Seminario “Retos históricos y actuales del norte de México y el suroeste de Estados Unidos:

frontera, migración y economía”

1 de febrero de 2024
No citar ni circular el texto sin autorización explícita del autor

The businesses of migration in transit: smuggling and corruption in the

1920s Mexico

Abraham Trejo Terreros

División de Historia, CIDE

Introduction
In November 1925, Americans José Fernández-Valdez and John Gelabert were sentenced to one
and two years in prison for attempting to fraudulently smuggle six foreigners Jews from Poland,
Russia and Spain into Laredo, Texas.1 Before this point, the immigrants had made stops in
Havana, Cuba, and Tampico, Mexico. Reports from the immigration authorities of Mexico and
the United States lead us to conclude that Fernández-Valdez and Gelabert were the human
smugglers hired by the six individuals to assist them in entering the United States. All six of
them were detained from the day they tried to enter on July 22, 1925, until November 20,
when they were deported to Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. Their statements to the U. S.
authorities revealed that the Americans had deceived them by assuring them that "with their
American passport, they would have no difficulty entering Mexico and then the United States."2
When the six foreigners were deported to Nuevo Laredo, the Mexican immigration inspector
demanded a bond of four hundred Mexican pesos (200 USD) from each of them, arguing that

1
Archivo Histórico del Instituto Nacional de Migración, Mexico City (hereafter AHINM) Exp. 4/362.3-1925-4; “The
United States vs John Gelabert & José Fernández-Valdez”, casefile 1308, box 57, Record Group 21, United States
District Courts Southern District of Texas, Laredo Division, Criminal Case Files, National Archives and Record
Administration (Fort Worth). (Hereafter NARA Fort Worth).
2
“The United States vs John Gelabert & José Fernández-Valdez”, casefile 1308, box 57, NARA Fort Worth.
this money would cover the cost of their deportation to Havana, or in their case, it would serve
as a fine for violating Mexican law. The Mexican immigration inspector contended that the six
Jews should be expelled to Cuba because they had entered the country from that island
through means he described as "malicious and fraudulent." Family members and potential
employers in Mexico and the U. S. supported individuals' trajectories by providing economic
resources and essential contacts for successful immigration to the U.S. The Nuevo Laredo
inspector, Félix Salinas, received letters from residents in Laredo, Texas, and Mexico City,
assuring that the six foreigners had excellent financial standing and would not become a burden
on the country. It is fair to assume that Inspector Salinas received bribes in addition to the
letters of recommendation because he advocated before the Department of Migration Central
Office for these migrants to stay in Mexico despite their irregular entry.3 This case highlights
the specialization of intermediaries in the falsification or fraudulent use of documents, as well
as the practice of paying bribes to Mexican inspectors as a requirement to meet the
immigration regulations of both countries. The 1921 Emergency Quota Act and the 1924
Immigration Act in the U.S. reflected postwar xenophobia and eugenics support4 but did not
include specific provisions for Jewish immigrants. Instead, they instituted a quota system
favoring Northern and Western European individuals while significantly limiting immigration
from Southern and Eastern Europe, which included a substantial Jewish population. This
nationality-based system assigned lower quotas to Southern and Eastern European countries
than their counterparts in the North and West, resulting in a notable decline in Jewish
immigration to the United States.5 These U.S. quota laws, centered on national origins,
adversely affected the six individuals mentioned, hindering their migration. Their Jewish
identity played a crucial role in navigating communication with relatives and potential
employers in the U.S. and Mexico, addressing the constraints imposed by both the quota
system and Mexican immigration regulations.
This article analyzes the distinct trajectories of Chinese, Italian, and European Jewish

3
AHINM,Exp. 4/362.3-1925-4.
4
Julian Lim, Porous borders: Multiracial migrations and the law in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, (North Carolina:
University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 12
5
Maddalena Marinari, “The 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts a Century Later: Roots and Long Shadows”, Journal
of American History, Volume 109, Issue 2, September 2022, 271–283.

2
migrants in Mexico, focusing specifically on the assistance solicited from human smugglers
during the U.S. quota system. The study highlights these communities' contrasting strategies to
circumvent U.S. and Mexican immigration controls in the 1920s and sheds light on their unique
trajectories within Mexico. Notably, the economic gains from movement across Mexico
affected both the burgeoning human smuggling business and Mexican immigration offices,
intertwining the experiences of migrants and the corruption landscape in the country.
Traditional historiography has primarily focused on the final destinations of migration and the
implications of new arrivals for the economy, citizenship dynamics, identity formation, and the
broader impact on the political community. It emphasizes the establishment of new permanent
residences after crossing international borders.6 However, this perspective has marginalized
the analysis of the dynamics inherent in the migratory process, partly due to the absence of
systematic archives documenting movement through different countries before settling in
centers of migratory attraction, such as the United States. Recent research, which focuses on
the in-depth study of the border, has facilitated comparisons among diverse border-crossing
experiences. Challenging the assumption that immigration regulations had uniform impacts on
diverse immigration communities, scholars have recently examined the U.S.-Mexico border to
underscore the diversity of border-crossing experiences, including factors such as race, gender,
and class. Historians Julian Lim and Patrick Ettinger have illuminated the diverse experiences of
those entering the Mexican border, in contrast to those arriving through seaports. These
scholars offer a more nuanced view of immigrant selection in the context of border dynamics,
revealing that a "porous border" led immigrants to create various "back doors" to enter the
United States.7

6
The bibliography is extensive, but the following titles are noteworthy: Kitty Calavita. Inside the State: the Bracero
Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. New York: Routledge, 1992; Jon Gjerde. Major Problems in American
Immigration and Ethnic History. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998); Donna Gabaccia. Italy's Many Diasporas:
Elites, Exiles and Workers of the World, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000); Douglas Massey, Jorge
Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic
Integration. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Erika Lee, At America´s gates. Chinese immigration
during the exclusion era, 1882-1943, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Roger Daniels,
Guarding the golden door. American immigration policy and immigrants since 1882, (New York: Hill & Wang,
2004); Tamar Jacoby. Reinventing the Melting Pot: the New Immigrants and What It Means to Be American, (New
York: Basic Books, 2004); Mae M. Ngai, Impossible subjects. Illegal aliens and the making of modern America,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
7
Julian Lim, Porous borders; Patrick Ettinger, Imaginary Lines. Border Enforcement and the Origins of
Undocumented Immigration, 1882-1930, (USA: University of Texas Press, 2009)

3
 First, Lim argues that immigration regulation profoundly shaped border-crossing
experiences, not only racializing diverse groups but also demanding total differentiation. The
result was that multiracial relations became socially problematic and dangerous to national
identity, primarily for the United States.8 In addition to this argument, this article posits that
the variety of immigrant communities socializing in the border region was a key factor in
understanding U.S. immigration control. For example, smuggling strategies employed by
Mexicans were also applied by Chinese, and other undesirable groups. In addition, Lim argues
that understanding immigrants' trajectories to the border and their experiences requires an
understanding of Mexico's immigration policies along with the U.S. system. Historian Kelly Lytle
Hernandez, analyzing immigration control bilaterally, asserts that the Mexican regime was the
result of the social impact of U.S. policy enforcement. According to this historian, the Mexican
Immigration Service extended the U.S. scheme south of the border.9
Complicating these assertions, I provide evidence of negotiations and arrangements
foreigners navigated in Mexico to reach the international border. Highlighting the emergence of
U.S. and Mexico migration control systems after 1917, particularly in the 1920s, spurred
migration-related businesses. Human smuggling became an illicit activity for evading
surveillance and surreptitiously entering the U.S. The attraction of a larger, complex immigrant
population through the Mexico border increased investments by both states to regulate
border-crossings. Simultaneously, human smuggling services engaged in complex schemes to
circumvent regulation. This circuit fostered corruption as a crucial practice to evade
immigration control or comply with the law. Bribery had broader implications in
postrevolutionary Mexico than in the U.S., influencing the experiences of individuals attempting
to enter U.S. territory through Mexico. This article contributes to the more recent
historiography by problematizing the emergence of two migratory systems that sometimes
mutually supported each other to exclude but whose contradictions allowed migrants to take
advantage of normative gaps and exploit their support networks to reach the United States.
The recent inclusion of research on the history of migration management and policy in Mexico

8
Julian Lim, Porous borders, 8-10.
9
Julian Lim, Porous borders, 113-15; Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra! A history of the U.S. border patrol,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 95 & ch. 4.

