Ethni c

Chines
as
e
Southea st
Asian s
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established
as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research
centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern
Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability
and security, economic development, and political and social
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Strategic and Political Studies Programme (RSPS), Regional Social
and Cultural Studies Programme (RSCS), and the Indochina
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by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative
officer.
 ____ thn ic
Chiasnes e
Sout• heas t
sia ns
edited by
Leo Suryadinata

St. Martin's Press- New York

Palgrave Macmillan
 Published by
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© 1997 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1997 978-0-312-17576-4

Library of Congress Catalog~ng-in-Publication Data

Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians/edited by Leo Suryadinata.

p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and Index.
ISBN 978-1-349-61695-4 ISBN 978-1-137-07635-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-07635-9
l. Chinese--Asia, Southeastern--Ethnic identity. 2. Chinese--
Asia, Southeastern--Economic conditions. 3. Investments, Foreign--
China. 4. Asia, Southeastern--Ethnic relations. I. Suryadinata,
Leo.
DS509.5.C5E85 1997
305.895' l059--dc2l 97-12113
CIP

ISBN 978-981-3055-50-6 (softcover, ISEAS, Singapore)

ISBN 978-981-3055-58-2 (hardcover, !SEAS, Singapore)
For Australia and New Zealand, a softcover edition (ISBN 1-86448-463-2)
is published by Allen & Unwin, Australia.
For the USA and Canada, this hardcover edition (ISBN 0-312-17576-0) is
published by St Martin's Press, New York.
Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd
 Contents

Preface vii

Contributors X

l. Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese,

Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?
Leo Suryadinata 1
Comments by Tan Chee Beng 25

2. The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia: Issues of Identity

Mely G. Tan 33
Comments by A. Dahana 66

3. Malaysian Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020

Lee Kam Hing 72
Comments by Ahmat Adam 108

4. Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar and their Identity

Mya Than liS
Comments by Khin Maung Kyi 147
vi Contents

5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos

Teresita Ang See 158
Comments by Renata S. Velasco 203
6. From Overseas Chinese to Chinese Singaporeans
Chiew Seen Kong 211
Comments by A. Mani 228

7. From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai:

Political Conditions and Identity Shifts
among the Chinese in Thailand
Supang Chantavanich 232
Comments by Anusorn Limmanee 260
8. Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and their Identity
Iran Khanh 267
Comments by Ta Huu Phuong 293
Appendix
Women and Chinese Identity:
An Exchange at the Closing Session of the Workshop
Mely Tan, Wang Gungwu, Leo Suryadinata and
Tan Chee Beng 296

Index 301
 Preface

Since the introduction of an open-door policy, many Chinese

entrepreneurs outside China have begun to invest in mainland
China. Attention has again turned to the Chinese in other parts
of the world, including those in Southeast Asia, and writers, both
in the West and Asia, have started to use the term "Overseas
Chinese" and "Chinese overseas" to refer to these Chinese outside
mainland China. This mainland China-centric view has confused
the position and identity of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, with
serious political implications as Southeast Asian Chinese are still
considered to be "Chinese overseas" or "Overseas Chinese", not
Southeast Asians.
In the light of this new development, a workshop was held
on the theme of "Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians" to discuss
the perception of the Southeast Asian Chinese in terms of their
position in the respective Southeast Asian countries, their
relationship with China, their self-identity, as well as the perception
of "indigenous" Southeast Asians towards the ethnic Chinese in
their countries.
viii

At this workshop, only six ASEAN states and Myanmar were

covered. Paperwriters were requested to include the following
aspects with regard to their studies on their respective countries:
l. The indigenous and ethnic Chinese notion of a nation (nation-
state) and the position of the ethnic Chinese in such a nation.
Is the nation racially or culturally defined or both7
2. The relationship between China and the ethnic Chinese
oversees - is this a problem for the integration of the ethnic
Chinese (or for nation-building)7
3. Is culture and the economic position of the ethnic Chinese a
problem for the integration of the ethnic Chinese in their
country of domicile 7 With the rise of ethnic consciousness
world-wide, is there national disintegration rather than national
integration in Southeast Asia? Does this trend affect the Chinese
communities7
4. Prospects of the ethnic Chinese in national integration - are
ethnic Chinese "Southeast Asians" or "Overseas Chinese"7
Two groups of scholars from Southeast Asia were invited. One
group consisted of ethnic Chinese (or of Chinese descent) and the
other group comprised "indigenous" or non-Chinese scholars. The
interaction of these two groups of scholars have provided a more
comprehensive picture about the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.
In the past, most of the works (for example, Suryadinata's
work) were based mainly on one country They were also not
done in conjunction with both ethnic Chinese and indigenous
scholars. Thus, this volume aims to be a major regional study
incorporating a variety of regional perspectives on common themes
relating to the question of the Chinese identity
This volume consists of eight chapters. Each chapter is ac-
companied by a brief commentary by a discussant. The Appendix
is based on the workshop discussion on the role of women in
shaping ethnic Chinese identity It is not a full-length paper but
is included here with the hope that others may pursue this under-
studied topic.
It should be noted here that the title of the workshop was
"Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians". Southeast Asians here refer
to people in the individual Southeast Asian states, and not a
Preface ix

collective regional identity. The editor is fully aware that a regional

identity has not yet emerged, but identification with an individual
country has been in existence.
The editor would like to take this opportunity to thank all the
workshop participants, especially the paperwriters and discussants,
for their contributions and co-operation. Special thanks also go to
Professor Chan Heng Chee, then Director of ISEAS, and Professor
Wang Gungwu, Chairman of the Institute of East Asian Political
Economy (lEAP E), for their kind support. We have all benefited
tremendously from their full participation in the two-day workshop.

Leo Suryadinata
 Contributors

Ahmat Adam, Ph.D., is Professor and Dean at the Centre for

General Studies, Universiti Malaysia Sabah.

Anusorn Limmanee, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the

Department of Government at the Faculty of Political Science,
Chulalongkorn University.

Supang Chantavanich, Ph.D., is Associate Professor and Head of

the Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies,
Chulalongkorn University.

Chiew Seen Kong, Ph.D., is a Senior Lecturer in the Department

of Sociology, National University of Singapore.

A. Dahana, Ph.D., is the Executive Director at the Fulbright

Commission of Indonesia (American-Indonesian Exchange
Foundation- AMINEF), jakarta.

Khin Maung Kyi, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow in the Department of

Business Policy, National University of Singapore.
Contributors xi

Lee Kam Ring, Ph.D., is a Professor in the Department of History,

University of Malaya.

A. Mani, Ph.D., is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology,

National University of Singapore.

Mya Than, Ph.D., is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, Singapore.

Teresita Ang See is the Executive Director at the Kaisa Para Sa

Kaunlaran, Inc, Manila.

Leo Suryadinata, Ph.D., is a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies and Associate Professor in the Department
of Political Science, National University of Singapore.

Ta Huu Phuong, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department

of Decision Sciences, National University of Singapore.

Tan Chee Beng, Ph.D., was an Associate Professor in the Depart-

ment of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Malaya, and is
now Professor in the Department of Anthropology, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong.

Mely G. Tan, Ph.D., is a Senior Researcher at the Indonesian

Institute of Sciences, Jakarta.

Tran Khanh, Ph.D., is Co-ordinator, Programme of Contemporary

Issues in Southeast Asia, National Center for Social Sciences and
Humanities of Vietnam, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies,
Vietnam.

Renato S. Velasco, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department

of Political Science at the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy,
University of the Philippines.

Wang Gungwu, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, is Distinguished Senior

Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Chairman
of the Institute of East Asian Political Economy, Singapore.
 Chapter 1
Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia:
Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas
or Southeast Asians?

Leo Suryadinata

The Chinese in Southeast Asia have gained some measure of

acceptance in the local scene. However, in recent years, with
dramatic events such as the end of the Cold War, the globalization
process, the opening up of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
and ethnic Chinese investments in their ancestral land, people
have begun to question the identity of the Chinese again. Old and
outdated terms, such as "Overseas Chinese" and "Chinese overseas"
have resurfaced and again become popular, 1 creating the impression
that the Chinese are no longer part of Southeast Asia but China.
This chapter examines the current position of the ethnic
Chinese in Southeast Asia. Do they perceive themselves as Chinese
overseas or Southeast Asians? 2 What are the perceptions of the
local population towards the Chinese 7 Are the Chinese accepted
as members of Southeast Asian nations? What have been the
2 Leo Suryad1nata

respective state policies towards the Chinese? Have these policies

achieved their objectives? What are the problems and prospects of
the Chinese in this part of the world?

What is in a Name? Variety of Terms Used

There are many terms used to refer to the Chinese. During the
colonial period, those Chinese who were born in Southeast Asia
were often considered colonial subjects. However, Imperial China
declared the Chinese as its subjects/citizens. Both the local born
and new immigrants were then regarded as Chinese nationals
overseas. It is true that many new immigrants who left China at
the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often
considered themselves as sojourners, and would eventually return
to their ancestral land. In the eyes of the Chinese Government,
these Chinese were in fact Huaqiao or Chinese nationals who
resided overseas. 3
Western writers consider the Chinese outside China as Overseas
Chinese. In fact, the term "Overseas Chinese" became the English
equivalent of Huaqiao. The English term was popularly used until
the end of World War II. The situation began to change after the
Southeast Asian countries gained independence and mainland
China turned communist. The new migrants and their immediate
descendants decided to remain in Southeast Asia and adopt local
citizenship. In order to show their different national status and
political loyalty, the Chinese began to coin other terms to refer to
themselves. Those who were still well-versed in Chinese, especially
in Malaya and Singapore, began. to refer to themselves as Huaren
(ethnic Chinese) or Huayi (Chinese descent). The term Huaren
has been popularized to refer to the Chinese in Southeast Asia,
who are mainly the citizens of their adopted land. However, those
who are still Chinese nationals but Southeast Asian residents are
often included in this category
The English equivalent of Huaren is "ethnic Chinese". Local
Chinese who were sensitive to Southeast Asian nationalism also
began to use this term in place of "Overseas Chinese" or "Chinese
overseas". However, some ethnic Chinese writers continue to use
the terms "Overseas Chinese" and "ethnic Chinese" interchangeably
The same can be said about Western writers. In recent years, the
/. Ethnic Chinese 1h Southeast Asia 3

term "Overseas Chinese" has gained new currency Perhaps many

still see the ethnic Chinese from mainland China's point of view,
without realizing its implications. Others perhaps have done this
on purpose to show that "once a Chinese, will always be a Chinese".
They could never become Southeast Asians.
Many writers, both Asian and Western, often use the term
"Overseas Chinese" to refer to the Chinese who live in Hong
Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 4 This infers that they share a common
identity with the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Strictly speaking, the
former should not be called "Overseas Chinese" because the
territories they reside in are politically and culturally part of
China, quite different from the Southeast Asian countries. More
importantly, the Chinese in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan regard
themselves as Chinese or Zhongguo ren (the man from the central
kingdom). In fact, these three areas form part of what is known
as "Greater China".
Can the people in "Greater China" be considered ethnic Chinese
or Huaren? The English term "ethnic Chinese" is commonly used
to refer to the Chinese outside China. The Chinese term Huaren
is also not used to refer to the Chinese in China. In general, the
Chinese in China call themselves Zhongguo ren. But within the
category of Zhongguo ren, there are various ethnic groups, namely
Han, Man, Mong, Hui, Zang, and so forth. With regard to the
Chinese in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, the Chinese Govern-
ment and scholars call them Gang-Ao-Tai tongbao (compatriots
from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan). But the Chinese in these
three areas call themselves simply Chinese, or Hong Kong Chinese,
Macao Chinese or Taiwanese if they want to emphasize their local
identity Only when they are in Southeast Asia, do they refer to
themselves as Huaren or ethnic Chinese, to differentiate themselves
from the local Chinese.
The Chinese Government and scholars are aware of the
connotation of the various terms. They have accepted the term
Huaren and its English equivalent "ethnic Chinese". Nevertheless,
they also use Huaqiao or "Overseas Chinese" when referring to a
specific period (when all Chinese overseas were still regarded as
Chinese nationals) or to those Chinese who are still citizens of
China.
4 Leo Suryadtnata

As a matter of fact, the picture of the ethnic Chinese is more

complex than what has been presented. Apart from the problem
of nationality, they have different degrees of Southeast Asianization,
or acculturation. The peranakan Chinese in Java and in Peninsular
Malaysia, the Sino-Thai in Thailand and the Chinese mestizo in
the Philippines have been highly acculturated. Can these people
still be called ethnic Chinese as, culturally, they have a high degree
of mixture? If ethnicity is defined solely in terms of "common
ancestry", 5 these people are "ethnic Chinese". However, ethnicity
is often used to refer to ethnic culture as well. 6 The Sino-Thai and
Chinese mestizo may therefore not be suitably classified as "ethnic
Chinese" but "of Chinese descent" (or Huayi). If this is the case,
should we include the latter in our discussion of the ethnic Chinese
in Southeast Asia? I think it is important to include them if only
for the purpose of showing that the "ethnic Chinese" are neither
"unassimilable" nor constitute a homogeneous group. However,
those of Chinese descent may have a different national identity
compared to the newer migrants, or Chinese-speaking Chinese.
This leads us to the question of the national identity of the Chinese
in Southeast Asia.

Concepts of Nation in Southeast Asia

National identity is closely linked to the modem concept of nation.
Nation is basically a Western concept which emerged in the last
two centuries, first in Western Europe. In the past, the concepts
of race, ethnic group and tribe were prevalent but the end of
colonialism following World War II, saw the emergence of
independent states in the Third World, when new "nations" came
into being.
The term "nation" often means a political community, and is
sometimes used interchangeably with "citizenship". However,
"nation" is different from "citizenship" in the sense that "citizenship"
is often used in a legal sense, while "nation" is both political and
cultural. Some writers have even used the term "nation" in a
psychological sense. However, for the purpose of our discussion,
nation is used here to refer to a political and cultural entity which
is larger than an ethnic group.
 5

These so-called nations in Southeast Asia are in fact "nations-

in-the-making". They are state-nations rather than nation-states.
This means that there is no nation but an ex-colonial state. The
state is created first and a new nation is built based on the state-
boundary. Thailand is the only state in Southeast Asia which was
never colonized. However, one can argue that the present concept
of the Thai nation is still quite recent because the Thai state
boundary was drawn in the twentieth century in accordance with
Western definitions. Accordingly, all Southeast Asian countries are
not "nation-states" but "multi-national states". For this chapter, I
prefer to use "ethnic group" for a sub-national group within a
state and reserve the term "nation" for a larger unit based on the
state.
In other words, all Southeast Asian states are multi-ethnic
states and their national identity is still weak and ethnic tension
is often very high. Therefore, leaders of newly independent
Southeast Asian countries make efforts to build a new nation
based on colonial boundaries. It is generally believed that ethnic
identity is a divisive force which may lead to political instability
and eventually the disintegration of a state.
Nevertheless, the concept of "nation" or "state-nation" in
Southeast Asia can be divided into at least two types: one is an
immigrant state-nation and the other, an indigenous state-nation.
The immigrant nation does not have a fixed model. As the
people of the state are made up of immigrants who are of different
races, the components of the "nation" are those migrant races. It
is true that there is an "indigenous" component (that is, the Malays)
but the group is a minority and is weak in various aspects. The
identity of this kind of "nation" is often not clear and it constantly
looks for new balances in the international community. However,
being in Southeast Asia, the identity needs to have some "neutral"
(that is, Western) and local components (for example, Malay) in
order to have racial harmony within the state and acceptance by
the neighbouring states. There is only one such state in Southeast
Asia: Singapore.
All other countries in Southeast Asia are indigenous state-
nations. In other words, the nation is defined in indigenous group
6 /.eo Suryad;nata

terms. The indigenous population is used as the "model" of the

nation- including its national language, national symbols, national
education and national institutions.
In the indigenous states, there are two types of minorities -
the indigenous minority (or homeland minority) and the non-
indigenous minority (non-homeland or immigrant minority). The
indigenous minority, being a minority with a homeland in the
country, is in a stronger position than the non-indigenous minority
The Chinese and Indians in Southeast Asia belong to the latter
category. The status of the indigenous and non-indigenous groups
differs. The indigenous group enjoys more rights compared to
the non-indigenous group. This is often reflected in government
policies and constitutions. When establishing a new national
culture, which is the essence of a nation, the cultures of indigenous
minorities are frequently taken into consideration but those of
non-indigenous minorities are often excluded.
The indigenous state-nations can be subdivided into those
which define a nation solely in cultural terms and those in both
cultural and racial terms. Thailand and the Philippines are the two
countries which define "nation" in cultural terms. An ethnic Chinese
will become a Thai or a Filipino/Filipina if the person has adopted
the local culture. However, in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia,
an ethnic Chinese is not fully accepted as a member of the nation.
However, all the indigenous nations use a dominant ethnic
group as the model or basis of the new nation. In Thailand, the
Thais are the basis of the nation, while in the Philippines, Tagalog-
speakers are often referred to as the model Filipinos. The Malays
in Malaysia form the essence of the Malaysian nation, while in
Indonesia the Javanese/Sumatrans are often used as the model of
the Indonesian nation. These nations are "ethno-nations" in the
making.
In the indigenous states which give priority to "indigenism",
citizenship is only one criterion used to differentiate a citizen
from a foreigner. However, among citizens there are also indigenous
and non-indigenous categories, with the former often having more
rights. For instance, both Indonesia and Malaysia have the concept
of pribumi (indigene) and bumiputra (native) which offers more
rights to the "native" population? In Myanmar too, indigenous
I. Etlmtc Chtnf'se tn Southeast Asta 7

Burmese are given privileges. In other words, there are unequal

rights between two types of citizens.
It is obvious that citizenship is not nationhood. Citizenship
connotes legal identity while nationhood (or nation) indicates
politico-cultural identity within a state. Although both are not the
same, citizenship can be used as a basis for building a nation.
This is due to the fact that once a person is a citizen of a country,
he/she will be subjected to the regulations and requirements of a
state (in this case, Southeast Asian states). Gradually, many citizens
of foreign descent come to share the "indigenous national culture",
either partially or wholly It is much more difficult for indigenous
minorities to accept another culture which is imposed on them to
be their "national culture".

Ethnic Chinese and Southeast Asian Citizenship

With the exception of Thailand, other Southeast Asian countries
achieved their statehood only after the end of World War II. With
statehood, citizenship was also introduced.
In the case of Thailand, in the nineteenth century there was
already an institutional channel for ethnic Chinese to become
Thais by cutting their queues and joining the Thai group. 8 In
modern Thailand, a Chinese can be naturalized as a Thai citizen
but he is still considered a Chinese up to the second generation.
Nevertheless, a Thai Chinese of a third generation would be
considered a Thai.
The majority of Sino-Thais are Thai citizens and have become
Thai culturally This is due partly to the jus soli principle adopted
by the Thai government in its citizenship law. Although a Chinese
born in Thailand has Thai citizenship, there are still 254,000
foreign-born Chinese who are foreigners, 9 most of them being
more recent migrants.
In the Philippines, before Ferdinand Marcos promulgated
martial law in 1972, citizenship was very difficult to obtain as the
law relating to it was based on jus sanguinis, rather than jus soli.
However, in the past there was a high degree of intermarriage
between the Chinese and the indigenous people. The Chinese
mestizos, who are the offsprings of such unions, have become
Filipino/Filipina.
8

Nevertheless, there are migrant Chinese who are still regarded

as Overseas Chinese by the local population. Some of them
wanted to become Philippine citizens but this was very difficult
until President Marcos issued Presidential Letters in the 1970s
granting alien Chinese the right to apply for Philippine citizenship.
Thus, a large number of Chinese were naturalized as Philippine
citizens. However, there are approximately 40,000 Chinese in the
Philippines who are still alien. 10
When Indonesia declared its independence, it introduced a
citizenship law based on jus soli. Any Chinese who was born in
Indonesia was a citizen of the new Republic if he/she did not
repudiate Indonesian citizenship. But in the 1950s Indonesia issued
a new citizenship law based on jus sanguinis, which made it more
difficult for foreign Chinese to obtain Indonesian citizenship. When
President Soeharto came to power, there were still more than one
million alien Chinese in Indonesia. A large number of them created
security and political problems for the Soeharto government.
Eventually in 1980 Suharto issued presidential decisions simplifying
the procedure to become Indonesian citizens. Many alien Chinese
applied for Indonesian citizenship and by the end of the 1980s
the numbers of alien Chinese were reduced to only 288,000. 11
In colonial Malaya, the Chinese were divided into British
subjects and Chinese citizens. On achieving independence, the
new Malayan government promulgated a citizenship law which
granted citizenship to Malayan-born Chinese freely. As a result,
many Chinese became citizens of Malaya. When Malaya became
Malaysia, the jus soli principle continued to apply to the citizenship
law. 12 Nevertheless, there are still some foreign-born Chinese who
are unable to obtain Malaysian citizenship. 11
Burma's citizenship law was based on jus sanguinis, making it
difficult for many Chinese to obtain Burmese citizenship. After
General Ne Win seized power in the military coup of 1962,
however, the government switched to the jus soli principle in a
move to resolve the alien Chinese problem. By the time Burma's
new citizenship law was promulgated in 1984, many Chinese
had become citizens of Burma (Myanmar, after june 1989).
By 1994, there were approximately 460,000 ethnic Chinese in
Myanmar, of which 58,000 are alien Chinese. H But acquisition of
l ttf;rnc Chint~se Sout/7cast Asia 9

citizenship did not mean an end to discrimination. Myanmar divides

its citizens into full citizens, associate citizens and naturalized
citizens with different socio-political rights. 15
Before the unification of North and South Vietnam, the Chinese
in the south were declared citizens of South Vietnam while those
in the north were free to choose their citizenship. However, after
the communists unified the country in 1976, most Chinese were
declared citizens of Vietnam. But the Sino-Vietnamese tension
which developed into a war created serious problems for the
Chinese in Vietnam. Ethnic Chinese became suspect and a large
number of them fled the country However, the approximately
962,000 ethnic Chinese](' who still remain in Vietnam are mainly
Vietnamese citizens. In fact, from the example of Vietnam, it
appears that the China factor is important to the citizenship issue
of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.
It can be seen therefore that the majority of the ethnic Chinese
in Southeast Asia have become citizens of the country where
they reside. However, the so-called Chinese problem in Southeast
Asia has not been resolved completely Many indigenous states
in Southeast Asia still consider their Chinese citizens as "half'
Southeast Asians.

The Ethnic Chinese Position in Southeast Asia

The dubious position of the ethnic Chinese in these new nations
or "state-nations" is worth examining. It is probably due to a
combination of factors: the history of Chinese migration in
Southeast Asia, the self-perception of the Chinese, and ethnic
Chinese relationships with the Southeast Asian states and China.
Initially, there was no mass migration of the Chinese from
China and many of those who came to Southeast Asia and their
descendants might have been integrated into the local societies.
However, towards the end of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the twentieth, a new international situation contrib-
uted to the mass migration of the ethnic Chinese. While famine
and political upheaval in China served as push factors, the
economic needs of the European colonial powers in Southeast
Asia served as pull factors. The colonialists badly needed cheap
manpower to tap resource-rich Southeast Asia and Chinese labour
10 Leo Suryad1nata

served this purpose well. (The Chinese were prepared to slog

under harsh conditions for meagre wages.) Those Chinese who
came to Southeast Asia during this period were not really migrants.
Many of them intended to return to China after they had made
enough money in Nanyang. However, for various reasons many of
them later decided to remain in Southeast Asia. And after the
communists took over the mainland, more Chinese began to
identify themselves with the countries in which they were residing.
They were reluctant to return to a communist regime in China
where they expected harsh living conditions.
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese in Southeast Asia are a
heterogeneous group. In terms of citizenship, some are nationals
of the PRC or Taiwan, but the majority are citizens of the Southeast
Asian states. Politically, some look towards either Beijing or Taipei,
but the majority are oriented towards their adopted land. Of course,
there are those who are still culturally Chinese, but there are also
many who are either acculturated or even assimilated into their
host society, so much so that they have generally lost an active
command of the Chinese language. The number of acculturated
Chinese in some Southeast Asian states appears to be growing.
Economically, there are rich and poor Chinese. It is true that the
Chinese as a group has been economically influential and often
form the middle class of the country in which they live. They are
even considered by some to be the economic elite of Southeast
AsiaY
Despite the heterogeneity of the Chinese, the perception of a
homogeneous Chinese community persists. This is due partly to
the relatively strong economic position of the Chinese as a group
across Southeast Asia and the existence of a group of first -generation
Chinese who refuse to identify themselves with the indigenous
population. The perception is also often linked to the desire of the
PRC government to utilize the ethnic Chinese to serve the interest
of China. These factors have helped to perpetuate the prejudice
against the Chinese population.
It is the desire of the governments in the region to integrate,
if not to assimilate, their Chinese populations into the host societies.
The indigenous (that is, non-Chinese) elite believe that by making
the ethnic Chinese less "Chinese", the Southeast Asian states would
I. Et17!7ic Chinese 1n Southeast AsH 11

enjoy better security as the PRC would have fewer opportunities

to use the local Chinese community to its advantage. Although
cultural and political loyalties may not always go hand in hand,
the perception of the indigenous leadership is important as the
government's policies are often influenced by these perceptions.

Government Policies towards the Ethnic Chinese

If the indigenous elite were eager to assimilate the Chinese, all
Southeast Asian states (except Singapore) should have introduced
an assimilationist policy However, this has not been the case. The
reasons probably lie in the different sizes of the Chinese commu-
nities in the region and the democratic or undemocratic nature
of the political systems there. 18 If the size of the Chinese popula-
tion is very small and the political system is authoritarian, the
government is likely to adopt an assimilationist policy (or both
assimilationist and expulsion policies), but if it is very small and
the political system is democratic, the government is likely to
adopt an accommodationist policy However, if the Chinese popu-
lation is large, regardless of the political system the government
is likely to introduce an accommodationist policy as it would be
unrealistic to pursue an assimilationist policy 19
Nevertheless, regardless of the population size and nature of
the political system, the indigenous-dominated government will
attempt to keep the number of Chinese small (by stopping new
Chinese immigration into the country) or reduce the number of
the Chinese (by increasing the indigenous population). 20

Assimilationist Policy
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have adopted assimila-
tionist policies. Assimilation refers to "a blending process whereby
two distinct groups form a homogeneous entity" 21 Donald
Horowitz identifies two types of assimilation: one is "amalgama-
tion", defined as "two or more groups united to form a larger
group"; the other is "incorporation", defined as "one group assumes
the identity of another" _22 In the case of Indonesia, "incorporation"
has been used more than "amalgamation", while in the case of
Thailand and the Philippines, "amalgamation" has been used more
than "incorporation".
12 Leo Suryad:nata

The above three countries have relatively small Chinese

populations. The purpose of the assimilationist policy has been to
reduce the ethnic characteristics of the minority, so that the Chinese
can be absorbed into the "indigenous population". The ethnic
Chinese in these countries are expected to "indigenize" their names,
speak the national language of the country and eventually accept
its national symbols. Of these three countries, the most radical
has been Indonesia. In fact, Indonesia has eliminated three pillars
which sustain Chinese society and identity, namely, Chinese
schools, Chinese mass media (especially the press), and Chinese
associations. In Thailand and the Philippines, although Chinese-
language medium schools no longer exist, there are still Filipinized
Chinese schools where the Chinese language is allowed to be
taught. This is also the case in Thailand. Apart from the Chinese
language, Chinese language newspapers and Chinese associations
are also allowed.
It should be noted that the rate of Chinese assimilation in
Thailand and the Philippines is the highest. This may be due to
the prevalence of different concepts of nation. In both countries,
nation has been defined more in cultural than racial terms. The
components of the nation are the result of "amalgamation" rather
than "incorporation", and therefore there are many elements which
are also "Chinese". Moreover, the two countries are dominated by
Buddhists and Christians. It appears that Buddhism and Christianity
are more easily accepted by the Chinese, while Islam often emerges
as an obstacle to the assimilation of the ethnic Chinese in the local
communities. Nevertheless, if the three countries no longer accept
massive Chinese migration, the local Chinese will be further
indigenized.
Some writers in recent years have argued that the Chinese
in Thailand are in fact not fully assimilated even after three
generations. Many in fact hold dual identities. Indeed, there are
still many Chinese in Thailand who are first-generation Chinese,
and many of them are still foreigners. However, in the case of
those who have already become Thai, their Thai identity is very
strong, especially when it comes to the public display of such
identity Former Prime Ministers Chuan Leekpai and Banham Silpa-
archa are both of Chinese descent. Some observers have asserted
I Ethn;c Chmese ;n Southeast As;a 13

that Banharn is still able to speak a Chinese dialect, and is therefore

also a Chinese. According to this view, the Chinese in Thailand
hold a double identity They are Thai as well as Chinese. However,
it has to be pointed out that these "Sino-Thai" (or Chinese-Thai)
deliberately display their Thai-ness in public, speak "perfect" Thai
and behave like indigenous Thais. Although they may have double
identities (that is, Chinese ethnic and Thai national identities),
their Thai national identity is stronger. It should also be pointed
out that as some elements of Thai culture are similar to Chinese
culture, a certain degree of Chineseness is not an issue in Thailand.
This is also the case in the Philippines. 23 Chinese mestizos
such as former President Corazon Aquino (maiden name: Corazon
Cojuangco) has acknowledged that she is of Chinese descent;
jaime Cardinal Sin has also paid a visit to his ancestral homeland
in Fujian, China. However, their Chinese descent was and is not
a problem for them to be accepted as Filipinos.

Accommodationist Policy
Malaysia and Brunei have adopted the accommodationist policy
The term "accommodation" means that "the groups develop work-
ing arrangements while maintaining their distinct identities". 24
However, I use this term in a liberal way and do not exclude some
degree of common national identity In Malaysia and Brunei,
accommodation is often accompanied by "linguistic assimilation"
through the national language policy
Both Malaysia and Brunei have large Chinese populations and
both are Muslim countries. Because of the large size of the Chinese
community, Malaysia, and to a lesser extent, Brunei, allow the
existence of Chinese culture, but require their citizens to learn
Malay It is also felt that the two governments want the Chinese
to identify themselves with the Malay language policy
However, Malaysia and Brunei have not adopted identical
policies. Malaysia has been more liberal because of the presence
of Chinese political and economic influence. The Malaysian
constitution guarantees the cultural rights of the Chinese, and
Chinese schools have so far been allowed to operate. Brunei,
however, appears to be more restrictive. Chinese schools were
converted to Malay schools in 1992.
14 leo Suryad;nara

Strictly speaking, Brunei is a Malay Sultanate and an absolute

monarchy and there is no concept of "nation". Therefore, the
government has not embarked on a "nation-building" policy But
in practice, Brunei is introducing this policy, which is not much
different from other Southeast Asian states.

Assimilationist and Accommodationist Policy

Countries may introduce different policies at different times. This
was the case in Vietnam. Before unification, north and south
Vietnam adopted the accommodationist policy However, after
1976, an assimilationist and expulsion policy was introduced. But
since the doi moi (renovation) period, especially after the collapse
of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Hanoi
has readopted the accommodationist policy

Pluralistic Policy/Cultural Pluralism

The term "cultural pluralism" is defined as the opposite of
assimilation and acculturation. It encourages the maintenance of
one's different cultural identity This often creates an impression
that unity is not necessary. In practice, cultural pluralism also has
some common elements, and a common language is often an
essential component. In the case of the United States, the English
language has been used as the cornerstone of the "American
Nation". In fact, cultural pluralism in practice is similar to the
accommodationist policy
Singapore has since self-government in 1959 adopted cultural
pluralism because of its ethnic composition, special geographical
location and historical experience. Its language policy has developed
in accordance with the changing political situation; but English,
as the language of communication for various ethnic groups, has
been maintained. A bilingual policy has been emphasized in recent
years to enable various ethnic groups to retain their cultural
tradition. This allows the Chinese culture to continue to prevail.
In the past, the government tended to stress on the Singaporean
identity The goal was to create a melting pot in Singapore society
using English as the major language of communication among the
different races. "Mother tongue" was de-emphasized. However,
since the end of the 1980s, some leaders have felt that a
I. Ethnic Ch1hese in Southeast Asia 15

homogeneous nation in Singapore would be difficult to achieve

and that ethnic cultures are needed for "national ethos". Thus,
both ethnic and Singaporean identities have been equally stressed.
The results of this recent shift is still too early to tell, but one
thing is clear, the Chinese element in Singapore society will not
disappear.

Are Ethnic Chinese Southeast Asians?

With the exception of Singapore, Southeast Asian governments
have tried to reduce the Chineseness of their ethnic Chinese
populations and to promote "indigenous" national identities. Some
have been more extreme than others and many continue to dis-
criminate against the Chinese by segregating their citizens into
indigenous and non-indigenous groups. This is against the goal
of "assimilation" or "integration". Because of political realities,
however, all governments in Southeast Asia allow their Chinese
communities to retain various degrees of religious freedom.
Through religious identification, the Chinese are able to retain
their ethnic identity But, China's attitude towards the ethnic
Chinese has often caused concern among some Southeast Asian
governments and complicated the ethnic Chinese issue.
Let us examine briefly China's recent policy towards the ethnic
Chinese. 25 China under Deng Xiaoping introduced the "Four
Modernization Programmes". Needing both skills and capital to
implement these programmes, Beijing urged the "Overseas Chinese"
to assist mainland China. Initially, the response was poor as during
the Cold War, both Southeast Asian governments and the West
were suspicious of the PRC.
However, the collapse of the communist system which led to
the end of the Cold War and the opening up of China provided
a new opportunity for both China and the ethnic Chinese to
interact more. Ideology (in the sense of communism) was no
longer an issue. A number of ethnic Chinese capitalists from the
region started to invest in the PRC. 26 This led some indigenous
leaders to question the identity and political loyalty of the ethnic
Chinese. Do the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia invest in China
for ethnic ties or profits or both? There is no agreement on this
issue. Some maintain that the ethnic Chinese are "patriotic" and
16 Leo Suryadmata

"love their ancestral land", and their investments are to express

their inner feelings and their strong sense of belonging to China.
Others maintain that there are two types of ethnic Chinese: the
Tan Kah Kee type who invested in China for patriotic reasons
while the other, the Wing On/Sincere type, who invested in China
merely for profits.
A brief survey of Southeast Asian Chinese capitalists who
invested in mainland China reveals that they are mainly first-
generation Chinese who are culturally Chinese. They are either
able to speak Chinese dialects or Mandarin or both. A few are
from the second generation but they too are still culturally Chinese.
The peranakan Chinese or acculturated Chinese in Southeast Asia,
having lost their command of Chinese, are unable to communicate
with the mainland Chinese.
The Southeast Asian Chinese capitalists invested in China partly
because of ethnic links. But they did not do so for ethnic reasons
alone. In fact, a strong case can be made that they are primarily
interested in economic profits. These Chinese did not move in to
China when they felt that they would not be able to make money
The influx of investments by Southeast Asian Chinese capitalists
only happened after they had made sober economic calculations.
It should be pointed out that the ethnic Chinese who have
invested in China are ethnic Chinese capitalists. They are small in
number and do not represent the average Chinese in Southeast
Asia. In addition, these Chinese capitalists are multinationals who
do not invest in China alone.
However, the reactions of the indigenous political public to
ethnic Chinese investment in China vary. The indigenous
Indonesians and Filipino elite have been rather critical, the Thais
adamant, and the Malays divided. 27
In fact, the impact of ethnic Chinese investment in China has
been dampened in recent years owing to Beijing's improved
relations with the Southeast Asian countries. Some argue that
there has been a convergence of economic interest between the
indigenous people and the ethnic Chinese elite, and hence the
emotional reactions towards ethnic Chinese investments in China
have been significantly reduced.
The behaviour of ethnic Chinese capitalists have often been
I. Ethntc Chthese in Sout/7east As1~1 17

seen as the "typical" behaviour of the ethnic Chinese by many

observers. Some have even confused Southeast Asian Chinese
capitalists with their counterparts in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Their
images of the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan are transferred
to those in Southeast Asia. Apart from ethnic Chinese investments
in China, there have also been a general resurgence of ethnicity
in the world. People have become more aware of their ethnic
identity There is no doubt that the resurgence of China has also
contributed to the "resinification" of some Southeast Asian Chinese.
These Chinese began to be attracted to the Chinese language and
Chinese culture. However, the "resinification" of these Chinese
will not be complete as long as they continue to live in Southeast
Asia where indigenous nationalism is strong. In the last twenty or
thirty years the ethnic Chinese as a group have also become stronger
economically and hence have become more confident.
But are the ethnic Chinese really Southeast Asians? Is there
any evidence to substantiate this? A few surveys conducted in
Southeast Asia may give us some answers.
In Indonesia, for instance, prior to the normalization of
relations between Beijing and jakarta, Editor conducted a survey
on the ethnic Chinese perception of Indonesia and China. 28 Among
the 129 Chinese respondents/ 9 only 14.72 per cent considered
China (PRC) as their fatherland and wanted to visit China regularly
and maintain Chinese customs. Another 41.86 per cent regarded
China as their ancestral land but they did not feel the need to
visit China, while 43.41 per cent regarded China as a foreign
country With regard to their attitude towards Indonesia, 93.79
per cent considered Indonesia as their "real fatherland", while
2.32 per cent said it was their second homeland, and 1.55 per
cent regarded it as a place to trade and 2.32 per cent were
ambiguous. When asked about their views on the normalization
of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic ties, 44.96 per cent said that this
would facilitate trade and business, 6.20 per cent said that this
would facilitate visits to their relatives in China, while yet another
24.80 per cent considered this a good opportunity to study the
ancestral culture, and 24.03 per cent felt it had no effect on their
lives. It is interesting to note that of the respondents, only 5.42
per cent were still able to write and speak Chinese, 35.65 per
18 Leo Suryadinata

cent understood some Chinese, while the rest did not understand
Chinese at all.
In the Philippines, some scholars are of the view that there
are major differences between the immigrant first-generation
Chinese and those born in the Philippines. While the older migrant
Chinese are still Chinese-speaking and China-oriented, the
Philippine-born Chinese are generally Tagalog-speaking and local-
oriented. Teresita Ang See conducted a survey of 381 Chinese
students in 1989, and found that lO per cent spoke only Chinese
at horrie, 77 per cent spoke a mixture, and a high 38 per cent
spoke only English and Tagalog. 30 Ang See also maintained that
"even if the present local born can speak Chinese, it is an
adulterated kind of Chinese mixed with Filipino prefixes and
suffixes, which easily distinguishes them as Philippine-Chinese. "31
A survey was also conducted by a Research Centre on Philippine
"Chinese school" students. When the students were asked which
sporting teams they would support in a competition, those in
favour of supporting the Philippine team were twice as many as
those supporting the team from China and five times those
choosing to support Taiwan. 32
Even in pluralistic Singapore, two studies (conducted in 1969
and 1989) argue that "there is a large measure of social cohesion". 33
The surveys show that inter-ethnic friendships between Chinese
and Malays, and Chinese and Indians, "have increased and are
now at high levels". The 1989 survey discovered that 4 7 per cent
of Chinese respondents were willing to marry Malays and 45 per
cent were willing to marry Indians, while 62 per cent of the
Malays and 58 per cent of the Indians were willing to marry
Chinese. It is interesting to note that while the majority of the
respondents (Chinese 58 per cent, Malay 70 per cent and Indian
63 per cent) agreed that "Singapore can be defended militarily",
a significant number of respondents felt "politically alienated"
(Chinese 41 per cent, Malay 57 per cent and Indian 52 per cent).
Many argue that indigenous leaders in Southeast Asia still
doubt the loyalty of their Chinese population. And it is uncertain
to what extent the Chinese have been accepted by the indigenous
population. It is also questionable if the Chinese want to identify
themselves with their adopted country.
I tmntc Chtnese tn Southeas! Asta 19

In Malaysia, differences exist between the Chinese-educated

and the non-Chinese-educated Chinese. It is obvious that the
Chinese-educated Chinese are more concerned with the Chinese
language but they too consider themselves Malaysians. They accept
Malay as the national language although they want to retain their
mother tongue. However, the English-educated Malaysian Chinese
and Baba, in their language identification, lean more towards bahasa
Malaysia (Malaysian language).
Although, some preliminary surveys on the identification
of the ethnic Chinese with their adopted country have been
conducted, it is clear that more systematic surveys and in-depth
research are badly needed. From the sketchy findings presented
above, however, one may draw the conclusion that the ethnic
Chinese in Southeast Asia are a heterogenous group, and their
identity varies from group to group and from country to country
Nevertheless, only a minority remain "Overseas Chinese" or
"Chinese overseas". The majority are already Southeast Asians -
or at least Southeast Asianized in terms of their language and
culture. The indigenous population, however, are still suspicious
of their ethnic Chinese community in general, although an
increasing number of the indigenous population have accepted
the ethnic Chinese as members of their "national family".

Conclusion
As the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia are not a homogeneous
group, it is often difficult to make sweeping generalizations.
Nevertheless, in terms of national identity, the following observa-
tions can be made.
Before World War II, the Southeast Asian states were largely
colonies. Not surprisingly, the majority of the ethnic Chinese at
that time were still Overseas Chinese (or Chinese overseas) in the
sense that they were citizens of China and hence tended to be
oriented towards their ancestral land, both politically and culturally
However, their identity underwent changes after the Southeast
Asian countries attained national independence.
As the concept of nation is new in Southeast Asia, Chinese
identification with the Southeast Asian nations is relatively recent.
However, in some countries where the Chinese population is small
20 Leo Suryadinata

and the concept of nation is more "inclusive", the Chinese can

more easily identify themselves with a Southeast Asian "state-
nation". However, when the Chinese population is large, and the
concept of nation is more "restrictive", the local identity of the
Chinese is more problematic.
The length of stay of the Chinese in the country is also a
factor in their identification with the nation. Those who were
born or whose families had lived in the country for many genera-
tions, generally tend to identify themselves with the country of
domicile. Their "Southeast Asian" identity is strong. Nevertheless,
some may have double or triple identities, but their national identity
is often stronger than their ethnic identity.
For more recent migrants, however, their ethnic identity is
stronger than their national identity: This is not a problem when
China's relations with the local Southeast Asian state are cordial.
But when Sino-Southeast Asian relations turn sour, those Chinese
who maintain ethnic and economic links with China will become
the focus of resentment from the indigenous people.
The resurgence of China can be a factor in the national identity
of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Some more recent migrants,
for economic and cultural reasons, may identify themselves with
China. This was especially the case when there were strong anti-
Chinese feelings in the Southeast Asian countries where these
Chinese reside. But the majority are likely to continue to be locally
oriented, especially in countries where the ethnic Chinese are
acculturated and accepted by the indigenous population.
It is safe to say that due to the complexity of the Southeast
Asian situation and Sino-Southeast Asian relationship, in addition
to the strong economic status of the ethnic Chinese population in
this region, the issue of Chinese identity will resurface from time
to time. In a country where the concept of "nation" is more liberal,
it will be easier for the Chinese to adapt, while in a country where
the concept of "nation" is rigid, this adaptation will be more
difficult. However, the problem may not become serious if there
is a higher degree of democratization in Southeast Asia and the
economic condition of the local population improves.
I. Ethnic Chinese in Southeast 1\s;a 21

TABLE 1
Numbers and Percentage of Ethnic Chinese
in Southeast Asia (1990)*

% of Chinese in
Total Population Ethnic Chinese Total Population
Brunei 260,482 40,621 16
Burma (Myanmar) 33,300,000 466,000 1.4
Cambodia 5,100,000 50,000** l.O
Indonesia 182,000,000 5,460,000 3.0
Laos 3,200,000 10,000 0.4
Malaysia 17,763,000 5,261,000 29.6
Philippines 67,000,000 850,000 1.3
Singapore 3,016,400 2,252,700 77.7
Thailand 55,888,050 4,813,000 8.6
Vietnam 64,412,000 962,000 1.5
Total 431,939,932 20,165,321 4.69
* Not all the figures on ethnic Chinese cited here are for 1990. Some are for 1985.
With the exceptions of Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore, all figures are estimates.
**According to Lianhe Zaobao (1 July 1994, p. 30), Phnom Penh has a population
of 800,000, of which one quarter are ethnic Chinese.
SouRcE: Cai Beihua, Haiwai Huaqiao Huaren Fazhan]ianshi (Shanghai: Social Sciences
Institute, 1992) p. 170; Li Qing, 'jianlun Dongnanya Huaren yu Huaren
Wenxue", Wenxue Shijie, no. 8 (1990), p. 13; Tran Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese
and Economic Development in Vietnam (Singapore: !SEAS, 1993), pp. 26-27;
Nirmal Ghosh, "Thugs will not stop Chinese-Filipino Activist", Sunday Times,
10 July 1994; Jiang Baiqao, Ershi shiji Taiguo Huaqiao Renkou Cutann (Bangkok
Bank, 30 April1992), p. 20. Singapore Census of Population 1990 (Singapore,
1992), pp. 3-4; Population Census of Malaysia 1990, cited in Lee Kam Hing,
'The Political Position of the Chinese in Post-Independence Malaysia" (Paper
presented at the Luodi Shenggen Seminar, San Francisco, November 1991).
22 Leo Suryadinata

Notes
1. Most of the recently published books, if not all, use the term "Overseas
Chinese". See David C.L. Ch'ng, The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in
East Asia (Melbourne: Committee for Economic Development of
Southeast Asia, 1993); Sterling Seagrave, Lords of the Rim: The Invisible
Empire of the Overseas Chinese (London &: New York: Bantam Press,
1995); and Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia (Canberra: East
Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995).
2. Southeast Asia here refers to ten countries, namely, Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
and Myanmar. It does not mean that the ethnic Chinese in these
countries have one regional identity already.
3. For a study of the term Huaqiao, see Wang Gungwu, "A Note on the
Origins of 'Hua-Ch'iao"', in his Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast
Asia and the Chinese (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1981), pp. 118-27.
4. A recent example is the book by S. Gordon Redding, The Spirit of
Chinese Capitalism (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1993),
pp. 17-24.
5. An ethnic group is defined as "those who conceive of themselves being
alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are
so regarded by others". See Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian W Kwan,
Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1965), p. 47. Cited in Richard M. Burkey, 'The Basic Units: Ethnic
Group, Race, Nationality and Society", in his Ethnic and Racial Groups:
The Dynamics of Dominance (Menlo Park, California: Cummings
Publishing Co., 1978), p. 1.
6. According to Richard Burkey, an ethnic group is "a community group
based upon the ascribed status of a diffused ancestry that is maintained
by similarities of culture, language and/or phenotype". Ibid., p. 8.
7. In my earlier study with Sharon Siddique, we examined the concept
of indigenism with special reference to two ASEAN states. See Sharon
Siddique and Leo Suryadinata, "Bumiputra and Pribumi: Economic
Nationalaism (Indigenism) in Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific Affairs
54, no. 4 (Winter 1981-82): 662-87.
8. William Skinner, "Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas:
A Comparison of Thailand and Java", journal of South Seas Society
[Nanyang Xuebao] 16 (1960): 86-100.
9. This was the 1989 figure, cited in Bangkok Bank, Ershi Shiji Taiguo
Huaqiao Renkou Chutan, 30 April 1992, p. 17.
10. The estimated number is between 40,000 and 200,000.
11. Xibo, "Xingshi Ruji he Sixiang Ruji", Dipingxian, no. 3 (1996), p. 23.
12. See Goh Cheng Teik, Integration in a Plural Society: The Chinese in
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1978), p. 25.
I. E!hntc Ch;nese ;n Southeast Asta 23

13. By 1970, 176,799 (5.7 per cent) out of 3,117,896 Chinese residing in
West Malaysia were still alien. See ibid. No recent figures are available.
14. The number of ethnic Chinese in Myanmar is merely an estimate. It
ranges between 234,000 and 800,000. See Huo Shengda, ed., Dangdai
Miandian [Contemporary Myanmar] (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin
Chubanshe, 1993), p. 350. See also the paper by Mya Than in this
volume.
15. Ibid.
16. Cited in Tran Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in
Vietnam (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993), pp. 26-27. See also Ethnic Minorities
in Vietnam (Hanoi: The Gioi, 1993), p. 233. (The figure cited in this
book is 900,000.)
17. For a brief study of Chinese tycoons in Southeast Asia, see Yoshihara
Kunia, The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 191-99; and Shijie Huren Fuhao
Bang, a publication of Forbes Chinese edition of Zibenjia (Hong Kong,
1994)
18. An earlier version of my arguments can be found in my article,
"Government Policies Towards the Ethnic Chinese in the ASEAN States:
A Comparative Analysis", in The Ethnic Chinese, Proceedings of the
International Conference on Changing Identities and Relations in
Southeast Asia, edited by Teresita Ang See and Go Bon Juan (Manila:
Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, 1994), pp. 67-80.
19. For the size of the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, see
Table 1.
20. A good example is Mahathir's population policy which was intended
to increase the Malaysian population to 70 million over an unspecified
period. However, the policy has quietly been abandoned.
21. James G. Martin and Clyde W Franklin, Minority Group Relations
(Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1973), p. 123.
22. Donald Horowitz, "Ethnic Identity", in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience,
edited by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P Moynihan (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 111-40.
23. Many writers have maintained that the Philippine elites in fact consist
of Spanish and Chinese mestizos.
24. Martin and Franklin, op. cit., p. 130.
25. For a brief analysis of the policy, see Leo Suryadinata, "China's Economic
Modernization and the Ethnic Chinese in ASEAN: A Preliminary Study",
in Southeast Asian Chinese and China: The Politico-Economic Dimension,
edited by Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995),
pp. 193-215.
26. For a study of ethnic Chinese capitalists' investments in China, see
ibid.
24 Leo Suryadmata

2 7. See the three articles by Leo Suryadinata, Teresa Chong Carino and Ho
Khai Leong in ibid.
28. "Budaya, Bisnis dan Pengabdian", Editor, no. 48 (11 August 1990):
25-26.
29. The ages of the respondents were between 17 and 25. Ibid.
30. Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Continuity and
Change", in Southeast Asian Chinese: The Socio-Cultural Dimension,
edited by Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995),
pp. 29-30.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid, pp. 31-32.
33. The 1969 survey was conducted by Chiew Seen Kong, while the 1989
survey was done by Chiew and Tan En Ser. See Chiew Seen Kong,
"National Identity, Ethnicity and National Issues", in In Search of
Singapore's National Value, edited by ]on S.T. Quah (Singapore: Times
Academic Press, 1990), pp. 66-75.
 Comments by
Tan Chee Beng on
"Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia:
Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas
or Southeast Asians?"
Presented by Leo Suryadinata

Leo Suryadinata's paper is quite comprehensive and appropriate

as an introduction to this volume. The paper addresses the theme
on whether the Chinese in Southeast Asia are Overseas Chinese,
Chinese overseas or Southeast Asians? I agree with his emphasis
that the Chinese in Southeast Asia are not a homogeneous group,
and that the majority see themselves as Southeast Asians, although
I would qualify the term "Southeast Asians".
Leo first discusses the terms used for the Chinese in Southeast
Asia. This is a complex issue, which I cannot comment in just a
few words. We agree with Leo that the Chinese in Southeast Asia
do not like to be called "Overseas Chinese". When I say "we" I
have in mind both the Chinese in Southeast Asia generally and
those of us who have spoken out against various scholars who
continue to use the term. At the 1991 Manila conference on the
Chinese in Southeast Asia, for instance, there was a heated academic
exchange on this issue between some of us and a few scholars
from Taiwan (see Tan 1992, pp. 6-7). As proud citizens of our
respective countries, we feel insulted to be called or even referred
to as "Overseas Chinese". We are overseas in China but not when
we are at home in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and so
forth.
Some scholars outside Southeast Asia do not understand our
sensitivity; they cannot grasp the feeling of the Chinese in Southeast
Asia. The pride of being local is not new nor merely political. It
is a natural development of local consciousness. Even in the early
period of Chinese settlement history, such as in Malaysia and
Indonesia, the earlier and more settled Chinese had always been
proud of their local status, and they looked down on later
26 Tan C/7ec Beng

immigrants. The Baba in the Straits Settlements, for example, used

their local status to claim a higher status over the Sinkeh, the new
immigrants. In fact, the popularity of the label Baba had much to
do with the contrast with Sinkeh. With the formation of the new
states in Southeast Asia, most Chinese, not just the Baba, identified
with the new states, and wanted to be a dignified part of the
emerging new "state-nations", to use Leo's description. The point
is that the rejection of the label "Overseas Chinese" is not merely
for political reasons (for example, to ensure acceptance by the
indigenous people), but it is very much the internal growth of
local consciousness and genuine local identification.
There are a number of reasons and motives for the persistent
use of the term "Overseas Chinese" in English. In the past there
were Overseas Chinese but after independence, most Chinese in
Southeast Asia ceased to see themselves as such, and the younger
generations identify themselves as Malaysians, Indonesians,
Singaporeans, and so on, of Chinese origin. Some writers have
ignored this important aspect of historical development and have
continued to treat the Chinese in Southeast Asia as Overseas
Chinese. In Europe, America and Australasia, there has been a
continuous influx of new immigrants from China, and this has
complicated the use of a label for the Chinese there.
There are writers, including those of Chinese origin, who use
the label "Overseas Chinese" out of convenience to refer to all the
Chinese outside China. They are aware of the historical inaccuracy
and the sensitivity of the local Chinese to the use of this term,
but they ask what is the alternative label to cover all the Chinese
referred to? To avoid this problem, in recent years some scholars,
mainly those of Chinese origin, have used the label "Chinese
overseas". I think this is translated from the Chinese Haiwai huaren.
This term is more acceptable than "Overseas Chinese", but as
expressed by Leo, some Chinese in Southeast Asia are still not
comfortable with the presence of the word "overseas". Nevertheless,
we should respect the good intention of writers who use the
label "Chinese overseas". From the perspective of the writers from
China, this is acceptable as it is a geographical term to refer to
the Chinese outside their own country, that is, outside China. Of
course, the label "Chinese overseas" includes both the local Chinese
Comments on Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia 27

of different nationalities and the Overseas Chinese who are nationals

of China.
There are, however, some writers from the West who are under
a sort of "yellow peril" paradigm to intentionally portray an
economically stronger China as a threat to world peace and security
- actually meaning against Western interests. They group the
Chinese from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan with the Chinese
from Southeast Asia as "Overseas Chinese", who are portrayed as
helping China to develop and dominate Asia. Leo correctly points
out that it is misleading to consider the Chinese from Hong Kong,
Macau and Taiwan as "Overseas Chinese". Furthermore, as many
scholars have shown, the so-called overseas investment in China
mostly come from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, and not so
much from Southeast Asia directly (cf. Li 1994). Leading Western
newspapers and magazines, such as The Economist, have in recent
years been consistent in portraying China as a threat to the rest
of Asia and therefore argue for the need to contain China. In fact,
the United States has been the dominating force in Asia and there
is a fear in the West that a stronger China may threaten continuing
Western domination. We have to speak out against this construction
of the culture of domination by Western media and writers. We
should be aware of the Western rhetoric on "Overseas Chinese"
and China to justify containing China and perpetuating Western
domination. Furthermore, this kind of rhetoric, if unchallenged,
may cause the indigenous people and governments of Southeast
Asia to distrust the local Chinese.
As pointed out by Leo and various other scholars, the invest-
ments in China by Southeast Asian Chinese capitalists have much
to do with business opportunities and profit. Businessmen from
all over the world have sought to invest in China, not just the
people of Chinese descent. Although Chinese businessmen from
Southeast Asia have the advantage of knowing the Chinese language
(but not all Chinese in Southeast Asia can speak and read Chinese)
and may have their social networks in China, this is a separate
issue. What should be questioned is the misleading assumption
that the people of Chinese descent, because of this fact, are always
politically oriented towards China, and their investment in China
is read from this perspective.
28 Tan Chee Beng

I should like to add that, in my opmwn, the Chinese in

different parts of the world do not form a single community. This
is despite the increasing networking between Chinese businessmen,
leaders and academicians world-wide. Nor is there a single Southeast
Asian Chinese community; the Chinese in Southeast Asia identify
with their respective countries and do not see themselves as
belonging to a common wider Southeast Asian Chinese community.
Leo and I may react to the use of the label "Overseas Chinese",
but we do so out of our perception and experience of living in our
respective Southeast Asian states.
It seems that we still lack a common term for the Chinese
who have sunk their roots outside China. In recent years, some
writers have talked of the Chinese diaspora, the term used to
describe the jewish people who are scattered all over the world.
Perhaps because of our experience of having to deal with the local
governments which treat the citizens of Chinese descent as still
somewhat alien, and because of our strong local identification, we
also find it difficult to accept the term "diaspora". We fear being
perceived as scattered communities without a sense of belonging,
whatever the good intentions of the term's users.
This leaves us with the term "ethnic Chinese" which appears
to be the most acceptable one, at least in this region. By tradition
of usage rather than its accuracy, the term has been used to refer
to the Chinese in Southeast Asia who are citizens of their respective
countries. In China, there are different Chinese ethnic groups but
in Southeast Asia, the term "ethnic Chinese" is used in relation to
other local ethnic groups. It is therefore local in orientation.
The term "people of Chinese descent" has also been used. I
myself have used this label to refer to people (outside China) who
identify themselves as Chinese irrespective of their nationality and
level of acculturation. It is not without difficulty, especially if it is
used loosely to include anyone who can trace some Chinese
descent. Of course, the term is derived from the Chinese term
huayi.
The Chinese in Southeast Asia generally refer to themselves as
Huaren. The consistent use of this label instead of Huaqiao or
"Overseas Chinese" after independence shows the shift in identity
and the emphasis on the local orientation. Zhongguo ren, which
Comments on Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia 29

means "people of China" or "Chinese", is avoided so as not to be

confused with the citizens of China. Huaren also means "Chinese"
but it is ethnic in reference; although it means Chinese in general,
not just the Chinese in Southeast Asia. For the people in China
the term Zhongguo ren is appropriate. The Chinese in Southeast
Asia perceive the term Huaren as special to them and so have
taken the term for granted. In the same way, in Southeast Asia,
Huayu means the Mandarin language, although Hua actually means
Chinese in general. For a person from China, Huayu can refer to
any Chinese language, not just Mandarin. Thus, the Chinese
magazine Yazhou Zhoukan usually provides Putong Hua in paren-
theses following the term Huayu to ensure that all readers know
what it means.
Since the Chinese in Southeast Asia call themselves Huaren
(that is "the Hua people") in Mandarin, it is reasonable to use the
label "Hua people" as a general label. In fact, the Chinese in
Vietnam have been called "Hoa". However, a label is also very
much a matter of usage, and so far the term "ethnic Chinese" is
more commonly used in English writings about the Chinese in
Southeast Asia by those who wish to avoid the label "Overseas
Chinese".
Overall, the Chinese in Southeast Asia should not be called
"Overseas Chinese", a label which is appropriate only for citizens
of China living overseas. Often, the context alone is sufficient to
indicate the kind of Chinese referred to, such as the description
"Chinese in Southeast Asia" or "Chinese worldwide". Where
necessary, the terms "ethnic Chinese", "people of Chinese descent"
or even "Hua people" may be used, as we have yet to find a
commonly acceptable collective term for all Chinese living outside
China and who are citizens of their respective countries.
Having dealt with the complex issue of labels, I need not say
much about the concepts of nation, citizenship and government
policies which Leo has discussed systematically His distinction of
state-nations and nation-states is useful for studying ethnicity and
state in Southeast Asia. He points out clearly that "(T)he state is
created first and a new nation is built on the state boundary".
What is of interest is how the indigenous people and the Chinese
view their new state-nations differently Even within the Chinese
30 Tan Chee Beng

community of each state, the nation is perceived differently by

different sections of the Chinese population. In Malaysia, for
example, a section of the Chinese-educated Chinese even think
that the Chinese should have their own separate system of
education, including a Chinese-medium university. Other Chinese
Malaysians are more concerned with equal participation in nation-
building and are not bothered very much about the medium of
instruction at the secondary and tertiary levels.
The position of the ethnic Chinese is affected by government
policies and citizenship laws. For example, indigenous economic
nationalism when realized as government policies affect the interests
of the Chinese. While the ethnic Chinese generally agree that
poverty among the indigenous people has to be addressed and
that the increased involvement of the indigenous people in business
is important, they do worry about racial policies which discriminate
against the Chinese. Overall, as is obvious in Leo's paper, it is the
power relations between the indigenous people and the Chinese
community concerned which determine the kind of policies
towards the ethnic Chinese.
The position of the Chinese in Southeast Asia differs from
state to state. Indonesia has adopted a rather assimilative policy
but this is not possible in Malaysia which has a much higher
proportion of Chinese who have some share of political power,
albeit subordinated to that of the Malays. The "Chinese problem"
in Indonesia is very much linked to the citizenship issue - in
fact, the so-called Chinese problem is actually one of government
attitudes and policies, and not a Chinese problem per se. The
assimilative policy is misguided by the view that the loyalty of
the Chinese can only be obtained by suppressing their ethnic
distinctiveness. In fact, diversity is a fact of life, and unity in
diversity can be achieved without trying to bring about uniformity,
which is not realistic. Ultimately, it is subjective identification
which counts, not cultural uniformity.
Lastly, I would like to deal with two issues which are relevant
to the paper. On the question of ethnic identification, we should
pay more attention to subjective identification by the people them-
selves, irrespective of the level of change in their cultural identity.
Are Melaka Baba Chinese, since their mother tongue is Baba
Comments on Ethmc C/11nese ;n Southeast As;a 31

Malay rather than a Chinese language? Of course, they are Chinese

as they perceive of themselves as such and are proud of being
Chinese. We have to distinguish subjective identification and
objective cultural manifestation, and it is misleading to use objective
cultural criteria of Chineseness to determine whether the accul-
turated Chinese are Chinese or not. Surely if we study ethnic
identity, the people's own ethnic perception must be our primary
consideration, although we can study how acculturation has
accounted for different ways of being Chinese. Thus, whether the
more locally acculturated people of Chinese descent are Chinese
or not is not so much a question of acculturation but a problem
in our research ability to understand their perception.
In some cases, like the Chinese mestizo in the Philippines,
outsiders may find it difficult to know whether they can be
considered Chinese or not, or both Chinese and Filipino. A person
can say that he or she is of Chinese descent, but if he identifies
himself as a Filipino only and not Chinese, then he is Filipino and
not ethnic Chinese, but if he also identifies himself as an ethnic
Chinese, then he is one irrespective of the level of acculturation.
President Corazon Aquino has acknowledged that she has Chinese
ancestry and the Chinese press has written of her as if she is an
ethnic Chinese. But how has she identified herself? Has she ever
identified herself as an ethnic Chinese? As far as I know, she is
just Filipino.
The phenomenon of double identity in Thailand is quite well
known, as Leo Suryadinata has described. A person can be both
ethnically Chinese and Thai, not just Thai by nationality This
should be distinguished from multiple levels of identities, as in
the case of Chinese Malaysians who can be Hokkien at one level
and ethnic Chinese in general in relation to the Malays, and
Malaysian in national identity The Chinese in Malaysia cannot be
both Chinese and Malay at the same time, and so there is no
double identity phenomenon. In my opinion, it is better to reserve
the use of "double identity" to refer to the possession of two
autonomous ethnic identities at the same time, not merely the
possession of different levels of identities. In this respect, perhaps
Leo can enlighten us whether the Chinese in Indonesia can have
32 Tan Chee Beng

double identity, that is, being both ethnically Chinese and ethnically
Indonesian at the same time.
Leo correctly concludes that the Chinese factor will always be
important, but the Chinese in Southeast Asia will continue to be
locally oriented. They are proud of their identities too. Of course,
ethnic identities are not static, being constantly influenced by
many factors such as government policies. Given the local orien-
tation of the ethnic Chinese, a more liberal definition of nation
will enhance their sense of participation, making meaningful
integration possible. A policy of forced assimilation and discrimi-
nation will make them feel alienated. I fully agree with Leo that
Chinese adjustment is not difficult if there is democratization and,
more importantly, the economic condition of the local population
improves.

