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Policy is to use the form of English native to the author. Kenneth W. Estes was born and educated in the
United States; therefore, American English has been adopted in this publication.

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First published in the United Kingdom and the United States of America 2018

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Copyright © Kenneth W. Estes 2018

ISBN 978-1-78155-646-7

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 Acknowledgments

The author is indebted to many individuals and institutions. Chief of Modern

Military Records section Timothy Nenninger rendered the most essential
services of the US National Archives and Records Administration. David
Fletcher and Stuart Wheeler shepherded me through a pleasant research visit at
the Library and Tank Museum, Bovington, UK. Michael Green and Steven J.
Zaloga shared their personal archives and knowledge, and also advised me over
the years while this project germinated. My thanks also to Peter Müller, Mike
Verrall, Katie Thompson (Bovington), Geoff Spender, and Emily Dean (Imperial
War Museum Photograph Department). At the Musée Général Estienne, Saumur,
Lt-Col. Dubois, secretary general of the Association of Friends of the Armor
Museum kindly gave me permission to crawl through their operational Tiger II
heavy tank and take numerous photos. Many thanks as well to fellow author
Romain Cansiere and Mr. Pierre Olivier Buan for assistance at the Saumur
Museum.
 Contents

Acknowledgments
Introduction

1 German Tank Development, 1918–1939

2 War and the Heavy Tank Programs, 1939–1945
3 The Tiger Tank
4 The Successor: The Tiger II Tank
5 Inspecting a Tiger II
6 Dr. Porsche’s Tank to the Battlefield: The Ferdinand-Elefant Experience
7 Superheavy Tanks: Maus and E-100
8 Jagdtiger
9 Sturmmörser Tiger
10 German Heavy Tank Units in World War II
11 Conclusions: Quality v. Quantity?

Epilogue: The Ruins of War

Appendix I: Schilling, History of German Tank Development
Appendix II: Interrogation of Dr. Stiele von Heydekampf
Appendix III: Interrogation of Dr. Ernest Kniepkamp [Tank Engines]
Appendix IV: Chobham Preliminary Report: Tiger B Turret Armor [for Porsche
Tiger]
Appendix V: German Heavy Tank Cannon, 1942–1945

Endnotes
Select Bibliography
Index
There is no arguing that the Tiger II was the largest tank of World War II. This is best illustrated by
photographs of Saumur Museum’s Tiger I and Tiger II taken at identical distances on the museum floor. (R.
Cansiere)
Mounting the tank is no easy matter, given the sloping frontal armor and overall height (c. 2 m) of the
chassis. Once in the commander’s hatch, one views the ground from over 3 m of height. Note the main gun
points toward a quadruple anti-aircraft machine gun on the museum floor. We will make reference to this
later. (R. Cansiere)

Looking down from the commander’s hatch, we see his seat first and, below and looking forward, that of
the gunner. The forward edge of the commander’s cupola reveals three of its seven periscopes. At the
commander’s right shoulder is the protective shield isolating him from the recoil movement of the gun.
Forward of the gunner’s seat is his manual traversing wheel; to its left, the round dial of the twelve-hour
azimuth indicator, showing the position of the gun with relation to the chassis. The hand lever on the left of
the manual traversing wheel is the power traverse control handle. (Author’s collection)
Looking down the loader’s hatch, we see the right side of the 88-mm gun breech and the auxiliary manual
traversing handwheel by which the loader assisted the gunner in this task.
Looking further forward from the loader’s station, we see the loader’s fixed periscope, the right recoil
cylinder, and the curved belt feed for the coaxial MG 34, which allowed it to be fed from a belt bag on the
right, feeding over the gun to the left-hand feed tray. The button on the white box is the loader’s safety.
(Author’s collection)
Looking aft from the commander’s seat reveals the rear hatch of the turret, used for loading and removing
large objects. The turret rear wall was also removable with a crane in the event the 88-mm gun had to be
replaced. The hatch also served as an escape hatch, although with a full load of 88-mm rounds, the exit
would remain partially blocked. The roller in the foreground served to facilitate loading and unloading.
(Michael Green)
The sides of the hull overhanging the tracks were filled with 88-mm ammunition from the engine
compartment firewall forward into the driver’s compartment. (Author’s collection)
The end view of the 88-mm gun shows the breech assembly and vertically sliding breechblock and the two
recoil and recuperator cylinders. Below, one sees the motor and hydraulic traversing assembly that drove
gears fitted to the turret race. (Author’s collection)

Here, the recoil and recuperator cylinders are mounted on the right and left sides, respectively, on top of the
gun mount, to ensure a steady and uniform force to reduce the recoil and accelerate the recovery of the gun
into battery. (Author’s collection)
The turret roof, seen from the loader’s position, has a spent cartridge ejection port, essential for keeping the
turret clear during rapid firing. (Author’s collection)
Close-up of the hydraulic pump that provides power traverse for the turret. It is driven via a power take-off
shaft from the engine drive shaft. (Author’s collection)
Aft of the loader’s periscope was the port in the turret roof for the close-in protection mortar, also a
responsibility of the loader. Note the position of the turret exhaust blower over the breech to evacuate the
fumes from firing. (Author’s collection)

The hydraulic turret traversing system spun reduction gears connecting to the turret race, here lacking the
usual metal shrouding of the production tank. The vertical jackscrew (right) is part of the elevation
hydraulic pump attached to the gunner’s elevation handwheel (left). (Author’s collection)
View of the commander’s cupola from below, showing its seven periscopes. (Author’s collection)
View of the museum interior via one of the periscopes. (Author’s collection)
View of the complete gunner’s articulated telescopic sight, adjustable for the gunner’s height via the vertical
brace. (Author’s collection)
Forward of the gunner’s position, one passes into the driver’s compartment, showing his seat, steering, and
braking controls, the transmission and steering unit housing to the right, separating driver from radio
operator, switches and instrument panel mounted on the housing (contemporary, not production). The red
interior paint is the original primer used on the Henschel assembly line, which was the only interior finish
applied late in the war to new tanks. (Author’s collection)
Turning to the right, the view includes the radio operator’s position and mounting for the bow machine gun.
With the radio sets mounted on top of the transmission and steering unit, the operator would not be visible.
(Author’s collection)
Moving closer to the driver, the controls for steering and braking become clearer as are the driver’s viewing
periscope and controls. The driver of the Tiger II, unlike that of the Tiger I, could also raise his seat and
steer from his open hatch, above. (Author’s collection)
From the engine compartment firewall, the drive shaft emerges to pass between the battery containers and
through the turret traversing drive on its way forward to power the transmission and steering unit. (Author’s
collection)
This is the driver’s periscope view of the quad anti-aircraft machine gun on the museum floor as noted in
the beginning of this section. (Author’s collection)
Seen from the driver’s seat, the turret floor is revealed and on it, the gunner’s tilting footplate, by which he
applied power traverse to the turret. There was also the alternative lever shown in the photo on the third
page of the section. Above the footplate is the foot lever that fires the coaxial machine gun. The edge of the
turret floor includes a protective plate to protect the gunner’s feet. (Author’s collection)
 Introduction

Popular historical surveys treating tank development may reach back to war
wagons and mobile forts once drawn by no less a visionary than Leonardo da
Vinci, as well as early examples and improvisations dating from Muscovy and
the Hussite Revolution. Although tanks and tank warfare also may claim
antecedents in chariots and cavalry arms of the ancients, modern tanks reflect
equally the evolution of siege machines. The inescapable fact remains that tanks
emerged as early innovations to break the deadlock of ground combat early in
the twentieth century.
The heavy tanks of World War II owe their existence to this siege machine
tradition. As a class of fighting vehicle, they began with the World War I concept
for a breakthrough tank. Without earlier improvements to the internal
combustion engine, metal fabrication, and rapid-firing weapons, their
introduction would have been much delayed. The World War I Western Front
provided the immediate military problem that caused their later development.
We should not be surprised that the breakthrough tank projects of the period
prior to World War II took place in the armies suffering the greatest casualties of
the Great War (Russia, France, United Kingdom, and Germany). Herein, we also
find the progenitors of the World War II heavy tank development.
Although only the French Army had some heavy and super-heavy
breakthrough tanks on hand at the beginning of World War II, the major armies
sooner or later began projects aimed at fielding updated versions of them, as well
as even larger super-heavy tanks intended to dominate the armored battlefield.
The latter category became the almost exclusive domain of the German Army as
it operated under the twin pressures of its diminishing strategic and operational
prospects in the war, plus the increasingly convoluted activities of industrial and
political leadership.
The first practical modern tanks, conceived and developed by the British
Army, went into action on the Somme front on September 15, 1916. They were
large, rhomboid-shaped armored tractors that contained propulsion machinery,
machine guns, cannon, and crews within a single chassis, protected against
bullets and artillery shell fragments. Their peculiar shape enabled trenches of up
to 2.44 m to be crossed. The descriptive term “tank” was applied largely as a
security cover for their development by the British and supplanted the awkward
alternative term of “landship.” Employed to cross barbed wire and destroy
opposing machine gun positions, they gained increasing success in the war when
employed en masse, with accompanying infantry and artillery support. Hundreds
of tanks saw action in the following years in the British and French armies,
including some lighter, two-man models and some featuring rotating turrets for
employing weapons. The Germans managed to field only a few dozen machines
for lack of initial incentive and materials. Although the Allies developed faster
machines, the tanks put into action remained, in general, walking-speed, limited-
endurance fighting vehicles, tied to an infantry support role and serving as a
form of armored battering ram or siege machine.
 1

German Tank Development, 1918–1939

By 1918, both the German and French armies planned a new generation of tanks
that would play a decisive role in 1919, each hoping to break through the
deadlock on the battlefield. The German General Staff took little interest initially
in tanks, which had not proved decisive at the outset, and in any case, the plan
for 1917 was to defend in the west while the decisive moves took place in the
east. Yet improvements in the British tanks and the need to return to the
offensive in the west provoked new policies in 1917. Their slowly evolving A7V
was ordered into low-rate production in early 1917, but modifications intervened
before it was ready. A supporting giant tank was proposed to augment the A7V,
the Groβkampfwagen (K-Wagen), with a planned size of 150 tons, sporting four
77-mm fortress guns and seven machine guns, and powered by two marine
diesel engines. Finally, ten such vehicles were ordered on June 28, 1917, taking
shape as somewhat smaller vehicles of around 120 tons. Two bridge-building
firms were contracted for their assembly, estimating a year to build. The track
was adopted from excavation machinery.
In October 1917, they were re-evaluated by the General Staff as suitable only
for static warfare, not exploitation. By the Armistice, two of the K-Wagen
designs were nearly completed (one without engines) by Reibe Ball Bearing
Works at Berlin, and another neared completion at Wegmann Carriage Works at
Kassel. The Germans dismantled them all under the close inspection of the
Allies.
The French Army mostly followed the guidance of General Jean Baptiste
Eugène Estienne in the development and formation of its tank arm, leading,
among many innovations, to the fielding of the FT-17 light tank, which had the
first rotating turret and could be produced en masse as an infantry-accompanying
tank. Yet he also subscribed to a heavy breakthrough tank concept, much heavier
and more tactically focused than the artillerie d’assault vehicles, such as the
Saint-Chamond and Schneider. He saw the need for a heavy tank for every three
to four light tanks as early as February 1917. The La Seyne (Toulon) shipyard of
the Société Nouvelle des Forges et Chantier de la Méditerranée (FCM) already
had heavy tank designs in development, and with the encouragement of
Estienne, proposed a super-heavy vehicle of some 68 tons, carrying a turret-
mounted 75-mm gun, armored to at least 35 mm, and capable of crossing
trenches of 4.5 m in width. The ensuing political and military dialogue
eventually produced a plan for 300 Char 2C in Plan 1919. The Armistice
produced sharp markdowns in procurement, and only ten of the super-heavies
would be funded.

Two K-Wagen breakthrough tanks neared completion at the Riebe Works in Berlin, 1918. Their
characteristics: weight: 120 metric tons; length: 13m; width: 6.1 m; height: 3 m; trench crossing: 4 m;
armor: 30 mm maximum (front and side). Armament: four 77-mm fortress guns and seven 7.92-mm
machine guns. Engine: two V-6 Daimler-Benz diesels, each 650 hp. Speed: 8 kph. Crew: twenty-seven. (US
National Archives)
The second Char 2C to be completed by FCM shipyard. The four machine guns are not fitted, but the photo
shows the unique cupola on the 75-mm gun turret (and the rear machine gun turret), which rotated at 300
rpm inside a similar static cylinder, giving stroboscopic vision to the occupant through the vertical slits, yet
remained impervious to small-arms fire. (Marius Bar, Toulon)

Once in hand, with the last Char 2C delivered in 1921, the French Army had
the unique position of having such vehicles for experimentation and subsequent
development of doctrine for their employment. Due to its age in 1939, the Char
2C may be mistaken for an antique artifact of a bygone era. However, a number
of benchmarks were achieved in its engineering. It ranks as the first operational
tank carrying a 75-mm gun in a turret, and to weigh 70 metric tons, for instance.
Although notions of heavy breakthrough tanks appeared in British, German,
and Russian studies and plans between the wars, the French explored these
concepts in greater detail. Thus, during the period 1918 to 1940, the French
Army pursued a program of heavy-tank development, beginning with the Char
2C of 70 metric tons, and analyzed lessons and experiences drawn from World
War I. The conception and construction of the Maginot Line also played an
important part in the development of a series of French heavy and super-heavy
tank studies and designs. These emerging designs variously sought to fight
enemy tanks, halt enemy breakthroughs, assault enemy fortifications, and
support the scheme of French defensive fortified zones, such as the Maginot
Line. Studies initially worked around a specified maximum weight of 45 tons,
but this factor soon increased because of additional armament and armor. By the
late 1920s, the designs of chars de forteresse (fortress tanks) called for 100-ton
machines protected by 100–150-mm armor-plating and mounting high-velocity
75-mm cannon. By 1938, the requirement for 90-mm cannon capable of firing
against the embrasures of fortifications and employing flamethrowers entered
into play. Various designs included a skeleton tank, an articulated tank, paired
cannon, the installation of two turrets, a tank capable of being disassembled and
transported by train, and a tank mounted on railway bogie wagons. The coming
of World War II then caused some rapid decisions, and many proposals for tanks
weighing 140 or even 220 tons therefore did not get off the drawing board. On
April 13, 1940, the eighth meeting of the Commission on Fortress Tanks
convened, viewing proposals from industry, and immediately ordered ten
vehicles from FCM, designated the F1, to be ready for operations in May–June
1941. The events of June 1940 made the order superfluous, and only a wooden
mock-up remained of the project.
There could be no continuation of World War I tank development in Germany
because of the prohibitions spelled out in the Treaty of Versailles, by which
Germany had ended the war. However, the Germans both evaded some of the
Versailles disarmament provisions and managed a clandestine rearmament
program for all the services, particularly the Army, where Chief of the General
Staff General Hans von Seeckt personally directed military cooperation with the
other pariah state in Europe, the Soviet Union. Especially after 1927, when
Germany convinced the victors that the Armistice Commission had finished its
tasks and saw it closed down, a host of cooperative programs with foreign states
and firms, especially in the USSR, gathered momentum.
The uneven results of German Army collaboration (1927–1933) with the Red
Army in tank development at their Kama test facility near Kazan can be debated,
but both sides clearly benefited from the combined courses in command by
which armored doctrine for both countries began to improve. The few prototype
machines produced by German industry were derided by Red Army officers,
who were convinced that better machines were being withheld from their view.
However, the three firms most directly involved—Krupp, Rheinmetall, and
Daimler-Benz (see Porsche below)—remained limited in experience and their
first efforts produced six codenamed Grosstraktor vehicles of 19 tons, arriving at
Kazan in July 1929. For the Germans, these small steps remained highly
satisfying, given the prohibitive conditions ensuing since the end of the war.
Although the two sides agreed upon various conventions, such as the categories
of light, medium, and heavy tanks, their internal debates continued to the full.
The next series of German tanks to debut at Kazan were the Krupp-made
“Agricultural Tractors,” prototypes later finalized as the Panzerkampfwagen
(PzKpfw) I. Krupp had so many difficulties fabricating it that it was not
delivered until July 1932. Even though the Reichswehr leadership knew that this
machine was not to be the main combat vehicle, it was patently useful as a
reconnaissance vehicle and substitute for more capable tanks that would follow.
Both existing operational doctrine and German manufacturing suggested that
small, fast vehicles would be preferred to slow and heavy ones.1
As the Kazan cooperation ended with the Soviet Union in 1933, the German
Army contracted Krupp and Rheinmetall for prototype heavy tanks, evolving the
Grosstraktor into a multi-turreted tank similar to the British Independent of
1926. The 23-ton vehicles, called Neubaufahrzeug, carried both 75-mm and 37-
mm cannon in a central turret, plus auxiliary turrets fore and aft with machine
guns. Poorly armored, complex, and crowded, these prototype tanks ended the
early exploratory phase of German tank development and the Army instead
ordered medium tanks with three-man turrets and 37-mm and 75-mm (short
barrel) guns in the 15–18 ton range from Daimler-Benz and Krupp respectively
as the PzKpfw III and IV for the provisioning of the new Panzer divisions
through the rest of the 1930s.
The Rheinmetall Neubaufahrzeug precursor to German heavy tanks, with Rheinmetall turret, 37-mm gun
above 75-mm gun, and small MG 34 turret fore and aft. (US Army)

Breakthrough Tanks and Heavy Tanks

The German heavy tanks of World War II originally stemmed from army
discussions in October 1935 for a 30-ton tank carrying a high-velocity 75-mm
cannon that would defeat the latest and heaviest foreign tanks known to exist.
Special mention was made of the need to defeat the French Char 2C super-heavy
tank as well as the Char D1 battle tank. As Tank Museum historian David
Fletcher has observed, that measure of effectiveness hardly seemed justified,
given the facts that only ten Char 2C tanks had been built in 1919–1920;
although it mounted the highly capable French 75-mm Model 1897 gun in a
turret, it had only a maximum 45 mm as frontal armor. The much smaller Char
D1 had 40-mm armor.2 In the end, discussion of the requirement centered upon
the need for a 12-cylinder 600-hp gasoline engine and a 75-mm tank cannon
with a muzzle velocity of 650 meters/second, neither of which had yet been
developed. As a result of this conference, the engine development requirements
for tank engines were consigned to the Maybach firm and tank cannon
requirements for a high-velocity 75-mm weapon continued as projects.
Over a year later, in January 1937, the Army Weapons Bureau requested that
the Henschel and Son firm develop a chassis for a 30-ton tank to its
specifications, while Krupp was already charged (in November 1936) with the
development of a turret for that tank, mounting a 75-mm short barrel gun. On
April 28, 1937, the name of the projected tank was decided as
Durchbruchswagen (DW), thereby reviving the breakthrough tank tradition of
the German World War I tank program culminating in the K-Wagen of 1918. The
Henschel firm proposed two prototypes, distinguished by two different steering
mechanisms, a Cletrac three-stage mechanism for the first machine, and a three-
stage differential with magnetic clutches for the second. Both vehicles used a
suspension system of six double road wheels each side, sprung by torsion bars.
The power plant was a Maybach HL120TR engine. The second prototype also
featured incremental improvements to final drive, parking brake and track pitch.
Hull thickness was 50 mm all around, with deck and belly plating of 20 mm.
 The Krupp turret proposed for the DW fit a 1.5-m turret ring and offered 50-
mm protection all around with turret roof armor of 15 mm and gun mantlet of 20
mm. The armament was the short barrel 75-mm gun already mounted in the
PzKpfw IV; Krupp designers held to that weapon to meet overall weight
requirements, seconded by the Army test branch. Testing the Henschel hull in
1938 led to a contract to continue development in the 30-ton tank with the 75-
mm short (L/24 or 24 calibers long) cannon, keeping the same crew
compartment as the PzKpfw IV medium tank then in production. The project
objective defined protection as proof against the German 37-mm anti-tank gun.
The next stage project, designated under the new Weapons Bureau system as VK
30.01 (full tracked motor vehicle weighing 30 metric tons, version one), featured
a complete hull manufactured as a single piece, with a new Maybach HL116
engine, and an additional road wheel set on each side to support the now 32-ton
design. The seven road wheels featured the new interleaving concept intended to
distribute the vehicle weight more evenly over the track. The Krupp turret
project detailed state of the art turret power and hand mechanisms for traverse
and elevation, gunsights, and vision devices, plus plans to add an additional
machine gun in the turret rear, in common with many foreign designs.
 2

War and the Heavy Tank Programs,

1939–1945

At last, on November 24, 1939, as the new world war swirled about Poland and
Western Europe, Krupp agreed to deliver three complete hulls with
superstructure to Henschel, but without turrets, as they would serve for driving
trials only. The latter would come under contract on July 23, 1940, when the
Weapons Bureau contracted for eight hulls and eight turrets, to be delivered to
Henschel between October 1941–January 1942. In the end, the three prototypes
and the eight armored hulls reached the Henschel Works by November 30, 1941
for assembly and Krupp-Essen delivered the last of the eight turret bodies to the
weapons outfitter Krupp-Gruson on January 21.
Meanwhile, the Russo-German War had begun and news from the Eastern
Front proved very mixed. The impressive Blitzkrieg campaign carried out under
Plan Barbarossa capitalized upon a degree of strategic surprise to this day
unexplained, and in three months (mid-June–mid-September 1941) the three
army groups employed by the German Army managed to encircle Leningrad and
Kiev and advance upon Moscow, destroying or severely damaging some thirteen
field armies of the Red Army. In the ensuing fall campaign, the Germans failed
to take Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov, and instead reeled back from a Winter
Offensive to the end that stalemate ensued with a cumulative loss of 11 percent
troops, 30 percent tanks, and 30 percent heavy transport vehicles.
Among the tactical and technical surprises encountered by the Germans, the
appearance of the T-34 medium and KV-1 series medium and heavy tanks,
almost impervious to German tank and anti-tank cannon, caused near panic in
the minds of soldiers and their commanders.
The failure of the Blitzkrieg against Russia capstoned the remarkable seizure
of power of the German state by Hitler, who personally directed the German
armed forces and the German economy, among other matters, in 1941. As the
supreme authority for both military strategy and operational planning as well as
economic policy, he directed the offensive against Russia, choosing the strategic
objectives, and at the same time, overseeing the war economy upon which the
armed forces depended for success. Contrary to the beliefs of Germany’s friends
and foes at the outset of World War II, the German economy was no more
prepared for World War II than in 1914. However, as long as military operations
consisted of relatively brief pulses of effort to, in turn, defeat Poland, occupy
Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries, and then defeat France and occupy
the Balkans, the German pre-war economy sufficed. In this way, evident
weaknesses in the German economy, especially shortages of raw materials,
labor, and finances, could be accommodated or prorogued. However, with the
end of the Blitzkrieg in Russia, so died the heavily compromised economic
policy of the Germans at that point in time.1
Well before the much acclaimed takeover of the Ministry of Armaments and
Munitions by Hitler’s favorite architect, Albert Speer, his predecessor, Dr. Fritz
Todt, took control of the war industry away from the dominance of the German
Army in 1940 by establishing industrial commissions or committees made up of
the managers and industrialists themselves.2 Hitler usually confined his interest
in the war economy to high-level decisions, such as the size of annual
conscriptions and the armed forces, leaving the details of allocating raw
materials, labor, stockpiling, and the like to his economic ministers. On the other
hand, he displayed a very detailed knowledge of weapons and munitions, and he
held lengthy discussions with them on their design and manufacture.
Accordingly, he personally selected Dr. Ferdinand Porsche to chair the Panzer
Commission in 1940. Although Porsche had worked in the electrical and
automotive industries of Austria (for which he received honorary doctorates
from Vienna and Stuttgart universities) from around the turn of the twentieth
century, to include military transport during World War I, his fame rested with
racecar design and had led to his appointment by Hitler in June 1934 to design
the Volkswagen. Porsche worked for Daimler-Benz from 1906 until 1929 as a
chief designer, and had designed that firm’s Grosstraktor prototype tank for
testing at Kazan. Porsche developed a fascination for tanks in the process and, in
this, found much shared interest with Hitler during his later association with him.
In September 1938, Porsche won a German National Prize.
Porsche used his personal access to Hitler to advocate larger and more
powerful tanks, asserting that the light vehicles then in use were worthless. He
also advocated electric drive systems for heavy tanks, thus bypassing the more
difficult mechanical transmission and steering problems that such heavy vehicles
posed for the technology of the era. His “innovative and inventive mind”
impressed Hitler, according to British tank expert Peter Gudgin, but in the event,
few of his ideas worked and Hitler’s own views became distracted by false
notions of a specific weapon’s size and power over general military effectiveness
as keys to winning wars. Porsche eventually fell out of favor and was replaced in
December 1943 as head of the Commission by Dr. Stiele von Heydekampf, by
then the appointed managing director of Henschel Works.3
The final problem concerning Hitler was his style of political and military
leadership. At almost any moment, Hitler could issue a Führer order on any
level or detail of management. The immediate effect of a Führerbefehl once
issued became a top-level request or series of the same, overriding and intruding
into any ongoing process or project. In one sense, Hitler could cut through
endless red tape and bureaucracy. On the other hand, given a German economy
strained beyond limits of materials, labor, and other resources, such an
overweening order could only have unforeseeable effects upon the rest of the
economy and, in the worst case, military and national grand strategy.
In any case, the slow progress in heavy tank development in Germany
reflected little of the ongoing struggle between the leading tank forces of the
world in 1941. In October 1941, the Weapons Testing Branch requested Krupp
study a more powerful weapon for the VK 30.01 prototype, to include
backfitting the new anti-tank 75-mm PAK L/43 into its turret, whatever the
consequences. In the end, the resulting turrets were used for emplacements on
the Atlantic Wall. There were also parallel projects (VK 36.01 and VK 65.01),
both offered to Henschel. The VK 65.01 was a simple up-armored version of the
VK 30.01, on a basis of 80 mm all around, retaining the same 75-mm L/24 turret
and weapon. The VK 36.01 took form in June 1940 as an up-gunned VK 30.01,
carrying a 10.5-mm L/28 gun turret that was modified almost a year later to the
tapered-bore Weapon 0725. Hull armor was 80 mm frontal and 50 mm sides, and
a new Maybach 12-cylinder HL174 developing 450 metric hp as its power plant.
On June 11, 1941, Krupp was ordered to cancel the 105-mm gun turret in favor
of producing six armored turrets fitted with the Weapon 0725. Henschel in turn
received contracts for one driving evaluation and six prototype tanks that would
carry the new Krupp turrets. The following month, the VK36.01 was cancelled.
Only a single VK 36.01 chassis was delivered for testing in March 1942. By
then, it had been folded into the new Tiger tank project.4

Hitler visited the Nibelungen Works on April 4, 1943: Hitler center, Speer next right, and behind the pair
wearing hat and glasses is Alkett operations manager Franz Hahne, all showing keen interest in the
assembly of the Ferdinand heavy tank destroyers (History Facts).
 3

The Tiger Tank

The specific origins of the Tiger tank can be ascribed to the intervention of Dr.
Porsche into the ongoing army projects supporting the breakthrough tank
requirements. His own firm began design work in 1939 of what was called Type
100, a candidate for the army VK 30.01 project. Given his position as chairman
of the newly created Panzer Commission, it was hardly surprising that he landed
a contract to produce three prototypes for the VK 30.01(P) (‘P’ for Porsche) in
1940, and the Krupp firm then rushed to assist him, offering a turret design
sporting an 88-mm L/56 cannon based upon the well-tested anti-aircraft gun.
They received a six-turret contract from the Army in April 1941. In the event,
only one Type 100 would be completed and tested because the requirements
became more stringent as the Russian campaign ensued.
On May 26, 1941, Hitler met with both Porsche and Henschel representatives
at his Eagle’s Nest and effectively began his four-year direction of the German
Army heavy fighting vehicle program. In what was by then a typical specificity
in his Führerbefehl, he erased the previous projects and decreed that the German
heavy tank must have 100 mm of frontal armor and mount either the Krupp 88-
mm tank cannon or the 75-mm Weapon 0725, provided stockpiles of tungsten
ore proved sufficient for that weapon’s ammunition (decided in the negative in
July 1941). His views stemmed from the available evidence of Russian heavy
tanks as well as others believed to be under construction in the United Kingdom.
Hitler instructed Dr. Porsche to expand his Type 100 to a Type 101 carrying the
88-mm gun with frontal armor on a 100-mm basis. The army further rewarded
Porsche for his insider advantage with a July 1941 contract to Krupp for 100
hulls and turrets for the new VK 45.01(P) “Tiger” heavy tank.
 Two days after the May Führerbefehlen, however, the Army awarded similar
contracts to Henschel to redesign their VK 36.01 chassis to carry the 88-mm
turret. When the cancellation of the Weapon 0725 took place, Henschel had no
other resort but to concentrate on changing its VK 36.01 prototype to
accommodate the Krupp 88-mm tank turret of the Porsche vehicle, and thus
“grow” its vehicle into the VK 45.01(H). Awarded a contract to produce three
such prototypes for the new Tiger tank project in July 1941, Henschel eventually
received a further incentive in an April 1942 contract to assemble 200 more
hulls.1
The Porsche design for the Tiger tank later became the basis for the Ferdinand tank destroyer, without the
turret. This ambitious but failed design had the turret unusually far forward in order to accommodate the
rearward engines, generators, and electric motors of the drive train advocated by the erratic “professor.” The
six road wheels on each side were supported by an unusual longitudinal torsion bar system. The Porsche
turret by Krupp was raised in height for use in the Henschel design.

