US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

US Army Command and General Staff School

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Advanced Operations Course (AOC)
Module I: Training and Deployment Operations
L400: Art of Command

L401: Military Genius: Intellect, Courage, and Determination

L401RC: Ridgway Takes Command1
Author: Dr. Thomas Bradbeer

“Classic military leadership changed the course of the Korean War. In a sustained feat of combat
command, an American general seized control of a fleeing and exhausted multinational army fired it
with fighting spirit and wheeled it about to face a larger enemy force. . . . The story of how General
Matthew B. Ridgway kept the 8th U.S. Army in the war eventually hurling the Chinese, with awesome
casualties, back into North Korea is not a story of heroism, although heroism abounded. It is a story
of disciplined combat leadership, relentlessly but wisely applied. It is a story of military know how, of
adamant refusal to compromise with adversity, and of a stubborn leader who demanded the absolute
best from every man and every weapon. Judgment, unclouded by fear or apprehension, played a part,
but above all, utter confidence in his men and himself wrought what was little short of a military
miracle.”1
– James F. Schnabel. “Ridgway in Korea” Military Review

Despite warnings from China’s Foreign Minister Zhou En lai to not cross the 38th Parallel, on 9
October 1950 elements of the American lead UN Forces crossed into North Korean territory. In
response, Chinese Communist Forces, (CCF), crossed the Yalu River and headed south. President
Truman’s foreign policy and military advisers (including the newly established Central Intelligence
Agency) had known as early as October 20 CCF had moved into North Korea. What Truman, Secretary
of Defense George C. Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar N. Bradley, and
Secretary of State Dean Acheson failed to realize was that the Chinese had entered the war in much
greater numbers than analysts estimated. By the end of October, hundreds of thousands of Chinese
Soldiers had crossed the border undetected into North Korea.2 Forty-eight hours after launching the
“home by Christmas” offensive, U.S. Eighth Army and X Corps found themselves under attack by two
Chinese Army groups. General Bradley received a rather hysterical message from MacArthur.
The developments resulting from our assault movements have now assumed a clear
definition. All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North
Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese
military forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever-increasing strength. We face
an entirely new war.3

Bradley called the president on November 28th, “We’ve got a terrific situation on our hands,”
Truman told his staff after receiving the message. “This is the worst situation we have had yet. We’ll just
have to meet it as we’ve met all the rest.”4 General Walton Walker, commander of the Eighth Army,
orderede a general withdrawal of all his forces on November 29 in what would become the longest retreat
in U.S. Army history.5

The retreat of the Eighth Army, although serious, was not catastrophic. The UN command had
superior weapons and held both naval and air superiority that the Chinese could not hope to compete with.

1 By Thomas G. Bradbeer - written by and for the CGSC – 2023-Not to be further reproduced.

L401 Reading C October 2023

Chinese tactics in Korea involved committing a massive amount of manpower against units, with the
intent of overwhelming the enemy with human-wave attacks. If this was not successful, they would
pause to allow resupply and reinforcement. The Chinese had demonstrated, especially against U.S. and
British and Commonwealth units, a tendency to overextend and were forced to pause long enough to
move up fresh units to replace those destroyed in combat. Chinese logistical operations were dependent
upon thousands of pack animals and Soldiers to transport food and ammunition to the front.6

This tactical pause allowed UN forces the opportunity to retreat, regroup, and establish new
defensive positions. With the CCF unable to exploit their gains, the Eighth Army was able to preserve
much of its combat power.

Within a week after the Chinese counteroffensive, the center of the UN line had been withdrawn fifty
miles. Abandoning the plan to stabilize a line of defense north of Pyongyang from coast to coast, Walker
decided that Eighth Army would contract its broad front and establish a defense along the 38th Parallel.
The Chinese advance slowed further as they experienced difficulty in maintaining contact with
withdrawing UN forces. As the Eighth Army retreated south of Pyongyang, it tightened its lines and
presented a shorter front. UN Forces abandoned Pyongyang on December 5th. Following a scorched-earth
policy, UN units burned warehouses, supply dumps, barracks, and anything of military value as the
covering force consisting of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division, two British brigades, and the Republic of
Korea, (ROK) 1st Infantry Division fell back across the Taedong River.7

The second week of December found the enemy shifting many of its units from the west to the center
of the peninsula, which was a telltale sign that its offensive against UN forces would soon resume.
Pressed between the Chinese from the north and thousands of North Korean guerrillas to the southeast,
the Eighth Army might have found itself driven into the Yellow Sea. By December 15, UN forces had
withdrawn below the 38th parallel and formed a defensive perimeter north and east of Seoul.

