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China’s Engagement in Africa:

Activities, Effects and Trends
by
Xuewu Gu
Clara Dinkelbach, Christiane Heidbrink, Ying Huang, Xiaojun Ke, Maximilian Mayer, Hendrik W. Ohnesorge

Content
Executive Summary 2
Introduction 5

1. China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” and “Special Economic Zones” in Africa 6
2. Trends and Destinations of China’s FDI in Africa 10
3. China-Africa Trade in Change 12
4. China: From the suspect of “Debt Trap” to the champion of “Debt Relief” 15
5. COVID-19-Pandemic and the Expansion of “Health Silk Road” to Africa 17
6. China’s Engagement in Africa’s Security and Mining Industry 23
7. Beijing’s “Green Deal” with Africa 28
8. China as a New Tech Player in Africa 29
9. China’s Soft Power in Africa: Potentials and Limits 35
Conclusion 42
References 43

1
 Executive Summary

Of 54 African countries, 52 have already signed a BRI (Belt & Road Initiative) Memorandum of Understanding
with China by April 2022, a clear indicator that the flagship project of Chinese foreign policy of the 21st century
is penetrating the whole African continent.
After the BRI 1.0 phase of engagement and negotiations with local Africans and with the international community,
Chinese investment patterns and sectors in Africa are poised for a major reorientation in the BRI 2.0 phase.
China acts as a newcomer in the landscape of Africa’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Economic and
Trade Cooperation Zones (ETCZs). But the country’s tiny share on total SEZs in Africa (less than 0.3 per cent)
indicates that Beijing seems to have no desire to spread its development model to Africa and to try to “colonize”
the continent with Chinese system, philosophy, institutions and business model.
For more than 10 years, annual Chinese FDI flows to Africa remained relatively stable – from a mere $2.1 billion
in 2010 to almost $5.4 billion in 2018 with the only exception of 2019 in which Chinese FDI flows to Africa
declined to $2.7 billion. This hesitation is mainly affected by the overall trend of shrinkage of China’s FDI based
on investors’ attitudes awaiting further information on upgrading of BRI from 1.0 to 2.0. In 2020, the strategic
clarity of BRI 2.0 has encouraged Chinese investors to continue to invest heavily across Africa throughout the
pandemic which swung up again to $4.2 billion.
Not every country in Africa benefits from China’s investments in the same intensity. In actuality, the beneficiaries
are not equally distributed over the continent. 63 per cent of all Chinese FDI in 2020 was focused on only ten
countries: South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Kenya,
Zimbabwe, Algeria, and Ghana. In stark contrast, this strong concentration of investment leaves only
approximately $380 million for each of the other recipients, a sum which averages at only half the sum amounting
from loans.
The resurge of Chinese FDI in Africa is a clear sign of Beijing’s willingness to continue to shape Africa’s FDI
landscape in the coming post-pandemic years. Indeed, projects attracting minerals and raw materials are
paving the ways for investing in the African services sector such as scientific research and technology services,
transport, warehousing, smart cities, and postal services.
China-Africa trade reached a record high of $254 billion in 2021 boosted by an impressive increase of 35 per
cent in comparison with 2020. Whether it keeps a long-term trend or a flash in the pan remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, this strong increase is remarkable. Particularly since it is made up of an increase in both Chinese
exports to Africa (29.9 per cent year-on-year) and imports from Africa (43.7 per cent year-on-year).
The top 10 African trading partners of China account for more than 66 per cent of the trade volume between
China and Africa. Topping the list is South Africa, which accounts for $54 billion or 21 per cent of total China-
Africa trade. It is followed at some distance by Nigeria and Angola. In contrast, only seven African countries
recorded a decline in trade volumes, namely Central African Republic, Gabon, Sudan, Chad, Western Sahara,
Sao Tome and Principe, and South Sudan. Nevertheless, while the Central African Republic was able to export
62 per cent more goods to China, Sao Tome and Principe imported three times the volume of Chinese goods
compared to the previous year even though both of them did not join the BRI until 2021.
With 18 per cent of the total share of external debt, China became the most significant debt relief country in the
world. It suspended $5.7 billion in debt payments, more than half of the total global debt moratorium and 45 per
2
cent of its own debt ratio. By doing so, the country presents itself as a Master of “Debt Relief” instead of a “Debt
Trap”.
COVID-19-pandemic has accelerated the expansion of the so-called “Health Silk Road” to Africa enabling China
to play a leading role in sharing masks, respirators and vaccines with the continent. As a result, China comes
out as a country that is temporally earlier than the United States (US) and spatially wider than the European
Union (EU) in providing Africa with COVID-19 vaccines and other anti-corona materials.
With the prospect that the COVID-19-pandemic will continue, China-Africa aid, investment and trade in medical
supplies will see growth in the short term. Given the pre-pandemic pattern of medical cooperation between
China and Africa, which was dominated by aid, and the unstable trend of trade & investment in pharmaceutical
products, the long-term trend in the area of investment and trade is not clear.
China’s industrial and infrastructure investments in Africa have declined due to the combined effects of the
previous global economic slowdown and the COVID-19-pandemic, and are gradually shifting to green and
sustainable as well as digital sectors. It is seen that China is starting to pay more attention to the impact of
Chinese investment and construction on the natural environment, as well as on the socio-cultural level.
Chinese technology and infrastructure companies are becoming a crucial factor in the rapid modernization of
African societies and economies. Chinese mobile phone producers dominate African markets. Huawei is more
or less monopolizing the transformation of Africa’s telecommunication networks from 4G to 5G even the
infrastructure stacks of African countries remain a mix of Western and Chinese technology.
China is making vigorous efforts to increase its military cooperation with African countries attempting to position
itself as a reliable security provider for the continent. Beijing leans mainly on using UN peacekeeping operations
as a platform for its security engagement in Africa. Of the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council,
China has become the biggest contributor to military observers, verifiers, inspectors, police operations as well
as peacekeeping troops by order of the United Nations (UN).
In recent years, military cooperation between China and Africa has been increasingly institutionalized in that
China is taking advantage of the BRI to bestow its projects with a wider framework. Unlike France and the US
which place a heavy overt troop presence in Africa, China tends to integrate its military cooperation into UN
peacekeeping operations or to present it as accompanying measures to its economic relations with African
countries.
Soft power, which is of increasing importance today, means the ability to get desired outcomes in international
affairs not by (military) coercion or (economic) inducement, but by (cultural) attraction. Africa is sensing a China
that recognizes this sort of power. Indeed, most African countries are first-hand experiencing strong inflows of
Chinese soft power elements.
The “Big Four” in Chinese international media presence (Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television, China
Radio International, and China Daily) have stepped up their game of late – and Africa has become a key target
across the board. At the same time, the number of Chinese Confucius Institutes has increased globally over the
past few years to about 550 today. In Africa, they rank now second only to the French Alliance Française.
China has become a major hub of international student mobility, especially for Africa. In 2020, it ranked second
only to France among top destinations for African students – with Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe the leading countries of origin.

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However, even China has become a major player in the race for soft power in Africa and around the world,
opinion polls and surveys indicate some concerns regarding Chinese perceptions abroad, a sure sign that the
country has a long way to go to enhance the effects of its soft power tools.
The number of Chinese workers going to Africa has declined significantly due to the overlapping effect of travel
restrictions since the pandemic and the economic slowdown that preceded the pandemic. It is also a result of
the upgrading of the BRI from 1.0 to 2.0 requiring Chinese corporations to create more jobs for local societies.
Chinese visits to Africa are expected to remain low for some time to come due to China’s strict pandemic
containment strategy, tight restrictions on entry and exit, as well as the lack of medical infrastructure in Africa.

4
Introduction
From the vantage point of global diplomacy, Africa’s unique advantage is its large number of states which
constitute “a voting block of 28 per cent at the United Nations (UN)”1. In terms of geopolitics, the continent
presents itself as an indispensable maritime gateway from Asia to Europe and conversely. Geo-economically,
Africa with a population of 1.3 billion and a land area of 30.37 million sq km, bestowed with considerable
resources, still remains an uncharted territory with huge potential to reach the centrality of global economy in
the coming decades. As Michelle D. Gavin, former US Ambassador to Botswana pointed out, all major powers
are facing the same facts: “by 2050, a quarter of the world’s population will be African and the continent’s
youthful and growing labor force — the largest in the world by that point — will stand in stark contrast to the
ageing populations of other regions.”2
In contrast to the US which has deployed more than 6000 troops “on the ground in Africa”3, China has basically
chosen an economic way to engage with the continent even though Africa-China security cooperation is
intensifying. In fact, there is a long tradition of Chinese investments in infrastructure, reaching back to the period
of decolonization. A famous example is the construction of a train line between Tanzania and Zambia (finished
in 1976), where China sent around “56,000 engineers and workers” to build 320 bridges, 22 tunnels and 93
stations.4
In 2021, the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and the China Railway Construction Limited
announced that they will construct a $1.32 billion train connection between the Lake Victoria port city of Mwanza
and the town of Isaka, as a 341 km part of a railway infrastructure connecting the Indian Ocean port of Dar es
Salaam with Tanzania’s interior.5 Even more than railways, Chinese companies have been the leading actor in
African dam projects, only surpassing Chinese construction activities in Southeast Asia.6 Most recently, the
Ethiopian renaissance dam, the biggest and one of the most controversial dam projects in the last decade, was
finished with Chinese engineering expertise and diplomatic support. In 2013, China gave Ethiopia a $1.3 billion
loan to build transmission lines from the dam that distribute the expected 6.45 gigawatts of electricity.7
However, the tide seems to be changing. Chinese activities in Africa that have been largely uncoordinated and
mutually less supportive are increasingly integrated into Beijing’s ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”.
Indeed, the 21st century Maritime Silk Road, the second pillar of BRI, bestows Africa a centrality in creating
connectivity between Asia and Europe. The program aims at connecting “a string of operating ports strategically
positioned along the littorals, sea lanes and choke points of the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Indian
Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.” 8 For Beijing, Africa is

1
Chanaka, Teshome Toga: China-Africa cooperation. (Center for China and Globalization, April 4, 2022), accessed on April 4, 2022, at
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/EI6BaD3L1T5ByNFi78nW-g.
2
Gavin, Michelle D.: Major Power Rivalry in Africa, Discussion Paper Series on Managing Global Disorder No. 5 May 2021, Center for Preventive Action,
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2021, p. 1., accessed on April 22, 2022, at https://www.cfr.org/report/major-power-rivalry-africa.
3
Ibid., p. 4.
4
"China Helped Us When Help Was Most Needed" — The Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Testament to China-Africa Friendship. (The Global Times, June 22,
2021), accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1226766.shtml.
5
Two Chinese firms to build $1.32 billion Tanzanian rail line. (Reuters, January 7, 2021), accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-
tanzania-railway-idUSKBN29C20X.
6
The New Great Walls. A Guide To China’s Oversea Dams Industry (International Rivers, Second Edition, November 2012), accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/archive/hub/publications/162708/new-great-walls-chinas-overseas-dam-industry.pdf, p. 6; see also: Bosshard, Peter:
China dams the world, in: World Policy Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2009, pp. 43-51.
7
Gorvett, Jonathan: China in the middle of Nile mega-dam feud. (Asia Times, July 31, 2021), accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://asiatimes.com/2021/07/china-in-the-middle-of-nile-mega-dam-feud/.
8
Arase, David: THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE ENTERS A SECOND PHASE, in: Asia Global Online, April 15, 2021, accessed on April 22, 2022, at
https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/belt-and-road-initiative-enters-second-phase.

5
indispensable for keeping its “Maritime Silk Road” strong and effective. To this purpose, the country is fervently
in the process with its African partners to pool together the coastline of the continent with ports, digital
infrastructures, airports, healthcare services, and “smart cities”, one of the 20 megatrends found by this study.
They demonstrate that China’s engagement in Africa is fully integrated into the BRI 2.0 starting from 2019/2020.
The BRI 2.0 is a revision to the 1.0 overhauling the most negative and high-risk elements of the initial phase
(2013-2019). More “green”, more “sustainable”, more “digital” as well as more “healthcare” are the pledges of
Beijing to Africa. The 20 megatrends confirm the wiliness of Beijing to implement this new agenda for Africa,
leaving, however, the question open, of whether and to what extent the promises would become entirely reality
in the foreseeable future.

