ae NAMES IU) =e) =15 | A FEARFUL SLAUGHTER Series Design: Dean Essig, Dave Powell Game Design: Dave Powell, Boyd Schorzman Game Research: Dave Powell Map Design: Dean Essig Playtesting and Proof Reading: Dan Cicero, Houndog Cross, Tom DeFranco, Dave Demko, Dave Friedrichs, Dirk Heinz, Chris Heizer, Bob Munns, Chip Pharr, Dave Powell, Thomas Prowell, Boyd Schorzman Artwork and Graphic Design: Dean Essig, Editing and Layout: Multi-Man Publishing, LLC. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Topi 21.0 Terrain and Map Notes 3 2.0General Special Rules 6 .0 Union Special Rules 8 4.0 Confederate Rules 10 5.0 Vietory Conditions M1 6.0 Scenarios 31 Designer's Notes 34 Historical Notes 38 Random Eh INTRODUCTION In April, 1862, the war's true character emerged, While other battles had already been fought, they had all been small af fairs, The resulting casualty lists had been long enough to pro- duce sorrow, but not shock. The news from Pittsburgh Land- ing was altogether different. It was stunning. More than 23,000 men had been killed, wounded, or were missing. Newspapers declared outrage at the loss of life. The London, Times called it "a stupendous slaughter." It was a first glimpse of the size ofthe bill of America's costliest war. Operationally, it was CSA General A.S, Johnston's desperate blow to restore Confederate fortunes in the West, Following the disaster at Ft. Donelson, Johnston felt only a decisive move could destroy the Union army and redeem Tennessee. Ignoring worries over exaggerated reports of enemy strength, Johnston said, “I would attack them if they were a million.” ‘Thus began the battle of Shiloh LCD 7, lhe 2108 Sequence of Play For the purposes ofthese rules, the Phasing Player i the player ‘whose turn isin progress while the non-Phasing Player isthe player \whose tur is noe in progress) First Player Turn Command Phase Order Issue Attack Stoppage Checks Initiative Determination Immediate Orders Attempts Informal Orders Attempts Standard Initiative Attempts Delay Reduction New Order Acceptance Random Event Determination Movement and Close Combat Phase Straggler Recovery Marker placement Movement and Close Combat ‘Ammo Resupply Fire Combat Phase Non-Phasing Player Fire Combat Phasing Player Fire Combat Rally Phase Straggler Recovery Rally Second Player Turn The Second Player repeats the above steps (now as the Phasing Player) Game Turn End Phase Advance the Turn markerA Frarru. SLavaHTEer General Note on Terminology ‘There are three types of die/dice rolls required in A Fearful Slaughter. The first is a single die roll netting a result of 1-6 (indicated in the rules by the term dr). The second is two dice rolled and summed netting a result of 2-12 (indicated in the rules by the term DR). The final type is two dice read with the colored die as the “tens” and the white die as the “ones” net- {ing a result of 11-66 (indicated in the rules by the term D66). Any modifiers applying to a dr are indicated by the term dem while modifiers to a DR are indicated by the term DRM. Play. ers take care to note the correet type of die/dice roll required by the various rules sections, charts, and tables. Exceptions to the rules are indicated in italics within brackets and are preceded by “EXC:”. For example, (EXC: Informal Orders; 2.46]. Examples of play or game mechanics are preceded by “EX:” and are indicated by slightly smaller text 1.0 TERRAIN AND MAP NOTES 1.1 Slopes and Extreme Slopes Three features represent elevation change in the game. The thin contour lines represent simple elevation changes and are not considered Slope hexsides. The thick contour lines are considered Slopes. Crossing one of the thick lines constitutes crossing a regular Slope hexside, while crossing two or more Of the thick contour lines along a single hexside is considered crossing an Extreme Slope hexside. The contour lines are drawn to generally conform to the hexsides, but do not always, ‘cover the entire hexside. It will usually be obvious during the course of movement when contour lines are crossed, and how many apply to a given move, However, in the rare instance ‘were ambiguity exists, a unit's movement can be assumed to follow a straight path from approximate hex center to approxi- mate hex center. There is no additional effect (beyond Ex- treme Slope penalties; see the Terrain Effects Chart) for cross- ing more than two thick contour lines on a single hexside. 1.2 Slope Hexes In addition to the more common hexside elevation, Slope and. Extreme Slope features, there are Slope hexes. Slope hexes, are included to more accurately reflect the effects of a steep hillside on moving troops, especially when moving laterally (e., across) the face of the hill. Slope hexes have no effect on line of sight. The presence of a Slope hex reflects only that there is a steep gradient in the hex and nothing specific about visibility, 2 es FSS 7.03, 1.3 Runs Runs are small in-hex water features provided for historical reference and visual cues for determining terrain elevations They have no effect on play. 1.4 Orchards Any hex that containing > one complete Orchard Tree Sym- bols is an Orchard hex. See CWB Series rule 19.3 for Orchard effects on LOS /EXC: the first (only) Orchard hex in any hex along a line of sight is ignored for purposes of LOS: the sec- ‘ond and all subsequent Orchards affect LOS per CWB 19.36] 1.5 Fields and Fences A Field hex is any hex containing either no Woods or Woods and a Fence. A hex with both Woods and a Fence is consid- cred to be Clear terrain for movement purposes. The Woods within such a hex affects LOS normally. A hex containing Woods (with no Fence) is considered Forest for both move~ ‘ment and LOS. Fences themselves only exist to more clearly depict the boundary between the open field and surrounding trees. Fences have no effect on play. EX: A unit moving fom B40.24 to 839.25 must pay the MP cost for entering ‘Wasa while moving fom BA0.24 to BA. 25 pays Clear MP cot 1.6 Woods and Thickets ‘Thickets are Woods with more dense undergrowth. Units oc- ccupying a Thicket hex suffer a -1 shift when firing, and a -2 shift when checking morale. Note: the -1 shift for fire combat effects the firing unit, not the target Design Note: Shiloh was a well-farmed area, and the normal woods were typical open-range farming style trees. These stands of trees were fairly open with litle undergrowth and relatively easy on troop movement. There were however, a number of areas where the undergrowth had dense, tangled thickets. These areas were much more difficult to move shrough and visibility was somewhat hindered. 1.7Bi All buildings are included for historical reference only, and. have no effects on play. atta btn Hom Te aes, Wap ieA Peakrul SLavenTEer RSS 7.09 1.8 The Tennessee River ‘The Tennessee River is considered impassable to all units EX: gunboats, Union units being ferried: see 1.10]. Partial river hexes are considered both land and river hexes for move~ ‘ment and combat (ie., gunboats may enter riverbank hexes), 1.9 Swamp ‘Swamp hexes represent tangled thickets that, atthe time of the battle, were compounded by the recent heavy rains. Most of the local creeks had overflowed their banks producing a com- bination of dense vegetation and standing water. Any unit at- tempting to exit a Swamp hex must first make a dr <4, On a ddr > 5, the unit(s) must end movement in the current hex. All nits attempting to leave a Swamp hex in a single Movement Phaye must make one combined dr. 1.10 The River Ferry Union units (only) may cross the Tennessee River via river ‘erry. Unit(s) beginning Movement Phase in a River Ferry hex may spend their entire movement allowance and move to the other River Ferry hex. The normal stacking limit of a River Ferry hex is 24 strength points. The river ferry can transport troops in both directions in a single turn 1.11 Camp Hexes (Camp hexes are set up hexes for Union units. The tent symbol in each Camp hex has a specific facing. ALI units associated with that Camp hex must be set up with this Facing only. Oth- erwise, Camp hexes have no effect on play [EXC: random events; 4.6]. 1.12 Map Assembly “There ae two maps in the game. Map Ais the norh map and Map B i the south map. They match along the long axis, ith a Yinch overlap 1.13 Fords ‘A ford exists in all stream hexes also containing a trail. 1.14 Indian Mounds Indian Mounds are included for historical interest only and have no effect on play. 2.0 GENERAL SPECIAL RULES 2.1 Half-Regiments i 21a Designation, Half-regiments are units with a state desig- ‘ation followed by "a" or "b" EX: the 15 Michigan of the Army of ho Tonnosse has wo counts: 15 Mie ‘and 15 Mich b 21b Restrictions and Use. Half-tegiments are treated as sep- ‘arate units for combat and morale purposes. Each unit has its own line on the regimental roster sheets, and is marked off separately on the brigade sheets when wrecked. The two units need not remain adjacent (hut they must remain within com- mand radius of their Brigade commander if they are not). Half-regiments (of the same unit) may always stack together, even in violation of normal stacking rules. No other unit may stack with the two units if doing so would violate normal stacking rules. Half-regiments may merge with each other Half-regiments may only merge with their other halves, and only if stacked together at the beginning of the Movement Phase. Remove one unit and add its strength to the other unit, Units may not merge if it would increase the surviving unit's strength to more than the printed strength, or if either unit had enough stragglers so that the recovered total would be larger than the printed strength. Once merged, the units may not sub- sequently *split apart.” Design Note: A number of regiments were nearly full size at Shiloha rarity in Civil War Battles. Given their numbers, ‘many would occupy two full hexes while in line formation. Rather than introduce extended lines into RSS, these units hhave been broken down into sub-units for ease of play. 2.2 Alternate Orders Types In addition to the normal methods of command, there are two alternate sets of orders available to both players. The first are Immediate Orders (issued via special army commander init tive, and an exception to CWB 10.2.c), and the second are In- formal Orders (issued via a form of brigade commander ini- ‘iative). Attempting to issue either type of alternate order is considered the equivalent of an initiative attempt for the pur- poses of CWB 10.2.. 2.2a Immediate Orders. Army commanders issue Immediate (Orders using a modified form of initiative (CWB 10.2), Aemy commanders receive initiative on a dr less than or equal 10 their printed rating (anti-inititive is NA). A dr of 6 results in the possibility of a loose cannon—make a subsequent dr, a re- sult of 1-3 results in a loose cannon, any other result is no ef fect. Army commanders may attempt this type of initiative (only) once per brigade commander currently in its hex.A FearruL SLav¢HTER ‘An army commander receiving initiative may use it only 10 give an Immediate Order to any one brigade commander (pre- designated prior to the attempt). Immediate Orders can only be given to brigade commanders—all orders to corps and divi- sion commanders must come via the normal orders process. ‘An army commander may attempt Immediate Orders once per brigade commander in its hex per Command Phase (each brigade commander may be subject to only one attempt per Command Phase). Immediate Order attempts do not use com- mand points and must be made before all other non-Immedi- ate Order initiative attempts. Immediate Orders are considered Brigade Goals and may not be conditional on other orders or circumstances (e.g., an order for Brigade A to attack when Brigade B attacks or moves is an invalid Immediate Order). Loose cannon results from Immedi- ate Order attempts effect any one brigade in the hex (enemy player's choice if more than one is stacked with the army ‘commander when the loose cannon result is rolled). EX: Beauregard begins tbe Command Phase stacked with Glade, Gibson and Pood tre of his bigade commanders), Beauregard attempts to ssve a Immediate Onde to Pond. The Immediate Order de isa 6 (possibility of & Joos cannon) with a subsequent dr of 5 (no loose cannon), Beauregard the, moms ssue an Tmmedite Onder to Gibson. The Immediate Order drs 1 resulting ina sucessful Immediate Onde. Tae CSA player writes @ new Brigade Goal for Gibson (which is immedstely accepod). Finally, Beaure- tard atempts an Immediate Onder for Gladden. The Immediate Order drs note 6. this ie witha subsequent de of 2 (esuling in a loose cannon). The Union payer chooses Gibson asthe loose cannon. Pond nd Gladden re not affected by the lose cannon esl. 2.2b Informal Orders. Any brigade commander beginning a Command Phase stacked with 2 1 unit from his brigade may attempt to issue an Informal Order. Brigade commanders may rake only one Informal Orders attempt per unit per Com- ‘mand Phase, each unit must be checked separately and may only be subject to one Informal Orders attempt per Command Phase, and all Informal Orders attempts must be made before any standard initiative attempts (CWB 10.2). Informal Order tempts sueceed only on a dr < the leader's initiative rating RSS 25.0). If successful, mark the unit with an Informal Orders marker. So long as the unit does not expend movement points [EXC: ‘on the turn itis assigned Informal Orders a unit may move the extent of its movement allowance (ignoring normal command radius restrictions), and units under Informal Orders may al- ‘ways use movement points to change formation), it ignores command radius, new orders applying to it's parent brigade, or ‘any ECRs that the parent might be forced to make. SS 7.03, Any unit marked with Informal Orders expending movement points (other than on the turn it us marked with an Informal Orders marker; see above) loses its Informal Orders status (re- ‘move the Informal Orders marker) and all regular command and movement rules apply immediately [EXC: if assigned new Informal Orders]. EX: Ammen (with a leader ating of 23) begins the Command Phase sacked ‘ith 24 Obi and9 Ind The Union player ad desires 0 ise fra Or- der to both nis, The Informal Orders drs ae 2 and (Fo the 24 Ohio and 9 Ind vespectively). The 24 Ohio is marked wit an Informal Orders muvker an the 9 Ind is not 24 Ohio may now move its full movement allowance inthe ‘upcoming Movement Phase without being restricted by command rads. The D fod doesnot receive Informal Odes his turn (though may ty sain in a fre toni t begins the Command Phase sacked with Ame) and aust rermin within command rave normally, 24 Ohio moves int blocking o> ‘don and changes formation to line. Once the 24 Ohio ends ts movemett for this turn ic may move not again aed retain its Informal Orders status except to change formation (Remember, Morale Table and/or CC reteas donot x pend movement points and therefore would not force removal of the Informal ‘Orders marker). Ammen could ie tothe 24 Oo and issue ansber set of le formal Onders i desired (even if 24 Obio is sll under he previous Informal (Orders ache. 2.3 Attack Stoppage ‘Attack stoppage checks are made for all orders groups indi- vidually. For example, if Sherman's Division of four brigades hhad three separate orders (such as a divisional order to attack with two brigades to re-capture Shiloh Church and two Brigade Goals to MeDowell and Stuart to assault separate ob- jectives), each turn, Sherman would have to make three sepa- rate attack stoppage checks—one for the division order, and ‘one for each Brigade Goal Brigades check for attack stoppage as divisions of one brigade. Thus, a wrecked brigade checking for stoppage ‘would roll on Table Three. Use the brigade commander's ini- tiative rating for stoppage checks. All formations failing an at- tack stoppage check revert to no-orders status. Design Note: In the CWB Series rules, a division under Divi- sional goals can revert to the Corps order voluntarily simply by moving back into command range of the Corps comman- der. This mechanic offers a loophole to players who find them- selves hampered by the divisional orders at start, oF who want to circumvent various divisional attack stoppages. In the RSS Series rules, a new section closes this loophole by more clearly defining no-orders status for these units. As noted above, now only units with valid orders to do so (or initiative) may rejoin an attack or let a divisional/brigade goal lapse. At Shiloh, this status applies equally to brigades that have failed stoppage cheeks or fulfilled orders conditions. ata Rta. Th ae: ly rpc se 8A FEanrul SLAUGHTER FSS 7.03 2.4 Withdrawal from EZOCs Any unit that leaving an EZOC must check morale before it begins moving. A BL, SH, DG, or R result is marked appro- priately, but it may not move except to retreat as required by the morale table (EXC: BL unit(s) may enter CC with one unit whose EZOC it occupied at the start of the Movement Phase]. Design Note: Withdrawing a formed unit under fire was a complex business, and all but beyond the skills of many of the ‘raw troops and commanders at Shiloh. Retreating in the face of the enemy vas likely to dissolve into chaos, and did so in several instances. This rule recreates the difficulties in con- ducting controlled retreats. 