There had been no major engagements with the CCF since December 1, but an uneasy lull hung over
the entire sector. Chinese reinforcements and supplies moved southwards until hard fighting broke out
along the right flank of the Eighth Army. Two ROK divisions engaged large North Korean formations in
the frozen Imjim River area between Yonchon and Kapyong. ROK troops fought north and south of the
parallel to straighten out their positions, but Eighth Army reported no Chinese units south of the 38th
parallel. Farther to the west thousands of refugees fled from the capital city of Seoul.

MacArthur’s headquarters knew that the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had been
reconstituted, retrained, and re-equipped by the Chinese. Tentatively, fifteen North Korean divisions,
roughly 150,000 men, along with twenty-six Chinese divisions and a minimum of 200,000 men in
reserve were thought to be in North Korea. With this information, MacArthur painted an extremely
foreboding picture for Truman and his military chiefs of staff. “The situation within the Eighth Army
becomes increasingly critical.” He anticipated that it would have to retreat all the way back to Seoul and
“that unless ground reinforcements of the greatest magnitude” arrived quickly, the UN command would
be “either forced into successive withdrawals or forced to take up beachhead bastions positions [which]
would afford little hope of anything beyond defense.” The ROK Army for the most part was combat
ineffective. Unless there was some positive and immediate action taken by the Pentagon and the JCS,
MacArthur predicted a campaign of “steady attrition leading to final destruction can reasonably be
contemplated.”8

L401 Reading C 2 October 2023

 To defend the ROK, General Walker had five corps in the line south of the 38th parallel. North and
west of Seoul, he positioned the U.S. I and IX Corps. The ROK I, II, and III Corps held the remainder of
the coast-to-coast front. Defensive positions thus stretched nearly 140 miles from the Yellow Sea to the
Sea of Japan. Behind them in reserve, was the X Corps, which successfully evacuated from Hungnam
over a two-week period from December 11 through 24.9 All of North Korea was once again in the hands
of the CCF.

Map 1: The UN Command withdraws South November 25, 1950- January 24, 1951. Map
courtesy: War in Peacetime by J. Lawton Collins (with permission from the Houghton
Mifflin Company)

L401 Reading C 3 October 2023

Truman’s Assessment Team goes to Korea

Truman directed MacArthur “that the preservation of your forces is now the primary consideration.
Consolidation of forces into beachheads is concurred in.” 10 He also directed that the Chief of Staff of the
Army, General J Lawton Collins, form an assessment team and fly to Tokyo to grasp the situation at
MacArthur’s headquarters before flying to Korea and meeting with Walker and his staff. Collins arrived
in Tokyo on December 4, and after meeting with MacArthur, he and his team flew to Seoul where they
met with Walker. The next day Collins met with Major General Edward Almond, commander of X
Corps and his subordinate division commanders before he returned to Tokyo to confer once more with
MacArthur and his senior leaders. They discussed three possible courses of action the U.S. might take in
Korea. MacArthur concluded that unless the Pentagon provided large numbers of reinforcements to
replace his losses, the United Nations Command should pull out of Korea. Collins agreed that if the UN
“did not fully support operations in Korea in the face of continued all-out Chinese attack, that General
MacArthur should be directed to take the necessary steps to safeguard his command and prepare plans
for evacuation from Korea.”11

While Collins was in Japan and Korea, senior officers on the Army staff in Washington, including
Generals Wade H. Haislip, Matthew B. Ridgway, Alfred M. Gruenther, Charles L. Bolte, and William O.
Reeder assessed the impact the CCF intervention had on the strategic and operational situation in Korea.
Based largely on MacArthur’s gloomy reports, they “concluded that United Nations forces stood in some
danger of being overrun and destroyed.” General Bolte, the Army Chief of Plans, recommended that
Eighth Army evacuate Korea as soon as possible.12 He based this recommendation on the lack of
available reinforcements. The reinforcements Eighth Army required were not available for the Korean
Peninsula because of mission requirements in Europe as well as requirement for maintaining US forces
for the defense of Japan. The chiefs of staff decided to take no action or make no recommendation to the
president until Collins returned from Korea and provided them and the President his assessment of the
situation there.