1. China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” and “Special Economic Zones” in Africa
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China’s major foreign policy directive since 2013, effective for Africa since
2015. By simply looking at a map of the African continent, the BRI seems to be a success story. Out of 54
countries reviewed, 52 countries have already signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concerning the
BRI, rendering these countries official participants. Among the first countries to sign a MoU were Cameroon,
Somalia and South Africa as early as 2015. The most successful accession year was 2018 when 28 African
countries entered the BRI. During the first year of the COVID-19-pandemic, no new MoUs were signed, but in
2021, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Eritrea, the Central African Republic,
Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and
Burkina Faso revived the BRI’s expansion.
Malawi signed the latest MoU in March 2022.
As of April 2022, only Eswatini and Mauritius
have not signed a MoU. In other words,
around 96 per cent of all African countries
have already signed a MoU. Since Mauritius
signed a Free Trade Agreement with China in
2019, a future BRI MoU is likely. Thus, not
having signed a MoU does not exclude
bilateral trade agreements.
As the BRI has become China’s major foreign
policy, it is hardly possible to distinguish BRI
projects from non-BRI projects. This is also
due to the fact that China’s engagement
predates and exceeds the BRI. Many
infrastructure projects already planned
before the official announcement of BRI have later been relabeled and subsumed under the BRI. This
“rebranding” of infrastructure projects can also be observed in Africa. Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway (SGR)
connecting Mombasa to Nairobi was already planned long before the BRI by Kenyan officials. The cooperation
agreement with China was signed in May 2014, hence after the BRI’s announcement by Xi Jinping in 2013 but
prior to the BRI’s official creation in 2015.

6
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones (ETCZs) have played an essential
role in Chinese modernization since Deng Xiaoping started to reform and open the country to the world in the
1980s. Applying the model of SEZs and ETCZs to Africa has been seen by Beijing as an effective means to
promote Chinese engagement in the continent and to enhance the international competitiveness of Chinese
companies in the world. All the more surprising is, therefore, the observation that Beijing’s advance momentum
of SEZs and ETCZs in Africa has noticeably diminished after the boom years in the wake of the country’s entry
into the WTO. Since 2007/2008 when all currently exiting SEZs and ETCZs were established, no single new
considerable SEZ or ETCZ has been established anymore. As the “Table: Chinese SEZs and ETCZs in Africa”
shows, Beijing’s advance of SEZs and ETCZs in Africa stagnates actually since years, at least at the quantitative
level.
Chinese SEZs and ETCZs in Africa
Country SEZ or ETCZ Start Developers Sectors
Zambia-China Non-Ferrous China Africa,
Zambia 2007 Copper mining
ETCZ (ZCCZ) subsidiary of CNMC
Chinese Jiangling Motors
Cooperation; Jiangxi Coal
Algeria Jiangling ETCZ 2008 Automobile
Corporation Group; Groupe
Mazouz
Tianjin Development Zone and Construction materials,
Egypt TEDA Suez ETCZ 2008 Tianjin TEDA Investment Holding manufacture and logistics,
Co., Ltd. commercial and entertainment
China Civil Engineering
Transport equipment, textile and
Construction Group; Jiangning
Nigeria Nigeria Lekki FTZ 2007 light industries, home appliances,
Development Corporation;
telecoms
Nanjing Beyond; China Railway
Ogun-Guangdong Construction materials, wood
Guangdong Xinguang; South
Nigeria Free Trade Zone 2008 processing, medicine, PCs and
China Development Group
(OGFTZ) lighting
Mauritius Tianli
Taiyuan Iron & Steel Co; Shanxi Hospitality, real estate, services,
Mauritius ETCZ (currently 2007
Coking Coal Group; Tianli Group manufacture and logistics
Jinfei ETCZ)
Qiyuan Group; Jianglian
Ethiopia Eastern Electric machinery, steel and
Ethiopia 2007 International Trading Co;
Industrial Zone metallurgy, construction material
Yangyang Asset Management
Table: Y. Huang (2022). Source: Alves, 2011.9

At the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit held in Beijing in 2006, Chinese President Hu
Jintao announced the establishment of 3 to 5 trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in the years 2006-
2009. 10 Quickly after the announcement and driven energetically by both governments, the first Chinese
overseas economic and trade cooperation zone in Africa, the Zambia-China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) was
established in February 2007. The zone emerged obviously from the strategic interests of both sides: China is

9
Alves, Ana Cristina: Chinese Economic and Trade Co-operation Zones in Africa: The Case of Mauritius, South African Institute of International Affairs.
Occasional Paper No. 74, January 2011, accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia_sop_74_alves_20110131.pdf, p. 6.
10
Ren, Xiaoping: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Its Significance for Namibia, November 8, 2009, accessed on April 3, 2022, at
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cena/eng/zngx/t625458.htm.

7
interested in Zambia’s copper reservoirs and the market in Zambia, while Zambia desires to attract more
investment and development chances, especially to “develop a manufacturing base around its mining sector”.11
In the same year, the Chinese government approved the Sino-Nigeria Lekki Free Zone (LFZ) and signed a
framework agreement with the Mauritius government targeting the establishment of “Mauritius Tianli ETCZ”
(currently Jinfei ETCZ). Almost at the same time, Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Zone is founded in 2007 and has
been treated with great importance by the Chinese and Ethiopian governments.12 The years 2007-2008 have
witnessed the founding of the second free trade zone between China and Nigeria – the Ogun-Guangdong Free
Trade Zone (OGFTZ). Also in 2008, China and Algeria entered into an agreement to launch a new Chinese SEZ
in North Africa – the Jiangling Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, which focused on the automobile industry.
Around the same time, China and Egypt established the TEDA Suez ETCZ, aiming to invite Chinese companies
to set up industries. Presently, the cooperation zone has become a significant platform for China-Egypt
economic and trade cooperation.13
However, the fact that the number of Chinese SEZs and ETCZs in Africa has remained unchanged for years at
the level of seven does not mean that Beijing had ceased to enhance the quality and effects of its SEZs and
ETCZs in the continent. On the contrary, China’s SEZs and the ETCZs in Africa have strongly focused on
resource-rich countries (such as Egypt, Algeria, Zambia and Nigeria) with big populations (such as Nigeria,
Egypt, Ethiopia and Algeria) demonstrating an impressive strategic clarity of its SEZ-ETCZ-Advance. All these
SEZs and ETCZs have been massively promoted by the so-called “Going Global” strategy, a flagship project
used by Beijing to enhance the globality of Chinese economy and corporations. They still enjoy, in fact, strong
support from the Chinese government.
In recent years, however, a clear shifting of strategy has emerged. Instead of establishing new SEZs and ETCZs
China has set out to deepen and upgrade the economic and trade zones. For example, the TEDA Suez ETCZ
was officially extended to new business sectors in 2016 in an inauguration ceremony attended by Chinese
President Xi Jinping on a state visit to Egypt. In September 2021, China and Zambia have strengthened their
trade ties, upgrading their existing ETCZ into a comprehensive free trade zone in southern central Africa.14
The quantitative stagnation of Chinese SEZs and ETCZs has obviously to do with the overwhelming effects of
the BRI on most Chinese oversee projects. In Africa, China makes the economic zones with African countries
part of the BRI project, providing the old China-Africa SEZs and ETCZs with both new drivers and appearances.
On January 27, 2014, the Shanghai-based private investment company Touchroad International Holdings Group
and the Djiboutian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to build a special economic
zone, which will be a fulcrum of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).15 Additionally, in 2016, China and
Egypt governments agreed to expand cooperation under the BRI meeting especially the desire of Cairo to
connect its own development plans with the BRI in the hope to attract more Chinese investment.

11
Meng, Guangwen, Sui, Nana and Wang, Xue: Construction and Development of the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, in: Tropical
Geography, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2017, p. 246-257.
12
China Services Info: Eastern Industry Zone, February 13, 2019, accessed on April 2, 2022, at
https://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201902/13/WS5c63c810498e27e33803839f/eastern-industry-
zone.html#:~:text=Founded%20in%202007%2C%20the%20zone,from%20governments%20at%20many%20levels.
13
China Daily: China, Egypt joint hands to write new chapter of Suez Canal development, November 18, 2019, accessed on April 2, 2022, at
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201911/18/WS5dd23667a310cf3e355781bf.html.
14
ZDA: ZDA, ZCCZ, CCCI, BRJRC Collaborate to Create E-Commerce Industrial Park to Strengthen Trade Relations between Zambia and China,
September 16, 2021, accessed on April 4, 2022, at https://www.zda.org.zm/index.php/2021/09/16/zda-zccz-ccci-brjrc-collaborate-to-create-e-
commerce-industrial-park-to-strengthen-trade-relations-between-zambia-and-china/.
15
China Daily: Touchroad Djibouti Special Economic Zone – African fulcrum of Belt and Road, August 12, 2016, accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/touchroad/2016-08/12/content_26451224.htm.

8
Almost by stealth, China-Africa SEZs and ETCZs have started to extend their original focus from mining and
manufacturing to high-tech businesses striving for a leading role in shaping African modernity. For instance,
The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) has signed a MoU with the ZCCZ, China Commodities City Overseas
Investment (CCCI) and the Belt and Road Joint Research Centre (BRJRC) of the University of Zambia to create
a new E-Commerce Industrial Park.16 The same is true for the inception of the “Eden Garden” located at the
heart of Jinfei ETCZ with the goal to spread “smart city” in Mauritius.17
Nevertheless, China presents itself as a newcomer in the landscape of Africa’s SEZs. Indeed, very few SEZs
have been established by China in comparison to other countries and partners. As early as in the 1970s, the
first SEZs were established by African countries with their different foreign partners when China was yet in its
swamp of “Cultural Revolution” leading its economy almost to the brink of collapse. It was the country’s entry
into the WTO in 2001 that promoted China’s SEZ advance to Africa 30 years ago, as a part of its strategy to
embrace globalization. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
there are, at the present time, 237 SEZs in Africa. The largest concentrations of them can be found in Kenya
(61), Nigeria (38), Ethiopia (18) and Egypt (10).18 Of 134 SEZs established in these “Top Five SEZ-Countries of
Africa”, only four derive from China making a modest percentage of 0.3 per cent. This fact shows that, although
China is probably the most well-known player in Africa for the time being, other international partners have been
more active than China in developing and promoting SEZs in Africa.19
Certainly, all SEZs between China and Africa are energetically supported by the Chinese government, which
provides them a relatively stable investment and finance.20 But China’s tiny share on total SEZs in Africa is quite
revealing: There is no evidence indicating that Beijing was making vigorous efforts to spread its development
model to Africa and trying to “colonize” the continent with Chinese system, philosophy, institutions, and business
model.
China in the landscape of African SEZs

0
Cameroon
9
1
Egypt
10
1
Ethiopia
18
2
Nigeria
36
0
Kenya
61
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
SEZs with China Total SEZs

Chart: Y. Huang. Source: UNCTAD.

16
ZDA, ibid.
17
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China: Chinese firm helps establish smart city in Mauritius as economic ties blossom,
July 31, 2018, accessed on April 5, 2022, at http://english.scio.gov.cn/beltandroad/2018-07/31/content_57904795.htm.
18
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): Handbook on Special Economic Zones in Africa. Towards Economic Diversification
across the Continent 2021, accessed on April 12, 2022, at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeia2021d3_en.pdf, pp. 35-36.
19
Ibid., p. 42.
20
Rifaoui, Anass: Special Economic Zones in Africa (SEZs): Impact, efforts, and recommendations. (Infomineo, January 18, 2021), accessed on April 12,
2022, at https://infomineo.com/special-economic-zones-in-africa-impact-efforts-and-recommendations/.

9
2. Trends and Destinations of China’s FDI in Africa
Since the 1980s, China has begun its direct investments in Africa.21 Chinese FDI have been declining between
2013 and 2016, whereas they jumped in 2017 and 2018. The peaking point with almost $5.4 billion coincides
with the aforementioned accession wave to the BRI, but was already cut back in 2019 before the COVID-19-
pandemic. In 2020, Chinese FDI to African countries recovered, but did not reach the 2018-level. Overall,
Chinese FDI flows have been volatile and do not indicate an overall expansion strategy. Nevertheless, these
numbers do not feature all investments as they do not capture non-FDI investments or investments made by
smaller or unofficial lenders.22
Chinese investments in the African continent focus on a selective number of markets. Construction with 35 per
cent of total investments in 2020 makes up the largest margin, followed closely by mining with 21 per cent of
investment in 2020. Other sectors such as manufacturing, financial services, leasing and business services are
supported to a lesser degree. Additionally, the beneficiaries are not equally distributed over the continent. 63
per cent of all Chinese FDI in 2020 was focused on only ten countries: South Africa, DRC, Zambia, Ethiopia,
Angola, Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Algeria, and Ghana. In stark contrast, this strong concentration of
investment leaves only approximately $380 million for each of the other recipients, a sum which averages at only
half the sum amounting from loans.23
The resurge of Chinese FDI in Africa is a clear sign of
Beijing’s willingness to continue to shape Africa’s FDI
landscape in the coming post-pandemic years. Indeed,
projects attracting minerals and raw materials are paving the
ways for investing in the African services sector such as
scientific research and technology services, transport,
warehousing, and postal services. 24 At the same time,
Chinese FDIs flaws reveal that Beijing still remains keen on
investing in the infrastructure of African countries. Regarding
infrastructure ambition, Chinese and African interests
overlap profoundly: Africa’s large demands for gigantic
projects such as airports, bridges, high ways, railways and
hospitals for modern infrastructure meet Chinese huge infrastructure-building capacities that are hungry. China
has, in fact, become the largest foreign investor in infrastructure in Africa.25
Both China and its African partners seem to have recognized the necessity to upgrade the cooperation
framework in order to make new investments more sustainable. In this context, the Eighth Ministerial Conference
of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held in Dakar in November 2021, Senegal, has the prospect of
becoming a new milestone in China’s investment in Africa. In the key document “China-Africa Cooperation Vision
21
Meng, ibid.
22
Mitchell, Jason: What will Africa’s FDI environment look like in 2030? Ask China…, Investment Monitor, January 4, 2022, accessed April 13,2022, at:
https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/analysis/what-will-africas-fdi-environment-look-like-in-2030-ask-china.
23
Fu, Yike: The Quiet China-Africa Revolution: Chinese Investment. (The Diplomat, November 22, 2021), accessed on March 17, 2022, at
https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/the-quiet-china-africa-revolution-chinese-investment/.
24
Mitchell, Jason: What will Africa’s FDI environment look like in 2030? Ask China… (Investment Monitor, January 4, 2022), accessed on April 9, 2022, at
https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/analysis/what-will-africas-fdi-environment-look-like-in-2030-ask-china.
25
Chen, Zhaoyuan: China-Africa cooperation upgraded. (China Daily, December 25, 2021), accessed on April 10, 2022, at
https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202112/25/WS61c6692fa310cdd39bc7d6a8.html.