2.5 Rout and Stragglers Any infantry or cavalry unit failing to rally (CWB 24.5) suf- fers an immediate 1 straggler loss. 2.6 Random Events Too much of what occurs in « Civil War battle lies beyond the realm of predictability. At Shiloh this was especially true, aiven the raw nature of both the troops and the commanders. In order to introduce a number of these events to the game table in a suitably chaotic manner, a Random Events Table for ceach side is included on map A. 2.6a Checking for Random Events (RE). At the end of each friendly Command Phase, make a DR on the phasing side's Random Events Table (« DR 2 9 indicates « RE may occur— ‘make a subsequent DR to determine which RE occurs). Apply any result(s) immediately. Since random events occur last in the Command Phase sequence—this means that although leader casualties will nt affect atack stoppage rolls until next turn (they have all been made for the current turn), nothing can be done about « Random Event imposed attack stoppage until next turn atthe eariest) 2.6b Random Events and Scenarios. All scenarios use ran- dom events, though not all events will apply to all scenarios. If a RE is rolled that doesn't apply, treat that result as No Event. 2.6c Random Events and Leader Loss. When leader loss is called for by a Random Event Table, only leaders actually in Play at the time of the event, brigade commanders < 4 hexes, from an enemy unit, division commanders s 8 hexes from an enemy unit, and corps or army commanders anywhere on the ‘map may be selected, Design Note: some players will pursue personal vendettas against specific leaders when the any chance arises, In order to prevent this kind of assassination, we suggest that no single Matting LLC Hepane,Se Aeme 208 enemy leader may be targeted for a Random Event leader loss a second time until all currently eligible leaders have been targeted at least once. This does not imply that no leader can be targeted twice until ALL leaders on the board have been targeted once, only that of those currently exposed, all ‘must have been selected as potential losses at least once. 2.6d Random Event Target Selection. Some Random Events call for a choice among attacking divisions, or among various leaders. In each case, randomly determine the final unit(s) f= fected. Any convenient means may be selected so long as each division/leader/ete. has an equal chance of being selected, 2.6e Attack Stoppage RE. RE Attack stoppage results have no effect on Defensive Onlers or any order not yet accepted. 2.7 Breastworks No units may build breastworks 2.8 Surrender Any DG or R unit completely surrounded by enemy units and/ot EZOCs receiving a retreat result immediately surrea- ders. Mark off all remaining strength points as permanent losses, Friendly units negate enemy Zones of Control for this purpose, Surrendered units may not be recreated by recover- ing stragglers Design Note: The confusing nature of the battle combined With the relative inexperience of the men and their comman ders resulted in a number of units being captured outright. Often the units simply did not realize that they were in danger ‘and attempted to retire too late. Other times, men were 100 ex- hausted to fight on and lay down their arms. Later battles would show much more mature battlefield commanders and soldiers. Though the number of units surrendering en masse dropped to almost zero, the bloodshed did not—both sides were learning how to fight. 2.9 Camp Re-Supply In addition to normal supply rules (RSS 28.4), units may at- tempt resupply in camp hexes. Units of both sides may use camp hexes for resupply. Any unit beginning a friendly Move- ‘ment Phase in/adjacen-to a camp hex (not also containing an enemy unit) desiring to attempt resupply must make a de. A result of I results in the Low/Out-of Ammo marker being re- moved. A result of 6 causes 1 straggler loss tothe attempting unit, All other results are no effect. Each unit must be done separately, no unit may make more than one attempt per turn, and all attempts must be made before any unit making an at tempt expends movement points. Resupply attempts may be done if eitherrboth the unit and camp hex are in an EZOC.A Fearru. SLaveHTER 3.0 UNION SPECIAL RULES 3.1 Army Command Ee Grant is the overall Union commander. In scenarios where Grant is not (yet) in play, no Union division commander as- sumes command, In these cases, only individual initiative may bbe used to provide new orders or alter existing orders, No unit commander may use initiative to give orders to a unit or com- ‘mander outside of his normal command span [EXC: Informal Orders; 2.2b]. If Grant arrives and is subsequently killed or wounded, the senior surviving division commander in play (see the officer seniority list) assumes command and may {issue orders as an army commander. 3.2 Divisional Command “There are no Union Corps. Each division is considered a sepa- rate command and the army commander (normally Grant) is- sues orders directly to the division commander, Each division HQ is treated as a Corps HQ similar to RSS Rule 10.5b, 3.3 Attachments 33a Divisions, No division may be attached to another divi- 3.3b Brigades. Up to one brigade of any division may be at- tached to another division. Brigades may be given Brigade Goals (RSS 10.5). 3.3¢ Other Units. Combat units exist as part of three eche- Tons; brigade, division, and army. Units may only be reas signed or detached as outlined below. (a) Units assigned to a brigade may not be reassigned or given Brigade Goals. They may be given Infor- smal Orders (2.26) (b) Units assigned to directly 10 @ division (ie. they have no brigade affiliation) trace command to their Division HQ. Divisional infantry regiments may be assigned 10 any brigade within their division. To do so, the units must begin a friendly Command Phase stacked with their division commander. From that point on, treat the regiment as a permanent part of tat brigade (je, it taces command radius to the new brigade commander, ete). Once assigned, such units may not later be reassigned. Artillery and Cavalry units may trace command to any brigade commander within their division, and need not be re-assigned 10 do s. SS 7.08, (©) Units with neither a brigade nor divisional affitia- tion may be assigned to any division. To do so, the units must begin a friendly Command Phase stacked with either the appropriate division com- mander or with the army commander. The army commander, if used, does not write any orders or expend Command Points t make this reassign- ment, Infantry assigned in this matter may not later be reassigned (EXC: to a brigade in the new divi- sion; see (b) above]. Antillery units may be freely reassigned as desired. If not currently assigned (0 any other unit, army troops are considered in com- mand if they are within 6 hexes of AS5.14, Army units tracing command to ASS.14 are automatically considered to have a defensive order to defend Pittsburgh Landing, (@) In all cases, the scenario special rules take prece- dence over the rules contained in (a)-(c) 3.4 Union Supply ‘RTeam -~ ‘Trains The Army of the Tennessee has two supply wagons and one tain. The Army of the Ohio has one supply wagon and one train, Any wagon or train may supply any unit ofthe appropri ate army. In addition, the Pittsburgh Landing hex functions as a supply source for both Union armies. 3.5 Union Alert ‘The wo Alert Schedules below indicate the units which be- come fully active (in game terms). In all scenarios using an historical CSA set up, use the Historical Alert Schedule. In scenarios allowing a free CSA set up, use the Optional Alert ‘Schedule, Any unit not activated by the Alert Schedule is non ‘Alert [EXC: a non-Alert unit immediately becomes alert fol- owing resolution of any fire attack conducted against it, after defending in a close combat attack, or when it has LOS 10 any ‘enemy unit within 2 hexes]. Historical, Aer ScHEDULE Turn Unir(s) At start Powell/L/6/T 6:15 am, 21 MofI/6/T, 16 lowa/6/T 15 Mich/A Tenn 630 am, v6rt 645 a.m, 53 Ohio/3/S/T 7S am. 3/5/T, rest of 6/T 7:30am, Remainder of 5/T 8:00 am, Any one division 8:30 am. Any one division 9:00 a.m. All remaining units ue Res ont Ca Qty Wai 3,A Fearrul SLaveaTER ASS 7.03 Ornionar. Ateer ScHepuLE ‘Turn Unis) At Start Any 1 Rgt of 6T 6:15am, Any 3 Ret 6:30am, Any 1 Bde of S/T or 6/T 645 am. Any 1 Ret 75am. Any 2 Bdes of 1/1, 5/T, and/or 6/T 730m. Remainder of S/T and 6% 8:00 am. Any 1 Division 830m, Any 1 Division 9:00 a.m, All remaining units All times listed are for April 6th. 3.5a Effects of being non-Alert. (a) Non-Alert units must face the direction indicated by their camp symbol (ie., facing must be the same di- rection as the tip of the tent). (b) Non-Alerted units defend normally and can con- ‘duct defensive fire through frontal hexes, (©) Non-Alert units may neither move nor change fac~ ing. (4) Non-Alert units suffer an additional -6 column shift when checking morale when fired upon (note, this cffect will occur only on the fist fire atack—they will be Alert for any subsequent attacks) Design Note: Despite a great many waming signs, the Union Anny was strategically surprised at Shiloh. On the tactical level, this surprise had litle effect, however: Instances of units simply being overrun by an unexpected enemy force were practicalty nonexistent. Mast units had sufficient preparation to fallin and form up before the attack was upon them. 3.6 Gunboats i Gunboats have an unlimited movement allowance, may only ‘move into or through river or riverbank hexes, and may attack enemy units via direct fire support (and also interdict straggler recovery; see below). A gunboat may fire at any unit in LOS as if it were an artillery battery (EXC: gunboats do not use ammunition, but are marked Low Ammo on any unmodified combat resolution DR of 11 or 12 during resoluion of an at- tack using any portion of a gunboats firepower; any gunboat receiving a second Low Ammo result is immediately removed rom play]. Additionally, no enemy unit may recover strag- eles if it is within 25 hexes of a gunboat (regardless of LOS). Gunboats never check morale, never suffer losses, and cannot Sa Rt LLC 3 Hage De, 7. Nee M208 be destroyed (though they may be removed if they run out of| ammunition; see above). Any unit fired on by a gunboat re- ceives an automatic -6 morale modifier applied tothe ensuing morale check. A gunboat may conduct a close combs attack Ys. an enemy unit in a riverbank hex by moving into that riverbank hex and following the normal Close Combat se- ‘quence [EXC: the gunboat does not check morale, the defend: ing unit checks morale at -10, no CC Odds Table dr is re quired —the gunboat always wins). Design Note: The seemingly invincible gunboats will have ‘only a limited effect on play. Seldom indeed will the foolish CSA unit stray to the river bank while a gunboat is patrolling the river. Ina practical sense, the gunboat rules serve to limit the freedom of movement of CSA units to prevent odd encir- cling movements along the river. Additionally, the Low Ammo procedure reflects the need for the gunboats to occasionall refill their stacks of ammunition. 3.7 Union Minor Variants 3.7a Wallace is on time, Lew Wallace and his division arrive ‘when Grant expects them. At Noon, April 6th, the entire 3/T division arrives at either entry hex G or H (Union player's choice), At 11:00 a.m. April 6th, the Union player must write aan order for the 3/T division. (Note that this order is written 1 hhour before Wallace arrives.) This order is considered imme- diately accepted, costs no orders points, and applies only to 3/T. This option costs 6 VP. Design Note: Wallace’s march is one of the great controver~ sies of the battle. Grant blamed Wallace for being late, Wal lace claimed that he was only marching for the flank of the ‘army where he thought he was needed. Whatever the truth, the end result was the loss of an entire division for the first day of Jfighting. This option assume that Grant's orders were more precise, and no time was lost counter-marching. As a lower-cost alternative to this entry, the Union player may leave the entry of 3/T to chance. Beginning with the Noon, April 6th turn, make a D66. On a result of 64-66, The 3/T di- vision enters play (randomly determine whether it enters at hex H or G). Upon arrival, the Union player must immediately write an order for 3/T, which is automatically accepted, costs ‘no points, and applies only to 3/T. If the location is G, the ‘Union player may instead choose to switch the arrival to entry area H, but with an automatic delay of 16 turns. This option costs only 3 VP. Design Note: This alternative is really designed to preserve the uncertainty that Grant felt. He spent most of the day ex- ecting Wallace momentarily. With a random entry, it is as likely that Wallace will arrive even later, so let the Union be: ware in using this option.A FEARFUL SLAUGHTER 3.7b All of 3/T Arrives. When the 3/T division arrives, allow all the optional units to enter with their appropriate com- ‘mands. The divisional troops enter with the HQ. This option costs 1 VP, Design Note: Several units were left to guard Crump's Land ing when Wallace marched. Wallace could have chosen to take his whole command, not wanting to leave such a small force exposed to capture 3.Je Sherman wakes up. Accelerate the Union Alert Sched- ule. Use the Optional Alert Schedule (regardless of CSA setup) and Double the number of units alerted each turn. This option costs 10 VP. EX: On he 6:15 am-aur, three regimens would normaly be alered. Using this option, sx egiments would be alerted. At 7:30 am. in adtion to the rast of S/T and 6/7, any one aidonal division canbe alerted, and at 8:00, dum, any wo divisions can be aletd Design Nowe: Sherman came under heavy criticism for his in- adequate preparations, He refused to accept early reports that the enemy was near until he finally was fired upon himself. Once engaged, of course, he did an outstanding job. The army could have been prepared much sooner to meet the Rebel ad- vance, had he heeded the warning signs available. 