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Israel’s Religious Soft Power

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Within and Beyond Judaism

Claudia Baumgart-​Ochse

Introduction

When Joseph Nye first introduced the term “soft power” into foreign policy
research, he defined it as the ability of states “to set the political agenda and
determine the framework of debate in a way that shapes others’ preferences”
(Nye, Jr. 1990, 166). While hard power is the ability to coerce and “grows out
of a country’s military and economic might,” soft power, Nye argues, “arises
from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies”
(Nye, Jr. 2004, 265). Soft power, therefore, is “the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, Jr. 2004, 265).
Does the State of Israel have such an ability to attract others and shape
their preferences? According to “The Soft Power 30,” an annual index which
measures the soft power of states by combining data across six categories
(Government, Culture, Education, Global Engagement, Enterprise, and
Digital) and international polling, Israel ranked 26th among the 30 countries
with the greatest resources for soft power in the index’s first edition in 2015;
the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, France, and Canada were
the top five countries in that year. However, Israel did not appear among the
30 countries with highest scores in soft power in subsequent years; it dropped
from the index altogether.
That fact that Israel does not rank high among the states which employ soft
power in their foreign policy may not be surprising. Due to its specific his-
tory and its geopolitical position in the region, Israel has set other priorities
than exercising soft power. The rather short history of the Jewish state has
seen a long sequence of wars and military conflicts with its Arab neighbors
and the local Palestinian population. The perception of this unstable and hos-
tile security situation is aggravated by the experience of the Nazis’ attempt to

Claudia Baumgart-​Ochse, Israel’s Religious Soft Power In: The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power. Edited by: Peter
Mandaville, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197605806.003.0012
212 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

extinguish the Jewish people in the Holocaust. The State of Israel, though
it was conceived by the early Zionists before the Holocaust, is seen as the
immediate response to the plight of the Jewish people in 1930s and 1940s
Europe and beyond. For the first time in modern history, the founding of

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the state provided political sovereignty and power to a hitherto dispersed,
persecuted and existentially threatened people. Therefore, security has be-
come a core concern of Israeli governments as well as of the Israeli public1—​
so much so that some observers argue that national security has obtained
the status of a religion in Israel. A team of researchers at the Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University (today renamed Institute for National
Security Studies) has conducted public opinion surveys on national security
in Israel since the mid-​1980s. They found that Israel’s security was such a per-
vasive issue that the Israeli public developed unique ways to deal with it: “On
the symbolic and psychological levels, there are the Almighty and the Jewish
people; on the level of rationality and professionalism, there are the Israel
Defence Forces, the Mossad, the Shin Bet Kaf (General Security Service) and
Israel’s other security institutions. Together, they make up a complex mosaic
which is at the heart of the religion of security” (Arian 1995, 164).
Against the backdrop of this religion of security, soft power is not regarded
the prime foreign policy strategy by Israeli officials. Speaking at the Munich
Security Conference in 2017, Israel’s defense minister Avigdor Lieberman
explicitly denied the value of soft power and said that the chaos and insta-
bility in the Middle East today were a result of leaders who lacked ‘polit-
ical determination’ and opted for softer, non-​kinetic means of diplomacy”
(Opall-​Rome 2017). The defense minister instead supported a policy to-
ward Iran and other actors in the region which according to Nye’s concep-
tualization qualifies as hard power: “a combination of economic pressure
and a very tough policy” (Opall-​Rome 2017). Henry Kissinger’s famous
quote that “Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics” (Holbrooke
1976, 157) would thus need to be qualified by the claim that Israel at least
has no foreign policy based on soft power. Its preferred currency in foreign
policy is hard power which is not least measured in its military capabilities
(International Institute for Strategic Studies 2020).
Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I argue that the State of Israel,
despite its strong emphasis on national security in a regional and interna-
tional environment which it perceives as overwhelmingly hostile and un-
trustworthy, does in fact employ soft power in order to achieve foreign
policy goals and shape others’ preferences. In particular, Israeli governments
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 213

have been addressing two distinct civil society audiences in the United
States, Israel’s most important ally. Israel is the largest recipient of US for-
eign aid in history and heavily relies upon the US administration’s military
as well as diplomatic support, for example in the United Nations. Therefore,

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Israeli governments take great care to maintain this relationship. Both the
US American Jewish community as well as US Evangelical Christians are
regarded by Israeli officials as being highly influential in setting the political
agenda and determining the framework of debate with regard to the State of
Israel in a way that shapes the US administration’s preferences. Therefore,
Israeli governments seek to influence these communities’ opinions and
actions regarding the Jewish state and its security concerns.
A country’s soft power, according to Nye, arises from the attractiveness
of its culture, political ideals, and policies. Although religion does not figure
separately in Nye’s conception, it may constitute an important compo-
nent of culture as a resource for some states’ soft power. In the cases of soft
power discussed here, religion is indeed very important—​although in dif-
ferent shades of its meaning. Concerning the Jewish state’s relationship with
American Jewish diaspora, the word “Jewish” seems to suggest a connection
that is exclusively grounded in religion; however, given the ambiguity of
the term “Jewish,” this relationship encompasses religion, but also goes well
beyond religious identity and belief to include secular and ethno-​national
variants of Jewishness (Waxman and Lasensky 2013, 233). Israel’s attrac-
tiveness to US American Jews is grounded in its being a cultural-​religious
symbol for Jewish peoplehood as well as providing a safe haven in times of
endangerment of the safety of Jews worldwide.
The State of Israel’s projection of soft power into the Evangelical com-
munity in the United States also comprises different shades of the culture-​
religion axis. The Jewish state’s attractiveness to Evangelicals in the United
States is first and foremost grounded in the significance of the Jewish people
and the ‘holy land’ for the Christian faith; not least is Israel/​Palestine the ge-
ographical region where Jesus actually lived. At the same time, the State of
Israel is also attractive for a certain portion of Evangelical Christians who
wish to overcome centuries of Christian contempt for Judaism and seek rec-
onciliation with the Jewish people by way of supporting the Jewish state.
Interestingly, both the literatures on the relationship between Israel
and US American Jews and on Israel and US Evangelical Christians have
so far focused on the US American side of the equation. Studies on Jewish
and Evangelical communities in the United States and their respective
214 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