10
2035” adopted by the Conference based on the opening speech by President Xi Jinping, Beijing pledges to
“invest another USD60 billion in Africa by 2035, especially in support of African agriculture, manufacturing,
infrastructure, environmental protection, digital economy, blue economy, etc.” 26 The Chinese president
promised to “upgrade […] African railway, highway, shipping, port, airline and communications network” and to
provide Africa with “quality infrastructure” as well as “new types of infrastructure” developing the digital economy
to bridge the digital divide [between Africa and the world].27
A glance at the map shows that China is investing particularly heavily in coastal regions, with port projects taking
center stage in the course of the BRI. Around 45 per cent of all BRI projects concentrate on infrastructure
projects including ports. These include the ports in Dolareh, Damerjog and Tadjourah in Djibouti, Massawa in
Eritrea, Port Sudan, the ports in Lamu and Mombasa in Kenya and many more. In total, China has invested in
over 74 African ports. The most famous case is probably the port of Djibouti. There, the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) Navy built its first overseas military
base, which has been in operation since
2017.
Additionally, China is investing in
connectivity projects such as railroads
(around 20 per cent or BRI projects) to
append landlocked mining and energy
projects to the emerging railroad system.28
This investment focus is due to China’s own
development experience in building
transportation networks that connect coastal
regions and ports with inland or remote
areas. 29 In this context, there are fears,
mostly expressed by Western observers,
that China could abuse its influence over
these ports for its own strategic interests.
This concerns both economic preferential
treatment, such as for the transport of raw
materials, finished goods and labor, and
military purposes by monitoring and
blocking overseas and deep-sea traffic.30
Despite these headwinds and concerns, the majority of Africans by far welcome Chinese engagement.
According to polls carried out by the Afrobarometer, a majority (63 per cent) of Africans consider China’s
economic and political influence in their country to be positive in 2021. Only a minority of 14 per cent consider
it negative. Interestingly, the perceptions expressed about the influence of the USA in Africa are almost identical

26
China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, accessed on April 12, 2022, at http://focac.org.cn/focacdakar/eng/hyqk_1/202112/t20211210_10466585.htm.
27
Ibid.
28
Lokanathan, Venkateswaran: China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications in Africa, in: Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Issue Brief No. 395, 2020,
accessed on March 24, 2022, at https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ORF_IssueBrief_395_BRI-Africa.pdf, p. 4.
29
Weng, Lingfei, Xue, Lan, Sayer, Jeffrey, Riggs, Rebecca Anne, Langston, James Douglas and Boedhihartono, Agni Klintuni: Challenges faced by
Chinese firms implementing the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Evidence from three railway projects, in: Research in Globalization, Vol. 3, 100074, 2021, p. 4.
30
Lokanathan, ibid., p. 4.

11
(60 per cent vs. 13 per cent).31 The 2021 CMS survey also found that most African respondents (62 per cent)
were satisfied with the results of the BRI. A similar percentage of African participants aimed to maintain or
increase their involvement in the BRI demonstrating a generally optimistic attitude. This may also be due to wide
shared expectations that the development of new BRI projects may help to offset the impact of the pandemic.
The virus indeed had serious impacts on BRI projects as reported by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.32
It also shifted greater attention to the so-called Health Silk Road, which concentrates on the supply of medical
infrastructure, goods and services.

3. China-Africa Trade in Change

Similar to FDI, China-Africa trade figures also show some irregularities. Bilateral trade initially peaked at $203
billion in 2015, then, it declined to $133 billion in 2016. The recent 35 per cent year-on-year (y-o-y) increase in
China-Africa trade to a record high of $254 billion in 2021 should therefore be watched closely to assess whether
it is a long-term trend or a flash in the pan. Nevertheless, this strong increase in trade volume in 2021 is
remarkable. Particularly since it is made up of an increase in both Chinese exports to Africa (29.9 per cent year-
on-year) and imports from Africa (43.7 per cent year-on-year).33
The top 10 African trading partners of China account for more than 66 per cent of the trade volume between
China and Africa. Topping the list is South Africa, which accounts for $54 billion or 21 per cent of total China-
Africa trade. It is followed at some distance by Nigeria and Angola. In contrast, only seven African countries
recorded a decline in trade volumes, namely Central African Republic, Gabon, Sudan, Chad, Western Sahara,
Sao Tome and Principe, and South Sudan. Nevertheless, while the Central African Republic was able to export
62 per cent more goods to China, Sao Tome and Principe imported three times the volume of Chinese goods

31
Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny, Josephine and Selormey, Edem: Africans welcome China’s influence but maintain democratic aspirations. (Afrobarometer
Dispatch, No. 489, November 15, 2021), accessed on March 24, 2022, at https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ad489-pap3-
africans_welcome_chinas_influence_maintain_democratic_aspirations.pdf.
32
CMS Legal Services: Belt and Road Initiative. The view from Africa, 2021, accessed on March 22, 2022, at
https://cms.law/en/media/international/files/publications/publications/bri-view-from-africa?v=1, p. 2.
33
General Administration of Costums P.R. China: 2021 nian 12 yue jin chukou shangpin guo bie (diqu) zong zhi biao (meiyuan zhi) [Table of total value of
import and export commodities by country (region) in December (U.S. dollar value)], January 18, 2022, accessed April 13, 2022, at:
http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/zfxxgk/2799825/302274/302277/302276/4127455/index.html.

12
compared to the previous year. Both countries did not join the BRI until 2021, making future developments for
these two countries interesting research cases.34

In addition, asymmetries and shifts in trade flows and types of goods can be identified. In 2021, Africa recorded
a trade deficit with China. Chinese exports amounted to $148 billion, whereas China imported only $105.92
billion worth of African goods. Accordingly, 58 per cent of trade consists of Chinese exports to Africa in 2021.35
This again marks a rebalance in comparison to the previous year 2020, when Chinese exports amounted to 65
per cent of the trade volume. While imports and exports balanced each other throughout most of the 2000s, the
share of Chinese exports to Africa has consistently outpaced its imports
from the continent since 2012.
Since the figures have fluctuated widely over the course of the last two
decades, no empirical evidence can be concluded for a systematically
applied expansion strategy for Chinese exports. This expansion strategy
is particularly assumed in the course of the BRI. However, especially after
the establishment of the BRI, a decline in China’s export share can be
observed between 2015 and 2018, while it only increased again
thereafter.36 Thus, the overarching fear that the African markets will be
swamped by cheap Chinese imports has so far not been proven.37 Whilst
China mostly imports raw materials, its export to Africa consists mainly of

34
General Administration of Costums P.R. China: 2021 nian 12 yue jin chukou shangpin guo bie (diqu) zong zhi biao (meiyuan zhi) [Table of total value of
import and export commodities by country (region) in December (U.S. dollar value)], January 18, 2022, accessed on April 13, 2022, at
http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/zfxxgk/2799825/302274/302277/302276/4127455/index.html.
35
Ibid.
36
Johns Hopkins University SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative: China’s exports to African Countries. (China Africa Research Initiative, 2022), accessed
on March 17, 2022, at http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade.
37
Devonshire-Ellis, Chris: China‘s Belt And Road Initiative Member Countries: Exports Up 28% In Three Years. (Silk Road Briefing, November 11, 2020),
accessed on March 17, 2022, at https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2020/11/10/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-member-countries-exports-up-28-in-
three-years/.

13
value-added products. Nigeria, designated as a strategic partner of China, exports minerals, oils, plastics,
rubber, animal products, ships and fruits. In contrast, Chinese imports to Nigeria consist mainly of machinery,
mechanical products, I.T., digital technologies and cell phones. 38 Due to the pandemic, China exported
significantly more medical and health-related items in 2021, which can be referred to as the so-called Health
Silk Road. Whether this represents a long-term trend needs to be further monitored in order to gauge the
changing nature of BRI.
Gross annual revenues of Chinese companies’
construction projects in the continent have declined
since 2015, this may indicate that higher social
standards and qualitative requirements of BRI 2.0 for
project operators have diverted income more towards
local partners and strongly away from Chinese
corporations. In fact, their annual gross revenue from
engineering and construction projects increased
rapidly between 2000 and 2015. However, these
revenues declined after the BRI was officially
established. In 2015, the revenues totaled $54.74
billion, and in 2020 $38.15 billion. By global
comparison, African projects account for the second-
largest gross revenues of Chinese companies in engineering and construction projects.
In 2020, for example, the share was about 24.6 per cent, while the share for Asia was 57.2 per cent. Revenues
from Europe (9.0 per cent) and the Americas (6 per cent) were far behind. However, a shift can be seen here
as well: Asia has become increasingly important as a source of revenue for Chinese companies after 2015,
while Africa’s share has since fallen (in 2015, it still accounted for 35.6 per cent of revenue) revealing the
willingness of Chinese companies to cede more profits to their African partners in exchange for their tacit
acceptance of BRI projects.

Interestingly, 7 out of 10 top destinations for Chinese FDI between 2015 and 2020 are also on the top 10 list of
major revenue sources for Chinese companies, which are Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, DRC, Zambia, Angola and
Tanzania. However, neither Algeria, being the major source of revenues for Chinese companies in engineering
and construction projects in 2020, nor Egypt, which placed third, are among the top 10 destinations of FDI since
the establishment of the BRI. With FDI flows of $553 million, Egypt is ranked 15th, whereas Algeria is even ranked

38
Ibid.

14
33rd out of 54 African countries with $43 million. Consequently, past investments did generate revenue for
Chinese companies, which are entrusted with the implementation of BRI projects. However, this pattern was
also often seen as sham investments in the target countries, as the funds did not remain in the countries but
were returned to China. This business model seems to begin to diminish with the starting of the BRI in 2015.

4. China: From the suspect of “Debt Trap” to the campion of “Debt Relief”
Indeed, China’s rising FDI in Africa faces increasing risks and challenges. Especially American analysts see
huge problems obscured by African governments and state-owned enterprises. The China-Africa Research
Initiative report presented by Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies reveals that
Chinese financiers have signed 1,141 loan commitments worth $153 billion with African governments and state-
owned enterprises.39 According to their investigations, some African countries are suspending or scrutinizing
contracts with Chinese firms, most of which belong to the BRI, because they are feeling being unable to repay
their loans.40 These developments triggered the discussion about the so-called “debt trap” into which China
allegedly lures other countries for political reasons. Empirical evidence shows that Chinese actors were
repeatedly required to renegotiate initial conditions resulting in debt relief. Beijing has granted at least $12.1
billion in global debt relief to several countries in 2020 and 2021. Among those officially confirmed were a $378
million debt cancellation by Kenya and a $110 million debt relief by Zambia.41
Considering the actual situation of African countries, since 2000, China has made nine commitments to cancel
the debts of borrowing countries. For countries that have failed to pay their debts in a timely manner, China has
offered a variety of debt restructuring options to help African countries tide over their difficulties, rather than
using asset seizures and other means to require borrowers to pay off their debts.

39
China Africa Research Initiative: Loan Data, accessed on April 11, 2022, at http://www.sais-cari.org/data.

15
The China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University finds that China has restructured or refinanced
about $15 billions of African debt between 2000 and 2019, without the “asset seizures” that countries like the
US have criticized in accusations of “debt traps”. While some contractual provisions call for arbitration against
the borrowing country in the event of failure to repay the debt in a timely manner, there is no evidence that China
has actually resorted to court enforcement of payments or the use of penalty rates.42
Debt Restructuring cases show a wide range of treatments
Reprofiling of debt Longer Maturity
Short Maturity Maturity Extension
service payments Extensions Specific Details
Treatment Extensions (e.g., 3- and Interest Rate
within original (e.g., 10-20 Unknown
7 years) Reduction
maturity years)
Cameroon (2002)
Mozambique Zimbabwe (2003, Benin (2004)
Zimbabwe (2007,
Cases (2017) Ethiopia (2018) 2004) Sudan (2012)
2010, 2012)
Cameroon (2019) Seychelles (2011) Chad (2017)
Niger (2018)

Table: X. Ke (2022). Source: SAIS-CARI 2020.

