Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 55

Aniceto Masferrer
Emilio García-Sánchez  Editors

Human Dignity
of the Vulnerable
in the Age of Rights
Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Aniceto Masferrer • Emilio García-Sánchez
Editors

Human Dignity of the

Vulnerable in the Age
of Rights
Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Contents

1 Vulnerability and Human Dignity in the Age of Rights ...................... 1

Aniceto Masferrer and Emilio García-Sánchez

Part I Human Dignity of the Vulnerable:

Ethical and Anthropological Perspectives
2 Vulnerability as a Part of Human Nature ............................................. 29
Alfredo Marcos
3 Ethics of Vulnerability ............................................................................ 45
Adela Cortina and Jesús Conill
4 Vulnerable: To Be Between Life and Death .......................................... 63
Aquilino Cayuela
5 The Vulnerability of Life in the Philosophy of Hans Jonas ................. 81
Paolo Becchi and Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo

Part II Human Dignity of the Vulnerable:

Biomedical and Sociological Perspectives
6 Biotechnologies Inside the Self: New Challenges
in Clinical Ontology ................................................................................ 123
Luis E. Echarte
7 Paradoxes of Authenticity: A Neuroscientific
Approach to Personal Identity ............................................................... 141
Luis E. Echarte
8 Vulnerability at the End of Life: A Medical Perspective ..................... 167
Joaquim Bosch-Barrera and Juan Vidal Bota
9 Cosmetic Vulnerability: The New Face of Human Frailty .................. 189
Emilio García-Sánchez

vii
viii Contents

Part III Human Dignity of the Vulnerable in the Age of Rights:

Historical, Legal Philosophical and Political Perspectives
10 Taking Human Dignity More Humanely .............................................. 221
Aniceto Masferrer
11 Is Vulnerability the Foundation of Human Rights? ............................. 257
Roberto Andorno
12 The Fragility of the Human Being and the ‘Right’
to Die: Biojuridical Considerations ....................................................... 273
Claudio Sartea
13 Taking Vulnerability Seriously: What Does
It Change for Bioethics and Politics? .................................................... 293
Corine Pelluchon
14 The Principle of Respect for Human Vulnerability
and Assisted Reproductive Technologies............................................... 313
Vicente Bellver
Chapter 3
Ethics of Vulnerability

Adela Cortina and Jesús Conill

Abstract The chapter begins by showing the facticity of vulnerability in different

situations of life. Then, it asserts, as do authors such as Williams, Nagel, MacIntyre
or Nussbaum, that western ethics has relegated the vulnerable nature of individuals
and has brought to the fore the ideal of self-sufficiency, autonomy, will of power or
of agency, when sketching models of good life. But, going beyond that, the question
asked, in a third stage, is how to establish a foundation for the moral obligation of
protecting vulnerable beings as a requirement of justice, and the chapter presents
three relevant answers. Firstly, an ethics of care in the tradition of Hyginus,
Heidegger, Boff and the Ethics of Earth, but also based on neuro-scientific and evo-
lutionary biology studies, such as those of Churchland. Secondly, an ethics of
responsibility, as proposed by Jonas, and by discourse ethics in the version of Apel
and Habermas, underlining the differences between them. And finally, an ethics of
cordial reason, which is a warm version of discourse ethics.

3.1 Fundamental Vulnerability of the Human Being: Natural

and Social Lottery

Ortega y Gasset said that human life is a task and the ethical task is what we do to
ourselves appropriating the best possibilities to lead a good life. From this perspec-
tive, human life consists of planning, creating, anticipating, oozing with fantasy into
the future; it consists of developing the capabilities that convert us into acting sub-
jects of our existence.1 The western philosophical tradition has reformulated these

This text is inserted within the Scientific Research and Technological Development Project
FFI2013-47136-C2-1-P, financed by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, and within
the activities of the research group of excellence PROMETEO/2009/085 of the Generalidad
Valenciana.
1
J. Ortega y Gasset, Historia como sistema, in Obras Completas (=OC), VI, Madrid, Taurus,2006,
p. 65; ‘Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro’, in OC, V, 2006, p. 120; ‘Epílogo de la filosofía’, in OC,
A. Cortina (*) • J. Conill
Faculty of Philosophy and Education Sciences, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 45

A. Masferrer, E. García-Sánchez (eds.), Human Dignity of the Vulnerable in the
Age of Rights, Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 55,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32693-1_3
46 A. Cortina and J. Conill

capabilities with different names: autonomy from the Kant legacy, that is, the ability
to establish laws for oneself, the will of power of Nietzsche, or the agency, which
Sen highlights as the basic capability of the human being, as a “meta-capability”
based on which all others are possible.2
Returning to Ortega, it is true that the famous statement “I am I and my circum-
stance, and if I do not save it, I do not save myself”, reveals that human beings
depend on the environment. But, ultimately, he who must save the circumstance is
the I creator. That other dimension of individuals, which also forms part of their
nature, remains in the shadows, the dimension of having to allow things to happen
to them, the dimension of being made. That dimension of passive subject¸ that also
accompanies us in all the stages of our lives, although more clearly in some than in
others. At those times when we are more vulnerable due to the “natural lottery”, in
other words, during childhood, old age or sickness, and at those times when we are
more vulnerable due to the “social lottery”, in other words, in those contexts of
injustice created by society that force the poor immigrants, those who live in refu-
gee camps and those who live in so many other places where slavery and misery
exist, to have to allow things to happen to them.
With respect to childhood, human beings are characterised from birth by their
biological helplessness. In the beginning, they have no biological qualities that
enable them to adapt, which is not the case of other animals, which adapt to their
environment (Umwelt). Precisely because human beings lack a good adaptation sys-
tem, authors such as Gehlen have considered them to be “deficient” animals from
the biological perspective, as a “creature of deficiencies” (Mängelwesen).3
According to Gehlen, human beings would be biologically sick creatures that
became biologically viable through intelligence. Intelligence is the power that is
capable of pre-view, which permits transforming adaptive deficiencies into vital
opportunities: it has a primary biological function, which is the function of making
a creature viable, as without it, it would be sentenced to disappear. But intelligence
does not adapt man to an environment (Umwelt), but rather it situates him at a
higher level, that of the world (Welt). The environment is closed and the answer is
pre-established, but the world is open and it is necessary to seek –create– the answer.
Zubiri also considers that human intelligence has a primary function, a function
that is biological, which consists of making a creature, who would otherwise disap-
pear, viable. Intelligence permits “taking responsibility” for reality, realising that
man lives in a maladjusted mannerand that he has to seek his own adjustment, he
has to “justify” himself.4