relationships with the State of Israel describe the origins, formation and
development of these communities and their organizations, their theolog-
ical and political backgrounds, their shared beliefs and convictions as well
as their internal controversies, and the strategies they employ in order to

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reach out to the United States and, more recently, to the State of Israel.2 When
analyzing the two triangles of actors—​US American Jews or US American
Evangelicals, the US government, and the Israeli government—​most studies
look at them from the perspective of the nonstate civil society actors. Both
Jews and Evangelicals are depicted as the driving forces in these relationships
while the governments are the addressees of their advocacy and actions. The
portrayal of these communities as energetic advocates and activists for what
they think is good for the State of Israel and the Jewish people is certainly cor-
rect; however, the role of the Jewish state in this equation remains somewhat
underexposed. In the remainder of this article, I seek to highlight the Israeli
government as an actor who intentionally employs the Jewish state’s cultural-​
religious significance for both communities in order to wield soft power and
shape not only their preferences, but eventually also the preferences of the
US administration on Israel.

From Consensus to Contention: Israel and the American

Jewish Community

US American Jews make up the largest Jewish community outside the State
of Israel. As of 2019, it comprised around 5.7 million people. This estimate,
published by the Jewish People Policy Institute—​a branch of the Jewish
Agency—​relies on findings from the 2013 Pew Report on Jewish Americans
(Pew Research Center 2013) and assessments of demographic trends among
US Jews since then (Rosner 2019, 22). However, other estimates see the
American Jewish population at about 6.7 or even 7 million due to different
definitions of “Jewishness,” that is, of who should be included in the count
(Rosner 2019, 22). For comparison, Israel’s population for the first time
reached 9 million persons in March 2019. Roughly 79 percent of them were
Jews—​about 6,66 million (Rosner 2019, 21).3
The sheer size of the Jewish community in the United States as well as its
location in Israel’s most important international ally state make it impera-
tive for the Israeli government to reach out to US American Jews and rally
for their support. As Waxman argues, “American Jewish politics directly
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 215

affects American politics in general, particularly when it comes to Israel. For

Israel itself, American Jewish politics is of even greater significance. Indeed,
it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Israel’s very future depends in part
on whether, and how, American Jews support it” (Waxman 2016, 6). The

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American Jewish community’s advocacy for Israel has become an issue of
American domestic politics—​“so much so, in fact, that both political parties
routinely compete over which one is more pro-​Israel [. . .]” (Waxman 2016,
7). Therefore, Israeli officials and diplomats pay a lot of attention to the
American Jewish community as they know how important a source of eco-
nomic, political, and psychological support it is (Waxman 2016, 7).
Israel’s attractiveness to American Jews, the foundation of its soft power,
has several sources. Waxman argues that American Jewish “Israelism”
rests on five pillars. Familism denotes a deep sense of kinship which in turn
nurtures a strong sense of responsibility and solidarity among Jews. Fear
for the safety of Israeli Jews in a hostile Arab environment as well as for the
safety of Jews worldwide in the face of anti-​Semitism elevates the State of
Israel to a safe haven for persecuted Jews which deserves all possible sup-
port. Functionality describes how supporting Israel has become a “substitute
religion” for many secular American Jews—​a way “of being Jewish without
having to be religious” (Waxman 2016, 26). The religiously grounded attach-
ment is, on the other hand, very important for religious Jews: in the Jewish
faith, the promised land, given by God to the Jewish people, is of utmost im-
portance and features prominently in theology, belief, rituals and liturgy.
Waxman adds one more pillar—​fantasy—​which points to the fact that many
American Jews have a romantic and idealistic idea of Israel, of a mythical,
imaginary land which has little to do with the real Israel (Waxman 2016,
26–​28).
These themes and motives of Israelism run through the history of the re-
lationship between Jewish Americans and the State of Israel from the state’s
founding until today. However, the degree of their importance to American
Jews varies depending on their denominational background as well as on the
historic-​political circumstances. In general, religious Jews—​as mentioned
above—​attach higher value to the State of Israel as the embodiment of
Biblical prophecies about the land and people of Israel (Pew Research Center
2013, 13). US American religious Jews’ connection to Israel is also affected
by historic-​political events and developments, but to a lesser degree than
secular or traditional Jews’ relationship. Under the leadership of rabbis like
Joseph B. Soloveitchik, a considerable portion of Orthodoxy in the United
216 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