Collins returned to Washington on December 8 and Truman requested he brief the British-American
conference sponsored by Truman and the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee at the White House.
Attlee was meeting with Truman to discuss the future direction of the war now that the Chinese had
committed themselves to supporting North Korea (and to gain clarification about Truman’s comments
about the possible use of atomic bombs in Korea made the week prior).13 Collins reported that if the
Chinese continued offensive operations it would be impossible to hold the Seoul-Inchon area; but he
added that if Eighth Army was not required to hold the South Korean capital, it was possible to retain a
bridgehead based at Pusan. The situation in the east where X Corps was located was very serious, but
Collins was convinced that it was possible to evacuate the entire corps along with South Korean units by
sea and they could then be repositioned in the south near Pusan. He concluded, “the situation in Korea
was serious but no longer critical.”14

After the British departed, Collins briefed the president in private. He reported that MacArthur and he
discussed three courses of action. The first was to continue combat operations against the CCF in Korea
only, adhering to the restrictions that had already been put in place (no air attacks on bases in Manchuria,
no naval blockade against the Chinese mainland, no use of nationalist Chinese troops, no major
reinforcements received from the UN or U.S. before the spring). MacArthur argued that if this course of
action was followed the Eighth Army would be forced by the Chinese to evacuate from Korea.

L401 Reading C 4 October 2023

 The second course of action called for a naval blockade by the United Nations of the Chinese coast,
the bombing of mainland China, and the introduction of Chinese nationalist troops into Korea and south
China. “Subsequent operations in Korea, or withdrawal therefrom, should be dependent upon Chinese
reactions.”15 This was the course of action that MacArthur recommended the president accept.

The third course of action was if the Chinese communists voluntarily agreed to remain north of the
38th parallel an armistice should be negotiated and accepted by the UN.

Truman was shocked that MacArthur favored the second course of action, which the president
believed “might well mean all-out, general world-war-atomic weapons and all.”16 He believed that
introducing Chinese nationalist forces into south China and bombing Chinese cities, ports, and airbases
would be an act of war and quite possibly bring the Soviets in on the side of the Chinese. It disturbed
Truman greatly that he and General MacArthur’s perspectives on the strategic situation in Korea were so
far apart.

Receiving disparate advice from his senior military and foreign policy advisers in Washington and
from the commander on the scene in Korea, Truman wrote, “The first two weeks of December 1950 were
a time of crisis. The military news from Korea was bad.”17 As events would play out during the rest of the
month, the situation got worse before it got better. On December 9 Truman wrote, “I’ve worked for peace
for five years and six months and it looks like World War III is here. I hope not but we must meet
whatever comes and we will.”18

In a radio and television address to the nation on December 15, Truman declared “a state of national
emergency” when he reported to America and the free world that the communists “are now willing to
push to the brink of general war [in order] to get what they want.” In response, the United States armed
forces would expand to 3.5 million men and women as rapidly as possible and production of military
aircraft, electronic components, and military vehicles would be increased by some 400 to 500 percent. To
prevent crippling inflation, he would impose selective price and wage controls and take other measures.
“No nation has ever had a greater responsibility than ours at this moment. We must remember that our
goal is not war but peace. We are willing to negotiate differences, but we will not yield to aggressions.
Appeasement of evil is not the road to peace.”19

At this time, Truman made two fundamental decisions. The first was that the U.S. (and the UN)
would not voluntarily leave Korea or abandon the ROK government or its army. UN forces would
continue to fight until forced out of Korea and, if forced out, would take as many South Koreans as
possible with them to Japan. Since General Collins believed that it would be possible for UN forces to
maintain the Pusan Perimeter as long as required, Truman still had to consider what options were
available to him if the Chinese committed overwhelming force against the Eighth Army in an attempt to
throw the U. S. and UN forces off the Peninsula. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Bradley, believed that short of a massive commitment of replacement troops by the U.S. and the UN it
was not realistic to think that the Eighth Army could clear the CCF out of North Korea and unite the
country under free elections. It was evident that by the middle of December the US would abandon this
goal. Acting on the recommendation made by his Secretary of State Dean Acheson, General Bradley, and
with the concurrence of the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, Truman decided to change the
objective in Korea to negotiating an armistice with the Chinese and returning to an international
boundary along the 38th parallel.20

L401 Reading C 5 October 2023

 The problem that faced Truman, Attlee, and the other leaders of the countries that had military forces
operating under the auspices of the UN mandate, was how to achieve an armistice without paying too
high a price.21 It was conceivable that, since the Chinese held the initiative and had put their armies on the
offensive, that they would probably propose a unification of Korea under a communist regime, demand a
seat in the United Nations, call for a cessation of American aid to France in their war in Indochina, and
even possibly demand the right to physically occupy Formosa, all of which were unacceptable to Truman.
In fact, the Chinese rejected both U.S. and British overtures for a ceasefire.