Following the outbreak of the COVID-19-pandemic, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund urged
the G20 to establish a Debt Service Standstill Initiative (DSSI). Since its entry into force in May 2020, 48 countries
eligible for the debt moratorium, most of them in Africa, have participated in the initiative before it expires at the
end of December 2021.43
The DSSI countries have shown a diversity of creditors over the past decades. Overall, borrowing has been
mainly from China, Paris Club official creditors as well as private banks and multilateral institutions.
Composition of external obligations for DSSI countries, 2006 and 2020
7% 3% 6% Other Private
2%
2016 28% 55% Eurobonds
Non Paris Club excl. China
2020 4% 18% 10% 48% China
8% 11% Paris Club
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Multilateral

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: IMF 2022.

In 2020, the share of DSSI countries borrowing from China rises from 2 per cent to 18 per cent, the share sold
to European private creditors increases from 3 per cent to 11 per cent, and the share of external debt owed to
Paris Club creditors decreases from 28 per cent in 2006 to 10 per cent in 2020.44
It is worth noting that China, with 18 per cent of the total share of external debt, became the most significant
debt relief country in this initiative. It suspended $5.7 billion in debt payments, contributing to more than half of

42
SAIS-CARI: Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics, 2020, accessed on April 20, 2022, at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/60353345259d4448e01a37d8/1614099270470/WP+39+-
+Acker%2C+Brautigam%2C+Huang+-+Debt+Relief.pdf.
43
World Bank: Debt Service Suspension Initiative, 2022, accessed on April 21, 2022, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-
service-suspension-initiative.
44
IMF: Restructuring Debt of Poorer Nations Requires More Efficient Coordination, 2022, accessed on April 21, 2022, at
https://blogs.imf.org/2022/04/07/restructuring-debt-of-poorer-nations-requires-more-efficient-coordination/#.

16
the total global debt moratorium. Through this action, 45 per cent of debts owned by the poorest countries to
China was suspended. In contrast, as the following figures show, the United Kingdom (UK) had no suspension
of payments on its commercial loans and still recovered $3.2 billion in debt from countries that applied for the
debt standstill initiative.45
Most important creditors suspending payments in DSSI

China 5,70

France 0,90 USD Billion

Japan 0,50

Saudi Arabia 0,50

India 0,30

- 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: JUBLIEE DEBT CAMPAIGN 2021.

Debt payments and suspension by selected creditors for the 46 countries applying
8 71% 80%
6,9
7 64% 70%
60%
6 5,7 56% 60%
5,3
5 45% 50%
4 3,2 3,2 40%
3 24% 30%
2 1,9 20%
1 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,9 0,5 0,5 0,2 10%
0% 0% 0% 0,3 0,2
0 0 0 0 0%
UK-based Bondholders World Bank IMF China Japan India France Saudi Arabia
private
lenders

Payments suspended Payments made % of payments suspended

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: JUBLIEE DEBT CAMPAIGN 2021.

5. COVID-19-Pandemic and the Expansion of “Health Silk Road” to Africa

Indeed, our current research findings may already partly confirm the assumption that the rapid increase of
China-Africa trade in 2021 stays in a close connection with the outbreak of the pandemic intensifying the
advance of the Health Silk Road, an integrated component of the BRI 2.0, to Africa. Investigated figures reveal
that the COVID-19-pandemic has caused strong demands from African countries for Chinese medical and
pharmaceutical products which in turn has driven the bilateral trade to a record high.

45
JUBLIEE DEBT CAMPAIGN: How the G20 debt suspension initiative benefits private lenders, 2021, accessed on April 21, 2022, at
https://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/How-the-G20-debt-suspension-initiative-benefits-private-lenders_10.21.pdf.

17
Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the China-Africa pharmaceutical trade did not show a significant trend of
increase or decrease. From 2010 to 2019, the year before the outbreak, the figure follows a steady and slowly
increasing trend. When combined with the growth rate, it is a curve that fluctuates up and down.46
Demand for pharmaceutical products, an immediate need in the fight against the pandemic, will amplify in the
short to medium term. According to a report released by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,
African countries will see an increase of $10.6 billion in medical spending due to the need to combat the COVID-
19-pandemic.
In addition, the international community’s assistance to Africa in fighting the pandemic has, to a certain extent,
led to an increase in the capacity of the public procurement market for Africa, involving personal protection,
diagnostic reagents and other products. 47 In this international environment, medical cooperation and
pharmaceutical trade in the BRI 2.0 period have proliferated significantly in the short term.48 This is shown in the
figure below. However, it remains unclear whether this trend will continue in the long term.
China-Africa pharmaceutical trade volume, 2010-2019
5
4 4,01
2,93
3
2,07 2,08 2,35 2,37 2,42 2,29 2,43 2,43
2 1,84
1,31
1 1,37 0,21 0,62 0,20
1,30 0,07 0,03
0 -0,54

-1 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Trade Volume Rate

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: Zhang 2020.

Growth/decline of BRI engagement in health, 2013-2021

6,93 7,32
5,29 4,7 4,5
3,61
2,31 2,6
217% 1,3 246%
0 31% 51% 31% -45%
-67% -50%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Investment Increase

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: GREEN FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT CENTER 2022.

46
Zhang, Xiaohui: "Big Year" for China and Africa Medical Cooperation: Five key points of "turning crisis into opportunity". (中非“⼤年”医药攻略 “化
危为机”五个关键点), December 2020, accessed on April 8, 2022, at http://www.yyjjb.com.cn/yyjjb/202012/202012071633583358_9276.shtml.
47
Ibid.
48
GREEN FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT CENTER: Brief: China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2021, 2022, accessed on April 6, 2022, at
https://greenfdc.org/brief-china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2021/.

18
Top 10 of Export Volume of Masks, 2020

China 8.342,76
United Kingdom 7.667,15
USA 5.566,88
Germany 4.173,82
Netherlands 1.642,79
United Arab Emirates 1.363,06
Other Asia, nes 1.275,50
Poland 1.229,99
Rep. of Korea 1.054,28
Australia 915,65

Units: Tons 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: UN Comtrade 2020.

Top 10 of Export Volume of Therapeutic Respiration Apparatus, 2020

China 63.390,43
USA 11.734,53
Singapore 10.744,80
Germany 9.502,44
Netherlands 8.771,94
United Kingdom 5.098,05
New Zealand 4.869,30
Malaysia 4.713,34
Ireland 3.633,77
Mexico 3.376,05
Units: Tons
Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: UN Comtrade 2020.

As the country where the COVID-19-pandemic first broke out, China is also the world’s leading producer of
protective medical gear such as masks. Its experience and production capacity in pandemic
prevention/containment can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the world’s fight against the
COVID-19 pandemic, especially in Africa, which lacks medical resources. The three figures below show China’s

19
exports of medical and pandemic prevention/containment supplies worldwide in 2020 and 2021 since the
COVID-19 outbreak. It is seen that China is the largest exporter of masks, respirators and vaccines. 49, 50
Even unspoken, there has been an overt and covert competition between China, the US and the EU for influence
on Africa’s fighting against the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020. Up to the beginning of 2022, more than 180
million doses of COVID-19 vaccine have been delivered by China to 53 African countries and the AU
Commission. 51 In December 2021, Xi pledged to Africa to provide an additional 1 billion doses of vaccine
against Covid in the form of donations or support for local production. 52
Somehow belated, but quite energetically, the US has launched its gigantic campaign to support the continent
to stop the spreading of coronavirus. Currently (but not before May 2021), the country has delivered 243 million
doses of vaccines to Africa and committed to donate at least 1.1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine for global
use by 2023.53 In contrast, the EU provided €100 million in humanitarian support for COVID-19 vaccination in
Africa directly. It also shares 145 million doses of vaccine with Africa and contributes €425 million ($469 million)
to the COVAX facility.54
Number of Domestic Use and Export of COVID-19 Vaccine in Relevant Countries, as of May 2021

Export Domestic use

252 345
China

USA 3 330

111 208
EU

India 69 180

Russia 13 22
27 3
Korea

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Unit: Million Doses
Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: the Institute of Boao Forum for Asia 2021.

49
UN: UN Comtrade Database. Export data at country level, 2022, accessed on April 9, 2022, at https://comtrade.un.org/data.
50
The Institute of Boao Forum for Asia, Renmin University of China: Launch of Report on the Global Use of COVID-19 Vaccines, 2021, accessed on April 9,
2022, at http://www.199it.com/archives/1290645.html.
51
Zhang, Hong: Chinese vaccines, bringing hope to Africa (中国疫苗，给非洲带来希望), accessed on March 31, 2022, at
http://health.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0106/c14739-32325083.html
52
Rédaction: China promises to help Africa fight Covid 19. (Africanews, December 6, 2021), accessed on March 31, 2022, at
https://www.africanews.com/2021/12/01/china-promises-to-help-africa-fight-covid-19/.
53
KFF: U.S. International COVID-19 Vaccine Donations Tracker – Updated as of March 30, 2022, accessed on March 31, 2022, at
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/u-s-international-covid-19-vaccine-donations-tracker/.
54
EU: Support package for the COVID-19 vaccination rollout in Africa, accessed on March 31, 2022, at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/support-
package-covid-19-vaccination-rollout-africa_en.

20
COVID-19 Vaccine Assistance to Africa

EU
Contributor

USA
China

0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5

Unit: Million Doses
Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: EU 2022.

Firm competition among the top-three assistance providers has also emerged in the domain of anti-pandemic
materials. For African countries, China has provided more than 120 batches of testing reagents, respirators, and
other anti-pandemic materials promptly. Its vaccine assistance has reached 50 African countries and the AU.
Additionally, the country has sent anti-pandemic medical experts to 17 African countries supporting local
medics to do their job more effectively based on Chinese experiences. 55
Even stressed by daunting domestic situations, the US has managed to donate up to 1,000 respiratory
ventilators and accompanying equipment to South Africa to assist its national response to COVID-19. The value
of the ventilator equipment alone was $14 million, and the accompanying equipment, service programs and
transportation totaled more than $20 million in US government assistance. 56
The EU’s assistance has been focused on East Africa. €261 million ($288 million) from development funding is
being redirected to support the immediate health care response, and €475 million ($524 million) will help mitigate
the economic and social consequences of COVID-19. More than €11 million worth of humanitarian funding has
also been allocated to the region to support coronavirus control and prevention, and to help vulnerable
populations gain access to health care, water and sanitation. 57
However, China seems to have done more than its competitors regarding investments in Africa’s healthcare.
Along with the COVID-19 outbreak, the coverage of Chinese healthcare investments in Africa has grown
significantly from Q3 2019 to Q3 2020. A similar advance by the US and the EU is absent insofar as available
research materials show. The chart below shows the number of countries and regions that received Chinese
equity investments and joint ventures in healthcare-related overseas investments.58 Thereby, Chinese equity
investors have shown strong interest in countries in South-East Africa: From Ethiopia and Uganda to Zimbabwe
and Botswana.

55
Zhang, Jiaxing: A set of figures to understand China's international anti-pandemic assistance (⼀组数字读懂中国国际抗疫援助), accessed on
March 31, 2022, at http://stdaily.com/index/kejixinwen/2021-10/26/content_1228365.shtml.
56
USAID: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S COVID-19 RESPONSE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 2020, accessed on March 31, 2022, at
https://www.usaid.gov/afrrica/documents/us-governments-covid-19-response-sub-saharan-africa.
57
EU: EU COVID-19 response for East Africa: first shipment of medical supplies arrives in Ethiopia, 2020, accessed on March 31, 2022, at
https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/news/eu-covid-19-response-east-africa-first-shipment-medical-supplies-arrives-ethiopia_en.
58
SIIS: Health Silk Road 2020: A Bridge to the Future of Health for All, 2021, accessed on April 7, 2022, at
https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/NzU0NzY0NDA4.

21
One of the crucial characteristics making China’s assistance to Africa distinct from that of the US and the EU is
what the German think tank SWP calls “combined assistance”. In the framework of the BRI, China has provided
all African countries with a combination of different medical supplies (masks, kits, respirators) and various forms
of assistance (medical teams, financial assistance) to fight against COVID-19.59

African Countries Receiving Chinese Aid-Material Combinations; BRI Cooperation Agreements in 2021

One Type of Aid Two Type of Aid Three Type of Aid

Aid Type
(3 countries) (20 countries) (26 countries)

Central African Republic,

Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali,
Libya, Niger, Mali, Chad,
Western Sahara, Senegal, Guinea-
Sudan, Democratic Republic of
Bissau, Sierra Leone, Cote D’Ivoire,
the Congo, Zambia, Botswana,
Eritrea, Eswatini, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon,
Countries Mozambique, Gabon, Rep of
Djibouti Egypt, South Sudan, Ethiopia,
Congo, Burkina Faso, Senegal,
Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania,
The Gambia, Guinea, EQ.
Angola, Namibia, South Africa,
Guinea, Malawi, Rwanda,
Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Lesotho
Burundi

Table: X. Ke (2022). Source: SWP 2021.