States opened up to modern life and other Jewish denominations—​and

modern Orthodoxy embraced Israel and Zionist positions on the matter. The
Conservative and Reform movements also stressed the religious and ethnic
ties to the Jewish State and acknowledged the responsibility to help build the

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state and secure its existence (Wertheimer 2008, 12–​14).
For secular American Jews, on the other hand, their attachment to the
Jewish state served as an important way to express their Jewish identity
without having to practice the Jewish faith. Rosenthal (2001) describes how
American Jews in the post–​World War II era moved into the mainstream
of American life. Their assimilation entailed the decline of religious observ-
ance, and Judaism for many became “increasingly nostalgic and sentimental
[. . .]. Israel’s image as a secular, progressive, pragmatic, and democratic state
accorded with American Jews’ self-​conceptions and provided a convenient
way to present their identity to the larger society” (Rosenthal 2001, XV).
American Jews’ support for Israel has seen different stages since World
War II. Although Zionist ideology did never take hold among American
Jews to a significant degree, they actively supported the establishment
of the State of Israel in 1948. Their support consisted of large amounts of
money and arms as well as of intensive lobbying of the US administration
and Congress on behalf of the fledgling state. However, the interest in Israel
declined quickly after 1948; once the state was established, US American
Jews returned to their own problems and issues. Among other things, they
were concerned about being accused of having “dual loyalties” (Waxman
2016, 34). This concern was fed by declarations made by Israeli officials and
Zionist leaders that all Jews should immigrate to Israel at this historic mo-
ment in time. Only in the sovereign state of Israel, they argued, could Jewish
survival and flourishing be assured. Such statements stemmed from classic
Zionism’s negative view of the Diaspora which it assumed was doomed to
wither. From this perspective, Diaspora communities were expected to play
a minor role in Jewish affairs while the State of Israel now took center stage
in the future development of the Jewish people. Therefore, Zionists focused
on promoting aliyah—​immigration to Israel. These calls for immigration,
combined with the often articulated claim of Israeli officials to speak on be-
half of all Jewry, caused considerable irritation in the American Jewish com-
munity who felt quite secure and at home in the United States: American
Jews have “maintained an undiminished allegiance and profound gratitude
to their land of residence, whose ethos from its inception has been shaped by
the belief that America is the new Promised Land” (Wertheimer 2008, 3). It
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 217

was only after the establishment of the State of Israel that Zionist ideological
attitudes softened: “Although aliyah remained a core objective, the State of
Israel preferred to develop relations with the Jewish communities as a whole
[. . .]. Ideological considerations came second to the need to maximise the

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financial and political support of the Diaspora, which was especially impor-
tant in the early years of statehood” (Rynhold 2007, 151).
As the Israeli government knew how important and indispensable the
financial and political support from American Jews was for the young
Jewish state, Prime Minister Ben-​Gurion in 1950 consented to publicly an-
nounce a policy that was designed to accommodate the American Jewish
perspective—​ he “swallowed his Zionist pride,” as Wertheimer writes
(Wertheimer 2008, 5). In an agreement with Jacob Blaustein, president of
the American Jewish Committee (AJC)—​one of the major Jewish organiza-
tions in the United States—​Ben Gurion declared that American Jews were
politically attached to the United States and did not owe political allegiance
to the State of Israel; Israel would represent and speak only on behalf of its
own citizens and not interfere with the internal affairs in Jewish communities
abroad. “Any weakening of American Jewry, any disruption of its communal
life, any lowering of its status, is a definite loss to Jews everywhere and to
Israel in particular,” Ben Gurion asserted. And he explained that Israel’s “suc-
cess or failure depends in large measure on our cooperation with, and on
the strength of, the great Jewish community of the United States” (American
Jewish Committee 1964, 55). Blaustein assured Ben Gurion of the Jewish
community’s support for the State of Israel, while at the same time stressing
that American Jews repudiated “any suggestion or implication that they are
in exile. American Jews—​young and old alike, Zionists and non-​Zionists
alike—​are profoundly attached to America” (American Jewish Committee
1964, 55).
The Ben-​Gurion-​Blaustein-​agreement shows the readiness of the Israeli
government to trade ideology for practical considerations and accommodate
the concerns of the American Jewish community. Although Israeli politicians
“retained a disdain for Diaspora lobbying” (Rynhold 2007, 152), they took
into consideration the concerns and criticism of US American Jews because
they needed their support; in other words, they adjusted their soft power as
to keep the flame of Israelism burning.
Such diplomatic maneuvers were hardly necessary after 1967. The Six-​
Day war not only fundamentally changed the Israeli polity and its geog-
raphy, it also had profound impact on the American Jewish community.
218 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

The fear of the imminent assault on Israel in the weeks preceding the war
as well as the euphoria about the sweeping victory were closely followed by
American Jews: “The widespread fear of a second Holocaust prior to the war,
followed by the relief and jubilation felt after Israel’s swift and stunning vic-

