*

G.R. No. 221836.  August 14, 2019.

ESTHER ABALOS y PUROC, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Estafa; Estafa by False Pretenses or

Fraudulent Acts; This kind of estafa is committed by any person
who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud. The elements are: (1) postdating or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3)
knowledge on the part of the offender of such circumstances; and
(4) damage to the complainant.—As can be inferred from the
records, petitioner was convicted of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the RPC, which provides: ART.
315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
x x x x 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
 396

fraud: x x x x (d) By [postdating] a check, or issuing a check

in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3)
days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A.
[No.] 4885, approved June 17, 1967) This kind of estafa is
committed by any person who shall defraud another by false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud. The elements are: (1) postdating
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the
check; (3) knowledge on the part of the offender of such
circumstances; and (4) damage to the complainant.
Same; Same; Same; Deceit; Words and Phrases; Deceit has
been defined as “the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct by false or misleading allegations or
by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which
deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal injury.”—What sets apart the crime of estafa
from the other offense of this nature (i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang
22) is the element of deceit. Deceit has been defined as “the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct by
false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which
should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A prima facie presumption of deceit
arises when the drawer of the dishonored check is
unable to pay the amount of the check within three (3) days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor.—The misrepresentation of
petitioner assured Sembrano that she is indeed dealing with
Vicenta Abalos who has sufficient means and property, and the
capacity to make good the issued checks. It is safe to say that
Sembrano was induced to release the money to petitioner relying
on the latter’s false pretense and fraudulent act. Evidently,
petitioner’s act of issuing a worthless check belonging to another
who appears to have sufficient means is the efficient cause of the
deceit and defraudation. Were it not for the

397

said circumstance, Sembrano would not have parted with her

money. At any rate a prima facie presumption of deceit arises
when the drawer of the dishonored check is unable to pay the
amount of the check within three days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor.
Same; Same; Same; It is against ordinary human behavior
and experience for a person to accept a check, even as a mere
guaranty for a supposed loan or obligation, if one knew
beforehand that the account against which the check was drawn
was already closed.—While it was indeed admitted by Sembrano
that the checks were collaterals, this only lends credence to the
fact that the said checks were the reason why Sembrano parted
with her money. Sembrano was assured that the loan contracted
was secured by the checks issued. Notwithstanding that the said
checks were merely used to guarantee a loan, the fact remains that
petitioner committed deceit when she failed to make known to
Sembrano that the checks she issued were not hers and they were
not sufficiently funded. Sembrano will not
accede to an arrangement of issuing unfunded checks to secure the
loan. It is against ordinary human behavior and experience for a
person to accept a check, even as a mere guaranty for a supposed
loan or obligation, if one knew beforehand that the account against
which the check was drawn was already closed. The check would
not even serve its purpose of guaranty because it can no longer be
encashed.
Same; Same; Same; While it is true that no criminal liability
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) arises from the mere
issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment, this is
not true in the instant case where the element of deceit is attendant
in the issuance of the said checks.—While it is true that no
criminal liability under the RPC arises from the mere issuance of
postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment, this is not true in
the instant case where the element of deceit is attendant in the
issuance of the said checks. The liability therefore is not merely
civil, but criminal. As to the penalty imposed, we take into
consideration the amendment embodied in R.A. No. 10951 which
modifies the penalty in swindling and estafa cases. Section 100 of
the said law, however, provides that it shall have retroactive effect
only insofar as it is favorable to the accused. This necessitates a
comparison of the corresponding penalties imposable under the
RPC and R.A. No. 10951.

398

Same; Penalties; Under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code

(RPC), the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium
period when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances.—Under Article 64 of the RPC, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period when there are
neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. Considering the
absence of any modifying circumstance in this case, the maximum
penalty should be anywhere within the medium period of eight
years, eight months and one day to nine years and four months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the minimum
term, which is left to the sound discretion of the court, should be
within the range of the penalty next lower than the aforementioned
penalty, which is left to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, the
minimum penalty should be one degree lower from the prescribed
penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, or prisión mayor in
its minimum period. The minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere from six years and one day to 10
years.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Kilaan, Managtag & Magalgalit Law Office and
Donaal and Arciaga & Associates for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

J. REYES, JR.,  J.:

The Case

Petitioner Esther P. Abalos (petitioner) comes to

1
this Court appealing her conviction for the crime of
Estafa rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its
2
Decision dated May 20, 2015,

_______________

1 By way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, Rollo,

pp. 7-25.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with
Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Elihu A. Ybañez,
concurring: id., at pp. 55-69.