4
adds a more complex and human perspective to this picture.
Erika Lee analyzes U.S. strategies for regulating immigration at both the northern and
southern borders. The U.S. employed diplomatic channels for Canada, controlling migratory
flows in cities like Seattle, Washington, Buffalo, and New York. Conversely, the Mexican border
saw a bureaucratic approach with a focus on surveillance, patrolling, and deportation, mainly
near San Diego, California, San Antonio, and El Paso, Texas.10 On the other hand, proximity to
the U. S. is crucial to understanding Mexico's migratory history.11 The research highlights
Mexico's northern border as a site of immigration interception and rejection, emphasizing the
efforts of the Mexican state during the establishment of the Border Patrol in 1924 in the U. S.
and the reorganization of the immigration office in Mexico in 1926. Thus, this study addresses a
gap in understanding the connections between U.S. immigration control. Firstly, Mexico's
Migration Service has roots in the 19th century, as elites aimed to modernize agriculture
through European immigration. However, the modern immigration control system, originating
in 1909 with the Immigration Law, regulated the arrival of individuals deemed undesirables due
to public health, protection of labor market, and racism, particularly targeting Chinese
immigrants.12 Contrasting the Porfirista Migratory Service (1876-1911) with the post-
Revolution era reveals a shift from immigration-focused policies to the incorporation of
emigration, evident in provisions from 1917, and more distinctly in the 1926 and 1930
migration laws. In the 19th century, rules governing foreigners' entry and stay were tied to
colonization efforts, evolving into the Migration Law of 1926, which aimed to control and
document foreigners, establishing a differentiation between immigrants and tourists. Mexican
Immigration officials closely examined the U.S. institutional framework, defining undesirable
aliens based on revolutionary nationalism, contrasting with their northern neighbors' criteria.
Additionally, the presence of foreigners significantly influenced immigration regulations.13

10
Erika Lee, At America´s gates, 151-152, 158-160; Robert Chao Romero, The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940,
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 3.
11
Pablo Yankelevich, ¿Deseables o inconvenientes? Las fronteras de la extranjería en el México
posrevolucionario, (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2011)
12
Andrés Landa y Piña, El Servicio de Migración en México, (México: Secretaría de Gobernación, Talleres
Gráficos de la Nación, 1930), 6-8; Abraham Trejo Terreros, “Saberes y prácticas médicos durante la revolución
bacteriológica y la ley de inmigración mexicana de 1909”, Historia Mexicana, 291, Enero-Marzo, 2024.
13
Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros. Raza, normas y corrupción en la gestión de la extranjería en México, 1900-1950,
(México: El Colegio de México, Bonilla Artigas Editores, Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2019).

5
Mexico's distinction between tourist and permanent immigration served to control and register
the identity and activities of entering foreigners, contributing to a comprehensive immigration
approach by regulating disparities between temporary and permanent entries. In this context,
the article explores the enforcement of immigration rules on foreigners deemed undesirable,
highlighting the arbitrary practices of immigration agents. Despite limited demographic flows,
Mexico paradoxically adopted restrictive immigration policies. This tension between real and
imagined foreign presence is evident in Mexico's anti-Semitism despite a small Jewish
population. The Jewish and Chinese communities encountered significant rejection in the
country during the first half of the 20th century.14
In 1923, U.S. and Mexican immigration agents coined the term "coyotes" for individuals
aiding the irregular border crossing. This practice extended beyond Mexican day laborers to
involve people from various nations.15 Recent research shows that the rise of these facilitators
affected agents on both sides, as corruption in border agencies facilitated profitable migrant
smuggling. While I focus on the Mexican case due to its implications for migration control, it's
not unique to Mexico.16 Comparing three migrant groups entering the U.S. allows a detailed
analysis of this business, contributing to understanding human smuggling in a specific historical
and social context. This enriches the historiography of migration and border control in Mexico
and the U.S., highlighting human trafficking as a significant, rather than an anomalous,
component in these contexts.
Additionally, the oversight of "in-transit" migration has limited historical understanding
of this phenomenon. The concept emerged in response to States' efforts to oversee, categorize,
and manage people's movements. In the nineteenth century, European migration regulations
defined migrants as those "en route to" who temporarily entered their territories, marked with
identification cards indicating the ship's final destination, often the United States. The term

14
Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros; Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, El antisemitismo y la ideología de la Revolución
Mexicana, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2010), 11-12
15
Álvaro Obregón, “III Informe de Gobierno del Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
Álvaro Obregón 1° de septiembre de 1923”, en Informes presidenciales. Álvaro Obregón, Cámara de Diputados,
Centro de Documentación, Información y Análisis, 2006, 173; Immigration and Naturalization Service Annual
Report (1923).
16
See Laura Gutiérrez, “Coyotaje, Corruption, and Border Enforcement in ‘Ambos Nogales’ in the 1930s”, Pacific
Historical Review (2023) 92 (1): 93–118.

6
"migrants in transit" is employed from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) records.
Establishing specific timeframes for such stays is challenging, ranging from days to years in
intermediary countries, as highlighted in recent historiography on transit migration. This
variable duration has remained constant since this migratory flow emerged. Conversely, in
examining international demographic movements, scholars introduced the term "migratory
chain" to describe situations where individuals relocate based on the presence of relatives or
acquaintances at the destination. Research on migration chains focuses on understanding how
this attraction influences immigrants and the subsequent economic, demographic, and social
implications. This article relies on the category of migrant networks to indicate that potential
migrants receive information about international mobility through family and friends,
influencing their decision to embark on the journey and providing financial support. Networks
also offer guidance on Mexican cities to reach and individuals to contact for border crossings,
including trustworthy human smugglers and migration agents. Migration networks encompass
more than information exchange, often guiding migrants through proven successful routes for
entering the United States.17
By tracing migrant routes, this article presents a historical account of the evolution of
migration control measures and strategies to circumvent them. The research offers evidence on
the factors shaping U.S.-Mexico border migration, including bureaucratic efficiency, the
significance of family networks, and methods of unauthorized border crossing. The study relies
on archives of immigration, family, and community documents from the U.S. and Mexico, with
a focus on repositories covering Chinese migration in California and European Jewish migration
in Texas. Additionally, documents from shipping companies in Rotterdam are utilized. The
article, organized to illustrate the experiences of foreigners crossing Mexican territory in the
1920s, begins with a sociodemographic approach to Chinese, Italian, and Jewish communities in

17
Max Kohler, Immigration and aliens in the United States. Studies of American immigrations laws and the legal
status of aliens in the United States, (New York: Bloch Pub. Co., 1936), 42, 303-304; Katja Wüstenbecker,
“Hamburg and the Transit of East European Emigrants”, en Andreas Fahrmeir, Olivier Faron, Patrick Weil (eds.),
Migration control in the North Atlantic World, (New York: Berghahn, 2003), 223.234; Michael Boyden, Hans
Krabbendam & Liselotte Vandenbussche (eds.), Tales of transit: narrative migrants’ spaces in Atlantic perspective,
1850-1950, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 9-11; Tanya Basok, et. al., Rethinking Transit
Migration: precarity, mobility, and self-making in Mexico, (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), Chapter
1.

7
Mexico, comparing them to their U.S. counterparts. It then explores the norms of the same
decade, crucial for examining, in the second part, the services provided by human smugglers,
the routes through Mexico, and the contrasting prices paid to smugglers.

Chinese, Italian and Jew immigration in 1920s Mexico

The sociodemographic compositions, migration patterns, and key cities and industries
associated with Chinese, Italian, and Jewish immigrants arriving in the U. S. from 1880 to 1930
are well-documented. As our understanding of transnational immigration community formation
in the U.S. and Mexico expands, a comparative approach can enhance our analysis of the
complex relationship between immigration control and settlement along the border. Notably,
from 1880 to 1930, settlement patterns for Chinese, Italians, and Jews in the U.S. were distinct,
shaped by migration trends and economic conditions. To shed light on how U.S. industries
influenced migration routes through Mexican territory, I highlight community formation in
Mexico, intricately linked to each group's sociodemographic composition and employment in
diverse industries in both countries.
The significant migration of Chinese individuals to the U. S. in the latter half of the 19th
century began with the 1848 California Gold Rush, followed by an increased influx during the
transcontinental railroad construction starting in 1867. By the century's end, Chinese
immigrants in California engaged in various occupations, including agriculture, domestic
service, laundry work, mining, and manufacturing.18 Despite various challenges, they
predominantly settled on the West Coast, particularly in San Francisco's Chinatown, while
simultaneously establishing communities in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington,
Texas, and Florida. The Chinese, seeking entry into the U.S. without proper authorization,
utilized Canada and Mexico, prompting reinforcement of U.S. immigration laws affecting
Chinese communities on both sides of the border. Historian Robert Chao explores the
formation of the Sino-Mexican community, emphasizing immigrant smuggling networks from
China to the U.S. that extended into Mexico and various American cities.19

18
Robert Chao Romero, The Chinese, 21-22.
19
Erika Lee, At America´s gates, 151-152, 158-160; Robert Chao Romero, The Chinese, 3.

