CHAPTER 15

The Founding of the Republic

of China

Fellow human beings, wake up, wake up, wake up!

If you don’t do what the American War of Independence did,
And stand up, refuse to pay taxes . . .
Never will you have the chance to change your destiny.
—Guo Moruo (1892–1978) poet, essayist, playwright,
historian, translator, c. 19231

The 1911 Revolution marked the beginning of the Republican period (1912–49) in Chinese history.
The Republican period was an interregnum between the Qing dynasty and the Communist People’s
Republic of China that finally succeeded in reunifying the Qing empire minus Outer Mongolia and
Taiwan. In the interim, central power devolved to the provinces, where competing regional strongmen,
known as “warlords,” fought either to maintain their own autonomy or to expand their territory. This
continued the devolution of central power begun during the great mid-nineteenth-century rebellions,
when the Qing dynasty allowed provincial authorities to create semiautonomous local armies that later
became the nuclei of the warlord armies. Initially, General Yuan Shikai attempted to impose another
dynasty in Beijing. His death in 1916 marked the beginning of the warlord period, and was characterized
by worsening relations with Japan and an increasingly virulent nationalist movement among China’s in-
tellectuals and students. Sun Yat-sen tried to consolidate his political base in South China through a suc-
cession of governments in Guangzhou, while a North China power struggle erupted after Yuan’s death.

The Republic under Yuan Shikai

The Republic, a nominally democratic form of government, had been born of a military uprising. At
its head was a former Qing general, Yuan Shikai, who quickly assumed dictatorial powers more in the
manner of traditional Chinese autocrats than in keeping with the westernized exterior of the new gov-
ernment. In light of the Manchu fall, Yuan Shikai quickly disbanded the New Army and transferred
military power to generals personally loyal to him. Thereafter, he established his capital in Beijing and
spent his first years as president trying to consolidate control both over China’s now autonomous prov-
inces and its far-flung dependencies and tributaries. Yuan’s success was limited, especially with regard to
the independence movement in South China and the imperial ambitions of his two closest neighbors,
tsarist Russia and Japan, which vied for influence over the periphery of the former Qing empire.
281
282    chapter 15

On February 15, 1912, the Nanjing Assembly unanimously elected Yuan Shikai as provisional
president; Li Yuanhong became provisional vice president five days later. Sun Yat-sen stepped down
on the condition that Yuan rule from Nanjing. Yuan’s power base, however, was in North China.
Units of the Beiyang Army rioted in various northern cities, apparently to lend credence to Yuan’s
claim that the restoration of order required his presence in the North. The Nanjing government
agreed that Yuan could rule from Beijing, where he was inaugurated as president of the Republic of
China on March 12, 1912. The Provisional Constitution precluded women’s suffrage, frustrating the
many women who had worked to establish the republic. As in previous periods of dynastic change,
the imperial bureaucracy remained in place, and Yuan simply took over the reins of power from his
Manchu predecessors. The enormous inertia of the imperial bureaucracy became a strong force of
continuity and a key impediment to radical change. Male suffrage expanded from about eight mil-
lion in the 1909 elections to forty million in the 1912–13 elections, or about 20 to 25 percent of
adult males.

Photo 15.1  In 1912, General Yuan Shikai became the president of the Republic of China,
after Sun Yat-sen, in return for convincing the Manchus to abdicate the throne. His presidency
helped set the stage for the warlord period that followed, in particular as he doled out
concessions to Russia and Japan in exchange for their support in his failed bid to become
China’s next emperor.
 The F ounding of the Republic of China     283

Yuan sought more than simple personal aggrandizement; more importantly, he hoped to restore
China to grandeur. He intended to emulate the Japanese model of economic development, which relied
on centralized political control to impose controversial reforms, including the westernization of legal
and financial institutions. As in Meiji Japan, Yuan hoped that the legal reforms would enable him to
negotiate the end to extraterritoriality, while the financial reforms would create the basis for economic
development. He also realized that economic development required an educated citizenry, hence
his attempt to implement compulsory primary education for boys. In addition, he tried to promote
economic development through improved agronomy, transportation, and credit availability. He took
action on social issues, cracking down on opium smoking and production, and promoting married
women’s rights. As in Japan, his program was controversial, but unlike the Meiji reformers, Yuan did
not remain in power for a generation to complete the reforms. He soon became preoccupied, like the
Empress Dowager before him, not with the creative exercise of power but with its retention.
As a former general, Yuan deftly asserted his control over the armed forces, recentralized power, and
governed China through his guanxi network of hand-picked military officers. Once in office, armed force
became the basis of his power. His decision to disband the New Army eliminated its role as a lightning rod
for antigovernment opposition and also the possibility of its transformation into a national army. Yuan’s
decision to replace the New Army with a force loyal to him personally, not to China generally, was an

Map 15.1   Second Revolution (1913)

284    chapter 15

Map 15.2  Third Revolution (1915–16)

important step toward warlord rule. In January 1913, Yuan went even further, placing all of the military
governors directly under his authority in order to subsume them and their guanxi networks under his own.
In the capital, he systematically undermined the power of the cabinet and then of the National Assembly,
where the precursor of the Nationalist Party became a major obstacle to his plans.
During summer 1913, the so-called Second Revolution broke out. (See map 15.1.) The elections
in 1913 delivered a landslide victory in both houses of the parliament to Sun’s party. In response, it
appears that supporters of Yuan Shikai had a key supporter of Sun Yat-sen, Song Jiaoren, assassinated.
Song had been educated in Japan and had played a key role in forming the coalition of parties that
united to become the precursor of the Nationalist Party on August 25, 1912. His plans for a Western
parliamentary system of government threatened Yuan’s hope to recentralize power under a dictatorial
executive. A succession of mysterious deaths of those connected with the assassination ensued. When
Yuan tried to finance his activities independently of the opposition-dominated parliament by seeking
foreign loans, the legislature objected. Yuan then surrounded the parliament with troops, cashiered pro-
opposition military governors, and on May 6, 1913, banned the party. Sun Yat-sen called for a Second
Revolution. Seven provinces responded by declaring independence, but Yuan’s troops defeated them
in battle, while his generals established themselves as warlords along the Yangzi River. This ended the
Second Revolution, but at the price of greatly exacerbated North-South tensions.
 The F ounding of the Republic of China     285