Beyond that, 31 African countries have received, with some of them still receiving, other aid outside of the
“combined assistance”. Most of these aids are provided based on specific demands of the recipients, mostly
in form of medical expert teams and/or financial assistance.

59
SWP Comment: China’s Health Diplomacy during Covid-19, 2021, accessed on April 7, 2022, at https://www.swp-
berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2021C09_ChinaHealthDiplomacy.pdf.

22
African Countries Receiving Other Chinese Aid in 2021
Teams of Medical Experts Financial Aid
(21 countries) (10 countries)
Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Comoros, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan,
South Sudan, Central African Republic, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Rep of Congo, EQ. Guinea, Sao Cape Verde, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Rep of Congo,
tome and Principe, Angola, Nigeria, Niger, Algeria, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Lesotho, Rwanda
Burkina Faso, Cote D’ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, The
Gambia
Table: X. Ke (2022). Source: SWP 2021.

En passant, several countries have received medical assistance surpassing the supporting activities included
in “combined services”, medical expert teams or financial aid. Most of them have been traditional partners of
China’s medical research institutions and hospitals from different provinces for decades.
African Countries Receiving Other Chinese Medical Aid in 2021
Countries Receiving Medical Assistance (Incremental) Countries Piloting Chinese Vaccines
(9 countries) (2 countries)
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Rwanda, Uganda, Morocco, Egypt
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco
Table: X. Ke (2022). Source: SIIS 2021.

6. China’s Engagement in Africa’s Security and Mining Industry

China’s security engagement in Africa is mostly known for its activities in Djibouti. In 2017, China established its
first, and so far its only overseas military base in the eastern African country of Djibouti. For the Wall Street
Journal, by introducing this project, China is going to establish a permanent military installation in the Central
African country of Equatorial Guinea.60 However, Chinese military experts immediately refuted this claim and
pointed out that “the US disclose information on China building an overseas military base” in order to hype the
“China threat”.61
In fact, the military base is not the only sign of increasing Chinese security and military engagement in Africa.
For China, UN peacekeeping operations serve, indeed, as the most important tool to expand Chinese military
cooperation with African countries. However, it was not until the 1990s (the country’s first engagement with UN
peacekeeping operations was its participation in the UN mission in Cambodia starting in 1990/91), that China
remained reluctant, if not skeptical, to any oversees military commitments. The principle of “no-intervention” had
been considered “sacred” for decades. But with its entry into the WTO in 2001, Beijing has overhauled its policy
introducing an active “military diplomacy”. As a result of this policy change, China has successfully transferred
itself from an embittered opponent to an active contributor to UN peacekeeping operations.
For more than two decades, China has participated in numerous multilateral peacekeeping missions in Africa,
such as 2003 in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 2012 in South Sudan

60
Phillips, Michael M.: China Seeks First Military Base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds. (The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2021),
accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-first-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-u-s-intelligence-finds-11638726327.
61
Guo, Yuandan: WSJ report on China’s military base on Africa’s Atlantic coast ‘not true,’ says Chinese military expert. (Global Times, December 6, 2021),
accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240819.shtml.

23
(UNMISS), 2013 in Mali (MINUSMA), and 2021 in Darfur (UNAMID). The participation in UN Peacekeeping in
Africa offers China not only a legal means to safeguard its massive investments in Africa, enhance its
international reputation as a benevolent rising superpower, but also helps the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
to obtain military skills and operational experience. 62 As the figure “Peacekeeping Contributions UNSC P5”
presented by Tom Bayes shows, “China’s deployed peacekeepers [for the UN] have increased from 52 in 2000
to 2437 in July 2019.”63 Of the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, China has become the
biggest contributor to military observers, verifiers, inspectors, police operations as well as peacekeeping troops
by order of the UN.
“Importantly”, as Bayes reports, “its personnel contributions are diverse: medical, engineering, police, and
combat units, as well as helicopter unit”.64 As to financial support for the UNPKOs, China ranks second only to
the US “contributing 15.21 per cent of the total (compared to the US’s 27.89 per cent and an aggregated 23.85
per cent for the EU’s members)”.65

In addition, as Beijing promotes its BRI in Africa strongly, China’s proactive engagement with UN peacekeeping
operations opens the country new avenues to facilitate its security cooperation with the participating African
countries.66 Implementing large-scale infrastructure projects depends on safety and stability, which motivates
both China and African countries to upgrade their military engagement. Indeed, China is seeking to increase its
military cooperation with African countries by creating connections of BRI to the UN and regional organizations.

62
Dyrenforth, Thomas: Beijing’s Blue Helmets: What to Make of China’s Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa. (Modern War Institute, August 19, 2021),
accessed on April 10, 2022, at https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/.
63
Bayes, Tom: China’s growing security role in Africa: Views from West Africa, Implications for Europe. (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2020), accessed
on April 2, 2022, at https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/7995358/China%E2%80%99s+growing+security+role+in+Africa.pdf/e0df44a4-bd9f-c794-
6201-311e78addd50?version=1.0&t=1594801201898, pp. 45-46.
64
Ibid. p. 46.
65
Ibid. p. 46.
66
Herbert, Natalie: China’s Belt and Road Initiative invests in African infrastructure — and African military and police forces. (The Washington Post, April
30, 2021), accessed on April 8, 2022, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/30/chinas-belt-road-initiative-invests-african-infrastructure-
african-military-police-forces/.

24
In 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for the UN to “help Africa improve its dependent capabilities
for peacekeeping”, to do more to help African countries in reducing conflicts in Africa and to set up a standing
army to deal with crises.67 Beijing is wielding its influence in the UN to safeguard its investments in Africa BRI
projects. Thus, active participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations in Africa is generating profound
windfalls for BRI projects. Conversely, BRI serves as a new approach to increase Chinese involvement in African
security.68 Unlike France and the US which place a heavy overt troop presence in Africa, China tends to integrate
military cooperation into its economic relations with African countries.69
It has been widely purported that China’s investment in Africa is much “dirtier” than that of the Western countries
because the “World´s Factory”, driven by its hunger for raw materials and minerals, had disproportional interests
to invest in mining and other attractive industries. China, due to being “unable to meet its annual demand for
copper, zinc, nickel and a range of other raw materials”, the Institute of Developing Economies of Japan asserted,
“is now the prime driver of world mineral prices and a number of Africa countries have become key beneficiaries
of this process”.70
A differentiated inquest into the subject shows, however, that China is not alone in investing in mining in Africa.
To a certain degree, the intensity of engagement with African mining industries by Western countries looks often
much stronger than that of China. This is at least true in the case of the US. A systematic comparison of the
composition of Chinese and American investment in Africa during the recent years reveals an over-proportional
weight of the mining industry in the US investment portfolio for which even the massive investment of Chinese
companies in African mining areas appears moderate.
Composition of China's foreign direct investment in Africa by industry, 2013 v. 2020

Construction industry

Mining industry
2013

Manufacturing industry

Scientific research and technology

service industry
2020
other

Financial industry
0 10 20 30 40 50
Leasing and business services
$ Billion

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 2014, 2021.

67
Zhang, Rachel: China urges UN to support African peacekeeping efforts. (South China Morning Post, April 20, 2021), accessed on April 8, 2022, at
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3130300/china-urges-un-support-african-peacekeeping-efforts.
68
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: Report by State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi At the Eighth Ministerial
Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 2021, accessed on April 6, 2022, at
http://focac.org.cn/focacdakar/eng/zxyw_1/202112/t20211206_10462843.htm.
69
Tanchum, Michaël: China’s new military base in Africa: What it means for Europe and America. (European Council on Foreign Relations, December 14,
2021), accessed on April 6, 2022, at https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/.
70
Institute of Developing Economies (IDE): China in Africa: Capital 8 “China’s Mining Footprint in Africa”, accessed on April 12, 2022, at
https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_08.html.

25
After the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched, China’s investment in Africa grew from $26.19 billion to
$43.4 billion between 2013 and 2020, mainly in construction, mining industry, manufacturing and finance.71,72
The BRI has had a significant impact on the promotion of Chinese investment in various industries in Africa. The
three sectors of construction, mineral industry and manufacturing maintained the top three shares of Chinese
investment in Africa during this seven-year period.
Composition of China's foreign direct investment in Africa by industry 2013
2013 Scientific research and technology service industry
5%
Financial industry
Construction industry
14%
26%

other
15%

Manufacturing industry Mining industry

13% 27%

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 2014.

Composition of China's foreign direct investment in Africa by industry 2020
2020 Leasing and business services
Financial industry 5%
10%
Construction industry
35%
other
15%

Manufacturing industry Mining industry

14% 21%

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 2021.

During the same period, US investment in Africa declines from $60.42 billion in 2013 to $47.5 billion in 2020.
The significant decline in total investment over this seven-year period is accompanied by a decline in investment
in the mining sector from 60 per cent to 41 per cent. However, US investment in Africa’s mining sector remains
the most dominant category of US investment in Africa in 2020, accounting for 41 per cent of total investment,
twice as large as China's level of 21 per cent over the same period.73,74 As shown in the below figures:

71
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China: Report on Development of China’s Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, 2021,
accessed on April 8, 2022, at http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-09/29/5639984/files/a3015be4dc1f45458513ab39691d37dd.pdf.
72
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China: Report on Development of China’s Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, 2014,
accessed on April 8, 2022, at http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tzhzcj/tzhz/upload/duiwaitouzihezuofazhanbaogao2014.pdf.
73
BEA: Direct Investment by Country and Industry, 2020,2021, accessed on April 8, 2022, at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/dici0721.pdf.
74
BEA: Direct Investment Positions for 2013 - Country and Industry Detail, 2014, accessed on April 8, 2022, at
https://apps.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2014/07%20July/0714_direct_investment_positions.pdf.

26
Composition of US’ foreign direct investment in Africa by industry, 2013 v. 2020

Mining
2013 Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Information
Finance (except depository institutions) and insurance
Professional, scientific, and technical services
2020 Holding companies (nonbank)
Other industries
Depository institutions
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
$ Billion

Composition of US’ foreign direct investment in Africa by industry, 2013 vs. 2020

2013
Other industries Depository institutions
2% 4%
Holding…

Professional, scientific, and technical

services 2%

Finance (except depository

institutions) and insurance 6% Mining
60%
Information 0%
Wholesale trade 3%
Manufacturing 6%

2020
Holding companies
(nonbank) 21%
Mining
41%
Professional, scientific, and technical
services 5%

Finance (except depository institutions)

and insurance 12%

Information 1% Manufacturing
Wholesale trade 8% 12%

Figure: X. Ke (2022).Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis [Bea] of the USA.

27
7. Beijing’s “Green Deal” with Africa
In her speech for the 2019 Belt and Road Forum, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde noted that BRI 2.0
and “[t]he launch of the green investment principle at this conference is a further important step forward for the
BRI”75. Chapter 41 of China's Fourteenth Five-Year Plan and Vision 2035 outlines a plan to promote the high-
quality development of the Belt and Road: to "embrace the concepts of green, openness and honesty", and to
promote the construction of the Green Silk Road by strengthening exchanges and cooperation in addressing
climate change, marine cooperation, wildlife conservation, desertification prevention and control. To cope with
climate change, China has proposed to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality by 2060 ("Carbon Neutral 2060"),
and the sharing of "carbon neutrality" experience and results will become an important part of the construction
of the Green Silk Road.76
Energy loans to Africa from the Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank were the main
financing institutions for the country’s overseas investments, mainly for hydropower, oil and coal, according to
Boston University. As shown in the figure below, 2020 saw a plunge in investments in unsustainable energy
sources such as oil and coal.77 As shown in the below figure.

China’s Energy Finance in Africa, 2016-2020

2016 Oil
2017 unspecified
2018 Coal
2019 Hydropower
2020
Solar
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Wind
$ Billion
Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: The Boston University Global Development Policy Center 2022.

While China was still funding fossil fuel projects and hydropower (the latter is low-carbon compared to natural
gas or coal-fired generation, but it produces more greenhouse gases than wind and solar), it has signaled the
need to mitigate climate change in its investment decisions at previous summits of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation.78
In 2021, with the announcement by Xi Jinping at the UN General Assembly in November of that year to end
financing for coal-fired power plants overseas, no coal projects have been financed or invested in to date, and
green energy financing has increased marginally to a new high of $6.3 billion ($6.2 billion in 2020) in Belt and

75
Lagarde, Christine: BRI 2.0: Stronger Frameworks in the New Phase of Belt and Road, accessed on April 6, 2022, at
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/04/25/sp042619-stronger-frameworks-in-the-new-phase-of-belt-and-road.
76
Guo: "One Belt, One Road" 2.0: carbon neutral to promote the construction of green silk road (“⼀带⼀路”2.0 时代，“碳中和” 推动绿⾊丝绸之
路建设), 2021, accessed on April 6, 2022, at https://www.163.com/dy/article/G61LPVC50519C6BH.html.
77
The Boston University Global Development Policy Center: China's Global Energy Finance - China Development Bank (CDB) and Export-Import Bank of
China (CHEXIM), 2022, accessed on April 6, 2022, at https://www.bu.edu/cgef/?lang=en#/2017/Country-EnergySource.
78
Pike, Lili: Are China’s energy investments in Africa green enough?. (China Dialogue, September 3, 2018), accessed on April 6, 2022, at
https://chinadialogue.net/en/energy/10799-are-china-s-energy-investments-in-africa-green-enough/.

