Ilustricimo vs. Nyk-Fil Ship Management, Inc.

G.R. No. 237487, June 27, 2018

Facts:
Petitioner was engaged by respondent International Cruise Services Ltd., through respondent NYK-
Fil Ship Management, Inc. (NYK), as a Quarter Master onboard its vessels from 1993 to 2014. His
last employment with the respondents was on board the vessel MV Crystal Serenity last April 2014.
Prior to his embarkation, petitioner underwent a routine Pre-Employment Medical Examination and
was declared physically fit to work.
Petitioner suffered an illness while on board the M/V Crystal Serenity. He underwent series of
consultations and operations using his own funds. This prompted him to secure the opinion of another
physician, Dr. Richard Combe, who diagnosed him with bladder mass and declared him unfit to work
due to his need to undergo instillation chemotherapy and cystoscopy every three months. Thereafter,
petitioner, thru counsel, sent respondents a letter, claiming total and permanent disability benefits.
Petitioner further declared in the said letter his willingness to undergo another examination to prove
the extent of his disability being claimed.
Ruling of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (VA)
The VA issued a Decision in favor of the petitioner and, accordingly, ordered respondents to pay him
total and permanent disability benefits.
Ruling of the CA
The CA granted the petition in the assailed Decision and adjudged respondents liable only for partial
permanent disability benefits under the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement.
According to the CA, while petitioner claims to have secured the opinion of a second doctor, no such
medical certification from the adverted personal doctor is extant in the records of the case, and that
only a copy the letter-request from petitioner's counsel seeking total and permanent disability benefits
from the respondents was submitted.
The CA likewise agreed with the respondents' postulation that, even on the assumption that petitioner
had indeed secured the opinion of a second doctor, petitioner failed to seek the opinion of a third
doctor as mandated under the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency – Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Thus, without the second doctor's certification and the non-
referral of the case to a third doctor, the CA ruled that petitioner's disability benefits must be based on
the final disability assessment made by the company-designated doctor.
Petitioner’s Claims before the CA
The CA's reliance on the Grade 7 disability rating given by the company-designated doctor is based
on the flawed finding that he failed to secure the opinion of a second doctor.
He likewise faults the respondents for the non-referral of the case to a third doctor as required under
Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC since the latter ignored his request to undergo another medical
examination to prove the extent of the disability being claimed.
Respondent’s Claims before the CA
They insist that petitioner's illness is not compensable since it is not listed as an occupational disease
under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC.
Assuming that petitioner's condition is disputably presumed to be work-related, the burden lies upon
him to prove that his work contributed/aggravated his illness, a burden which, according to the
respondents, he failed to discharge.
And even if petitioner's illness is compensable, respondents maintain that the disability rating of
Grade 7 given by its doctor should prevail in view of his failure to prove that he sought a second
medical opinion and to seek for the opinion of a third doctor, as provided for in the POEA-SEC.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits [YES]
Ruling:
The SC granted the petition.
Petitioner's illness is work-related
For disability to be compensable under Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, two elements must
concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must
have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. The same provision defines a
work-related illness is "any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A
of [the] Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." Meanwhile, illnesses not mentioned under
Section 32 of the POEA-SEC are disputably presumed as workrelated. Notwithstanding the
presumption of work-relatedness of an illness under Section 20(A)(4), the seafarer must still prove by
substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of contracting the
disease.
Established principle: For illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the
employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer - It is sufficient that
there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a
rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very
least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.
The SC agreed with the findings of the VA. According to the VA, petitioner suffered from "cancer of
the urinary bladder" due to the malignant tumors found in his urinary bladder. The VA then considered
the illness as workrelated based on Section 32 of POEA-SEC. The VA added that even if petitioner's
illness is not among those specifically mentioned in Section 32, the same is deemed work-related
since the risk factors for the illness include occupational exposure to aromatic amines as stated on
the company doctors' medical certification. No less than respondents' doctor diagnosed the petitioner
with bladder cancer and opined that his occupation exposed him to elements that increased his risk of
contracting the illness. They themselves did not dispute petitioner's entitlement to disability benefits.
They only dispute that his disability is total and permanent. They also assail the amount of disability
benefits due to the petitioner, and not his entitlement thereto.
No breach of petitioner's duties under the POEA-SEC
Anent the matter of compliance with the third-doctor referral procedure in the POEA-SEC, Section
20(A)(3) of the contract provides that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment of the company-designated doctor, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
employer and the seafarer, and the third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
This referral to a third doctor has been held by the Court to be a mandatory procedure as a
consequence of the provision in the POEA-SEC that the company can insist on its disability rating
even against the contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement
by asking for a referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision
shall be final and binding on the parties.
According to the SC, the respondents’ reliance on petitioner's failure to communicate his separate
medical certification prior to the filing of the complaint not only constitutes a breach of his contractual
obligations under the POEA-SEC, but also renders the complaint premature and is a ground for the
dismissal of his claim for disability benefits, is misplaced. They do not deny receiving petitioner’s letter
despite their insistence that he failed to activate the third doctor provision. The fact remains that they
have been notified of the petitioner’s intent to inform them of the opinion of petitioner’s second doctor
and his intent to refer his case to a third doctor.
The SC reiterated its earlier pronouncement in Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. v. Constantino that
when the seafarer challenges the company doctor's assessment through the assessment made by
his own doctor, the seafarer shall so signify and the company thereafter carries the burden of
activating the third doctor provision.
The POEA-SEC does not require a specific period within which the parties may seek the opinion of a
third doctor, and they may do so even during the mandatory conference before the labor tribunals.
Accordingly, upon being notified of petitioner's intent to dispute the company doctors' findings,
whether prior or during the mandatory conference, the burden to refer the case to a third doctor has
shifted to the respondents. This, they failed to do so, and petitioner cannot be faulted for the non-
referral. Consequently, the company-designated doctors' assessment is not binding.
Petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits
In any event, the rule that the company-designated physician's findings shall prevail in case of non-
referral of the case to a third doctor is not a hard and fast rule. It has been previously held that labor
tribunals and the courts are not bound by the medical findings of the company-designated physician
and that the inherent merits of its medical findings will be weighed and duly considered.
The SC concurred with the VA’s conclusion. the VA disagrees that petitioner merely suffers from a
moderate disorder of intraabdominal organ and with the final disability grading given. It noted that
petitioner's illness is serious in nature considering the company doctors' requirement for him to
undergo periodic cystoscopy despite having undergone chemotherapy and surgery. It further
observed that petitioner was never declared "cancer-free" and "fit to work" by his attending physicians
and his illness persisted despite the final disability grade of 7 given. For the VA, this means that
petitioner could no longer return to the seafaring profession and is, thus, permanently and totally
disabled.
In keeping with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and full protection to labor, the
SC has applied the Labor Code concept of disability to Filipino seafarers. Thus, it held that the notion
of disability is intimately related to the worker's capacity to earn, and what is compensated is not his
injury or illness but his inability to work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity. Hence,
disability should be understood less on its medical significance but more on the loss of earning
capacity. It further defined total disability as "the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of
work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do." In determining whether a disability is
total or partial, what is crucial is whether the employee who suffered from disability could still perform
his work notwithstanding the disability he met. A permanent partial disability, on the other hand,
presupposes a seafarer's fitness to resume sea duties before the end of the 120/240-day medical
treatment period despite the injuries sustained and works on the premise that such partial injuries did
not disable a seafarer to earn wages in the same kind of work or similar nature for which he was
trained.