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tory, led to a spontaneous outpouring of support for Israel from American
Jews” (Waxman 2016, 35). The 1967 war forged a new Jewish American
unanimity on Israel; the Jewish state had become the new civil religion of
American Jews, and its heroes were Israeli officials like Moshe Dayan and
Abba Eban (Rosenthal 2001, xvi). Israel’s soft power reached its peak. The
Jewish state was seen by American Jews as the culmination of Jewish history,
as the highest expression of virtue and essential component of Jewish iden-
tity. Therefore, they were ready to provide all possible financial and polit-
ical support “for whatever goals or policies the Jewish state chose to pursue.
Critics of Israel were simply read out of the organized Jewish community”
(Rosenthal 2001, 1).
But even in these days of unwavering support did Israel remain a religious-​
cultural symbol rather than a real country in the minds of most US American
Jews. Few were actually interested in or had knowledge about Israel’s actual
society and politics. It was possibly this discrepancy between the imaginary,
idealized Israel which figured so prominently in American Jewish identity
and the real Israel which was largely unknown to Jews abroad that allowed
for the unprecedented level of support to the State of Israel in the 1960s and
1970s. The Israeli government did not have to put much effort into its at-
tractiveness to American Jews in order to exert soft power. Rather, it could
build on the cultural and especially religious traditions, symbols and motives
which elevated Israel to a special place in collective Jewish memory: “At dif-
ferent times, Israel symbolized very different aspects of Jewish civilization—​
liberation from exile, David fighting Goliath, Jewish cultural renaissance,
concern for fellow Jews, and religious renewal” (Wertheimer 2008, 78).
The “American Jewish romance” (Finkelstein 2012) or “love affair”
(Rosenthal 2001) with Israel began to wane in the late 1970s; since then, there
has been increasing “trouble in the tribe” (Waxman 2016). The euphoria of
the post-​1967 period evaporated when in 1977 for the first time a right-​wing
government under Menachem Begin from the Likud party took power. Israel
under Begin looked much more right-​wing, religious, intolerant and expan-
sionist than the egalitarian, progressive and peace-​loving Israel that many
US American Jews were attached to. A series of events changed the attitude
of Jewish Americans toward the State of Israel. The occupation of Palestinian
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 219

territories took on increasingly repressive and violent features. The massacre

of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camp of Sabra and Shatila in the wake
of the Lebanon war in 1982, carried out by Israel’s allied Phalangist militias,
profoundly shook Jewish Americans’ perspective on Israel. The first Intifada

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and Israel’s harsh crack down on it further spurred massive criticism and
disillusionment with Israel. Israel, once revered for maintaining its demo-
cratic character and its moral army in the face of a hostile environment, now
became the oppressor and occupier in the eyes of many Jews in the United
States and beyond. This impression was reinforced by the fact that more US
American Jews began to actually visit Israel and thus were confronted with
the real Israel instead of its idealized version (Waxman 2016, 46). While gen-
eral support of a Jewish state—​be it as fulfilment of Biblical prophecy, culmi-
nation of Jewish civilization, or as a safe haven for threatened and persecuted
Jews—​remained an important element of Jewish identity in the United
States, many American Jews began to view critically the actual day-​to-​day
policies of the Israeli state and its institutions.
The Israeli-​Palestinian conflict and its repercussions on the Jewish state
began to take center stage in US American Jews’ engagement with Israel. It
changed both the terms of the debate among American Jews as well as the
ways in which this engagement was operatively channeled. While the 1960s
were largely characterized by a broad consensus among the American Jewish
community and their lobby organizations on the Jewish state, the debate
became successively more pluralistic and even polarized. The controversy
about the right way of going forward with the Israeli-​Palestinian conflict
was accompanied by a profound change in the ways US American Jews or-
ganize and lobby on behalf of Israel. While US-​Jewry/​Israel-​relations until
the 1980s have been characterized by what Sasson calls mass mobilization,
the new way of connecting with Israel is via direct engagement. Mass mo-
bilization rested on “large, centralized core organizations of American
Jewry” (Sasson 2010, 175), most notably the AJC, the Council of Jewish
Federations (CJF), the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations (CPMAJO), and later the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC). They raised funds and advocated politically for Israel
along the lines of the Israeli government’s policies. The State of Israel, for its
part, used governmental as well as quasi-​governmental institutions such as
the Diaspora ministry and the Jewish Agency in order to facilitate coopera-
tion and handle the huge amounts of donations from US American Jews as
well as issues such as travel and immigration.
220 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

Sasson describes that the first crack in the united front of Jewish organiza-
tions was provoked by the right, not by the Israeli left. After the Oslo Accords
were announced, Benjamin Netanyahu, head of the opposition Likud party,
“traveled to the U.S. to rally American Jewish opposition to the pact” (Sasson

