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/ 11
86 fs Naomi Zack
is ironic, because in the United States the discrepancy between the two types
of family identity was established to protect monoracial social families, in a
‘way that seemed biological. OF course, the apparent biological bass of family
racial identity persists. For instance, as of this writing, in Albany, New York,
during the spring of 2001, a local cell phone company offers a plan that
includes four phones for family members. The plan is advertised in a televi-
sion commercial that is presented as comical, because it depicts groups of
individuals with diferent racial appearances attempting to apply for the plan
2s families. Nevertheless the multiracial respondents to the 2000 census have
shown that not everyone believes that families need to be monoracial
6.
Race and Contemporary Anthropology
Disciplinary Connections
‘Most twentieth-century philosophers writing about race focused on social
identities and racism. This is understandable in that philosophy is afield in
the humanities. Anthropologists, by contrast, have steadily focused an the
biological aspects of race, revising over the twentieth century what their
predecessors constructed during the nineteenth. Although the founders of
the modern sciences, including anthropology, started out as philosophers,
philosophy of science isa relatively new specialization in the field of pailos-
phy, and its model has largely been the science of physics. Thus, philoso-
phy of biology is new, as are philosophies of the social sciences. I am not
aware that philosophy of anthropology is a recognized specialization in
philosophy of science, but I believe that there is a very important area of
inquiry in which philosophical analysis of biological ideas of race intersects
with theoretical analysis of biological race in anthropology.
As the underlying biological information relative to race has become avail-
able, anthropologists have not hesitated to discard earlier essen-ialist
taxonomies of human variety. Indeed, anthropologists now substantially
agree that there is no biological foundation for the historical notions of
‘human racial divisions. However, T think that there isa distinctively philo-
sophical contribution that can be made to the anthropological consensus,
and T will try to establish that in this chapter.
Let me begin with « summary of the previous chapters, here. In chapter
1. T showed how Fume and Kantassumed withoutempirical justification that
Implicitly or explicitly, they were both commited to racial essences. These
racial essences were for a long time belicved to cause differences in psychol-
ogy, talents, and culture. The existence of biological racial essences and the
links between those essences and other aspects of human life were two
distinct versions of racial essentialism. In chapter 2, Lexplored the:historyof
the belief that world geographical differences are an empirical basis for race:
Given studies in contemporary population genetics, I concluded that
‘geographical location has no causal bearing on social racial taxonomy, for
‘two reasons: the environmental adaptations associated with geograpiay are
continuous, while racial divisions are discrete; the evidence for geographical 88 Naomi Zack
‘ancestral origin in populations, namely persistent mutations in mitochon-
drial DNA, is unrelated to social physical racial characteristics. Chapter 3
addressed the possibility of.
‘Skin shade varies continu-
‘ously, without any qualitative differences that correspond to social racial
differences, and membership in blood-type groups varies independently of
‘other recognized racial traits. Chapter 4 was/abrief exeuision into transmis-
‘No social racial group has a distinctive set
of so-called racial traits, which is shared by each one of its members. Neither
does 2 population basis for racial taxonomy work. A substitution of popula~
tions with distinc: proportions of inherited phenorypes, for races can not take
place without presupposing the social identification of races, which sitselfin
need of aa independent scientific justification. In chapter 5, iebecameevident
only f such taxonomies, which, again, are themselves in need of justification,
. Essences, geography,
phenotypes, genotypes, and genealogy are the only known candidates for
physical scientific bases of race. Fach fils. Therefore, there is no physical
scientific basis fer social racial taxonomy. Returning to my proviso in the
Introduction, if common sense racial taxonomy is assumed to be real because
ithasa basis in science, and it does not have a bass in science, then common
sense race is unreal. The latter isa philosophical, or logical, point.
Sail,
think that the presentation of the anthropological consensus about race would
bbe stronger if it were made clear what is meant by “race.” Therefore, inthis
chapter, I want to consider several theoretical aspects of the 199S/Amesica®
and the commentary on
an earlier draft of this statement, published in the Anthropology Newsletter
(AN) between September 1997 and September 1998. [hope to show how the
‘nonexistence of race, that i the falsity of biological racial essentialist, makes
itunnecessary to argue against links between racial biology and culture, that
is, cultural racial essentialism. Given that human variety is real but not racial
itshould also be possible to understand how limited forensic classification o
‘ypology may be pursued without racialist—much les racist—projections. As
well, agreement sbout the nonexistence of race has important implications
for public health policy and medical practice (and for speculations about
connections between rice and IQ, which I will address inthe next chapter).