Table 15.1  The Three Revolutions, 1911–16

dates show declarations of independence by province
First Revolution Second Revolution Third Revolution
Fanned out from central South China revolution. Yuan South China Revolution.
China. Began with mutiny Shikai successfully deployed Opposition to Yuan Shikai’s
in Wuhan. Culminated in army to reverse opposition attempt to become emperor.
dynastic overthrow. legislative victory. Increased Army divided into factions.
power of army. Warlord period began with
death of Yuan on June 6.
October 10, 1911, Hubei July 15, 1913, Jiangsu December 25, 1915, Yunnan
October 22, 1911, Hunan July 17, 1913, Anhui December 27, 1915, Guizhou
October 22, 1911, Shaanxi July 18, 1913, Guangdong March 15, 1916, Guangxi
October 29, 1911, Shanxi July 18, 1913, Jiangxi April 6, 1916, Guangdong
October 31, 1911, Jiangxi July 19, 1913, Fujian April 12, 1916, Zhejiang
October 31, 1911, Yunnan July 25, 1913, Hunan May 15, 1916, Shaanxi
November 4, 1911, Jiangsu August 4, 1913, Sichuan May 22, 1916, Sichuan
November 4, 1911, Guizhou May 27, 1916, Hunan
November 5, 1911, Zhejiang
November 7, 1911, Guangxi
November 8, 1911, Anhui
November 9, 1911, Guangdong
November 11, 1911, Fujian
November 12, 1911, Fengtian
November 13, 1911, Shandong
November 16, 1911, Jilin
November 17, 1911, Heilongjiang
November 27, 1911, Sichuan
December 1, 1911, Mongolia
January 6, 1912, Gansu
January 7, 1912, Xinjiang
Provinces not declaring Provinces not declaring Provinces not declaring
independence from Manchus: independence from Yuan independence from Yuan
Zhili, Henan. Shikai: Shandong, Hunan, Shikai: Zhili, Fengtian,
Shanxi, Shaanxi, Hubei, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Gansu,
Tibet declares independence Gansu, Xinjiang, Guizhou, Xinjiang, Shandong, Jiangsu,
from China in 1912. Jilin, Fengtian, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei,
Yunnan, Guangxi, Zhejiang. Jiangxi, Fujian.
Mongolia remained quasi-
independent.
Source: Limin Kuo, comp., Zhongguo jindaishi cankao ditu (Changsha: Hunan jiaoshu chubanshe, 1984), 41–42, 45;
S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 289.

The opposition-dominated parliament remained determined to block Yuan’s attempts to restore

dynastic institutions. On January 10, 1914, Yuan dispensed with the National Assembly and the pro-
vincial assemblies altogether. He replaced the former with a loyal political council, with the northern
warlord Duan Qirui serving as prime minister, and in May he extended his presidential term to ten
years. Regulations enacted in November 1913 and March 1914 banned women from politics. In 1915
Yuan attempted to dispense with the Republican government as well by proclaiming himself emperor.
His restoration of imperial rule differed from Japan’s Meiji restoration, in which the emperor was a
286    chapter 15

symbol of national authority legitimizing the work of powerful behind-the-scenes oligarch-bureaucrats.

Yuan intended to exercise power personally.
Although Yuan’s forces crushed the renegade provinces during the Second Revolution, beginning
in late 1915 opposition to his plan to become emperor erupted. Yunnan declared independence on
December 25 and Guizhou on December 27. The rest of the provinces waited to see what would hap-
pen. When Yuan’s supporters were unable to crush the rebels, Guangxi declared its independence on
March 15, 1916, followed by Guangdong on April 6, Zhejiang on April 12, Shaanxi on May 15, Sich-
uan on May 22, and Hunan on May 27. This became known as the Third Revolution. (See map 15.2.)
Yuan refused to resign. Then on June 6, 1916, in the midst of the crisis, he suddenly died at the age of
fifty-six of uremia, a severe impairment of the kidneys. (See table 15.1.)

Relations with Russia, Japan, and Britain

In the aftermath of the Second Revolution, Yuan Shikai could ill afford foreign opposition to his plans,
especially along China’s northern borders. He tried to avoid foreign policy crises in order to focus on
his domestic programs and to secure foreign loans to fund them. This strategy came at the price of de-
ferring treaty revision, a fervently desired goal of Chinese nationalists. Yuan bought Russian, Japanese,
and British support with a variety of agreements. Although his plans for dynastic restoration died with
him, the secret treaties he signed retained the force of international law long after his death. Treaties
with tsarist Russia and Japan greatly increased their spheres of influence. One set of treaties gave the
Russians extensive rights and privileges in Outer Mongolia, transforming the region into a Russian
protectorate. Another set increased Japan’s hold over Manchuria and, following the outbreak of World
War I, allowed Japan to usurp German control over concessions in Shandong province. To little effect,
the United States protested these actions as violations of the Open Door Policy.
In the wake of the 1911 Revolution, Beijing renamed the Foreign Office the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and promoted Western-educated officials. Under this new leadership, the ministry established a
commission to study China’s treaties as the first step to renegotiate them on the basis of juridical equal-
ity. The Chinese government was determined to eliminate the so-called unequal treaties that established
the concession system, guaranteed extraterritoriality and most-favored-nation treatment to foreigners,
and set the country’s tariffs. But Yuan Shikai ruled for just four years.
The dynastic chaos in China worked to Russia’s advantage; Russia may even have assisted the
New Army conspirators, who planned the Wuchang Uprising from the Russian concession. As soon as
the 1911 Revolution broke out, tsarist Russia tried to take advantage of the ensuing Mongolian inde-
pendence movement by negotiating two agreements in 1912 and 1913 to establish Outer Mongolian
autonomy from China. In 1914, Russia presented Beijing with a list of Twenty-one Demands that
would have made Outer Mongolia a de facto Russian protectorate. Yuan appeared willing to sign such
a pact in order to gain Russia’s backing for his own plan to become China’s new monarch.
The Japanese were aghast at this dramatic expansion of Russian influence, including the transfer
of hundreds of thousands of square miles of Chinese territory in Outer Mongolia to Russian control.
They had already fought two wars to contain Russian expansion in East Asia—the First Sino-Japanese
War (1894–95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5)—and believed that Japanese national security
rested on containing further Russian expansion. On January 18, 1915, mirroring Russia’s Twenty-one
Demands, Tokyo presented Beijing with its much more famous Twenty-one Demands.
In addition to countering Russia, the Japanese government hoped to take advantage of the Western
preoccupation with World War I to solidify its own position in China south of the Great Wall. The Japa-
nese wanted (1) to assume control over the German concessions in Shandong province, which they had just
taken from Germany by force; (2) to acquire mining and commercial privileges along the Yangzi River; (3)
to expand their sphere of influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia as a counterweight to Russia; and (4)
to prevent China from leasing additional coastal areas to other foreign powers. In a very controversial fifth
set of demands, the Japanese sought a wide range of political rights, including the appointment of Japanese
 The F ounding of the Republic of China     287