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2010, 177). Netanyahu convinced right-​leaning American organizations
such as the Zionist Organization of America to lobby Congress to attach
conditions to assistance to the Palestinian Authority—​“against the wishes
of the Israeli government and AIPAC” (Sasson 2010). Left-​leaning organi-
zations such as Americans for Peace Now in turn lobbied in support of the
Accords. Since then, new organizations on both sides of the spectrum have
emerged which depart from the consensual mode of the traditional Jewish
American lobby organizations and pursue either hawkish or dovish policies
in parallel to the Israeli divide over the conflict. “While mainstream lobbying
organizations such as AIPAC typically seek to promote the policies favored
by the Israeli government, the new partisan organizations have pursued
their own political agendas, promoting more hawkish or dovish policies”
(Sasson 2010, 177).4 The new pattern of direct engagement is also reflected
in fundraising for Israel. While the collecting of funds for Israel was mainly a
centralized process handled by the United Jewish Appeal, now many smaller
organizations raise money for specific projects and organizations in Israel
which are in line with their political stances. In addition, American Jews in-
creasingly spend time working and living part-​time in Israel and regularly
consume Israeli news and culture, thereby gaining a direct and individual
impression of state and society in Israel (Sasson 2010, 186).
With the emergence of new organizations on the left and on the right,
Israeli governments now had to deal with a range of organizations and
diverging political positions within the American Jewish community.
Against the background of the Israeli-​Palestinian conflict, Israel’s attractive-
ness for US American Jews has decreased. While most US American Jews
still stand with Israel in general terms, they frequently voice criticism and
diverging opinions on the Israeli government’s policies, in particular with
regard to the conflict with the Palestinians. An increasing camp of young
American Jewish activists openly departs from former generations’ uncrit-
ical advocacy for the Jewish state’s policies. Instead, these activists partici-
pate in an emergent Jewish-​Palestinian solidarity movement, merging ideas
of social justice and human rights with a reframed Jewish identity which
emphasizes the prophetic and social justice oriented character of Judaism
(Omer 2019).
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 221

Israeli officials—​the President, the Prime Minister, and other govern-

ment ministers—​still do not miss a single big conference of the traditional
lobby organizations such as AJC, AIPAC, or CPMAJO in order to project the
state’s soft power by evoking Jewish solidarity. However, giving welcoming

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speeches at these conferences does not exhaust the repertoire of soft power
deployed by the state.
Since the late 1990s, Israel has tried to adapt to the new plurality of views
as well as the more direct and individual forms of engagement of American
Jews with Israel. The Israeli government is among the major funders of
the so-​called Taglit-​Birthright program. The homeland tourism program
Taglit-​Birthright is targeted at young Jewish adults at the age of 18 to 26. The
program especially reaches out to Jews outside Israel who are not already
involved in Diaspora organizations. Taglit-​Birthright brings them to Israel
for 10-​day educational trips which are organized by several tour organiza-
tions. The organization oversees the program and, most importantly, designs
and regulates its educational content. Since its inception, more than 750.000
young Jewish adults from around the world have visited Israel on one of
these trips.
Based on the literature on diaspora politics, Abramson analyses home-
land tourism “as an attempt to construct a diasporic identity”; such
“diasporization” is “used by political actors within the state and outside of
it to diasporize the participants—​to transform a land into a homeland and
create a sense of collective identity across borders” (Abramson 2017, 15).
Taglit-​Birthright was founded against the background of growing concerns
among American Jewish organizations about Jewish continuity due to
high rates of inter-​marriage and processes of assimilation and seculariza-
tion in the United States. However, the idea was first brought up by Israeli
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yossi Beilin, and then taken up by Jewish
philanthropists as well as major US Jewish organizations. Today, the goals of
Taglit-​Birthright reach beyond the US context and explicitly include the re-
lationship to and support of the State of Israel: “Birthright Israel seeks to en-
sure the future of the Jewish people by strengthening Jewish identity, Jewish
communities, and connection with Israel via a trip to Israel for the majority
of Jewish young adults from around the world. [. . .] Our hope is that our
trips motivate young people to continue to explore their Jewish identity and
support for Israel and maintain long-​lasting connections with the Israelis
they meet on their trip” (Birthright Israel 2012). In order to achieve these
goals, the trips focus on three core themes: narratives of the Jewish people,
222 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

contemporary Israel, and ideas and values of the Jewish people (Birthright
Israel 2012, 6–​7). The groups visit historical and religious sites in Israel such
as Yad Vashem, the City of David, or Independence Hall. All groups also visit
Masada, the Western Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem, as well as the Knesset

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or the Supreme Court.
The strategic attempt to construct a diasporic identity through direct,
physical experience of the homeland and personal encounters with Israeli
and other Jewish peers includes three processes according to Abramson: a
certain territory is transformed into a homeland in parallel to the existing
home at the country of residence; a narrative of dispersion is created and
shared among co-​ethnics or co-​citizens across borders; and a group mem-
bership is demarcated—​“crystallizing a group identity vis-​à-​vis excluded
others” (Abramson 2017, 15). In addition to tools for diasporization such
as storytelling (e.g., by the tour guide), physical engagement (e.g., hiking)
and group crystallization, the program uses rituals in order to create attach-
ment to the land. The borderlines between secular and religious rituals and
ceremonies are being blurred—​ranging from dancing at sunset in front of
the Western Wall to lighting candles at Shabbat, group blessings or personal
prayers upon reaching the top of Masada (Abramson 2017, 19). As one of the
major funders of Taglit-​Birthright, the State of Israel can certainly be said
to employ some sort of religious soft power via these trips, seeking to build
long-​lasting support from American Jews by acquainting them with the
“homeland,” its culture, society, history, and, not least, its religious tradition.