References
Li, Guoliang. "Zhanhou Dongnanya Huaren Rentong Yanjiu de Gongshi yu
Fengqi" [Studies on the Identity of Ethnic Chinese in Post-war Southeast
Asia: Consensus and Dissension]. In The Ethnic Chinese, edited by
Teresita Ang See and Go Bon Juan, pp. 243-49. Manila: Kaisa Para Sa
Kaunlaran, Inc., 1994.
Tan Chee Beng. "Echos De La Recherche: International Conference on
Changing Ethnic Identities and Relations in Southeast Asia: The Case
of the Chinese Minority". Archipel 44 (1992): 3-13.
 Chapter 2
The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia:
Issues of Identity

Mely G. Tan

Citizenship and Identity

It was thirty-four years ago that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia
had to make an active choice between Indonesian or Chinese
(People's Republic of China) citizenship, based on the Sino-
Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality, signed in Bandung on 22
April1955. After due process, which took almost five years, during
a two-year period from January 1960 to January 1962, those who
were considered to have dual citizenship had to declare in a court
of law that they rejected Chinese citizenship if they wanted to opt
for Indonesian citizenship. 1 For virtually all of the ethnic Chinese
qualified to take this action, this was the first time they had to
face the reality of deciding who they were, where they were and
how they saw their future - in other words, to determine their
identity
34 MelyG. Tan

There were four categories of people who acted in different

ways at the time: those who made up their mind that the only
and best choice was to opt for Indonesian citizenship; those who
agonized during the whole two-year option period and only
decided to opt when the deadline drew near; those who decided
not to do anything, thereby becoming aliens (warganegara asing
or WNA); and those who were ignorant of the Treaty and the
action they had to take, thereby losing the option to become
Indonesian citizens.
At this point it is appropriate to ask whether by making an
active choice of citizenship, the ethnic Chinese had a notion of a
nation and being part of a nation. It is quite probable that most
of them had not even thought about it, and had not considered
it when making their choice. However, from the writings of those
who had, it is clear that they adhered to the concept espoused by
Soekarno, the first President of Indonesia. As shown in his speech
"The Birth of Pancasila", delivered on 1 june 1945, Soekarno
stated: "... What are the requirements of a nation? According to
Renan, the requirements for a nation is the desire to be united.
The people feel themselves to be united and want to be united.
Ernest Renan said that the requirement for a nation is le desir
d'etre ensemble, the desire to be united. According to Ernest Renans
definition, it follows that what becomes a nation is a group of
people who want to be united, who feel themselves united". Then,
he went on to quote Otto Bauer in his book Die Nationalitaetenfrage,
"... Was ist eine Nation? and the answer is given: Eine Nation ist
eine aus Schicksalgemeinschaft erwachsene Charaktergemeinschaft [A
nation is a community of character which has grown out of a
community of shared experience]". 2 Since then, this concept of
nation espoused by Soekarno has been used by virtually everyone
in defining the concept of a nation in Indonesia. Among them was
the late Harsja W Bachtiar, well-known Professor of Sociology at
the University of Indonesia, in an article written in 1987 and
reprinted in 1992. 3
One of the ethnic Chinese who has been most articulate in
propounding this concept is Harry Tjan Silalahi, a prominent
politician, former member of Parliament and of the Supreme
Consultative Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung) of Indonesia,
2. The Ettmtc Chtnese in !ndonesta 35

and today a member of the board of directors of the Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta. In a lecture
to the participants of one of the regular courses of the National
Resilience Institute (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional) in April 1994,
he stated that because of its pluralistic nature, the concept of
nation in Indonesia has followed the definitions of Ernest Renan
and Otto Bauer, quoting the same statements as those attributed
to Soekarno, mentioned above. He further emphasized that the
"Founding Fathers" reaffirmed that " ... the Indonesian nation is
not based on having the same mother tongue, or constituting one
ethnic group, culture or religion. What unites the peoples of
Indonesia is their shared history, shared suffering, shared
oppression, the struggle for independence . . . From this shared
fate emerged the will to be together. This is the foundation of the
unity of the Indonesian nation". 4 It is obvious that the ethnic
Chinese who have become Indonesian citizens will adhere to this
concept of the Indonesian nation as it is not based on race or
ethnicity, and therefore constitutes the basis for and confirms their
right to be part of this nation.
According to estimates, of the approximately 2.45 million
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia during the option period, about one
million could be considered to have dual nationality Most of
them registered their choice, and of these, according to official
sources, about 65 per cent opted for Indonesian citizenship, while
according to Chinese leaders the proportion was between 70 and
90 per cent (Mackie and Coppel in Mackie 1976, pp. l l and
214). Thus, one could assume that the legal status of the ethnic
Chinese was finally settled in 1962.
However, problems related to citizenship continued to emerge,
and in 1969, the Indonesian Government unilaterally abrogated
the Treaty This meant, among other things, that whereas according
to the Treaty the children of those who had an alien status could
choose their citizenship within one year after coming of age (Article
VI), now they could only become an Indonesian citizen through
naturalization. Moreover, after the abortive coup of September
1965 (referred to with the acronym G-30-S for Gerakan 30
September), diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the PRC
were frozen (starting in 1967), and only resumed twenty-three
36 MelyG. Tan

years later in 1990. This event was marked by the signing of a

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the foreign ministers
of both countries on 8 August 1990 in jakarta, witnessed by
President Soeharto for Indonesia and Prime Minister Li Peng for
the PRC. This document consists of only four paragraphs, and
two of them deal with dual nationality (referring to Indonesian
citizens of Chinese origin), and non-interference in each other's
domestic affairs. It is interesting to note that a figure of 300,000
was mentioned as the number of people whose citizenship status
needed to be resolved (Tan 1991, p. 115).
As a follow-up to the signing of the MOU, a series of meetings
on a bilateral basis ensued both in Jakarta and in Beijing. Most of
these meetings occurred in 1992. On 14-16 April1992, a Senior
Officials Meeting (SOM) was held in jakarta with delegations from
both countries. This was in preparation for the signing of the
MOU by the Indonesian Minister of Justice Ismael Saleh and the
Minister of justice of the PRC Cai Ceng, in Beijing on 4 May
1992. The deliberations dealt with the determination of the status
of the approximately 300,000 (the figure mentioned was 299,224)
persons considered to be aliens, but who had settled in Indonesia
for decades. The PRC Government stated that it was prepared to
provide them with PRC passports. There were also those catego-
rized as illegal immigrants. These included about 3,058 persons
who had left Indonesia with the status "exit permit only", as a
result of the disturbances related to the implementation of regu-
lation PP10/1959 (Kompas, 1 April1992). Included in this category
were also those who had entered Indonesia with a false/forged
passport.
Then there were those who were already in possession of an
"exit permit only" document but who did not leave Indonesia
because the transportation provided by China was not sufficient
to take them. Figures mentioned that of the approximately 140,000
who had registered, only about 40,000 were able to leave, and
about 100,000 remained in Indonesia. Apparently, over the years
their numbers were reduced as a result of Keputusan Presiden
or Keppres (Presidential Decision) No. 13, 1980, which provided
for a less complicated, faster and cheaper naturalization process.
Besides, it appears that many of the women married Indonesian
2. The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 37

citizens, and, of course, there were also those who had passed
away (Suara Karya, 18 September 1992).
Furthermore, on 17 September 1992, both ministers met in
jakarta and signed a "Record of Discussion", where it was agreed
that the process of dealing with illegal immigrants was to be
extended to 3 january 1993. On the same day, the Minister of
justice, lsmael Saleh, told the press that those considered citizens
of the PRC, but who had lived in Indonesia for decades, number-
ing about 230,000, could become Indonesian citizens through
naturalization (Kompas, 18 September 1992).
What was the reaction of those affected by these agreements
between the governments of Indonesia and the PRC? If the report
from the situation in Central java is any indication, the reaction
was positive. According to the head of the regional office of the
Department of Justice of Central java, there were 17,000 requests
for Indonesian citizenship. However, he stated that none had been
granted yet because this depended on the decisions made at the
national level (Kompas, 7 October 1992). At the same time, there
were also reports that in Pangkalpinang, for example, 3,827 aliens
of Chinese descent, might lose the opportunity to become Indo-
nesian citizens because they did not have enough funds to acquire
their citizenship papers (Media Indonesia, 11 December 1992). In
West Kalimantan province, with an ethnic Chinese population of
406,182 (one of the largest numbers of ethnic Chinese in Indo-
nesia), by 30 june 1990, 155,512 had received the Surat Bukti
Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia (SBKRI or the Certificate of
Indonesian citizenship) document (Bisnis Indonesia, 11 December
1992).
These agreements and the follow-up actions were designed to
resolve the problem of the citizenship status of those ethnic Chinese
who did not possess the appropriate documents. If the figures
mentioned are accurate or approximately accurate, this would
involve about 300,000 people.
What about those who have become Indonesian citizens since
the option period 1960-62, and through further regulations, such
as Instruksi Presiden or Inpres (Presidential Instruction) Republik
Indonesia No. 2, 1980, issued on 31 January 1980, which was
meant to provide those who were considered de facto citizens, but
38 Me61 G Tan

who lacked the documents to prove this, with a Surat Bukti

Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia and the Keputusan Presiden
or Keppres No. 13, 1980, issued on February 1980, mentioned
earlier. These regulations, especially the SBKRI, most probably
influenced the outcome of the 1980 census, which was taken in
October 1980, about two months after the expiration of the
implementation of this regulation. This census registered the
number of alien Chinese as 462,314, which was a drastic drop
from the 1,028,935 in the 1971 census (Tan 1987, p. 65). This
figure was probably used as the basis for determining the number
of 300,000 mentioned in the MOU of 1990.
A further development was the confirmation that children of
Indonesian citizens of foreign descent need not have the SBKRI.
This was stated by the Minister of justice Ismael Saleh on 2 7
March 1992, at a ceremony to present the SBKRI symbolically to
a number of youths in Pontianak, West Kalimantan. He confirmed
that those children need not possess the document themselves
(Kompas, 30 March 1992). This regulation became formal by the
Decision of the Minister of justice, signed on 10 july 1992. It was
stipulated that the status of children of parents who have an
SBKRI can be ascertained from their birth certificate and Kartu
Tanda Penduduk (KTP) or identification card (Business News, 6
November 1992).
If we keep to the figure of 3 per cent as the proportion of
ethnic Chinese in the Indonesian population, now estimated at
about 195 million, this would mean an absolute number of around
5,850,000. This is the number of ethnic Chinese we are concerned
with in this chapter.
There is today an upsurge of interest in the ethnic Chinese,
especially in Southeast Asia. The popularity of books such as john
Naisbitts' Megatrends Asia and Sterling Seagrave's Lords of the Rim
(both published in 1995) attest to this. The thrust of these recent
writings is that the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, in particular
the business people, have kept their identity as Chinese, which is
sustained by the network that has developed among them. This
chapter will discuss how the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia identify
themselves today and perceive their prospects for the future.
2. The Ethntc Chtnese tn lndonesta 39

Issues of Identity
Conceptually, the most comprehensive analysis of the identity of
the Southeast Asian Chinese to date is probably still Wang
Gungwu's 'The study of Chinese identities in Southeast Asia" (in
Cushman and Wang 1988, pp. 1-23; also reproduced in Wang
1991, ch. ll). He notes a very important development among
this group of people: that during the past decades, contrary to the
stereotype "once a Chinese, always a Chinese", the ethnic Chinese
in Southeast Asia have changed and they are capable of undergoing
further change.
A number of studies have indicated that there are people of
Chinese descent who have become citizens of the country they
settled in and who do not consider themselves Chinese. Then
there are those who had lost almost all their affinity with their
Chinese origin, but who have rediscovered their Chineseness and
who are trying to be resinicized. There is yet another category of
ethnic Chinese who have what Wang calls a "double identity".
These people are citizens of, and identify with, their country of
adoption, yet remain conscious of being Chinese.
Based on these observations Wang identifies the following
types of ethnic Chinese identity in Southeast Asia:
1. a historical identity, which is a pre-World War II phenomenon,
and is now encapsulated in the concept of cultural identity;
2. a Chinese nationalist identity, which is also a pre-World War
II phenomenon and today practically non-existent;
3. a communal identity, which is a characteristic of the Malaysian
situation and which may change to ethnic identity;
4. a national or local identity, which is now found among most
Southeast Asian Chinese who have become citizens of their
country of residence;
5. a cultural identity, a concept that has absorbed the traditional
historical identity;
6. an ethnic identity, which corrects the cultural identity on the
point of racial origins;
7. and a class identity, which depends on crossing ethnic
boundaries.
40 MelyG Tan

Wang points out that in reality some of these identities overlap,

and it is therefore more appropriate to approach this topic through
the notion of multiple identities. In other words, the ethnic Chinese
in Southeast Asia usually have more than one identity at the same
time.
How these identities are determined, Wang suggests, is through
the concept of norms. He identifies four types of norms that exist
in any society: physical norms, political norms, economic norms
and cultural norms. By combining four of the now still existing
common identities, that is, national, cultural, ethnic and class,
with the four types of norms, he shows that, depending on the
pressures put on the ethnic Chinese in terms of the norms, they
will lean towards any one of the four types of identity or a
combination of them.
Using this model, Wang has come up with some interesting
observations about the type of identity existing in a number of
Southeast Asian countries. In this chapter, we will only discuss his
observations on the situation in Indonesia.
He notes that: "Indonesia provides the most complex, and
even contradictory picture. On the one hand, political norms weigh
so strongly on people of Chinese descent that there are few options
open to them. Access to Chinese cultural norms is kept to a
minimum and the normative national identity is the primary
standard for all. On the other hand, up to half the Chinese popu-
lation are aliens and are unable to obtain Indonesian citizenship.
For them, the cultural identity route to survival and success remains
their only option" (Wang 1988, p. 16).
Wang's paper was presented and discussed at a symposium in
Canberra in June 1985, about eleven years ago. Nonetheless, the
model is still useful in analysing the situation in Indonesia today,
although some of the facts and the relationship between Indonesia
and the PRC have changed significantly
No doubt, the position of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is
still complex and much attention has been and is still being paid
by the media 5 to the relationship between the two countries,
especially the question of citizenship of those whose status was
declared unclear. As mentioned earlier, the number of those con-
sidered aliens at the time of the signing of the MOU to resume
Z The Ethnic Ch1nese in Indonesia 41

diplomatic relations in 1990 was about 300,000. This is contrary

to the observation of Wang that in the 1980s half the ethnic
Chinese in Indonesia were aliens.
Nevertheless, an indication of the complexity of the position
of the ethnic Chinese is the fact that although the MOU on the
resolution of citizenship was signed by the ministers of justice of
the two countries in 1992, the status of about 208,000 ethnic
Chinese is still being processed. 6
Apparently, President Soeharto himself was made aware of the
slowness of this process and on 14 August 1995 he signed a
Presidential Decision (Keppres No. 57, 1995) on the procedure to
resolve requests for naturalization, followed by a Presidential
Instruction (Inpres No. 6, 1995), signed on lO November 1995.
The intent of both documents was to speed up the process to
acquire naturalization. The deadline was mentioned as 31 March
1996. The issuing of these documents indicates that Indonesia is
prepared to grant citizenship to these people, although they still
have the option to be nationals of the PRC.
As it was generally known that the delay was at the imple-
mentation stage, after the two regulations were issued, the office
of the Cabinet Secretariat called a meeting in jakarta on 2 7
November 1995. It was attended by the highest officials in the
government agencies involved in the implementation of the two
documents.
This development indicates that at the top level of government
there is agreement about resolving the citizenship status of the
ethnic Chinese involved. It is at the level of implementation that
the problems arise. Considering the history of the process since
1990, it remains to be seen whether by the end of March 1996
the naturalization process will indeed be concluded. 7
What are the issues involved in determining the identity of
the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia? How true is the observation of
Wang that the pressure of political norms on the ethnic Chinese
is so strong that they have no choice but to lean towards a
normative national identity? These questions will apply to virtually
all the ethnic Chinese, as those considered aliens have been reduced
to about 200,000 and if the naturalization process is resolved as
scheduled, almost none will be left. Thus, in discussing the issues
42 MelyG Tan

of identity, we will deal with all ethnic Chinese who are Indonesian
citizens.
Although the majority of Indonesians tend to group all ethnic
Chinese together as one entity, there are clear differences among
them and this has implications for the determination of their
identity An important distinction is by cultural orientation, which
is the result of their educational experience, the number of
generations their family has settled in Indonesia, and whether
they are of mixed descent. This has led to the distinction between
the totok and peranakan.R
The totok are those who are usually not of mixed descent,
whose families have been in Indonesia for two or three genera-
tions, have had a Chinese language education and a Chinese
cultural orientation, primarily indicated by the fact that they speak
Mandarin or one of the Chinese dialects at home - at least, the
older generation. By occupation, most of these totok are in business
and trade.
The peranakan are those who are of mixed descent, whose
families have settled in Indonesia for at least three generations,
who may have had some Chinese language school education but
do not speak Chinese as the home language, and whose cultural
orientation is more towards the culture of the area in which they
have settled. By occupation, many of them have had a university
education and are in the free professions (physicians, dentists,
engineers, lawyers, accountants), but a sizeable number are also
in business and trade.
Today, the validity of this distinction into totok and peranakan
is being questioned, especially the distinction into totok. This is
no doubt largely due to the fact that since 1966 Chinese language
schools have been closed down, and in 1967 the government
issued a regulation prohibiting the use of Chinese characters in
public places, and the expression of cultural elements construed
to be of Chinese origin, such as the Chinese lunar new year,
outside the home environment. This is part of the assimilation
policy, consistently, albeit with some lapses, followed by the
government 9 Whenever it is felt that this regulation has been
transgressed, it is put into effect again.
2. The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 43

This happened with the 1996 lunar new year (the Year of the
Rat) which fell on 19 February, one day before the end of the
Moslem fasting month of Ramadhan, referred to as Idul Fitri,
when there is a two-day national holiday As had been the case for
the past several years, in the week before new year's day, especially
on the eve before the event, the Chinese temples in Jakarta were
crowded with people who burned candles, incense sticks and
took out joss sticks to ascertain their future.
The Governor of Jakarta apparently felt that these festivities
needed to be curbed. On 14 February, in a letter (No. 4, 1996,
dated 14 February 1996) (Suara Pembaruan, 15 February 1996)
concerning the celebration of the lunar new year (referred to as
Tahun Baru Imlek), he noted that in the past few years, the
festivities had been contrary to the regulations in force. Accord-
ing to the governor, these activities would hinder the process of
assimilation and threaten the unity of the nation. He therefore
exhorted that the lunar new year be celebrated in accordance with
Inpres No. 14, 1967, on Chinese religion, beliefs and tradition,
the Joint Decision of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 67,
1980, the Decision of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 224, 1980
and of the Attorney General No. KEP-IIV].N 10/1980 on Instruc-
tion for the Implementation of Inpres No.I4, 1967.
He further reiterated that the celebration of Imlek be within
the family circle, or within the premises of the temple. Imlek, he
noted, was not part of the Buddhist religion but a tradition in
Chinese culture, and therefore should not be celebrated in the
temple. He also appealed to the people not to put up decorations,
banners, printed material or symbols that were manifestations of
Chinese culture. They should also not have in public places
festivities, theatre performances, dances, and other expressions of
culture that are based on Chinese stories or pictures.
As a result of these policies, especially the closing down of
Chinese language schools, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have
refrained from speaking Chinese in public, and from expressing
their cultural traditions, or at least have kept them to a minimum
and within the family circle. This situation is of course not
conducive to maintaining and observing traditional customs.
44 MelyG Tan

Nonetheless, VlSltmg older relatives as an expression of paying

respect to parents, grandparents and relatives of the older genera-
tion is still being practised on the occasion of the lunar new year.
The custom of presenting children and younger relatives with a
"red packet" (referred to as ang pao in Hokkien) is still main-
tained. This, of course, forms an added incentive for the young to
visit the old. This tradition of paying respect to parents and other
older relatives has great potential for survival, as it is one of the
strongest values inculcated among the young.
There are other ways of distinguishing among the ethnic
Chinese. It can be by area of settlement, where their cultural life
and values are strongly influenced by the culture of the dominant
ethnic group of the area. This form of acculturation is expressed
in the use of the local language or a mixture of the local language
and Indonesian at home, as, for instance, Javanese in Central and
East java, Sundanese in West java, Minangkabau in West Sumatra,
Menadonese in North Sulawesi, Ambonese in the Moluccas, and
Balinese in Bali.
Another distinction is by generation: the older generation (50
years and over) who still speak their local language, and Dutch
or Chinese, depending on their educational experience; 10 and the
younger generation (in particular those under 35, who were born
a few years before or after the upheaval of 1965), who speak
mostly Indonesian and, among those who have studied abroad,
the language of the country they studied in, usually English. The
distinction by generation also means a difference in historical
experience. The older generation had experienced the colonial
period under the Dutch, when the population was systematically
·divided by race (Dutch, foreign orientals including Chinese, Arabs
and Indians, and indigenous people); the Japanese occupation
when all Chinese (totoh and peranahan) were lumped together in
one category; and the revolutionary period, when at one point
the Chinese were accused of collaborating with the Dutch. The
younger generation has had no such experience. What some of
them may have experienced is the role of ethnic Chinese university
students in the turbulent period after 1965, when some of them
became well-known members of the "1966 generation" - the
young people, mostly university students who were instrumental
2 The Ethntc Chtnese tn lndonesta 45

in the overthrow of the "Old Order" government under President

Soekarno (Tan 1991, pp. 123, 124).
The understanding of these distinctions is important in
discussing the issues of identity As shown above, language used
at home is a crucial indicator; so are educational experience,
occupation and residence.

Some Empirical Studies

So far, very few substantive empirical studies exist that describe
and analyse the changes in the social structure and cultural outlook
of the ethnic Chinese since the beginning of the New Order. One
of the few, though limited in scope, is Stuart Greif's Indonesians of
Chinese Origin. Assimilation and Goal of "One Nation-One People".
Greif did the study in 1985, when he interviewed ethnic Chinese
on their views of their position in Indonesia, how they identified
themselves, their reasons for the riots in Solo and Semarang which
occurred five years before (1980), the naturalization of alien
Chinese, and on the possibility of the resumption of diplomatic
relations between Indonesia and the PRC. 11 The study involved
interviews with 25 (17 men and 8 women) ethnic Chinese,
presumably selected at random. They were from jakarta (10),
Semarang (4), Yogya (4), Bali (3), and Solo and Bogar (2 each).
Distinguishing them by age, there were nine in the younger (30
years and less) group, and sixteen in the older (31 years and
older). Two of them were aliens (warga negara asing or WNA) and
another two naturalized citizens. This was a qualitative study and
the report was presented in the form of case studies based on the
questions and answers from the interviews. For our purpose here,
we will focus on the question on identity
The answers to this question varied greatly, but all (except for
the two who were WNA) stated that they were Indonesians or
WNI (warganegara Indonesia), but always with some qualification,
indicating that they felt "different". A sample of the most interesting
responses follow.
A thirty-one-year-old peranakan woman from Denpasar, Bali,
who, together with her husband (peranakan of mixed Chinese
and Balinese origin) is in the tourism business, and running a
guest house and a handicrafts shop, said: "We are Indonesians of
46 MelyG. Tan

Chinese origin, but we also know we are not Balinese .... We are
different from the Balinese, but then we are not real Chinese
either" (pp. 32, 33).
A thirty-one-year-old man from Semarang, who is an accountant
in his father's hardware shop said that his family was WNI by
birth, but his in-laws had become citizens by naturalization some
ten years before. "We are of mixed racial background, but consider
ourselves Indonesians of Chinese origin. I cannot speak Chinese.
My father knows a little, but never uses it" (p. 21).
A forty-year-old man from Bali, born in Surabaya and owns a
restaurant, and whose father was a Hakka WNA until his death
while his mother was Javanese, had assumed his mother's nation-
ality, that is, WNI. His wife was a Protestant Torajanese, and he
had become a Protestant. He said, "[I regard myselfl as an Indo-
nesian of Chinese origin. The traditional way of looking at things
in Indonesia stipulates that you are what your father is. Thus, my
children are Chinese, but should my daughter marry a pribumi,
her children will be pribumi. It is very arbitrary" (p. 26).
A forty-six-year-old man from Bogor, a peranakan born in
Bandung, but who moved to Bogor after the 1963 riots when his
family lost everything, said "We are Indonesians first . . . the trend
in the cities, especially in java, is toward loss of Chinese identity"
(p. 45).
A thirty-three-year-old peranakan man from Yogyakarta, born
in Semarang, who was in the family transport, food distribution,
and bus service business, spoke both Javanese and Indonesian
and said that his family continued to practise the Chinese religion,
and for the Chinese lunar new year they would go to Semarang
to pray at the Sam Poo Kong temple, though some members of
the family had become Catholic: "We are all Indonesians" (pp. 61,
62).
A fifty-eight-year-old woman from jakarta, with peranakan
ancestors who had lived in jakarta for an unknown number of
generations and whose family and husband's family were involved
in the wholesale foodstuff and transport business, said: "We are
Batavian Chinese. . .. We have a firm place in Indonesian history
and society and are proud of our heritage. Some of us do not even
look Chinese, but we call ourselves Chinese because of our distinct
2 The Ethnic Chmese in lndonesta 47

class in colonial days. We do not speak Chinese and are very

Indonesianized, but we still prefer to remain a separate group. Our
loyalty is to Indonesia, not to China. But we are neither totok nor
pribumi. ... We marry amongst ourselves .... At one time we were
the most Indonesianized of the Chinese, but now we are among
the most determined to hold onto our identity" (pp. 40, 41).
A forty-five-year-old man from jakarta, born in Central java,
who owned a clothing factory, said: "My outlook is Indonesian ....
Our children do not even look Chinese. I have seen tremendous
changes taking place in Indonesia, and I am confident of the
future. The Chinese are changing along with everyone else,
especially here in jakarta" (p. 58). He was of peranakan stock and
his wife was Sudanese.
A thirty-four-year-old woman from jakarta, who is a secretary
in a law office and whose parents and husband were from a
peranakan background, said she had many pribumi friends: "The
social structure of jakarta, at the higher levels anyway, is not
racial, but based upon professional standard and income. Race
relations are good on every level, especially at the top. There is
plenty of room for peaceful competition. People have no doubt
where we stand as far as nationality is concerned. We are accepted
as 100 per cent Indonesian" (p. 63).
The above examples were responses of those in the older age
group (31 years and over). We will now look at the views expressed
by six in the younger age group (30 years and less). (Of the nine
cases, two were WNA and one was a naturalized citizen.)
A twenty-eight-year-old man from Yogyakarta, who was born
there, as were his parents and grandparents, said: "We are half
Javanese, and I do not know our exact Chinese origins. Culturally,
we are Javanese, and we speak Javanese more often than Indo-
nesian. . .. we are Indonesians in every way .... " On how far the
assimilation process should go, he said, "As far as individuals
want to take it. There should be no regulation of human behaviour.
If people want to intermarry that is their business. If they want
to remain distinct, that is their right, too, just as long as they are
loyal Indonesians" (pp. 51, 52).
A twenty-eight-year-old man, a university graduate from
jakarta and born there, whose totok parents came from Padang,
48 MelyG. Tan

said: "[Parents] still keep many Chinese customs and are dis-
appointed that their children have no real interest. We can speak
Hakka but we rarely do so. Our wives and husbands either have
left their totok ways or are peranakan . ... I am a university graduate,
as is one of my brothers, and this further removes us from the
Chinese past. We use Indonesian almost all of the time and our
thinking is Indonesian . . . . Pancasila guarantees us freedom of
religion" (p. 65).
A twenty-eight-year-old man from jakarta, and born there,
whose parents were from East java, and grandparents from Fukien,
spoke Chinese but could not read or write it, while his peranakan
wife did not know Chinese. He said, "As a result of a silly decision
on the part of my parents before I was born, I was obliged to
spend a lot of time and money getting naturalized. . . . to enhance
my position in business I legally changed my name as well." On
whether naturalization and his name change were both sincere
acts, he replied, "Certainly, the naturalization was. After all this is
my home and country. I think of myself as an Indonesian with
every right to be here. The name change I am not sure about. In
time, I suppose, I shall conceive of myself by that name, but my
children will never have such doubts" (p. 30).
A twenty-nine-year-old man from Semarang, born there and
a Hakka WNA, and married to a Hakka, claimed that his family
history in Indonesia went back a hundred years. He ran an electrical
goods shop, but still helped in his family's furniture business. He
said, "I can speak Chinese, but prefer to use Indonesian only with
my wife and children, since I do not want my children to be
disadvantaged in school. We are WNA, but I shall want to do
something about this so that my children can have a higher
education if they choose to." On being aware of difficulties in
getting naturalized, he said, "Very much so. It will take time and
money, but in my case, it will be worth it. ... I am paying the
price for my parents' mistakes .... " On the manifestation of Chinese
culture in his family, he said, "In every way, from business ethics
to relationships, to cultural and religious outlook, cooking, etc."
(pp. 33, 34).
A twenty-nine-year-old woman from Semarang, and born there,
whose grandparents were from Canton, and whose family was
Z The Ethnic Chinese 1h Indonesia 49

totok, as was her husband, said that they usually spoke Cantonese
at home. "We are not Indonesian citizens, but Indonesia is still
our home. We live fairly contented lives here and look forward to
the future." On why not become naturalized, she replied, "It is
very expensive and time consuming.... It is better to put the time
and money into the business. We lose little by our WNA status,
although being WNI means greater security." On WNA status, she
said, "We are paying the price for a decision made by our parents
before we were even born" (pp. 47, 48).
A twenty-six-year-old woman from jakarta, born in Medan
but who had come to jakarta with her parents when she was eight
years old, and whose parents were full-blooded Chinese, and
husband peranakan, worked as secretary in her husband's legal
firm. She said, "A lot of our work [in husband's legal firm] is with
Chinese, but the bulk is with pribumi or foreign companies ....
through education and experience I am jakartan. I can speak
Chinese, but I cannot read or write .... Through education I have
become an Indonesian . . . . There are no real ways of keeping a
separate Chinese identity" (pp. 35, 36).
These case studies provide a number of interesting observations:
1. Although Greif's study was done eleven years ago and limited
to people in a few big cities in Java and Bali, the findings can
be seen as indicative of the situation at the time, and is probably
to a great extent still valid for the situation today;
2. He interviewed only twenty-five people, thus obviating any
claim to be representative of the ethnic Chinese as a whole,
yet they do show the great variety of this group and represent
a group of people that form the majority of the ethnic Chinese,
that is, people who are self-employed or work in a medium-
size family enterprise. As such, they can be put in the category
of medium or small businessmen and can be considered part
of the so-called "lower middle class", a group that has not
been studied much (Gondomono 1990);
3. The findings show that there is not much difference in identity
between those in the older and the younger age group and by
gender: except for the two who were WNA, all identified
themselves as Indonesians, but recognized the fact that they
50 MelyG. Tan

were of Chinese ongm, and therefore different from the

majority ethnic Indonesians. Those who considered themselves
peranakan emphasized that they were neither ethnic Indonesian
(in most cases Javanese, and in some Balinese), nor totok;
4. Most of them were of the opinion that the government policy
of assimilation had worked to a large extent, as indicated by
the fact that most of them did not speak Chinese at all, and
the few who did, could only speak, but not read or write it;
5. Almost all of them accepted the regulation of 1967 on
restricting expressions of Chinese culture within the family
environment or temple grounds. As one respondent stated:
" ... it may be a price that must be paid .... My parents have
paid a far greater price, but still they stayed and never thought
of leaving" (p. 54).
It is interesting to note the conclusions Greif made on the
basis of his findings. He observes that although the assimilation
process has been painful, it is succeeding. He appears confident
that what he found in 1985 has made all previous studies in the
English language outdated: "In five years' time, this present study
will be a source material for a history of the Chinese here, since
it, too, will be already outdated. Terms such as totok, peranakan,
Indonesian Chinese or Chinese-Indonesians are virtually mean-
ingless. Rather, at least in Java and Bali, we have Indonesians of
Chinese or mixed Chinese origin" (p. 69).
Greif himself admits that his study was mostly concentrated
on WNI Chinese who have been successful and have benefited
from the government policy of assimilation. In his observation,
younger Chinese have no resentment against the assimilation
process, as it is their parents who have had to pay the initial price.
He notes that there is widespread support of the government in
general, and that there is a general feeling that the government is,
in fact, pro-Chinese.

Recent Developments
In the light of recent developments, these observations seem overly
optimistic and too sweeping, especially considering the fact that
the findings are based on the views of a limited number of people,
2. The Ethnic Chinese 1h Indonesia 51

whose selection, as admitted by the author himself, was biased

towards those who had benefited from the government's assimi-
lation policy.
A major development that needs to be examined carefully is
the process of globalization, which is expressed predominantly in
the economy and in informatics, in particular the mass media.
The impact of this process is seen especially in the cities, and in
Indonesia, in jakarta. In the economy, it is manifest in the influx
of foreign investment, in particular from other Asian countries,
and the increase of expatriate workers.
There is the observation that there is a specific "jakarta culture"
that affects everybody. This has led to a form of "internationali-
zation", adopting a specific lifestyle, seen in big cities all over
Asia, and affecting especially the younger generation. This "inter-
national culture" has elements of Western culture and contem-
porary Asian culture, with a dominance of Chinese and japanese
culture. This is expressed, among others, in the popularity of
martial arts (kung ju) movies from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and
the proliferation of karaoke joints in many hotels, restaurants, and
other entertainment places in the business and shopping areas all
over jakarta and other big cities.
As a result, there is a move away from traditional culture, be
it Chinese or Javanese, towards a contemporary culture, which has
a streak of hedonism and individualism. In the view of a business-
man informant, 12 it used to be that people with education were
respected; today, it is people with money. He stated that he felt not
entirely accepted by the ethnic Indonesians, and that one always
had to be on the alert. When there was social unrest, one could
easily become a victim. However, he added that when he visited
China he also did not feel comfortable among the Chinese there.
In terms of identity, in the view of a peranakan high functionary
of a state enterprise, the ethnic Chinese are confused, especially
among the younger generation in the business community. Al-
though they see themselves as Indonesian rather than Chinese,
they recognize their Chinese origin, albeit knowing very little of
Chinese culture and tradition.
The younger generation feels much more Indonesian than
their elders but they also say that one has to be on the alert. On
52 MelyG. Tan

a person-to-person basis relations are good, but it is different at

the group level. A young peranakan man, who is branch manager
of a big private bank, and who belongs to the fourth generation
in Indonesia, stated that he felt comfortable with other peranakan
Chinese, which was not a feeling he shared with ethnic Indonesians.
When they went out for meals, for example, it was almost always
taken for granted by the ethnic Indonesians that the ethnic Chinese
would pay
Among the well-to-do families, many of the younger generation
have studied abroad (to get an MBA is very popular), in the
United States, Australia, Singapore. There is also a trend to send
their children to primary schools in Singapore, where they are
considered to get a good "modern" education, plus an opportunity
to learn Mandarin. This is seen as a good preparation for them to
move into Asian business circles later on. Thus, according to a
businessman informant, to give children this kind of education is
motivated by purely practical considerations for the future.
This kind of reasoning and explanation is questioned by ethnic
Indonesians and rekindles suspicions of a return to "Chineseness",
that is, the phenomenon of the "China factor". This is the view of
the potential influence of China on the ethnic Chinese, through
culture and the economy, which is considered to be especially
plausible since the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1990.
This view is reinforced by the investments in China of some of the
prominent Chinese-Indonesian big businessmen, referred to as
"conglomerates", which continue to receive extensive coverage in
the Indonesian press. 13
Meanwhile, according to one of the very few peranakan
politicians, there is among the ethnic Chinese, especially among
the big businessmen, a growing feeling of impatience that they
are still treated differently, and that they are basically being used,
because of the continuous requests for large funds. For instance,
at the meeting at the Tapas ranch of President Soeharto in March
1990, twenty-nine out of the thirty-one big businessmen invited
were ethnic Chinese. The gist of the President's speech at the time
was to request big business to set aside a certain percentage of
their profits to help the development of co-operatives. Apparently,
this plan did not really get off the ground. 14
2. The Ethntc 0Jtnese tn lndonesta 53

More recently, there was a meeting of ninety-six ethnic Chinese

and ethnic Indonesian big businessmen at Jimbaran, Bali, from
25-27 August 1995. At the end of the meeting, which was meant
to inculcate the ideas of Pancasila (the Penataran Pedoman
Penghayatan Pancasila or P4 course) to these businessmen, a
declaration, referred to as the Deklarasi Jimbaran, was issued. The
declaration consisted of seven points, the gist of which was that
they were prepared to assist in the development of medium and
small enterprises. This was planned to be realized in 1996, starting
with the assistance of 2,500 small enterprises. 15
This declaration was followed by Presidential Decision
(Keppres) No. 90, 1995, issued towards the end of the year. It
required companies (apparently including the foreign ones) to set
aside 2 per cent of the net profit after tax which exceeds Rp.1 00
million, to help families in the category of pra-sejahtera (pre-
welfare) and sejahtera I (welfare I). This was a programme initiated
by the Minister of Population and Coordination of Family Planning,
and supported by President Soeharto (Media Indonesia Minggu, 14
january 1996).
The most recent development in which ethnic Chinese big
businessmen were involved was the establishment of PT. Dua Satu
Tiga Puluh on 16 February 1996. This company was set up to
secure funds needed for the development of the jet plane N-2130
(hence the name of the company), to be produced by PT. Industri
Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN) headed by ].B. Habibie. At the
initial stage, the funds needed would be four trillion rupiah, and
the source for these funds would be the konglomerat. The signing
of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two
companies (by Saadilah Mursjid as Direktur Utama of PT 2130
and ].B. Habibie as Direktur Utama of PT IPTN) was witnessed by
President Soeharto and about fifty konglomerat of the Jimbaran
group. Seen standing next to the President in the picture accom-
panying the article were Mohamad (Bob) Hasan, Eka Tjipta Wijaya,
Prayogo Pangestu, Henry Pribadi (all ethnic Chinese) and Sudwikat-
mono (prominent ethnic Indonesian businessman) (Sinar, 2 March
1996, p. 76).
This feeling of being treated differently from the majority ethnic
Indonesians also exists among the younger generation. Although
54 Mely (] 7~Jn

there is a directive by the Minister of Justice indicating that the

offspring of WNI of foreign descent do not need an SBKRI
(certificate of citizenship), and that an identification card is
sufficient, in reality children of WNI still need a document declaring
that they are WNI when, for example, they enrol in a school,
make a passport, or make an identification card and each time
they have to renew it. According to the politician respondent, as
a result, there is a tendency among the younger generation to be
more conscious of their ethnicity This was also indicated in a
study of ethnic Chinese high school students in the town of
Sukabumi in West Java, where one of the major findings was that
the younger generation tended to withdraw within their own group,
and to be more aware of their ethnic Chinese identity - which
may not mean that they emphasize their Chineseness, but at the
least that they see themselves as different from the ethnic
Indonesians. 16
The politician respondent stated that it annoyed him that as
a Member of Parliament he still had to show documents proving
that he was a WNI whenever he had to renew his identification
card or his passport. Or when he felt compelled to assist his
children in getting their Indonesian citizenship documents, while
in fact legally this was not necessary It is this inconsistency and
arbitrariness in the implementation of existing regulations, and
having to face a bureaucracy that can find ways to circumvent
them, as these informants indicated, that frustrates most of the
ethnic Chinese who identify themselves as Indonesians but are
constantly reminded that they are of Chinese origin, and therefore
different.

Prospects for the Future

After fifty years of independence, the last thirty years under the
New Order government, how do the ethnic Chinese identify
themselves today and what are their prospects for the future? As
conversations with a number of ethnic Chinese in business, state
enterprises, politics, in the Bakom-PKB, and in research work
indicate, the trend is definitely towards integration and identification
as Indonesians, albeit still recognizing their Chinese origin. This
form of identity, as hyphenated Indonesians, will probably continue
2. The Ethnic Chinese m Indonesia 55

through the present younger generation. In Wang Gungwu's model,

this type of identity is a combination of national and ethnic
(cultural) identity
However, we should note that whereas national identity is
clearly based on citizenship, there is variation in the degree of
cultural identity, constituting a continuum ranging from those
who completely identify as Indonesian to those who are still
Chinese-oriented in that their language at home and at work is
Mandarin or one of the dialects, and that they observe rituals and
tradition recognized as elements of Chinese religion and culture.
With the eventual acceptance of virtually all ethnic Chinese,
including those whose citizenship status was unclear, as Indonesian
citizens, this variation in cultural identity is inevitable.
At one end of this continuum are the ethnic Chinese who
have become completely absorbed into the local community and
the culture of the area they have settled, as, for instance, becoming
completely Javanized. An outstanding example of aJavanized ethnic
Chinese was the late Professor Tjan Tjoe Siem, an internationally
known Javanologist, who was married to a Javanese woman. He
and his late brother, the internationally known sinologist Professor
Tjan Tjoe Som, came from Surakarta, where they belonged to a
well-known family who have been Moslems for generations.
Today, one of the best-known, both nationally and interna-
tionally, Javanologist is Kanjeng Raden Hario Tumenggung (KRHT,
a title of nobility conferred on him by the Sunan of Surakarta)
Hardjonagoro. He was born in Surakarta in 1931 with the name
Go Tik Swan, and is a descendant of the Luitenant der Chinezen
(the head of the Chinese community during the Dutch colonial
period). Known as Hardjono Gotikswan, he is an expert in all
aspects of Javanese culture, including batik, keris Qavanese dagger),
literature, gamelan, Javanese dances and wayang (shadow play)
(Kompas, l l February 1996).
At this same end of the continuum are also those who have
converted to Islam. One of the best known figures is Junus Jahja,
a Rotterdam-trained economist, who became a Moslem in 1979,
and married a Sundanese woman some years later. He is convinced
that the best road to assimilation is by becoming a Moslem, the
religion of some 87 per cent of ethnic Indonesians. Another figure
56 Mely G. Tan

was the late Masagung (Tjio Wie Thay), owner of one of the first
and biggest book stores in Indonesia, and founder of the Islamic
Center built at the cost of Rp 1.5 billion. Other businessmen
include jos Sutomo and Jusuf Hamka (foster son of the late Moslem
leader Buya Hamka) (Media Indonesia Minggu, 18 February 1996).
Among the academics, there is Professor Muhammad Budiyatna,
dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics at the Uni-
versity of Indonesia, and Professor Haji Muhammad Hembing
Wijayakusuma, an expert in alternative medicine, who has a weekly
programme on this topic on one of the private TV stations.
Still in this category of Moslem converts are a number of da'i,
or preachers, who not only preach among converts but are also
popular among the Moslem population in general. During the
month of Ramadhan in 1996, a number of them appeared regu-
larly in the Ramadhan programme on TV stations. Among this
group is Alifuddin El Islami (Sim Song Thian), who was born in
1951 in Deli Serdang, North Sumatra. Other TV figures are Anton
Medan (Tan Hok Liang), born in Medan, and Muhamad Syafi'i
Antonio, born Nio Cwang Chung in Sukabumi in 1967. This
information on da'i of Chinese descent appeared in a series of
articles on this topic in the news magazine Gatra of 17 February
1996. In the article on these da'i, there was a listing of eight of
the most popular, among whom were two women: Putri Wong
Kam Fu, whose name at birth was Pak Kiem Lioe and whose
Moslem name is Leoni Fatimah, a professional astrologer and
granddaughter of the well-known astrologer Wong Kam Fu; and
Qomariah Baladraf, born in Gorontalo, North Sulawesi, with the
name Tan Giok Sien.
Among those who identify themselves as Indonesian, without
any qualification, are also those who fully believe in assimilation,
in the sense of being absorbed into the local community of
residence. These include people like K. Sindhunata, who until
this year was the chairperson of Bakom-PKB from its inception
(in the present board of officers, he is a member of the Dewan
Penyantun or Advisory Council), Harry Tjan Silalahi (also a
member of the Dewan Penyantun), Indradi (secretary-general of
Bakom-PKB), and many younger people who have become Catholic
or Protestant.
2. The Ethnic Chinese 1h Indonesia 57

At the other end of the continuum are those who are culturally
still Chinese-oriented, have had a Chinese language education,
and many of whom have become citizens through naturalization.
Among them are some of the big businessmen, like Sudano Salim,
who speaks sub-standard Indonesian with a Chinese accent,
Mochtar Ryadi, and others, still referred to as totok. Their offspring,
however, belong to the category that has been internationalized,
having studied abroad and belonging to a network of business
people involved in international or at least regional trade.
In this category are also those who can be considered to belong
to the "lower middle class", who are self-employed, have a small
family business, or a shop. Examples are the four families
mentioned in Gondomono's studyl 7 of the Chinese community in
jakarta: the older generation still speaks Mandarin, Hakka or
Hokkien, and some of their children also do. However, because
of marriage to peranakan, who do not speak Chinese, and in one
family there is intermarriage with ethnic Indonesians, the language
used at home is mixed. All the families also practise some form
of the Chinese religion.
In between these two ends is the majority of ethnic Chinese,
mostly peranakan, who are culturally more Indonesia-oriented,
speak Indonesian or the local language at home, do not speak
Chinese at all, and are minimally knowledgeable about Chinese
religion and tradition. They earn enough to live comfortably, but
the number of those who have difficulty in making ends meet, or
who are actually poor, is usually underestimated. In jakarta, these
people can be found in the back streets, behind the glittering
shopping malls in the downtown area that is still considered the
Chinatown of jakarta. In fact, they can be found in all big cities
in Indonesia where there is a sizeable ethnic Chinese population.
They have no doubts about being Indonesian citizens, but they
still recognize their Chinese origin.
How they determine their identity and their children's identity
depends very much on their assessment of the way the govern-
ment and the majority of ethnic Indonesians perceive them. From
the case studies by Greif, the conversations referred to above,
and other writings, there is the perception that there is still an
ambiguous attitude in accepting the ethnic Chinese fully as fellow
58 Mely CJ Tan

citizens. There is also the feeling of insecurity, that during an

outbreak of social unrest, they will always be a target in one way
or another. In October and November 1995, for instance, there
were incidents in Purwakarta (Westjava) and Pekalongan (Central
Java) that turned into actions against property (mainly shops and
vehicles) owned by ethnic Chinese (Suara Pembauran, 11 January
1996).
Nonetheless, there are indications that the government recog-
nizes the importance of social and political stability, especially in
the face of the implementation of agreements on the liberalization
of trade and investment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), and in general, fulfilling the requirements for the accept-
ance of a market economy as the prevailing economic system.
Hence, in the recent outbreaks of unrest, incidents were kept
localized owing to the speedy intervention of the security forces.
In the view of the respondent from a state enterprise, the
acceptance of the market system has created a real dilemma for
the government and ethnic Indonesians: the more open the
economy, the more the ethnic Chinese can take advantage of it,
thereby enriching them even more; the more closed the economy,
the more the ethnic Indonesians, as the majority population, will
suffer.
Another interesting development is the composition of the
board of officers of the Bakom-PKB. This new board was installed
by the Minister of Home Affairs on 12 December 1995 for the
period 1995-2000. K. Sindhunata, a Catholic peranakan lawyer
and former officer of the Indonesian Navy, who had been the
General Chairperson (Ketua Umum) since its inception, was
replaced by Juwono Sudarsono, a professor of political science
and former dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics at
the University of Indonesia, and presently the Deputy Governor
of the National Resilience Institute (Media Indonesia, 13 December
1995).
In an interview in Media Indonesia Minggu (14 January 1996),
Sudarsono stated that the programme for the next five years will
focus not on the problem of the "non-pri" ("non-pribumi", meaning
non-indigenous, a term used to denote ethnic Chinese) and "pri"
("pribumi", meaning indigenous, a term used to denote ethnic
2. The Ethntc Chinese th lndonesta 59

Indonesians), but on the problem of nation building, which

includes inter-religious and inter-ethnic relations. He put his views
as follows: "I would like to ask the 'pribumi' to be more honest,
to restrain themselves, and to recognize the fact the 'non-pri'
should really be viewed as an asset. ... We should be more open,
see the future more clearly. First, this is a long-term program of
at the least 15 years. Second, we cannot satisfy everybody. Third,
there will continue to be friction between 'pri' and 'non-pri'. The
'non-pri' will always be at fault, while in fact the fault also lies
with the 'pribumi'. These are the ideas I want to develop".
Furthermore, he stated that ethnic or racial origin should not be
an issue. "We should respect peoples origin .... If someone declares
himself an Indonesian, we should consider him [her] an Indo-
nesian. Where is our maturity after 50 years of independence,
that we should still make an issue of a person's physical features,
skin colour or shape of the eyes?".
For the first time, the nucleus of the board of officers of the
Bakom-PKB consists of mostly ethnic Indonesians. Besides juwono
Sudarsono as General Chairperson {Ketua Umum), the other
chairpersons are Rosita Noer (a Minangkabau woman physician),
Dr Bachtiar Ali (from the University of Indonesia), Dr Dillon Singh
(an agriculturist from the Department of Agriculture, who is of
Indian descent), Natalia Subagio (a Javanese businesswoman, with
a degree in Sinology), Usman Atmadjaja, and M. Indradi Kusumah,
a peranakan lawyer, as the Secretary General. The former members
of the board, who are mostly peranakan Chinese, are now mem-
bers of the Council of_Advisors, including K. Sindhunata, Jusuf
Wanandi, Sudano Salim (Liem Sioe Liang), William Soerjadjaja,
Harry Tjan Silalahi, and Soekamdani Sahid Gitosardjono (an ethnic
Indonesian). 18
As the Bakom-PKB is under the aegis of the Department of
Home Affairs, the composition of the board and the programme
and approach, as outlined by Juwono Sudarsono, must have had
the approval of the government. This can be seen as an indication
that there are influential people who are willing to try· to resolve
the problem of the ethnic Chinese in a comprehensive manner, as
part of the overall process of nation building.
60 Me!yG. Tan

Although it still remains to be seen how the work of the

Bakom-PKB will evolve, for the ethnic Chinese this is an indication
that they are viewed as part of a national problem that needs to
be resolved nationally, rather than as an isolated problem that
needs a special solution. For the ethnic Chinese who have struggled
for decades to resolve the so-called "Chinese problem", this must
be an encouraging development, which will boost their efforts to
continue seeking for the solution most acceptable to all parties
concerned, thereby ensuring better relations between all ethnic
groups in general and between the ethnic Chinese and ethnic
Indonesians in particular. 19

Notes
l. For the full text of the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality,
signed in Bandung on 22 April 1955, by Chou Enlai, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and Sunarjo, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, see Leo Suryadinata,
China and the Asean States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 1985), pp. 166-72. See also Mary Somers-
Heidhues, "Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian
Revolution", in Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since
World War II, edited by jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988).
2. Sukarno, "The Pantja Sila (1945)", in Indonesian Political Thinking
1945-1965, edited by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 40, 41. This important
sourcebook includes the writings and speeches of Soekarno from 1930
("The Promise of a Brightly Beckoning Future") to 1965 ("Storming the
Last Bulwarks of Imperialism").
3. Harsja W Bachtiar (who passed away in December 1995) was a professor
of sociology at the University of Indonesia, with a Ph.D. from Harvard
University (1973). He has written extensively on national integration.
He was a member of the board of the Bakom-PKB from 1990-95. His
ideas on nation, nation-building and national integration in Indonesia,
are expounded in an article entitled "Integrasi Nasional Indonesia" in
Wawasan Kebangsaan Indonesia. Gagasan dan Pemikiran Badan Komunikasi
Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa, revised edition (Bakom-PKB Pusat, 1987
and 1992), pp. 7-56. On the concept of nation, he espoused the ideas
adhered to by Soekarno, adding the information that Ernest Renan
presented his concept of a nation in a public lecture entitled "Qu'est-
ce qu'un nation?" at the Sorbonne, Paris, in 1882.
2. The Ethnic Chinese in lndones;a 61

4. The paper presented by Harry Tjan Silalahi to the participants of the

short regular course at the National Resilience Institute (lemhannas)
on l3 April 1994, was entitled "Cina dan Permasalahannya". For his
biography, see leo Suryadinata, Prominent Indonesian Chinese: Biographical
Sketches (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), pp.
149-51.
5. The interest in matters related to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and
in Southeast Asia in general is continuing. This can be seen in the
coverage by the printed media, which has been compiled by, among
others, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in
jakarta. On the topic of the Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik
Indonesia (SBKRI), there were 53 pages of clippings, covering the
period from September 1991-December 1992. There were 68 pages of
various writings on or related to ethnic Chinese covering the period
from October 1991 to October 1993. These were clippings from the
major jakarta newspapers, including Kompas, Suara Pembaruan,
Republika, Media Indonesia, Merdeka, Pelita, Suara Karya, Angkatan
Bersenjata, jakarta Post, and the news magazine Tempo. In February
1996, due to the coincidence of the lunar new year on 19 February
and the Idul Fitri (end of Ramadhan) on 20 and 21 February, Media
Indonesia Minggu (18 February 1996) appeared with a lead article and
various other articles on the Moslem Chinese in Indonesia and on the
celebration of the lunar new year among the ethnic Chinese, while the
news magazine Gatra (17 February 1996) had a special coverage on
ethnic Chinese da'i, or Moslem preachers.
6. The information on the most recent developments in resolving the
citizenship status of the about 300,000 ethnic Chinese, was received
from a key functionary in the Bakom-PKB, who has been assisting in
the implementation of the policies concerning citizenship of the ethnic
Chinese in Indonesia. He has an extensive knowledge of the history of
this issue, the way the policies have been implemented and the figures
involved. He is one of those deeply concerned about the problems of
the implementation of the regulations, as, for example, the fact that
children of WNI parents are still asked to show their citizen papers,
while this is no longer legally necessary
7. According to a news item in the Suara Pembaruan of l3 june 1996, the
date has been extended to 30 june 1996.
8. On totok and peranakan, see leo Suryadinata, op. cit., pp. 3, 11. See
also Mely G. Tan. "The Role of Ethnic Chinese Minority in Development:
The Indonesian Case", in Southeast Asian Studies 25, no. 3 (December
1987): 64, 65.
9. For the full text of the Instruction of the Cabinet Presidium No. 37/
U/IN/6/1967, concerning the Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese
62 Mety (] Tan

Problem, see leo Suryadinata, op. cit., pp. 173-77. This policy concerns
the alien Chinese. On the policies concerning Indonesian citizens of
Chinese origin, that is, Presidential Instruction No.14/l967 and
Presidential Decision No. 240/1967, see Mely G. Tan, "The Social and
Cultural Dimensions of the Role of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesian
Society", in Indonesia, 1991 (Proceedings of the symposium held at
Cornell University, july 1990), pp. 114-25.
10. For the languages spoken by the various types of ethnic Chinese, see
Dede Oetomo, "The Chinese of Pasuruan: A Study of language and
Identity in a Minority Community in Transition" (Ph D. thesis, Cornell
University, I 984 ); and De de Oetomo "Multilingualism and Chinese
Identities in Indonesia", in Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian
Chinese since World War II, edited by jennifer Cushman and Wang
Gungwu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988).
11. Stuart William Greif, Indonesians of Chinese Origin. Assimilation and Goal
of "One Nation-One People" (New York: Professors of World Peace
Academy, 1988) At the time of the study he held a position in political
science at the University of Otago in New Zealand. He had then written
two books and several articles on the "Overseas Chinese" in New
Zealand and in Fiji. He first visited Indonesia in 1980 and made two
more trips. In 1985 he started on the study of the ethnic Chinese in
Java and Bali. He worked on this project because he felt that in most
studies on the Indonesian Chinese in the English language, "the human
aspect was missing".
12. The information in this section was the result of interviews in an
informal manner, more like conversations, with an older generation
businessman, who still speaks Chinese, but whose sons and daughters
(except one working with him) do not speak any Chinese; a peranakan
jakartan (wife Javanese), who has a high position in a state enterprise;
a peranakan key functionary of the Bakom-PKB; a peranakan politician
and Member of Parliament (from Golkar, the government-backed party);
a young, peranakan branch manager of one of the big private banks;
a peranakan economist working in a government research institute,
and a peranakan woman sociologist.
13. The investment in China by a number of prominent ethnic Chinese
"conglomerates" in Indonesia, and especially the Second World Chinese
Entrepreneurs' Convention held in Hong Kong in November 1993,
which was meant to be a meeting to promote investment in China,
received wide coverage, mostly in a negative vein, from the press in
Indonesia. See Mely G. Tan, "The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia: Issues
and Implications", in Southeast Asian Chinese: The Socio-cultural
Dimension, edited by leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Times Academic Press,
1995), pp 20, 21.
2 The Ethnic Chinese in lndones;a 63

14. For an elaboration of the Tapos meeting in March 1990, see Mely G.
Tan, "The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role of the Ethnic
Chinese in Indonesian Society", in Indonesia (1991).
15. Suyono A.G., "Deklarasi Jimbaran, semoga tidak sekedar janji", in
Rekaman Peristiwa 1995 Oakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996). (This
is an annual publication comprising a selection of what the publishers
consider the most prominent news items that appeared in the daily
Suara Pembaruan in the past year.) The article questions to what extent
this Declaration will be realized, considering previous efforts along this
line that have not materialized. Among the 96 big businessmen who
participated in the P-4 and subsequently were signatory to the Jimbaran
Declaration, were such media figures as Liem Sioe Liong (Sudano
Salim), his son Anthony Salim, Eka Tjipta Widjaja, Sofjan Wanandi,
Prajogo Pangestu, William Suryajaya, Ciputra, Harry Darmawan (all
ethnic Chinese), while among the ethnic Indonesians were noted
Bambang Trihatmodjo and Sigit Hardjojudanto (second and first son of
President Soeharto), and Aburizal Bakrie.
16. Stephen Suleeman, "Persepsi golongan keturunan Tionghoa Indonesia
terhadap golongan bumi putera". Skripsi Sarjana Ilmu Komunikasi,
(Universitas Indonesia, 1986), as quoted in Tan, "The Social and Cultural
Dimensions", pp. 123, 124.
17. Gondomono, "The Chinese Community in jakarta: A Study of Chinese
Familism in an Indonesian Urban Environment" (Ph.D. dissertation in
Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, 1990). This is
one of the very few studies on the type of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia,
who can be considered to belong to the so-called "lower middle class".
This kind of study indicates that there are "other ethnic Chinese"; that
only a small minority of ethnic Chinese fit the stereotype of being
wealthy big businessmen.
18. This information was received from a key functionary of the Bakom-
PKB.
19. On 13 May 1996, the Bakom-PKB under the new leadership organized
a one-day seminar, in co-operation with the Lemhannas (the National
Resilience Institute), with the Institute as the venue. As noted earlier,
the General Chairperson (Ketua Umum) of the Bakom-PKB is also the
Deputy Governor of the Lemhannas, and a professor of political science
at the University of Indonesia. The theme of the seminar was "Negara
Bangsa dalam Era Globalisasi" (The nation-state in the era of globali-
zation). This theme and the presenters as well as the substance of the
papers reflect the new approach as expounded by the chairperson. The
keynote speech was given by the Minister of Defence, General (ret.)
Edi Sudrajat. In his paper, he also referred to Indonesia as a nation
that is not based on race, ethnicity or religion, but on shared intent,
and the spirit to live as a nation (bangsa) within the same state,
64 Mely G. Tan

disregarding differences in ethnicity, race, religion or group. The paper

presenters included only one ethnic Chinese, the historian Onghokham.
Another ethnic Chinese, james Riady (son of Mochtar Riady of the
Lippo Group) was mentioned in the programme as "still to be
confirmed", but he did not show up. All the others were ethnic
Indonesian (except one of Indian descent) academics, mostly historians.
There were also a playwright (the former chief editor of the banned
tabloid Detik), a politician and member of the Indonesian Human
Rights Commission, and a businessman.

References
Bachtiar, Harsja W "Integrasi Nasional Indonesia". In Wawasan Kebangsaan
Indonesia. Gagasan dan Pemikiran Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan
Bangsa. jakarta: Bakom-PKB Pusat, 1992.
Coppel, Charles A. Indonesian Chinese in Crisis. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1983.
Cushman, jennifer and Wang Gungwu, eds., Changing Identities of the
Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II. Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1988.
Gondomono. "The Chinese Community in jakarta: A Study of Chinese
Familism in an Indonesian Urban Environment". Ph.D. dissertation in
Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, 1990.
Greif, Stuart William. Indonesians of Chinese Origin. Assimilation and the Goal
of "One Nation- One People". New York: Professors World Peace Academy,
1988.
jahja, junus, ed. Non-pri di Mata Pribumi. jakarta: Yayasan Tunas Bangsa,
1991.
Mackie, j.A.C. and Charles A. Copp~. "A Preliminary Survey". In The
Chinese in Indonesia: Five Essays, edited by j.A.C. Mackie, pp. 1-19.
Sydney: Thomas Nelson (Australia) Ltd., 1976.
Naisbitt, john. Megatrends Asia. The Eight Asian Megatrends that are Changing
the World. London: Nicholas Brealey, 1995.
Oetomo, Dede. "The Chinese of Pasuruan: A Study of Language and Identity
in a Minority Community in Transition". Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University,
1984.
- - - . "Multilingualism and Chinese Identities in Indonesia". In Changing
Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II, edited by
jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu. Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1988.
Seagrave, Sterling. Lords of the Rim. London: Bantam Press, 1995.
Sidharta, Priguna. Seorang Dokter dari Losarang. Sebuah Otobiografi. jakarta:
P.T. Temprint, 1993.
Somers Heidhues, Mary f "Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia". Ph.D.
thesis, Cornell University, 1965.
2. The Etr1nrc Chtnese tn lndonesta 65

Somers Heidhues, Mary F "Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese and

the Indonesian Revolution". In Wang, ed., pp. 115-39.
Suleeman, Stephen. "Persepsi golongan keturunan Tionghoa Indonesia
terhadap golongan Bumiputera". Skripsi Sarjana Ilmu Komunikasi. FISH~
Universitas Indonesia, 1986.
Suryadinata, Leo. China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension.
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985.
Tan, Mely G. "The Role of Ethnic Chinese Minority in Development: The
Indonesian Case". Southeast Asian Studies (Centre for Southeast Asian
Studies, Kyoto University, Kyoto, japan) 25, no. 3 (December 1987):
63-82.
- - - . "The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role of Ethnic Chinese
in Indonesian Society". Indonesia (1991), pp. 113-27.
- - - . "The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia: Issues and Implications". In
Southeast Asian Chinese. The Socio-cultural Dimension, edited by Leo
Suryadinata, pp. 13-28. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995.
Toer, Pramoedya Ananta and Stanley Adi Prasetyo, eds. Memoar Oei Tjoe
Tat. Pembantu Presiden. jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1995.
Wang Gungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academic
Press, 1991.
- - - . "The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia". In Cushman
and Wang, eds., op. cit., pp. 1-23.

Newspapers and Magazines:

Kompas, Suara Pembaruan, Media Indonesia, Media Indonesia Minggu, Suara
Karya, Business News, Tempo, Gatra, Sinar.
 Comments by
A. Dahana on
"The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia:
Issues of Identity"
Presented by Mely G. Tan

Before I begin, please allow me to say three things as an opening

to my remarks. First, I would like to say thank you to the organizers
of this conference for inviting me to participate. This is my first
return to the Institute since 1982 when I was a research associate
collecting data for my dissertation. Secondly, although my field of
research is China, my main interest is Chinese affairs on mainland
China. I am not an expert on ethnic Chinese in this region,
although I always follow current developments in this area. There-
fore, please regard my comments on Dr Tan's paper as additional
information, rather than a discussion, coming from a layman based
on observation and not as a critic from an academician. Thirdly,
any discussion on the issues related to the ethnic Chinese in
Indonesia will always involve controversy. Such old themes as
whether or not they have been fully assimilated into Indonesian
society and other related issues are still relevant for many people
in Indonesia. The "Chinese problem" or masalah Cina is still in the
minds of many people from various walks of life. Based on the
fact that controversies still exist, I would like to present a different
conclusion from that of Dr Tan.
To start with, I basically agree with all the data, information
and arguments presented by Dr Tan. But let me begin my discussion
by repeating the question she raised: ". . . it remains to be seen
whether by the end of March 1996 the naturalization process will
indeed be concluded". It is now April, and do we see the results?
I am sorry to say that to my knowledge we are still waiting for
something important.
My first impressions on the development of pribumi-non-pribumi
relationship during the last thirty years is that it is no better nor
worse than during the 1950s and 1960s. During the Soekarno era
Comments on The Ut1n1c Ch;nesc 1n lnc1oneso 67

there were several ministers with ethnic Chinese background.

Now we do not have even one. Perhaps if we were still under
Soekarno, people such as Jusuf Wanandi and Harry Tjan- two
of several prominent ethnic Chinese leaders mentioned by Dr Tan
- would have been ministers or at least be in high positions in
the bureaucracy or Golkar, the ruling party.
Although there is a clear distinction between the peranahan
and the totoh in the area of cultural orientation, the government's
policy still treats and the Indonesian public still regards the
Indonesian ethnic Chinese as a single entity. Although they are
not barred from economic activities, their political participation
and rights are to some extent still limited. Consequently, although
I agree with Dr Tan that most of the Indonesian ethnic Chinese
have fully identified themselves as Indonesians, there seems to be
two tendencies which are not beneficial to the full assimilation of
the ethnic Chinese into Indonesian society. On the one hand,
most ethnic Chinese, both totoh and peranahan, are active in
business and trade, but on the other, there is a corps of bureau-
crats dominated by the pribumi. This situation is more or less
similar to the situation in Malaysia prior to the New Economic
Policy (NEP). Consequently, there is still traditional mistrust and
stereotyping of pribumi towards the non-pribumi and vice-versa.
The ethnic Chinese are still identified with such attributes as:
they are rich, economic animals, an exclusive group, unpatriotic,
oriented towards China, having double loyalty, and so forth. The
term hoahiau or Cina perantauan or "Overseas Chinese" is still
widely used despite the fact that it is dated.
Secondly, as a consequence of the first factor, and in contrast
to Dr Tan's argument that there is no such tendency among the
ethnic Chinese to become more culturally Chinese and to search
for a Chinese identity, there is concern and fear within the
government and some segments of the Indonesian public that
there is a "totohization" process of the peranahan in the making.
Take, for example, the popularity of learning Mandarin among
young people of Chinese origin. Dr Tan has argued that learning
Mandarin does not mean a return to being culturally Chinese or
a search for a Chinese identity, but rather an act of survival in
an era of globalization when the Asia-Pacific will play a greater
68 A Oal7ana

role in world economic development as we enter the twenty-first

century.
The Indonesian Government sees it differently The interest in
learning Mandarin is regarded as detrimental to the objective of
the full assimilation of the Chinese. There is therefore a strict
regulation regarding the teaching and learning of Mandarin.
The government's policy to eliminate any remnant of Chinese
identity, like confining the Imlek celebrations to temples, homes
and family circles, and the ban on Chinese characters from public
display, is based on the consideration that it is for the purpose of
national unity and for the complete assimilation of the Chinese
into Indonesian society However, the result is contrary to the
objective as it makes most Chinese feel alienated. This tendency
is clearly illustrated in Greif's study, that is, although they identify
themselves as Indonesians, they are still different from the pribumi.
How does this feeling of being Indonesians but of Chinese
origin fit into the assimilation process of the Chinese into Indo-
nesian society? It is not enough to view this solely from the ethnic
Chinese angle. Assimilation or integration is a two-way process,
and it is therefore important to know how the pribumi identify the
non-pribumi. This is a challenge for sociologists to do research on
this issue. Most works we have today deal with the question of
how the Chinese identify themselves within the changing Indone-
sian society We have still to see works on how the pribumi see the
Chinese. My observation is that the government's policy and the
view of the Indonesian public towards the Indonesian ethnic
Chinese have not changed. Therefore, I fully agree with Dr Tan's
notion that "how [the Chinese] determine their identity ... depends
very much on their assessment of the way the government and
the majority of ethnic Indonesians perceive them". (p. 15)
I wish I could share Dr Tan's optimistic conclusion which she
presented in the section "Prospects for the future" (pp. 13-16), in
which she mentions that the tendency is towards "integration and
identification as Indonesian, albeit still recognizing their Chinese
origins". Again, based on my observations, the process of integra-
tion of the Indonesian Chinese has still a long way to go. For this
I would like to discuss some examples she presents in the last part
of her paper.
Comments on The Ethnic Chinese th Indonesia 69

First, take the dramatic fate of two brothers, the late Professors
Tjan Tjoe Som and Tjan Tjoe Siem. The two prominent academi-
cians were Moslems and had become culturally Javanese. How-
ever, because of their participation in the left-leaning academic
organization, both were dismissed from their professorships at the
University of Indonesia following the political upheaval of 30
September 1965. It is because of the 1965 affair that most Indo-
nesian Chinese, with the exception of a few, are now reluctant to
participate in any political activity
The short cut towards assimilation by converts into Islam,
exemplified by Drs junus jahja and his group, is a new phenom-
enon and indeed very interesting to note. The group feels that the
only way towards total assimilation is through abandoning their
Chinese identity and conversion into the mainstream, that is, by
becoming followers of Islam. The group is currently very active
under the umbrella of Yayasan Abdul Karim Oei (Abdul Karim
Oei Foundation) in efforts to spread the teachings of Islam among
the Indonesian Chinese. With due respect to their efforts, how-
ever, it is unclear whether this strategy is popular among the
ethnic Chinese and whether it can stand firm during times of
crisis.
What about the role of the BAKOM-PKB? The government's
hand in regulating the assimilation of the Chinese is sometimes
regarded as too bureaucratic. People have no doubt about the
good intentions of the officials and prominent people who sit on
the central board of the organization. But some segments of the
ethnic Chinese community feel that the assimilation process should
be natural without too much interference from the authorities.
Furthermore, most of my Chinese friends whom I spoke with said
that the local boards of the organization at the provincial levels
usually act only as a tool for soliciting financial contributions
from the local Chinese communities for national and local
celebrations.
As a final note, and this is again based on my observations,
I see at least three factors which could be considered detrimental
to the objectives of assimilation. The first factor is in the area of
education. It is said that there is an unwritten regulation limiting
the number of ethnic Chinese high school graduates entering state
70 1\. Oahana

universities. This policy is based on three assumptions. First, since

state universities have limited seats for new students, priority should
be given to pribumi children. Secondly, since non-pribumi are
economically better off than the pribumi, they would be able to
send their children to expensive private universities or even to
study abroad. Thirdly, if the number of ethnic Chinese children
entering state universities is not limited, they will come to dominate
the population in the universities. Again, this is an assumption, as
Chinese children are usually graduates of private schools with
academically high standards and would likely be more successful
in the tight competition to enter state universities. Knowing that
their chances are limited, many high school graduates of Chinese
origin simply do not bother to participate in the examinations to
enter state universities.
As a result, we see a trend which is not beneficial to the
objective of integration of the ethnic Chinese into Indonesian
society. The majority of the Chinese students are concentrated in
certain private universities, or they study abroad. Studying abroad
is currently popular among Indonesian high school graduates
whose parents can afford it. My observation is that the majority
of those who study abroad are students of Chinese origin.
The second factor is job distribution which I have mentioned
earlier. Most Chinese are concentrated in trade and business
activities, while native Indonesians mostly go into government
service. Related to this, there is a strong belief among the public
that collusion between Chinese businessmen and the Indonesian
bureaucracy is rampant. This belief is fuelled by a strong suspicion
that at high levels, there is collusion between elite members of
the bureaucracy and the Chinese cukong (taipans or big business-
men). This is further exacerbated by the existence of a economic
gap between the poor and the rich and consequently, because the
Chinese are always identified with the rich, any grudge or dis-
satisfaction towards the government is always attributed to the
Chinese. They have become scapegoats, since they are weak
victims.
Lastly, the booming real estate business since the mid-l980s
and early 1990s has created "new Chinatowns" in the big cities.
Comments on The Ethnic Ch1hese 1n IndoneSia 71

Take jakarta as an example. Most occupants of new neighbour-

hoods, especially in West and North jakarta, are ethnic Chinese.
The Indonesian capital city is unconsciously practising segregation
between pribumi and non-pribumi in the way housing is arranged.
The objective of national unity can only be achieved when all
sections of the community can live together, understand each
other, and be tolerant to differences.
 Chapter 3
Malaysian Chinese:
Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020

Lee Kam Hing

Introduction
The rise of China as a major regional power and the maintenance
of a vibrant business network among the so-called "Overseas"
Chinese have led some observers to look once again at the
integration process of the ethnic Chinese within Southeast Asia.
Some scholars and political leaders argue that the emerging
international stature of China could conceivably encourage a
cultural re-sinification of the Southeast Asian Chinese. This new
concern comes at a time when increasing evidence suggest that
the ethnic Chinese are integrating into the local Southeast Asian
societies. In some countries, the Chinese have even progressed
some way towards assimilation.
Within these new discussions, the question of the loyalty of
the ethnic Chinese to the countries of domicile is sometimes raised
and there is rekindled the previous suspicion of the Chinese in
3. Malaystan Chtnese 73

Southeast Asia as potential fifth columnist. In the years after the

communist take-over in 1949, China was seen by the West and
in some Southeast Asian countries as an expansionist power and
therefore a threat to the region's security China was said to have
supported armed insurgences in the region. Consequently, over
the years the various Southeast Asian countries have engaged China
differently Where China is strongly perceived as a threat, the
Chinese in those countries are liable to experience a stricter test
of loyalty There are now suggestions that the Chinese are using
their networking to serve the economic interests of China. Reports
of such economic linkages conjure up images of a broad Chinese
economic sphere where the labour of mainland China combines
with the marketing skills, technology, and capital of the overseas
Chinese. Given this new economic and political stature of China,
its supposed links with and influence on ethnic Chinese in
Southeast Asia naturally arouse some unease. Observers have
attributed China's impressive economic development to the inflow
of large foreign investments, and some analysts estimate that nearly
80 per cent of these funds come from the "Overseas" Chinese who
have invested largely in the southeastern part of China from where
the ancestors of most of them had emigrated. 1 These journal
reports, by highlighting the success of the Chinese overseas and
their role not only in the economic emergence of China but also
in the countries they presently reside, could cause hostile reactions
against the Chinese especially in Southeast Asia, however
unintended these may be.
Linking the Overseas Chinese and the rise of China sustains
a persistent presumption that Beijing continues to command the
affection of these local Chinese. Such a perception is not helpful
to the integration process of the Southeast Asian Chinese. Indeed,
it could be argued to the contrary that as the ethnic Chinese
become more integrated, China would be less of a sentimental
attraction. When this happens, there ought to be less doubts about
the loyalty of the local Chinese, and governments will be more
prepared for new economic and political engagements with China
that are beneficial to all sides.
But the China factor counts as only one element in this
integration process, and this is increasingly becoming of less
74 LeeKam Hing

importance. New social and cultural forces are emerging to reshape

the national identity Of these, renewed ethnic sentiments and
religious resurgence are the two most powerful. They sometimes
set new parameters for integration and inter-ethnic harmony. The
dynamics of inter-ethnic relations are taking place within a context
of regionalism and growing economic interdependence and these
could determine how indigenous Southeast Asians view themselves,
and in turn affect the way ethnic Chinese view themselves in the
evolving society
The situation of the Chinese in Malaysia differs significantly in
some respects from that in other Southeast Asian countries. For
a start, the community is, with the exception of Singapore, the
largest in percentage terms. The Chinese form about 30 per cent
of the population and they are able therefore to play some effective
role within the Malaysian political system and to have their
concerns seriously noted. 2 However, they are not large enough to
ensure that all of their most crucial demands are met. There is
also a very large Indian population of about 10 per cent as well
as several indigenous minority groups. Many of the political and
economic concerns affecting the Chinese are shared by the Indians,
and therefore unlike elsewhere, the issues are not just Chinese but
broad non-Malay ones. The Malaysian Indian Congress is able
sometimes to win significant concessions because in representing
a much smaller community it is seen as non-threatening, and in
the process this has helped the Chinese. Not surprisingly there-
fore, some of the most articulate in representing Chinese issues
in education and language are of Indian origin, such as the
Seenivasagam brothers and presently, Karpal Singh.
Nearly half the Chinese in Malaysia live in the rural or semi-
rural areas where they are by occupation farmers, fishermen,
miners, and labourers. In 1980, 39 per cent of economically active
Chinese were in production, transport and other worker category,
19 per cent were in agriculture and 9 per cent in the services. The
Chinese are represented in the public service, and a much smaller
number in the armed forces and the police. There are poor Chinese
and of these many live in villages with inadequate resources.
Represented in almost all spectrum and levels of economic life, it
is difficult to generalize the Chinese in Malaysia as urban merchants,
3. Malays1an Chmese 75

as might be the case in other countries. Some scholars suggested

that many issues currently presented as ethnic issues may be
appropriately looked at in class terms.
Nevertheless, the evolving inter-ethnic political balance is still
essential to explain the nature of Malaysia's relations with China.
Until Malay political power was assured, the government was
wary of opening up ties with China. Malay sensitivity had to be
considered especially at a time when there was still apprehension
that too much political concessions had been given to the Chinese
and to open up ties with China at that stage might not be acceptable
to most Malays. It was also not wise to risk exposing the Chinese
to possible competing loyalties at a time when many had just
become citizens, and within the country adjustments were still
being made to the new inter-ethnic co-operation.
Indeed, until the end of World War II, many Chinese saw
themselves as transient, and the term "Overseas" Chinese or Huaqiao
would be quite appropriate in referring to them. China was the
sentimental homeland and the visits of political activists seeking
moral and financial support sustained this attachment towards
China. During that period too, successful Chinese from Southeast
Asia invested in China. Linked together through trade in Southeast
Asia these businessmen combined to open up enterprises in Fujian
and Guangdong. Although they were essentially business ventures
there was nevertheless also a sense of mission to help China
modernize. The imperial Chinese Government sought out the
expertise and investments of these Southeast Asian Chinese, and
in recognition of their contribution conferred awards and appointed
some as honorary Chinese consuls. 3
Large-scale Chinese immigration into Malaya and their
continued political attachment to China were noted by Malay
nationalists. Then in june 1948 Malay unease with the local Chinese
sharply increased when the mainly Chinese-backed Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) launched a rebellion against the British.
Founded in the 1920s, the MCP sought independence through
revolutionary means. It claimed to be non-racial but its support
came largely from young Chinese, who were mostly Chinese-
educated and who felt that colonial policies had long discriminated
against them in higher education or job opportunities. The MCP's
76 LeeKam Hing

links with the Chinese Communist Party also appealed to their

feelings of Chineseness. Earlier, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese
Army (MPAJA), the precursor of the MCP and which had led a
resistant movement during World War II, had exacted retribution
on Malays whom they accused of collaborating with the Japanese.
The Malays fought back and the violence assumed a racial dimen-
sion. The "Emergency" took on a further ethnic character when
Malay troops joined in operations against the largely Chinese
guerrillas.
In the early years of Malaysia's independence, Kuala Lumpur
had no diplomatic relations with China. Malaysians were also not
allowed to visit China. This was despite a growing trade between
the two countries, particularly in rubber. In explaining its non-
recognition of China, Kuala Lumpur contended that Beijing was
supporting the MCP in the jungle war. The pro-West Tengku
Abdul Rahman also saw China as a threat to regional security and,
during the Sino-India border conflict, launched a "Save Democracy"
fund in support of India in 1962. The Tengku's assessment seemed
confirmed when in the 1963-65 period, Beijing aligned itself with
Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia.
For the older generation of Chinese, the government's China
policy cut off all social visits. Given the political atmosphere of
the Emergency, it was not possible to argue against this policy.
The Tengku developed links with Taiwan instead. The Malaysian
Government allowed travel to Taiwan for business and education.
Several hundred Malaysian students, mainly from Chinese schools,
enrolled each year in Taiwanese universities. 4 A trade mission was
sent to Taiwan in November 1965.
It was under the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak that Malaysia
opened up relations with China. Tun Razak wanted to shift away
from the country's largely pro-West foreign policy. By then too,
the MCP as a serious military threat was destroyed and remnant
units were confined largely to the Thai-Malaysian border. In 1974
Tun Razak made an official visit to Beijing. With a reputation as
a Malay nationalist, Razak's China initiatives were generally trusted
by the Malays.
Despite the opening of ties, domestic concern continued to
shape the nature of the relations. There was still the links between
3 Malays;an Ch;nese 77

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the MCP that bothered
Malaysia. Secondly, despite Beijing's rejection of dual nationality
during the 1974 discussions, Kuala Lumpur believed that China
was still treating returning Malaysian Chinese as Overseas Chinese.
It noted that the Office for Overseas Chinese was restored in
1978. The newly-opened relations with China was consequently
placed on a government to government basis. 5 Travel to China by
Malaysians was still banned but this was eventually relaxed to
allow social visits for those over the age of sixty Private traders
could buy from Chinese corporations or through agents in Hong
Kong or Singapore. But Pemas, the national trading company, was
granted supervisory power and the responsibility to encourage
Malay participation in the China trade. However, in the 1974-84
period, while the volume of Malaysia-China trade grew, its percent-
age in overall Malaysian trade declined from 3. 5 to 1. 5 per cent.

