*

G.R. No. 146294.  July 31, 2006.

JOHN ABING, petitioner, vs. JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.

Property; Ownership; Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone

through his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for
the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support
such naked claim.—Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru
his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the
construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such
naked claim. For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent
therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives from
whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he
borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of reinforcing
his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money in putting up the
subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Macaraeg
to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then,
Macaraeg stated in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John
borrowed said amount from him. With the petitioner’s own admission that
the subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the
amount he allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the construction of
the structure in dispute.
Same; Same; Neither tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
realty when not supported by other effective proofs.—Sure, petitioner has
in his favor the tax declaration covering the subject structure. We have,
however, ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove ownership
but at best an indicia of claims of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof
of
ownership, any more than indicating possession in the concept of an
owner. Neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation
purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when
not supported by other effective proofs.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

203

VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 203

Abing vs. Waeyan

Co-ownership; In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property

acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by
them in equal shares.—The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs
to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during their
period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint
efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is
governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned
their properties in common “in equal shares.” Being herself a co-owner of
the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be
ejected therefrom.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ma. Inglay Capuyan-Fokno for petitioner.
Mathew P. Kollin for respondent.
GARCIA,  J.:

In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner John Abing (John,
1
hereafter) seeks to set aside the Decision dated October
24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675,
reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet,
Branch 64, which affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in an ejectment suit
thereat commenced by the petitioner against the respondent.
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman
who, during the good old days, lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they
acquired properties. Later, they parted

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. Delos Santos with Associate Justices

Eugenio S. Labitoria (ret.) and Eloy R. Bello (ret.), concurring; Rollo, pp. 16-23.

204

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abing vs. Waeyan

ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of

their common properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet,
for short) met and fell in love with each other. In time, the duo
cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Together, the couple bought a 2-storey residential house from one
Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned by a certain
Alejandro Diño on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent
to the purchase, the tax declaration of the 2-storey house was
transferred in the name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in
Korea. She would send money to John who deposited the same in
their joint bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent
renovation. To it was annexed a new structure
which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and the sari-sari
store thereat are the properties involved in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with
John. She managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a mine
employee of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to
worse. Hence, they decided to partition their properties. . For the
purpose, they executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of
Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the
parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their
unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples’ dwelling with
Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John’s
share in all their properties. On the same date—October 7, 1995 —
Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment
of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in
twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995.
205

VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 205

Abing vs. Waeyan

Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account

thereof, John demanded of her to vacate the annex structure
housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an
ejectment suit against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the
construction of the annex structure with his own funds and thru
money he borrowed from his relatives. In fact, he added that the
tax declaration for the structure was under his name. On this
premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject
structure, which thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet
therefrom upon the latter’s failure to pay the agreed balance due
him under the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.
 In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was
renovated thru their common funds and that the subject structure
annexed thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their
original residential house, hence the same pertained to the two of
them in common.
2
In a decision dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding
that the money used in the construction of the structure in question
solely came from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to
the latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet’s eviction therefrom,
including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to surrender
possession thereof to John, thus:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John)
and against the defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in
litigation covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of the
Plaintiff and turn over possession thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of
P2,500.00 a month from the time she withheld possession of the store in
litigation in June 1996 until she vacates the same and turn over possession
thereof to the Plaintiff.

_______________

2 As reproduced in the Petition, p. 1, Rollo, pp. 9-12, at p. 9.

206

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abing vs. Waeyan

Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the

Plaintiff by way of Attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”

On Juliet’s appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July

29, 1995, affirmed that of the MTC. Undaunted, Juliet then went to
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.
 As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of
3
October 24, 2000, reversed that of the RTC, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision
of the Regional Trial Court is hereby reversed and set aside.
Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled to possess the property and
maintain therein her business.
SO ORDERED.”

Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:

It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and

wife without the benefit of marriage from 1986 to 1995 and that they
acquired certain properties which must be divided between them
upon the termination of their common law relationship.
x x x  x x x  xxx
. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision
of the Civil Code on conjugal partnership... . . . but by the rule on co-
ownership.
x x x  x x x  xxx
. . . the parties’ share in respect of the properties they have
accumulated during their cohabitation shall be equal unless there is
proof to the contrary.