advisers throughout the Chinese government and police administration, Japanese domination of arms sales
to China, and Japanese development of Fujian province across the strait from their colony of Taiwan.
On March 13, 1915, when the United States protested this attempt to dominate China politi-
cally, militarily, and economically, Japan modified its fifth set of demands. It no longer required China
to accept Japanese police or an exclusive Japanese zone in Fujian province. On April 28, 1915, in the
midst of the uproar, Japan publicly offered to restore the Shandong concession to China.
The Japanese were simultaneously negotiating with Sun Yat-sen’s opposition government, but no known
agreement was reached. Sun accused Yuan of secretly agreeing in advance to accept Russian and Japanese
terms in return for their support for Yuan’s ambitions to become China’s new emperor. According to Sun:
“In fact, the Twenty-one Demands were presented by Japan at his [Yuan’s] own instigation; Japan did not, at
the beginning, press him to accept these Demands.”2 According to this view, Japan delivered its conditions in
the form of demands, instead of a formal treaty, in order to provide Yuan with a face-saving way to accept the
terms, whereas in reality, Yuan agreed to all of them in advance to further his own political agenda.
The treaty encapsulating the Twenty-one Demands became an international issue when the Paris Peace
Conference terminating World War I deliberated on the Shandong question. As Liang Qichao, the late
Qing revolutionary, later concluded, if China had openly resisted Japan in 1915, its claim at the Paris Peace
Conference that Shandong should be returned directly to China would have been very strong. Instead, Yuan
Shikai made the political calculation that he needed to focus on consolidating his own power domestically
before he could take on Japan or Russia. From Japan’s point of view, the new treaty would counterbalance
tsarist Russian efforts to expand into Outer Mongolia. Taking Shandong from Germany also avenged Japan
for German involvement in the Triple Intervention of 1895 that deprived Japan of the Liaodong Peninsula.
Yuan Shikai had no better luck dealing with Britain over Tibet. When news of the 1911 Revolu-
tion reached Tibet in 1912, the local population immediately expelled Chinese officials and troops
from Lhasa for the first time since the eighteenth century. (See the “Tibetan Minority” feature.) The
Tibetans then sought British aid to protect their new-found independence. Although the British suc-
cessfully pressured the Chinese into joining tripartite negotiations with Britain and Tibet, they were
unable to secure Chinese ratification of the resulting Simla Convention of 1914. It became an Anglo-
Tibetan agreement instead, dividing Tibet into Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet. The Dalai Lama would
rule Outer Tibet with de facto autonomy but under nominal Chinese suzerainty. Inner Tibet, also
known as Kham, encompassed the ethnic Tibetan regions of eastern Qinghai and Western Sichuan.
It was given a more vague status, but with the Dalai Lama preeminent in religious affairs. While the
British would not back the official independence that the Tibetans desired, they provided the Tibetans
with sufficient military aid to keep the Chinese out and gain favorable terms of trade for themselves.
Tibet did not return to Chinese rule until the People’s Liberation Army occupied it beginning in 1950.

Tibetan Minority
The Tibetans inhabit virtually inaccessible plateaus surrounded by mountains high above sea level. Only the main
valley, the location of the capital, Lhasa, is suitable for cultivation; the other mountain valleys can support only
grazing. The growing season is short and the rainfall scant, making for a harsh existence. Most Tibetans practice
the Lama variant of Mahayana Buddhism that incorporates elements of ancient Tibetan shamanism and magic.
Buddhism probably came to Tibet in the seventh century. At that time, the Tibetan empire expanded
into Nepal and Yunnan. Thereafter, it expanded northward to dominate the lucrative Silk Route trade as
far north as Kashgar and as far east as Xi’an, the modern name for the Tang dynasty (618–907) capital,
which the Tibetans sacked. Tibetan expansion ended with the assassination of their king in 842, while
Tang dynasty emperors tried to buy peace on the frontier by marrying off Han princesses to the kings of
Tibet. The Chinese have since claimed that these marriages document Tibet’s tributary status. At the end
of the twelfth century, many Indian Buddhists fled to Tibet to escape invading Muslim armies. When
the Mongols established the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) in China, they also extended their influence over
Tibet, where Mongol domination continued until the Qing conquest of Tibet in the eighteenth century.
288    chapter 15