Developing New Malaysia-China Relations

Under Prime Minister Data Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia
enhanced ties with China. This was part of Dr Mahathir's shift
towards an emphasis on East Asia. Described as "controlled
relationship", the government allowed businessmen to visit China.
Travel to China was subsequently opened to all Malaysians. In
1985, there were about 250 Malaysian companies trading there.
In November that year, Dr Mahathir led a large trade and
investment delegation of about 130 businessmen on an official
visit to China. Four major trade agreements were signed during
the visit. Since then, relations between Malaysia and China have
continued to improve with the exchange of official visits. Dr
Mahathir has made three more officials visits to China, the most
recent being in August 1996. The growing congruence in interest
of the two countries was highlighted during the first Malaysia-
China Forum held in Kuala Lumpur inJanuary 1995. Dr Mahathir,
in his keynote address, indicated that Malaysia does not regard
China as a military or political threat, noting that Chinas military
spending is less than that of Japan, Korea, and the United States.
In tum, President Jiang Zemin declared China's support of the
EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) proposal by Malaysia during
his official visit to Kuala Lumpur in November 1995 6
78 LeeKamHmc;

In 1993, bilateral trade between Malaysia and China was worth

over RM6 billion. This was an almost seventeenfold increase,
compared to trade figures of twenty years earlier. By 1994, it had
reached RM8.5 billion. 7 Over the years, China had been among
the largest buyers of Malaysian rubber and since 1994 it had also
become the biggest importer of Malaysian palm oil. The sharp
growth in trade between Malaysia and China in the last few years
has been due, in part, to the recession during the mid-1980s as
well as the liberalization in trade ties between the two countries.
During the recession, a number of Malaysian Chinese companies
ventured overseas, including China, in search of investment
opportunities.
In 1994, it was reported that thirty-six large corporations listed
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange had signed Memoranda of
Understanding (MOU) or joint-venture agreements with China,
with an estimated value of RM8 billion. These agreements in-
cluded highway and power plant construction, financial services,
manufacturing, and retail. Many of these contracts were entered
into by corporations such as Petronas, Renong, UMW (United
Motor Works), Hicom, and Eon which have predominant Malay
or government equity. Other Malay groups have since joined in.
In October 1994, Bornian Corporation reportedly joined a con-
sortium of contractors from China and Malaysia to construct the
RM700 million hydroelectric power plant in Liwagu. The consor-
tium was also to build twenty 50-megawatt power stations at the
Dahan Economic Zone. 8 Sateras, another bumiputra (indigenous)
company, is moving into the car assembly business in China.
A number are joint Sino-Malay ventures. In june 1993 during
Dr Mahathir's visit to China, Bridgecon Engineering Sendirian
Berhad, headed by Datuk Wan Adli Wan Ibrahim, joined a con-
sortium of Malaysian companies that included the Berjaya Group
(Cayman) and Country Heights Construction in an agreement to
construct the Second Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge. Kuala Lumpur
Industries, under its chairman Tan Sri Wan Sidek Hj Wan Abdul
Rahim, signed an MOU with Ping An Insurance Company of
China to set up a representative office of its subsidiary company,
People's Insurance Company (M) Sdn. And Tengku Ahmad
3 Malays;an C!Jtnese 79

Rithauddeen, formerly the foreign minister and now chairman of

Road Builder announced plans to diversify into China.
The two Malaysian companies usually cited as most success-
ful in China are Kanzen and Lion Corporation. Though largely
Chinese, both Kanzen and Lion Corporation have significant Malay
equity. 9 In 1986, Lim Kim Hong who started Dreamland Corpo-
ration, which later became Kanzen, signed an agreement with
Dreamland Tianjin Pte Ltd to produce and market mattresses.
Dreamland Malaysia held 40 per cent of the equity. By 1990
Dreamland had established eight factories in different parts of
China. The Lion Corporation is presently engaged in various
development projects in China but its most successful is the retail
business where it has opened a chain of Parkson stores. The
success of Kanzen and Lion are looked upon as examples in which
Chinese business skills and networking have worked to the
advantage of Malaysian business in China.
Some Malaysian Chinese groups certainly hope to benefit
from such cultural affinity and networking to enhance business
opportunities in China. In May 1995, it was reported that the
Federation of Hokkien Associations of Malaysia proposed to set
up an industrial park in Fujian province. A mission led by its
president, Datuk Lim Gaik Tong, surveyed the area of Xiamen,
Chuan Chou and Fu Zhu to look for a 2,000 hectare site. It also
planned to set up a one-stop agency to assist Malaysians investing
in Fujian. The delegation also visited China to promote the second
World Fujian Clan Conference to be held in Kuala Lumpur in
August 1996 1 L1
While numerous MOUs and contracts have been signed, the
number that have actually been carried out is relatively low. Many
companies have merely joined in as part of the present rush to
China, attracted by the prospects but finding projects difficult to
take off. Various companies have prematurely made announce-
ments of obtaining gaming concessions from different provincial
governments. There is also the suspicion that these company
statements were intended to interest investors, especially in the
stock market. Furthermore, Malaysia's investments in China make
up only a fraction of total foreign funds.
80 LeeKam Hing

Mahathir's New Society

Malaysia5 growing trade links with China should be seen in the
context of Dr Mahathir's effort to take the country to a developed
status by the year 2020. This aim of achieving developed status,
now popularly referred to as Wawasan 2020, was first outlined in
a speech he made to the inaugural meeting of the Malaysian
Business Council in 1991. To achieve this goal, there is to be
liberalization in trade and investments. New infrastructure are
being built and a multi-media super corridor planned to ensure
that Malaysia would be a developed nation by the year 2020. The
recent expansion of private tertiary education and the use of
English are to open up educational opportunities and to tum the
country into a regional learning centre. Through these, Dr Mahathir
wants Malaysia to play a more influential role in international
trade and diplomacy
In the speech in 1991, Dr Mahathir also gave his vision of a
new and united society by the year 2020 and expressed the hope
that a people who would be entirely Malaysian in perspective,
that is, a truly bangsa Malaysia, would emerge. This bangsa would
help the nation to be confident, democratic, liberal, tolerant, caring,
and instilled with strong moral and ethical values. He spoke of
the economy being competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient and
its wealth justly and equitably distributed to create a progressive
and prosperous population. The idea of a bangsa Malaysia continues
to appear in Dr Mahathir's statements.
The new policies are significant to inter-ethnic relations
and they certainly reflect a very confident Malay leadership. Dr
Mahathir's policies suggest that he sees the struggle of Malay
nationalism as broadening towards a more international framework.
Success for Malaysia in international economics would be an
achievement for Malay nationalism. Assured of political dominance
and growing influence in the economy, the leadership is willing to
adopt policies beneficial to the country even if these at first appear
to initially favour the non-Malays. Seeking greater regional and
international economic participation would undoubtedly benefit
the Chinese. But already, major corporate changes have created
Malay conglomerates such as Renong, MCRB, Sapura, and Arab-
Malaysian Finance, which are equally capable of entering into
3. Malays;an Chinese 81

ambitious ventures overseas. Malaysia's multi-ethnic character can

be turned into a strength. Its standing as a Muslim-majority country
helps Malaysia in dealing with the Middle East and Muslim Central
Asia, while its businessmen of Indian and Chinese origin are
competing strongly in South and East Asia respectively:
Although not defined, non-Malays reacted very favourably to
the idea of a bangsa Malaysia. The term conveys the notion of a
bangsa Malaysia that is still evolving and not one where an existing
bangsa is to be imposed on the rest. Recent loosening of government
regulations have given non-Malays grounds to be optimistic about
the commitment of senior Malay leaders towards such a goal.
More recently, Dr Mahathir in declaring open the second World
Hokkien Conference said that Malaysia accepts multi-culturalism
and that while "the Malay language is the national and official
language, the languages and cultures of the other races will be
preserved." 11 Opening a world Hokkien conference was already a
significant gesture, but even more important was his statement
that the different roots of the people should not affect their loyalty
to the nation.
Equally significant was the launching in August 1996 of a
three billion ringgit investment fund to be managed by the
government, which would be open to all Malaysians between the
ages of 12 and 20. In the past, all government-managed investment
funds such as the Amanah Saham Nasional, which have yielded
very attractive dividends and bonuses, had been reserved for
Malays. If any one institution symbolized the affirmative action of
the government to help the Malays, it surely must be the Amanah
Saham Nasional. This had resulted in considerable resentment
from the other races. This time round, 49 per cent of the issues
will be for non-Malays. Launched by Dr Mahathir, the new Amanah
Saham Wawasan 2020 is an affirmation that young Malaysians of
all races have a stake in the future of the country: 12
The idea of bangsa Malaysia outlined by Dr Mahathir is an
ideal sought by leaders of all the major communities. Gaining
broad acceptance will be challenging and by presenting this idea
Dr Mahathir affirms a confidence that the country has achieved a
degree of consensus among the various communities to begin
putting it into place. If indeed bangsa Malaysia is interpreted as
82 LeeKamH1ng

replacing the different existing bangsa, or at the least that all bangsa
are subsumed under bangsa Malaysia, this would represent major
progress in the thinking of all sides. Certainly, for a long time
there had been reservations towards such an idea.
For the Malays, the struggle had always been for a bangsa
Melayu (Malay nation). The Malays had earlier seen an independent
Malaya more as a restoration of the old Malay sultanates. Malaya
was a Malay country with fully developed indigenous political
institutions and cultural symbols. The period of British rule was
merely an interruption, and independence in 1957 was a return
to the original course of Malay history and identity. In emphasizing
a historical continuity of Malay identity and with Islam defining
that identity, bangsa Melayu strictly would exclude all non-Malays.
For some early Malay nationalists, this indeed was the goal of the
struggle. When it became clear that the political realities required
accommodating the non-Malays, the term bangsa Melayu was still
insisted on for the new nationality. Granting citizenship to large
numbers of immigrants was a major concession to be reciprocated
by the new citizens acknowledging Malay rights and the continuity
of a Malay character in the new nation. But since a central feature
in the original bangsa Melayu is Islam, the application of this term
broadly to include non-Muslims raised difficulties and consequently
found little support among both Malays and non-Malays.

Early Inter-ethnic Co-operation

The willingness of the Malaysian Government to move towards
what the Chinese regard as a more liberal and tolerant approach,
both in domestic politics and in dealing with China, stems from
a decisive power shift favouring the Malays. Until then, the inter-
ethnic political equilibrium appeared more evenly balanced. The
early inter-ethnic balance was created immediately after the war
and was maintained on the basis of trust among the major races.
It took considerable bargaining to fashion out a basis of inter-
ethnic co-operation within which the interests of the Chinese, the
Malays, and other races were accommodated, but this coalition
always came under pressure from the communal demands of all
sides. The inter-ethnic understanding could be forged at a crucial
moment in the country's history because of expected political
3. Malays1an Chinese 83

change and because there was sufficient shift in the political

orientation of the Chinese.
It was only towards World War II that some Chinese realized
the need to work for a political future of the community in Malaya.
They were beginning to be aware of impending political changes
as nationalist stirrings in Asia were already having an impact on
Malaya. Malay political consciousness was in evidence especially
in the growth of radical and religious organizations. Gradually,
therefore, the political orientation of some Chinese turned to issues
affecting them in Malaya. They began to talk about independence,
of a new Malayan society; and the role of the Malayan Chinese in
this change.
It was this new consciousness that began to provide some
common direction to what was then a very disparate group of
Chinese. The Chinese were divided along dialect and district lines.
There was the division between those born in China and those
born locally. Among the local born there were those who had
incorporated elements of Malay culture. Even among this group,
referred to as peranakan but more popularly as Baba, there
developed differences between those in Penang and Malacca, and
those Chinese long domiciled in Kelantan who manifest a variant
of the Baba culture. But the major cleavage within the Chinese
community was that between the Chinese- and the English-
educated. Representing the diverse background as well as occupa-
tional and economic interests of the different Chinese groups in
the country were a host of associations and organizations. These
included chambers of commerce, clan and guild associations as
well as organizations of the Chinese educationists.
One of the first groups to assume a leadership role of the
Chinese was the English-educated. Many were Straits-born and a
number came from families which had been in Malaya for several
generations. The Straits Chinese, such as Tan Cheng Lock, enjoyed
some early links with British and Malay political leaders. Tan
Cheng Lock and his associates had long developed business
connections with British firms. 13 They had served in representa-
tive bodies such as the Chinese Advisory Boards, the Legislative
Council, and the state councils. There was early contact with
Malay radicals but eventually it was with Dato Onn jaafar and
84 LeeKamHing

UMNO (United Malays National Organization) that the MCA

(Malaysian Chinese Association) leaders evolved a sustained
political relationship. UMNO was formed in 1946 to mobilize
Malay opinion against the Malayan Union, a constitutional change
which threatened the special status of the Malays.
There were also the Chinese-educated who had for long played
an important social and political leadership role within the Chinese
community. They commanded more influence, and represented a
much broader spectrum of social, cultural, and economic interests
of the Chinese than the English-educated. While some had
involved themselves in the politics of China, others were just as
concerned with the future of the local Chinese and in particular
the status of Chinese education and culture. There was a re-
orientation away from China and many of them believed strongly
that the Chinese as citizens in a new Malayan nation should be
given the right to maintain their identity, and that this could only
be possible through preserving the use of the Chinese language
in the country. Through the school boards, the Chinese-educated
merchants were brought into contact with the influential Chinese
educationist groups. 14
The Chinese-educated and the English-educated got together
just after the start of the "Emergency" to form an expressly Chinese
party, the Malayan Chinese Association. The leaders of both groups
were mainly businessmen involved in tin, rubber, and trade, and
they had much to lose should the communists win the jungle war.
The British believed that it was from these two groups that an
alternative leadership of the Chinese should be encouraged if the
communists were to be defeated. The "Emergency" continued to
be difficult despite British deployment of some 40,000 regular
and 70,000 auxiliary troops, and the support of the Chinese was
therefore essential. 15 A credible Chinese leadership was needed
because this was also a period when constitutional changes were
being negotiated and the large Chinese community could not be
entirely ignored.
Thus, at the most crucial juncture in the political history of
Malaysia, the MCA was formed to provide a leadership acceptable
to the British and the Malays as well as to a fair section of the
Chinese population. The Western-educated within the party were
5 Malaystcm Chmese 85

able to convince the British and the Malays that the Chinese were
loyal and committed to political goals similar to theirs. The Chinese~
educated leadership won some significant support of the Chinese
community and thereby demonstrated to the British and the Malays
that the MCA was a credible Chinese party The Chinese-educated
leadership achieved this because of their commitment to Chinese
education and Chinese culture, being aware that these must be
prominent in the agenda of the party if it was to gain the support
of the community In this, they were backed by the Western-
educated who agreed that Chinese language and education were
essential to preserving the identity of the community
The MCA continued to play a key part in ensuring some
political role for the Chinese in Malaysia at this crucial juncture.
It helped thousands of Chinese to register as citizens and thereby
to be eligible in the political process. The MCA also raised money
to assist nearly half a million Chinese who had been resettled
in 5 50 new villages across the country. The party provided
representation to many Chinese suspected of communist links
and threatened with deportation to China. The MCA leaders were
alarmed that the British were arbitrary in the arrest of mostly
Chinese. Such actions reflected the prevailing assumption held by
the British and to some extent the Malays, of guilt of the entire
Chinese community Certainly, this was not helped by the fact that
hundreds of Chinese youth returned to China rather than be
called up in the general mobilization against the communists. But
against this, several hundred MCA members were assassinated in
the course of the "New Village" work by the MCP Home guards
in Perak formed by the Chinese protected tin-mines and fought
the communists. The MCA thus provided a leadership for those
Chinese not implicated in the rebellion.
In 1952 and I955, the MCA combined successfully with
UMNO and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) to win newly-
introduced local elections. The MCA leaders, realizing how dam-
aging the "Emergency" had been on the political position of the
Chinese, decided that it was through working with the Malays
that they could rebuild a credible role. The leadership of UMNO
accepted the MCA, recognizing that unless there was some dem-
onstration of multi-racial co-operation, significant constitutional
86 Lee Kam Htnq

concessions could not be obtained. To expedite progress towards

independence, the leaders of the major communities agreed to
some accommodation on various contentious issues. The Alliance
memorandum to the Reid Constitution Commission was a com-
promise against a background of competing demands from the
different communities.
Overall, the constitution favoured the Malays. This was because
the thrust of nationalism had come from the Malays and because
some colonial administrators believed that the British, having signed
the earlier treaties in 1874 with the Sultans allowing for interven-
tion, had an obligation to protect the interests of the indigenous
communities. Furthermore, during the communist insurrection,
the Malays had proved politically reliable. The constitution recog-
nized the special status of the Malay language, Islam, and the
Malay sultanates, and it provided for special privileges to assist
the Malays, the majority of whom then were rural and poor. 16 But
important concessions were also made to the non-Malays. The
most important of these was that citizenship conditions for non-
Malays were liberalized. Equally important was that the non-Malays
were allowed to use their languages and to practise their cultures,
including the freedom of religion.
The constitution and inter-ethnic co-operation were possible
because of an unwritten understanding arrived at between the
MCA and UMNO leaders. Under this, the Malays would have
political power while the Chinese would retain economic influence.
Neither side realized at that time the full implications of the
bargain nor did the leaders articulate clearly what they expected
from it. The Chinese thought that what they then conceded was
political pre-eminence rather than dominance. The MCA leaders
generally conceived of Malaya as a new nation whose cultural
identity was to be created, and within this evolving entity Chinese
culture and language would be granted equal status. This
assumption was argued on the principle that equality of status is
the entitlement of all citizens. Sometimes, the more chauvinistic
would contend that equality has been earned through the
contribution of non-Malay immigrant labour in building modern
Malaya.
3 Maiays;an Ct11nese 87

Tension in Inter-ethnic Coalition

However, once the expediency and urgency of decolonization were
no more, stresses in inter-ethnic relations emerged. All sides had
not been entirely happy with the different provisions in the con-
stitution. In the years after independence, many Chinese com-
plained that the constitutional bargain had seriously weakened the
position of the community This was reflected in the composition
of the government and in Parliament. Although forming nearly 38
per cent of the population, Chinese-majority seats in parliament
was slightly less than a third. This discrepancy was due to weightage
favouring the rural areas which were predominantly Malay But it
was the Chinese-educated who felt most aggrieved, pointing out
that Chinese education and language were not accorded the rec-
ognition as had been expected. Chinese was not recognized as an
official language and Chinese-language secondary education was
not part of the national school system. They feared that Chinese
features were being peripheralized in the course of developing a
national culture. There was also the grievance that few Chinese
were given scholarships and their quota for public service ap-
pointment was very low. Many Chinese felt that the newly gained
citizenship had not offered equal rights and entitlements.
Even as the Chinese began to regard Malaya as their new
home, a persistent demand from the Malays was that acceptance
of them rested on the demonstration of new loyalties. This new
loyalty was more than just abandoning political attachments to
the old homeland. It was required that symbols of the new state
be embraced. But there was disagreement regarding the range of
such symbols and how much of the Chinese distinctives could be
included, and over the years these have become a source of tension
in inter-ethnic relations. Consensus has not been easy because of
the significant size of the community, the economic role it plays,
and its immigrant background. Given the community's size, it
will take a longer time for integration, and this leads to the
accusation of its unwillingness to be an indistinguishable part of
a larger society Its immigrant background has been convenient to
the more communal elements who, by pointing to the past when
the Chinese in Malaysia had sought inspiration from political
88 LeeKamHtng

developments in China, question the commitment and loyalty of

the Chinese.
As in the MCA, the moderate Malay leadership itself faced
pressure from Malay frustration. Despite various programmes, the
economic position of the Malays was still depressed. Malays con-
tinued to have a lower per capita income and a higher unemploy-
ment rate than the Chinese. For the cultural nationalists, there
was disappointment that English and not Malay was widely used
for official purposes. For the religious groups, the1;e was un-
happiness that Islamic laws were not introduced. Thus, for many
Malays, what had been promised in the independence struggle
had not been fulfilled.
So long as this political unhappiness of the various commu-
nities was contained within the coalition through regular con-
sultation, inter-ethnic relations were kept at a manageable level.
However, as these issues came to be taken up by the opposition,
the attacks began to erode the coalition's electoral standing. The
MCA, in particular, lost in local elections in Penang and in
Seremban to the Labour Party and in Ipoh to the People's Progres-
sive Party In such circumstances, the mechanism of accommoda-
tion within the coalition came under stress. This happened when
members from the ruling coalition publicly took up opposition
issues and the solidarity within the coalition came to be severely
tested. There had been expectations that the leaders of the different
communities would be loyal to the mechanism of inter-ethnic
political consultation and committed to the terms of the political
understanding. But the ruling elites had increasingly to contend
with strong pressure from their communities.
Just two years after independence, the difficulties faced by
inter-ethnic coalition came out into the open. The MCA, under
pressure through electoral losses, was anxious that there should
not be any changes made to the federal constitution which could
be disadvantageous to the Chinese. It therefore asked for a third
of the seats to be contested in the impending elections. More
importantly, the party wanted a review of the Education Act,
especially the position of Chinese-language education. This demand
was a response to the Chinese educationists and the traditional
guilds and associations which were then strong within the party
3. Malay"an Ch;nese 89

The growing electoral strength of Parti Islam, which prompted

the MCA's two demands, was seen by UMNO as an even more
serious threat to it, and the Prime Minister then, Tengku Abdul
Rahman, certainly felt unable to make the concessions asked by
the MCA without incurring a serious Malay backlash. The Tengku
turned down the MCA's demands, and the party's leadership
eventually resignedY The I959 crisis led to a withdrawal of support
from the MCA by the influential Chinese educationists.
The position of the MCA was further eroded when the People's
Action Party (PAP) entered Malaysia and rallied the non-Malays
under the slogan of a Malaysian Malaysia. The PAP was more
articulate and forceful than the MCA had been, and the Malaysian
Malaysia concept encapsulated the main aspirations of the non-
Malays in language, culture as well as equal opportunities to
scholarships and to government employment. A Malaysian Malaysia
required the features of identity of the nation to be less Malay and
more representative of the other races. A Malaysian Malaysia was
a rejection of some of the symbols of loyalty insisted on by the
Malays. In August I965, the Tengku decided that the separation
of Singapore was necessary to ease the racial tension arising from
the PAP's Malaysian Malaysia campaign.
The separation of Singapore did not end the debate and the
call for a Malaysian Malaysia was taken up by the DAP (Democratic
Action Party) and other non-Malay parties such as Parti Gerakan
Rakyaat Malaysia and the PPP (People's Progressive Party). So
appealing was such a call that the opposition made significant
gains against the ruling coalition, particularly the MCA, in the
I969 elections. The disappointment of the election results and the
celebration of opposition supporters led to the worst inter-ethnic
riots ever in the country. 18 What aggravated the tension was that
the strain in relations between UMNO and the MCA had become
evident, and this led to the withdrawal of the latter from the
government.

Establishment of a More Malay Character to the State

For twenty months following the riots, the country was ruled by
the National Operation Council. By the time the country returned
to parliamentary government, changes had been set in motion
90 Ice Kam Htnq

both through the creation of new institutions and in amendments

to the constitution that decisively shifted the political balance in
favour of the Malays. Malay political dominance was firmly estab-
lished. The ruling coalition was retained and the appearance of
sharing political power among the races maintained. But in effect
it was UMNO that dominated and that decided on all major
issues. This dominance was backed by a bureaucracy and an armed
forces that was predominantly Malay The ruling coalition was
enlarged and this consequently weakened the MCA. The MCA
could no longer claim to be the sole party representing the Chinese
in government and any threat of withdrawal would not have the
same menacing effect as had been the case in 1959 and 1969. The
MCA soon lost the finance and trade portfolios which had given
assurance and access to Chinese business. Within a constellation
of fourteen members, UMNO dominance became more pro-
nounced.19 With that, an even more Malay character of the state
and of the new symbols of loyalty was insisted upon.
The government introduced the New Economic Policy to re-
dress the economic gap between the Malays and the non-Malays.
Attention was given to creating a Malay commercial class so that
Malay equity participation in the corporate sector would be raised
from 1.9 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent by the end of the Plan. 2 l1
A new education policy converted the schools into a largely Malay-
language system and a quota system was introduced to ensure
improved Malay access to higher education. Malay culture was
recognized as the basis of a national culture during a conference
on the subject held in 1971. Only elements from the culture of
the other communities deemed suitable would be accepted into
the national culture.
Business activities became more regulated, and large and
successful Chinese companies came under pressure to restructure
to allow Malay participation. Licences and contracts were largely
reserved for Malays or state-backed Malay enterprises. In other
sectors, the non-Malays complained of restricted appointment and
promotion opportunities in the public service. In education, the
enrolment of Chinese in the local universities fell in percentage
terms. Of continued concern to the Chinese was that Chinese-
3 Malaystan Chtnese 91

medium secondary schools did not receive government financial

backing or recognition.
As these changes were taking place, there was observed a
strong resurgence of Islam. Calls from PAS (Parti Islam se Malaysia)
as well as Muslim leaders associated with UMNO were made for
the implementation of the syariah and the setting up of an Islamic
state. Many Chinese feared that within such a state their status
and identity would be further subordinated. Naturally, there was
apprehension among the non-Malays when Dr Mahathir, on taking
office in 1981, declared a policy of introducing Islamic values in
administration. The establishment of Islamic banking, insurance,
and in 1983 the International Islamic University appeared to be
determined steps towards a more Islamic character of the state.
Moves such as that in 1989 when the Selangor government
amended the Islamic Administration Enactment Act granting those
who had reached puberty the right to convert without their parents'
permission heightened such fears. Non-Muslim religious groups
faced increasing difficulties in getting land for temples and
churches, and laws were gazetted by states prohibiting the use of
certain Malay words for worship.

Chinese Response
In the face of the major restructuring within society the Chinese
debated on the most effective adjustments. The options were either
to encourage greater communal solidarity or to move towards a
less communal posture and to seek new relationships with Malay
political and economic power. Both responses were tried out at
much the same time. But the initial and instinctive response to
develop greater political cohesion within the community gained
much attention. At the political front, there was popular support
to reform and to revitalize the MCA. In 1973, young Chinese
launched the Chinese Unity Movement, believing that Chinese
interests could best be defended through a strong communally-
based organization to bargain effectively with the Malays. 21 They
argued that Malay gains had been achieved because of political
unity through UMNO. They therefore hoped to bring back the
groups such as the traditional associations and the Chinese
educationists which had once provided the popular support of
92 Lee Kam H!nc;

the MCA. However, the reform effort failed largely because the
association and educationists as well as the merchants no longer
saw the MCA as being able to represent their interests.
Some Chinese also turned to communal solidarity to defend
their economic position that was being seriously eroded by ex-
panding corporate Malay interests. Many Chinese business groups
felt threatened because government-backed enterprises such as
Pernas, the Urban Development Authority (UDA) and state devel-
opment corporations had steadily acquired commanding stakes in
the country's banking, mining, plantations and trading sectors.
Some Chinese, therefore, turned to the traditional associations to
mobilize resources and to modernize the networking of Chinese
business. The Hainanese, for example, set up Grand United Hold-
ings. The Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce itself started
an investment arm.
Others created new forms, the most significant of which was
Multi-Purpose Holdings (MPHB). Initiated by the MCA, the MPHB
aimed at protecting Chinese economic interests. Hoping to be like
the state-backed Malay PNB (Permodalan Nasional Berhad) it
sought to mobilize the resources of the Chinese to retain partici-
pation in key economic sectors and to modernize traditional
Chinese business. The MCA argued that going back to the dialect
associations to help out would keep the Chinese divided, and in
any case the associations did not have the skills and resources to
match the new Malay institutions. It was thought that with MCA
sponsorship the MPHB would be acceptable to the Malays and the
other Chinese. 22
The period 1981-87 was marked by a series of open irritants
in inter-ethnic relations. All sides were still adjusting to the post-
1969 economic and political changes. Some of the inter-ethnic
differences were made more difficult because of the economic
recession of the mid-1980s. The Malay political leadership was
also going through a phase of uncertainty. Dr Mahathir had just
taken over as Prime Minister from Data Hussein Onn and he had
not fully consolidated his leadership within the party. There were
to be contests for the deputy President's post in 1982 and 1984,
and he himself was later to be challenged.
3 Malaystan 07tnese 93

Business competition entered into inter-ethnic relations and

was to become a new source of tension within the coalition. In
1984 MPHB, which held 40 per cent of the UMBC (United Malayan
Banking Corporation) shares sought to gain the lO per cent held
by the estate of Chang Ming Tien, which would have given it a
controlling stake. UMBC was then the third largest bank in the
country. The other major shareholder was Pernas, which had been
set up to assist the Malays in trade. The plan came to be known
to UMNO and the matter was raised in a heated debate in the
1984 general assembly. MPHB's move was opposed because some
delegates saw it as contrary to the goals of the New Economic
Policy. The party's youth wing strongly opposed the MPHB's
intention. In the end, neither MPHB nor Pernas, the other major
shareholder, gained control. But the issue helped Data Musa Hitam
to defeat Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah who was then known to be
close to Chinese business groups.
Language and culture continued to be of concern to the
Chinese, and these, together with related issues, aroused consid-
erable passion. Changes proposed by the authorities were often
seen as threatening the cultural and religious interests of the
non-Malays, especially that of the Chinese. What particularly
troubled supporters of Chinese education was a provision in the
1971 Education Act which allowed the Education Minister to
convert a national-type Chinese-medium primary school into a
Malay-medium school. The Dongjiao Zhong, a body representing
Chinese school teachers and management formed in 1954, sought
to have the provision removed. The Chinese educationists also
campaigned for the setting up of a Chinese-language university. In
August 1974, a limited company was formed to start the Merdeka
University which intended to provide opportunities for higher
education to those coming out of the private Chinese secondary
schools. Chinese educationists argued that there was a real need
for such an institution, especially as Nanyang University in
Singapore was being merged into the National University of
Singapore. The application to establish the Merdeka University
was turned down and a legal case taken up in the courts was
equally unsuccessful.
94 lee Karn Htng

In October 1987, inter-ethnic tension reached a dangerous

point when a decision was made by the Education Ministry to
promote non-Mandarin-speaking teachers as senior assistants in
national-type Chinese primary schools. Chinese educationists feared
that the appointments would be a step towards altering the character
of Chinese education, with irreversible consequences. So strongly
felt was the concern that leaders of Chinese-based parties within
the coalition took up the matter. Senior leaders of the MCA and
the Gerakan joined the DAP and educational organizations at a
meeting in the Thean Hou Temple to declare solidarity in protecting
Chinese education.
In defending Chinese language and culture, there was a con-
tinuing consciousness and desire that these features be recognized
as part of the Malaysian identity. Chinese educationists rejected
criticisms that Chinese language and culture were archaic and
alien. They pointed out that Mandarin and the major dialects
spoken in Malaysia had acquired Malay terms and features that
distinguished them from those used in China and Taiwan. There
was also a contention that in its evolution, Chinese culture in
Malaysia had become part of the country's heritage and was
inseparable from its history. There was therefore strong objection
when in 1984 the Malacca state government proposed to develop
Bukit China into a commercial area. Bukit China is a sprawling
Chinese cemetery that dates back to the fifteenth century and
which the Chinese community regards as historically significant.
The proposed clearing of part of Bukit China for development
was seen as an attempt to obliterate the community's historical
presence and links to the nation's identity.
The Chinese also took offence when in 1986 several Malay
intellectuals began using the terms kaum immigran and kaum
pendatang when referring to the non-Malays. Some Chinese objected
to the use of such terms and believed that these were attempts at
distinguishing different classes of citizens. This was, it was argued,
inimical to efforts towards full integration of all its citizens. In
seeking to popularize the terms, the Malay intellectuals sought to
emphasize once again the indigenous Malay character or, as they
described it, the definitive features of the state. But some of the
retaliatory statements from Chinese leaders, such as the claim that
3. Malaysian Cl7tnese 95

those Malays originating from elsewhere in the archipelago were

also immigrants, aroused Malay anger.
The efforts by the Chinese towards political or economic
solidarity disturbed the Malays. These moves were viewed as
continuing Chinese communal challenge to the new power balance.
UMNO, while desiring a coalition partner which enjoyed respect-
able Chinese support, would now tolerate only domesticated
Chinese-based parties without their more communal Chinese links.
There could be no return to the seeming political parity of the
Alliance Party structure.
The UMNO Youth debate in 1984 over the UMBC shares
represented an example of strong Malay :-eaction to the perceived
Chinese economic and political challenge. Even more emotional
was the response of UMNO Youth to the October 1987 Chinese
school issue. In reaction to the Thean Hou Temple meeting of
Chinese leaders, thousands of UMNO youth members held a rally
a few days later in support of the Education Ministry's decision at
the TPCA stadium. Racial tension heightened so dangerously that
there were fears that disturbances similar to that in May 1969
would occur. The crisis was averted when the Prime Minister
banned another proposed UMN 0 rally and ordered the arrest of
some 118 people for, among other reasons, allegedly inciting
communal feelings.
In the light of these developments, some Chinese leaders
suggested that continued Chinese political visibility was no
advantage to the community. The option was to adopt a non-
communal approach where the interests of all ethnic groups were
to be fought for without distinction. They believed that relying on
communal solidarity would only encourage racial polarization and
retard integration. The formation of Gerakan, the Sarawak United
People's Party (SUPP) and the DAP were efforts towards a non-
racial political approach. But these parties have been unable to
break out of their largely Chinese mould in membership and in
articulation of issues. The Chinese character of the non-communal
parties has become even more pronounced in recent years with
the increase in their membership of the largely Mandarin-speaking.
In the MCA, for instance, about 75 per cent of its members are
Mandarin-speaking. The leadership of the Chinese-based parties is
96 Lee Kam H;ng

still largely held by the English-educated but in the future fluency

in all three languages of Chinese, English, and Malay would be
essential. The lack of progress of the non-communal parties is also
due to the preference by the major communities to be represented
by other communal parties such as UMNO and MIC.

Reaction to Recent Mahathir Initiatives

The recent policies and gestures from the Malay political leader-
ship under Dr Mahathir are acknowledged as being more open
and tolerant and these have been well received by the Chinese
community. Certainly, in the 1995 elections, the majority of the
Chinese voted the Barisan Nasional to give a mandate to Dr
Mahathir and his programmes. Indeed, Chinese-based parties
campaigned on the strength of Dr Mahathir's policies. Dr Mahathir
in turn acknowledged the community's electoral support. Within
the inter-ethnic framework, such demonstration of what some
leaders would regard as loyalty to the coalition or to the bargain
is helpful to stability and integration.
The Chinese business groups are comfortable with the leader-
ship of Dr Mahathir and his vision of Wawasan 2020. Economic
growth and the opening up of international trade and investment
links, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, have created new
opportunities for Malaysians, particularly the Chinese business
sector. Trade procedures have been liberalized and the government
is actively promoting and supporting business to expand within
the country and overseas. There have been growth in small and
medium-size industries (SMI), and many of these SMis have local
Chinese participation. The development of this sector benefits
previously neglected areas, such as the former "New Villages"
which are pre-dominantly Chinese. The coming in of foreign
investments and the setting up of factories by the Taiwanese, for
example, have also created business and employment opportunities,
especially for the Chinese and Taiwan-educated who had previously
been disadvantaged. The Chinese prefer Dr Mahathir's firm and
decisive style as this has encouraged a more consistent and
predictable implementation of business regulations.
The encouragement given to private business initiatives has
been extended to the field of education. Educational opportunities
3. Malaysian Ch1hese 97

have now broadened through twinning arrangements by local

private colleges with foreign universities. Indeed, no issue in the
past has caused more anxiety to the Chinese than education and
recent changes have opened up new avenues for Chinese educa-
tional aspirations. Equally significant, the Chinese have noted a
new tolerance in cultural and language matters. Not only have
there been statements of assurance but sensitivity to the cultural
pluralism of the country is in evidence such as on public functions
and on radio and television. Lion dances, banned for a while in
the past, are now allowed. Indeed, all sides have displayed sufficient
sensitivity to each other so that the expressions of inter-ethnic
harmony is consciously made visible and given official approval
and backing. This is reflected at the "open house" functions held
during festive seasons, and the coining of "Gong Xi Raya" greeting
for Aidil Fitri and Chinese New Year, the dates of which coincided
in 1996. The Malay and Chinese Chambers of Commerce held a
joint "open house" which Dr Mahathir attended, during which he
called for Sino-Malay business ventures.
Malay political and economic confidence also allows members
of the community to look afresh at some of the old bogeymen. A
conference on Islam and Confucianism held at the University of
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, in March 1995 is indicative of such a
willingness. Attended by some 200 participants, including a
number of internationally renown scholars, the two-day conference
was seen to have political significance, not the least because it
received the patronage of the Deputy Prime Minister, Dato Seri
Anwar Ibrahim, who also delivered the opening speech. As a
student leader Dato Seri Anwar had organized demonstrations
against the Tengku for being too accommodating to the non-
Malays. He later founded Abim, the Islamic youth organization.
In September 1994 Dato Seri Anwar made his first official
visit to China. What was different on this occasion was that apart
from the courtesy calls and visits to industrial centres, he went to
the birth-place of Confucius and later to the tomb of Cheng Ho,
the famous Chinese admiral and a Muslim, who had visited Malacca
in the early years of the sultanate. Anwar's visit drew the attention
of Malaysians not only to the cultural richness of the Chinese
civilization but also to the mutual respect demonstrated in China's
98 Lee Kam Hing

links with this region. It was, in a sense, a rediscovery of Islam

in China and a reminder to the Malays of those early ties that
helped secure the rise of the Malacca sultanate. At the same time,
it was perhaps an acknowledgement to the Chinese of the
community's heritage but at the same time to show that there is
not such a great distance between their culture and that of the
Malays. Whereas Dr Mahathir had focused on the political and
economic concerns of Malaysia-China relations, Dato Seri Anwar
drew attention to the cultural aspect. 23
The various initiatives of Dr Mahathir are not without some
opposition. The main critics have come from groups of Malay
intellectuals who reflect the more nationalistic or, as some non-
Malays would regard them, communal wing within UMNO. Mainly
members of universities and literary organizations, they see the
position of Malay language and culture under some threat, and
the economic and education gains possibly undermined. A number
of Malay intellectuals talk of Malay political dominance (ketuaan
Melayu) and fear that this is being endangered by present trends.
They are supported by those who complain that existing develop-
ments have benefited only the urban centres and the few Malay
rich.
Possibly arising from such a thinking, the matter of the
Malaysian Chinese doing business in China was raised as a supple-
mentary question in Parliament on ll May 1993 by a government
back-bencher, who asked whether Malaysian Chinese conducting
business in China were motivated by sentimental reasons. This
was given very brief mention in the local press. 24 It was a speech
on the same subject made the next day by Tengku Razaleigh
Hamzah, however, which gained more attention and aroused some
controversy Tengku Razaleigh, in addressing the fourth general
assembly of Parti Semangat 46, pointed out that Malaysian Chinese
doing business in China should instead be investing at home to
help develop the more backward regions. He questioned the priority
of the Malaysian Chinese and reportedly raised doubts about their
loyalty and sincerity 25
It is such statements and sentiments that cause many Chinese
to be unsure of whether bangsa Malaysia, as they understand it,
could truly evolve and gain acceptance. The term bangsa is presently
3 Malaysran Cllrncsc 99

used in close association with Malayness and Islam, and except

for Dr Mahathir there had not been much comments or elaboration
of the idea of bangsa Malaysia from many other senior Malay
leaders. To the contrary, there has been some insistence by Malay
cultural groups that the term for the official language should be
bahasa Melayu (Malay language) instead of bahasa Malaysia
(Malaysian language).
Nevertheless, that the subject of the Malaysian Chinese
investing in China did not become an issue is a commentary of
the prevailing stability of the new power equilibrium within the
Barisan Nasional. Since 1988, communal temper has largely cooled
and issues that threaten inter-ethnic relations are checked very
early by the authorities. Much of this is due to the strengthening
of Dr Mahathir's position as leader of UMNO. He has ensured that
the executive branch of government is greatly strengthened in
relation to the legislative and judiciary With secure and enhanced
power, Dr Mahathir has been able to carry out policies, both
domestic and foreign, which many consider as innovative and
bold.

The Coming Trends

Given the size of their population and their early participation in
the independence movement, the Chinese will still play a significant
part in the country's political process. The Chinese form their own
political parties and at least three of these are part of the ruling
coalition at the federal and state levels. There are six Chinese
Cabinet ministers, two state chief ministers, two state deputy
chief-ministers, and representatives in state executive committees.
The largest opposition party is identifiably Chinese.
Chinese education remains an integral part of the school system
and 2 7 per cent of the total enrolment are in state-supported
Chinese primary schools. 20 Nowhere else can there be found a
Chinese-language education stream that is part of the public
system. About 80 per cent of the Chinese send their children to
Chinese primary schools and this high figure has been main-
tained over the years. There are some 35,000 Malays in these
Chinese schools. There are no state-supported Chinese secondary
schools but the government allows some sixty private schools to
100 Lee Kam Hmg

operate. The Dongjiao Zhong is hoping to start a Chinese-medium

New Era College in Kajang, which is intended to provide higher
education opportunities for the Chinese-educated and to train
teachers for the independent Chinese secondary schools. There
are nearly half a dozen widely-circulated Chinese newspapers,
and Chinese TV and radio programmes are aired on state and
private stations.
Many leaders express the hope that as Malaysia searches for a
larger international economic and political role, domestic concerns
bounded by ethnic identification can be transcended. Nevertheless,
in the changing balance of domestic political power, the format of
inter-ethnic co-operation will still be preserved. This is held to be
essential to the parliamentary process in Malaysia which, despite
criticisms of imperfections, has helped to ensure stability and all
sides see little reason for wanting it replaced. The coalition is
regarded as the only possible framework of political co-operation
and the principal mechanism mediating differences among the
races. 27 For the Chinese, it is in the ruling coalition that they have
a role in government and thereby some input in policy formulation.
Through the MCA, they have a claim to having been part of the
historic independence movement. Many Chinese believe that their
interest could be safeguarded only within the coalition and through
supporting moderate UMNO leaders against those representing
more communal demands.
Even UMNO finds the coalition arrangement of some value,
especially in the electoral process. Non-Malay votes mobilized by,
for example, the MCA are crucial in keenly contested Malay
constituencies against the more Islamic PAS in the same manner
that disciplined Malay voters have consistently helped Chinese-
based coalition parties win many of their seats. More recently, in
1988 the momentum of the new Semangat 46 party challenge to
Dr Mahathir was checked when the Chinese voted for the UMNO
candidate in Parit Raja, johor. In Sabah and Sarawak, where no
ethnic groups are in the majority, the Chinese are still a deciding
factor. Chinese votes have been decisive in changes in state
governments in Sabah. In Sarawak, the largely Chinese SUPP,
which was previously a powerful left-wing opposition, has helped
the coalition to stay in power since joining the state Barisan
3 Malaystan Chtnese 101

Nasional. So important is the inter-ethnic coalition in Malaysia

that when it appears to break down, racial understanding is harmed
and national stability threatened. Serious tension within the coali-
tion signal to the public that the leaders are experiencing difficulties
in accommodating conflicting inter-ethnic interests.
Within the Malaysian political process the main opposition
criticisms could be ignored. Electorally, UMNO sees no danger of
the opposition coming to power at the federal level. The opposi-
tion serves as a convenient political safety valve through which
part of the frustration of the non-Malays is vented. Furthermore,
non-Malay opposition electoral gains trim the representation of
the MCA or Parti Gerakan and through this, weaken their
bargaining position within the coalition. Finally, an opposition
such as the DAP, when portrayed as a Chinese threat, rallies Malay
solidarity.
The politics of the Chinese will continue to be articulated
through expressly communal and non-communal parties. But these
parties will have a less assertive role. The Chinese recognize the
limits to which non-Malay demands can be effectively made;
nevertheless, they continue to work within such parameters. There
have been changes within the Chinese community, more than 90
per cent of whom are local-born. Many Chinese are fluent in
Malay and an entire generation born after independence have
gone through the national education system that is Malaysia-
oriented. It is not possible yet to identify an essentially Malay-
educated group that is large enough and which in orientation is
different from the Chinese and the English-educated. The influence
of the present generation of Chinese- and English-educated is
still strong, while higher education institutions will maintain the
continued role of the two groups. The economic growth of China,
Taiwan, and Singapore has also enhanced the value of Chinese as
a regional business language, while English remains useful for
international communication.
Secondly, significant demographic changes are taking place in
the country. A lower birth rate is resulting in a decline of the
Chinese percentage so that by the year 2020 it is estimated that
the Chinese would form no more than 18 per cent of the total
population. Equally significant is the increasing urbanization of
102 Lee Kam Htnc;

the Malays. Where Kuala Lumpur, the capital, was once predomi-
nantly Chinese, Malays today form nearly half its inhabitants.
These two trends are already affecting the electoral pattern. In the
1995 elections, there were fewer urban constituencies which were
overwhelmingly Chinese.
The MCA, the only expressly Chinese party in the country,
which went through debilitating in-fighting and power-struggles
in the 1980s, is striving for a less communal image. It has, for
instance, liberalized its membership to allow those with one parent
who is Chinese to join. The Tengku Abdul Rahman (TAR) college,
which it is closely associated with, enrols a significant proportion
of non-Chinese students. The party has also launched the Langkawi
Project which aims at providing educational assistance to the rural
areas irrespective of race.
Having weak political influence is not new to the Chinese in
Malaysia as this was the situation in the early Malay states and
during the colonial period. The Chinese are likely to continue to
direct their energy and ambition to the economic sphere. As
opportunities in the more traditional economic sectors become
restricted either because of NEP rules or changing economic
demands, some Chinese are venturing into new types of trade and
to manufacturing. Manufacturing and high-tech industries have
particularly attracted the Chinese, given the thrust of the country's
economic development and in a sector where there are less NEP
encumbrances. Manufacturing is the largest export earner in the
country today, having overtaken palm oil and rubber, and an
estimated 80 per cent of the small and medium-size industries are
Chinese-owned.
The Chinese will no doubt look to strong political leadership
that is supportive of business. Even the Chinese-based parties will
still be considered relevant to represent the interests of Chinese
business interests. Such indeed was the case in 1985 when the
Ministry of Trade and Industry awarded to Satria Utara Enterprise
Sdn Bhd, a subsidiary of Pemas, the sole permit to import mandarin
oranges for the Chinese New Year. This led to strong protests from
the traditional importers who were Chinese, and the matter was
resolved through the Chinese-based parties in the coalition. Further-
more, it is through the Chinese-based parties that businessmen
3 Malayst~m011nese 103

find help in dealing with lower level authorities and in establishing

contact with Malay business-political groups.
The larger and older Chinese businesses will continue to
cultivate political links, perhaps more with powerful Malays and
less with overtly Chinese parties. People such as Lim Goh Tong,
Lee Loy Seng, Loh Boon Siew, and Robert Kuok are examples of
the earlier Chinese whose established businesses were enhanced
by opening links with influential Malays. Khoo Kay Peng's Malayan
United Industries, Teh Hong Piow's Public Bank, Quek Leng Chans
Hong Leong, the Lion Corporation, Kamunting Corporation, and
Sunway Holding represent the more recent business groups which
have benefited by establishing connections with important Malay
partners.
It has been observed that in recent years Sabah and Sarawak
have produced more than a fair number of prominent Chinese
entrepreneurs. In Sabah, there are Teh Soon Seng of Aokam and
joseph Lee of CASH, while in Sarawak the more prominent in
recent years are Ting Pik Khiing of Ekran and Tiong Hiew King
of the Rimbunan Hijau Group. These two states in the political
periphery are resource-rich, especially in timber, and given the
pivotal political role which the Chinese are still able to play there,
allow the Chinese greater economic possibilities. Dialect ties there
are still very strong, especially among the Foochows. Some, such
as Tan Sri Ling Beng Siew, founder of Hock Hua Bank, belong to
the older generation of successful entrepreneurs and demonstrate
the dynamism of these dialect networks.
More recently, and at a time when there has been spectacular
Malay gains in the corporate sector, there have emerged a number
of major companies largely owned by young Chinese but whose
rapid diversification and expansion have been credited to powerful
Malay backing. These include Westmont Holdings, Promet, the
Phileo Allied Group, and Berjaya Corporation. These young Chinese
bring with them management and trading skills, and have gained
a reputation for corporate daring as they take over old companies
and turn them into widely-diversified, though sometimes highly-
geared, enterprises. A few of them have gone into ship-building,
steel-mills, high-technology industries, and even defence contracts.
What distinguishes some of these companies from the earlier ones,
104 LeeKam H;ng

however, is their apparent greater dependence on Malay financial

and political support 28
Besides bringing in management and technological skills as
well as some capital, the Chinese will continue to rely on net-
working, especially that based on dialect, to give them a competitive
edge. It is a network that can be traced to the nineteenth century
when Penang and Singapore were used as key centres linking the
major ports of the region. Today, that link is retained to facilitate
business engagements and to help open new opportunities into
Vietnam and Myanmar. For instance, Robert Kuok is connected in
business to Liem Sioe Liong of Indonesia and the Bangkok Bank
group in Thailand, and Liem's Salim and the Lippo groups have
expanded their business and investments in Southeast Asia and
Hong Kong. Likewise, joseph Lee of the CASH group has entered
into joint ventures with Barito's Prajogo Pangestu of Indonesia. 29
Today, that connection extends to Hong Kong and Taiwan. 30
Networking is viewed as a facilitator to Chinese business in
Southeast Asia rather than for cultural solidarity.
Business networking, especially in Malaysia, relies on the
maintenance of distinctives that are Chinese. For this reason, at
least traditional beliefs and religions of the Chinese remain
important. In Malaysia, Islam is not regarded as a part of that
Chinese distinctiveness or identity. This may explain why there
has not been conversion in significant numbers to Islam among
the Chinese, as conversion means abandoning their identity. Islam
is identified with the Malays, and the resurgence of the faith is
seen by the Chinese as associated with rising Malay nationalism.
According to the 1991 census there are an estimated 15,000
Chinese Muslims in the country or 0.4 per cent of the Chinese
population. Reports suggest that those who converted have not
been fully accepted within the community by the Malays.
Yet, some Chinese see in the universalism taught in Islam
a moderating influence upon Malay nationalism. In 1986, for
example, some Chinese formed the Chinese Consultative Committee
(CCC) to support PAS in the elections. The CCC members were
impressed by the willingness of some PAS leaders to consider
multilingualism and to review the status of Malay special privileges.
3. Malays;an Ch;nese 105

PAS seemed to argue that Islam does not condone ethnic lines as
a basis for preferential treatment.
There has been a revival of the various non-Muslim faiths
among the Chinese in recent years which, in part, is a reaction
to growing Islamic resurgence in the country. There is a strong
Buddhist revival movement particularly among the Chinese-
educated. Some Chinese-educated, especially the Foochows in
Sarawak and in Sitiawan, are Christians. But it is among the
English-educated where there was early conversion through the
schools, that the number of Christians are larger. Christians total
about 1,357,751 or 7.76 per cent in the 1991 census but, despite
recent growth, they remain a minority within the Chinese
community
To the young and able Chinese who are fired with more
idealism, it is the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
social movements that they are increasingly drawn to. They share
concern about alleviating social conditions and raising aware-
ness on global concerns such as the environment, nuclear non-
proliferation, and human rights. In approaching such problems,
these organizations have generally transcended narrow ethnic
preoccupations, and in expressing a more Malaysian perspective,
they help promote some integration. There are now more Chinese
participating in consumers' organizations and environmental protec-
tion movements. They are joined by non-Malay leaders who are
frustrated with opposition politics. Lee Lam Thye from the DAP
is active in Pemadam, a drug rehabilitation body, and Kua Kia
Soong, also from the DAP, is involved in a coalition of concerned
NGOs against the Bakun Dam project.
Thus, in the last few years, the Chinese in Malaysia have
developed a range of political and economic responses to the
changes they face. Though their political role has weakened, their
participation remains important in ensuring a multiracial image
necessary to maintain stability In the business sector, they are
evolving new relations with major Malay political and economic
centres. They are valued for their entrepreneurial skills and for
their international business networking. It is possible that some
indigenous entrepreneurs, through local joint ventures, could
become part of this Chinese networking. Certainly, the present
106 Lee Kam HtrKJ

political leadership values the continuance of a multiracial society

and considers it an achievement of Malay nationalism, and that it
remains valuable in the expansion of Malaysia's regional and
international interests. Despite reservations by Malay cultural
nationalists, the Chinese distinctiveness and their overseas links
are accepted by many Malay leaders as less threatening. China
serves no more than a reminder to the local Chinese of the source
of their identity and evokes a sentiment little different from that
felt by Muslims towards the Middle East.

Notes
1. Michael Blackman et al., Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia
(Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs in Trade, 1995).
2. Even up to the period of independence, the indigenous Malay
community was only approaching 50 per cent of the population.
3. Michael Godley, The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese
enterprise in the modernization of China, 1893-1911 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
4. john Wong, The Political Economy of Malaysia's Trade Relations with China
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974).
5. Stephen Leong, "Malaysia and the People's Republic of China in the
1980s: Political Vigilance and Economic Pragmatism", Asian Survey 27,
no. 10 (October 1987)
6. Stephen Leong, "New Paradigm in Malaysia-China Relations: From
Control to Cooperation", ]etro Sensor, june 1995.
7. Star, 31 May 1993.
8. Star, 2l October 1994.
9. Pemegang Amanah Raya Malaysia which operates the Sekim Amanah
Saham Bumiputra held 25.83 per cent of Lion Corporation in 1993.
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual Companies Handbook, vol. xix,
Book 1 Qune 1993), p. 218.
10. Star, 29 May 1995.
11. Star, 17 August 1996.
12. New Straits Time, 29 August 1996.
13. Soh Eng Lim, "Tan Cheng Lock: His Leadership of the Malayan Chinese",
journal of Southeast Asian History 1, no. 1 (March 1960): 29-55.
14. Tan Liok Ee, The Rhetoric of Bangsa and Minzu (Clayton, Australia
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1988).
15. R. Stubbs, Hearts and Mind in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency,
1948-1960 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989).
16. FG. Carnell, "Constitutional Reforms and Elections in Malaya", Pacific
Affairs 27, no. 3 (September 1954) 99-117; Colonial Office (Great
3. Malaystan Chinese 107

Britain), Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission

(London, 1957); Tun Mohamed Suffian, H. P Lee, and FA. Trindadae,
eds., The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Development, 1957-1977 (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978).
17. Heng Pek Koon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian
Chinese Association (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988).
18. R.K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Elections of 1969 (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1972): Karl von Vorys, Democracy without
Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaya (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975).
19. Felix Gagliano, Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political
Aftermath (Athens, Ohio: Ohio Centre for International Studies, 1970).
20. The Second Malaysia Plan (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaysia,
1971).
21. Loh Kok Wah, The Politics of Chinese Unity in Malaysia: Reform and
Conflict in the Malaysian Chinese Association, 1971-1973 (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).
22. Bruce Gale, Politics and Business: A Study of Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad
(Kuala Lumpur: Eastern Universities Press, 1985).
23. There is recently formed a Malaysia-China Friendship Society with
well-known Malay poet, Usman Awang, as President and Lee Lam
Thye in the committee.
24. Star, 12 May 1993.
25. Nanyang Siang Pau, 13 May 1993; and Sin Chew ]it Pau, 13 May 1993.
26. In 1984 there were some 1,296 state-supported Chinese primary schools
with an enrolment of 588,836. Enrolled in the 60 private schools were
44,656 students. Kua Kia Soong, The Chinese Schools in Malaysia: A
Protean Saga (Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees
Association of Malaysia, 1985).
27. R.S. Milne, Diane Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia (Kuala
Lumpur: Federal Publications, 1978).
28. Sally Cheong, Changes in Ownership of KI5E Companies (Kuala Lumpur:
Corporate Research Services, 1995).
29. Irene Sia, "Robert Kuok: Taipan Incorporated", in Formation and
Restructuring of Business Groups in Malaysia, edited by Hara Fujio (Tokyo:
Institute of Developing Economies, 1993), pp. 57-72.
30. Toh Kin Woon, "Taiwanese Investments in Malaysia: A Macro and
Micro Analysis", in The Development of Bumiputra Enterprizes and Sino-
Malay Economic Cooperation in Malaysia, edited by Hara Fujio (Tokyo:
Institute of Developing Economies, 1994), pp. 109-30.
 Comments by
Ahmat Adam on
"Malaysian Chinese:
Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020"
Presented by Lee Kam Hing

This is a very comprehensive paper. Professor Lee Kam Hing, who

is a keen watcher of contemporary Chinese affairs in Malaysia, has
done a very thorough job on the subject of the Malaysian Chinese
and their identity. There are several points that the paper attempts
to highlight:
l. The emergence of China as a giant growth area and the
involvement of the "Overseas Chinese" especially from South-
east Asia have renewed suspicions about the local Chinese. In
Professor Lee's opinion, there is a kind of uneasiness among
the Malays in the peninsula with regard to the issue of the
Malaysian Chinese doing business in China. He thinks that
the re-emergence of China as an economic and political power
is perceived by indigenous Southeast Asians, including the
Malays, as encouraging the resinicization of the Chinese in
Southeast Asia.
2. Nationalism and religious resurgence of the indigenous people
are factors that continue to form parameters for the integration
of the Chinese.
3. In Malaysia, inter-ethnic equilibrium is maintained by an inter-
ethnic coalition in government. Since the 1950s the so-called
inter-ethnic political bargain, which became the basis of inter-
ethnic co-operation, has undergone several tests and forms
of adaptations to result in a consensus that brought about
considerable shifts and adjustments on both non-Malays and
Malays.
4. Being a substantially large minority group, the Chinese have
been able to retain their identity as Chinese since they are
represented at every political level and have a strong hold on
Comments on The Identity of the Malaysian Chinese 109

the economy. Both Chinese education and Chinese language

have also been assured of their continued existence.
5. The inter-ethnic coalition is regarded as the only workable
framework for political co-operation "and the principal mecha-
nism mediating differences among the races". Many Chinese
contend that Chinese interests are better safeguarded through
political negotiations within the coalition. Any breakdown in
the coalition would tend to bring about instability and racial
strife.
6. There were several occasions when the coalition was threatened:
a) One happened in july 1959 when the MCA, under the
leadership of UMNO, demanded a third of the seats for
the coming elections. (Earlier, the MCA had been allocated
28 seats but demanded that this be increased to 35). The
MCA also demanded for the Education Act to be reviewed.
b) Another occurred during the campaign by Lee Kuan Yew
on the Malaysian-Malaysia concept. The concept challenged
what Professor Lee calls "the symbols of loyalty insisted
on by the Malays".
c) Another occasion was when the campaign for the 1969
general election became heated over racial issues which,
following the announcement of the results of the elections,
led to the riots of l3 May.
7. Following the suspension of democracy immediately after the
riots, important policy changes were made. A more Malay
character of the state was pursued, with new symbols of
loyalty being insisted upon.
8. In the opinion of Professor Lee, after the reinstitution of
parliamentary democracy in March 1971 the MCA as the
effective party to represent Chinese interests was weakened
by the enlargement of the Alliance party concept, that is, the
formation of the Barisan Nasional.
9. New changes, which included the implementation of the New
Economic Policy, caused apprehension among the Chinese.
Chinese commercial enterprises came under pressure to re-
structure in order to accommodate Malay economic partici-
pation.
1 10 Ahmat Adam

10. The response from the Chinese towards these changes was to
forge greater communal solidarity and this gave birth to the
Chinese Unity Movement in 1973. The MCA also formed
Multi-Purpose Holdings to protect Chinese economic interests.
11. There was inter-ethnic tension between the Chinese and Malays
during the period of the recession, particularly between 1981
and 1987. While some Malay intellectuals were using the
term kaum pendatang to refer to the Chinese, which caused
irritation to the latter, some Chinese leaders made statements
tantamount to denying the historical claims of the Malays as
the indigenous people.
12. By and large, the Chinese community in Malaysia are quite
comfortable with Dr Mahathir's style of leadership. His firm
control of UMNO has also enabled him to check any inter-
ethnic tension that might lead to instability Under his lead-
ership, Malaysia's economic growth and the opening up of
international trade and investment links have created new
opportunities for Chinese business.
13. The Malaysian Chinese community are also happy over the
broadening of educational opportunities. These changes, says
Professor Lee, appear to accommodate Chinese aspirations.
14. The rise of a new breed of Malay entrepreneurs in the corporate
world has also enabled inter-ethnic co-operation between
Malays and Chinese to take a positive twist. Mahathirs policy
seems to encourage economic joint ventures of Malay and
Chinese businessmen and this reflects the mood of the country,
to promote inter-ethnic co-operation in order to realize the
aims of making Malaysia a fully industrialized country by the
year 2020.
15. There are also attempts to promote intercultural dialogue
between Muslim Malays and Chinese - for example, the
conference on Islam and Confucianism.
16. Both the Malay and Chinese politicalleaderships acknowledge
that the multiracial political and economic formats that are
benefiting Malaysia recently must be maintained and multi-
ethnic co-operation preserved.
17. Although the Chinese will continue to make demands for
their community, nevertheless they recognize the limits to
CornmtY715 on Tile /dcnt;ty of tile ,v/alays;an C/J;nesc Ill

their demands and would accordingly try to accommodate

their aspirations within the parameters already acknowl-
edged.
18. Demographic changes are taking place. Professor Lee Kam
Hing thinks that by the next century the Chinese population
will decline in number because of the lower birth rate. (But
I think his figure of 18 per cent for the Chinese population
by the year 2020 is too low. According to my sources, it is
closer to 29 per cent, with Malays making up 62 per cent of
the total population.)

