Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No.

L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such
issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose –
for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
CABANAS v. PILAPIL

58 SCRA 94

FACTS:

Florentino Pilapil, the insured, had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, Melchora Cabanas. The
complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant Francisco Pilapil, the brother of the deceased is
the one designated by the latter to act as his daughter’s trustee during her minority. Thus, upon
Florentino’s death, the proceeds were paid to his brother hence the complaint of the mother whom the
child lives with. Petitioner contends that she should be entitled to act as the trustee of the insurance
policy of her child.

ISSUE:

Does the State have the authority to interfere with the terms of the insurance policy by virtue of parens
patriae?HELD:

The appealed decision adheres to the concept that the judiciary, as an agent of the State, acts as parens
patriae. As such, the judiciary cannot remain insensible to the validity of the petitioner’s plea. “The State
shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution”. The Constitution, moreover, dictates that it is
the family as a unit that has to be strengthened. As such, the decision of the lower courts, entitling the
mother as the trustee, is affirmed.
CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

75 PHIL 113

FACTS:

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in
petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation, issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court during the
Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue
pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was
no de facto government.

ISSUES:1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain
good and valid?

2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidate all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of said
court?

3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?

HELD:

It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by military
forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto
governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that
the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not
invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence
of the courts depends upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws,
not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed
by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in
cases, not of political complexion.
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or
limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either
to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people”
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the
other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal
in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act
of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members
of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared
null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace
them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials
were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have
been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the
one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987
designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer
rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of
6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially by its regular
driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's
death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's
employer. After trial, the court awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla.
NIA appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the NIA does not perform solely and primarily
proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is
therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.

ISSUE:

May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver
who was not its special agent?

HELD:

Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government.
It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its
special agent. (Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991)
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS

AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,

REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO,
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.

2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.

4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power
of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.

2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules.

2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
Gov’t of the Phil Islands. Vs Monte de Piedad

Facts:

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to
$400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of
the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more
working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.

In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The
respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General,
bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the
benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for
the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from
February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the
competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be
instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.

Issues:

Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank
for the reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?

Discussions:

In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of
the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest.
No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has
the right to take back the money intended for the people.
Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in
representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending
authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power
is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to
be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly
look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient
functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but
that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for
the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any
other cases whatever.
JACOBSON vs Massachusetts

RULE:

The police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The mode or
manner is within the discretion of the state, subject only to the condition that no rule prescribed by a
state, nor any regulation adopted by a local governmental agency acting under the sanction of state
legislation, shall contravene the Constitution of the United States. A local enactment or regulation must
always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the general government of any power it possesses
under the Constitution, or with any right which that instrument gives or secures.

FACTS:

Cities in Massachusetts could require that all residents be vaccinated, as authorized by a state statute.
This type of regulation was adopted by the city of Cambridge.

ISSUE:

In order to protect public health and safety, does the scope of the state’s police power include the
authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so?

ANSWER:

Yes.

CONCLUSION:

In order to protect public health and safety, the scope of the state"s police power includes the authority
to enact reasonable regulations to do so. The Constitution secures liberty for every person within its
jurisdiction, but does not give an absolute right for each person to be free from restraint at all times and
in all circumstances. Every person is required to be subject to various restraints for the common good.
The efforts by Cambridge to stamp out smallpox are substantially related to the protection of public
health and safety. There has been nothing to clearly justify the Court holding the statute to be
unconstitutional. Affirmed.
LAUREL v. MISA

77 PHIL 856FACTS:

Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then
suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation
of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:

1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?

2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:

The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government on the sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier.
There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the
same government and same sovereign people.
AWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO

G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986

Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner

vs.

President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant

Facts:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption
of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

2. Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Discussions:

● In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favourable action.
 ● The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people
that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its
legitimacy.

Rulings:

1. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding
that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause
of action.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of
the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.
MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION

114 SCRA 77FACTS:

On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI
of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with “acts unbecoming of a judge” when the latter purchased
a property which was previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered the decision.
Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to
which their shares and interests in said property were conveyed. According to the petitioner,
respondent allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of
Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics.

ISSUE:

Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?

HELD:

Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees like justices and judges. Said provision must
be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in force. The
respondent is not found to have violated the articles invoked by the petitioner but he was advised
by the Court to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
Facts:

In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the
country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.
3. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline
regime of nearby territories.

Issues:

Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.

Discussions:

The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the
outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as
internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic
doctrine.

Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding
the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that
extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its
archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the
resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

________________________________________

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts,
the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of President John
Adams (President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought
suit against President Thomas Jefferson’s (President Jefferson) Secretary of State, James
Madison, seeking delivery of his commission.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has
constitutional authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has
limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution),
which may not be enlarged by the Congress.

Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to
secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with
Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under
the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the
District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jefferson’s inauguration.
A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson took
office. The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of
the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to
deliver his commission.

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As the President signed Marbury’s
commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right to
the commission. Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver
Marbury’s commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when
the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an
officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,” mandamus is the
appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court. To issue mandamus to the Secretary of
State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits
of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case
establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of
constitutional law rests, it also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to
an equipotent head of a branch of the federal government.
FACTS:
On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to allow the
return of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held
that President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare.

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal, fearing the
instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former President Marcos were to be
brought back to the country. In a statement, she said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E.
Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under
this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos' remains.

2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is tantamount to
dictatorship.

HELD:

1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department
and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the
result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Among the
duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to
protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the
Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.

2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas
the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution refers to an express grant of power.

CASE DIGEST: MUTUC VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

FACTS:

Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil
action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the
Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or
the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and
was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.

HELD:

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle
form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s
approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act
was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable
vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance
to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable
but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.
People v. Perfecto (Case Digest)

MissIdea Uncategorized July 10, 2014 1 Minute

People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered
that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
– edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in
the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted
to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the
present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the
change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked
provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to
be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered
no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946

Nature of the Action: Petition for prohibition, praying that respondents be commanded to desist from
further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before the military court

Facts: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated
camps or military bases all over the country. When the Japanese forces reached Mindoro, Ruffy and his
band were forced to retreat to the mountains. A guerilla outfit was then organized, called as the “Bolo
Area”. However, a certain Capt. Esteban Beloncio relieved petitioners of their positions and duties in the
“Bolo Area”, after Lieut. Col. Enrique Jurado effected a change of command. The latter, however, was
slain allegedly by petitioners, and it was this murder which gave rise to petitioners’ trial, the legality of
which is now being contested.

Issue: Were the petitioners subject to the military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation?

Ruling: Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with
costs.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes, the petitioners were subject to military law. By their acceptance of appointments
as officers in the Bolo Area, they became members of the Philippine Army—the Bolo Area being a
contingent of the 6th military district which is recognized by the United States army. Thus, petitioners
are covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War, and other pertinent laws during an occupation.

Related

The Collector Of Internal Revenue vs Campos Rueda

42 SCRA 238 [GR No. L-13250 October 29, 1971]

Facts: This is an appeal interposed by herein respondent Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the
estate of the deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda de Cedeira, from the decision of the
petitioner, collector of internal revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum of
Php161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest therein and penalties, on
the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria
Cedeira. She is a spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a spanish citizen and was a resident of
Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she left
among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines. On September 29, 1955, respondent
filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of Maria Cedeira. On the same
date, petitioner, pending investigation issued an assessment for estate and inheritance tax in the
respective amounts of Php111,592.48 and Php 157,791.48 or a total of Php369,383.96 which tax
liabilities were paid by respondent. On November 27, 1955, an amended return was filed wherein
intangible personal properties with the value of Php396,308.90 were claimed as exempt from taxes. On
November 23, 1955, petitioner issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the
amounts of Php 202,262.40 and Php267,402.84 respectively or a total of Php469,665.24. In a letter
dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for the exemption on the ground that the law of
Tangier is not reciprocal with section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent
demanded the payment of the sums of Php239,439.79 representing the deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interest and compromise penalties. In a
letter dated February 8, 1956, respondent requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the
claim for the tax exemption. However, the same was denied. The denial was premise on the ground that
there was no reciprocity with Tangier, which was moreover a mere principality, not a foreign country.

Issue: Whether or not the intangible personal properties of Maria Cedeira are exempt from estate and
inheritance tax.

Held: Yes. The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in section 122 of the NIRC. It reads thus:

that no tax shall be collected under this title in respect of intangible personal properties

1. if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of
his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible personal
properties of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country; or

2. if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death
allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
personal properties owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country.

This court commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, hardly an international personality
in the sense did fall under the exempt category.

The expression “foreign country,” was used in the last proviso of section 122 of NIRC refers to a
government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of
international law does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens
not residing therein whose law allow a similar exemption from such taxes. It is therefore not necessary
that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the respondent to the
exemption benefits of the proviso of said section 122 of our tax code.
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TOLENTINO V SEC. OF FINANCE (CASE DIGEST)

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995

TOPIC: Constitutional Law, RA 7716, VAT

FACTS:

PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 impairs the
obligations of contracts, and violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that
Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.

CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that
the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT
would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. In withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which
other businesses have long ago been subject. The VAT is not a license tax. It is imposed purely for
revenue purposes.

Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
be taxed at the same rate. It is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms,
and corporations placed in similar situation.