The Mongols recognized the authority of Tibet’s monks over both spiritual and temporal matters, giving
enormous authority to the clergy.
During the early Qing dynasty, the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617–82) and the Seventh Dalai Lama
(1708–57) reached an accommodation with the Qing. They ruled through a monastic bureaucracy that
kept peace at home, power concentrated in key monastic institutions and a limited number of lay aristo-
cratic clans, and Tibet demilitarized so that the Qing felt little need to interfere. The British invasion in
1903–4 that sent the Dalai Lama fleeing to Mongolia, however, awakened Chinese fears of border security.
The Anglo-Russian rivalry for dominance of Central Asia had fueled British fears concerning the defense
of India and resulted in a military expedition to Tibet. In response, the Chinese allowed the Dalai Lama
to return home but rapidly reinvigorated their administration of Tibet and efforts at Sinification. When
the Tibetans resisted, the Qing deployed their army, occupying Tibet in 1910 and sending the Dalai Lama
back into exile, this time to India. Upon the fall of the Qing dynasty, the Dalai Lama raised an army and
took control of Tibet in 1913. Tibet remained autonomous until 1950.
In the interim the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (1876–1933) tried to establish a centralized nation-state,
causing the Panchen Lama, the second most important incarnate lama after the Dalai Lama, to flee to
China in 1924. Han nationalists accepted the Qing definition of China and wanted Tibet back. Prior to
Nationalist reunification of China in 1927, governments in Beijing emphasized the “Harmonious Union
of the Five Races,” meaning the Han, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Muslims, and
sometimes referred to the post-Qing government as the Republic of the Five Races. The Tibetans, like
the Muslims and Mongols, understood this union to mean Han domination in practice. Thereafter, the
Nationalists emphasized Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles, but given the numerous concerns of the
new Nationalist government, there was little impact on Tibet. On the contrary, in the 1920s and 1930s,
Tibetan Buddhism greatly influenced many Chinese, who found solace in the religion at a time when
China devolved into chaos. The Nationalist government sought to cultivate ties with Tibet, sponsored a
variety of joint educational institutions, and gave legal protection to Buddhist land holdings.

Photo 15.2   Tibet’s approximately two million ethnic Tibetans occupy one of the most inaccessible
regions in the world. Despite persistent attempts by China to dominate Tibet, the Tibetan people
have so far resisted assimilation. The spiritual leader of the Tibetans is the Dalai Lama, now living in
exile. This picture is of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who died in 1933. His successor was identified
in 1935, and officially became the Fourteenth Dalai Lama on February 22, 1940.
 The F ounding of the Republic of China     289

In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army invaded Tibet but initially tolerated Buddhist institutions. When
China included Tibet in its land reform program that overturned the aristocratic-monastic social order, the
Tibetans unsuccessfully revolted and the Fourteenth Dalai Lama (1935–) fled to India, where he has remained
ever since. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), China tried to eradicate Tibetan culture as part of its
campaign to eliminate the Four Olds: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. China shut down
virtually all monasteries in this period and imprisoned many monks; numerous Tibetans perished. The Tibet-
ans revolted again in the 1980s, which resulted in another wave of prison sentences and executions.
The flowering of Tibetan written culture occurred from the tenth through sixteenth centuries with
the publication of numerous religious works. Judging from Tibet’s architectural heritage, it reached the
height of its prosperity during the early and middle period of Mongol domination from the thirteenth
through sixteenth centuries. Numerous Buddhist temples and pagodas date to this period, but almost all
were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.
Traditionally, the Tibetans raised yaks, a beast resistant to the cold. They relied on yak milk and
meat for food, the hair for textiles, and the live animal for transportation. Most of the population were
serfs and lived in dire poverty. Up to one-third of the male population became monks, which meant that
their maintenance depended in part on the alms of others. Foreigners who visited Lhasa in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries were appalled by its filth. Human and animal excrement, garbage, and even
dead animals littered the city streets. Few educational opportunities were available, so the vast majority of
the population remained illiterate. Today one-fifth of Tibetans remain in poverty. In 1990, 45 percent of
men over age fifteen remained illiterate, as did 80 percent of women of childbearing age. The Chinese have
argued that their involvement in Tibet has been an attempt to drag the Tibetans into the modern world
and to improve their standard of living. Administratively, the Chinese have divided the areas of Tibetan
population into Tibet (formerly Outer Tibet), and Qinghai and Western Sichuan (formerly Inner Tibet).
People’s Liberation Army troops continue to garrison the region. A railway trunk line was completed in
2006 and will greatly facilitate Han migration to Tibet. The latest round of unrest began on March 14,
2008, to coincide with the forty-ninth anniversary of the 1959 uprising against Chinese rule.

The Founding of the Nationalist Party

All too quickly, the political compromise unraveled between the civil forces from South China affiliated
with Sun Yat-sen and the military forces from North China under Yuan Shikai. Following the relocation
of China’s capital to Beijing, Sun and Yuan began to disagree on how the Republic of China should
be governed. Sun then unsuccessfully attempted to create an alternate government in the South. He
returned to Guangzhou, the capital of his native province of Guangdong, where the acting governor,
Chen Jiongming, controlled the local troops. Yuan hoped to use Chen against Sun, but instead the two
joined forces against Yuan in 1913. As part of the merger of anti-Yuan forces, women’s suffrage was
dropped from the program. During the Second Revolution in 1913, when forces loyal to Yuan defeated
the southern provinces, Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan, where he remained until the cascade of revolts in the
last year of Yuan’s rule.
While in Tokyo, Sun reorganized his party, the Tongmenghui, which had been active in the
overthrow of the Manchus. On July 8, 1914, he renamed it the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhong-
guo Gemingdang). Its members vowed personal allegiance to Sun. They made him generalissimo of
the Chinese Revolutionary Army, with powers much like those of the other Chinese warlords, except
that his movement produced an ideology and a political party that ultimately transcended provincial
boundaries to become a truly national movement.
Sun Yat-sen’s political philosophy, known as the Three People’s Principles, emphasized the three
principles of nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood. These ideas became central to his
political platform to reunify China. His earliest writings reveal the strong influence of his westernized
education in Hong Kong and Hawaii, particularly concerning nationalism and democracy. In 1906
he defined nationalism as preventing foreign nations from violating Chinese sovereignty and interfer-
290    chapter 15

ing in its domestic affairs. This definition fit with the U.S. Open Door Policy. In December 1911 he
urged the Chinese to foster nationalism in order to honor China and showcase the distinctive traits of
the Chinese people.
In 1918, Sun presented a detailed definition of nationalism in his Memoirs of a Chinese Revolution-
ary, calling for a united Chinese Republic in order to combine China’s various nationalities into a pow-
erful nation. In 1919, he integrated President Woodrow Wilson’s views on national self-determination
into his Three People’s Principles, calling on the Han

to merge in all sincerity with the Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans in one
melting pot to create a new order of Chinese nationalism, just as America has produced
the world’s leading nationalism by melding scores of different people, black and white.3