IX, 2009, p. 583; J. L. L. Aranguren, La ética de Ortega, in Obras Completas, II, Madrid, Trotta,
1994, pp. 503–539.
2
A. Sen, Development as Freedom, New York, Anchor Books, 1999; D.A. Crocker, Ethics of
Global Development, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
3
A. Gehlen, Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, Frankfurt a.M./Bonn,
Athenäum, pp. 20, 33, 83 and 354.
4
X. Zubiri, Sobre el hombre, Madrid, Alianza, 1986.
3 Ethics of Vulnerability 47

With respect to old age, this is a period in life that is increasing in length in all
the countries of the Earth, an aspect that is clearly seen by the progress of geriatrics:
the number of elderly people who need to be cared for is growing. In this sense,
Aranguren talked about “fourth age” or valetudinarian old age,5 which would be
distinguished by the inability to care for oneself. In his opinion, what differentiates
the stages or “ages of life” is the physical and mental state of health, the valetudo,
more than the number of years. It is true that “valetudo” means “health”, but “val-
etudinarian” is taken as a synonym of “decrepit”, that is, the person who cannot care
for himself.
Illness also affects human beings due to the natural lottery, and with respect to
this Laín Entralgo, among others, has put forward some deep reflections. Influenced
by von Weizäcker, Laín highlights the experiential-pathic nature of illness.6 In his
opinion, illness is a way of life, a way of projecting oneself towards the future; it
produces a general sentiment, whereby the sick person feels inhibited, humiliated
and threatened. The experience of sickness forces us to recognise our limits and it
immerses us into the mystery, into the opacity of life.7 When we suffer illnesses, we
lose our autonomy and feel differently, because fragility is imposed on us, but at the
same time it opens up a new way of discovering ourselves.
Indeed, the World Health Organisation’s slogan in 1993 was “Fragile life” and its
purpose was to raise public opinion about the fragility of life. But the truth is that a
simple glance at daily life quickly reveals to us that illness, suffering, old-age and
the closeness of death are universal facticities, which claim a meaning that cannot
always be found. Human life is always “on the brink of the abyss”,8 heading towards
“limit-situations” as Jaspers would say. Pascal interpreted the human being by
means of the “thinking reed” metaphor and, in the religious perspective, sin and
blame are analysed as a result of the limitation, until the notion of original sin is
reached. Given all this, the tragic and nihilistic experience of life emerges, for
example, in the form of a “tragic feeling of life” (Nietzsche, Unamuno) or in the
opening of the “unfathomable mystery” (Marcel). Questions without answers arise,
where the solitude of life is felt in silence.
And, with respect to vulnerability that depends on the social lottery, the case of
extreme poverty is obvious, that is, of poverty that cannot be abandoned without the
help of others. Concern for poverty has a long history. It is repeatedly present in the
biblical and medieval tradition, but also in modern economic thought. Smith consid-
ers that contempt for the poor and humble reveals a corruption of sentiments,9 and

5
J.L. Aranguren, La vejez como autorrealización personal y social, Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos
Sociales, 1992.
6
P. Laín, Antropología médica para clínicos, Barcelona, Salvat, 1984, p. 316.
7
N. Orringer, La aventura de curar, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg/Círculo de Lectores, 1997,
pp. 186–187.
8
D. Gracia, ‘Ética de la fragilidad’, in Bioética clínica, 2, Bogotá, El Búho, 1998, pp. 33–40.
9
A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1976, part I, section III, chap. 3 [this chapter was added in ed. 6] (p. 61–66): ‘Of
the corruption of our moral sentiments’.
48 A. Cortina and J. Conill

concern for poverty is essential in works such as those of Myrdal10 or Sen,11 among
others. Nowadays, eradicating poverty is one of the explicit goals of economic
thought,12 as shown, among others, by the “clinical economics” of Jeffrey Sachs,13
the studies on the economics and ethics of development, the proposals of the UNDP
or the Post-2015 Development Agenda.
This vulnerable dimension of life forces us to confront the disproportions of
moral idealism and of scientific positivism that share the haughty confidence of
believing that solving all the problems is in their hands, even promising happiness,
either by a moral path or by the path of scientific knowledge. On the contrary, cau-
tious reflection acknowledges the facticity of the vulnerability of people, of institu-
tions and of life itself. Hence, reflecting upon this aspect of life contributes to
overcoming frivolous attitudes, which on the other hand, are always transitory as
well as fragile.

3.2 Vulnerability and Good Life

A vulnerable creature is a creature that can be hurt or injured, both physically or

morally. In this sense, all living creatures are vulnerable and, consequently, human
beings are, too. This irremovable dimension can be expressed in ontological terms
of finitude, of limitation, of contingency, but, in any case, all of this takes us to that
possibility of being harmed of those who are in the hands of internal or external fate.
Vulnerable means, then,a person who is not self-sufficient, and there is no doubt that
human beings are dependent, or better still, interdependent.
However, it is also true that the aspiration to invulnerability has accompanied
human beings throughout history. The example of Achilles is already proverbial.
His mother, Thetis, wants to save him from death and to do so she submerges him
into the river Styx, which is the source of invulnerability. But, this is not within the
reach of human beings, and a poisoned arrow kills him during the Battle of Troy,
striking him in exactly the same heel that Thetis is holding him by when bathing
him. Gods are immortal, but men are not, not even heroes: that is the teaching of the
classical world. For that reason, they are incapable of compassion. The nature of the
Christian God is very different, because he becomes vulnerable through the kénosis,

