with me, let us
settle this at home" — he brought her to the police headquarters., where examination of the package
in Claudio's bag confirmed his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana. The Court held the
warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified, and the evidence thus
discovered admissible in evidence against the accused.

In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990),  two police officers and a barangay
19

tanod were conducting a "surveillance mission" at the Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there)
but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information
supplied by informers; . . . they noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag . . who was acting
suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag; the person did so only after they identified
themselves as peace officers; found in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing
one kilogram, more or less; the person was then taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he was investigated; and an information was thereafter filed against that person,
Tangliben, charging him with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as
amended. Upon these facts it was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a valid warrantless
arrest and a proper warrantless search incident thereto.

The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In
contrast" to Aminnudin where the Court perceived no urgency as to preclude the application for and
obtention of a search warrant, it was declared that the Tangliben case —

. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an informer who pointed
to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana . . . Faced with such on-the-spot information,
the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant .
. . To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robber, etc.
would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated.

In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on hand to enable the PC
officers to secure a search warrant, had there been time. But because there was actually no time to
get the warrant, and there were "on-the-spot" indications that Tangliben was then actually
committing a crime, the search of his person and his effects was considered valid.

Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al.,
decided on August 2, 1990,  and People v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990.
20 21

In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two members of the INP, Davao
Metrodiscom, and when he was accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police officers,
he suddenly fled. He was pursued, overtaken and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody.
The buri bag Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a revolver, for which he could produce
no license or authority to possess, four rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas grenade. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and convicted after trial. This Court
affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a search
without warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he
had with him at the time. The Court cited with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court
in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio,  a 1968 case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify
22

the search.

In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit
of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles
on the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by
informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of
marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As
expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the
checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw
that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks
and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon
placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific
examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus
conducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest,  and declared that, as in Tangliben,
23

supra, Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs at the
time of their arrest. Again, the Court took occasion to distinguish the case from Aminnudin  in which,
24

as aforestated, it appeared that the police officers were aware of Aminnudin's identity, his projected
criminal enterprise and the vessel on which he would be arriving, and, equally as importantly, had
sufficient time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the
Court found that the officers concerned had no exact description of the vehicle the former would be
using to transport marijuana, and no inkling of the definite time of the suspects' arrival, and pointed
out that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a passenger boat on the high seas whose route
and time of arrival are more or less certain, and which ordinarily cannot deviate from or otherwise
alter its course, or select another destination.
25

The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure appears to be People v. Lo Ho
Wing; et al., G.R. No. 88017, decided on January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an
undercover or "deep penetration" agent, Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into a group of
suspected drug smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim Ching Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo
to Guangzhou, China, where he saw him and other person empty the contents of six (6) tins of tea
and replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with the cans of substituted "tea," they
were met at the airport by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were
intercepted by officers and operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), who had earlier been
tipped off by Tia, and placed under arrest. As search of the luggage brought in by Tia and Peter Lo,
loaded on the group's vehicles, quickly disclosed the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of
white crystalline powder which, upon analysis, was identified as metamphetamine. Tia, Lo and Lim
were indicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was discharged as state witness.
Lo and Lim were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the questions
raised by them in this Court on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their vehicles and
personal effects was legal. The Court, citing Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267
(1986),  held legal the search of the appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure therefrom of the
26

dangerous drug, considering that there was intelligence information, including clandestine reports by
a planted spy actually participating in the activity, that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs
into the country; that the requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity," and "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 27

In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing, facts existed which were
found by the Court as justifying warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly
ascertained that the woman he was arresting was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had
personally seen that her bag contained not only vegetables but also a package emitting the odor of
marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, and had been
positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused were about to board
passenger buses, making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and decisive
action. In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, too, and when
accosted had attempted to flee from the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was
definite information of the precise identity of the persons engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at
a particular time and place.

Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the case at bar make out a
legitimate instance of a warrantless search and seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable
divergence of views among the members of the Court.

Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant should be absolved
on reasonable doubt. There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by
an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably
persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the offense for
which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch and
the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. It matters not that the search
disclosed that the bags contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and
suspicion. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless
arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was
being or about to be committed, or adjust been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional
waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore illegal,
since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body
and his belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first
undertaken, and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An
arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident of such an
unlawful arrest, also unlawful.

The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic Command at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Malmstedt had, it is said, willingly admitted that there were was hashish inside the "teddy
bears" in the luggage found in his possession — an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory
examination — does not help the cause of the prosecution one bit. Nothing in the record even
remotely suggests that Malmstedt was accorded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all
persons under custodial investigation.  He was not informed, prior to being interrogated, that he had
28

the "right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice," and that if he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one; not
does it appear at all that he waived those rights "in writing and in the presence of counsel." The
soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead with the investigation of Malmstedt, without
counsel. The admissions elicited from Malmstedt under these circumstances, as the Constitution
clearly states, are "inadmissible in evidence against him. 29

The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having been taken in violation of
the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are inadmissible against him
"for any purpose in any proceeding." Also pronounced as incompetent evidence against him are the
admissions supposedly made by him without his first being accorded the constitutional rights of
persons under custodial investigation. Without such object evidence and admissions, nothing
remains of the case against Malmstedt.

It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence presented by Malmstedt in his
defense is feeble, unworthy of credence. This is beside the point; for conformably to the familiar
axiom, the State must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
The unfortunate fact is that although the existence of the hashish is an objective physical reality that
cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate with any degree of persuasion,
much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was engaged in a criminal activity. This is the
paradox created by the disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is
that the hashish in question has been correctly confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn from
private use.

What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a disparagement of the
efforts of the police and military authorities to deter and detect offenses, whether they be possession
of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or some other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and
commendation of the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen. But those efforts must take
account of the basic rights granted by the Constitution and the law to persons who may fall under
suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be justified by the objective
of ferreting out and punishing crime, no matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective
might be. Disregard of those rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of
the guilty, and all because the "constable has blundered," rendering the evidence inadmissible even
if truthful or otherwise credible.
30
I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989 and to acquit the appellant
on reasonable doubt.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe represents the correct application
to the facts of this case of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and
seizures. It is consistent with my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with
Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a unanimous decision of the Court en banc, and my
dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311, Valmonte v. De Villa (on
checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181 SCRA 623.

I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made during the deliberation on this
case that some members of the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of extending its
protection to society, which deserves our higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong
priorities, criminals are being imprudently let free, to violate our laws again; and it is all our fault.

Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I do not consider a
person a criminal, until he is convicted by final judgment after a fair trial by a competent and impartial
court. Until then, the Constitution bids us to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak
crudely or sport tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our own standards of propriety and
decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he may look like a criminal.

It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also so wrong.

On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal search
and seizure as long as the suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited article That
fact will retroactively validate the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize,
the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession, not the fact of illegal
search and seizure.

This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1,
which was discredited in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejected by
an express provision in the 1973 Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the present
Constitution, again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally obtained "shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."

The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of criminal justice.  In the
1âwphi1

case at bar, the search was made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that the
route was being used by marijuana dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at his
waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that probable cause? The ponencia notes that the
military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the Sagada with prohibited
drugs in his possession. This is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless
search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily accept
it.

The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent
discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's
suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the
probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree
that washed clean the tree itself.

In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years ago:

. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available
evidence should be used.  It is also desirable that the government should not itself foster and
1avvphi1

pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it
pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay
them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of
disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for
the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.

If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am "coddling criminals," I welcome
the accusation and take pride in it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with
outlawed evidence than exalt order at the price of liberty.

 P v. Cuison, 326 Phil. 345 (1996)

G.R. No. 109287 April 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTOLIN CUIZON y ORTEGA, STEVE PUA y CLOFAS alias "STEPHEN PO y UY" or "TOMMY
SY" and PAUL LEE y WONG alias "PAUL LEUNG", accused- appellants.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

In deciding the case at bench, the Court reiterates doctrines on illegal searches and seizures, and the requirements for a valid warrantless
search incident to a valid warrantless arrest. While the Court appreciates and encourages pro-active law enforcement, it nonetheless
upholds the sacredness of constitutional rights and repeats the familiar maxim, "the end never justifies the means."

This is an appeal from the Decision  dated January 5, 1993 (Criminal Case No. 92-0230) of the
1

Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,  Pasay City finding appellants guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A.
2

6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

On March 10, 1992, an Information  was filed against the appellants charging them as follows:
3

That on or about February 21, 1992 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country, without lawful
authority, 16 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE,
also popularly known as "SHABU", a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant Antolin Cuizon, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. During
the arraignment of appellants Paul Lee and Steve Pua, the latter translated the information into
Chinese-Cantonese for the understanding of appellant Lee, who does not speak nor understand
English, Pilipino or any other Philippine dialect. Both of them, duly assisted by their counsel, also
pleaded not guilty.  Trial ensued and on January 5, 1993, the court a quo found appellants guilty as
4

charged and rendered the following disposition: 5

WHEREFORE, accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias Stephen

Po y Uy or Tommy Sy, and Paul Lee y Wong, alias Paul Leung, are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or "shabu", a regulated drug, as charged in the aforequoted
Information; and they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

The methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" involved in this case is declared

forfeited in favor of the government and is ordered turned over to the Dangerous
Drug Board for proper disposal.

The Facts

According to the Prosecution

The facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Solicitor General, who added the
page references to the transcript of stenographic notes as indicated in brackets, are as follows:
6

In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
gathered an information regarding the drug, activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y
Ortega and his wife, Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was conducted on them. The
residence of the spouses was traced to Caloocan City (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18,
21).

In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from its
informant in Hong Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving on
the same day at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, from the British crown colony, carrying with him a big quantity of "shabu". A
team was organized to intercept the suspects. Heading the team was Jose Yap, with
Ernesto Diño, Marcelino Amurao, Jose Bataller and Alfredo Jacinto, as members.
Some belonged to the Narcotics Division and the others to the Reaction Group of the
NBI (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4, 18).