8
 Simultaneously, with restrictions on Chinese immigration to the U.S., certain sectors in
Mexico actively sought labor for agriculture, mining, and railway construction. This resulted in
substantial increases in the Chinese population in Mexico, evident in the 1895, 1900, and 1910
censuses, recording counts of 1,009, 2,835, and 13,203 individuals, respectively. By 1920, the
Chinese population in Mexico reached 14,813, predominantly comprising men. This contrasts
with U.S. census figures: 107,488, 89,863, and 71,531 Chinese immigrants in 1890, 1900, and
1910, respectively, decreasing to 61,659 by 1920. 20

The 1910 Mexican census reported a Chinese community in the border state of Sonora
of 4,449 people, with counts of 663 and 851 in Sinaloa and Baja California, respectively. A 1919
report from the Mexico Department of Labor anticipated increased Chinese immigration in
northern regions during the Revolution, with 6,078 individuals in Sonora and 1,573 in Sinaloa.
The 1921 census confirmed this trend, with 2,019 and 5,889 Chinese residents in Sinaloa and
Baja California, respectively. Most Chinese immigrants arriving in Mexico concentrated in these
border territories until 1930.21
Examining states with the highest number of Chinese immigrants in Mexico, Oaxaca and
Colima, which had authorized ports for Asian immigrants, exhibited relatively low Chinese
populations during censuses from 1895 to 1930. This prompts inquiry into the destinations of
these immigrants upon arrival in Mexican ports.22 Some immediately migrated to the U.S.-
Mexico border, while others made temporary stops within Mexico, establishing communities
across the Mexican Republic. Consequently, the presence of migrants in border states played a
pivotal role in shaping the strategies employed by Chinese immigrants traversing Mexican
territory and crossing the border.
In contrast, Italians formed the largest immigrant community in early 20th-century
United States. Initially unskilled, they engaged in manual labor, particularly in construction and

20
Erika Lee, At America´s gates, 238; Robert Chao Romero, The Chinese, 43; Delia Salazar Anaya, Las cuentas de
los sueños. La presencia extranjera en México a través de estadísticas nacionales, 1880-1914, (México: Instituto
Nacional de Migración, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 2010), 276 & 279.
21
Inspección de migración de Esteban Flores, "Informe relativo a la inmigración china", Departamento del Trabajo
box 77, exp.1, Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City; Marco Antonio Samaniego López (coord.), Breve
historia de Baja California, (México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2006), 144-149; Jason Oliver Chang, Chino: anti-
chinese racism in Mexico, 1880-1940, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017), 87.
22
Cott, "Mexican", 72, quoted in Elliott Young, Alien nation. Chinese migration in the Americas from the coolie
era through World War II, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 171-172.

9
the garment industry, significantly influencing urban economies. Concentrating in urban areas,
such as New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia, Italians exhibited the highest return rate
among all U.S. nationalities. Between 1899 and 1924, 3,820,986 individuals from both southern
and northern Italy entered the United States. This wave of Italian immigration between 1880
and 1930 is widely called the grande migrazione. The prevailing profile of these Italian
immigrants was a male, typically from a rural background, driven by economic motives and
displaying notably high rates of return, the highest among all immigrant groups to the United
States. Toward the close of the 19th century, northern Italian migrants predominantly headed
to continental Europe, whereas southern Italian emigration primarily targeted overseas
territories. However, the cost of tickets was a critical factor in determining the final destination,
as traveling to the U. S. proved cheaper than venturing to Latin America. In contrast to the
substantial numbers in the United States, the Mexican government only counted 2,292 Italians
in the country in 1920. This number more than doubled in 1930 (4,908) and declined to 1,183
by 1940. Consequently, the grande migrazione did not significantly affect Mexico, and the few
Italians who settled there mainly engaged in agricultural, trade, or maritime occupations.23
Additionally, the U.S. quota laws led some Italians to re-enter the United States, with Mexico
serving as a mandatory stopover.
Jews, pivotal in the garment industry, significantly contributed to urban economies in
the U.S., showcasing diverse economic roles. Fleeing Eastern European persecution, they
sought economic opportunities, initially concentrating in New York, and extending migration to
Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Miami, and Los Angeles. Unlike Italians, Jewish migrants
formed communities in Mexico in the 1920s, tracing back to late 19th-century European
migrations. A substantial demographic exodus from Eastern Europe to the Western continent
occurred between 1880 and 1914, primarily to the United States. About 2.5 million Jews
undertook this journey, initially motivated by economic factors and later by the threat of
pogroms. Emigration was viewed as a solution to the expulsion of Jews from their territories.
While the flow of displaced Jews overlapped with emigrants, the former traveled in family
units, unable to return to their places of origin. Jewish associations played a crucial role in

23
Delia Salazar Anaya, Las cuentas, 170-174.

10
aiding these travelers.24
In 1907, the Galveston Project aimed to support European newcomers, guiding them to
the port in Texas. From 1907 to 1914, around 10,000 Eastern European Jews arrived at the Gulf
of Mexico port.25 In 1917, Mexico housed about two thousand Jews.26 President Álvaro
Obregón invited Jewish immigration in 1922, reaffirmed by President Plutarco Elías Calles,
resulting in the entry of 3,270 Ashkenazi Jews in the 1920s.27 Between 1920 and 1924, 581
Jews arrived, increasing to 1,957 from 1924 to 1928, with 43% of Russian and 39% of Polish
origin.28 Despite low initial numbers, the Jewish population in Mexico saw a 375% increase
between 1917 and 1930, becoming more "visible" amid prominent anti-Semitism. The
construction of Mexican national identity involved aggressively targeting "others," shaping the
revolutionary and postrevolutionary Mexican identity through monitoring foreign
immigration.29

Comparing the U.S. and Mexican migration systems

From the passage of the Page Act on March 3, 1875, which prohibited the entry of prostitutes,
coolies, and criminals, until 1943, the U. S. maintained a migration control system that
consistently excluded an increasing number of immigrants. The concept of an undesirable
immigrant was built on factors such as poverty, health, eugenics and racism.30 Additionally,

24
Michael R. Marrus, The unwanted. European refugees in the twentieth century, (New York, Oxford University,
1985), 31-39; Garland, After they closed the gates.
25
Bernard Marinbach, Galveston: Ellis Island of the West, (Nueva York: State University of New York Press,
1984). However, this figure appears small in comparison to the two million Jews from Europe who arrived between
1880 and 1924. Saskia Sassen, Inmigrantes y ciudadanos. De las migraciones masivas a la Europa fortaleza
(Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 2013), 115-128; Michael R. Marrus, The unwanted, 63.
26
Martin Zielonka, “Jews in Mexico are subject of Speech by Rabbi Zielonka”, The Daily Texas, (February 20,
1923).
27
Gloria Carreño, “Con los brazos abiertos” en Alicia Gojman de Backal (coord. Gral.), Generaciones judías en
México: la kehilá ashkenazí (1922-1992), Gloria Carreño, (coord), Tomo 1. Pasaporte a la esperanza, México,
Comunidad Ashkenazí de México, 1993, 51.
28
Gloria Carreño, Pasaporte.
29
Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, El antisemitismo, 11-12, 195-233. In 1930, the number of Jews in the country was 9,500.
Daniela Gleizer, El exilio incómodo: México y los refugiados judíos,1933-1945, (México: El Colegio de México),
2011, 57. For a general view see Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros; and the Chinese case can be found in Jason Oliver
Chang, Chino.
30
Mae M. Ngai, Impossible subjects; Roger Daniels, Guarding the golden door; Alan M. Kraut, Silent travelers:
germs, genes, and the “Immigrant Menace”, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

11
restrictive measures aimed at the Chinese, initiated by the "Chinese Exclusion Act" on May 6,
1882, were later extended to the Japanese in 1907 and, by 1917, applied to nearly all Asians
except for Filipinos. Historian Anna Pegler-Gordon posits that U.S. immigration policies are
rooted in the evolving international regime governing migration flows, the issuance of identity
documents, and the establishment of specialized immigration control offices.31
The Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, expanded and redefined the criteria for
undesirable immigrants, adding to the 1875 exclusion list: polygamists, individuals convicted of
moral offenses, and those with contagious diseases. In 1903, anarchists, people with epilepsy,
and gambling professionals were added to this list. Furthermore, in 1907, "imbeciles" and
tuberculosis patients were also subject to exclusion.32
Between 1917 and 1924, U.S. immigration regulations played a crucial role in shaping
the passage of individuals through Mexico before entering the U. S. and their strategies. The
Immigration Act of 1917 aimed to restrict people from southern and eastern Europe.33 The Act
of May 22, 1918, titled "Prevention in time of war of departure from or entry into the United
States contrary to the public safety", and the Act of March 2, 1921, titled "Regulations as to
Alien Passport Requirements", established the mandatory requirements for possessing a valid
passport for both entry to and departure from the country.34
The Act of May 19, 1921, known as "The First Quota Act" or the "Emergency Quota Act",
introduced an annual immigration quota equivalent to 3% of all U. S. residents with the same
nationality as recorded in the 1910 census. Nationality was determined based on the country of
birth, although the nations of the American continent were exempt from this quota.
Consequently, the number of individuals allowed to enter between June 1921 and May 1922
was limited to 350,000. This quota system led to a significant reduction in immigration, with
only 309,556 individuals entering, compared to the previous year's 805,228.35 Furthermore,
the regulations imposed a monthly limit, allowing 20% of the total annual quota to enter each

31
Anna Pegler-Gordon, In sight of America: Photography and the development of U.S. immigration
policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 2 & 8.
32
Patrick Ettinger, Imaginary Lines, 69-70.
33
Roger Daniels, Guarding, 45.
34
Anna Pegler-Gordon, In sight of America, chapters 5 & 6.
35
Carl Bankston, & Danielle Antoinette Hidalgo (eds.), Immigration in U.S. history. Volume 2, (Pasadena,
California: Salem, 2006), 343-353.