10
See G. Myrdal, AsianDrama. An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, New York, Twentieth
Century Fund and Allen Lane The Penguin Books, 1968; The Challenge of World Poverty: A
World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline, New York, Pantheon Books, 1970.
11
A. Sen, Poverty and Famines, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981; Development as Freedom,
New York, Anchor Books, 2000; A. Cortina and G. Pereira (eds.), Pobreza y libertad, Madrid,
Tecnos, 2009.
12
J. Conill, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of the Capabilities Approach’, in Ch. Luetge (ed.),
Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/New York/
London, Springer, volume 2, p. 661–674.
13
J. Sachs, The End of Poverty, New York, The Penguin Press, 2005.
3 Ethics of Vulnerability 49

by relinquishing the privileges that accompany being a god, precisely to have the
capability for compassion.
Insofar as politics is concerned, the history of social contract since Hobbes, is the
attempt to avoid fate, which can take life and property away from human beings,
because even the weakest can take your life away.14 Thus, it becomes necessary to
construct the political community by means of an agreement, whose meaning will
primarily consist in protecting citizens’ civil and political rights, but which will later
include economic, social and cultural rights. All of those rights respond to demands
for justice and protecting them is the social and political form of protecting and
empowering those who are vulnerable.
However, and despite the fact that the vulnerability of human beings is a facticity,
authors such as Williams, Nagel, MacIntyre or Nussbaum, among others, state that
the history of western ethics is marked by the desire to exclude vulnerability in the
projects of good life.15 If tyche means what happens to a person, opposed to what
the person does, the majority of the classics of Greek philosophy purported to seek
a happy life through autarchy, through self-sufficiency, which would be achieved by
the exercise of reason. Cynics, Epicureans and Stoics would make an effort to reach
that goal along different paths: in the case of the Cynics, doing away with all social
convention and all property; in the case of the Epicureans, resorting to simpler plea-
sures and eliminating the fear of gods and death; in the case of the Stoics, achieving
ataraxy by relinquishing desires, hopes and dreams, which are in the hands of fate
and necessarily generate dependency and frustration.
To you – says Seneca’s god to the wise men- I have given the true and enduring goods,
which are greater and better the more anyone turns them over and views them from every
side. I have permitted you to scorn all that dismays and to distain desires. Outwardly you do
not shine: your goods are directed inward (…). Inwardly I did everything well, your happi-
ness consists in not desiring happiness.16

And it is true that the Greek and Latin mentality despise those who are not self-
sufficient. Within this context, the aforementioned authors assert that in contempo-
rary moral philosophy, the concept of vulnerability has been relegated to a second
plane, due to the great influence of Kantian ethics, which is, to a considerable extent,
the heir of stoicism. And, indeed, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant does not
understand virtue as the cultivation of character, following the pattern of right

14
Th. Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by R. E. Flathman and D. Johnston, New York and London,
W.W. Norton and Co., 1997, chap. XIII.
15
B. Williams, “Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50 (1956); Th. Nagel,
“Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 50 (1976), reprint in Mortal Questions,
Cambridge, 1979, 24–38; M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2001 (revised edition). However, E. Bonete has defended that this is an exagger-
ated statement that he attempts to refute by setting out the thoughts of some classical authors such
as St. Thomas of Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Stuart Mill, Schopenhauer, Levinas, Jonas, Apel,
Noddings. SeeE. Bonete, Ética de la dependencia, Madrid, Tecnos, 2009.
16
L.A. Seneca, ‘De Providentia’, Dialogorum Libri Duodecim, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1977, 6, 6–12 (in Moral Essays, Cambridge Mass./London, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 45).
http://www.loebclassics.com/view/seneca_younger-de_providentia/1928/pb_LCL214.45.xml.
50 A. Cortina and J. Conill

reasoning, but as “the force of the maxim of man in compliance with his duty.”17
Hence, the strength of spirit is “the strength of resolution of a man as a creature
endowed with freedom, insofar as he is in control of himself (in his senses) and so
in the state of health proper to a human being.”18 The state of health proper to a
human being is measured by autonomy.
Following the lesson learned from Tetens’ psychology, Kant understands that
active powers are what make man clearly human. Hence, it is in autonomy where
the basis of dignity lies.19 And this is the reason –say the authors that we have
referred to– why the concept of vulnerability has been relegated in contemporary
ethical consideration.
However, they themselves remember that this was not so in the philosophy of
Aristotle, who opted for integrating the dependence of human beings into the con-
cept of eudaimony. That is why they launch the slogan, “Back to Aristotle”, as
occurred previously in that “Rehabilitierung der praktischenPhilosophie”, which
was produced in the seventies of the twentieth century, and which was more a return
to Greek ethics and politics, above all to those of Aristotle.20 As opposed to the
liberal and socialist traditions that have given pride of place to the ethics and politics
of duty and of rules, the questions about good life and the role of virtues in personal
and political life emerged again and, in our case, about the place of vulnerability in
the projects of a life worth living.
Indeed, according to this splendid characterisation of Aristotle, man is not only
reason, but a combination of desire and intellect: “a desiring intellect or a thinking
desire.”21 Both must be arranged to achieve a good life. And that life is achieved
through the development of virtues, both ethical and dianoethical ones, by forging
character. It is our vulnerability that requires us to forge character, and it is vulner-
ability that claims a careful study of passions and emotions, and not only of reason.
In this regard, works like those byMacIntyre or Nussbaum are paradigmatic.
Indeed, in his book, Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre recalls that we are
rational animals and, therefore, vulnerable and dependent, needy of the human com-
munity to develop our potentialities.22 That means that it is essential to educate in
the virtues of recognising fragility and dependence. But in order to preserve and
transmit these virtues, adequate social relations must be established, having an ade-
quate conception of the common good, because, in his opinion, neither the modern