Arriving at the NAIA shortly before 12:00 noon of February 21, 1992, Diño positioned
himself at the Arrival Area, while Yap and the other members of the team posted
themselves at the parking area of the airport. At about 12:45 in the afternoon of the
same date, accused Cuizon and his wife, who had just returned from Hong Kong,
after passing through the Immigration and Customs Areas at the NAIA, proceeded to
the Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to their boarding a car. While there,
accused Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4) traveling bags to accused
Steve Pua y Clofas and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the vicinity of the
Arrival Area. Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab which they boarded
in leaving the airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took another vehicle (tsn, May 19,
1992, pp. 4-5, 8-9).
At this juncture, Diño, who was observing the activities of the accused, radioed the
group of Yap at the parking area, describing the vehicle boarded by accused Pua
and Lee so that Yap and his companions could apprehend the two. However, the
message of Diño was not completely received by his teammates as the radio he was
using ran short of battery power (tsn, May 13, 1992, pp. 25-26).

Immediately after the vehicle boarded by Pua and Lee had left, Diño proceeded to
the place where his companions were stationed for the purpose of giving assistance
to them, believing that they were already in the process of apprehending accused
Pua and Lee. When he realized that the two accused were not apprehended, Diño
told the group of Yap to follow him as he was following the vehicle taken by Pua and
Lee which, according to an earlier tip he learned, was proceeding to the Manila
Peninsula Hotel in Makati, Metro Manila (tan, May 19, 1992 pp. 25-26; tsn, May 21,
1992, pp. 6, 15).

Upon arriving at about 2:00 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, in the
Manila Peninsula Hotel, in whose premises the taxicab boarded by accused Pua and
Lee entered, Diño and the other members of the team coordinated with Col. Regino
Arellano, Chief Security Officer of the hotel, for the purpose of apprehending the two
accused. A verification made by the Chief Security Officer showed that accused Pua
and Lee occupied Room 340 of the hotel. The two accused allowed Diño and Yap,
together with Col. Arellano, to enter their room. Found inside Room 340 were four (4)
traveling bags, which were similar to the ones handed by accused Cuizon to accused
Pua and Lee at the Arrival Area of the NAIA. After having introduced themselves as
NBI agents, Diño and Yap were permitted by accused Pua and Lee to search their
bags in the presence of Col. Arellano. The permission was made in writing. (Exh. I).
Three (3) of the four (4) bags each yielded a plastic package containing a
considerable quantity of white crystalline substance suspected to be
methamphethamine hydrochloride or "shabu". Each package was sandwiched
between two (2) pieces of board which appear to be "lawanit" placed at the bottom of
each of the three (3) bags. The suspected "shabu" contained in one bag weighed
2.571 kilos, that found in the other had a weight of 2.768 kilos, and the suspected
"shabu" retrieved from the third bag weighed 2.970 kilos. Pua and Lee were then
apprehended by Diño and his companions (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 9-13; tsn, May 7,
1992, p. 9, Exh. "F-2", p. 75, Records).

Immediately thereafter, Diño and the other members of the team proceeded to the
house of accused Cuizon in Caloocan City, taking with them accused Pua and Lee
and the bags with their contents of suspected dangerous drugs. They reached the
place at about 5:50 in the afternoon of the same date of February 21, 1992.
Retrieved from accused Cuizon in his residence was another bag also containing a
white crystalline substance weighing 2.695 kilos, likewise believed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu". In addition, a .38 Cal. firearm was taken
from accused Cuizon (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 10-11).

Pua, Lee, Cuizon and his wife were then brought by the arresting officers to the NBI
headquarters at Taft Avenue, Manila, for further investigation. They were
subsequently referred to the Prosecution Division of the Department of Justice for
inquest. However, only the present three accused were charged in court (tsn, May
19, 1992, pp. 12-13, 16-17).
 In the meantime, at about 5:30 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, Joselito
Soriano, roomboy of the Manila Peninsula Hotel, while cleaning Room 340, observed
that a portion of the ceiling was misaligned. While fixing it, he discovered in the
ceiling a laundry bag containing suspected "shabu" of more than five (5) kilos (Exh.
"X," p. 110). Informed of the discovery while they were already in their office in the
NBI, Yap and some companions returned to the hotel. The suspected "shabu" was
turned over to them (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 19-22).

When examined in the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the white crystalline
substance taken from the three (3) travelling bags found in the room of accused Pua
and Lee in the Manila Peninsula hotel, the white crystalline substance retrieved from
the bag confiscated from accused Cuizon in his house in Caloocan City, and the
white crystalline substance hidden in the ceiling of Room 340 of the hotel were
confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", a regulated drug.
(Board Regulation No. 6, dated December 11, 1972, of the Dangerous Drugs Board)
(tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 12).

The Defense's Version(s)

Appellant Pua, on his part, interposed the defense of alibi. On direct examination, he testified that at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense, he and his co-appellant Lee were in their room at
the Manila Peninsula Hotel.  His version of what happened on February 21, 1992 can be
7

summarized as follows:

At around 9:30 in the morning, he accompanied appellant Paul Lee to check-in at the Manila
Peninsula Hotel for and in behalf of the latter's personal friend named Leong Chong Chong or Paul
Leung, who was expected to arrive that evening because of a delayed flight. Appellant Pua was
engaged by appellant Lee to act as interpreter as Lee does not know how to speak English and the
local language.8

While in Room 340, past 1:00 in the afternoon, they received a call from the lobby informing them of
the arrival of Paul Leung's luggage. At Pua's instructions, the said luggage were brought to the room
by a bellboy. Thereafter, two persons knocked on their door, accompanied by a "tomboy" and a thin
man with curly hair. The two men identified themselves as NBI agents and asked appellant Pua to
let them in. He declined since he did not know who they were. However, when Col. Arellano, the
Chief Security Officer of the hotel, arrived and identified the two NBI agents, he and Lee relented
and permitted them to enter. Thereafter, he and Lee were told by the agents to sign a piece of
paper. Made to understand that they were merely giving their consent for the agents to enter their
room, Pua and Lee signed the same. Whereupon, the agents told them that they will open Paul
Leung's bags. Again appellant Pua refused, saying that the bags did not belong to them. Just the
same, the agents, without appellants Pua and Lee's consent, opened the bags and found the shabu.
Pua and Lee were then apprehended and brought to the NBI headquarters. 9

Appellant Cuizon, on the other hand, flatly rejected the prosecution's version of the incident. While
admitting that on February 21, 1992, he and his wife Susan did arrive from Hong Kong with several
pieces of luggage, he denied that he met Pua and Lee at the arrival area of the airport, much less
passed to them the four pieces of luggage. According to him, only his two-year old son,
accompanied by his cousin, Ronald Allan Ong, met them outside the airport. Ong fetched them from
the airport and brought them to their home in Caloocan city. They arrived at their house around 3:00
in the afternoon. 10
About two hours later, while he was resting together with his wife and son on his bed, two NBI
agents suddenly barged in and poked a gun at him. They manhandled him in front of his wife and
son. His hands were tied with a necktie and he was forcibly brought out of their house while the NBI
agents ransacked the place without any warrant. He, his wife Susan, and his cousin Ronald Allan
Ong, were afterwards brought to the NBI Headquarters in Manila and there the NBI agents
continued mauling him. 11

Appellant Cuizon's wife Susan, his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, and his nephew Nestor Dalde, testified
in his favor basically reiterating or confirming his testimony.
12

Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word of English or Pilipino
and only knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness stand for lack of an interpreter
who would translate his testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28, 1992, the last trial
date allotted to the defense for the reception of Lee's testimony, his counsel, although notified of the
proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the trial court deemed him and Pua to have waived their right to
present additional evidence,  and the case was considered submitted for decision after the filing of
13

memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask for the reconsideration of such ruling; neither
did he submit any memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who was assisted by another counsel, was
able to submit his memorandum.

The Issues

In their brief, appellants Pua and Lee made the following assignments of errors: 14

I. The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.

II. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Marcelino Amurao, Jose Yap and Ernesto Diño despite contradictions made on
material points.

III. The trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present his
evidence in his defense in violation of his constitutional right to due process.

Appellant Cuizon, in a separate brief, essentially reiterates the first two assignments of errors above-
quoted, and in addition challenges the legality and validity of his warrantless arrest and the search
and seizure incidental thereto. 15

As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the legality of the
arrest and search of herein appellants effected by the NBI operatives. Put differently, were the
warrantless arrests and the warrantless searches conducted by the NBI legal and constitutional?

The answer to this threshold question determines whether the judgment of the court a quo will stand
or fall. Consequently, there is a need to resolve first this issue before endeavoring to consider the
other issues raised by appellants.

A necessary side issue to be considered is, assuming the searches and arrests to have been illegal,
whether failure by appellants Pua and Lee to explicitly assign the same as errors before this Court
amounted to a waiver of their constitutional rights against such illegal searches and arrests.

The Court's Ruling

 General Rule on Warrantless

Arrests, Searches & Seizures

Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a
valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the
fundamental law of the
land  ordains it:
16

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
"produce, and particularly describing the place to be Searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."

It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. 71

However, the right against warrantless arrest and search and seizure is not absolute. Thus, under
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, an arrest without a warrant may be lawfully
made by a peace officer or a private person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate arrest without warrant, the
person arrested may be subjected to a search of his body and of his personal effects or belongings,
"for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,"
likewise without need of a search warrant. 18

However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other than those
justifying a warrantless arrest, as discussed above, upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on
some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime has been committed
by him, then the search made of such person as well as his arrest are deemed
illegal.  Consequently, any evidence which may have been obtained during such search, even if
19

tending to confirm or actually confirming such initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible for any
purpose and in any proceeding,  the same being "the fruit of the poisonous tree".  Emphasis is to be
20 21

laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the
search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest
effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful,
for being contrary to law.

The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under

The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc.

Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with and accept the
conclusion of the trial court that the appellants were caught in flagrante delicto which would justify
the search without a warrant. The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the baselessness
of its findings and conclusion:

. . . the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as
valid for being incidential to a lawful arrest. . . . The arrest of accused Pua and Lee
without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be considered to have
committed the crime of transporting "shabu" in the presence of the arresting officers
from the time they received the bags containing the regulated drug in the airport up
to the time they brought the bags to the hotel. Or their arrest without a warrant was
legal as falling under the situation where an offense had in fact just been committed,
and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said
accused were the ones who committed it. . . . 22

Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests without
warrant, we note that par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being
escapees from a penal institution at the time of arrest. Par. (a) an the other hand requires that the
person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer(s). These requirements
are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were
merely resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife
and child inside his home. No offense had just been committed, or was being actually committed or
being attempted by any of the accused in the presence of the lawmen. 23

Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting requirements have
also not been met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused-appellants had committed it. Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing
over four pieces of luggage to the other two appellants, be considered to have committed the
offense of "carrying and transporting" prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case, there
was no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the accused were then and
there committing a crime. The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecution's
version to be true; cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed
under suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically at high noon,
and out in the open, in full view of the public.  Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in
24

an airport setting, for travellers and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering
pieces of baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our fellow
countrymen for sending along ("pakikipadala") things and gifts through friends and relatives.
Moreover, one cannot determine from the external appearance of the luggage that they contained
"shabu" hidden beneath some secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of parting
with luggage took on the color and dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen
were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received that morning, to the
effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu. To quote
from another decision of like import, "(A)11 they had was hearsay information (from the telephone
caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed." 25

In the leading case of People vs. Burgos,  this Court laid down clear guidelines, as follows:
26

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

The same decision is highly instructive as it goes on to state:

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered
lawful under Section 6 (b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that the
information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground
(for belief) that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that
a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime.
They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent
recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a
frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. . . .

The foregoing doctrine was affirmed in the case of Alih vs. Castro, 7 where this Court ruled that ". . .
2

under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must
have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos."

In the case at bench, not only did the NBI agents rely merely on hearsay information ("tips"), but they
were completely uncertain that anything was really "going down" that day. That much is undisputed,
from a reading of the testimony of Agent Diño:

Q Now, but you were informed by the personnel of the airport that the
spouses Cuizon were going to bring in or transport into the country
shabu on February 21, 1992?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, you were not sure or your group was not sure that they
indeed would bring in shabu, is it not? That was only the information
relayed to your group?

A Yes, sir.
 xxx xxx xxx

Q But then you were jumping ahead. You were not sure is it not that
they were bringing in shabu?

A Yes, sir. (TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 37-38.)

In his testimony, NBI Investigator Jose Justo Yap, who was with Agent Diño during the
operation, likewise admitted in substantially the same tenor their uncertainty regarding the
commission of the offense (cf. TSN, May 20, 1992, pp. 29 & 34.).

We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to establish that
there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had
committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were made; hence, said
search and arrest do not come under the exception in par. (b) of Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and therefore
should be deemed illegal. We eight add that the search conducted on Pua and Lee was not incident
to a lawful warrantless arrest, having preceded the same and produced the justification therefor. On
the other hand, the search on Cuizon's residence, without the benefit of a search warrant, was
clearly illegal and the "shabu" seized thereat cannot but be considered inadmissible in evidence.
More an these points later.

Comparison Between The Present Case

and Earlier Decisions of This Court

For clarity's sake, it is imperative to compare the foregoing holding with previous decisions by this
Court in various drug cases, in which apparently different conclusions were reached, in order to
distinguish them from the instant case and avoid any potential misunderstanding of the foregoing
holding as well as the constitutional and legal principles on which it is based.

1. In People vs. Claudio,  the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for Baguio city, was arrested by
28

a policeman on the same bus because of the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from the
plastic bag she was carrying. The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be
lawful, the search justified and the evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence.

2. In People vs. Tangliben,  the accused, carrying a travelling bag at a bus terminal, was noticed by
29

lawmen to be acting suspiciously, and was also positively fingered by an informer as carrying
marijuana, and so he was accosted by policemen who happened to be on a surveillance mission;
the lawmen asked him to open the bag, in which was found a package of marijuana leaves. It was
held that there was a valid warrantless arrest and search incident thereto. The Court in effect
considered the evidence on hand sufficient to have enabled the law enforcers to secure a search
warrant had there been time, but as the case "presented urgency," and there was actually no time to
obtain a warrant since the accused was about to board a bus, and inasmuch as an informer had
given information "on the spot" that the accused was carrying marijuana, the search of his person
and effects was thus considered valid.

3. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,  the accused was seen acting suspiciously, and when accosted
30

by two members of the Davao INP who identified themselves as lawmen, he suddenly fled, but was
pursued, subdued and placed in custody. The buri bag he was carrying yielded an unlicensed
revolver, live ammunition and a tear gas grenade. This Court upheld his conviction for illegal
possession of firearms, holding that there was under the circumstances sufficient probable cause for
a warrantless search.

4. In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al.,  agents of the Narcotics Command set up a checkpoint on
31

a highway in Atok, Benguet, to screen vehicular traffic on the way to Baguio City due to confidential
reports from informers that Maspil and a certain Bagking would be transporting a large quantity of
marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of November 1, 1986, the two suspects, riding a jeepney, pulled up to the
checkpoint and were made to stop. The officers noticed that the vehicle was loaded with some sacks
and tin cans, which, when opened, were seen to contain marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the
search thus conducted as being incidental to a valid warrantless arrest.

5. In People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al.,  the Court ruled that the search of the appellants' moving
32

vehicles and the seizure of "shabu" therefrom was legal, in view of the intelligence information,
including notably, clandestine reports by a planted deep penetration agent or spy who was even
participating in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate, to the effect that appellants were
bringing in prohibited drugs into the country. The Court also held that it is not practicable to secure a
search warrant in cases of smuggling with the use of a moving vehicle to transport contraband,
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.

6. In People vs. Malmstedt,  NARCOM agents stationed at Camp Dangwa, Mountain Province, set
33

up a temporary checkpoint to check vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region, due to persistent
reports that vehicles from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other drugs, and because of
particular information to the effect that a Caucasian would be travelling from Sagada that day with
prohibited drugs. The bus in which accused was riding was stopped at the checkpoint. While
conducting an inspection, one of the NARCOM men noticed that accused, the only foreigner on
board, had a bulge at the waist area. Thinking it might be a gun, the officer sought accused's
passport or other identification papers. When the latter failed to comply, the lawman directed him to
bring out whatever it was that was bulging at his waist. It was a pouch bag which, when opened by
the accused, was found to contain packages of hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Invited for
questioning, the accused disembarked from the bus and brought along with him two pieces of
luggage; found inside were two teddy bears stuffed with more hashish. The Court held that there
was sufficient probable cause in the premises for the lawmen to believe that the accused was then
and there committing a crime and/or trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. Said
probable cause arose not only from the persistent reports of the transport of prohibited drugs from
Sagada, and the "tip" received by the NARCOM that same day that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada would be bringing prohibited drugs, but also from the failure of the accused to present his
passport or other identification papers when confronted by the lawmen, which only triggered
suspicion on the part of the law enforcers that accused was trying to hide his identity, it being the
normal thing expected of an innocent man with nothing to hide, that he readily present identification
papers when asked to do so. The warrantless arrest and search were thus justified.

In all the cases discussed hereinabove, there were facts which were found by the Court to provide
probable cause justifying warrantless arrests and searches, i.e., distinct odor of marijuana, reports
about drug transporting or positive identification by informers, suspicious behaviour, attempt to flee,
failure to produce identification papers, and so on. Too, urgency attended the arrests and searches
because each of the above-mentioned cases involved the use of motor vehicles and the great
likelihood that the accused would get away long before a warrant can be procured. And, lest it be
overlooked, unlike in the case before us now, the law enforcers in the aforementioned cases acted
immediately on the information received, suspicions raised, and probable causes established, and
effected the arrests and searches without any delay.
 Unexplained Matters in the Instant Case

In the case before us, the NBI agents testified that they purportedly decided against arresting the
accused-appellants inside the airport as they allegedly wanted to discover the identities of the airport
immigration, security or customs personnel who might be protecting the accused or otherwise
involved in the drug smuggling activities, and also in order to avoid the possibility of an armed
encounter with such protectors, which might result in injuries to innocent bystanders. These excuses
are simply unacceptable. They are obviously after-thoughts concocted to justify their rank failure to
effect the arrest within constitutional limits. Indeed, the NBI men failed to explain how come they did
not apprehend the appellants at the moment Cuizon handed over the baggage to Pua and Lee, or
even afterwards, in relative safety. Such arrest would have been consistent with the settled
constitutional, legal and jurisprudential precedents earlier cited.

The spouses Cuizon had already passed through the airport security checks allegedly with their
contraband cargo undetected in their luggage. Apparently, the NBI agents did not see (as indeed
they did not testify that they saw) anyone from the airport immigration, security or customs who
could have escorted the spouses Cuizon, and therefore, there was no danger of any "live ammo
encounter" with such group(s). The alleged drug couriers had already made their way outside the
NAIA, had allegedly made contact with the accused Pua and Lee, and were in the very act of
handing over the luggage to the latter. Why the NBI men did not move in and pounce on them at that
very instant has not been satisfactorily explained. Instead, one of the agents, Diño, merely watched
as Pua and Lee loaded the luggage into a cab and took off for Makati. Furthermore, it taxes the
imagination too much to think that at the most critical and climactic moment, when agent Diño
radioed his companions for help to close in on the suspects, the most amazing and stupendous thing
actually happened: Murphy's Law kicked in — whatever could go wrong, did, and at the worst
possible time — the batteries in Agent Diño's hand-held radio supposedly went dead and his
message was not transmitted. Thus the departing Pua and Lee proceeded merrily and unimpeded to
the Peninsula Hotel, while the spouses Cuizon simultaneously sped off to their residence in
Caloocan City, leaving the lawmen empty-handed and scampering madly to catch up. Such
absolutely astounding and incredible happenstance might find a place in a fourth-rate movie script,
but expecting the courts to swallow it — hook, line and sinker — is infinite naivete, if not downright
malevolence.