3.74 Buell Brings it AM. When Buell arrives, the rest of the Army of Ohio optional forces arrive with him. 15/6/0 Brigade arrives with Wood at 2:00 p.m. April 7th, 1/0 Division arrives at 6:00 am. April 7th, ¥O Division arrives at 8:00 a.m, April 7th. The Union player may choose to bring on part oF all of each Division, Each optional brigade of the Army costs 2 VP. Division leader, division HQ. and troops for UO and 3/0 enter ano additional VP cost when atleast one brigade of their di- vision enters play. Design Note: A large number of Buel's troops were either act ing as rear area garrisons or were simply unable to reach the {field in time. The seven additional brigades this option brings ‘are a powerful force, mitigated by the fact shat they arrive on the 7th. 3.7e Night or Buell. Ignore the historical entry times for all Army of Ohio units except Buell and the Army of Ohio HQ, Instead, at the start of each friendly Command Phase, the Union player makes a DR on the following table. A result Within the range indicated allows the Army of Ohio to enter. Beginning with next hour turn, any one division of the Army of Ohio is available for entry. Each turn thereafter, the Union player may land up to 24 strength points of Army of Ohio ‘oops at Pittsburgh Landing. Each hour turn thereafter, one additional division of the Army of Ohio is available for land: ing (the 24 strength point per turn limit still applies). Units in ‘excess ofthe limit are held off-map until they can enter. ssn sn ting Le SS 7.03 Te D6 Before 3:00 p.m. April 6th 66 3:00 pm. 07:45 p.m. April 6th 65-66 8:00 p.m. to Midnight, April 6th 64-66 ‘Any turn on April 7th 61-66 Orders: The first arriving division is ordered to move to ASS.14 and defend within 8 hexes of that hex. All other divisions are to report to army HQ and await further orders. This option costs a variable number of VPs, depending on when exactly the Army of Ohio arrives. For each hour (or por- tion thereof earlier than 5:00 p.m. the army arrives, the CSA, player receives 2 VP. For each hour (or portion thereof) after 10:00 p.m, thatthe army arrives, the Union player receives 1 YP. Note, this option ean be combined with 2.7d above, pay ing the appropriate costs to each side as required EX: Ifthe army of Ohio aived at 1:15 pm. Apel tb, this would give the CSA player 8 VP for being 3 hours and 4S minis cal. Ifthe Acmy arrives 1-445, this would stil give the CSA player 2 VP, for being pst of an hour carly, Design Note: Buelt's advance was delayed by many factors, not the least of which was the bridging of the rain-swollen Duck River. By April Sth the lead elements of the army had made finally made contact with Grant near Savannah Nonetheless, the overall timing was still very iffy. For exam- le, had Johnston managed a better march from Corinth, they ‘might have attacked a day early. That would have likely meant ‘no Buell at Shiloh. 4.0 CSA SPECIAL RULES 4.1 On-Map Army Command Beauregard is the overall CSA commander (EXC: if Beaure- ‘gard is notin play; Johnston is the army commander]. When- ever both Johnston and Beauregard are in play, Johnston may issues orders only by Army Commander Initiative (2.2). If Beauregard is killed or wounded, Johnston immediately ss- sumes command of the army. 4.2 Johnston Johnston bas two ratings. The first rating is used for all orders functions, including Army Commander Initiative, The second. rating is used for any morale modifiers and rout recovery rolls, At the beginning of any CSA Movement Phase, the CSA. player may declare Johnston to be Leading a Charge, For the duration of the CSA turn, Johnston may use his morale bonus4 Feanrut SLaventer —$<—<—— ass703 ‘on any unit(s) in or adjacent to his hex. Once a this bonus is declared > 1 CSA unit/stack must move adjacent to an enemy unit. Any unit receiving Johnston's Leading a Charge morale bonus subjected to enemy fire must make check for Leader Loss (CWB 25.4) for Johnston even if Johnston is not in the hex and regardless of whether or not casualties were sus. tained. 4.3 Unit Attachment 43a visions. No division may be attached to another corps, 4.3b Brigades. No brigade may be attached to another divi- sion or corps. Brigades may be given Brigade Goals. 4.3e Army Troops. Army troops may be assigned to divisions and brigades as described in 2.3c, may be given Informal Or- ders, or may be given orders directly by the army commander, If not currently assigned to any higher unit, they may not 4.4 CSA Movement Restrictions No CSA infantry unit may enter column or use road move- ment before 9:00 am. on 6 April. No CSA Cavalry unit may ‘move adjacent to or fire on any non-alerted Union unit 4.5 The S/2/1 Brigade ‘S/2/1 Brigade has two commanders. When the Brigade enters play, Stephens is in command, and acts in all ways as a nor mal brigade commander, He remains in command of $/2/1 tuntil he either a) becomes a casualty or b) Maney arrives and ‘moves within command radius of the brigade. If Stephens be comes a casualty before Maney arrives, he is replaced with a normal repl Ieader (who is then removed when Maney arrives ind moves within command radius of the division). Once Maney arrives, Stephens relinquishes command of the brigade, but remains in play and can use his leader rating for all morale benefits for any unit in the brigade with which he is stacked, 4.6 CSA Minor Variants 4.64 No Movement Restri ‘costs 5 VP. ons. Delete rule 4.4, This option Design Note: This option assumes that the CSA did a much better job of scouting the Union positions and the local road network, This option tends to lead 10 a great deal more Union troops being surprised in their camps (i.e,, non-Alert. int Pig LLC Hebe 87 Mei 200 4.6» Free CSA Deployment. The CSA Player may set up his starting units anywhere southwest of the line B6.13-B13.01 line inclusive). The historial setup for Scenario 6.9 provides the exact line (hex by hex). Units may be in any formation, but are still subject to the restrictions of 4.4 /EXC: if also using option 4.6a}. This option costs 6 VP, Design Note: Most experts agree thatthe initial CSA troop de- ployments greatly exacerbated tactical confusion and all but ‘guaranteed that unit cohesion would be lost when the line ad- vanced. This option allows players more freedom to use deep columns and better tactical control for effective corps orders implementation. 4.6c Fort Donelson Garrison. Beginning with the 8:00 a.m, 6 April turn, the CSA player must make a DR at the start of every Command Phase. On a DR > 10, all units of F Corps. ‘may enter at entry area A on the next CSA Movement Phase. F Comps enters with orders to report to the Army HQ and await further orders (alternatively, the Rebel Player may choose to enter F Corps at 1:00 PM. April 6th). Some, none, or all of F Corps may enter once activated by the above DR. Each Brigade entering play costs 2 VP EXC: I/E/F and 2IF cost | VP each]. The CSA Player may replace Floyd with Buckner by paying an additional 3 VP. If this change in leaders is conducted, Wharton commands Floyd's division while Buckner would command both the Corps and his divi Design Note: These units represent the remaining troops of the Ft, Donelson garrison. Had the aftermath of Ft. Donelson been less extreme, these units could have easily been reorga- nized in time for use at Shiloh, 4.6d Army of the West, Beginning with the 1:00 p.m. 6 April turn, the CSA player must make a DR at the start of every ‘Command Phase. On a DR > 10, The Army of the West enters con the next CSA Movement Phase. The Army of the Westen: ters with orders to move to the Army HQ and await further oF ders, Alternatively, the Army of the West enters automatically ‘on the 6:00 p.m. 6 April turn. Some, none, or all of the Army ‘may enter once activated by the above DR. Each Brigade that centers play costs 2 VP [EXC: Pike's brigade costs 1 VP]. The Army of the West is considered Corps for all purposes, not an army, and Van Dorn does not function like an army com- ‘ander in any way. Design Note: This is perhaps the most speculated ‘what-if of Shiloh, Van Dorn's self-styled Army of the West could have ap- eared on the field had a great number of circumstances gone exactly right 4.6e Island #10 Abandoned. Beginning with the 6:00 am. 6 April turn, the CSA player must make a DR at the start of ‘every Command Phase. On a DR 2 10, MeCown's Division (M Division) enters play on the next CSA Movement Phase.A Feanrul SLaveHTer McCown's Division enters with orders to move to the Army HQ and await further orders. Alternatively, MeCown’s Divi- sion enters automatically on the 10:00 a.m. 6 April turn. ‘Some, none, or all of the division may enter once activated by the above DR. Each Brigade that enters play costs 2 VP, Design Note: Island Number 10 was near New Madrid, Mis- souri. Fort Pillow was some 40 miles north of Memphis on the Mississippi River. Both of these outposts held garrisons that could have made it to the battle had they been called upon while the army was preparing to move. 5.0 VICTORY CONDITIONS Unless specified by the specific scenario information, use the schedule of VP awards below. Each player totals his victory points for enemy losses, cap- tured terrain, enemy wrecked formations, and special awards for lost batteries, leaders, or wrecked cavalry units, Subtract the CSA total from the Union total to produce the final VP Tally (which may be a negative number). Consult the victory conditions for the specific scenario to determine the level of victory, ‘All losses are cumulative. For scenarios that start after the be- ginning of the battle, pre-scenario losses are listed as well as, any wrecked units. All of these losses count for victory, and should be added into the total losses for the scenario, 5.1 Terrain Capture VP In order to claim VP for a hex, the player must have been the last side to occupy the hex with @ non-Routed combat unit (leaders and supply trains/Wwagon are not considered combat units). Control of a field is defined as having no non-Routed enemy combat unit(s) in any hex(es) of the field, while > 1 cone friendly non-Routed combat unit occupies a hex of the field. Control VP are determined only at scenario end unless specified otherwise. In scenarios only using one map, only VP hexes forthe map in play are considered. CsA Hi ‘Awanp A402 2 AZT A362 ASLI2 46.14 AS0.13 AS6.12 43.05 BS5.01 BI218 BI9.29 ‘UNION ‘Awano Ass 7.03 CSA Usiox Hex: AwaRD AwaRn B22,32 3 2) 831.05 5 B35.25, i 1 1835.33, 2 1 B38.30 1 I 42.26 1 i Ba4.27 1 1 48.22 1 1 5.2 Casualty VP Each side receives victory points for losses inflicted on the enemy. Each loss should be recorded on the track with the ‘markers provided. In scenarios that start with Previous losses, record those losses on the track before play begins. Only per ‘manent losses count for VPs, not stragglers. VPs are awarded as shown below, with Union VPs awarded for CSA losses and vvice versa. Each enemy battery eliminated is worth /s VP. ve CSA Union Awanp Losses’ Losses 0 0-40 0-50 I 41-75 51-85 3 76-105 86-120 6 106-140 121-160 9 141-165 161-190 12 166-180 191-225 16 81-205 226-260 20 206-235, 261-300 4 236-260 301-335, 28 261-285 336-370 32 286-320 371-405 36 321-350 406-440 41 2351 2441 4 Ifthe CSA player enters 2 72 Optional nis, se the Union Losses columa to determine VP awards for CSA lowes 5.3 Wrecked Formation VP Wrecked brigades, divisions, and corps result in VP for the enemy. Each wrecked brigade and each wrecked cavalry unit (regardless of size) is worth 1 VP to the enemy. For the pur- poses of wrecked status determination, stragglers and perma nent casualties count, In addition, the CSA player receives VP for wrecked Union divisions and the Union player receives VP for wrecked CSA corps and divisions based on the follow- ing table. ate stn eT Gey Nap 10A Fearru. SLaven Ter SS 7.09 CSA VP for Wrecked Divisions: 1 Tenn - 2 VP 2 Tenn - 2. VP 3 Tenn-2 VP 4 Tenn -2 VP 5 Tenn-2 VP 6Tenn- 1 VP 1 Ohio - 2 VP 5 Ohio 6 Ohio- 1 VP 1vP Union VP Wrecked Corps or Divisions: 1 Corps - 3 VP 2 Comps-4 VP 3 Comps - | VP Res Corps - 1 VP West - 4 VP. F Corps -4 VP M Division -1 VP 6.0 SCENARIOS ‘A setup designation of 10 indicates that all noted units begin the scenario marked with an Informal Orders marker (2.2b), 6.1 Stuart's Brigade (One of Sherman's Brigades fought a lonely battle, far from the rest of the division, Separated from their parent command by Prentiss’ men, the three regiments of Stuart's Brigade made a desperate stand south of the Peach Orchard, and ever after ‘ward felt they had saved the army from destruction, This is an ideal introductory scenario, General Information Map Area: Map B, south of XX.25 and east of 46.XX_ First Turn: 11:30 a.m. Last Turn: 1:00 p.m, Total Turns: 7 First Player: CSA. Union Information Set Up: 2US/T Brigade ‘4 Ohio—B56.16 Stuart, 55 II—BS1.20 71 Ohio—B49.21 Orders: 2/S/T is to defend the Larkin Bell Field and prevent a Confed. erate advance up the Hamburg Road. Mi tn Rtg LLC Heute 7 Nw ML 218 ul Artillery Ammunition: Unlimited Previous Losses: None Wrecked Regiments: None Eliminated Uni None Reinforcements: None CSA Inform: Set Up: C/2/2, Girardey Bty/3/22—wii 2 of BS2.12 7 Miss (8), 9 Miss (6), 10 Miss (5) Orders: Chalmers’ Brigade is to capture the Larkin Bell field and de- siroy Stuart's Brigade. Girardey is attached to C/2/2, Artillery Ammunition: Unlimited Previous Losses: 7 Miss - 1 SP, 1 Straggler, 9 Miss - 1 SP, 1 straggler, 10 Miss - 1 SP, | straggler Wrecked Regiments: None Eliminated Units: None Reinforcements: None. Victory Condito ‘The side with the most VP at game end is the winner, VP are determined by the following schedule (only), VP per wrecked enemy regiment 3 VP per wrecked enemy brigade 3 VP for Larkin Bell Field 6.2 "Take your damned Regiment back to Ohio!" Despite Sherman's feeling that no attack was forthcoming, the Rebel approach was not entirely unexpected. A number of units sent out patrols. The fighting began quite early as a skir- rishes between small bodies of troops broke out up and down the line, This scenario covers those initial clashes and the frst significant attack on Sherman's line. The fighting was very fragmented. Consequently, some units that were present only for a short time are omitted due to cither the transitory nature of their presence or the fact that they were not committed 10 fighting in this sector. Also, McClernand’s portion of this fight carried on into the early afternoon and onto map A, well be- yond the scope of this scenario.A Fearrul SLaveHver General Information Map Area: Map B, west of the 32.XX hex row First Turn: 6:00 a.m. Apeil 6th Last Turn: 11:00 a.m. April 6th Total Turns: 21 First Player: CSA Union Information Set Up: we E, 2 ll Bty—B22,32 aut 17 —B24.31 29 TIB26.30 Raith, 43 II—B28,29 49 1N—B30.28 Sherman, 5 Tenn HQ—B22.30 Thieleman Cav—B23.31 2,3/4 Tll Cav—B27.26 6 Ind Bty—B11.32 B, | ll Bty—B23.30 E1 Ill Bty—B22.26 sr McDowell—B13.33 6 lowa a,b —B8.32 46 Ohio a,b—B10.32 40 —B13.31 31ST 77 Ohio a, b, Hildebrand—B20.28 53 Ohio a,b—B22.23 57 Ohio—B24.26 ast 48 Ohio, Buckland—B17.30 70 Ohio a.b—B19.30 72 Ohio a.b—B16.30 vor Peabody, 25 Mo—B29.22 12 Mich—B30.20 21 Mo—B31.20 Powell—B16.14 Orders: Powell/I/6/T has a Regimental Goal to defend the road from BI7.14 10 B29.2.. 1/677 has orders to defend the line of it's camps oxnssnasua nding tc FSS 7.03 has orders to support Sherman's Division. Once the rest of 1 Tenn arrives, it joins the division 5 Tenn, once active, has orders to defend in place, Alerted Units: At Stat—Powell/ /6/T 6:15 am—2I Mo/l/6/T 6:30 am. —U6rT 6:45 a.m.—$3 Ohio/3/S/T 7S am—3S/T 7:30 a.m.—test of 5 Tenn Division 8:00 a.m.