Logical Implications of the Nonexistence of Race
‘The 1998 AAA Statement on “Race” is a work of anthropological theory
because it interprets past empirical research and, where accepted, would
Philosophy of Science and Race 8
influence future research, At the same time, the statement is meant to present
the facts about race “to the public” in a way that wll increase social justice.1
Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century scientists were insistent about
imposing a socially constructed hierarchical taxonomy of biological race on
the public, partly as a justification for slavery and segregation.? Middle and
late-twentieth-century anthropologists were generally less firm about
disabusing the public about false notions of biological race. THE998ANA.
‘Further-
‘more, discussion in AN prior to the final draft of the starement made itclear
that “the public” was meant to include politicians, teachers, and scholars in
other fields, who for one reason or another are extremely resistant to the
{dea that race as they imagine itis nonexistent Let us now consider the first
part of the text of the 1998 AAA Statement on “Race”:
In the US both scholars and the general public have been conditioned to
viewing human races 2s natural and separate divisions within the human
species based on visible physicel differences. With the vast expansion of
scientific knowledge in this century, however, it has become clear that
Jhuman populations are not unambiguous, clearly demarcated, biologi-
cally distinct groups. Evidence from the analysis of genetics (e.g., DNA)
indicates thet there is greater variation within racial groups than between
them. This means that most physical variation, about 94% lies withinso-
called racial groups. Conventional geographic racial groupings differ
from one another only in about 6% of their genes. In neighboring pou
lations there is much over-lapping of genes and their phenotypic (phys-
ical) expressions. Throughout history whenever different groups hive
‘come into contact, they have interbred. The continued sharing of genetic
‘materials has maintained all of humankind asa single species... Today
scholars in many fields argue that race as iis understood in the USA was
2 social mechanism invented during the 18th century to refer to those
Populations brought together in colonial America: the English and other
European setters, the conquered Indian people, and dhuse pouples of
Africa brought in to provide slave labar*
Ie should be noted as a factual clarification to the statement that since it
is 94 percent of the human genetic difference overall that falls within races,
and that overall difference is 0.2 percent, the 6 percent of genetic difference
resulting from perceived racial difference is 6 percent of 0.2 percent of all
human genetic material, which is 0.012 percent, of less than 1/8000.’ And,
as Jonathen Maris points out, the difference based on racial difference 2s
defined by social categories may be even less. The figures used forthe differ-
ence in the statement are based on differences in mitochondrial DNA, which
occar about five times more rapidly than nuclear genetic differences in the 2. Naomi Zack
histories of species. Marks therefore suggests that the amount of nuclear
genetic difference based on preselected social racial categories is probably
0.0024 percent or less than 1/40,000 of human genetic material.
Following the claim in the 1998 statement about the nonexistence of
biological race is en explanation of how hierarchical cheories of racial differ-
ence functioned historically to justify cultural domination by whites of
indigenous peopk, colonized people, Africans, and Jews. The statement
closes with the broad anthropological tenet that human cultural behavior is
earned and all normal human beings are able to lear any culture. Further-
‘more, studies of infant and childhood learning confirm the effect of culture
‘on human identites. Therefore, itis concluded:
that present-day inequalities between so-called racial groups are not
‘consequences of their biological inheritance but products of historical
and contemporry social, economic, educational, and political cireum-
stances.”
In 1952, Claude Lévi-Strauss wrote an essay that explained how cultural
ifferences among human beings were not the result of biological or rac
differences, bur of history and environment 8 During the 1950s and 1960s,
this position was developed in different ways by L. C. Dunn, Michel Leitis,
and others. The consensus within this group about the independence of
culture and humén aptitude, from biology and race, was expressed in four
statements on racimn, o discrimination and beliefs about the inferiority and
superiority of diferent races, which were first published by UNESCO?
‘Throughout thes: statements, the existence of biological race is not clearly
and directly contested. The liberatory force of the UNESCO statements lies
in the proclamation that human cultural achievement is not determined or
constrained by biological racial identity:
The peoples ofthe world tray appear to possess equal biological poten-
\ialities for ataining any civilizational level. Differences in the achieve-
ments of different penples must he attributed solely to their cultural
history.10
‘We have seen that the 1998 AAA Statement on “Race” begins with the
claim that biological race does not exist. Iris traditional for scientists to base
their claims about the existence or nonexistence of things on empirical data.