17
I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., AkademieTextausgabe,
1968, VI, p. 409.
18
Ibid., 384.
19
I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter& Co.,
AkademieTextausgabe, 1968, IV, p. 436.
20
M. Riedel (ed.), Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie, Bd. I, Freiburg i.B., Rombach,
1972.
21
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by H.G. Apostle, Dordrecht/Boston, Reidel
Publishing, 1976, VI, 2, 1139b 4–5.
22
A. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, Chicago and La Salle, Carus Publishing Company,
1999.
3 Ethics of Vulnerability 51

state-nation nor today’s family can provide the kind of social and political associa-
tion required.23
In terms of social relations, in principle there are two kinds: relations that are
contracted to obtain advantages, by negotiation and rational choice; and emotional
relations, voluntarily accepted, which result from sympathy. However, these two
forms of relations are embedded in community links, which are a series of relations
of giving and receiving that are not based on calculation. The virtues of the recogni-
tion of dependence, that is, misericordia and beneficentia, which incorporate justice
and generosity, develop within those relations.24 Education in these virtues rests
upon a wise reflection that any human being should make: “I could have been he.”
Noteworthy among those virtues are just generosity, which requires acting from
an attentive and affectionate regard of others,25 and misericordia, which is grief or
sorrow over someone else’s distress, insofar as it is understood as one’s own, and
that is possible because there is a previous link with that other person, or because it
is acknowledged that the distress the person suffers could have been suffered by
oneself. This acknowledgement implies acknowledging the other as “a fellow
human being”, therefore, a certain affinity. This means that misericordia extends
human relations beyond established communities, including other human beings,
worrying about them and caring for them.26
On her part, Nussbaum will state that human vulnerability, or vulnerability in
general, is the central thread running through the variety of the subjects of her
thought, even when she chose the capabilities approach as her philosophical option.
According to her words:
The theme they [these subjects] have in common is human vulnerability or vulnerability in
general. When working with emotions and on tragedy, I have always thought the emotions
as recognition of the ways in which we are vulnerable when we relate to others, and of
everything that isout of reach and over which we have no control. So, the question that
arises then is: which types of vulnerability are good-for the life of each individual- and
which ones should we try to eliminate? On this point, my thoughts on justice are connected
with political philosophy. The capabilities approach is an attempt to promote opportunities
to seek out the good types of vulnerability such as love, friendship, a professional career,
and to avoid the bad ones, such as physical violence, hunger and so many others. This is
perhaps the easiest way to define the central thread running through my thought.27

As can be seen in this text, attention to vulnerability is an essential part of life,

but it also poses demands of justice so that vulnerable beings are protected.28 If we
pay attention to the famous distinction between the good and the right, the truth is

23
Ibid., p. 9.
24
Ibid., p. 117–118.
25
Ibid., p. 122.
26
J. Conill, Ética hermenéutica, Madrid, Tecnos, 2006, pp. 136–141.
27
F. Birulésand A.L. Di Tullio, “Entrevista con Martha C. Nussbaum”, in Barcelona Metrópolis,
January-March, 2011 (http://w2.bcn.cat/bcnmetropolis/arxiu/en/page37cb.html?id=21&ui=473).
28
A. Cortina, ‘Martha C. Nussbaum: vulnerabilidad y justicia’, in Luisa Ribeiro (ed.),
Marginalidade e Alternativa. Filósofas dos séculos XX e XXI (forthcoming).
52 A. Cortina and J. Conill

that present-day political philosophy and ethics consider vulnerability as an essen-

tial key to design good life projects and to propose demands of justice.
Insofar as good life projects are concerned, the analysis of the vulnerability of
human beings confirms the facticity of the passive dimension, of dependence and
contingency. It is prudent then to know that our fragility must play a role in those
projects, and therefore it is necessary to learn about interdependence and cultivate
the adequate virtues. But insofar as demands of justice are concerned, the question
asked of the field of ethics is as follows: “is any moral obligation deduced after veri-
fying that we human beings are vulnerable?” It is necessary to go beyond the analy-
sis of facticity and pose the question about the rational validity of the obligation of
protecting and empowering vulnerable creatures. Three relevant proposals in our
days would be the ethics of care, the ethics of responsibility and cordial ethics.

3.3 The Ethics of Care and its Biological Bases

The well-known fable of Hyginus, which begins with the words “One day, when
Cura was crossing a certain river, she saw some clayey mud”, tries to show that the
essence of human beings consists in the need to be cared for because they are vul-
nerable, but also in the capacity to care for the vulnerable. All people are the daugh-
ters of the care taken by their mothers when they gave birth to them and welcomed
them into this world, and of the care of their male fathers. But, furthermore, the
capability of caring makes us into human beings: it is an existentiality, as Heidegger
says when carrying out his existential analysis in Being and Time.29
As a matter of fact, Heidegger tells the fable of Hyginus to strengthen his thesis,
according to which, the human being lives in the field of the “cura”, in the context
of the Sorge, which also means watchfulness, solicitude, diligence in relation to
someone or something, and it even means prevention to prevent something bad from
occurring. That ethics of care for the vulnerable is what a considerable number of
authors propose today, including Boff, as an ethical attitude that must be adopted
with respect to the Earth, which we have made vulnerable through scientific and
technical progress.30 He herewith also follows the line established by Jonas, who,
faced with the possibility of us destroying the vulnerable earth, and with it the
human species, claims an ethics of responsibility, which also contains an ethics of
care, as we will see.
According to the defenders of the ethics of care, the attitude of domination with
respect to other living beings and with respect to nature, the obsession to increase
technological power converting all creatures into objects and into goods, is what has
led us to a world that is made up of poverty, hunger, and plundering of nature. A
world that endangers the survival of Earth. And the solution would not consist in