12
month, potentially exhausting the quota in just five months.36
Because the Emergency Quota Act had a one-year validity, the U.S. Congress passed the
May 11, 1922 Act, which amended and extended the May 19, 1921 Act. This extension
prolonged immigration restrictions until 1924, with significant implications for the mandatory
stopovers in third countries for migrants seeking entry into the United States. The Emergency
Quota Act also stipulated that foreigners who had resided in American countries the year
before applying to enter the U. S. would not be counted within their nationality quota.
However, the Immigration Act of 1924, commonly known as the Johnson-Reed Act and titled
"To limit the immigration of aliens into the United States", made notable changes. It increased
the requirement for the exception mentioned earlier to two years of residence and reduced the
quota by nationality from 3% to 2%.37 This act also shifted the quota base to the 1890 census, a
time when the amount of demographic flows had not yet arrived.38
Historian John Torpey underscores the role of passports in categorizing and selecting
citizens, legitimizing the state's monopoly over people's movement.39 The evolution of the U.S.
immigration control system, particularly with the Chinese Exclusion Acts, further highlighted
this mechanism.40 Verification of identity through documents resulted in corrupt practices
within the U.S. immigration service, as seen with Chinese migrants fabricating family identities
and relationships to bypass immigration restrictions.41 Mechanisms to select Chinese
immigrants were later applied to regulate border crossing with Mexico through the Immigration
Act of 1917, the Emergency Quota Act, and the Johnson-Reed Act. These acts marked the first
instance where all immigrants, including those entering via the Mexican border, were required
to have a photograph on their visas.42 The Acts of May 22, 1918, and March 2, 1921 reiterated

36
Act of May 19, 1921, "The First Quota Act".
37
Act of May 19, 1921, "The First Quota Act"; Act of May 11, 1922 (Amends and extends the Act of May 19,
1921), Section 2; Immigration Act of 1924, "To limit the Immigration of aliens into the United States", Section 4
(d).
38
Mae M. Ngai, Impossible subjects, 21-25; Frank Caestecker, “A Lasting Transit in Antwerp: Eastern European
Jewish Migrants on Their Way to the New World, 1900-1925”, en Michael Boyden, et. al. (eds.), Tales of Transit,
59–79.
39
John Torpey, The invention of the Passport. Surveillance, citizenship, and the State, (Cambridge, United
Kingdom & Nueva York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
40
Anna Pegler-Gordon, In sight of America, 24-25, 30-33 & 63-64.
41
Anna Pegler-Gordon, In sight of America, 27.
42
Anna Pegler-Gordon, In sight of America, chapter 5.

13
the necessity of possessing a valid passport for entry into or exit from the United States, laying
the groundwork for the business of providing passports.43 By 1923, human smugglers offered
European migrants services, including obtaining passports and facilitating entry into
neighboring countries and eventually American territory.44
This legislative evolution in the 1920s significantly impacted migration dynamics in
Mexico, highlighting the interplay between legal frameworks and corruption in Mexico. Indeed,
immigration enforcement reveals the reliance of Mexico's public administration on informal
arrangements with state officials, necessitating a deep examination of the rooted corrupt
practices in the State's operations. For this reason, this research underscores how agents'
corruption served both to circumvent and, paradoxically, comply with the law,45 particularly in
the context of soliciting money from foreigners, which could be viewed as a form of extortion.
Acknowledging that bribes were integral to this corrupt system, it becomes challenging to
establish clear distinctions between bribery and extortion within the migratory context. Firstly,
the 1917 Constitution established the right to free mobility within Mexico but regulated it
based on emigration, immigration, and health criteria.46 In the 1920s, as Mexico developed its
Migratory Service, two categories emerged: foreigners and emigrant braceros to the United
States.47 The Ministry of the Interior prioritized controlling labor migration to the U.S.,
overshadowing principles guiding people's arrival. Mexico's entry regulations aimed to manage
foreign entry for public health and protect domestic workers from foreign competition, driven
by postrevolutionary nationalism. Despite not facing a significant U.S. demographic influx,
Mexico adopted strong immigration measures to control immigration and prevent labor
exploitation of braceros.48 Post-revolution nationalism, as described by Jason Oliver Chang,
justified anti-Chinese discrimination, shaping a pro-Mexican public sphere that excluded

43
Act of March 2, 1921, "Regulations as to Alien Passport Requirements".
44
Immigration and Naturalization Service Annual Report (1923), 52.
45
Gerhard Anders & Monique Nuijten (eds.), Corruption and the secret of law: a legal anthropological perspective,
(United Kingdom: Routledge, 2007); Deborah Poole, “Los dos cuerpos del juez: comunidad, justicia y corrupción en
el Perú de los neoliberales”, en Óscar Ugarteche (comp.), Vicios públicos. Poder y corrupción, (Lima: SUR, Casa de
Estudios del Socialismo, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005), 57-80; Claudio Lomnitz-Adler (coord.), Vicios
públicos, virtudes privadas. La corrupción en México, (México: Ciesas, Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2000); Pablo
Yankelevich, Los otros.
46
Constitución política de los estados unidos mexicanos, art. 11.
47
AHINM, Exp. 4/091.3-1928-5A. Ley de Migración de 1926, art. 26 & 27.
48
Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros, ch. 3.

14
Chinese immigrants. This nationalist ideology redirected scientific racism against the Chinese to
advance mestizo racial nationalism and construct an identity excluding Chinese immigrants and
their descendants.49
The deployment of immigration posts in the territory reflects nationalist governments'
concerns about the outflow of temporary workers to the U.S. Using existing rail lines to access
the neighboring country's labor market, immigration laws prompt the deployment of coyote
services along railroad tracks and near newly established immigration offices (See map 1). In
1926, when the Department of Migration was created, evidence indicates a significant gap
between norms and regulatory implementation due to the vast territory and limited economic
and human resources. The establishment of taxes on demographic flow aimed to cover office
expenses and provide additional income to immigration agents with already low salaries.
Despite the organization of the Migratory Service in the 1920s, it became evident that the
Mexican territory played a crucial role for those intending to move to the United States. In
1925, immigration agent Luis Vega y Pavón proposed registering both Mexicans and foreigners
to monitor their movement toward the northern border.50 The emphasis on controlling foreign
travelers' departure to the U. S. in the late 1920s highlights the challenge and frustration of
lacking an effective registration system for border crossings in both directions.51

49
Jason Oliver Chang, Chino, 18-19.
50
AHINM, Exp. 4/161-1925-1. In response to the Migration Service's announcement regarding the registration of
arriving foreigners by sea, particularly those not permitted to proceed directly to the northern border, additional
details are available in AHINM, Exp. 4/352.2-1925-3A.
51
AHINM, Exp. 4/100.015-1930-541.

15
 Map 1. Railroads and Immigration stations in Mexico
(1930).52

Smuggling services and challenges of migrant journeys through Mexico

U.S. and Mexican immigration regulations facilitated the business of transporting
foreigners into the United States. The movement of Jews and Italians through Mexican territory
formed a chain connecting their places of origin to their ultimate destination in the United
States, as described by the Commissioner-General of Immigration in 1924. He recounted that
the migrant's journey concluded when they successfully crossed the border without
authorization or were apprehended on the spot.53 Similar to the Chinese immigrants, Jews
arriving at the northern border required local guides to facilitate unauthorized border crossing.

52
Source: the author of this article with information gathered from Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros, 127; Great Britain
Admiralty, A handbook of Mexico...Prepared by the Geographical section of the Naval. intelligence division, Naval
staff, Admiralty, London, H.M. Stationery off., Frederick Hall, Oxford, 1920.
53
Immigration and Naturalization Service Annual Report (1924), 17.