But empirical data may confirm or disconfirm the existence of things on
different levels of generality. Fluman biological racial taxonomy, of race, isa
very general construct. The lack of empirical referents for the construct of
racial taxonomy (that is, for ‘race’) precludes the existence of more specific
sspects of such a taxonomy, and of the interaction of elements of such a
taxonomy with things that do exist. This is simply a matter of logic. The
Philosophy of Science and Race 3
1998 AAA Starement on “Race” would have been theoretically stronger, as
well as potentially more enlightening for the public, if some of the logical
‘truths concerning racial taxonomy were clearly stated. The relevant logical
truths follow from two assumptions: nonexistent entities cannot be causes,
effects, or objects in relationships with things that do exist; nonexistent enti.
ties cannot have subcategories that exist. Thus, for example, unicorns, which
do not exist, cannot have an impact on existing ecological systems, and since
unicorns do not exist as a general category, its impossible for gray or golden
‘unicorns to exist. The relevant logical truths about race are as follow:
If there is no human biological racial taxonomy, then there is no
human biological racial hierarchy.
2. If there is no human biological racial taxonomy, then there are no
specific biological races.
If there are no biological races, then there are no pure or mixed
biological races.
4. If there is no human biological racial taxonomy, then there are no
biological causal connections between biological race and culture or
Psychology.
5. If there is no human biological racial exxonomy, then there are no
biological causal connections berween biological race and other
aspects of human biology.
6-1f there is no human biological racial taxonomy, then there are n0
biological causal connections between race and ethnicity.
‘To say that items 1 through 6 are logically true is another way of saying
that they area priori true. They need no farther empirical confirmation, and
they are immune to further empirical findings. If the first clauses in 1
through 6 are true, that is, if race does not exist, then there is no scientific
finding that could lend credence to links between race and hierarchy, purity,
culture, biology, or ethnicity. However, the 1998 AAA Statement on “Race”
implies that both the nonexistence of race and the ineffectiveness of racial
differeuce for causing cultural difference have been empirically conirmed,
But, as noted, ifrace does not exist, its logically impossible that race biolog-
ically causes culture, so the facts concerning the universality of humar learn
ing, and the ways in which culture determines identities, are beside the point.
‘That these facts are reiterated almost fifty years after Lévi-Strauss and his
cohort brought international attention to them suggests that the authors of
the AAA starement take them to be confirmation of the nonexistence of race.
‘This in earn implies that ifthe facts in question were otherwise, race might
have the biological reality itis now falsely assumed to have by the public.
But, the evidenee for the nonexistence of race, or the lack of evidence for
the existence of race, has to be independent of ‘nature vs. nurture’ interpre-
tations of human learning and development. Otherwise, it would be accept- 2 Neomi Zack
able to base the existence of race on empirical evidence that biology deter-
mines culture, without first defining ‘race,’ and independently determining
its existence. Part of the difficulty in refating false constructions of race is
that those biological traits believed to be racial traits are in fact hereditary.
However, not everything that is biological or hereditary qualifies as racial —
not even according to the most extreme racists. Therefore, the general claim
that biological interitance does not determine human capacities, abilities,
or cultural identities, while it may be true on many grounds, s too broad a
defense of the nonexistence of race. The breadth of this claim makes it seem
as though future empirical findings about the link between biology and
culture could confirm the existence of human biological racial taxonomy,
which is not the case.
art of this confusion in the 1998 AAA Statement on “Race,” between
biology and heredity overall, and race in particular, stems from the lack of a
clear definition of what those who believe race is biologically real mean by
race. Obviously, the culvaral traits distinctive of different so-called races on
‘a geographical basis, as well as the stereotypical traits attributed to subordi-
nate racial populations, are not biologically determined, Buc the nonscien-
tific belief in bialogical race is more than a belief in the existence of
racially specific calture and behavior, although that belief about culture and
behavior is part ofthe nonscientific belief about race. The nonscicatfic belief
in biological race entails that there is a biological foundation for distinct
racial identity that underlies phenotypes within any race. This assumed
biological foundation resembles genealogy, but itis supposed to underlie
even genealogy, at least in the United States. Consider the American one~
drop rule, which is an exaggerated form of hypodescent: A person is desig-
nated racially blick if he or she has at least one black ancestor anywhere in
family history. Today, the one-drop rale may be justified by reference to
cither custom or preference, but ar the end of the nineteenth century it was
justified by a belief thar physical racial essences were passed down genera-
tionally, through blood. The foundation of the one-drop rule was thus 2
belief in racial essences, a belief that still lingers despite widespread scientific
‘evidence that no such things have ever existed.!? The 1998 AAA Statement
‘on “Race” is thus combating the public's false belief in the existence of
biological racial essences, but without explicitly addressing this belief.