It has become a cliché to state that the Tiger tank was designed quickly by the
Porsche and Henschel firms. One might just as easily have stated that the rush to
production of this vehicle, after barely one third of the normal tank research and
development period, caused numerous difficulties and at least a few false starts,
almost crippling production plans from the outset. The Army assisted in the
complications by requiring the new tank to be capable of submerged crossings of
watercourses by means of an air intake snorkel device, effective to a depth of 4.5
m of water. The reason was the scarcity of adequate bridging in Europe capable
of supporting a 45-ton tank. Thus, the tank structure had to be made watertight,
except for certain free-flooding sections. Other specifications introduced
required stowage for ninety-two rounds of 88-mm ammunition and design of a
retractable frontal armor shield covering the tracks and running gear. Above all,
the surge of the design weight to 58 tons before a single prototype had been
fabricated required immediate redesign of suspension components and materials.
In what is no longer considered a surprising characteristic of the Hitler
regime, each firm was required to present its prototype Tiger for demonstration
and subsequent testing on Hitler’s next birthday (April 20, 1942), by order of the
new Armaments and Munitions Minister, Albert Speer.2 This detail rendered a
comic opera character to rush what was otherwise a massive and complex
technical and industrial effort to provide an operational advantage to the
increasingly beleaguered Axis troops on the Russian front. Less than a year
remained for the two firms to transform a mere concept into an operable heavy
armored fighting vehicle of unprecedented size and power.
The Henschel prototype VK 45.01 with snorkel raised, folding armor on front for protection of track, and
pistol ports on turret rear. There is a horn on top of the driver’s position. (US Army)

Two Competing Prototypes

Dr. Porsche changed little of his Type 100, then called the Leopard, except for
increasing the power of its engines. Porsche insisted again upon use of hybrid
gasoline-electric drive for his tank designs, based upon his presumption that such
heavy vehicles overtaxed existing mechanical transmissions and steering
technologies. In no small way, he was extending his acknowledged success of
1898 as the designer of the Lohner-Porsche hybrid car, with which he
established his fame as a designer, later attracting the attention of the Daimler-
Benz firm.
The two 320-hp air-cooled engines, coupled to a pair of 275-kW generators,
were now shifted to the rear, forcing the turret to an unusually awkward forward
position. Frontal armor became 100 mm with side protection of 80 mm. Krupp’s
88-mm gun turret design featured a unique 80-mm-thick horseshoe-shaped side
with the open end closed by the 100-mm turret front plates and a cast gun
mantlet. Dr. Porsche also repeated his preference for a longitudinal torsion bar
suspension vice conventional transverse bars or alternate spring devices. The
technical difficulties of his unique longitudinal bars related mostly to the
requirement to convert the vertical movement of paired bogie wheels to a
longitudinal rotational movement, using complicated geared linkages. The
limited space for these longitudinal torsion bars also limited the overload forces
they could accommodate, such as when crossing very rough terrain. The
breakages experienced with such torsion bars did not offset the savings in
material and overall vehicle height.

Four views of the Porsche prototype Tiger I begin here: Dr. Porsche wearing a dark hat while the vehicle is
prepared outside Hall VI of Nibelungen Works. Porsche Tigers were usually parked with turrets reversed to
allow easier access to the driver and radio operator positions from inside. (History Facts)
In the company testing grounds. Note extensive gratings on engine deck. (History Facts)

At Nibelungen plant railhead, facing entrance to testing grounds. (History Facts)

Good view of Porsche suspension and loose track. (History Facts)

VK 45.01(P) Prototype for the PzKW VI (P) heavy tank

(SdKfz 181) Specifications3
Crew: five
Weight: 60 tons
Power-to-weight ratio: 10.6 hp/ton
Overall length: 7.77 m, 9.54 m with gun forward
Width: 3.32 m with combat track
Height: 2.9 m
Ground clearance: 0.48 m
Turret ring diameter: 1.57 m
Engine: Two Porsche gasoline 320-hp air-cooled V-10
Transmission: Electric
Fuel capacity: 520 l
Max. speed (road): 35 kph
Max. range: 105 km
Ground clearance: 0.48 m
Ground pressure: 1.13 kg/cm2 [16 psi]
Armament: 88-mm KwK 36 L/56, two MG 34 (hull, turret); eighty rounds 88-
mm, twenty-nine sacks MG 34 belts (4350 rounds).
Elevation: -8/+15 degrees
Armor:
Hull front 100 mm upper/80 mm lower
Turret front: 100 mm
Sides: 80 mm, turret 80 mm
Rear: hull 80 mm, turret 80 mm
Turret roof: 25 mm

In addition to the novelties of gasoline-electric drive and longitudinal torsion bar

suspension, the Porsche prototype incorporated a rear sprocket drive, a toothed
forward idler wheel of the same pattern, and six paired road wheels per side in
three bogie sets. The most notable characteristic of this Porsche vehicle was the
growth in weight from the Type 100, with approximately the same size hull and
modest increase in power, such that the ground pressure and power to weight
ratio of the tank meant that it was seriously underpowered and more prone to
bogging in difficult terrain.
The Henschel team was forced to redesign its VK 36.01 for the new VK
45.01(H), but could draw upon considerable experience in previous years
connected with the breakthrough tank projects. In the end, the VK 36.01 hull
was enlarged and improved in internal volume by extending the superstructure
over the tracks in order to accommodate the cooling fans and equipment of the
Maybach HL 210 twelve-cylinder engine that now was required. The forward
portion of this “pannier” superstructure would serve to provide most of the
storage space for the ninety-two rounds of 88-mm ammunition in the new
requirement. It also was required to support the much larger diameter 88-mm
gun turret designed by Krupp for the Porsche Type 100. The suspension, final
drives, sprocket and idler wheels, and steering mechanisms of the VK 36.01
design passed with little change into the larger vehicle. However, the numbers of
road wheels had to be increased from pairs to triplets on each road wheel arm
axle to support the increased weight. The interleaving of the road wheels was
retained from the earlier designs as even more essential for weight bearing. As if
the new design was not complex enough, the Army levied its requirement for the
new tank to be capable of submerged fording operations to a depth of 4.5 m
underwater.
Henschel’s Tiger H1 (as designated in official documents in February 1942)
represented a very large quantum leap in sophistication and technical complexity
in tank design, especially when compared to the two German medium tanks then
in production. Due to transport requirements, the tank would use two different
sets of track, a 0.725-m wide set for cross-country operations, and a 0.520-m set
for loading and transport, at which time the outermost road wheels also required
dismounting. Ordered because of the scarcity of adequate bridging for the tank
during operations, the deepwater fording requirement of 4.5 m required
considerable waterproofing throughout the vehicle, completely sealing the
engine compartment, which drew intake air from a 3-m snorkel tube. Exhaust
gases were expelled using ordinary manifold pressure and the existing exhaust
pipes. These exited the rear armor plate, curved upward, and were released
through flame suppressed apertures. Thick armor castings protected the two
exhaust tubes outside the hull armor. Cooling air for the radiators was drawn in
and expelled through four separate armored grills located on the rear deck, offset
to either side. These were switched off for submerged operations, and free
flooding provided radiator cooling.
The early production Tiger I, showing stowage of tools, drum type cupola, headlights on top of driver’s
compartment, vision slits, and pistol ports for submachine guns. (US Army)

Driver and radio operator hatches were usually closed while moving, but periscopes were provided. (US
Army)
Details of engine deck gratings. The Feifel air cleaners were required for desert operations, simplified in
March 1943, and discontinued that October. Note the turret exhaust blower to evacuate gun fumes, located
behind the loader’s hatch. (US Army)

The Krupp turret was modified to receive hydraulic and hand traversing gear,
whereas electrical and hand controls had been specified for the Porsche Tiger
(P). Above all, the new Tiger (H) required sound transmission and steering
mechanisms for maneuvering its size and weight across the most difficult terrain.
In this case, the Henschel L600 (later L800) series steering drive was taken from
the input side of propulsion gears of the transmission with two ranges,
permitting sixteen different turning radii. The double differential transmission
installed in the tank was another development from the VK 30.01 project. The
Olvar 401216 series gearbox offered mechanical semi-automatic shifting
through eight forward and four reverse speeds by simply depressing the clutch
pedal and moving the selector lever. The tank was capable of a neutral steer
when the transmission was placed in neutral and the clutch disengaged.
The driver’s position had two different viewing devices from the inside and
was not designed for operating the vehicle from the position’s opened hatch. An
armored double shutter opened to permit direct viewing forward through a thick
laminated glass. With the shutter closed, the driver used a binocular periscope
with no magnification and a 65-degree lateral view through two holes made in
the armor above the shutters.
Ammunition stowage totaling ninety-two rounds of 88-mm ammunition was
primarily located in four sixteen-round bins in the panniers of the center or
fighting compartment, with a further six rounds stowed in a bin next to the
driver. An additional sixteen rounds were carried in bins below the pannier bins
and a final reserve of six rounds remained below the turret floor. Machine gun
ammunition was stowed in thirty-two canvas sacks, each holding a 150-round
belt; half of these hung on the firewall of the fighting compartment.

The Henschel version of the VK 3001 employed an L320C transmission,

which incorporated a double differential steering gear, providing three turn
radii. The steering drive was taken from the output of the six-speed range
gears, however, resulting in the three radii being the same, which-ever gear
was selected. The Henschel L600C and L800 transmissions employed in
the later Tiger, however, took the L600C steering drive from the Olvar OG
401216 A pre-select gearbox input, resulting in two turn radii being
available in each of the eight forward speeds, and the four reverse gears, the
turn radii increasing in magnitude with each higher gear. Tiger II employed
the Olvar OG 401216 B gearbox and the L801 steering gearbox.4

VK 45.01(H) Prototype for the PzKW VI (H1) heavy

tank (SdKfz 181) Specifications5
Crew: five
Weight: 52 tons
Power-to-weight ratio: 11.5 hp/ton
Overall length: 6.30 cm, 8.03 cm with gun forward
Width: 3.55 m with combat track
Height: 2.9 m
Turret ring diameter: 1.82 m
Engine: Maybach HL 210, gasoline 600-hp water-cooled V-12
Transmission: Olvar automatic transmission OG 401216 A
Fuel capacity: 570 l
Max. speed (road): 40 kph
Max. range: 140 km
Ground clearance: 0.47 m
Ground pressure: 1.03 kg/cm2 [14.7 psi]
Armament: 88-mm KwK 36 L/56, two MG 34 (hull, turret); (92-mm close
defense mortar weapon with twelve ready rounds from March 1944);
ammunition: ninety-two rounds 88-mm, thirty-two sacks MG 34 belts (4,800
rounds).
Elevation: -9/+18 degrees
Armor:
Hull front 100 mm
Turret front: 100 mm
Sides: hull 80 mm, turret 80 mm
Rear: hull 80 mm, turret 80 mm
Turret roof: 25 mm

While each firm struggled to produce pre-production prototypes for the all-
important testing by the Army, the order for a demonstration of each before
Hitler on his April 20, 1942 birthday produced additional frenzy. Porsche’s team
worked with the new Nibelungen Works at St. Valentin, Austria, on his
prototypes and managed to deliver one vehicle to Rastenburg on April 19,
apparently completing final welding procedures en route. Henschel and Son
assembled their vehicles at Kassel and prototype vehicle V1 was ready and
running on April 15 for transport.
On the great day, the demonstrations before Hitler showed that neither
prototype was ready for production, however, to the Führer’s surprise, Dr.
Porsche’s vehicle appeared much inferior to the Henschel tank. While
Henschel’s tank suffered from overheating and brake failures, Dr. Porsche’s
vehicle had several engine compartment fires. The latter also demonstrated an
inferior ability to cross deep mud. A significant flaw remained the Porsche-
designed engines, which had to run almost continuously at full speed to generate
the necessary electrical power, causing frequent overheating and forced
shutdowns.6
Additional prototypes were sent by each firm for the final evaluations
conducted at Berka (Eisenach) and Kummersdorf test centers beginning in May
1942. The panel of officers and engineers unanimously endorsed the Henschel
design, dismissing the Porsche tanks as interesting technically but too difficult to
maintain in frontline units. Engine, cooling and suspension problems continued
to dog the VK 45.01(P). The turret electrical drive failed to function when on an
incline. In a series of tests in July, the engines of the Porsche tank were
considered completely burned out after 100 km of travel and repeated
breakdowns. Minister Speer secured Hitler’s approval to terminate Porsche Tiger
production in September. Production of the VK 45.01(P) series tanks was
officially terminated in October, but production had stalled from lack of parts a
month earlier.7 Of the original order for 100 vehicles, only ten had been
completed, including seven fitted with turrets, by October. The supplementary
order for 200 more Tiger(P) was rescinded. On the other hand, all 100 hulls of
the initial order had been completed by Krupp-Essen, therefore Speer and Hitler
determined on September 22 that ninety of these would be finished as heavy
tank destroyers. Of the other ten hulls of the first production order, four were
finished as Tiger(P), three more fitted as special recovery vehicles and the last
three languished amid pending decisions to produce Ram Tigers.8
During later trials of the Porsche Tiger, Speer drove chassis number seven and two others on August 27,
1942. It had a slightly higher turret roof than the first prototypes. (History Facts)
Henschel production line, occupied by early production Tiger I. The binocular gunner’s sight aperture is
evident on the leading vehicle turret mantlet. (US Army)

Producing the Tiger I Heavy Tank

The rush to production of the Tiger tanks affected Henschel in a similar manner
to Porsche but accelerated upon the cancellation of the Porsche orders. The first
series production order for 100 VK 45.01(H) and a second series order for 200
more had been received before the first prototype chassis had been completed in
April 1942. In August and November, the Army ordered another 124 and 250
vehicles respectively for a total of 424 in that year; in 1943, another 608 were
ordered. The final production order for 128 came in February 1944; however,
Henschel reassembled a further fifty-four tanks from components of tanks
recovered from the fronts and salvaged, for a total of 1,346 tanks. Monthly
output quotas increased from thirty units per month in December 1942 to
seventy-five per month in September 1943 and 125 per month in April 1944,
except the latter was never obtained (104 instead).9
Completing these orders became quite another matter for the various
manufacturers to accomplish. The final assembly took place at Henschel’s plant
in Kassel. However, the hulls and turrets came from Krupp and Dortmund
Hörder Huttenverein with an intermediate stop for turrets at the Wegmann Works
in Kassel for their assembling. The engines came from the Maybach plant in
Friedrichshafen, although Auto Union made the engines when the former was
out of action from Allied bombing raids in 1944.
Hitler had ordered the first twenty-five-tank unit ready for action by October 1
1942; however, nothing of the sort was possible because of the modifications
and production changes required from the evaluation and testing efforts that took
place after the first vehicles performed before Hitler in April. That unit would
have been one of two identical ones of Porsche’s model promised to Field
Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps that month. In fact, only eleven
production Tigers had been accepted by that date and a total of seventy-six by
the year’s end.10
Delays in production and deployment of the PzKpfw VI H1 would continue to
dog Henschel almost throughout its history, as first testing and then combat
experiences revealed the need for engineering changes and component
replacement.
Under continuing pressure, Henschel completed eight production tanks in
August 1942 and four were shipped to the Leningrad front with the remainder of
1st Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 tanks arriving September 8. This
deployment has been treated derisively by most historical accounts because of
the difficult terrain posed by the Leningrad front, particularly in the winter. What
has been ignored, however, was the operational situation. Following the fall of
Sevastopol, the German 11th Army staff and its siege artillery was shifted from
there to Leningrad in preparation for Operation Northern Light, the seizure of
Leningrad. Slated to begin with initial bombardments in late August, the planned
assault on the city was spoiled by Russian offensives starting in mid-month and
continuing through the winter. The first deployment of the heavy PzKpfw VI H
Model H1 (official name of the Tiger 1 at this point) to Leningrad fit the original
breakthrough tank concept that had brought the Tiger tank development very
well, and they even managed to carry out the spearheading of counterattacks on
occasion after the assault on Leningrad had to be curtailed.
The early production Tiger I is identified best by the taller barrel-type cupola with vision ports, vice
periscopes, rubber-rimmed road wheels, dual headlights, and Feifel air cleaners.

However well-intended the deployment to Leningrad may have been, it

quickly turned sour as the tanks failed almost immediately upon arrival. The
frequency of engine fires, failures of brakes, steering units, transmissions, and
final drives in the first vehicles sent to Leningrad did not swell the morale of
their crewmen. On the other hand, Henschel was unable to meet its production
goals for three months because of the need to support just the first four (and then
eight) tanks sent to Army Group North. This pattern proved a characteristic of
this most complex fighting vehicle and a search for its replacement would follow
upon discovering its disappointing reliability in the field.
A sampling of modifications to the production tanks illustrates the hazards of
the rush to production of such a weapons system:

Steering gear modified (September 1942)

New transmission placed in production line (November 1942)
Better hose clamps for cooling system (January 1943)
Replaced steering device (February 1943)
New brake lining introduced (March 1943; the Tiger I official designation
changed in this month to PzKpfw Tiger Model E)
New fan drive system oil lines introduced (April 1943)
Completed improvements to the transmission in tank number 578 (c.
September 1943)
New final drive seals (December 1943)

On the other hand, the Army rescinded its requirement that the Tiger tank
operate submerged on August 30, 1943, starting with tank number 495 onwards.
As the tank’s engine compartment had to be sealed to maintain this capability, its
rate of engine fires likely dropped once a more normal ventilation of the
compartment was obtained; all tanks leak fuel and oil, by nature.

Operating the Tiger I

From its very ambiguous launching in mid-1942, the Tiger I stood out from the
world’s fighting vehicles as a unique weapons system, featuring outstanding
firepower and protection. The range, accuracy, and penetrating power of its gun
was seemingly worth the sacrifices in the third of the honored triad of tank
design characteristics: firepower, protection, and maneuverability. The size and
weight of the vehicle brought with it considerable penalties in range,
trafficability, transport, logistical sustainment, and reliability. Such an imbalance
of traditional design features might have proved worthwhile on campaign, had
German industry been capable of producing sufficient numbers of the Tiger
tanks. However, what German companies referred to as “mass production” bore
little comparison to the Allied industrial efforts in World War II, where tank
production was measured in the thousands vice hundreds.
Initially, the frequent German success in battle left their forces in control of
the battlefield, such that recovery of the battle damaged, mired, broken down
and otherwise abandoned tanks often could be effected. During 1943, however,
Axis fortunes turned for the worse, and too many times these otherwise
unequalled fighting vehicles had to be destroyed to prevent their capture, or just
abandoned in haste. Such excessive losses of these expensive vehicles, combined
with their low production rates, suggested that Hitler’s developing mania for
technical superiority at all costs could not lead to winning the war.
The Germans developed no satisfactory method for battlefield recovery of
their heaviest vehicles. Using tanks to pull their equivalents out of bogs or
minefields was a frequent expedient of all armored forces. However, the strain of
56-ton vehicles hauling away at other mired 56 tonners too frequently
overstressed the elaborate and refined engines, transmissions, gearboxes,
steering mechanisms, and clutches, not to mention the increased danger on an
active battlefield. Lacking specialized recovery vehicles, the Army instead
improvised with insufficient numbers of their Sd.Kfz. 9 half-tracked prime
movers for battlefield recovery, with all the attendant handicaps.
Among its most impressive features, the Tiger I provided an unusual degree of
space and unheard-of conveniences (avoiding the term “comfort” for obvious
reasons) for the crew. As a British Army preliminary report described the first
Tiger they captured, the crewmen “have a good sound tank, able to outrange any
it has met, roomy, and with comfortable positions for all. Driving, in particular,
is a pleasure, and the gunner’s layout as convenient as he could wish.”11
Beginning with the commander’s position, the seat was fixed to the turret side,
at about 7 o’clock, behind the gunner. Actually two seats at different heights, the
upper one allowed the commander to look out from the hatchway of his armored
cupola. The lower seat, positioned him to observe through any of the five vision
slits of the drum-shaped structure. Thick sections of armored glass clamped
inside the slit, protecting the commander from fragments. At his left hand, the
commander used a manual turret-traversing wheel to physically align the turret
weapons on the intended target, or more commonly to assist the gunner in
traversing manually when in a defensive position with the engine shut down. A
sheet steel plate protected the commander’s right side from the recoil and
cartridge case ejection of the 88-mm cannon. The cupola hatch raised and
lowered on hinges at the rear of the hatchway, but this type of hatch attracted the
attention of enemy snipers and gunners, and a new low-profile hatch replaced
the early production drum-type in July 1943 (starting with vehicle 391), such
that the commander viewed through seven periscopes arrayed on its
circumference and the hatch pivoted to the side. At the same time, the protective
steel on the right side was replaced by a fireproof cloth blanket that allowed
better communication with the loader. The new cupola thus presented much less
of a vulnerability to anti-tank guns. A ring mount for an anti-aircraft machine
gun (7.92 mm) topped off the new design.
The gunsight aiming reticle for the 88-mm tank cannon moved up or down as the range was set, to apply the
necessary elevation to the gun. The smaller triangles to each side were used for leading moving targets. The
larger triangle was the aiming point and the base of it assisted in range estimation. (US Army)

Cutaway view of an early production Tiger I or Tiger H. (The Tank Museum, Bovington)
 The gunner’s position, located immediately forward of the commander’s seat,
consisted of a fixed padded seat mounted on a horizontal arm attached to the
turret side, with a curved and padded backrest. The manual elevation wheel
(permitting +15 to -8 degrees) was located at his right hand. The main gun
trigger consisted of a curved steel bar mounted on the elevating wheel. A single
push of a finger connected the electrical firing circuit. The manual traversing
wheel extended before and above the gunner’s seat, and he rotated the wheel via
a handle on its underside. Power traverse (hydraulic) was controlled by the
gunner’s foot pedal, tipping the pedal forward to rotate to the right and
backwards to rotate it to the left. A separate control lever selected two traversing
speeds. The coaxial machine gun was fired by a separate lever actuated by the
gunner’s right foot. In addition to his optical sights, the gunner used a vision slit
on his left side, protected by armored glass. In August 1943, an improved vision
device was fitted with a wider field of view. This visor covered an important
blind spot of the early commander’s cupola.
Although power traverse was preferred in combat, gunners frequently used the
manual controls for the finer manipulation of the gun. In defensive positions, the
engine was frequently turned off, leaving only manual controls ready for use.
The gunner’s only aiming device was the articulated TZF Model 9B binocular
gunsight, replaced in March 1944 by the monocular TZF 9C. The gunsight
featured 2.5 × (additional 5 × in the 9C) magnification and a 25-degree field of
view. This was a ballistic sight, and the gunner estimated the range to the target,
coached as necessary by the commander, and by rotating the eyepiece, set the
range for the main gun and coaxial machine gun such that the aiming (inverted
‘V’) reticule marks were raised or lowered so that the aiming point, when placed
at the bottom of the target, applied the correct elevation for the gun to hit at that
specific range. The other marks served to estimate the range from the target size,
and to provide aim-off leads for a moving target. The applicable range scales
were 0–4,000 m for the 88-mm cannon and 0–1,200 m for the coaxial 7.92-mm
machine gun. An internal travel lock braced the main gun from excessive
movement while the tank moved, except during combat. Starting with vehicles
635 and ending with 876, an additional external travel lock was fitted on the
right rear engine deck, used for administrative movements.
The loader usually performed his duties without wearing his intercom headset
because he had to move rapidly within the turret and fighting compartment to
move ammunition from stowage to the guns (both cannon and coaxial machine
gun) according to the orders of the commander. Accordingly, he relied upon
shouted orders or hand indicators of the commander. The 88-mm cannon was
loaded from the right side and the loader had to trip the safety lock before the
gunner could fire. He also had to keep the coaxial machine gun loaded and
correct any stoppages. This machine gun was difficult to access because it was
mounted so close to the main gun, and the ammunition sacks only held 150
rounds each for the 7.92-mm MG 34 weapon. Similar to the gunner, he had a
vision slit on the side of the turret, backed by armored glass for outside viewing.
This was likewise improved in August 1943 with a wider field of view.
However, the best improvement came in March 1943 with the installation of a
fixed periscope facing forward mounted in front of the loader’s hatch. This tank
also provided the comparative luxury of a folding loader’s seat, mounted on the
elevation gearbox, facing to the rear. The Tiger I carried ninety-two rounds of
88-mm ammunition, usually divided evenly between the high explosive shell
and the armor piercing Panzergranate 39 round with a small bursting charge.
There was also a special composite armor piercing round developed for the 88-
mm gun, the Panzergranate 40, which contained a tungsten core for enhanced
penetration of steel armor. Produced for the 88-mm gun in 1942 and 1943, it was
later removed from munitions applications because of tungsten scarcity and
priority use in the manufacture of machine tools. Finally, some amounts of
shaped-charge ammunition were available for the 88-mm gun as the
Panzergranate 39 (hollow charge) round, but its armor penetration remained
inferior to the conventional armor piercing munitions.
The driver, considered by several veteran tank commanders as the most
important crew member, occupied a position in the left front of the forward
compartment in a padded seat and backrest adjustable forward and backward.
The backrest was adjustable from tilt to fully dropped back for access into the
turret/fighting compartment. There was no adjustment for seat height because
the design did not permit driving with a view from an open hatchway. Instead, he
used a heavy armored visor backed by armored glass and closed by a heavy
sliding vertical shutter, operated by a handwheel. When closed, the driver could
look through a binocular periscope fitted to two holes drilled above the visor, but
in February 1943, this fixture was deleted from new production and the holes
were plugged and welded shut. Finally, the driver had a periscope fitting in his
hatch angled to the left. The driving controls and instrumentation have been
described rightly as “intuitive” to a modern driver. The steering wheel, foot
pedals for clutch, brake, and throttle, handbrake, and gear selector are in familiar
locations. Shifting gears requires a single finger to actuate, as the shifting lever
merely indicates one of eight forward and four rearward speeds, with the actual
shifting accomplished hydraulically. This feature, plus the ease of steering,
represented a singular technical achievement in tank technology of the day. That
said, the skill and attention of the driver in handling this heavy tank remained an
important determinant for keeping the vehicle in action and avoiding
breakdowns during field operations.
The radio operator’s position opposed that of the driver, occupying the right
side of the forward compartment. Each of these crewmen remained relatively
isolated from each other, because of the mass posed by the drive shaft, steering
unit/transmission housing, instrument panel and other fittings. The radio
operator had a seat similar to the driver, except it was not adjustable, save the
folding feature that permitted exit into the turret. The standard tank radio
transmitter and receiver set FuG 5 was fitted over the transmission case,
completing the isolation from the driver’s position. A platoon commander’s tank
carried a second radio set, FuG 2. The tank intercom system was also mounted
with the radio sets.
The radio operator also manned the hull machine gun (7.92 mm), placed in a
ball mounting with an armor barrel sleeve on the near vertical front armor plate
of the forward or driver’s compartment. The gun traversed 20 degrees to either
side, with +20 degrees elevation and -10 degrees depression. Aiming was via a
1.8 × magnified KZF2 telescopic sight. That sight and the hatch periscope
similar to the driver’s, and angled to the right, provided the sole outside viewer
at this position.
The mid-production Tiger E made several simplifications and improvements. There is a single headlight,
center mounted, the grenade launchers on the turret sides are deleted, and a new turret has a lower cast
cupola, improved protection for the loader periscope, with the turret ventilator moved over the gun breach
for efficiency.