399

in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 35633, which affirmed the

indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of
prisión correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and actual damages of P232,500.00
imposed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), but modified
the legal interest at 6% per annum from finality of the
decision until fully paid.

The Version of the

Prosecution

In April 2011, petitioner, who introduced herself as

“Vicenta Abalos,” accompanied by Christine Molina
(Molina), went to the office of private complainant Elaine
D. Sembrano (Sembrano) at Manulife, Baguio City and
offered to her two EastWest Bank checks for
3
rediscounting. The checks were signed by petitioner in
Sembrano’s office, as follows:

Sembrano agreed to rediscount the checks upon

assurance of petitioner and her companion, Molina, that
5
they were good checks. Sembrano gave the amount of
P250,000.00 less 7% as interest. Sometime later, she
learned from friends that petitioner’s name was Esther and
6
not “Vicenta.” When Sembrano presented the checks
 7
for payment on due dates, the checks were dishonored.
Sembrano then engaged the services of Benguet Credit
Collectors to collect from petitioner. Petitioner failed to
make good the checks such that a demand letter was

_______________

3 Id., at p. 58.
4 Id., at p. 56.
5 Id., at p. 27.
6 Id., at p. 58.
7 Id.

400

8
sent to petitioner which she received on October 23, 2011.
Despite the said demand, petitioner made a promise to pay,
9
but up to this date, nothing was received by Sembrano. For
failure to pay her loans, a complaint for estafa under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed against
petitioner.

The Version of the Defense

Petitioner denied the accusations. She claimed that the

checks were issued only as a collateral for a loan together
10
with the title to a property in the name of “Vicenta Abalos.”
She stated that she did not personally transact with
11
Sembrano and that it was Molina who transacted with her
and she merely accompanied Molina to Sembrano’s office in
12
April 2011. As a requirement for the release of the loan,
petitioner was asked to present as collateral an original
certificate of title and a check, which
 13
she agreed. When she was informed that the loan was
ready, she together with Molina proceeded to the office of
14
Sembrano purposely to receive the money. Before taking
the money from Sembrano, petitioner was asked to sign a
real estate mortgage offering the title as a collateral to the
15
loan. After she and Molina received the money from
Sembrano, they went to a convenience store where Molina
gave petitioner P100,000.00 and petitioner handed back to
16
Molina P20,000.00 as commission. Petitioner insists that
the checks she issued were merely to serve as

_______________

8 Id., at p. 59.
9 Id., at p. 27.
10 Id., at p. 59.
11 Id., at p. 27.
12 Id., at p. 59.
13 Id., at p. 27.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.

401

collateral for the loan and not for the purpose of

17
rediscounting the same.
The Ruling of the RTC

On November 29, 2012, the RTC rendered a

18
Decision finding petitioner guilty, viz.:
 WHEREFORE, all premises duly considered, the [c]ourt
finds the accused, GUILTY as charged. Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being
no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correctional as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
The accused is likewise found to be civilly liable to pay
the private complainant the amount of Php232,500.00 as
and by way of actual damages, with legal interest thereon to
be computed from the date of the filing of this case, until
the same is fully paid.
19
SO ORDERED.

The Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, but fixed the

rate of interest at 6% per annum, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 29, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Baguio City, in
Criminal Case No. 32571-R, finding [appellant] guilty of
[Estafa] is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellant is directed to pay private complainant the amount

_______________

17 Id.
18 Penned by Judge Edilberto T. Claravall; id., at pp. 26-30.
19 Id., at pp. 29-30.
 402

of P232,500.00 as and by way of actual damages, with

legal interest at six percent (6%) per annum from finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
20
SO ORDERED.

The CA is convinced that the false pretense of petitioner

is apparent when she, together with her
companion knowingly and intelligently misrepresented
herself as “Vicenta Abalos” by showing to Sembrano a
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Vicenta Abalos,
a BIR ID Card, a Community Tax Certificate all bearing the
name of Vicenta Abalos, and by signing the subject checks
as “Vicenta Abalos.” These pieces of evidence assured
Sembrano that petitioner can make good the checks she
issued as she has the means to do so prompting her to part
with her money. The CA likewise ruled that mere issuance
of a check and its subsequent nonpayment is a prima facie
evidence of deceit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant appeal.