Even granting arguendo that the radio really went dead, nevertheless, the agents were not thereby
rendered helpless or without recourse. The NBI agents, numbering five in all, not counting their so-
called informant, claimed to have piled into three cars (TSN, May 19, 1992) and tailed the suspects
Pua and Lee into Makati, keeping a safe two-car distance behind (TSN, May 20, 1992). The lawmen
and the prosecutors failed to explain why the agents did not intercept the vehicle in which Pua and
Lee were riding, along the way, pull them over, arrest them and search the luggage. And since the
agents were in three (3) cars, they also could have easily arranged to have agents in one vehicle
follow, intercept and apprehend the Cuizons while the others went after Pua and Lee. All or any of
these possible moves are mere ordinary, common-sense steps, not requiring a great deal of
intelligence. The NBI men who testified claimed to have conducted or participated in previous drug
busts or similar operations and therefore must have been familiar with contingency planning, or at
least should have known what to do in this situation where their alleged original plan fell through. At
any rate, what the lawmen opted to do, i.e., allow Pua and Lee to freely leave the airport, allegedly
bringing the drug cache to the hotel, and Cuizon to leave unimpededly the airport and reach his
residence with one of the luggage, increased significantly the risk of the suspects (and/or the drugs)
slipping through the lawmen's fingers, and puts into question the regularity of performance of their
official functions. The agents' alleged actions in this case compare poorly with the forthright and
decisive steps taken by lawmen in the cases earlier cited where this Court held the arrests and
seizures to be valid.
Had the arrests and searches been made in transitu, i.e., had the agents intercepted and collared
the suspects on the way to Makati and Caloocan, or better yet, at the very moment of the hand-over,
then there would not have been any question at all as to the legality of their arrest and search, as
they would presumably have been caught red-handed with the evidence, and consequently for that
reason and by the very nature and manner of commission of the offense charged, there would have
been no doubt also as to the existence of conspiracy among the appellants to transport the drugs.
However, because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no sufficient proof of
conspiracy between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is
no clear and convincing evidence that the four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the
airport were the very same ones found in the possession of the latter in Room 340 of the Peninsula
Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could definitely and positively state that the bags
seized from Room 340 were the very same ones passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could
only say that they "looked like" the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them to be the
same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty as to the actual ownership of the said bags as at
the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time they were seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot
sustain the finding of conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and Lee on the other.
Well-settled is the rule that conspiracy must be proved independently and beyond reasonable
doubt.34

Additionally, in light of the foregoing discussion, we find it extremely difficult to subscribe to the trial
court's finding as to the existence and sufficiency of probable cause in this case, one major
component of which would have been the alleged information or "tip" purportedly received by the
agents as to the expected arrival of the spouses Cuizon that fateful day with a large cache of
"shabu". The question that defies resolution in our minds is why, if indeed the information or "tip" was
genuine and from a highly reliable source as claimed by the government agents, did they not act on
it? Throw in the alleged month-long surveillance supposedly conducted by some of the NBI people
on the Cuizon couple, and the mystery only deepens. Even with the so-called tip and the results of
surveillance, the government officers were still seemingly hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps
afraid, to arrest and search the accused appellants, so much so that the NBI agents who went after
Pua and Lee at the Peninsula Hotel, instead of outrightly cuffing and searching them, as they were
supposed to, opted instead to play it safe and meekly beseeched the two to sign a written consent
for the agents to search their personal effects! Indeed, this is one for the books. If this is how
confident the agents were about their "hot tips", reliable informers and undercover surveillance, then
we cannot be blamed for failing to appreciate the existence/sufficiency of probable cause to justify a
warrantless arrest and search in this case. There is a whole lot more that can be said on this score,
but we shall leave it at that for now. We shall now dispose of the appeals of the accused-appellants
individually.

Re: Appellant Antolin Cuizon

The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted without any warrant, and not
on the occasion or as an incident of a valid warrantless arrest, was indubitably illegal, and the shabu
seized thereat could not be admissible in evidence. That is why even the trial judge did not make an
effort to hold him liable under such seizure. He lamely argued: "(A)t any rate, accused Cuizon is not
held criminally liable in this case in connection with the bag containing "shabu" confiscated from his
residence. His responsibility is based on the bags containing "shabu" which he handed to Pua and
Lee at the NAIA. Consequently, even if the bag and its contents of "shabu" taken from his house
were not admitted in evidence, the remaining proofs of the prosecution would still be sufficient to
establish the charge against him." However, contrary to the trial judge's conclusion, we hold that
insofar as Cuizon is concerned, all the evidence seized are considered fruit of the poisonous tree
and are inadmissible as against him, and thus, he should be acquitted, since, as shown
hereinabove, (i) the warrantless search conducted on Pua and Lee was clearly illegal per se, not
being incident to a valid warrantless arrest either; (ii) and even if the search on Pua and Lee were
not illegal, conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and appellants Pua and Lee on the other
had not been established by sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) appellant Cuizon had
timely raised before this Court the issue of the illegality of his own arrest and the search and seizure
conducted at his residence, and questioned the admission of the seized shabu in evidence.

Re: Appellant Steve Pua @ "Tommy Sy"

What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the search and arrest
carried out on him and Lee may have been illegal for not being incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest, the unfortunate fact is that appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and
search, as well as the admission of the evidence obtained thereby; he did not raise the issue or
assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly, any possible challenge thereto based on
constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This Court has upheld and recognized waivers of
constitutional rights, including, particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in
cases such as People vs. Malasugui 35 and De Garcia vs. Locsin.
36

Additionally, the prosecution had argued and the trial court agreed that by virtue of the handwritten
consent (Exhibit "I") secured by the arresting officers from appellants Pua and Lee, the latter freely
gave their consent to the search of their baggage, and thus, the drugs discovered as a result of the
consented search is admissible in evidence. The said written permission is in English, and states
plainly that they (Pua and Lee) freely consent to the search of their luggage to be conducted by NBI
agents to determine if Pua and Lee are carrying shabu. It appears that appellant Pua understands
both English and Tagalog; he is born of a Filipino mother, had resided in Vito Cruz, Manila, and gave
his occupation as that of salesman. He admitted that he was asked to sign the written consent, and
that he did in fact sign it (TSN, May 28, 1992, pp. 33-34). His barefaced claim made during his direct
and cross examinations to the effect that he did not really read the consent but signed it right away,
and that by signing it he only meant to give permission for the NBI agents to enter the room (and not
to search) is hardly worthy of belief, considering that prior to the search, he seemed to have been
extra careful about who to let into the hotel room.

Thus, the full weight of the prosecution's testimonial evidence plus the large amount of prohibited
drugs found, must be given full force vis-a-vis Pua's claim of innocent presence in the hotel room,
which is weak and not worthy of credence.

Re: Appellant Paul Lee @ "Paul Leung"

Appellant Lee's situation is different from that of Pua. We agree with the Solicitor General when he
noted that the trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make available compulsory process and to
see to it that accused-appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is clear that appellant Lee was
effectively denied his right to counsel, for although he was provided with one, he could not
understand and communicate with him concerning his defense such that, among other things, no
memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was denied his right to have compulsory process to
guarantee the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf, including the
services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to present his testimony.  7 In sum,
3

he was denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the case as against Lee must be
remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial.

Epilogue

It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust operation and in
the process violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and
seizures. Because of the large haul of illegal drugs that the government officers claimed to have
recovered, this Court agonized over the case before us and struggled to apply the law with an even
hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary
people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were
obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it
only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never
justifies the means.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant Antolin Cuizon y Ortega

is hereby ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds. His immediate release is ordered unless he is
detained for other valid causes. Accused-appellant Steve Pua y Clofas is hereby found GUILTY of
the crime of Illegal Transport of Regulated Drugs, penalized under Section 15, R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; the Decision
appealed from, as herein modified, is hereby affirmed as to appellant Pua. Finally, the case as to
appellant Lee is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court in order that said accused may be
given his day in court. The Decision appealed from is also AFFIRMED with respect to the disposition
of the prohibited drugs involved in the case.

SO ORDERED.

 P v. Encimada, 345 Phil 301 (1997)

[G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROEL ENCINADA, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In acquitting the appellant, the Court reiterates the constitutional proscription that
evidence (in this case, prohibited drugs) seized without a valid search warrant is
inadmissible in any proceeding. A yield of incriminating evidence will not legitimize an
illegal search. Indeed, the end never justifies the means.

The Case

This principle is stressed in this appeal from the Judgment,1 promulgated on July 15,
1994 by the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32,2 in Criminal Case No.
3668, convicting Appellant Roel Encinada of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179.

An Information,3 dated May 22, 1992, was filed by Third Asst. Surigao City Prosecutor
Virgilio M. Egay charging appellant of said crime allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about May 21, 1992, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in gross disregard of the
prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 179, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control dried marijuana leaves weighing 800 grams, more or
less, which he transported to Surigao City from Cebu City aboard a passenger ship, well
knowing that such acts are expressly prohibited by law.

Before arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel Antonio Casurra, offered to plead

guilty to a lesser offense, i.e.,  illegal possession of prohibited drugs.4 The trial court
requested the prosecution to study the offer,5 but the records do not show any
agreement on such proposal.

Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.6 After the prosecution
presented its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court,7 a Demurrer to Evidence
dated September 1, 1993,8 questioning the admissibility of the evidence which allegedly
was illegally seized from appellant. The court a quo  denied the motion, ruling:9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For resolution is the demurrer to evidence dated September 1, 1993 of the accused,
Roel Encinada, praying that he be acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of the
inadmissibility of the evidence for the prosecution consisting of the marijuana (seized)
from him by the police. The accused raised the following issues, to wit: (1) Whether the
arrest and search of the accused without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of
warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest; and, (2) Whether the subject
marijuana is admissible in evidence against the accused.

xxx

A scrutiny of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the events leading to the
arrest of the accused started when SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia, chief of the PNP vice control
section, received a tip from his informer that the accused, Roel Encinada would be
arriving on board the M/V Sweet Pearl at about seven oclock in the morning of May 21,
1992. On cross-examination SPO4 Bolonia testified that the information was given to
him by his asset at about four oclock in the afternoon of May 20, 1992. After receiving
the tip he relayed the information to SPO4 Cipriano Iligan, Jr., PNP chief of intelligence.
SPO4 Bolonia further declared that he would have applied for a search warrant but
there was simply no time for it.

xxx

In the later case of People vs. Tangliben (184 SCRA 220) the Supreme Court modified
its ruling in the Aminuddin case when it held that the arrest and search is lawful when
the police had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. It
is noted that the tip was given to SPO4 Bolonia by his informant at about the closing
time of the offices of the various courts. He still had to inform SPO4 Iligan in order to
coordinate with him. The boat carrying the accused was scheduled to dock in Surigao
City at seven oclock the following morning when the courts had not yet opened.
It is therefore quite obvious that the police did not have enough time to apply for a
search warrant in the interim. The police cannot be faulted for acting on the tip and for
stopping and searching the accused even without a warrant.