A small number (eighty-four) of Tiger tanks were completed as command

vehicles for company (Sd.Kfz. 268) and battalion commanders (Sd Kfz 267). In
this case, an additional long-range receiver transmitter FuG 7 or FuG 8,
respectively, was fitted in the place of the FuG 5, which was moved to the turret.
In each case, the 88-mm ammunition stowage dropped from ninety-two to sixty-
six rounds, machine gun ammunition from thirty-two to twenty-two sacks, and
the coaxial machine gun was removed from the turret. Two additional antennae
(one a star array in the case of the FuG 8) were carried as well as a GG 400
auxiliary generator mounted in the hull.

A command variant of the Tiger E, built in January–February 1944, demonstrates the improved
commander’s cupola. The pistol port on the left front has been plugged. By this point, the use of spare track
as additional protection is common. (IWM)
The late production Tiger I has the monocular gunsight, steel road wheels, and a smaller 600-mm rear idler
wheel. Not shown is the close defense weapon, mounted behind the loader’s hatch.
 4

The Successor: The Tiger II Tank

No sooner had the Tiger H1 entered series production when the Army Weapons
Bureau contracted Henschel to design a new Tiger tank on the lines of the new
Panther medium tank being prepared for production by the MAN firm. In part,
this order reflected the Army’s need to satisfy the demands of Hitler for a tank
mounting the improved Rheinmetall 88-mm Flak 41 weapon, which featured a
longer 72-caliber barrel and a resulting muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s, compared
to the 840 m/s of the earlier Krupp 88-mm flak guns (data for firing antiaircraft
ammunition). The Army bureau knew that both Henschel and Porsche versions
of the VK 45.01 could not mount the Flak 41 and would instead use the Krupp
88-mm L/56 tank cannon. Accordingly, both firms were given contracts in 1942
to develop a new heavy tank to replace Tiger I Model H with a new vehicle
carrying Krupp’s new developmental (contracted November 1941) tank cannon
based upon the Flak 41 and eventually standardized as the 88-mm KwK 43 with
a 71-caliber barrel. Dr. Porsche remained confident that his VK 45.01 (P) chassis
could be used with few changes to take a new Krupp turret and gun and on
March 23, 1942, he named his new vehicle the Type 180, in turn designated VK
45.02(P) by the Army. Upon the failure of his VK 45.01(P) vehicles in the
summer and fall of 1942, the Army cancelled Porsche’s participation in the Tiger
tank replacement VK 45.02(P) and later ordered the fifty Krupp turrets already
being built for Porsche’s design to be furnished instead to Henschel for use in
their vehicle.
Henschel had been working on their project VK 45.03(H) (originally VK
45.02(H)) since April 16, 1942. As Henschel’s production of the Tiger I Model
H was barely beginning in October, the Army decided that the Tiger I production
would continue into 1943 with the VK 45.03(H) production to begin in
September 1943 with the objective of providing 100 improved Tiger tanks for
the 1944 spring offensive.1
The Henschel Tiger II design retained the same layout as their Tiger I, but the
hull armor would be sloped as with the new Panther tank, using 150-mm armor
plates frontally and 80 mm on the sides and rear. As before, the turret would be
mounted in the center, using the fifty turrets ordered for the Porsche candidate in
early production vehicles, but reverting for series production to their own design
that avoided the curved complexities of Porsche’s design, using instead flat
plates (180-mm frontal, 80-mm sides) and a bell-shaped mantlet that also
eliminated a pronounced frontal shot-trap of the previous turret’s shape. A large
multipurpose hatch in the turret rear permitted the removal of the main gun
without removing the turret from the hull in both turrets, although several shell
racks had to be removed. If the entire hatch assembly was removed, the gun
carriage could be removed as well.
The business end of the Tiger II demonstrates its increased protection and firepower, with the 88-mm KwK
43, arguably the best tank cannon of World War II, given its penetrative power and accuracy. Unfortunately,
the armor plating of Tiger II sometimes failed design expectations because of the deterioration of armor
forging quality and severe shortages of molybdenum. (IWM)

The Tiger II Model B torsion bar suspension was conventional, but this time
nine dual road wheels were overlapped but not interleaved, as in Tiger I and
Panther, with commensurate simplicity. The power plant would be common to
the Panther and later production Tiger I, the Maybach HL230 coupled to the
Olvar transmission (B model) and a new L 801 steering unit. The series
production Tiger II Model B reached an astounding 69.8 metric tons, making it
easily the heaviest production turreted tank of World War II.

Most of the early Tiger B or Tiger II off the assembly lines used the fifty Krupp turrets allocated from the
failed Porsche Tiger II project. This was the version of the Tiger B encountered by the Anglo-American
armies at Normandy for the first time. It had slightly thinner turret face and roof armor than later production
vehicles.
The rest of the Tiger II used the series turret built by Krupp for the Henschel vehicles and it had the
additional advantage of correcting a perceived shot trap of the turret mantlet that exposed the forward turret
ring area.

Tiger Model B (SdKfz 182 ) heavy tank Specifications2

Crew: five
Weight: 69.8 tons
Power-to-weight ratio: 10.7
Overall length: 7.38 m, 10.29 m with gun forward
Width: 3.625 m with combat track
Height: 3.09 m
Turret ring diameter: 1.85 m
Engine: Maybach HL 230 P30, gasoline, 750-hp, water-cooled V-12
Transmission: Olvar automatic transmission OG 401216B
Fuel capacity: 860 l
Max. speed (road): 38 kph
Max. range: 170 km
Ground clearance: 0.495/0.510 m front/rear
Ground pressure: 1.02 kg/cm2 [14.5 psi]
Armament: 88-mm KwK 34 L/71, three MG 34 (hull, turret, AA), 92-mm close
defense mortar weapon; seventy rounds of 88-mm, thirty-two sacks MG 34 belts
(4,800 rounds), twelve ready rounds for 92-mm close defense mortar.
Turret gun elevation: -8/+15 degrees
Armor [mm/angle in degrees from vertical]:
Hull front 150/50 upper, 100/50 lower
Turret front: 185/10, side: 80/20, rear: 80/20
Hull sides: 80/25 upper, 80/0 lower; Hull rear: 80/30
Turret roof 44/horizontal center, 80 mm front and rear

Producing the Tiger II

Although the Tiger B design and series production was conceivably as rushed as
was the case with the Tiger I and Panther programs (we avoid German
references to mass production, which was not achieved in the III Reich to Allied
standards), one can observe a considerable improvement in the Tiger II program,
owing to the increased experience and lessons learned by Henschel Works and
its suppliers to date. Unfortunately, the Army also ordered compatibility with
MAN’s new design for a Panther II, which was later cancelled, costing
unforeseen delays (estimated at three months) in redesign. The Army ordered the
Henschel VK 45.03(H) into production in four batches, totaling 1,237 vehicles,
of which 950 were to be completed by September 1945. As usual, the Army staff
thoughts of delivering 100 vehicles for the “spring offensive of 1944” proved as
nonexistent as that offensive. In July 1944, cumulative deliveries of the Tiger B
reached 112 vehicles. Henschel had delivered the first three production vehicles
in January 1944 and, in August 1944, achieved the highest monthly production
of ninety-four Tiger B (totaling then 206 delivered). From that point onward, the
Allied bombing offensive wreaked havoc upon the German armaments industry,
with particular attention to tank production, as the killing of heavy tanks in the
factories became evidently easier there than on the battlefields. A mere 489
series production Tiger B were thus delivered to the German Army by the end of
March 1945. Eight more incomplete Tiger B chassis were discovered the next
month by American troops occupying the Henschel property in Kassel. Henschel
attempted to compensate for the bombing campaign by assigning some of its
Tiger B orders to the Nibelungen Works in St. Valentine, Austria, where the
derivative Jagdtiger was assembled, but to no avail.
Accordingly, we will find no evidence of production delays caused by
modifications to Tiger B production as had taken place with the Tiger I Model
H/E production in 1942–1944, as the changes were simple and evolutionary,
such as:

Maybach HL 230 engine governor set to max. 2,500 rpm vice (earlier 3,000
rpm) in November 1943 (applied to Tiger E as well).
The extendable engine intake snorkel was deleted from production models
in March 1944. However, an armored plate to cover the opening in the
engine cover was not ordered until December 1944.
Monocular gunner’s sight 9D introduced in April 1944.
New track and a nine-tooth sprocket wheel introduced in May 1944.
Loader’s hatch cover increased in thickness from 25 mm to 40 mm; hangers
for spare track links in June 1944.
New commander’s cupola with a quick-release spring-loaded hatch, bolted
to the turret roof by seven bolts in August 1944.

Operating the Tiger II

The tank commander of the Tiger B enjoyed the use of an advanced cupola
featuring seven periscopes and the umbrella hatch, similar to the later production
Tiger E and current Panther setup. The commander could use a seat and backrest
to observe through the periscopes or fold them aside and stand on the footrests in
order to observe directly the battlefield from under his hatch cover. As the
auxiliary manual traverse lever was now placed in the loader’s position, the
commander had fewer demands on him apart from directing the crew’s actions.
A steel shield extended from the gun mount on the commander’s side to protect
him from the gun recoil and the ejecting cartridge cases, which could rebound at
odd angles. The anti-aircraft machine gun MG 34 was standard by this time and
mounted on a ring atop the cupola.
The gunner sat in front of the commander on the left side as in the Tiger E, but
with the traversing handwheel closer and with the linkage running between his
knees to the gearing. A tilting floorplate controlled power traverse such that
tilting forward with the left foot traversed the turret left and the right foot
traversed to the right. A hand lever served as an alternate power control,
mounted on the left side of the gunner’s seat. It was operated by moving it
forward (left traverse) or back (right traverse) using the same linkage as the
footplate. The trigger for the 88-mm gun was a steel bar curved to parallel the
elevation handwheel, such that the gunner operated the handwheel and pulled the
lever to the wheel to connect the firing circuit with the same hand.
Similar to the Tiger E, the gunsight for the gunner was at first the articulated
binocular TZF9b/1, but this was replaced by the monocular model 9d, and these
both had two magnifications available: 2 × and 5 ×. The aiming and range
reticules were the same as those of the Tiger E.
The loader necessarily had considerable space on the right side of the turret to
grasp and manipulate the projectiles from their several stowage points. The side
panniers of the hull carried a total of forty-eight rounds of 88-mm ammunition,
with a further twenty-two rounds (sixteen in the first turrets built for the Porsche
firm) stowed in the turret rear for a total of seventy rounds. The types of 88-mm
ammunition available for the Tiger B were identical in design to those of the
Tiger E but not interchangeable.
The turret had a loader’s hatch for entry and exit, a fixed periscope in front of
the hatch for his observation, and a small hatch for ejecting the expended 88-mm
cartridge cases. As with the later production Tiger E tanks, all the Tiger B
models carried the close-defense weapon, mounted on the turret roof, which was
an additional task for the loader to operate and keep loaded with fragmentation,
signal, or smoke grenades. Finally, it fell to the loader to operate an auxiliary
traverse handwheel to assist the gunner in manual traversing when necessary.
Close-in view of Tiger II of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 in Budapest, October 1944. The turret face armor
remains impressive, with thick plating and a bell-shaped mantlet. Note the monocular gunner’s telescope
and Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating. (US Army)
 The driver’s position in the Tiger B permitted operation of the vehicle with the
driver’s head inside or outside the hatchway. Thus, the seat and several controls
were extendable in order to function in either position of the driver. The driver
used a pivoting periscope as his sole method of driving with his hatch closed.
Next to him, the radio operator also could look out the open hatch while moving
and otherwise manned a conventional ball-mounted MG 34 machine gun with
telescope sight. With hatches closed, the radio operator could observe only
through that sight or a fixed periscope angled to the right front.
The upshot of these arrangements remained that crews of the Tiger E vehicles
had little difficulty changing to the new model Tiger B once they became
available starting in mid-1944 for use in the German heavy tank battalions,
except for the drivers now taking charge of a much heavier vehicle. To a
considerable extent, this advantage also applied to the two heavy tank destroyer
battalions eventually equipped with the even larger and more powerful Jagdtiger
because it was based upon the Tiger B chassis and automotive systems. The
same could not be said for the troops manning the two heavy tank destroyer
battalions of the German Army equipped in mid-1943 with the Porsche-designed
tank destroyer converted from the original chassis and automotive plants of the
failed Porsche Tiger I project; more detail on those vehicles follows below.
The provision of command tank versions of the Tiger B proved similar to the
earlier Tiger tank. The same long-range radios were carried, and ammunition
was reduced to fifty-three rounds of 88-mm ammunition and twenty-two sacks
of 7.92-mm machine gun ammunition.
 5

Inspecting a Tiger II

The Tank
In the aftermath of World War II, the victorious Allies wasted no time in
gathering the materiel of the Axis forces, chiefly Germany, in order to study
technological advances and designs. German tank technology was particularly of
interest to them, given the difficulties encountered in fighting the German Army
even in the final days of the war. Examples of the heavy tanks and tank
destroyers had been captured on the battlefields, but now, the occupying forces
could examine not only operational vehicles, but also the manufacturing and
testing facilities with their valuable documentation and expert staffs. Many of
the tanks taken by the occupiers were subjected to destructive testing to
determine the power of tank cannon and resistance of the latest armor.
The French Army had particular need for such investigation and testing. Due
to the 1940 Armistice and German occupation, France had not benefited from
the technological advances experienced in the war and needed to catch up.
Fortunately, the battles of 1944 had left numerous examples of military
equipment of all kinds on French territory, readily available for exploitation.
Most of the armored fighting vehicles were gathered by French Army technical
services at Satory as well as in and around the armor and cavalry training center
and school complex located at Saumur. Today, some 880 fighting vehicles
remain there, with a mere fraction exhibited in the Armor Museum now named
for General Estienne. The museum staff have emphasized the restoration of the
maximum possible possible number of the vehicles it exhibits, among which
stands the only operating Tiger II heavy tank in the world. A brief photographic
tour illustrates best how formidable that vehicle could be in fighting trim.
The Tiger II of Saumur was found in the aftermath of the Normandy campaign
in the fall of 1944. It was among the fourteen Tiger II tanks shipped in early
August to the 1st Company, 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion. In the aftermath of
the Allied breakout from Normandy, the shattered German forces attempted to
regroup for a defense of the Seine, refurbishing units as feasible north of the
Seine. The 1st Company had been sent to Beauvais and the 3rd Company Army
Heavy Tank Battalion 503 to Mailly-le-Camp for refitting with Tiger II tanks.
Both of these companies were ordered back into action when the American 79th
Infantry Division established a bridgehead over the River Seine at Mantes-sur-
Seine.
Half of the tanks broke down on the way there, in the case of each company.
The 3rd Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 was first to arrive at the Vexin
forest assembly area, five miles from the US frontlines on August 21, followed
by the 1st Company, 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion on the 23rd. The 3rd
Company attacked the American lines that day, fighting in support of the 18th
Luftwaffe Division. The battlefield situation turned suddenly against the
surprised American infantry, who fell back, especially when their accompanying
M10 tank destroyers were destroyed. American artillery concentrations caused a
halt to the German attack. These Tigers were joined two days later by the seven
1st/101st SS tanks as the Germans continued their attack against Fontenay-Saint-
Père, and again had to break off the attack amid intensive barrages of US
artillery, causing some damage to the tanks. American P-47 fighter bombers
attacked and three tanks had to be abandoned.
On August 27, the US 79th Division was joined by the 30th Infantry Division
on its right flank. Two US tank destroyer battalions also arrived. The Americans
attacked and a platoon from each German heavy tank company countered. The
armored duels raged for about an hour. One Tiger was knocked out by
concentrated fire of the M10s, another headed back for repairs, but Tiger number
123 of the SS company was near hit by artillery and fragments struck the tank,
which suddenly stopped. The engine would not restart and the crew abandoned
it.
The Germans broke off contact starting the 30th as the US 2nd Armored
Division arrived and attacked in force across the front. The rear-guard action was
fought by infantry of the 6th Parachute Division and the remaining Tiger II.
There were no more German counter attacks as their entire Army was
withdrawing and abandoning Northern France. The SS tank company saved two
Tiger IIs while the Army company lost all.
Tank 123 remained on the battlefield, intact, and was recovered by the French
Army in early September, passing postwar into the Saumur collection.1

The Inspection
The Tiger II, like its predecessor, remains surprisingly roomy inside if you forget
about the forty-eight rounds of 88-mm ammunition and thirty-two sacks of
machine gun ammunition and more ammunition for the self-defense roof mortar
that were stowed in the hull sides forward of the engine compartment to the
driver’s compartment, plus up to twenty-two more 88-mm rounds in the turret
bustle. The Tiger I had no main gun ammo in the turret and apparently, their
crews did not like to store rounds in the Tiger II turret, but the whole thing was
an ammo box, and the turret ammo remained the handiest for loading. There is
much interior room for everybody but the gunner. One easily stands fully upright
in the loader and commander positions, and the driver and radio operator can
make use of their hatches while on the march.
Gunner and driver controls are good, yet the British Army examination found
the manual traversing wheel awkward, projecting into the gunner’s lap. The
auxiliary manual traverse located in front of the loader makes much sense. The
Tiger II was apparently as easy to drive as the earlier Tiger; however, an
untrained driver more likely could damage the engine or bog the tank because of
the considerable growth in weight. Many controls are redundant; for instance,
braking is via foot pedals and the usual levers, which must help a lot for panic
stops.
The Tiger II was well-engineered, at first impression, and it likely represented
the limits of automotive engineering of its day. Unfortunately for the Germans,
the Tiger II joined the rest of these heavy armored fighting vehicles in entering
service prematurely, with many defects yet to be discovered and corrected.
Moreover, seldom were troops allowed proper time to train with and become
accustomed to these vehicles. It was very well-armored and its more powerful
88-mm gun could handle any opposing tanks of the day. As always, however,
crew training, tactics, and leadership carried the day, or not.
 6

Dr. Porsche’s Tank to the Battlefield:

The Ferdinand-Elefant Experience

As noted above, the failure of the Porsche project VK 45.01(P) series tanks to
pass German Army acceptance trials left the problem of what to do with the
rather scandalous early production of 100 hulls in anticipation of Porsche’s
design winning the competition. Since Hitler already argued for the mounting of
the Rheinmetall 88-mm anti-aircraft gun with its 72-caliber long barrel on a
tank, with Speer, he determined on September 2, 1942, that the ninety
unassembled chassis could serve such a requirement, in the form of a heavy
assault gun or the newly specialized concept of a heavy tank destroyer. Hitler
specified 200 mm of frontal armor in his orders, and the Alkett firm of Berlin
received the urgent order to redesign and produce a modified Porsche Tiger
chassis to carry the additional armor and the new Krupp anti-tank gun Model
43/2 (L/71). Alkett (Altmärkische Kettenwerk) finished the redesign assignment
on November 30. However, the final assembly was changed by Speer to the
Nibelungen Works at St. Valentin, Austria, which had finished the ten Porsche
45.01(P) prototype Tiger tank hulls and the nearby Upper Danube Iron Works at
Linz would now modify the remaining ninety VK 45.01(P) hulls to the Alkett
redesign, mounting a fixed casemate instead of the rotating turret of the Tiger
design. Accordingly, Alkett transferred an operations manager and 150 fitters to
Nibelungen Works in March 1943 to assist in meeting the critical deadlines for
the German summer 1943 offensive.
The Redesign
The initial design of the new tank destroyer raised the frontal armor of the hull to
200 mm upper and 110 mm lower, and added a further 80-mm plate angled at 50
degrees in front of the driver and radio operator positions. A 15-ton casemate
was placed on the hull to enclose the armament and fighting compartment,
armored to 200 mm in front and 80 mm to sides and rear. As the weight rose to
just under 69 tons, designers feared for the suspension system, originally
designed for the 45-ton prototype tank with a 55-ton theoretical limit. As a
result, the frontal hull armor was reduced to 200 mm upper and 80 mm lower
armor, with the sloped additional plate removed.

A Ferdinand as delivered, with barrel splinter shield added in May 1943. It has a rectangular commander
hatch and original gratings over radiators.

Two Maybach HL 120 engines of 265 hp replaced the failed 310-hp air-cooled
engines of the original tank, however less powerful, and otherwise, the gasoline-
electric drive and longitudinal torsion bar suspension of the 45.01(P) remained
installed. The engines and generators had moved forward to the center of the
chassis, leaving the driver’s compartment physically isolated from the rest of the
vehicle. Installing the water-cooled engines, already in use for Panzer III and IV
vehicles, proved very difficult in a very crowded hull. In the fighting
compartment, the two loaders sat or stood to either side of the gun, while gunner
and commander sat on the left and right respectively. Visibility with closed
hatches was limited; the driver had three periscopes while the radio operator had
a vision slit to his right; the gunner used his Sfl.ZF.1a periscope gun sight and
one rotating periscope served the loaders to the rear. The commander had to
open his hatch in order to make use of his SF 14Z stereoscopic scissors
periscope. Originally, one of the loaders would operate a ball-mounted machine
gun mounted to the right of the 88-mm gun, but this was not feasible to install in
the 200-mm plate, and the MG 34 machine gun remained free for use from
inside along with crew personal weapons.1
These vehicles experienced the same developmental problems as the Tiger
tanks, with the additional burden of being derived from admittedly failed
prototypes. As in most aspects of the war for Germany, events moved too
quickly to allow deliberate field testing and engineering of defects. Early
production vehicles were sent to trials at Magdeburg and Kummersdorf where
the following defects were encountered, among many:
Nibelungen Works: A Ferdinand tank destroyer of 68.5 metric tons is easily handled by a gantry crane.
(History Facts)

Telecine shafts, used for throttle linkages, caused variable resistance, giving
unequal engine speeds.
Left fuel lines too close to exhaust pipe.
Fuel pumps unreliable.
Cold starting system too difficult to handle.
Cooling pipes improperly located, leading to likely damage.
Difficult to drain cooling system and check air compressor oil levels.
Cooling fan drives failed at 200 km.
Handbrake grip uncertain, unreliable.
Weak construction of electrical control box, vulnerable to shorts on
impact.
Unable to start one vehicle with power from another.
Electrical control system does not equalize power to each side.
Inadequate jack and towing equipment.
Roadwheel springs likely to break due to overweight vehicle.
The removal or replacement of engine, generator and electric motor,
cooling system and gun assembly each require removal of the casemate
via gantry crane.

Field testing and operational reports caused the Weapons Testing Bureau to
conclude by September 1943:
On April 15, 1943, Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering visits the Nibelungen Works, which he acquired
under his Bank of German Luftwaffe, which he headed. Ferdinand Porche stands on factory floor, extreme
left. Troops of the two tank destroyer battalions trained at the factory and assisted in final assembly of their
vehicles. (History Facts)

Excessive dust and dirt entering the fighting compartment clog the air
intake filters after 100km on the road.
After 900 km, very high wear shows in the engines, because they operate at
very high rpm and have poor air filtration.
Lifespans: Alternator V-belts: 227 km; compressed air system: 765 km;
pipework of compressed air system: 700 km; rubber engine mountings: 700
km; and gasoline engines: 911 km.
Trunnions of the dual road wheel assemblies show cracks at 911 km
Generators show heavy smoke stains and worn brushes by 911 km.

There was, of course, no time to remedy these defects during production,

although some modification kits were sent to the deployed units for installation
in the field. The Ferdinands were not without the shortfalls of the VK45.01(P),
but the Maybach engines replaced Porche’s engines and some other fixes took
place. However, it was still a delicate vehicle, prone to vehicle fires, electrical
shorts, and of course, bogging.

Panzerjäger [tank destroyer] Tiger (P) later Ferdinand

(Sd.Kfz. 184) Specifications2
Crew: six
Weight: 68.5 tons
Power-to-weight ratio: 9.4
Overall length: 8.14 m; 6.8 m chassis length
Width: 3.38 m
Height: 2.97 m
Turret basket diameter: N/A
Engines: Two Maybach HL 120TRM gasoline, 265 hp, water-cooled V-12
Transmission: Electric, Porsche-Siemens
Fuel capacity: 1080 l
Max. speed (road): 20 kph
Max. range: 150 km
Ground clearance: 0.480 m
Ground pressure: 1.23 kg/cm2 (17.49 psi)
Armament: 88-mm KwK 34 L/71, one MG 34 (stowed internally); fifty-five
stowed rounds for 88-mm, 600 rounds for MG 34. Elevation: -8/+14 degrees;
traverse: 28 degrees. Crews reportedly improvised ways to stow up to ninety
rounds of 88-mm on operations.
Armor [mm/angle in degrees from vertical]:
Hull front: 100 and 100/12 upper; lower 80 and 30/35
Casemate front: 200/25
Gun mantlet: 100/spherical and 25 mm splinter shield on barrel
Sides: hull 80/0, casemate 80/30
Rear: hull: 80/40 upper, 80/0 lower, casemate 80/20
Casemate roof: 30 mm; hull roof: 25 mm

The last of the ninety Panzerjäger Tiger (P) Ferdinands was delivered on May 8,
1943. As if the hurried development of the Ferdinand tank destroyer was not
enough, the crewmen of the two battalions issued these vehicles had very little
time to train on them before entering battle for the first time in the appalling
conditions of the Battle of Kursk (July 5–August 23, 1943). Heavy Tank
Destroyer Battalions 653 and 656 were assigned to the northern front of the
enemy salient and Army Group Center attack, supporting the assault infantry
divisions of the Ninth Army’s XLI Panzer Korps.
Attacking in support of the 292nd and 86th Infantry Divisions, the ninety
Ferdinands suffered from breakdowns and minefield losses; however, they
overcame the Russian anti-tank defenses of the first two lines in a 9-mile
penetration. Their actions outstripped their infantry support and they had to
withdraw to regain contact with them. In two days, the Ninth Army lost 13,000
casualties, predominantly infantry and combat engineers, and its offensive
ground to a halt. Fewer than half the Ferdinands remained in action after the first
day, although repairs continued through the night on the disabled vehicles. Two
days later, the Army’s offensive had ended and all the Ferdinands were out of
action or awaiting repair, although officially thirty-seven Ferdinands were
reported available on July 7, declining by day to twenty-six, thirteen, and ten.3

The 653rd Tank Destroyer Battalion received its first issues of the Ferdinand at Neusiedl am See. Note the
large rear hatch, impossible to close by hand once opened. (History Facts)

The Ferdinands performed as well as expected considering their imperfect

designs and hurried assembly, and the armor protection and powerful 88-mm
guns performed vital services where feasible on the battlefield. However, the
depleted infantry and combat engineer strength of the Ninth Army (and the
German Army overall) simply could not repeat the feats against a determined
enemy as in previous years, and the overall effort fell short.
The Battle of Kursk ended in a series of counteroffensives by Russian forces
north and south of the intended German breakthrough. The two battalions
equipped with Ferdinands contributed to stem the tide, along with the forces of
the two Army groups involved. Ultimately, the battalions were released in
December and their approximately forty-eight surviving or salvageable vehicles
returned to the Nibelungen Works for a rebuild in the early months of 1944,
given the many lessons of their first deployment and combat action. By March
1945, forty-seven vehicles, now renamed Elefant, had been rebuilt, with a
further five too badly damaged and sent to Vienna Arsenal and its Army Vehicle
Workshop.
In addition, three Ferdinand recovery vehicles had been completed in August
1943 and sent to the frontline battalions in September. These had been converted
from chassis of Tiger (P) hulls as originally completed.
Here, the 653rd continued training at Leitha, Austria. The 88-mm gun barrels still lack the splinter shield
designed to prevent fragments from entering the spherical gun mantlet where it emerges from the casemate.
(History Facts)

The recovery vehicle variant of the Ferdinand was much-needed, but served only briefly, only three being
built. Only with the recovery variant of the Panther tank was an adequate vehicle of this type available to
German troops, albeit in short supply.