Sun continued to support Wilsonian nationalism in a later book, China’s Revolution, published in early
1923, defining nationalism as “unity and equality of races within China, and China’s rights among the
nations of the world.”4 Both before and after World War I, his nationalistic goals included protecting
Chinese sovereignty from foreign interference, guaranteeing the rights of China’s ethnic minorities, and
gradually melding these different groups into one nationality.
In late 1917, in opposition to the attempt by the northern warlord Duan Qirui to assert control
over the government in Beijing, Chen Jiongming and Sun’s party again combined forces. On August 31,
1917, Sun set up his first of three rival governments in Guangzhou. (See table 15.2.) Sun called his
government the Constitution Protection Movement and his military force the Constitution Protection
Army, but he lacked direct control over his armed forces. These remained under the command of Chen
Jiongming. Together they formed an alternate government to Beijing. Although Premier Duan Qirui
in Beijing sent troops to destroy the Guangzhou government, infighting among the northern warlords
prevented their success. This failure contributed to Duan’s resignation on November 22, 1918.
As Chen Jiongming tried to create a consolidated military base in Guangdong and Fujian prov-
inces, Sun Yat-sen soon ran into warlord troubles of his own. In May 1918, when the local power
brokers in Guangzhou deprived Sun of authority within the new government, he left for Shanghai,
where he reorganized his political party yet again. On October 10, 1919, on the eighth anniversary of
the Wuchang Uprising, he renamed the party the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo Guomindang,
Kuomintang or KMT). For simplicity, from 1914 on, it will be referred to as the Nationalist Party and
its members as Nationalists. This is the same party that long ruled Taiwan and remains a major politi-
cal force there. By 1920, Chen defeated the rival warlord in Guangxi and Sun had plans to return to
Guangzhou to set up a new government; from Guangzhou, he hoped to launch a military expedition
northward to unite China. Sun returned to Guangzhou to his second opposition government, with
himself as president, on April 2, 1921.

Table 15.2   Guangzhou Governments of Sun Yat-sen

Government Term of Rule Reason for Creation Reason for Dissolution
First government August 1917– Rump parliament, Loss of military
May 1918 dissolved in Beijing, support
convenes in Guangzhou
Second government April 1921– Military infighting Chen Jiongming
June 1922 allows rump parliament in allied with Zhili
Guangzhou to reinstate Sun Clique to force Sun’s
resignation
Third government February 1923– Yunnan and Guangxi Death of Sun Yat-sen
March 1925 warlords, and defectors
from Chen’s army oust
Chen to restore Sun to
power
 The F ounding of the Republic of China     291

During most of these years, Sun’s Guangzhou governments did not have a specific domestic or
foreign policy program or even a clear plan on how to reunite China. Sun also lacked a well-organized
army to defeat the northern warlords. This required funds, military advisers, and modern armaments.
Although Sun tried to obtain foreign support, the major powers all recognized the Beijing government.
Unifying China under the Nationalist Party became possible only after Sun allied with Moscow in
January 1923 and received military aid from the Soviet-funded Communist International (Comintern).

North China Warlord Intrigues

The factional infighting of the Republican period was extraordinarily complex. (See table 15.3 and
map 15.3.) The rivalries were multilateral and both civil and military. In the World War I period, China
north of the Yangzi River was split among three primary factions: the Anhui Clique, the Zhili Clique,
and the Fengtian or Manchurian Clique. All were named after the provinces of origin of their leaders. In
addition, there was the residual vice president of Yuan Shikai’s government, Li Yuanhong. The complexity
of these factions reflected the underlying structure of power, which was personal, not institutional. It fol-
lowed the traditional lines of guanxi. With the Qing’s fall and the collapse of central institutions, the main
ties holding China together were guanxi. With the exception of the Manchurian Clique, the primary Chi-
nese factions were offshoots of Yuan Shikai’s guanxi network, the so-called Beiyang Clique, which, in turn,
was an offshoot of Li Hongzhang’s Self-strengthening guanxi network. “Beiyang” referred to Yuan Shikai’s
Beiyang Army, which had formed the nucleus of his power but had been decapitated with his death.

Table 15.3   Beijing Government, 1916–20

Period President Premier Legislature Key Issue
1916 Li Yuanhong Duan Qirui Nationalist Rivalry among president,
(leader of 1911 Party premier, and legislature for
Revolution in control of Beijing government
Wuhan) following death of Yuan Shikai.
July 1917 Failed Qing Beijing government
restoration disintegrated over whether
to enter World War I and to
accept Japanese loans.
Attempt to restore dynasty
during the power vacuum
collapsed when Duan and
Feng cooperated to restore
the Beijing government.
August 1917 Feng Guozhang Duan Qirui Duan Sun Yat-sen formed the First
(Zhili Clique) (Anhui supporters Guangzhou government,
Clique) creating a rival government in
South China.
Former members of Yuan
Shikai’s guanxi network split
into rival cliques over how to
respond.
Anhui Clique supported
military Reunification. Zhili
Clique Supported political
unification.
1917–20 Figurehead Figurehead Duan in control from behind
the scenes.
292    chapter 15

Map 15.3   Warlord Governments (1917–18)