The overall picture that Professor Lee tries to present is that

the Chinese in Malaysia today have, since the end of World War
II, been able to maintain their Chineseness through making
adjustments with existing symbols of Malay polity
The Malaysian Chinese, nevertheless, as has been rightly
pointed out by Professor Wang Gungwu, while willing to adopt
the Malaysian national identity, have "at the same time developed
a powerful sense of communal identity to assert the community's
right to share power in the country". 1 Their ability to assert such
right is proven by the fact that UMNO, the party that dominates
the Barisan Nasional, has very much accepted the fact that while
some semblance of Malay claims to "pre-eminence" should be
maintained, Malaysian society is really a multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural society
A clear indication of UMNOs changing attitude is the increased
flexibility shown towards the Chinese pertaining to their culture,
education and language. Even the appointment of a Chinese to be
the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and the increasing support
given to Sino-Malay economic co-operation could be interpreted
as signs of greater inter-ethnic tolerance. Under the strong lead-
ership of Dr Mahathir, UMNO has also consistently addressed
issues regarding nation-building from a multi-ethnic perspective.
This explains the fact that Chinese culture is now quite liberally
accepted as part and parcel of the Malaysian culture. No longer
does one hear of Malay politicians protesting at the inclusion of
the Chinese dragon dance or lion dance at functions officiated or
attended by Malay senior ministers, including the Prime Minister
112 A/JmatAdam

himself or his deputy. Perhaps this wind of change is not only due
to a shift in policy by UMNO but also is a consequence of Chinese
steadfastness in the struggle to assert their communal rights.
There is also less politicization of such issues as the national
culture and the national language by UMNO leaders. As a matter
of fact, even if such issues have from time to time been raised by
Malay cultural organizations, they no longer receive the same
response or the same attention as they used to in the seventies
or early eighties. The fact that UMNO has allowed the English
language to play a very significant role in the development of a
modern Malaysia is another indication of the changing attitude of
UMNO. This is not to say that there are no critics from certain
quarters within the Malay elite to UMNO's stand on the issues of
Malay language and culture. But the emergence of a new breed
of Malay political elite whose economic base and educational
background are different from the political leaders of the fifties
and sixties, has brought changes not only to the political culture
of UMNO but also given birth to new perspectives on ideas of
nation building of which the Chinese are part and parcel.
The crucial issue in the eyes of many Malay intellectuals in
Malaysia today is the question of nation building. By nation
building, they mean the creation of a Malaysian nation out of the
diverse ethnic groups. The first time the issue of nation building
cropped up was in january 1991 when a group of Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) lecturers wrote a memorandum to
the Prime Minister upon the expiry of the New Economic Policy
suggesting that the issue of nation building be taken up and to
have it linked with an economic policy that would replace the
NEP The thrust of the argument in that memorandum was to
emphasize the need for an economic policy that would continue
to give attention to rural poverty while advocating a shift in policy
towards industrialization. The end of the NEP brought apprehen-
sion to Malay intellectuals especially when the privatization con-
cept was increasingly gaining acceptance in government circles
and among the top leaders of UMNO. They were unsure of what
the effects of privatization of education would have on Malay
educational opportunities and the role of the Malay language as
a tool for nation building. There was fear that Chinese economic
Comments on The Identity of the Malays;an Chinese I 13

predominance would again push the Malays into economic and

educational regression.
The much criticized NEP was, however, replaced by the New
Development Policy (NDP). The cornerstone of the NDP was
privatization. Inherent in the new economic philosophy was the
emphasis on growth and the modernization of the Malaysian
economy. The strategy was a shift from a mixed economy to one
that is industrial-based. In order to achieve this, Malaysians are
constantly reminded that there are strategies that they will have to
adopt if Malaysia is to achieve the status of a fully modem nation
state by the year 2020. There are challenges and hurdles that
Malaysians will have to face, one of which is the creation of a
united Malaysian nation, or what is termed bangsa Malaysia.
Thus far, it seems that the ideas that were outlined by Dr
Mahathir's Vision 2020 speech, which he delivered to the Malaysian
Business Council Meeting in early 1991, have received undivided
support from the Chinese community. Nation building in the
Mahathir era does not entail the restriction of Chinese economic
activities, as pointed out by Professor Lee Kam Hing. Neither
would policies that attempt to enforce assimilationist tendencies,
such as the pursuance of a national culture and a one-language
policy, benefit the country in the long run, especially if one realizes
that to achieve Vision 2020 not only would inter-ethnic harmony
between the Chinese and Malays need to be sustained but the
vital role that the Chinese business community can play in the
pursuit of industrialization, given their wealth and economic
strength, industriousness and educational skills, also need to be
recognized.
To quote Professor Wang Gungwu again, "The Chinese have
never had a concept of identity, only a concept of Chineseness ... "2
I think when one discusses the identity of the Malaysian Chinese
one cannot but recognize this fact. Political pressure exerted by
the Malay majority in the late sixties and the seventies was perceived
by the Malaysian Chinese community as an attempt to put Chinese
culture and Chinese language under threat of extinction. This
resulted in the struggle to project a Chinese communal identity.
Hence, the strained relationship between the Chinese and Malays
in the late seventies and mid-eighties.
114 Ai7matAdam

The present political setting, however, appears to have diluted

the fear and tension. Nevertheless, to many indigenous Southeast
Asians, including the Malays, the "communal identity" still persists
especially in the wake of a greater awareness among Southeast
Asian Chinese of the re-emergence of China as an economic giant
and a superpower. In Malaysia, many Malay cultural activists are
dismayed that their vision of creating a Malaysian nation built on
Malay polity and culture is no longer acceptable to the present
Malay political elite. In this sense, Professor Lee is quite correct
to say that the newly-found confidence of the Malay corporate
elite, which also happens to be the group that is now holding the
reins of Malay political leadership, has enabled it to accept the
reality that a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Malaysia is the only
basis for nation building and, thus, the only alternative for a
better future both for the Malays and the country

Notes
l. jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu, eds., Changing Identities of the
Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II (Hong Kong University Press,
1988), p. 4.
2. Ibid, p. l.
 Chapter 4
The Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar
and their Identity

Mya Than

Introduction
The purpose of this study is to explore and analyse the ethnic
Chinese in Myanmar and their identity in terms of their attitudes
towards the nation-state and their relationships with the indig-
enous people and with China. As the Chinese immigrated into
Myanmar in several waves, their concepts of nation-state and their
identity probably changed from time to time, or wave to wave.
There are many reasons for overseas Chinese migration. Some
immigrated for political/security reasons (such as civil wars or
political oppression; for example, the panthay rebellion in 1873),
some for economic or commercial reasons (business and employ-
ment opportunities, famines, for geographical reasons and for easier
communication), while others were for social reasons (over-
population in their home countries, racial and cultural affinities,
connection with host countries, stimulus of pioneers in their home
116 Mya Than

towns, and development of migration agencies) (for details, see

Hicks 1995, chapter 2).
Chinese immigration into Myanmar is almost as old as the
country's history. Thus, later generations of migrants and the
descendants of migrants who were born in the country would
have different attitudes from those long resident in the country.
Moreover, their political, economic and social positions would
influence their definitions of their identity and their attitudes
towards the nation of their residence and towards the indigenous
ethnic groups.
Therefore, this chapter will discuss briefly the historical and
demographic development of the ethnic Chinese in Myanmar and
their political, social and economic positions in the country. Then,
it will explore their identity - in other words, how the Chinese
view their Chineseness, whether they consider themselves as
"indigenous ethnic Chinese" or "Southeast Asians" or "Overseas
Chinese", their assimilation into or integration with other indig-
enous groups and their attitudes toward the People's Republic of
China (PRC), also in the historical perspective. In order to have
a complete picture, the attitudes of the indigenous ethnic groups
towards the ethnic Chinese will also be examined. As Myanmar
now practises an "open-door" policy and recently attained observer
status in ASEAN after acceding to the organization's Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation, the chapter will also address the role
played by the ethnic Chinese in this regionalization process.
For the purpose of this study, the term "ethnic Chinese" will
be used to mean "Chinese who have immigrated into Myanmar
and their descendants", or "a group of people in Myanmar of
Chinese ancestry with cultural affinity", or just "individuals of
substantial Chinese ancestry who observe some important cultural
rituals, such as ancestor worship, Chinese New Year celebrations,
funeral rites, and so on", although Professor Wang Gungwu (1981)
has different definitions for "ethnic Chinese". In addition, as the
name of the country of Burma has been officially changed from
the "Union of Burma" to the "Union of Myanmar" in June 1989,
for those events pre-dating the name change, the original name
"Burma" is retained in order to preserve the chronological order;
while for those events which post-date the name change, the
4. The Ethnic Chtnese in Myanmar and their Identity 117

name "Myanmar" is used. (Since june 1989, the term "Burmese",

for the citizens of Burma, has been replaced with "Myanmar" and
the term "Burman", an ethnic group of Burma, with "Bamar".)

The Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar

Chinese from Guangdong and Fujian in China emigrated into
Burma in the Song (960-1279 AD) and Ming (1368-1644 AD)
dynasties (East Asia Analytical Unit 1995, p. 61). However, the
numbers were few until the Yuan (1271-1368 AD) dynasty when
Chinese businessmen expanded their businesses on a more
permanent basis. As Myanmar has a common border of more than
2,000 kilometres with Yunnan, Chinese immigration into Myanmar
might even have been earlier than historical records show. After
the British colonization of the region, the Chinese arrived via
Malaysia, which was then called Malaya. Hence, in terms of the
routes they took, there are two types of Chinese in Myanmar -
Mountain Chinese and Maritime Chinese. Mountain Chinese are
those who came from Yunnan by taking the mountain road while
the Maritime Chinese came by sea via Malaysia. According to
local Myanmar, there are two kinds of Chinese - "Leta" (literally,
short sleeve) and "Letshe" (long sleeve), depending on their occu-
pations, generally like blue-collar and white-collar. Leta Chinese
were mostly carpenters, coolies and farmers whereas Letshe used
to be traders, bankers and brokers. According to Chen (1976), the
Cantonese are referred to as Leta while the Fukianese are Letshe.
According to dialects, there are in Myanmar, Yunnanese,
Cantonese, Hokkien and Hakka, Apart from these, there are local
ethnic Chinese called Kokang Chinese who live along the Yunnan-
Myanmar border and speak Mandarin. The ethnic Chinese in
upper Burma are mostly Yunnanese, Hokkien and Kokang while
Hokkien and Cantonese are found mostly in the lower part of
Myanmer along the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) delta, including
Yangon, and Tanintharyi (Tenaserrim) coast.
During the pre-war period, the population of ethnic Chinese
in Myanmar numbered about 193 thousand in 1931, which was
about 1.3 per cent of the total population of the country (Table
1). This figure is less significant compared to that of Indians
which accounted for about 5 per cent of the total population in
118

TABLE 1
Chinese Population in Myanmar, 1931-83
(In thousand)
------

Year 1931 1941 1953 1961 1973 1983

Chinese 194 300('" 350# 227 234
Total 14,670 16,824 19,100 21,530* 28,921 35,307
Chinese as (%)
of total (1.3) (-) (1.6) (1.6) (08) (0 6)
1"' Skinner (1950)

" Purcell (1965)

* UN Demographic Yearbook 1962

SmrR(T Censuses of India and the Union of Burma.

the same period. Out of these 193 thousand ethnic Chinese, about
54 per cent were, according to the 1931 census of India, born in
Myanmar.
The size of the Chinese population just before World War II
was estimated at 20 thousand by Harvey, as quoted in Purcell's
(1965, p. 42) work. This was even after "most of racketeers brought
in by the Burma Road had gone off to Shanghai". Soon after
World War II, there was a sharp increase in Chinese immigration,
especially from Yunnan. They were mostly from the Kuomintang
(KMT) faction of the Chinese army and those who fled Yunnan
when the communists took over power. The size of the ethnic
Chinese community increased to about 300 thousand, which was
about 1.6 per cent of the total Myanmar population of 19.1 million
in 1953.
According to Skinner (1950), about half of the total Chinese
population of Burma was found in and around the Ayeyarwady
(Irrawaddy) delta, including Yangon (50,000) and Mawlamyine
(15,000). The proportions of the various dialect groups were
roughly as follows: Hokkien 40 per cent, Cantonese 25 per cent,
Yunnanese 20 per cent, Hakka 8 per cent, and Hainanese 3 per
cent (p. 3).
As border areas have always been difficult to control because
of the terrain, the increasing Chinese immigrants from Yunnan
could not be checked, despite the government's concerted efforts.
4. The Ethn:c Cil!!Jesc :n Myanrnar 1nci t!Je:r ldenDry 119

Thus, it is estimated that there were 350,000 ethnic Chinese in

Myanmar in 1961, which is equivalent to slightly more than 1.6
per cent of the total population during that period. However, the
size of this community seems to have been declining since the
1970s, probably caused by two factors. Firstly, the nationalization
of private firms in 1964, including industries, trading houses, and
banks, especially those owned by ethnic Indians and Chinese.
About 300,000 Indians and 100,000 Chinese left the country
after 1962 (Smith 1994, p. 63). Secondly, a new citizenship law
which "discriminates" against the ethnic races of foreign origin
was introduced in 1982. As a result, many ethnic Chinese left the
country, mostly going to Taiwan, the United States, Hong Kong
and Australia. There is the possibility that some Chinese were
also registered under the "mixed foreign and Burmese" category
in both censuses. Therefore, the number of ethnic Chinese in the
censuses of 1973 and 1983 seems to be underestimated. The
ethnic Chinese in 1973 numbered 227,000, which is about 0.8
per cent of the total population, whereas in 1983, the number
was 234,000 which accounted for about 0.6 per cent of the total.
The sex ratio also declined from 11}.5 in 1973 to 106.8 in 1983
(Table 2).
Currently, one source has estimated the size of the ethnic
Chinese community, or those who are of largely Chinese ancestry
at 15 to 20 per cent (East Asia Analytical Unit 199 5, p. 61),
which seems to be overestimated, whereas Smith (1994) under-
estimated it at 400,000 (p. 64). A more realistic estimate of the
Chinese population would be about 2 to 3 per cent of the total
45 million. The East Asia Analytical Unit also estimated that 20
per cent of Myanmar's ethnic Chinese live in Yangon, with another
20 per cent in the Shan States, and 13 per cent each in the Bago
and Ayeyarwady regions. Mandalay and Tanintharyi account for
the rest (p. 62).
However, compared to some Southeast Asian countries, the
size of the Chinese population in Myanmar is small.
In terms of origin, almost 45 per cent of the Chinese in Burma
in 1931 were Fukianese or Cantonese, about 21 per cent were
Yunnanese including a small number of Panthays (Muslim Chinese),
and the rest were from elsewhere in China south of the Yangtze.
 -
N
0

TABLE 2
Percentage Distribution of Racial and Ethnic Groups,
by Sex: Burma, 1973, 1983

Total Males Females Sex ratio

Group 1973 1983 1973 1983 1973 1983 1973 1983
Burman 68.0 69.0 67.6 68.9 68.2 69.1 98.0 98.3
Shan 8.9 8.5 9.0 8.5 8.9 8.5 100.1 98.2
Karen 6.6 6.2 6.6 6.2 6.6 6.2 97.9 98.4
Yakhine 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.5 100.1 99.4
Other indigenous 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.5 99.1 99.5
Mixed Burmese 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.3 102.7 101.8
Chinese 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 113.5 106.8
Indians and Pakistan 1.9 1.4 2.1 1.4 1.8 1.3 113.1 104.5
Other foreign races 1.2 2.0 1.3 2.0 1.2 1.9 105.1 100.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 28,085 34,125 13,963 14,122 16,940 17,185
SouRer: Calculation based on Union of Burma Censuses (1973 and 1983) by I. Khin Maung.
~
'li
:=i
'li
::J
4. The Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar and their Identity 121

It is estimated that, presently, Yunnanese and Kokang account for

about 30 to 40 per cent of the total ethnic Chinese in Myanmar.

Nation-building and the Positions of the Ethnic Chinese

Myanmar, like Malaysia and India, was under British colonial rule
for more than a hundred years. This colonial period generated
political and economic alienation, especially among the young
Bamars (Burman). The separation of modem economic opportu-
nities and traditional activities and of the sources of power shared
by the British and Indians in Myanmar, led young Bamar leaders
of the post-independence period to identify themselves with
nationalism, socialism and Buddhism. These three elements have
been the basis of the national ideology during the nation-building
period since Myanmar gained its independence from the British.
Like Myanmar, other single nation states, which were once
autonomous political entities under the colonialists, have emerged
in Southeast Asia since World War II. 'The fundamental concern
of these nations is how to be economically and politically viable
entities after having been exploited for decades and even centuries
of colonialism, and how to compete in a world dominated by
imperialist forces which keep the Third World nations under-
developed and dependent on them" (Tan 1988, p. 140).
During the process of nation-building, the establishment of
racial harmony was an important factor, especially in Myanmar
where there are seven major ethnic groups, namely, Shan, Kachin,
Chin, Karen, Mon, Yakhine (Arakanese) and Kayah, and more
than 130 minor ethnic minorities: This was because during the
colonial period, the Bamar group was kept isolated by the British
from most of the other indigenous ethnic groups. Hence, Burma
in 1948 formed the "Union" - a unitary state which is in fact
"the fusion of the different ethnic peoples into a nation with a set
of overarching common goals and aspiration" (Steinberg 1982,
p. 47). Thus, Myanmar has been a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic
and multi-religious society for most of its history.
As in other Southeast Asian nations, nation building in
Myanmar has had significant consequences on Chinese cultural
identity although, unlike Malaysia or Indonesia, the number of
122 Mya //Jan

ethnic Chinese was very small, forming only about 1.6 per cent
of the country's population. Some political and social factors forced
the Chinese minority to be assimilated into Bamar society as they
were considered, along with the Europeans and Indians, to be
exploiting the indigenous people. They were seen by the locals as
rich, and the economy of the country was perceived to be mostly
under their control. Successive Burmese governments therefore
tried to restrict their "economic power" and to limit Chinese
education. At some stages of modern history, they have also become
the "convenient scapegoats for economic difficulty in the country".
As a result of nation building and later, so-called "socialist-nation-
building", the Chinese in Myanmar had only two options: either
leave the country, or assimilate. Those who stayed behind had no
alternative but to integrate or assimilate into the Myanmar society
Since then, their political, social, and economic positions have
changed significantly throughout the post -war modern history of
Myanmar.
In sum, let me quote Tan (1988), "Other than having to look
after their own cultural, economic and political interests, the
Chinese also have to think about their identity and even be
concerned with the identity of their future generations. Being
Chinese can no longer be taken for granted. Indeed they even
have to redefine their own view of Chineseness" (p. 141).

Economic Position
Unlike in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia,
Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam,
the ethnic Chinese in Myanmar did not occupy a prominent role
in commerce in pre-war days. As Table 3 (a) and (b) shows, they
were obviously in third place after the Europeans and Indians
during the colonial period. Most of the Chinese were merchants,
manufacturers, brokers and millers. According to the 1931 census,
41 per cent of the Chinese were traders and merchants, 38 per
cent were carpenters and workers in metal and leather, 9 per cent
were semi-skilled workers, and 6 per cent were in agriculture and
the forest sector (Purcell 1965, p. 45). In almost all the cities and
towns, there were Chinese general merchandise shops, and many
sole agents for petroleum products were found to be Chinese.
4 The Ethnic Chinese in iVlyanrnar anci tr-1e.tt fcJenrt~y 123

TABLE 3a
Business Firms in Rangoon by Types of Business and
by Nationality of Ownership
(In per cent)

Total E c B u
l. Merchants 1895 121 23.1 47.1 19.9 9.9 0
1930 659 9.7 57.8 19.7 7.9 4.9
2. Manufacturers 1895 7 42.9 28.6 28.5 0 0
1930 80 18.8 23.8 10.0 16.2 31.2
3. Brokers &:. Dealers 1895 64 7.8 23.4 26.6 37.5 4.7
1930 229 20.1 48.4 11.8 6.6 13.1
4. Service 1895 191 86.9 7.3 5.2 0.6 0
1930 256 37.1 28.9 6.3 14.8 12.9
5. Bankers &:. Money 1895 31 0 96.8 0 3.2 0
Lenders 1930 29 13.8 82.8 0 0 3.4
6. Owners and Millers 1895 20 75.0 0 20.0 5.0 0
1930 103 19.4 34.9 22.3 11.7 11.7
7. Agents and Insurance 1895 15 86.7 13.3 0 0 0
Companies 1930 47 49.2 29.6 4.2 6.4 10.6
8. Contractors 1895 29 44.8 20.7 31.0 3.5 0
1930 69 36.2 39.1 4.3 7.3 13.1
9. Shopkeepers 1895 16 37.5 43.8 18.7 0 0
1930
10. Traders 1895 111 15.3 45.0 17.1 22.6 0
1930
11. Partners 1895 50 74 14 12 0 0
1930
12. Distributors and 1895
Suppliers 1930 31 22.6 38.7 12.9 6.5 19.3
13. Extraction 1895
1930 4 100 0 0 0 0
14. Import/Export 1895
1930 316 29.8 52.8 8.6 2.5 6.3
E = Europeans
I =Indians
C =Chinese
B = Burmans
U = Unidentified
Sl'URCE: Khin, june 1970.
124 Mya Than

TABLE 3b
Business Firms in District Towns by Lines of Business and
by Nationality of Ownership
(In per cent)

Total E I c B u
1. Merchants 1895 192 6.8 25.5 9.4 56.8 1.6
1930 641 9.7 37.5 16.1 34.7 2.0
2. Manufacturers 1895 2 50.0 50.0 0 0 0
1930 39 33.4 12.8 5.1 15.3 34.4
3. Brokers and Dealers 1895 39 0 12.8 5.1 82.1 0
1930 231 3.5 3.5 42.8 47.6 2.6
4. Service 1895 137 46.7 40.9 1.5 10.9 0
1930 233 11.6 24.0 4.3 35.6 24.5
5. Bankers and Money 1895 30 0 90.0 0 6.7 3.3
Lenders 1930 35 14.3 51.4 0 34.3 0
6. Owners and Millers 1895 3 0 0 0 100.0 0
1930 239 7.5 11.7 10.0 65.8 5.0
7. Agents 1895 42 38.1 42.9 4.8 11.8 2.4
1930 58 15.5 13.8 8.7 62.0 0
8. Contractors 1895 27 33.3 37.0 18.5 11.2 0
1930 124 7.3 50.8 20.1 21.8 0
9. Shopkeepers 1895 26 34.6 46.2 0 19.2 0
1930 96 l.l 53.1 12.5 33.3 0
10. Traders 1895 221 4.5 13.6 17.6 63.8 0.5
1930 644 0.2 23.0 10.6 65.7 0.5
11. Import/Export 1896
1930 20 15.0 40.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
12. Distributors and 1895
Suppliers 1930 10 10.0 60.0 0 30.0 0
13. Extraction 1895
1930 4 100.0 0 0 0 0
14. Partners 1895
1930
E = Europeans
I =Indians
C =Chinese
B = Burmans
U = Unidentified
SouRCE: Khin, june 1970.
4. The Ethnic Chmese in Myanmar and ther Identity 125

They even ran illicit opium and gambling dens, tea-shops, liquor-
shops, and so forth.
To promote their common interests, the ethnic Chinese
businessmen in Rangoon formed a Chamber of Commerce at the
beginning of the twentieth century: "The Chinese Overseas Bank,
the Bank of China, and Chinese Insurance, shipping, rice, and
mercantile firms maintained five branches along the Burma Road,
and the payment of Chinese customs could be made through
these branches" (Purcell, p. 46). In short, the pre-war colonial
economy was largely controlled by foreign nationals and capital,
mainly by the Europeans, the Indians and then the Chinese.
However, World War II changed the situation significantly
Soon after Burma gained independence in 1948, the government
pursued a policy of indigenization in both administrative and
economic affairs as part of the nation building process. With this
aim, the government nationalized some major industries such as
timber, transport, and oil. It also gave a larger share of retail
trading and importing to Burmese nationals through import-
licensing and quotas. This nationalization and indigenization policy
affected the Indians more than the Chinese.
During the post-war period, according to Skinner (1950), more
than 40 per cent of all ethnic Chinese were traders and merchants.
Chinese as well as Indian retail shops were found in almost all the
towns and cities of the country: The Indians, however, began
returning in ever greater numbers to their homeland after the war,
and the position of the Chinese traders thus improved. In the
larger cities, they had their own Chamber of Commerce and all
the major firms were members. In addition, there were numerous
trade organizations and guilds, usually called t'ung yeh kung hui,
which represented the various trades in which the Chinese
participated (p. 25).
"When new industrialization in the form of import substitution
industries began to catch on in the late 1950s, Indian participation
was marginal. Most of the new industries were initiated by the
Bamar, Sino-Bamar, or naturalized Chinese businessmen" (Khin
1993, p. 644). This was because the Chinese community had
already accommodated the changes demanded by the indigeni-
zation process, and adopted Burmese names, dress and language
126 Mya Than

even before the government started to pursue this policy. Since

then the ethnic Chinese began to take the place of many Indian
shopkeepers, as the number of Indians greatly declined. "But they
did not have a grip of the rice trade as they had in Siam, Indochina,
and the Philippines, this being very largely in the hands of the
Indians - mostly Marwaris, Maimanis, etc. The Chinese were
active bidders for fishery and ferry rights in many streams" (Purcell,
p. 45).
Then came the military regime which took over power after
the coup d'etat in 1962. The new regime introduced the "Burmese
Way to Socialism" which called for a stronger approach to nation-
alization and indigenization of the economy. After the introduction
of the Enterprise Nationalization Law of 1963, almost all retail,
wholesale, and import trade, (and later) manufacturing businesses
and the banking sector were taken over by the government.
Although these actions affected both foreigners and Burmese
businessmen, it was the Indians and Chinese businessmen who
were the hardest hit. As a result, many Indians (about 200 thousand
of them) and a small number of Chinese businessmen left the
country. Moreover, in response to the threat of the Cultural
Revolution instigated by some pro-China ethnic Chinese groups,
anti-Chinese riots broke out in some cities. This resulted in serious
damage to Chinese businesses in several cities.
However, as the Burmese Way to Socialism gave birth to the
booming black market in the late 1960s, the ethnic Chinese again
took these opportunities and played a dominant role in it. In the
seventies and early 1980s, as the government relaxed some of its
rigid economic policies, the ethnic Chinese once again became
overwhelmingly active in the service and cottage industries. In
Rangoon, more than half of the shops in various big markets were
estimated to be run by them.
In terms of the labour force, the Chinese accounted for 0.8
per cent of the total labour force in 1983, which was a decline
from 0.9 per cent in 1973 (Table 4). However, in absolute numbers,
they increased by 12.5 thousand. It is interesting to note that
although the ethnic Chinese population accounted for about 0.6
per cent of the total population in 1983, their contribution to the
labour force as a percentage of the total was 0.8 per cent.
 -k
TABLE 4 ~
::f
Labour Force, by Race and Sex, 1973 and 1983 't
rr,
~

1973 1983 Absolute Percentage

Change Change ;'
Race and Sex Number Percentage Number Percentage 1973-83 1973-83 ~
't
:::::;.
Total 9,367,054 100.0 12,199,979 100.0 2,932,925 30.24 ?
<:;"
Burmese 6,113,095 65.3 8,484,690 69.5 2,371,595 38.79 ()

Male 4,103,376 (67.1) 5,481,149 (64 6) 1,377,773 33.57 ~

"-'',
Female 2,009,719 (32.9) 3,003,541 (354) 993,822 4945 ~
Other Indigenous 2,805,689 29.9 3,182,163 26.1 376,474 13.41 ·:i
~

Male 1,800,087 (64 2) 1,921,321 (604) 121,234 6.73 Bi-,

Female 1,005,602 (35.8) 1,260,842 (39 6) 255,240 25.38 Q
Mixed Parentage 112,485 1.2 133,635 l.l 21,150 18.80 j
Male 80,463 (71.5) 91,622 (68.6) 11,159 13.86 ~""
Female 32,022 (28.5) 42,013 (314) 9,991 31.20
Chinese 81,724 0.9 94,212 0.8 12,488 15.28
Male 58,004 (71.0) 62,594 (66.4) 4,590 7.91
Female 23,720 (29.0) 31,618 (33.6) 7,898 33.29
Indian & Pakistani 157,918 1.7 152,996 1.3 -4,922 -3.11
Male 135,230 (85.6) 118,251 (77.3) -16,979 -12.55
Female 22,688 (14 4) 34,745 (22.7) 12,057 53.14
All Others 96,143 l.O 152,283 1.2 56,140 58.39
Male 85,752 (89.2) 129,750 (85.2) 43,998 51.30
Female 10,391 (10 8) 22,533 (14 8) 12,142 116.85
---·--- -·-------.~----

N
-....,
Soc:Rcr: Calculation by I. Khin Maung, based on Union of Burma Censuses (1973 and 1983).
128 Mya Than

In 1988 when the present military regime, the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC), took over power, the "open
door" policy was introduced. The private sector was encouraged
and the law on foreign direct investment (FDI) was promulgated.
Today, the country's ethnic Chinese are again at the forefront in
Myanmar's economy: The majority of retail, wholesale and import
trade, including cross-border trade and big restaurants, are run by
them or by mixed Chinese-Bamar; and the largest supermarket in
Yangon is operated by an ethnic Chinese group. More importantly,
the government does not differentiate between ethnic Chinese
and other Myanmar citizens, or between their respective companies,
in employment policies or purchasing requirements (East Asia
Analytical Unit 1995, p. 63). Much of the foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) entering the country is channelled through ethnic
Chinese networks throughout Southeast Asia (East Asia Analytical
Unit 1995, p. 64). On the other hand, many wealthy Chinese in
Yangon tend to have investments outside the country, especially
in Singapore.
Some observers have found the reason for the success of the
ethnic Chinese in Myanmar. "Myanmar, like China, legal and other
'soft' infrastructures are still being developed, and good connec-
tions are essential for doing business. The ethnic Chinese have
social and business structures which operate well in the absence
of sound legal and other structures; they have a propensity for
developing international connections. They are therefore at their
most competitive in countries such as Myanmar" (ibid, p. 60).
In sum, it can be said that the ethnic Chinese have contributed
to the economic development of the country to some extent.

Political Position
Historically, the relationship between Myanmar and China is not
as long and close as that between China and Indochina. China
occupied Indochina for more than a millennium, while in
Myanmar, apart from a few invasions from China, there has been
no political interference between the two since 1767. This was
mainly due to the difficulty of communication between the two
countries because of the mountain ranges and rivers along the
2000-kilometre-long border. This is also the reason why despite
4. The Ethn;c Chinese in Myanmar and the;r Identity 129

the affinity of their races, Chinese culture has never had much
influence on Myanmar. It has been far easier for Myanmar to
communicate with India by sea and as a result, Indian culture has
had much influence over Myanmar culture, especially religion.
However, "it was only in 1940-41, the deputy ministers and
other officials of KMT came into Burma and behaved as if they
owned the place" (Purcell1965, p. 47). Moreover, in 1945, Chinese
armies came into northern Burma and behaved as if Burma
belonged to them since schools and training centres in Chungking
used maps showing all northern Burma and parts of Assam as
China Irrendenta (ibid, p. 48). Again in 1949, large fragments of
the defeated armies of the KMT occupied some areas in the
northeast of Myanmar for some time. This problem was later
resolved with United Nations assistance.
It is important to note that Burma was the first non-communist
country to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) in
1949. Border disputes between the two countries were settled
amicably, and Myanmar pursued the only-one-China policy. The
two countries strictly followed the policy of peaceful coexistence
until1967 when outbursts of the Cultural Revolution significantly
damaged the relationship between the two countries. Moreover,
until the early 1980s, China supported and gave refuge to the
armed Communist Party of Burma. Presently, China is one of the
few countries that give full political and economic support to the
present regime in Myanmar.
As an ethnic group, unlike in some of the Southeast Asian
countries, the Chinese in Myanmar have never played a domi-
nant role in the country's politics although their social position
improved gradually throughout the country's history. During the
days of the Burmese kings, unlike other foreign residents, the
role of the Chinese in the country was simply commercial. That
role did not change even in the colonial days. However, in the
colonial parliament, and in the Rangoon Municipal Administra-
tion, there were one or two representatives from the Chinese
community.
During the war with japan, some ethnic Chinese, mostly Sino-
Bamar, actively participated along with other ethnic groups. It was
only after World War II that their offspring began to be employed
130 Mya Than

as civil servants, technicians, doctors, military officers and so on,

but there were only a very few in politics. As China was divided
into two - that is, mainland China and Taiwan, or in other
words, communist and non-communist - so also were their
supporters in Burma divided. The Burmese called the supporters
of mainland China tayoke ni (red Chinese), and the other group,
tayoke phyu (white Chinese). There were a few clashes between
them. As Burma was a strong supporter of mainland China and
because of KMT aggression in the early 1950s, tayoke phyu in the
country were tolerated but closely watched by the then democrati-
cally elected government. In those days, whenever an important
person from China visited Burma, prominent tayoke phyu leaders
would be detained for the duration of the visit. Since some Sino-
Bamar and ethnic Chinese had participated in the war against
japanese invasion, a few of them were given important positions
in government and in the political parties in the newly independent
state of Burma.
Until it was nationalized in the 1960s, the Chinese press in
Burma also played an important role in politics. Out of four Chinese
dailies and weeklies, a few were politically oriented as they were
funded by some political parties.
Since the military government took over power in 1962,
political participation by the ethnic Chinese has become marginal
although there exist a few high-ranking Sino-Bamar military officers.

Social Position
Unlike other ethnic groups of foreign origin, the ethnic Chinese
have a special place in Myanmar. In other words, the ethnic Chinese
are more socially acceptable to Myanmar than other foreigners.
This is because of racial affinity, language affinity with the Shan,
one of the native races, and the ethnic Chinese' easy adoption of
Myanmar language, dress and local customs. Many have also
changed their Buddhist sect from Mahayana to Theravada Bud-
dhism. Table 5 shows that in 1983 more than 82 per cent of the
ethnic Chinese were found to be Buddhists. It is interesting to note
that, despite these racial affinities with the Chinese, the Burmese
have stronger cultural ties with India, especially in religion owing
to the communication factor in the early days of Myanmars history.
4. The Ethnic Chtnese in Myanmar and their ldenttty 131

TABLE 5
Population by Race and by Religion, 1983
(In thousand)

Race Buddhist Christian Hindu Muslim Others Total

Burmese 23,220 46 3 254 9 23,532
Chinese 192 5 3 33 233
Indians 116 19 144 140 9 428
Others 6,992 1,608 27 912 2,071 9,932
Union Total 3,0520 1,678 174 1,309 2,122 34,125
SouRcE: Union of Burma Census 1983.

In feudal times, many Indian Brahmins served the Burmese kings

as astrologers and advisors, whereas the Chinese were just traders.
During the colonial period, the role of the Chinese as traders/
merchants did not change although their economic position
improved. They diversified into manufacturing and the services
sectors although they were in third place, following the Europeans
and Indians (see Table 3a and b). Their representatives, although
few, could be found in the colonial Burma Legislature and the
local administration in the big cities. In Yangon, Chinese busi-
nessmen voiced and raised their common interests through the
Chambers of Commerce; one of them, the Burmese Chinese
Chamber of Commerce, was established in 1910.
After World War II, there were six Chinese chambers of
commerce. Apart from these, there existed many clan/dialect
associations in most of the cities and big towns, as most of the
ethnic Chinese lived in the urban areas.
Table 6 shows the distribution of the rural-urban population
by race. According to the table, the shares of the ethnic Chinese
population in both the urban and rural areas to total population
declined significantly by about four to five times. This was probably
because of an increase of Bamar and other indigenous races and
racial identification during the census. Table 6 also indicates that
most of the ethnic Chinese lived in the urban areas.
As was mentioned earlier, the social position of the ethnic
Chinese in terms of employment up to World War II did not
132 Mya Than

TABLE 6
Rural and Urban Population by Race
(In per cent)

1931 Census 1953154 Census 1973 Census

Race Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Myanmar 97.0 82.0 99.5 97.3
Chinese 1.0 6.0 0.2 1.4
Indians &:. Pakistanis 2.0 9.0 0.2 1.2
Others 0.0 3.0 0.1 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

change much, that is, their role was mainly in the economic sectors,
not in the political nor administrative sectors. Unlike in some
Southeast Asian countries, after the war, not a few of the Chinese
in Burma replaced the Indian professionals and administrators
who left Burma. Most of these ethnic Chinese were from the
second or third generation of Chinese immigrants, were educated
in Burma and had adopted Burmese names and dress. A few of
them held important political and military posts in the post-
independence period but more of them were involved in mer-
chandise, commercial, manufacturing and services sectors.
The government allowed the ethnic Chinese to establish their
own temples, cemeteries, clan or dialect associations and Chinese
schools in almost all the cities and towns. In the heart of Chinatown
near the centre of Yangon, two famous Cantonese and Hokkien
temples built in the year 1890 and 1900 are still being visited by
well-wishers and worshippers. As far as religion is concerned,
they have been free to practise their own throughout history It
seems that they have more freedom than the Muslim community
although the successive constitutions have given them equal status.
There is also no restriction on their cultural affairs but the Chinese
community has played down its activities since 1964 in order not
to attract much public attention.
The post-independent government allowed the Chinese com-
munity to open their own schools to teach the Chinese language
4. The Ethnic Chtnese tn Myanmar and their Identity 133

and disseminate Chinese culture. According to the 1931 census,

the literacy rate of the Chinese population was about 41 per cent.
There is no doubt that this rate has increased significantly in the
post-independence period. In the post-war period, there were
twenty-eight Chinese schools in Rangoon alone. Out of these,
eight were middle or secondary schools while the rest were primary
Some Chinese schools in Rangoon and Mandalay were ranked
among the top high schools in the country in terms of academic
achievements, sports, and disciplines. With the exception of the
primary schools, Chinese, Burmese and English languages, along
with other academic subjects were taught in these secondary
schools. There were altogether 180 Chinese schools in the rest of
the country, with most of them primary schools.
However, after 196 7, due to nationalization measures and
serious anti-Chinese riots in response to the spillover effect of the
Cultural Revolution in China, many Chinese businesses and homes
were damaged and many traditional associations and schools were
banned. Chinese schools were forced to close. Since then, the ethnic
Chinese have kept a low profile in all economic, social and political
sectors. The hardest blow to the ethnic Chinese community was
the promulgation of the Citizenship Law in 1982. Many of their
children were not allowed to attend professional tertiary educational
institutions, such as medical, engineering, agricultural and even
economics colleges. Many students of Chinese origin who were
already studying in these institutions at the time were expelled. A
few holding important political posts were also forced to resign.
Now that the country has opened up its economy and is
plugged into the regional network, especially to ASEAN and China,
the role of the ethnic Chinese in the social and economic spheres
has improved significantly

Legal Status
There have been significant changes in the legal status of the
Chinese community throughout Myanmar$ recent history because
of the bitter pre-war experience of exploitation by aliens in the
country and racial unrest. As far as the legal status of foreigners
and non-indigenous citizens of Myanmar is concerned, the
successive governments have tried to define it through various
134 Mya li1an

constitutions and citizenship acts/laws, such as the Foreigners

Registration Act of 1940, the 1947 Constitution, the 1948 Union
of Burma Citizenship Act, the Union Citizenship (Election) Act
of 1948, the 1974 Constitution, and the 1982 Burma Citizenship
Law.
During the days of the Burmese kings, the status of foreigners
was defined by the kings based on their whims and fancies, and
on a case-by-case basis. The British colonialists encouraged im-
migrants because of the labour and capital shortage. Although the
registration of foreigners was properly kept, there was in practice
no clear definition of the legal status of foreigners and citizens of
the country.
Under the Burmese government after the war, the line between
foreigners and citizens was clearly defined. According to Section
II of the 1947 Constitution, citizenship would be granted to:
1. every person both of whose parents belong or belonged to
any of the indigenous races of Burma;
2. every person born in any of the territories included within the
Union, at least one of whose grandparents belongs or belonged
to any of the indigenous races of Burma;
3. every person born in any of the territories included within the
Union of parents both of whom are, or if they had been alive
at the commencement of this Constitution would have been,
citizens of the Union; and
4. every person who was born in any of the territories which at
the time of his birth was included within His Britannic Majesty:S
dominions and who had resided in any of the territories
included within the Union for a period of not less than eight
years in the ten years immediately preceding the date of the
commencement of this Constitution or immediately preceding
1 January 1942 and who intended to reside permanently therein
and who signified his election of citizenship of the Union in
the manner and within the time prescribed by law.
Most of the Indians and Chinese who had not been permanent
residents before World War II but were recent migrants or itinerant
workers fell into the fourth category. All those who fell under the
first three categories quoted above automatically became citizens
4. The Ethn1c Chinese in Myanmar and their Identity 135

ofthe Union of Burma (for details, see Taylor 1993). Ethnic Chinese
who belonged to the third category cited above became "full-
fledged" citizens of Burma. However, those who belonged to the
fourth category had to apply to become citizens by 30 April1950,
according to the U:r:.ion Citizenship (Election) Act of 1948. A few
ethnic Chinese even contested in general elections in the newly
independent Burma.
However, the situation has changed dramatically since 1962
when the military took over power in Burma. The then ruling
military "Revolutionary Council" declared the 194 7 Constitution
null and void. Only when the Revolutionary Council handed over
power to the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1974 was a new
constitution promulgated. In the 1974 Constitution, there exists
one article, Article 145 of Chapter XI, which mentions citizenship
matters. It specifies that:
a. All persons born of parents both of whom are nationals of the
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma are citizens of the
Union.
b. Persons who are vested with citizenship according to existing
laws on the date this Constitution comes into force are also
citizens.
According to section (b) quoted above, most ethnic Chinese
who were already citizens of Burma were constitutionally recog-
nized as citizens.
Although the 1974 Constitution guarantees equal rights to all
citizens, there exists political "discrimination" among the citizens.
In Chapter XII, Article 177, paragraph (a) a distinction is drawn
between the political rights of citizens differentiated in Article
145, which states as follows: only those citizens "born of parents
both of whom are also citizens" can be elected to the national
legislature, the Pyi Thu Hluttaw, or the lower level state organs of
power, the various levels of the People's Councils. "In effect, the
Constitution (of 1974) draws a distinction between those who
became citizens more than a generation back and those who did
not" (Taylor 1993, p. 678).
Then in 1982, the Burma Citizenship Law was promulgated.
This law, in effect, underscores the distinction between the two
136 MyaThan

groups of citizens drawn by the 1974 Constitution. The objective

of this law was to clarify the positions of the immigrants and their
descendants as well as defend the security of the state. This was
in line with the speech made by U Ne Win, the then chairman of
the ruling party, at a party meeting held on 11 December 1979,
referring to persons of mixed blood: "Because of their mixed
parentage, the descendants of alien-Burmese unions, like full aliens,
could not be fully trusted because of their alleged foreign contacts
and possible external economic or political interests".
According to the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, there are three
categories of citizens.
l. Full citizens: Nationals who are the descendants of residents
of the country before 1823, that is, citizens at the time the
legislation came into force; or persons who are born of parents,
either one or both of whom were citizens at the time of birth.
2. Associate citizens: Persons who "apply for the citizenship under
the Union of Burma Citizenship Act, 1948".
3. Naturalized citizens: Persons who have yet to apply but are
eligible to apply for citizenship under the Burma Citizenship
Act of 1948.
The difference between these three groups is more a political
one. The first group has, officially, full rights as citizens. They are
entitled to all rights and privileges accorded to full citizens except
for those rights specifically promulgated by the state from time to
time. However, as a small non-indigenous ethnic group, the Chinese
are less equal compared to other indigenous ethnic groups like
the Shans or Kachins, in the sense that the Chinese do not have
a special administrative area designated to them. On the other
hand, Bamar, as the largest indigenous ethnic group, has a special
position because of its population size and historical dominance.
Compared to the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, the citizenship
legislation enacted in 1948 seems to be relatively liberal for the
ethnic Chinese in Myanmar. The interesting remarks on this law
made by Taylor (1993) are as follows:
The 1982 legislation had been criticized both inside and outside
Burma for its allegedly racist features. The Burma Communist
4 The Ethnrc Ch1nese 1n Myanmar and t/Jelr Identity 137

Party condemned it as an act of racial bigotry, a "narrow-minded,

bourgeois and racist manifesto". Since Indians and Chinese in
Burma are known to have expressed anxiety about their status as
have others who are aware of their mixed origins. However, for
most people the legislation has made little difference. Those with-
out citizenship, either legal or illegal foreign residents, are not
concerned about the new law as it does not change their status at
all. Those excluded from full citizenship are aware that the decision
taken on their status is political and not racial in nature. As all
power of decision rests with Ministers on the recommendation of
their subordinates, there is relatively little an individual can do
but to use whatever personal influence he or she may have to
effect a favourable decision. As under the previous arrangements,
the poor and the illiterate will face the greatest barriers to citizenship
for themselves and their children" (p. 680).

In sum, since 1962, it seems that the political, economic and

social autonomy of the ethnic Chinese has declined significantly
However, since 1988, when the present military regime took
over power, the legal status of the ethnic Chinese has again be-
come ambiguous. Their position, at least in commercial affairs,
may be stronger now as a result of the opening up of the country's
economy However, the National Convention for drafting the con-
stitution is being held in Myanmar, and it is too early to assess the
outcome of the convention regarding the legal status of the ethnic
Chinese.
It is interesting to note the impact of citizenship legislation on
the registered number of foreigners residing in Myanmar, which
is shown in Table 7. According to the table, the largest number
of foreigners registered in Myanmar was in 1970 before the 1974
Constitution was introduced. Since then, the number has declined
significantly The number of Indians started to decline in the 1960s
whereas the number of Chinese started to do so only in the 1970s.
It seems that legislation for citizenship throughout the years have
affected the Indians more than the Chinese as the former decreased
about three times while the number of Chinese registered as
foreigners declined by about one and a half times only This may
be because the Chinese are more easily assimilated into Myanmar
society compared to other non-indigenous ethnic groups.
138 Mya T!ur:

TABLE 7
Number of Registered Foreigners

1961 1970 1975 1981 1991 1994

Indians 108,738 81,301 58,459 55,740 40,956 36,590

Pakistanis 26,250 19,336 11,569 8,799 5,414 4,622
Chinese 81,766 128,052 114,666 99,296 70,558 57,785
Others 9,999 24,596 11,569 22,901 14,955 14,721

Total 226,753 253,285 179,863 186,786 131,883 118,718

SllliRCE: Statistical Year Books, various issues.

The Ethnic Chinese and their Identity

According to Tan (1988), "an ethnic identity has three major
components, namely, the label, the objective aspects (such as
languages and customs) of the identification, and the subjective
experiences of that identification. The last component includes
the self-perception as well as the social and psychological meanings
of being a Chinese" (p. 140). Ideally, in Myanmar, three factors
must be considered in identifying whether a person is an ethnic
Chinese or not. They include ethnic and cultural norms - namely,
ancestry, culture, and Myanmar citizenship.
As ancestry and Myanmar citizenship are given factors, the
cultural component is the most important one for identifying the
ethnic Chinese. For the cultural component, Professor Wang's
(1981) concept is useful for the purpose of this study. According
to him,
By cultural here, I am referring to the inclusive way it is used in
cultural anthropology, that is, everything related to traits which
were ·learned and transmitted by and to members of society,
including knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, religions and law.
These traits were similar in nature to those found in the traditional
Chinese sense of identity. But the new cultural identity went further.
Unlike what I have called historical identity, which was largely
based on past cultural values and which depended on the
persistence of these values among overseas Chinese communities,
the new awareness of culture recognized the function and usefulness
4 T11e E!flniC CfJtncse tn Myanrnar ancl their lcJcntlty 139

of modem non-Chinese cultures from which Chinese communities

could learn new ways of e:r;tsuring their prosperity and success.
However, since the above is too broad, Chinese ethnic identity
1s defined for the purpose of this study, as follows: as long as
they follow their cultural customs and rituals such as New Year
celebration, ancestral worship, funeral rites and so on, and if they
consider themselves as ethnic Chinese, then they are identified as
ethnic Chinese. Currently, in Myanmar, unlike in other countries,
written language and dress are not significant components of
Chineseness.
However, there seems to be a greater extent of assimilation
and integration of the ethnic Chinese into Myanmar society One
contributing factor is mixed marriage. The offsprings of mixed
marriages usually incline to the side of their current environment
(host country). However, there seems to be a custom for the male
offspring of such unions to assume the Chinese race and for the
females to assume the race of the mother.
Nevertheless, the degree of assimilation (or Chineseness)
depends on many other factors. Firstly, it depends on where they
live and which school they attended. Those Chinese who live in
the Chinatown area are less assimilated into Myanmar society
than those who live outside Chinatown. In other words, those
who live in Chinatown observe Chinese cultural traditions or
speak the Chinese language (dialects) more than others. Ethnic
Chinese who live in the small towns are also more readily assimi-
lated than those in the cities. Moreover, those who have Myanmar
education are almost completely integrated into the surrounding
environment, whereas those who have Chinese education are less
assimilated. In sum, those Chinese who live in small towns or
outside Chinatown in the cities and who had Myanmar education
and do not observe or observe only a few Chinese traditional
rituals are identified as Bamar. Those who belong to this group
and are married to Myanmar are no longer Chinese in the eyes of
the Chinese or Myanmar. They are considered native Myanmar.
At the community level, there are three factors to identify
Chineseness or to measure the extent of assimilation, namely,
Chinese education, clan or dialect association, and Chinese mass
media.
140 Mya Than

In the past, the Chinese schools played a very important role

in teaching language and passing on "values" to the younger
generations. Many textbooks were imported from China, Singapore
and Hong Kong. Since the mid-1960s, however, Chinese schools
in Myanmar together with other private schools, including mission
schools, have been nationalized and Burmanized. Since then, the
teaching of the Chinese language and culture have not been
allowed and all Chinese children have had to attend Burmese
schools.
As far as the Chinese media is concerned, there were four
Chinese dailies and three weeklies in the country, which constituted
the only Chinese press before nationalization was carried out in
1964/65. The circulation of the dailies in the early 1950s was
estimated at about 12,000 (Skinner 1950). Since there were no
Chinese radio stations in the country, the Chinese dailies picked
up news from foreign radios such as Radio Peking. With the
nationalization and Burmanization of the mass media, the Chinese
media disappeared. Recently, the Chinese community in Yangon
produced a daily newsletter which contained mainly prices for the
day's trading in the main commodities in Yangon.
There are still many Chinese associations such as clan asso-
ciations, dialect associations, regional associations (for example,
the Fukian association, and the Guandong association), the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce, temple associations and even the so-called
secret societies in Myanmar. However, unlike in the days of pre-
military rule in the 1960s, they keep a low profile.
During the 1950s, there were more than eighty clan associa-
tions in Rangoon alone. They are still active in Myanmar although
not on the scale of the post-independence period. In earlier days,
probably until the early 1960s, they organized the transfer of
remittances to mainland China and gave business capital at
marginal interest rates to poorer members. Some clan societies
still teach Chinese martial arts and organize lion dance groups.
They also take care of the old destitute and homeless and thus
pass Chinese values to members of their clan.
Chinese temples remain very significant institutions to dis-
seminate and promote Chinese culture. They help in performing
funeral ceremonies, ancestor worship, and some also keep the
4. The Ethnic Ch1nese in Myanmar and ther Identity 141

ash-urns of the deceased. Many of them collect money and give

out scholarships to students and help the poor. There are also
secret societies which disseminate martial arts to members and
help the weaker ones.
Before they were banned, the Chinese Chambers of Commerce
in Yangon not only functioned as lobby groups for Chinese
businessmen, but also helped the Chinese community to observe
traditional Chinese culture. After 1988, the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce in Yangon, founded in 1910, functioned on a de facto
basis. These associations are still popular within the Chinese
community in Myanmar but they tend to focus on welfare and
social activities.
This shows that out of the three pillars supporting the identity
of the ethnic Chinese, only one has survived, which in turn suggests
that the Chinese in Myanmar are very well assimilated into
Myanmar society- in other words, they are well Myanmarized.
At the national level, the ethnic Chinese, as in other Southeast
Asian countries, consider Myanmar as their national identity in
terms of their political and legal status but without losing their
consciousness of being Chinese.
More importantly, as the national identity of Myanmar is made
up of two factors, nationalism and Buddhism, it is not difficult for
the Chinese to be identified as Myanmar at the national level.
An important question to be asked then is when they cease to
be ethnic Chinese. According to my interviewees, both Chinese
and Bamars, many of Chinese origin have assimilated into Myanmar
society so well that they have not only changed their names and
dress but also do not speak the dialects or perform any Chinese
cultural rites, and therefore are no longer Chinese. These ethnic
Chinese are completely assimilated into the Myanmar society, so
much so that they do not even bother to observe fundamental
Chinese customs. Most of them belong to the younger and
modernized generation, or were educated in Myanmar schools, or
live in small towns or outside the Chinatowns of the cities, or
have married into Myanmar families. In other words, even though
they have Chinese blood, if they do not observe Chinese customs
and do not speak their language, they cease to be Chinese since
their identity is closely related to Myanmar culture.
142 Mya Than

For some, the reasons would be political, economic, or social.

During the post-1964 (after the nationalization of businesses) and
post-1974 (after the introduction of the new socialist constitution)
periods, even for those who consider themselves as Chinese, they
would when asked identify themselves as Sino-Bamar when they
do not want to be identified as Chinese, especially for official
purposes. This was probably reflected in the 1983 national census.
Nowadays, as in most countries, due to the invasion of Western
culture, the assimilation process through mixed marriages, and
political and social pressures imposed by the state, the degree of
Chineseness has declined in relative terms. Despite this trend,
especially since 1990 when the Myanmar Government began to
allow foreigners to invest in the country, "Chineseness" appears to
have been revived. This may be because many Chinese investors
from the neighbouring countries such as Singapore, Thailand and
Malaysia are setting up businesses in the country, and this situation
demands increased contacts with local Chinese groups of various
dialects. As a consequence, many Chinese who hid behind the
"national identity" for some time have now openly come out to
announce their "cultural identity" to the world.
As regards ethnic Chinese-Myanmar relations, Purcell (1965)
was right when he said, "Many persons of Chinese race in Burma
had long regarded themselves as Burmese citizens and had no
more interest in China than US citizens of the second or third
generations have in their European ancestral homes" (p. 42). Even
in the times of the Burmese kings, "they were, in spite of their
character of middlemen, instinctively recognized by the Burmese
as of close kindred in blood, and were not classified by them with
the kalas or other foreigners, though that term included every
race of India proper, of Western Asia, and of Europe" (ibid,
p. 60). Purcell even found that, 'To a greater extent than in Siam,
Malaya, or Indochina, the Chinese in Burma came to regard the
country as their home" (p. 69). This attitude was confirmed by
Wee (1972) that so long as the Chinese are willing to become
Burmese nationals and adopt Burmese names, they will have equal
economic opportunities as their Burmese brethren.
Lastly, we will look at the issue of how other ethnic groups,
especially Bamar, see them. Like the concept of Chinese identity,
4 The Ethnic Ch;nese ;n Myanmar and their Identity 143

the attitudes of other ethnic groups towards the Chinese also vary,
depending on the political and socio-economic situation. During
the pre-war period, when the Chinese were in third place behind
the Europeans and Indians in the economic sphere, the Bamars'
attitude towards the Chinese was relatively not as prejudiced as
they were towards other resident foreigners, although the Chinese
were also considered as "exploiters" during the recession years.
In the post-war and nation-building period, as the Chinese
became more prepared to assimilate themselves into the society
than the Indians and because of racial and cultural affinities, many
Bamar considered them as pauk phaws, or siblings. Although greater
assimilation of the major indigenous ethnic groups into a supra-
ethnic Myanmar nationality has not occurred, many ethnic Chinese
have been readily assimilated. However, as their economic power
and political inclinations towards mainland China and Taiwan
became more apparent in the late I950s and early I960s, some
Bamars, especially those in power and in business, viewed them
as "guests" who were exploiting the country's resources. Despite
this, unlike other indigenous ethnic groups like the Karens or
Shans or Kachins, the ethnic Chinese did not pose a security
threat to the government, and therefore the government's attitude
towards them was more benign.
Since 1990, the ethnic Chinese are once again playing a more
dominant role in the economy They are being treated as equals
and competitors. However, in Mandalay where the Chinese, mostly
non-Burmese-speaking Chinese from the border areas, control
commercial life and the income gap is widening, there exist
"negative" attitudes towards the Chinese there.

Conclusion
Based on the above findings, the prospects of ethnic Chinese
integration in the national and regional sphere will be discussed
here.
As mentioned earlier, those Chinese in Myanmar who could
not integrate into Myanmar society had left the country at various
times for many reasons: political, economic, and social. Those
ethnic Chinese who remained are so well integrated into the host
society that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between them
144 Mya Them

and other ethnic groups such as the Bamar, Shan, Karens, and so
on. This is because most of the ethnic Chinese speak the local
language, dress like the locals and mix easily with the local people.
They have also contributed to the development of the country
They participate in traditional Myanmar festivals and most of them
follow the Myanmar Buddhist way of life, which allows spirit and
ancestral worship. (At the world-famous Shwedagon pagoda in
Yangon, one can find temples erected by the ethnic Chinese.)
Many Chinese now live outside the Chinatown areas of the cities
while many Myanmar also live in the Chinatown areas. Most of
the ethnic Chinese can speak the Myanmar language and have
adopted Bamar names and dress. More importantly, like most
Myanmar people, they are generally Buddhist. There have also
been more mixed marriages between the Chinese and the Bamars.
Thus, this has fostered integration of the Chinese into Myanmar
society.
However, those Chinese who recently migrated from the border
areas to Mandalay find it difficult to assimilate with the local
people because of their different languages, customs and levels of
wealth. The central quarters of Mandalay have been transformed
into a booming business centre with hotels, restaurants, shops,
foreign business offices and modem buildings many of them owned
by the "new-wave" Chinese. Only some native-owned businesses
like printing presses, shoe shops, garment shops and cheroot
factories are left. Some critics have even gone so far as to describe
the situation in Mandalay as a plural society as in the colonial
period "in which alien social groups dominate the society and
economy at the expense of economic hardship and economic decay
for the Burmese" (Mya Maung 1994, p. 459). If the income gap
between the ethnic groups, especially between the native Bamar
and the ethnic Chinese, continues to widen further, the possibility
of undesirable social consequences cannot be ruled out. This will
be a negative factor for national integration.
Another issue is whether the ethnic Chinese in Myanmar have
become "Southeast Asians" or "Overseas Chinese". As far as the
ethnic Chinese in Myanmar are concerned, it is true that they
have become less "Chinese" than their forefathers as a result of
adopting Myanmar culture more and more. There is also an affinity
4. The Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar and ther Identity 145

between Bamar and Chinese culture so that many Bamar are

worshipping the Goddess of Mercy (Guanyin) while many Chinese
regularly visit pagodas and monasteries.
However, even though most of the local-born Chinese are
almost completely assimilated into Myanmar society, they are more
"Southeast Asian" than other Myanmar people in the sense that
they are networking through their "Chinese" connections or "ethnic
networks" based on mutual economic interests and cultural
affinities, such as dialect groups and some traditional customs (for
details, see Suryadinata 1995). Today, Myanmar's ethnic Chinese
seem to be at the forefront of the country's economy Much of the
foreign investment now entering Myanmar is channelled through
ethnic Chinese networks (East Asia Analytical Unit 1995, p. 64).
Moreover, the identity of the younger generation of ethnic Chinese,
especially the youth, is probably more like that of their counterparts
in other Southeast Asian countries in terms of dress, body language,
values and attitudes.
To conclude, more in-depth studies on the ethnic Chinese in
Myanmar and their identity are needed since values and attitudes
are involved and there is so far a vacuum in this area. It is hoped
that this chapter, despite its many limitations, will serve as a
ground-breaking study or as an exploratory one for those scholars
who wish to pursue further in-depth studies on the ethnic Chinese
in Southeast Asia.