No detailed loss reports exist to determine the exact causes of loss, especially
because vehicles were repaired incompletely and returned to action as soon as
possible in the various actions of the second half of 1943. The Russian artillery
caused serious losses with their barrages, and direct hits and fragments
penetrated the engine grills, frequently causing fires that left the vehicles
destroyed. Technical failures caused short circuits and fires destroyed at least
four Ferdinands in their first day of action. In the first three days of the Battle of
Kursk, some forty Ferdinands fell out, disabled by mines, with twenty reportedly
repaired during the action.

Ferdinand Modification to Elefant

The rebuilding effort for the vehicles at Nibelungen Works could hardly change
the basic design and must be considered a refurbishment with some degree of
modification included.
The most important changes were as follows:

Commander cupola installed, with periscopes, similar to assault guns then

in service.
New tracks, fitted now in the opposite direction; greater reduction gearing
in gearbox.
Hull machine gun, operated by the radio operator.
Increased armor of engine gratings.
Track covers reinforced.
Thicker, reversed mounting of the gun shield ahead of the ball mounting.
Improved ammunition stowage.
Electrical changes to reduce radio interference.
Rain awnings.
Exhaust pipes changed.
Installation of fire extinguishers and better access to engine compartment
from rear.
Flexible battery mountings.
Improved sealing against rainwater, dust and dirt; sealing gap between hull
and casemate.
Welding fillers into gaps.
Machine telegraph between commander and driver.
Improved cooling, ventilation and rear shield.

In a smaller scale version of the 1943 experience, the first eleven Elefants to be
finished were issued to a company of the 653rd Battalion that was reformed, and
it was dispatched hurriedly to the Anzio front in February where it languished,
practically road-bound, for three months. It then withdrew in front of the Allied
offensives, departing Italy in August 1944. After losing two vehicles upon
arrival at the front, the company seldom had more than six operational Elefants
available. On August 6, the company turned in three Elefants and a recovery
Elefant to the Arsenal, Vienna, and rejoined its parent battalion then training in
Poland. Disabled vehicles had become total losses and they still showed a
propensity to breakdown, engine fires, and suspension failures. Spare parts
remained difficult to obtain.

The Elefant, a refitting of the original Ferdinand vehicles. The vehicle commander now has a proper cupola,
identical to the German assault guns. Also fitted are the front hull machine gun, reinforced armor gratings
over the radiators, headlights removed, and the barrel splinter shield has been reversed.
Elefant and crewmen of 1st Company 653rd Tank Destroyer Battalion at the Rome maintenance facility,
March 1944. The company was assigned to the Anzio Front. (History Facts)

A total of thirty-four Elefants and two Elefant recovery vehicles eventually

equipped the 653rd Battalion (less its 1st Company), which deployed to Russia
and joined Army Group North Ukraine in April 1944. A command Tiger(P) was
delivered to the battalion in late May, one of the VK 45.01(P) prototypes that
had been designated for such use. This vehicle, used in the failed Army tests of
1942, had been retained at the Kummersdorf base for use as a testbed vehicle,
but was returned to the Nibelungen Works for conversion to a command vehicle
for the one Elefant battalion. Rebuilt with the same Maybach engines and
additional hull frontal armor like the Elefant, it became the sole Porsche Tiger
tank to see combat duty.
Once back in Russia, the Elefant turned in a good performance when on the
battlefield, with its firepower and armor protection, but was still difficult to
move to and away from any battlefield. Readiness dropped to half after the first
action, recovering to twenty-eight to thirty-three Elefants available per week in
June and half of July. However, Russian breakthroughs in late July and August
forced a fighting retreat in which almost all the battalion’s vehicles were lost: the
command Tiger(P), twenty-two Elefants, and the two recovery Elefants among
them. The weaknesses of the Porsche design left them disabled for minor
problems, from which in many cases the vehicles had to be abandoned or
destroyed. In addition, fuel shortages forced similar losses. From August
onward, the last twelve operational Elefants were allocated to the 2nd Company
of the 653rd, now re-designated Heavy Tank Destroyer Company 614, and
assigned to 4th Panzer Army in December. Most were lost in further retreats and
the company survivors reported falling back to the vicinity of Zossen (south of
Berlin) at the end of January 1945 with four Elefants and a Panther recovery
vehicle. Scattered reports suggest that a pair of Elefants may have participated in
the Battle of Berlin after the company arrived at Zossen.4
 7

Superheavy Tanks: Maus and E-100

Maus
This tank project illustrated best the increasing influence of civilian contractors
and political leadership upon German tank design and production that ran
contrary to the previous well-established routine among Army departments and
contractors. The German Army bureaus acted on November 1, 1941 to the
situation in Russia to specify a future super-heavy tank in the 70-metric-ton
class. As the Krupp works had lost out on the Panther tank contract, the Army
approached them to pursue the project, stating an upper limit of 90 tons for the
projected vehicle. In February 1942, with the situation in Russia deteriorating,
the Army awarded Krupp a contract for two VK 70.01 prototypes in the 72-ton
class with an 800-hp Maybach HL230 engine, Tiger drive train and armor, and a
new 105-mm, 70-caliber gun. An alternative main gun of 150-mm, 35-caliber
under development by Krupp, gained mention in the project. The intention was
to go into series production as soon as the prototypes were delivered. In April,
the project became the Löwe (Lion) tank, PzKpfw VII.
Almost immediately, this tank project attracted Hitler’s interest, and in
conference with Speer on March 5–6, 1942, he directed Krupp to develop a 100-
ton tank to be ready for testing before the spring of 1943. The designers created
a 90-ton scheme beginning in April. However, by this time, Hitler was
convinced that heavier Russian tanks would appear by that spring and that
superior German tanks must be readied on a 100–120-ton basis. The Porsche
firm had received an Army contract for a Project 205 100-ton tank on March 22,
and in late June, Hitler approved the drawings for the Porsche 100-ton tank, now
named Maus, to be armed with either the 105-mm or the new 150-mm cannon.
Krupp was to build the turret and received that contract on July 17. The Löwe
tank previously ordered by the Army was cancelled on May 18 (hull) and July
20 (turret). Both the Porsche and Krupp firms initially competed for an enlarged
and heavier tank in the 150–170-ton range, carrying a 150-mm and 75-mm dual
armament. By this point, the tank’s concept had reverted to the old breakthrough
tank role, so a slower speed and infantry support mission supplanted any
particular notion of dueling with enemy tanks in a fluid battlefield, which would
have taken place in any case as the war narrowed to the defense of the Reich.
The Krupp contract called for the heavy PzKpfw VIII Maus turret, but the Army
procurement officers had urged the firm to continue work on a lighter tank
design that would make use of as many Tiger B tank components as possible, in
view of Professor Porsche’s difficulties with his Tiger design, then in its final
stages. This move also reflected the Army bureaus’ frustration with the meddling
of industrialists and politicians in Army procurement processes. The Krupp
project received formal approval on November 10, leading eventually to the E-
100 vehicle. Dr. Porsche presented his firm’s drawings for a 170-ton tank on
November 14, calling for a turret placed on the vehicle rear, with engine forward
of it, generators under the turret, and electrical propulsion at the rear. The heavy
armor included covering most of the suspension and track. Hitler ordered the
Porsche Maus into production during a January 3–5, 1943 meeting, with an
Alkett factory slated for the assembly of ten units per month for an eventual total
of six prototypes and 135 operational vehicles. Hitler here decided on a 128-mm
main gun, with a coaxial 75-mm gun and no second turret, but ordered a new
turret finished with the 150-mm gun for future consideration, with the current
Krupp turret required to carry either main gun (a measure canceled by the Army
in June 1944). However, neither gun caliber was small enough to allow 100
stored rounds of ammunition per gun in the tank (also an original requirement).
Continuing Hitler’s fixation with runaway heavy tank technology, he professed
that tanks in hand, such as Tiger and Panther for 1943, could maintain
superiority only for a year, and Maus and the Tiger B would therefore be
required in early 1944.1
Design efforts culminated in the presentation of a full-size wooden model to
Hitler on 13 March 1943. He had previously ordered the production of the first
vehicle by May 1943, which would have frozen the design work effective that
very March as he gazed upon the mockup. These measures proved too ambitious
and in January the deadline for the first vehicle was reset instead to September
1943, with four more ordered completed by year’s end. The desired production
rate remained set at ten units per month.2
Then, disaster twice struck the Krupp Works at Essen. A bombing raid on the
night of March 5–6, 1943, destroyed the engineering worksheets and drawings
for the Maus turret, and burned a wooden engineering mockup. The first turret
delivery slowed from mid-October to at least two months later. The armored hull
assembly line was unmolested. However, a second air raid in early August
effectively killed the project. The first ten hulls survived but would take more
time for finishing. The first two could be sent to Alkett once debris was cleared.
Armor plates existed for another thirty vehicles. Turrets remained a different
matter, however. The first turret was delayed until December by destroyed
components, and no others could be worked on until such parts were located and
the damaged armor works restored to operation. A later estimate delayed further
hull and turret production for seven to eight months. In response, the Army
canceled production of the Maus on October 27 in order to concentrate on
ongoing production of other vehicles. One Maus turret and two hulls would be
completed and shipped to Alkett. This was the only known destruction of an
entire armored vehicle production program by strategic bombing in history. All
contracts were canceled or modified for the closeout by November 12. Despite
feelers put out to restart production by industry leaders, especially Dr. Porsche,
the Army gave permission on July 27, 1944 for Krupp to scrap the next four
hulls that remained in its shops so as not to obstruct current production.3
Among many astounding qualities, the Maus had two of its crew completely isolated from the rest, as
happened with the Ferdinand tank destroyer. The driver and radio operator sat in the front, using external
hatches for entry and exit, separated from the fighting compartment of the tank by its machinery. The 75-
mm coaxial cannon was supposed to be the prewar short gun, but it was extended to thirty-six calibers of
length so that its propellant gasses would not enter the engine intakes on the hull deck.
 Krupp shipped the first Maus hull to Alkett on September 26, 1943. Alkett
assembled its suspension and shipped it to Böblingen on January 10, 1944 for
testing. To make space for production of other vehicles, Alkett shipped its
remaining parts for the second hull on March 7 to Böblingen for final assembly.
The lone Maus turret arrived at Böblingen on May 3, 1944 and was placed on
the second hull during June.
The first Maus hull ran its trials at Böblingen with a weight structure mounted
to simulate the turret weight and size. The chassis alone was driven 5 km from
the railhead to the tank park without difficulty on January 14. The next day, with
the turret weight structure, the vehicle steered well for a 2-km off-road trip,
despite sinking a half meter into the clay soil. Later trials determined the turning
radius as 14.5 m at forward speed. With its electrical drive, a neutral steer could
be performed when halted. The chassis forded streams 1-meter deep and
negotiated banks of 45 percent successfully.
The second Maus arrived from Alkett on March 20, requiring finishing at the
tank park. Its turret arrived from Krupp Works on May 4 and was installed on
June 8. Manual traverse was attempted on a 10-degree slope, and it required 30
kg of force to accomplish. Power traverse was not yet available, but failed when
energized in early July. Fuel consumption then was noted as 350 liters per 10
km, although engine defects may have accounted for some of this poor
performance. The original flat track plates were considered unusable and cleated
track was ordered as replacements. The replacement of the track in the tank park
required six men and eight hours’ effort. With the second prototype on hand, the
evaluation of the specified powering of one tank through an electrical cable to
another engaged in fording proved successful. On November 19, 1944, Krupp
returned its workers to Essen on orders of the Army procurement bureau, and
further work on the Maus was ordered to cease. Hitler had already ordered all
development of tanks with such heavy guns stopped on July 21, but the
armaments industry had its own inertia. The two vehicles moved to the
Kummersdorf testing facility before the end of the year, where they apparently
remained non-operational. When the Soviet Army approached Kummersdorf, the
second vehicle with its turret was destroyed by the garrison. There remains no
evidence of their use in combat. The Russians eventually placed the turret on the
first prototype for testing and it now rests on exhibit at the Kubinka Tank
Museum.

Prototype number one Maus began testing with a special weight structure representing the missing turret. It
was this hull that was taken by the Russian Army post-war to their Kubinka research facility and later
museum. (US Army)

The same prototype returns to the tank park under the observation of Dr. Porsche (back, nearest camera).
The vehicle’s length to width ratio becomes clear. Steering in mud and soft soil was reportedly difficult. (US
Army)
Any prospect for reviving super-heavy tank projects dimmed markedly after the Allied successes at
Normandy. All such projects were cancelled and the nearly inoperable second Maus prototype with turret
was destroyed at Kummersdorf on the approach of the Red Army in April 1945. That turret now rests atop
the number one chassis at Kubinka Museum. (US Army)

Superheavy Tank Porsche Type 205 Specifications.4

Crew: six
Weight: 180 tons design, 189 tons actual
Power-to-weight ratio: N/A
Overall length: 10.085 m overall [9.034 m chassis]
Width: 3.67 m
Height: 3.63 m
Turret basket diameter: N/A
Engines: Proposed was Daimler-Benz 603A2, gasoline, fuel-injected, 1,750 hp.
Protoypes used Daimler-Benz MB 509 V-12 gasoline engine developing 1,540
hp [1,200 actual].
Transmission: Electric, two D 2185 Siemens-Schuckert motors
Fuel capacity: 1600 l internal
Max. speed (road): 20–25 kph
Max. range: 160 km
Ground clearance: 0.75 m
Ground pressure: 1.45 kg/cm2 [20.65 psi]
Armament: 128-mm KwK 44 L/55, 75 mm L/36.6, one MG 34 all coaxial,
elevation -5/+18 degrees. In prototype turret, forty-eight 128-mm stowed rounds,
twenty-eight of 75-mm; Planned total was sixty-eight rounds of 128 mm; 100
rounds of 75-mm, 1,000 rounds of 7.92-mm.
Armor [mm/angle in degrees from vertical]:
Hull front 200/55 upper, 200/35 lower
Hull sides: 185/0 upper, 105/0 lower, inner side plate: 80/0
Hull rear: 160/35 upper, 160/30 lower
Hull top: 105.5/90 forward
Hull bottom: 105.5/90 forward, 50/90 aft
Track guards: 100/13 front
Turret front: 210/curved
Turret side: 210/30
Turret rear: 210/12
Turret roof: 105/90

The E-100 Development

As noted in the Maus development, the Army had encouraged the Krupp
engineers to pursue a competitive Maus project in which Tiger tank components
would be used to maximum effect in order to save weight and improve reliability
and performance. Although the Porsche design finally was designated the sole
Maus project, the Army managed to continue Krupp’s Maus as the E-100
project. The Entwicklung (Development) Series of vehicles created by the Army
procurement bureaus ostensibly aimed at a series of fighting vehicles in
successive weight classes that would share components and offer commonality
of design as an overall economy measure. The reality remained that these
designs frequently had no basis in the Army program but were intended to
dissuade the industrialists from using their access to Hitler, Speer, and other
leaders in order to press new programs that the Army neither needed nor desired.
At the same time, the E-Series vehicles demonstrated the requirement to limit
further growth in external dimensions because of cost, weight, and transport
penalties. As the size and required stowage of projectiles also had increased
during the war, the new designs freed more internal volume for such use by
abandoning torsion bar suspensions in favor of externally mounted ones, and
also by placing all engine and drive components in the rear hull, thus eliminating
the power train extending through the driver’s compartment. Only in the largest
vehicle class, the E-100, was this last measure initially not feasible, although a
new rear hull-mounted power pack remained with the designers as a future
possibility. The E-Series also was alone in taking seriously the General Staff
requirement to carry sufficient fuel for five hours of full power operations.5
Although the Krupp Maus design was adopted as the basis for the E-100
project, the Army procurement officers did not think Krupp could add another
such project to its manufacturing workload. Accordingly, the Adler automotive
works of Frankfurt was designated as the contractor, working with the Army
Weapons Office from June 30, 1943 to finish the pilot design, which they would
assemble at the Henschel proving ground at Haustenbeck, near the Sennelager
Army base and Paderborn. Work progressed slowly, a sure indication of the
priorities of the E-Series. By January 15, 1944, the Army reported the chassis
assembly at Paderborn was almost complete, but practically stalled because of
delays caused by parts not arriving or related wartime difficulties, such as
misrouting. Only three Adler workers labored at that point at the assembly site.
In particular, the Belleville system suspension spring units, combat track (1-m
wide), fuel lines, and transmission cover plate had yet to be delivered. The
workers could complete neither the suspension assembly nor the electrical
system in the driver’s compartment. For lack of a better engine, the Maybach
HL230 had to be installed as a temporary measure. Most serious, though, was
the absence of a turret, for which the Army report lacked information. Krupp had
supposedly designed a turret for the E-100 by May 1944 that had saved weight
compared with the one from their original Maus project of the previous year. It
had thinner plates with a sloped front and mounted the 75-mm coaxial gun on
top of the more reasonable 128-mm gun, still a most unusual arrangement.
The E-100 project attempted to make use of existing designs and vehicles to accomplish the objectives of
the Maus with more proven components and technologies. There remained no logical requirement to sustain
the effort however, and like the rest of the E-Series projects, nothing was accomplished.

Dr. Karl Jenschke, the technical director and chief constructor of the Adler
Works, considered the E-100 an obsolete design once accepted. Post-war, he
testified that rail movement required removing the outermost road wheels, outer
sprocket and idler wheel rings, and suspension armor and then fitting transport
track. He considered the proposed heavy armament of either a 150-mm or 170-
mm gun to be feasible only as an assault gun variant, because the turret space
could not accommodate loading such weapons. Krupp was supposedly
manufacturing the turret, but had been delayed. A dead-weight unit would have
served for initial trials.6

The surviving E-100 chassis and some ancillary parts were captured near Sennelager/Paderborn in early
April 1945 by US troops, and ownership passed to the British Army not long afterward. Krupp had
provided no turret, given the cancellation of such projects and the chassis revealed no useful technologies to
the British Army. Its sole success perhaps was in keeping Dr. Porsche out of the project. (US Army)
The E-100 as loaded on a heavy transport trailer for its shipment to UK. Note the road wheels and
roadwheel arms have been mounted but not the springs, hence the suspension is not under tension. This
view shows better the similarities to the Tiger B design. (US Army)

The E-100 chassis was captured in early April 1945 by advancing US troops.
Little more had been accomplished and the suspension could not even mount the
combat track that had finally arrived. There is no record of a turret being
assembled for it and the project was likely stillborn. Postwar, the British claimed
the chassis and shipped it to their Department of Tank Design, Chertsey, after
which it was scrapped.7

Superheavy Tank E-100 Specifications8

Crew: six
Weight: 123.5 tons design
Power-to-weight ratio: 4.8
Overall length: 11.073 m overall [8.733 chassis]
Width: 4.48 m
Height: 3.375 m
Turret basket diameter: N/A
Engines: Maybach HL230 gasoline, 600 hp; theoretical replacement was HL234,
developing 700–900 hp.
Transmission: OG 40 12 16B; For the HL234 engine, a Mekydro transmission
was specified
Fuel capacity: 2,050 l internal
Max. speed (road): 23 kph
Max. range: 160 km
Ground clearance: 0.5 m
Ground pressure: 1.26 kg/cm2 [17.93 psi]
Armament: 128-mm KwK 44 L/55, one 75-mm L/24, one MG 34. Elevation
-7/+20 degrees. Ammunition stowage unknown.
Armor [mm/angle in degrees from vertical]:
Hull front 200/60 upper, 150/50 lower
Hull sides: 120/0
Hull rear: 150/30
Hull top: 40/90 forward
Hull bottom: 80/90 forward, 40/90 aft
Turret front: 200/30
Turret side: 80/29
Turret rear: 150/15
Turret roof: 40/90
 8

Jagdtiger

Ironically, the ill-fated Maus project did contribute to the sole German super-
heavy fighting vehicle put into production, and indeed the largest and most
powerful operational one of World War II. The Maus specifications eventually
centered upon a derived version of the 128-mm anti-aircraft gun, model Flak 40,
produced since 1942 by Rheinmetall-Borsig with a barrel length of 61 calibers.
The Krupp firm undertook its redesign, resulting in the 128-mm Pak 44 anti-tank
cannon, later renamed 128-mm Panzerjäger Kanone 80, using a barrel 55
calibers long. No equilibrator was fitted and the resulting mounting remained
barrel heavy, reducing the possibility of lengthening it for higher performance.
Accordingly, no muzzle brake was fitted to avoid any reduction in muzzle
velocity. The resulting weapon remained very fragile, and a folding travel lock
as well as an internal gun lock was required to avoid knocking the weapon out of
alignment.
The Army procurement bureau first approached the Krupp firm on February 2,
1943 with its proposal for a heavy tank hunter (Jagdpanzer) mounting the 128-
mm gun on the chassis of the Tiger B heavy tank, slated for series production by
Henschel starting late that year. The concept of employment stated the need for
an infantry-support weapon capable of fighting at ranges of 3,000 m. Firepower
and armor protection were given priority over mobility, although good off-road
capability, including mud and snow, was desired. The orders at first called for
frontal armor of 200 mm. While Krupp held responsibility for producing the gun
up to the armor attached to the gun cradle, also designing the required mantlet
armor, the design and assembly of the vehicle rested with the Henschel firm. It
would lengthen its Tiger B chassis by 410 mm in order to accommodate the new
design specifications.
Hitler approved the project on August 21, 1943 and Henschel had a full-scale
wooden model ready to show him on October 20. Construction had already
begun on the first modified hull at the Upper Danube Iron Works; it finished that
November and was followed by three more the next month. Final assembly and
series production began at the nearby Nibelungen Works in December, and the
first two vehicles rolled out in February 1944. They began the required testing
for all vehicles at Kummersdorf on May 5, 1944.

The sole operational fighting vehicle of World War II in the super-heavy class was the German Jagdtiger
heavy tank destroyer. Based upon the Tiger B chassis and components, it provided some shock to the Allies,
but remained yet another ambitious project pushed into service too quickly. Dr. Porsche managed to inflict
damage on this project as well with his suspension system of four bogy sets of road wheels with
longitudinal torsion bar suspension. Some ideas died hard.
Nibelungen Works, Hall ‘V’, December 1944: the boring machines prepare the hulls for installation of the
Henschel suspension. Note the assembly of the casemate and upper hull side as a single piece. (History
Facts)

After their review of the wooden model, the Army bureaus had made several
changes, some of them major. There would be no ports for firing submachine
guns; semi-fixed ammunition for the 128-mm gun was decided; frontal armor for
the fighting compartment or casemate increased to 250 mm; a 70-caliber barrel
proposal was abandoned; and indirect firing capability was discarded.
On the other hand, some interruption to the production effort came from the
irrepressible Dr. Porsche, who once again nominated the suspension system from
his unsuccessful Tiger tank prototype that had been converted to the Ferdinand
heavy tank destroyer. It consisted of four paired road-wheel trucks on each side,
using a longitudinal torsion bar to stabilize each pair. Due to the simplicity and
the external mounting of the suspension with simple screws, the Porsche
suspension saved 1.2 metric tons of steel and 450 man-hours of work on each
vehicle assembly. It also saved some internal volume and raised the ground
clearance by 100 mm, compared with the Henschel Tiger B torsion bar
suspension with nine road wheels per side.
Among the initial vehicles assembled, the first two delivered in February 1944
had the Porsche and Henschel suspensions mounted respectively. Testing during
May revealed a serious vibration and pitching problems with the Porsche system,
which abated only when exceeding 14–15 kph on a hard-surface road. Shear
forces could break the wheel units from the hull, and wheel loading increased
track wear and breakage. The decision was made to manufacture only the
Henschel version, but a total of eleven vehicles remained to be finished with the
Porsche suspension by September. This incident, as well as the ordered
acceleration of PzKpfw IV medium tank manufacture at the Nibelungen Works,
imposed certain delay in production that was not helped by a damaging bombing
raid in mid-October.
Following the first two vehicles, the Nibelungen plant assembled three
Jagdtigers each month in July–August, then eight, nine, and six each following
month until the record twenty delivered in December. On October 12, 1944, the
Army fixed the total order for this vehicle at 150, after which its production line
would shift to Tiger B heavy tanks. Hitler intervened in January 1945; however,
ordering production to continue and to accelerate if possible. The Army hesitated
to implement this command, and hedged it by ordering only 100 more from
Nibelungen Works, transferring production scheduled for May 1945 to the Jung
firm, which had no experience in assembling fighting vehicles. Some eighty-
eight of the Jagdtiger model were completed in all, with the last eight fitted with
88-mm L/71 cannon because of shortages. Most likely, the last eight never left
the factory grounds and were supposedly destroyed before the Red Army took
the plant on May 9, 1945. Examples of this vehicle may be seen today at the
Tank Museum, Bovington (with Porsche suspension), the Ordnance Training and
Heritage Museum, Fort Lee, Virginia, and the Russian tank museum at
Kubinka.1
Technically, the Jagdtiger remained a highly advanced tank destroyer, fitted
with a binocular gunner’s periscope sight of 10 × magnification with range
scales of 0–4,000 m and 0–8,000 m for armor-piercing and high-explosive
ammunition respectively. The 128-mm, fifty-five-caliber cannon penetrated 148
mm of armor sloped 30 degrees at 2,000 m and 167 mm at 1,000 m.
Nibelungen Works, Workshop VII at the end of 1944: workers and Panzer troops work together on final
assembly of Jagdtigers. In the foreground, a Henschel suspension has been installed, except for the torsion
bars and road wheels. (History Facts)

The lone surviving Jagdtiger with a Porsche suspension stands today at the Tank Museum, Bovington.
Captured at the Henschel proving ground at Haustenbeck by US troops, it had probably been cannibalized
to prepare another one for action with the ad hoc defense forces around Paderborn. It shows the spare track
mounting points to augment its side armor. The gaily colored tubes are cleaning rods for the gun. (Author’s
collection)

This Jagdtiger with Henschel suspension rests today in the US Army collection at the Fort Lee Ordnance
Museum, formerly located at Aberdeen Proving Ground. It still bears the scars of many superficial hits by
US tank cannon. However, one of these jammed the left final drive unit, sending the vehicle into a spinning
halt and presenting its flank to US tanks, whereupon the crew bailed out. (Michael Green)

In operation, however, the vehicle displayed serious limitations because of its

sheer size and mobility, frequency of breakdown, and difficulties in maintaining
its armament in top condition. There is little doubt that the deterioration of
logistic support and crew quality by the last year of the war contributed to some
of these difficulties. However, the two battalions actually equipped with these
vehicles suffered most of their losses from mechanical breakdown, lack of fuel,
or bogging. Very few firefights took place, largely because of the difficulties of
moving the tanks to the front in time for planned operations. Furthermore, the
vehicles needed to be employed together in significant numbers because of their
low rate of fire. The alignment of the sights and gun barrel needed frequent
resetting because of the vibration they experienced, especially when operating
without the travel braces in place. Even firing vibrations required frequent
resetting of the sights. Engines and drive train did not hold up well on long
marches, and the steering units required replacement almost immediately in use
because of unforeseen design interface problems. The driving characteristics of
these large, heavy vehicles proved especially challenging, and the lack of
suitable bridges reduced the possibility of employing them on several occasions.
Fording streams proved inadvisable because of the strain on the drive train and
possibility of bogging.
Many of these defects may be considered teething problems given the hurried
construction and issue to the troop units. However, they also represent the likely
fate of the other tanks of the super-heavy class treated in this study. In a rush to
achieve technological superiority over the opposing forces, the equipment
quality actually fell far short of desired effectiveness simply because too few of
the components could have been tested before incorporation in designs that
themselves proved far too ambitious for the materials and engineering capacity
of contemporary industry. One can sympathize greatly with the German Army
procurement bureaus, which consistently sought to plan armored vehicle
production for 1945 and onward simply in terms of numbers of Panther and
Tiger B tanks, and otherwise only smaller non-turreted vehicles.