—I Tenn Division All einforcements arrive alerted. Artillery Ammunition: 75, Previous Losses: None. Wrecked Regiments: None Eliminated Units: None Reinforcements: Hex Time Units B25.35 8:00am, MeClernand, 1 Tenn HQ, 21/7, DIM, 14 Obio Bry 25.35 8:15am. VI/T,D2M1By Orders: 1 Tenn Division has orders to defend the line of the Hamburg- Purdy Road. CSA Information Set Up: Johnston, Beauregard, A Miss HQ and Supply—B5.01 Hardee, 3 Corps HQ and Supply —B 10.06 cms 2 Tenn—B6.13 24 Tenn—B7.13 Cleburne, 15 Ark—B8.12 5 Tenn, 6 Miss—B9.12 23 Tenn—B10.11 Trigg Bty—B7.12 Hindman, Calvert Bty -B8.11 Hubbard Bty—B9.11 WHR 27 Tenn, 16 Ala—BIL.I1 Wood, 44 Tenn, 8 Ark—B11.10 9 Ark Bn, 55 Tenn—B12.09 3 Miss Bn—B13.13 Ga Dragoons, Harper Bty—B11.07 a aime Tres QW 8A FEarruL SLAUGHTER SS 7.03 smH3 7 Ark ab—B13.09 Shaver, 2 Atk—B13.08 ‘Swett Bty, Miller Bty—B12.07 6 Atk—B14.07 3. CSA—B14.06 Bragg, 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B7.03 Pu 38 Tenn ab—B2.11 16 La, Orleans Gd—B3.11 Pond, Ketchum Bty, Jenkins Cay—B3.10 18 La—B4.10 Crescent ,b—B4.09 ANID 17 La, Conf Gd—B5.09 Ruggles, Washington Bty—B5.08 Anderson, 20 La—B6.08 9 Texas, | Fl Bn—B6.07 Orders: 3 Corps is to capture Lost, Review, and Woolf Fields. CCIHIS has a Brigade Goal to capture Shiloh Church 2 Corps is to capture Woolf and Review Fields. /1/2 has a Brigade Goal to capture Ben Howell Field Antillery Ammunition: 60 Previous losses: None ‘Wrecked Regiments: None Eliminated Units: None forcements: ‘Time Units 6:30am, R/I/I Brigade 7:00am. 32/1 Brigade Ordet RII/I has a Brigade Goal to capture Lost and Review Fields. {2/1 has a Brigade Goal to capture Shiloh Church, then ad- ‘vance and capture Woolf Field, Victory Conditions The side with the most VP at game end is the winner. VP are determined by the following schedule (only). 1 VP per wrecked enemy brigade 2 VP cach for Lost Field, Review Field, and Shiloh Church. a att Lure, Se, Ae M206 6.3 Prentiss Attacked Prentiss’ initial position in Spain Field was the brunt of several heavy attacks. He was finally dislodged around 9:00 a.m, The remnants of his command fell back to the Sunken Read, General Information ‘Map Area: Map B, east of the 22.XX hexrow, west of the 42.XX hexrow, and south of the Hamburg Purdy Road, First Turn: 7:30 a.m, April 6th Last Turn: 10:00 a.m. April 6th ‘otal Turns: 11 First Player: CSA Union Information Set Up: 6T HQ—B38.20 Prentiss, 1 Minn Bty—B34.17 5 Ohio Bty—B35.17 ver 25 Mo—B27.21 Peabody, Powell (6)—B28.20 12 Mich—B29.20 21 Mo (10)—B30.19 16 Wisc a—B32.15 16 Wise b—B33.15 u6rr Miller, 18 Mo—B35.15, 61 Ill—B36.15, 18 Wisc a—B37.16 18 Wise b—B38.16 15 Mich a/ATenn (out of ammo)—B37.19 15 Mich b/ATenn (out of ammo)—B36.19 Orders: 6T has orders to defend in place. 15 Mich is attached to 6/T Special Rules: All Union units begin the scenario Alerted. Union units may exit the map by crossing the Hamburg-Purdy Road. Any unit that does so is removed from play and is not considered eliminated for VP purposes. Artillery Ammunition: Unlimited. the 15 Mich a & b can resupply on any turn that the Union player rolls «1 or 2 on one die. No other unit can resupply. Previous losses: Powell straggler 1 SP, 1 straggler, 21 Mo - ISP, 1 Wrecked Regiments: NoneA Fearru. SLavaHTeRr Eliminated Units: None Reinforcements: None. CSA Information Set Up: wis 27 Tenn, 16 Ala—B22.17 Wood, 9 Ark Bn, 44 Tenn, 8 Atk—B23.17 3 Miss Bn (4), 55 Tenn—B24.16 S/HB 7 Ark a(6), 7 Ark b—B27.17 Shaver, 2 Ark—B28.16 6 Ark (8), 3 Conf—B29.16 Gia 26 Ala, 1 La—B28.12 Gladden, 22 Ala, 25 Ala- 21 Ala—B30.11 Robertson Bty—B27.10 B29.12 cnn 5 Miss, 52 Tenn—B31.09 Chalmers, 10 Miss, 9 Miss—B32.08 Withers, 7 Miss—B33.09 Gage Bty—B30.06 Orders: W/HI3 has a Brigade Goal to clear the road defended by 1/6/T and capture Lost Field S/HI3 has a Brigade Goal to capture Barnes Field. 2/2 has a Divisional Goal to capture Spain Field, the ridge east of Spain field, and advance to the Hamburg-Purdy Road. Artillery Ammunition: Unlimited Previous losses: 3 Miss/W/H/3 - 1 SP, 1 straggler, 7 Atk alS/H/ - | straggler, 6 Ark - 1 SP, 1 Straggler. Wrecked Regiments: None Eliminated Units: None Reinforcements: None ‘Victory Conditions ‘The side with the most VP at game end is the winner. VP are determined by the following schedule (only). 1 VP per wrecked enemy brigade 1 VP for Spain Field, 2.VP each for Lost Field and Barnes Field. 4 RSS 7.09 6.4 Opening attack ‘This scenario covers the entire initial Rebel attack, from first light through about noon on 6 April General Information Map Area: Map B, First Turn: 6:00 a.m. April 6th Last Turn: Noon, April 6th Total Turns: 25 First Player: CSA ut E, 2 Ill Bty—B22.32 svt 17 T—B24.31 29 I1l—B26.30 Raith, 43 I—B28.29 49 II—B30.28 Sherman, 5 Tenn HQ—B22.30 Thieleman Cay—B23.31 2,3/4 Ill Cav—B27.26 6 Ind Bty—B11.32 B, 111 Bty—B23.30 EL Ill Bty—B22.26 S/T McDowell—B13.33 6 Towa ab —B8.32 46 Ohio a,b—B10.32 40 MI—B13.31 2s/T Stuart—B51.22 55 IIl—B51.20 54 Ohio—B49.22 71 Ohio—B47.21 315i 77 Ohio a, b, Hildebrand —B20,28 53 Ohio a.b—B22.23, 57 Ohio—B24.26 srr 48 Ohio, Buckland—B17.30 70 Ohio a,b—B19.30 72 Ohio a,b—B16.30 Prentiss, 6 Tenn HQ—B38.20 a Patti oe Cee ly Wap 86 Feanrvi StavenTer SS 7-03, 1/2 Mil Cay—B41,22 5th Ohio Bty—B36.19 1 Minn By—B37.20 Wore Peabody, 25 Mo—B29.22 12 Mich—B30.20 21 Mo—B32.19 16 Wisc a,b—B34.19 Powell—B16.14 2161 Miller, 18 Mo—B35.18 61 IN—B37.18 18 Wise a,b—B39.18 Orders: Powell/1/6/T has a Regimental Goal to defend the approach to 1/6/T's camps, delaying the enemy advance as much as possi- ble while avoiding destruction, 12 Mich/1/6/T has a Regimental Goal to join Powell/1/6/T and then to delay the enemy advance as much as possible while avoiding destruction. 5 Tenn, once active, has orders to defend in place. 2/SIT has a Brigade Goal to defend the Union left flank and prevent the Confederates from outflanking the Sunken Road/Peach Orchard line to the east. 6 Tenn, once active, has orders to defend in place. Alerted Units: At start—Powell/1/6/T 6:15 am.—2 Mo/l/6T 6:30am, 6-45 am.—S3 Ohio/3/5/T 7:15 am—3/S/T, rest of 6/T 7:30 am—test of S/T 8:00 a.m.—All remaining units Artillery Ammunition: 100 Previous losses: None. Wrecked Regiments: None mated Units: None 15 Reinforcements: Hex ‘Time B3935 6:30am. VA Tenn - out of ammo B2535 8:00am, MeClernand, 1 Tenn HQ, 2/1/T, D ill, 14 Ohio Bry BIS35&:ISam, I/I/T,D 21 Bry B3935 9:00am. 1M4/T, 23 Mo/6/T B4A35 9:15am. A/T (less 1M/T, CavidtT) B44.35 10:15 am, McArthur, 9 I, 12 1/2/2/T, AIM Bry/2T 839.35 10:30 am, rest of 2/7 (except cav and rest of 2rry Orders: 15 Mich is o join 6 Tenn Division. I Tenn Division is to defend the line of the Hamburg-Purdy Road. V4rT is to join 1 Tenn Division. 23 MoI6/T isto join 6 Tenn Division. 4 Tenn Division is to defend the Sarah Bell Field, 22/7 has a Brigade Goal to support Stuart and 2/5/T 2 Tenn Division is to defend the Sunken Road and Duncan Field, A Information Set Up: Johnston, Beauregard, A Miss HQ and Supply—B5.01 Hardee, 3 Corps HQ and Supply—B10.06 cms 2 Tenn—B6.13 24 Tenn—B7.13, Cleburne, 15 Ark—B8.12 5 Tenn, 6 Miss—B9.12 23 Tenn—B10.11 ‘Trigg Bly—B7.12 Hindman, Calvert Bty -B8.11 Hubbard Bty—B9.11 wiHi3 27 Tenn, 16 Ala—B1L.LL Wood, 44 Tenn, 8 Ark—B11.10 9 Ark Bn, 55 Tenn—B12.09 3 Miss Bn—B13.13 Ga Dragoons, Harper Bty—B11.07 SIHI3 7 Ark ab—B13.09 Shaver, 2 Atk—B13.08 ‘Swett Bty, Miller Bty—B12.07 6 Atk—B14.07 3CSA—B14.06 ‘ta Man ning LCA Frapru. SLavanrer cnn 1 La—B15.06 26 Ala—B15.05, Gladden, 25 Ala—B16.04 22 Ala- B16.03 Robertson Bty—B15.03 21 Ala—B17.03, Bragg, 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B7.03, Pra 38 Tenn a,b—B2.11 16 La, Orleans Gd—B3.11 Pond, Ketchum Bty, Jenkins Cav—B3.10 18 La—B4.10 Crescent a,b—B4.09 AIL 17 La, Conf Gd—B5.09 Ruggles, Washington Bly—B5.08 Anderson, 20 La—B6,08 9 Texas, | Fl Bn—B6.07 Gn 1 Ark ab—B7.07 19 La, —B7.06 Gibson, 4 La—B8.06 13 Laa,b—B8.05 se, Girardey Bty—B8.04 Clinton Cav/2/2—B7.04 17 Ala—B9,05 Jackson, 2 Texas—B9.04 18 Ala—B10.03, 19 Ala—B11.03 cn Withers, Gage Bty—B10.02 Chalmers, 52 Tenn, 5 Miss—B11.02 9 Miss, 10 Miss—B12.01 7 Miss—B13.01 Orders: CC/E3 has a Brigade Goal to capture Shiloh Church 3 Corps is to capture Lost, Review, and Woolf Fields. Withers/2 Corps has a Divisional Goal to capture Spain, Barnes, and Davis Fields Gi2/2 has a Brigade Goal to capture Spain, Barnes, and Davis Fields. P/1/2 has a Brigade Goal to capture Ben Howell Field Ruggle2 Corps has a Divisional Goal to capture Woolf and Review Fields. 16 RSs 7.09 2 Comps is to accompany one of the above divisions. That ‘order then becomes the Corps order. all other 2 Corps units with separate goals continue on those goal. Artillery Ammunition: 100 Previous Losses: None Wrecked Regiments: None Eliminated Units: None Reinforcements: ‘As per the CSA Reinforcement Schedule Vietory: Union Massive 15 or more VPs Union Major 8t0 14 VPs Union Minor 307 VPs Draw 2102 VPs CSA Minor -Tto-3 VPs CSA Major “1410-8 VPs CSA Massive -15 or less VPs Historically, the Scenario was a draw, with I VP. 6.5 Hornet’s Nest By midday, Union resistance in the center and right solidified along the Sunken Road, stretching between the Peach Orchard ‘and Duncan Field, Here men of three Federal divisions - Pren- tiss' 6th, W.H.L, Wallace's 2nd, and Hurlbuts 4th - formed a solid line that became known ever after as the Hornet's Nest. ‘The position held out until almost 6:00 p.m., finally falling to repeated Rebel attacks and in the face of heavy odds, General Information ‘Map Area: Both i 1:00 a.m, April 6th 6:00 pm. April 6th ‘Total Game Length: 29 Turns First Player: CSA Union Information Set Up: Grant, ATenn HQ—A4I.12 A Tenn Supply Train—A55.14 A Tenn Supply Wagon—A55.13 A Tenn supply wagon—B44.31 8 Ohio Bty—A57.09 F 21 Bty—A55.12 HIM Bty—A54.12 B 2 Ill Bty—A52.12 11 Tl Bty—A38.17 ast dig. Hone Th ane, Quy Wap 18A Fearrul SLavenTer ASS7.00 10—15 Mich a (5), 15 Mich b—w/i 3 of A55.14 vr 1 Tenn HQ—A27.10 C&S Ill Cav, 1/4 Ill Cay—A26.10 D1 Ill Bty@), D2 Ill Bry(2)—A26.09 E2 IM Bty(2)—B29.11 4 Ohio Bty—eliminated var McClernand, Hare, 13 lowa a(5) 13 lowa b(5)—A26.05, 18 MI(3) 11 Towa a(2) 11 Towa b(4)—A27.06 1O—8 I1(7)—A36.01 ane Marsh, 45 I11(5) 48 T11(7)—A29.04 20 TI(6) 11 1113)—A28.04 3a Repl leader, 49 111(6) 29 I(3) 17 1N(4) 43 11(2)— 27.05 wn W. Wallace, 2 Tenn HQ—A39.01 A&B 2 Ill Cav, US Cav—w/i 1 of A39.01 ie Tuttle, 12 Iowa, D 1 Mo Bty—B37.31 7 Howa—B37.32 2 lowa, K 1 Mo Bty—B36.32 14 Towa —B38.30 22T McArthur, 9 Ill—B47.25 12, A 1 Ill Bty—B46.25, 13 Mo—A24.07 10—14 Mo, 81 Ohio—w/i 1 of A36.28 32T 8 Towa a, H | Mo Bty—B38.29 8 lowa b—B39.30 ‘Sweeny, 58 II—B35.33 7 IN—B35.34 52 Ill a & b—B37.34 57 Ill a & b—B38,33, 50 T—B48.24 ar Hurlbut, 4 Tenn HQ—B44,27 5 Ohio Cav—B45.26 7 wart Williams, 28 I—B43.24 32 Ill, C 1 Mo Bty—B44.23 3 lowa—B45.24 41 Ill, 2 Mich Bty—B42.23 art Veatch, 46 I11(6) 25 Ind(3)—A29.05 14 I(8) 15 II4)}—A30.08 s/4rT 17 Ky, 25 Ky—B41.24 Lauman, 44 Ind, 13 Ohio Bty—B41.25 31 Ind—B41.26 sit 5 Tenn HQ—A30.11 Thieleman, 2&3/4 Il Cav—w/i 1 of A30.14 B 1 Ill Bty—A27.10 106 Ind Bty(1)—wii 1 of ASS.14 usr McDowell, 46 Ohio a & b—A24.06 6 lowa a & b—A23.07 40 I1N(6)—A24.07 sit Stuart, 55 I—BS3.20 54 Ohio—B54.19 71 Ohio—BS1.21 ast Sherman, Buckland, 48 Ohio(6) 72 Ohio a(1)—A25.06 TO—70 Ohio a(6) 70 Ohio b(4)—A28.11 all other units of 5/T not listed are eliminated. or Prentiss, 6 Tenn HQ—B40.29 11 II Cav—A43.05 15 Towa a & b—A30.08 16 Iowa a & b—A29.09 23 Mo, 5 Ohio Bty(4)—B40.27 err Repl leader, 12 Mich(7)—B38.28 21 Mo(1) 1 Minn Bty(4)—B38.30 25 Mo (3)—B39.28A Fearrvt StaveHTer 206rT Miller, 18 Wise a(2) 18 Mo(2)—B39.28 61 TC) —B38.32 Orders: All units marked IO have informal orders. I/T is ordered to counter-attack to recapture Shiloh Church 2, is ordered to defend the Sunken Road line 2AT has a Brigade Goal to defend the Union flank near the Peach Orchard 13 Mo/2/2/T is attached to 1/5/T 8 Iowa a & b/3/2/T are attached to 1-2-T AIT is ordered to defend the Sunken Road line and the Sarah Bell Field S/T is ordered to counter-attack to recapture Shiloh Church, 2USIT has a Brigade Goal to defend Larkin Bell Field and the Union flank 617 is ordered to defend the Sunken Road line. 15 Iowa a & b, 16 Iowa a & b, have orders to defend Jones Field, Previous Losses: 66 Wrecked Regiments: 1/1/T 2, 3/1/T B/S/T 5, 41ST - 4 OI - 5, 21677 - 4 3, 24-2, UST -1, Eliminated Units: All units of 6/T not initially set up on map Reinforcements: As per the Union Reinforcement Schedule. CSA Information Set-up: Beauregard, A Miss HQ and Supply—B15.19 Johnston—B35.20 Polk, 1 Corps HQ—B20.29 1 Corps Supply, Mise Cav/1 Corps—B19.29 ul Stewart—B26.32 (Clark is wounded) RI 13 Tenn(7) Bankhead Bty(4)—B31.34 Russell, 11 LA() 22 Tenn a(5) 22 Tenn b(4)—B30.33 12 Tenn a(S) 12 Tenn 6(5)—B29.33 18 ASS 7.03 san 13 Ark, Stanford Bry—B26.32 Repl Leader, 5 Tenn a and b—B25.33 4 Tenn a(S) 4 Tenn b(4)—B24,32 33 Tenn(11)}—B24.33, wn Repl Leader, 15 Tenn(6) 154 Tenn a(3) 154 Tenn b(2)— B28.32 Blythe Tenn(4) 2 Tenn(2) Polk Bty(4)—B27.33 spn Cheatham, Stephens, 9 Tenn, Smith Bty—B35.27 7 Ky—B34.27 6 Tenn—B36.26 1 Miss Cav/1 Corps—B35.25 Brewer Cav/l Corps—B27.31 2 Corps Bragg, 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B35.19 12 Ruggles B23.34 AID Anderson, 17 LA(4) 1 FL Bn(1)—B22.33 20 LA(4) 9 Texas(1) Washington Bty—B23.34 Conf Gds Bn—eliminated cnn All units w/i 1 hex of B33.23 PA JO—38 Tenn a & B—A5.O1 10—Crescent a & b—A6.01 16 LA—A17.04 Pond, 18 LA—A18.03 Orleans Gd, Ketchum Bty—A19.03 2 cnn Gage Bty—B52.12 Withers, 52 Tenn—BS4.16 Chalmers, 5 Miss, 10 Miss(5)—BSS.16 7 Miss(7), 9 Miss(6)—B56.15 enn (note, unit formed in square formation, set up facing all directions) 25 Ala(3)—B37.20 Repl Leader, 22 Ala(6) Robertson Bty—B38.20 21 Ala(4)—B39.20 26 Ala(2) 1 La(2)—B38.19 Maa Pig Te Games Qs Wap 188A FEarrul SLAU@HTER 987.08 yor Cobb Bty—B23.33 2 Texas—B50.16 Byrne Bty—B21.32 19 Ala—BS1.15 Morgan Cav—B21.31 Jackson, 18 Ala—B52.15 17 Ala—B53.15 Assorted Cav units Girardey Bty—B51.12 10—Jenkins/ I / 2, Clanton/2/2, Adams/A Tenn, Ga Dragoons/W/H/3—w/il hex of B58.08 3 Comps 10—Wharton a & b/A Tenn—B13.33 Hardee, 3 Corps HQ and Supply —B30.28 Hindman wounded, no repl Orders: All units marked 10 have informal orders. coms 1 Corps has orders to atack and capture Jones Field with 1/1 5 Tenn(4) 23 Tenn(6) Hubbard Bty—B25.27 Corps Division. 211 Corps has no orders. ‘DN is attached to 1/1 Comps 2 Comps has no orders. 1/2 Comps has a Divisional Goal to defend Woolf Field, Ben Howell Field, and Shiloh Church. Cleburne, 24 Tenn(8) Calvert Bty—B26.25 15 Ark(6) Trigg Bty—B26.26 6 Miss, 2 Tenn—eliminated S/H/3 2/2 has a Divisional Goal to attack and capture Larkin Bell 7 Atk a(4) 7 Ark b(4) B29.31 Field Shaver, 2 Ark(5) 6 Ark(7)—B30.30 G/2/2 has no orders, and is not part of 2/2 attack, above, 10—3 Confi3)—B36.19 3 Corps has no orders. Miller Bty—B31.28 Res Comps has orders (0 attack and capture Sarah Bell Field, Swett Bty—B31.29 and Peach Orchard ‘TiRes Corps has a Brigade Goal to defend Woolf and Ben ar Howell Fields, and Shiloh Church Repl leader, 27 Tenn(3) 3 Miss Bn(3)—B27.30 44 Tenn(2) 9 Ark Bn(1) 8 Atk(3) —B28.29 Artillery Ammunition: 70, 16 Ala(4) 55 Tenn(2)}—B31.30 Previous Losses: 76 Harper Bty—B31.27 Res Corps Wrecked Regiments: R/I/I - 1, S/M/~ 1, W2/1-4, A/1/2- Breckinridge, Res Corps HQ—B39.17 4,GI22-4, SIIB -2 Res Corps Supply —B34.16 CHB 3, WI 6 BiRes Eliminated Units: None 9 Ark—BAL.18, Reinforcements: Eee ea vacson Bry BAL.17 ‘As per the CSA Reinforcement Schedule. Bowen, 10 Ark, 2 Conf—B42.17 1 Mo—B43.17 Vietory: Union Massive 18 or more VPs siRes Union Major ‘120 17 VPs 22 Miss, 28 Tenn—B36.16 Union Minor 6 to 11 VPs Statham, 15 Miss, 20 Tenn—B37.16 Draw 5105 VPs 45 Tenn, 19 Tenn—B38.15, CSA Minor 11 10-6 VPs Rutledge Bty—B36.15, CSA Major -17t0-12 VPs McClung Biy/A Tenn-B35.15 CSA Massive -18 or ess VPs ae Historically the scenario was a draw, with -3 VPs. 4 Ky—BI8.34 Trabue, 6 Ky, 31 Ala—B19.34 5 Ky, 4 Ala Bn—B20.33 3 Ky, Crews Bn—B21.33 Man iin LAC age Se et M2168 os asain LE 19& Fearrc. S.aveaTer 6.6 The Final Drive Beauregard's order to halt and not make the final attack on Grant's battered forces has been both hailed as the only realis- tic choice, and reviled as the fatal decision that doomed the ‘South's independence. This scenario examines that question directly: could Grant have been driven into the Tennessee River? When the fighting stopped, the situation was very con- fused, No brigade was intact, and many regiments had drifted to the rear or to find a campsite. After the war, the myth sprang up that one more determined push would have finished the fight, Here the CSA player has a chance to try that final, determined push - everyone gripped with the same urgency, in ‘an all or nothing final drive on the landing General Information Map Area: Both First Turn: 5:00 p.m, April 6th Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. April 6th ‘Total Game Length: 11 Turns