Steadfast Support: Israel and US American

Evangelical Christians

The intense lobby work of the American Jewish community certainly helps
explaining why Israel plays such a prominent role in US foreign policy, at
times even outdoing other major global concerns such as the rise of China
or the Syrian war. However, as Miller argues, “the American constituency
most supportive of Israel is not Jews but fundamentalist and evangelical
Christians” (Miller 2014, 8). In 2013, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life reported that 82 percent of Evangelicals “believed that Israel was given
to the Jewish people by God—​more than double the percentage of American
Jews who held this belief [. . .]” (Miller 2014). A recent Pew Research Center
survey found that Jewish Americans, despite their strong attachment to Israel,
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 223

are divided in their assessment of the Trump administration’s policies toward

Israel such as moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israel’s
sovereignty over the Golan heights: “Roughly four-​in-​ten (42%) say they
think Trump is favoring the Israelis too much, while a similar share (47%)

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say he is striking the right balance between the Israelis and Palestinians”
(Smith 2019). By contrast, 72 percent of Evangelical Protestants say they
think Trump strikes the right balance between the Israelis and Palestinians,
and 15 percent say that Trump favors the Israelis too much (Smith 2019).
The Evangelical supporters of the State of Israel are often called Christian
Zionists, combining Christian belief and the specific Jewish nationalism
which has its origins in 19th century Europe. The literature which seeks to
explain Christian Zionists` strong attachment to Israel focuses predomi-
nantly on specific religious and theological beliefs and ideas. The theology of
premillennial dispensationalism gets by far the most attention, probably due
to its fascinating strangeness in the eyes of mostly secular social scientists.5
Premillennial dispensationalism was conceived and disseminated in the
mid-​nineteenth century by the Anglican dissenter John Nelson Darby.
Conventionally, the Christian tradition held by-​and-​large that the Jews had
lost their status as a “chosen people” when they rejected Jesus as the Messiah;
instead, the church inherited God’s covenant. Darby and his successors
rejected what is commonly known as “replacement theology.” Based on his
reading of the Bible, Darby divided salvation history in seven epochs which
he called dispensations. The so-​called Church Age or Great Parenthesis is
the sixth and current dispensation. Once the church has fulfilled its role,
Christian believers will be “physically carried off into the clouds to be safe
with Christ in an event called the Rapture” (Spector 2009, 14). After this rap-
ture and a so-​called tribulation of seven years, Jesus is expected to destroy the
enemy at Armageddon and install his throne in Jerusalem (Hummel 2019,
12). The Jews play an important role in that tribulation as there “will be an
opening of the eyes of some Jews to the truth of Jesus Christ. These Jewish
believers will then evangelize the remaining Gentiles” (Shapiro 2015, 11).
Thus, the Jews are being ascribed a new centrality in the unfolding of divine
history, quite contrary to previous replacement theology. God’s covenant
with the Jewish people has never been repealed, his promises to the Jewish
people are still valid today.
In the United States, Christian Zionist ideas appeared already in the late
19th century, promoted by the dispensationalist William E. Blackstone
(Shindler 2000, 157). The founding of the Jewish state in 1948 and the
224 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

subsequent wars are seen by dispensationalists as clear signs that the end
times are near. As Spector notes: “At the center of the dispensational system
is the idea that the Jews would establish their own state. Without that, there
would be no Antichrist, no tribulation, no battle of Armageddon, and no

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Second Coming” (Spector 2009, 14–​15).
The majority of Christian Zionists believe in dispensationalism to some
degree. Some observers argue that their support and attachment to Israel
runs so deep that Christian Zionism has developed into an outsider diaspora
nationalism. The performance of Zionism by Evangelical Christians, Sturm
(2018) argues, is actually a performance of their religion and not just an in-
strumental use of religion for nationalist ideologies: Judaism, Jews and Israel
“are essential parts to the performance, and therefore practice, of their re-
ligion, regardless of them serving an imminent/​immanent function in the
continuum of history” (Sturm 2018, 302). As Christian Zionists’ perception
of End Times draws closer, Sturm shows how their national loyalty is in the
process of shifting from America to Israel.
However, there are also other currents in contemporary Evangelicalism.
Many Evangelicals base their support for Israel less on sophisticated apoc-
alyptic theories and more on basic biblical teachings. In the center of what
Mohr (2013) calls Biblical Christian Zionism stands Genesis 12:3 which
connects the welfare of peoples to the way they treat Israel: “And I will bless
them that bless thee, And curse him that curseth thee: And in thee shall all
families of the earth be blessed” (The Bible). Not least because critics argue
that dispensationalists only support the Jewish people due to their pivotal
role in the end times, knowing that many Jews will be killed during the tribu-
lation, Christian Zionist organizations tend to downplay dispensational the-
ology and instead emphasize scripture which highlights God’s continuous
covenant with the Jewish people. Therefore, Genesis 12:3 is like a common
denominator of Christian Zionism today, allowing for interreligious cooper-
ation with Jewish organizations and individuals.
At the progressive end of the Evangelical spectrum, Christian ethics play
a more important role than apocalyptic scenarios in explaining support for
modern Israel. Against the background of recent history in which the Jews
of Europe suffered extraordinary cruelties at the hand of Christians, liberal
churches seek to complete the work of the Reformation, fight anti-​Semitism
and make amends for past sins by protecting and supporting Jews and the
Jewish state (Mead 2008, 31). Thus, the quest for reconciliation has become a
driving force for pro-​Israel activism (Hummel 2019).
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 225

The dominant focus in the literature on specific religious ideas has led to
the impression that Christian Zionism is a direct consequence of Evangelical
theology. In a recent book, Hummel posits instead that “the evangelical po-
litical movement to support Israel is a product of advocacy, organizing, and