The series production Jagdtiger had the Henschel suspension, which had the unenviable task of supporting
this overweight and underpowered fighting vehicle. It was further handicapped by more than the usual
range of teething problems as it was rushed into production.

Jagdtiger [tank destroyer Tiger] (Skfz 185 (88-mm/71)

and 186 (128-mm/55)) Specifications2
Crew: six
Weight: 71.7 tons [69.9 Porsche susp] [75 tons loaded]
Power-to-weight ratio: 9.76
Overall length: 10.66 m [7.8 m chassis]
Width: 3.63 m
Height: 2.72 m
Engines: Maybach HL 230 P30 gasoline, V12 600/700 hp
Transmission: Olvar 40 12 16 B
Fuel capacity: 860 l
Max. speed (road): 38 kph
Max. range: 170 km
Ground clearance: 0.49 pm
Ground pressure: 1.06 kg/cm2 [14.22 psi]
Armament: 128-mm Pak 80 L/55, Elev -7.5/+15; traverse 20 degrees; one MG
34 in bow, one MG42 on engine cover monopod; forty stowed rounds for 128-
mm, 5,100 rounds for MG 34, twelve rounds ready for 92-mm
Armor (mm/degrees slope):
Hull front 150/50; lower 100/50
Casemate front: 250/15
Gun mantlet: 60–130 mm [front 350 mm of length, 80 mm after 600 mm]
Sides: hull and casemate 80/25, lower hull 80/0 rear: casemate 80/6, hull
80/30
Bottom hull: 40/90 forward, 25/90 aft
Casemate roof: 40/90, hull roof: 50/90 forward, 40/90 aft
Sponson bottom: 25/90

Only two Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalions actually formed to use the Jagdtiger.
The choice of the 653rd Battalion was logical as it had been withdrawn from the
Ukraine in late 1944, bereft of its Elefant vehicles. Relocated to Döllersheim,
Austria in early October, they began training for their new vehicles and visiting
the Nibelungen Works, located 130 km to the south-west, for familiarization
with the vehicles. Within a few weeks, the battalion had twelve vehicles in hand,
including several with Porsche suspensions, and the 1st and 3rd Companies
began to use them on the training fields. Although sixteen Jagdtigers and
personnel of the 1st and 3rd Companies were shipped by rail to Blankenheim on
December 21, they were not ordered into action in the Ardennes Offensive and
the battalion was instead ordered to Zweibrücken to participate in Operation
North Wind, in Alsace. The sometimes rumored or reported operations of
Jagdtigers in the Ardennes may be ascribed to mistaken identity of them with
the Jagdpanzer IV, a much smaller tank destroyer with a similar construction and
appearance.
Just three Jagdtigers were fit to move forward under blizzard conditions and
join the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division for the start of Operation North Wind,
during January 4–7. One US M4 tank was destroyed by this section before
January 9, when one of the Jagdtigers was destroyed while crossing a snow-
covered field by a US bazooka rocket that hit on the side and detonated its
ammunition, killing the six-man crew. The intended use of the Jagdtigers by the
division had been to destroy fortifications of the Maginot Line in the area, but at
this point the chaotic operation was being cancelled and units withdrawing.3
On January 13, 1945, orders went to the battalion to transfer from all points to
Lauterbourg to join the XXXIX Panzer Corps then attacking south along the left
bank of the Rhine with the potential objective of Strasbourg. They were also
required for immediate action against Maginot Line bunkers and outer works
being used by the US troops. First to arrive were five Jagdtigers from
Döllersheim, which marched 25 km along the road to Rœschwoog and went into
action on January 18. Four bunkers were destroyed at a range of 1,000 m, and an
M4 tank likewise was taken out.
By February 10, the battalion was operational with thirty-two Jagdtigers.
However, a disastrous road march out of the Ardennes to Boppard had not been
resolved: of eight disabled Jagdtigers, one was repaired, four in long-term repair,
and three in short-term repair. That same day, a Jagdtiger was destroyed by
artillery fire. As if this were not enough, a message from high command advised
the battalion commander on February 16 that there was a design defect in the
Jagdtiger’s L801 steering units, requiring their entire replacement with new ones
not yet shipped to the battalion. Time to change a single steering unit in the field
was four days, with a crane. The next day, orders came moving the battalion to
the front at the Forest of Haguenau.
The chief fighting for the Jagdtigers took place around Haguenau, where they
generally rested as an anti-tank reserve of the corps. The 2nd Company finally
joined Battalion 653 from Austria in February. The American and French attacks
on the German forces in Northern Alsace began in March. Shortly after
achieving its maximum strength with forty-one Jagdtigers, with thirty-eight
operational, it had its first engagement counterattacking the advancing Allied
columns on March 16 with its 3rd Company. An air attack damaged five
vehicles, artillery damaged two more, and only two of these could be recovered,
the rest being destroyed. By March 18, the battalion was down to thirty-four
Jagdtigers with only eighteen operational. It joined the general retreat and
suffered steady losses of vehicles, crossing the Rhine back into Germany on
March 24. Its major accomplishment had taken place on March 16 when the 3rd
Company shot up an American tank column at distances of 3–4 km. The next
day, attacking US tanks were shot up with accurate 128-mm fire and fell back.
Apparently ordered to counterattack, the company left its covered positions and
was immediately attacked by P-47 fighter bombers and artillery, whence they
suffered the noted losses of five Jagdtigers in their withdrawal.
High command orders to keep the Jagdtigers intact for later operations caused
all the companies to withdraw in good order, and they had destroyed several US
tanks and tank destroyers in their engagements as well. After its reassembly, the
battalion had twenty-eight Jagdtigers remaining and needed a two-week lull to
repair most of them. Instead, it had three days before American forces crossed
the Rhine near Worms and continued their offensive. Only nine of the Jagdtigers
were operational on March 30. An attempted counterattack quickly lost three
more and the battalion began to retreat, successfully evacuating ten of its
disabled heavy tank destroyers by rail. On April 1, only twenty-four Jagdtigers
remained, with three operational. After a brief firefight at Eppingen, the 653rd
continued to retreat amid scattered skirmishes. On April 7, the battalion reported
seventeen Jagdtigers in hand, with ten of them operational. In preparation for the
defense of Nurnberg, the seven damaged vehicles were cannibalized to keep the
ten operational.
Most of the vehicles did not make it to Nurnberg and the battalion continued
into Austria with the intention of reaching the Nibelungen plant and finding new
vehicles. When that effort came to nothing, the battalion surrendered to US
forces at Liezen with its two remaining Jagdtigers.
The other Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion operating the Jagdtiger, the 512th,
began forming personnel in January 1945. As small numbers of Jagdtigers were
finished by the Nibelungen Works, they were shipped to Döllersheim for training
the 512th along with the 2nd Company of the 653rd, which then departed in
February to join its battalion. The 512th was ordered to assemble west of
Paderborn. Most of the vehicle crews and commanders in the 512th were
tankers, many of which were experienced and decorated veterans of Tiger tank
units. Their doubts about manning even larger, slower, more fragile, and
turretless fighting vehicles could never abate once they began operations,
especially with the announcement of the faulty steering units, which had delayed
the completion of their vehicles at the factory. They did have fighting spirit
however, and they fought with unusual tenacity in the west at the same time that
other German units were surrendering rather easily.
After several false starts, the 2nd Company of the 512th concentrated near
Siegen with the battalion headquarters on March 30. The 1st Company had at
first trained with 2nd Company Jagdtigers at Sennelager while awaiting the
arrival of their own from the factory. Their ten Jagdtigers arrived on March 13
and the company began test firing the guns and training with the vehicles right
away. They were experienced tank destroyer crews from the 500th Replacement
Battalion at Sennelager and were more enthusiastic about their new assignment,
many having served in Jagdpanther and Hornisse (Nashorn) units in Russia.
After less than a week of training, they loaded trains the night of March 19–20 to
join the battalion. Six days ensued in the relatively short trip, a sure indication of
Allied air supremacy and the cumulative damage to the rail lines at this point.
This Jagdtiger, turret number X7 of 1st Company, 512th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was abandoned at
Obernetphen after being disabled, thus sharing the fate of so many heavy fighting vehicles. (US Army)

The same vehicle that was later preserved at Bovington, the fourth production vehicle that remained in the
custody of the army testing bureau, was captured in April 1945. With no sign of battle damage, yet lacking
a suspension unit and engine deck plate, it appears likely that it had been cannibalized or otherwise
discarded by the ad hoc defenders of Sennelager, here in the initial hands of US Army soldiers. (US Army)

The surrender of the last elements of 1st Company 512th Tank Destroyer Battalion on April 16, 1945 on the
Schillerplatz of Iserlohn, including three operating Jagdtigers. (History Facts)

Ordered to cover the withdrawal of Fifth Army from the Westerwald, the 1st
Company fought US tanks starting March 28, falling back on Siegen over three
days. It lost four Jagdtigers but was able to use long range fire to destroy
numerous tanks without becoming decisively engaged. Unable to assist in the
abortive breakout of Army Group ‘B’ from the Ruhr Pocket, the battalion and its
two companies moved northward in the Pocket in April.
The 3rd Company of the battalion received its first five Jagdtigers at
Sennelager the night of March 25 and commenced training. After only five days,
it was thrown into an ad hoc unit organized from school units and stragglers to
defend the Paderborn area against advancing US armor. Small but deadly
because of the number of Tiger II and Panther tanks, the unit began to hit back at
the US spearheads while the 3rd Company of the 514th occupied the southwest
approaches to Paderborn. On April 2, two Jagdtigers were damaged and had to
be destroyed, leaving the three others to join the withdrawal of the German units
toward the Weser River line. The other two companies of the 514th Battalion
fought to defend cities on the Ruhr River in April, but were soon overtaken and
surrounded by US forces. The 2nd Company destroyed its six Jagdtigers and
surrendered at Ergste on April 15; the 1st Company surrendered with its last
three Jagdtigers at Iserlohn on April 16.4
 9

Sturmmörser Tiger

The production of the Tiger tanks had too high a priority to spare much
production capacity on specialized variants. The exception came predictably
from Hitler, who stated a need in August 1943 for an assault gun version of
enhanced power to overcome urban and fortified zones using the navy’s RW 61
38-cm rocket launcher, which was originally designed for defense against
submarines in coastal waters. Probably influenced by the extraordinary fighting
at Stalingrad that had bled his forces dry in the city, he ordered a monthly
production of ten of these Stürmmorser Tiger and subsequently approved a steel
prototype shown him at Arys training area that October. By April 1944, the
production burden had been reduced to a mere eighteen vehicles, using badly
damaged Tiger tanks returned from the front for reconstruction. Alkett was
contracted for the work, using its Spandau Works to assemble special casemates
from Brandenburg Iron Works to Tiger hulls and the firm produced seven such
vehicles by September 21, 1944. Since eight of these vehicles were found in
Berlin by occupying forces, it can be surmised that only ten vehicles were
delivered to the three companies designated to receive them: Stürmmorser
Companies 1001–1003. These fought sporadically for several months in
defensive roles far from their anticipated use, except at the Warsaw Uprising,
where the conventional 150-mm assault guns proved more than adequate.
The munitions for the RW 61 came in both high-explosive and shaped charge
versions in naval service, and 300 rounds per month were supposed to be
allocated to the new assault rocket launcher vehicles. The munition itself
weighted a considerable 351 kg and was 1.5 m long, not a small challenge for
even the roomier interior of the Tiger. Thus, the armored fighting compartment
had to accommodate the rocket launcher, twelve to fourteen rounds, and the
handling crane needed for loading the vehicle. The 2.5-m long breech-loading
rocket launcher featured an unusual rifled design with forward vents in its barrel
that exhausted the propellant gasses forward to the muzzle. The 1.50-m long
rocket projectile had a range of 4,600 m with a muzzle velocity of 91 mps,
delivering a warhead of some 125 kg. Its shaped charge projectile could
penetrate 2.5 m of reinforced concrete.1

Sequential series of four photos showing loading and firing of RW 61 rockets. The rocket is unpacked from
shipping materials and winched over the casemate loading hatch. (History Facts)
Loading into launcher by hand; when firing is imminent, a primer is inserted into the breechblock. (History
Facts)

RW 61 rocket is lowered into casemate for stowage or loading into launcher. (History Facts)
Firing RW 61 on training range. (History Facts)

Sturmmörser [Assault Mortar] Tiger Specifications

No Sd Kfz number was assigned but this was designated ‘Weapon 817.’2

Crew: five
Weight: 65 tons
Power-to-weight ratio: 10.77
Overall length: 6.28 m
Width: 3.57 m
Height: 2.85 m
Turret ring diameter: N/A
Engines: Maybach HL 230 P45 gasoline, 700 hp, water-cooled V-12
Transmission: Olvar 40 12 16
Fuel capacity: 534 l
Max. speed (road): 40 kph
Max. range: 120 km
Ground clearance: 0.47 m
Ground pressure: 1.24 kg/cm2 [17.6 psi]
Armament: one 38 cm/L5.4 StuM RW 61 launcher; 20-degree traverse, elevation
0/+85; one MG 34; twelve stowed rounds for RW 61, 800 rounds for MG 34.
Reportedly, fourteen 38-cm rounds were carried, including one loaded, one on
tray.
Armor (Thickness in mm/angle in degrees):
Hull front 100/25
Casemate front: 150/45
Sides: hull 80/30, casemate 80/30
Rear: hull 80/9, casemate 80/0
Casemate roof: 40 mm
Hull roof: 25 mm
Sturmmörser Company
Company HQ: one observer vehicle (SdKfz 251/18)
Two platoons: each two SM Tiger

Notes: 1000 Company stood up August 13, 1944, deployed to Warsaw with one
platoon, while the other platoon was sent to the Western Front (Meaux) arriving
August 25. 1001 Company stood up September 23 and 1002 Company on
October 22. Both 1000 and 1001 Companies were sent to the Ardennes
Offensive in December. On January 23, 1945, the three companies were
transferred to Artillery and renamed 1000–1002 Assault Mortar Batteries.3
The barrel of the RW 61 shows the unique venting ports for the rocket exhaust to the outside. On exhibit at
the Tank Museum, Bovington. (Author’s collection)
 10

German Heavy Tank Units in World

War II

From the outset, it became clear that the Tiger heavy tanks and the later
equivalent vehicles would not fare well if mixed into the existing organizations
of the German Panzer divisions. Such complex and unique vehicles made
tremendous demands upon supply and maintenance functions of the German
Army. The normal support echelons of the divisions would simply collapse with
the additional burdens of the heavy tanks, to no good end. Furthermore, in the
German quest for highest quality and superior armored fighting vehicles, it never
became possible to achieve production in the desired qualities for the various
campaigns remaining in the war. Therefore, the deployment and employment of
these vehicles took the form of the independent heavy Army tank battalion
designated schwere Panzerabteilung, assigned normally to corps and Army
headquarters in the field, for assignment in direct support or attachment if
necessary down to the divisional level. For the heavy tank destroyers, the same
applied in the form of the Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung, after a sustained
battle between the German Army artillery and tank inspectorates over control of
assault guns concluded in a momentary truce with the tank inspectorate
acquiring only the heavy tank destroyer units.
These separate heavy tank battalions consisted in the main of the command
section and the headquarters and support company common to most combat
battalions, with two or three subordinate tank companies, each with two to four
tank platoons. However capable and powerful these combat units appeared,
however, they could not operate for very long without the key services of the
Maintenance Company, which included all the maintenance echelons for the
battalion apart from maintenance personnel of the tank companies, plus the
recovery vehicles and the all important gantry crane(s) required to service and
repair these formidable and complicated vehicles in the field.

The portable Fries gantry crane, of 15-ton lifting capacity, was essential equipment for Tiger units as many
repairs required removal of the turret. For this reason alone, the Tigers remained not supportable by
conventional tank units of the German army and Waffen-SS. (US Army)
Tiger I tanks en route to the front. The nearer vehicle is an early production tank with drum-type cupola.
The combat track is still mounted and the transport track rolled up on the flatcar. (US Army)

Heavy Tank Battalion (August 1942)

Bn HQ (two Tigers)

1st and 2nd Company, each: HQ and Support Company Maintenance Company

HQ: two Tigers, two Pz III Light Platoon: ten Pz III Recovery Platoon: eight–nine 18-ton
prime movers

Four platoons each: Signals Platoon Three Maintenance Platoons

Two Tigers, two Pz III Anti-aircraft Platoon

Motorcycle Platoon

Engineer Platoon

Transport Platoon

Medical Section

Note: The 1st and 2nd Heavy Tank Companies were identical. A third such
company would have been formed had production been sufficient, which was
not the case. The first five heavy tank battalions (501–505) were formed under
this organization. Separate heavy tank companies were authorized for the tank
regiment of the first three divisions of the Waffen-SS (November 1942) and that
of the Army Grossdeutschland Motorized Infantry Division (January 1943).

Heavy Tank Battalion (March 1943)

Bn HQ (two Command
Tigers, one Tiger)

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Company HQ and Support Company Maintenance Company

HQ: two Tigers Anti-aircraft Platoon

Three platoons, each: four Motorcycle Platoon Recovery Platoon: eight–nine 18-ton
Tigers prime movers

HQ and Support Company Three Maintenance Platoons

Reconnaissance Platoon

Engineer Platoon

Signals Platoon

Transport Platoon

Medical Section

Note: The three heavy tank companies were identical. This organization served
for both Tiger I and Tiger II equipped battalions, with minor variations, for the
rest of the war. The new Army battalions (506–510) and three new Waffen-SS
battalions (101–103) formed with this organization and the earlier battalions
reformed under the same as tanks became available. The Grossdeutschland Tiger
company expanded into the III. Heavy Tank Battalion under the expanded
Panzer Regiment Grossdeutchland.
Only the SS Division Totenkopf retained a Tiger company in its organic tank
regiment. When the Panzer Lehr [demonstration] Division was sent to the
Normandy front, it took with it the first five Tiger B received from the
production line. These proved so unsatisfactory mechanically that they were
destroyed in place without being used in combat.1
 Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion (Ferdinand/Elefant)2

Bn HQ (three Ferdinands:
reserve platoon)

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Company HQ and Support Company Maintenance Company

HQ: two Ferdinands Reconnaissance Platoon

Three platoons, each four Signals Platoon Recovery Platoon: eight–nine 18-ton
Ferdinands prime movers

Anti-aircraft Platoon Three Maintenance Platoons

Motorcycle Platoon

Engineer Platoon

Transport Platoon

Medical Section

Note: The 653 and 656 Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalions alone used this
organization, until the number of the Ferdinand, later Elefant, vehicles declined
to company strength. This was the organization on the eve of the Battle of
Kursk, their first engagement. The new Elefant recovery vehicles arrived too late
for the battle, augmenting the usual 18-ton half-track prime movers. Later, the
two battalions switched to Jagdtiger and Jagdpanther vehicles, respectively.

Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion (Jagdtiger)3

Bn HQ (three medium
halftracks)

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies HQ Company Support Company

HQ: two Jagdtiger Signals Section

Three Platoons, each four Anti-aircraft Platoon Recovery Section: Four Bergepanther
Jagdtiger

Engineer Platoon Ammunition Section

Medical Section Fuel Section

Reconnaissance Platoon Transport Section

 Maintenance Company HQ

Maintenance Platoons

Note: The 653 and 512 Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalions used this organization,
except that the 512th did not ever join its 3rd Company, which received its
vehicles only gradually at the Sennheim training base. It was ordered into action
by higher headquarters after only five days of training and gunnery to defend the
base and city of Paderborn with five operational Jagdtigers.

The First Battalions

As noted earlier, Hitler had promised Field Marshal Rommel the first two Tiger
battalions of twenty-five vehicles each. Had the Tiger (P) vehicles been
successful and produced as ordered, they might have been sent to him before any
reinforcement was too late; such was not the case. Presumably, these would have
been the 501st and 502nd Battalions, already forming their personnel and
training in May 1942. Beginning with only eight production vehicles received in
August 1942, four were issued to the 1st Company of 502 Heavy Tank Battalion
and shipped to Army Group North with half the battalion headquarters company
and half the Maintenance Company for employment in Operation Northern
Light, the assault on Leningrad. Another two Tigers followed in September.
Arriving at Mga train station on August 29, the first four tanks and crews
found themselves not joining the siege of Leningrad, but instead within the
maelstrom of a series of spoiling attacks launched by the Russians to delay and
eventually obstruct Operation Northern Light. In short order, two Tigers broke
down with gearbox failures and a third one with a blown engine. Using several
18-ton prime movers to tow each damaged Tiger out of the battle area, a
relatively safe haven was found and the vehicles assessed. One tank had bogged
down and overheated its engines trying to extract itself from the mud. It was
quickly learned that the removal of outer road wheels assisted the tanks
considerably under such conditions. After a flurry of air transport flights to
return the broken components to the factory and receive replacement parts, the
tanks were ready for action on September 15. Meanwhile, Henschel could only
complete three more Tigers in September because of the need to repair the
deployed Tigers and correct flaws revealed in the transmissions and engines on
the rest of the production line.
Entering combat on September 22, supporting the counterattack of 170th
Infantry Division, the four Tigers, and some of their PzKpfw III escort tanks
came under fire by Russian anti-tank guns, and artillery, such that by days’ end,
all four had been knocked out of action or broken down. The recovery of three
tanks was feasible but the fourth had to be destroyed to prevent capture and
inspection by the enemy.
After a discouraging start, the tank crews and supporting personnel made
significant progress and the Tiger tanks began to prove themselves in the
Leningrad front where maneuvering remained restricted and nothing the
Russians had on hand could take on the Tiger tanks when employed properly by
alert crews, especially in the defense. The general operational pattern was set,
however, with inadequate recovery vehicles and low operational readiness rates
because of supply shortages and frequent maintenance periods required for
overloaded drive trains and suspensions. The number of available vehicles for
the 1st Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 502 during the first three months of
1943 ranged from thirteen to two. Three of the six Tigers it lost were by self-
destruction of vehicles rendered unrecoverable, one by mechanical failure alone.
Unfortunately, one of these was bogged intact on January 18, only to be
recovered by the Russians, providing them with their first opportunity to
examine it in Moscow. A second Tiger fell into Russian hands the same month.
On the other hand, where a Tiger tank stood fully operational, the terrain
remained under German domination. At the Battle of Krasny Bor, where a
surprise Russian offensive broke through an infantry division and threatened to
collapse the front in the Kolpino sector on February 10, the L Corps managed to
contain the Russians with reinforcements, leaving a considerable portion of the
German positions lost and a serious Russian salient in their lines. On February
19, the newly arrived 24th Infantry Division attacked the Russian position with
three regiments, one each following a road, led by a single Tiger tank,
accompanied by assault guns and other tanks, restoring the entire position with
few casualties. In early 1943, there was scarcely a single weapon in the Soviet
Army that could stop, let alone destroy, a Tiger, and it showed that day. For a
brief period of some months, the Tiger ruled the battlefield. Such would not last
through the entire year.