Biological racial essentialism is different from cultural racial essentialism,
whereby stereotypical cultural traits are believed ro be the effect of what
people believe tobe biological race. However, the biological case overrides
the cultural case logically (sce items 4 and 6 earlier in this section), because
‘what people believe to be biclogical race in the ease of cultural essentialism
does not exist. (Beliefs about culture are often themselves lacking in existent
referents, but that is another matter) In science, biological racial essences
have gone the way of phlogiston. But the failure of the AAA statement to
address the lingering superstition is costly. We are told, “Throughout history
____ Philosophy of Science and Race 93
whenever different groups have come into contact, they have interbred. The
continued sharing of genetic materials has maintained all of humankind as a
single species.” The implication here is that humankind might xot be a
single species without continued sharing of genetic material. Indeeé, speci-
ation can result from isolated breeding within groups that have common
ancestors with other groups. But, if humans never were distinct races to
begin with, their maintenance as one species would not be a resul: of the
kind of continued sharing of racial genes, as the statement imaplies. Rather,
there has simply been a mixing of genes in the history of humankind
The authors of the 1998 AAA Statement on “Racc” are not alone in
describing humanity as a whole as inextricably racially mixed. Many who
now write about mixed-race identity fall into the confusion of thinking that
mixed-race people have varied biological racial ancestry. This assumption is
evident in an AN reference to 2000 U.S. census forms as allowing respon-
dents to identify “more than one” category of race to report diverse ances-
‘uy But, if there are no racial essences, then there are no races in the way
the public believes, and there are no things that in combination could result
in mixed race in a biological sense (see item 3, above).
Race and Forensic Anthropology
Te would in most cases be a distortion to interpret the way in which the idea
of race is now used in evolutionary biology, genetics, or biological anthro-
pology as an unspoken or unexamined assumption sbout the existence of
literal racial essences. Those scientists who use concepts that resemble
common sense racial categories, such as mongoloid, negroid ox eaucid, arc
‘usually referring to collections of typical traits shared by members of groups
originating in geographical areas ata certain time in the past. As well, most
evolutionary models for group membership now rely more on common
ancestry than similarity of traits, for classificatory purposes. When scientists
do currently speak of races, its often with qualifications and disclaimers to
disassociate their views from nineteenth-century biological essentialist: they
are speaking of populations rather than individuals; their conclusions about
the traits shared by such groups are no more than statistical or highly prob-
able; the groups identified in gencalogical terms, based on genetic analyses,
‘ay not resemble common sense racial categories, even though the names
for them are similar, Nevertheless, such scientific use of biological concepts
‘of race easly sides into a kind of typology that can be mistaken for the phlo-
giston kind of racial essentialism. This is because typology itself party relies
‘on what the eighteenth-century philosopher George Berkeley called abstract
general ideas, An abstract general idea is supposed to be 2 symbol for all
‘members of a group, which characterizes each one of them, 2s 2 whole entity,
in the same way. Berkeley thought that abstract general ideas are ticks of
the mind because there is nothing in reality to which they refer. He believed 94 Naomi Zack
that our idea man is an abstract general idea because all men are different,
and there is nothing that characterizes every one of them, 2s wholes, in the
same way.
f population and genealogical concepts of race, which apply to groups,
are applied to individual members of those groups, then they become
abstract general ideas in Berkeley's sense, because there is no one thing or set
of things thet all members of such groups have in common. Usually, evolu-
tionary biologists and population geneticists do not speak of individuals.
However, forensic anthropologists, who classify individuals based on their
skeletal remains, Fave no choice but to speak of individuals, and this is where
‘group-based scientific concepts of race may slide into essentialist concepts of
“The group-based racial term becomes a label for an individual, and by
extension it may seem as though every individual in the group to which the
new individual has been assigned shares the same defining something, in this
case a shared group trait. Once this association between group membership
and shared group trait becomes established, it may be very difficult to imag-
ine that an individual could be a member of a predescribed geographic or
genealogical group if that individual lacks typical traits of the group.
‘However, on either the geographic or genealogical model of human popu-
lations, there are bound to be “atypical” members of these groups once the
shared similarity model is rejected and, of course, once the notion of group
essences has beer discarded. The question of whether a given individual is
assigned to a group if the individual is atypical will be decided based on
‘whether the criteria for group membership are primarily geographical, oste~
ological, or genetic. This kind of decision highlights the ways in which all
typologies are somewhat arbitrary constructions, rather than literal models
of natural divisions.