References
Chen, Yi-Sein. "The Chinese in Rangoon during the 18th and 19th
Centuries". In Papers on Asian History, Religion, Languages, Literature,
Music Folklore, and Anthropology. Ascona, Leiden: Artibus Asia, 1976.
East Asia Analytical Unit. Overseas Chinese Networks in Asia. Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Parkes ACT, 1995.
Fitzgerald, Stephen. China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's
Changing Policy 1949-70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
Khin Maung Kyi. "Indians in Burma: Problems of an Alien Subculture in
a Highly Integrated Society". In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia,
edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 625-66. Singapore: Times
Academic Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.
---.journal of Burma Research Society (JBRS) Lll1 Oune 1970).
Mya Maung. "On the Road to Mandalay: A Case Study of the Sinonization
of Upper Burma". Asian Survey, no. 5 (May 1994).
146 Mya Than

Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 2nd edition. London: Oxford
University Press, 1965.
Shozo, Fukuda. With Sweat & Abacus: Economic Roles of Southeast Asian
Chinese on the Eve of World War II, English edition. Singapore: Select
Books, 1995.
Skinner, G.W Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Michigan University
Microfilms, Cornell University, December 1950.
Smith, Martin. Ethnic Groups in Burma. London: Anti-Slavery International,
1994.
Steinberg, David I. Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia. Colorado:
Westview Press, 1982.
Suryadinata, Leo, ed. Southeast Asian Chinese and China: The Politico-Economic
Dimension. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995.
Tan, Chee-Beng. "Nation-building and Being Chinese in a Southeast Asian
State: Malaysia". In Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese
since World War II, edited by jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu.
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988.
Taylor, Robert. "The Legal Status of Indians in Contemporary Burma". In
Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu&:. A. Mani.
Singapore: Times Academic Press and ISEAS, I993.
Wang, Gungwu. Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the
Chinese. Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Pte. Ltd.,
1981.
Wee Mon-Cheng. The Future of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: As Viewed from
the Economic Angle. Singapore: University Education Press, 1972.
 Comments by
Khin Maung Kyi on
"The Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar and their Identity"
Presented by Mya Than

The papers presented at this meeting principally deal with the

problems of large Chinese migrant groups who happen to hold
strong economic dominance in the countries of Southeast Asia in
which they are domiciled. Burma's case is entirely different from
the experience of the other Southeast Asian countries.*
Mya Than has done an admirable job of welding all the recent
facts together to present the existing state of ethnic relations with
regard to the Chinese in Burma. However, this writer feels that
ethnic Chinese problems should be more incisively interpreted in
the larger context of national integration and identity, the historical
experiences of the Burmese nation, and the relative economic
position of the Chinese vis-a-vis other ethnic groups, either foreign
or local. This paper will therefore complement Mya Than's paper.
The migrant ethnic Chinese population in Burma was
historically very small compared with those in other countries in

* In this paper, the more commonly known term "Burma" is used instead
of the recently introduced "Myanmar" to denote the country. It should be
noted that Myanmar and Bamar are interchangeable terms: Bamar is more
colloquial whereas Myanmar is more confined to literary or court usage.
The reason why Burma is preferred here is that Burma or Bamar connotes
the whole people of Burma including all ethnic groups whereas Myanmar
is more confined to the Myanmar ethnic group, the largest group of all and
its language. In 1930, when the nationalist "Our Burma" movement was
founded, all Burmese leaders agreed that from then on Bamar would be
used to represent the whole country including all ethnic groups among
which Myanmar was only one. Burma or Bamar was not restricted to the
colonial period either. Early European travellers mentioned the country as
Birma. The Thais also called it Phama. Only the Chinese used Myein,
probably because Sinq-Burmese historical relationships were mostly formal
and through the Burmese Court. The Court of Ava, the Burmese Court,
used the term "Myanmar".
148 Kh;n Maung Ky;

Southeast Asia. For example, Thailand had a large proportion of

ethnic Chinese before their active integration into Thai society In
Burma, however, the Chinese formed only 1.3 per cent of the
total population in 1930, whereas the more ubiquitous Indians
made up 7 per cent of the total population. The Chinese and
Indian proportions in total population shrank to 0.6 per cent and
0.4 per cent respectively by 1973, as a result of the very extensive
nationalization of businesses; most Indian businessmen and many
well-to-do Chinese left the country between 1962 and 1970.
Another important pattern to note is that most Chinese
migrants came to Burma after the annexation of Burma by the
British in 1986. Merchants, tradesmen and labourers came to
work in the coastal cities like Moulmein, Tovoy, Mergue and
Rangoon first, and then spread later into the hinterland. It should
also be noted that most Sino-Burmans, even the first generation
children of mixed Chinese and Burmese parentage would have
registered or presented themselves as Burmese. This would have
reduced the number of Chinese in the population census in later
periods when the intense integration process was being introduced.
Mya Than has reported how the blending of the Chinese and their
descendants with the mainstream Burmese was very easily and
conveniently done.
The next point to note is that Chinese migration took place
through maritime rather than land routes although Burma has a
very long land frontier with China. It would have been expected
that Burma with its sparse population and abundant resources
would be a candidate for waves of Chinese migration from the
North. This never happened. First, the ethnic northern tribes and
ethnic groups who lived in Yunnan province served as a buffer
against Chinese migration. In fact, the tribes in Yunnan and the
northern tribes in Burma belong to the same ethnic group. In
addition, the distance between the main population centres of
China and the Burmese frontiers, and the difficulty of transport
and lack of established routes further restricted migration by land.
When upper Burma, the only remaining part of Burma still under
Burmese rule, was annexed by British India in 1886, the migration
of Chinese nationals from either China or other settlements in the
East to Burma became difficult, whereas Indians from India could
The Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar and their Identity 149

freely travel to Burma without any documentation or visa as Burma

had became a province of India.
The degree of economic dominance of a foreign ethnic group
domiciled in a country is directly related to the relationships
between the host people and the immigrants. Historically, Chinese
traders were operating in Burma since the early days of the Pagan
period (AD 1000 to 1300), and the Silk Road probably passed not
far from Burma. Border trade between Burma and China thus
existed for a long time. In fact, the last Burma-China War was
fought because of trade disputes in the border areas. Under the
Burmese kings, ethnic Chinese merchants enjoyed a comparative
advantage over other nationalities in dealing with the Burmese
court because they were familiar with the methods and protocol
of the Burmese court. External trade was done through royal or
state monopolies. Apparently, the Chinese as agents of the crown
had almost total control over the export of lac, cotton and other
agricultural products. These comparative advantages were wiped
away when Burma was placed under Indian administration.
Indian merchants who were familiar with Western administration,
machinery and its laws gained dominance in commerce and trade
in Burma. In fact, Furnivall in his unpublished manuscript on
"Economic History of Burma", describes very clearly the loss of
Chinese dominance in Burma$ external trade after the annexation
of Burma.
Under the British administration, the importance of the role
of the Chinese in internal trade and business gradually declined.
As Table 3a in Mya Than$ paper indicates, between 1895 and
1930, Chinese businesses in three sectors, namely, manufacturing,
brokerage and contracting, out of six types of businesses they
were active in, declined. Their relative shares as a proportion of
establishments owned by the Chinese in these categories of
business had shrunk from 28.5 to 10 per cent in manufacturing,
from 26.6 to 1.8 per cent in brokerage and from 31 to 4.3 per
cent in contracting. On the other hand, Indian businesses
improved their position substantially in the six categories of
businesses, out of the total of eight categories they were active in.
In each of these categories, they controlled a large proportion of
the business.
ISO Klun Maung Ky;

TABLE A
Business Firms in Small Towns by Line of Business
and Nationality of Ownership
(In per cent)

Nationality of Ownership
Total
Line of Business Year Number E c B u
Merchants 1895 236 6.4 16.9 12.3 64.0 0.4
1930 770 3.8 38.3 13.1 44.2 0.6
Manufacturers 1895 1 1000 0 0 0 0
1930 12 0 25.0 0 75.0 0
Brokers and 1895 28 0 3.6 7.1 85.7 3.6
Dealers 1930 185 1.6 15.7 16.2 57.8 8.7
Services 1895 30 66.6 23.3 0 10.1 0
1930 181 11.6 30.9 10.0 38.6 8.9
Bankers and 1895 6 0 33.3 33.3 33.4 0
Money-Lenders 1930 2l 33.3 14.3 0 52.4 0
Owners and 1895 7 14.3 42.9 0 42.8 0
Millers 1930 313 5.8 13.4 4.5 75.3 l.O
Agents 1895 15 40.0 6.7 13.3 40.0 0
1930 32 6.3 25.0 15.6 49.9 3.2
Contractors 1895 16 6.3 37.4 31.3 18.7 6.3
1930 210 1.5 4.9 19.2 38.4 0
Shopkeepers 1895 15 20.0 60.0 6.7 13.3 0
1930 436 0.3 52.2 18.3 28.9 0.3
Traders 1895 128 3.9 16.4 13.3 63.3 3.1
1930 1,854 0.3 15.5 12.6 71.5 0.1
Import/Export 1895 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a.
1930 3 0 0 33.3 0 66.7
Distributors and 1895 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Suppliers 1930 2 0 50.0 0 50.0 0
Extraction 1895 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1930 7 85.7 0 0 0 14.3
Partners 1895 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1930 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Non: E = European C =Chinese U = Unidentified

I= Indian B = Bamar n.a. = not available
SouRce: Burma Trade Directory, 1895 and 1930.
The Emn;c 07/0t'Se ;n Myanmar and the;r klentlly 151

However, in the case of businesses in the small towns, the

picture is quite different. In 1930, out of ten categories of busi-
nesses, in which all three communities - Indian, Chinese and
Burmese - were operating, the proportion of Indian businesses
had declined in three categories, namely, banking and money
lending, owners and millers, and shopkeepers, but in other types
of businesses, they held the same position as in 1895, or im-
proved substantially in some cases. On the other hand, Chinese
participation had declined in banking and money lending, but
was maintained or improved in other categories. On the whole,
however, their share of business establishments was next to the
Indian and Burmese communities. However, the Burmese share of
business establishments improved markedly in seven categories.
They occupied a dominant position in merchandizing, manufac-
turing, banking and money lending, brokerage and dealership,
and trading although on a reduced scale in some areas. This
indicates that Burmese business, having been exposed to Western
business methods for thirty-five years, had improved their skills
and competence.
Mya Than also mentioned the prevalence of Chinese businesses
in the small towns. It is true that in certain businesses, the Chinese
were dominant, especially in storekeeping, medical stores, coffee
shops, noodle shops, restaurants, pig butchery, village shops, and
liquor and opium dens. They also owned rice mills and participated
in trade but this field was largely controlled by European and
Indian firms. The tea shops, restaurants, and stores, did not
compete with the local businesses or impinge on the lives of the
majority The fact that Burmese business in the small towns enjoyed
a relatively prominent position in some areas over other groups
probably lessened the impact of the Chinese intrusion on these
communities.
The lesser role of Chinese businesses in the Burmese economy
compared with other foreign ethnic groups such as the Europeans
and Indians could also be explained by the change in the direction
of trade after the annexation of Burma. Table B indicates that the
percentage of export trade that went to India increased progres-
sively up to the beginning of World War II from 20.6 per cent in
152 Kh1n M2ung Ky1

TABLE B
Burma's Export by Country
(In per cent)

West Asia and Far East Total

Else- Straits Else- '000 of
Year U.K where India Settlement where % Rupees
----
1868-69 65.8 2.0 25.1 5.3 1.8 100 32,662
1883-84 36.9 20.9 20.6 18.3 3.3 100 68,770
1897-98 12.9 23.8 44.9 12.6 5.8 100 139,084
1910-11 10.8 19.4 35.8 9.1 24.9 100 323,600
1920-21 12.7 8.2 51.6 7.7 19.8 100 535,409
1930-31 9.2 12.1 40.6 7.1 31.0 100 541,995
1939-40 13.6 5.8 60.9 4.6 15.1 100 530,987

SocRcE: j.S Furnivall, "Economic History of Burma", Tables VoL I- X

1883-84 to 60.9 per cent in 1939-40, while exports to the Straits

Settlements declined from 18.3 per cent in 1883-84 to 4.6 per
cent in 1939-40. The British share of Burmese exports too fell
from 36.9 per cent to 13.6 per cent in the same period, establishing
India as the dominant trading partner for Burma.
Likewise, Burma's imports from the Straits Settlements where
the Overseas Chinese businesses operated more prominently,
declined from 12.9 per cent of total imports in 1883-84 to 2.6
per cent in 1939-40 (Table C). On the other hand, India's hold
on Burma's imports remained strong throughout 1868.:_69 to 1930-
40, when 50 per cent of imports to Burma came from India. The
United Kingdom, Europe and others made up about 30 to 40 per
cent of Burma's imports throughout the period, indicating the
importance of manufactured goods that came from these indus-
trially advanced countries.
Within this context, Indian businesses had a very strong hold
on the Burmese economy The business network and knowledge
they had accumulated were far more important than the knowledge
and network of the Chinese merchants in the Far East.
The problem of ethnic integration or assimilation in Burma
goes back a long way Burma, besides Vietnam, has had a long
The Etrlnlc Ch1nese 1n Myanmar and their ldermcy 153

TABLE C
Burma's Imports by Country
(In per cent)

West Asia and Far East Total

Else- Straits Else- '000 of
Year U.K. where India Settlement where % Rupees
1868-69 37.1 l.l 51.1 9.4 1.3 100 27,588
1883-84 38.7 1.6 45.2 12.9 1.6 100 60,145
1897-98 35.7 5.1 44.9 8.6 5.7 100 101,241
1910-ll 31.6 10.4 42.4 4.6 11.0 100 186,497
1920-21 28.0 12.9 45.7 2.3 11.1 100 370,518
1930-31 23.7 14.1 41.9 2.7 17.6 100 283,424
1939-40 17.2 10.8 55.4 2.6 14.0 100 251,603

SocRCE: j S. Furnivall, "Economic History of Burma", Tables Vol. I - X.

history of often tumultuous relations with China. Ever since

Burma's ethnic groups comprising linguistically and culturally
similar groups of Tibeto-Burmans moved slowly down to the plains
of the Irrawaddy, the Myanmar ethnic group, the most energetic
and aggressive of all, had been trying to weld all the diverse but
related ethnic groups into a single nation, while at the same time
warding off often forceful overtures from China. Burmese history
has recorded incessant struggles in uniting and integrating the
Burman races. Each time a Burman empire was established, the
break-up would follow after a few generations of rulers. The
Burmans first absorbed and assimilated the earlier Proto Burman
kingdom of Pyu and later conquered the Mon Khmese kingdom
of Pegu in the South. But rebellions and re-establishment of new
Mon kingdoms ensued, culminating in a brutal put down, by the
Burmese, of the last Mon rebellion in 1756. The Burmans also
had to contend with new waves of immigrating Shans. The weak
Burmese empire after the Tartar invasion in 1283 had to absorb
and co-opt rising Shan rulers to the Burmese fold, and Shan
princes were accepted as the new kings of Burma. They, on their
part, accepted and followed the traditions, titles, and language of
the Burman courts and chose to rule as Burman kings. The coming
154 Khin Maung Kyi

of the British as the new colonial rulers interrupted the whole

process of integration and assimilation before it was completed.
On the other hand, in external relations, the Chinese figured
prominently While the Burmans had only a cultural relationship
with India, China had directly attempted to intervene in the affairs
of Burma. The Chinese Army came down to Burma four times,
the last in 1769 when the invading Chinese army was roundly
defeated by the Burmese forces. Although the Chinese claim for
suzerainty or tributary rights over Burma was never established,
successive Chinese governments persisted in holding on to the
idea of the Burmese kingdom as a tribulatory state, even including
Upper Burma as part of China in their maps, until the Sino-
Burma border agreement was signed in 1961.
Such being its historical experience, Burma has been very
careful in dealing with its powerful neighbour. Its strategy has
been to maintain a cordial and non-threatening relationship,
particularly avoiding a situation that China may construe as
threatening to its security At the same time, successive governments
in Burma had been quite apprehensive of possible Chinese inter-
ference in its internal conflict. Maintaining its own internal unity
and stability, and being watchful of the migrant Chinese community
had been the central core of this strategy Under General Ne Win,
the nationalization of all foreign schools, and the introduction of
the Burmese language as the medium of instruction in all schools,
together with the nationalization of all businesses, was thought to
effectively neutralize the possibility of Chinese ethnicity rearing
its head again in Burma. Thus, the Chinese born in Burma in the
last twenty-five years have been effectively Burmanized.
However, this situation has been rapidly undergoing change
under the guise of an open-door policy that the present military
regime has been pursuing. Three elements are rapidly changing
the situation. First, the small Chinese settlement in the Burmese
border state of Kokang, a member of which happened to secure
the rulership earlier under Chinese patronage, has been swelling
in its ranks with remnants of the Kuomintang who had fled
from communist China since 1951. This fully- or half-Chinese
community has taken control over opium cultivation and trade,
and probably earns as much foreign exchange as the Burmese
The Ethn;c Ch;nese ;n Myanmar and lhe;r identity 155

government itself receives from its foreign exports. Their ranks

have been recently reinforced by economic migrants coming down
from the more northern parts of China. These economically
powerful pure ethnic Chinese groups have bought their way into
Burma by conniving with corrupt local officials in the border
region. They have also almost taken over the business centre of
Mandalay, the traditional city of Burma, by buying up choice
property in the town areas and pushing the Burmese population
to the outskirts.
Their strength has been further enhanced by Burmas continuing
dependence on the cheap and sub-standard consumer goods from
China and their control of this trade. As Yunnan and the neigh-
bouring provinces develop new and nascent industries, Burma
with its hunger for consumer goods has become a potentially
captive market for these new industries to introduce or export
new products through open border trade, thus enjoying both scale
effects and experience curve advantage. The money from the drug
business has also increased the power of this new breed of towkays
and lawpans.
Added to this is the increase of Chinese capital coming from
the countries of Southeast Asia. Though there is nothing intrin-
sically wrong with foreign direct investments coming into and
investing in a country, the tipping of the balance of economic
power of one ethnic group, with strident ethnic overtones, over
indigenous ethnic groups could court problems in its wake. As
Mya Than has rightly pointed out, the resurgence of ethnicity and
awareness of ethnocentricity is rising again in Burma. The ringing
bells of ethnic networking in the Chinese diaspora in Southeast
Asia, as espoused by some Southeast Asian leaders may not help
allay the fears of the indigenous people about their economic
future. For them, the power of the "Lords of the Rim" and the
rising might of the "new Middle Kingdom" may seem very real
and formidable. For the best interest of Burma's development,
investments from many different countries and sources should
be welcomed and encouraged, both to get the best competitive
deals and to prevent dependency on a few sources. Under the
present political circumstances, however, options are more or less
limited.
156 Khin Maung Ky1

Burma's ethnic Chinese problem has had much deeper roots

than those in other countries of Southeast Asia. Burma faces both
the ethnic Chinese and Chinas problems. Managing ethnic Chinese
problems in Burma with a reasonable level of negative impacts
requires an intricate balancing of different requirements and
interests, the needs of free trade, the demands of local indigenous
development, real or implied threat of the powerful neighbour,
and the impending rise of native resentment. The problem has
been further compounded by the interruption in the process of
national integration itself, while consensus and unity among the
political forces have still to be achieved.
A well-known authority on Burma, j.S. Fumivall, in his preface
to the seminal work on Political Economy of Burma, first published
in 1931, recognizing the then imminence ofBurmas independence,
its lack of preparation for the task, its reigning problems of
ethnic diversity, and the sheer task of nation building, had this
to say:
If, as is but too probably, the obstacles prove insurmountable, the
end of British influence in Burma can be only a matter of time
and, after a period of anarchy more or less prolonged, our
descendants may find Burma a Province of China. China has a
great civilisation and it is quite possible that the absorption of
Burma by the Chinese will be the best destiny for Burmans. Then
the European visitor looking at Burman lads playing Burmese and
Association football will probably reflect that at least one valuable
element of Burmese civilisation outlasted British rule and that
there is one good thing we gave them. But this will be an inglorious,
if not unfitting, memorial of British rule in Burma.
It may sound harsh, condescending or even demeaning to
Burmese patriotic ears, but fifty years after independence, the
most promising Southeast Asian candidate for development has
become the most backward and retrogressive in the region. It
would be up to the Burmese and their leaders to prove Fumivall's
prophesy to be not true after all.
The Ethnrc Chinese in Myanmar and their Identity 157

References
Furnivall,] .S. An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma, 3rd edition.
Rangoon: Burmese Advertising Press, 1957.
- - - . "Economic History of Burma", Tables No. 1-X. Unpublished
manuscript.
Khin Maung Kyi. "Western Enterprise and Economic Development in
Burma". journal of Burma Research Society 53, Pt.1 (1970): 25-52.
Kyaw Thet. History of Union of Burma. Rangoon: People's Stores Corporation,
1960.
 Chapter 5
The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos

Teresita Ang See

Introduction
In the past decade, especially after the introduction of the open-
door policy in China and the influx of investments from Chinese
all over the world into China, there has been rising interest in the
phenomenon of what many writers call the "Overseas Chinese"
or the "Chinese overseas." There has been quite a number of
international conferences held which are focused on the topic.
Likewise, a plethora of publications about the Chinese outside
mainland China, specifically about the Chinese in Southeast Asia,
has emerged. The government of Australia even went to the extent
of commissioning a study on Chinese Business Networks in Southeast
Asia, 1 one of the better researched works on the topic in recent
years. However, the interest, albeit a much welcome one, can also
have serious implications especially for the Chinese in Southeast
Asia, depending on how this interest is manifested or expressed.
Among some writers nowadays, there seems to be an increasing
trend to lump all the ethnic Chinese together into "a grand
5. The Ethntc Unnese as Ft!tpinos 159

conspiracy" to form a so-called "Third China" or "Greater China"

powerful enough to tip the economic balance scale against the
United States and japan.
One glaring example is the three-part series published in San
jose Mercury News 2 of California on 27-29 june 1994. The series
deliberately twisted a lot of facts and exaggerated figures that
tended to overstate the role of the ethnic Chinese in their own
country's domestic economy and to substantiate the authors' thesis
of a supposed "new yellow peril". The series was written by Lewis
M. Simmons and Michael Zielenziger and carry statements like:
"Overseas Chinese have a lock on much of Asia's economy, how
do they do it? Through a vast network of family businesses
run on trust and intuition." The last part, on 29 june on, "The
consequences of indifference" emphasizes the central thesis that
gives us an inkling of why the three-part series was written in the
first place. The blurb says: 'The United States and japan slept as
Chinese influence grew in Asia. Even now, they're barely aware of
the challenge." Another example is Sterling Seagrave's Lords of the
Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese. 3 Seagrave writes:
"Be so subtle that you are invisible. Be so mysterious that you are
intangible. Then you will control your rivals' fate." Sun Tzu in the
Art of War also writes, "and no group has taken his advice more
to heart than the Overseas Chinese, a vast, highly interconnected
network of fifty-five million expatriate Chinese who control up to
two trillion dollars in assets, and not only dominate the Pacific
Rim but are making increasing inroads into the West." Like the
story in San jose Mercury News, Seagrave warns: "The longer term
outlook is that the Overseas Chinese will greatly increase their
commercial lead over the rest of the world - and if the West
does not prepare for that possibility, it is in for a major shock."
Both used words such as "a vast interconnected network, expatriates
dominate the economy" to promote the idea that these ethnic
Chinese are a homogeneous group invisibly linked together
("controlling two trillion dollars in assets") with a common agenda
of displacing America's and japan's economic superiority. Others
use language such as "borderless empire", "Chinese diaspora",
"offshore China", "Greater China", and the like. In fact, the use of
China-centric terms such as "Chinese overseas" or "Overseas
160 TereSita Ang See

Chinese" itself reflects back to the Cold-War era when these Chinese
were considered "yellow perils". Wittingly or unwittingly, these
writers are promoting ideas that may have dangerous implications
for the ethnic Chinese in their own countries.
Convening a workshop with a theme such as "The Ethnic
Chinese as Southeast Asians" is most timely and the convenor, Dr.
Leo Suryadinata, deserves to be congratulated for his perceptiveness
in pushing for a discussion of such a concept. Serious scholars on
the study of the ethnic Chinese in recent years have posited the
qualification that the Southeast Asian Chinese are indeed no longer
Huaqiao or sojourners, much less "overseas Chinese or "Chinese
overseas". They are, in fact, Southeast Asians, albeit of Chinese
origin. They are responsible to their respective Southeast Asian
countries and are not homogeneously lumped together to form a
vast interconnected network to serve China, much less to dominate
the local economies of their own countries. The sojourners of
the past have now become Thais, Malaysians, Indonesians,
Singaporeans, or Filipinos, each one distinct from the other. As
for the Chinese in the Philippines, they can be Ilocanos, Tausugs,
Bicolanos, Samals, Manilans, Negrenses, and so forth without
discarding the truth that they are of Chinese origin.
Convening such a workshop also recognizes a uniqueness
common to these Southeast Asian nations - the presence of a
substantial number of ethnic Chinese in their midst. Apart from
similarities in geography, history, culture and race, Southeast Asia
as a region is also home for the biggest number of ethnic Chinese
outside of mainland China. Hence, a workshop on the ethnic
Chinese as Southeast Asians holds even greater and more far-
reaching significance. Because of their common experiences,
Southeast Asian countries have formed themselves into a regional
grouping and they are now playing an increasingly important role
in the global economic and political arena. If we consider the
presence of the ethnic Chinese as a uniqueness of these Southeast
Asian countries, can such a presence also be tapped to exert a
more crucial influence on the growing importance of Southeast
Asia as a region? At the outset, I mentioned the growing importance
of the role of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and people
have increasingly paid greater attention to this fact. I would now
S The Ethmc Chinese as Ftl!ptnos 161

like to posit this question: while each of the ethnic Chinese

populations identify with their respective Southeast Asian countries,
can they, at the same time, be encouraged to identify themselves
also with Southeast Asia as a region, and can each be tapped to
exert greater influence for and on behalf of Southeast Asia? In
short, can the presence of the ethnic Chinese be a unifying factor
serving Southeast Asian interests rather than the more far-fetched
claim of a Southeast Asian "overseas Chinese enclave" serving a
Greater China?
Since I am from the Philippines, I am to talk about the Chinese
Filipinos or the ethnic Chinese as Filipinos. After exploring the
question of whether they are Chinese or Filipinos, allow me to go
back and relate it to the theme of the workshop, "The Ethnic
Chinese as Southeast Asians" and raise the question: can they
eventually also identify themselves as Southeast Asians in much
the same way as the French, Germans, British, Spaniards and
others identify themselves as Europeans? However, before I start
discussing the identity of the Chinese Filipinos, let me briefly
review the Philippine colonial experience and the formation of the
Filipino nationality which is a late nineteenth century phenomenon.
Likewise, I will discuss some crucial historical factors and govern-
ment policies that served to retard the process of integration and
to constrain the ethnic Chinese from finally identifying themselves
as Filipinos. These factors are: the Philippines' relations with China
and the Philippine Government's policy on citizenship; the pro-
Taiwan and pro-China factionalism in the community; the colonial
experience and the divide-and-rule policy in particular; and lastly,
the colonial legacy of discrimination, negative perceptions and
stereotypes about the ethnic Chinese.

Filipino National Identity and Nationhood

The emergence of the Philippines as a nation with a national
identity is relatively recent, a late nineteenth century phenomenon,
in fact. Even in the middle of the twentieth century, some scholars
still said that the Philippines was a country in search of a national
identity. The many revolutionary uprisings against the Spanish
government that occurred towards the end of Spanish rule at the
turn of the century were launched by a highly fragmented society.
162 Teresita Ang See

They were prodded not by a national consciousness or aspiration

for the country to be freed from the shackles of colonial rule but
more for parochial concerns of the regions where the uprisings
occurred, or for the personal grievances of the leaders of the
uprisings. Historian Renata Constantino writes: "The growth of
the concept of nationhood was coterminous with the develop-
ment of the concept of Filipino."4 With this historical background,
it is easy to understand why the identification of the ethnic
Chinese as Filipinos is a late twentieth century phenomenon. Father
Miguel A. Bernad, a jesuit historian, writes: "In the course of the
past four hundred years (over three hundred under Spain, a half
century under America, and three decades under our own in-
dependent government) a national unity has emerged in which
people of different regions and of different linguistic groups do
not consider themselves merely Tagalogs, Visayans, Pampangos,
Ilocanos, Bicols, and so on, but first and foremost as Filipinos.
However, this unification of the country into one nation and one
people has not been completed. There are still minority groups
within the country who do not yet feel at home within this union.
When every member of a minority group feels that he is, first, a
Filipino, and only secondarily a member of his ethnic group, the
task of unification will have been completed. "5
The people who propagated the consciousness for a national
identity and the idea of a Filipino identity and nationhood were
the Ilustrados, mainly Chinese mestizos who formed the middle
class and who were able to receive and be influenced by the more
liberal Western ideas during their studies or exile abroad. Prominent
Filipinos in both the reform and revolutionary movements were
almost all of Chinese descent although they joined the revolution
as Malay Filipinos and not as Chinese mestizos. Historian Dr.
Antonio Tan succinctly states the Chinese mestizos' contributions
to national development: "The Chinese mestizos were an important
element of Philippine society in the 19th century. They played a
significant role in the formation of the Filipino middle class, in
the agitation for reforms, in the 1898 revolution, and in the
formation of what is now known as the Filipino nationality "6
Moreover, the Philippines, made up of 7,100 islands, has always
5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 163

been a culturally pluralistic society. It has tolerated the existence

of different cultural communities in as many linguistic divisions,
from the Cordillera and Sierra Madre mountains' tribal minorities
in the. north to the Muslim minorities in the south. Thus, under
this cultural pluralism, the recognition of the ethnic Chinese as a
cultural minority should have been a much smoother process, but
other barriers, like the lack of citizenship and other factors to be
discussed below, have been responsible for the Chinese being
considered alien minorities for a long time.

The Ethnic Chinese and China

Up to 1975, the Philippines had diplomatic relations with Taiwan
and had very close relations with it. The Philippines recognized
Taiwan's jurisdiction over a hundred thousand alien Chinese
permanently residing in the country, and allowed it to closely
supervise the affairs of the Chinese community. Taiwan exercised
rights of supervision over the so-called Chinese schools, in terms
of curriculum, textbooks, and even hiring and training of teachers
through the General Association of Chinese Schools CK .& ). Taiwan
also actively involved itself in the affairs of the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce (# ~ jl}f ~.it-~) and
in the Grand Family Association (#- ~), a federation of family
associations all over the country. 7
In june 1975, however, the Philippines established diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and thus
turned away from Taiwan. In preparation for this, the Philippines
had to address two main issues: the question of the allegiance of
the local Chinese, and the fear of the Chinese possibly becoming
tools of communism. Thus, two Presidential Decrees (P.D.)
specifically addressing these problems were promulgated by then
President Ferdinand Marcos before diplomatic relations were
established. The first was P.D. 176, promulgated in 1973 to
implement the constitutional provision on the Filipinization of all
alien schools. The second was Letters of Instruction (LOI) 270
issued on l l April1975 just two months before the establishment
of diplomatic relations with China. LOI 270 paved the way for
the mass naturalization of the resident Chinese by administrative
164 TeresttaAng See

means. Both decrees had quite significant and far-reaching impact

on the Chinese community, particularly in hastening the integration
of the local Chinese into mainstream society 8
Before the mass naturalization process, the ethnic Chinese
could obtain citizenship only through the judicial system, since
the Philippine Constitution adopted the jus sanguinis (citizenship
by blood) as against jus soli (citizenship by birth) principle of
citizenship. The judicial process of naturalization was a time-
consuming, onerous and extremely expensive process since it was
fraught with graft and corruption. Therefore, it left a sizeable
number of ethnic Chinese (no matter if they were born and
educated in the Philippines) with Chinese (at the time, Taiwan)
citizenship. The Philippine Government facilitated the mass
naturalization of the local Chinese because of its fears that if
allowed to retain their Chinese citizenship after diplomatic relations
with the PRC were established, these Chinese would owe allegiance
and be subjected to the direct supervision and control of the PRC,
a communist country, thereby creating a possibility of their adopting
or being influenced by the communist ideology. 9
The facts, however, showed that the government's fears were
misplaced. An understanding of the Chinese community would
show that the local Chinese are basically capitalist, profit-oriented
businessmen - antithetical to communism. They are as against
communist ideology as most Filipinos. The question of allegiance
at that time, however, was a chicken-and-egg issue. The Philippine
Government hesitated in granting citizenship to the local Chinese
because it doubted their loyalty On the other hand, the local
Chinese argued that they could not freely give political allegiance
to a country which they did not belong to. This issue was
thoroughly debated upon during the 1971 Constitutional Con-
vention's deliberations on the adoption of the jus soli as against the
jus sanguinis principle of citizenship. 10
When the government finally saw its way to granting easy
access to citizenship through LOI 270, a greatly accelerated inte-
gration process was easily seen. The local Chinese, young and old,
availed of this process. Without doubt, this mass naturalization
gave great impetus to the integration of the local Chinese. What
the Philippine Government failed to realize at that point was that
5 The Ethn1c Ch1nese as F111pmos 165

the majority of the local Chinese were already native born, they
grew up in the Philippines, were educated in Philippine schools,
had no first-hand experience of China, and had known no other
country except the Philippines. What had held them back from
fully identifying themselves as Filipinos was the lack of citizenship.
When citizenship was granted, therefore, political identity was
established and the barriers to full commitment to citizenship
were finally liftedY
The establishment of diplomatic relations with China itself
was also of great significance. In fact, it can be considered a
turning point in the history of the Chinese in the Philippines
because of its far-reaching implications in affecting the conscious-
ness and orientation of the older generation Chinese. just before
the establishment of Philippine-China diplomatic relations, China
regained its rightful position in the United Nations. China thus
achieved a new status and became a player of consequence on the
international stage. For a while, there was widespread euphoria
among the Philippine Chinese who pinned high hopes on the
diplomatic relations with China. They believed that with a "great
China" to support them and to protect their interests, their days
of being underdogs were over. With such a powerful mother
country and its embassy officials to depend on, their problems
could all be solved. This China-oriented outlook and ethnocentrism
verging on outright cultural chauvinism was typical of the older
generation Chinese who had strong loyalties to China and who
longed for a strong mother country to help and protect them.
They admired the gunship diplomacy of the West and wished that
China could do the same. 12
For the Taiwan-oriented faction within the local Chinese
community, the uncertainties regarding Taiwan's political future,
especially after the Philippines severed its political ties with Taiwan,
left many in limbo. Unwilling to commit themselves to China
whose communist system was opposed to their capitalistic way of
life and beliefs, many decided that it was time to hitch their
fortunes with the Philippines. Out of habit, many of them, until
now, are pro-Taiwan in sentiment but they also realize that they
have only themselves to depend on to work out their future in the
Philippines. In recent years, many of these Kuomintang-oriented
166 Terestta Ang See

sympathizers have modified their outlook and this has been

reflected in their speeches. They have started to talk about the
long range interests of the greater society and the need to identify
with the mainstream.
However, it did not take long for these Chinese to wake up
to the reality that China's "protection" and support cannot be
granted as a matter of course. Due to its anti-hegemony stance
and its avowed policy of non-recognition of dual nationality and
non-interference in local affairs, China, no matter how strong,
cannot live up to the expectations of the local Chinese especially
since many of them are already Filipino citizens. China's cautious-
ness and reluctance to interfere and to involve itself in the affairs
of the local Chinese (which, admittedly, are internal affairs of the
Philippines) even after diplomatic relations were established was
a rude awakening to many of these China-oriented older generation
Chinese. In their disappointment, many came to realize that their
survival depended not on China's greatness but on the Philippines'
own future. They started to open their eyes to the fact that their
interests could not be separated from the interests of Philippine
society and that the so-called local Chinese problems were directly
related to the pro.blems of the larger Philippine society and as
such, could only be solved within the boundaries of Philippine
society. 13
This has been demonstrated most clearly in recent years. As
the spate of kidnappings menaced and traumatized the ethnic
Chinese community, they tried to pin their hopes on Taiwan and
China. They thought that Taiwan could put economic pressure
and China could put political pressure on the Philippine govern-
ment to solve the problem. It was an even ruder awakening
when China stuck to its principle of non-interference in internal
affairs and Taiwan also refused to lift its hands in relation to the
kidnapping problem except to help in the prosecution of one
kidnapping case where the victim was a Taiwanese. Ironically, in
this Taiwanese case, it was later discovered that the one involved
in the kidnapping was Colonel Reynaldo Berroya, the former head
of the government's anti-kidnapping task force himself. 14 Colonel
Berroya was convicted of kidnapping in I 995 but the case is still
on appeal.
5. The Ethn1c 011nese as F11ip1nos 167

Pro-Taiwan vs. Pro-China Factionalism

The historical reality of a long and intimate relationship with
Taiwan preceding diplomatic relations with the PRC also gave rise
to a phenomenon in the Philippines that has no parallel in
Southeast Asia - a split in the Chinese community into two
clashing factions, one with a pro-China orientation and the other
with a pro-Taiwan orientation. The existence of these two factions
and the bitter and active rivalry between them has no equal in
Southeast Asia. There are five Chinese-language dailies with a
total circulation of about 35,000 in the Philippines. Two of these
dailies are pro-Beijing, two are pro-Taipei, and one is a fence-
sitter. There are also two rival factions in the fire-prevention
brigades, and there are family associations, like the Cua-Chua, the
Co, and the Lim Associations, which are split into two factions.
Chambers of Commerce, which should have been involved only
in business matters, are not exempted from this factionalism. There
are other groups -literary groups, .athletic groups, music clubs,
and even schools - that have clearly defined leanings. The
situation sometimes verges on the ridiculous. On their respective
foundation anniversaries on l October and 10 October, the two
factions rival each other in the number of congratulatory newspaper
advertisements they get, the number of guests and government
officials in their respective receptions, and so on. Any worthwhile
projects launched by one group would be boycotted by the other
group. Some prominent businessmen even leave the country to
avoid meeting with the Chinese ambassador at official gatherings.
In recent years, however, this active rivalry has been growing
weaker as more and more of the pro-Taiwan factions are making
a beeline to the lucrative China market; it is nevertheless still a
contentious issue that has divided the community and affected its
stand on various pressing issues that affect them directly. 15
However, this ongoing cold war is confined only to a very
small sector of the Chinese community, mostly the older genera-
tion businessmen who, unfortunately, still hold leadership positions
and wield power and influence in the community. The younger
generation, however, are not even aware of the existence of these
petty intrigues and senseless animosities among the professed
leaders of the community. They would find what their elders are
168 Teresita Ang See

fighting for an irrelevant issue which is of no concern to them

because their concern lies with their future in the Philippines.
Way back in 1970, Dr. Robert Tilman had concluded in his study
of the Philippine-Chinese youth: "The problems, frustrations,
prejudices, follies, faults, hopes and aspirations are about the same,
whether the students be Chinese or Filipino." 16
In addition to the factionalism, for the past several decades
since the war, the older generation Chinese have clung stubbornly
to their ethnocentrism and cultural chauvinism. They have laboured
hard to perpetuate their Chineseness. The saying "Once a Chinese,
always a Chinese" was a ruling passion among them. Yet, no
matter how hard they tried to resist the changes brought about by
their environment, their efforts have been futile and they have
learned that integration is a natural sociological phenomenon which
nobody can prevent. In fact, the process of detachment from China
as a nation started from the beginning of the twentieth century
when many of the Chinese fulfilled their dreams of economic
success, and dreams of returning home to China gradually
vanished. Most importantly, after 1949, when China closed its
doors to the outside world, the local Chinese finally realized that
there was no more going home and that the Philippines was the
only country where they and their future generations would live.
Contrary, therefore, to the fears that diplomatic relations would be
a stumbling block to integration, facts have proved that even the
older Chinese have come to realize that their destinies cannot be
separated from the Philippines and that it is the Philippines, not
China, which has a decisive influence on their future. From events
in the past two decades, the local Chinese have realized that only
by working hand in hand with the Filipinos for the greater national
interest rather than for narrow self-interests of their parochial
community can their own future be assured. This realization, in
turn, was greatly instrumental in hastening the process of
integration.

Legacy of Colonial Experience

The more than three centuries of Spanish rule and five decades of
American occupation left indelible marks on the Philippines, espe-
cially in the relations between the ethnic Chinese and the native
5 The Ethnic Chtnese as Ftltptnos 169

Filipinos. True to the dictum of divide and rule, both the Spaniards
and the Americans separated the ethnic Chinese from the Filipino
mainstream. The Spaniards put up a physical barrier by confin-
ing the Chinese in their exclusive enclave, the Parian, and the
Americans perpetuated a psychological barrier by encouraging the
Chinese to live a separate existence by having their own schools,
press, chamber of commerce and other associations. Both
colonizers, as well as the short-lived japanese rulers, exploited to
the hilt the art of scapegoatism - blaming the Chinese for the
economic ills that befell the country caused by their maladmin-
istration and ineffective economic policies. The deliberate anti-
Chinese policies of discrimination and the tendencies of the colonial
administration to blame the ethnic Chinese for their own failed
policies are legacies which have been passed on and perpetuated
to the present. 17
Many Social Distance surveys 18 and studies on ethnic prejudices
have been conducted in the past. Although they differ in degree,
they have a common finding - that the Chinese, just like the
Muslims in Southern Philippines, lie low in the social distance
scale. In the studies using semantical differences, both the studies
of Weightman and Berreman 19 came up with these adjectives: the
Chinese are business-minded, good in mathematics, rich, indus-
trious, thrifty, dynamic, and persevering. On the negative side,
most of these attitude and behaviour surveys reveal that the native
Filipinos resent the Chinese for being exploiters, abusive employers,
shrewd businessmen, and tax evaders, and for the prevalent belief
that the Chinese control the economy An analysis of both the
positive and negative images of the Chinese leads to one conclusion
- all the traits mentioned are economic in nature. They are a
reflection of the supposed "business success" of the Chinese. In
fact, they intensify the myth that all Chinese are businessmen or
to say it more bluntly, the Chinese are all "economic animals".
More importantly, they reinforce the image of "economic power"
held by the local Chinese, which further elicit envy and distrust
of the native Filipinos.
In my past papers on these biases and stereotypes, especially
the paper on the "Images of the Chinese in the Philippines", I
have pointed out that these stereotypes are based on prejudices
170 TeresttaAng See

and misunderstanding borne mostly out of some unfortunate

personal experiences and grudges. Most importantly, the traits
such as abusive employers, exploiters, and tax evaders, are true of
any race and can be blamed on irresponsible and opportunistic
businessmen and not on the Chinese as a racial trait. 20 Most of
these social distance and attitude surveys were conducted in
the sixties and seventies and it would be useful to conduct new
surveys. With so many changes happening among the ethnic
Chinese, it would be worthwhile to find out if perceptions about
them have changed. Among 120 respondents in a survey my
students conducted informally in 1989, 21 there seems to be much
improvement in attitudes towards the ethnic Chinese in that the
majority answered that they did not mind having a Chinese as a
business partner, a neighbour, a friend or even as a spouse. The
negative attitudes about them are again confined mostly to business
practices, like being secretive and paying low salaries.
Most of the dynamics of animosity are concentrated in
Metropolitan Manila and among the middle class. In a study in
1971, anthropologist john Omohundro observed that: "Not all
regions and social strata of Filipinos feel the same way about the
Chinese but there is little careful inquiry into variations within
the country It is popular knowledge that the Ilocano-speaking
regions of Luzon are the most anti-Chinese, whereas the Muslim
Filipinos of Mindanao are considered in the main very tolerant.
The Ilongo and Cebuano-speaking people of the central Philippines,
popularly considered easy-going people, harbour less animosity
and express it less than the Tagalog speakers of Manila. It remains
to be shown that these popular conceptions are a social reality "22
Undercurrents of racism and latent racial animosity have
always lain below the surface but they have not really been
problematic except on occasions when politicians deliberately
exploit the issue and fan racial unrest to serve their own ends.
In recent years, during elections especially, some candidates or
interest groups would deliberately fan anti-Chinese prejudices by
campaigning against candidates with "short" surnames. In 1995,
there were campaign posters such as "Sa Intsik na nga ang
ekonomiya, pati ba naman ang politika? (The economy already
belongs to the Chinese, even politics too)?" This was led by jun
S Tt1e Ett1n1c C/71nese as F1!1p1nos 171

Ducat, a businessman who purportedly heads Kalipi (Kadugong

Liping Filipino or Filipinos of same blood and race). The irony
is that this anti-Chinese campaign was targetted at candidates
who have been Filipinos for three generations, and whom no-
body would acknowledge to be an ethnic Chinese - such as
the present Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim, or the Congressman of
Tarlac and uncle of President Corazon Aquino, Representative
Jose Yap. 21 The same campaign posters resurrected the old slogan,
"The Philippines for the Filipinos", reminiscent of the earlier
"Filipino First" campaign immediately after independence from
the United States and the establishment of the new Republic.
At that time, nationalism was equated with being anti-foreign
and anti-Chinese.
In recent years, we have again witnessed anti-Chinese and
racist acts especially after every economic crisis spawned, for
instance, by an oil price increase or a rice shortage. The govern-
ment's tendency to divert attention away from real problems by
blaming the Chinese traders is an age-old practice but it is
nevertheless still dangerous and demoralizing for the local Chinese.
Worse is the fact that other sectors may deliberately exploit this
latent racism for their own ends. Sociologist Dr. Rodolfo Bulatao
says: "Childhood prejudices and narrow loyalties may be diluted
and overlayed with specific concerns as one matures, but they
remain latent and capable of being mobilized unwittingly or by
design. The less aware the public is of these underlying cleavages,
the more explosive their potential, and the less adequately ethnic
tensions are handled, the more difficult it will be to create one
national unity out of the country's various ethnic components. "24
This warning, especially on the unwitting or deliberate mobilization
of latent hostilities, cannot be ignored and there have been
increasing signs that the "ethnic Chinese" can be utilized to divert
attention from more pressing national issues, as had happened
countless times in the past.
This can be clearly seen in the anti-Chinese mass rally that
took place in Angeles City on 5 July 1986, just a day after the
announcement of American withdrawal from Clark Air Base in
Angeles City Slogans and posters scattered all over the city blamed
the Chinese for the high prices of goods and suggested that instead
172 Teresita Ang See

of sending the Americans out, the Filipinos should unite to send

the Chinese out of the country In 1995, the convenient practice
of scapegoatism found its target among the big Chinese Filipino
rice traders. Because of the failure of the government's own agri-
cultural policies that resulted in a rice shortage and the fact that
measures to alleviate the rice shortage through importation were
not put in place immediately since it was election time (May
1995), the shortage became a full-blown crisis. The old bogey of
a so-called "rice cartel" of Chinese rice traders was resurrected
deliberately and the rice crisis was blamed on them. This was
done even though the government knew all the while that out of
the seven members of the alleged "rice cartel" three were no longer
in the rice business since 1990. These traders became tired of
always being the butt of the blame whenever something went
wrong with the supply of rice (which they called a "political
foodstuff'). This act of diverting attention away from the real
problem and conveniently blaming others has dangerous reper-
cussions for the Chinese community It intensifies feelings of
vulnerability and jolts the confidence of the ethnic Chinese in
continuing their businesses in the Philippines. 25
Adding to the fears and unrest among the ethnic Chinese are
the repeated pronouncements by President Fidel V Ramos' political
adviser himself, General]ose Almonte, which has been interpreted
to be racist. For example, Almonte was quoted by the Straits
Times (Singapore) as saying: "Our so-called Taipans, they're not as
big as the Taipans of Hong Kong or maybe Singapore, but they
claim that, between them, they can pay our indebtedness and that
is about $30 billion. That's a lot of money Now, it's all right if this
was acquired through means acceptable to the national community,
but they were not, and we must get them to show a greater
responsibility to the community" In another interview in Congress,
General Almonte was quoted as saying: 'The problem of insurgency
is no longer in the mountains of the Sierra Madres and Cordillera
but in the boardrooms of Binondo and Makati." Binondo is the
acknowledged financial and distribution centre of the Chinese
Filipinos while Makati is the financial and commercial centre owned
by the Spanish Filipino elites and home to most of the multinational
companies. 26
5. The Ethnic Chrnese as Filrprnos 173

While the earlier surveys prevalently showed the economic

nature of the prejudices, the social image, leaves much to be
desired. Many of the surveys showed that the Chinese are con-
sidered "unassimilable", that they are clannish, that they refuse to
marry Filipinos, that they are a dirty and noisy people, and other
similar negative impressions. The image of the Chinese as "Intsik
Beho or Intsik Tsekwa" is still prevalent in Philippine literatureY
The myth that "Once a Chinese, always a Chinese," is, unfortu-
nately, also still a prevalent belief. Gregorio F Zaide, writing in
Political and Cultural History of the Philippines, summed up the
prevalent anti-Chinese sentiments this way: "The Chinese were
obnoxious because they were economically dominant, strange
because they were culturally alien, repulsive because they were
culturally clannish and disloyal because they were politically
unreliable. "28 But, do realities fit this image? Rapid changes have
occurred, especially among the young local-born Chinese. The
accusations of "unassimilability" of the Chinese can be easily refuted
by looking at the socio-cultural changes that have occurred among
the younger generation of Chinese Filipinos. The changes are
described more fully in the following pages on socio-cultural
integration.
In consonance with these changes, even the image of the
Filipinos in the minds of the Chinese has changed. Among the
older generation Chinese, personal contacts they have had with
Filipinos are limited to their workers, their employees, their maids
at home, corrupt policemen and firemen, Bureau of Internal
Revenue agents and City Hall inspectors who harass them regularly,
and politicians who befriend or lambast them depending on
personal conveniences and purposes. Hence, the image of the
Filipino in their consciousness is also negative. Likewise, the
economic disparity or class differences between the majority of
the Filipinos who still live below the poverty line and the
predominantly middle class ethnic Chinese is a reality that often
intensifies this negative attitude from both sides. Now, with the
younger generation Chinese having personal Filipino friends in
school, at work, and in their neighbourhood, a deeper and more
intimate relationship is formed which gives rise to a generally
more positive image of the Filipinos in their minds 29
174 TeresitaAng See

Taking these historical realities, like Philippine-China relations

and the legacy of discrimination as a background, we realize that
the process of integration among the ethnic Chinese has actually
happened under such disadvantageous or adverse circumstances.
Let us now go to the main discussion on the ethnic Chinese as
Filipinos. First, I would like to emphasize that the ethnic Chinese
in the Philippines is not a homogeneous or cohesive group and I
will also point out that it is not accurate to use only the urban
Metropolitan Manila Chinese as our-yardstick in tackling the whole
issue of the Chinese as Filipinos.

Diversity and Complexity

Historically, the largest concentration of ethnic Chinese has always
been in Metro Manila, or in the City of Manila specifically: Out of
the 800,000 to 850,000 ethnic Chinese all over the Philippines,
forming roughly 1.2 per cent of the population of 68 million,
more than half can be found in Metro Manila and the other half
of this number are concentrated in the areas bounded by Binondo
and a part of the congested districts of Tondo, San Nicolas, Sta.
Cruz and Quiapo. Added to this heavy concentration of ethnic
Chinese in Metro Manila is the fact that the greater number of
Chinese associations - whether chambers of commerce, home-
town, family or clan, alumni, arts, literary, or religious - are also
concentrated in Manila; in fact, they are predominantly located in
Binondo, or the so-called "Chinatown" district. Hence, when people
talk about the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines, they often refer
to the Chinese in Manila. In short, the Chinese Manilans are
considered to be the representatives of the entire ethnic Chinese
population in the country: In addition to this, the definition of
ethnic Chinese, in practice, is further narrowed down to refer
mostly to the traditional leaders of the Chinese community - the
so-called qiao ling ({fr4_Di) - who come predominantly from the
leadership ranks of traditional Chinese organizations. When the
Chinese community is mentioned or events in the Chinese
community are reported, people often jump to the conclusion
that these refer only to the so-called qiao ling and their activities
because they are mainly what appear in the Chinese-language
dailies. 30
S Tile EtllrliC Chinese as Filipinos 175

Likewise, researchers and scholars have also focused their

studies mostly on the Chinese in Manila and these studies are
often made to reflect the situation of the entire ethnic Chinese
population in the Philippines. The truth, however, is that the
Chinese Manilans, much less the group made up only of the qiao
ling, can hardly represent the entire Chinese population in the
Philippines. As we explore the one unifying identity of the ethnic
Chinese as Filipinos, we should bear in mind that there exists a
vast continuum of differences and uniqueness among the ethnic
Chinese in different parts of the country made up of 7,100 islands.
Studying the ethnic Chinese as Cebuanos, Ilonggos, Ilocanos,
Pangasinenses, Tausugs, Zamboanguenos, and so forth would
certainly bring out the pitfalls of generalizing about the Chinese
in the Philippines.
In fact, even among the Chinese Manilans, there also exist
vast differences. just take citizenship as an example. There are
those who already have Filipino citizenship and can be legally
considered Filipinos, or Filipino citizens. However, there exists a
pocket of Chinese who are still non-Filipino in citizenship. Should
they be included in our topic "The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos"
or should they be left out? If they are to be left out, we should
remember that among these non-Filipino citizens, there are those
who cannot even speak Chinese, who grew up only in Filipino
neighbourhoods, have only Filipino friends and for all intents
and purposes are like any other Filipino except for the lack of
citizenship. Is it fair to consider them aliens and not as Chinese
Filipinos/ Take the case of the scholar of Rotary Club in Cotabato
who was sent to the United States on a one-year exchange
scholarship. Upon arrival back at the Manila International Airport
after a year, she was detained by the immigration and refused
entry to the Philippines because she did not have a re-entry permit.
The girl never knew that as a Chinese passport holder, she was
considered an alien and needed to apply for a re-entry permit to
come back to the only country that she knew. Even the immigration
agents did not know what to do with her. They wanted to deport
her to Taiwan but the girl did not know anyone there, she did not
even speak Chinese and never had any Chinese-language education.
In fact, she only learned that she was a Chinese citizen (by virtue
176 TeresitaAng See

of her father being Chinese) when she was applying for a Filipino
passport and was denied one. She was detained by the immigration
for several days while the Rotary Club made arrangements to
prove that she was a permanent resident of the country 31
On the other hand, among those who possess Filipino citizen-
ship, the degree of Filipinoness compared to their Chineseness
also vary greatly. Added to this, the dimension of the new immi-
grants from China, Hong Kong or Taiwan must also be considered.
To what extent and what criteria can be used to consider the latter
group as Chinese Filipinos? Are they within the scope of this
study? This illustrates the fact that it is really quite difficult to use
citizenship to make generalizations as to who are Chinese Filipinos.
This is particularly true if we factor in the corruption in the
Philippine bureaucracy and the reality that there are many ways,
legal and extra-legal, by which Filipino citizenship can be obtained,
especially among the new immigrants.
Just the issue of citizenship alone illustrates the complexity of
studying the Chinese Manilans. Moreover, we should bear in mind
that they are not truly representative of all the Chinese in the
Philippines, much less be lumped together with the ethnic Chinese
in other parts of the country, especially in the provinces and in
the rural areas. On the other hand, the complexity also serves to
emphasize the need to explore in depth the uniqueness, the
differences and the varying levels or degrees of being Filipinos.
These differences can be seen in age or generation, levels of
education, cultural background (such as whether they participate
in traditional Chinese organizations or not), degree of language
proficiency, social and economic status, personal experiences,
lifestyle, attitudes and orientation, as well as their sense of identity
and belonging. To many Filipinos and foreigners, the Chinese
community in the Philippines appears to be a homogeneous one,
instead of the complex and diversified population that it really is.
In fact, even the definition of ethnic Chinese leaves a lot of
confusion. Here, I use the well-accepted sociological definition
that the ethnic Chinese are people with a measurable degree of
Chinese parentage, have undergone a minimum Chinese language
education, can understand and speak a bare minimum of Chinese
dialect, still have close contacts with the Chinese community and
5. The Ethntc C/Jtnese as Ftltpinos 177

have retained some Chinese customs and traditions enough to

consider themselves and be considered by others as Chinese. It is
acknowledged that lO per cent of the Filipinos have Chinese
blood in them but only about 1.2 per cent can really be considered
ethnic Chinese. 32
For the purposes of this study, I conducted a survey on "Ethnic
Identity of the Tsinoys" 33 (Tsinoy is a colloquial term increasingly
used now to refer to the Tsinong Pinoy or Chinese Filipinos). The
510 respondents gathered from schools, civic organizations and
alumni and parents associations are mainly from Metro Manila
(80 per cent), with some from the provinces (20 per cent). The
ages ranged from 17 to 60 and I subdivided the ages according
to Philippine demographic groupings. Henceforth, this survey
will be referred to as the 1995 Identity Survey when cited, in
comparison with an earlier survey done among 381 students in
1988.
Let me now highlight some major points of diversity among
the ethnic Chinese population in the Philippines: 34
1. Based on citizenship, as mentioned above, the main difference
is among those who are Filipino citizens and those who are
not.
2. Among those who do not have Filipino citizenship, some hold
China (PRC) passports, Taiwan (ROC) passports, Hong Kong
passports or British identity cards. Then there are those who
hold U.S., Canadian, Australian or Singapore passports. One
striking irony is the fact that some were born locally and have
never been to China. If they have not gone abroad and therefore
have no need for passports, their only identification papers
are their birth certificates, to prove that they were born in the
Philippines, and the Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR)
and the Immigrant Certificate of Registration (ICR) issued by
the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines, if they had
registered themselves; they are, de facto, stateless.
3. Among the holders of PRC or ROC passports, the newcomers
and older immigrants, and the local-born and China-born
must also be further differentiated. Of the China-born, those
who came in before the fifties or before the Pacific war are
178 Teres1ta 11ng See

certainly different from those who came in later in the seven-

ties, eighties or nineties in terms of their sense of identity and
belonging. Then again, they are also different compared to the
Chinese passport holders who were born in the Philippines
and grew up in the Philippines. Among the Taiwan (ROC)
passport holders, apart from the real Taiwanese themselves,
there are those who have dual nationality, like the Chinese
Filipino overseas contract workers who, for the convenience
of working in Taiwan, also applied for Taiwan citizenship
despite the fact that they already hold Filipino citizenship.
4. Among those who have Filipino citizenship there are also
differences. Some are natural born Filipinos (that is, both
parents or the father or mother are Filipino citizens at birth);
while some are naturalized citizens (including those who
applied under judicial means and those who applied under
the administrative decree of Marcos in 1975). Besides these
are those who obtained Filipino citizenship fraudulently but
who are, nonetheless, considered legitimate Filipinos. The 1995
Identity Survey showed that more than 70 per cent of the
ethnic Chinese were natural born (see Table 1).
It is interesting to note that when broken down into age
groups, the youngest age bracket of 17 to 21 years showed
the highest number of natural born citizens (82.6 per cent).
This is the generation born after 1975 of parents who ac-
quired citizenship through LOI 270, the decree facilitating
naturalization promulgated by then President Marcos.

TABLE 1
How Citizenship is Acquired

Freq. Percentage
Chinese citizens 20 3.9
Natural born Filipino 369 72.3
Naturalized Filipino 110 21.6
Others [2 Brits., 2 Amer.] 4 0.8
No answer 7 1.4

Total 510 100

5. The Ethnic Ch;nese as Filip;nos 179

TABLE 2
How Citizenship is Acquired
(By age)

Citizenship
Natural Filipino
Chinese Born Naturalized by No
Age Citizens Filipino Filipino Election Others Answer Total
17-21 2.6% 82.6% ll.5% 0.3% 6.0% 2.3% 100%
22-32 6.7% 67.6% 24.1% 0.9% 0.9% 0.0 100%
33-45 5.3% 28.1% 54.4% 10.5% 1.8% 0.0 100%
46-Above 0.0 28.0% 52.0% 20.0% 0.0 0.0 100%
No Age 12.5% 56.3% 31.3% 0.0 0.0 0.0 100%

5. Based on ethnic ongm, no matter what the citizenship is,

there is a big difference among Filipino citizens whose parents
are pure Chinese and those who have mixed parentage. The
mestizos are naturally more Filipinized than those who hail
from pure Chinese racial stock. The 1995 Identity Survey
showed that among those who are Filipino citizens, 55.9 per
cent had parents who were pure Chinese and 32 per cent
Chinese mestizos. This jives with the earlier survey of 1988
where more than 50 per cent of the student respondents said
that they would not mind getting married to Filipinos. It was
also a confirmation of the earlier premise that the rate of
intermarriages was on the rise. 35

TABLE 3
Racial Origins

Freq. Percentage
Pure Chinese 285 55.9
Chinese Mestizos 163 32.0
Others 50 9.8
No Answer 12 2.3
Total 510 100
180 Teres;ta ling See

6. Based on educational level and cultural background, whether

or not the person was a Filipino citizen, those who were
educated in the Philippines were naturally more greatly
influenced by the Philippine environment, and their sense
of belonging and attachment to the Philippines was deeper
compared to those who were educated in China or outside the
Philippines. In fact, studies have pointed out that native-born
ethnic Chinese who are educated in Philippine schools are no
different from Filipinos. In contrast, those who are educated
in China, Taiwan or Hong Kong are naturally much more
sinified.
7. Based on age or generational differences, except for some
isolated cases or isolated influences, generally, the younger
the generation, the more Filipino they become. The older the
generation, the greater the Chinese influence especially con-
sidering the fact that the ethnic Chinese make up only 1.2 per
cent of the population.
8. Based on geographical location, there are differences between
the Chinese in Metro Manila and the provincial Chinese. Those
who live in Metro Manila are further differentiated between
those in the so-called Chinatown area and those in the suburbs.
Even in the case of the provincial Chinese, those who come
from Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Davao and other bigger urban
areas are different from those who come from the rural villages.
The degree of interaction and relationship with Filipinos would
naturally influence their affinity with the Filipinos as well as
their sense of identity as Filipinos.
9. Based on social and economic status, business or profession,
the differences affect the degree of interaction and relations
with Filipinos which in turn also influence their identity as
Filipinos. The elites and the lower classes who have closer
relations with Filipinos are more Filipinized compared to those
who socialize or interact only with fellow Chinese.
10. Based on social activities, those who are members of tradi-
tional Chinese organizations and are active in the affairs of
these associations are more exposed to Chinese community
events and are better represented in affairs and concerns of
the community. In contrast, those who are active members of
5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 181

Filipino civic groups and organizations are more exposed to

the Filipino social milieu and have closer relationships with
the Filipinos.
11. Based on hometown origins, the Fujianese, making up 85 per
cent of ethnic Chinese, are different from the Cantonese
although the cultural differences are not very distinguishable
to outsiders. Some have observed that among the younger
generation, the cultural divide between Filipinos and Chinese
may at times be narrower than that between Fujianese and
Cantonese.

Identity and Integration

Whatever the differences or diversities, the most important criteria
for gauging the Filipinoness of the Chinese would be their sense
of identity and the degree of their integration into Philippine
society. This can be viewed from the standpoints of socio-cultural,
economic, and political integration. These points have been dis-
cussed thoroughly in several of my past papers. My central thesis
is that integration has happened among the Chinese in the Philip-
pines, dramatically so among the younger local-born generation.
This is so among the Chinese Manilans but even more so among
the Chinese in the provinces. The evolution of the Chinese from
itinerant traders and seafarers to become sojourners or Huaqiao
and later immigrant permanent residents has been a long, difficult
historical process. The dramatic changes that have taken place
among the younger generation born in the country after the Pacific
War may have happened in a shorter period historically, but they
are no less significant. 36 When asked "What country do you call
your home?" in the 1995 Identity Survey, 97.3 per cent of the
510 respondents said that the Philippines was their home (see
Table 4).
There was no significant difference in the answers of those
from the provinces and those from Metro Manila, and when
broken down according to age distribution, the differences were
also slight.
When asked, however, on whether they forsee themselves as
staying on in the Philippines, only 69.6 per cent answered "yes"
(see Table 6). The reasons given (for staying) were mostly: this is
182 Teres1taAng See

TABLE 4
What Country Do You Call Home?

Country Freq. Percentage

Philippines 496 97.3
China 6 1.1
Others/No Answer 8 1.6
Total 510 100

TABLE 5
What Country Do You Call Home?
(By address and age)

Others/
Philippines China No Answer Total
Address
Metro Manila 96.8%6 1.7% 1.6% 100%
Provinces 97.3%0 0.0 2.7% 100%
No Address 100% 0.0 0.0 100%
Age
17-21 96.7% 1.9% 1.3% 100%
22-32 98.1% 0.0 1.9% 100%
33-45 98.2% 0.0 1.8% 100%
46-above 96.0% 0.0 4.0% 100%
No Age 100% 0.0 0.0 100%

the only country that I know; this is where my family, friends

and relatives are; and this is where I find good opportunities.
Those who answered that they do not forsee themselves staying
cited the peace and order situation and the worsening problems
in the country as their main reason for wanting to leave. Those
in the provinces (73.6 per cent) had a slight edge over those in
Metro Manila (66.2 per cent) in their desire to stay on. The older
people were more prone to taking the option of leaving compared
to the younger ones.
5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 183

TABLE 6
Do You Forsee Yourself Staying on in the Philippines?
(By address and age)

Yes No No Answer Total

Overall 69.6% 21.4% 9.0% 100%
Metro Manila 67.9% 22.0% 10.1% 100%
Provinces 75.3% 21.9% 2.7% 100%
No Address 73.3% 16.7% 10.0% 100%
Age
17-21 65.1% 24.3% 10.5% 100%
22-32 63.9% 25.9% 10.2% 100%
33-45 91.2% 7.0% 1.8% 100%
46-Above 88.0% 8.0% 4.0% 100%
No Age 87.5% 6.3% 6.3% 100%

The answers of those who consider the Philippines as home

and those who forsee themselves staying on are quite revealing
and disturbing. The penchant for going abroad either to work or
to immigrate is equally strong, whether one is a native Filipino or
a Tsinoy. Dr. Robert Tilman found the same answers in his survey
in the late sixties and a much publicized youth survey conducted
recently by the advertising agency McCann-Erickson also showed
the prevalent dream of leaving the country. This is an alarming
trend that Philippine policy-makers must address. 37
Other concrete examples of the many aspects of integration
that have taken place at the political, cultural, social and economic
levels include the following.

The Socio-cultural Level. The Filipinized ways of the younger

generation have always been their elders' bane. Much has been
done to improve Chinese language education and to give impetus
to cultural renewal and invigoration. The influence of the envi-
ronment, however, proves to be too strong. The fact that the
ethnic Chinese make up only a very small percentage, both rela-
tive to the total Philippine population and in absolute numbers,
is a deciding factor in the socio-cultural make-up of the younger
184 Teresi!a Ang See

generation who are more at home in the Westernized Filipino

rather than the purely Chinese cultural milieu. The ethnic barriers
that separated their parents from their Filipino peers are no longer
as visible.
Another indicator of socio-cultural integration is seen in the
fact that more and more young Chinese have native Filipinos as
their close personal friends. Likewise, more and more of them are
joining Filipino cause-oriented groups and other civic organizations
like the Jaycees, the Rotary Club, and the Lions Club, instead of
joining purely Chinese organizations concerned only with narrow
interests of the Chinese community. Professional organizations
nowadays are also teeming with active Chinese members and
officers. Among them are the Writers Association of the Philippines,
the University Student Councils, the Filipino businessmens groups,
professional associations like the Philippine Medical Society, Asso-
ciation of Architects, Certified Public Accountants, and the like.
In fact, many young Chinese-Filipinos have been so successfully
integrated into the Filipino social milieu that they are no longer
aware of the possibility of any strains in Filipino-Chinese relations.
Perhaps, because many of their close personal friends are Filipinos,
they would tend to dismiss or ignore the existence of a "Chinese-
problem."38
The historical reality that 90 per cent of the local Chinese are
already native-born citizens who have gone to Philippine schools,
joined Filipino organizations, and learned to speak Tagalog and
English as their first languages naturally has a tremendous effect
on the present ethnic identity. That the younger ethnic Chinese
have long lost their ability to speak Hokkien (the lingua franca of
the Chinese community) is a fact which many Chinese parents
lament about; but many Filipinos are not aware of it. How much
this language facility has deteriorated is substantiated by both the
1988 survey39 (see Table 7) and the 199 5 Identity Survey (see
Table 8). About 13 per cent can speak Hokkien or Mandarin, 44
per cent can speak Filipino, 10 per cent can speak a local dialect
and, 31 per cent can speak English. Adding those who can speak
English, Filipino and a local dialect together gives a total of 85
per cent. The younger the generation is, the weaker is the ability
to speak Hokkien. The same is true with the provincial Chinese
5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 185

TABLE 7
Language Ability, 1988

Percentage
Fluent in Filipino 85
Fluent in Hokkien 47
Speak Hokkien only at home lO
Speak a mixture of Filipino and Hokkien at home 77

whose ability to speak a local dialect (4 7. 9 per cent) is better than

their ability to speak Filipino (2 4. 7 per cent) but the ability to
speak Filipino is better than the ability to speak Hokkien (6.8 per
cent).
Many Filipinos still do not see this reality and other tremendous
changes that have happened to the ethnic Chinese community
since the war. Even the older generation Chinese sometimes deny
this reality and collectively lament the loss of identification with
China among the younger generation.

The Economic Level. The integration of economic interests is some-

thing inevitable because most of the businesses of the ethnic
Chinese are domestic. Unlike multinational companies which have
companies in other parts of the world, most of the companies of
the Chinese Filipinos are local or domestic companies whose
profits are ploughed back into the Philippine economy Regard-
less of their citizenship, the local busine·sses owned by the ethnic
Chinese can be considered only as Filipino businesses, integral
parts of the national economy, subject to and affected by local
laws, sustained by Philippine economic growth, or overwhelmed
by Philippine adversities and calamities. In short, whatever affect
Filipino businesses affect them and vice-versa.
Moreover, since 1975, when easy access to citizenship was
provided through a decree of former President Marcos, many young
Chinese have become Filipino citizens, and more and more of
them are moving out of traditional business and going into the
professions. Without citizenship, they could not practise any of
the professions so most of them flocked to business courses. Now,
 OJ
0'

TABLE 8
Language Spoken at Home, 1995

Filipino English Hokkien Mandarin Local Others No Answer Total

-~-

Overall 43.7% 30.8% 12.2% 0.8% 10.4% 0_2% 2.0% 100%

Metro Manila 47.7% 32.9% 13.8% 1.1% 3.7% 0.3% 0.5% 100%
Provinces 24.7% 13.7% 6.8% o_o 47.9% 0.0 6.8% 100%
No Address 41.7% 38.3% 8.3% 0.0 6.7% 0.0 5.0% 100%
Age
17-21 53.0% 29.6% 6.9% 0.7% 8.6% 0.3% 1.0% 100%
22-32 44.4% 32.4% 14.8% 1.9% 5.6% 0.0 0.9% 100%
33-45 10.5% 36.8% 22.8% 0.0 24.6% 0.0 5.3% 100%
46-Above 12.0% 16.0% 32.0% 0.0 28.0% 0.0 12.0% 100%
No Age 31.3% 43.8% 25.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 00 100%

;:j;'
~
20
),
::J
lCl
V;
ClJ
ClJ
5. The Ethn1c Chinese as Filipinos 187

young Chinese have become successful in new fields in the arts

and sciences - law, literature, journalism, art, music, mass
communication, and even Philippine studies, social work, and so
forth. These courses and/or careers have been chosen by people
who have wholeheartedly accepted their being Filipino and whose
lives will be lived in the Philippines. One will not take up social
work or mass communications, for instance, if one does not have
a sense of belonging to Philippine society.
In a paper on the "The Myths of Ethnic Chinese Economic
Miracle", presented at the 1994 Hong Kong International Confer-
ence on Chinese Overseas, researcher and banker Go Bon juan
cited the objective and subjective conditions that accounted for
the success of the ethnic Chinese in business. He explained that
conditions such as the location of these businesses in the Southeast
Asian countries at a time when the business climate was most
conducive for growth far outweighed the subjective conditions of
the culture and tradition of these Chinese. His observations un-
doubtedly support our argument that the full integration of Chinese
businesses into the Philippine economy redounds principally to
the country's domestic economy. 40

The Political Level. Since the citizenship decree of 1975 which

allowed the majority of the ethnic Chinese to gain the legal dis-
tinction of being Filipino citizens, the greatest barrier to political
integration has been lifted. Issues of national concern affect them
as greatly as they affect other Filipinos. In contrast, concerns in
China affect them only peripherally or indirectly. From the legal
standpoint, the majority (85-90 per cent) of the ethnic Chinese
in the country are already Filipino nationals and thus can be
considered Filipinos. Therefore, whatever contributions they have
made to the economy; politics, society or culture, legally speaking,
can be said to be their contributions or obligations as citizens of
the country.
In the 1995 Identity Survey, one of the questions asked was
whether they agreed that the ethnic Chinese should keep out of
politics; only a small 9 per cent said they agreed while 79 per cent
disagreed. In the same vein, the majority (74.1 per cent) agreed
that the ethnic Chinese had the right to pressure the government
188 Teres1taAng See

to attend to problems that confront the community while 10 per

cent said that they had no right to do so (see Table 9). The degree
of political integration can also be seen in the fact that many
Chinese now completely identify themselves as Filipinos. In recent
elections after the dictatorial regime of former President Marcos
was deposed, many of the local Chinese participated in the electoral
process not just as voters but as candidates themselves. The list
of ethnic Chinese candidates who ran in the national and local
elections was quite impressive. When Senator Ninoy Aquino was
murdered upon his arrival at the Manila International Airport,
young Chinese felt the tragedy as deeply as their Filipino brothers.
Many of them also joined the Filipinos in keeping vigil at EDSA
during the peaceful peoples power revolution of February 1986.
They staked their lives too for they keenly and sincerely felt that
it was also their birthright that they were fighting for. 41
In many issues that affect the national interest, it is heartening
to realize that many of these young Chinese would consider the
Philippine interest as their paramount concern, even if they conflict
with the Chinese communitys interests, with China's interests, or
with Taiwan's interests. This can be seen from several events where
there was a clear dividing line between the older generation China-
oriented or Chinese-community-centred Chinese and the younger
generation Philippine-oriented Chinese. For example, during the
elections which catapulted President Corazon Aquino into power,
many Chinese households were caught in conflict over who to
vote for. Most of the older Chinese would say that despite what
Marcos did, he had always been good to the Chinese, he had
suppressed many of the anti-Chinese tendencies of his officials
and had created opportunities and a more peaceful climate for the
Chinese to make money and earn profits. Moreover, the Chinese
were grateful for the citizenship decree promulgated by Marcos.
Not many realized that the decree was issued out of expediency
and in preparation for diplomatic relations with China. However,
the young would argue that Marcos was not good for the Philippines
and what is not good for the Philippines would never be good for
the Chinese also. They lamented over the shortsightedness and
narrow mindedness of their elders who considered only their selfish
interests. In many instances, the dilemma was resolved only with
 V1

::i
(l)
rn
3-
~
95
~
(l)
TABLE 9 &:
Political Participation ~5
R
A. The Chinese should keep out of politics B. The Chinese can pressure the government
Agree Disagree No Answer I Agree Disagree No Answer
Overall 9.0% 79.0% 12.0% Overall 74.1% 10.0% 15.9%
I
Age Age
17-21 9.2% 75.0% 15.8% 17-21 67.8% 9.2% 23.0%
22-32 10.2% 81.5% 8.3% 22-32 78.7% 13.0% 8.3%
32-45 10.5% 86.0% 3.5% 32-45 87.7% 10.5% 1.8%
46-Above 0.0% 92.0% 8.0% 46-Above 100% 0.0% 0.0%
No Age 6.3% 93.8% 0.0% No Age 75.0% 18.8% 12.3%

-
CXl
..0
190 Teres1ta Ang See

the households having a split vote - the older ones voting for
Marcos, and the young ones voting for Cory Aquino. 42
Another manifestation of the increasing detachment towards
events in China is shown in their knowledge about Filipino political
leaders, compared to Chinese leaders. The respondents were asked
to rank the leaders in order of how well they knew them. The
ranking from the most well known to the least known were: Dr.
Jose Rizal, former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mayor Alfredo
Lim (of the City of Manila), Senator Nikki Coseteng (an ethnic
Chinese Senator), Senator Edgardo Angara (Senate President), Mao
Zedong, Sun Yat Sen, Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, Jiang Ze Min. It is
not at all surprising that the last two received only about 0.5 per
cent recognition. The same was true of the problems in Philippine
society that the respondents were concerned with. Understandably,
peace and order was the topmost concern but next in rank were
problems of poverty, inefficiency and corruption in the government,
unequal distribution of wealth - much as any Filipino would
have answered the questions.

Religion and Objective Factors. Apart from socio-cultural, economic

and political integration, another factor that helped as a unifying
factor between Filipinos and Chinese is the absence of religious
animosity In other countries, differences in religion can be a factor
that retards integration but in the Philippines, the majority of the
ethnic Chinese are Catholics and Protestants although some observe
their faith only nominally In the 1995 survey 82.9 per cent
professed to be Catholics or Christians (see Table 10). For the
small sector (2 per cent) who practise Buddhism, Taoism or folk
Chinese religion, it is interesting to note that religious syncretism
is quite prevalent also. It is usual for the Chinese to practise
Christianity while at the same time also observe many of the
Chinese folk customs and rituals. Chinese Buddhist and Taoist
figures side by side with Catholic images of the Virgin Mary and
Jesus Christ are common sights in many Chinese households and
stores. Life rituals from birth to death are a mixture of Filipino
and Chinese ways. 43 In fact, the 1995 survey showed that only 40
per cent still practise ancestor worship (see Table 11) and the
younger the age, the less they practise such rituals.
5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 191

TABLE 10
Religion

Catholic Christian Buddhist Islam Atheist No Answer

Overall 70.0% 12.9% 2.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0
Age
17-21 71.3% 13.7% 1.0% 0.3% 0.3% 13.4%
22-32 65.9% 13.6% 1.1% 0.0 0.0 19.3%
33-45 75.9% 8.6% 3.4% 0.0 0.0 12.1%
46-Above 76.0% 4.0% 16.0% 0.0 0.0 4.0%
No Age 10.0% 30.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0%

TABLE 11
Do You Practice Ancestor Worship?