The Issue

Petitioner submits for the Court’s consideration the lone

issue that —
THE [CA] ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF ESTAFA
CONSIDERING THAT THE REAL TRANSACTION
BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AS DEFINED BY LAW,
IS NOT CRIMINAL IN NATURE, BUT CIVIL
21
ONLY.
 Petitioner insists that not all elements of estafa were
established. The element of deceit and/or false pretenses are
lacking because the issuance of the checks was not the
factor that induced private complainant to grant the loan,
but the inter-

_______________

20 Id., at p. 68.
21 Id., at p. 15.

403

cession made by Molina and the interest to be earned on the

22
money lent. It was Molina who maneuvered the
transaction with private complainant by assuring the latter
23
that petitioner will pay the loan.
Petitioner also zeroed-in on the irreconcilable conflict
between Sembrano’s affidavit and her testimony in open
court. In her affidavit, Sembrano stated that the checks were
offered to her for rediscounting, while her testimony in
open court, she admitted that the checks were used for
24
collaterals. This inconsistency put doubt on the testimony
of Sembrano, but strengthened petitioner’s claim that the
checks were meant to be collaterals of the loan which are
25
supposed to be encashed only upon nonpayment.
The Ruling of the Court

As can be inferred from the records, petitioner was

convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
26
RPC, which provides:
_______________

22 Id., at p. 18.
23 Id., at p. 19.
24 Id., at pp. 20-21.
25 Id., at pp. 17, 22.
26 Id., at pp. 56-57; Information dated December 6, 2011, reads:
That sometime in the month of April 2011, prior and/or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
by means of deceit, committed prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud ELAINE D. SEMBRANO, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused induced the complainant to have
the following EastWest Bank Baguio Branch:

404

ART.  315.  Swindling (estafa).—Any person who

shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by: x x x x

2.  By means of any of the following false

pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: x x x
x

(d) By [postdating] a check, or issuing a check in

payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the
 check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or

_______________

be rediscounted although knowing fully well that said checks are

not good or backed up with sufficient funds and the offended party
believing and relying on the false pretenses and misrepresentation
of the accused, delivered the total amount of P267,500.00 to the
accused, but when the checks were presented for payment with the
drawee bank on the due dates or soon thereafter, the same were
dishonored for having been drawn against “Account Closed” and
despite demands for her to pay the value of the aforesaid checks,
the accused failed or refused to do so. Thereby misapplying,
misappropriating and converting to her own personal use and
benefit the amount of Php267,500.00, to the damage and prejudice
of the offended party in the aforementioned amount of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P267,500.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

405

fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A.

[No.] 4885, approved June 17, 1967)
 This kind of estafa is committed by any person who
shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud. The elements are:
(1)postdating or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2)
lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3) knowledge
on the part of the offender of such circumstances; and (4)
27
damage to the complainant.
The prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the aforesaid elements of estafa.
There is no question that petitioner issued two checks in
the total amount of P267,500.00 in payment for an
obligation. The issued checks have insufficient funds as
proven by the fact that they were dishonored for the reason
“account closed.” Because petitioner knew too well that she
was not the owner of the check, petitioner had no
knowledge whether the checks were sufficiently funded to
cover the amount drawn against the checks. Petitioner did
not inform Sembrano about the insufficiency/lack of funds
of the checks. Thus, upon presentment for payment, the
checks were eventually dishonored causing damages to
28
Sembrano in the total amount of P267,500.00, as what
was reflected in the issued checks.
What sets apart the crime of estafa from the other
offense of this nature (i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang 22) is
the element of deceit. Deceit has been defined as “the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct by false or misleading allegations or by
concealment of that which should

_______________
 27 People v. Dimalanta, 483 Phil. 56, 64; 440 SCRA 55, 61
(2004).
28 TSN, July 10, 2012, p. 6.

406

have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to

deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
29
injury.”
30
In Juaquico v. People, the Court reiterated that in the
crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit
and damage are essential elements of the offense and have
to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction. To constitute estafa, deceit must be the efficient
cause of the defraudation, such that the issuance of the
check should be the means to obtain money or property
31
from the payer resulting to the latter’s damage. In other
words, the issuance of the check must have been the
inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his
32
money or property.
The element of deceit was established from the very
beginning when petitioner misrepresented herself as
Vicenta Abalos, the owner of the check. To fortify the
misrepresentation, petitioner issued and signed the checks
33
in front of Sembrano presumably to show good faith on
her part. Petitioner also showed Sembrano documents such
as an Identification Card and Community Tax Certificate to
prove that she is Vicenta Abalos. And lastly, she showed a
transfer certificate of title of a land registered under the
name of “Vicenta Abalos” presumably guaranteeing her
capability to pay. As observed by the RTC, at the outset,
petitioner’s fraudulent scheme was already evident.
 The misrepresentation of petitioner assured Sembrano
that she is indeed dealing with Vicenta Abalos who has
sufficient means and property, and the capacity to make
good the issued checks. It is safe to say that Sembrano was
induced to release

_______________

29 Batac v. People, G.R. No. 191622, June 6, 2018, 864 SCRA

319.
30 G.R. No. 223998, March 5, 2018, 857 SCRA 360.
31 Ilagan v. People, 550 Phil. 791, 801; 522 SCRA 699, 708-
709 (2007).
32 People v. Cuyugan, 440 Phil. 637, 647; 392 SCRA 140, 148
(2002).
33 Rollo, p. 122.