Rearming Tiger number 312 of 3rd Company, Army Heavy Tank Battalion 502. (US Army)

The 502d Heavy Tank Battalion remained in the Leningrad sector with its 1st
Company unreinforced until mid-June 1943, when the new 3rd Company joined
it, accompanied by the rest of the battalion headquarters and maintenance
companies. Its 2nd Company was used by High Command as part of the force
completing the occupation of France in November 1942; it was then ordered to
reinforce the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion in Southern Russia and only rejoined
its parent battalion at Mga in July 1943. After the Third Battle of Lake Ladoga,
the battalion was pulled out of lines to refit and returned to action November
1943 at Nevel. Its major action as a full battalion came in the epic defense of
Narva in February–April 1944. It then fought in successive delaying actions
back to Riga and the Courland Peninsula and later took part in the
counteroffensive to Memel and East Prussia in late October. Cut off in Memel,
the 3rd Company personnel were evacuated through Courland by sea and
reformed at Paderborn with the new Tiger II tank while the rest of the battalion
fought against Soviet forces bypassing Courland into East Prussia. Ordered out
of the pocket in January 1945, the 502nd Battalion, now renamed the 511th to
avoid confusion with the Waffen-SS 501–503 Heavy Tank Battalions, embarked
shipping for East Prussia, from where it spearheaded the drive to relieve
Königsberg, joining the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion in the perimeter defenses.
Cut off in the city, the 502/511th fought to escape but surrendered on May 8,
with no way out. The battalion fought only with the Tiger I and never left the
Eastern Front.4
Meanwhile, the growing trickle of Tiger tanks off the assembly line had
allowed the formation and equipment of the 501st Heavy Tank Battalion, starting
with two tanks received on August 30, 1942. The battalion was then alerted to its
pending deployment to North Africa as the first of the two battalions promised
by Hitler. One wonders by what feat these heavy tanks could have reached
Rommel to assist in the decisive battles of the Afrika Korps against the British
8th Army in Egypt. However, in the event, the problem was settled by bringing
the battle to the tanks. Surprised by the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria,
Hitler ordered up the 501st for immediate deployment to Tunisia on November
10. The Battalion’s 1st Company was already scheduled to move that month and
did so smartly, arriving via Siebel ferries at Bizerte from 20 November onward.
The 2nd Company, however, was incorporated into the German forces assigned
to complete the occupation of France (the Vichy zone) occasioned by the Allied
invasion of French colonial territory. It did not reach Tunisia until early January.
Even more unfortunate, the Battalion’s Maintenance Company arrived in stages
starting with its 1st Platoon on December 25. Of its twenty-two assigned Tigers,
the highest number operationally ready was fourteen, achieved on February 14
and 26; however, all but two were knocked out by the end of February 26. Thus,
the reported feat of maintaining 62 percent readiness, while a professional
achievement under such poor conditions, really amounted to an insignificant
effect upon the campaign.
The second heavy tank battalion promised to Rommel took form as the 504th
Heavy Tank Battalion, which stood up at Bad Fallingbostel on February 8 and
hurriedly trained before departing the 27th of that month. The arrival of the
504th in Tunis hardly counted, however, as the 501st was down to only four
operable Tigers and its own 2nd Company had been diverted from France to
Sicily as the situation in Tunisia worsened. Absorbing the 501st, the 504th
roamed the Axis lines as a mobile bulwark, but by this time, the Allies had
mustered nineteen divisions with overwhelming air and artillery support, not to
mention more than 1,000 tanks. The fifteen worn-out Axis divisions had only
110 operable tanks, including thirteen Tigers. The final Allied offensive began
on April 17, 1943, and the German and Italian forces began to pull back. On
April 22, British troops discovered an intact Tiger tank abandoned on the
battlefield, the first operable Tiger to fall in British hands. It now rests in the
Tank Museum, Bovington, UK, and is still running there; it is a very popular
feature.5

Tiger of 1st Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 501 in Tunisia. Note headlight moved from top deck to front
of driver compartment. Narrow mudguards were typical of Tigers built prior to November 1942. (US Army)

As would become a hallmark for the German forces after 1942, most of their
actions were too few and too late to change the failing prospects for German
victory. Although the handful of Tiger tanks apparently ran up impressive
numbers of knocked out Allied tanks, only thirty-two ever arrived in Tunisia and
never exceeded twenty operable at any time. Of the eight Tiger tanks lost in
action by the 502nd prior to its surrender, only half were destroyed by enemy
action. All were lost with the Axis surrender at Tunisia of May 8, 1943.
Although the 501st gained fame by spearheading some offensive drives and
spoiling attacks, such as the overrunning of US forces defending the Kasserine
Pass, and racking up impressive claims of Allied tanks destroyed, the facts of the
matter were that so few Tiger tanks could not change the balance of forces in
Tunisia. Moreover, the continuing attrition of German tanks by mines, artillery,
and especially the first effective anti-tank guns (such as the British 6- and 17-
pounders) now limited the effects of the Tiger on the battlefield. Just as was
experienced in the Leningrad Front, the cumulative effects of multiple hits on
Tiger tanks, while not destroying them, could and did render them not combat
ready in subsequent operations because of damage to key components for which
few (if any) replacement parts were available. Clearly, the pace of operations
quickly exceeded the marginal ability of the Tiger to operate without pauses for
maintenance and upkeep.
The 2nd Company of the 504th fought under the misguided command of the
Herman Goering Luftwaffe Division at Sicily, with seventeen Tiger tanks and
some borrowed PzKpfw IVs as its light support tanks. Repulsed from a hurried
counterattack of the American landing beaches at Gela, the company withered
away between July 10 and August 19 under overwhelming Allied attacks. Only a
single Tiger was ferried back to the Italian mainland, with the rest destroyed to
prevent capture.6
The fourth heavy tank battalion to be deployed in 1942 was the 503rd, ordered
to Army Group Don on December 27. Although Stalingrad was already
encircled by the Red Army, the immediate priority for Army Group Don was to
protect the Rostov bridgehead so that the forces in the Caucasus could withdraw
and form new defensive positions on the Donets river, after which the relief of
Stalingrad could be attempted. As was already the pattern for the heavy tank
battalions, there were no breakthrough missions to be conducted because of the
requirement for Tiger formations as blocking forces in both fixed and mobile
defensive efforts. In this mode, they more resembled the French heavy tank
concept of the mid-1930s, the Char d’arrêt that would stop tanks and troops
attempting to break through or bypass French defensive works and positions.
During January 1–17, Heavy Tank Battalion 503 secured river crossing sites,
in one case motor marching 65 km between those positions. The battalion
accomplished this by serious march discipline, stopping every 20 km for at-halt
checks and maintenance. On January 14, the battalion added 2nd Company,
Heavy Tank Battalion 502 as a reinforcement, becoming the only battalion
outfitted with three tank companies among the early table of organization units.
Overall, the battalion operated successfully, inflicting serious damage to the
enemy while only losing three Tigers to enemy action and one disabled that had
to be destroyed at a train station while awaiting shipment to Germany. Four other
Tigers had sufficient damage that they also required such evacuation. Obviously,
the logistics and geographic location assisted this battalion’s success, but it also
worked hard to recover vehicles and avoid any necessity to destroy them in
place.7

Tiger found abandoned by US troops in Sicily, July 1943. A vehicle of 2nd Company, 504th Heavy Tank
Battalion, it was produced in April 1943, has three spare tracks racked on turret, and a simplified Feifel air
filter system. It was lost in the first three days of battle. (History Facts)
View from loader’s position of Tiger tank, showing column forming up carrying extra fuel drums for road
march. (US Army)

The last of the early deploying battalions with the two-tank company
organization was the 505th, formed in late January, which was initially preparing
to be a third heavy tank battalion sent to Tunisia, but instead reported to Army
Group Center on May 1, 1943. Its baptism of fire was to be the Battle of Kursk.

The Showdown at Kursk

By mid-1943, the two heavy tank battalions destroyed in Tunisia were reformed
under the new (March 1943) organizational tables and trained in Germany, both
unavailable for use in the Summer Offensive of 1943. The 501st fought at
Vitebsk and was destroyed in July 1944, and reformed again with the Tiger II. In
December 1944, it was renumbered the 424th to avoid confusion with the 501st
(former 101st) Heavy Tank Battalion of the Waffen-SS. The 504th reformed in
the Netherlands during the winter of 1943–1944. The second set of five Army
Heavy Tank Battalions, numbered 506–510, formed during July 1943–June
1944.
The Battle of Kursk took place on July 5–16, 1943, as the last great summer
offensive of the German Army on the Eastern Front. As was the case in 1942,
the German build-up for the main effort at Kursk depleted most of the resources
of the Army in terms of replacements and reinforcements that might have
otherwise been available. Even Hitler himself came to view the offensive as a
“gamble” but allowed it to continue at terrible costs. Given its importance, the
battle posed something of an irony that the last great effort to affect a
breakthrough offensive on the Eastern Front included only two heavy tank
battalions seemingly designed for the event: the 503rd and the newly formed
505th. Of a total inventory of Tiger tanks produced by June 1943 (340), only
some 147 could be assigned to units at Kursk, although five replacements
arrived during the fighting.8 The two heavy tank battalions operated forty-five
Tigers each, although the 3rd Company of the 505th did not join the battalion
until July 8. The remainder of the Tigers were operated by the separate Tiger
companies of the Grossdeutchland Division and the three SS divisions of the II
SS Panzerkorps. Of the paper strength of 133 Tiger tanks on the eve of battle,
only ninety-seven were available on the first day of battle because of
maintenance problems and difficulties in marshalling all the vehicles and
equipment for a gigantic battle.
From the outset, the German situation for a summer offensive in 1943
remained deeply flawed. Two field armies had already surrendered in Stalingrad
and Tunisia. The weakened German Army in the East Front now lacked most of
its allies, the Italians and Hungarians withdrawing their forces from Russia and
Romania reducing its contingent. Finland, as always, conducted a war almost
unrelated to German plans and objectives. The difference was Hitler himself. A
victory against Russia in 1943 would not only rally his wavering allies, but also
might move Turkey more into the Axis orbit. Also, if there was ever to be a
negotiated peace with Stalin, it could best proceed from some advantages, yet to
be determined. So, the manifest need for an offensive remained with little
debate, but the question was where this would be.
Tigers and targets at Kursk; T-34 in foreground. (US Army)

The salient left in the aftermath of the winter struggles bulged to the west
between the Army Groups Center and South. A battle of annihilation
successfully fought there would pinch out a considerable expanse of recently lost
territory and would inflict losses upon the Russian forces, rendering them less
able to counter further moves against revived German forces on a shorter front.
Unfortunately for the Germans, the entire scope and sufficient detail of the
German planning became known to the Russians early enough to construct a
fortified zone within the Kursk salient, which posed hitherto unknown
concentrations of defensive forces with minefields, obstacles, and fortifications
the likes of which had never been encountered in Russia. Successive delays
imposed by the German command in order to increase the numbers of new
weapons, especially Tiger and Panther tanks, into their forces simply bolstered
the strength of Russian defensive positions and reinforcements, including forces
now concentrating quietly on the flanks of the Kursk salient for a timely
counteroffensive once the German assault had been stopped.
By July, the Kursk defenses presented up to six successive zones of defense,
each of which had several components to a depth of some fifty miles to the rear.
There were even two more positions constructed in the Steppe Front, extending
the depth of defenses to some 200 miles. In all of these, multiple entrenched and
fortified positions hid almost a million men in their trenches, blockhouses, and
bunkers, fronted by some 640,000 mines and backed by 20,000 guns and
mortars, 300 rocket launchers, and 3,300 tanks. Tactical training included the
latest wisdom on how to stop the Tiger tanks and other machines about to enter
use, based upon previous experience in the year—firing at tank tracks with anti-
tank guns and field guns; firing artillery barrages; and creating fire pockets
where anti-tank guns could bear on the lesser armored flanks of the advancing
tanks instead of their frontal armor. Above all, camouflage, concealment, and
deception ruled in the salient. The Germans were attacking against forces
superior in numbers of men and every type of equipment between 2.5 and 1.5 to
1 favoring the Red Army and supporting aviation. All the Germans could hope
for was that tactical skills and determinations of the individual soldier and his
commanders might carry the day. At Kursk, however, there would be too much
time taken at each phase of the operation, with little opportunity to gain any
lasting advantage.9
The Battle of Kursk began with classic German pincer movements from the
north and the south, aimed at the rail junction of Kursk (see map below). From
the North, the weaker pincer was formed in Army Group Center by the Ninth
Army under General Walter Model. Of his fifteen infantry and four Panzer
divisions, Model committed two corps with all the tanks and three infantry
divisions to affect their breakthrough. In this, he was assisted by the attachment
of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion and the 656th Heavy Tank Destroyer
Regiment, the latter with two battalions operating ninety of Dr. Porsche’s
Ferdinand vehicles in assault gun missions. They raised the total number of
tanks and assault guns to approximately 600.
Operating on the south side of the Kursk salient, Army Group South fielded a
more powerful and balanced force of all arms in General Herman Hoth’s Fourth
Panzer Army, as well as the less powerful Army Detachment Kempf (three
Panzer and five infantry divisions) commanded by General Werner Kempf who
had the mission of providing right flank security to support the movements of
Hoth’s main effort. The latter was formed by the XLVIII Panzer Corps of two
Panzer divisions, Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutchland, a new 10th Panzer
Brigade with 204 of the new Panther D medium tanks (yet untested) and an
infantry division; and the II SS Panzer Corps with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd SS
Panzergrenadier Divisions. This front mustered more Tiger tanks because of the
503rd Heavy Tank Battalion placed in Army Detachment Kempf plus the four
divisional Tiger companies of Hoth’s Panzer grenadier divisions. Would the total
of 1,400 tanks and assault guns be sufficient?
The ensuing battles at Kursk took many unexpected turns for both sides. In the
Ninth Army, the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, supporting the 6th Infantry
Division, used combined arms tactics to clear the first two lines of Russian
defenses, crossed the Oka river, and stood off the waves of light tanks and T-34s
that struck in counterattack. This would have been the moment to unleash the
2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions of the XLVI Panzer Corps to exploit the
breakthrough. However, these units were scheduled to enter the battle the next
day and were not in any position to come forward. Obviously, the Germans were
less flexible than in previous campaigns and the opportunity was lost. Almost
the same took place with the Ferdinand battalions supporting the 86th and 292nd
Divisions in XLI Panzer Corps. Acting as assault guns, the Ferdinands gave a
good account of themselves with their powerful and accurate guns destroying
bunkers, anti-tank guns, and dug-in tanks of the two defensive lines, reaching the
third; however, in doing so, they outran their supporting infantry, upon which
they fell back at the end of the first day. Unfortunately, the losses to minefields
and artillery concentrations left too few vehicles to make more significant
contributions to the Eighth Army fighting, which shifted into a defensive
struggle around the village of Ponyri. Committing Panzer divisions to the front
on the second day (July 6) brought no success against a tide of counterattacking
Russian armor; by July 8, the Eighth Army stood on the defensive.10
An early production Tiger I with 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division advances during Operation Citadel
(Kursk) near Bykówka. (US Army)
 According to the inspector general of armored troops’ report of July 17, “Total
losses: 19 Ferdinand—most occurred due to heavy artillery fire hits on the air-
intake gratings, four vehicles burnt out following electrical short-circuiting,
without enemy effort. Temporary losses due to mine damage: 40 Ferdinands: 20
had been repaired by 11 July.”11
The lack of machine guns (and they did carry an MG 34 inside for crew use
because the coax in the original plan was not feasible in the forward 200-mm
plating scheme of the fighting compartment) has been exaggerated in most
accounts as few Ferdinands were assaulted at close range and they did very well
against AT guns, bunkers, and tanks of the successive prepared defensive lines of
the Red Army. Most were knocked out by artillery fire that sent fragments
through the engine cover grill works, setting them on fire; there were also some
breakdowns and a few cases of heavy caliber penetration shots. There is no
acknowledged source for the fate of each vehicle though. The overall failure at
Kursk, besides attacking such Russian strength in the first place, was the
weakness of the German infantry and assault engineers. The units were not up to
strength and too many were lost in the initial fighting to advance with the armor
and consolidate the gains. This was true on every front. Germany simply lacked
the old combined arms capacity of previous years. In two days, the Ninth Army
lost 13,000 casualties, predominantly infantry and combat engineers, and its
offensive ground to a halt. Fewer than half the Ferdinands remained in action
after the first day, although repairs continued through the night on the disabled
vehicles.
The two battalions formed to operate the Ferdinands at Kursk were the 653rd
and 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalions under the 656th Heavy Tank
Destroyer Regiment. The regiment’s cadre came from Panzer Regiment 35. The
653rd was the former 197th Assault Gun Battalion, formed in November 1940
and experienced in the first two years of the Russian campaign. The 654th was a
former towed anti-tank gun battalion that fought in Poland, Holland, and France.
Decimated in Russia in the 1942–1943 winter, it was designated for reforming as
a Hornisse tank destroyer battalion, but changed at the last minute to the
Ferdinand. They received their vehicles first and trained at Rouen, France
starting in mid-April 1943. Thus, neither unit had a long experience with the
Ferdinand, but the 653rd had previously been a self-propelled assault gun unit
and the other was just towed with halftracks. That presented quite a different
learning curve. The 653rd had thirteen totally destroyed vehicles of the total loss
of thirty-six Ferdinands by July 27. After Kursk, the 654th turned its surviving
vehicles over to the 653rd and became the first battalion to form with the new
Jagdpanther tank destroyer.12
The outcome of the battle for the Kursk Salient now rested on Generals Hoth
and Kempf and the southern pincer. Initial successes swelled the German notions
of imminent victory as the left-hand XLVIII Panzer Corps rapidly adjusted to
local setbacks and continued to push forward. The II SS Panzer Corps also
muscled forward and penetrated the first fortified line by 9 a.m., despite what
reports termed “resistance of an unprecedented nature and scale.” Thus, the
second line proved too hard a nut to crunch and the Psel river line was not
crossed in face of an anti-tank “front” sufficient to stop even the SS divisional
Tiger companies.13
On Hoth’s right flank, the Kempf Detachment fell behind schedule in face of
Russian artillery barrages and stubborn resistance on the objective Donets river
crossings. Its tank strength made little difference while the various engineer units
sorted out the crossings. In any case, Kempf had split his 503th Heavy Tank
Battalion into company attachments to his three Panzer divisions, a true violation
of the desired doctrine of concentration of such units. The 2nd Company was
rendered completely immobile on a minefield the first day of the attack. Still, the
III Panzer Corps managed to advance 20 km by the day’s end. However,
Kempf’s forces were unable to catch up with the II Panzer Corps before its final
major tank battle of July 12.

The End of German Operational Dominance

As Dennis Showalter asserted in his masterly assessment of the Kursk
Campaign, the Red Army demonstrated three points at the outset:

The Soviet ability at all levels to conceal their strength and their
dispositions even as the battle developed; maskirovka did not stop at zero
hour … The Soviet ability to disrupt German timetables … Finally,
 Kempf’s experiences in particular suggested that the Germans’ ability to
work inside what today would be called the Red Army’s “observe, orient,
decide and act” loop was a diminishing, when not a wasting, asset.

The Soviet Army had learned too well from its masters of 1941. It was now able
to anticipate German moves and make assessments to counter them. It was only
a matter of time before they proved capable of executing a sustained offensive
campaign.14
It was still a close-run thing from the Russian viewpoints. The German forces
had advanced too far in each sector on the first day. Reserves had been thrown
into counterattacks earlier than anticipated, demanding their replacement from
higher headquarters. In similar fashion to the Russian actions against the German
Ninth Army pincer, Marshal Nicolai Vatutin sent his armor reserves forward:
two corps of the First Tank Army and two Guards tank corps to confront the
advancing XLVIII and II SS Panzer Corps.

Tiger 123 of Heavy Tank Battalion 503 at Kursk: loading 88-mm ammunition through loader’s hatch and
taking a quick meal of sandwiches at same time. (US Army)
A more distant picture, showing the general setting, almost casual. (US Army)

Against such steady and studied resistance, the German offensive collapsed.
The quality of the Tiger tank in combat was unquestioned and only thirteen of
them had been destroyed by July 16, but only an average of 38 percent of them
were available on any given day. By that date, at the suspension of the offensive,
only fifty-two Tigers were ready for action with eighty-seven temporarily out of
action. The corollary to Hitler’s dream of technical superiority was the ability to
keep the vehicles operational; there, the dream had foundered. Heavy Tank
Battalion 503 had six Tiger tanks available on July 14, from its high point of
forty-two tanks ready on the first day of battle. To the north, the 505th had an
average of 45.7 percent of its Tigers operational during July 4–20 July. At the
end of the second day of fighting, there were only six running from the twenty-
six with which it had started the attack. With the arrival of its 3rd Company on
July 8, it achieved its highest number of ready Tigers: twenty-nine.15
Efforts to continue the Kursk offensive foundered across the German Front on
July 13, but the real reason for the termination of the German offensive came in
the form of the Operation Kutuzov, the assault on the obverse German salient
around Orel covered by the remaining elements of Army Group Center not fit
for the Kursk operation. Long feared by Model, the attack by four Russian field
armies toward Orel could not be stopped by shifting air power to that sector, and
serious German armor reinforcements would have to go to the new front from
the Ninth Army. By the night of July 13–14, four of Model’s Panzer Divisions
were moving into the newly threatened sectors.
Hitler, already leery of the Allied invasion of Sicily on July 10, now called off
his “gamble,” and began to order reinforcements for the developing Italian
Front. After trying several deployment options, Field Marshal Manstein called
upon Hoth and Kempf to establish main lines of resistance on July 16. The
Kursk offensive had halted for all time.
The Russian offensive in the South began on August 3 and the overall retreat
of the German Army in the east began. It would be a fighting withdrawal and
German tactical brilliance demonstrated much, but the German Army from now
on would fight on the defensive.
The fighting power of the Tiger tank gained much respect from the Russians
during the Kursk fighting. Almost everywhere, Tiger tanks were reported on the
move as well as Ferdinands, far in excess of their limited numbers it would
appear. In a similar fashion to what U.S. and British Commonwealth troops
would report on the Western Front, any box-like tank shape became a Tiger, and
in the east, any assault gun might be reported as a Ferdinand or Elefant. After
Kursk, the Russians remained in no doubt that their T-34 mainstay medium tank
was seriously outclassed and obsolete in face of the German armor fielded in
1943. Having been content to produce the greatest number of tanks of all types
thus far in the war, the search began for at least better tank cannon that could
penetrate German tanks at greater than suicidal distances. In December, a new
three-man turret mounting an 85-mm gun went into production on the T-34
medium and KV-1 heavy tank, and work accelerated on a new heavy tank
employing a 122-mm cannon derived from an existing field gun. The resulting
IS-2 heavy tank began production in early 1944, but in limited numbers for
designated breakthrough regiments. As an interim measure, the Russians began
production of 76-mm high-velocity ammunition with tungsten sub-caliber
penetrators in February 1944 for the older T-34s that perforce remained a
backbone of the Army.16
The brief period of the Tiger’s battlefield dominance experienced in 1943
would therefore eclipse in time; however, the prospects for the German Army in
the Russian Front turned worse much faster. On January 1, 1944, the Red Army
had 24,400 tanks on hand (including 10,300 light tanks). Throughout the
remainder of that year, the German Army faced them with no more than 1644
tanks on hand, with no more than 1,404 operational. The German Army would
lose 641 Tiger I tanks in the Eastern Front from December 1943 to November
1944, representing 48 percent of the Tigers built through production ending that
August.17

Additional Battalions to the Fronts

The rest of the eleven Army and three Waffen-SS heavy tank battalions entered
service after the Battle of Kursk, as Tiger I production steadily improved. With
the Russian offensive against Army Group South being most dangerous, the
503rd Heavy Tank Battalion was joined by the new 506th and 509th Heavy Tank
Battalions, while the Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutchland expanded its
Tiger company to a complete III Battalion of its Panzer Regiment
Grossdeutschland.
In Italy, two heavy tank battalions reinforced the German positions in Italy:
the new 508th and the reformed 504th. The former arrived first to reinforce the
defenses against the Anzio landings in February 1944. It fought in the peninsula
through February 12, 1945, whence it turned over its remaining fifteen Tigers to
the 504th. That battalion arrived on June 20, 1944, just in time to participate in
the general retreat north from Rome, losing twenty-eight of its forty-five Tigers
by July 1, mostly from breakdown on road marches. Farther to the east in the
German receding lines, the 508th lost thirteen of twenty-three Tigers in similar
fashion. The 508th suffered another retreat, this time from the British offensive
of September, leaving eleven Tigers self-destroyed in its wake. Throughout the
campaign, the 504th and 508th lost eighty-seven and seventy Tigers respectively,
having destroyed at best two Allied tanks for each Tiger lost. Given the terrain
and equally difficult German operational situation in Italy, this seems to have
been a major error in deployment, perhaps indicating that nothing had been
learned in the German leadership since Tunisia.18
 In other quarters, the 505th and new 506, 507, and 509th Heavy Tank
Battalions joined Army Group Ukraine in early 1944 in anticipation of the
Russian summer offensive. After the summer offensive instead began against
Army Group Center, where only a depleted 501st was assigned, and soon
annihilated in the ensuing collapse, the 505 and 507th entrained to the north,
where they assisted the 5th Panzer Division in securing the Minsk–Orsha
highway crossings of the Berezina to allow other German units to escape to the
west. They later escaped encirclement and were reformed with new Tiger II
tanks in September 1944 and March 1945.19
The 510th Heavy Tank Battalion formed in June 1944 but had to take Tiger I
tanks to fill out its complement. Shipped to East Prussia in early August 1944, it
fought at Memel and Königsberg, surrendering in Courland on May 8, 1945.

Tiger tanks in the Brenner Pass, September 1943. (History Facts)

On the Western Front, only three heavy tank attalions fought at Normandy,
including the first two of the Waffen-SS. Army Heavy Tank Battalion 503
reformed in June 1944 after having participated in the fighting retreat of Army
Group South after Kursk. It received the new Tiger II tank for its 1st Company,
the other two being issued the Tiger I. Moving by rail across the Seine river in
July, it then road-marched by successive nights reaching an assembly position 13
km east of Caen to await orders on July 6. Assigned to the 21st Panzer Division
on July 11, it began a series of engagements around Caen, including defense
against Operation Goodwood. Its 3rd Company withdrew back to Mailly-le-
Camp training area in late September, where it was refitted with Tiger II tanks. It
rejoined the fighting north of the Seine until these tanks were lost. By September
22, the battalion had refitted at Paderborn with a complete set of forty-five Tiger
II tanks and was ordered to Budapest, reaching it on October 14. There, it fought
at diminishing strength until just twelve Tigers were operating and the battalion
withdrew to the west, guarded by its last tanks until these were destroyed on
May 10, and personnel released to move in small groups back to Germany.
The three Waffen-SS heavy tank battalions at first formed in October 1943
with the first three SS Divisions already equipped with Tiger companies,
numbered 101–103 in sequence, although initially, they did not have three tank
companies. The 103rd Heavy SS Tank Battalion was not established until
November 1943. In line with Army practice, these were pulled out of the
divisions in September 1944 and assigned as corps level battalions, renumbered
501–503. To avoid confusion, the Army designated their 501–503 battalions as
424th, 511th, and Feldherrnhalle [Division] Battalions.
Mid-production Tiger I of 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion in 1944. It has improved cupola but also older
rubber-rimmed road wheels. (US Army)

The same vehicle, showing Zimmerit anti-magnetic mine paste and cupola anti-aircraft mount for MG 34.
(US Army)
Normandy Debacle
At the time of the Normandy landings, only the first two heavy SS tank
battalions had received a full complement of forty-five Tiger I tanks, the 103rd
having only six. The 1st Heavy SS Tank Battalion marched with the I SS Panzer
Corps and 1st SS Division by road, beginning to arrive with fewer than half its
tanks operational, but still went into action on June 13 at Villers-Bocage.
Between June 13 and July 8, it lost fifteen of its Tiger tanks. This was the first
heavy tank battalion to reach the front.
The 102nd Heavy SS Tank Battalion arrived by rail at Paris on June 27, but
reported as late as July 20 that ten of its Tigers were still en route from there.
Apart from counterattacking locally against British advances, the main
accomplishments of the 503rd Army and 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalions took
place in the successful German defense against Operation Goodwood, the major
British armored attack attempting to flank Caen to the east on July 18–20. The
102nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion mainly fought through July, beginning on the
11th on and around the heavily disputed Hill 112, which dominated the Orne and
Odon river valleys. The battalion lost only seven Tiger tanks during this battle,
but often operated as few as five tanks a day as the fighting was that severe.
In August, all the German efforts at Normandy came to naught as the US
forces effected their breakout from the Normandy enclave, flanking the German
armies from the south and east as the American forces drove toward Paris. The
crucial effort came with Operation Totalize, where the Canadian II Corps struck
to the southeast on August 7–12 to cut the narrowing German escape route at the
town of Falaise. Facing them were two depleted German units: 12th SS Panzer
Division and the Heavy SS Tank Battalion 101. The battalion commander by this
point was newly promoted Captain Michael Wittmann, the renowned tank ace of
the Waffen-SS. Wittmann led the eight Tigers under his direct control in a
spoiling attack north on the Caen–Falaise road the afternoon of August 8 with
two small battle groups of the 12th SS Panzer Division attacking north in
parallel on roads to the east. The estimated 216 British and Canadian tanks
waited in position as the eight Tigers attacked, thirty-six of these being the new
“Firefly” conversions of the M4 tank, fitted with the very lethal 17-pdr tank
cannon. The Tigers and Captain Wittmann were annihilated in this near-final
action. Amazingly, three Tigers remained intact and were joined by other Tigers
of the 101st Battalion that had rallied to the battle site from other assignments.
By the end of the day, the battalion mustered eight operational Tigers out of
eighteen on hand, two more having been lost while fighting the 1st Polish
Armored Division to a standstill south of Saint-Aignan. Faced with such
resistance, the Canadian Corps could advance no farther against the gathering
German forces. The slender shoulder of the Falaise Gap held from August 16–
20, and only at this point were any Tigers destroyed by their own crews to avoid
capture.