16
Conversely, Italians had contact with smugglers of their own nationality to navigate Mexican
territory and cross the border. The organization of these migratory chains relied on family
networks and the communities of origin in both countries. In this context, coyotes tailored their
services based on the immigrant's profile. These coyotes assisted individuals in evading city
inspections along their journey to the United States. Concerning the extortions faced by
foreigners heading to the northern border, Europeans paid agents to comply with immigration
laws for desirable immigrants, while the Chinese sought help circumvent exclusion laws.
Migration services can be categorized based on the location of migration surveillance, the
immigrant's profile, and the presence of family members and immigrant communities. This
classification encompasses transportation to the country, orientation through Mexican
territory, obtaining documents and bribery, and the paradoxical figure of the migration agent,
who simultaneously acts as a human smuggler. Furthermore, I demonstrate that community
and family networks play a central role in understanding the diverse experiences of transit
migration.

Transportation to the Americas and guidance in Mexican territory

Human smugglers played a key role in guiding migrants through the complex terrain of Mexican
territory, adapting routes based on existing communities, commercial networks, and
immigration offices' surveillance. The evolution of migration facilitation extends from
smugglers' adaptations in navigating Mexican landscapes to the historical roots of the
transatlantic migration business. Firstly, since the late 19th century, shipping companies
cooperated with European governments for medical inspections to maintain operations and
ensure customers reached their final destinations.54 This same motivation persisted during the

54
According to the port of departure, three zones were established to facilitate transatlantic travel between Europe
and the United States in the 1880s. One of these zones pertained to British and Scandinavian shipping companies,
another to those departing from the Mediterranean ports, and the third to steamships departing from the German
Empire, the Netherlands and Belgium. The French Compagnie Transatlantique primarily focused on Mediterranean
ports, while the German, Dutch and Belgian companies served the Eastern European migrant market. North German
Lloyd and Hapag (Hamburg America Line) operated from the German ports of Bremen and Hamburg, respectively,
while the Holland America Line departed from the Dutch port of Rotterdam, and the Red Star Line from Antwerp,
Belgium. In July 1893, Lloyd and Hapag proposed to the Prussian government the establishment of “control
stations” on its border with Russia to conduct medical inspections and disinfect passenger luggage. They aimed to
transfer healthy migrants to German ports. These arrangements with the Prussian-German authorities influenced the
routes taken by migrants from Eastern Europe on the continent before heading to America. Katja Wüstenbecker,

17
implementation of quota laws in the 1920s. In the early 1920s, five shipping companies offered
transportation from continental Europe to Havana, Veracruz and Tampico. They held meetings
to coordinate the services they provided to these ports in Cuba and Mexico. Among their
agreements was the maintenance of a weekly record of their voyages. Over a decade, the
statistics indicate that migrants from Eastern Europe made a mandatory stopover in Mexico.
For instance, records show that between July 1921 and July 1922, 8,161 passengers journeyed
to Cuba and Mexico. In 1923, the number of passengers increased by 250%, and in 1924, the
number of migrants grew by 150%. By 1931, the five companies had transported 867 migrants
on that route.55 (see figure 1). Originating at the end of the XIX century, the transatlantic
migration business adjusted to the demand for landing in territories adjacent to the United
States, like Cuba and Mexico.

“Hamburg”, 223-236; Paul Gottheil, “Historical Development of Steamship Agreements and Conferences in the
American Foreign Trade”, en The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 55, (Sept.
1914), 56; Torsten Feys, “Steampshipping companies and transmigration patterns: the use of European cities as hubs
during the era of mass migration to the US”, en Journal of Migration History. Special Issue: Cities and Overseas
Migration in the Long Nineteenth Century, Volume 2 (2016): Issue 2 (Sep 2016), 247-274; Michael Boyden, et. al.
(eds.), Tales of transit; Frank Caestecker, “A Lasting Transit”, 59–79.
55
Cuba-Mexico Passenger Conference: Weekly steerage statistics, 1921-1931, nummer 318.04/1736, Archieven
van de Holland Amerika Lijn, Passage A, 1900-1969, Stadsarchief Rotterdam (hereafter AHAL, PAS)

18
 Graphic 1. Passengers records of shipping companies for the
ports of Havana and Veracruz, 1921-1931.56

1921 1922 1923A 1923B 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931

35000

30581
30000

25000

20615
20000
16020
14561
15000

9743
10000 8161 8499 8691 8474

4983 5402
5000

867
0

Foreigners navigating Mexican territory faced communication obstacles, and human

smugglers tailored services to immigrants' specific needs. Chinese immigration led to Mexican
guides specializing in crossing the border at unauthorized points. In the early 20th century,
language barred Mexican border residents' activities, limiting them as guides. These guides
were present at various points along the international line,57 primarily facilitating travel from
specific Mexican locations to defined destinations in the U.S., such as hotels or boarding
houses. The language barrier between guides and foreigners was surmounted through letters

56
Before "1923A" corresponds to the fiscal year ending on July 31, while the field "1923B" indicates the period
from August 1 to December 31, 1923. This information was complied by the author using data from AHAL, PAS.
57
U.S. vs Angel Lazarraga (smuggling Chinese), september 28, 1904, box 80, casefile 1720, & U.S. vs Juan
Sapaniero (smuggling Chinese), October 4, 1904, casefile 1721, Arizona Territorial Court, Criminal Case Files,
1882-1912, Record Group 21, Records of the District Courts of the United States, NARA (Riverside); “Inspector in
charge, U. S. Immigration Service, El Paso, Texas, San Marcial, Nuevo Mexico”, November 3, 1908, entry 237, vol.
19 (oct. 25, 1908-nov. 17, 1908), box 3, Inspector’s Daily Reports, Record Group 85, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (El Paso District) NARA (Fort Worth)

19
carried by migrants or pre-assigned instructions.58
In the 1920s, not only Mexicans were guides since foreign settlers at Mexican ports also
served as initial contact points for those heading the northern border. In 1927, El Paso's
inspector received information indicating that numerous Europeans arriving in Veracruz
connected with a Syrian or Greek entrepreneur running a small fruit business at the Mexican
port. Allegedly, this individual played a pivotal role in a network facilitating unauthorized
crossings into the United States. The inspector's data hinted that this person, with a previous
residence in California, possessed fluency in English and an American birth certificate. Arguably,
individuals facilitating the movements of European migrants required specific attributes to
establish themselves as effective intermediaries. These attributes likely encompassed an
understanding of the dynamics in arrival ports and the ability to provide essential contacts for
migrants heading toward the northern border. In a separate case from Tampico in 1927, citizen
José Castillo alerted the U. S. immigration service to people crossing the border with fraudulent
passports and visas acquired in Monterrey. Notably, these migrants possessed adequate
financial resources to purchase these documents, often with the complicity of Laredo and
Nuevo Laredo inspectors. Foreigners crossing at unauthorized points paid $200, compared to
the $ 500 spent on acquiring counterfeit documents. These irregular border crossings occurred
primarily in Villa Acuña, Piedras Negras, and, most notably, Reynosa. Castillo reported that over
fifty Greeks, Italians, and Germans had departed from Tampico for the border.59
The geography of the international border significantly impacted the development of
irregular crossing strategies. For instance, in 1923, an El Paso agent observed increased
unauthorized European entries into New Mexico and Arizona. He pointed out that some of
these Europeans lacked the means to hire guides and thus attempted to cross the border
independently. Additionally, they employed a specific strategy, though it is unclear whether
they received guidance from locals or devised it themselves. Their approach involved crossing

58
Robert Chao Romero, The Chinese in Mexico, pp. 30-31.
59
"Office of District Director, El Paso, Texas, To Commissioner-General of Immigration", January 17, 1927,
casefile 55224/358E, & "Commissioner-General of Immigration to Office of District Director in San Antonio,
Texas”, March 14, 1927. casefile 55224/358E, Record Group 85, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Subject
Correspondence Files, National Archives and Record Administration (Washington) (hereafter NARA Washington).
See also the interview with a former Border Patrol agent: Wesley Shaw C, interview to “Wesley E. Stiles”, en
Institute of Oral History, University of Texas, El Paso, No. 756, January 1986, 3 & 9.