In the case at bar, the accused was caught in flagrante delicto in actual possession of
the marijuana. The search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (a) of Rule 113, Section 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
allows a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest (People vs. Malmstedt, 198
SCRA 401).

xxxxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer to evidence in question is denied for

lack of merit.

After trial in due course, the assailed Judgment was rendered, the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, Roel Encinada, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 4, Article II, of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.

The marijuana (Exhibit B) involved in this case is hereby forfeited to the government to
be destroyed or disposed of pursuant to present rules and regulations. The two plastic
chairs (Exhibits D and D-1) are also forfeited to the government.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Solicitor General, in the Appellees Brief, recounts the events leading to appellants
arrest, as follows:10
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At around 4 p.m. of May 20, 1992, SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when he
received a tip from an informant that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City
from Cebu City in the morning of May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing
with him marijuana. Bolonia was then Chief of the Vice Control Squad of the Surigao
City Police (pp. 27-29; TSN, November 27, 1992, 34-40; p. 10, TSN, May 14, 1993).

Bolonia already knew Encinada because the latter previously was engaged in illegal
gambling known as buloy-buloy. After receiving the tip, Bolonia notified the members of
his team - SPO3 Marcial Tiro, SPO3 Glen Abot and SPO3 Charlito Duero - as well as his
colleague SPO4 Cipriano Iligan, Jr., the chief of the Intelligence and Investigation
Division, of the information he received. Because the information came late, there was
no more time to secure a search warrant (pp. 38; TSN, November 27, 1992, May 14,
1993, p. 13; pp. 4, 19; TSN, March 3, 1993).
In the early morning of May 21, 1992, Bolonia, Iligan and other police officers deployed
themselves in different strategic points at the city wharf to intercept Encinada. At about
8:15 a.m. of the same day, the M/V Sweet Pearl finally docked. The police officers saw
Encinada walk briskly down the gangplank, carrying two small colored plastic baby
chairs in his hand (p. 11 TSN, May 14, 1993; pp. 4, 5, 15-16 TSN, March 3, 1993; pp.
29-30 TSN, November 27, 1992, pp. 29-30).

From their various positions, the police officers followed Encinada immediately boarded
a tricycle at Borromeo Street, still holding the plastic chairs. As the tricycle slowly
moved forward, Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver to stop after identifying
himself as a police officer. When the vehicle stopped, Bolinia identified himself to
Encinada and ordered him to alight from the tricycle. Bolonia asked Encinada to hand
over the plastic chairs, to which the latter complied (pp. 5, 6, 17 TSN, March 3, 1993,
pp. 30-32, 35 TSN, November 27, 1992).

Bolonia noticed that there were two small chairs, one green and the other blue, stacked
together and tied with a piece of string. Between the stack of chairs, there was a bulky
package. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana.
Making a small tear in the cellophane cover, Bolonia could see and smell the what
appeared to be marijuana, a prohibited drug (pp. 6-9 TSN, March 3, 1993, Exh. B, D
and sub-markings; pp. 32-34. 35-39 TSN, November 27, 1992).

Encinada was brought to the central police station. Bolonia, in the presence of one
Nonoy Lerio who is a member of the local media and a friend of Encinada, opened the
package. It was discovered that indeed, the contents consisted of dried leaves known
as marijuana. In the course of the investigation, Encinada surrendered to Bolonia his
passenger ticket issued by M/V Sweet Pearl (pp. 9-11 TSN, March 3, 1993, Exh. E; pp.
34-35, 39-40 TSN, November 27, 1992).

On July 13, 1992, Bolonia brought the package of dried leaves for examination at the
PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City. The forensic chemist,
Inspector Vicente Armada, tested the leaves and confirmed that they were positive for
marijuana. However, the marijuana only weighed 610 grams, which Armada opined to
be probably due to shrinkage and moisture loss (pp. 12-17, 19-21, 24-40, 41; TSN,
November 27,1992, Exh. A, B. C and sub-markings.)

Version of the Defense

Appellant sets up denial as his defense. In his brief, he denied ownership and
possession of said plastic baby chairs, as follows:11
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1) In the morning of May 21, 1992, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, more or less,
the accused was seen to have disembarked from MV Sweet Pearl after an overnight trip
from Cebu City;

2) The accused proceeded to the Surigao PPA Gate and boarded a motorela bound for
his residence at Little Tondo, (within the City Proper), Surigao City. The Motorela was
fully loaded with passengers, with the accused as the fourth passenger;
3) When the motorela was already able to travel a distance of about ten (10) meters
more or less, the same was forcibly stopped by persons who ordered the passengers to
disembarked (sic). Thereafter, all the (baggage) of the passengers and the driver were
ordered to stand in a line for which a body search was made individually (sic);

4) After the search was made, the accused was singled out in the line and ordered to
board the service vehicle of the police and was brought to the PNP Police Station.

Before however the accused boarded the jeep, he was openly protesting to the action
taken by the police authorities and demanded from the apprehending officers a copy of
a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest for the search made and for his
apprehension;

5) In the police headquarters, the accused was made to undergo custodial investigation
for which a plastic bag was presented to him allegedly containing the subject marijuana
leaves. The accused denied that the said plastic bag belonged to him.

The denial was witnessed by Mr. Daniel Nonoy Lerio, Jr. a member of the Surigao City
Press, who was invited by the Police Investigators to witness the presentation of the
alleged marijuana leaves, during the said investigation;

6) After the custodial investigation, the accused was placed immediately behind bars
and the Information for Violation of RA 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179
was filed before the Court;

xxx

Aside from appellant, the defense also presented five (5) other witnesses whose
testimony allegedly established the following:12
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

8.a) Ruben Concha the driver of the motorela who testified that he was surprised when
the motorela he was driving was forcibly stopped (while already in motion ) by the
police authorities while directing his four (4) passengers, (3 males and 1 female) to
disembarked (sic) together with their (baggage).

That after the search was made, the accused was singled out, and despite the protests
made, was ordered to board the Police service vehicle, while the 2 other male
passengers just left the scene while the female passenger continued to board the
motorela who directed him to proceed to the residence of Baby Encinada to verify
whether the person picked up by the police authorities was related to the latter;

8.b) Josephine Nodalo testified that she is a beautician, and that she was one of the
four (4) passengers of the motorela driven by Ruben Concha, which motorela was
forcibly stopped by men who are chasing it after travelling a distance of 5 to 10 meters
away from its loading area near the PPA Gate.

All the four (4) passengers were ordered to disembarked (sic) from the motorela
whereupon they were all subjected to body search including their (baggage).
That it was the male passenger who was sitting at the rear portion of the motorela who
was picked up by the Police Authorities and despite the protests made was ordered to
board the Police service vehicle.

Upon learning from the persons who were gathered at the scene, that the one who was
picked up was the son of Mr. Encinada, the latter boarded back the motorela and
directed the driver to proceed to the residence of the Encinadas at Little Tondo to verify
whether it was really their son who was picked up by the police authorities. She made
this, as Mrs. Encinada, (the mother of the accused) is his (regular) customer;

8.c) Mr. Daniel Nonoy Lerio, Jr. testified that, being a member of the Press, he was
requested by the police authorities to witness the custodial investigation conducted
upon the person of the accused, who, during the entire proceedings of the investigation
vehemently denied having any knowledge about the marijuana leaves placed inside the
plastic bag;

8.d) Isabelita Encinada testified that she was informed by her manicurist (Josephine
Nodalo) about the arrest x x x (of) her son, somewhere at the PPA Port Area and upon
being informed, she and her husband immediately went to the Surigao PNP
Headquarters to verify the (news) x x x;

xxx.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court rejected appellants claim that he was merely an innocent passenger and
that his package contained mango and otap samples, not marijuana. Emphasizing that
the Surigao City Police had no ill motive against appellant, the trial court gave credence
to SPO4 Bolonias story that he actually received from his police asset the information
regarding appellants arrival in Surigao City. The trial court further emphasized that
appellant was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante delicto. Hence, the warrantless
search following his lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana obtained was admissible
in evidence.

Assignment of Errors

In his Brief, appellant submits the following assignment of errors:13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I. The lower court erred in finding that the accused was caught
in flagranti (sic) delicto in possession of the subject marijuana leaves and is the one
responsible in transporting the same;

II. The lower court gravely erred in finding that search and the arrest of the accused
without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as incident to a
lawful arrest --

III. The lower court gravely erred in finding that the subject marijuana leaves is
admissible in evidence
In short, the main issues are (1) the sufficiency of the evidence showing possession of
marijuana by appellant and (2) the validity of the search conducted on the person and
belongings of the appellant.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs

Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and ownership of
the plastic baby chairs. He contends that the testimonies of Bolonia and Iligan
conflicted as to the number of passengers riding the motorela. Such alleged conflict is
peripheral and irrelevant. Hence, it deserves scant consideration. Appellant adds that
such testimonies also conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside
the motorela. This claim, aside from being flimsy, is also not supported by the
transcript of stenographic notes.

In his testimony, appellant vehemently denied possession of the plastic baby chairs,
stressing that he was not holding them when the search was conducted. However, his
denial is easily rebutted by Bolonias testimony:14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Q: When you saw Roel Encinada who disembarked from M/V Sweet Pearl, what did you
observe in his person, if any?

A: He was carrying a (sic) baby chairs.

Q: What kind of chairs?

A: A (sic) plastic chairs.

xxx

Q: After you saw Roel Encinada disembarked (sic) from the boat, what did you and
your companions do?

A: We followed him behind because we posted in the different direction(s) in the wharf.

xxx

Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you followed him?

A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him
stopped (sic).

xxx

Q: By the way, where was (sic) this (sic) two plastic chairs placed in the motorize
tricycle?
A: He was sitting at the back of the motor at the right portion of the seat and the chairs
was (sic) placed besides him. ([W]itness indicating that he was sitting (sic) an
imaginary seat at the back of the motor and holding an (sic) imaginary chairs with his
left arm).