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cooperation beginning after the founding of the state of Israel in 1948 and
advancing significantly in the wake of the 1967 Arab-​Israeli War” (Hummel
2019, 8). Instead of assuming a simplistic translation of religious ideas into
political action, Hummel emphasizes a range of factors—​and one of them is
the active engagement of the State of Israel. The Christian Zionist movement,
Hummel argues, is “built on three pillars of recent origin: interreligious en-
counter, support by the government of Israel and by American Jewish allies,
and changing evangelical attitudes toward political mobilization. [. . .] The
rise of the Christian Zionist movement required strategic leadership, theo-
logical interreligious cooperation, political mobilization, and state-​to-​state
diplomacy.” In his book, Hummel presents an impressive historical account
of all of these factors—​including the State of Israel’s role: “Outside actors—​
the government of Israel chief among them—​have been constitutive to
creating modern evangelical Christian Zionism and, by extension, modern
conservative evangelical politics” (Hummel 2019, 15).
Israel, which sought to improve its image and searched for international
support, recognized early on the potential of Christian Zionist interest
in Israel. When in the 1950s the American G. Douglas Young founded the
American Institute of Holy Land Studies and began to call US-​Evangelicals’
attention to the political implications of dispensational theology, the Israeli
government was at first concerned about possible missionary ambitions.
Later on, after Young had moved to Israel and dispersed those concerns, he
and his institute enjoyed the support of the Israeli government—​and espe-
cially the foreign ministry—​for their efforts to mobilize a new generation of
Evangelicals for Israel. From 1967 through 1973, Hummel reports, “Young
spoke as many as 200 times a month throughout Europe and North America,
often under the auspices of Israel’s Ministry of Tourism” (Hummel 2019, 49).
During the same period, Israeli officials such as Yitzhak Rabin made first
appearances before US Evangelical audiences, and prominent Evangelicals
such as Billy Graham voiced their support for Israel and sought alignment
with American Jews as well as the State of Israel.
Israel actively worked to gather Evangelical support for its policies after
the 1967 war in which it had occupied the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip,
the West Bank and East Jerusalem with the Temple Mount and the Old
226 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

City. Confronted with increasing criticism—​not only from states and in-
ternational institutions, but also from Catholic and mainline Protestant
churches—​Israel, in cooperation with American Jewish defense organiza-
tions, sought to “create an evangelical pro-​Israel movement that would ad-

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vance Israeli national interests in the American public and apply electoral
pressure in support of Israeli policies” (Hummel 2019, 65). Shortly after
the war, Yona Malachy, deputy director of the Christian Desk in Israel’s
foreign ministry, undertook a study tour of US Protestant seminaries and
colleges, including Ivy League universities such as Harvard and Princeton,
but also conservative Evangelical colleges. There he found widespread be-
lief in dispensational theology and Israel’s prophetic significance, but little
transfer of these beliefs into tangible political action on behalf of Israel
(Hummel 2019, 70). Therefore, part of the effort to reach out to conserva-
tive Evangelicals was to convey the ample importance of the actual land to
Jewish peoplehood. This was to be achieved by Jewish scholars who engaged
in interreligious Jewish-​Christian research and dialogue and taught their
Christian counterparts about the centrality of the land and the State of Israel
in Jewish self-​understanding (Hummel 2019, 68–​69). Among Evangelicals
who believed that the 1967 war was a fulfilment of Biblical prophecy before
the Second Coming, this outreach fell on fertile ground.
In 1971, conservative Evangelicals organized a Bible prophecy conference
in Jerusalem. The conference was attended by 1400 US American Christians.
Israel’s government provided the Jerusalem Convention Center free of
charge, and former Prime Minister David Ben-​Gurion addressed the con-
ference and talked about Israel as the land of the Jewish people. This con-
ference is seen as helping to spur two important developments: large-​scale
Evangelical tourism to Israel and an increasingly close alliance between
Israel’s conservative party, Likud, and Christian Zionists (Belhassen and Ebel
2009, 363; Spector 2009, 146).
Interestingly, by vigorously promoting Evangelical tourism to the Holy
Land, Israel used a similar strategy to employ religious soft power as it did
later in the case of the Birthright Israel tours for American Jews discussed
above: facilitating direct experience of the physical land, combined with
the dissemination of a specific ideological-​religious framing of this en-
counter. From the 1970s on, the Israeli Ministry of Tourism brought “hun-
dreds of evangelical pastors to the Jewish state at no charge” (Spector 2009,
146). In the following decades, the number of organizers of Holy Land tours
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 227

grew steadily. Belhassen-​Ebel sees four different actors involved in this en-
deavor: Christian Zionist organizations such as the International Christian
Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ), grass-​roots tour organizers in the United States,
the tourists or pilgrims themselves, and Israeli officials who choose to pro-

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mote Christian Zionist tourism due to its Zionist orientation and econom-
ical value (Belhassen and Ebel 2009, 367). The Ministry of Tourism worked
closely with Christian Zionists; it acted

as a gatekeeper, promoting familiar evangelical leaders and sidelining those

who fell outside its political goals. Longtime evangelical allies helped mar-
keting firms and government ministries develop strategies for Holy Land
tourism, creating the Christian Zionist pitches to evangelical tourists: Israel
as the homeland of Judaism and Christianity; the modern state of Israel
as a sacred expression of biblical prophecy; Israel as a unique site of
interreligious reconciliation. (Hummel 2019, 84)