29
M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, § 41 and foll.
30
L. Boff, El cuidado necesario, Madrid, Trotta, 2012; see also Encyclical Letter ‘Laudatio Si’ of
the Holy Father Francis on care for our common home, 2015.
3 Ethics of Vulnerability 53

using more refined techniques to cause a lesser harm, but rather, it is a question of
ethics: it is a matter of a change in attitude, of voluntarily adopting the willingness
to care, which is a loving, respectful, non-aggressive relationship with reality and
thus is not destructive. However, we may wonder: is assuming that attitude a moral
duty? Why must a person morally care for the Earth?
According to these authors, because human beings are part of nature and mem-
bers of the biotic and cosmic community, and therefore, they are responsible for
protecting it, regenerating it and caring for it. Care would then be a new paradigm
of relationship with the Earth and with human beings. The “caring being” of the
human being should replace the dominating being, and that attitude of care would
also make the sustainability of nature possible.31
This is the attitude defended by the famous Earth Charter, which was drafted
between 1992 and 2000 by civil society in all places and cultures, and which was
assumed by the UNESCO in 2003. The preamble of the Charter expressly says: “the
choice is ours: form a global partnership to care for Earth and one another or risk the
destruction of ourselves and the diversity of life”. The categories ‘care’ and ‘sus-
tainable way of life’ are the main backbones of the document.
Perhaps the most interesting part of this ethics of care is that it does not force
human beings to go against their biological nature, but rather it has a biological
basis. Animals, above all superior mammals, take care of their young, of their par-
ents and close friends and relations. And in the case of the Homo sapiens, he is not
just a homo oeconomicus, as often said, whose rationality consists in trying to maxi-
mise his profit, but he is also, among other things, a being that is willing to care for
himself and for others. The mechanism of evolution has prepared him to care,
selecting the tendency to care as one of the essential attitudes to maintain life and
reproduce it, an attitude that is deeply attached to our biological humanity.32
This is one of the points that studies on evolutionary biology and neuroscience
agree upon, and this is the basic thesis of Churchland in her book, Braintrust; a
thesis that appears to be reasonably confirmed.33 According to Churchland, “the
attachment, underwritten by the painfulness of separation and the pleasure of com-
pany, and managed by intricate neural circuitry and neurochemicals, is the neural
platform for morality”. With the term “attachment” she refers, in the terminology of
neuroendocrinology, “to the disposition to extend care to others, to want to be with
them, and to be distressed by separation.”34

31
It is curious that the term “sustainability” is taken from the economic field andthat it was intro-
duced by Carl von Carlowitzin 1713, in De Sylvicultura oeconomica. See M. Novo, El desarrollo
sostenible, Madrid, Pearson/UNESCO, pp. 152–153.
32
A. Cortina, Neuroética y neuropolítica. Sugerencias para la educación moral, Madrid, Tecnos,
2011, chaps. 2 and 4; ¿Para qué sirve realmente la ética?, Barcelona, Paidós, 2013, chap. 3.
33
P. S. Churchland, Braintrust, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011.
34
Ibid., 16. This point, in our opinion, is very true, although we substantially disagree with the rest
of Churchland’s theoretical construction. See A. Cortina, “Neuroética y ética del discurso”, in
A. Salles and K. Evers (Coord.), La vida social del cerebro, México, Fontamara, 2014,
pp. 167–191.
54 A. Cortina and J. Conill

It can be said, therefore, that human beings are born biologically linked, at least,
to their young and their mates, and that this link in some way configures a biological
commitment to care, which requires sacrifices, but which is carried out with a good
disposition in a natural manner. Protecting vulnerable beings who have been placed
in our care is one of the keys of happiness, whilst individualist selfishness is suicide.
Thus, the biological commitment becomes a hypothetical imperative of prudence, a
piece of advice for prudent people: “if you want to be happy, protect the vulnerable
beings that have been biologically placed under your care”. But the question is then:
is the obligation only to protect those who are biologically placed under our care, or
does the obligation go further, in which case is it necessary to go beyond the bio-
logical link, too?
According to authors, such as Hamilton, it is impossible to overcome genetic
altruism, which would consist in the willingness to invest energy in adapting those
beings who share one’s own genetic heritage, even at the expense of losing possi-
bilities of one’s own adaptation.35 However, and despite Hamilton’s view, human
beings engage in altruism that transcends the limits of relationship.36 Research stud-
ies on evolutionary biology since Darwin’s days have attempted to explain what has
been called the “mystery of biological altruism” in different ways, but the more
credible research studies today state that the human being is a homo reciprocans: he
is biologically prepared to be altruistic when he can expect something in return,
which may come from the beneficiary or from society. This is the biological basis
of contractual societies, which are willing to cooperate. And precisely what has
shown the superiority of the human species with respect to others, as the old anar-
chists used to say, is not so much having fostered unfettered competition in the fight
for life, but mutual support. The greatest conquest of human beings has consisted in
caring for the vulnerable, the weak and the sick who would have inevitably died in
the fight and conflict between the strongest.
But, despite the good news that we human beings are not only biologically pre-
pared to care, but also to cooperate, the truth is that the imperative of cooperating
with those from whom one can obtain a benefit is still a hypothetical imperative of
prudence, because it does not require protecting all vulnerable creatures due to their
internal value, but rather it advises cooperating with those who can give something
in exchange. An ethics of responsibility proposes going beyond those limits.

3.4 Ethics of Responsibility

In his book Das PrinzipVerantwortung Jonas states that traditional ethics cannot
respond to the ecological challenge posed by the progress of science and technique,
because they are not future-related ethics of responsibility. And, on the other hand,

35
W.D. Hamilton, “The evolution of altruistic behavior”, in American Naturalist, 97, pp. 354–356;
“The genetical evolution of social behavior”, in Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, pp. 1–52.
36
A. Cortina, Neuroética y neuropolítica, pp. 112 ff.
3 Ethics of Vulnerability 55

future-related ethics, as is the case of Bloch’s proposal in Das Prinzip Hoffnung,

may lead to sacrificing the current generation with a view to saving future genera-
tions. Therefore –Jonas understands– it is necessary to propose an ethics of respon-
sibility “an ethics of preservation and prevention and not [one] of progress and
perfection.”37 It is necessary to preserve the human species and the Earth because
thanks to the progress of science and technique they are already vulnerable. Is there
any archetype of moral responsibility for the vulnerable?
In Jonas’s opinion, the archetype is responsibility for the newborn or for the
child, which is a natural duty, and which as such already appears in traditional eth-
ics. Children would die without their parents’ care and that is why parents must
assume responsibility for their children. The peculiarity of this natural duty is that it
is not based on reciprocity, but rather it is asymmetrical.38
This is –states Jonas- the only class of fully selfless behaviour supplied by nature; and
indeed, it is this one-way relationship to dependent progeny, given with the biological facts
of procreation, and not in the mutual relationship between independent adults (from which,
rather springs the idea of reciprocal rights and duties) that one should look for the origin of
the idea of (basically one-sided) responsibility in general.39