Between these two contentions, the choice of the trial court prevails because this is a
matter that involves credibility of witnesses. On this subject of credibility, the opinion of
the trial court deserves great respect as it was in a better position to observe the
demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on the stand;15 hence, it was in a superior
situation to assess their testimonies.

Furthermore, proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the prosecution of

illegal drug cases;16 it is sufficient that such drug is found in appellants possession.

Second Issue: Illegal Search and Seizure

Based on the foregoing discussion, appellants conviction could have been affirmed by
this Court. However, the very evidence implicating him -- the prohibited drugs found in
his possession -- cannot be used against him in this case or, for that matter, in any
proceeding.

Generally, a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured warrant;

otherwise, such search and seizure is subject to challenge.17 Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, is apropos:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as

a fruit of the poisonous tree. This principle is covered by this exclusionary rule:

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be

inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The plain import of the foregoing provision is that a search and seizure is normally
unlawful unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. This
protection is based on the principle that, between a citizen and the police, the
magistrate stands as a mediator, nay, an authority clothed with power to issue or
refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.18 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The right against warrantless searches, however, is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions, as follows: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused
themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.19 In these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause as the essential
requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.20cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, Bolonia received at 4:00 p.m. on May 20, 1992 an intelligence report that
appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard the
M/V Sweet Pearl. Although such report could have been the basis of probable cause,
Bolonia explained that he could not secure a warrant because the courts in Surigao City
were already closed for the day. Thus, he and the other lawmen had no choice but to
proceed the next morning to the port area. After appellant disembarked from the ship
and rode a motorela, Bolonia stopped the motor vehicle and conducted the search. He
rummaged through the two strapped plastic baby chairs which were held by appellant
and found inserted between them a package of marijuana wrapped in a small plastic
envelope.

Appellant contended before the lower court that the warrantless search of his
belongings was proscribed by the Constitution. But the trial judge rejected this
contention, opining that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto  at the time of his
arrest. Hence, it concluded that the warrantless search conducted after his lawful arrest
was valid and that the marijuana was admissible in evidence.

Rule 113, Section 5, discusses the instances when a warrantless arrest may be
effected, as follows:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

xxx.
In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao City
policemen. Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed an offense. The search cannot be said to
be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient
ground for a warrantless arrest. Bolonias testimony shows that the search preceded the
arrest:21
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you followed him?

A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him
stopped (sic).

xxx

Q: You said you stopped the motor tricycle in which Roel Encinada (sic) riding, what did
you do?

A: At first I identified myself to the driver and to some of the passengers.

xxx

Q: And after that, what happened next?

A: I requested Roel Encinada to disembark from the motor tricycle because of that
information given to us in his possession.

Q: Possession of what?

A: Possession of marijuana, Sir.

Q: And Roel Encinada alighted from the motor vehicle?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, People v. Tangliben22 is factually inapplicable to the

case at bar. The prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the
appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact
demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare
circumstances.

We disagree with the trial courts justification for the search:

The arrest of the accused without warrant was lawful because there was a probable
cause or ground for his apprehension. The police had received reliable, albeit
confidential information from their informant that Roel Encinada would be bringing in
marijuana from Cebu City on board the M/V Sweet Pearl. Unfortunately there was no
more time for the police to apply for and secure a search warrant as the information
was received late in the afternoon of May 20, 1992 and the accused was expected to
arrive at seven oclock the following morning. The different courts were closed by then.
Nevertheless the police felt constrained to act on the valuable piece of information.

Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his
house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet
Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Administrative
Circular No. 13 allows applications for search warrants even after court hours:

3. Rafflling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for
search warrant may be filed directly with any judge in whose jurisdiction the place to be
searched is located, after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify under oath the urgency of the
issuance thereof after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays;
(Emphasis supplied)

The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series
of 1987, entitled Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Applications for Search
Warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro
Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas:

This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications
for search warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes
affecting peace and order. There is a need for prompt action on such applications for
search warrant. Accordingly, these amended guidelines in the issuance of a search
warrant are issued:

1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act,
crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal
possession of firearms and/or ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken
cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to
be searched is located.

2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge  shall take

cognizance of and personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive Judge or
Vice-Executive Judge, the application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon
by any  judge of the Court where the application is filed.

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall
likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having
jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and
state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent.

4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally
conduct the examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible
leakage of information. He shall observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for
the issuance of search warrants provided for in this Courts Administrative Circular No.
13, dated October 1, 1985.

In People v. Aminnudin, the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana

found in appellants possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been
illegally seized. The Court firmly struck down the policemens cavalier disregard for the
Bill of Rights, explaining:

The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.

Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce.
Bolonias receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the
particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the
need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed or neglected to do so. Such failure
or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of the appellant.

It is significant that the Solicitor General does not share the trial judges opinion. Taking
a totally different approach to justify the search, the Republics counsel avers that
appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of marijuana to the
arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search.
This, he gleaned from Bolonias testimony:23 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two plastic
chairs that he carried, what did you do next?

A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an
otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted
above -- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants
silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search.24 The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.25 Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted
irregularly, i.e.,  without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the
presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.

Appellants alleged acquiescence should be distinguished from the consent appreciated

in the recent case of People v. Lacerna.26 In said case, the search was conducted at a
validly established checkpoint and was made in the regular performance of the
policemens duty. Although it became intrusive when the policemen opened his
baggage, it was validated by the consent of appellant, who testified in open court that
he allowed such search because he had nothing to hide. In the present case, there was
no checkpoint established. The policemen stopped the motorela and forthwith subjected
the passengers to a search of their persons and baggage. In contrast to the accused in
Lacerna, herein appellant testified that he openly objected to the search by asking for a
warrant.

Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand.
There is simply no sufficient evidence remaining to convict him. That the search
disclosed a prohibited substance in appellants possession, and thus confirmed the police
officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal
search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the
evidence yielded by the search.

We should stress that the Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement
agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions
of crimes and apprehensions of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill
of Rights. Law enforcers are required to follow the law and to respect the peoples
rights. Otherwise, their efforts become counterproductive. We remind them of this
recent exhortation by this Court:27

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to

expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of
their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an
illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the
crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude
condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the
more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society.
While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the
law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them
to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the
law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED. Unless convicted for any other
crime or detained for some lawful reason, Appellant Roel Encinada is ORDERED
RELEASED immediately.

G.R. No. 200334               July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,
vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of
their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more
apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what
could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of
society.

Squarely raised in· this appeal  is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless
1

arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on
their personal knowledge. The information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text
message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly
contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without
the accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the
meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop
and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly,
and without improper pressure or coercion.

The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should
be acquitted.

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a
text message from an unidentified civilian informer"  that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin
2

Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana"  from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
3

Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. 4

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."  PSI Bayan ordered SPO1
5

Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint
in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.  A passenger
6

jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint.  The jeepney driver
7

disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were
carrying marijuana.  SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified
8

as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.  Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack
9

while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. 10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.  Cogaed and Dayao
11

told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin.  After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks
12

of what looked like marijuana.  Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet
13

gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the
bag."  "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police
14

station."  Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags"  inside the station.
15 16 17

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.  Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces
18

of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"  and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected
19

marijuana. 20

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.  PSI Bayan personally 21

delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.  Forensic Chemical Officer Police
22

Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were
indeed marijuana.  The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5
23

grams.  The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.  The marijuana collected from
24 25

Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.  A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and
26

Dayao’s bags. 27

According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney
to take him"  to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.  He boarded a jeepney and
28 29

recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend.  Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
30

Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.  Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help in
31

carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack."  Cogaed agreed because they were
32

both going to the market.  This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1
33

Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know.  SPO1 34

Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.  Thereafter, 35

SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.  These facts 36

were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot
where Cogaed was apprehended. 37

At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head."  The bags were also 38

opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. 39

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.  The information against them
40

states:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and
possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four
hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165
(otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"). 41

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union.  Cogaed 42

and Dayao pleaded not guilty.  The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14
43

years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.  Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision  dated May 21,
44 45

2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). 46

The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or
that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest."  Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also
47

be considered illegal.  However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest,
48

Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity"  when "he did not protest when SPO1
49

Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag." 50

Cogaed appealed  the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and
51

affirmed the trial court’s decision.  The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against
52

warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened
his bag."  Hence, this appeal was filed.
53

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY
VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS. 54

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on
the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary. 55

We find for the accused.

II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many
dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and
seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the
requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause
that can only be determined by a judge.  The existence of probable cause must be established by
56

the judge after asking searching questions and answers.  Probable cause at this stage can only
57

exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by
the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be
searched. 58

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.  In the Rules
59

of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant.  This
60

court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured."  The61

known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;

4. Consentedwarrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.  (Citations omitted)

62

III

One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk"
searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of
Court.  Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto,
63

and the search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to
ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. 64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals  was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation
65

whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information."  This court stated that the
66

"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search
warrant." 67

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all
the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches ) are necessary for law
68

enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe —
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of
an illicit act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,  the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented
69

by people abusing drugs.  When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish
70

eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner."  The suspicion increased when the man avoided
71

the police officers.  These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
72

drugs.  These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and]
73

investigate." 74

In People v. Solayao,  police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.  This man was also
75 76

"wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit."  Upon seeing the police, the man fled.  His flight
77 78

added to the suspicion.  After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade
79

firearm"  in his possession.  This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents
80 81

could not possibly have procured a search warrant first."  This was also a valid search.
82

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing
a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative
of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.
The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the
driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:

COURT:
Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger
jeep?

WITNESS:

A Not yet, Your Honor. 83

SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:

Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that
the accused were carrying marijuana?

WITNESS:

A No, Your Honor. 84

The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion
of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is
necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.  Anything less
85

than this would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

IV

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge
to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,  one of the earliest cases adopting
86

the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.  (Emphasis supplied)
87

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged." 88

Malacat v. Court of Appeals  clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable
89

cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion.  It has to be a "genuine reason"  to serve the purposes of the
90 91

"stop and frisk" exception: 92

Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.  (Emphasis supplied,
93

footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,  Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely
94

on a single suspicious circumstance.  There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly

95

innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."  The 96

Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."  Certainly, reliance on only one
97

suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. 98

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting
the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of
protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.  (Emphasis supplied)
99

The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.  As in Manalili,  jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
100 101

dangerous drugs.