For instance, Leonard Lieberman explains how the nature of the relevant
skeletal reference cllection determines how forensic anthropologists classify
new skeletal remsins. All of the skeletal traits that compose the typology of
skeletal reference collections exist on continua among the different types,
and they are usvally referred to as cies rather than racial traits, This means
that che existence of a typology depend on more or less arbitrary decisions
about where to draw the lines between types. The criteria for incfusion in
types are farther contingent in that boncs arc shaped by environmental, as
well as hereditary factors. Classification therefore works best if unidentified
members have ancestors who come from the same geographic area as those
in the reference collection.16 This qualification poses extreme difficulties
‘when remains that are unusual or of unknown origin have to be classified.
Given these parameters for forensic anthropology, itis clear that care must
be taken not to equivocate between meanings of labels for groups in inter
preting data, Fo: example, if a skeletal reference collection is made up of
remains of members of groups with no living descendants, there is no basis
Philosophy of Science and Race 95
‘on which to assume that traits of the group characterize members of living
groups who, according to cultura criteria, have been assigned to a race bear
ing a-name similar to the name of the decedent group. Furthermore, as
Lieberman points out, the forensic assignment of an individual to any group
is only going to be as valid as were the original criteria used in assembling
the skeletal reference collection.
‘The discussion of Kennewick Man in the Anthropology Newsletter is an
informative example of how the application of population- and genealogi-
cal-based ideas of race to human osteological remains sounds like racial
cessentialism to those who reject common sense racial typology, whileit may
seem to be no more than normal empirical science to forensic anthropolo-
gists who think they can classify given remains. Let’ begin with the facts of
the case. Kennewick Man is the name given to remains found after flooding
of the Columbie River in Kennewick, Washington, in 1996, The skeleton
‘was examined by James Chatters, who identified a well-preserved middle-
aged man with apparent ‘cauczsoid’ features who lived about 9,300 years ago.
‘Chatters believes that his preliminary data support hypotheses that there was
an earlier, now extinct, European group in the Americas that predated occu-
pation by the North Asian groups believed to be the ancestors of contem-
porary Native Americans.” Chatters and his colleagues anticipated farther
study of the remains, but the age of the skeleton brought it under the juris
diction of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of
1990. The Army Corp of Engineers removed the skeleton to a secure vault
con the assumption that it legally belonged to the Umatilla Indians, tribes in
‘Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, who claimed Kennewick Man for reburial.
(Chatters and seven colleagues litigated for return ofthe skeleton to themn for
farther study.® (Those are the main facts)
‘The Umatilla Indians do noe think thet farther study is desirable because
itis against their spiritual traditions to remove the dead from original places
of burial. Neither do they think that farther study of the skeleton is neces-
sary, because they believe that its age alone establishes its identity as Native
‘American, Thus, Armand Minthorn, speaking for the Umatillas:
If his individual istry over 9,000 years old, that only substantiates our
belief thathe is Native American. From our orl histories, we know that
cour people have been part of tis land since the beginning of time. We
do not believe that our people migrated here from another continent, a8
the scientists do,
‘Wealso do not agree withthe notion shat this individual is Caucasian.
Scientists say that because the individual’ head measurements does aot
‘match ours, he isnot Native American. We believe that humans and ani-
mals change overtime to adapt to their environment. And, our eldershave
told us that Indian people did not aways look the way we look woiay!? %6 ‘Naomi Zack
It shold be added “hat practitioners of a Norse religion in California with
ideological ties to white supremacist groups have also claimed the skeleton
asan ancestor af members oftheir group, the Asatra Folk Assembly22
‘The discussion about Kennewick Man in AN was published during the
same time as other commentary that contributed to the 1998 AAA State-
ment on “Race.” Several issues were intertwined in exchanges about
‘Kennewick Man, ard their relation to essentialist versus nonessemtialist defi-
nitions of race is instructive, First, there was the question of whether the
Kennewick remains ought to be made available for study by Euro-American
scientists ("was,” because the case was decided in favor-of the Umatilla Indi-
ans in 2001).21 Then, there is the question of the race of the remains.
Finally, there is the issue of what the characteristics of the remains might
suggest about precontact populations in the Americas and their geographi-
cal origins.