Yes No Occasionally Parents Only No Answer

Overall 40.0% 36.9% 0.2% 21.0% 2.0%
Age
17-21 34.9% 42.8% 0.0 20.4% 2.0%
22-32 41.7% 31.5% 0.0 24.1% 2.8%
33-45 54.4% 22.8% 1.8% 21.1% 0.0
46-Above 64.0% 32.0% 0.0 4.0% 0.0
No Age 37.5% 18.8% 0.0 37.5% 6.3%

By and large, however, the objective reality that the ethnic

Chinese live their lives in the Philippines, carry on their businesses
or practise their professions in the country, already provides the
condition for their integration with the mainstream society whether
they are conscious of it or not. For example, as mentioned earlier,
government policies, political developments, the business climate,
and economic issues of the country affect the ethnic Chinese
directly as they live and conduct their businesses there. Subjectively,
some of them (especially the older generation) may still consciously
refuse to identify themselves with the Philippines and the interests
of the Filipinos, but objectively, it increasingly appears to be a
matter of fiat and not by subjective choice owing to the conditions
192 Teres;ta Ang See

surrounding their presence in Philippine life. However, though

the objective conditions show the extent of integration and the
degree of identification as Filipinos, many may not be conscious
of the changes nor be aware of the semantical differences, as
shown in Table 12. When asked how they identified themselves,
the older respondents answered that they were Filipinos of Chinese
descent. They probably had exposure to literature on integration
and social changes (particularly the regular publications of Kaisa
like the fortnightly Tulay (Bridge) in English and Filipino, and the
weekly Chinese supplement in World News, Integration [~~]).
It appears that many, especially the young, student sectors are
sure of the significant differences between a Filipino of Chinese
descent and a Chinese who happen to be a Filipino citizen. Hence,
in the blank for Others, some answered, I am a Chinese Filipino,
a Tsinoy, and so forth, with an understandable lack of awareness
of semantical differences. But at least, only 1 per cent answered
"I am a Chinese."
Likewise, to test the extent of ties the respondents still had
with China, they were asked on whether they or their parents had
made contributions to China. For those who answered the question,
a high 93.7 per cent said that they had donated to the Philippines
and almost the same number said they had not made contributions
to China (see Table 13). However, the answers are not significant
because of the extremely high number (60 per cent) of respondents
who failed to answer the question for some reason. Some belong
to the younger group who may not know if their parents had
made contributions to China, while some of the older ones failed
to answer perhaps because of the fear that the question was
sensitive.
In an earlier article, I mentioned the fact that whenever a
visiting basketball team from China competes with a local team,
the young people in the audience would always cheer the Philippine
team while their parents would cheer for the visiting China team.
This is confirmed by the survey results where 75.9 per cent of the
respondents said that they would support the Philippine team
while 15.9 per cent said that they favoured the China team (see
Table 14). The younger groups and also the provincial respondents
would also favour the Philippine team.
 \.1"1
::]!
(1)

TABLE 12 S'
:J
n
How Do You Identify Yourself? 95
Oi
(1)
A. Overall B. Age
&I
Overall 17-2 22-32 33-45 46-Above No Age ~5
I am a Filipino of Chinese descent 1.2% 62.2% 51.9% 77.2% 80.0% 56.3% ~

I am a Chinese who happen

to be a Filipino citizen 30.2% 31.3% 36.1% 17.5% 16.0% 37.5%
Chinese of Filipino descent 0.2% 0.3% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Others: 5.7% 5.2% 9.2% 3.6% 4.0% 0.0
Any of two given choices (0.2%)
Both Filipino and Chinese (0.2%)
Chinese-Filipino (0.2%)
Chinese (l.O%)
Filipino-Chinese (l.O%)
Filipino (2.5%)
Tsinoy (0.6%)
NA 0.4% 0.0 0.9% 1.8% 0.0 0.0
No Answer 1.2% l.O% 1.9% 0.0 0.0 6.3%

. .0
-
w
194 Teresita Ang See

TABLE 13
Contributions to China

You donate Parents donate Parents donate

to China to China to RP
Yes 4.7% 17.5%
No 32.5% 18.2%
Never 0.0 0.0 2.7%
Occasionally 0.0 0.0 22.5%
Often 0.2% 0.0 11.6%
No Answer 62.5% 64.3% 63.1%

TABLE 14
Which Team Do You Want To Win?

RP Team Chinese Team Any None No Answer

Overall 75.9% 15.9% 0.2% 0.4% 7.6%
Age
17-21 81.9% 11.5% 0.3% 0.3% 5.9%
22-32 73.1% 20.4% 0.0 0.9% 5.6%
33-45 63.8% 20.7% 0.0 0.0 15.5%
46-Above 44.0% 32.0% 0.0 0.0 24.0%
No Age 68.8% 31.3% 0.0 0.0 0.0%

A Question of Acceptance
It should also be mentioned here that despite its success the
integration process has not always been smooth and there have
been resistance from the Chinese community. On the other hand,
there has also been resistance to fully accept the ethnic Chinese
on the part of the Filipinos.
At the turn of the century, the increasing repressions and
cruelties of the Spanish authorities and later on of the American
colonizers drove the local Chinese into a strong spirit of commu-
nalism. Chinese institutions such as schools, the press, and other
associations were set up as agencies of communal mobilization. 44
At the same time, the national political awakening of the Chinese
5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 195

in China elicited a strong response from the local Chinese, which

further intensified their Chineseness. The schools and press
especially became strong media for cultural renewal. However,
after the war, the standard of Chinese education slowly deteriorated.
Education is the foremost weapon the Chinese can think of to pull
the young Chinese back from the tide of integration and preserve
the Chinese cultural heritage. No matter what their political
orientations are, the local Chinese are united in their views that
the Chinese education of their school children must be safeguarded.
They harbour only one hope - that their descendants would
continue to retain their Chineseness and remember that they are
descended from the Yellow Emperor in China.
In the past decade, many of the Chinese leaders frantically
looked for ways to fund projects to improve the teaching of the
Chinese language. Seminars on Chinese language and culture have
been organized, and teachers have been sent to Taiwan and China
for skills improvement, but again, environmental forces are stronger
than the conscious will. Chinese language education has continued
and will continue to deteriorate despite these efforts because of
the objective reality that the Chinese are a small part of the total
Philippine population and integration will continue to happen
whether they accept it or not. Because of the failure of the Chinese
schools to strengthen the Chinese identity of the young Chinese
and the far-reaching effects of the mass naturalization decree on
the eve of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China,
the younger generation Chinese have moved further on in the
continuum of deculturation. 45
It must be pointed out that the process of becoming Filipino
is not a one-sided process. It has another equally important facet
- the Filipinos' or Philippine society's acceptance of ones being
a Filipino and belonging to mainstream Philippine society. Only
after this full acceptance and recognition is given to the ethnic
Chinese would they be able to fully contribute to the country and
participate fully in the concerns of Philippine society as Filipinos.
Three decades ago, to postulate "the ethnic Chinese as
Filipinos" may shock a number of people. In the past two decades,
however, dramatic changes have occurred in the composition,
orientation, and status of the ethnic Chinese. Are they now more
196 Teresita 11ng See

readily or easily accepted as Filipinos and as equal partners is a

question that must be seriously explored. As mentioned earlier,
my recent studies have shown that there still exist some under-
currents of racism and latent hostilities but these are borne mostly
out of some isolated, unfortunate, personal experiences. I would
theorize that unless these latent hostilities are exploited frequently
by unscrupulous persons for their own personal agenda, there
seems to be little danger now that the issue of racism would again
explode to the extent of what happened in earlier years, especially
in the nascent years of Philippine independence.
But, the initiative for an ethnic Chinese to be considered a
Filipino must come from the Chinese himself. There must be a
complete identification with the Philippines and affinity with the
concerns of the Filipino people. The initiative to educate the ethnic
Chinese, especially the older generation and the new immigrants,
about the Philippines and the Filipino way of life must come
from the ethnic Chinese themselves. In thoughts and in deeds,
they must be completely Filipino, fully attuned to Philippine life,
legally, emotionally, and mentally It is for this reason that an
organization devoted to the active promotion of integration, such
as the Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, exists and has made much progress
in being a bridge of understanding between Filipinos and Chinese.
Much effort has been exerted into making Filipinos aware of the
changes that have taken place in the ethnic Chinese community
and to encourage the latter to get involved and meaningfully
participate in the concerns of Philippine society Unless there is
a secret political agenda to deliberately ostracize the ethnic
Chinese, efforts to promote their full acceptance as Filipinos should
succeed.

Conclusion
From the beginning, when the Chinese sailed the southseas as
immigrant huaqiao, they have been going through a gradual process
of de-sinicization. Leaving their ancestral homes was an initiation
to this de-sinicization. The process became more and more
entrenched and far-reaching as the years went by because it was
a natural historical development. The result is that the ethnic
Chinese are becoming more and more un-Chinese. This natural
5 The Ethntc Chinese as Fi!tptnos 197

phenomenon cannot be prevented, and in fact, need not be

prevented.
As the Chinese Filipinos cross the ethnic lines and come to
identify themselves more as Filipinos, their cultural traditions
also gradually become part of the greater national tradition. The
result is mutual enrichment and enhancement of the positive
elements in each culture. This healthy interchange can promote
greater goodwill among people. just as in early days when Chinese
products were a prime commodity for exchange in the international
market, Chinese human elements have also become agents of
change that would bring greater enrichment and development to
the Filipino nation.
The new identity that has emerged is a direct by-product of
integration, a historical force that has occurred spontaneously and
naturally under objective conditions in Philippine society itself. It
is the Philippine soil, the Philippine social environment that has
given birth and nurtured the new generation of Chinese Filipinos
who comfortably accept their identity as Filipinos yet remain proud
of their Chinese heritage. They are not just Chinese who live in
the Philippines C$1t ~ if' A.) but have actually become Filipinos
of Chinese descent (if' it$ A.) who are a living part of the country,
with their roots sunk deeply into Filipino soil. The future is in
their hands and the future direction of the local Chinese community
will largely depend on them. 46
Finally, we have mentioned that all Southeast Asian countries
share some racial, historical and geographical affinity as well as
the unique presence of the ethnic Chinese in their midst. Can this
uniqueness be tapped to strengthen the development of Southeast
Asia as a region? More concretely, can the web of relations spawned
by the ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians be tapped to have a
greater influence economically, culturally and politically on the
region? Since Southeast Asia has the greatest concentration of
ethnic Chinese in the world, they can be tapped to play a historical
role of uniting the region and spur a more concerted effort to
develop the region.
Perhaps this can be the ultimate achievement of such a con-
ference as "The Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians". It is reasonable
to expect the ethnic Chinese, after learning to identify themselves
198 Teresital\ng See

with their individual Southeast Asian countries, to one day also

learn to identify themselves with the interests of Southeast Asia as
a region, rather than unite to form a mythical "invisible empire"
for the interests of China.

Notes
1. Chinese Business Networks in Southeast Asia, Research output of the East
Asia Analytical Unit (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Commonwealth of Australia, 1995).
2. Lewis M. Simmons and Michael Zielenziger, San jose Mercury News,
27-29 June 1994. The first part dated 27 June 1994 is titled "All in
the Family", and the blurb says: "Overseas Chinese have a lock on
much of Asias economy, how do they do it? Through a vast network
of family businesses run on trust and intuition." The second part on
28 June is titled "The Chinese Connection" and the blurb says: "Lured
by the promise of profits and pulled by ancestral ties, overseas Chinese
are pouring billions of dollars into China and driving its phenomenal
economic development." Most of the graphs and figures quoted in the
article were exaggerations that tended to overstate the ethnic Chinese
portion in the domestic economy of Southeast Asia.
3. Sterling Seagrave, Lords of the Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas
Chinese (London: Bantam Press, 1995), p. 1 and p. 5.
4. Renata Constantino, A Past Revisited (Quezon City: Renato Constantino,
1973), p. 151.
5. Miguel A. Bernad, S.J., "Philippine Culture and the Filipino Identity",
in The Filipino in the Seventies - An Ecumenical Perspective, edited by
Vitaliano R. Gorospe, S.J. and Richard L. Deats (Quezon City: New
Day Publishers, 1973), pp. 9-10.
6. Antonio Tan, The Chinese Mestizos and the Formation of the Filipino
Nationality (Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, Inc., 1989).
7. Chinben See, "Chinese Organizations and Ethnic Identity in the
Philippines", in The Chinese Immigrants - Selected Writings of Prof.
Chinben See, edited by Teresita Ang See (Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran,
Inc., 1994), pp. 164-77. See also, Theresa C. Carino, "State Ideology,
Policies and Ethnic Identity: The Case of the Chinese in the Philippines",
in The Ethnic Chinese - Changing Relations and Identities in Southeast
Asia, edited by Teresita Ang See and Go Bon juan (Manila: Kaisa Para
Sa Kaunlaran, Inc., 1994), pp. 149-55. See also various souvenir pro-
grammes of the organizations mentioned. Most would carry messages
from Taiwan leaders and in accounts of their formation, the organizations
would acknowledge the help of the then Republic of China (Taiwan)
Embassy
5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 199

8. Teresita Ang See, 'The Chinese in the Philippines: Changing Views and
Perceptions", in The Chinese in the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives,
edited by Teresita Ang See (Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, Inc.,
1990), pp. 94-106.
9. Ibid. See also Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Assets
or Liabilities", in ibid., pp. 107-19.
10. Teresita Ang See, "Citizenship Discussion in the Constitutional
Convention", in Philippine Chinese Profile: Essays and Studies, edited by
Charles McCarthy (Manila: Pagkakaisa Sa Pag-unlad, Inc., 1974), pp.
184-211.
11. Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Changing Views and
Perceptions", in The Chinese in the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives.
See also, Rosita Tan, "The Future of the Pinsinos is Here in the
Philippines", and Victor Go "Resolve our Own Destiny," in Crossroads
- Short Essays on the Chinese Filipinos, edited by Teresita Ang See and
Lily Chua (Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, Inc., 1988), pp. 127-31
and pp. 150-54.
12. Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Changing Views and
Perceptions".
13. Ibid.
14. PNP Col. Reynaldo Berroya and AFP General Dictador Alqueza were
accused of kidnapping jack Chou, son of a Taiwanese businessman on
11 May 1993 in Parafiaque, Metro Manila. The court convicted Col.
Berroya but acquitted Gen. Alqueza. See Tulay, 7 August 1995, p. 4.
15. Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Changing Views and
Perceptions". See also articles of Chinben See, Lily Chua, Rosita Tan
and Victor Go in the fourth section of "Direction", in Teresita Ang See
and Lily Chua, eds., Crossroads, pp. 127-68.
16. Robert Tilman, "Philippine-Chinese Youth, Today and Tomorrow," in
Charles McCarthy, ed., Philippine Chinese Profile, p. 48.
17. Antonio S. Tan, "Five Hundred Years of Anti-Chinese Prejudices" (Paper
presented at the Conference on "The Many Faces of Racism, Intolerance
and Prejudices", jointly sponsored by the UNESCO and the National
Historical Institute, April 1988).
18. Some of the Social Distance and Attitude Surveys include:
Allen L. Tan. "A Survey on Studies on Anti-Sinoism in the Philippines".
Asian Studies 4, No. 2 (1968): 198-207.
Rodolfo Bulatao. "A Test of the Belief Congruence Principle in Prejudice
against Chinese in the Philippines." Master's thesis, University of the
Philippines 1967.
- - - . "Ethnic Attitudes in Five Philippine Cities". A Report Submitted
to the Philippine Social Science Council Research Committee. Quezon
City: Social Science Research Laboratory, University of the Philippines,
1973.
200 Teresita 11ng See

Stanley D. Eitzen. "Two Minorities: The jews of Poland and the Chinese
in the Philippines." In Philippine Chinese Profile: Essays and Studies, pp.
107-28.
Margaret W Horsley "Sangleys: The Formation of Anti-Chinese Feelings
in the Philippines - A Cultural Study of Stereotypes of Prejudice."
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1950.
Chester Hunt, "Social Distance in the Philippines". Sociology and Social
Research 40 (1956): 253-60.
George Henry Weightman. "Anti-Sinocism in the Philippines." Asian
Studies 5, no. 1 (1967): 220-31.
- - - . "A Study of Prejudices in a Personalistic Society: An Analysis
of an Attitude Survey of College Students - University of the
Philippines." Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (1964): 87-101.
- - - . "The Philippine Chinese: Cultural History of a Marginal Trading
Community". Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1960.
19. George H. Weightman and joel V Berreman, "Filipino Stereotypes
of Racial and National Minorities", Pacific Sociological Review 1 (1958):
7-12.
20. Teresita Ang See, "Images of the Chinese in the Philippines", in Teresita
Ang See, ed., The Chinese in the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives,
pp. 18-44.
21. Survey conducted by the History class of Teresita Ang See, De La Salle
University, 1989.
22. john T. Omohundro, Chinese Merchant Family in Iloilo (Quezon City:
Ateneo de Manila University, 1974). See also, john T. Omohundro,
"Anti-Chinese Attitudes in the Philippines - Social Distance in Iloilo
City" (Results of field work conducted in Iloilo City in 1971-72 under
the auspices of the Institute of Philippine Culture and the National
Institute of Mental Health).
23. "Anti-Sino stages hunger strike", Today, 6 May 1995. In a radio interview,
jun Ducat, purportedly the head of Kalipi (Kadugong Liping Filipino or
Filipinos of same blood and race) said that the Philippines was for the
Filipinos and not the Chinese. He pointed out that Mayor Alfredo Lim
of Manila, Quezon City Representative Renato Yap, and the Cojuangcos
are Filipinos of Chinese ethnicity who should be stopped from regaining
their present situations. Mayor Lim called this interview "racism at its
worst" and accused his chief rival, Mayor Gemiliano Lopez of initiating
the racist campaign.
24. Rodolfo Bulatao, "Ethnic Attitudes".
25. At the end of 1994, the government authorities realized the shortfall
in the rice harvest but as elections were to be held in May 1995 the
administration did not dare to announce the rice shortage, which began
to be felt by summer 1995. In june and july, newspapers headlined
news on raids conducted on stores of Chinese rice traders and
5. The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 201

government authorities were quick to blame unscrupulous traders for

the rice crisis. The Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, together with another
non-governmental organization, Konsyensyang Pilipino, convened a
forum on the rice crisis by bringing the farmers, traders, millers and
consumers together. The summary of the consultations were published
in Tulay-Chinese Filipino Digest, on 21 August, 4 September and 18
September 1995.
26. "Putting a Country in Order", interview of Gen. jose Almonte by
Margaret Thomas, Straits Times (Singapore), and Business Times Weekend
Edition, 9-10 july 1994, p. EL3. See also, Budget Hearing, House of
Representatives, as reported by the Philppine News Agency, also published
in Manila Bulletin, and quoted by Max Soliven, in Philippine Star (19
September 1993), and Asiaweek (20 October 1993), p. 57.
27. Bernard C. Go., 'The Pinsinos: Facts and Fancies", in Philippine Chinese
Profile, p. 235. See also joaquin Sy, "Ang Larawan ng Tsino sa Panitikang
Pilipino" [The Image of the Chinese in Philippine Literature], Tulay
Literary journal II (February 1987): 64-87.
28. Gregorio F Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History, Vol. II (Manila:
Philippine Education Co., 1958): 63.
29. Teresita Ang See, "Images of the Chinese in the Philippines", p. 41.
30. Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Continuity and
Change", in Southeast Asian Chinese - The Socio-Cultural Dimension,
edited by Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Times Academic Press, I995),
pp. 28-41.
31. Teresita Ang See, "The Ethnic Chinese as Manilans" (Paper delivered at
the Conference on "The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos", sponsored by the
Philippine Association for Chinese Studies, the UP Asian Center and
World News, November 1995).
32. Charles ]. McCarthy, "The Chinese in the Philippines", in Philippine
Chinese Profile, p. l.
33. The survey covered a total of 700 respondents, which included some
non-ethnic Chinese (almost all native Filipinos). For the purposes of
this study, I subtracted the 190 non- Tsinoy respondents for accuracy
34. Teresita Ang See, "Ethnic Chinese as Manilans".
35. Teresita Ang See, "Integration and Identity: Social Changes in the Post
WWII Philippine-Chinese Community", pp. 1-17; and "Social Change:
Impact on Philippine-Chinese Literature," pp. 68-83, in Problems and
Perspectives.
36. Ibid. Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Continuity and
Change," in Southeast Asian Chinese, pp. 28-41. See also Chinben See,
"Cultural Adaptation and Integration of the Chinese Filipinos", in Chinese
Immigrants, pp. 155-63; and Wang Gungwu, 'The Study of Chinese
Identities in Southeast Asia," in Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian
202 Terestta Anq See

Chinese since World War II, edited by Jennifer Cushman and Wang
Gungwu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), pp. 1-21.
37. A survey on Filipino youth, conducted by the advertising agency,
McCann-Erickson, Philippines, January 1993.
38. Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Changing Views and
Perceptions."
39. Teresita Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Integration and
Identity."
40. Go Bon Juan, "The Myth of Ethnic Chinese Economic Miracle" (Paper
presented at the International Conference on "Comparative Perspectives:
The Chinese Overseas 1945 to 1994", sponsored by the International
Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas [ISSCO], University of Hong
Kong, 19-21 December 1994).
41. An account of the ethnic Chinese who participated in the EDSA people
power revolution is found in Marilies Von Brevern's book, The Turning
Point. The account is reprinted in Tulay journal (literary journal of
World News) 1, no. 1 Oune 1987): 74-81. Other materials on the
Chinese in the Philippine political process are presented in my article
on political participation (see note 42).
42. Teresita Ang See, "Political Participation, Integration and Identity of
the Chinese in the Philippines", in The Ethnic Chinese, pp. 139-48.
4 3. Teresita Ang See, "Religious Syncretism among the Chinese in the
Philippines," in Problems and Perspectives, pp. 54-67.
44. Antonio S.Tan, The Chinese in the Philippines 1898-1935: A Study of their
National Awakening (Quezon City: R.P Garcia Publishing Co., 1965).
45. Teresita Ang See, "Chinese-language Education in the Philippines -
Problems and Prospects" (Paper presented at the International
Conference on Chinese Schools in Southeast Asia, National Pingtung
Teachers College, Pingtung, Taiwan, 6-7 June 1994).
46. Teresita Ang See, "Integration and Identity".
 Comments by
Renato S. Velasco on
"The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos"
Presented by Teresita Ang See

I wish to express my gratitude to our gracious host, the Institute

of Southeast Asian Studies led by a Chinese-Singaporean, Professor
Chan Heng Chee, and to the organizers of this timely and
interesting seminar, led also by a Chinese-Singaporean, Professor
Leo Suryadinata.
I congratulate Ms Teresita Ang See for her well-documented
and engaging paper. Her background as a leading Chinese-Filipino
activist in the integration movement makes her piece more absorb-
ing - if not provocative - than other previous works on the
subject. Her comparative presentation of her 1988 and 1995 surveys
also provide useful insights and up-to-date data on Chinese-
Filipinos (Chifils or Tsinong Pinoy - "Tsinoys").

Points of Agreement
I agree with most of the arguments in Ms Ang See's paper, the
most important points of which include the following:
1. The increasing identity and consciousness of the Chifils as
Filipinos. This strong integration has been brought about by
a good combination of push and pull factors. The push factors
were the harsh or negative conditions that made them leave
China, such as poverty, unemployment and unrest. The clos-
ing of PRC doors in 1949, and its avowed policy of non-
interference in the Chifils' activities in the Philippines further
eroded the so-called "Chineseness". The pull factors in turn
were the positive conditions that helped them decide to settle
and stake their future in the Philippines. These included the
economic opportunities which allowed many of them to enjoy
a high and comfortable standard of living; the 1975 citizenship
decree which granted Filipino citizenship to most of them;
204 Renata S Velasco

cultural pluralism and civil liberties which allowed the Chifils

to practise old beliefs and customs and freely join the various
civil society groups.
2. The deepening Filipinoness of the younger or third-generation
Chifils. The ongoing deeper and multi-faceted integration of
Chifils cannot be stopped. This inevitability is explained by
the fact that they have experienced various forms of happiness,
disappointment, pride, embarrassment, pessimism, pain, glory
and hope as Filipinos rather than as Chinese. As revealed in
the paper, more than 75 per cent of the Chifils are Philippine-
born. They grew up and received their formal education in
the country They imbibed the Filipino language and culture
and joined various Filipino groups and organizations. Many
of them married Filipinos, and are starting their own families.
They are productively engaged in different professions and
other activities, including politics and civic action. Their
children are studying in non-Chinese Philippine schools. They
have more Filipino friends and associates than Chifils, and
their command of Hokkien or Mandarin is poor if not non-
existent.
3. There are few lingering remnants of the old stereotyped images
of Chifils - economic animals/economic power-wielder,
shrewd businessmen, culturally clannish, politically unreliable,
tax evaders, abusive employers, homogeneous, monolithic, con-
spiring bloc/network. These "perceptive myths" are, however,
not exclusive to the Chifils. Other ethno-linguistic groups also
suffer from these racist images: Indian-Filipinos as "foul-
smelling and abusive usurers"; Spanish-Filipinos as "arrogant,
lazy and cultural snobs", cultural minorities as "uncivilized,
backward and ignorant". Overseas Filipinos are subjected
themselves to these stereotyped linkages, such as the Japanese
belief that many Filipinas are prostitutes; while in Singapore,
Taiwan and Malaysia, they are domestic helpers and drivers.
4. The bases of these derogatory perceptive myths on Chifils are
weakening and disappearing, especially their being "economic
animals". To behave like "economic animals" in the era of
John F Kennedy or Mother Teresa may be derogatory, but in
the age of Bill Gates and the World Trade Organization, it has
The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos 205

become quite a virtue. In the past, the Japanese were dis-

missed as simple transistor makers and car salesmen; now
they are called management gurus and high-tech industry
leaders. Cultural clannishness is now being perceived as a
strength among the Chifils which is being seriously studied
and considered as an entry point to penetrating the wide and
lucrative ethnic Chinese business network. The days when
Hokkien or Mandarin were considered the languages of "eco-
nomic animals" or clowns are long over.
5. The periodic resuscitation of anti-Chifil images will continue
because of the ingenious efforts of demagogues, politicians
and "enterprising" writers. The easiest way to cover one's
mistake is to put the blame on others, and the Chifils are easy
targets. This simple strategy is useful in getting instant attention,
fame, and more importantly, money. But the coming years will
see the further erosion of this propaganda line.
6. The heterogeneity of Chifils amid the stereotyped images
(Chifils in and outside Manila; citizen Chifils and non-citizen
Chifils; Hokkien, or Mandarin or English-speaking Chifils;
pro-PRC and pro-Taiwan Chinese). This fact which is often
ignored or overlooked for some reason is also true of other
ethno-linguistic groups who are perceived to be homogenous,
such as the Muslims, Japanese, Europeans, and others.

Clarificatory Comments
Having said my points of agreement, I wish to raise some obser-
vations and comments. They are as follows:
l. There seems to be some over-reading of the so-called cases of
anti-Chifil racism. While saying "undercurrents of racism ...
are borne mostly out of isolated, unfortunate, personal expe-
riences", the bent of the discussion of these cases seems to
conjure an image of a consistent and organized anti-Chifils
campaign.
I am certain that the author is no alarmist. However, I
detect a tendency or a disposition to inflate the importance of
a few and isolated cases of anti-Chifil actions. The result is a
neat but limp integration of unrelated, widely ignored and
206 Renata S Velasco

ridiculed cases of racism in a dramatic but unconvincing grand

scheme of "new yellow peril" propaganda.
Note that Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim and Tarlac Repre-
sentative Jose Yap won their re-election bids with landslide
victories in the 1995 elections despite, or perhaps precisely
because of, these anti-Chifil campaigns. It is significant to
mention that Mayor Lim has been the mayor of the country's
capital since 1992. In the 1980s, the city was run by an ethnic
Indian, Ramon Bagatsing. Ms Ang See's major reference to the
so-called Filipinos' "prevalent anti-Chinese belief' is 38 years
old, long before the promulgation of the 1975 mass citizenship
decree and the subsequent multi-sided integration of Chifils
in Philippine society and culture which were documented by
her own 1988 and 1995 surveys.
Presidential Security Adviser General Jose Almonte often
attracts attention by issuing rhetorical and controversial state-
ments. This usually makes him a good copy for the media
but not for serious policy analysts. Not long ago when he was
a doctoral student at our Department, he insisted that his
dissertation proposal be "classified" and restricted to the dis-
sertation panel "on account of national security". When the
Department found that he was serious in his proposal, it also
took him seriously: it opposed his proposal until he exceeded
its maximum residence rule and he was dropped from the list
of graduate students.
Except for the few rather insignificant materials cited in
the paper, mainstream and authoritative readings on the subject
are at worst simply factual or descriptive, for example, "Chinese
Business Networks in Southeast Asia".
2. There is a unidimensional bent to explain the slow integration
of Chifils, especially before 1975. The seclusion policy during
the Spanish colonization was not limited to the Chinese but
also included other cultural minorities - the Muslims in
Mindanao and the Igorots in the Cordilleras. The "native"
Filipinos themselves were notably slapped with individual
residence certificates to facilitate the Spanish conquest by
confining the "natives" to their designated barangays. In many
ways, this colonial policy reinforced the barrio-based parochial
The Ethnic Ch1nese as Filipinos 207

views and concerns of the natives and unwittingly advanced

the interests of the Chinese. Why? Because it also positioned
the Chinese traders to gain a foothold and earn profits from
intra- and inter-island trade. This explains the fact that when
the Philippines was opened to world trade after the termination
of the Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade in the 1820s, it was the
Chinese traders who profited as brokers, agents and business
partners of British, American and other foreign merchant
houses. With their economic affluence, the social standing of
the Chinese inevitably improved. Many of the former cultural
snobs yet bankrupt members of the colonial and local elites
suddenly found the "unsophisticated" and "unChristian"
Chinese attractive business partners, friends, sponsors or better
still husbands of their daughters. In due time, the intermarriage
between the locals, mestizoes and the Chinese produced the
economically-powerful, educated but politically disenfranchised
middle class in the 1860s. This same class later championed
the Philippine reform and independence movement against
Spanish colonization and American invasion.
While admitting that the discriminatory colonial policy
of "scapegoatism" was instrumental in the Chifils' sense of
segregation, is it also not a fact that such policy has been
abetted in some ways by acts or, at the very least, remnants
of traditional exclusivism, if not cultural supremacism, of the
ethnic Chinese? Note that the seventeenth century Parian (now
Binondo) is still a Chinese enclave - long after the Spanish
colonizers left the country in 1898. Many applaud Ms Ang
See's "Citizens Action Against Crime" (CAAC) every time it
lambasts the government's incapability and inaction against
syndicates and criminals victimizing Chifils. But many more
will praise and support the CAAC if this "citizens" movement
is consistent in staging boisterous protest even in cases where
the victims are not Chifils.
3. The surveys cited in the paper have some flaws and inconsist-
encies. First, comparison between the 1988 and 1995 surveys
is limited. This is borne out by the fact that the respondents
of the two surveys are not the same - the 1988 survey
involved only students; while the 1995 survey involved
208 Renata S Velasco

students and others from different groups and places. The

paper should also explain further the geo-economic and sectoral
characteristics of the respondents; how representative these
respondents are to the entire population of Chifils, and the
tum-out or percentages of completed survey questionnaires.
4. I disagree with at least two historical interpretations or
misreadings in the paper. First, several reputable historical
readings, including those of Renata Constantino and Miguel
Bemad, which were cited in the paper, would clearly refute
the assertion that the "formation of Filipino nationality" is "a
twentieth century phenomenon". If this thesis is true, what
was the organizing and mobilizing framework for the
Filipinization of the Catholic Church's movement of the 1870s?
And for the propaganda movement that campaigned for re-
forms in the Philippines, the Philippine Revolution against
Spain in 1896, and the establishment of the First Philippine
Republic in 1898?
The more than 250 recorded revolutionary uprisings against
Spain, caused by "parochial regional concerns" and "personal
grievances", occurred earlier and served as the building blocks
of Filipino identity and consciousness. The paper did not
explain its definition of nationalism and its related but still
different concepts of national unity and unification. I have yet
to see, however, a nationalist movement which was started
and launched without any shade of regional concerns or
personal grievances. In the same vein, if an Okinawan feels
that he is first an Okinawan before being a japanese it does
not mean that he is less of a japanese compared to those from
Tokyo, and that national unification in japan has not been
completed? As a yardstick of national unity, is ethnic identity
always inferior to, or in conflict with national identity? The
varied experiences of multi-ethnic societies in Asia and Europe
offer answers and so I do not think there is a hard and fast
rule on this matter.
Secondly, the author could have corrected the mis-
impression/or stereotyped perceptions of other ethnic Chinese
if she was aware of the abovementioned facts about Philippine
history and nationhood. While I am quite touched· by her
Tl7e Ethmc C/71nese as F;/;p;nos 209

answer to the question raised at a Hong Kong conference, I

am, however, not intellectually convinced.
Unknown to many, including several Filipinos, the Filipinos
have a rather long tradition of nationalism which pre-dates
those of the Chinese and other Asians. The first successful
anti-colonial war for national independence was launched by
Filipinos in 1896 - fifteen years ahead of the Chinese
Revolution in 1911. This historical fact made the Filipinos the
first among Asians to defeat a Western colonial power in a war
of independence. In the same vein, Asia's first republic was
established by the Filipinos in 1898. In two years time, the
country will in fact celebrate its centennial anniversary of its
first republic. Like millions of Chinese brothers who died
fighting against Western invasion, thousands of Filipinos
perished in at least 250 revolts during the 300 years of Spanish
colonization. When the Americans invaded the country in
1899, the newly established Republic asserted its independence.
The war of resistance lasted for several years, resulting in the
death of one million Filipinos, or 20 per cent of the population
of Luzon. If China produced great patriots like Sun Yat-sen
and India, Gandhi and Nehru, the Philippines has its own
Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio and several others. This tradition
of nationalism and self-sacrifice persisted during the Japanese
Occupation, the martial law years, and up to the present.
With or without the Chifils -but better with them - Filipinos
love their country, for better or worse, then and now.
5. Finally, I wish to share a few random thoughts about the
main theme of this conference on "Ethnic Chinese as South-
east Asians". I believe the Chifils - as represented by their
prominent business leaders - are developing a strong sense
of ASEAN regional identity and consciousness. This ASEAN
psyche, as the expression of shared regional interests, vision
and destiny, is engendered by the increasing trade and business
linkages of Chifils with other ethnic Chinese, as well as with
the local inhabitants in other ASEAN-member countries. One
example is the case of the Philippines' Metro Pacific (Malaysian
Chinese Robert Kuok, Chifils Andrew Gotianum, Henry Sy,
George Ty and Lucio Tan) and Smart Communications
210 Renata S Velasco

(Orlando Yea, and others), which have business tie-ups with

Indonesia's huge Salim group of companies. The latter in tum
has extensive joint ventures with Beri jucker in Thailand; with
Batam Industrial Park and United Industrial Corporation in
Singapore; and with Kuantan Flour Mills in Malaysia.
Projecting its revolutionary impact, Keinichi Ohmae argues
that robust supranational trade, led and/or participated in by
the ethnic Chinese, has in fact sealed the "death" of the nation
state and the "birth" of region states. As the old notion of
political boundaries increasingly lose meaning, communities
will be demarcated by their cultural identities. The free flow
of goods and services, the facility of communication and
integration of production have in tum spawned homogeneity
in consumption patterns and a sharper sense of communal
identity. National identity under this post-statist paradigm has
become obsolete in favour of a regional or internationalist
mindset.
In the same manner that Western culture and practices
spread in the region under the imperatives of colonial trade,
the foundations of an emerging ASEAN cultural community
are firmed up by ongoing multi-faceted intra-ASEAN trade
and economic co-operation. Together with the Filipinos -
who led in the formation of an ASEAN Political Community
- the Chifils are now playing a major role in the develop-
ment of ASEANism that is strongly anchored on a vibrant and
prosperous ASEAN economic community.
 Chapter 6
From Overseas Chinese to
Chinese Singaporeans
Chiew Seen Kong

The Overseas Chinese: A Biographical Example

The concept of overseas Chinese evokes a view of people of Chinese
descent from the perspective of China, that is, these people are
overseas, away from the motherland China. This concept may be
true sometimes but may be false at other times. Some personal
anecdotal or biographical examples will illustrate this apparent
puzzle.
My parents were both born in Guangdong Province, China.
However, they were married in Singapore before the Japanese
Occupation. They may be described as, and they may perceive
themselves to be, overseas Chinese in Singapore then.
I was born in Singapore before the Japanese Occupation. I
visited my parents' home towns (Xiqiao and Foshan towns in
Guangdong Province) in 1986 for the first time. Before that I had
not the slightest idea what my parental hometowns or China were
212 Ch;ew Seen Kong

like, and hence I was unable to psychologically relate to or identify

with these hometowns. I did not view myself as an overseas
Chinese. But I did view myself culturally as a Chinese. Legally
and politically, I was born a British subject and a citizen of
Singapore and therefore was not an overseas Chinese.
My parents later became naturalized citizens of Singapore and
were hence British subjects during British colonial times. Legally
and politically, they had renounced their Chinese citizenship, and
were no more overseas Chinese (citizens). But psychologically, my
parents had dual identities: they viewed themselves as (a) Chinese
from China and Chinese by culture, and (b) as Singapore citizens
and were proud of their new political status, especially after 1949,
as my father was a member of the Kuomintang (KMT).
During the japanese Occupation, we did not identify ourselves
as japanese subjects: we hated and feared the japanese rulers.
When peace returned in 1945, we re-asserted our status as citizens
of Singapore. Then came political awakening: I was psychologically
moved by the nationalism and anti-colonialism movements after
the end of World War II.
I received my primary and secondary education in English. I
completed my Standard IX (equivalent to GCE "0"-level) educa-
tion at Raffles Institution in December 1954. At that time, Britain
sent two Members of Parliament (MPs) to Singapore to assess the
readiness of the local British subjects to self-rule. Consequently,
several political parties were formed and contested the 1959
elections. Some pressed for immediate political independence, while
others wanted self-government before full independence. At this
time, my Guangdong-born maid referred to Britain as my joe ga
("motherland" in Cantonese), and I felt offended by her assertion
of identity. I told her that my joe ga was Singapore: I was caught
by the strong winds of nationalism and anti-colonialism at that
time. I was a Chinese Singaporean, not an overseas Chinese.
A mere four years later in 1963, Singapore became part of the
Federation of Malaysia. But soon it was evicted from Malaysia and
became politically independent in 1965. Between 1963 and 1965
I did not view myself as a Malaysian: three years were not long
enough to nurture a new identity, and those three years were full
of racial tension. I still thought of myself as a Chinese Singaporean
6 From Overseas Ch1nese ro Ch1nese Singaporeans 213

during that tense period. The racial riots in Malaysia in 1969 left
an imprint on Singaporeans: during the few years after 1969,
intermarriage rates in Singapore declined significantly Bad "racial"
memories lingered on for a while. Under these unfavourable
conditions, Chinese Singaporeans could not change their identities
to Chinese Malaysians.
Thus, from teenage onwards, I had never identified myself as
an overseas Chinese. But during teenage (when I was in Raffles
Institution) I was proud to be a British subject, but anti-colonialism
in the 1950s made identification with a colonial power unbear-
able. Nationalism and the struggle for political independence or
statehood nurtured the formation of a Singaporean identity
This narrative suggests that macro-processes of change provide
the framework within which individuals view and identify them-
selves. Thus, some overseas Chinese of my parents' generation
might also have been drawn into the whirlpool of anti-colonialism
and nationalism just like their own local-born children, and be-
came psychologically transformed into Chinese Singaporeans. Some
of our first-generation political leaders no doubt underwent such
a transformation. This self-image, as Chinese Singaporeans, may
then become their master status, as it has become my master
identity These macro-processes of change include not only politi-
cal and ideological changes but social, demographic and other
momentous changes as well. The following sections of this study
will document and discuss them in relation to their impact on
people's identities.

Demographic Changes
Census data show that from 1921 to 1957, the proportion of the
Chinese population who were born in Singapore rose steadily
from 24 per cent to 68 per cent (see Table 1). Thus, when the
newly formed political parties in Singapore were struggling for
independence or self-government in 1959, about two-thirds of
the Chinese were local born and one-third were foreign born. By
1990, 85 per cent of the citizens and permanent residents of
Chinese descent were born here.
Table 2 shows that 38.7 per cent of the Chinese population
in colonial Singapore in 194 7 were born in China, Hong Kong
214 Chiew Seen Kong

TABLE 1
Singapore-born Chinese, Singapore, 1921-90
(In per cent)

Year 1921 1931 1947 1957 1970 1980 1990

Per cent 24 35 58 68 77 80 85*
* Citizens and Permanent Residents only.
SouRCE: Chiew Seen Kong, "Citizens and Foreign Labour in Singapore" in Crossing
Borders: Transmigration in Asia Pacific, edited by Ong ]in Hui, Chan Kwok
Bun and Chew Soon Beng (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 0000), Table 28.3,
p. 474.

and Taiwan (these will be referred to simply as China). Ten years

later in 1957, only 25.5 per cent were born in China. The rate
dropped further to 15.4 per cent in 1970, and then to 10.2 per
cent in 1980 and a mere 7.1 per cent in 1990.
These demographic facts suggest that fewer and fewer
Singaporean citizens of Chinese origin are likely to identify them-
selves as overseas Chinese.
Between 194 7 and 1990, the Chinese population increased
rapidly from 729,418 persons in 1947 to 2,102,795 citizens and
permanent residents of Chinese descent in 1990, that is, an increase
of 2.88 times (Table 2). Among the Chinese who were born in
Singapore, their numbers rose from 421,406 in 1947 to 1,783,185
in 1990 (or 4.23 times). The Chinese who were born in China
dropped from 282,537 in 1947 to 149,769 in 1990 (a decline of
0.53 times). They began to decrease in large numbers from 1957
onwards, that is, after mainland China turned communist (see
Table 3).
These demographic facts indicate again that the concept of
overseas Chinese is likely to have little relevance in the daily lives
of Singaporeans of Chinese descent.
Besides Chinese born in China, there were also other Chinese
who were born in Malaysia, Indonesia, and elsewhere. In the
nineteenth century, the Chinese came to Singapore from China
and some of them later proceeded to Malaysia and Indonesia.
Singapore then served as a labour distribution centre. Thus, the
Chinese moved about in the region in search of a better life. In
 ""'
i33
0
rt
TABLE 2 c:
rl)
2i
Country of Birth of the Chinese in Singapore, 194 7-90 9'5
:;;rl)
1947 1957 1970 1980 1990+
Q
Country of Birth Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 9'5
Oi
rn
Singapore 421,406 57.8 741,224 68.0 1,210,419 76.6 1,490,065 80.3 1,783,185 84.8
China/Hong Kong/ ::J
\.(l
""
Taiwan 282,537 38.7 278,371 25.5 243,273 15.4 188,627 10.2 149,769 7.1 u()
'"
...,
Malaysia 17,217* 2.4 60,181 5.5 110,643 7.0 159,985 8.6 150,774 7.2 ffi
Indonesia 7,569 1.0 7,365 0.7 11,238 0.7 13,713 c:;
0.7 13,228 0.6
Elsewhere 689 0.1 3,455 0.3 4,293 0.3 3,847 0.2 5,839 0.3
---
Total 729,418 100.0 1,090,596 100.0 1,579,866 100.0 1,856,237 100.0 2,102,795 100.0
*Included those born in Brunei.
• Citizens and Permanent Residents only
SoL.:RCE: Chiew, op. cit., Table 28.5, p. 4 76; and M.V Del Tufo, Malaya: A Report on the 194 7 Census of Population (London: The Crown
Agents, n.d.), Table 44, pp. 323-27. ·

N
U1
 TABLE 3 N
-
a-
Rate of Increase of Chinese by Country of Birth,
Singapore, 1957-90

1947 1957-47 195711947 1957 1970-57 1970/1957

Country of Birth Number Number Per cent Number Number Per cent
----------

Singapore 421,406 319,818 175.9 741,224 469,195 163.3

China/Hong Kong/Taiwan 282,537 -4,166 98.5 278,371 -35,098 87.4
Malaysia 17,217 42,964 349.5 60,181 50,462 183.9
Indonesia 7,569 -204 97.3 7,365 -3,873 152.6
Elsewhere 689 2,766 501.5 3,455 838 124.3
Total 729,418 361,178 149.5 1,090,596 489,270 144.9
------
1970 1980-70 198011970 1980 1990-80 199011980
Country of Birth Number Number Per cent Number Number Per cent
Singapore 1,210,419 279,646 123.1 1,490,065 293,120 119.7
China/Hong Kong/Taiwan 243,273 -54,646 77.5 188,627 -38,858 79.4
Malaysia 110,643 49,342 144.6 159,985 -9,211 94.2
Indonesia 11,238 2,475 122.0 13,713 -485 96.5 Q
Elsewhere 4,293 -446 89.6 3,847 1,992 151.8 i%
~
(lJ
Total l ,579,866 276,371 117.5 1,856,237 246,558 113.3 "'
C§
SocRcF: As for Table 2. 0
0
""
'~
6. From Overseas Ch1nese to Chmese Singaporeans 217

194 7 there were 17,217 Chinese in Singapore who were born in

Malaysia (and Brunei), comprising only 2.4 per cent of the
community Ten years later their numbers swelled to 60,181 (see
Table 2), increasing 3.49 times (see Table 3). They increased further
to 110,643 in 1970 and reached a peak of 159,985 in 1980, or
8.6 per cent of the Chinese in Singapore (see Table 2). They then
dropped slightly to 150,774 in 1990, constituting 7.2 per cent of
the Chinese in Singapore.
The Chinese who were born in Indonesia showed a similar
pattern of change as those born in Malaysia. In 194 7 there were
7,569 Chinese born in Indonesia but their number decreased
slightly to 7,365 in 1957. Their proportion dropped from l.O per
cent of all the Chinese in Singapore in 194 7 to a mere 0. 7 per
cent in 1957. Their numerical strength then increased to 11,238
in 1970 and to 13,713 in 1980, but then dropped slightly to
13,228 in 1990 or only 0.6 per cent of the Chinese in Singapore
in 1990.
These census data show that the Chinese who were born in
Malaysia and Indonesia constitute only a small percentage of the
Chinese in Singapore in the last four decades. They are not over-
seas Chinese but they may be viewed as other Southeast Asian
Chinese.

Race Riots and National Integration

The 1964 race riots on Prophet Mohammed's birthday and the
1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur showed graphically the destruc-
tive power of racial issues. The key issues of these race riots were
growing economic disparity between the ethnic groups, particu-
larly the income disparity between the Chinese and Malays, and
their cultural differences. In order to avoid another race riot, the
government took steps to minimize racial differences among the
Chinese, Malays, Indians and other ethnic minorities.
Several measures for nation-building proposed by the All-Party
Report in 1956 (a White Paper) were implemented by the govern-
ment. The main objective was to integrate the various ethnic groups
as much as possible. The ethnic groups had been segregated by
the British colonial administration to serve their goal of divide
and rule.
218 Chiew Seen Kong

School Integration
Thus, the ethnic schools were integrated into English-Chinese,
English-Malay and other combined schools so that Chinese pupils
from the Chinese school could study with and become friends of
Malay, Indian and Eurasian students in the English school, after
the two schools became one integrated English-Chinese school
(Chiew 1971 and 1983).
The old ethnic-oriented school textbooks were replaced by
Singapore-oriented textbooks in the four official languages of Malay,
English, Chinese and Tamil. In this way, students of Chinese,
Malay, Indian and Eurasian origins were socialized in the same
multicultural school culture. The school culture also emphasized
the nurturing of a national identity, racial tolerance, and mutual
cultural understanding in order to reduce cultural differences and
to build a supra-ethnic, national identity Slowly, a Singaporean
identity evolved.
In a national survey in 1969, I used 23 indicators to measure,
for the first time, national identity (Chiew 1971). The survey
findings showed that most citizens of Chinese descent considered
themselves as both Chinese and Singaporeans. When they were
asked to choose between them, most of them preferred to be
known as Singaporeans rather than Chinese. Other measures
showed that national identity among Singaporeans of Chinese
descent was high.
A slightly smaller proportion of the Chinese-educated Chinese
scored high in Singaporean identity compared to the English-
educated. Since bilingualism was made compulsory in schools
since 1966, the proportion of Chinese-educated Chinese in the
population slowly decreased as more and more Singaporeans of
Chinese descent became bilingual and multicultural. Hence, the
small differences in ethnic/national identity between the Chinese-
educated Chinese and the English-educated in the past will even-
tually pale into insignificance as the number of the former slowly
but steadily diminishes in the years to come.
Twenty years later in 1989, another national survey was
conducted. The survey data again showed that national identity
among Singaporeans of Chinese descent remained high, and even
higher than previous assessments (Chiew and Tan 1990).
6 From Overseas Chtnese to Chtnese Stngaporeans 219

Disaggregated Public Housing

The Housing Development Board (HDB) was established in 1960
to provide affordable housing quickly to low-income families. Today
about 86 per cent of the population live in HDB and other public
(for example, middle-income HUDC) flats. Because of the official
first-come, first-served policy of allocation of public housing, these
public housing estates have evolved into multi-ethnic residential
areas where Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians of more or
less the same income groups live in close physical proximity. Small-
scale studies of selected housing estates (for example, Koh Yang
Gek, 1993/94) showed again and again that residents of different
ethnic origins do express neighbourly behaviour, but such social
integration is rather superficial in nature. Deep friendships across
ethnic lines are yet to form. However, friendly relations are better
than ethnic suspicion and avoidance.
The 1969 and 1989 surveys mentioned earlier also showed
that a higher percentage of Chinese have non-Chinese neighbours,
and a higher percentage of Malays have non-Malay neighbours,
and the same is true of Indian residents.

Social Integration
The 1969 and 1989 surveys also showed that higher proportions
of Chinese have non-Chinese friends, and likewise higher
proportions of Malays have non-Malay friends, and more Indians
have non-Indian friends. They also socialize more across ethnic
lines in terms of the mutual celebration of birthdays, weddings
and festivals.

Chinese Singaporeans
The survey data also indicated evolutionary changes of identity,
from a strong ethnic identity to a relatively strong national identity
in Singapore. The first generation of Chinese immigrants initially
identified themselves as overseas Chinese and had strong senti-
mental attachments to their homeland in China. Their Singapore-
born children, who grew up in Singapore, had their education in
English schools or the current bilingual schools, and live in close
proximity with other ethnic groups, know no other country and
hence are unable to identify themselves with China, especially
220 Chiew Seen Kong

since 1949 when China became a poor, communist country.

Moreover, the Chinese communists denounced many Chinese
social institutions and customs as feudal and bad, and tried to
replace them with Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ones, which are alien
to the overseas Chinese and their Singapore-born children.
Thus, cut-off from their ancestral roots and given the various
integration processes described above, the Chinese slowly became
Chinese Singaporeans. A Singaporean life-style also evolved. This
common life-style evolved from the close contacts among the
Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians in schools, in their housing
estates, at their integrated places of work, in the armed forces as
National Servicemen, and at recreational centres, restaurants, food
courts, and so forth. This Singaporean life-style represents a fusion
of the cultures and the supra-ethnic demands of urban living in
a modem city.
At this point in time, there are still some noticeable cultural
differences among the ethnic groups. For instance, non-Chinese
do not practise the Chinese custom of ancestor worship and do
not have Chinese names. Likewise, Chinese Singaporeans do not
go to mosques or the Hindu temple to pray (although a few do).
But Malays, Indians and Eurasians do use chopsticks and enjoy
Chine~.e food while Chinese Singaporeans enjoy Malay, Indian
and European foods and use their hands or fork and spoon to eat.
Hence, the Chinese have not yet lost their Chineseness com-
pletely even though they have stopped practising some of their
customs and traditions (for example, the Seventh Moon festival).
They have become Chinese Singaporeans but have not yet evolved
into Singaporeans without their Chinese cultural attributes and
identity.

Ethnic Identity
Cultural Attributes
There are three different perspectives on ethnic identity. The first
pertains to a persons cultural attributes. One who habitually speaks
a Chinese dialect or Mandarin, reads books and newspapers in
Chinese, writes in Chinese, and practises various Chinese customs,
is culturally a Chinese. But some are more Chinese than others.
Some practise more Chinese customs and live their lives more by
6. From Overseas Chinese to Chinese Singaporeans 221

Chinese or Confucian values, beliefs and norms than others. Thus,

on some scale of Chineseness, Singaporeans of Chinese descent
may vary in terms of their degree of Chineseness or extent of their
possession and practise of Chinese cultural attributes. One who
habitually speaks Cantonese will continue to speak Cantonese,
and one who prefers to consume pork porridge or yam cake for
breakfast will continue to enjoy this type of Chinese breakfast.
This type of Chinese identity or Chineseness is stable and tends
to be the accepted ethnic status for the individual (Wilder 1982;
Smolicz 1981).

Self Image
It is conceivable that some individuals may view themselves as
Chinese even though they may not have many Chinese cultural
attributes. However, my parents who possessed more Chinese
attributes than I are more likely to view themselves as Chinese
than me as I consider my Singaporean identity as important as my
Chinese identity. Generally speaking, it is hypothesized that those
who score high on Chineseness are more likely to stress their
Chinese identity more than those who score low on Chinese
cultural attributes:
High

Chinese
Identity

Low
Low High
Chinese Attributes

In real life, there are, of course, some exceptions. Some who

have many Chinese attributes may view themselves more as
Singaporeans than Chinese, while others who have few Chinese
attributes prefer to view themselves as Chinese more than as
Singaporeans. Such ethnic identity is a psychological state and
process.
222 Ch1ew Seen Kong

Situational Ethnicity
Situational ethnicity refers to the ethnic identity one chooses to
project in a given context or situation (Clammer 1975 and 1979;
and Lian 1982). It is usually instrumental in nature, that is, one
chooses to call oneself a Chinese or Cantonese when doing so
enhances one's benefits, such as when one is trying to strike a deal
with a Hong Kong Cantonese or a Guangdong Cantonese. It is
assumed here that calling oneself a Cantonese when dealing with
another Cantonese would help foster a closer sentimental relation
with the other Cantonese.
Suppose that a Singaporean Chinese is ababa Cantonese who
is unable to speak proper Cantonese. Even if it is advantageous to
project himself as a Cantonese, he is unable to do so. Thus, when
pertinent cultural attributes are not available, the individual is not
free to project his ethnic (for example, Cantonese) identity, even
though he desires to do so. When a fourth generation Chinese in
Thailand has lost all traces of his Chinese attributes and has become
culturally a Thai, he is not able and is not free to project a Chinese
identity even though it is advantageous for him to do so. He may
want to assert that he is a Chinese but his Chinese counterparts
may not accept him as one since he cannot even speak Chinese.
His claim of Chinese ethnicity is not credible when he lacks Chinese
attributes to buttress his claim. Thus, there are constraints to
situational ethnicity
Sometimes the constraints are external. During the apartheid
days in the Union of South Africa, black Africans were not free to
pretend that they were whites and hence were entitled to dine in
that part of the restaurant which was reserved for whites only
Neither were they able to project a white identity in an attempt
to marry whites. Situational ethnicity has greatest freedom of
expression or choice of ethnic identity only in truly free societies.
The literature on situational ethnicity often exaggerates the freedom
of choice of ethnic identity or instability of ethnic identity and
likewise plays down the social constraints.

Out-group Perception
People label each other by various cultural and/or physical criteria.
One who manifests many Chinese cultural attributes is most likely
6. From Overseas Chinese to Chinese Singaporeans 223

to be perceived by non-Chinese to be a Chinese. However, if one

has the "looks" of a Chinese but has few or even no Chinese
cultural attributes except his Chinese name, non-Chinese may
still identify him as a Chinese. In Singapore, in daily interactions,
people often label a person at a distance as Indian by his physical
traits such as a dark skin, even though they have no contact with
him. Today, most people are still recognizable as Chinese, Malays,
Indians, Eurasians and Europeans by their physical and cultural
traits. For instance, no one will ever mistake me for an Indian,
Malay, Eurasian or European. However, perceived ethnicity may
or may not be correct according to people's cultural attributes,
and may or may not be consistent with people's ethnic self-images.
Despite the risk of wrong labelling, people often act on their
perception of others. If you think that a person is a Malay, you
will not treat him to a bowl of pork porridge. If a person is
viewed as a member of an out-group, you may object to your
daughter marrying him.
The risk of error in identification is higher if there is no
interpersonal interaction. Where there is personal contact with
out-group members, error in ethnic identification is lowered
dramatically as interaction allows the interacting individuals to
seek information to make accurate judgment of the ethnic identity
of out-group members. At the point of close contact, the processes
of situational ethnicity, under social constraints, come into play.

The China Factor

Chinese Singaporeans are generally aware of the momentous
changes taking place in China, especially its success in economic
development. Prompted by the government's encouragement to
expand their economic activities in the region and in East Asia
(including China), more and more Chinese Singaporeans are
investing and/or working in China. As 90 per cent of Chinese
Singaporeans originated from the Fujian and Guangdong provinces
and the island of Hainan and are able to speak these dialects, and
as these two coastal provinces and the island of Hainan have
special economic zones (which are some of the most developed
economic regions in China), Chinese Singaporeans tended to
invest or work in these areas first. Such external developments
224 Ch;ew Seen Kong

led to frequent projections of sub-ethnic identities as Hokkiens,

Cantonese, Teochews, Hainanese, Hakkas and so forth when
Chinese Singaporeans return to the hometowns of their parents or
grandparents to invest or work
Motivated by instrumental motifs, these Chinese Singaporeans
began to deepen their knowledge of the Chinese language, and
find out more about Chinese culture and history Thus, in terms
of Chinese cultural attributes, they become more Chinese.
In the last decade or so, Chinese Singaporeans have earned
themselves a better reputation than the Taiwanese and Hong
Kongers in terms of being more trustworthy business partners or
associates. The relationship between the Chinese Government and
the Singapore Government has been excellent. Consequently, these
two factors are likely to maintain the Singaporean identity of these
Chinese as this identity confers some advantages over the Taiwanese
and Hong Kongers. After all, Hong Kong will be returned to
China and will be governed by the mainland. Politically, Beijing
is the ultimate "boss" while Hong Kongers are their "provincial"
citizens; likewise, likely the Taiwanese. But Singapore is a friendly,
rich, sovereign state and Singaporeans are not the "little brothers"
of the mainland Chinese but are perceived as the smarter, more
knowledgeable "overseas Chinese" to the people on the mainland.
Hence, the "Singaporean" identity is likely to be maintained.
It must be stressed that those Chinese Singaporeans who invest
or work in China come from the small managerial or professional
"class", and not from the rest of the population such as bus drivers,
salesgirls, or typists. As Singapore's multinational corporations
(MNCs) grow in number and size, more and more of this small
top segment of Singapore society will venture overseas, including
to China. To these Singapore citizens, the world seems borderless
(but not borderless to the typists, hawkers or school teachers) as
they live here for a few months or years and then perhaps in
another country wherever their business takes them. Some of
them are likely to emigrate and put down roots where the reward
is high. There is some chance therefore that Singapore will lose
some of its already small number of talented Chinese Singaporeans
to China or Hong Kong (after 1997) if in the next decade or two
Chinas economy takes off and corporations (local or foreign) in
6 From Overseas Chinese to Chinese Singaporeans 225

China pay competitive salaries and other benefits. Thus, China's

projected economic growth into a giant or super economy in the
next two or three decades is likely to cause a brain drain from
Singapore. As more and more Chinese Singaporeans deepen their
knowledge of the Chinese language and culture, and as more and
more of them work in China, some may marry their Guangdong,
Fujian, Shanghai or Beijing colleagues and settle down in China.
This process implies a reversal in the flow of Singaporeans of
Chinese descent to China, from the nineteenth century Chinese
migration to Singapore. In the nineteenth century, the flow was
one of quantity but the future reversed flow is likely to be one of
quality

Conclusion
The first generation of Chinese immigrants from China may be
conceptualized as overseas Chinese. But this concept would be
inappropriate to describe the ethnic identity of their children or
grandchildren who were born and brought up in Singapore,
especially when their early years coincided with two major events:
nationalism and independence from British rule in Singapore and
the turning of China to communism in 1949, and thereafter. These
macro domestic and external changes provided the macro
framework within which the first generation of Chinese immigrants
and their local-born children developed their ethnic and national
identities. In a multi-ethnic society, the presence of non-Chinese
cultural groups and the process of out-group perception and
identification invariably lead to self-identification as Chinese in
the cultural and sometimes also physical sense. But macro processes
of change, such as educational transformation, residential
integration, social integration and so forth, slowly but surely reduce
the cultural distinctiveness and foster the evolution of a Singaporean
life-style or culture embraced in varying degrees by all. Nation-
building processes, planned and unplanned, slowly foster a national
identity But ethnic or cultural attributes and practices change
slowly and hence ethnic identity co-exists with national identity
at this point in time. A dual identity as Chinese Singaporeans thus
emerges. As China develops and becomes an economic power in
the near future these Chinese Singaporeans who invest or work in
226 Cfliew Seen Kong

China will find their Singaporean identity an asset which they

would like to preserve. However, economic opportunities in China
are likely to encourage Chinese Singaporeans to learn more about
Chinese culture and history and thus maintain, if not strengthen,
their Chinese cultural identity and to continue to project their
Chinese (and Singaporean) identity in China. China is expected to
become the biggest economy in the world by the second or third
decade of the twenty-first century As China approaches this target,
Singapore may lose some of its talented Chinese Singaporeans
to China when corporations (local and foreign) in China are able
to pay competitive salaries and other benefits to them. Chinas
development in the next few decades is thus likely to arrest the
evolution of Chinese Singaporeans into Singaporeans here,
especially among its professional and managerial class.

References
Chiew Seen Kong. "Singaporean National Identity". M.Soc.Sci. thesis,
University of Singapore, 1971.
- - - . "Ethnicity and National Integration: The Evolution of a Multi-
ethnic Society". In Singapore: Development Policies and Trends, edited by
Peter S.J Chen. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- - - . "Citizens and Foreign Labour in Singapore". In Crossing Borders:
Transmigration in Asia Pacific, edited by Ong ]in Hui, Chan Kwok Bun
and Chew Soon Beng. Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1995.
Chiew Seen Kong and Tan Ern Ser. "The Singaporean: Ethnicity, National
Identity and Citizenship". Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1990.
Clammer, john. "Overseas Chinese Assimilation and Resinification: A
Malaysian Case Study". Southeast Asian journal of Social Science 3,
no. 2 (1975).
- - - . The Ambiguity of Identity: Ethnicity Maintenance and Change Amongst
the Straits Chinese Community of Malaysia and Singapore. Occasional
Paper, No. 54. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979.
Koh Yang Gek. "Corridors to Harmony: Inter- and Intra-ethnic Interaction
in a HDB Housing Estate". Honours Academic Exercise, Dept. of
Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1993/94.
lian Kwen Fee. "Identity in Minority Group Relations". Ethnic and Racial
Studies 5 (1982): 42-52.
Smolicz, jerzy "Core Values and Cultural Identity". Ethnic and Racial Studies
4, no. 1 Qanuary 1981): 75-90.
6. From Overseas Chinese to Chinese Singaporeans 227

Tufo, M.V Del. Malaya. A Report on the 1947 Census of Population. London:
The Crown Agents, n.d.
Wilder, WD. "Psychosocial Dimensions of Ethnicity". Southeast Asian journal
of Social Science 10, no. 1 (1982): 103-15.
 Comments by
A. Manion
"From Overseas Chinese to Chinese Singaporeans"
Presented by Chiew Seen Kong

Dr Chiew Seen Kong has used the biographical approach, where

he refers to his own life experiences, to discuss the shift from
being migrants to becoming citizens of Singapore. This approach
has made the discussion of the process of becoming citizens
extremely interesting.
In the biographical approach, he has covered a number of
dimensions. Among these is the comparison across generations, of
how migrants become citizens. Then he discusses the socialization
of citizens, achieved through shared and localized education. The
third dimension is the historical conditions which help to shape
one's sense of ethnic identity and national loyalties.
First generation migrants from China had viewed Singapore
as a foreign land. They were overseas Chinese, whose sentiments
were close to their country of birth. Even though many were not
successful in accumulating enough money within a period of time
to return home, they were psychologically attracted to events that
took place in their homeland.
The second generation Chinese underwent different life
experiences. As they were born in Singapore, they were British
subjects, and thought differently according to their socializing
experiences. Those who went to English medium schools, like
the author, retained their cultural affinity of being Chinese but
otherwise felt Singapore was their home, while appreciating their
parents' affinity to China.
Those who, unlike the author, went to Chinese schools were
closer to Chinese culture, but probably saw their life chances
worsening as Malaya progressed towards independence. Probably
in asserting their rights they were viewed as extremist Chinese
who were not so loyal to the local government.
From Overseas Chtnese to Chtnese Stngaporeans 229

Both groups, however, lived in a plural society where a Chinese

way of life in the context of Singapore was shared only amongst
them, more than with any other ethnic group in Singapore. The
progression towards becoming more Malayan in the 1950s and
early 1960s would have made most of them feel that they had to
give up "something Chinese". This "something" would have meant
differently to different groups, be they be clans, dialect groups,
business associations, or even the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
The generation of ethnic Chinese in Singapore in the 1950s
and the 1960s would also have experienced larger community
processes of pulling together various groups of Chinese to form a
larger identity, like the establishment of Nanyang University. They
might also have felt the processes of creating a nation state from
the late 1950s to mid-1970s as a desinification attempt, to make
Singaporean Chinese give less emphasis to Chinese language and
culture.
This period can be described as one during which the
government was able to effectively break down not only the intra-
ethnic cleavages in Singapore but also inter-ethnic barriers to
communication and interaction.
Ethnic Chinese born in post-war Singapore would generally
have attended schools organized by the government of the day
and they would have been socialized into the ethos of that period.
The third aspect is the historical conditions that have shaped
the meaning of ethnicity for Chinese Singaporeans. World War II
and the japanese occupation of Singapore probably made all of
them more Chinese. A similar process could be said for Indians.
Similarly, the historical conditions up to the time Singapore joined
Malaysia, then being in Malaysia, and then suddenly thrust with
independence in 1965, when for the first time the ethnic Chinese
formed the majority in a state within Southeast Asia could have
brought euphoria to some and apprehension to many. It is re-
markable that this dominance of the Chinese in a country far
away from China has been managed rationally to create a better
Singapore for all.
Ethnicity is one of the many identities that people can have
in nation states. The history of political realities in Malaysia and
Singapore has emphasized the maintenance of ethnic identity
230 1\. Manr

together with national integration. Thus, while migrants have

become citizens, they have also merged from being Cantonese,
Hakka, and so on, to become the Chinese. This may not be similar
to other Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia and
Thailand, where the ethnic Chinese identity has not been publicly
encouraged. In Singapore, everyone has to have an ethnic label,
however much they may object to it. Singaporeans have been
given the generic labels of being either Malays, Chinese, Indians,
or others, with nothing in-between. Any anomalous identities
are ethnically labelled after ones paternal identities. Despite these
observations, for a variety of reasons, as discussed in Dr Chiew
Seen Kong's paper, large segments of the first generation migrants
and their descendants have retained their cultural identities. These
cultural identities themselves have undergone mutations that may
be different from present-day conditions in the natal areas of the
first generation migrants. To many visitors from India to Singapore
and Malaysia, for example, it is a surprise to realize that Thaipusam
and Theemithi are the dominant festivals of Hinduism, whereas in
India they are merely localized religious festivals.
Even though demographically, Singaporeans are enumerated
according to racial groups, the statistics hide the process of
integration and assimilation that has proceeded in Singapore. Dr
Chiew Seen Kong has taken this into account by shifting the
discussion from "racial categories" as implied by demography to
a discussion of ethnic identities. Both internal and external factors
have aided the process of ethnic Chinese Singaporean identity.
Besides the internal process already mentioned in the paper, the
author could have reviewed the attempts by Singapore's political
leadership since 1977 to have "Speak Mandarin" campaigns, to
emphasize "Confucianism", to force the use of hanyu pinyin names
for ethnic Chinese, to implement the Special Assistance Plan schools,
to make the top 10 per cent of ethnic Chinese students after their
Primary Six learn Mandarin at the first language level, and finally
to encourage a Chinese Cultural Month which had not been done
before. Is it not possible that in the post-1980s period, there is an
assertion of state-supported Chinese Singaporean identity vis-a-vis
other ethnic identities in Singapore? For instance, after 1987,
other ethnic identities in Singapore have become constitutionally
From Overseas Chtnese to Chtnese Stngaporeans 231

classified as "minority" ethnic identities to be accommodated by

the dominant ethnic Chinese Singaporean identity. Do these
developments mean that Singapore is now a predominantly ethnic
Chinese society located in Southeast Asia?
Can an argument be made that political elites in Singapore
since the 1980s embarked on a resinification process of the ethnic
Chinese in Singapore? This process can have implications for other
ethnic groups in Singapore. It could also be viewed as a reversal
of the process of desinification pursued from the 1950s to the
1970s with the eventual closure of Nanyang University, reorganiza-
tion of the Chinese newspapers, and the de-emphasis of Chinese
grassroots organizations such as clan associations.
The author raises the question whether "economic oppor-
tunities in China may arrest the expected process of evolution
from Chinese Singaporeans to simply Singaporeans". This raises
numerous questions for Singapore in Southeast Asia as well as for
Singaporeans to ponder whether economic benefits alone should
decide their social goals as a people located in Southeast Asia.
 Chapter 7
From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai:
Political Conditions and Identity Shifts
among the Chinese in Thailand*

Supang Chantavanich

"Siamese-Chinese" or jin-Sayam (in Thai), or Sian Hua (i{_ ~ in

Chinese) was the name that the overseas Chinese in Thailand
called themselves. It might be She ow Hut -seng, a Hokkien scholar
who was editor of the Siamese-Chinese Magazine (Hua Sian Sin Po
~i{_-;fJf.fli.), who introduced the term. King Wachirawut of Siam,
using a pen-name, criticized the term as one connoting a new
Thai breed whom one could not guess when they would consider
themselves as Thai and when as expatriate. The dubious name
thus represented a group of undesirable people who overtly showed
that they were watching the way the wind was blowing. According

* I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Suwadee Tanaprasitsatana and

Kullada Kesboonchoo who provided me with some useful documents; and
to Aaron Stern and Colleen Mitchell for thdr editorial comments.
7 From S1amese~Chinese10 Ch1nese~Tha1 233

to King Wachirawut, these Siamese-Chinese could become Thai

only when they proved their allegiance to Thailand, not China. 1
Why did King Wachirawut express so strongly and overtly his
feeling against the overseas Chinese, as he did in his two pamphlets,
The jews of the Orient (1914), and The Clogs on Our Wheels (1915)?
Why did he introduce the nationalist concept against the Chinese?
Why did Phibulsongkhram, the Thai Prime Minister in 1938,
revive the nationalist movement against the Chinese in Thailand?
How did such movements affect the self-identity of the Chinese?
What is the Chinese situation after World War II? Do they remain
overseas Chinese or have they assumed a Thai identity? This chapter
will try to address these questions.
The assimilation of the overseas Chinese in Thailand was a
long process which lasted for over a century. In this process, the
integration was sometimes smooth and successful but it was also
difficult and confrontational at other times. The Thai stances on
nationalism were significant political conditions which acceler-
ated the assimilation of the overseas Chinese. This chapter will
examine these political conditions, namely, Thai official national-
ism and its impact on the identity of the overseas Chinese. It will
also analyse the Chinese nationalist movement as a resisting force
against assimilation. Finally, it will describe the naturalization
phenomenon among the overseas Chinese and their gradual change
of identity
The first Thai nationalist movement lasted about twelve years
(1913-25). The second movement also lasted about twelve years
(1938-50), but there was a gap of thirteen years between the two
movements, which did not happen without a reason. The two
movements were the reaction of the Thai State to the Chinese
nationalist movement which spread among the overseas Chinese
in Thailand. The two nationalist ideologies interacted with each
other and finally had an impact on the Sino-Siamese identity

First Wave of Thai Nationalism in 1910

King Wachirawut did not introduce the Thai nationalist ideology
to the overseas Chinese without good reason. Earlier in 1908, the
Chinese in Bangkok had held a strike, refusing to sell consumer
goods or to work The cause of this strike was the Thai Government's
234 Supang Chantavanich

decision to increase the amount of tax per head on Chinese aliens

from 4.25 baht to 6 baht (which was the rate for Thais). In the
past, the Chinese in Thailand had paid a lower tax as they made
up the majority of the labour force. 2 When the decree on the tax
increase was announced, the Chinese who could not read nor
understand the Thai language very well reacted demonstratively.
They distributed a letter inviting compatriots to join the strike.
For three days, most Thai people in Bangkok could not find rice
or food for their daily consumption. They then realized that they
depended a lot on the Chinese merchants. To many Thais, the
strike also demonstrated that "the Chinese valued the small amount
of tax increase over allegiance, obedience and justice". 3 As a result
they did not consider the Sino-Siamese to be their friends any
longer.
The strike took place three months before the death of King
Chulalongkorn. When Wachirawut succeeded his father to the
throne, he did not forget the event. As a young king educated
in England - where imperialism was strong at the time -
Wachirawut was inspired by the ideology of a modern nation
state and nationalism. 4 The fall of the Ching dynasty in 1911 was
another factor. He had good reason to be afraid of the republican
Sino-Siamese whose ideology could be a threat to the Thai mon-
archy. A historian described Wachirawut's nationalism as follows:
Wachirawut. .. [modelled] himself on the self-naturalizing dynasts
of Europe. Although and because he was educated in late Victorian
England, he dramatized himself as his country's 'first nationalist'.
The target of this nationalism ... was the Chinese whom his father
had so recently and blithely imported. The style of his anti-Chinese
stance is suggested by the titles of two of his most famous
pamphlets: The Jews of the Orients (1914) and The Clogs on Our
Wheels (1915).
Here is fine example of the character of official nationalism,
an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups who are
threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging
nationally imagined community. (It goes without saying that
Wachirawut also began moving all the policy levers of official
nationalism: compulsory state-controlled primary education, state-
organized propaganda, official rewriting of history, militarism here
7 From S;amese-Chinese to Ch;nese-Thai 235

more visible show than the real thing - and endless affirmations
of the identity of dynasty and nationality).5
Thai official nationalism as introduced by King Wachirawut
considers the three pillars of the Thai state - the monarch, the
nation and religion - as the traditional symbols with which the
Thais can identify themselves. The King's nationalist ideology was
to maintain the position of the monarch as the pillar of loyalty,
to develop the concept of nation, which was new to most people,
and to enhance the role of traditional religion. The monarch was
put at the core of the nationalist concept, giving the analogy that
the state was like an organic body and the King was the brain.
The King represented the nation's dignity and therefore should
receive all honour appropriate to the nation. Government officials
should devote themselves to their duty and to the king. Unity
within the nation was a key condition of solidarity Buddhism was
used as a tool to keep people's morality and as a code of conduct.
King Wachirawut's nationalism had a clear logic behind it and
should not be labelled as "romantic", as Skinner, an expert on the
Chinese in Thailand, once called it. 6 A vigorous call for democracy
and a republican regime had been made in 1912 in the Thai
court. An aborted coup d'etat led by young government officials
occurred two years after Wachirawut's ascension to the throne.
After the coup, he established the Wild Tiger Corps (Sua Pa), a
paramilitary organization to serve as the King's new security force
and as means to disseminate the official ideology to government
officials. The aborted coup, the Chinese strike, the heated debate
between the King (under his pen-name in the newspaper) and
Sheow Hut-seng (the Chinese scholar), and the visit of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen in 1908 to campaign for the revolution in China all led to
the King's decision to introduce official nationalism.
Concrete measures were taken by the King not only in the
form of the two books attacking the Sino-Siamese. Historical data
also reveals that the King promulgated the following laws and
announcements:
1913 First Nationality Law, which indicated that local-born
Chinese were of Thai nationality
1913 Last Name Law
236 Supang Chantavan;ch

1914 Association Law, which controlled the activities of all

associations and clubs, especially the Chinese associations
in order to make them non-political.
1921 Primary School Act
1925 Announcement to close Sheow Hut-sengs printing house.
However, since most legal measures were not strictly enforced
at the time, the Sino-Siamese were not directly affected by this
nationalism. Most still kept their strong ties and participated in
the Chinese nationalism propagated by Dr Sun Yat -sen. The Chinese
nationalism played a significant role in preserving the Chinese
qualities of the Sino-Siamese.