The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta.  In that case, an informant told the
102

police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus.  At the bus 103

terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.  The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
104

street  and identified her as "Aling Rosa."  The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged
105 106

that she allowed them to look inside her bag.  The bag contained marijuana leaves.
107 108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.  There were no
109

suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.  It 110

was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.  The evidence obtained was not
111

admissible because of the illegal search.  Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.

112 113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police’s informant,
who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.  Here, the National Bureau
114

ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs.  The NBI 115

waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a
boat.  Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what
116

turnedout to be marijuana leaves.  The court declared that the searchand seizure was
117

illegal.  Aminnudin was acquitted.

118 119
People v. Chua  also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been
120

receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles
City."  One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
121

Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout.  A car "arrived and parked"  at the hotel. The
122 123 124

informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.  The man alighted from
125

his car.  He was carrying a juice box.  The police immediately apprehended him and discovered
126 127

live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding. 128

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation when the
police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’." 129

VI

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there
to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, withouta
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At
the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to
commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected,
"two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting officer."  Both elements were missing
130

when Cogaed was arrested.  There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
131

suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest.

VII

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence
to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.  (Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection
132

was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive
intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from
the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:

ATTY. BINWAG:

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it
not?

WITNESS:

A Yes, ma’am.

Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?

A None, ma’am.

Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe bag,
you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?

A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.

Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it
not?

A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised.  (Emphasis supplied)
133

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to Judge
Florendo’s questions:

COURT:

....

Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?

A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened.  He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put down
1âwphi1
the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to
carry."
134

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.  The police officer must also
1âwphi1

inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of
his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer
must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or
her constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.

VIII
The Constitution provides:

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 135

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.  This rule prohibits the issuance of
136

general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."  It ensures that
137

the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon
and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags,
a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict
Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However,
we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union
and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he
is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 238453

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JAIME SISON, LEONARDO YANSON, AND ROSALIE BAUTISTA, Accused

LEONARDO YANSON, Accused-Appellant

 DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

To be valid, searches must proceed from a warrant issued by a judge.  While there are exceptions to
1

this rule, warrantless searches can only be carried out when founded on probable cause, or "a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged."  There must be a confluence of several suspicious circumstances. A solitary tip hardly
2

suffices as probable cause; items seized during warrantless searches based on solitary tips are
inadmissible as evidence.

In offenses involving illegal drugs, narcotics or related items establish the commission of the crime
charged. They are the corpus delicti of the offense. The inadmissibility of illegally seized evidence
3

that forms the corpus delicti dooms the prosecution's cause. Without proof of corpus delicti, no
conviction can ensue, and acquittal is inexorable.

This Court resolves an appeal from the assailed Decision  of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
4

the Regional Trial Court's Joint Judgment  convicting accused-appellant Leonardo Yanson (Yanson)
5

and his co accused, Jaime Sison (Sison) and Rosalie Bautista (Bautista), for violation of Section
4  of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
6

An Information was filed against Sison, Yanson, and Bautista before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Kabacan, Cotabato City, charging them with violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972:

That on May 31, 1996, in the Municipality of Mlang (sic), Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without any permit from the authorities,
transport, shipped (sic) and carry along with them, in a vehicle with trademark ISUZU, colored Silver
gray, with Plate No. SDC 619, Six (6) kilos of dried marijuana leaves/Indian Hemp, placed inside two
(2) separate sacks, which is prohibited drugs.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

On arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial then followed.  8

The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses:  (1) Superintendent/Colonel Eriel Mallorca
9

(Superintendent Mallorca); (2) Senior Police Officer 4 Dionisio Arsenio (SPO4 Arsenio); (3) PO3
Rafael Biton; (4) SPO3 Isaac Prado (SPO3 Prado); (5) SPO4 Vivencio Jaurigue; and (6) SPO4
Albert Claudio. The defense presented the three (3) accused as its witnesses.  10

According to the prosecution, at 8:30 a.m. on May 31, 1996, the Municipal Police Station of M’lang,
North Cotabato received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with plate number
619  and carrying three (3) people—that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police
11

instructed the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the riverside police outpost along the road from
Matalam to M’lang.  12

At around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the team of
police officers on standby. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The driver
alighted and, at an officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were
discovered beside the engine.  13

The vehicle, its driver, and its passengers were brought to the local police station.  The Chief of
14

Police kept the seized sacks. The following day, he and SPO4 Arsenio brought the seized items to
the Davao City Crime Laboratory for examination. The seized sacks were personally received by
Superintendent Mallorca, who then examined the items and later reported that their contents tested
positive for marijuana, weighing a total of 5,637 grams. 15

The driver and the two (2) passengers were later identified as Sison, Bautista, and Yanson,
respectively. 16

For the defense, Yanson testified that at around 5:30 a.m. on the day of the incident, Bautista and
Sison fetched him from his house in Poblacion, Surallah, South Cotabato. They all drove to
Midsayap to get something from the house of the Surallah Mayor, who was Sison's uncle. He
claimed, however, that he did not know what that something was.  While he stayed in the pickup,
17

Sison and Bautista entered the Mayor's house, came out 30 minutes later, then returned to their
vehicle. They drove off, but stopped in Kabacan, North Cotabato to eat at a terminal before going
home.  18

As they reached M’lang on their way home, they were stopped by police officers who inspected the
vehicle and told them that they were looking for something. After the inspection, they were brought
to the police station where they were detained and compelled to admit that marijuana was seized
from them.  19

Sison testified on substantially the same sequence of events as Yanson, though he notably recalled
that they took the trip to Midsayap at 5:30 p.m.
20

Bautista testified that at around 5:30 to 6:00 a.m. on the day of their arrest, she was waiting by the
roadside for a ride to Marbel (also called Koronadal, South Cotabato) to purchase goods for resale in
her ready-to wear or "RTW" business. While she was waiting, Sison and Yanson, who were aboard
a silver gray Isuzu pickup, saw her and stopped. Yanson asked about her destination and offered
her a ride, which she accepted. En route to Cotabato City, they passed by Yanson's house where
Yanson’s male friend joined them. After passing a long steel bridge, Yanson told Sison to park
Yanson and his friend alighted and, on foot, crossed the highway and walked ahead together. 21

After 30 minutes, Yanson and his friend returned and told Bautista that they were all going to return
to the place they had just come from Bautista, however, stayed behind by the highway. After some
15 to 20 minutes, Sison, Yanson, and his companion returned. When they were about to leave,
Yanson's companion disembarked, leaving her, Yanson, and Sison to take the return trip at around
9:00 a.m. or 10:00 a.m. They stopped to eat at a carinderia before resuming their trip. 22

Bautista further alleged that when they reached M’lang, they were stopped by police officers who
inspected their vehicle. Sison alighted and opened the vehicle's hood, exposing the marijuana under
it. Upon discovery, they were taken to the police station along with their vehicle, and there they were
detained. 23

In a Joint Judgment  promulgated on March 11, 2013, the Regional Trial Court convicted Yanson,
24

Sison, and Bautista of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the Joint Judgment read:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds all accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of 1972D.]

This Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT. In addition, this Court
imposes upon each of them a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 20,000.00).

In the service of their sentences, let the period of their respective preventive detention be credited in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

The marijuana involved in this case is hereby confiscated in favor of the Government and shall be
properly disposed of in accordance with the law.

Considering that the use of the vehicle in the commission of the offense is not authorized by its
owner, it is hereby ordered that the said vehicle be returned to its owner.

The bail bond for accused-convict Rosalie Bautista is hereby cancelled. Pending the finality of this
Judgment, let convict Rosalie Bautista be committed for detention at the North Cotabato District Jail,
BJMP, Amas, Kidapawan City.

SO ORDERED. 25

The Regional Trial Court sustained the search conducted on the tipped vehicle as a valid
warrantless search because, according to it, the accused consented anyway. 26

Moreover, the trial court made much of apparent inconsistencies in the accused's testimonies. It
noted that Sison and Yanson testified that there were just three (3) of them in the trip, while Bautista
recalled Yanson having a male companion. It also noted that Yanson and Bautista recalled leaving
for Surallah at around 5:30 in the morning, while Sison recalled leaving at 5:30 in the afternoon. Also
noteworthy to the trial court, Yanson and Sison claimed that they were heading to Midsayap while
Bautista maintained that they were headed to Cotabato City. 27

The trial court further concluded that all three (3) accused engaged in a conspiracy. It noted their
acts of leaving Surallah together on board the same vehicle and making their return trip together as
indicative of their joint purpose and design.28

Only Yanson appealed before the Court of Appeals. 29

Yanson contended that the two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and
Sison are inadmissible evidence since the police officers did not have probable cause to conduct a
search on their vehicle.  He noted that the radio message supposedly received by the police officers
30

was "[t]he sole basis for their belief of the alleged transportation of marijuana[.]"31

Citing People v. Vinecario,  Yanson asserted that searches at checkpoints, in the absence of

32

probable cause, should be limited only to a visual search. Thus, he maintained that the further
instruction for Sison to open the hood of their pickup amounted to an unreasonable intrusion and
violation of privacy. Yanson added that Sison could never have freely consented to an extensive
search considering how, when they were flagged down and asked about opening the hood, he was
surrounded by police officers and could not feel secure in declining.  33

Yanson added that while the governing law at the time he allegedly committed the offense was
Republic Act No. 6425, he was entitled to benefit from the favorable amendatory provisions of
Republic Act No. 9165. He noted that Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires arresting officers
to strictly comply with the chain of custody requirements. 34

Yanson claimed that the police officers who arrested them failed to faithfully comply with Section 21,
particularly when they failed to mark and seal the two (2) sacks of marijuana allegedly found under
the pickup's hood. He also pointed out that the Chief of Police, Jose Calimutan, failed to testify on
the steps he took to maintain the integrity of the items allegedly seized.35

Yanson faulted the Regional Trial Court for maintaining that he engaged in a conspiracy with his co-
accused. He asserted that he was simply a passenger who had no knowledge of whatever materials
lay under the pickup's hood.36

The Office of the Solicitor General countered that probable cause was properly established since
there was verified information that the pickup was being used to transport illegal drugs. It maintained
that an extensive search in checkpoints is allowed if the officers conducting the search have
probable cause to believe, prior to the search, "that either the motorist was a law offender or that
they would find evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched." 37

The Office of the Solicitor General added that the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
could not be applied as the crime was committed on May 31, 1996, long before Republic Act No.
9165 came into effect. It added that, in any case, the police officers were shown to have adhered to
the four (4) critical links concerning chain of custody. 
38

The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Yanson conspired with his co-accused to
transport marijuana. It contended "that conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an
agreement of the parties to commit long as the acts of the accused collectively and individually
demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of [the] same unlawful
purpose."39

In its January 23, 2018 Decision,  the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Joint
40

Judgment.