And Jonas celebrates the fact that this archetype of responsible action does not
have to be deduced from any principle, because it is implanted in human beings by
nature. Moral responsibility is thus based on vulnerability and it is activated by the
fear of what is going to happen if we do not look after the helpless, which drives one
to care for the vulnerable. Moral responsibility expands along that path, as far as our
power reaches, beyond reciprocity and exchange.
However, despite Jonas’ approach, the biological morality of caring for children,
as we have mentioned, does not become a moral imperative whereby we must take
responsibility for all vulnerable creatures, and in this regard, Apel’s criticism is
absolutely true.40 According to Apel, the abolition of the reciprocity of obligations
in an ethics of responsibility to the future “fails to show that responsibility is not a
relationship of reciprocity”. The example of the care that parents lavish on their
children shows rather that the fundamental responsibility of human beings with
respect to each other is a potential relationship that becomes actual only in accor-
dance with a real advantage of power. But then, the questions are: can the ethical
ought be metaphysically derived from a form of being? Can an ought be derived
from our capacity to help a creature that is in our hands? In that case, we would turn
Kant’s proposition “You can, for you ought” around, and we would convert it into
“You ought, for you can.”41 But for the rule “You ought, for you can” to be binding,

37
H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1984, p. 249 [The
Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 139].
38
Ibid., pp. 84–85 [The Imperative of Responsibility, pp. 38–39].
39
Ibid., p. 85 [The Imperative of Responsibility, p. 39].
40
K.-O. Apel, “The Problem of a Macroethic of Responsibility to the Future in the Crisis of
Technological Civilization: An Attempt to Come to Terms with Hans Jonas’s ‘Principle of
Responsibility’”, Man and World 20: p. 3–40 (1987).
41
Ibid., p. 19.
56 A. Cortina and J. Conill

that is, to be able to be legitimated, it must presuppose a deeper principle, in agree-

ment with which we are obliged to accept the responsibility. That is, “it is a princi-
ple in accordance with which we are obliged to take part in organising the aforesaid
responsibility as a solidarity responsibility that adheres to a formal principle con-
sisting in a universalised responsibility.”42
In this sense, in 1967, Apel had already pointed out the need for an ethics of soli-
dary responsibility, capable of assuming responsibility, on a global level, for the
consequences of science and technique.43 And he had understood that discourse
ethics is able to provide this.
According to discourse ethics, anyone seriously arguing about the justice of
norms has already acknowledged that their interlocutors are individuals and that
their interests must be dialogically taken into account. The community of speakers,
either real or virtual, forms a real community of communication, which any one of
them pragmatically commits to preserving when making a communicative action.
That is, that anyone endowed with communicative competence has the solidary
responsibility of helping maintain the real community of communication, or, as
Apel will later say, has the co-responsibility of helping maintain it. In agreement
with Jonas, Apel considers that it is not morally licit to sacrifice the real community
of communication for the sake of the future community, but rather it is necessary to
preserve the real community and assume responsibility for it. But, unlike Jonas, he
understands that it is not only a question of preserving mankind, but of doing so
with respect for the dignity of each one of the human beings, because there is a bond
of reciprocal recognition among them. That is why it is necessary to also lay the
basis to construct that ideal community of communication in the future, which is a
regulatory idea contained within the actual plot of language: “In the real, human
community of communication the ideal community of communication must always
remain to be realised progressively.”44
Apel’s proposal will thus be that of an ethics of solidary responsibility, or of co-
responsibility which does not aim to have a biological or even a metaphysical base,
but which attempts to discover the pragmatic-transcendental presuppositions of
communicative actions and of the fact of argumentation. Those requirements show
that there is a bond of reciprocal recognition among human beings, whereby they
must mutually respect dignity in any case, and contingently help in cases of
vulnerability.
A similar proposal is expressed by Habermas in his article “Justice and solidar-
ity”. In it, Habermas criticises Kohlberg’s proposal to introduce a seventh stage into
the development of moral conscience in childhood, a stage where there would be

42
Ibid., p. 20.
43
At a conference given in Goteborg and published later in Transformation der Philosophie,
Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1973, II, pp. 358–435.
44
K.-O. Apel, “The Problem of a Macroethic of Responsibility to the Future in the Crisis of
Technological Civilization: An Attempt to Come to Terms with Hans Jonas’s ‘Principle of
Responsibility’”, p. 24.
3 Ethics of Vulnerability 57

two virtues, justice and benevolence.45 Habermas agrees with the fact that the dig-
nity of human beings must have two aspects: autonomy and vulnerability. But the
virtues that must concern them would not be justice and benevolence as Kohlberg
proposes, but justice and solidarity.46 In Habermas’s opinion the connection between
the principle of justice and benevolence lies in an ambiguous concept of person. To
explain this ambiguity, it is necessary to distinguish between the respect that each
person deserves as an independent individual in general (justice) and the respect
deserved as a singular individual; because it is not the same “to protect the person
as an individual that is able to self determine himself” as “to promote one’s personal
self-realisation.”47 In this second case, respect does not just refer to the integrity of
the vulnerable person, but also to concern for their happiness; and something simi-
lar occurs with the role assumption, where empathy (Einfühlung) must not be con-
fused with universalisation. To this end, Habermas proposes discourse ethics as an
alternative, which permits articulating justice and solidarity.
Indeed, people are beings capable of language, who become individuals through
a socialisation process.48 Within this process, the individual enters a network of
reciprocal interdependencies and needs for protection. Therefore, “the integrity of
the individuals cannot be preserved without the integrity of the lifeworld which
makes their common, interpersonal belonging possible, as well as relationships of
reciprocal recognition.” The integrity of the plots of reciprocal recognition must be
guaranteed to ensure the integrity of individual people. This requires complement-
ing justice with solidarity, because each one has to assume responsibility for the
other and for the integrity of the common vital context of which they are members.49
Justice must be done, therefore, claiming equal treatment and equivalent respect for
the dignity of each one, and demanding solidarity from individuals, demanding
them to protect the intersubjective relations of reciprocal recognition.
But, is this sufficient? In our opinion, it is not. Because the duty of justice to
respect beings endowed with communicative competence is grounded on the recog-
nition of dignity, and the duty of solidarity refers to caring for the networks where
these beings are socialised, but the duty of taking care of beings endowed with com-
municative competence, who are vulnerable, requires another foundation: it requires
the recognition of a deeper bond, which is revealed through the feeling of compas-
sion. Discovering this bond requires passing from communicative rationality to
compassionate reason, to cordial reason.