Chinese Nationalism and the Tung Meng Hui Movement

Sun Yat-sen's visit and address to the Chinese community in
Chinatown in 1908 were the beginnings of Chinese nationalism
in Thailand. In that same year, after the visit, Sheow Hut-seng
formed the Tung Meng Hui movement, or the Chinese Revolution
Alliance, to support the democratic revolution in China. Although
there was a group of pro-Ching royalist Chinese in Thailand, they
were smaller in number and less rigorous in their ideology com-
pared to the Tung Meng Hui supporters. Another group of non-
aligned Chinese formed themselves into the Chinese Chamber
of Commerce (CCC) led by Koh Hui-chiya in 1910. The CCC
members pledged loyalty to King Wachirawut and expressed their
regret about the Chinese strike in 1908T (However, two decades
later, the CCC became engaged in the Chinese nationalist move-
ment.) Wachirawut himself was not happy with Sun Yat-sen's visit
and criticized the latter in his writings. 8
When China became a republic in 1911, the Tung Meng Hui
nationalists in Thailand became more confident. They formed
themselves into the Sino-Siamese Consolidation Club in 1914.
The club openly supported the Kuomintang. In response, King
Wachirawut promulgated the Association Law in 1914.
Another factor which strengthened the Chinese nationalist
movement in Thailand was the weakening of the language boundary
among the five dialect groups, that is, the Teochew, Hokkien,
Cantonese, Hakka, and Hainanese. In the late nineteenth century,
7 From Stamese-Chtnese w Chinese-Tt7at 237

the five groups had been very conscious about their sub-ethnic
status. Competitions and disputes were common among them and
each group had its own secret society to protect its members. The
founding of Tien Hua hospital in 1906 and the CCC in 1910 were
significant events because they illustrated the inclinations of the
groups. The Tien Hua hospital was founded by funds donated by
Chinese traders to offer medical treatment to Chinese people from
all dialect groups. A representative from each group would take
turns directing the hospital. Simultaneously, the CCC executive
committee consisted of representatives from all dialect groups. 9
With such solidarity, the Chinese from all the five groups partici-
pated in the Chinese nationalist movement in Thailand, although
their levels of participation differed.
There were two factions within the nationalist movement, the
pro-democracy and the pro-communist. However, the factions
which split according to the Kuomintang and the Communist
parties in China were not so evident during this period.
The business elite who formed the Sino-Siam Consolidation
Club (the group which engaged in political activities) exhibited a
new trend of national identity by changing their names - that is,
by adding a Thai last name to their existing names, according to
the Family Name Act 1913. Some examples were Sheow Hud-
seng Sibun-reung, Tiensieng Kannasut, Chua Penpakkul, Tan Hong-
hi Tantivejakul. On the other hand, business leaders who joined
the CCC (which was non-politically oriented initially) such as
Koh Hui-chiya and Tan Lib-buay still kept their Chinese names.
Suehiro hypothesized that the elite who used Thai last names were
people born in Thailand but with Chinese ancestors. They were
instilled with Thai nationalism and required to have a Thai last
name according to the Nationality Act and the Family Name Act. 9
Another interpretation is that this group of business elite (with
Sheow Hut-seng as leader) had experienced King Wachirawut's
nationalist measures and had learned how to demonstrate their
loyalty to Thailand, by adopting Thai family names. However, all
of them maintained their Chinese names for dealing with other
Chinese businessmen. This attempt to keep a dual identity among
the Chinese was consistently found when confronted by political
conditions later.
238 Supang Chantavamch

The Anti-japanese Movement: Second Wave of Chinese

Nationalism
The first period of Chinese nationalism in 1910 accelerated the
consolidation of the five dialect groups and revealed various fac-
tions based on political ideologies. The japan-China war intensi-
fied Chinese nationalism because of the appearance of a concrete,
external enemy. All factions united against the japanese. The
merging of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang (KMT) to
fight for China enabled the various factions to unite to form a new
nationalist movement.
The decade of the 1930s was the peak of the second wave of
Chinese nationalism and political upheaval. In 1925, the anti-
japanese movement had started with a strike led by Puy-yin School
children and Chinese workers. Later in 1928, after the attack at
Shandong Cape where more than 5,000 Chinese were killed by
the japanese, the Sino-Siamese boycotted japanese goods and
japanese trade. The boycott lasted many months. The Chinese
leaders used the secret societies to force and threaten Chinese
businessmen who traded with japanese traders. Murasima described
the anti-japanese strike as follows:
From June to September 1928, the boycott worked effectively. All
buying and selling of Japanese goods stopped totally.. The
boycotters used the secret societies to threaten traders ... Chinese
businessmen who traded with Japanese traders were forced to pay
a fine to the boycott gang ... Some were threatened for life ..
. . . On August 6, 1928, Ang Khu-eng, the son of Ang Sia-leng
Pharmacy owner was shot dead.. The Siamese government put
all the boycott gang to investigation.. Some of them were
deported ... In April1929, the anti-Japanese strike calmed down. 10
The anti-japanese movement was aggravated by the death of
Sun Yat-sen. After his death, the nationalists were divided again
into the pro-Chiang Kai-shek group and the pro-Wang Chao-ming
group. Tan Siew-meng, the son of Tan Lib-buay who founded the
CCC with his friends, was the leader of the Pro-Chiang clique
while Hia Kwang-Iam, another business leader, led the pro-Wang
clique. Tan Siew-meng was elected the Chairman of the CCC and
also appointed Trade Attache for the Chiang government in Thai-
land. The two leaders co-operated throughout in the anti-japanese
7 From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai 239

movement and raised funds for remittance to China. The amount

of remittances sent to China during August 193 7 to February
1938 reached 705,086 baht (US$28,203 )_11
While the Japan-China war continued in China, the boycott
of the Sino-Siamese continued in Thailand in 1937. Some Chinese
traders who refused to join the boycott because of the attractive
profits to be derived from such trading were targets of the move-
ment. The nationalists treated the traders harshly through the
secret societies. The secret societies would send a letter ordering
the traders to pay a fine for being disobedient. A group of seven
or eight gangs assassinated sixty-one traders. Hia Kwang-lam was
among them.
Hia Kwang-Iam's death in 1932 could be considered as the
apex and the point when the second wave of Chinese nationalism
began to decline. As an ardent nationalist, Hia had devoted his
energy, time and resources to supporting the movement. One
hypothesis is that his death was a revenge killing by a Chinese
family whose father was killed by the secret society. Some suspected
that Hia commanded the secret society. Another explanation was
that the Japanese ordered a Chinese to kill him since he was very
active in the anti-Japanese boycott. The important point is that he
was assassinated by a compatriot while he was active in the
movement. This incident had a great impact on the nationalist
movement. Many of his followers began asking themselves many
questions: Who are we? What are we doing? The defeat of the
Chinese army in 1938-39 might also have weakened the morale
of the nationalists in Thailand. Meanwhile, the number of Chinese
traders who decided to trade with the Japanese merchants
increased. They felt the boycott was a foolish way to save the
nation. 13 All these factors brought about the decline of Chinese
nationalism in Thailand. The Sino-Siamese began to realize that
Thailand might be the place to live their lives and this helped to
tone down their nationalist ideology. Nonetheless, they continued
to keep their dubious national identity.

Constitutional Monarchy and Phibulsongkhram's Nationalism

The second half of the Chinese nationalist picture can be seen
in the emergence of the second wave of Thai nationalism under
240 Supang Chantavan;c/7

Phibulsongkhram. In 1927, during the reign of King Prachadhipok

(successor to King Wachirawut), the Thai Government promulgated
the Immigration Act. Although King Prachadhipok did not promote
nationalism to the same degree as his father, the number of Chinese
immigrants during his reign increased so much that the govern-
ment felt compelled to enforce the Act. During 1927-28, an
estimated 154,600 immigrants arrived in Thailand. 14 At the dawn
of constitutional monarchy, Thailand had no immediate anti-
Chinese policy and the Chinese nationalist movement enjoyed
full liberty
When Phibulsongkhram became Prime Minister of Thailand
in 1938, the Chinese nationalist movement and the fear of
communism were the two factors that convinced him of the need
for stronger Thai nationalism. It is important to note that Phibul-
songkhram's nationalism differed from Wachirawut's. It was a
chauvinistic nationalism expressed in an aggressive, expansionistic
and militaristic manner. Phibulsongkhram's aim was to protect
social cohesion and public order. Certainly, the Chinese nationalist
movement was considered a threat to Thai social cohesion and
public order. However, Phibulsongkhram's nationalism was not
against the ethnic Chinese but against the allegiance which the
ethnic Chinese had for China. He and other leaders always
emphasized that they themselves had some Chinese blood and
therefore their protest was not against the Chinese per se but
because they were nationalistic towards China and not loyal to
Thailand. Such persons could bring communism to the country
Like Wachirawut, Phibulsongkhram's nationalism had a clear
rationale. There was a revival of Chinese nationalism. Chinese
newspapers, divided into factions, were very popular. Chinese
schools increased in number from 48 schools in 1925 to 2 71 in
1933. 15 They were also active in the nationalist movement: teachers
were activists and funds were raised among students to support
the Kuomintang army in China; and the Chinese national flag was
hoisted on various occasions. 16 Secret societies also expanded their
memberships, especially among the students and labourers. These
circumstances alerted Phibulsongkhram to the danger of Chinese
nationalism towards Thailand. He decided to close the Chinese
schools and newspapers in 1939, the same year that Hia was
7 From Stamese-Chtnese to C!Jtnese-That 241

killed. Phibulsongkhram also took over the remittance business

because it was the way that the nationalist Chinese supported the
KMT army In 1940, the Phibulsongkhram government deported
a group of Chinese activists who were members of secret societies.
On the other hand, the government opened the door to those
who expressed their loyalty to Thailand and agreed to be natural-
ized in 1939. During I939-40, there were 104 naturalizations.
Most of those naturalized were among the business elite who had
resided in Thailand for more than twenty years and were literate
in the Thai languageY
Phibulsongkhram also introduced economic nationalism in
addition to his political measures. He wanted to take back eco-
nomic power from the Chinese businessmen. Between 1938 and
1939 he used naturalized Chinese businessmen like Ma Liab-kun
(Ma Bulkul) and Ung Chak-meng (Amporn Bulpak) to run state-
owned companies, such as the Thai Rice Company, the Thai
Commercial Company, and the Thai Crop Trade Company 18 In
addition, a group of Thai merchants formed the Siamese Chamber
of Commerce (SCC) in 1933 to promote business by Thai traders.
The establishment of the SCC was in accordance with the 1932
constitutional policy to strengthen the Thais' role in the economy 19
Later, in 1941, Phibulsongkhram enacted a law to reserve certain
occupations for Thai people. In 1949, he implemented a major
cut in the quota for Chinese immigrants from 10,000 persons per
year to 200 persons per year. 20
Phibulsongkhram believed that the Chinese schools and Chinese
secret societies strongly linked the Sino-Siamese to China. He
therefore announced in a Cabinet meeting on 1 November 1939,
that: "Anything can be done; just to disappear Chinese schools
and the ang-yi." 21 Four restrictive measures were consequently
implemented: 1) the closure of Chinese schools; 2) the closure of
Chinese newspapers; 3) the closure of Chinese secret societies;
and 4) the seizure of control over Chinese remittances.
Regarding the schools, Phibulsongkhram reintroduced the
Primary School Act 1921 and the Private School Act 1919 to
control all Chinese schools which were considered as private
schools. Chinese language courses were reduced to 7 hours per
week and the language of instruction for other courses had to be
242 Supang Chantavamch

in Thai. Teachers had to have Thai educational qualifications. The

Chinese community protested strongly against these policies (which
started in 1933-36), but the protest was in vain. As a result,
Chinese schools, where more than 8,000 Chinese pupils were
studying, had to close voluntarily or were closed by the government
because they did not comply with the Private School Act.
These Chinese schools had earlier shifted from teaching in the
various dialects to Mandarin in 1930. The decision was the result
of discussions among the elite from different dialect groups who
agreed that Mandarin would be the most useful and consolidating
language for their children. 22 Unlike most Chinese schools in
Southeast Asia, which taught only a single dialect depending upon
the ethnicity of the dominant dialect group residing in that country,
Chinese schools in Thailand amalgamated the five dialect groups
by teaching Mandarin. The members of each dialect group thus
shifted their identity from Teochew, Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka
and Hainanese to a Chinese national identity. And when the
Chinese schools had to teach in Thai, the identity of the Chinese
in Thailand again shifted to that of the Chinese Thai. 23 In this way,
education played an important role in shifting the Chinese identity
towards Thailand.
Chinese newspapers in Thailand were also highly politicized.
The leading business elite normally owned a newspaper each, with
each promoting a particular Chinese nationalist political ideology.
Thus, most newspapers aroused nationalistic feelings and anti-
japanese sentiments. The Chinese businessmen who traded with
the japanese were forced to announce their apologies to the Chinese
community in those newspapers. 24 During 1937-38, daily sales of
Chinese newspapers reached 20,000 copies. Phibulsongkhram used
the Printing Act of 192 7 to close some of these newspapers. Later,
in 1939, he closed all the Chinese newspapers, alleging that they
were destroying state order and good relationship with other
countries. Only one newspaper (Tong Guan) continued to publish
by changing its theme from political to social news. In 1941, this
newspaper was taken over by the japanese 25 From that point
onwards, the Chinese community turned away from the Chinese
newspapers and they gradually began to lose their Chinese
identity.
1. From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai 243

Like Chinese secret societies elsewhere, the ang-yi in Thailand

were guilds, a type of informal occupational association. Most of
the members were workers in saw mills, rice mills or construc-
tion. Skinner indicated that in 1910, almost all Chinese railway
workers were members of secret societies. 26 These occupational
groupings were considered to be an overseas Chinese culture.
When these people left China; they had no family nor kin. They
therefore needed protection, especially in their work, and thus
turned to secret societies which were based on the idea that
brotherhood could offer protection to workers employed in the
same occupation. The leaders, who acted as heads of a big family,
could negotiate with employers and corrupt officials. 27 For example,
during the anti-Japanese period, the secret society sae-khang had
3,000 members. In 1938, Phibulsongkhram ordered police raids
into the opium dens where society members usually gathered. He
deported 3,156 Chinese, many of whom were members of the
ang-yi. His action convinced the Chinese in Thailand that they
should withdraw from those associations and stop their secret
activities. The ties with their homeland through membership of
the ang-yi were cut and resulted in a shift of their Chinese identity
away from their homeland.
During the anti-Japanese movement, Chinese remittances were
not familial or kinship affairs. They became a nationwide activity
because money was sent back to support the KMT to save the
country from the Japanese invasion. Many Chinese organizations
in Thailand campaigned for such contributions. Although the Thai
Government forbade cash donations, the Chinese continued to
accept donations in kind (especially rice). The Overseas Chinese
Bank and other Chinese banks were very active in facilitating the
money transfers. In 1939, in a police raid on those banks, it was
found out that an amount of US$2,400,000 was sent to China
during November 1938 -April 1939. The bank managers were
arrested and later deported. After this discovery, the Bank of
Thailand took control over remittances. This affected the transfer
of money to relatives in China, and the Chinese in Thailand had
to send remittances secretly. With the victory of the Communist
Party in China in 1949, most connections and remittances from
Thailand to China were totally cut off. Hence, the Chinese
244 Supang Chanravantch

identification with their homeland through remittances was stopped

step by step.

Chinese Nationalism and Chinese Identity

The communist victory over Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 had a
strong impact on the nationalist Chinese in Thailand. After this
event, some Chinese decided to naturalize. During 1942-44, a
group of 167 Chinese in Thailand were naturalized under the
Naturalization Act of 1912 and Phibulsongkhram's newly set
measures. Such measures were not easy to fulfill. The Committee
for the Consideration of the Chinese in Siam set the following
requirements for naturalization. 28
l. the person must be 20 years of age;
2. the person must work with the government or have performed
something good for the government;
3. the person must declare his properties, especially real estate;
4. the person cannot be a worker;
5. the persons spouse and children must also be naturalized;
6. the person should send his/her children to Thai schools; and
7. the person must be able to read and write Thai.
It was also stated that the applicant had to stop his allegiance
to China and have a strong intention to become Thai. All such
measures were publicized in the local Chinese newspapers.
Although the number of naturalized Chinese was small
compared to the total number of Chinese in Thailand at that
time, this naturalization was important because it was the first
time that the Thai Government permitted the Chinese to obtain
Thai nationality Moreover, Thailand did not usually grant Thai
nationality to nationals of a country with whom Thailand had no
diplomatic relations, which was the case with China at that time.
Such permission offered the chance for the Chinese in Thailand
to choose their identity Wang Gungwu observed that the Chinese
overseas in Southeast Asia were mostly loyal to their homeland.
However, this group of migrants had a complex set of identities.
There were two major types of identity: one was a politically-
focused identity while the other was a c'Jlturally-focused one. The
political identity covered the Chinese nationalist identity, the local
7. From Stamese-Chinese ro Chtnese-TI7at 245

national identity and the ethnic (racial) Chinese identity which

emphasized their legal and political rights in the receiving country
The cultural identity, which focused on the glorious history of
China, was the historical, and ethnic (cultural) identity which
emphasized the distinctiveness of Chinese culture. In reality, the
overseas Chinese possessed a multiple identity which changed
over time, as Wang Gungwu has observed:
... The Chinese sense of their own identity could be changed by
changing events. The new indigenous elite seemed to have
understood this and had good reason to expect the Chinese to
change again when circumstances further changed. Thus, for several
decades to 1950, Chinese historical identity seemed to have been
partially superseded by Chinese nationalist identity. But, even
when this nationalist identity was at its peak in the 1930s and
1940s, not all Chinese changed in favour of Chinese nationalism.
Some had sought to identify with local indigenous nationalist
movements .... the point to note is that consciously changing their
identity was an option which some younger Chinese were already
exploring. 29

With regard to the Chinese in Thailand, such observation fits

well with reality. Wachirawut's official nationalism and Phibul-
songkhram's nationalism were both causes and consequences of
the Chinese community's economic power, a power shown clearly
when the Chinese consolidated in the strike against the increase
in Thai taxes. Sun Yat-sen's visit to Thailand also magnified fears
of Chinese nationalism among the Thai authorities. Thus, Thai-
land's first nationalism was a consequence of Chinese nationalism.
This first period of nationalism might not have aroused many
feelings about a Chinese identity among the Chinese in Thailand.
But it signalled to the Sino-Siamese that a demonstration of total
allegiance to China would irritate the Thai elite. It also shifted the
Sino-Siamese's historical-cultural identity towards a more Chinese
nationalist oriented one.
The disruption of the Thai nationalist stance during the
reign of King Prachadipok allowed Chinese nationalism and the
Chinese nationalist identity to nurture their intensified ideologies.
All over Southeast Asia, the KMT movement spread rapidly among
the overseas Chinese. Simultaneously, the number of Chinese
246 Supang Chantavanich

immigrants to Siam reached its peak in 1927-28 when 154,600

people arrived. The Japan-China war aroused more emotional
contagion and the increasing number of immigrants made the
Chinese aware of their massive political force. Consequently, the
Sino-Siamese, with the invention of Japan as their common enemy,
consolidated and built among themselves an "imagined community"
where nationalism was the core ideology. This imagined community
was quite similar to Benedict Anderson's description, that is, an
imagined political community both inherently limited and sover-
eign. 30 Such a community is built upon the use of a common
language and the printing technology which give rise to a shared
ideology and nationalism. The overseas Chinese community in
Thailand was an imagined community in the sense that it was
built upon the transformation of the five dialects into the Mandarin
language and the popular printed newspapers that brought all
Sino-Siamese into a common sense of nationalism and a shared
ideology, that is, Chinese nationalism and KMT ideology: And in
1930, all Chinese schools in Thailand started to teach in Mandarin.
Mandarin was then used in business and politics. It was also the
means of arousing patriotic feeling among the overseas Chinese.
Concurrently, the nine Chinese newspapers printed in Thailand
were very active in discussing political issues and disseminating
them to the Chinese who were in the same imagined community,
although many of them did not reside in Sampheng or Chinatown
in Bangkok. Such an imagined community was larger then the
physical boundary, but it was inherently limited - that is, limited
to only the ethnic Chinese. However, the sovereignty of this com-
munity was dubious and its existence was always changing like
the Chinese identity:
There is inadequate information to discuss in more depth the
sovereignty of the imagined community of the Chinese in Thailand.
Nonetheless, the flag hoisting event, which will be discussed later,
may be related to this sovereignty: For the moment, what we can
conclude is that the imagined community of the Chinese in Thai-
land was constructed with the support of the common Mandarin
language and the printed Chinese newspapers. The nationalist
ideology of the community determined the Chinese identity of its
members.
7 From Stamese-Chtnese to Chtnese-That 247

Three characteristics of an imagined community are its

boundary, its sovereignty and its communal brotherhood. The
next section examines the characteristics of the Chinese community
in Thailand and the way they conditioned the Chinese identity
The Chinese conglomerates in Thailand were mostly located
in the Sampheng, Yaowarat, Rachawong, Plabplachai, and Bang
Rag areas of Bangkok. But as the Chinese had settled in every
part of the country, the Chinese community was not confined to
Chinatown. The boundary of the community was based on
"Chineseness" and the Chinese nationalist ideology It was a
collective behaviour of people who although they did not live in
the same physical space shared the same ideological and cultural
space. Those people believed to a certain extent that they had
sovereignty over their "ideological territory". An example of such
a belief was the flag hoisting phenomenon.
Leading Chinese organizations such as the CCC, the Sino-
Siamese Consolidation Club and the Chinese schools always asked
the Chinese people in Thailand to hoist the Chinese and the Thai
flags at various important occasions - for example, hoisting the
Chinese flag at half-mast to commemorate the death of Sun Yat-
sen (1925); decorating areas with the Thai flag on the King's
birthday (1928); hoisting the Chinese flag to celebrate the news
that the Chinese army had defeated the Japanese at Shanghai
(which was not true) (1932); and decorating schools with Chinese
flags on Chinese National Day (1934). More often, people hoisted
the Chinese flag. The Chinese in Thailand affirmed their Chinese-
ness and sovereignty of their community through the act of hoist-
ing the Chinese flag. Flag-raising emphasized the estrangement
between them and the indigenous people. On the Thai side, the
government considered such flag hoisting as an overt challenge to
state authority Thus, the imagined community of the Chinese
existed on the dichotomy of sovereignty and confirmation of
Chinese identity on one hand and the conflict with the Thai state
on the other land.
The ang-yi, or triads, were the most concrete form of brother-
hood ideology of the imagined community Although the relation-
ship in those secret associations had a vertical direction, with big
brother (Tua-hia) at the top of the hierarchy; the relationship at
248 Supang Chantavanich

the bottom was more horizontal, linking mostly labourers in the

same occupation together. This horizontal relationship resembled
the fraternity principle of an imagined community.
Thus, the overseas Chinese in Thailand constructed an
imagined community which, led by the nationalist ideology,
had a specific task, that is, to push its members to support the
KMT. This Chinese imagined community was the cause of
Phibulsongkhrams reintroduction of Thai nationalism in 1938.
The identity of the Chinese during the nationalist movement
was politically oriented. This identity bound all Chinese together
against the Japanese. Without the China-Japan war, Chinese
nationalist identity would not have been so intense and politicized.
The harsh regulations that Phibulsongkhram implemented had
affected the configuration of the identity of the Chinese. In his
study of the politics of the Sino-Siamese, Murasima 31 classified the
Sino Siamese into three categories. The first group of Chinese
were those who had absorbed a Thai identity. They cultivated a
Thai national identity through the process of naturalization and
co-operation with the Thai state in developing the Thai economy.
The second group, at the other extreme, rebelled to maintain their
Chinese national identity. Their reward was deportation. With
only 167 naturalized Chinese and 3,256 deportees, we can guess
the trend of the majority which constituted the third group. This
last group was more flexible. They acted according to four
conditions: 1) the Thai government's strict measures towards the
Chinese; 2) ties with the homeland in China; 3) the protection of
business interests; and 4) the changing political circumstances in
both Thailand and China. They down-played overt Chineseness.
And, as Wang Gungwu described, "consciously changing their
identity was an option which some younger Chinese were already
exploring." This is supported by Ruth McVey's remark: "[D]irect
pressures, acculturation to the model set by the ruling elite, and
the business need for close relationships with the state all make
for down-playing overt Chineseness, and the line between what
is Chinese and what is indigenous is becoming increasingly
uncertain. "32
The uncertain identity among the third group of overseas
Chinese was obvious. In their actions, they co-operated with the
7 From S1amese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai 249

Thai government as the first group did. They tried to prove their
allegiance to Thailand. For example, they donated money to buy
weapons for the Thai Army on Constitution Day: They also donated
money to support the rally in the Thai-French dispute over Indo-
china and to build hospitals and academic buildings. Nonetheless,
they continued secretly to support the KMT. When Japanese troops
landed in Thailand in 1941, these Chinese, mostly businessmen,
co-operated with the Thai Government and the Japanese army:
Yet, they assisted the anti-Japanese movement secretly: During
the period of watching which way the wind blew, the Chinese
developed a three-tiered kind of identity: 1) a secret Chinese
nationalist identity; 2) an overt Thai nationalist identity; and 3) a
Chinese ethnic and cultural identity:

The Post-War Identity Shift

Phibulsongkhram's decision to bring Thailand to join Japan in the
Axis in World War II was very significant to the Chinese in Thai-
land. The nationalist Chinese had demonstrated a strong reaction
against the Japanese in Thailand during the Japan-China war.
When Thailand joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere",
the Chinese had to camouflage their hostility against the Japanese
in order to adapt to the Thai political policy: In such conditions,
the third group of overseas Chinese down-played their supporting
role to the KMT. When the war came to an end with the victory
of the Alliance, the overseas Chinese had to admit that they could
not continue to keep the Chinese nationalist ideology:
The defeat of the Republican government by the Communist
Party in China in 1949 was the turning point of the Chinese
national identity in Thailand. Since Thailand decided not to have
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and even
considered the communist regime as a threat to the nation, the
Chinese in Thailand knew that they could not continue overtly to
keep their Chinese national identity and express their allegiance
to China. The radical societal changes at the beginning of the
communist regime in China also alerted the overseas Chinese that
their homeland was no more a safe place to return.
With the closure of Chinese schools in Thailand, Thai schools
provided the Chinese children with a new programme of socialization
250 Supang Chantavan1ch

and more Chinese youth were assimilated into Thai society; their
parents constituted another contributive factor. During the post-
war period, many Chinese youth had parents who were born in
China but there were some who were born in Thailand. It was
found that the Chinese youth whose parents were born in China
were less likely to assimilate than those whose parents were born
in Thailand. 33 The reason is that the first generation parents were
more Chinese-oriented and maintained the traditions of their
homeland. Their memory of China reinforced their Chinese iden-
tity. On the other hand, the local-born parents had less personal
attachments to China and less Chinese orientation in their family.
As a result, the latter group were more likely to be assimilated.
The languages spoken in the family confirm this. Children with
Chinese-born parents spoke more Chinese with their parents and
their siblings while children with local-born parents spoke more
Thai.
The results ·of assimilation for the Chinese in Thailand,
especially the younger generation, were the new opportunities
available to them in society in general. As Guskin describes:
... As a result of his new ethnic identity, attitudes and behavior,
the assimilated Chinese student can choose, as freely as his Thai
peers, the occupation and educational level he desires. For, if a
Chinese person talks like a Thai, behaves like a Thai, has a Thai
name, and identifies as a Thai, Thai society will quite readily
accept him and behave towards him as if he were a Thai. This is
even more true if the assimilated Chinese person was born in
Thailand. 34
Consequently, the Chinese, especially the youth, continued to
assimilate in larger numbers due to two major factors: family
orientation and the assimilation pressures from Thai politics and
Thai schooling. Simultaneously, the number of new Chinese
immigrants also declined substantially after the 1930s. The arrivals
which reached 154,600 in 1927-28, started to decline in 1931.
As shown in Table 1, Chinese immigration during 1931-35
decreased to 46,400 persons. Later, it declined to 38,200 and
21,300 during 1936-40 and 1941-45 respectively. Only after
World War II and before the victory of the Communist Party in
7 From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai 251

TABLE 1
Chinese Immigration, 1921-50
(in thousand persons)

Annual Average
Total
Period Arrivals Departure Net Addition
1921-25 95.0 61.0 34.0 169.9
1926-30 116.5 70.8 45.7 228.6
1931-35 46.4 40.2 6.3 31.4
1936-40 38.2 23.7 14.5 72.5
1941-45 21.3 20.9 0.4 2.2
1946-50 45.2 14.9 30.2 151.2
Total 665.8
SouRCE: Sompop, cited in Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and
Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 178.

1949 did the last batch of immigrants reach 45,200 persons. In

1952, the Thai Government announced that the Chinese quota
had been completely filled, 35 and no new immigrant could come.
The local Chinese community, therefore, stopped expanding in
size.

Naturalization and Citizenship

It was believed that the overseas Chinese in Thailand were primarily
more concerned with making a living and took a passive interest
in the formal political life of the country. The Thai Government
policy towards them was quite complex. Whereas in education
and economic activities there was a clear and steady policy, in the
case of citizenship and nationality, the government occasionally
changed its policy Thailand started its citizenship policy as a
liberal one, then changed to a more restrictive one, then became
more benevolent again. For the Chinese, the first nationality law
which became effective in 1913 ruled that all Chinese born on
Thai soil were Thai citizens. However, the Nationality Act in 1952
rescinded this and stated that only persons with at least one Thai
parent could be granted citizenship. Thus, the children born in
252 Supang ChantavanJch

Thailand of Chinese alien parents stayed as aliens. The Nationality

Act of 1956 again changed the policy and accepted any persons
born within the Kingdom as its citizens. 36
The Chinese aliens who wished to become Thai had to go
through the naturalization procedures, which again followed the
same government policy on nationality As a result, naturalization
was relatively liberal at the beginning, then restrictive, and later
more liberal again. The Thai Government did not always encourage
the naturalization of the Chinese, neither did some of the Chinese
want to become Thai citizens. The reason for the former was that
the government still considered the huge number of Chinese (if
they were naturalized but not assimilated) as a threat to national
security As for the Chinese, they preferred to keep their Chinese
nationality as they still identified themselves as Chinese. In addition,
becoming Thai would mean that they had to do military service
(for all male citizens). Therefore, only during the war years when
by acquiring Thai nationality they could escape the restrictions
imposed on aliens did some Chinese want to become citizens.
Statistics of Chinese applications for Thai citizenship and naturali-
zation in Table 2 illustrate the low number of applications. How-
ever, in 1943 the number of applicants increased drastically because
of wartime restrictions. After this, applications became low again,
but the number of persons granted citizenship by naturalization
were even lower. Only 4,652 Chinese persons were naturalized in
twenty-four years (1935-58). Later, the number of Chinese who
became Thai citizens increased because of two factors: the Nation-
ality Act of 1956 and the drop in the number of new immigrants.
The Nationality Act 1956 granted citizenship to Chinese children
who were born in Thailand, resulting in the second generation
Chinese becoming Thai automatically In addition, no new arrivals
could officially come to Thailand after 1949. As a result, the
number of Chinese aliens stopped increasing.
Table 3 shows that the number of Chinese aliens in Thailand
decreased during 1939-47. In 1929, official records showed
185,080 cases of aliens. In 1939 and 1947, the number dropped
to 78,788 and 47,480 persons which proved that almost all Chinese
had become Thai citizens. A population census later showed that
there were 409,508 Chinese aliens in Thailand in 1960 and 311,093
7 From S1amese-Ch1nese to Chmese-TI1ar 253

TABLE 2
Chinese Applications for Thai Citizenship and Naturalization

Year Number of Applications Number of Persons

for Citizenship Naturalized
1935 22 22
1936 33 33
1937 83 80
1938 109 109
1939 192 170
1940 131 124
1941 646 589
1942 134 100
1943 6,086 2,761
1944 789 175
1945 47 ll
1946 6 4
1947 13 10
1948 43 11*
1949 104 *
1950 118 3*
1951 97 1
1952 20 l3
1953 54 38
1954 47 30
1955 92 61
1956 118 96
1957 196 163
1958 104 48
Total 9,302 4,652
*No naturalization was permitted between November 1948 and Apri\1950.
SouRcE: R. Coughlin, Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Thailand (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 1960), p. 176.

in 1970. Most of the new arrivals after 1975 were businessmen

who stayed in the country as aliens. It should be noted that a new
influx of illegal immigrants from Southern China came to Thailand
for employment in the 1990s.
254 Supang Chantavanich

TABLE 3
Number of Chinese Aliens in Thailand

Year Number
1929 185,080
1939 78,788
1947 47,480
1960 409,508
1970 311,093
SouRCE: Data from 1929-47 came from Coughlin, op. cit., p. 24.
Data from 1960-70 came from Thailand national
population census and housing of 1960 and 1970.

Contemporary Ethnic Chinese in Thailand

Finally, most of the Siamese-Chinese of the mid-twentieth century
have all become Thai citizens, and the appropriate term for them
should be 'Thais of Chinese descent" or "Chinese-Thais or Sino-
Thais". These ethnic Chinese live comfortably in Thai society
because they can keep their ethnic Chinese identity while at the
same time use their national identity as Thai. This dual identity
is accepted as long as the Chinese prove their allegiance to Thailand
and express their nationalist ideology by supporting the three
traditional and everlasting symbols of Thai nationalism: nation,
religion and king. It is possible to be a Thai and an ethnic Chinese
at the same time as the Thais define national identity in political,
cultural and ideological terms, while ethnicity, in terms of descent
and traditional practices, does not come into conflict with Thai
national identity. Unlike conditions in some Southeast Asian
countries, the ethnic Chinese in Thailand are free to observe their
ancestral and traditional customs even in public. But they also
absorb the Thai culture in their everyday life.
The ethnic Chinese businessmen have constituted the majority
of the entrepreneurial class in Thai society. Beginning with their
trading activities in the South China Sea among the Chinese con-
glomerates, these ethnic Chinese expanded their business to cover
trade in rice, pepper, sugar and forest products. Later, they were
involved in banking and finance, manufacturing, agro-business
7 From S;amese-Ch;nese to Ch;nese-That 255

and real estate. There were at least sixty-five family groups holding
assets worth US$ 6 billion in Thailand in the decade of the 1970s. 37
Most of these families were ethnic Chinese family corporations.
They accumulated their capital through business among the local
dialect group or ethnic Chinese network, the corporate culture of
kongsi in the family, intermarriage among business families, and
other political factors. 38 Finally, they consolidated themselves into
business associations whose roles in Thai politics emerged gradually
Many political leaders today are descendants of Chinese parents
or grandparents, for example, Chamlong Sri Muang (former leader
of the Palang Dharma Party), Chuan Leekpai (leader of the
Democrat Party and former Prime Minister) and Banharn Silpa-
Archa (Prime Minister in 1996). But all of them strongly identify
themselves as Thai, not as Chinese. They do not deny having
Chinese ancestors (as many Thais do) or a Chinese name. However,
it is evident that they do not consider themselves as ethnic Chinese.
Among those ethnic Chinese who are active in politics and those
active in business, the latter group can more easily admit that they
are ethnic Chinese. The election laws of 1951 and 1956 denied
voting and candidacy rights to citizens with alien parents who
had not attended a Thai secondary school. 39 Consequently, the
Chinese factor can still be sensitive for Thai politicians of Chinese
descent.

Conclusion
The origin, spread and impact of the Thai and Chinese nationalist
movements in Thailand during 1908-41 have been discussed above.
The two nationalist movements resulted in the configuration of
the Siamese-Chinese identity At the beginning, Chinese nationalist
identity was dominant owing to the growth of KMT nationalism
and the anti-Japanese movement. However, the Sino-Siamese were
aware of the Thai government's concern with regard to such an
identity They consequently adapted by down-playing their Chinese-
ness and switching to a more cultural and ethnically-oriented
identity This changing identity is complex in nature, consisting of
political, racial, ethnic and cultural aspects. 40 The composition
depended on the pressures from the Thai side and their efforts to
keep a balance from their own side. What finally emerged was an
256 Supang Chantavanich

overt Thai nationalist identity with a secret Chinese national identity.

However, after 1949 political circumstances in China and Thai
foreign policy forced them to mitigate their Chinese nationalist
identity and to demonstrate only their Chinese cultural identity
and Thai nationalist identity in order to survive.
The post-war period saw the Chinese in Thailand more
assimilated because of Thai schooling and generational factors.
The communist regime in China also accelerated the identity shift
of the Chinese towards Thailand since they were not certain about
the future of their homeland. When Thai society became more
open and receptive after the Nationality Act of 1956 which accepted
any person born within the Kingdom as a citizen, more Chinese
became Thais. The contemporary Chinese in Thailand can thus
be called Chinese Thais because they keep their Thai national
identity and only identify themselves as Chinese in terms of descent.
The ethnic Thai and ethnic Chinese are now so mixed that Nai
Busya, a well-known Thai poet in the reign of Wachirawut,
described in his "Niras Sampheng" (A Visit to the Chinatown) the
mix of the Thai and Chinese as follows:
Small road is crowded by jek [Chinese] and Thai,
Unavoidably mingling, clashing with one another.
jek mix with Thai beyond recognition,
Who is who?
One can't help but wonder.
Modem times deviantly mess up the place.
Jin [Chinese] cut off their pigtails and become Thai undetectably.
What an unconventional abnormality,
People surprisingly reverse their ethnicity. 41

There is not enough data to examine the shifts of identity

among the overseas Chinese in Thailand with different socio-
economic backgrounds. Nonetheless, there seems to have been a
tendency for the non-Teochew dialect groups to adapt themselves
more easily compared with the Teochews. Most of the naturalized
Chinese were not Teochews when naturalization began. At the
same time, those who rebelled against the Thai government and
were deported were also not Teochew. Some of them were
Hainanese workers. Another observation is that ethnic identity by
7 From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai 257

speech groups was not so significant among the second generation

of Chinese immigrants, because they attended schools where the
language of instruction was Mandarin, not dialect. This identity
shift had an impact on the running of businesses since it enlarged
the dialect group hub of trade to the Chinese race hub. It affirmed
the Chinese identity but not the speech group identity of the
second generation Chinese in Thailand.

Notes
1. The description is summarized from the article "Mixed Thai! Undesir-
able People", in Ten Opinions of Asawaphahu (2458, pp. 81-87), cited
in Sirirat Phoomkerd, "Asawaphahu and His Use of Literary Work to
Disseminate Political Ideology" (M.A. thesis in History, Faculty of Arts,
Chulalongkorn University, 2538), pp. 97-98.
2. W Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History, Thai
translation (Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 164.
3. Ibid., p. 163-65.
4. For more details on King Wachirawut's nationalism, see Walter F Vella,
Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism
(Honolulu: East West Center, 1995), p. xiv, 6, 67-68. See also Kullada
Kesboonchoo, "Official Nationalism Under King Vajiravudh" (Paper
presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies, Canberra,
3-6 July 1987).
5. B. Anderson, Imagined Community: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism (London: Verso Editions, 1983), pp. 94-95.
6. Skinner, op. cit., p. 158.
7. Ibid., p. 172.
8. King Wachirawut expressed his disagreement with Sun Yat-sens concept
in his articles, "The New Huangti" and "The Future of China", in Nine
Opinions of Asawaphahu, during 1915-16, as follows: "Dr. Sun Yat-sen
finally accepted that. . . his dream for democracy was unachievable.
After the suppression of the Ching, he continued to dream ... ". King
Wachirawut also showed his displeasure with Sun Yat-sen's visit to
Thailand. He said, "I am not a Chinese subject, therefore, I should not
have to suffer from hearing the Chinese disputing with each other in
my own house. In addition, if they decide to get into quarrels; for
what reason should they raise funds from Chinese in Thailand to
support them?", cited in Sirirat Phoomkerd, op. cit., pp. 103-5.
9. A. Suehiro, "An Analysis of the Registered Limited Companies in the
Pre-War Period 1901-33", Kikan Keizei Kenkyu (Osaka City University,
14 June, 1991), pp. 27-71.
258 Supang Chantavamch

10. E. Murasima (author and translator), Worasak Mahatranobol (translator

and editor), Sino-Siamese Politics: Political Movements of the Overseas
Chinese in Thailand during 1924-1941 (Chinese Studies Center, Institute
of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1996), pp. 14-15.
11. Murasima, op. cit., p. 49.
12. Ibid., pp. 132-42.
13. Ibid., pp. 142-43.
14. Skinner, op. cit, p. 177.
15. Ibid., p. 231.
16. Murasima, op. cit., p. 30.
17. Ibid., pp. 186-87.
18. Suehiro, op. cit., p. 16.
19. Murasima, op. cit., p. 187.
20. Skinner, op. cit., p. 181.
21. Murasima, op. cit., p. 180.
22. Skinner, op. cit., p. 236.
23. I have described elsewhere in more detail the process of socialization
in Chinese schools where children were acculturated into Thai practices
and at the same time were taught to preserve their ethnic Chinese
identity. See S. Chantavanich and Somkiat Sikharaksakul, "Preservation
of Ethnic Identity and Acculturation: A Case Study of a Hainanese
School in Bangkok", Southeast Asian journal of Social Science 23, no. 1
(1995): 78-87.
24. See Vipha Uttamachan et al., Role and Status of Chinese Newspapers in
Thailand (Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 2528)
pp. 19-20.
25. Murasima, op. cit., p. 134.
26. Skinner, op. cit., p. 141.
27. See Wang Gung-wu, "The Culture of Chinese Merchants", in China and
the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), p. 191.
28. Murasima, op. cit., p. 179. See also R. Coughlin, Double Identity: The
Chinese in Modern Thailand (Hong Kong University Press, 1960),
pp. 170-77.
29. Wang Gung-wu, "The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia",
in China and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 206-7.
30. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 14-16.
31. Murasima, op. cit., pp. 186-88.
32. Ruth McVey, "The Materialization of the Southeast Asian Entrepreneur",
in Southeast Asian Capitalists, edited by Ruth McVey (Cornell Modern
Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1992), p. 20.
33. Alan E. Guskin, Changing Identity: The Assimilation of the Chinese in
Thailand (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968), pp. 94-95.
34. Ibid., pp. 122-23.
35. Coughlin, op. cit., p. 29.
7 From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai 259

36. Ibid., p. 29.

3 7. Krirkiat Phipatseritham and Kunio Yoshirara, Business Groups in Thailand.
Research Notes and Discussion Paper, No. 41 (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).
38. Supang Chantavanich, "From Gongsi to Business Corporatism: Socio-
Cultural and Political Conditions of Ethnic Chinese Big Business
Families' Success", in Entrepreneurship and Socio-economic Transformation
in Thailand and Southeast Asia, edited by A. Pongsapich et al.
(Chulalongkom University Social Research Institute and French Institute
of Scientific Research for Development in Cooperation, 1993), pp.
297-305.
39. Coughlin, op. cit., pp. 177-78.
40. Nai Busya, Niras Sampheng, cited by Kasian Tejapira, "Pigtail: A
Prehistory of Chineseness in Siam", SOJOURN 7, no. 1 (1992): 114.
41. With regard to the multi-faceted identity changes of the Chinese, Richard
Coughlin analysed Chinese citizenship and political interests in Thailand
and confirmed that naturalization was useful for the Chinese
businessmen because it entitled them to a Thai passport and therefore
travel without restriction (p. 176). Finally, the overseas Chinese had
altered his way of life, culturally and socially, to such an extent that
much of his behaviour was no longer compatible with the patterns of
people still living in China (p. 189). See Coughlin, op. cit. Guskin also
analysed the changing identity of the Chinese in Thailand during a
later period (the 1960s) when the second-generation Chinese were
more assimilated into Thai society through Thai schooling. See details
in Guskin, op. cit., pp. 61-92.
 Comments* by
Anusorn Limmanee on
"From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese Thai:
Political Conditions and Identity Shifts
among the Chinese in Thailand"
Presented by Supang Chantavanich

In her paper, Professor Supang Chantavanich seems to focus on

the reactions of the Thai state against the Chinese nationalist
movement as the main and direct political conditions which
influenced the identity shifts of the Sino-Siamese between 1910
and 1941. The reactions were evidently expressed twice as the
two Thai nationalist movements, the first one from 1913 to 1925
and the second between 1938 and 1950. The shifts of identity
were self-adjustments of the Sino-Siamese for their political survival
and resulted mostly from the conflict between Thai and Chinese
nationalism. As a consequence, the identity of the Sino-Siamese
has become less politically but still culturally and ethnically
oriented. Thai nationalism was, therefore, the only political force
which caused the identity shift, while other political conditions
seemingly influenced the rise of the ideology. In other words,
those political conditions, except Thai nationalism, had likely just
indirect effects on the changes of the Sino-Chinese identity during
the period.
According to the paper, the first wave of Thai nationalism was
initiated by King Wachirawut as a response of the state to the then
actual and potential threats - for example, the 1908 Chinese
strike and the visit of Dr Sun Yat -sen, the fall of the Ching dynasty
and the abortive coup of 1911. A series of legal measures were
imposed with the Sino-Siamese as their main targets, although
their enforcement was noticeably not strong enough to weaken

* These comments are based on an earlier version of Supang's paper which

only covers the pre-war period.
From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese Thai 261

the Chinese nationalist movement in Thailand. However, this anti-

Chinese policy triggered an adjustment of identity among some
Chinese business leaders by adopting Thai family names.
In the second wave, the implementation of the nationalist
policy by Phibulsongkram's government led to the harsh suppres-
sion of Chinese secret societies and the strict control over Chinese
schools and newspapers for fear of the Chinese roles in the nation-
alist and communist movements. Economically, measures were
also taken to lessen the Chinese domination over the Thai economy.
The policy, together with the communist victory over Chiang Kai-
chek, forced some Sino-Siamese to change their national identity
through naturalization.
In the paper, as in some other works on nationalism in
Thailand, the term "nationalism" is not clearly defined. Since the
meaning of nationalism is quite broad and multi-dimensional, this
tends to lessen the usefulness of the concept for historical analysis
(see Barme 1993, p. 7). It is also questionable whether there was
or were any other form(s) of nationalism before and during the
period. In addition, the two waves of nationalism, as described in
the paper, seem to suggest that the Thai nationalist movement was
unsuccessful. With regard to the identity shifts among the Sino-
Siamese, in fact even without the two nationalist movements the
identity of the overseas Chinese in Thailand has gradually changed.
The assimilation of the overseas Chinese into Thai society through,
for example, marriage, education, and working in the public
bureaucracy, has long been known to dilute the Chinese identity.
Thus, the identity shifts described in this paper are special cases
because they were pressured by the state.
In my view, the two waves of Thai nationalism were just
particular forms of nationalism which the two Thai leaders applied
to achieve some ideological goal and to avert certain political
problems. They took place under specific political and economic
conditions both on the local and global scale and cannot be sepa-
rated from the ideological conflicts among various groups, particu-
larly between the liberal and conservative groups in Thai society.
Before discussing these points, I would like to begin with a quick
look at the nature of nationalism in order to understand what
nationalism means in this paper.
262 Anusorn Lirnmanee

Historically, nationalism grew side by side with the rise of the

nation state and spread to peripheral societies in the early twentieth
century Its traditional goal is nation-building through either uni-
fication or achievement of independence. However, nationalism
is, in itself, a political doctrine without ideological unity and can
be expressed in various and sometimes opposite ideologies. Regard-
ing its form, nationalism may take a liberal, or conservative or
chauvinistic form. In the liberal form, nationalism, apart from its
opposition against every kind of foreign domination and oppres-
sion, also wants to establish a representative and constitutional
government in society as well as a peaceful and friendly inter-
national order. On the contrary, conservative nationalism, usually
developed in established nation states, places strong emphasis
on the promise of social cohesion and public order embodied in
the sentiment of national patriotism. The defence of traditional
institutions and the traditional way of life is an important tenet of
this form of nationalism. As for chauvinistic nationalism, it is the
aggressive, expansionistic and militaristic form which expresses
itself in intense patriotism and belief in ethnic superiority. Each
form is generated by such factors as the leaders' ideology, social
structure, historical developments and geographical location. At
different times nationalism in a society can take different dominant
forms which influence the activities of the movement or policies
of the state. In addition, the movement may change from an elite
movement to a mass movement and from a united to a divided
one and vice versa. Despite its many forms, what every kind of
nationalism has in common is the belief that the national interest
is more important than individuals, and the government is an
indispensable agency for the expression of these interests (see
Heywood 1992, chap. 5; Kohn 1968, pp. 63-65; Watkins 1964,
p. 40). In the periphery, this political doctrine was developed as
a political reaction against Western imperialism. Through its
colonization, imperialism brought into peripheral societies not
only various aspects of modernization but also some political
ideologies and doctrines which shaped directly or indirectly their
nationalism.
By its form, Thai nationalism in the two periods described
was conservative and more or less chauvinistic, promoted by the
From Stamesc-Chtnese to Chtnese That 263

political leaders of the Thai state. Thus, the term "nationalism",

as used in the paper, means a conservative and chauvinistic form
of official nationalism. To differentiate it from other nationalist
activities in Thailand before, during, or after the two waves of
nationalism, as pointed out by the paper, it should be clearly
defined as the two waves of conservative and chauvinistic nation-
alism. They were conservative owing to their aim to defend some
traditional institutions, for example, the monarch, the nation and
religion in King Wachirawut's nationalism (Kullada 1987) or to
protect social cohesion and public order as in Phibulsongkhram's
nationalist policy (Likhit 1987, p. 251). However, Phibulsong-
khram's nationalism was evidently much more chauvinistic than
that of King Wachirawuth. This is why the second wave of
nationalism was more anti-Chinese and had a stronger impact on
the identity shift among the Sino-Chinese than the first wave. The
Pan-Thai policy of Phibulsongkhram's regime certainly speaks for
itself. As social movements, the two waves of nationalism in
Thailand, unlike the Chinese nationalist movement in the same
period, were less mass-based and more elite-dependent, though
some groups of Thai people were mobilized to support them
through, for example, the Wild Tiger Corps in the first wave, and
the Yuwachon military movement in the second wave.
Nationalism in Asia generally developed after World War I
and became a powerful driving force of political developments
in this area. It inspired, at first, elites and intellectuals and, later
on, the masses to pursue the goal of national liberation and
modernization. During this period, as shown by the paper, the
nationalist movements both in Thailand and China came into
existence. Nevertheless, the formation of a nationalist movement
in Thailand can be traced back to the late nineteenth century,
particularly in the period of King Chulalongkom (Kullada 1984).
The concept of nation or chat or chat baan muang was widely
discussed and applied by the elite to implant Thai patriotism
among the educated public from the 1880s. A good example of
the nationalism of this period is found in the petition submitted
by a group of princely officials to King Chulalongkom suggesting
the need for radical reform to maintain the political independence
of Siam (Barme 1993, pp. 16-17). The growth of this movement
264 Anusorn Limmanee

was instrumental in the administrative reform and the rise of an

absolutist nation state. Since no freeman had existed in Thai society
until the dissolution of the corvee system and slavery in 1905
(Likhit 1987, pp. 207-8), in the beginning nationalism in Thailand
was formed as an elite movement led by the young King and
composed of the King, his brothers and relatives and some leading
civil servants. To escape Western colonization and to consolidate
royal power, this elite gave its first priority to modernization and
nation-building. As a consequence, the nationalist movement was,
at first, relatively liberal in its form. Although before and during
this period a huge number of Chinese immigrants flooded into
Thailand, no anti-Chinese policy was imposed by the state. A
basic reason was that they were the biggest sources of labour and
entrepreneurs necessary for the rapidly expanding economy (Keyes
1989, p. 47).
The modernization itself, however, generated a new genera-
tion of nationalist intellectuals and middle class in Thai society.
Exposed to better education, communication and information,
these intellectuals of Thai and Chinese descent began to develop
their own notion of nationalism. Once the reform seemed to end
up with the establishment of an absolutist state and a new
bureaucracy without political reform, the people began to criticize
the existing political regime and to ask for constitutional democracy.
In the early twentieth century, a journalist named Tianwan, for
example, proposed in his newspaper that parliamentary democracy
should be introduced into Thai society (Likhit 1987, pp. 234-
35). This was certainly in opposition to King Chulalongkorn's
view that the Thai people were not yet ready to rule themselves.
From then, the conservative form of official nationalism started to
take root.
Amid the rise of republican nationalism and the fall of many
kingdoms in Asia, King Wachirawut ascended the throne in 1911.
In 1912 he was faced with a coup attempt by some military
officers who wanted to replace the absolute monarchy with con-
stitutional democracy. Threatened by the tide of revolutionary
change and the increasing challenge from the middle class in
addition to the conflict between himself and the royal elite, he
developed a more conservative form of nationalism called for by
From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese Thai 265

the intellectuals (see Wyatt 1984, chap. 8). As a main and easy
target of the King's nationalist campaign, the Sino-Chinese were
frequently harassed by him. In his view, they dominated the Thai
economy and some of them, like Sheow Hut-seng, were critical
intellectuals who ideologically opposed him. But the King's weak
base of power, variety of interest and relatively short reign did not
enable him to enforce the anti-Chinese policy strictly
This does not mean that the conservative and somewhat
chauvinist form of nationalism in Thailand disappeared with the
death of King Wachirawut in 1925. Certainly, from 1925 to 1938
it had not been the official ideology but was still kept or expanded
chauvinistically by such elite as Prince Boworadet or Luang Wichit
Wathakan and even minor officials like Chamrat Sarawisut (Terewil
1991). The rise to power of the Peoples Party in 1932 with economic
nationalism as its official ideology paved the way for the return of
the conservative form of nationalism, though at first its nationalism
seemed politically liberal. After the victory of Phibulsongkhram in
the intra-party struggle for state power, official nationalism became
more conservative and chauvinistic. Phibulsongkhrams attempt to
consolidate his power, and his desire to make Thailand a great
power in Southeast Asia were likely the basic reasons behind his
nationalist campaign. It was carried out amid a closer relationship
between Thailand and Japan and the growth of the anti-Japanese
movement among the overseas Chinese as well as the spread of
Chinese-dominated communist activities in Thailand. Under these
conditions, the Sino-Chinese were unavoidably the main targets of
the nationalist policies. This led to a substantial shift of identity
among the Sino-Chinese. However, the widespread and voluntary
change of identity among them actually occurred after World
War II when their ties with mainland China were severed by the
triumph of the Communist Party
It is clear that although some political conditions did have
some relevance to the identity shifts among the Sino-Chinese
between 1910 and 1941, they did not have any direct effect on
the changes. They just influenced the rise of the conservative and
chauvinistic form of Thai nationalism. Since nationalism was found
to be the only political condition which directly caused the shifts,
it deserves to replace the "political conditions" in the title of the
266 /\nusorn Limmanee

paper. In addition, to do justice to the term "nationalism" more

elaboration is needed.

References
Barme, Scott. Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of a Thai Identity.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.
Heywood, Andrew. Political Ideologies. London: Macmillan, 1992.
Keyes, Charles F Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modem Nation State. Bangkok:
Duang Kamol, 1989.
Kohn, Hans. "Nationalism". In International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
edited by David L. Sills, pp. 63-70. New York: Macmillan and Free
Press, 1968.
Kullada Kesboonchoo. "Official Nationalism under King Chulalongkorn".
Paper presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies,
Bangkok, 22-24 August 1984.
- - - . "Official Nationalism under King Vajiravudh". In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Thai Studies, Vol. 3, Part I, pp. 107-20.
Canberra: Australian National University, 1987.
Likhit Dhiravegin. Evolution of Thai Politics and Government (in Thai).
Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1987.
Terweil, B.]. "Thai Nationalism and Identity: Popular Themes of the 1930s".
In National Identity and its Defenders, edited by Craig ]. Reynolds,
pp. 133-55. Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 1991.
Watkins, Federick M. The Age of Ideology: Political Thought, 1750 to the
Present. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
Wyatt, David K. Thailand: A Short History. Chiangmai: Silkworm Books,
I984.
 Chapter 8
Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam
and Their Identity

Tran Khanh

Introduction
In the last decade, the open-door policy and economic reforms of
Vietnam, as well as the improved economic and diplomatic relations
of Vietnam with the Southeast Asian countries where many ethnic
Chinese reside have led to the resumption of the roles played by
the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam's economy. The ethnic Chinese
community once again became influential in the development of
the domestic trade, and the restoration and diversification of
business links between Vietnam and the region. It seems that
changes in Vietnam in the last decade have also contributed to the
ethnic Chinese being better integrated with the larger Vietnamese
community.
This chapter is an attempt to grapple with some aspects relat-
ing to the policies of Vietnam and China towards the ethnic
Chinese, and their impact on the integration of the ethnic Chinese
268 Tran Khanh

in Vietnamese society It will also consider the overseas connection

of the Vietnamese Chinese and its bearing on the economic and
cultural activities of their country Finally, some concluding remarks
will be made on the position, role, and identity of the ethnic
Chinese in Vietnam in the past, present, and future.