Tiger 323 of 3rd Company, 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion on road march to Normandy front on June 7,
1944. (US Army)
One of the first Tiger tanks finished in June 1944, with transport tracks, Zimmerit anti-magnetic mine paste,
hangers for spare track blocks on turret side, and pistol ports. (US Army)

Tiger B tank of 1st Company, 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion knocked out near Magny-en-Vexin by British
anti-tank fire in Seine bridgehead combat and the end of August 1944. This tank is now displayed at the
Defense College of Management and Technology, Shrivenham, and occasionally at Bovington. This is
likely the same vehicle depicted on page 41. (US Army)
Tiger B of 1st Company 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion in France self-destructed after being disabled in aerial
bombardment. (US Army)

Acting company commander Lt Baron Richard von Rosen (1922–2015) leads off his 3rd Company, 503rd
Heavy Tank Battalion in a parade at Sennelager, prior to his battalion’s deployment to Hungary, September
22, 1944. His company had been bombed ineffective in mid-July at Normandy, refitted with Tiger II in
early August, then destroyed again at the Seine bridgehead battles of late August. The company now stood-
to for the next call to battle. (IWM)

In the end, sixty Tiger tanks of the three heavy battalions were lost in direct
combat, thirteen by air attack, and fifty-eight destroyed or abandoned in place.
Only three Tigers escaped destruction by being shipped back to German for
repair prior to the collapse.20

Continued Retreat in the East

Although the Tiger II first saw combat in company strength with the 503rd
Heavy Tank Battalion at Normandy, facing Operation Goodwood, the 501st
Heavy Tank Battalion became the first to receive a full allotment of Tiger II
tanks. It entered combat in Poland on August 13, 1944, as part of the attempt to
reduce the Russian bridgeheads across the Vistula river at Baronov and
Sandomierz. At this point in time, the weak numbers were counting worst for the
German Army.
The virtual destruction of Army Group Center and the near annihilation of the
Seventh Army in Normandy left too few units to cover the three major fronts.
Assessing the thirteen existing heavy tank battalions in August, three were being
destroyed at Normandy and two more continued their costly withdrawal from
US and British forces north of Rome through difficult terrain. Three heavy tank
battalions fought in Courland and East Prussia and two were in Poland; one
retreated under pressure in Northern Poland. The 501st, newly arrived, joined
Fourth Panzer Army. The other three battalions reformed in Germany, awaiting
delivery of Tiger II tanks.
The Sandomierz-Baranów bridgehead in Fourth Panzer Army Zone. (US Army)

The 501st Heavy Tank Battalion reported to the Fourth Panzer Army short a
company. The training with the new Tiger II had produced many mechanical
problems, to include oil and fuel leaks stemming from poor factory assembly
and the usual problems of weak transmissions, final drives, and overtaxed
engines. Three of the new tanks caught fire during training and became total
losses. Only by forced transfer of two Tiger II from the 505th Battalion was the
501st able to depart Germany with just the two companies complete. Later in
August, the remaining company rejoined.
The usual long road march from railhead to battlefield (50 km in this case)
brought breakdowns to most of the tanks, delaying the planned counterattack
with the 16th Panzer Division. On August 11, only eleven Tiger II tanks joined
the attack. The sandy soil caused the heavy tanks to remain road-bound; that
proved their undoing. Among the few Russian tanks defending the Baronov
bridgehead area stood eleven IS-2 heavy tanks of the 71st Independent Guards
Heavy Tank Battalion. Deployed in various hide and ambush positions, the IS-2
first destroyed three Tiger II tanks in the morning hours, plus another one a few
hours later. The Russians seized the opportunity to counterattack during which
they captured three abandoned Tiger II tanks, one of which was still operable
with fuel and ammunition. In the two days’ fighting that ensued, the 501st lost
seven more Tiger II for an overall cost of fourteen Tiger II destroyed or captured
out of the thirty employed by its two companies. The Russian losses were three
IS-2 destroyed and seven more disabled and withdrawn from the battle. Such
was hardly a reassuring baptism of fire by the first full battalion of Tiger II,
illustrating once again the perils of committing new equipment to action with
undue haste. The 501st continued to operate against Soviet bridgeheads in the
area until it was caught in the January 1945 offensive that brought the Russians
to the Oder river in Germany.21

The Last Attack in the West

Only two heavy tank battalions could be found for the Ardennes Offensive of
December 1945 that resulted in the Battle of the Bulge, both equipped with the
Tiger II. SS Heavy Tank Battalion 501 (formerly 101) was assigned to the I SS
Panzer Corps, and thus ended up in Combat Group Peiper of the 1st SS Panzer
Regiment, 1st SS Panzer Division. Charged with leading the entire 6th SS
Panzer Army rapidly to the Meuse river crossings, Peiper knew that the Tiger II
would not be suitable, but could prove worthy for the fighting at the Meuse. In
the attack, the Tiger II proved unable to even follow in trace of Peiper’s force on
the narrow roads. The typical mechanical breakdowns continued to plague the
vehicles. Moreover, the US defenders quickly destroyed bridges that the Tiger II
required to follow the penetration forces. In the end, as Peiper’s successes faded
and options dwindled, he arrived at La Gleize, just 60 km short of the Meuse
River. At this point, only six Tiger II accompanied him, and they were low in
fuel. Once again, the US engineers demolished the needed bridge and an ensuing
fight developed with mostly US infantry. With no way out and low in fuel, the
Combat Group Peiper abandoned its position and vehicles and left the pocket to
rejoin the rest of his division.
The other Tiger II-equipped battalion participating in the Ardennes Offensive,
Heavy Tank Battalion 506, had been fighting in the region since September, and
simply moved from Aachen to join the Fifth Panzer Army. It had forty-one Tiger
II tanks on hand but probably fewer were operational, given its previous
commitments to action. It participated in the rout of the US cavalry screens and
in the envelopment of the US 106th Infantry Division December 17–20 in the
Schnee Eifel region. It contributed to the taking of St. Vith on December 21, but
probably only had a few Tiger II there. The battalion then supported the
encirclement and attacks on the US forces at Bastogne but only small numbers
of these tanks could be maneuvered in the snow and rough terrain, and
maintenance and supply problems kept the effective numbers low in any case.
Between December 17 and January 13, the two heavy tank battalions lost
twenty-two Tiger II tanks; the 506th lost six to direct fire and one more to air
attack; and the 501st SS lost six to direct fire and abandoned another nine. Only
in the retreat from the Bastogne position did the 506th abandon and destroy three
Tiger II tanks.
The lessons of the Ardennes remained clear—such heavy vehicles in
unfavorable terrain could make only minor contributions to the fighting, yet
remained liabilities for supply and maintenance, especially in the final retreats.
Little had been accomplished for the loss of twenty-five expensive machines.22
US soldiers test-ride captured Tiger II from 2nd Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 506, restored to service by
‘B’ Company, 129th Ordnance Battalion, in December 1944. (US Army)

Collapsing Fortunes on all Fronts

The last four months of the European portion of the war found the Third Reich
practically prostrate because of dwindling resources, while the Russians and
Western Allies prepared for the final struggle to destroy the Wehrmacht and
occupy Germany. For the heavy tank battalions, eleven would be destroyed in
action with the Soviet Army and three more in the west. Heavy Tank Battalions
504 and 508 dwindled in Northern Italy before the surrender and Heavy Tank
Battalion 506 fought in western Germany after retreating from the Ardennes,
surrendering when trapped in the Ruhr Pocket.
In the Eastern Front, Hitler contributed much to the strategic choices that
doomed most of his armies, ironically weakening the Berlin approaches in favor
of efforts to hold Vienna and recover Budapest. The latter was not a priority for
the Soviet Army as it refurbished its armored formations for the final offensives
into the heart of Germany, and the commanders of the Russian Second and Third
Ukrainian Fronts were told to not expect reinforcement and to make do with
their existing resources. Lacking sufficient armored forces, they perforce turned
to anti-tank guns and strongpoint defenses against the German Army Group
South as it endeavored to satisfy Hitler’s demand to rescue the beleaguered
Budapest garrison (IX SS Mountain Corps, surrounded since December 26) and
keep the Hungarian oil fields secure. The result would be a miniature
reenactment of Kursk during January–March 1944, where the Tiger battalions
actually achieved in part some elements of the breakthroughs for which they had
been designed.
Two German corps, IV SS Panzer and III Panzer, attacked beginning New
Year’s Day to the south-east, with Budapest a tempting 30 miles distant. In the
III Panzer Corps, a weakened Heavy Tank Battalion 503 operated with its ten
operational Tiger II (of twenty-six on hand) with the 4th Cavalry Brigade in a
supporting attack on the right flank of IV SS Panzer Corps. Supporting both the
4th Cavalry Brigade and the 23rd Panzer Division, the battalion fought through
January 11, destroying several Russian tanks and seizing terrain. A chance
encounter with SU-152 assault guns in a reverse slope position cost three Tiger
II destroyed and seven badly damaged. The battalion now had only three of its
twenty-three Tiger II tanks operational.
The newly arrived Heavy Tank Battalion 509, refitted with forty-five Tiger II
tanks now supported the main attack of IV SS Panzer Corps and its five Panzer
divisions launched from a new position at the northern tip of Lake Balaton. The
offensive continued January 18–29, and on the first day covered forty miles,
with the 509th deployed in full strength, leading the 3rd SS Panzer Division in
the center main effort of the IV Corps. This force broke through successive
minefields and several fortified lines, eliminating anti-tank guns and tanks.
However, there was a price to be paid. Many leaders of the battalion were killed
or wounded and only eighteen Tiger II tanks continued the afternoon attack,
which brought the force to the Sarviz Canal, only to see the only Tiger-capable
bridge blown up as the lead tank approached it. The rest of the advance
continued without the heavy tanks, of which seven had been destroyed and
perhaps sixteen disabled to battle damage or mechanical breakdown. On January
29, Russian reinforcements brought the German advance to a halt and the
Budapest garrison fought to a bitter end, with two separate breakout attempts
quashed with few (if any) survivors. Resistance ended on February 13. It was the
worst city fighting seen on the Eastern front since Stalingrad.
The stage was now set for yet another tangential effort in Hungary, this time
using the very last reserves of armor the Third Reich held, the 6th SS Panzer
Army, withdrawn from the Ardennes in January and somewhat refurbished in
tank strength, yet there was little accomplished in the way of replacements for
lost infantrymen. Hitler remained blind to the threats in the west because he
mused that the Ardennes Offensive had stymied any Anglo-American offensives
for the moment; at the same time, he dismissed German intelligence reports
indicating the Russians were massing their armor against Vienna and Berlin. He
was more impressed by the gains made in the attempt to relieve Budapest and
now dreamed of a greater offensive that would continue to protect Hungarian
oilfields but also knock out major Russian forces between Lake Balaton and the
Danube, advancing north to south with the I and II SS Panzer Corps and pin the
remnants against the Drava river banks still held by Army Group ‘F’. In what
was one of the most bizarre mistakes of the Germans at this stage, they sought to
occupy terrain that could not be defended, nor have any effect upon the coming
decisive battles for the Third Reich homeland.
Dubbed Operation Spring Awakening (Frühlingserwachen), the main effort of
Sixth SS Panzer Army was the I SS Panzer Corps that headed off on March 7
and penetrated two defensive lines for a gain of 20 miles on the west side of the
Sarviz Canal. On the east side of the canal, II SS Panzer Corps made less
progress in snow and rain, gaining five miles during March 10–12. Still
operating with I Corps since the Ardennes was the SS Heavy Tank Battalion
501, which started this operation with only four of its thirty-six Tiger II tanks
operational because of a previous operation and extensive road movements
required to reach its assembly areas. On the other hand, the Army Heavy Tank
Battalion 509 had remained in place since the failed relief of Budapest, merely
shifting from IV SS Panzer Corps to the III Panzer Corps, and had used the
maintenance pause to start this operation with thirty-two operational Tiger II
tanks. In the event, the muddy and swampy conditions and relative lack of
Russian armor to engage made this a mostly infantry operation. The SS 501st did
not advance beyond the second day probably because no Tiger II-capable bridge
could be located. This halt proved advantageous because the Russian
counteroffensive began on the 13th north of 6th SS Panzer Army, where Sixth
Army stood with III Panzer Corps and IV SS Panzer Corps. The 6th SS Panzer
Army was ordered to stop its sweep to the south and instead to return north to
counter the Russians, already pressing heavily against IV SS Panzer Corps. The
Heavy Tank Battalion 509 fought with III Panzer Corps in its attacks supporting
the initial operations, and then contributed well to the fighting withdrawal of
Sixth Army in face of the Russian counteroffensive. The Russians hoped to pin
both Sixth and Sixth SS Panzer Armies east of Lake Balaton and cut their line of
supply in the same movement. On March 23, the Sixth Army managed to run a
gauntlet to take up new lines between Lake Balaton and the Sixth SS Panzer
Army, which had crossed to the north of the former to hold the shoulder of what
was by then blossoming into a breakthrough by the combined Russian fronts on
their way to Vienna. Just as took place at Kursk, the German attacks at Operation
Spring Awakening remained insignificant as the Russians surged forward and the
German forces commenced yet another long retreat. In this case, they all would
surrender within six weeks in Germany and Czechoslovakia.23

Tiger B of 2nd Company, Heavy Tank Battalion 503, forming an essential part of the force detailed to
restore Budapest to German control in late 1944. (US Army)
The end of one of twenty-seven Tiger B tanks of Heavy Tank Battalion 507, drawn from the Henschel plant
in late March 1945, abandoned in April near Paderborn. (US Army)

Much fighting and suffering remained for the battered armies on both sides of
the Eastern Front, but for the German forces in the east and west the end was
irreversible and coherent operations by organized units devolved into struggling
battle groups and ad hoc formations of all kinds. There were no more units to
reform or stand up, and the schools, test centers and training commands also
ended up as scratch units commanded by strangers, generally moving west or
south to avoid the Soviet Army and find some way to escape further mayhem.
 11

Conclusions: Quality v. Quantity?

Although primarily a history of multiple failures, the German heavy fighting

vehicles of World War II provided a multitude of challenges within the
engineering problems of tank design and manufacture, and several technological
exploits resulted from the experience of bringing them to the final stages. In
most cases, however, the sheer size, scope and weight of these vehicles generally
exceeded the available technologies and manufacturing capabilities.
These setbacks proved no specific undoing for the armies concerned despite
the sheer waste of materials one might consider they involved. The numbers
attempted remained very small. Above all, the tactical and operational
considerations that brought them into development were proven false or obsolete
by the time they could have entered service. Fortifications of all kinds and power
were encountered and overcome in World War II without the use of specialized
armored vehicles. The accomplishment of tactical and operational breakthrough
on the modern battlefield came to depend more on numbers, mobility, and
logistical sustainment than the application of superior guns and armor at a single
point. The minor experiences of German operations with their Jagdtiger tank
destroyers pointed out that when not employed in substantial numbers, even
super-heavy fighting vehicles were soon overwhelmed and swept aside in the
Allied advances.
Above all, the logistical handicaps of the heavies presaged their doom. The
operational constraints posed by at least partial disassembly for rail transport, the
limitations of bridging and fording means, and the ever-existent possibility of
miring in swamps or even city streets that their high length-to-width steering
profiles could carve up all made for extraordinary difficulties. Left to their own
automotive power for deployment, they could not hold up for long under
constant stressing of barely tested components.
As is well known, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany in 1941 was
intended to be yet another brief campaign in a striking series of victories
accomplished by German arms since 1939. The German position that summer
was unprecedented, especially given the faulty economic and financial
preparations of the Third Reich in the years through 1939. Contrary to the usual
view of Nazi efficiency preparing for war with a sustained period of production
and investment that yielded the successes later dubbed Blitzkrieg by the foreign
press, the pace of German rearmament staggered during 1937–1938. In
particular, the steel (and later, copper) rationing required for the three armed
services stagnated production of armaments. On the day of the Munich
Settlement, the new German priority became the preparation for war with the
United Kingdom, plus France, with presumed American support, all targeted for
1942. Yet the 1936 armaments programs for the German Army at that point
would require about a fourth of German steel production in 1939 for completion.
The new goals for the three services would require three times the 1938
production in the following year.1
By the spring of 1939, the Army procurement plan lapsed into full retreat.
Ammunition production plummeted, building steel was unavailable for 300 new
infantry battalions that lived under canvas, and weapons programs experienced
severe cuts; machine gun and field artillery orders fell by at least half and those
for the current infantry rifle were ordered to stop by the fall of 1939. The tank
production originally programmed for 1,200 medium tanks between October
1938 and October 1939 was halved. At least thirty-four of the planned wartime
force of 105 divisions would suffer serious shortages of equipment. Ammunition
for all would stall at a quantity sufficient for only fourteen days heavy fighting.
The circumstances for the other services remained just as poor.2
Accordingly, Hitler grasped the only straw he could, an early launch of the
war he had forecast for 1944, then 1942. As he stated to his military leaders at
Berchtesgaden on August 22, 1939, “we have nothing to lose; we have
everything to gain. Because of our restrictions our economic situation is such
that we can only hold out for a few more years. We must act.” Hitler and
Germany had run out of time.3
 The victories came in surprising sequence and ease, especially the fall of
France. However, the ability of the German economy to sustain the war effort
remained circumspect. It was, for instance, impossible to calculate the
requirements for each and every campaign in advance. In the case of the Russian
campaign, it had to be supplied while at the same time, Germany and Italy
engaged the United Kingdom on several fronts. For the first time, therefore, the
economic priorities in 1941 were hitched to the Blitzkrieg concept of short but
hard-fought operations, leading to a rapid conclusion on the battlefield.
Accordingly, the armaments plan “Rüstungsprogramm ‘B’” would dictate the
armaments output for the eight months of October 1940–April 1941 in order to
increase the strength of the German Army and its firepower sufficient for the
rapid defeat of the Soviet Army and another victory. Before Russia was invaded,
it was presumed that the surge of production, materials and labor could be
shunted to the navy and air force for the final priority of the United Kingdom.
The emphasis on tank production remained the new model medium tanks with
which the German Army had defeated France, not the various projects for heavy
tanks that had not been required in the war thus far; they were also not forecast
as being required for the Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union. These conditions
explain to a considerable extent the rather dilatory pace at which the 1939–1941
heavy tank designs had progressed.
The misfortunes of the German Army in Russia mostly fall beyond the scope
of this work; however, the defeat of the 1941 Blitzkrieg campaign in Russia had
reverberations throughout the structures and programs of the Third Reich, not
least of which was the management of the war economy and the German
industrial sectors. Not only had the German invasion foundered instead of
producing a quick victory, but also that same setback coincided with perhaps a
greater danger, the entry of the United States into the war, thanks to Hitler’s
declaration of hostilities on December 11, just after the Battle of Moscow had
turned badly against his Army. Although Hitler knew that the United States
could not effect immediate changes to the Allied situation, the possibility of a
long-term war had just received new impetus. For the war industry, ammunition
would now become the dominant production category, accounting for half of
Minister Speer’s so-called initial “miracle.” By mid-1943, ammunition
accounted for half the Army’s steel quota, compared to 15 percent each allocated
to weapons and tanks.4
The German capacity to continue all parts of the war economy, yet introduce
new weapons with an especial urgency easily waned under the conditions of
1942. The German heavy fighting vehicle programs reflected this markedly.
Their specialized designs required considerable engineering feats that differed
from the continued production of current model medium tanks already entering
obsolescence. The rush to produce the heavy tanks and tank destroyers
consumed larger amounts of scarce raw materials and also resulted in specific
dead ends with commensurate waste. However, to a certain extent, Hitler was
correct in calling for the development of superior fighting vehicles to be fielded
that would somehow offset the looming gap in numbers German forces faced in
fighting the three major Allied powers on the ground. Unable to match the Allies
in numbers of weapons and men, superiority would have to be sought in the
quality of weapons that would prove decisive on the battlefields of Europe, Asia,
and Africa.
However, such quality weapons could be manufactured, though their impact
would still depend upon sufficient numbers being produced along with proper
logistical support to keep them in action long enough to gain success on the
battlefields where they fought. These factors too would elude the Third Reich in
World War II. With only a few factories capable of producing precision forgings
and assembling them in rapid sequence, the numbers produced far lagged
requirements. The damage inflicted on German industry by Anglo-American
strategic bombing exacerbated these shortfalls beginning in mid-1943.
Furthermore, the losses sustained in action by these dominant armored vehicles,
too often engaged in insufficient numbers to carry the battle, prevented the
accumulation of a larger dominant tank force. If a month’s production of fighting
vehicles were lost in three to four months time, little growth and operational
impact occurred. By 1943, the Germans were faced with superior numbers of all
types on three strategic fronts. A mere fourteen battalions of heavy tanks and two
more of heavy tank destroyers were not likely going to turn the tide unless they
could somehow be concentrated. Such was never achieved. In the meantime, two
German field armies had surrendered in the field by May 1943.
On the operational level, the heavy fighting vehicles could inflict serious
blows upon their opponents. Their weaknesses in automotive range and
mechanical endurance worked against them, and the requirements for a day of
maintenance for every three of operations were seldom permitted in the huge
battles that raged on the Russian steppes and in the Norman countryside. In
terms of logistic support, a superior fighting vehicle could prove effective in
battle only as long as its components held up to battle damage of all sorts
inflicted by enemy troops, tanks, minefields, and artillery. In this aspect, the
critical failure of German logistical support proved consistently decisive. Despite
the heralded accomplishments of the maintenance workshops and personnel, the
lack of sufficient spare parts and components quickly reduced the numbers of
operating vehicles of a company or battalion to a mere shadow of the same in
just a few days. German manufacturers preferred that battle-damaged tanks be
retrograded to Germany for rebuild rather than spreading spares over the various
armies in the field. Spare parts to them represented reduced production of new
vehicles. However, for most of the war the fronts remained distant from the
factories and German transportation difficulties increased throughout the war.
The shortages of fuel inevitably dogged the heavy fighting vehicles, especially
when they had to perform road marches to enter the battles for which they were
assigned. The very notion that Tiger tanks might have been assigned to
Rommel’s commands in Africa with such a short radius of action and poor
mechanical reliability simply boggles the mind. Under persistent fuel shortages,
the quality of spare engines sent to the fronts began to decline as well, as
regulations prevented new engines being run-in because static test machines
were considered a proper economy.5
In the end, the gun-armor race may have sidetracked critical mobility concerns
of the commanders and troops in the field. Speer’s November 1944 report from a
trip to Italy (November 19–25) showed that the troops were willing to give up
armor and weight in order to gain maneuverability and mobility:

On the Southwest Front, opinions are in favor of the Sherman tank and its
cross-country ability. The Sherman tank climbs mountains that our Panzer
crews consider impassable. This is accomplished by the especially powerful
engine in the Sherman in comparison to its weight. Also, according to
reports from the 26th Panzer Division, the terrain-crossing ability on level
ground (in the Po valley) is completely superior to our Panzers. The
 Sherman tanks drive freely cross-country, while our Panzers must remain
on trails and narrow roads and therefore are very restricted in their ability to
fight.
All Panzer crews want to receive lighter Panzers, which are more
maneuverable, possess increased ability to cross terrain, and guarantee
the necessary combat power just with a superior gun. This desire by the
troops corresponds with conditions that will develop in the future as a
result of the drop in production capacity and of the fact that, because of a
shortage of chrome, sufficient armor plate can’t be produced to meet the
increased production plans. Therefore, either the number of Panzers
produced must be reduced or it will be necessary to reduce the thickness
of the armor plate. In that case, the troops will unequivocally ask for a
reduction of the armor thickness in order to increase the total number of
Panzers produced.6

In the end, the nature of World War II suggests that numbers did count, provided
some minimum level of quality could be delivered.
Experimentation by most major armies in the immediate aftermath of World
War I confirmed the tank as a supporting arm for the infantry and the armored
car remained useful for colonial security and the support of cavalry operations.
However, the armies overcame limitations of the early vehicles thanks to a series
of technical improvements in engines, suspension systems, and drive trains
elaborated mostly in the 1930s. Advances in the civilian automotive and aircraft
industries proved essential and military engineers provided key applications and
adaptations for a new generation of armored fighting vehicles.
Visionaries in France, Great Britain, and Germany provided key theories of a
future operational doctrine before any improved vehicles reached the drawing
board. Although many people conceived of armored warfare as a translated sea
battle with landships dueling for battlefield supremacy, a better doctrine
emphasizing combined arms began to emerge in the late 1930s. Fire and
movement became effective tactics and large-scale maneuvers an operational
doctrine with a balanced force of all arms, mechanized, or motorized to permit
continuous movement and mounted combat. In addition to fielding tank units
and mechanizing the traditional arms of infantry, artillery (field, anti-aircraft, and
anti-tank), cavalry, engineers, and services, the incorporation of modern
communications into the new armored formations became a key element.
Armored commanders needed effective voice radios and message services to
send and receive intelligence, request air and artillery support, report their
situation, and give their subordinates new maneuvers and missions as the fluid
situations of mounted combat occurred. The extent to which these vital
communications functions took root in various national armies determined their
success at the outset. French and British armor remained hopelessly
outmaneuvered in 1940 by the German Panzer units, which extended radio
communications down to the individual tank and reconnaissance vehicle. In
1941, it became the turn of the Red Army’s tank forces to face the same contrast,
with their radio issue initially extending only down to company commanders.
The Russians had also made a temporary error of abandoning the combined arms
force and returning the tank units to the piecemeal support of infantry
formations.
In the end, all the major armies fighting World War II in Europe adopted the
best features of the Panzer Division and the qualitative edge of the German
forces disappeared at the same time that the experience and organization of their
opponents improved. No longer able to knock out a major opponent in a single
campaign after 1940, the fate of the Third Reich was sealed, despite any array of
miracle weapons it attempted to field.
 Epilogue: The Ruins of War

Although over 2,000 heavy fighting vehicles were produced by Germany during
World War II, very few examples remain to be seen today, in stark contrast to the
fates of Allied tanks. This fact relates very much to the devastation of Germany
and its Wehrmacht in the last year of the war, culminating in its complete
occupation by fighting forces. In addition, it must be said that the recovery of
such heavy machines from the battlefields proved a great challenge to the
surviving postwar civilian engineering capacity in many countries. Many of the
damaged or simply disabled vehicles had to be demolished with explosives,
scrapped in place or, in some cases, simply buried. Although the Allies took
many of the best surviving samples of these vehicles in hand for research and
testing, they expended them in destructive ballistics testing or scrapped them at
the conclusion of their research.
One will find the surviving vehicles and active preservation projects in the
below listed collections.

Tiger E: 1,346 Produced, Seven Remain

The Tank Museum, Bovington, UK
Tiger 131 (chassis production number 25,012), 504th Heavy Tank Battalion, was
the first such tank captured in the west, on April 21, 1943 by the 48th Royal
Tank Regiment attacking on the approaches to Tunis. Repaired and taken to
Britain for evaluation, it remains today fully restored and the only operable Tiger
E known to exist, a popular feature at the museum’s annual Tankfest.

Musée des Blindés, Saumur, France

Tiger 221 (251,114), SS Heavy Tank Battalion 102, is a late production tank
captured in the Cauville sector of Normandy, when discovered abandoned with a
mechanical breakdown. It was placed in service as Tank “Colmar” with the 2nd
Squadron of the 6th Cuirassier Regiment, fighting all the way back to Germany.
See the photo on page 41.

Vimoutiers, Normandy, France

Another late production Tiger of SS Heavy Tank Battalion 102 was abandoned
near the town of Vimoutiers, damaged by demolition charges. In 1983, the town
began to preserve the tank, which has remained outdoors. Accordingly, the
hatches have been welded shut for decades and there is no known hull number.

Kubinka Tank Museum (“Patriot Park”), Moscow, Russia

Command Tiger version (250,427) is displayed indoors, reportedly captured in
January 1945 as Heavy Tank Battalion 424 withdrew to the west.