No one in the pages of AN offered strong support for reburial of the
remains under NAGPRA, and even Alan Goodman, who deplored the racial-
iation of the remains, stated that he would welcome an opportunity to study
them without such racialization.22 Richard Jantz and Douglas Owsley
claimed that the Army Corp of Engineers ought not to have seized the
remains without “an orderly process” for determining their group identity?
eis understandable that empirical scientists would be in favor of further
study “no matter what” and that they might tend to dismiss obstacles related
to folk claims about identity, as “political.” The Umatilla imperative to
rebury the remains follows from their presumed Native American identity,
and scientists might not wish to give such an imperative priority, insofar as
it is merely religious. But, the age of the remains was what triggered their
seizure under NAGPRA, and this is related to historical legal principles that
‘cannot be a8 easily dismissed. U.S. treaty law and legislation such as
NAGPRA recognize the precolonial sovereignty of ancestors of contempo-
rary Native Americans. As the only living groups likely to be descended from
those erstwhile American sovereign groups, contemporary Native Ameri-
‘cans would seem to have a prima facie right to claim remains that could be
their ancestore. This would be an argument based on inheritance that
bypasses race in any sense of the term. Even if Kennewick Man were (appar
cently) racially white, he could stil have been the ancestor of contemporary
‘Native Americans. The claim by the Asatru Folk Assembly that Kennewick
Man could not have been the ancestor of contemporary Native Americans,
as well asa possible assumption by some anthropologists that belonging to
a Caucasian or caxcasoid group precludes Kennewick Man having Native
‘American descendants, would hold up only on the basis of false biological
racial essentialist, The essentialist principle would be that Native Ameri-
cans and whites each have something biologically distinct about them which
determines that all descendants will be of the same “race” as their ancestors.
Furthermore, even if Kennewick Man were racially white, itis virtually
Philosophy of Science and Race om
certain that he could not be the ancestor of contemporary racially white
Americans, because all oftheir ancestors arrived after colonial contact. The
only way whites, such as the Asatru Assembly, could claim Kennewick Man
as their ancestor would be through the nonexistent referent of an abstract
general idea of racial whiteness which overrode actual biological genedlogy
and made every white person a member of the same line of descent; buteven
in that case, it is likely that members of the Asatru Assembly would be only
collateral kin to Kennewick Man.
‘What race is Kennewick Man? The question is scientifically meaningless
if “race” means common sense taxonomies. No one in the AN discussion,
including the litigating anthropologists, has claimed that if Kennewick Man
can conclusively be determined to be caucasoid, it will mean that he is white
{in common sense racial terms. Fveryone acknowledges that the similarity of
the population-based terms ‘caucasoid,’ ‘mongoloid,’ and ‘negroid’ to the
‘common sense terms ‘white,’ ‘Asian,’ and ‘black,’ confuses issues of anthro~
pological identification. Thus, Douglas Preston, who wrote a popularized
account of the Kennewick Man case for The New Yerker magazine, suggested
in AN that anthropologists could substitute their racial-sounding taxonomy
with “Group A,” “Group B” and “Group C.”2 Whether or not Preston
‘meant for this suggestion to be taken seriously, it raises an important point.
‘The terms ‘caucasoid,’ ‘mongoloid’ and ‘negroid,’ insofar as they are not
essentialist, must refer to presumed places of ancestral origin, boch as,
genealogical beginnings and as evolutionary sources, in terms of environ-
mental adapration of different skeletal traits that can be used to clissify
remains, Both ancestral origins and phenotypic differences in groups, which
have resulted from environmental adaptation, have been racialized in exsen-
tialist constructions of race. This does not mean, however, that the varieties
that have been racialized are not in themselves real, That is, the problem is
not with words or with the traits ro which words refer, but with the ese
tializing aspect of racalization. Ifthe words are changed without addressing
false beliefS and meanings that have no empirical referents, after a brief
respite, the old false beliefs and meanings will reattach themselves to the new
swords (or letters)
‘Nonessentalist population-based typology, although it might have empir-
ical referents, is a weak form of typology, for two reasons. First, as everyone
acknowledges, the traits typified are continnous aver populations, rather than
discretely divided. Second, geographical-origin typology is a matter of
decision. There is nothing in nature to indicate how far back one must go to
make the right cut to the branches of ancestral groups. Over history,
‘geographically isolated populations continually branch off, in tsrms of time-
spatis in different places, which are reflected in genetic difference. As L. Luca
‘Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi, and Alberto Piazza describe their own systern
of human evolutionary branching in The History and Geography of Haman
Genes, “The level at which we stop our classification is completely arbi- 8 Naomi Zack
srary."?5 Thus, if we accept the hypothesis that modern humans originated
in Afi, then al man stall could be asied ay negro” Although,
just as we saw in chapter 2 that one race does not constitute a taxonomy of
zace, one type does not make a typology. Furthermore, on what basis is it
decided how many years spent in a place make the traits of inhabitants of
‘that place typical of that particular origin in a defining way? Although a fall
answer to this question exceeds the scope of this chapter, itis not highly spec-
lative to suggest that evolutionary geneticists make the major cuts in ways
that correspond, albeit roughly, to contemporary common sense racial typol-
‘ogy. If this speculation is correct, then scientific typology is only as good as
the common sense typology on which itis based—which means not very
ood at all,
Minthorn, specking for the Umatilla, uses geographical origin to deter-
mine human types, a method shared by the anthropologists who typed
‘Kennewick Man as caucasoid: Kennewick Man is Indian for the Umatillas
because he comes from the Americas; Kennewick Man is caucasoid for the
scientists because he resembles people whose ancestors came from Europe.