Weber has called these tours “tour bus diplomacy,” pointing to the instru-
mental value of this strategy of projecting religious soft power in order to in-
fluence American politics toward Israel (Weber 2005, 220–​222).
In addition to this level of practical support for Christian Zionist Holy
Land tourism, Israeli leaders sought to build and benefit from personal
relationships to Christian Zionist leaders. Golda Meir, for example, sought
the help of Billy Graham who was close to President Nixon when diplomatic
relations were at a low during the Nixon years (Hummel 2019, 73). The rela-
tionship between Israel and Christian Zionists became even closer—​or “sym-
biotic,” as Shindler (2000, 156) argues—​when Likud came into government
in 1977. Despite the theological-​political peculiarities of dispensationalism
which saw the Jews as an instrument in bringing about the second coming of
Jesus, the Likud nevertheless wished to strengthen the ties with the Christian
right and the Republicans “in order to maintain a Congressional bulwark
against Presidential moves toward a peace settlement in the Middle East”
(Shindler 2000, 169). Prime Minister Menachem Begin cultivated a special
relationship with Christian Zionist leaders, most notably the televangelist
Jerry Falwell. The rise of the Likud and its embrace of the messianic traits of
national-​religious Zionism—​epitomized in the settler movement in the oc-
cupied territories—​coincided with the rise of conservative Evangelicalism in
the United States, most visible in the increasing political influence of Falwell’s
228 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse

organization “Moral Majority.” Christian Zionist support, Shindler finds,

“proved to be important for successive Likud governments because there was
a common ideological denominator in retaining territory and a willingness
vociferously to promote it in the White House and US government circles”

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(Shindler 2000, 165).
This special relationship between Israeli officials, mostly from the
Likud, and Christian Zionists has endured up to the present age. Benjamin
Netanyahu invested heavily in personal ties with Christian Zionist leaders
in both his tenures as Prime Minister of Israel. Back in the 1990s, he en-
listed them in his efforts to roll back the Oslo peace process which was based
on territorial compromise. In his second stint as head of government from
2009 to 2020, he again sought Christian Zionists’ support for his uncom-
promising stance on territorial issues. At a virtual conference of Christians
United for Israel (CUFI), currently the most important Evangelical lobby or-
ganization for Israel in the United States, Netanyahu said that Biblical sites
such as the Jewish settlements Beit El and Shiloh were “an integral part of
the historic Jewish homeland” and “these places are also an integral part of
Christian identity, part of your heritage and of our common civilization.” He
added that “under Israeli sovereignty, this heritage will be forever protected”
(Tibon 2020). He praised then-​US president Donald Trump for presenting
a Middle East plan that would have allowed Israel to annex these territories
which have been under military occupation since 1967. Netanyahu utilized
the fact that Donald Trump rallied for the Evangelical vote in the 2020 elec-
tion. During the Trump years, Evangelical Christians “reached the zenith of
political power in Washington,” shaping a range of US policies, including on
Israel and the Israeli-​Palestinian conflict (Lynch 2021). Therefore, the Israeli
government had considerable incentives to influence the Evangelical constit-
uency in its own direction by using the religious soft power at its disposal.
Its zenith might now lie behind Christian Zionism. Naftali Bennett, who
became Prime Minister in 2021, had a somewhat rough start regarding his
government’s standing in Christian Zionist circles. Evangelicals criticized
the right-​wing, religious-​nationalist politician Bennett for joining a gov-
ernment with centrist Israeli parties and even an Arab Israeli party, thereby
sparking fears of renewed chances for a two-​state solution. In addition, polls
show that the support for Israel among young US Evangelicals has con-
siderably dropped in recent years (Lynch 2021). It remains to be seen how
the new government will adjust its religious soft power in the light of these
developments.
 Israel’s Religious Soft Power 229

Israel’s Religious Soft Power

The Israeli government is in a unique position for exercising religious soft

power. The small territory at the Mediterranean has been the site of both the

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history of the Jewish people as well as the early history of Christendom. The
stories of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament—​those pertaining to the
past and those telling of the future—​are deeply entwined with the landscape
and locations which make up this territory. Both communities described
above have their very own motivations and reasons to support the Jewish
state. However, this paper has shown how Israeli governments skillfully
use the religious traditions, beliefs, imagery, and hopes tied to Erez Israel/​
the Holy Land in order to strengthen the bonds of these communities with
the State of Israel. Given the size and importance of Jewish and Evangelical
communities in the United States, they often prove to be crucial in US
elections. Therefore, Israeli officials have a considerable interest in obtaining
their support in order to determine the framework of debate in a way that
shapes the US administration’s preferences with regard to Israel.
Among a variety of strategies for employing religious soft power, the
government’s promotion and support of bringing both American Jews and
American Evangelicals to Israel stands out. The government’s financial and
organizational involvement in these touristic trips is geared toward ensuring
that visitors are provided with an image of Israel which reflects the state’s ide-
ological foundations as well as its policies on various issues. The trips are care-
fully designed to combine religious and cultural experiences with an overall
political message to support the contemporary State of Israel. Therefore, the
instrument of tourism seems to be an important tool for exercising Israel’s
religious soft power to these specific religious-​cultural communities in the
United States.

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