407

the money to petitioner relying on the latter’s false pretense

and fraudulent act. Evidently, petitioner’s act of issuing a
worthless check belonging to another who appears to have
sufficient means is the efficient cause of the deceit and
defraudation. Were it not for the said circumstance,
Sembrano would not have parted with her money. At any
rate a prima facie presumption of deceit arises when the
drawer of the dishonored check is unable to pay the amount
of the check within three days from receipt of the notice of
34
dishonor.
In its last ditch effort to enfeeble the case against her,
petitioner pointed out the inconsistency in the evidence of
the prosecution specifically with the testimonies of
Sembrano herself. In her affidavit, Sembrano stated that the
checks were offered to her for rediscounting, while
her testimony in open court, she admitted that the checks
35
were used for collaterals. For a discrepancy to serve as
basis for acquittal, it must refer to significant facts vital to
the guilt or innocence of the accused. An inconsistency,
which has nothing to do with the elements of the crime,
36
cannot be a ground to reverse a conviction. The
inconsistency referred to in this case does not attach upon
the very element of the crime of estafa.
While it was indeed admitted by Sembrano that the
checks were collaterals, this only lends credence to the fact
that the said checks were the reason why Sembrano parted
with her money. Sembrano was assured that the loan
contracted was secured by the checks issued.
Notwithstanding that the said checks were merely used to
guarantee a loan, the fact remains that petitioner committed
deceit when she failed to make known to Sembrano that the
checks she issued were not hers and they were not
sufficiently funded. Sembrano will not accede to an
arrangement of issuing unfunded checks to se-

_______________

34 Hisoler v. People, G.R. No. 237337, June 6, 2018 (Unsigned

Resolution).
35 Rollo, pp. 20-21.
36 People v. Almazan, 417 Phil. 697, 705; 365 SCRA 373, 380
(2001).

408

cure the loan. It is against ordinary human behavior and

experience for a person to accept a check, even as a mere
guaranty for a supposed loan or obligation, if one knew
beforehand that the
account against which the check was drawn was already
37
closed. The check would not even serve its purpose of
38
guaranty because it can no longer be encashed.
While it is true that no criminal liability under the RPC
arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a
39
guarantee of repayment, this is not true in the instant case
where the element of deceit is attendant in the issuance of
the said checks. The liability therefore is not merely civil,
but criminal.
As to the penalty imposed, we take into consideration
40
the amendment embodied in R.A. No. 10951 which
modifies the penalty in swindling and estafa cases. Section
100 of the said law, however, provides that it shall have
retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to the
accused. This necessitates a comparison of the
corresponding penalties imposable under the RPC and R.A.
No. 10951.
The penalty imposed by the RPC in estafa committed
under Section 315, paragraph 2(d) are as follows:
ART.  315.  Swindling (estafa).—Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
herein below shall be punished by:

1st.  The penalty of prisión correccional in its

maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is

_______________

37 Supra note 34.

38 Id.
39 Supra note 31.
40 Republic Act No. 10951, An Act Adjusting the Amount or
the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based,
and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code, approved
on August 29, 2017.

409

over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if

such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.

Considering that the penalty prescribed by law is

composed only of two periods, pursuant to Article 65 of the
RPC, the same must be divided into three equal portions of
time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period
41
for each of the three portions, to wit:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years; Medium
- 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days;
and
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months,
42
10 days.

43
Since the amount involved in this case is P232,500.00
which is beyond the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, the
penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner should be taken
within the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed which is eight years; and
from there should be added the incremental penalty of 21
years (P232,500.00 less P22,000.00 divided by 10).
However, the law only provides the highest allowable
duration which is 20 years. Therefore, the maximum period
of indeterminate penalty is 20 years.

_______________

41 Supra note 34.

42 Id.
43 Actual amount handed to petitioner.

410

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum

term should be within the penalty next lower in degree of
the penalty prescribed, which is, prisión correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or anywhere from six
months and one day to four years and two months. If only
to be beneficial to the accused, the lowest term possible that
can be imposed is six months and one day.
Hence, under the RPC, the penalty of estafa (of the
amount of P232,500.00) ranged from six months and one
day as minimum to 20 years as maximum.
On the other hand, R.A. No. 10951 provides:
SEC.  85.  Article 315 of the same Act, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential
Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:

ART.  315.  Swindling (estafa).—x x x

 xxxx

Any person who shall defraud another by means

of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) hereof shall be punished by:
4th. The penalty of prisión mayor in its
medium period, if such amount is over Forty
thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not
exceed One million two hundred thousand
pesos (P1,200,000).