Decapitation of a guanxi network meant a power struggle among its competing components and
rival networks to reconstitute a personal power base under a successor. The lack of institutional mecha-
nisms for succession in China has made the political process opaque to Chinese and foreigners alike.
Guanxi networks are inherently secretive, since power revealed is power diminished. Conceptually, one
can think of a guanxi network as a prolific family tree, with all branches and generations alive simulta-
neously. The original ancestor sits at the head of the network of connections. He can call upon the next
generation, or branches of the tree, who in turn call upon their subsidiary branches, and so on, even
though he does not necessarily know the extent and strength of the guanxi networks of his subordinates;
nor do the subordinates know the full extent or strength of the networks of their superiors.
Upon Yuan Shikai’s death, Vice President Li Yuanhong succeeded to the presidency on June 7,
1916, naming Duan Qirui, Yuan’s aide and powerful Beijing warlord, as his premier. There was an
initial dispute over which constitution should prevail—the original 1912 constitution or Yuan’s 1914
document providing much stronger presidential powers. President Li agreed to return to the 1912 con-
stitution and restore the original National Assembly in exchange for promises by the southern provinces
to rejoin the Republic. This compromise kept China nominally unified during late 1916 and early
1917. Although the Republican government had official authority, warlords and their armies actually
monopolized the real power.
Li Yuanhong and Duan Qirui both lacked the prestige of Yuan Shikai and proved unable to reglue
the Republic. China fell into a ten-year period of civil war and chaos as Yuan’s generals competed
to reconstitute his guanxi network under their personal control. China quickly divided into regional
 The F ounding of the Republic of China     293

governments under local warlords. The country also divided on North-South lines: In the North, a
succession of warlord governments took control of Beijing; in the South, Sun Yat-sen founded his own
republican government in Guangzhou, heavily dependent on the warlord Chen Jiongming.
Duan Qirui, who became the leader of the Anhui Clique, served as Yuan’s minister of war, as his
personal envoy to convince Li Yuanhong to serve as vice president, and as the prime minister. By 1914,
he became the most powerful supporter of Yuan Shikai, but his control over the promotions in the Bei-
yang Army meant that many of the younger officers were more loyal to him than to Yuan. When Yuan
tried to reassert his control over the military, Duan responded by opposing Yuan’s plans to become
monarch. The ensuing power struggle lasted until Yuan’s sudden death. Although Vice President Li
Yuanhong assumed the presidency, Duan retained control over the Beiyang Army and sought to fund
his army through his connections with Japan.
In the fall of 1916, another associate of Yuan Shikai, Cao Rulin, who had studied law at Waseda
and Chūō Universities in Tokyo and had diplomatic connections through his service in the Qing For-
eign Ministry, presented Duan with a plan to reunify China by manipulating the foreign powers. Cao
pledged his diplomatic connections to negotiate Japanese loans to underwrite Duan’s army. To placate
Britain, France, and the United States, Duan justified this military modernization by acceding to the
Entente’s demands to enter World War I against Germany. Duan then turned to Japan for massive war
loans. The newly modernized armies, however, would be used to reunify China, not to fight in Europe.
The Japanese, in turn, wanted to maximize their sphere of influence in China while the European pow-
ers were preoccupied with the war in Europe. In return for the Nishihara loans negotiated from 1917 to
1918, Japan received valuable mining, banking, railway, armaments, and other contracts. No accurate
records of the loans were ever made public because the Japan connection was extremely controversial.
Premier Duan Qirui’s plan to dominate China backfired. When he declared war on Germany and
Austro-Hungary without parliamentary approval, the legislature demanded his resignation. President
Li Yuanhong agreed to resign, but a number of mainly northern pro-Duan provinces declared their
independence from the Republic and threatened to attack Beijing. During the infighting, there was a
brief attempt from July 1 to 12, 1917, to revive the Qing dynasty by restoring to the throne the former
Xuantong emperor (Henry Puyi). Duan put an end to this attempt by sending his army to Beijing. Li
Yuanhong was compelled to resign, but was replaced by Duan’s Beiyang Clique rival, Feng Guozhang.
When Duan convened a new National Assembly packed with loyal supporters, the political parties of
South China formed a separate government in Guangzhou under Sun Yat-sen. This was Sun’s First
Guangzhou government.
The Beiyang Army then split into the Anhui and Zhili Cliques. Duan wanted to launch a military
expedition to suppress the Guangzhou government and his supporters became known as the Anhui
Clique, named after his native province. His rivals became known as the Zhili Clique, named for the
native province of its leader, another protégé of Yuan Shikai, Feng Guozhang, who favored a diplomatic
solution to China’s North-South division that did not require Japanese financing. Duan’s inability to
restore central control over Hunan and Sichuan provinces led to his forced resignation in the fall of
1917. But the Zhili Clique did not remain in power for long. Pressure from Duan forced the govern-
ment to resume its military campaign to pacify Hubei and Hunan. On March 19, 1918, the majority
of the Beiyang Army generals and eighteen military governors demanded that Duan be restored as
premier, which occurred on March 23, 1918. Support from the Manchurian warlord and leader of the
Fengtian Clique, Zhang Zuolin, also known for his Japanese connections, helped tip the balance of
power in Duan’s favor.
Thereafter, Duan ruled through a combination of military and civil authority. His Japanese-funded
modernized military force, known as the Northwestern Frontier Army, was intended to reunify China,
while his Anfu Club, named for Anfu Street, the location of its headquarters, marshaled supporters to
dominate the parliament elected in 1918, the so-called Anfu Parliament that replaced the original 1912
parliament. Anfu Club discipline did not endure for long but succumbed to factionalism. Duan’s insis-
tence on a military rather than a negotiated reunification of China angered many, while his financial con-
nections with Japan alienated Chinese nationalists. In the fall of 1918, Feng Guozhang resigned from the
294    chapter 15

presidency and Duan Qirui from the premiership, but Duan continued to dominate the government from
behind the scenes for the next two years. His popularity plummeted, however, as a result of his dealings
with Japan, intrigues at home, and negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference terminating World War I.