28
Road investments. A major change in the pattern of Chinese energy investment emerges in the Belt and Road
from 2020 onwards, with a significant increase in the share of solar/wind investments.79
At the November 2021 ministerial meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China sharply reduced its
investment in energy-intensive infrastructure in Africa over the next three years. It also cut aid in capacity
building by 90 per cent. At the same time, the Vision 2035 document released at the conference pledged to
build a new green growth model for China-Africa joint ecological development; in January 2022, China’s Ministry
of Ecology and Environment, in conjunction with the Ministry of Commerce, issued new Guidelines for Ecological
Environmental Protection of Foreign Investment Cooperation and Construction Projects, which will have a
significant impact on China’s overseas investment patterns in the coming period.80
There is a major shift in China’s thinking on energy investment and construction financing in the BRI countries
and especially in Africa, with green and sustainable investment becoming an important trend for Chinese
investment in the BRI 2.0 era.81As shown in the following Figure.

Chinese energy engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 2013-2021 by subsector
100%
5,49% 4,79% 8,18% 7,00% 10,84% 12,47%
90% 16,80%
21,05% 24,24% 18,75% 21,16% 30,75% 30,70%
80%
22,92%
70% 19,05% 32,53% solar/wind
14,38% 16,60%
% of engagement

60% 17,16% 16,54%

29,06% 18,75% 10,68% Hydro
50% 11,24% 31,79%
Gas
40% 25,47% 21,76%
41,23% 34,19% Oil
15,02% 38,88% 8,64%
30% 31,71%
0,45 10,19% 9,28% Coal
20%
0,28 31,00%
10% 0,18 0,20 0,19 0,20
0,16 0,15
0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Figure: X. Ke (2022). Source: GREEN FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT CENTER 2022.

8. China as a New Tech Player in Africa

Chinese technology and infrastructure companies are becoming a crucial factor in the rapid modernization of
African societies and economies. Especially the rise of Chinese digital technology and platform companies in
Africa has raised eyebrows, often linked to the claim that Chinese companies would spread authoritarian models
of government.82 Arguably, the widespread use of mobile phones generated the most important impact on the
technological transformation of individual and collective life in Africa. As Achille Mbembe points out, “the
introduction of the mobile phone on the continent has been a technological event of considerable singularity…

79
GREEN FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT CENTER, ibid.
80
Feffer, John: China’s Evolving Energy Policies in Africa, 2022, accessed on April 6, 2022, at https://ips-dc.org/chinas-evolving-energy-policies-in-africa/.
81
GREEN FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT CENTER, ibid.
82
Anderson, Ross: The Panopticon Is Already Here. (The Atlantic, September 2000 Issue), accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/.

29
In Africa, this device is not only a medium of communication. It is also a medium of self-stylization and self-
singularization.“83
While “shanzhai” (imitation) products no longer sell easily on the Chinese market, companies such as Oppo
found a growing number of untapped markets in Africa.84 Key companies, such as Transsion, a company that
produces affordable mobile phones in Shenzhen, are often largely unknown both in China and the West.
Transsion has a market share of almost 47 per cent in Africa for mobile phones. Chinese digital technologies,
thus, play a central role in an “Africa that accords a central place to experimentation, an Africa in which
astonishingly postmodern images and practices of existence germinate.”85 As the table demonstrates, Chinese
companies dominate the African market with more than 64 per cent of the shipped units. The South Korean
company Samsung, on the other hand, had a market share of only 19 per cent in the second quarter of 2021.

Share of Smartphone Uni Shipments to Africa by Vendor

100%
19,60 17 14
80% 3
3 5 9
3,90 5
8,70 8,80 8
60%
19 19
27,40
40%

20% 45,20 47
37,40

0%
Q2 '19 Q2 '20 Q2 '21

Transsion Samsung Huawei (incl. Honor) OPPO Xiaomi HMD Others

Chart: M. Mayer (2022). Source: Statista / IDC.

The sum of investments of Chinese large high-technology companies in Africa are amounting to 12 per cent of
their overall projects and investments abroad according to the data set from ASPI (see table 2). Given the
relatively small share of Africa in Chinese foreign trade,86 this indicates an outsized interest and expectation in
the continent. This great vision of success and progress is shared by Alibaba. In November 2019, Jack Ma
visited Ethiopia’s capital to ink a deal in which the Alibaba Group and the Ethiopian government partnered to
create the Electronic World Trade platform Ethiopia Hub. The hub is supposed to promote digital connectivity
and global e-commerce.87

83
Mbembe, Achille: Out of the dark night, Columbia University Press 2021, p. 216.
84
Williams, Alexandria: China is making more of Africa’s phones than you think. (Quartz Africa, December 12, 2019), accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://qz.com/africa/1764356/china-makes-majority-of-africas-smartphones/.
85
Mbembe, ibid., p. 6.
86
China's leading export partners in 2021, based on export value. (Statista, February 2022), accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://www.statista.com/statistics/256350/main-export-partners-for-china-by-export-value/.
87
Fasil, Mahlet: Alibaba Group to help Ethiopia set up first eWTP hub, the second in Africa. (Addis Standard, November 25, 2019), accessed on April 5,
2022, at https://addisstandard.com/news-alibaba-group-to-help-ethiopia-set-up-first-ewtp-hubthe-second-in-africa/.

30
Currently, the digital trade mainly serves to facilitate the export of agricultural products such as coffee.88 The
Ethiopia Hub, which is linked to Alibaba’s Tmall Global, promoted the Ethiopian Coffee Brands Launch with
11,200 bags of Ethiopian coffee sold in one second. The UN is also partnering with these initiatives. UN Under-
Secretary-General and Executive of the ECA, Secretary Vera Songwe noted that the „success recorded in
exporting Ethiopian coffee to China will provide a roadmap in leveraging export potential for other ten African
countries, where ECA is working this year, to provide more export potential from Africa to China”89. According
to H. E. Gebremeskel Chala, Ethiopian Minister of Trade and Regional Integration, such digital connections show
the „benefits that, not only Ethiopia, but Africa can reap in harnessing digitalization.” 90

Distribution Chinese Tech Companies Overseas Projects & Investments

12%

29%
15%

17%
27%

Europe Asia North American the Rest Africa

Chart: M. Mayer (2022). Source: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

The graph below shows that Huawei conducts by far the largest share of projects and investments in Africa (44
per cent), followed by ZTE (18 per cent), Uniview (9 per cent) and China telecom. This mix indicates that Chinese
companies are absolutely critical providers of telecommunication infrastructures in Africa. In fact, without
Chinese tech companies, cellular communications in Africa would not be at the same level as they are today:
“50 percent of 3G systems used by African telecommunication operators were built by Huawei and another 20
percent to 30 percent were built by ZTE, while Huawei has built up 70 percent of 4G networks and is likely to
build all 5G networks.”91
China’s Digital Silk Road addresses a need of African countries: to invest in and construct massive digital and
data infrastructures,92 required to run Africa’s megacities and emerging economic corridors. China plans to

88
Mureithi, Carlos: African diplomats are live-streaming and making deliveries to China’s consumers. (Quartz Africa, January 27, 2022), accessed on April
5, 2022, at https://qz.com/africa/2117788/african-nations-bet-big-on-chinas-e-commerce-market/.
89
Africa: Ethiopian Coffee Brands Launch on China's Largest e-Commerce Platform, Alibaba Group, in a Joint Effort with ECA and the Ethiopian
Government. (All Africa, Press Release, January 24, 2022), accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://allafrica.com/stories/202201240560.html.
90
Ibid.
91
Wright, Bianca: Made in China: Africa’s ICT infrastructure backbone. (Chief Information Officer, March 22, 2020), accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://www.cio.com/article/193170/made-in-china-africas-ict-infrastructure-backbone.html.
92
Chimbelu, Chiponda: Investing in Africa's tech infrastructure. Has China won already?. (Deutsche Welle, May 3, 2019), accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://www.dw.com/en/investing-in-africas-tech-infrastructure-has-china-won-already/a-48540426.

31
invest further $ 8.43 billion in Africa to promote the Digital Silk Road.93 Infrastructure, scientific cooperation and
the digital economic feature prominently adopted in the “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan
(2022-2024)” on 30th November 2021, at the 8th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) in Dakar, Senegal.94 African countries, thus, are highly unlikely to join the US-led “Clean
Network Initiative” which aims at curbing the influence of Huawei and ZTE.

Chinese Activities in Africa according to Companies

3% 2%
6%
6%

9% 44%

13%

18%

Huawei ZTE the Rest Uniview China Telecom China Unicom Ant Group Alibaba

Chart: M. Mayer (2022). Source: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

The variety of sectors and different uses of digital technologies provided by Chinese tech companies in Africa
point to a trend of diversification away from infrastructure. The figure “Chinese tech firms’ activities in Africa”
below shows that surveillance and “smart city” projects account for almost 50 per cent of activities. Yet, there
are also e-payment ecosystems, biotechnology, cloud technology, artificial technology projects and increasing
investments in fintech startups.95 As China became the most important trading partner for most African countries,
it becomes a key economic and development concern that integrating African economies into global value
chains also leads to increases in the “share of higher-value activities in its export structure”96. Chinese IT aid
projects, perhaps, might add here a transnational network of private and state actors to the picture which pushes
digitalization in various African countries.
This results in a unique constellation of Chinese and local actors in the African tech landscape that contradicts
the often-one-dimensional understanding of the impact of “Chinese state capitalism” on African economies.97
Various studies demonstrate that private tech companies and state-owned enterprises follow different logics of
93
Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy: China reportedly investing $ 8.43 bn in Africa as part of Digital Silk Road initiative. (The Economic Times, October 15, 2021),
accessed on April, 5, 2022, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-reportedly-investing-8-43-bn-in-africa-as-part-
of-digital-silk-road-initiative/articleshow/87039334.cms?from=mdr"%20\o%20"https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-
news/china-reportedly-investing-8-43-bn-in-africa-as-part-of-digital-silk-road-initiative/articleshow/87039334.cms?from=mdr.
94
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 30, 2021),
accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202112/t20211202_10461183.html.
95
Nyabiage, Jevans: Chinese investors are again pouring millions into Africa’s fintech start-ups. (South China Morning Post, August 29, 2022), accessed
on April 5, 2022, at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3146678/chinese-investors-are-again-pouring-millions-africas-fintech.
96
Fuchs, Andreas: Africa benefits from trade with Asia and China. (IFW Kiel Institute For The World Economy, September 2, 2020), accessed on April 5,
2022, at https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/media-information/2020/africa-benefits-from-trade-with-asia-and-china/.
97
Wang, Rong, Bar, François, and Hong, Yu: ICT aid flows from China to African countries: A communication network perspective, in: International Journal
of Communication, Vol. 14, 2020, pp. 1498-1523 (p. 1498).

32
investment, organization and engagement with local actors. Most importantly, African societies and
governments are not passive but follow their own interests. This heterogeneous agency is a crucial part of the
new reality in African technological developments.98

Chinese Tech Activies in Africa according to Sectors

4% 4%
10% 30%

12%

13%
27%

Smart Cities Surveillance Cloud 5G ePayments Biotech Artificial Intelligence

Chart: M. Mayer (2022). Source: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Given the cheap and reliable technological solutions Chinese companies provide from smartphones and sea
cables to 5G infrastructure and smart surveillance technologies, it is unquestionable that Chinese digital
technologies are quickly becoming crucial components at all levels of the African tech stake. The involvement
of Huawei in multiple “Safe City” projects across African countries, therefore, led to the assumption that Chinese
companies could soon become dominant players in the global South. “After adopting Huawei’s equipment,
countries may be “locked-in” by high replacement costs. As these economies grow, Huawei is poised to capture
market share, spread its standards, and gain access to foreign data to improve its technology.”99
In some cases, Chinese companies used IT standards for ICT broadband backbone that were only compatible
with Huawei routers.100 Another example is massive Chinese investments in the construction of the new Egyptian
capital which includes urban conglomerations, smart infrastructure, and industrial and special manufacturing
zones along the Suez’s Canal. This will give China a stake in the capital of one of the regionally leading states.
However, US companies including Google, Facebook and Elon Musk’s Starlink also build enormous new
infrastructures including satellite-based internet access and new sea cables that link Africa with other
continents.101 As a result, African governments will on the one hand greatly increase their infrastructural power

98
Chen, Weiwei: China and Africa: Ethiopia case study debunks investment myths. (The Conversation, February 21, 2022), accessed on April 5, 2022, at
https://theconversation.com/china-and-africa-ethiopia-case-study-debunks-investment-myths-177098; see also: Lee, Ching Kwan: The Specter of Global
China, University of Chicago Press 2020; Gagliardone, Iginio: China, Africa, and the Future of the Internet, Bloomsbury Publishing 2019.
99
Hillman, Jonathan E. and McCalpin, Maesea: Watching Huawei’s “Safe Cities”. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Briefs, November,
2019), accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/191030_HillmanMcCalpin_HuaweiSafeCity_layout_v4.pdf.
100
Vaidyanathan, Veda and Gomera, Jumanne: Power and Communication Infrastructure - Case Studies of Mtwara – Dar es Salaam Natural Gas Pipeline
Project and National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB), in: Vaidyanathan, Veda (ed.), China’s Infrastructure Development in Africa: An Examination of
Projects in Tanzania and Kenya, Delhi: Institute of Chinese Studies 2019, p. 95-110.
101
Wright, ibid.