‘The main difference in method is that Minthorn does not think the claim
that Indians have always inhabited the Americas can be falsified. The oral
‘tradition Minthom speaks from also posits what scientists might call ad hoc
hypotheses of micro-cvolution to account for Kennewick Man's caucasoid
traits, is not clear however, whether Minthorn thinks that anyone alive
‘over 9,000 years ago in the Americas is by definition a Native American
because of geographical location at that time, or whether Minthorn is, in
cffect, a polygenicist on the subject of human evolution. His assertion of the
folk belief that Native Americans have always been in the Americas would
seem to confirm the latter, unless the Umatilla believe that Homo sapiens
‘originated in the Americas and migrated to other continents.
Another difference between the Umatillas and the litigating anthropelo-
sists is that the Umatillas use what they believe are ultimate geographic
origins to type remains, whereas the anthropologists use time slices in
ancient history, when relative isolation in different environments resulted in
what they can identify as distinee types. There is come question about
whether typing in this sense is possible, ‘Those responding to Goodman's
assertion that Nasive American typing cannot be accomplished with accu-
racy suggest that some methods are more reliable than others.26 Whatever
the method, the size ofthe sample or skeleton reference collection is crucial.
(Chatters claims that there isa large enough sample to classify Kennewick
‘Man as a member of a distinct and now extinct group.27 Duane Anderson,
Alan Swedlund, and David Breterniz believe that the sample is small and the
‘Kennewick find éoes not motivate them to change their classification of a
{9,700-year-old female skeleton found in Gordon Creek in 1963 as Native
American, despite her possession of what others identify as caucasoid taits”*
‘The population-based identification of Kennewick Manis thus inconclu-
Philosophy of Science and Race 9
sive, partly because of disagreement about the existence of criteria for clas-
sification. And there is the further question of whether or not a cauea-
soid-Native American typology is even possible. Goodman claims i is not
possible because ancient remains often have varied typological taits.?®
Ovsley and Janez insist that the variety within early groups is only apparent
and that in cases where itis known that whites and Native Americans were
present in the same location, after details of where the remains have heen
found are taken into account, classification ean reliably be carried out}?
Jonathan Marks, commenting on the disagreement, emphasizes the possi
lity of what appears to be racial diversity among ancient Native Americans
and reports that mitochondrial DNA characteristic of Native Americans hes
been found in one very old apparently caucasoid skull! What is interesting
about the entire discussion among Goodman, Owsley and Jantz, and Marks
{is that the disagreement stems from two incompatible premises: groups are
osteologically distiner; groups are not osteologically distinct. Assuming that
«the claim about group distinctions is limited to nonessentialist variations that
) ate not racial, it would seem to be an empirical matter whether rema.ns can
be classified in any given context, given accepted criteria for classification,
But, disagreement about appropriate osteological criteria for classifeation
would need to be resolved on the basis of additional information from
archaeology and genetics.
How the ancient Americas were settled, when, and by which group—as
minimally defined by where they came from—are empirical questions. The
completion of this story would be of broad narrative human interest, but
‘without essentialist ideas of race itis difficult to see how the story could have
nonmetaphorical and (nonrhetoricel) political or even identity implications
in the present. Kennewick Man and members of his historical-geogrephical
sroup might have been caucasoid. Caucasoid or not, they might have been
ancestors of contemporary Native Americans or unrelated to them. AsChat-
ters himself states, the history of the ancient Americas is turning out to be
far more complex than was previously believed.®? This is hardly surprising,
because ancient human history is generally an incomplete inquiry at this
‘ime, While writing this scctiun, I ead about a BBC program that presented
‘evidence for a hypothesis that the earliest inhabitants of Brazil were a negroid
group who originated in Australia, (An archaeological site at Serra De Capi-
vara in northeast Brazil yielded rock paintings believed co be 50,000 years
‘old and a 12,000-year-old skull with apparent negroid features according to
forensic reconstruction.33)
‘The AN discussion about Kennewick Man makes clear the importance of
not essentializing geographically based osteological typology. Such typology
‘ay be useful to crack human migrations historically. But, iis intelli ble to
the public because it seems to correspond to popular ideas about race. The
latter is part of the essentialist problem, generally. Popular ideas of rce are
based on genetic variation that is (taken to be) dramatic in terms of appear- 100 Neomi Zack
ance and in terms of political and economic history, especially colonials
In terms of biological realty, as Jonathan Friedlaender points out, more reli-
able population markers can be found in genetic variations of mitochondrial
DNA. The groups picked out by those markers provide a different taxon-
‘omy than caucasoid-mongoloid-negroid divisions. Still, the me DNA mark-
ers are not present in all members of these populations in which they occur,
so typology based on them is also a fabrication beyond “nature.” What all
of the postessentialst scientific categories of human “racial” groups share
epistemologicallyis x certain circularity. Any criterion used to classify members
ofa group atthe same time defines membership in a group. This is because
there is no consistent, objective determinant of racial, geographical, osteo-
logical, or genetichuman group membership, for any group.