First Player: CS, Union Information Set Up: Grant, A Tenn HQ, Buell, A Ohio HQ—A48.15 8 Ohio Bty—A57.09 Tenn McClernand, 1 Tenn HQ, 1/4 Ill Cay, C&S 1 Cay— Ad2.19 D LIN Bty(3)—A41.19 vir Hare, 8 II(5) 18 IHI(L) 11 Jowa b(2)—A46.13 13 Towa a(3) 13 Iowa b(4) H I Mo Bry/2 Tenn—A47.13, 2 Marsh, 45 111(3) 48 11I(1)—A37.19 sure Repl ldr, 49 11K6)—A41.15 17 Ma) —Aa2.14 43 TII(1) 46 2/4/14) —A43.15 29 IL) B 2 Ill Bty/A Tenn—A50.12 2rTenn W. Wallace, 2 Tenn HQ US Cay—A36.23 A&B 211 Cay—A36.21 eliminated, Lore Tattle, 2 lowa(7) 7 Lowa(5) 3 lowa/I/4/T(1)—A45.14 a asta tig RSS 7.08 22st McArthur, 13 Mo(3) 9 1112) A 1M Bty(1) —A44.14 81 Obio(7)—A37.18, 14 Mo, [1 Ill Bty/A Tenn—A38.17 12 1G)—A40.18, 32st Repl ldr, 7 117) D 2 Ml Bty/1 Tenn(1) K 1 Mo Bty— AS4.11 50 111(6) H 1 Ill Bty/A Tenn—A55.12 2) $7 IN b@)—ASL.12 52 Ml a(2) 52 1 b(@3)—AS1.14 4ffenn Hurlbut, 4 Tenn HQ—AS5.14 5 Ohio Cav, 2 Mich Bty(1)—AS4.14 ware Repl Idr, 28 MCI) 41 MICA) 32 IN) 15 MV2/A/T(L) E 2 TH Buy/t Tenn(2)—A48.12 2a Veatch, 14 III(4) C 1 Mo Bty(2)-—A53.12 aan Lauman, 31 Ind(5) 44 Ind(1) 25 Ky(2) D 1 Mo Bty/2 Tenn(2)—A49.13 5/Tenn Sherman, 5 Tenn HQ—A44.16 ‘Thielemann Cay, 4 Ill Cav—A45.17 vst Repl Idt, 46 Ohio a(2) 46 Ohio b(3) 6 Iowa a(2) 6 lowa (1) 40 N12) —A52.12 sir Repl ldr, 54 Ohio(1) 11 Towa a/I/1/T(1)—A56.12 3ST Hildebrand, 53 Ohio a(3) 70 Ohio a/4/S/T(4) A 1 TIL Bty/A Tenn—A40.15, ais Buckland, 48 Ohio(6) 72 Ohio a(1) B 1 Ill Bty—A38.16 70 Ohio b(6) 6 Ind Bty(1)—A39.16 6rTenn Prentiss, 6 Tenn HQ—eliminated 16 Iowa a(2) 16 Iowa b(4)—A41.17 sn tg Het eC ey Wn 88A Feakrul SLavenrer SS 7.03, 5 Ohio Bry(3)—A47.15 11 Cav—A50.16 15 Towa a(1) 15 Towa b(2)—AS7.14 1 Minn Bty(4)—AS7.10 4/Ohio Nelson, 4 Ohio HQ—AS7.12 10/40 Ammen, 9 Ind, 6 Ohio—A58.11 36 Ohio, F 2 Ill Bty/A Tenn—A56.11 24 Ohio—A61.11 Gunboat Tyle—any hex of the Tennessee River A Tenn Supply Train, 2x A Tenn Supply Wagons—w/i 3 hexes any Union unit, Orders: There are no regular orders. Instead, every Federal unit is con- sidered to have an order to defend Pittsburgh Landing and the final Union Tine. All units are considered in command if they remain north of the Axx.10 hexrow, and east of the line de- fined by Tilghman's Branch and Owl Creek. Note: By this time, formal command had collapsed. Men were rallied on a scraiched-together line, Grant and bis re- ‘maining division commanders assembled, readied for one last stand. The proximity of the Landing itself aided this line; both, formed troops and stragglers instinctively drifted there, and everyone understood the importance of holding it. Hence, every soldier in that final Tine, from Grant down to the rear rank privates, knew what the orders were implicitly, without needing a great deal of direction beyond a hastily barked com- mand to *stop here, and face that way Artillery Ammunition: 40 Previous Losses: 208 Wrecked Regiments: 1/1/T- 5, 2/1/T -4, ¥/1/T- 4, U/2/T -2, 2OIT - 2, HDT - 8, WAIT - 4, 2IA/T 4, 3/4IT - 4, LIST = 5, DST -3, SIE - 5, 4/S/T - 4, LIGIT- 6, 2167T -4, Ur -s Eliminated Units: None Reinforcements: AS per the Union Reinforcement Schedule between 5:00 p.m and 8:00 p.m. mu CSA Information Set Up: Beauregard, A Miss HQ and Supply—B22.30 McClung Bty—A50.01 Adams Cav—B38.30 Wharton a Cav—A34.09 Wharton b Cav—A34.08 Polk, | Corps HQ and Supply, Misc Cay—B35.33 Brewer Cav—A33.10 1 Miss Cav—A43.05 mw Clark wounded, Stewart commands division RIL Russell, 22 Tenn a(4) 22 Tenn 6(3)—A26.05 12 Tenn a(4) 12 Tenn b(3)—A26.04 13 Tenn(6)—A26.06 11 LA(4)—B22.23 Bankhead Bty—A25.03 sili Repl Lar, 33 Tenn(7), 4 Tenn a(3) 4 Tenn b(2)—A30.08 5 Tenn a(4) 5 Tenn b(4)—A26.03 13 Ark(@3)—B22.23 Stanford Bty(2)—A52.04 22 Cheatham—w/i 4 of B7.04 yon Repl Lr, 15 Tenn(4) 154 Tenn a(2) 154 Tenn b(1)—w/i 4 of B8.04 Polk Bty(4)—B21.24 Blythe Miss(2)—B17.28 spi Stephens, 6 Tenn(4) 9 Tenn(6)—w/i 1 of B7.04 Maney, Smith Bty(3)—B48.27 7 Ky(4)—B47.28, Bragg, 2 Corps HQ and Supply —A41.02 v2 Ruggles, Washington Bty/A/1/2- 444.03 Jenkins Cav—A44,01 Anz Anderson, 17 LA(I) 9 Texas(1)}-—A46.06 20 La(2)—A45.07A Fearru. SLauaHTER cn Gibson, 4 LA(S) Ketchum Bty—B33.23 13 LA a(4) 13 LA b(2) —B33.24 1 Ark a(2) 1 Ark b(3)—B34.23 19 LAC) —B20.08 P/U Pond, 16 LA(3) 18 LA(2) A34.12 Orleans Ga(2)—A34.11 Crescent a(4) Crescent b(4)—A40.04 38 Tenn a(3) 38 Tenn b(4)—A41.04 2n Withers, Gerardy Bty/J/2/2—A50.05 Clanton Cav—A56.01 cnn Chalmers, 7 Miss(3) 9 Miss(4) Gage Bty—AS3.05 5 Miss(5)—A54.05 10 Miss(2)—A56.02 A53.06 Gn Repl Ldr, 22 Ala(4) 1 LA()—A47.06 21 Ala(3)—B44.26 Robertson Bty—B45.26 25 Ala(2)}—B46,25 wor Jackson, 17 Ala(5)—A51.06 19 Ala(4)—A50.06 18 Ala(4)—B49.22 Hardee, 3 Corps HQ and Supply —B22.32 cms Cleburne, 5 Tenn(1) 24 Tenn(8) 15 Ark(4) Hubbard, Trigg, Calvert Btys—w/i | A37.08 23 Tenn(6) 6 Miss(1)—w/i 1 BS.02 SHS Shaver, 2 Ark(2) 6 Ark(4) 7 Ark a(1) 7 Ark b(2) Miller, ‘Swett Brys—w/i 1 B31.28 wrHi3 Wood, 27 Tenn(3) 9 Ark Bn(1) 8 Ark(3) Harper, Ga Dragoons—w/i 1 439.01 16 Ala(4) 3 Miss Bn(3)—w/i 1 B6.01 Breckenridge, Res Corps HQ—AS0.02 2 FSS 7.03 BiRes Repl Lar, 1 Mo(S) 9 Ark(1) 10 Ark(2) Watson, Hudson Btys—w/i | A51.03 SiRes Statham, 15 Miss(1) 22 Miss(4) 19 Tenn(2) 28 Tenn(2) 45 Tenn(1) Rutledge Bty—w/i | A48.02 1 Tenn Cav a(4) 1 Tenn Cav b—B44,30 4 TiRes Trabue, 31 Ala(3) 4 Ky(4) 5 Ky(2) 6 Ky(2) Morgan Cav, Crews Bn(1)—wfi 1 AS4.03 3 Ky(S) Byrne Bty, 4 Ala Bn(2}—B24.31 Orders: 2 Comps (except P/1/2) has orders to attack and capture Pitts- burgh Landing Res Corps has orders to attack and capture Pittsburgh Land- ing No other units have any orders. Alternate Orders Al units on the map have orders to attack and capture Pitts burgh Landing. Artillery Ammunition: 25, Previous Losses: 173 Wrecked Regiments: R/I/I - 5, S/l/1 3, J2/1 - 5, S/2/1 - 3, GMD - 5, A/D - 5, PII2- 4, GID - 5, C22 - 4, 22-4, CIU3- 5, W/L - 6, TiRes - 6, B/Res- 4, Victory Conditions: Union Massive 18 or more VPs Union Major 1210 17 VPs. Union Minor 61011 VPs Draw “S105 VPs CSA Minor “11 10-6 VPs CSA Major “1710-12. VPs CSA Massive -18 or less VPs Historically the scenario was a draw, with -3 VPs. 6.7 "No enemy nearer than Corinth" Titled by another quote Sherman would live to regret, this see nario examines the entire first day's fighting. a Mn sing ae Te Came, ay Wap i 854 Fearrul SLAUGHTER ss 7.03 General Information lap Area: Both First Turn: 6:00 a.m, April 6th Last Turn: 7:00 p.m. April 6th ‘Total Game Length: 53 Turns First Player: CSA Union Information All Union information is the same as in Scenario 6.9, except that only those reinforcements scheduled to enter before 7:00 p.m, April 6th enter play. CSA Information All CSA information is the same as in Scenario 6.9, except that only those reinforcements scheduled to enter before 7:00 pam. April 6th enter play. Victory Conditions: Union Massive 18 or more VPs Union Major 120 17 VPs Union Minor 61011 VPs Draw “S105 VPs CSA Minor “11 10-6 VPs CSA Major “17 0-12. VPs CSA Massive -18 or less VPs Historically the scenario was a dravs, with -3 VPs, 6.8 "Lick 'em tomorrow" Grant’ failure to take even rudimentary precautions against an attack must be considered one of the larger mistakes of his military career, but the resultant disaster did allow one of his ‘greatest atributes as a commander 10 shine through: his iron will. Where many might have given up, Grant joined with Buell in counter-attacking on the 7th, driving the enemy off the field General Information Map Area: Both First Turn: 5:00 a.m. April 7th Last Turn: 6:00 p.m. April 7th Total Game Length: 53 turns First Player: Union Union Information Set Uj Grant, A Tenn HQ—A48.15 A Tenn supply train, 2x Tenn supply wagons—w/i 1 of 49.16 14 Wia & b—A44.09 15 Mich a(7) 15 Mich b—AS4.14 B 21M Bty—AS0.12 HL IN Bty—ASS.12 an ing LLC WS Hegel F 2111 By—A56.11 8 Ohio Bty—AS7.09 ‘McClernand, 1 Tenn HQ—A46.16 C&S Il Cay, 1/4 Ill Cav—wii | of A46.16 E 2 Ill Bty(2)—A48.12 D1 MBty3)—A4l.19 D2 Bty(2)—AS4.11 wrt 8 Tl (8)—A45.15 Hare, 11 lowa a(5) 11 Towa b(5)—A46.14 18 1(6)—A47.14 13 Towa a(5) 13 Towa b(5)—A48.13, nt ‘Marsh, 45 I11(6) 48 II(5)—A44.15 11 12) 20 TS) —A43.16 3 Repl ldr, 17 TIS) 29 I1(3)—A44.17 49 N(7) 43 (4) —A45.17 2 Tenn—all units wii 5 of 446.22 WELL. Wallace is dead, 12 Iowa is eliminated. A LILBtyG) H 1 Mo Bry(3) 1/2IT—2 lowa(9) 7 Towa(6) 14 Towa(4) 2/2FT—9 TCS) 12 IK) 13 Mo(7) 81 Ohio(8) 3/2/T—Repl Idr, 7 I(10) 8 Towa a(3) 8 Towa (2) 50 MILO) 52 Il a(5) 52 Ml b(6) , $7 IL a(S) 57 MH b(S) 58 m4) L. Wallace, 3 Tenn HQ—A37.22 3/11 TI Cay—A35.27 3/5 Ohio Cav—A35.26 13/T Smith, 1] Ind a & b—A37.19 8Moa & b, 9th Ind Lt Bty—A37.18, 24 Ind a & b—A38.18 28/T Thayer, 23 Ind a & b—A37.20 68 Ohio a & b—A36.20 58 Ohio a & b—A37.21 1 Neb—A38.20A Feapro. SLavaHTeR 33T Whittlesey, 20 Ohio—A37.23 76 Ohio a & b, 1 Mo Bty—A35.23, 56 Ohio a & b—A36,.21 78 Ohio a & b—A36.22 Hurlbut, 4 Tenn HQ—AS1.15 5 Ohio Cay, 2 Mich Bty(1) C 1 Mo Bty(2)—w/i 1 of ASLIS vat repl Idr, 3 Towa(6) 32 1118). 28 116) 41 T(8)—AS0.13 49.14 art Veatch, 15 111(6) 14 1i(8)—A51.13 46 IlI(8) 25 Ind(S)—AS2.13 314 Lauman, 44 Ind(6) 25 Ky(3)—A53.13 31 Ind(9) 17 Ky(3)—A54.12 Sherman, 5 Tenn HQ—A41.16 Thielemann Cay, 4 Ill Cav—w/i I of A41.16 usr Repl Idr, 46 Ohio a(4) 46 Ohio b(5) 6 Ind Bty(1)— 39.16 40 III(6)—A40.18 6 Iowa a(5) 6 lowa b(4)—A40.19 srr repl Idr, 55 114) 71 Ohio(S) B 1 Ill Bty—A38.16 54 Ohio(6) [1 Ill Bty/A Tenn—A38.17 3/5 Hildebrand, 53 Ohio a(6) 53 Ohio b(5)—A41.16 57 Ohio(6)—A41.17 77 Ohio a(5) 77 Ohio b(4)—A42.17 ait Buckland, 70 Ohio a(8)—A39.14 70 Ohio b(7)—A39.13 48 Ohio(10)—A39.15 72 Ohio a(4) 72 Ohio b(3)—A40.12 6 Tenn—all units w/i 5 of AS2.18 All leaders are Repl leaders. 1 Minn Bty(4) 5 Ohio Bty(3) 15 Towa a(6) 15 Towa 6(6) 16 Towa a(6) 16 Towa b(7) 23 Mo(1) RSS 7.03 1/6/T—21 Mo(6) 25 Mo(5) 12 Mich(9) Powell(6) 16 Wi a(8) 16 Wi (6) 2IG/T—18 Wi a(5) 18 Wi b(4) 18 Mo(6) 61 1116) Buell, A Ohio HQ and Supply—A55.13 Nelson, 4 Ohio HQ—A52.10 10/4/0—wii 1 of AS4.09 19/40 —w/i 1 of A49.10 22/4(0—wii 1 of AS1.09 Crittenden, 5 Ohio HQ—A47.11 G 1 Ohio Bty, H&M 4 US Bty—wii I of A47.11 11/5/0—wii 1 of A46.10 14/510 —wii 1 of A45.09 Gunboats Lexington, Tyler—any hex of the Tennessee River. Orders: 1 Tenn has orders to defend in place. 2 Tenn has no orders, 3 Tenn has orders to attack and capture Glover and Jones Fields, 4 Tenn has orders to defend Pittsburgh Landing. 5 Tenn has orders to attack and capture Cavalry and Jones Fields 6 Tenn has no orders, 4 Ohio has orders to attack and capture the Sarah Bell Field. 5 Ohio has orders o attack and capture Davis Field. Artillery Ammunition: 75, Previous Losses: 208, Wrecked Regiments: 2/1/T-1, 3/1/T-2, 1/2/T-2, 2/2/T-1, 3/27F-3, 2A/T-L, 2ISIT-2, 4577-1, 1677-1, 1/60 Eliminated Units: 14 Ohio Bry/1 Tenn, 12 Iowa/1/2/T, 13 ‘Ohio Bty/4 Tenn, E 1 Il Bty/S Tenn, Reinforcements: Per the Union Reinforcement Schedule CSA Information Set UI Ri Russell, 22 Tenn a(7) 22 Tenn b(7)—A27.11 12 Tenn a(6) 12 Tenn b(6)—A27.12 Cheatham, 13 Tenn(9)}—A26.11 ee tig. ee Te Ga Quay WageSS 7-08, si Stewart, 13 Ark(4)—B38.26 5 Tenn a(6) 5 Tenn b(6)—B41.24 4 Tenn a(6) Gerardey Bty/I/2/2—A27.06 4 Tenn b(6)—A26.05 33 Tenn(9)—A26.10 set Repl Idr, 2 Tenn(5)—B4: Blythe Bu(4)—B43.23 154 Tenn a(5) 154 Tenn b(4)—B44.23 15 Tenn(7)—B39.25 sri Maney, 9 Tenn(8) 1 Tenn Bn(2) McClung Bty/A Tenn— 840.28 Stephens, 6 Tenn(7)—A27.13 AD Anderson, 20 La(7) 9 Texas(4)—A31.03 1 FI Bn(3) Conf Gds(1}—A31.02 17 La(5) 11 La/R/V/1(7)—A31.01 Gan, 4 La(8)—A29.04 Gibson, 1 Ark a(5) | Ark b(5)—A30.08 Ruggles, 13 La a(5) 13 La b(4)—A30.02 19 Lat) Washington Bty/A1/2—B37.25 Pri 16 La(5) 18 La(6)—A29.17 Pond, 38 Tenn a(6) 38 Tenn b(6)—A30,16 Orleans Gd(4)—A30.15 Ketchum Bty—A30.14 Crescent a(6) Crescent b(6)—B36.20 cr Chalmers, 7 Miss(7)—B52.21 9 Miss(6) 10 Miss(S)—BS1.22 5 Miss(7) 52-Tenn(2)—B50.21 Gn. Repl Idr, 21 Ala(7)—B49.22 26 Ala(3) Robertson Bty—B48,22 25 Ala(S)—B38.24 1 La(S) 22 Ala(6)}—A26.13 JN 19 Ala(7)—B47.23 2 Texas(2)—B46.22 eh Sn ie LL gD, 7. Ale M8 cmHy3 2 Tenn(4) Bankhead Bty/R/1/1—B38.27 Cleburne, 15 Ark(7)—A27.05 23 Tenn(9)—A28.04 24 Tenn(8) 5 Tenn(5)—A28.05 S/H/3 Shaver, 6 Ark(8) Smith Bty/S/2/1(3)—A27.07 7 Ark a(S) 7 Ark b(4)—A27.08 2. Ark(7)—A26.07 WH Wood, 44 Tenn(2) 16 Ala(6)—A27.09 9 Ark Bn(2) 27 Tenn(5) 8 Ark(5)—A27.10 Harper Bty—B38,28 BiRes 10 Ark(S) 2 Conf(2)—B37.31 repl Idr, 9 Ark(5) Hudson Bry—I 1 Mo(8)—B38.29 SiRes 15 Miss(4) 20 Tenn(3) Stanford Bty/S/1/1(2)—B34.31 Statham, 19 Tenn(S) 22 Miss(6)—B35.31 45 Tenn(4) 28 Tenn(4)}—B36.31 TiRes 3 Ky(6) 31 Ala(S)—A32.01 4 Ky) —A33.01 Trabue, 5 Ky(5) 6 Ky(6)—B33.34 4 Ala Bn, Crews Bn(3) Byrne Bly—B33.33, Higher commands Withers, Clinton Cay/2/2—B41.22 Hardee, 3 Corps HQ and supply —B36.19 Breckinridge, Res Corps HQ—B34.26 Polk, 1 Corps HQ and supply—A25.01 Bragg, 2 Corps HQ and supply—A23.08 Beauregard, A Miss HQ and Supply—B19.29 Set up south of Bxx.25, west of B25.xx: ‘Wharton a(7) Wharton b, Adams Miss Cav of A Miss; 1 Miss Cav, Brewer Cav, Mise Cav of 1 Corps; Polk Bty/J/2/1(4) 7 Ky/SI2/1(7) Jenkins Cav/2 Comps, Gage Bty/C/2/2, 18 Ala/I2/2(8) Calvert, Hubbard, Trigg Btys and 6 Miss(3) of C/H/3: Swett and Miller Btys, 3 Conf(4) of S/H/3 3 Miss Bn(S) 55 Tenn(4) Ga Dragoons of W/H/3 Watson Bty/B/Res, Rutledge Bty, | Tenn Cav a(6) 1 Tenn Cav b/S/Res Morgan Cav/T ResA Fearrvl SLaveHTER ‘onfederate tactical organization had all but collapsed. by the second day. The above set-up reflects the Rebel line as it was formed early in the morning, but atthe start of this sce- nario, it was still assembling. Unit commanders mostly gave up on divisional and corps control, settling for simply cob- bling together a line, As such, any orders for the units are an approximation, at best All units may trace radius to any brigade commander. Each, comps leader has a sector of the Tine, and units within that sec- tor can be considered in commane! while there. 1 Corps: Duncan Field to Jones-Sowell Field 2 Comps: Glover, Jones, Sowell, and Crescent Fields. 3 Corps: Sarah Bell Field, Larkin Bell Field, Davis Field, and the Peach Orchard. Res Corps: Davis to Duncan Fields, including the Sunken Road, No CSA unit may move for the first four turns, except for those unis in Glover or Jones Fields. Units in the free-set up ‘zone may move towards the battle line, and join any part of it Artillery Ammunition: 50 Previous losses: 173 Wrecked Regiments: $/2/1-1, A/1/ 2/2-1, CIM/3-1, W/HI3-2, B/Res-1, SIR /2-2, C/2/2-1, 1 Eliminated Units: Cobb Biy/T/Res, 17 Ala/J/2/2 Reinforcements: Per the CSA Reinforcement Schedule Victory Conditions: Union Massive $1 or more VPs Union Major 35 10.50. VPs Union Minor 2010 34 VPs. Draw 51019 VPs CSA Minor “10104 VPs. CSA Major 2010-11 VPs CSA Massive -21 or ess VPs Historically the scenario was a Union Major Victory, with 43 VPs, Design Note: The victory conditions for scenarios covering April 6th are much different from those covering both days. Simply put, the Union reinforcements dramatically ilt the bal- cance, and it is highly unlikely that the Confederates can hang onto much—if any—of the field. Historically, the Union army pretty much swept the map on the 7th, with all Confederate forces exiting t0 go back to Corinth to avoid destruction. Hence, victory conditions for the Confederates in any full two SS 7.08, day game will reflect how well they can hang on in spite of this massive Federal force, and do not really measure how well they do on the 6th. Also, players may debate how major the Federal victory was. think that it was substantial, though the fruits of that vietory were thrown away by the combined uncertainty of Halleck, Buell, and Grant, The Federals were so stunned that the Rebels even attacked that they immediately became paranoid ‘about a repeat. Tactically, however, the Confederate army had ‘been badly mauled and lost all cohesion in the immediate af termath of Shiloh, while the Federals had several organized divisions at their command with which to pursue. Ihave tried to judge the immediate effects of the batle on each army, not the way in which the campaign was conducted after Shiloh. 