33
and thereby become more autonomous vis-à-vis other social and economic actors and society at large. On the
other hand, African countries are increasingly dependent on both US and Chinese tech companies whilst their
soft and hardware infrastructure (stake) entails components from the rivalling technology poles – defying the
binary exclusionary logic of the US Clean Network Initiative. So, African technology sectors and infrastructures
are poised to become a hotbed for great power competition which evolves around China, the EU’s global
gateway and a renewed US interest in Africa.102
Recognizing this complex technological trajectory, the claim that China spreads “totalitarian technology” in
Africa also needs to be scrutinized. Observers and scholars have noticed that some African states try to imitate
China’s internet governance approach, including censorship and surveillance techniques. Others have argued
that China can export its brand of digital authoritarianism by using exported digital information technology and
data infrastructures. Furthermore, China’s approach to cyber government is attractive to authoritarian regimes.
For instance, concerning the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), China “has the upper hand on
the normative side of this competition” with the US, while Chinese firms “play an integral role in affordable 5G
network development”103. There is little evidence as of now, however, that China is indeed successfully exporting
“digital authoritarianism”. Regardless of whether in the global North or South, the country has not been able to
turn its infrastructural or institutional influence into productive power, shaping social relations, preferences and
political systems.
Moreover, as Mandira Bagwandeen pointed out, “the narrative that China is championing digital authoritarianism
on the continent cannot be analyzed without the miasma of hegemons waging tech wars and overarching
struggles for dominance. By portraying China (and, by extension, its tech companies) as deviant actors that
want to diminish digital democracy, the US places itself on higher moral ground. However, this moral edifice is
one thinly lacquered – after all, they too spy on their citizens (thanks to Edward Snowden for enlightening us on
extensive surveillance by US intelligence). Furthermore, countries such as France, the US, the UK, Israel and
Germany also supply high-end surveillance technology, spyware, hacking software and censorship applications
to fragile democracies and illiberal governments.”104
Recent scholarship on the impact of Chinese telecommunication technologies on African countries
demonstrates that “rather than exporting ‘digital Leninism’ through regulations attached to its aid, it seems that
China trends toward a fundamentally more Smithian pursuit of self-interest.”105 Chinese companies are active
within and across all levels of the stack in African countries, 106 but Internet policies and infrastructural
constellations emerging in African countries suggest an independent local agency that does not reproduce the
binary logic of “digital colonialism”. 107 In sum, Chinese-provided data infrastructures are increasingly

102
Runde, Daniel, Savoy, Conor and Staguhn, Janina: China and SMEs in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Window of Opportunity for the United States. (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Briefs, October 15, 2021), accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-smes-sub-
saharan-africa-window-opportunity-united-states; see also: Lau, Stuart and Moens, Barbara: EU tempts Africa away from Chinese influence. (Politico,
February 15, 2022), accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-tempts-africa-away-from-chinese-influence/ and Schneidman,
Witney and Wiegert, Joel: Competing in Africa: China, the European Union, and the United States. (Brookings, April 16, 2018), accessed on April 5,
2022, at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/16/competing-in-africa-china-the-european-union-and-the-united-states/.
103
Khorrami, Nima: The Great Power Race in GCC Cyberspace. (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, December 14, 2020), accessed on April 5,
2022, at https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/83446.
104
Bagwandeen, Mandira: Don’t blame China for the rise of digital authoritarianism in Africa. (Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 13, 2021),
accessed on April 5, 2022, at https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/09/dont-blame-china-for-the-rise-of-digital-authoritarianism-in-africa/.
105
Tong, Amy: China’s ICT Engagement in Africa: A Comparative Analysis. (The Yale Review of International Studies, Volume 11, 2021), accessed on April
5, 2022, at http://yris.yira.org/essays/4702.
106
Agbebi, Motolani: China’s Digital Silk Road and Africa’s Technological Future. (Council on Foreign Relations, February 1, 2022), accessed on April 5,
2022, at https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Chinas%20Digital%20Silk%20Road%20and%20Africas%20Technological%20Future_FINAL.pdf.
107
Gagliardone, ibid.

34
widespread in African countries. They are becoming co-constitutive for states and societies, yet, without easily
exporting and implanting Chinese norms and principles.

9. China’s Soft Power in Africa: Potentials and Limits

The Rise of China, among the most consequential and most fiercely discussed topics in global politics of late,
does not make itself felt in its increasing military clout or growing economic prowess alone. In other words, it is
not restricted to the realm of hard power already discussed above. Rather, China also massively stepped up its
efforts to increase national soft power around the globe in recent years – and Africa has been assigned a special
place in this global scramble for attraction. Soft power, at its core, refers to “the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”108 Accordingly, states and other actors on the international
stage seek to apply soft power in order to create followership, to convince and attract others of the desirability
of their agenda, and – ultimately – to get desired (political) outcomes. It rests on such resources as culture,
foreign policies, and values and can be disseminated globally by such instruments as public and personal
diplomacy.109
Public diplomacy tools in particular rate high among the instruments at a nation’s disposal. Among them, cultural
diplomacy (e.g., the establishment of cultural institutes, programs, or exhibitions), international broadcasting
(e.g., news programs, radio stations, or online services), and exchange diplomacy (e.g., student or professional
exchange and scholarship programs) count among the most important. 110 Since attractiveness to a
considerable degree lies in the eyes of the beholder,
Soft power refers to the ability to get desired outcomes opinion polls or surveys play a major role in examining
in international relations not by (military) coercion or the reception side, and hence the very success or failure
(economic) inducement, but by (cultural) attraction.
of soft power.
Keeping this understanding of soft power in mind, we do observe a number of developments indicating China’s
soft power expansion towards Africa over the last years. At least since Hu Jintao, President of the People’s
Republic of China from 2003 to 2013, called for an enhancement of national cultural activities in his much-
noticed speech at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on October 15, 2007, soft
power prominently entered the Chinese foreign policy discourse. President Hu thus argued, explicitly referring
to the concept of soft power in his speech, “In the present era, culture has become a more and more important
source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall
national strength.”111 Four years later, in 2011, Hu reaffirmed his intention to put special emphasis on the role of
Chinese culture as a means to foster national soft power. On the occasion of the 90th Anniversary Gathering of
the Communist Party of China, he thus remarked, “We should bring Chinese culture to the world, develop cultural
soft power compatible with China's international standing, and increase the influence of Chinese culture in the
world.”112

108
Nye, Joseph S., Jr.: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York 2004, p. X.
109
Ohnesorge, Hendrik W.: Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations, Cham 2020, pp. 85-171.
110
Cull, Nicholas J.: Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories, in: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 616,
March 2008, pp. 31-54.
111
Hu, Jintao: Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous
Society in all, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 15, 2007, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm.
112
Hu, Jintao: Speech at the Communist Party of China 90th Anniversary Gathering, July 1, 2011, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
http://www.china.org.cn/china/CPC_90_anniversary /2011-07/01/content_22901507_14.htm.

35
In response to such calls to action, China soon and drastically increased its efforts in virtually all of the major
instruments of soft power noted above. David Shambaugh, for example, calculated that already in 2013 China
spent an estimated USD 7-10 billion per year on its international publicity efforts.113 While Chinese efforts, as
part of a global “Going Out Strategy,” are directed at the entire world, the African continent has featured
prominently from a very early point.114 In particular, the soft power instruments of international broadcasting,
cultural diplomacy, and exchange diplomacy have played a key role ever since. Accordingly, they shall gain
center stage in the following.
Media as Power
International broadcasting, an expression of a nation’s global media presence, can be defined as “a complex
combination of state-sponsored news, information, and entertainment directed at a population outside the
sponsoring state’s boundaries.”115 Practiced as early as in World War I, radio and newsreel were increasingly
used to inform and influence foreign publics during World War II and later the Cold War. Today, in the global
information age of the 21st century, such traditional programs have been complemented by a broad variety of
online services and social media platforms.
In the Chinese context, the so-called “Big Four” – Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television, China Radio
International, and China Daily – have each undergone extensive restructuring and initiated globally-oriented
programs to spread Chinese culture, improve China’s
image around the world, and, not least, to produce
The “Big Four” in Chinese international media presence
financial profits. 116 With the creation and continual (Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television, China
expansion of media outlets such as these, China seeks Radio International, and China Daily) have stepped up
to provide an alternative to the predominantly Western- their game of late – and Africa has become a key target
dominated media “by presenting China’s own version of across the board.
issues and events happening inside China, Asia, and
the world.”117
Africa has become a special target of such programs, as recent figures and developments indicate: Xinhua
News Agency, founded in 1932, is the largest official Chinese news agency with about 10,000 journalists based
in 144 bureaus around the world. It provides daily news coverage in politics, economics, sports, and culture.118
Its Africa section provides basic information on Chinese relations with Africa at large as well as detailed
information on each of its states from Algeria to Zimbabwe. According to Zhou Qisheng, Xinhua Executive
Deputy Editor-in-Chief, “Xinhua’s expansion into overseas markets is closely related to China’s expansion of its
soft power abroad – we cannot just rely on economic power alone!”119
The nation’s foremost television broadcaster, Central China Television, is a further instrument designed and put
to use in order to enhance China’s soft power. Founded in 1958, the channel’s international branch, meanwhile
called China Global Television Network (CGNT), was launched in 2010. Today, besides its flagship
headquarters in Beijing, it has two production centers abroad: one in the US (Washington, D.C.) and one in
Kenya (Nairobi). In recent years, programs were expanded dramatically and are accompanied by a strong
113
Shambaugh, David: China Goes Global: The Partial Power, New York 2013, p. 207.
114
Grassi, Sergio: Changing the Narrative: Chinas mediale Offensive in Afrika, Internationale Politikanalyse, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin 2014, p. 1.
115
Price, Monroe E., Haas, Susan, and Drew, Margolin: New Technologies and International Broadcasting: Reflections on Adaptations and
Transformations, in: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, No. 1, 2008, pp. 150-172 (pp. 152-153).
116
Shambaugh, ibid., p. 227.
117
Zhang, Xioaling,: Chinese State Media Going Global, in: East Asian Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010, pp. 42-55 (p. 43).
118
Agence France-Presse (AFP), Xinhua News Agency, accessed on March 15, 2022, at https://www.afp.com/en/products/partners/xinhua-news-agency.
119
Shambaugh, ibid., p. 230.

36
presence on social media. Additionally, Chinese media provide free content for local African stations as well as
training programs for journalists, once more with a special focus on Africa.120
Considering initiatives on the airwaves, China has in recent years heavily invested in the global outreach of
China Radio International (CRI). Founded as Radio Beijing in 1941, CRI meanwhile is broadcasting globally in
30 foreign bureaus and 43 languages. Attesting once more to the special significance of Africa in China’s media
and soft power strategy, its first radio staying broadcasting on FM abroad was launched in Nairobi in 2006.121
Lastly, China Daily takes pride of its place as the oldest and most widely read English-language Chinese
newspaper with an international direction. Founded in 1981, it has an aggregate circulation of more than 400,000,
one-quarter of which is attributed to the overseas market.122 In recent years, the Chinese government has been
investing huge sums into China Daily, with the African market as a particular target once again.123 The launch of
a specific China Daily Africa Edition in December 2012 emphasizes this.124
In the final analysis, the “Big Four” in the Chinese media landscape, and among them especially the Xinhua
News Agency and China Central Television, have experienced substantive expansion regarding their funding
and global outreach at the hands of the Chinese government. These developments indicate that the Chinese
government seems to have recognized that success in world politics in the 21st century may not (or at least not
solely) rest upon having the strongest economy or the greatest military but, to quote John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt, “may ultimately be about whose story wins.”125
An integral component in this regard is making one’s story available to the world in the first place. China’s recent
broadcasting and media initiatives can clearly be identified to answer this very purpose – and Africa has been
identified as a particularly crucial target, with specific programs geared towards the general population as well
as local elites. So far, however, a decided closeness to the CPC has, according to some surveys and studies,
discredited much of the Chinese media outreach. In the highly competitive international media landscape,
Xinhua, in particular, has yet to deliver itself from the accusation of merely transmitting state propaganda and
get rid of what has been called the “Xinhua stigma.” 126 A central ingredient for Chinese international
broadcasting and media services in this regard is to become, in the eyes of the global public, an independent,
reliable and trustworthy source of information.127
Confucius Institutes: Intensity and Distribution
Besides international broadcasting, the creation of Chinese cultural institutes, the Confucius Institutes, can be
identified as a particularly important, visible, and impactful aspect of China’s quest to wield its soft power
globally. In fact, perhaps no other Chinese soft power instrument has caused greater ripples than the creation
of hundreds of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms at universities and schools around the world. With their very

120
Rawnsley, Gary D.: Communicating Confidence: China’s Public Diplomacy, in: Nancy Snow and Nicholas J. Cull (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Public
Diplomacy, 2nd Edition, New York 2020, pp. 284-300 (p. 294).
121
CRIonline: Über uns, September 17, 2019, accessed on March 15, 2022, at http://german.cri.cn/wir/wir/3268/20190917/351604.html.
122
Shambaugh, ibid., pp. 233-234.
123
Grassi, ibid., pp. 1-3.
124
China Daily: Pages of History, 2016, accessed on March 15, 2022, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/cd35years/index.html.
125
Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David: The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy, Santa Monica 1999, p. 53.
126
Bloomberg Businessweek: Bloomberg, Reuters – and Xinhua?. February 16, 2003, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2003-02-16/bloomberg-reuters-and-xinhua.
127
Si, Si: Expansion of International Broadcasting: The Growing Global Reach of China Central Television, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism,
Working Paper, July 2014, accessed on March 15, 2022, at https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-
01/Expansion%20of%20International%20Broadcasting.pdf, p. 12.