The Republic of China Enters the First World War

The outbreak of World War I in Europe had immediate ramifications in East Asia. Japan carried out
its obligations to Great Britain under the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 by declaring war on Ger-
many and Austria. By the end of 1914, Japanese forces had taken control of Germany’s concession in
Shandong province. Soon Tokyo consolidated its position by signing the Twenty-one Demands with
Beijing. On March 14, 1917, almost three years after the outbreak of World War I, China finally sev-
ered diplomatic relations with Germany and Austria. Five months later, China formally declared war
on August 14, 1917.
Many Chinese intellectuals and reformers, such as Liang Qichao, had long advocated that China
join the Entente as a first step toward obtaining juridical equality. Chen Duxiu (Ch’en Tu-hsiu), the
future leader of the Chinese Communist Party, supported the war effort in the hope that it would
enhance China’s world standing. Early participation in the war would have positioned China favorably
at the anticipated peace negotiations to demand the restoration of the German and Austrian conces-
sions.
China immediately received financial benefits for declaring war: Beijing discontinued paying Ger-
many’s and Austria’s combined one-fifth share of the Boxer indemnity mandated by the 1901 Boxer
Protocol. Thereafter, the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and,
later, Russia all agreed to allow China to defer for five years all or part of their shares of the Boxer pay-
ments. These savings greatly increased the budget of the Beijing government, which was constantly in
debt. Yet, the Chinese contribution to the war was minimal. China sent no troops to Europe. Approxi-
mately one hundred thousand Chinese laborers did travel to Europe to work for the Entente powers,
but most of them had contracted to go before China declared war.
Japanese diplomats quickly foresaw the implications of China’s declaration of war vis-à-vis Ger-
many’s concession in Shandong. To ensure that Japan did not lose its gains from the Twenty-one
Demands, as had happened after the First Sino-Japanese War, Tokyo signed a series of secret agree-
ments with most of the other Entente powers supporting the Twenty-one Demands and Japan’s claims
to Shandong. On February 21, 1917, Japan signed a secret agreement with Great Britain in which
London promised to support Tokyo’s claim to the Shandong concession in return for Japan’s support
for British claims to all of Germany’s South Pacific islands. On March 5, 1917, Russia agreed to rec-
ognize the Twenty-one Demands in return for Japan’s recognition of Russia’s preeminent position in
Outer Mongolia. On March 6, 1917, Japan secretly agreed with France to work to persuade China to
break off diplomatic relations with Germany and impound German ships. On March 28, 1917, Japan
and Italy signed a similar secret agreement. Finally, on November 2, 1917, the United States and Japan
exchanged what became known as the Lansing-Ishii Notes; Tokyo interpreted these notes to mean that
the United States supported Japan’s legitimate economic interests in China, while Washington empha-
sized Tokyo’s promise to uphold the Open Door Policy. The United States was the only major power
not to recognize Japan’s Twenty-one Demands. Nevertheless, all of this diplomacy supported the
Japanese claim over the Shandong concessions by treaties either tacitly recognizing Japan’s economic
interests in China or explicitly recognizing the Twenty-one Demands.
In September 1918, just three months prior to the formal beginning of the Paris Peace Confer-
ence, the Beijing government signed two additional secret agreements with Japan, recognizing the
validity of those sections of the Twenty-one Demands pertaining to Shandong and to Japanese-funded
railway construction. On September 24, 1918, Tokyo and Beijing exchanged confidential notes on
the administration of Shandong and the construction of two new Japanese-financed railway lines. On
September 28, 1918, they signed another secret agreement setting the railway loan and providing an
 The F ounding of the Republic of China     295

immediate $9 million advance. Chinese acceptance of the money meant that under international law
Beijing recognized the continued validity of the Twenty-one Demands as embodied in its May 25,
1915, treaty with Tokyo. This undermined the Chinese argument that Japan had forced the 1915
agreement on China as well as China’s case for direct restitution of the Shandong concession from
Germany, which was Beijing’s original goal in declaring war on Germany and Austria.
Like Yuan Shikai, who signed agreements that endured long after his death, the northern warlord
Duan Qirui, who was repeatedly in and out of power during the 1917–18 period, cut a deal with Japan
that gave him immediate cash at the expense of his country’s long-term interests. Once these deals were
signed, they became international law. While preoccupied with these secret dealings with Japan, the
Beijing government missed a historic opportunity to take advantage of the Russian Revolution in 1917
to restore Chinese sovereignty over Russia’s vast concessions in Manchuria. This, however, would not
have benefited Duan directly, but rather his rival, the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, so nothing
came of it. In the warlord period, China was fractured by rival warlord guanxi networks whose primary
interests were regional, not national.
The Sino-Japanese agreements were kept secret not only from the Chinese people, but also from
China’s own diplomatic representatives at the Paris Peace Conference. China’s lead representative, V. K.
Wellington Koo, apparently was not informed of their terms until January 1919. Although Washington
had not recognized the Twenty-one Demands, it did recognize the rule of international law. China’s own
diplomacy left the American diplomats little room for maneuver. Not only had Japan signed agreements
with all of the major Allied powers backing its claim to the Shandong concession, but it had concluded
treaties with China during 1915 and 1918 that did likewise. Although the Chinese delegates tried to
argue that Japan had compelled China to sign the Sino-Japanese agreements disposing of the Shandong
concessions, Beijing’s acceptance of a cash advance from Japan in 1918 undermined this argument. As
the reformer Liang Qichao pointed out after the conclusion the Paris Peace Conference, the 1918 agree-
ments rendered “China’s trump card . . . at once ineffective.”5 When pieces of the convoluted diplomacy
became public, the visceral popular outrage greatly amplified its importance.