Nation-State in the Policies of Vietnam Towards

Ethnic Chinese and their Position in Vietnamese Society
In the great family of the Vietnamese nation, there are altogether
fifty-five small and large ethnic groups, of which the Viet (known
as the King) form 87 per cent of the total Vietnamese population.
The ethnic Chinese (known as the Hoa) who constitute 1.4 per
cent (or more than one million out of the 75 million population)
is the third largest ethnic group in the country 1
The Viet are the descendants of the two Viet tribes, Lac Viet
and Au Viet. In ancient times, these two Viet clans belonged to
the same racial and cultural groups. Together with the Bach Viet
(Hundred Yues tribes), they lived south of the Yangtze River.
Towards the third century B.C., the Lac Viet and Au Viet
gathered together and founded the Au Lac Kingdom, the first
ancient state in Vietnam. Early in the second century B.C. (year
111), the Au Lac Kingdom was conquered by the Han dynasty
which integrated this Kingdom into its empire. After more than
ten centuries of Chinese colonization, this Vietnamese territory
became one of the many places for refugees, convicts, officers and
garrisons coming from northern China. Most of them consisted of
men. 2
During the one thousand years of Chinese domination, the
Han feudal lords implemented a policy of systematic assimilation
between the Han-Tang and Viet peoples. History records the fact
that many Han peoples came to live in and subsequently dominated
North Vietnam with each succeeding generation. They married
Viet women and their children later became the local people, like
other Viet. Many of them joined the indigenous population in its
struggle for Vietnam's independence and sovereignty 3
It should be noted that during the one thousand years of
Chinese political domination, the Han administrators and the
Chinese troops garrisoned in North Vietnam controlled only the
8. Ethntc Chthese in Vietnam and Their Identity 269

districts and populated centres. Thus, the Chinese character and

Confucianism only penetrated the noble families and the Buddhist
priests in the Han occupied areas. Real power still remained in the
hands of the Viet leaders of the different clans. The communal
villages of the Viet people remained almost intact with the
traditional way of life and culture of the people practising wet rice
cultivation. 4
The struggle for the survival of the Viet people against the
Hans enhanced the community spirit of the Viet people. They felt
that they were brothers and sisters with common ancestors and
did their utmost to safeguard their culture and race. In order to
maintain their national community, the Viet people nurtured a
strong will to gain back control over the country Since then, the
Viet have developed a strong sense of national sovereignty The
year 939 was a turning point in the history of the Viet nation-
state. In that year the Viet, under the leadership of Ngo Quyen,
rose up to expel the Southern Han troops from the whole territory
known as Northern Vietnam today, thus ushering in the era of
national independence for Vietnam.
From the tenth century onwards, the community spirit and
national sovereignty developed into that of a nation-state. The
concept of the Vietnamese nation-state at that time was synony-
mous with the motherland or homeland where they lived and
earned their livelihood. In the course of time, they felt that they
shared a common history of struggle for building and defending
the country and a common cultural heritage. For that reason, the
spirit of building and defending the motherland became a yardstick
for measuring the Vietnamese identity
It should be emphasized that motherland or homeland con-
stitutes the essence of Vietnam's culture. This concept is not found
in the orthodox Confucian doctrine. Confucius did not mention
the concept of motherland or homeland. What he mentioned was
the concept of people "under Heaven" together with the concept
of the behaviour of men "under Heaven". The people "under
Heaven", according to Confucianism, is a form of cultural com-
munity, not a country or homeland. Thus, human being is a
component part of the whole world and the people at large (under
Heaven) live in it; he is not a component part of the motherland
270 Tran Khanh

or nation. In Confucianism, "dutifulness" means the obligation

of children towards their parents, while "loyalty" implies the
faithfulness of subjects to the king or leader. But in Vietnam,
"dutifulness" is divided into small and great ones. "Small dutiful-
ness" is the respect for and obedience to ones parents while "great
dutifulness" is the devotion to one's motherland and people.
"Loyalty" means faithfulness to the country, and to the rights and
interests of the nation-state. 5 Thus, for the Vietnamese, the concept
of nation-state is closely connected with the notion of motherland
or homeland.
Successive invasions against the independent nation of Viet-
nam by various Chinese feudal dynasties from the tenth century
onwards further enhanced the spirit of national sovereignty and
unity among the Vietnamese. Nguyen Trai, a national liberation
hero and a man of culture, who lived in the fifteenth century,
characterized the Vietnamese nation-state as follows:
1. The nation is a form of community having a particular culture,
a specific history of struggle for building and defending the
country;
2. The nation possesses its own territory and border undeniably;
3. The nation boasts its own customs, habits and regulations;
4. The nation enjoys full sovereignty and is not dependent upon
any foreign country: 6
The concept of the nation-state that Nguyen Trai had described
has found the clearest expression in Vietnam's modern history:
As the perception of the Vietnamese nation-state is closely
connected with the concept of motherland or homeland, anyone
who claims to be a Vietnamese, or has a Vietnamese identity, must
first and foremost have a culture of, and loyalty to, his or her
motherland. These notions have governed the policies of the
Vietnamese state towards the Chinese settlers.
In order to build a nation-state with its own national charac-
teristics and to cope with the schemes of annexation of Vietnam
by different Chinese feudal dynasties, the feudal rulers of Vietnam
imposed a policy of assimilation on the Chinese migrants.
During the reign of Ly's (1009-1225) and the subsequent Tran
dynasty (1226-1400), the use of ethnic Chinese scholars and
8 Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Ther Identity 271

other political fugitives from China in leading administrative

positions was advocated. But this applied only to those Chinese
who chose to settle permanently in Vietnam. 7
Under the later Le dynasty (1428-1592) and during the rules
of the Trinh lords in the North until 1777, the assimilation and
surveillance of the ethnic Chinese community were intensified.
The Chinese who permanently resided in Vietnam had to abide
by Vietnamese laws, conform with Vietnamese customs and
traditions and dress in the Vietnamese way. The migrant Chinese
were not free to travel within Vietnam and were only permitted
to settle in a special zone. The Chinese merchants were also heavily
taxed and they were not allowed to distribute Chinese books and
other literature in Vietnam. 8 The more stringent Vietnamese attitude
towards the Chinese community was due to the fact that the Le's
reign came about as a result of having defeated the occupied force
of the Ming dynasty in China. The Chinese army had earlier
entered Vietnam on the pretext of helping the then Tran dynasty
to quell a rebellion. However, they stayed on for twenty years
(1407-27).
By the second half of the seventeenth century, Chinese settle-
ments in Vietnam had reached a critical stage. Prior to this, Chinese
migration had been gradual and the migrants would tend to
assimilate over the years. From this time onwards, however, Chinese
immigrants were permitted to reside in major economic and
trading centres of Vietnam, especially in the south. The massive
and continuous Chinese migrations resulted in the emergence of
Chinatowns in the big cities and major trading centres, such as
Pho Hien (in centre of the Red River Delta), Thang Long (Hanoi),
Hoi An (in the central part of Vietnam), Gia Dinh and Cho Lon
(part of Ho Chi Minh City today), and Ha Tien (in the extreme
south-west of Vietnam). It was at this time that the Chinese also
began to congregate on the basis of their dialect group. The large
Chinese settlement in Vietnam since the seventeenth century was
the result of Vietnamese policies. The Nguyen lords in the South
(1592-1777), and later the Imperial Court at Hue (1802-1945)
allowed Chinese immigrants to settle permanently in Vietnam
and to prosper in their business. The Chinese who chose to settle
permanently in Vietnam had the same civil rights as the Vietnamese,
272 Tran Khanh

but they were exempted from military service and corvee. Chinese
merchants were usually involved in the collection of taxes. They
could buy houses, acquire land and set up their social, religious
and economic organizations. 9
In order to control the Chinese community, the Nguyen dynasty
introduced a law on the status of the ethnic Chinese. Under the
reign of Emperor Minh Mang (1820-1831), the Chinese residents
were divided into two groups: the Minh Huang people and Thanh
(Qing) people. The Minh Huang, like the peranakan of Indonesia,
had ancestors who migrated from China in the sixteenth or
seventeenth centuries. Most of them were of mixed Sino-Vietnamese
parentage. Until1829 their children were considered to be Chinese,
but later they were regarded as Vietnamese and were granted
political rights. During Emperor Minh Mang's reign they were also
allowed to take civil service examinations, but they were not
permitted to participate in the election of Chinese bang. The Minh
Huang and their children were prohibited to leave for China and
were also required to dress like Vietnamese.
The Thanh people, like the totok Chinese of Indonesia, came
to Vietnam in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries (during the
Qing dynasty in China). These people continued to use Chinese
dialects as their main languages of communication, followed
Chinese customs and retained links with China. Most of them did
not intermarry with the indigenous people. They were regarded as
foreign citizens and were not entitled to hold office in the Viet-
namese government services but they were granted rights to reside
in Vietnam. 10
The preferential treatment for Chinese immigrants and natu-
ralization exercise under Nguyen rules during the seventeenth
and nineteenth centuries helped the ethnic Chinese to expand
their business activities, and encouraged their integration into
Vietnamese society Most of the Chinese descendants considered
Vietnam as their homeland and many, such as Trinh Hoai Due,
Phan Thanh Gian, and so forth, became high-ranking mandarins
during the Nguyen dynasty 11
The establishment of the French colony in Nam ky (Cochin-
china) in 1867 and protectorates in Bac Ky (Tonkin) and Trung
Ky (Annam) in 1884 drastically altered the evolution of the
B. Ethnic Chinese 1h Vietnam and Their Identity 273

Chinese community in Vietnam in general, and the legal status of

the ethnic Chinese in particular. The Chinese community came
under French attention, not only in the form of different attempts
at taxation, but also in the control of Chinese immigration to
Vietnam.
Like the Nguyen dynasty, the French colonial administration
practised a "divide and rule" policy towards various ethnic groups.
The Chinese residents in Vietnam were divided into those of
Chinese descent, known as the Minh Huang and Chinese
sojourners (later known as Huaqiao). Until1885, the Minh Huang
were regarded as Vietnamese. Later, the French offered them the
right to choose to be Chinese nationals or belong to a new category
known as French Asian citizens. 12 According to a French official
source, in Cochinchina (Namky) in 1921 there were about 46,500
Minh Huang who formed 42 per cent of the total Chinese popu-
lation in that area. In 1950 the number of Minh Huang had
increased to 75,000 persons, constituting about 10 per cent of
total Chinese population in Cochinchina. 13 This big drop in the
proportion of Minh Huang gives an indication of the size of the
influx of Chinese immigrants during this period. In addition, the
Chinese who migrated from China during 1920-40 brought their
families. From that time on, Chinese men had more opportunities
to marry their country women.
Another Chinese group was the Huaqiao. These people were
considered Chinese nationals or foreigners and were required to
join one of the bang associations according to their dialect group
if they wanted to live in Vietnam. 14 In order to get more financial
benefits from the Chinese, the French granted the Huaqiao the
privilege of not paying personal taxes. Meanwhile, other foreigners
such as the British and Indians had to pay this tax. 15 Thus, the
"divide and rule" policy of the French by promoting a separate
status for the Chinese residents in Vietnam, together with the use
of Chinese bang, tended to make the Chinese socially isolated
from the Vietnamese.
Starting from the French colonial period, the Chinese were
mainly engaged in commerce and a few were in processing indus-
tries such as the milling of rice. They refrained from investing
heavily in other industries because the French excluded local and
274 Tran Khanh

other foreigners (Chinese) from the industrial sector. It was not

until the Nanjing Agreement between France and China on 16
March 1930 that the Chinese in Vietnam obtained their right to
participate in foreign trade and industrial activities. Later, the
Chongqing Agreement of 26 February 1946 gave the Chinese the
right to be involved in mining, buy and develop land, and put up
buildings. 16 This led to the domination of the Chinese in Vietnam's
domestic trade.
After the French left in 1954, Vietnam was temporarily divided
into two political systems. In the South, Ngo Dinh Diem became
Chief-of-State and proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (ROY).
The Ngo Dinh Diem authority further attempted to assimilate or,
more precisely, to tum the overseas Chinese into Vietnamese citizens
and to break their economic power. A Nationality Decree No. 10
promulgated on 7 December 1955 in the South revived what had
been the practice before French rule: all children born of mixed
Chinese-Vietnamese parents were considered Vietnamese citizens.
In 1956, President Ngo Dinh Diem (1956-63) declared that all
overseas Chinese born in Vietnam were Vietnamese citizens, irre-
spective of their parents' or their own wishes. All other Chinese
were aliens and needed to apply for residential permit, which had
to be renewed periodically. Subsequently, Decree No. 52 was issued
on 29 August 1956 which required all Vietnamese citizens to
adopt a Vietnamese name within six months or pay a heavy fine.
Decree No. 53, which was issued on 6 September 1956, listed
eleven types of trade which aliens could not engage in; at that
time, all of these trades were heavily dominated by the ethnic
Chinese. The aliens who were involved in these trades had six
months to liquidate or to transfer their businesses to Vietnamese
citizens. 17 Given these laws, a great majority of the ethnic Chinese
in the ROY adopted Vietnamese nationality out of necessity. Many
simply became Vietnamese citizens or passed their businesses to
sons or daughters who were born in Vietnam. There was no strong
resistance from the Chinese community. 18 Thus, the Ngo Dinh
Diem laws in general did not operate too punitively against the
ethnic Chinese businesses. The message to the ethnic Chinese,
however, was clear: the ROY wanted them to assimilate as quickly
as possible.
8 Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Their Identity 275

At the same time, the Ngo Dinh Diem government took steps
to control the Chinese education system by requiring the
Vietnamese language to be used in all Chinese schools and all
principals had to be Vietnamese. There was further evidence of
this assimilation policy of the Diem regime: the banning of the
Association of Patriotic Overseas Chinese in 1956, and bang
associations in 1960. 19 Notwithstanding this, the Chinese bangs
and Chinese independent schools were not only maintained but
were further developed by the ethnic Chinese until the communist
victory in 1975.
Owing to the escalation of the war, the Nguyen Van Thieu
regime (1964-75) in the South did not pay much attention to the
assimilation of the ethnic Chinese. At that time, the Chinese efforts
were focused on business undertakings and the maintenance and
development of their culture. They became more successful in
business. Their disproportionately high involvement in business
in the South was one of the main reasons which set the ethnic
Chinese apart from the Vietnamese, giving rise to resentment among
the indigenous Vietnamese. This situation was similar to those
experienced by other countries in Southeast Asia during 1950-60.
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the North
(1945-75), and thereafter the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (the
whole country since 1976) approached the issue of the ethnic
Chinese from the standpoint of class solidarity. Since the formation
of the Indochina Communist Party (in 1930), the Vietnamese
communists had considered the Chinese workers and labourers
as allies of the Vietnamese revolution. Many Chinese immigrants
were recruited into the Vietnamese revolutionary army and were
granted political rights. 20
After the restoration of peace in Vietnam in ·1954, the Hanoi
government, like the regime in Saigon, had to sort out the con-
fused situation of the nationality of the ethnic Chinese left behind
by the French. In 1955, the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP;
since 1976 it has been renamed the Vietnamese Communist Party
or VCP), and the Chinese Communist Party came to an official
agreement under which the ethnic Chinese in North Vietnam
were placed under the leadership of the VWP and were gradually
to become Vietnamese citizens. In February 1957, Hanoi and
276 Tran Khanh

Beijing agreed that the Ngai, a minority group found in Quang

Ninh province, would be considered Vietnamese citizens even
though they were sinicized in language and culture. As for most
of the ethnic Chinese living in the DRY, they were to become
Vietnamese citizens by the end of the 1950s and would be treated
as citizens of the DRVY
After the liberation of the South in 1975, and the reunification
of the country in 1976 as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV),
the government continued to regard the ethnic Chinese as part of
the great family of the Vietnamese nation-state, and a large number
of them as an integral part of the Vietnamese revolution. However,
the socialist transformation of the private capitalist industry and
trade in the newly liberated South and tense relations between
Vietnam and China during 1977-79 affected negatively the inte-
gration of the ethnic Chinese into Vietnamese society. At that
time, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese rejected Vietnamese
nationality. They considered themselves as Chinese citizens, or as
overseas Chinese, notwithstanding that they were already Viet-
namese citizens since the late 1950s. These ethnic Chinese had
the intention to leave Vietnam. According to one estimate, from
the fall of Saigon on 30 April1975 to the end of September 1979,
about 230,000 ethnic Chinese left Vietnam for China and an-
other 220,000 left for Southeast Asia by boatY The rejection of
Vietnamese nationality by the ethnic Chinese, together with their
exodus, gave rise to the Vietnamese government's suspicion on
their loyalty towards the Vietnamese nation-state. For that reason,
the Vietnamese authorities at that time did not prevent the exodus
of these ethnic Chinese.
Since the early 1980s, the Vietnamese government has gradu-
ally reintegrated the ethnic Chinese into the mainstream of Viet-
namese society. By 1982, the Vietnamese Communist Party had
officially reversed its policy towards the ethnic Chinese. Directive
10, which was passed on 17 November 1982 by the secretariat of
the Party Central Committee, stipulated that the ethnic Chinese
living in Vietnam would be considered as Vietnamese. They had
the same rights and obligations as other Vietnamese citizens. It
also emphasized, however, that cadres and students of the ethnic
Chinese would be allowed to participate in or study for certain
8 Et/7/liC C/7;nese ;n Viemam and The;r Identity 277

professions only They had the duty to serve in the army, but
could not become officers. 23 Thus, the Vietnamese government
began to acknowledge that the ethnic Chinese should no longer
be considered as reactionaries, but they were still suspected as a
"fifth column". The suspicion of the Vietnamese government to-
wards the ethnic Chinese was also manifested in Act 14 which
was issued on l3 September 1983 by the Politburo of the Viet-
namese Communist Party The Act reads in part: "to forbid ethnic
Chinese participation in commerce, transport, printing, cultural
business, information and operating of schools". 24 Obviously, this
Act has hindered ethnic Chinese investment endeavours, and it
has also delayed the reintegration of the ethnic Chinese into Viet-
namese society
The new period of reintegration of the ethnic Chinese into
Vietnamese society began in 1986, when the Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party formally introduced a programme of reforms known as
doi moi. Prior to the sixth Communist Party Congress in December
1986, specifically on the question of the ethnic Chinese community,
Directive 256 was issued in October 1986 by the Chairman of the
Ministerial Council to implement the suspended Directive 10. 25
The most important force reactivating ethnic Chinese education
was the decrees of the local authorities (cities and provinces) on
the implementation of Directive 256. For example, the Decree of
the Municipal People Committee of Ho Chi Minh City, which was
issued on 20 February 1987 with regard to the implementation
and realization of the Directive 256, reaffirmed that the ethnic
Chinese had the same rights and obligations as other Vietnamese
citizens. Their children had rights to participate in or study for
all professions at all national education levels. The primary and
secondary schools with high concentrations of ethnic Chinese
students were allowed to resume teaching in the Chinese language,
but the teachers had to follow a curriculum prepared by the
Ministry of Education. 26 The ethnic Chinese have also been allowed
to set up a body called the Association to Sponsor Chinese
Language Teaching 27 In 1988, the Ministry of Education of Viet-
nam also issued a series of decrees concerning ethnic Chinese
education. The decrees once again confirmed what were noted in
Directive 256. 28
278 Tran Khanh

Vietnam's efforts to reintegrate the ethnic Chinese into Viet-

namese society were manifested in the commitments made at the
seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1991.
The commitment stated that the Vietnamese government guarantees
all civil rights and civic duties of the ethnic Chinese community,
to respect their culture and religion and to create conditions for
them to work confidently, so that they can contribute to the
building of Vietnam and cultivate friendly relations between the
people of Vietnam and China. 29
In short, doi moi and its endorsement of a multisector economy
in Vietnam since 1986 have given propitious opportunities for
restoring the civic consciousness and duties of the ethnic Chinese.
They have also been fully involved in the economic restructuring
of Vietnam. Some of their industries, such as in garment, shoes,
textiles, plastics and foodstuff processing, have regained their
previous status as major players in Vietnam's light industries. In
political life, the ethnic Chinese are no longer regarded as some
kind of "fifth column" working in favour of Chinas interests. They
have the same rights and obligations as other Vietnamese citizens.
In culture and education, the ethnic Chinese have been allowed
to resume teaching, broadcasting, and printing in the Chinese
language. However, their activities in this area are still much less
than before 1975.

The China Factor and the Integration of the Ethnic Chinese

in Vietnam
After a long period of subjugation to the Chinese empire, it was
not until the tenth century that Vietnam regained its independence.
During th£s time, the inhabitants living in the southern part of the
Yangtze River as well as the Viet and the Chinese who were living
in the lands forming North Vietnam today were considered to be
subjects of the Chinese Empire.
From the tenth century to the latter half of the nineteenth
century, the Chinese immigrants and settlers became the objects
of assimilation by the Vietnamese authorities. Because of the rela-
tive similarities in terms of culture, style of living, religion, socio-
political and administrative structures between Vietnam and China,
the ethnic Chinese could live in comfort in Vietnam and integrate
8 Et/Jntc Chinese in Vietnam and Thetr Identity 279

themselves well into Vietnamese society. The natural assimilation

of the Chinese settlers continued throughout Vietnam's feudal
history.
But owing to their permanent readiness and high vigilance
to cope with the threat of invasion at any time by the Chinese
Empire, the feudal Vietnamese dynasties had to impose compulsory
assimilation on the Chinese immigrants. The main aim was to
have strict control over the latter in the event of any attack against
Vietnam. It was also to prevent the Chinese immigrants and settlers
from establishing political relations with China. The Vietnamese
feudal dynasties at the same time, however, considered the Chinese
immigrants and settlers to be a bridge linking the two countries
in the development of their relationships.
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, the succes-
sive Chinese dynasties seemed to pay no heed to the fate of their
subjects living in foreign countries. 30 In order to survive and
develop in foreign lands, the overseas Chinese had to adjust them-
selves to the conditions of their host country. They engaged mainly
in trading activities and formed traditional social organizations,
such as bang, clan, religious and other associations. In the early
days, these organizations were often independent of the jurisdiction
of the host country. Nevertheless, they neither attempted to seek
the protection of Chinese law nor requested official recognition
from China. 31
From the second half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese
authorities began to officially recognize and protect the rights and
interests of the overseas Chinese. They intended to seek political
and financial support from the overseas Chinese in order to counter
the possibility of intervention and aggression by the European
powers and Japan. At the same time, they wished to expand their
influence over the countries where the overseas Chinese were
living to attract capital investments from them to rebuild China.
The overseas Chinese in Vietnam during the French colonial
period came under the protection of the Manchu dynasty and
later, the Kuomintang (KMT) government. In the years 1885-86,
the French government and the Manchu administration signed a
number of treaties of friendship and trade in Tianjin in which
there was a provision recognizing the trading rights of the overseas
280 Tran Khanh

Chinese in Vietnam. The Nanjing Agreement of 1930 and the

Chonqing Agreement of 1949 between the French and the
Kuomintang governments gave the Huaqiao more rights to engage
in economic and social activities in Vietnam.
The Geneva Agreement in july 1954 led to the temporary
partition of Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel into two parts. In
the southern part, the anti-communist force set up the Republic
of Vietnam (ROV). The Kuomintang government in Taiwan
(Republic of China, or ROC) and the ROV were close strategic
friends in the U.S.-led alliance against communism in Asia. This
was the reason that Taiwan was able to wield influence over the
Chinese community in South Vietnam. In order to extend its
influence, the Taiwan representatives in Saigon participated in the
organization and leadership of the ethnic Chinese associations.
This explains why, although the Chinese bang associations were
abolished by ROV law in 1960, in reality they remained until
the communist victory in 1975. This also explains why other
social organizations, such as regional and clan associations, became
more important among the ethnic Chinese in the South during
1960-75.
The education of the ethnic Chinese in southern Vietnam
before 1975 was also strongly influenced by the Kuomintang.
School textbooks and teaching aids were supplied by the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Committee in Taipei. 32 Moreover, Taiwan also
provided ethnic Chinese firms with technology, financial support
and skilled manpower. The connection helped some small and
medium-sized ethnic Chinese enterprises in the south to upgrade
themselves into large-scale enterprises with modem equipment
and advanced management. 31
During 1956-57, the Ngo Dinh Diem government in the South
tried to gain control of ethnic Chinese economic activities and
forced them to adopt Vietnamese citizenship. The Taiwan authori-
ties protested against the action of Ngo Dinh Diem. On 7 May
1957, Taiwan declared that the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam who
did not want to take up Vietnamese citizenship would be given
help to resettle in Taiwan. 34 However, the actions of Taiwan did
not affect the Chinese situation in South Vietnam. Instead, the
ethnic Chinese eventually chose to become Vietnamese citizens.
8. 1-:thn;c C!Jtnese ;n Vtetnam and Thetr /dennty 281

The economic domination of the ethnic Chinese community was

not broken. On the contrary, by becoming Vietnamese citizens,
they were able to expand their businesses. 35
Like the Taiwanese administration, the government of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in its foreign policy also consid-
ered the overseas Chinese to be an important force. It put up a
resolute struggle to secure its position and gain influence over the
overseas Chinese communities. However, the PRC has followed
the path of socialist development and has approached the issue of
the ethnic Chinese from the standpoint of class solidarity
Up to the late 1970s, the relationship between Beijing and the
Chinese abroad was based on both politics and class. The ethnic
Chinese were then used as a tool by Beijing for the spread of
Maoism. Since 1977, however, Beijing has greatly changed its
attitude towards the ethnic Chinese who are now not only re-
garded as a bridge to expand the PRC's influence abroad, but also
constitute an economic force capable of helping mainland China
modernize.
In Vietnam, since the late 1940s, the Chinese Communist
Party has established close relations with the communist organi-
zations of Vietnam, of which there was one comprising the over-
seas Chinese. Many cadres of the People's Liberation Army of
China went to Vietnam in the years 1946-54 in order to help the
Vietnamese Communist Party to organize different unions of over-
seas Chinese to fight against French imperialism and colonialism. 36
For that reason, since the 1940s, the political organizations of the
overseas Chinese in Vietnam (especially in Northern Vietnam)
have been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party
After the re-establishment of peace in Vietnam in 1954, the
PRC had more chances to extend their influence over the ethnic
Chinese in North Vietnam. During 1954-58 the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam (DRY) allowed the Chinese Affairs Commission
in Beijing to organize Chinese education for the ethnic Chinese in
the DRV The school administrators were despatched from China
to head Chinese primary and secondary schools in Hanoi and
Haiphong. At the same time, the Hanoi Teacher Training Institute
was set up by China to train ethnic Chinese teachers for Chinese
primary and secondary schools in the DRV
282 Tran Khanh

Since late 1958, the PRC had initiated new policies (known as
"3 good" policy, such as nationality, no-interference, resettlement),
encouraging the overseas Chinese to integrate themselves into
Vietnamese society: At that time, the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi
was informed that the right of running Chinese schools in Viet-
nam was being transferred to the DRV Since then, the Hanoi
government has begun to take over the administration of the
Chinese schools in the DRV By 1962, administrators and teachers
sent by China had all been gradually withdrawn. By the mid-
1960s, the Chinese language in the Chinese schools in Vietnam
was downgraded to the level of a foreign language. Although the
Chinese education system was Vietnamized, the Chinese Embassy
in Hanoi still maintained their links with the ethnic Chinese in
the DRV through ethnic Chinese mass organizations, such as the
Hoa Lien (United Hoa) Association and the General Association of
Hoa in Vietnam. 37 However, the Cultural Revolution in China
during the 1960s weakened the linkages between Beijing and the
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.
After 1975, especially during 1976-79 the ethnic Chinese
society in Vietnam in general, and their consciousness of Vietnam
as their homeland in particular, were sharply shaken. In 1976,
when the socialist government of a united Vietnam carried out a
registration campaign for foreign residents, hundreds of thousands
of ethnic Chinese identified themselves as citizens of China. In
1977-78, there was an outflow of hundreds of thousands of ethnic
Chinese from North Vietnam to China by land, and from South
Vietnam to the countries of Southeast Asia by sea. One of the
factors which created this disturbance among ethnic Chinese in
Vietnam at that time was the impact of mainland China.
With a view to gain influence and control over the ethnic
Chinese community in South Vietnam, the Beijing-led "Progressive
Chinese" group 38 set up several new political organizations in
Saigon-Cholon: they were the Chinese Residents Peace Association,
the Huaqiao Association for Saving the Country from Danger, the
Overseas Chinese Marxist-Leninist Youth Union, and so on. The
aims of these organizations were to mobilize capitalists and
intellectuals to pool money and expertise to help the land of their
ancestors. When Saigon was liberalized on 30 April 1975, this
8. Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Their Identity 283

group tried to seize the Taiwan Embassy, the offices of the

Newspaper Vien Dong (Far East), the Nghee An School, the Teochew
Hospital and the Taiwan tourist agency: It also mobilized the ethnic
Chinese in Cholon to display the Chinese national flag and the
portrait of Mao Zedong. In 19 76-78 the Beijing agencies intensely
incited the ethnic Chinese to leave Vietnam for China. 39
With the incitement from Beijing, the cutting off of aid, the
withdrawal of experts and specialists from Vietnam, the support
given to the Pol-Pot administration in Cambodia to attack Vietnam:S
south-western provinces, the concentration of troops near the
Vietnam-China border and the 1978 despatch of war vessels to
Vietnamese territorial waters caused much perplexity and anxiety
among the ethnic Chinese, especially those who lived in Vietnam's
northern provinces. As a result, hundreds of thousands of ethnic
Chinese fled Vietnam for China. On the other hand, the campaign
for the socialist transformation of "capitalist" industry and trade,
which was launched in March 1978 by Vietnam, also caused
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese to flee Vietnam for foreign
countries by boat. In addition, the war of aggression by China
against Vietnam in the spring of 1979, together with Vietnam's
economic decline also caused the departure of the ethnic Chinese.
The reintegration of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam took place
in the early 1980s, especially from the second half of the decade.
In recent years, thousands of ethnic Chinese who had formerly
left Vietnam for one reason or another, have expressed their wish
to return to Vietnam to remake their living. 40 This trend may
have been motivated by the new policy of economic renovation,
implemented during the past decade. Moreover, normalization of
relations between Vietnam and China, which started in the late
1980s, has also contributed to the process of reintegration of the
ethnic Chinese into the Vietnamese population.
Before 1975, the ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam had business
and kinship ties with other Chinese, especially those in Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and Cambodia. Although Vietnam
was largely closed for a decade after 1975, many Vietnamese Chinese
managed to maintain close contact with them. The mass exodus
of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam during 1978-79 expanded their
ties with the Chinese in other regions (such as North America, and
284 Tran Khanh

Australia). Vietnam$ statistics show that at the end of 1987, 55 per

cent of the ethnic Chinese households in Ho Chi Minh City had
relatives living in twenty countries in the world, excluding China.
It is estimated that at the beginning of the 1990s, about two-thirds
of the ethnic Chinese in this city have relatives abroad. 41
At the present time, there are more than 2 million overseas
Vietnamese, of whom about 35 to 40 per cent are of ethnic Chinese
origin. 42 Among them, about 50 to 60 per cent live in North
America, especially in the United States of America. 43 According
to the 1991 census of Australia, more than 30 per cent of the
Vietnamese-born community in Australia have Chinese ancestry. 44
Within the last fifteen to twenty years, a large number of Vietnamese
refugees, including ethnic Chinese, have made it good in their
new countries. Many of them have become wealthy businessmen
and are capable of providing their relatives in Vietnam with capital
to explore business opportunities, made possible by the more
relaxed and liberal economic policy of doi moi.
Apart from these investments by returnees, who are ex-citizens,
foreign investments coming into Vietnam are also being led by
people of the Chinese race. Currently, the East and Southeast
Asian capital-rich economies are major investors in Vietnam, and
three of them - Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore - are pre-
dominantly Chinese. As a whole, investments from the ASEAN
countries where the Chinese form a minority, are derived mainly
from their wealthy ethnic Chinese tycoons.
Since the Sino-Vietnamese border was informally reopened in
February 1989, especially after Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic rela-
tions were normalized in October 1991, border trade between the
two countries has rapidly developed. In the pre-1989 period,
import -export turnover of commodities through the Vietnam-China
border had stood at only several million U.S. dollars, but in 1991
it attained US$24 7 million, and reached about US$900 million in
1995_45 The hustle and bustle of the border market between Viet-
nam and China in the past five to seven years has created busy
commercial centres along the common border. On the Vietnam
side, the border trade activities have brought back prosperity to
these border areas. Before 1989, such areas as Dong Dang, Tam
Thanh and the town of Lang Son in Lang Son province; the town
8. Ethn;c Chinese 1n Vietnam and The;r Identity 285

of Mong Cai in Quang Ninh province; and the town of Lao Cai
in Lao Cai province remained severely devastated by the Vietnam-
China border war of 1979. Since then, however, these towns have
become thriving urban business centres in Vietnam. Many traders
and companies from China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are
operating in those towns. For example, the Mong Cai market in
the town of Mong Cai had up to 300 large stalls and stands by
the end of 1993, of which over 100 were rented to Chinese
traders from Guangxi. 46
With the good conditions created by Vietnam's open-door
policy and its improved diplomatic relations with China, the ethnic
Chinese in Vietnam and those formerly repatriated to China for
political reasons during the 1978-79 period, have now plenty of
opportunities to pay visits to one another and pool their resources
into joint ventures for making profits. China itself has undergone
economic reforms in recent years, and Southern China has been
widely recognized as one of the most promising growth areas with
vast economic potential. This has given rise to a people-to-people
relationship between China and Vietnam. It has also contributed
to the extension of economic activities of the ethnic Chinese in
Vietnam.
Vietnam's official membership in ASEAN since july 1995 and
its participation in AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) since january
1996 have had a great influence on Vietnam's socio-economic
developments in general, and on the ethnic Chinese community
in particular. At this juncture, the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam have
had more opportunities to restore and develop their business
networks with other ethnic Chinese trading communities in the
world, especially those in Asia. This will not only create more
economic competitive strength for the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam,
but will also give an impetus to their cultural development, espe-
cially the development of the Chinese language in the community.
In short, the business and kinship relations of the ethnic
Chinese in Vietnam with their counterparts outside Vietnam are
one of the factors affecting the integration of the ethnic Chinese
in Vietnam. These relations once maintained and developed will
create a stronger economic competitiveness for the ethnic Chinese
and consolidate their cultural character. The setting up of a series
286 Tran Khanh

of Chinese language teaching centres in towns and cities inhabited

by the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam is a typical example. In recent
years, there has been an emergence of a Chinese language learning
movement in Ho Chi Minh City and in many towns of the Mekong
River Delta where a large number of the ethnic Chinese live.
Though the curricula of these Chinese language centres in different
localities are diverse in content, they nevertheless bear the character
of foreign language teaching. The teaching materials used by these
centres are mainly based on those published by Taiwan or the
PRC. The Chinese language teaching centres have a big enrolment
of ethnic Chinese children. Moreover, the Chinese language is
also taught in the families of the ethnic Chinese, and this is
particularly common in Ho Chi Minh City Because more time is
spent in learning Chinese and English, many ethnic Chinese
students in public schools have neglected the learning of the
Vietnamese language and other subjects. Hence, many ethnic
Chinese children do not read and write Vietnamese well. 47 The
teaching of school subjects in the Chinese language is clearly a
matter of importance to the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. This meets
the requirements of the market and the aspirations of the ethnic
Chinese themselves. However, the promotion of the Chinese
language among the ethnic Chinese is one of the main factors
helping to preserve the Chinese identity This attention to learning
Chinese and neglect of the Vietnamese language among the ethnic
Chinese community may create a line of demarcation between the
ethnic Chinese and the host Vietnamese community, thereby
slowing down the process of integration of ethnic Chinese into
Vietnamese society

Concluding Remarks
The integration experiences of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam during
the different historical periods reveal some significant trends and
implications.
First, owing to Vietnamese history, language, religion, culture,
social and administrative structures and political institutions and
the more than two thousand years of contact with China, including
almost one thousand years of Chinese political domination, the
Chinese migrants were easily integrated into the mainstream of
8. Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Their Identity 287

Vietnamese society. However, the Chinese migrants were some-

times the targets of discrimination by the Vietnamese authorities.
Compulsory assimilation was imposed on the Chinese migrants,
mainly through the requirement for the defence of national sov-
ereignty and security, against intervention from China. Thus, the
ethnic, cultural and religious differences between the Vietnamese
and ethnic Chinese were not the main reasons for Vietnamese
hostility towards the ethnic Chinese.
Secondly, in order to survive and develop in Vietnam, the
ethnic Chinese had to adjust themselves to the conditions of
Vietnamese society. They engaged in trading activities and estab-
lished their social organizations such as bang, clan and religious
or occupational associations. Chinatowns and their traditional
organizations were the nucleus for maintaining their Chinese
identity.
Thirdly, the "divide and rule" policy of the authorities in
Vietnam by promoting a separate status for Chinese residents
according to parentage and birthplace, together with the use of
the Chinese bang as an administrative unit, also contributed to the
social isolation of the Chinese from the Vietnamese.
Fourthly, the socialist transformation of private capitalist
industry and trade in South Vietnam during 1977-79 was one of
the reasons for the ethnic Chinese to identify themselves as Chinese
citizens, or as overseas Chinese, despite the fact that they were
already Vietnamese citizens during the late 1950s. The main reason
for rejecting Vietnamese citizenship was pragmatic: by claiming to
be Chinese or Taiwanese citizens, they probably hoped that as
foreign nationals they would be in a better position under the
new rules and be allowed to leave Vietnam easily.
Fifthly, the tense relationship between China and Vietnam
together with the incited racial policy of China during 1978-79
contributed to the Chinese departure from Vietnam. The rejection
of Vietnamese nationality by the ethnic Chinese together with the
exodus of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam,
especially from the North, to China in 1978, gave rise to the
suspicion by the Vietnamese government on the loyalty of the
ethnic Chinese towards Vietnam. For that reason, Hanoi at that
time did not prevent the exodus of the ethnic Chinese, and also
288 Tran K!Jan!J

carried out some measures to restrict ethnic Chinese involvement

in political and social activities. These factors hindered the inte-
gration of the ethnic Chinese into Vietnamese society
Sixthly, during the 1980s, especially the latter half, there was
reintegration of the ethnic Chinese into Vietnamese society In
recent years, many ethnic Chinese who had formerly left Viet-
nam, have expressed their wish to return to Vietnam. This trend
was due mainly to Vietnam's renovation policy In the economic
area, the ethnic Chinese have returned to most of the activities
which they were involved in prior to 1975. They are no longer
regarded as the "fifth column" working for Chinas interests, and
their civil rights and duties are now guaranteed. Their cultural
and educational rights have also been restored. However, their
activities in the socio-cultural area are still at a much reduced
level compared to the mid-1960s in the North and before 1975
in South Vietnam.
Seventhly, the normalized economic and diplomatic relations
between Vietnam and China, the increased economic co-operation
between Vietnam and the East and Southeast Asian nations where
many people of Chinese descent live, and the geographical and
cultural closeness of Vietnam and China, may create more oppor-
tunities for the "China factor" to penetrate Vietnamese society At
present, the Vietnamese Chinese community constitutes an influ-
ential socio-economic entity which is playing an important role in
the economic development of Vietnam. A long-term effect of the
above-mentioned economic and political trends and the close
traditional ties between the ethnic Chinese themselves may see
the community in Vietnam regain its economic pre-eminence. If
a sizeable portion of Vietnam's economy is in the hands of an
ethnic Chinese minority, it may give rise to Vietnamese resent-
ment as the indigenous Vietnamese would want an equitable share
of the national economy This was the reason that had set the
ethnic Chinese apart from the Vietnamese, and may again result
in a discriminatory policy towards the ethnic Chinese. This will,
of course, have an impact on the identity of the ethnic Chinese.
If Vietnam becomes more thriving and democratic, more ethnic
Chinese would devote their loyalty to Vietnam, but if "Greater
China" becomes one of the most powerful economic and political
8. Ethntc Chtnese tn Vietnam and Their Identity 289

entities in the world, more ethnic Chinese would revert to the

status of an overseas Chinese identity.

Notes
1. The 1989 census of Vietnam found the number of individuals who
identified themselves as ethnic Chinese (known as the Hoa) to be
962,000. See Tran Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Dt;velop-
ment in Vietnam (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993),
pp. 26-27.
2. See Dao Duy Anh. Dat nuoc Vietnam qua cac doi [Vietnam in various
dynasties), Parts I-VII (Hue: NXB Thuan Hoa, 1994); and, Kitai i
Saseiv drevnosti i Sretnic vekok [China and neighbouring countries in
ancient and middle times] (Moscova: Nauka, 1970), pp. 63-66.
3. Nguyen Van Huy, Nguoi hoa tai Vietnam [The Hoa in Vietnam] (Costa
Mesa: Nha xuat ban NBC, 1993), pp. 276-79.
4. See Nguyen Tai Thu, ed., Lich su tu tuong Vietnam [History of Viet-
namese Ideology), Volume 1 (Hanoi: NXB Khoa hoc xa hoi, 1993),
part 1 and 2.
5. Phan ngoc, Van hoa Vietnam va each tiep can moi [Vietnamese culture:
The new approach] (Hanoi: NXB Van Hoa - thong tin, 1994), pp.
106-7, and 117-18.
6. See Nguyen Tai Thu, ed., Lich su tu tuong Vietnam [History of Vietnamese
Ideology), Volume 1 (Hanoi: NXB Khoa hoc xa hoi, 1993), parts 2
and 3.
7. Fujiwara Ruchiro, Chinh sach doi voi dan Trung Hoa di cu cua cac trieu
dai Vietnam [Policies of the Vietnamese dynasties towards Chinese
migrants] (Saigon: Vietnam khao co tap san, 1974), pp. 142-44; and
Nguyen Van Huy, op. cit., pp. 22-24.
8. Tran Khanh, op. cit., p. 17.
9. By 1814, during the reign of Emperor Gia Long (1802-20), the Chinese
bang were legally recognized and authorized to operate publicly From
the later nineteenth century, each bang had its own financial investment
organization, its own chamber of commerce, schools, clinics, etc. At
the beginning of the twentieth century, they organized a Chinese
Regional Grouping administration to represent all the bang. See Tran
Khanh, op. cit., pp. 17-20, 34-36.
10. Dao Trinh Nhat, The luc khach tru va van de li dan vao Nam ky [The
Position of the Chinese Sojourners and Problems of Emigration into
Cochinchina] (Hanoi: Butky Trung Hoa, 1929), p. 4.
ll. See Nguyen Van Huy, op. cit., pp. 279-302.
12. In 1933, a new law was passed by the French permitting Minh Huong
born in Cochinchina, in the cities of Haiphong, Hanoi and Danang,
as well as their children after that date to become a new category of
290 Tran Khanh

French Asian citizens. Those who were born before that date were
considered Chinese nationals or foreigners. See Tsai Maw Kuey, Les
Chinois au Sud - Vietnam (Paris: Bibliotheque National, 1968), pp.
199-200.
13. Tran Khanh, op. cit., p. 28.
14. In 1886, the Chinese bang or "congregations" were legally recognized
by the French and these were used as administrative services and were
given the power to regulate certain matters within their respective
communities. The prerogatives of bang were to settle disputes, handle
matters of immigration, act as guarantee for newcomers, levy taxes,
keep family registration up-to-date and carry out public welfare projects.
See Nguyen Van Huy, op. cit., p. 57; and Tran Khanh, op. cit., p. 34.
15. Nguyen Van Huy, op. cit., p. 57.
16. See Tran Khanh, op. cit., Chapter II.
17. Tsai Maw Kuey, op. cit., pp. 199-200; and Tran Khanh, op. cit., pp.
28-29.
18. In South Vietnam in 1955 there were approximately 621,000 ethnic
Chinese who were Chinese nationals. Three years later that number
decreased to 3,000. By 1961 this number had dwindled to 2,000. This
remaining small number consisted mainly of those carrying the Chinese
nationality conferred by Taiwan. In November 1963, a new nationality
law of the Republic of Vietnam was passed allowing Chinese aliens to
choose Vietnamese or retain their Taiwanese citizenship. See Kotova
T.M., "Kitaiskaia obsina Vietnama- politicheskie orugie v rukac Peking"
[Chinese community in Vietnam - political instrument of Peking], Far
Eastern Issues, No. 4 (1978), p. 105. See also Wu Yuan-Li and Wu
Chun hsi, Economic Development in Southeast Asia: The Chinese Dimension
(California: Hoove Institute Press, 1980), p. 119.
19. Nguyen Van Huy, op. cit., pp. 76-80; Chang Pao-ming, Beijing, Hanoi
and the Overseas Chinese (California: Institute of East Asian Studies,
University of California, 1982), p. 12; and Ramses Amer, The Ethnic
Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Forum,
1991), p. 20.
20. The Hoa in Vietnam. Dossiers, Vol. 1 (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing
House, 1978), pp. 23-24.
21. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
22. Ramses Amer, op. cit., p. 106.
23. "Nguoi Hoa o Vietnam va chinh sach cua Dang ta" [The ethnic Chinese
in Vietnam and our Party$ policies] (Hanoi: National Central Committee
for Mobilization of the Hoa in Vietnam, l l january 1989), pp. 23-25.
24. Ibid., p. 25.
25. See Mac Duong, Xa hoi nguoi Hoa o Thanh pho Ho Chi Minh sau 1975
[The Hoa society in Ho Chi Minh City after 1975] (Hanoi: Social
Science Publishing House, 1994), pp. 174-79.
B. Ethn1c Chinese in Vietnam and Their Identity 291

26. Ibid., pp. 189-98.

2 7. Phan Van Bien, "Ve tinh hinh giao due tieng Hoa hien nay trong cong
dong nguoi Hoa o Thanh pho Ho Chi Minh" [On the situation of
Chinese language education among ethnic Chinese community in Ho
Chi Minh City at present time], Language Education and Development of
Culture of Ethnic Minority Groups in Southern Vietnam (Hanoi: Social
Science Publishing House, 1993), pp. 186-87.
28. See Murray Hiebert, "Cautious re-emergence by ethnic Chinese: Market
test", Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 August 1991, pp. 24-25.
29. Ramses Amer, 'The Chinese minority in Vietnam since 1975: Impact
of economic and political changes", Ilmu Masyarakat, no. 22 (1992),
p. 28.
30. During the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the overseas Chinese in
the Philippines and Indonesia were suppressed by Western colonialists.
In Vietnam during the reign of Tay Son (1792), there was a massacre
of the Chinese in Cho Lon.
31. See Wang Gungwu, China and Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times
Academic Press, 1991), chapters 6 and 7; and Dai Trung Hoa va nguoi
Hoa o nuoc ngoai [Greater China and Chinese abroad] (Thong tan xa
Vietnam. Tai lieu tham khao so 10 va 11, 1994), pp. 33-49.
32. E.S. Ungar, "The struggle over the Chinese community in Vietnam,
1946-1986", Pacific Affairs 60, no. 4 (Winter 1987-1988): 605.
33. Tran Khanh, op. cit., pp. 67-70 and 106.
34. The small number of ethnic Chinese were allowed to leave Vietnam
because the Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of China did not
reach an agreement on how to carry out the operation. Relations between
the two states were soured as a result. See Ramses Amer. The Ethnic
Chinese in Vietnam, pp. 20-21.
35. Tran Khanh, op. cit., pp. 29, 53-73.
36. The United Hoa association for the struggle against imperialism and
colonialism was set up in 1950 by the Viet Minh. The Association of
Patriotic Overseas Chinese was founded by the Chinese Communist
Party in 1948.
37. E.S. Ungar, op. cit., pp. 603-604.
38. Vietnam's dossiers published in 1979, note that some Chinese from the
Peoples Republic of China who had worked in North Vietnam before
1967 were afterwards sent to Cambodia during the Lon Nol era, and
were ordered to go to Saigon in April 1975 after the fall of Phnom
Penh. These agents were sent to organize "Young Red Guards", targeting
ethnic Chinese children, students and teachers. See Su thuc ve quan he
Vietnam - Trung Quae trong 30 nam qua [The facts about Vietnam-
Chinese relationship in the last 30 years] (Hanoi: Bo Ngoai giao, 1979),
pp. 80-81.
39. Ibid., pp. 82-84; and E.S. Unger, op. cit., p. 607.
292 Tran Khanh

40. Mac Duong, op. cit., p. 30.

41. "Phat huytiem nang cua nguoi Hoa trong chien luoc phat trien kinh
te- xa hoi cua Thanh pho Ho Chi Minh 1991-2000" [To utilize ethnic
Chinese resources in the strategy for the socio-economic development
of Ho Chi Minh City in 1991-2000] (Consultative material for the
Mobilization of the Hoa in Ho Chi Minh City, 1992), p. 9.
42. The number of ethnic Chinese who left Vietnam illegally during 1978-
79 and the ODP (Orderly Departure Program) during 1979-91 was
estimated to be 700,000 persons. The number of ethnic Chinese who
left Vietnam illegally during 1975-77 and the 1980s may be between
50,000 and 100,000 persons. Thus, the total number of ethnic Chinese
who left Vietnam from 1975 to 1990 was between 750,000 and 800,000
persons, constituting about 35 to 40 per cent of the total Vietnamese-
born Chinese community abroad. See Ramses Amer, China, Vietnam
and the Chinese Minority in Vietnam, Discussion Paper No. 22 (Center
for East and Southeast Asian Studies. University of Copenhagen,
November 1993), p. 32.
43. Nguyen Van Huy, op. cit., p. 153.
44. Mandy Thomas, "The Vietnamese in Australia: A Demographic and
Socio-economic Profile from the 1991 Census" (Department of
Anthropology, Australian National University), p. 5.
45. Tran Anh Phuong, "Bien mau Viet- Trung va nhung tac dong kinh te
xa hoi" [Vietnam-China border trade and its socio-economic impact].
Kinh te chau A- Thai Binh Duong 2, no. 3 (1994): 28; Vietnam dau tu
nuoc ngoai [Vietnam Investment Review] 138 (28 November 1995): 7.
46. Tran Anh Phuong, op. cit., pp. 27-29.
47. See Pham Van Bien, op. cit., pp. 186-92.
 Comments by
Ta Huu Phuong on
"Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Their Identity"
Presented by Tran Khanh

Dr Tran Khanh's paper 1s mteresting, comprehensive and well-

researched. It traces the historical development of Sino-Vietnamese
relations and the socio-economic activities of the ethnic Chinese
in Vietnam. The paper also gives a historical account of the poli-
cies implemented by the Vietnamese authorities on the Chinese
community in Vietnam and discusses the implications of these
policies.
After reading Dr Khanh's paper and listening to Professor Leo
Suryadinata's presentation of his paper on "Ethnic Chinese in
Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese overseas or Southeast
Asians?" I could not help but note that the various Vietnamese
policies on the ethnic Chinese fit very well into Leos framework
of assimilationist and accommodationist policies.
Over the years these two strategies were used by the Vietnamese
authorities on two main aspects of activities, namely, socio-
economic life and education.
In addition, I note that, invariably, "selective restrictions" were
also imposed from time to time. I will show this by going through
the different periods of Vietnamese history. Let me start off with
the Le dynasty.
l. The Le dynasty (I 428-1592) and the Trinh lords (1592-1777)
practised an assimilationist policy: ethnic Chinese must conform
to Vietnamese customs and traditions including dressing.
Examples of selective restrictions are: the ethnic Chinese were
allowed to live in special zones only; they were not free to
travel within Vietnam; the merchants were heavily taxed; and
people were not allowed to distribute Chinese books and
literature.
294 Ta Huu Phuong

2. The Nguyen dynasty in the south (1592-1777), and later

the Imperial Court of Hue (1802-1945), implemented an
accommodationist policy approach. The ethnic Chinese were
allowed to buy land and houses, to set up social, religious
and business associations. In general, they had the same civil
rights as the Vietnamese, but were exempted from military
service.
Here we must highlight the important contributions of the
ethnic Chinese to the socio-economic development of Vietnam,
such as Trinh Hoai Due and Phan Thanh Gian.
3. After independence in 1954, both North and South Vietnam
adopted an accommodationist policy. The government of the
Republic of Vietnam in the south allowed the ethnic Chinese
to have the same civil rights as the Vietnamese and considered
all Chinese born in Vietnam as citizens. However, the ethnic
Chinese were required to learn Vietnamese in the schools and
to change their names to Vietnamese ones.
In the north the government of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam granted political rights to the ethnic Chinese and
considered them as allies of the regime.
4. During the period after reunification in 1975, the Vietnamese
government first adopted an assimilationist strategy and later
switched to an accommodationist mode.
Khanh attributed the adoption of the assimilationist policy
during the decade 1975-85 to the tense relations between China
and Vietnam (1977-79) and the change from a capitalist system
to a socialist regime in South Vietnam.
Since early 1986, the introduction of doi moi (renovation) saw
a reversal to the accommodationist policy. The ethnic Chinese
have the same rights and obligations as the Vietnamese. They are
allowed to participate in all professions and to teach the Chinese
language within the curriculum given by the government.
An interesting point to note is that, in many instances, the
switch between these two strategies, known in strategic manage-
ment literature as the push-pull approach, sometimes by the same
authorities was practised by various administrations over the past
generations.
Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Their Identity 295

It would be worthwhile to find out whether the switch was

due to external influences (for example, the state of the relationship
with China and neighbouring countries) or to internal influences
(such as the self-realization by the Vietnamese leadership that the
contribution of every citizen of the land is to be appreciated).
 Appendix
Women and Chinese Identity:
An Exchange at the Closing Session
of the Workshop

Towards the end of the workshop, four participants- Mely Tan,

Wang Gungwu, Leo Suryadinata and Tan Chee Beng - discussed
the role of indigenouslperanakan women who married Chinese
men. The discussion is presented below.

Mely Tan
I am wondering why we have not really looked at the role of
women in this whole process. Why have we ignored the role of
50 per cent of the ethnic Chinese that we have been talking about?
In Asian culture, both parents, especially the mother, are the
socializers of the younger generation. To my knowledge, in our
culture in this region, mothers are usually given the task of educating
the young. Now, we seem to have completely forgotten how the
women educate their children in this whole process. That is why
I asked Dr Chiew Seen Kong about his sisters who went to Chinese
language schools, while all his brothers went to English schools.
Women and Ch;nese Identity 297

I was serious about this question but he took it lightly, saying that
there is a problem but did not pursue the point. If I leave this
conference without saying anything about this, I will feel sorry All
my friends who went to China to attend the Beijing United Nations
conference on women will also feel sorry What did we do in this
workshop? We talked about the continuation of cultural change
and ignored completely the role of 50 per cent of the people -
the women. Well, there is no time to remedy this situation but I
think in future conferences, we should really consider this issue.
Thank you.

WangGungwu
I am absolutely delighted that Mely has raised this question. But
the answer may well be unpalatable to the ethnic Chinese - that
is, of all the communities in Southeast Asia, the Chinese are prob-
ably the most male chauvinistic in their cultural tradition. In fact,
Southeast Asians are much more bilateral in the descent line. It is
probably a reflection of how unintegrated the ethnic Chinese are
to Southeast Asian culture that they are still so patriarchal. In a
sense, this is a test because of all the cultures that I know, Chinese
culture is the most strictly patriarchal. Of course, it has been in
a way reinforced by the fact that from the very beginning, it was
mostly men who came to Southeast Asia and they married local
women. If you look at the background of the baba!peranakan
family you will see that the males were able to dominate and
preserve a Chinese identity. The very fact that we see the survival
of these baba!peranakan families is a sign of the "maleness" of the
Chinese tradition itself. When you consider that the mothers were
Southeast Asians, most of their children should have become
Southeast Asians very quickly, if the children followed their mother
tongue and their mother's culture; in a bilateral cultural situation,
this would have been very normal. In many ways, I think that is
what happened in the Philippines, where the indigenous bilateral
line was strong enough. Moreover, with the support of the Catholic
Church, the Chinese males had to identify locally and could not
dictate the adherence to Chinese culture to the same extent as the
baba!peranakan did in Indonesia and Malaysia.
298 Append;)<

I always find it fascinating that in the Philippines, the assimi-

lation of the next generation of ethnic Chinese did not follow the
male line as much as in the Malaysian and Indonesian world. I
think the reason is that in the Philippines the bilateral line descent
tradition is very strong. I mean, you can see even among the
indigenous Filipinos themselves, the tensions between the patri-
local and matrilocal lines. Islam brought a male chauvinistic line
to Malaysia and Indonesia, and so with the male chauvinistic
Chinese culture plus the male chauvinistic Islamic culture, we get
this baba!peranakan kind of community In Vietnam, Thailand or
Myanmar, the women were also stronger in their bilateral descent
relationship and therefore it was just as likely for the product of
a mixed marriage to follow the mother and not necessarily accept
the culture of the Chinese father. That may be one of the reasons
why we do not really hear of the equivalent of a baba!peranakan
culture in Myanmar, Thailand or Vietnam. They could either go
one way or the other but not in between; only in Malaysia and
Indonesia do we have this baba!peranakan community
This relates very much to the question of why in the Philip-
pines it is the other way around. When we look at the mestizo,
few of them really maintain a Chinese ethnic identity There is no
baba!peranakan kind of situation in the Chinese mestizo. Although
people may say they still have Chinese links, they are really Fili-
pinos. The fact that their grandfathers were Chinese is irrelevant
because they were brought up mainly by the mother, or the female
line, with the backing of the Catholic Church, thus ensuring that
they were much more Filipino. So I agree with Mely that the role
of the women should be examined more closely if we have another
opportunity to do so, by tracing the product of intermarriages
where the role of the women have made a difference to the degree
of assimilation and integration. I think that is a very important
point.

Leo Suryadinata
Professor Wang has raised an interesting point on the role of
women in the retention of Chinese identity I remember William
Skinner did a study in the early 1950s, arguing that the marriage
custom of the peranakan in West java followed the indigenous
Women and Ch1nese Identity 299

pattern. It was "matriarchal" as the wedding was held and the

marriage was consummated in the bride's home rather than in the
bridegroom's house.
We do not know their precise identity. It is possible that some
of them became more indigenous but others remained Chinese,
depending on the cultural background of the men. In the twentieth
century, many peranakan women married totok men. The male
chauvinist culture was revived and dominated the peranakan society
again. Perhaps, the preservation of the Chinese ethnic identity
among the peranakan Chinese is also a result of the Dutch "ethnic
separation" policy in java. I don't know. I think more study should
be conducted on this issue.

Tan Chee Beng

Can I add to that? Yes, this is an interesting issue. I do agree with
Professor Wang that the male ideology is quite strong even among
the baba. Among the baba of Malacca, Singapore, and Penang,
there was this phenomenon of matrilocal marriage. This is actually
an expression of male ideology involving the class factor. The
baba were more established, and peranakan women (nyonya) were
very "precious". When a Chinese immigrant wanted to marry a
nyonya from an established family, her father might say to the
future son-in-law, "Well, you have to come in to my family". This
is what I mean by the class factor. So this matrilocal marriage
became established. But there is another factor which Leo raised,
which is important. With the influx of the Chinese migrants, the
baba eventually had to conform to the rules of the non-baba
Chinese. Thus, the baba today do not practise matrilocal marriage
any longer.
In the case of the nyonya, I think they played an important
role in the socialization of identity, in perpetuating the baba or
nyonya kind of culture, in the forms of cuisine, dress, and language,
of course. And the nyonya played an important role in making the
local-born Chinese speak Malay within a generation. But if we
study the subject of cooking, its development really reflects the
traditional male ideology, in that women were expected to stay
at home to cultivate feminine skills like cooking, so as to be
marriageable and to serve men at home.
300 Appendix

Leo Suryadinata
The role of women and ethnic identity is very interesting but we
do not have time to examine it in detail. I hope this topic will be
further explored.
 Index

Abdul Rahman, Tengku 76 Baba 19, 26, 30, 83, 297, 298
Abim 97 Bachtiar, Harsja W 34
Ahmat, Adam 108 Bakom-PKB 56, 58, 59, 60, 67
Aidil Fitri (Idul Fitri) 97 Baladraf, Qomariah (Tan Giok
Ali, Bachtiar Dr 59 Sien) 56
Alien Certificate of Registration Balinese 44, 55, 46
(ACR) 177 Banharn Silpa-archa 12, 255
Almonte, General jose 172 bangsa Malaysia (Malay nation)
Ambonese 44 80, 81, 82, 98, 99, 113, 114
ang pao 44 bangsa Mclayu 82
Angara, Edgardo, Senator 190 Barisan Nasional 96
Anusorn limmanee 260 Barmar (Burman) 121
Anwar, Dato Seri Ibrahim 97 Berjaya Group 78, 103
APEC 58 Bernad, Miguel A. 162
Aquino, Corazon (Cory Aquino) Berroya, Colonel Reynaldo 166
13, 188, 190 Bicolanos 160
Aquino, Ninoy, Senator 188 Binondo 172
Association of Southeast Asian Bouer, Otto 35
Nations (ASEAN) 116, 209, Boworadet, Prince 265
210 Buddhism 12
Atmadjap, Usman 59 Budiyatna, Muhammad 56
Au Lac Kingdom 268 Bukit China (Malaysia) 94
302 Index

bumiputra 6 communism 14
Burma Citizenship Act of 1948 Confucianism 269, 230
136 Cappel, Charles 35
Burma Citizenship Law (1982) Coseteng, Nikki 190
133, 135, 136 Cushman, jennifer 39
Burma Road 118
Burma, the term 14 7 Dahana, A. 66
Dahan Economic Zone 78
Cai Ceng 36 Deklarasi Jimbaran (Bali) 53
Centre for Strategic and Democratic Action Party (DAP),
International Studies (CSIS) 35 89, 94, 95, 105
Chamlong Sri Muang 255 Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Chan, Heng Chee 203 (DRY) 276, 281
Cheng Ho, tomb of 97 Deng Xiaoping 15, 190
Chiew Seen Kong 230 Dewan Pertimbangan Agung
Chifils (Chinese-Filipinos) 203-16 (DPA) 34
Chinese Chamber of Commerce doi moi 14, 278, 294
(Malaysia) 97 Dongjiao Zhong (Malaysia) 93, 100
Chinese Chamber of Commerce double identity 31
(CCC, Thailand) 236, 237, 247 Ducat, jun 1 7l
Chinese Chamber of Commerce Dutch 44
(in Yangon) 140-41
Chinese Chamber of Commerce East Asian Economic Caucus
(Singapore) 229 (EAEC) 77
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Ekran 103
77, 249 Enterprise Nationalization Law
Chinese Consultative Committee (Burma) 126
(CCC) 104 Ethnic Chinese
Chinese diaspora 28, 159 and concepts of nation 4-7
Chinese mestizos 179 and Southeast Asian
Chinese New Year (Lunar New citizenship 7-9
Year) 97, 102 as Southeast Asians 15-19
Chinese Unity Movement 110 definition of 2-4; 25-28
Cho Lon 271 governments' policies towards
Chongqing Agreement 2 74 11-15
Christianity 12 identity and women 296-300
Chuan Leekpai 12, 255, numbers of (Southeast Asian) 2l
Chulalongkorn, King 234, 263, 264 Overseas Chinese and 3
Citizens Action Against Crime Family Name Act (Thailand) 237
(CAAC, Philippines) 207 Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Cold War 1, 15 Chambers of Commerce 163
Index 303

Filipinos of Chinese descent 197 Indochina Communist Party 275

Fumivall, ].S. 156 Indonesia
citizenship and identity of the
Gandhi 209 Chinese in 33-45
General Association of Chinese empirical studies of the
Schools (Philippines) 163 Chinese in 45-50
Gerakan 94, 95 future of the Chinese in 50-54
Gerakan 30 September (G-30-S) Islam and the Chinese in 69
35, 69 Islam and Confucianism 97, 110
Go Bon Juan 187 Islamic Administration Enactment
Go Tik Swan, Hardjono 55 Act 91
Golkar 67 Jahja, Junus 56, 69
Gondomono 49, 57 Jakarta 37
Gotianum, Andrew 209 Javanese 6, 47
Grand Family Association Jiang Zemin 77, 190
(Philippines) 163 jos soli 164
"Greater China" 3 159, 161 jus sanguinis 7-8, 164
Greif, Stuart, 45, 57, 68
Guanyin (Goddess of Mercy) 145 Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran 196
Kalipi 171
Habibie, J .B. 53 Kamunting Corporation 103
Haiwai huaren 26 Kennedy, John F. 204
Hakka 46, 48, 57 Khin Maung Kyi 147
Hamka, Buya 56 Khoo Kay Peng 103
Hasan, Mohamad (Bob) 53 Kua Kia Soong 105
Hoa Lien Association (Vietnam) Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
282 (KLSE) 78
Hong Leong 103 Kuok, Robert 103, 104, 209
Housing and Development Board Kuomintang (KMT) 118, 129,
(HDB) 219 130, 279, 280, 212, 238, 241,
Hua Sian Sin Po 232 245, 246, 248, 249, 256
Huaqiao 2, 3, 181, 273 kungfu 51
Huaren 2, 3, 28, 29 Kusumah, Indradi 56, 59
Huayi 2, 4
Huayii 29 Labour Party 88
Hussein Onn, Dato 92 Le dynasty 271
Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional
Ilocanos 160, 170 (Lemhanas, National Resilience
Immigrant Certificate of Registration Institute) 35, 58
(ACR), Philippines 177 Lemhanas, see Lembaga
Indians 18 Pertahanan Nasional
304 Index

Lee, joseph (of the CASH group) Malay and Chinese relations in
103, 104 82-89; 96-99
Lee Kam Hing 108, 111, 113, 114 Malay character of the state in
Lee Lam Thye 105 89-91
Lee Loy Seng 103 new society of 80-82
Leoni Fatimah (Pak Kiem Lioe) overall picture of the Chinese
56 in 108-11
Li Peng 36 recent Chinese position in
Liem Sioe Liong 104 96-106
Lim, Alfredo (Manila Mayor) 171, Malaysian Business Council
190, 206 Meeting 113
Lim Gaik Tong 79 Malaysian Chinese Association
Lim Goh Tong 103 (MCA) 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90,
Lim Kim Hong 79 91, 92, 94, 100, 101, 102,
Ling Beng Siew, Tan Sri 103 109, 110
Lion Corporation 103 Manchu dynasty 2 79
Lippo Group 104 Mani, A. 228
Loh Boon Siew 103 Mao Zedong 190, 283
Luang Wichit Wathakan 265 Marcos, Ferdinand, President 7,
Lunar New Year (Chinese New 163, 188, 190
Year or Imlek) 43, 68, 97 Masagung (Tjio Wie Thay) 56
McCann-Erickson 183
Mackie, Jamie 35 Medan, Anton (Tan Hok Liang) 56
Mahathir, Dato Seri Mohamad 77, Menadonese 44
78, 80, 81, 91, 92, 96, 97, Merdeka University 93
98, 99, 100, 110, 111 mestizo 4, 7
Makati 172 Minangkabau 44
Malay Chamber of Commerce 97 Minh Huong 272, 273
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) Minh Mang 2 72
75, 76, 77 Multi-Purpose Holdings (MPHB)
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) 92, 93, 110
85 Mursjid, Saadilah 53
Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Mya Than 147
Army (MPAJA) 76 Myanmar (Burma)
Malaysia Burma and 14 7
Chinese response to Malay Chinese and nation-building in
nation 91-96 121-22
development of new nation in Chinese and their identity in
111-14 138-43
economic relations between Chinese economic position in
China and 77-79 122-28; 149-55
Index 305

Chinese immigration to 148 Overseas Chinese Marxist-Leninist

Chinese legal status in 133-38 Youth Union 282
Chinese political position in
128-30 Palang Dharma Party 255
Chinese problem 156 Pancasila 34, 48, 53
Chinese social position in Pangestu, Prayogo 53
130-33 pant hay 115, 119
ethnic Chinese in 117-21 Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia
(Gerakan) 89, 101
Naisbitts, john 38 Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) 91,
Nanjing agreement 274, 280 100, 104, 105
Nanyang University 93 Parti Semangat '46 (New Semangat
nationalization and indigenization Party) 98, 100
policy (Burma) 125 pauk phaws 143
Ne Win, General 8 peranakan 4, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48,
Ne Win, U, 136 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 59, 67,
Nehru 209 83, 297, 298, 299
Pernas 93
New Development Policy (NDP)
People's Action Party (PAP) 89
113
People's Party (of Thailand) 265
New Economic Policy (NEP) 67,
People's Progressive Party (PPP)
90, 102, 112, 113
88, 89
New Era College (Kajang) 100
People's Republic of China l, 10,
New Order 54
11, 15, 17, 33, 36, 37, 45,
Ngo Dinh Diem 274, 275, 280
116, 129, 163, 164, 177, 195,
Ngo Quyen 269
203, 281, 282
Nguyen dynasty 271-73 Permodalan N asional Berhad
Nguyen Trai 270 (PNB) 92
Nguyen Van Thieu 275 Petronas 78, 102
Nio Cwang Chung 56 Phan Thanh Gian 2 72
Niras Sampheng 256 Phibulsongkhram (Prime Minister)
Noer, Rosita 59 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 263,
non-governmental organizations 265
(NGOs) 105 Phileo Allied Group 103
non-pribumi 58, 68 Philippine Citizenship 164
nyonya 299 Philippines
acceptance of the Chinese in
Ohmae, Keinichi 210 the 194-96
Omohundro, john 170 Chinese and Filipino
Onn, jaafar Dato 83 nationalism in the 209
Overseas Chinese Affairs Chinese and nationhood in the
Committee 280 161-66
306 Index

Chinese diversity in the 174-81 Sam Poo Kong temple 46

Chinese integration in the Samals 160
181-94 Sarawak United People's Party
Chinese legal status in the (SUPP) 95, 100
168-74 Satria Utara Enterprise 102
identity of the Chinese in the Seagrave, Sterling 38, 159
196-98 See, Teresita Ang 18, 203
pro-Taiwan and pro-China Seenivasagam 74
Chinese in the 167-68 Sheow Hut-seng 235, 236, 237
Pol Pot 283 Siamese Chamber of Commerce
Prachadhipok, King 240, 245 241
Pribadi, Henry 53 Silalahi, Harry Tjan 34, 56, 59,
pribumi 6, 46, 58, 59, 67, 68, 70, 67
7l Sim Song Thian (Alifuddin El
Promet 103 Islami) 56
Purcell, Victor ll8, 122, 125, Simons, Lewis M. 159
129, 142 Sin, Jaime Cardinal 13
putong hua 29 Sindhunata, K. 56, 58
Pyi Thu Hluttaw 135 Singapore
Chinese demographic change
qiaoling (community leader, in 213-17
Philippines) 174-75 China factor in 223
Quek Leng Chan 103 race riots in 21 7
school and social integration in
Ramadhan 43, 56 218-19
Ramos, Fidel V 172 various identities of the
Razak, Tun 76 Chinese in 228-31
Razaleigh, Tengku Hamzah 93, 98 Singh, Dr Dillon 59
Renan, Ernest 34, 35 Singh, Kapal 74
Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) sinheh 26
177, 178, 195 Sino-Bamar 142
Republic of Vietnam (ROY) 274, Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual
280 Nationality 33
Riots in Semarang 45 Sino-Thai 13
Riots in Solo 45 Smolicz, Jerzy 221
Rizal, Jose 209 Soeharto, President 36, 41, 52, 53
Ryadi, Mochtar 57 Soekamdani 59
Soekarno 34, 35, 45, 67
Saleh, Ismail 36, 37 Soerjadjaja, William 59
Salim Group 104, 210 Soviet Union 14
Salim, Sudano 57 Speak Mandarin Campaign 230
Index 307

State Law and Order Restoration Thean Hou Temple 94, 95

Council (SLORC) 128 "Third China" 159
Straits Chinese 83 Tilman, Robert 168, 183
Subagio, Natalia 59 Ting Pik Khiing 103
Sudarsono, juwono 58-59 Tiong Hiew King 103
Sudwikatmono 53 Tjan Tjoe Siem 55
Suehiro 237 Tjan Tjoe Som 55, 69
Sumatran 6 Torajanese 46
Sun Yat Sen, Dr 190, 209, 235, totok 42, 44, 48, 50, 57, 67
236, 245, 247, 261 Tran dynasty 270-71
Sundanese 44 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation
Supang Chantavanich 232, 260 116
Suryadinata, Leo 1, 25, 203, 296 Trinh Hoai Due 272, 294
Sutomo, jos 56 Tsinong Pinoy 177, 203
Sy, Henry 209 Tsinoys 177,192,203
Tu!ay 192
Ta Huu Phuong 293 Tung Meng Hui 236
Tagalog 6, 18, 170 T'ung yeh kung hui 125
Tan Chee Beng 25, 32, 296 Ty, George 209
Tan Cheng Lock 83
Tan Kah Kee 16 Union of Myanmar 116-17
Tan, Lucio 209 United Malayan Banking
Tan, Mely G. 33, 66, 296 Corporation (UMBC) 93, 95
Tausugs 160 United Malays National
. tayoke ni 130 Organization (UMNO) 84, 85,
tayoke phyu 130 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98,
Teh Soon Seng 103 99, 100, 101, 109, 112
Tengku Abdul Rahman (TAR) United Nations 165
College 102 United States of America (USA)
Teresa, Mother 204 52, 284
Thai Nationality Act (of 1956) 252 Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
Thailand (UKM) 112
Chinese and local citizenship Urban Development Authority
in 251-54 (UDA) 92
Chinese and local nationalism in
233-36; 239-44, 260-65 Velasco, Renata S. 203
Chinese nationalism in 236-39 Vietnam
post-war Chinese identity in China and the integration of
249-51 the Chinese in 278-86
pre-war Chinese identity in Chinese and local nationalism
244-49 in 267-78
308 Index

ethnic Chinese policy of Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020) 80,

293-95 113
general survey of Chinese Weightman, George H. 169
position in 286-89 West Kalimantan 3 7
Vietnamese Communist Party Westmont Holdings 103
277-78 Wijayakusuma, Haji Muhammad
Vietnamese Workers Party 275 Hembing 56
Wild Tiger Corp. 235, 263
Wachirawut, King 232-33, 234, Wilder, WD. 221
235, 240, 260-63, 264, 265 Wing On/Sincere 16
Wan Adil Wan Ibrahim 78 Wong Kam Fu 56
Wan Sidek Hj Wan Abdul Rahim World Hokkien Conference 87
78
Wanandi, jusuf 59 Yayasan Abdul Karim Oei 69
Wang Gungwu 39, 40, 41, 111, "yellow peril" 27, 160
113, 116, 245, 248, 296, 297,
298, 299 Zaide, Gregorio F 173
Warganegara Asing (WNA) 34, Zhongguo ren 3, 29
45, 47, 48, 49 Zielenziger, Michael 159
Warganegara Indonesia (WNI) 49,
54