Military-historical Museum of Lenino-Snegiri, Russia

A non-preserved Tiger tank (251,227) of Heavy Tank Battalion 510 is located
near Moscow. Badly damaged as a range target, it nevertheless is a very late
production vehicle showing the crane mounting points and single headlight. It
lacks many fittings, such as stowage box and suspension parts, and is displayed
with a fake gun barrel.

United States Army Armor and Cavalry Museum, Fort Benning,

Georgia
Tiger 712 (250,031) of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was captured by the British in
Tunisia and acquired there by the US Army as its first Tiger. Its unit had been
attached to the 7th Panzer Regiment as its 7th Company, explaining its 700-
series tactical number. Like Tiger 131 of Bovington, this is a very early
production vehicle. After the usual exploitation, the tank became part of the
collections at the Aberdeen Proving Ground and its tenant Ordnance School
Museum. Although in good condition, its left side hull and turret plating were
removed in the late 1940s for better instructional viewing. In 1989, this tank
began an infamous odyssey first to Koblenz, Germany, where a cosmetic
restoration was received in return for a ten-year exhibition period at Munster
Tank Museum. After tedious diplomatic discussions for its return to the US, the
tank next traveled to Great Britain in 2001, where the collector Kevin
Wheatcroft had arranged with the US Army for a similar temporary loan and
restoration, whence Mr. Wheatcroft’s organization was able to remove and
measure component parts for later reproduction for his own Tiger E project.
Upon the transfer of the Ordnance Museum to Fort Lee, Virginia, the chief of
military history assigned tank 712 to the Fort Benning Museum collection,
where it has resided since late 2012. This museum has yet to open for lack of
funding.
Private Collection, Germany
A tank was displayed at the German Tank Museum, Munster, from April 2013 to
December 2016. Christian Hoebig (who reconstructed this tank, assisted by his
son Alexandre) was once the owner of the Trun scrapyard in Normandy. As
several Tiger E tanks had been scrapped there, he was able to salvage pieces and
weld them back together. Additional parts came from similar wrecks in
Courland. The tank has 90 percent original parts but remains empty, without
engine and transmission.

Private Collection, UK
Several restoration or perhaps reconstruction efforts remain in hand in the
military vehicle collection of Kevin Wheatcroft at Leicestershire, England. His
work with Tiger tank 712 noted above was undertaken as part of his
reconstruction of a Tiger E; he also has a Tiger B project ongoing. None are
completed to date.

Sturmmörser: Ten Built, Two Remain

German Tank Museum, Munster
A Sturmmörser Tiger (250174) is on loan from the Wehrtechnische
Studiensammlung in Koblenz. It was originally captured by US troops on April
14, 1945 and eventually stored at Aberdeen Ordnance Museum. It was
transferred to Koblenz upon the dispersing of the Aberdeen collection by the US
Army.

Kubinka Tank Museum (“Patriot Park”), Moscow, Russia

This vehicle (205,543), which is considered the Sturmmörser prototype, was
most likely captured in the Elbe region in April 1945. The hull is empty.

Ferdinand/Elefant: Ninety Built, Two Remain

Kubinka Tank Museum (“Patriot Park”), Moscow, Russia
Ferdinand 501 (150,072) was captured by Soviet forces at the Battle of Kursk. It
was operated by Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion 654.

United States Army Ordnance Museum, Fort Lee, Virginia

Elefant 102 (150040) of the 1st Company, Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion 653
was captured at Anzio by the US Army; post-war, it rested in the collection of
the Ordnance Museum, Aberdeen. That museum transferred with the Ordnance
School to Fort Lee, but the museum first refurbished this vehicle to display
standards in 2007–2008, as documented in a Canadian series Tank Overhaul.
The five episodes can usually be found at youtube.com. This vehicle was loaned
to the Tank Museum Bovington as part of its “Tiger Collection” display held for
eighteen months, starting April 2017.

Tiger B: 489 Built, Eight Remain

Musée des Blindés, Saumur, France
Tiger 233 (280,112) remains the only working example in existence. It has the
production turret and is on display indoors. See Chapter 5 for its detailed history.
It is driven for public display several times per year, especially at the annual
Carrousel.

The Tank Museum, Bovington, UK

Here, a Tiger (V2) with an early production turret is on display. This vehicle was
the second soft steel prototype and served for testing and training purposes. Its
engine now powers the collection’s Tiger E 131.

Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, UK

Tiger 104 (280,093) from SS Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was captured in
Normandy near Beauvais, where it had been disabled and abandoned. See the
photo on page 41, showing it as found in a beet field. It has been loaned for
display at The Tank Museum, Bovington since 2006.

King Tiger at La Gleize, Belgium

Tiger 213 (280,273), SS Heavy Tank Battalion 501, was abandoned in the
Ardennes on December 24, 1944. It was partially restored in the 1970s by the
village.

United States Army Armor and Cavalry Museum,Fort Benning,

Georgia
Tiger 332 (280,243) was transferred to SS Heavy Tank Battalion 501 from the
Army’s Heavy Tank Battalion 509 just prior to the Ardennes Offensive and was
abandoned near Coo by its crew on December 26, 1944. After evaluation in the
US, it became part of the Ordnance Museum collection, with its left side hull and
turret armor removed for instructional viewing. It was transferred to the Patton
Museum at Fort Knox, Kentucky, during September 1991 and received a
renovation. It now resides, along with most of the historic armor collection of
Fort Knox, in the closed and unfunded Fort Benning Museum collection as a
result of the involuntary move of the Armor Center to that base, as ordered by
Congress.

Kubinka Tank Museum (“Patriot Park”), Moscow, Russia

Tiger command version 502 of Heavy Tank Battalion 501 was captured at
Oględów, Poland, in August 1944 by the Soviet Army during the fighting for the
Baronov bridgehead.

German Tank Museum, Munster

Tiger 321 (280,101), SS Heavy Tank Battalion 501 (as tank 121), ran out of fuel
at La Capelle, France, while withdrawing from Guise in September 1944. The
crew damaged the gun and engine, leaving it as a road obstacle, after which US
engineers bulldozed it over an embankment, leaving it upside down in a field,
the gun barrel now broken. It was recovered in December and shipped to
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. In 1960, it was presented as a gift to the
German Army at Munster. The tank was restored in 1982 by the Wegmann firm
and now carries the tactical number 321.

Swiss Military Museum, Full-Reuenthal

A Tiger (280,215) of Heavy Tank Battalion 506, previously held by the Thun
Army Tank Museum, was transferred to the Full Museum in 2006. It has been
completely disassembled and will be restored to full running condition in an
unspecified period of time. The work is performed in an open bay inside the
museum, in full public view. The tank came to Switzerland among several held
by the French Army postwar and given to the Swiss to further technical
knowledge they missed during the war.

The Swiss Army’s Tiger B undergoing reconstruction and preservation at the Swiss Military Museum at
Full. It remains within public view in the museum and at present has been completely disassembled, with
reassembly beginning with refurbished suspension components.

An unknown Tiger B wreck lies buried under regional road D913 within the
limits of Fontenay-Saint-Père village, in the district of Mantes-la-Jolie. Parts of
the turret have been recovered, but the project requires financing and legal
clarification to continue. There are plans to fully excavate and restore this Tiger
II for a memorial commemorating combat taking place in the Vexin region
during late August and early September 1944.
As noted above, private collector Kevin Wheatcroft seeks to assemble a
complete and operational Tiger B from parts he has gathered, with reportedly 80
percent presently in hand.

Jagdtiger: 88 Built, Three Remain

The Tank Museum, Bovington, England
Jagdtiger (305,004), with its Porsche suspension, was captured by US troops in
April 1945 near Sennelager, Germany, where it was being used only for training
and trials, as was the Tiger B (V2) prototype also held at Bovington. It lacks to
this day the third road wheel set on the left side.

National Armor & Cavalry Museum in Fort Benning, Georgia

Jagdtiger 331 (305,020) of Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion 653 was captured in
battle against the 10th Armored Division by US troops on March 21, 1945 in
Neustadt an der Weinstraße. Damage is still visible on the gun mantlet, glacis
plate, and lower front armor. After examination in the US, it remained at
Aberdeen Proving Ground’s Ordnance Museum, usually exposed to the weather.
It is now part of the dormant collection of the unopened Fort Benning Museum.
It has the Henschel suspension.

Kubinka Tank Museum (“Patriot Park”), Moscow, Russia

Jagdtiger (305,083) with no tactical markings, one of four reported complete at
the Nibelungen Works on April 15, 1945, and released for combat with pick-up
crews on April 29. It surrendered with two of the others on May 5 to Americans
at Strengberg, Austria, on May 5, 1945. The Russians were linking up at the
moment with the Americans and took interest in the still-operational vehicles. It
has full skirt armor and lacks only an air filter unit and optics. It is fitted with
Henschel suspension.

Maus: Two Prototypes Built, One Remains

Kubinka Tank Museum (“Patriot Park”), Moscow, Russia
Maus prototype (V1/V2). As noted in Chapter 8, the two prototype vehicles were
captured in damaged state in the final days of the war and after exploitation at
Kubinka, the hull of V1 and turret of V2 were joined and, at some point, placed
on exhibit at the museum.
 Appendix I

Schilling, History of German Tank

Development
 Appendix II

Interrogation of Dr. Stiele von

Heydekampf
 Appendix III

Interrogation of Dr. Ernest Kniepkamp

[Tank Engines]
 Appendix IV

Chobham Preliminary Report: Tiger B

Turret Armor [for Porsche Tiger]
 Appendix V

German Heavy Tank Cannon, 1942–

1945

Cf. Steven Zaloga, Pershing vs. Tiger: Germany 1945 (Oxford: Osprey: 2017),
8.
 Endnotes

Chapter One
1 Habeck, Storm of Steel (2003), pp. 71–158 passim.
2 Fletcher, Tiger Tank (2011), p. 14.

Chapter Two
1 Milward, The German Economy at War (1965), pp. 7–14.
2 Milward, p. 59.
3 Gudgin, The Tiger Tanks (1991), p. 20.
4 Jentz, Germany’s Tiger Tanks, Vol. I (2000), pp. 17–19. The use of tapered-
bore weapons such as Weapon 0725 became unnecessary with the
development by Rheinmetall of the 75-mm KwK 42 used in the Panther tank
and tank destroyers.

Chapter Three
1 Jentz, Tiger, Vol 1, pp. 23–25, 67.
2 Speer took office officially on 18 February after the death of Fritz Todt; the
idea of demonstrating the tanks on Hitler’s birthday is ascribed to his
assistant Otto Saur, by Winniger, OKH Toy Factory (2013), p. 192.
3 Jentz, Tiger, Vol 1, pp. 171–174.
4 Verrall, “TOG Transmission in Development” (December, 1996), 26. See
 also Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development (1968) p. 117.
5 Jentz Tiger, Vol 1, pp. 175–176.
6 Green, Tiger Tanks at War, 16; Anderson, Ferdinand and Elefant (2015), pp.
23, 32.
7 Winninger, pp. 200–201.
8 Jentz, Panzerkampfwagen VI P, 54. He also asserted in a later work that
Alkett converted a 91st hull to the Panzerjäger Tiger P, without correcting
the disposition of the other 10 hulls first made. If so, the 91st hull must have
been retained by the army for testing and modifications, Jentz, Tiger Vol I, p.
28.
9 Jentz, Tiger Vol I, pp. 68–69.
10 Gudgin, 45; Jentz, Tiger Vol I, p. 68.
11 Litterdale, “Preliminary Report of Pz.Kw. VI (Model ‘H’) Examined at
Chobham” School of Tank Technology, Chertsey (November, 1943).

Chapter Four
1 Jentz, Tiger Vol 2, 9–17 relates a typically complex and convoluted
combination of events, without elaboration or consolidation. Much preferred
is Gudgin’s more succinct summary of VK45.02(P) and VK 45.03, pp. 74–
77.
2 Jentz, Tiger, Vol II, pp. 162–165, 169.

Chapter Five
1 Grandclément, “Le Tigre Royal en France Durant l’Ete 1944 (Pt 2)”,
Bulletin de l’Association des Amis du Musée des Blindés de Saumur. (54:
June 2009), pp. 33–39.

Chapter Six
1 Spielberger, Heavy Jagdpanzer (2007), pp. 63-70; Winninger, pp. 203–211;
Anderson, p. 23.
2 Spielberger, p. 197.
 3 Ibid., p. 86.
4 Münch, German Heavy Antitank Unit 653 in World War II (1997), pp. 224–
229.

Chapter Seven
1 Jentz and Doyle, Panzertracts 6-3: Schwere Panzerkampfwagen 8 and E
100 (2008), pp. 1-5; Frölich, Kampfpanzer Maus, pp. 12–13.
2 The 1:5 scale remote control model demonstrated the same day reflected an
older design, with a 150mm/37 main gun with muzzle brake and side
mounted flamethrowers; Frölich, p. 24.
3 Photographs of Essen under US army occupation indicate hulls and turrets
stored there indicate that Krupp at best could have finished hulls and turrets
for one production and four more prototype versions of the Maus. Frölich, p.
103.
4 Jentz & Doyle, Panzer Tracts 6-3, p. 47; Frölich, p. 103.
5 See Appendix III, second page.
6 Jentz & Doyle, Panzer Tracts 6-3, p. 51–54.
7 Gudgin, p. 8.
8 Jentz & Doyle, Panzer Tracts 6-3, p. 72.

Chapter Eight
1 Winneger notes that a final Jagdtiger was produced at war’s end for the
occupying Russian forces, 289, 333; citing Austrian R&A Report 22, Steyr-
Daimler-Puch, A Major Austrian Industrial Concern, Office of Strategic
Services, p. 11.
2 Spielberger, Heavy JagdPanzer, p. 197; Devey, Jagdtiger, Vol I, passim;
Henschel JT plan EP 410 Fig 7, Bovington Tank Museum Library
3 Devey, Vol II, 194-97; most US sources credit a US M36 tank destroyer with
the destruction of the Jagdtiger on 9 January.
4 Devey, Vol II, passim.
Chapter Nine
1 Gudgin, pp. 65–73.
2 Chamberlain and Doyle, Encyclopedia, p. 138; Gudgin, pp. 66–68.
3 Jentz, Tiger Vol III, pp. 174, 271.

Chapter Ten
1 Jentz and Doyle, Kingtiger, p. 35.
2 Anderson, pp. 50–53; Devey, II, p. 172.
3 Devey, II, p. 218.
4 Gudgin, pp. 96–99, 118–125; Wilbeck, Sledgehammers (2004), pp. 38–39.
5 Gudgin, pp. 99–117. Major [then Lieutenant] Gudgin’s own Churchill tank
was one of two destroyed by the Tiger that was captured the following day,
and now stands in The Tank Museum, Bovington; Wilbeck, pp. 39–58.
6 Gudgin, p. 117.
7 Wilbeck, pp. 58–63.
8 Zaloga, Armored Champion (2015), p. 196.
9 Showalter, Armor and Blood (2013), pp. 37–94.
10 Ibid., pp. 78–94; Wilbeck, pp. 69-72; Münch, pp. 43–51; Zaloga, pp. 187–
198.
11 Anderson, p. 111.
12 Münch, pp. 43–91, passim; Spielberger, pp. 81–98; Anderson, pp. 103–134.
13 Showalter, p. 105.
14 Ibid., p. 109.
15 Wilbeck, p. 72.
16 Zaloga, pp. 198–201, 214.
17 Ibid., pp. 217, 219, 228, 230.
18 Wilbeck, pp. 86–99.
19 Ibid., pp. 101–104.
20 Ibid., pp. 111–131.
21 Ibid., pp. 132–136.
22 Ibid., pp. 157–164, Gudgin, pp. 136–137.
23 Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin (1968), pp. 410–435, Erickson, The Road to
 Berlin (1983), pp. 508–517; Zaloga, pp. 281–289. pp. Wilbeck, 164–175.

Chapter Eleven
1 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction (2007), pp. 232, 241, 288–294.
2 Ibid., pp. 302–303.
3 Ibid., p. 316.
4 Ibid., pp. 429–432; 568–569.
5 Friedl, Repairing the Panzers (2011), pp. 17, 40, 45, 50, 60, 64, 152, and
189.
6 Jentz, Panzertruppen (1996), II: pp. 150–151.
 Select Bibliography

Books
Anderson, T., Ferdinand and Elefant, (Oxford: Osprey, 2015).
Chamberlain, P. H., Doyle, H. L., and Jentz T., Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War II, (London:
Arms & Armour, Revised 1993).
Devey, A., Jagdtiger: The Most Powerful Armored Fighting Vehicle of World War II, 2 vols (Atglen:
Schiffer, 1999).
Erickson, J., The Road to Moscow, (Boulder: Westview, 1983).
Fletcher, D., Willey, D., and Hayton, M., Tiger Tank: Owner’s Workshop Manual, (Bovington: The Tank
Museum, 2011).
Friedli, L., Repairing the Panzers: German Tank Maintenance in World War II, 2 vols (Monroe:
Panzerwrecks, 2011)
Frölich, M., Kampfpanzer Maus: der Überschwere Panzer Porsche Typ 205, (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 2013).
Green, M., and Brown. J. D., Tiger Tanks at War, (Minneapolis: Zenith, 2008).
Gudgin, P., The Tiger Tanks, (London: Arms and Armor, 1991).
Habeck, M. R., Storm of Steel, (Ithaca: Cornell, 2003).
Jentz, T. L., Panzerkampfwagen Maus, (Darlington: Darlington Press, 1997); (ed.) Panzertruppen: The
Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Force, Vol II: 1943–1945
(Atglen: Schiffer, 1996).
Jentz, T. L., and Doyle, H. L., Schwere Panzerkampfwagen Maus and E100: Development and Production
from 1942 to 1945. Panzer Tracts 6-3, (Boyds: Panzer Tracts, 2008); Germany’s Tiger Tanks, Vol. I D.W.
to Tiger I, (Atglen: Schiffer, 2000); Germany’s Tiger Tanks, Vol. II VK45.02 to Tiger II, (Atglen:
Schiffer, 1997).
Jentz, T. L., Doyle, H. L., and Sarson, P., Kingtiger Heavy Tank, 1942–1945, (Oxford: Osprey, 1993).
Milward, A. S. The German Economy at War, (London: Athlone, 1965).
Münch, K., German Heavy Antitank Unit 653 in World War II, (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole,1997).
Musée des Blindes. Le Char 2C, (Saumur Muséum, n.d.).
Ogorkiewicz, R.M. Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968).
Schneider, W., and Strasheim, R., Deutsche Kampfwagen im 1. Weltkrieg. Der A7V und die Anfänge
deutscher Panzerentwicklung, (Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas, 1988).
Showalter, D., Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk, (New York: Random House, 2013).
Spielberger, W. J., Doyle, H. L., and Jentz, T. L., Heavy Jagdpanzer, (Atglen: Schiffer, 2007).
Tooze, A., The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, (New York: Viking,
2006).
Tucker-Jones, A., Tiger I & Tiger II, (Barnesley: Pen & Sword, 2013).
Wilbeck, C. W., Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II, (Bedford:
Aberjona, 2004).
Winninger, M., OKH Toy Factory. The Nibelungenwerk: Tank Production in St. Valentin, (Andelfingen:
History Facts, 2013).
Zaloga, S. J., Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II, (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 2015);
German Panzers 1914–18, (Oxford: Osprey, 2006); Pershing vs. Tiger: Germany 1945, (Oxford:
Osprey, 2017).
Ziemke, E. F. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, (Washington: GPO, 1968).

Articles
Grandclément, S., “Le Tigre Royal en France Durant l’Ete 1944 (Pt 2)”, Bulletin de l’Association des Amis
du Musée des Blindés de Saumur, (54: June 2009), pp. 33–39.
Malmassari, P., “Les Projets de Chars de Forteress”, Revue Historique des Armées, 1 (2004), pp. 11–24.

Unpublished Works
Henschel Works. “Jagdtiger plan EP 410, Fig 7,” Bovington Tank Museum Library.
Litterdale, A. D. “Preliminary Report of Pz.Kw. VI (Model ‘H’) Examined at Chobham,” School of Tank
Technology, Chertsey (1943).
United Kingdom. “Development of New Series German Tanks up to the end of March, 1945,”
Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee 19:XXXII:35.
Verrall, M. “TOG Transmission in Development” (Bovington: Tank Museum Library, 1996).
 Index

Adler Works 69
Afrika Korps 30
Allied Tanks: Char 2C 12-13, 15; Char D1 15; IS-2 104-105, 114; KV-1 16, 104-105; M-4 Sherman 78-79,
108, 124; SU-152 116; T-34 16, 99, 104
Altmärkische Kettenwerk (Alkett) 18, 51, 62
anti-tank guns 35, 98, 101, 116
Army Detachment Kempf 99, 102, 104
artillery 49, 79, 86, 91, 94, 101, 124–125
assault guns 58, 87, 92, 99, 101, 104, 116

Battles and Campaigns: Anzio 105, 128; Ardennes Offensive 78–79, 86, 114–117, 119, 129; Armament 12,
15, 24, 28, 43, 51, 55, 66, 71, 76, 78, 85, 122; Battle of Kursk 55-56, 58, 90, 96–98, 105, 128; Blitzkrieg
16–17, 122; Falaise 108; France, occupation of, 92-93; Krasny Bor 92; Kursk 55–56, 58, 90, 96–99,
101–106, 116, 120, 128; Kursk Salient 98–99, 102; Lake Balaton 116–117, 119; Lake Ladoga Third 92;
Normandy campaign 48, 108–109; Operation Kutuzov 104; Operation Northern Light 16, 32, 91–92;
Operation Spring Awakening 117, 120; Ruhr Pocket, 82, 116; Sicily 93, 95, 104; Stalingrad 83, 95, 97,
117, 155; Tunis 93–94, 126; Warsaw Uprising 83
breakdowns 55, 60, 76, 101, 105, 114

Canadian II Corps 108

Combat Group Peiper 114–115

Daimler-Benz 14, 17, 22, 66

designs 13, 17, 21, 25, 36, 40, 43, 45, 48, 67–68, 70, 72, 77, 153–154
development 9–11, 13, 15, 27, 61, 67, 121, 123, 153, 156
Dortmund Hörder Huttenverein 30

E-100 7, 61–63, 65, 67–71

Elefant tank destroyer 56, 58–60, 78, 90, 104, 128, 153
E-Series vehicles 67, 69
Estienne, J. 11, 48

Feldherrnhalle Division 108

Ferdinand tank destroyer 7, 18, 20, 51–59, 63, 74, 90, 101–102, 104, 128, 153
Fifth Panzer Army 115
Fourth Panzer Army 99, 113–14
Führerbefehl 17, 19

German economy 16–17, 122, 153

German forces 79, 93–94, 102, 108, 120, 123, 125
German Tank Development 7, 11, 13–15, 132
Grossdeutschland Motorized Infantry Division 89, 97, 99, 105

heavy tank Specifications 43, 72

Henschel 15–16, 18–19, 27–28, 30, 32, 40, 43–44, 67, 72, 74, 91; design 15, 20–21, 27–28, 42–43;
suspension 73–77, 131; Tiger 25, 74; Tiger II design 40; Works 16–17, 19, 21, 25, 29–30, 40, 43–44, 75,
119

Hermann Göring Luftwaffe Division 95

Heydekampf, S. 7, 17, 137
Hitler, A. 16–19, 21, 28, 30, 51, 61–62, 65, 67, 72, 74, 91, 93, 97–98, 104, 116–117, 122–123
Hitler regime 21
Hoth, H. 102

III Panzer Corps 102, 116, 119

II Panzer Corps 102
II SS Panzer Corps 97, 99, 102, 117
IV Corps 116
IV SS Panzer Corps 116, 119
IX SS Mountain Corps 116

Jagdtiger 73
Jagdtiger and Jagdpanther vehicles 80, 90
Jagdtiger tank destroyers 7, 44, 47, 72–82, 90–91, 121, 131, 154

Kazan 13–14, 17
Kempf, W. 99
Kniepkamp, E. 7, 142
Krupp Maus 67
Krupp Works 14–16, 18-20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 40, 42, 61–62, 64-65, 67, 69, 72, 154
Kubinka 74, 131
Kummersdorf base 28, 60
K-Wagen 11, 15

Löwe, PzKpfw VII 61

Manstein, E. 104
Maus PzKpfw VIII 7, 61–69, 71–72, 131, 154
Maybach engines 15, 18, 30, 41, 54, 61, 69–70
Model, W. 98

Neubaufahrzeug 14
Nibelungen Works 23, 28, 74, 79
Ninth Army 55–56, 98–99, 101–102, 104

Olvar transmissions 27–28, 43, 77, 85

Panther programs 40–41, 43–44, 57, 60–62, 77, 82, 98–99, 153
Panzer Commission 17, 19
Panzer Lehr Division 89
Porsche, F. 14, 17, 19, 22, 30, 40, 45, 51, 61–62, 64–65, 69, 73–74
Porsche 100-ton tank 61
Porsche and Henschel suspensions 24, 74–75, 78, 131
Porsche candidate in early production vehicles 20, 40
Porsche-designed engines 24, 28
Porsche Maus 62, 69, 72
Porsche project VK 19, 25, 51
Porsche prototype Tiger 22, 25
Porsche’s Ferdinand 47, 99
Porsche Tiger, failed 42, 47
PzKpfw III 14, 52, 91
PzKpfw IV medium tank 15, 52, 74

Ram Tigers 30
Rheinmetall, 14, 51, 72, 153
Rommel, E. 30, 91, 93, 124,

Seventh Army 111

Sixth Army 119
Sixth SS Panzer Army 114, 117, 119
Spandau Works, 83
Speer, Albert 17, 21, 28, 123
SS divisional Tiger companies 102
SS Division Totenkopf 89
SS Panzer Corps 108, 114, 116–117
SS Panzergrenadier Divisions 78, 99
Steyr-Daimler-Puch, 154
Sturmmörser Tiger 7, 83, 85, 128
Superheavy Tank E-100, 70
Superheavy Tanks 7, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71
superiority, technical 33, 76, 104
suspension assembly 21, 28, 60, 69, 81, 127, 130

tank development 9, 11, 13, 18, 32, 62, 65, 122

tank project, new Tiger 18–19
Tiger 26–27, 29–34, 36, 38, 40–45, 47, 49, 55–56, 62, 72–74, 87–97, 103–6, 108–11, 126–29, 152–55
Tiger battalions 91, 116
Tiger companies, divisional 99
Tiger design 51, 61–62, 83
Tiger II 7, 27, 40–45, 47–50, 82, 89, 96, 106, 111, 114–116, 119, 131
Tiger’s battlefield dominance 105
Tiger tanks 19–21, 23, 25, 27, 29–33, 35, 37–39, 91–99, 104, 106, 108, 124, 127–128, 153
Todt, F. 17, 153
torsion bar suspensions, longitudinal 20, 25, 52, 73
tungsten sub-caliber penetrators 105

Upper Danube Iron Works, 51, 72

VK36.01 18
VK45.01 54
VK45.02 154
Volkswagen 17

Weapons, German Tanks: 37-mm 14–15; 75-mm 11, 13–15, 18–19, 62–63, 67, 69, 71, 153; 88-mm 19,
21–22, 24–25, 27–28, 33–36, 38, 40–41, 43–45, 47, 49–52, 55–57; 92-mm, self defense 28, 39, 43, 45,
78; 105-mm 18, 61; 128-mm 62, 66, 69, 71–72, 74, 78–79; 150-mm 61–62, 69, 83; 170-mm 69
Weapons, Other Tanks: 17-pounder, 94; 85-mm, 104; 90-mm, 13; 122-mm, 104
Wegmann Works 11, 30
Wittmann, M. 108

XXXIX Panzer Corps 78

XLI Panzer Corps 55, 101
XLVI Panzer Corps 99
XLVIII Panzer Corps 99, 102