Essentialism and Medicine
In the case of Kennewick Man, a distinction between population-based and
racialized, skeletal traits would scem to have the effect of making empirical
inquiry les fraught, even though it does not mean all human remains can or
should be objects of scientific study. In the fields of medicine and public
health, the essentalist racalization of people identified as Hispanic, Asian,
‘African American, or white may block useful research into the causes of
disease and illness by falsely implying that statistical associations of some
debilities with social racial identities has explanatory force on a biological
level. If racial distinctions do not exist in human biology then, purely as a
matter of logic, biological race cannot be causally linked to physical predis-
positions for diseases or disabilities. When socially identified racial groups
are found to have different diseases or types of illness, which are believed to
be directly inherited or the result of inherited “predispositions,” this should
bbe the beginning of demographically based medical research and not the end
of it. Socially identified race has no medical nomological value when it is
linked to disease or illness. If such apparent links come co be generally
accepted as signals of the necessity for further research then, eventually, it
could he possible ro do more than offer treatment for disease (although
sometimes the availability of treatment is in itself “racially” unequal).
‘Unequal social conditions that cause different rates of disease could be
addressed as a ley toward the prevention of certain diseases. Thus, for
‘example, HIV/AIDS has recently been increasing in the African American
group while decteasing in other groups. This is a problem that at once
requires medical treatment, demographically based research about why
blacks arc now at greatest risk for AIDS, and social justice remedies should
it be the case thet specific (and immediately correctable) discrimination
against blacks isa factor in these figures.35
‘Among anthropologists and other scientists in human biology, there are
now two different approaches to the combination of the facts about human
fe Philosophy of Science and Race 101
diversity in disease and recognition of the lack of a biological foundation for
race. Both approaches require that physiological, genetic, and genealogical
data be collected directly from individuals. The first approach accepts 2
population-based notion of race but questions whether itis possible o deter~
ine what populations individuals belong to as a reliable diagnostic tool. For
example, when, in 1991 the policy committee of the American Medical Asso-
ciation recommended tht all infants be tested for sickle cell anemia, the
reasoning was that although sickle cell anemia occurs most frequently among
people with Mediterranean and Aftican ancestry there is no reliable way to
independently determine such ancestry. A second example of the associa-
tion of population typology with disease concerns research on bone marrow
compatibility based on human leukocyte antigens (LTLAs). Bone marrow
compatibility depends on a match in HILAs, and recent studies have
confirmed that African Americans and Asian Americans have a large number
of FILAs specific to their “racial” groups, while Caucasians, Latin Ameri-
cans, and Native Americans share a number of common HLAs.7 The
registry of Aftican American donors is disproportionately small. But, African
‘Americans are the most varied in HILAs, so even ifthe registry for African
American donors were very large, some researchers are not confident that
wansplantation compatibility would increase. They therefore suggest that
future resources be concentrated on working with partial compatiiities for
hard-to-match recipients. 8 Also, it should be emphasized that when popu-
lation membership is used to screen potential donors for bone marrow trans-
plants, there has to be individual testing to determine a match for the HLAS
in question.
‘The use of population-based typology for medical rescarch was also
assumed in places during the discussion attendant to the AAA Statement on
“Race” in AN. Thus, Robert Halberstein, writing about research on hyper-
tension, sickle cell anemia, and forensic photography in the Caribbean,
argues that phenotypical markers of social race are “unreliable criteria for
classifying breeding populations.”2? Halberstein's assumption wonld seem
to be that breeding populations are themselves reliable criteria for the pres-
ence of certain diseases, Siutilarly, Jonathan Friedlaender suggests that the
concept of isolated breeding populations that are subject to randone genetic