To the CA, John’s evidence failed to establish that he alone

spent for the construction of the annex structure. Hence, the same
pertained to both, and being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be
evicted therefrom, adding that if ever, John’s cause of action
should have been for a sum of money “because he

_______________

3 Supra note 1.

207

VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 207

Abing vs. Waeyan
claims that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension.”
According to the CA, ejectment cannot lie against Juliet because
Juliet’s possession of the premises in dispute was not by virtue of a
contract, express or implied, nor did she obtain such possession
thru force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, John’s present recourse, submitting that the CA erred
in—
1.  not giving effect to the parties’ Memorandum of Agreement
which should have been binding between them albeit unsigned by
both;
2.  in holding that the subject premises (annex structure
housing the sari-sari store) is owned by the two of them in common;
3.  in ruling that the parties should settle their common
properties in a separate action for partition even as the community
character of the subject premises has not been proven.

We AFFIRM with modification.

Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of
whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the
exclusive ownership of petitioner, John. Departing from the factual
findings of the two courts before it, the CA found that the premises
in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, the latter
having failed to establish by the required quantum of proof that the
money spent for the construction thereof solely came from him.
Being a co-owner of the same structure, Juliet may not be ejected
therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the
Court normally eschews from, yet, given the conflicting factual
findings of the three courts below, the Court shall go by the
4
exception to the general rule and proceed to make its own
assessment of the evidence.

_______________

4 Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118749, April 25, 2003, 401 SCRA
594.

208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abing vs. Waeyan

First and foremost, , it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived

together as husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the
benefit of marriage. Neither is it disputed that sometime in
December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending
money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In
fact, Juliet was still in Korea when the annex structure was
constructed in 1992.
Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds
and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction
of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim. For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent
therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives
from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money
he borrowed from them. . All that petitioner could offer by way of
reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money
in putting up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a
certain Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner borrowed
P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated in his affidavit that
it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said amount from him.
With the petitioner’s own admission that the subject structure was
constructed only in 1992, or two years after he borrowed P30,000.00
from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he allegedly
borrowed from the latter went into the construction of the structure in
dispute. More, it is noted that while petitioner was able to present in
evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he failed to introduce similar
affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from whom he claimed to have
made similar borrowings. For sure, not a single relative came forward
to confirm petitioner’s tale. In short, there is a paucity of evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to support petitioner’s self-serving
allegation that the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store
was put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure,
petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration covering the subject
structure. We
have, however, ruled time and again that tax declarations do not
prove own-
209

VOL. 497, JULY 31, 2006 209

Abing vs. Waeyan

5
ership but at best an indicia of claims of ownership. Payment of
taxes is not proof of ownership, any more than indicating
6
possession in the concept of an owner. Neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess realty when not supported by
7
other effective proofs.
In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is
instructive. . It reads:
Art.  147.  When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while

they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.

The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the

contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during
their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru
their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their
property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership.
And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in
equal shares.” Being herself a
_______________

5 Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapata, G.R. No. L-65334, December 26,

1984, 133 SCRA 820.
6 Arambulo v. CACourt of Appeals,, G.R. No. 120166, August 3, 1998,
293 SCRA 567.
7 De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506.

210

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abing vs. Waeyan

co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by

the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
8
True it is that under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner
may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common
property. It bears stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is
totally wanting to establish John’s or Juliet’s exclusive ownership of
the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession thereof
by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in
possession of the subject structure and the sari-sari store thereat by
virtue of her being a co-owner thereof. As such, she is as much
entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the
subject Memorandum of Agreement, being unsigned by Juliet and
John, has no binding effect between them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet
did pay John the amount of P232,397.66, as initial payment for
John’s share in their common properties, with the balance of
P196,472.34 payable in twelve monthly installments beginning
November 1995. . It is also a matter of record that the Agreement
was signed by the witnesses thereto. . Hence, the irrelevant
circumstances that the Agreement was left unsigned by Juliet and
John cannot adversely affect its binding force or effect between
them, as evidently, Juliet’s
 initial payment of P232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what
the parties had agreed upon thereunder. However, and as correctly
held by the CA, Juliet’s failure to pay John the balance of the
latter’s share in their common properties could at best give rise to
an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the
said agreement and not for ejectment.

_______________

8 Art.  487.  Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

© Copyright 2022 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.