45
L. Kohlberg, D. R. Boyd und Ch. Levine, “Die Wiederkehr der sechsten Stufe: Gerechtigkeit,
Wohlwollen und der Standpunkt der Moral”, W. Edelstein & G. Nunner-Winkler, Zur Bestimmung
der Moral, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1986, pp. 205–240.
46
J. Habermas, ‘Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität’, in: W. Edelstein & G. Nunner-Winkler, Zur
Bestimmung der Moral, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1986, pp. 291–318.
47
Ibid., p. 309.
48
Ibid., pp. 310 ff.
49
Ibid., pp. 310–312.
58 A. Cortina and J. Conill

3.5 Cordial Ethics: Respect for Dignity and Compassion

for Vulnerable Beings

Throughout the history of western ethics, two feelings seem to dispute the merit of
occupying the first place when impregnating human relations, to make them moral
in the broadest meaning of the word. One comes from the Stoic and Kantian tradi-
tion, and that is respect for the dignity of human beings, for those to whom a simple
price cannot be assigned because each one of them is unique; they admit no equiva-
lent for which they can be exchanged. Precisely, the dignity of individuals has
become the grounds of human rights, the foundation of that Declaration that was
proclaimed in 1948. But, the dignity of human beings is also philosophically based
on the Kantian statement that every human being is an end in himself, it has an
absolute value and therefore it ought not be instrumentalised: the rational being is a
limitative end for human actions.50
But really, the rational being is not only a limitative end, but also a positive end
of human actions. The recognition of their absolute value requires they should not
be harmed, but it also requires them to be benefited: it is a moral obligation to
empower beings who have dignity so they can attain the ends they propose, provid-
ing they do not prevent others from reaching their own ends. This was stated by
Kant in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,51 but even clearer in The
Metaphysics of Morals:
The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: act in accordance with a maxim of ends
that it can be a universal law for everyone to have.- In accordance with this principle, a
human being is an end for himself as well as for others, and it is not enough that he is not
authorized to use either himself or others merely as a means (since he could then still be
indifferent to them); it is in itself his duty to make the human being as such his end.52

All human beings have subjective ends and the discovery that they are beings,
who are valuable in themselves, morally demands them to accomplish these ends,
providing they do not prevent others from reaching their own ends. This will be the
structure of a Kingdom of Ends: a kingdom where every human being will be treated
as an end in himself, which requires organising each one’s subjective ends so that
they can accomplish them.53
Obviously, this moral duty of helping every individual reach their subjective
ends, morally requires protecting and empowering those who are vulnerable. Thus,
in our opinion, the philosophical foundation of the capabilities approach, which
demands empowering the basic capabilities of human beings, can be found in the
Kantian statement of the end in itself, and not in Aristotle’s philosophy.54 And, as all
human beings are vulnerable, the duty to empower them refers to all of them.

50
I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 429–430.
51
Ibid., p. 433.
52
I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 395.
53
I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 433.
54
J. Conill, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of the Capabilities Approach’, p. 664.
3 Ethics of Vulnerability 59

However, it is also true that the feeling of respect, which is –according to Kant–
the motive for fulfilling the moral imperatives, is insufficient to move the will to
protect and benefit all other human beings. Thus, in The Metaphysics of Morals
Kant will recognise the need to also resort to another feeling, compassion:
But while it is not itself a duty to experience the sufferings (as well as the joy) of others, it
is a duty to participate actively in their fate. To this end, it is therefore an indirect duty to
cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so
many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them.-
Thus, it is a duty not to avoid the places where the poor, who lack the most basic necessities,
are to be found, but rather to seek them out, and not to shun sick-rooms or debtors’ prisons
and so forth in order to avoid the painful feelings one may not be able to resist. For this is
still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty
alone might not accomplish.55

The feeling of compassion has been repeatedly dealt with in the history of west-
ern ethics, at least since Aristotle,56 and Kant is right when he recognises that, with-
out this, it is very difficult to obey the duty to actively participate in the fate of other
human beings and to help them achieve their goals. But, in our opinion, that feeling
is not only aroused by contemplating the suffering of others, but by contemplating
their joy, too: it is the feeling that emerges when we experience the bond that unites
us to other individuals. When we discover that we are not isolated individuals who
seal contracts with other individuals worthy of respect, but that intersubjectivity is
part of us, that we relate to each other through ties of reciprocal recognition. And,
not only how the interlocutors of a dialogue feel related as stated by the discourse
ethics in Apel’s and Habermas’ version, which thus demands respect for the rights
of people and caring for the networks where they are socialised through solidarity.
But also, how those that in some way recognise they are flesh of the same flesh and
bone of the same bone feel and know they are related.57
Thus, compassion is a mixture of kardia, justice and commitment, the virtue of
the lucid heart.58

References

1. Apel, K.-O. Transformation der Philosophie (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1973), vol. II.
2. Apel, K.-O. “The Problem of a Macroethic of Responsibility to the Future in the Crisis of
Technological Civilization: An Attempt to Come to Terms with Hans Jonas’s ‘Principle of
Responsibility’”, Man and World 20 (1987), pp. 3–40.
3. Aranguren, J.L. La vejez como autorrealización personal y social (Madrid, Ministerio de
Asuntos Sociales, 1992).