6.9 "Water our horses in the Tennessee River" The Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April, 1862 General Information ‘Map Area: Both First Turn: 6:00 a.m. April 6th Last Turn: 6:00 p.m. April 7th ‘Total Game Length: 125 turns First Player: CSA, Union Information Set up: McClernand, 1 Tenn HQ—A27.01 C&S Cav/IT—A27.02 1/4 IML Cav/IT—A35.09 E, 2 Ill Bty—B22.32 D, 1M Bty—A25.05 D2 Bty—A27.12, 14 Ohio Bty—A25.06 we Hare, 11 Lowa a,b—A30.08 13 Lowa a,b—A30.10 18 M—A30.12 8 —A30.14 aT 45 Il—A25.01 48 M—A26.03, 20 M—A26.05 Marsh, 11 Il—A27.08 ‘Mo ii. Hc Te Gey Mae sce 88; AFEaRFUL S.a0¢HTeR ASS 7.03, 3uT 17 —B24.31 29 M—B26.30 Raith, 43 I—B28.29 49 IlL—B30.28 W. Wallace, 2 Tenn HQ—A53.13 US Cav/2/T—A35.22 A&B/2 Ill Cav/2/T—A41.19 A, 111 Bty—A42.15, H, | Mo Bty—A56.18 D, 1 Mo Bty—AS1.13, K, 1 Mo Bty— var ‘Tuttle, 2 lowa—A45.15 14 Towa—A47.15 7 lowa—A49.16 12 lowa—A52.18, aur McArthur—A39.16 14 Mo—A38.17 13 Mo—A37.19 9 ML—A40.16 12 M—A40.18 81 Ohio—A47.09 aT Sweeny, 52 Ill a,b —A44.15 71N—A48.17 8 Towa ab—A44.19 57 Ill ab—A44.21 50 I—A44.23, 58 IIL—A42.23 Hurlbut, 4 Tenn HQ —A44.02 5 Ohio Cay—B46.28 C, 1 Mo Bty—A51.02 2 Mich Bty—A41.08 13 Ohio Bty—B45.32 wart Williams, 3 lowa—A41.04 41 M—A42,02 32 IIL—A44.01 28 IL—B44.33 a tn Ping LLC eg, 7, ee M18 2 wart Veatch, 25 Ind—A44.12 14 T—A38.11 15 Ill—A37.08 46 —A42.11 3arr Lauman—A47.02 31 Ind—A45.03 44 Ind—A46.02 17 Ky—A48.02 25 Ky—A49.02 Sherman, 5 Tenn HQ—B22.30 Thieleman Cav—B23.31 3/4 TI Cav—B27.26 6 Ind Bry—B11.32 B, 1 I Bty—B23.30 E 1 Ill Bry—B22; sft McDowell—B13.33 6 Iowa ab —B8.32 46 Ohio a,b—B10.32 40 W—B13.31 usr Stuart—B51.22 55 I—B51.20, ‘54 Ohio—B49.22 71 Ohio—B47.21 35ST 77 Ohio a, b, Hildebrand—B20.28 53 Ohio a,b—B22.23 57 Ohio—B24.26 asst 48 Ohio, Buckland—B17.30 70 Ohio ,b—B19.30 72 Ohio a,b—B16.30 Prentiss, 6 Tenn HQ—B38.20 1/2 Il Cay—B41 22 Sth Ohio Bty—B36.19 1 Minn Bty—B37.20 16 Iowa a,b, out of ammo—A49.13A Fearrul SLaveH TER vert Peabody, 25 Mo—B29,22 12 Mich—B30.20 21 Mo—B32.19 16 Wisc a,b—B34.19 Powell—B16.14 err Miller, 18 Mo—B35.18 61 I—B37.18 18 Wise a,b—B39.18 Army troops A Tenn Supply Train, 2x A Tenn wagons—A55.14 B, 2 Ill Bty—AS2.12 H, LMM Bty—A54.12 F,2 ll Bly—ASS.12 8 Ohio Bly—AS7.09 15 Mich a,b—AS6.11 Orders: Powell/1/6/T has a regimental goal to defend the approach to V67T's camps, delaying the enemy advance as much as possi ble while avoiding destruction, 12 Mich/1/6/T has a regimental goal to join Powell/1/6/T and then to delay the enemy advance as much as possible while avoiding destruction Tenn, once active, has orders to support Sherman's Division. 2 Tenn, once active, has orders to move to the Sunken Road ‘nd defend that line 4 Tenn, once active, has orders to support Prenti 5 Tenn, once active, has orders to defend in place. SIT has a brigade goal to defend the Union left flank and prevent the Confederates from outflanking the Sunken Road/Peach Orchard line to the east. 6 Tenn, once active, has orders to defend in place. 16 Towa has orders to move to join 6/T. It may resupply. 15 Michigan has orders to join 6/T. Other Army Troops have no orders ! Division Artillery Ammunition: 150 Previous Losses: none ‘Wrecked Regiments: None Eliminated U: Reinforcements: Per the Union Reinforcement Schedule etna tig SS7.03 CSA Information Set Up: Johnston, Beauregard, A Miss HQ and Supply—B5.01 Hardee, 3 Corps HQ and Supply —B 10.06 CHB 2 Tenn—B6.13, 24 Tenn—B7.13, Cleburne, 15 Ark—B8.12 5 Tenn, 6 Miss—B9.12 23 Tenn—B10.11 ‘Trigg Bty—B7.12 Hindman, Calvert Bty -B8.11 Hubbard Bty—B9.11 WHS 27 Tenn, 16 Ala—B1L.I1 Wood, 44 Tenn, 8 Ark—B11.10 9 Ark Bn, 55 Tenn—B12.09 3 Miss Bn—B13.13 Ga Dragoons, Harper Bty—B11.07 SmHI3 7 Atk a,b—B13.09 Shaver, 2 Ark—B13.08 Swett Bty, Miller Bty—B12.07 6 Ark—B14.07 3 CSA—B14.06 Grn 1 La—B15.06 26 Ala—B15.05 Gladden, 25 Ala—B16.04 22 Ala- B16.03, Robertson Bty—B15.03, 21 Ala—B17.03, Bragg, 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B7.03 Pre 38 Tenn a,b—B2.11 16 La, Orleans Gd—B3.11 Pond, Ketchum Bty, Jenkins Cav—B3.10 18 La—B4.10 Crescent a,b—B4.09 aa ig one Te ene ly epee 186A Feanrut SLavegte! RSS 7.03 AID 17 La, Conf Gd—B5.09 Ruggles, Washington Bty—B5.08 Anderson, 20 La—B6.08 9 Texas, | Fl Bn—B6.07 Gn 1 Ark a.b—B7.07 19 La—B7.06 Gibson, 4 La—B8.06 13 Laab—B8.05, Wan Girardey Bty—B8.04 Clinton Cav/2/2—B7.04 17 Ala—B9.05 Jackson, 2 Texas—B9.04 18 Ala—B10.03, 19 Ala—B11.03, cn Withers, Gage Bty—B10.02 Chalmers, 52 Tenn, 5 Miss—B11.02 9 Miss, 10 Miss—B12.01 7 Miss—B13.01 Orders: ‘CIM - Brigade Goal to capture Shiloh Church 3 Corps - capture Lost, Review, and Woolf Fields, Withers/2 Comps - Divisional Goal to capture Spain, Barnes, and Davis Fields. Gi2/2 - Brigade Goal to capture Spain, Barnes, and Davis Fields P/1/2.- Brigade Goal to capture Ben Howell Field Ruggles/2 Corps - Divisional Goal to capture Woolf and Re- view Fields. 2 Corps - accompany one of the above divisions. That order then becomes the Corps order. all other 2 Corps units with separate goals continue on those goals. Each order must roll separately for attack stoppage. Design Note: Despite having been there for two days, and having monitored the Union camps for a month, the Confeder- ates lacked both good maps and a detailed sense of how the Union camps were laid out. The actual attack orders were very vague —merely to attack, capture Pittsburgh landing, and drive the enemy into the river. In practical terms, this ‘meant that the Rebel troops needed constant correction and redirection once actual comact was made. Hence, the orders given here are fragmentary and limited in nature. ki 113g Se. Meni M2108 29 Previous Losses: None Wrecked Regiments: None Reinforcements: Per the CSA Reinforcement Schedule Victory Conditions: Union Massive SI or more VPs Union Major 35 10 50 VPs Union Minor 200 34 VPs. Draw Sto 19 VPs CSA Minor -10104 VPs CSA Major -20to-11 VPs CSA Massive -21 or less VPs Historically the scenario was a Union Major Victory, with 43 VPs 6.10 What might have Been A Fearful Slaughter contains many options, including free de- ployment, extra troops, and variable reinforcements. Undoubt- edly players will want to experiment with these options on theit own. Incorporating many of the major changes, however, can lead to some significant modifications to existing set-ups and reinforcements. Here, we have tried to incorporate most of those changes already, $0 as not to burden the players un- duly - jump right in. This scenario is primarily an alternative Confederate deployment and incorporates several of the more intriguing options. Be forewarned that this scenario strongly favors the Confederates. General Information Map Area: Both First Turn: 6:00 a.m. April 6th Last Turn: 6:00 p.m. April 7th Total Game Length: 125 turns First Player: CSA Special Rule: ‘The Confederate movement restrictions of 3.4 are NA. Union Information: ‘All Union information is the same as for Scenario 6.9. CSA Information Set Up: Johnston, Beauregard, A Miss HQ and Supply—B5.01 Polk 1 Corps HQ and Supply, Mise and Brewer Cav— wii | of BOL am nating& Pearru. SLaven Ter Clark, R/I/1—w/i 1 of B15.02 S/V/—wii 1 of B12.01 Bragg, 2 Corps HQ and Supply —B7.04 Ruggles, Jenkins Cav—B 12.08 A/L2—wfi 1 of B12.08 G//2—wfi 1 of B10.06 P/1/2—wii 1 of B8.04 Hardee, 3 Corps HQ—BS.08 3 Corps Supply—B6.01 Hindman, C/H/3—w/i 2 of B6.10 S/H/3—w/i 1 of B5.08 W/HI3—w/i 1 of B3.05 Orders: 1 Corps—Advance via the Bark Road to the Eastern Corinth Road, and attack to capture the Spain, Barnes, Davis, and Sarah Bell Fields, 2 Corps - Attack up the Corinth Road to capture the Rea, Lost, Review, and Duncan Fields 3 Corps - Advance through the Fraley and Widow Howell Fields to capture Shiloh Church, Ben Howell Field, and Woolf Field. Artillery Ammunition: 150 Previous Losses: None Wrecked Regiments: None Eliminated Units: None Reinforcements: April 6 Time Area Orders Units 60am. A MDivision 7:00am = A 1 Cheatham, 1/2/1, 1 Miss Cav Tlsam. A ——-1_S/2/I(less Maney, 1 Tenn Bn) TaSam. A 1-2/2 Corps 9:00am. A 2 Breckinridge, Res Corps HQ, ‘TiRes QSam. A 3_B/Res, McClung Bty/A Miss. 930am. A 1 S/Res (less 19 Tenn) 10:00am. A * FComps 1:00pm. C4 Adams Miss Cav 1:00pm. A *_—_ Army of the West RSS 7403 Time Area Orders Units 1:30pm. HS Whartona& bCav 200pm. B61 Tenna & bCay, 19 Tenm/S/Res, Maney, 1 Tenn Bu/S/2/1 7 April Time Area Orders Units 60am. A 7 47 Tenma&b Order * M Division, F Corps, and Army of the West are all op- tional troops. Times listed aro when the CSA Player be- gins rolling for entry. See Rules 3.6c, 3.6d, and 3.6e for full details on arrival times and costs. All units have or- ders to move to the Army HQ and await further orders, 1 Move to join Corps 2. Res Corps has orders to move to B12.08, halt, and await further orders. 3. Move to join Corps. McClung is attached to Res Corps. 4 Adams Cav is ordered to move to BSS.18 and await fur- ther orders, Wharton's Cav is ordered to move to A6,01 and await fur ther orders 6 19 Tenn/S/2/1 is ordered to join it's brigade. 1 Tenn Cav is ordered to march down the Bark Road, up the Hamburg Rad to B49.22 and await further orders. Maney and 1 Tenn Bn are ordered to rejoin $/2/1. 747 Tenn is ordered to move to the Army HQ and await further orders. Once there, it may be re-assigned to any brigade. Victory Conditions: Union Massive $1 or more VPs ‘Union Major 3510 50 VPs. Union Minor 20 to 34 VPs Draw ‘Sto 19 VPs CSA Minor “10 to4 VPs CSA Major 20 to-11 VPs CSAMassive — -21 or less VPs Historically the scenario was @ Union Major Victory, with 43, VPs. Design Note: Alternatively, players can choose to simply recreate the First Day's fight using this situation. Use the time limits and victory conditions of Scenario 6.7. Also, players ‘may elect to give the Union player a 15 VP handicap when using this scenario, to offset the advantages the Confederate {forces have here. Mee Rin The i iy Wap i 84 Fearru. SLavenTer SS 7-08, 6.11 The Shiloh that Was ‘This scenario is the most historically accurate possible—thus it sacrifices a great deal of player control as a result. Players ‘undertaking this scenario are advised 10 do so with the under- standing that a number of special rules limit player control and introduce chaos into the mix on a much larger scale than in any of the other scenarios. General Information Map Area: Both First Turn: 6:00 am. April 6th Last Turn: 6:00 p.m. April 7th Total Game Length: 125 turns First Player: CSA Scenario Special Rules: The following rules apply to both sides, 6.11a, Contiguous Command. In clear hexes, trace brigade command radius normally. In woods and thickets, however, all units are within command radius of their Brigade comman- der only if they are stacked with him, adjacent to the his hex, ‘or adjacent to a another unit who is adjacent to his hex. In other words, a brigade's command radius can only be traced through contiguous occupied hexes. Note: it is not necessary for all hexes to be occupied by units of the same brigade, an exception to the series rule that allows, ‘command radius to be traced into but not through a hex con- taining units of other brigades. 6.11b. Regiments and Command Control. Regiments within brigade command radius may move normally with their com: mand, Regiments that are not within command radius of their normal Brigade commander but are within command radius of another Brigade commander automatically attach them- selves to that brigade. Such attachment lasts until the unit is no longer within command radius of that Brigade commander {at which point the unit must attempt to rejoin its unit unless it is within command radius of another Brigade commander—in which case i ataches itself to that Brigade commander). Reg- iments not within command radius of their Brigade comman: ddr that are within radius of > 2 other Brigade commanders, attach to one of the commanders at random. In all cases, ifthe unit is within command radius of its Brigade Commander, re- gardless of the presence of other Brigade Commanders, it ‘must stay with its unit (unless detached via normal orders methods) 6.1le. Regiments out of Command. Regiments not within command radius of any Brigade Commander have their move ‘ment restricted. Such units may only move if a) they begin their movement stacked with a friendly leader, or b) their ‘movement is directed by a Random Eveat. 6.11d Retreats. The enemy player controls all retreats. Units that are forced to retreat must do so in as straight a line as pos- sible, even if it means retreating through other friendly units Other units may NOT displace to avoid retreating units, in- stead they must remain in the hex and adopt the morale state of the retreating unit, 6.11e Random Events. RE possiblity occurs on a DR of 6 (instead of 2 9 normally), On a RE DR > 6, make a subse- quent DR on the RE Table and implement the results, Union Information: Al Union Information is the same as for Scenario 6.9 CSA Informatio AILCSA Information is the same as for Scenario 6.9 Victory Conditions: Players can choose to play either the first day or both days using this scenario. If playing only April 6th, use the victory conditions found in Scenario 6.7. If playing out both days, use the victory conditions in Scenario 6.9. SHILOH DESIGNER'S NOTES Half-regiments Shiloh was an early-war battle, and a large number of units were larger than the norm for later ACW engagements. Some regiments were so new they were nearly full strength, and would take up two full hexes if deployed in line, Tt became impossible to recreate historic frontages without either using extended lines or going to half-regiments (we hesitate to call, them battalions because there was no formal designation as such.) Extended lines always created some problems in the CWB, and there is actually some historical justification for using Separate counters instead: in a number of instances, the regiments detached companies on independent missions or to fight elsewhere, creating in effect a two-battalion unit, Even When in a single line, the Lt. Col. often took command of the other end of the formation, because it was too long for one ‘man to control. Finally, the newness of these units meant they lacked a certain drill proficiency, and some of the more com plicated evolutions that extended lines typically represent Were beyond these units, Powell and the Patrols Essentially, we decided not to include the various Union pick ets in the historical game. They remain an option to counter Free Confederate Set-up Scenarios. However, Powell and Moore's skirmishes were larger than that of mere pickets Powell’s patrol amounted to some 350 men in several compa: nies of the 12th Michigan and 25th Missouri, while Moore's advance included the remainder of the 12th Michigan, All told, this force represented an advance guard of almost 1000A Fearrul SLavaa ver men, (oo large to simply dismiss as pickets. Besides, they had. a significant delaying effect on the Confederate advance in that sector, We decided to make Powell a permanent counter, and reduce the 12th Michigan and 25th Missouri appropriately. This proved a more realistic solution than creating a system of de- tachments to handle the situation. Powell, the man who dis- covered the enemy force and may well have saved the Union army from total surprise, deserves at least the recognition of his name on the counter, all the more so given the fact that he was a casualty of the battle. As far as I know, he is no relation, Immediate Orders Players may question the methods by which the normal orders process is bypassed in this game. Simply put, Shiloh was a very unusual battle, and senior commanders intervened di rectly in the lower echelon command quite a bit. Army com- ‘mander initiative and immediate orders are both methods ‘whereby a player can intervene immediately in a crisis situa- tion, albeit at the cost of fragmenting his own command struc ture. Beware of using this rule too liberally, as it can have real consequences later in the game, when you are trying to man. age some sort of larger effort. The random events table will ‘impose some of these things on you anyway, some