20
the demarcation line and dispersing into small groups. This tactic ensured that if one group was
apprehended by law enforcement, the others still had a chance to evade capture.60 In 1924,
the district inspector in San Antonio provided an account of how local boat owners engaged in
smuggling operations. According to his report, these boat operators transported Mexicans,
Europeans, criminals, "decent people", and Bolsheviks alike using their rudimentary boats.61

Documentation and bribery

Obtaining documents and overcoming bureaucratic hurdles became costly but necessary for
the migration journey. Coyotes provided services to bypass inspections in cities along the route
to the United States. Regarding extortion faced by foreigners en route to the northern border
by immigration agents, as previously mentioned, Europeans paid to meet legal requirements
for desirable immigrants, while the Chinese did so to circumvent exclusion mechanisms. In
addition, the revenues of the immigration offices increased due to the flow of individuals
heading to the northern border, creating tensions at the immigration border posts. For
instance, in 1925, the head of the Ciudad Juárez immigration station reached out to his
counterpart in Torreón, Coahuila, requesting assistance in preventing "the departure to the
north of foreigners who cannot prove they have been in the Republic for more than two
years."62 Agents in Chihuahua reported the arrival of foreigners who had successfully evaded
surveillance in Torreón with the aid of train porters and drivers. This scheme involved the
shippers advising migrants to travel in Pullman wagons to the border. While Torreón's agent
attempted to regulate these activities, his efforts only led to a confrontation with the union,
and the Central Offices recommended that he refrain from interfering in matters beyond his
jurisdiction.63 At times, paradoxically, collecting money to expedite procedures or facilitate the
transfer to the northern border at the Torreón immigration station stirred frustration among
Ciudad Juárez agents because they could no longer charge for their issuance when foreigners
arrived with proper documents.

60
Immigration and Naturalization Service Annual Report (1923), 18.
61
Immigration and Naturalization Service Annual Report (1924), 254.
62
AHINM, Exp. 4/352.2-1925-3A.
63
AHINM, Exp. 4/352.2-1925-3A.

21
 Inspection by Mexican Immigration Service personnel at their offices confirmed that the
agents were fostering extortion. A 1926 report emphasized the need to increase staff at border
offices "because there are individuals who make a living from smuggling."64 However, reports
on the activities of coyote networks could potentially conceal the complicity of migrant
employees. In December 1931, Agent Arnulfo de los Santos, stationed in Nuevo Laredo,
Tamaulipas, reported cases of coyotes during that year, concluding that "indeed, there have
been instances of individuals who engaged in advising and assisting in various ways with the
illegal passage of nationals and foreigners to the neighbouring country".65 Nevertheless, De Los
Santos was involved in the human smuggling business, collaborating with Candelario Guajardo,
who owned a fleet of automobiles and sold bus and taxi tickets to individuals traveling to the
United States. De Los Santos made it easier for those who purchased tickets from him to obtain
the necessary documents, but he made it difficult for those who refused.66 This agent's
association with coyotes should be seen in the context of the competition in the border
crossing business. For example, in November 1931, the agent reported Messrs. Alfredo Alcorta,
Luis Guillén and Jerónimo Cortés to the Federal Public Ministry for assisting the irregular
passage of migrant Eddy Russey McDuff. It can be assumed that these coyotes declined to pay
for the services of the vehicles favored by De Los Santos.67
While Mexican authorities faced challenges in regulating departures, their U.S.
counterparts sought to closely monitor the movements of non-compliant individuals transiting
through Mexico. The U.S. consulates in Mexico aimed to monitor non-compliant foreigners'
movements regarding U.S. immigration requirements.68 Post the May 19, 1921 Act, consulates
began recording the "national origin" of those departing European ports for Mexico, with the
State Department instructing reports from Gulf of Mexico ports.69 Furthermore, to oversee

64
AHINM,Exp. 4/161-1926-13.
65
AHINM,Exp. 4/357-1929-27.
66
Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros, 210.
67
AHINM, Exp. 4/357-1929-27.
68
"American Consulate, Bucharest, Romania, to Secretary of State", August 27, 1921, casefile 55079/290, NARA
Washington.
69
"Department of State to The Secretary of Labor", May 28, 1921, casefile 55079/290; “Memo for the assistant
Secretary”, July 29, 1922, casefile 55079/290, NARA Washington; Libby Garland, After they closed the gates:
Jewish illegal immigration to the United States, 1921-1965, (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2018)
16.

22
irregular movements, the 1923 U.S. immigration service proposed deploying an inspector in
Mexico City, aiming for covert operations and Mexican government cooperation. No evidence
suggests U.S. agents executing these functions in Mexico, but U.S. border authorities still
gathered information on individuals aiding foreigners using Mexico as a transit point to the U.S.
and their routes.70

Human smuggling inside the State

While traversing Mexico, agents intermittently extorted funds from northbound foreigners.
Immigration officials, selectively enforcing regulations, influenced migrant travel. The
complicity of Immigration Service employees eased these illicit charges, potentially implicating
Mexico City authorities.71 Chapter VIII of the 1926 Migration Law mandated that Mexicans and
foreigners planning to leave the country must report to the migration authorities at their
departure location, providing various information, including their final destination, for
registration on an individual identification card.72 In July of that same year, it was discovered
that agents in the Torreón office were selling tickets, rather than the identity document
required by law, to migrants heading to the United States, falsely assuring them that these
tickets were sufficient to exit the country. The Piedras Negras border delegation contacted the
Interior Ministry to seek instructions on handling Mexicans and foreigners arriving with these
tickets instead of the cards specified by Article 69 of the Migration Law. In response, the
Migration Department directed the Torreón office to cease issuing these tickets as they did not
align with the cards by the law.73 While it could be argued that the call to address the actions
of Torreón agents was intended to prevent improper charges from becoming exclusive to that
city's personnel74, the dispute over bribery and extortion money did lead to complaints among
federal employees and served as a limitation on corrupt practices.
The Migration Law of 1926 mandated issuing identification cards for foreigners, but its

70
"Office of Inspector in Charge, San Antonio, Texas, to Commissioner-General of Immigration", December 6,
1924, casefile 55224/358-B, NARA Washington.
71
Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros, 209-223.
72
Ley de Migración de 1926, art. 69-79.
73
AHINM, Exp. 4/352.2-1925-15A.
74
Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros.

23
implementation proved complex due to the shortage of agents capable of registering and
monitoring migrants. The Migration Law of 1930 addressed the same issue. During the latter
part of the 1920s, some agents failed to issue cards to foreigners. However, it was not until
World War II that the Department of the National Registry of Foreigners was established. As
mentioned before, what set the post-revolution governments apart from their predecessors
was the establishment of an Immigration Service.75
In the port of Manzanillo, Colima, the Migration Department established an office to
oversee the arrival of Asians. Emilio Campos served as a delegate of that office from August
1930 to March 1931. His actions raised concerns among the local inhabitants, employees of
other federal offices, and his own office. One documented anomaly was that the office did not
settle its debts for running its operations "even though it had received funds for these services
from customs." One of his immigration agents even accused him of tarnishing the reputation of
the Immigration Service. In May 1931, Inspector Ramón Tirado visited the office to investigate
the case and described the irregularities during Campos' tenure. These irregularities included
improper deposits and collections totaling 2,238 pesos (1,119 USD) in the foreigner registry,
irregular collection of immigration taxes, and the negotiation of employment contracts for
personal gain. Campos was also found to be demanding payment "of thirty dollars (15 USD)
from several foreigners [...] for permits to move to Baja California. Upon his departure, some
undisclosed agreements he had made with foreigners came to light". Adulfo Wong, for
instance, paid Campos 185 pesos (92.5 USD) to help bring his brother into the country, a service
that Campos did not fulfill "because the Ministry had denied the required authorization, and
Campos had to leave the delegation".76
Article 116 of the 1930 Migration Law stipulated that foreigners residing in the country
must promptly register with the authorities "within thirty days following the publication" of the
law. In September of that year, Campos exploited foreigners, falsely claiming to enforce this
rule, which had been promulgated on August 30. As Akhil Gupta terms it, he followed a practice

75
Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros, 124; Érika Pani, Para pertenecer a la gran familia mexicana: procesos de
naturalización en el siglo XIX, (México: El Colegio de México, 2015), 25 & ff; Carlos González Parrodi (coord.),
La historia del pasaporte en México. (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1994), 41, 96 & 100.
76
AHINM, Exp. 4/161-1931-196.

24
to demonstrate compliance with the law.77 Tirado's interviews with employees at the
Manzanillo immigration office revealed that Campos registered foreigners during trips he took
either alone or in the company of a private waiter. It is fair to assume that he did this as a
means of extorting immigrants. Campos charged at least two pesos for registering foreigners,
with the fee varying based on the person's social standing and the verification of their legal
status. The law required immigrants to provide personal information and details about their
entry into the country. However, Tirado's investigations exposed that Campos demanded
deposits ranging from two hundred to five hundred pesos (100 to 250 USD) from those who did
not have the necessary funds. The Department of Migration informed Campos that these
charges were illegal and prohibited him from registering foreigners in this manner.
Nevertheless, the delegate in Manzanillo persisted in doing so, as Tirado suggests that there
were no penalties, and no official was dispatched to investigate his activities. This case
highlights how Mexican immigration agents used compliance as a pretext for extortion when
individuals were not in violation of the law.78
The information available in the Historical Migration Archive regarding the case of
delegate Campos offers only a partial perspective on the operations of Chinese smuggling
groups. It creates the impression that the immigration agent orchestrated their entry into the
country and their transfer to the border. However, it should be noted that the transportation of
Chinese individuals in Mexico involved increasingly extensive networks, encompassing
immigration and customs office agents, railway personnel, guides, and drivers.