37
designation, these institutes allude to the focus on culture and
Confucian values, like family and harmony, as major sources of
Chinese soft power.128
Since the first Confucius Institute opened its doors in Seoul in 2004,
numbers have virtually exploded and now stand at about 550
institutes around the world. As depicted in the map above, the main
target regions for Chinese cultural institutes are still the US (with 85
institutes in 2021, despite a slight decrease in recent years) as well
as the UK (with 30 institutes). Africa, as a continent, however, has
seen a steep increase of late. 129 In fact, Confucius Institutes have
become, according to CGNT, “a bedrock of China’s growing cultural
ties with Africa”.130 And since the first Chinese cultural institute on the
African continent opened in Nairobi in December 2005, the number
of Confucius Institutes is now second only to that of comparable
French institutions. Until 2018 alone, more than seven million students
had attended Chinese language and cultural classes around the world, emphasizing the broad reach of Chinese
cultural programs.131
Meanwhile, however, Chinese Confucius Institutes have also become both the target of scholarly debate and
political controversy. Accordingly, charges of political bias and propaganda have repeatedly been made,
resulting even in the closing down of some institutes. Also, recent polls by the Afrobarometer indicate that among

128
Cho, Young Nam and Jong, Ho Jeong: China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 3, May/June 2008,
pp. 453-472 (p. 470).
129
Digmandarin: Confucius Institutes around the World – 2021, February 22, 2021, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
https://www.digmandarin.com/confucius-institutes-around-the-world.html.
130
Bhaya, Abhishek G.: Confucius Institutes a bedrock of China’s growing cultural ties with Africa, August 22, 2018, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514f346b544e79457a6333566d54/share_p.html.
131
Ibid.

38
those 34 African countries polled, the Chinese language is named only by 3 per cent as the “most important
international language to learn,” far behind English (69 per cent) and French (14 per cent).132
While the Confucius Institute might be the most visible player in the Chinese soft power competition, various
other cultural initiatives could be named, for example, the Sino-African Cultural Year hosted by China in 2004.133
In fact, the establishment and deepening of cultural relations at large have been described as a key interest at
least since the 2006 White Paper on African Policy, even though some researchers also attested to a certain
imbalance within the relationship.134
Students and People-to-People Exchanges
Today, China has become a major hub for incoming and outgoing students, as figures indicate: According to
the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, the total number of outbound Chinese students thus increased from 403,175
in 2006 to 719,014 in 2013 to 1,061,511 in 2019 – an increase by 163 per cent. During the same time period,
inbound international students studying at Chinese institutions of higher education increased from 36,386 in
2006 to 96,409 in 2013 to 201,177 in 2019 – an increase of 453 per cent.135 In recent years, in particular, China
has stepped up its efforts to attract international students to its universities, with impressive success.
While certainly a global phenomenon, Africa again plays a particularly important role in this crucial soft power
dimension: When the People’s Republic of China opened up diplomatic relations with African countries in the
1950s, a humble 24 African students studied in China, with numbers growing to 164 students by the mid-
1960s.136 In more recent times, however, this development has gathered pace dramatically: from 1,793 African
students at Chinese universities in 2003 to 16,404 in 2010 to 81,562 students in 2018, an overall increase of
about 4,500 per cent or 300 per cent annually over a 15 year period.137

132
Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny, ibid., p. 18.
133
Xinhua News Agency, China, Africa Boost Soft Power through Cultural Exchanges, June 19, 2006, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/wenjiabaoafrica/171843.htm.
134
Batchelor, Kathryn: How Genuine is China-Africa Cultural Cooperation?. Policy Briefing, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/groups/ctccs/documents/policy-briefing-china-africa-cultural-cooperation.pdf.
135
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS): UIS.Stat, accessed on March 15, 2022, at http://data.uis.unesco.org.
136
Liu, Hongwu and Luo, Jianbo: Sino-African Development Cooperation: Studies on the Theories, Strategies, and Policies, Singapore 2021, p. 116.
137
Breezegeography: Update to: Stats on International Students Studying in China, June 26, 2019, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
http://en.moe.gov.cn/news/press_releases/201904/t20190418_378586.html.

39
This development clearly indicates that Africa
constitutes a veritable “growth market” for
outgoing students attending Chinese
universities. In fact, Africa meanwhile ranks
second only behind Asia among continents of
origin, accounting for 17 per cent of
international students in China. As these
figures show, China has grown particularly
popular among African students, and in 2020
China ranked second only behind France
among top destinations for African students –
with Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe as the leading countries of origin. According to
University World News, this trend can be attributed to a growing attraction towards China among African
students, stemming not least from lower tuitions fees as well as lower language and visa requirements.138 Against
the backdrop of these developments, Benjamin Mulvey has noted the distinct soft power potential flowing from
these student exchanges, often explicitly encouraged by scholarship programs, especially in the long run: “It is
most likely such benefits would accrue after African graduates of
Chinese universities move into more senior positions in business or
politics in their home countries a decade or two later.”139
Concerning outgoing Chinese students, globally and with particular
respect to Africa, however, the picture is a different one. According
to data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics, the US (340,222),
Australia (155,594), and the UK (122,140) rank as the most popular
destinations for outgoing Chinese students. The first African country
making the list is South Africa with a modest 165 students in 2019.140
Once more, a certain imbalance becomes visible in the incoming-
outgoing ratio of international students. Besides these “classical”
examples of exchange diplomacy, 2,300 institutions offer joint-
degree programs alongside Chinese partners around the world and
nine universities have established joint campuses in China (3 from
the US, 2 from the UK, 2 from Hong Kong, one from Russia, and one
from Israel), emphasizing China’s interest in creating long-term
partnerships for years to come.141
Due to the deficits of African immigration management and government infrastructure, the statistics of Chinese
emigrants and international students in Africa have no accurate and unified data for the time being, and the data
from different sources are conflicting at times. According to research data from the Blue Book of Overseas

138
Kigotho, Wachira: Educational Superhighway from Africa to China Speeds up Mobility, University World News, November 19, 2020, accessed on March
15, 2022, at https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20201118132655210.
139
Ibid.
140
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS): Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students, accessed on March 15, 2022, at http://uis.unesco.org/en/uis-student-flow.
141
Economist Intelligence: How Will the Coronavirus Affect Outbound Chinese Students?. September 25, 2020, accessed on March 15, 2022, at
https://www.eiu.com/n/how-will-the-coronavirus-affect-outbound-chinese-students/.

40
Chinese (2011), as of 2010, there were 250,000 Chinese emigrants in Africa.142 According to another source on
the website of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of PRC, there were at least 500,000
Chinese doing business in Africa around 2010.143 Chinese scholar Lv Ting mentioned in his article Analysis of
Educational Needs and Exploration of Supply Model for New Emigrants of Chinese Diaspora in Africa
published in Annual Report on Overseas Chinese Study (2016) that China has 550,000 people in Africa,
accounting for 1.2 per cent of China’s emigrant population abroad, and Africa is the last in the destination
continent for emigrants (78.1 per cent in Asia, 13.9 per cent in America, 4.7 per cent in Europe, 2.1 per cent in
Oceania, and 1.2 per cent in Africa). 144

The number of Chinese workers in Africa at the end of 2020 was 104,074, a 43 per cent decline from the previous
year, due to travel difficulties in 2020. This continues the trend of declining numbers of Chinese workers in Africa,
down from a peak of 263,659 in 2015. The five countries with the most Chinese workers in 2020 are Algeria,
Nigeria, Ethiopia, the DRC and Angola. These five countries accounted for 46 per cent of all Chinese workers in
Africa by the end of 2020; Algeria alone accounted for 17 per cent. These figures include Chinese workers sent
to Africa to work on construction contracts for Chinese companies (contract workers) and Chinese workers
employed in other labor sectors, such as those working in factories (workers engaged in general labor); they
are reported by Chinese contractors and do not include informal migrants such as traders and shopkeepers.145

142
Liu, Zhang: Lives and Development of Chinese Diaspora in Africa (非洲中国海外移⺠的⽣存和发展), 2015, accessed on March 31, 2022, at
http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/181/2584.shtml.
143
Yuan, Zhuang: African Chinese Business Profile Analysis (非洲华商概况分析), 2011, accessed on March 31, 2022, at
http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/159/1742.shtml.
144
Lv, Ting: Analysis of Educational Needs and Exploration of Supply Model for New Emigrants of Chinese Diaspora in Africa (非洲华侨华⼈新移⺠教
育需求分析与供给模式探索), ANNUAL REPORT ON OVERSEAS CHINESE STUDY 2016, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2016.
145
CARI: DATA: CHINESE WORKERS IN AFRICA, accessed on March 31, 2022, at http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-workers-in-africa.

41
Conclusion
The facts and effects of China’s engagement in Africa demonstrated by the latest major development trends
have at large invalidated the allegation that China poses development pressure on Africa. With its
comprehensive cooperation with African countries in diplomacy, trade, investment, health, vaccine, medicine,
security, energy, technology, media and culture, China has proven to be neither a manipulator of “debt trap”,
nor a booster of “Neo-Colonialism”, neither a “Resource Plunder” nor a “Trade Predator”.146
Negative impacts such as supplanting of local manufacturers by more advanced Chinese producers, trade
frictions or unfair deals and agreements enforced by some Chinese companies remain sporadic and locally
limited. In this context, Conteh-Morgan highlights that “intangible rhetoric” from the US accusing China of
“sabotaging the neo-liberal democratic capitalistic order on the continent” might be “laudable”. He believes,
however, “they are devoid of, or pale in comparison with intangibles like roads, ports, dams, railways that have
visible and immediate effects on personal, community, and even national livelihoods or existential security.”147
One of the most tangible effects of Chinese engagement in Africa seems to be the extent to which the self-
confidence of African countries in dealing with foreign forces has been enhanced by China’s entry into the
continent where political games had been dictated by the West. One statement made by Teshome Toga
Chanaka, Ambassador of Ethiopia to China, confirms this observation impressively:
“The recent narrative that China is “colonizing Africa” economically is strongly refuted by African leaders
and not corroborated by evidence. To talk about neocolonialism in the 21st century, in whatever form or
shape, is simply mind boggling. First, it diminishes the true horrors that were suffered by Africans and
Black people across the world due to slavery, colonialism and apartheid — memories of which are still
very vivid in many African minds. Second, Africans are mature enough not to allow neocolonialism by
China or any other power for that matter. It is also a puzzling paradox for many observers that those who
criticize Africa for its engagement with China and those who gratify such a prejudice against the
partnership do far more businesses with China than Africa.”148
Indeed, the agency of African companies and states is often overlooked in the narrative of "digital colonialism".
The picture is much more complicated. Throughout the continent, African countries and societies are
increasingly adept at using their resources and markets to serve their own interests in negotiation with foreign
powers including China.
With growing capital and technology flaws from China promoted by the BRI 2.0, Africa is becoming a central
arena for the escalating tech rivalry between the US, China (and less so the EU). However, all indications are
that African governments will be likely to follow their independent course and will not join the US-led Clean
Network Initiative – an expression of a multi-polar and interdependent tech world in the global South.

146
Armel, Kaze: China’s engagement in Africa: Is China a “Partner or a Predator”, in: Chinese Journal of International Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2021, pp.1-26,
accessed on April 22, 2022, at https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S2630531321500025.
147
Conteh-Morgan, Earl: Strategies of Sino-American Rivalry in Africa: From 2000 to Covid-19, in: Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp.
265-278 (p. 275), accessed on March 23, 2022, at https//doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2021-21-2-265-278.
148
Chanaka, ibid.

42
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