55
I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 457.
56
Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 8, 1385b 13 ff. M. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 306 ff.
57
A. Cortina, Covenant and Contract, Leuven, Peeters, 2003.
58
A. Cortina, Ética de la razón cordial, Nobel, Oviedo, 2007.
60 A. Cortina and J. Conill

4. Aranguren, J.L. La ética de Ortega, in Obras Completas, II (Madrid, Trotta, 1994),

pp. 503–539.
5. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by H.G. Apostle (Dordrecht/Boston, Reidel
Publishing, 1976).
6. Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts (The University of Adelaida, 2014).
7. Birulés F. and Di Tullio, A.L. (2011), “Entrevista con Martha C. Nussbaum”, in:Barcelona
Metrópolis, January-March. http://w2.bcn.cat/bcnmetropolis/arxiu/en/page37cb.
html?id=21&ui=473
8. Boff, L., El cuidado necesario (Madrid, Trotta, 2012).
9. Bonete, E., Ética de la dependencia (Madrid, Tecnos, 2009).
10. Churchland, P. S., Braintrust (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011).
11. Conill, J., ‘The Philosophical Foundations of the Capabilities Approach’, in: Ch. Luetge (ed.),
Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/New
York/London, Springer, 2013, volume 2, pp. 661–674.
12. Conill, J., Ética hermenéutica (Madrid, Tecnos, 2006).
13. Cortina, A. Covenant and Contract (Leuven, Peeters, 2003).
14. Cortina, A. Ética de la razón cordial (Oviedo, Nobel, 2007).
15. Cortina, A. Neuroética y neuropolítica. Sugerencias para la educación moral (Madrid, Tecnos,
2011).
16. Cortina, A. ¿Para qué sirve realmente la ética? (Barcelona, Paidós, 2013).
17. Cortina, A. ‘Neuroética y ética del discurso’, in: A. Salles and K. Evers (Coord.), La vida
social del cerebro (México, Fontamara, 2014), pp. 167–191.
18. Cortina, A. ‘Martha C. Nussbaum: vulnerabilidad y justicia’, in: Luisa Ribeiro (ed.),
Marginalidade e Alternativa. Filósofas dos séculos XX e XXI (forthcoming, 2015).
19. Cortina, A. (with Pereira G., eds.), Pobreza y libertad (Madrid, Tecnos, 2009).
20. Crocker, D.A., Ethics of Global Development (Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press,
2008).
21. Encyclical Letter Laudatio Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on care for our common home, 2015.
22. Gehlen, G., Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (Frankfurt a.M./Bonn,
Athenäum, 1966).
23. Gracia, D., ‘Ética de la fragilidad’, in Bioética clínica, 2 (1988), Bogotá, El Búho.
24. Habermas, J., ‘Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität’, in: W. Edelstein & G. Nunner-Winkler, Zur
Bestimmung der Moral, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1986, pp. 291–318.
25. Hamilton, W.D. “The evolution of altruistic behavior”, American Naturalist 97 (1963),
pp. 354–356.
26. Hamilton, W.D. “The genetical evolution of social behavior”, Journal of Theoretical Biology
7 (1964), pp. 1–52.
27. Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit (Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1993).
28. Hobbes, Th., Leviathan, edited by R. E. Flathman and D. Johnston (New York and London,
W.W. Norton and Co, 1997).
29. Jonas, H., Das PrinzipVerantwortung, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1984 [The Imperative of
Responsibility (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1984)].
30. Kant, I. Die Metaphysik der Sitten (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter& Co., AkademieTextausgabe,
1968), VI.
31. Kant, I. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter& Co.,
AkademieTextausgabe, 1968), IV.
32. Kohlberg, L., Boyd, D. R. and Levine, Ch., “Die Wiederkehr der sechsten Stufe: Gerechtigkeit,
Wohlwollen und der Standpunkt der Moral”, in: W. Edelstein & G. Nunner-Winkler, Zur
Bestimmung der Moral (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1986), pp. 205–240.
33. Laín, P., Antropología médica para clínicos (Barcelona, Salvat, 1984).
34. MacIntyre, A., Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago and La Salle, Carus Publishing
Company, 1999).
3 Ethics of Vulnerability 61

35. Myrdal, G. Asian Drama. An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York, Twentieth
Century Fund and Allen Lane The Penguin Books, 1968).
36. Myrdal, G. The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Program in Outline (New
York, Pantheon Books, 1970).
37. Nagel, Th., “Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 50, p. 137–151, reprint in
Mortal Questions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 24–38.
38. Novo, M., El desarrollo sostenible (Madrid, Pearson/UNESCO, 2006).
39. Nussbaum, M.C. The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001,
revised edition).
40. Nussbaum, M.C. Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
41. Ortega y Gasset, J. Historia como sistema, in: Obras Completas (=OC), VI (Madrid, Taurus,
2006), pp. 45–81.
42. Ortega y Gasset, J. ‘Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro’, in: OC, V (2006), pp. 120–142.
43. Ortega y Gasset, J. ‘Epílogo de la filosofía’, in: OC, IX (2009), pp. 583–620.
44. Orringer, N., La aventura de curar (Barcelona, Galaxia Gutenberg/Círculo de Lectores, 1997).
45. Riedel, M. (ed.), Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie, Bd. I (Freiburg i.B., Rombach,
1972).
46. Sachs, J., The End of Poverty (New York, The Penguin Press, 2005).
47. Sen, A. Poverty and Famines (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981).
48. Sen, A. Development as Freedom (New York, Anchor Books, 1999).
49. Seneca, L.A., ‘De Providentia’, DialogorumLibriDuodecim, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1977, 6, 6–12 (in Moral Essays, Cambridge Mass./London, Harvard University Press, 1985,
p. 45). http://www.loebclassics.com/view/seneca_younger-de_providentia/1928/pb_
LCL214.45.xml
50. Smith, A., The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1976).
51. Williams, B., “Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50 (1976), pp. 115–135.
52. Zubiri, X., Sobre el hombre (Madrid, Alianza, 1986).