Community and Family Network Support

Transnational communities played a central role in navigating the complexities of migration
across borders, as exemplified by the earlier example of Jewish migration. Associations in the U.
S. played a crucial role by providing essential resources, such as funds, letters of
recommendation, and contacts for potential employers in the U. S. and Mexico. This
underscores the significance of community and family networks amidst the challenges faced by

77
Akhil Gupta, "Blurred boundaries. The discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state” en
American Ethnologist, May 1995, Vol.22(2), 375-402.
78
AHINM, Exp. 4/161-1931-196.

25
migrants.
Jews in Texas demonstrate how familial ties prompted migration to the new continent,
forming Jewish communities on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. Family networks, crucial
for Jewish immigrants arriving in early 20th-century Texas, facilitated entry into the United
States. For instance, in cities like Austin and El Paso, these immigrants aided relatives in
reaching the Mexican northern border, providing economic support for settlement in Mexican
cities during monthly U.S. immigration quota waits. Additionally, family support played a pivotal
role in securing guides for irregular crossings. In El Paso, a Hungarian-born immigrant named
Joseph H. Goodman gained recognition in the Jewish community for his successful immigration
services. Referred to as the "one-man immigration service," Goodman assisted 47 Europeans in
relocating to Texas before 1925. After arriving in New York in 1893 and settling in El Paso in
1902, he established stores that enabled the construction of boarding houses on the south side
of the border in 1911. During the Mexican Revolution, individuals displaced and arriving in
Juarez sought refuge in Goodman's houses near the international border.79 The assistance
provided by family networks extended beyond economic support, proving essential for
establishing contact with guides who facilitated irregular border crossings. The collaboration
between Jewish immigrants and Joseph H. Goodman exemplifies how community support
played a vital role in navigating the complexities of immigration during this period.
Like Jewish migrants who used Mexico as a staging ground to enter the United States,
Italians had support networks that provided intermediaries and guides of the same nationality
already residing in Mexico or the United States. In the latter case, there is information that
intermediaries traveled to Mexico to arrange the trip through Mexican soil, the border crossing,
and the subsequent transfer to U.S. territory. An example of this is Isidore Gamba, a World War
I veteran who, lacking a valid passport to enter the United States, attempted an illegal entry
from Mexico in 1924. He arrived in Mexicali with four other Italians,80 where they were picked
up by fellow countryman Angelo Zaura, a Los Angeles resident, who instructed them to cross

79
Sessel: “An Analysis of the Jewish Presence in El Paso”, box 3A189, folder Communities, El Paso, Texas Jewish
Historical Society Records, Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin, (hereafter
TJHSR)
80
Italians traversed Veracruz, Mexico City, Mazatlán, Guaymas, and Mexicali.

26
the border on foot, after which he would drive them through U.S. territory. 81 Considering that
Italians had the highest rates of return to their places of origin, the phenomenon of migrants of
this nationality in transit through Mexico also illustrates that U.S. immigration regulations did
not deter those who returned from making the journey to the North American country.
Similarly, during the 1920s, reliable family associations organized transfers from Italy's places of
origin. In a chain, each link had a family member responsible for taking the migrants to the next
one until they reached the United States. When the Italians arrived at the port of Veracruz, they
were transported to the border by train or truck and charged $200 for the trip into Mexico.82
Note that this amount was equivalent to the cost of the irregular border crossing at the Laredo-
Nuevo Laredo border in 1927. Each migrant community employed specific strategies to
circumvent immigration control at the U.S.-Mexico border. The Italians fabricated stories to
secure labor contracts in Mexico and wait for the opening of slots in the quota for Italians to
enter the United States. For instance, in 1924, the consul in Ensenada reported the recent
arrival of Italians in that port but suspected that their work contracts in Mexico were false, and
they intended to wait until July when places in the annual quota would be opened. All were
men aged between 22 and 38, and of the eleven on record, five came from the Bergamo region
of northern Italy and six from Colledimezzo and Agnone in the south.83

Routes to access northern Mexico

The pathways of migrants traversing Mexican territory closely mirrored those of Mexican day
laborers. Their routes were shaped by communities of their respective nationalities in the U. S.
and the commercial networks in Mexico. These routes were further influenced by the railroads
and adjusted in response to the presence of the migration offices in both countries.
Paradoxically, migrants who paid coyotes to avoid government agent inspections on their way
to the northern border could unexpectedly face immigration agents who demanded money

81
“Italian Aliens and smuggler captured”, en Calexico Chronicle (21 de junio de 1924).
82
One example is the Concetto family, which can be found in NARA (Washington), RG 85, INS, SCF, casefile
55224/358C: “Departamento de Tesoro a Departamento de Trabajo”, 26 de febrero de 1926; “Asistente del
comisionado general de Inmigración a director del Distrito de Inmigración, El Paso”, march 15, 1926.
83
NARA (Washington), RG 85, INS, SCF, casefile 55224/358-B: “Consulado en Ensenada al secretario de Estado”,
25 de junio de 1924. Italian origins were reviewed on Familysearch.org.

27
from the coyotes to allow foreigners to continue their journey to the international line.84

Map 2. Migrant routes through Mexico in the 1920s.85

Upon disembarking at one of the Mexican Pacific ports authorized to receive them86, the
Chinese continued their journey to the northern border. They either connected to the railroad
network through Mexico City or boarded boats departing from Salina Cruz, Manzanillo, and
Mazatlán, which would eventually reach the ports of Ensenada, Baja California, or Guaymas,
Sonora. These routes had been in use by the Chinese since the early the 20th century.87 For
example, in the 1920s, when Asians arrived at a port in Guatemala, they entered Mexico
through Chiapas. From there, they had a choice between arriving by train to Mexico City via
Oaxaca or traveling along the Pacific coast by boat.

84
Erika Lee, At America´s gates, chapters 5 & 6.
85
Source: Own elaboration based on information consulted in Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros, 127; Great Britain
Admiralty, A handbook of Mexico.
86
Salina Cruz, Oaxaca; Acapulco, Guerrero; Mazatlán, Sinaloa; Guaymas, Sonora; Tampico, Tamaulipas, &
Coatzacoalcos o Veracruz, Veracruz.
87
Elliott Young, Alien nation., 174-179; Robert Chao Romero, The Chinese in Mexico, chapter 3.

28
 My analysis of the cases of Jews and Italians reveals that migration to the U. S. played
pivotal role in what we now refer to as family reunification and re-entry into the American
country after returning to their places of origin. The funds for these transfers often came from
acquaintances and relatives in the United States.88 In 1924, the U.S. consul in Costa Rica noted
that Italian migrants arrived in Puerto Limón on Italian, French, Dutch and German ships.
Furthermore, a local banker informed the consul about recent financial transfers from New
York to Italians and immigrants from Southern Europe temporarily in that port. The San Antonio
inspector reported that Italian migrants in Tampico received money from relatives in California.
U.S. authorities suspected that this money was intended to bribe immigration agents during
their transfer through Mexico and subsequent irregular crossing into the United States. It is
possible that Italians were redirected to Central America before crossing Mexican territory,
taking advantage of a legal exception that allowed them to bypass the mandatory two-year stay
in Mexico before entering the United States. The Immigration Act of 1924 allowed the entry of
foreigners from neighboring countries and required two years of residence in Mexico for those
seeking to enter the United States. However, in 1927, a State Department employee argued
that this clause did not apply to foreigners who disembarked in Guatemala and later entered
the U. S. through the Mexican border.89
Italians and Jews arriving in Tampico typically headed towards the Laredo and Nuevo
Laredo border. Those who arrived at the port of Veracruz made their way to Mexico City. From
the capital, Jews continued their journey to the northern border, following the route of the
National Railways to Ciudad Juárez, entering through El Paso, thanks to the presence of Jewish
communities in Texas. The stories of Jews in Texas illustrate how connections with family
members in Europe fueled migration to the new continent and the formation of Jewish
communities on both sides of the US-Mexico border. The Hungarian Schwartz family businesses

88
Immigration and Naturalization Service Annual Report (1924), 18.
89
“Storker to Hanson”, September 16, 1924, casefile 55224/358-B; " Commissioner-General to Immigration
Officers in Charge at El Paso, Galveston, New Orleans, Jacksonville, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York
and Boston", September 30, 1924; casefile 55224/358-B, NARA Washington. Provisions of Section 17 of
Immigration Act of 1924; Opinion of the solicitor of the State Department holds that Section 17 does not apply to
alien passengers brought from Guatemala to Mexico by railway, November 25, 1927, decimal classification
814.5611, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to internal affairs of Guatemala, 1910-
1929, National Archives Microfilm Publications.