Considering that the actual amount involved in this case

is P232,500.00, the proper imposable penalty is prisión
mayor in its medium period. Since the penalty prescribed
by law is a penalty composed of only one period, Article 65
of the RPC requires the division of the time included in the
penalty into three portions, thus:

411

Maximum: 9 years, 4 months and 1 day to 10 years;

Medium: 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 9 years and 4
months; and
44
Minimum: 8 years and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months.

Under Article 64 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed

shall be imposed in its medium period when there are
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances.
Considering the absence of any modifying circumstance in
this case, the maximum penalty should be anywhere within
the medium
period of eight years, eight months and one day to nine
years and four months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the
minimum term, which is left to the sound discretion of the
court, should be within the range of the penalty next lower
than the aforementioned penalty, which is left to the sound
45
discretion of the court. Thus, the minimum penalty should
be one degree lower from the prescribed penalty of prisión
mayor in its medium period, or prisión mayor in its
46
minimum period. The minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere from six years and one day to
10 years.
Under R.A. No. 10951, therefore, the petitioner is liable
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six years and one day of prisión mayor, as minimum,
to eight years, eight months and one day of prisión mayor,
47
as maximum.
It appears, however, that the imposable penalty under
the RPC, which is six months and one day to 20 years,
presents a lower minimum period, but a higher maximum
period of imprisonment compared to that imposable under
R.A. No. 10951, which is six years and one day to eight
years, eight

_______________

44 Supra note 34.

45 Supra note 29.
46 Supra note 34.
47 Id.

412
 48
months and one day. In the case of Hisoler v. People, the
Court has ruled that since the penalty under the RPC is
more beneficial to the accused, thus, it is the proper penalty
to be imposed. It ratiocinated as follows:
At any rate, even if the maximum period imposable
upon the petitioner under the RPC in this case is higher than
that under R.A. No. 10951, the Court finds that the benefits
that would accrue to the petitioner with the imposition of a
lower minimum sentence outweighs the longer prison
sentence and is more in keeping with the spirit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In fixing the indeterminate penalty imposable upon the
accused, the Court should be mindful that the basic purpose
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to “uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness.” Simply, an indeterminate sentence is imposed
to give the accused the opportunity to shorten the term of
imprisonment depending upon his or her demeanor, and
physical, mental, and moral record as a prisoner. The goal
of the law is to encourage reformation and good behavior,
and reduce the incidence of recidivism. While the grant of
parole after service of the minimum sentence is still
conditional, the flexibility granted upon the petitioner to
immediately avail of the benefits of parole considering the
much shorter minimum sentence under the RPC should
inspire the petitioner into achieving the underlying purpose
49
behind the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

It is clear, therefore, that if R.A. No. 10951 would be

given retroactive effect, the same will prejudice petitioner.
The penalty under the RPC,
insofar as it benefits the petitioner must prevail. Hence, the
penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA, which is four
years and two months of prisión correccional as

_______________

48 Id.
49 Id.

413

minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, is

correct as it is within the proper penalty imposed by law.
The legal rate of interest of 6% per annum on the
monetary award of P232,500.00 (the actual damage
sustained by Sembrano), from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid, as imposed by the CA, is modified
as follows: the monetary award shall earn interest at the rate
of 12% per annum from the filing of the Information until
June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until
the finality of the decision. The total amount of the
foregoing shall, in turn, earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the finality of the decision until full payment
50
of the same.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 20, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 35633
sentencing petitioner to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prisión correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
monetary award of P232,500.00 shall be subject to interest
rate of 12% per annum from the filing of
the Information until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum
from July 1, 2013 until the finality of the decision, and the
total amount of the foregoing shall, in turn, earn interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the decision
until full payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Carpio (Chairperson, Senior Associate Justice), J., On
Official Leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification.

_______________

50 See Resolution dated October 3, 2018 of the Second Division.

414

Notes.—In the crime of estafa under Article 315,

paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, deceit and
damage are additional and essential elements of the offense.
(Gaditano vs. San Miguel Corporation, 702 SCRA 191
[2013])
The act complained of in the instant case is penalized
under Article 334, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), wherein estafa is committed by any person
who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. (Suliman vs. People, 741 SCRA
477 [2014])

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