good, some bad. Adding to the problem can backtire, ‘This does not mean that we are abandoning the traditional or- drs structure found in the CWB and RSS - far from it. It does ‘mean that we try and recreate the historical conditions of the battle, including both the positive and negative aspects of this kind of command. One of the biggest effects will simply be that the more brigade goals you create, the more stoppage die rolls you have to make, creating an overall disjointed effect. This can be very frustrating, especially either early on in the game, where a bad die roll can really screw up the opening at- tacks, or late in the day, when you are massing for that final drive and the troops just don't seem to want to keep going. Grant benefits the most from these rules, because he has the best rating. However, it will be his army that is the most ‘mauled by the end of the day, mitigating his 2/3 chance of success. Also remember that any commander has a chance of loose cannon, which is not meant to indicate poor judgment so ‘much as simply reflect how hard it was on the field to figure ‘out what was happening. ‘The immediate orders really exist for to recreate those dra- ‘matic stands that occurred repeatedly. The image of some des- perate brigadier impassionedly telling some regimental com- ‘ander to "hold at all costs” is too good to pass up, and 100 ‘important in the actual battle to ignore. The postwar regimen. {al literature is full of florid descriptions of desperate, lonely stands that ‘saved’ the Union army, only to go unrecognized in the aftermath. While doubtless a great deal of hyperbole can 32 RSS 7.09 be found in these war stories, there is also a lot of truth. To steal a phrase, April 6th was a day that needed a great deal of saving for the Federals Note that the Rebel army has two army commanders, and that the only way Johnston can issue orders is via initiative, at Teast as long as Beauregard remains in action. This might seem odd at first (given that Johnston was actually in com- ‘mand), but it reflects the choices Johnston himself made, He chose fo roam the field at will, providing direct inspiration and personal attention at moments of crisis. Beauregard was to te- ‘main at HQ and direct the flow or reinforcements forward—in effect acting as the army commander in the game terms, Confederate Movement Restrictions AC first glance, this rule seems very arbitrary. In fact, it reere~ ates an important aspect of the Rebel attack: the lack of ade- quate recon. Despite having been in the vicinity for two days, the Rebels still had only a vague idea of where the Union ‘camps were. The plan called for the Army to advance in a se- ries of supporting lines. Of course this fell apart once the ‘movement started, but the Rebels tried very hard to maintain alignment and proper distance for the first few hours of the battle. Similarly, the Confederate cavalry is prohibited from attacking un-alerted Union units at all. This prohibition does not have a direct historical precedent, It is designer meddling, pure and simple, to come up with an easy way of preventing wholly ahistorical cavalry ‘commando’ raids on unsuspecting Feder als. Historically, almost all the cavalry were assigned flank ‘guard duties to make sure the Rebels weren't surprised in turn, ‘What few mounted troops that entered the actual fight tended to roam around fairly aimlessly behind the attacking infantry, Joking for something to charge. They did, in fact, manage several charges, but all in the afternoon, well after the Feder- als were fully alerted. Gunboats In all honesty, a simple one line rule could probably take care of the gunboats’ historical impact. The prevention of straggler recovery within 20 hexes is sufficient to send the Rebels back to historically respectful distances from the landing. The di- rect fire stuff is merely window dressing, but will have one potential benefit - it guarantees that the Rebels will not be able to block the landing directly. Not including the gunboats was not really considered, however - both designers are too much enamored of “big iron" not to put them in, One simplification was the reduction of the gunboat armament to one type of ‘cannon, simply called a Naval Gun (NG) on the chart. In real- ity, each boat cartied a mix of rifles and smoothbores. Sah Mn Ring. Th Ga ey Ne se& Feanrvt StavenTer ASS 7.03 ‘Technically, field artillery might have gotten lucky and dam- aged a gunboat in a duel. In practical terms, the gunboats were 0 intimidating that the very few attempts in this part of the war by field guns to fight naval cannon were soon ended by a few shots from the gunboats. ‘Swamps and Thickets: 1 was lucky enough to find a whole masters thesis devoted to nothing but the terrain effects at Shiloh, That work led t0 the terrain rules for these two types that you see now. Normally the streams were also tangles of vines and small trees anyway, but the addition of floodwaters really complicated crossing these usually small trickles. The most famous example of swamps effecting the batile is of course Cleburne's unfortu- nate foray into them around the Shiloh Branch, After some pondering of how to best recreate the unique impact of the swamps, we followed the lead of the guys at XTR: we bor rovsed the idea for rolling to exit such hexes from their game on Shilob of several years ago. In two spots, dense thickets of vegetation hindered the attack without any attendant water - these are the Thicket hexes in the game. All the research indicates that these two areas around Woolf Field and along the Sunken Road - were the only sites where such tangled growth was significant enough to really effect the fight. We don't know why for sure: one possible reason is that these areas were recent clear-cuts or abandoned fields, and the re-growth was particularly fierce. In any case, they posed significant problems for troops trying {0 cross them, Otherwise, the woods were remarkably clear. A number of ar- Lillery units managed to gain limited line of sight at targets 1000 yards or more away. The Federals in the camps of Stu- art's Brigade could see the Confederate Flags of the regiments foverrunning Prentiss’ camps, also several hundred yards dis- tant through forested areas. The trees were just budding out, and the lack of ground cover from open range farming made for quite surprising lines of sight in some places. ‘The Historical Scenario Shiloh was a batle of rank amateurs. Despite the presence of aan entire Rebel army on their front for almost 24 hours before the attack, the Federals were surprised when that attack came. For their part, the Rebels advanced with only the sketchiest notion of the actual Federal deployment. Once the battle com- enced, virtually every brigade in both armies fragmented, with units joining other commands, leaving the field for ammo or to escort prisoners, massive straggling, and general contusion. A number of brigade commanders lost track of their commands, and at least one, Jackson, did not rejoin his ‘men until Tuesday back in Corinth, having become totally lost by Sunday afternoon, It became clear early on that any effort to fully capture this chaos would simply prevent the average gamer from exercis- ing any control over his army, reducing him to being litle ‘more than a middleman for a long series of random event rolls, However, It has been my intention all along to recreate the historical battles as much as possible in the RSS, and Shiloh is no exception. Boyd and I both feel that the history is ‘an important aspect of these projects, and should not be shorted Hence the historical scenario, In it we placed all the special rules and modified random results that we felt necessary (0 recreate the historical mess. If you play it, you will clearly see the progressive splintering of each side's army, and the loss of control. We urge you not fo think of it as a competitive game, but instead a group historical exercise which can be enjoyed for the unfolding picture it paints, drawal (One of the things brought out in the early testing was that the Union testers were effectively conducting a phased with- drawal each turn - they would fall back into woods, just far enough to minimize losses and exposure to enemy fire. In ef- fect, they were trading space for time, and creating, a signifi- ccant disparity in losses. Good gaming, yes, but poor history. ‘Too many regiments were too green, to big, of too poorly led {to manage this kind of tactical finesse - instead, they formed lines and blazed away until one side or the other cracked. Hence the morale check. Even a BL or Shaken will halt a unit in i's tracks, and likely cause real problems for a player at- tempting to avoid flanking issues while trying this tactic [ike the effect so much that I am going to try it out in all the RSS games, with the only difference being in the later games, SH or BL unit may still move normally, adopting the morale state at the end of the move. This variation reflects the greater flexibility of veteran teoops. I hope others will ty it The Morale Ratings One of the first things that players will note upon examining the counter sheet for the frst time is that there are a wider va- riety of unit morale ratings than have been the case in the prior two games in the series, Both This Hollowed Ground and This Terrible Sound pitted experienced Armies against each other. At Shiloh both armies, but especially the Confed- erate forces were fighting in their first major action. We decided that command range requirements, combined with tough terrain would produce the appropriate amount of conf. sion when brigades were committed to action. When you commit your green brigades to combat you will quickly dis- cover that some regiments will hold up well under fire, some will cut and run virtually at the first shot, while others will merely falter. What to do with the brigade commander? Con-A Fearru. Siavantee tinue the now fragmented attack leading from the front while ‘many if not the majority of the regiments in the brigade suffer in the rear out of command control? Or halt the momentum of the atlack to reform the brigade—risking an attack stoppage? In any event things will not be nearly so predicable as with more experienced forces. The goal is to reduce uniformity of player control, SHILOH HISTORICAL NOTES As in the two previous games in the RSS, the basic outlines of the Shiloh story have been told many times. Rather than re- peal a basic overview again, we have elected to focus on sev= eral short stories, if you will: some of the more fascinating as- pects ofthe campaign that deserve highlighting Grant and Lew Wallace Grant probably wrecked Lew Wallace's military career after Shiloh. Wallace's failure to reach the field early in the fight became, by extension, the reason Grant gave forall of the re- verses suffered on April 6th. After the battle, Wallace was not court-martialed, but was instead had his command re-orga- nized out from under him. He commanded rear areas or was left with no command for almost two years. ‘This was a hard fate for a man who's star had risen so dramati- cally in the first year of the war. An Indiana state senator with, both Mexican War and militia experience, Wallace was ap- pointed the State Adjutant General at the outbreak of war, He proved an excellent administrator, more than filling the state's ‘quota under Lincoln's first call for troops. He then resigned to lake command of the 11th Indiana Zouaves, determined this time to make it to the front. (Hostilities ceased before he saw action in the Mexican War.) He quickly rose to brigade and di- vision command, experienced combat in West Virginia and at Fort Donelson, and by March, 1862, was the youngest Major General in the Union army. ‘On April 6th, Wallace's division was not with the rest of the army. Instead, it was several miles downstream, at Crump's, Landing, detached from the main body. Wallace, worried about the isolated nature of his command, arranged to famil- iarize himself with the roads between Crump's and Pittsburgh Landings, ensuring a rapid response if trouble arose. He also greatly improved one of the roads, which ran close to the river and was often swampy and impassible. Once properly pre- pared, there were two main routes by which Wallace could join the army or vice-versa: the River Road and the Shunpike, ‘The latter route took Wallace not to the landing, but to Sher~ man's position at the Southeast corner of the army’s camps, ‘When Grant sailed past Crump's Landing on the way to the bate on the 6th, he briefly conferred with Wallace about the distant sounds of battle, Both agreed it was a general engage- ‘ment, and then Grant steamed on, leaving Wallace with orders RSS 7.02 to "hold himself in readiness" to march. Grant would send more specifics as to destination once he arrived at Pittsburgh, Landing and assessed the situation. What followed was a classic misunderstanding. Once he ar rived at the battle, Grant verbally ordered an side to return to ‘Crump's Landing and bring up Wallace. The aide, fearing he might not correctly relay Grants wishes, asked for and got a written nove from Rawlins, Grant's Chief of staff, directing Wallace to come up to the tight of the army and form on it With that hasty note, Baxter, the courier, took boat down: stream, At 11:30, Baxter arrived at Wallace's HQ. There, Wallace in. {erpreted the order to mean he should join Sherman, who was the right of the army. The order did not specify either a route oor a clear destination: Wallace was not ordered to Pittsburgh Landing. Hence, Wallace chose to march on the Shunpike, then to the Purdy Road, and join Sherman's extreme right flank near Shiloh Church. Wallace's next action, however, was somewhat curious, De- spite the urgency of the order und the clear sounds of battle heard upriver, Wallace first let his men eat, incurring another hhalf hour delay. There a second courier from Grant arrived, a cavalry lieutenant who had ridden up the River Road, sent by Grant shortly after Baxter was dispatched. This courier found ‘Wallace's men eating, and came away with the impression that ‘Wallace refused to move without written orders, a charge Wal- lace always denied. Since Wallace already had writen orders at this time, it seems likely that the Lieutenant was mistaken, and interpreted Wallace's decision fo let the men eat first as a refusal (0 march. While not true, it was the impression con- veyed back to Grant when the Lieutenant returned to Shiloh. About noon, Wallace marched out via the Shunpike. At the same time, Grant sent another aide, Captain Rowley, to insist Wallace come up and provide the written orders if necessary Mystified, Rowley and a small escort rode the length of the River Road to Crump's Landing without finding Wallace, Fi- nally, they overtook the division on the Shunpike at about 2:00 p.m. Wallace had halted the men for a res. Rowley was able to convey to Wallace the extent of the problem. ‘Sherman was driven back, and the whole army was in danger of being pushed into the river. Wallace had to come to Pitsburgh Landing immediately. There was nothing to do but retrace steps bback to Crump Landing, and then march down the River Road, atrip of about 6 miles from where Wallace was currently halted. In another bad decision, Wallace decided that instead of merely turning the whole column about in place, he needed to counter- ‘march so that the head of his command would remain in front Given that the length of the column was about three miles, this turned out to be a time consuming choice. Rowley fairly seethed at the delays, and even Wallace admitted later that the process as exceedingly slow. arin. Te Gat Qs Wi in 84AFeaarut SLaveHTeR SS 7.03 Al told, it was nearly 7:00 p.m, when Wallace's mea finally crossed Snake Creck. They halted after crossing the creck, taking up positions along Grant’ final line. They saw no fight- ing on April 6th, though they did advance