It ruled that there was probable cause to conduct an extensive search since the information received
by the police officers was sufficiently accurate, given how the pickup "was spotted in the place where
it was said to be coming from and was actually loaded with marijuana." 41

Moreover, the Court of Appeals found no reason to apply Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165,
considering that Republic Act No. 9165 was not in effect when the crime was committed. 42

The Court of Appeals also maintained the finding of conspiracy in Yanson's act of travelling with
Sison and Bautista from Pikit to M’lang with the contraband. 43

The dispositive portion of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Judgment dated February 11, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 16, Kabacan, Cotabato in Criminal Case No. 96-121 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion
Perpetua instead of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php
20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.  44
Yanson filed his Notice of Appeal,  which was given due course by the Court of Appeals in its March
45

7, 2018 Resolution. 46

Acting on the records transmitted by the Court of Appeals, this Court issued a June 4, 2018
Resolution  informing the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs. Through
47

separate manifestations, however, the parties opted to not file supplemental briefs and merely
adopted the arguments and issues they had raised before the Court of Appeals. 48

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not accused appellant Leonardo Yanson's guilt
for illegally transporting marijuana was established beyond reasonable doubt. Subsumed under this
issue are the issues previously raised before the Court of Appeals:

First, whether or not a valid search and seizure was conducted on the pickup boarded by accused-
appellant and his co-accused, Jaime Sison and Rosalie Bautista;

Second, whether or not Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 may retroactively apply; and

Finally, whether or not accused-appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused.

The Court grants the appeal. Accused-appellant and his co-accused are acquitted.

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires a warrant to be issued by a judge before a
search can be validly effected:

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

The issuance of a search warrant must be premised on a finding of probable cause; that is, the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place to be searched."  49

The rule requiring warrants is, however, not absolute. Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional
instances when warrantless searches and seizures are considered permissible:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest ...;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view,"...;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.  (Emphasis supplied)

50

A search of a moving vehicle is one (1) of the few permissible exceptions where warrantless
searches can be made. People v. Mariacos  explains:
51

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is
made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a
warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles
since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be
sought.   (Citation omitted)
52

However, for a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable cause remains
imperative.  Law enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct searches. In Caballes v.
53

Court of Appeals: 54

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the
absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.  (Emphasis supplied,
55

citation omitted)

In determining the existence of probable cause, bare suspicion is never enough. While probable
cause does not demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction,  it requires the
56

existence of "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in

themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged." 57

II

People v. Cogaed,  citing Chief Justice Lucas Bersamin's dissent in Esquillo v. People,  emphasized
58 59

that in warrantless searches, law enforcers "must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance."  What is required is the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity,
60

which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."61 Indeed, it is unlikely
that a law enforcer's suspicion is reasonably roused at the sight of a single activity, which may very
well be innocent. It is far more likely that there first be several, continuous, peculiar acts of a suspect
before any law enforcer's suspicion is roused. At every peculiar act done, a law enforcer's suspicion
is successively confirmed and strengthened.

There have been a number of cases where this Court considered warrantless searches made in
moving vehicles to be valid. In these cases, probable cause was founded on more than just a
solitary suspicious circumstance.

In People v. Malmstedt,  Narcotics Command officers set up a temporary checkpoint in response to

62

"persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs."   These included information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
63

prohibited drugs in his possession. At the checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and inspected it,
starting from the front, going towards the rear. The bus turned out to be the vehicle boarded by the
accused. Upon reaching the accused, an officer noticed a bulge on his waist. This prompted the
officer to ask for the accused's passport and identification papers, which the accused failed to
provide. The accused was then made to reveal what was bulging on his waist. It turned out to be
hashish, a derivative of marijuana. 64

In Malmstedt, this Court ruled that the warrantless search was valid because there was probable
cause--premised on circumstances other than the original tip concerning a Caucasian person for the
arresting officers to search the accused:

It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. 65

In People v. Que,  police officers went on patrol after receiving information that "a ten-wheeler truck
66

bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos
Norte."  When they saw the truck resembling this description pass by, the officers flagged it down.
67

Q: That information was relayed to you only by your Chief Calimutan, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And, because of that you went to the check point (sic) and put a barricade along the National
Highway?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And then you searched every vehicle that passed on that check point (sic)?

A: No, because according to the information[,] it was a pick-up.

Q: So, you checked all pick-up that passed on your check point (sic) on that morning on May 31,
1996?

A: Not all, sir.

Q: Now, how many of you who (sic) conducted the check point (sic), Mr. Witness?

A: There were many of us but I can no longer remember how many.   (Emphasis supplied)
92

Sison's predicament calls to mind a similar situation that this Court passed upon in Aniag, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections.   There, this Court noted:
93

In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone
and a mere employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to
protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied
acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's
part to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent
within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.   (Citation omitted)
94
Sison did not have much of a choice when he was asked to open the hood of the vehicle. He could
not have given his genuine, sincere consent.

Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution stipulates that illegal searches and seizures result in the
inadmissibility in evidence of whatever items were seized:

SECTION 3....

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures]
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

This exclusionary rule is a protection against erring officers who deliberately or negligently disregard
the proper procedure in effecting searches, and would so recklessly trample on one's right to
privacy. By negating the admissibility in evidence of items seized in illegal searches and seizures,
the Constitution declines to validate the law enforcers' illicit conduct. "Evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree."  95

Section 4  of Republic Act No. 6425  punished the sale, administration, delivery, distribution,
96 97

and transportation of prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 9165,  which was enacted in lieu of
98

Republic Act No. 6425, punishes under its Section 5  the sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
99

delivery, distribution, and transportation of dangerous drugs, and/or controlled precursors and

essential chemicals. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes the same set of acts as Section 4
of Republic Act No. 6425, except that the amending law extends to controlled precursors and
essential chemicals.

Essential elements must be proven for a successful prosecution of violations of Section 5 of

Republic Act No. 9165 (or what used to be Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425). People v.
Montevirgen  discussed the elements for conviction for the illegal sale of illegal drugs, one (1) of the
100

several acts penalized by Section 5:

In every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following
elements must be proved: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. ... What is material in
a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in
evidence.  (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
101

Corpus delicti, literally meaning the "body of the crime," pertains "to the fact of the commission of the
crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime."  Jurisprudence explains that, to
102

prove corpus delicti, "it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact has
been proven—say, a person has died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is
criminally responsible for the act."103

In cases involving drugs, the confiscated article constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime
charged.  Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the essence of the crime is the sale, trading,
104

administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs, and/or

controlled precursors and essential chemicals. The act of transporting the drugs, as in this case,
must be duly proven by the prosecution, along with how a particular person is the perpetrator of that
act. The seized drug, then, becomes the corpus delicti of the crime charged. The entire case of the
prosecution revolves around that material.

In drugs cases where the allegedly confiscated drug is excluded from admissible evidence-as when
it was acquired through an invalid warrantless search-the prosecution is left without proof of corpus
delicti. Any discussion on whether a crime has been committed becomes an exercise in futility.
Acquittal is then inexorable.

Thus, here, the arresting officers' search and subsequent seizure are invalid. As such, the two (2)
sacks of marijuana supposedly being transported in the pickup cannot be admitted in evidence.

Even assuming that they were admissible, there remains no proof, whether direct or circumstantial,
that the accused actually knew that there were drugs under the hood of their vehicle. Ultimately, their
actual authorship of or conscious engagement in the illegal activity of transporting dangerous drugs
could not be ascertained.

In any case, with evidence on corpus delicti being inadmissible and placed beyond the Regional
Trial Court's contemplation, the prosecution is left with a fatal handicap: it is insisting on the
commission of the crime charged, but is without evidence. Accused-appellant's acquittal must

ensue. 105

VI

His co-accused, Sison and Bautista, must also be acquitted.

Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concerns situations where there
are several accused but not all of them appeal their conviction:

SECTION 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

As a rule, the effects of an appeal can only bind the accused who appealed his or her conviction.
However, when an appellate court renders a

and the conduct of the parties' lawyers" to determine whether the delay is justifiable. When the case
is simple and the evidence is straightforward, it is possible that delay may occur even within the
given periods.  (Citations omitted)
116

This Court fails to see what extraordinary facts and circumstances or peculiar complexity warranted
taking as much as 17 years to rule on this case. The Regional Trial Court's delay is immensely
distressing, even more so now that each of the accused, as this Court has found, must be acquitted.
This Court endeavored to do its best to resolve this appeal with dispatch resolving it within more
than just a year of the appeal having been brought before it. But even its judgment of acquittal can
only come after all of 22 years that it had taken the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to
rule on this case.

In light of this occasion, this Court enjoins judges and justices at all levels to be more heedful not
only of the imperative to timely render judgment, but also of the need to always be conscientious in
resolving cases. The accused here could have benefitted from their acquittal much sooner had the
Regional Trial Court judge or the Court of Appeals justices been more scrupulous in discharging
their functions and readily appreciated the fatal flaws in the prosecution's case. This Court is
constrained to grapple with the already immense delay that confronted us at the filing of accused
appellant's appeal. We can only hope that our judgment of acquittal—and the lessons it can offer--
can dispense a measure of recompense to the wrongfully accused.

WHEREFORE, the January 23, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01374-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Leonardo Yanson and his co-
accused, Jaime Sison and Rosalie Bautista, are ACQUITTED of transportation of prohibited drugs
and are ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are being held for some other legal
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate
implementation.  The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has
1âшphi1

taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

For their information, copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine National
Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board
for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.