29
in El Paso and Eagle Pass are a testament to the dynamics that could arise from living on the
border. Adolph Schwartz was born in Stropkov, Austria-Hungary, and arrived in New York in
1885 at 19. Before settling in El Paso, he had lived in Ohio, California and Ciudad Juárez. In
Chihuahua, he partnered with Simon Picard to open a goods store. In 1897, Schwartz crossed
the river to El Paso and opened a department store, which he sold years later to return to
Europe. He collected money from friends and family and started a new business in El Paso.
Popular Dry Products grew into a significant establishment, paving the way for Schwartz to
become the president of the local chamber of commerce and the director of the El Paso branch
of the National Bank. Adolph Schwartz's role was so crucial that it facilitated a meeting between
the presidents of Mexico and the U. S. in October 1909. Descendants of the Schwartz family,
also influential members of the Jewish community in Texas, petitioned the head of Mexico's
Department of Migration, Andres Landa and Piña, in 1939, in the run-up to World War II,
requesting that the Mexican government provide visas to their relatives in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.90
Similarly, the routes taken by Italians were oriented toward communities of their
nationality in the United States. The most numerous Italian settlements were in cities on the
East Coast and the Midwest, particularly Chicago. As the western frontier expanded, Italians
also formed significant communities in California. After arriving in Mexico City from Veracruz,
they had two options. One was to follow the train route to Torreón, then on to Piedras Negras
or Ciudad Juárez. The other route had more steps, and the objective was to reach the crossing
points in the border sections that divide Arizona from Sonora or California from Baja California.
The journey from Mexico City included stops in Guadalajara and Pacific ports, especially
Manzanillo, to reach the Baja California coast by sea. Alternatively, they could go to Mazatlán
using rental boats or drivers from Manzanillo and then board the train to the Sonoran border.

90
"Morris Riskin to Texas Jewish Historical Society", August 21, 1988, folder Communities, box 3A189; and "Sam
Schwartz: "Pioneer of the theatre industry; Narrative for historical marker. Aztec theatre and Sam Schwartz Eagle
Pass, Texas"; “Fierman: Peddlers and merchants on the southwest frontier 1850-1880", folder Jews El Paso, box
3A170, TJHSR. See Pablo Yankelevich, Los otros, chapter 3; David A. Chapin (ed.), The first Jew of Texas. The life
of Jim Novy: an American success story, 1896-1971, (College Stations, Texas: Virtualbookworm.com, 2012).

30
Italian migrants also arrived in Costa Rica or Guatemala to cross Mexico's southern border,91
eventually following the Mexican Pacific route to Sonora or Baja California.

The prices
Human smugglers set varying prices for migrants who made a forced stopover in Mexico before
entering the U. S. due to immigration regulations imposed by both countries. As regulations
became more effective, prices increased, as they needed to hire drivers and guides and pay
employees of the Mexican railways and immigration offices on both sides of the border.
The prohibition of Asian entry into the U. S. led them to pay higher prices compared to
Jews and Italians. For instance, in 1907, a Japanese migrant would pay between $90 and $115
to travel from Ciudad Juárez to Denver, Colorado. Interestingly, the human smuggler, who was
of the same nationality, paid a Mexican guide $60 to transport four Japanese across the Rio
Grande to Texas. In addition, the Japanese smuggler would provide $700 to an El Paso office
employee to obtain 12 income tax receipts if immigration agents required them on the
railroads and trucks that the Japanese would board from El Paso to Denver. Consequently, the
human smuggler pocketed between $17 and $42 for each migrant after deducting expenses
from the fees charged to the migrants. However, it is important to consider that these figures
still need to account for payments for accommodations in El Paso and train and bus tickets for
travel within the United States.92
In 1909, Chinese migrants paid up to $450 for entry and transportation through Mexican
territory. In contrast, around 1927, Italians paid prices ranging from $ 150 to $ 200 for a coyote
to take them from Veracruz to the Pacific coast, via Mexico City and Guadalajara. Even though
there were restrictions on Italian entry into the United States, the amount they paid after the
quota laws were enacted was less than what the Chinese paid in the first decade of the century.
Increased vigilance in the U. S. le to a higher demand for coyotes, resulting in a rise in the price

91
“Storker to Hanson”, September 16, 1924, casefile 55224/358-B; " Commissioner-General to Immigration
Officers in Charge at El Paso, Galveston, New Orleans, Jacksonville, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York
and Boston", September 30, 1924; casefile 55224/358-B, NARA Washington.
92
"Charles L. Babcock to Commissioner-General to Immigration”, January 10, 1908, NARA Washington. See also
Jorge Durand, “Un ´coyote´ japonés en Ciudad Juárez (1905-1911)”, Desacatos, 46 (septiembre-diciembre, 2014),
192-207.

31
of their services. In 1927, Chinese migrants invested between $250 and $1000 for border
crossings by airplanes and subsequent transfers within the United States. Nonetheless, the
costs of in-transit migration remained lower than the Border Patrol's estimates.93
Furthermore, the point of entry into Mexico also influenced the price. In 1927, coyotes
charged Chinese migrants between $25 and $50 who entered irregularly through the Chiapas
and Guatemala border. In 1930, Chinese migrants paid agents between $ 100 and $ 250 in
bribes to enter Manzanillo. The payment of documents made by Chinese migrants arriving at
the Mexican Pacific port facilitated their transfer to the northern border compared to those
who disembarked in Guatemala.
In 1926, Italian migrants brought by a band of smugglers to Veracruz paid $200 to the
Italian coyote located in the Mexican port to take them to Texas. In contrast, in 1927, Polish
Jews crossing the border through the Laredo region were charged $200 for an irregular crossing
and $500 for a false passport visa. Reports on these cases noted price differences in the same
location, depending on the community ties. Italians hired smugglers who conducted staggered
transfers from Italy to the U. S. with an itinerary that entrusted the border crossing to a local
guide. This segmentation of smugglers allowed Italians to enjoy lower prices than other migrant
groups that directly negotiated with regional guides. The information available shows that
Italians were the group that made the least use of Mexico as a stopover to enter the United
States, but they also had a more efficient and cost-effective transfer system.
Even when foreigners purchased false documents from coyotes, U.S. agents could
intercept them in their attempt to cross the border and deport them to Mexico. This last
circumstance initiated a new stage of negotiation with government authorities for migrants in
transit since Mexican agents could selectively charge them to enforce immigration regulations.
In deportation cases, community and family networks helped cover the costs of settling in cities
near the international border.

93
Clifford Alan Perkins, Border Patrol. With the U.S. Immigration Service on the Mexican Boundary 1910-1954,
Texas, Texas Western Press, The University of Texas at El Paso, 1978, 79-81.

32
Conclusions
In delineating the intricate interplay of smuggling services and migrant experiences in
Mexico during the 1920s, this work highlighted the multifaceted narratives of challenges,
negotiations, and resilient networks. Coyotes, serving as crucial lifelines for migrants traversing
Mexican territory, underscore the financial and bureaucratic hurdles en route to the United
States. Amidst these complexities, community and family networks emerge as resilient support
pillars.
The emergence of normative frameworks compels international migrants to either
comply with these new regulations or forcibly pass through third countries to reach their
intended destinations. Ethnicity and class significantly influence the ability to move to the
United States, as evident in the hindrance of Asian immigration stemming from racial inferiority
assumptions. Italians and Jews, constituting substantial groups entering the U.S. in the 1920s,
faced immigration regulations incorporating eugenic discourses.
Contrary to a national framework analysis, changing migration corridors demonstrate
that national normative rules shape human mobility in neighboring countries. In conjunction
with their U.S. counterparts, Mexican authorities engaged in regulating border-crossings. This
work illustrates the specific dynamics that influenced the control of foreign migration into
Mexico. The stance here differs from viewing the Mexican system merely as an extension of the
U.S. system. This is because the social and political circumstances of the postrevolutionary
period led to employees of the newly established Department of Immigration (1926)
incorporating the collection of fees from migrants as part of their salaries. Therefore, this
research challenges the traditional binary view of coyotes as facilitators of informal border
crossings and border agents as guardians of formal border crossings. Instead, it reveals a
blurred boundary in practice, where state efforts to regulate movement created incentives for
the professionalization of human smugglers and corruption of government agents on both sides
of the border.

33