at dawn on the 7th fighting most of the 2nd day. Grant, who had come under intense criticism for Shilob, blamed Wallace for many things. The general tardiness and the confusion over the written orders became, in Grant's mind, intentional failures of leadership from Wallace, rather than the kind of typical command confusion that they more likely were. Certainly Wallace hurt himself with the decision to ccounter-march and the lack overall lack of haste Fate intervened to give Wallace one last chance at glory, when he defended Washington at the battle of the Monacacy in 1864, With half the force of the attacking Rebels, Wallace ‘gamely defended the line of the Monacacy River for most of a day, buying time for Grant's reinforcements from Virginia to arrive in Washington DC and finally secure the capital from Rebel attack. This feat partially redeemed him, but Wallace never really recovered from Shiloh. ‘And, of course, Wallace wrote Ben Hur, A story of the Christ, providing him with fame of a more lasting kind. Death and Night “Death and Night.” This phrase, inscribed on the Daughters of the Confederacy Monument put up to the Confederate Sol- diets at Shilot, sums up the classic romantic illusion so cher- ished by Southerners in the memorial period: that Sidney Johnston, had he only lived, would have carried the day and driven Grant into the river. His fall triggered the confusion that led, ultimately, to the delay that doomed the South: Grant survived the night, Buell arived, and the war went on, Did the South come that close? Modern scholarship and more dispassionate look at the facts suggests otherwise. The Confederate officers had largely lost coutrol of their men as an ‘organized force by the time Johnston fell, and it is unlikely that had he survived, he would have had any better grasp of the situation than the nearest Brigadier did. A number of units ‘had actually left the field by late afternoon, either marching off when they ran out of ammunition, or sent back escorting prisoners, or simply deciding that they had done enough and it was time to camp for the evening. Grants final line was well braced with canton, had a number of fresh troops up - namely a brigade from Buell and Ws lace’s tardy command - and was imbued with a sense of all or nothing on that river bank that night. By contrast, when Beauregard called off the last attack, his men were widely scattered, he had only two brigades that were in any immediate condition to attack, and more impor- 35 tantly, close enough to mount an attack quickly, and he had al- most no sense of where any of his men were. Bragg, Polk, and Hardee - the three ranking commanders on the front lines ~ all, hhad little or no knowledge of where the bulk of their com- mands were either. This condition was created by the con- fused and vicious fighting of the day, not by Johnston's fall, and had he not been shot it would not have changed the dispo- sitions of the troops. Simply setting up the scenario for the final attack should soon convince most gamers of the impossi- bility of Southern success here: die-hards should be won over after the first few turns, Regardless of Johaston’s circum- stances, the South's bolt was shot, and Grant's men were un- likely to be driven into the river. Duplicate Regiments ‘As usual in the Confederate order of atl, there are a number ‘of duplicate regiments, These are not mistakes - all these units did exist, and with the numbers shown here. There are two 15th Arkansas Regiments in the bate, one with Cleburne (his ‘own regiment before elevation to brigade command) and one under Col. Gee in Pillow's Division of the Fort Donelson troops. There are also two SSth Tennessee regiments, one raised by Brown (surrendered at Island No, 10) and one raised ‘by MeKoin, found in Wood's Brigade, Hardee's Corps. ‘Stephens and Maney In all the official reports, and in Reed's detailed study for the Park at the win of the century, the Second Brigade, Second Division of First Corps is called "Stephens" after i’s comman- Ger. In fact, Stephens was not the commander, Col. Maney was. At 6:30 a.m. on the 6th, Maney was sent to guard Lick Creek, and Stephens took command of the rest of the brigade as next ranking Colonel. Maney rejoined his brigade at about 2:30 p.m,, and remained in command forthe rest of the battle. The game accurately portrays this command shuffle, How- ever, the official designation of the brigade remains S/2/1, be ‘cause every official report calls it that, and to do otherwise would confuse the historically minded trying to follow the ac- tual battle on the game-map. Additionally, Stephens turned out to be a pretty good officer. When Maney arrives, the Con- federate player ends up with two good commanders for this brigade (assuming neither has been lost) which translates into a small morale bonus - consider it a gift of fate Bains' Battery, Vinden Mississippi Artillery This battery is listed in all the OOB records as present at Shiloh, attached to Gibson's Brigade, Ist Division of 2nd Comps. In fact, it was not yet fit for field service and remained behind at Corinth, One section of two guas did serve with ‘Stanford's Battery, probably the two 12 pound howitzers.A Fearru. StavaHTEeR V/A Mo Arty/3/T Division Also known as Buell's independent Mo By, this unit actually contained 6 guns, but left one behind at Crump's landing on April 6th. The optional unit includes the extra gun, ‘The Unfortunate Colonel Raith Raith was a last-minute replacement of another temporary acting brigade commander, Col. Reardon, who was in turn re~ placing the absent Colonel Ross. Reardon was supposed to be ‘commanding the Brigade (or more properly he was the tempo- rary acting commander as senior remaining Col. in the brigade, commanding the 29th Illinois Regiment) but chose to inform the brigade of his “ill-health’ the morning of the bat- tle—after gunfire was clearly audible, and the enemy was within a few hundred yards of the brigade. Seniority put Raith in charge as the battle was developing that morning, Mind you at no time did Reardon tell Raith he was in charge. This piece of cheerful news came from the Brigade Adjutant whilst Rear- don headed for the landing and points north never to be seen nor heard from again, ‘The whole command apparatus of this brigade did quite poorly. Essentially Raith wandered about the battlefield out of touch of the Brigade Adjutant (who was sent on a task better suited for an orderly- oops there weren% any of those around since Reardon's abrupt departure had left the brigade HQ un- ear on who was in charge) and the rest of the brigade for some time after he had been hurriedly informed he was in ‘command. ‘When Raith did finally show up for the war in the vicinity of ‘Waterhouse's battery the brigade had been in action holding there for some time on their own, Raith chose to lead his brigade from the front, and of course was killed quite grue~ somely: appliqued to the front of his troops. The entire brigade promptly ran at the sight of the red mist (see Sher- ‘man’s report), resulting in Waterhouse’s battery losing three ‘guns. WAHL. Wallace You will note that the 2nd Division of the Army of the Ten- nessee under a decidedly average Brigadier General William HLL. Wallace have particularly strong brigade commanders. ‘The recently promoted General Wallace was grotesquely wounded in the battle (head wounds in the mid-19th century were usually fatal) and we credit his Brigade commanders with successfully helping to shore up the Union center at a critical time. Their actions bought precious time along the tight of the Hornet's Nest. The unfortunate General Wallace was recovered, still alive, after the battle, but died in his wife's arms some few days later. ‘exo ee mai 2 FSS79 — Optional Confederate Forces ‘The optional troops come from three major groups: the men lost at Fort Donelson who should have been withdrawn, the smaller force surrendered at Island No. 10 who also should have been withdrawn, and whom Beauregard actually did in- tend to withdraw before disaster struck, and finally Earl Van Dorn's composite Army of the West Fort Donelson ‘The troops at Donelson represented more than 15,000 men Jost to Johnston at a critical phase of the war. The only reason the garrison did not get out was the failure of nerve of the top commanders, Buckner no less than the others. Floyd and Pil- Jow earned the greater notoriety for fleeing, but it was Buckn- e's pessimism and refusal to listen to Forrest that made sur- render inevitable, Here it is assumed that the garrison followed Forrest and escaped that night in February, giving Johnston an extra army corps at Shiloh. Minus the black mark ‘gained by leaving their men in the lurch at Donelson, how- ever, Floyd and Pillow doubtless would have retained com- ‘mand, decreasing the relative value of this force. As a final tidbit, the option to place Buckner in command, ditching Floyd, is tossed in as a sop to those players who cannot bear to have Floyd and Pillow in charge of anything, Island No. 10 In March, toe brigades of men were left to ganison the Mississippi River noth of Memphis. At Island Number 10 and New Maid, Job P. McCown had command of the equal of two brigades of infantry, a ‘numberof cavalry, and a large fore of heavy atilerymen manning the river batters. One additional brigade was downstream at Fat Pillow. This was about half the garson that was present in ate February, but the restof the men had gone to join Jolnston at Corinth ‘Beauregard clearly recognized that the remaining force was too small to effectively defend the position, but too large to risk as a delaying force. Beauregard ordered the garrison abandoned in late March, but the movement was too slow and ancxher 5-7000 troops were captured by the Federals. Here itis assumed they got away prompdy. Army ofthe West Originally, Albert Sidney Johnston asked Fart Van Doen, the newly ap- pointed commander ofthe Trans-Mississpp, to join his forces at Corinth, Van Dorn ever aggressive, had already embarked on one of the most sh offensive moves ofthe war: he took his polyglot of Arkansans, Texans, and Missouri State Troops back to nonhwest ‘Arkansas to fight the bate of Elkhorn Tavern. Deep in the remote ‘wilderness ofthe Boston Mountains, Van Doe would not have been able to reach Johnston in time for Stile unless he moved right away, abandoning any offensive notions wes ofthe Mississippi. Mata Man HoT Ca iy Wags si 84 Pearrul SLaveHTER SS 7-08, ‘The entice premise for this option is that Elkhorn Tavern was never fought, and Van Dorn instead joined Johnston, This larger assumption requires several smaller ones: that McCul- loch and Mcintosh are not killed, that the Missouri State ‘Guard under Price would have been willing to leave Arkansas + and by extension abandon their home state - 10 swear into Confederate service and fight east of the River, and that Van Dorn would re-organize his army more efficiently than he did for Elkhorn Tavern. In fact, the army you see in the game re- quires some supposition: a couple of the brigades existed only fleetingly; and at least two - Mill's 3/M/W and Pike's Indians- never actually crossed the Mississippi at all. It is highly un- likely thatthe Indians would have ever come east, but they are included for local color. Moreover, many of the units did not yet have regimental designations in March, 1862. Most in- ‘Stead were named for commanders, and some never had a for- mal existence. By June, the Army structure stabilized and all ‘units were either assigned regimental numbers or merged into proper commands. We have taken the small liberty of simply backdating that reorganization by a few months. More sources. ‘were used to follow the obscure threads of this particular co- ‘nundrum than any other single aspect of the game. ‘One final note on the Army of the West: Ben McCulloch never reached the rank of Major General, since his death at Elkhorn Tavern precluded any further chance of promotion. However, he was the second ranked brigadier in the entire Confederate army upon his appointment, and had he lived to «ross the Mississippi he would have almost certainly been ele- vated. Since the options presented here postulate no fight at Elkhorn, we have given him his long overdue promotion. In the game he is rated as per his reputation; likely that was it fated in real life a bit, but every game needs a few larger than life characters. Rating the Army Commanders Shiloh was a very poorly controlled battle to say the least. The ‘Secessionists opted for an initial plan that was unintentionally farcical in it?s impracticality. Given the terrain and the experi ence level of the commanders and troops, there was simply no ‘way that Beauregard?s plan had any hope of succeeding as planned, That Johnston either didn? recognize the unrealistic nature of Beauregard?s scheme or didn?t choose to alter itis certainly no endorsement of Johnston as a army commander. ‘The special rules on Johnston reflect what the designers per- ceive to be his main atribute- during the battle he acted in fect as an excellent brigade commander with army command authority. Once the battle was joined there is no hint of overall, control and guidance from Johnston, Beauregard's rating is due primarily to his lack of ability to control his army. His confusion and the lack of contro! over Bragg during the first day is well known but also quite unde standable, His absolute failure to even make a feeble attempt at reorganization of the army over night before the second day tn Ring LLC age ee. Ae 2108 37 ‘of battle is virually indefensible. When dawn broke on the 7th of April 1862 the Union Army under Grant was able to con- duct cohesive operations and the Secessionist Army under Beauregard was capable only of flight, believe that Shiloh was Grant's (and probably Buell’s also) finest hour. His mistakes were many, but in this battle they are confined t0 the opening set up. The Union Army is surprised and not well deployed to receive an attack, Onee he arrived on the battlefield Grant was in his element, The defensive line he constructed to defend the landing was extremely strong and given the terrain, was as close to secure a position that could be constructed. Finally, during the night while the Southern commanders milled about in confusion and indifference, Grant and Buell maintained control oftheir troops and reorgs: nized. At dawn, Buell attacked shortly followed by Grant and the Southerners were swept from the field in defeat ‘A Common Unit on a Bad Day Finally we would like to relate the tale of Captain James PTi- mony commanding battery D of the 2nd Illinois Light Ar. tillery. The battery was assigned to the First Division, Ist Brigade, Army of the Tennessee. To quote the report of Ezra ‘Taylor Chief of the Artillery for Sherman’ Division "In order to do justice to all I cannot close this report without mentioning the batter [sic] commanded by Captain Timony. ‘who were put in battery under my direction on Sunday, the 6th, under the most terrific fir, perhaps, that occurred at any point or at any time during the fight. This occurred at the same point on the field, in front of General McClernang's headquat- ters, where the enemy had a full sweep of the field in front ‘with his batteries and a galling fire of musketry on our left. To say that they fought bravely till their horses were literally piled up, creating a barrier to the retreat of their guns, is a sim pile statement of facts, and I doubt not the general command: ing the First Division will give to them the credit due them. Such bravery cannot but obtain its reward.” (On the first day of battle battery D/ 2nd Illinois Lt Artillery suffered 25 casualties and lost 53 horses as well as four out of six guns and five out of six caissons, The brave Illinois cap- tain and his battery as well as thousands like him were the rea- son that General Johnston's Army was prevented from water- ing its horses in the Tennessee.