Conclusions
The collapse of the Qing dynasty put institutional change at center stage on the political agenda. Deter-
mining the future course of Chinese politics was an inherently contentious but inescapable issue. In the
absence of legitimate political institutions, these momentous decisions were ultimately resolved through
political assassinations and on the battlefield, where military leaders marshaled rival armies and cobbled
together rival governments on the basis of guanxi. For several decades, warlords buttressed by their
own personal followings vied to control China. When warlords died, their followers dispersed, only
to coalesce in some new combination around another. Therefore, few warlords left any institutional
legacy. Their exclusive focus on the military elements of power meant little progress enhancing effec-
tive government administration. Only the Nationalists and, later, the Communists made significant
progress on institution building.
Following the creation of a Republican government, President Yuan Shikai tried to install himself
as China’s new emperor. But the attempt found no public support. Yuan Shikai’s sudden death in 1916
meant the decapitation of his vast guanxi network. His followers vied to take power for themselves.
The Anhui Clique under Duan Qirui, the Zhili Clique under Feng Guozhang, the Manchurian Clique
under Zhang Zuolin, and Li Yuanhong, Yuan’s successor, played an intricate game of political chess
to control North China. All but Zhang Zuolin were rival offshoots of Yuan Shikai’s guanxi network.
While these were the main North China warlords, in the period from 1912 to 1928 there were more
than 1,300 Chinese in control of a personal army and a territorial base, meeting the minimum quali-
fications for a warlord.
Divisions between North and South China had become increasingly apparent ever since the Tai-
ping Rebellion. The Taipings, the 1911 Revolution, and Sun Yat-sen’s Guangzhou governments were
296    chapter 15

all South China attempts to overthrow North China rule. In the final years of Qing rule, North-South
divisions deepened when the South refused to rally behind the Manchus to expel the foreigners in the
Boxer Uprising. During the early Republic, intermittent civil war undermined stability in the North.
Competing factions shifted in and out of control over Beijing, which remained a symbol of central
control and governmental legitimacy. In South China, Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party led a separatist
movement that opposed Yuan Shikai’s dictatorial powers, particularly after he tried to install himself as
emperor. A succession of governments attempted to rule from Guangzhou. Most were under warlords
allied with Sun’s Nationalist Party.
The beginning of World War I in Europe seemed to offer China an unexpected opportunity to
regain lost rights and privileges from the foreign powers. Chinese efforts first focused on Germany and
Austria, the two central powers, which were quickly dispossessed of their concessions in China. The
Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and the ensuing Russian Civil War (1918–22) seemed to offer the Chi-
nese the chance to retake Russia’s concessions. But with the European powers and the United States
preoccupied with the war in Europe, Japan stepped in to fill the power vacuum in China. Japan offered
Yuan Shikai and Duan Qirui the funds they needed to stay in power in exchange for expanded Japanese
influence in China. However, once signed, these agreements obligated China under international law.

Notes
 1 Kuo Mojo, The Works of Kuo, vol. 1 trans. in Kai-yu Hsu, Twentieth Century Chinese Poetry (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 29.
 2 Sun Yat-sen, The Vital Problem of China (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 55.
  3  Cited in Julie Lee Wei, Ramon H. Myers, and Donald G. Gillin, Prescriptions for Saving China: Se-
lected Writings of Sun Yat-sen (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1994), 222–36.
  4  Cited in Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1968), 286–89.
  5  Cited in Bruce A. Elleman, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 27.

Bibliography
Chen, Jerome. Yuan Shih-k’ai. 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972.
Ch’i, Hsi-sheng. Warlord Politics in China, 1916–1928. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976.
Deane, Hugh. Good Deeds & Gunboats: Two Centuries of American-Chinese Encounters. San Francisco: China
Books & Periodicals, 1990.
Edwards, Louise. Gender, Politics, and Democracy: Women’s Suffrage in China. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2008.
Elleman, Bruce A. Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–
1927. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997.
———. Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002.
Ewing, Thomas. Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia 1911–
1921. Bloomington, IN: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1980.
Geyer, Dietrich. Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914. Translated
by Bruce Little. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.
Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet: The Demise of the Lamaist State. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1989.
———. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997.
Grunfeld, A. Tom. The Making of Modern Tibet. Rev. edition. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
 The F ounding of the Republic of China     297

McCord, Edward A. The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1993.
Nathan, Andrew J. Peking Politics, 1918–1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976.
Paine, S. C. M. Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
Power, Brian. The Puppet Emperor: The Life of Pu Yi, the Last Emperor of China. New York: Universe, 1986.
Price, Ernest Batson. The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia. 1933.
Reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1971.
Robertson, James Oliver. No Third Choice: Progressives in Republican Politics, 1916–1921. New York: Gar-
land, 1983.
Schiffrin, Harold. Sun Yat-sen: Reluctant Revolutionary. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980.
Sharman, Lyon. Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968.
Sheridan, James E. China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912–1949. New York:
Free Press, 1975.
Tang, Peter S. H. Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911–1930. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1959.
Tuttle, Gray. Tibetan Buddhists and the Making of Modern China. New York: Columbia University Press,
2005.
Wei, Julie Lee, Ramon H. Myers, and Donald G. Gillin. Prescriptions for Saving China: Selected Writings of
Sun Yat-sen. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1994.
Wilbur, C. Martin. Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
Young, Ernest P. The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977.
Yu, George, T. Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912–1924. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1966.
Chronology
1897 Germany occupies Jiaozhou Harbor
1898 Germany establishes concession at Qingdao on Jiaozhou Bay
1914–18 World War I
1914 Yuan Shikai declares Chinese neutrality in World War I
Japan declares war on Germany and Austria
Japan occupies the German concession in the Shandong Peninsula
1915 Japan presents Twenty-one Demands, becomes National Humiliation Day
Beginning of anti-Japanese movement
1917 Duan Qirui’s government declares war on Germany and Austria
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
1918 Wilson issues Fourteen Points
Duan Qirui’s government signs secret agreements with Japan
1919 Versailles Peace Conference
May Fourth Movement
1921 Establishment of the Chinese Communist Party
1921–22 Washington Conference
1922 Japan returns the Shandong concession to China