On December 19, the Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
discuss possible courses of action if the Soviet Union entered the war on the side of the Chinese and
ways to protect a vulnerable Japan. While the meeting was in session, a message from MacArthur arrived
that also addressed Japan’s vulnerability. MacArthur requested that the four National Guard divisions
mobilized in September be sent to Japan immediately where they could complete their training and at the
same time serve as a show of force to the Soviets. As Bradley recorded:

No member of the JCS wanted to comply with this request. In the first place, the four
divisions had only been in camp a few weeks. They had been beefed up with thousands of
draftees. The divisions would not even complete basic training until March 1. It would be
extremely unwise downright crazy in fact to send them to Japan. Moreover, it would cause
chaos in our overall training and expansion plans and disrupt and delay our vital need to send
U.S. troops to Europe.22

Both Truman and the state department agreed with the JCS, and on December 23, the JCS notified
MacArthur that the president had disapproved his request and “no additional divisions would be deployed
to the Far East.”23

Another critical event occurred on December 23 that would have an immeasurable impact on the
future conduct of the Korean War. General Walker, the Eighth Army commander, died in a motor vehicle
accident when his jeep collided with a South Korean weapons carrier. During one of his earlier trips to
the Far East Command, Collins had discussed with MacArthur a possible successor to the Eighth Army
commander in the event that Walker was killed or injured. They agreed that General Matthew B.
Ridgway, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, would be his replacement. Upon
hearing of Walker’s death, President Truman immediately designated Ridgway as the new commander of
Eighth Army. Ridgway heard of his new assignment while at a dinner party. Without delaying to spend
Christmas with his family, he left Washington the next day and arrived in Tokyo before midnight on
Christmas Day.24

LTG Matthew Ridgway

Ridgway emerged from World War II as one of the Army’s most successful and respected field
generals. Known as one of the fathers of the American airborne community, he was the first commanding
general of the 82d Airborne Division. Ridgway organized and trained the division for more than two
years from its initial formation in the United States through much hard fighting in Sicily, Italy, France,
and Holland. Shortly following the Allied invasion of France, he made lieutenant general and took
command of the newly formed XVIII Airborne Corps until the end of fighting in Europe. He proved
himself one of, if not the best combat corps commander in the entire Army.25

Following WWII, Ridgway began a series of post-war assignments that laid a path to future wartime
command. Immediately after WWII Ridgway briefly served under MacArthur in the Philippines.
In October 1945, he moved back to Europe and took command of the Mediterranean Theater. In January
the following year, Eisenhower selected Ridgway to serve as the Army’s representative to the Military

L401 Reading C 6 October 2023

Staff Committee of the United Nations. From 1946 to 1948, Ridgway would gain diplomatic experience
and help shape the nature of UN military policy for the Security Council. Following duty with the UN, he
took over the newly formed Caribbean Defense Command in Panama until mid-September 1949. From
Panama, he moved to the Army Staff to serve as the deputy chief of staff for operations and
administration under Collins.

Ridgway assumed his Pentagon duties at a pivotal time in American military history. Russia
conducted its first nuclear test, the Rosenbergs had been accused of providing nuclear secrets to the
Soviets, and the communists under Mao were within two weeks of overthrowing one of our closest allies
in Asia, the nationalist Chinese. The Cold War was heating up and America’s civilian and military leaders
debated about how to defend America and the free world. Ridgway often found himself at odds with
many officials who thought the next war would be an atomic exchange with little or no role for the foot
Soldier. Ridgway challenged this line of thought and advocated a balanced force that leveraged the entire
military and the industrial strength of the nation closely linked with strong international alliances. He
lobbied hard against total war and advocated the formation of a small committee of experts to develop a
grand strategy for World War III.

Leading up to the Korean War, Ridgway’s career had spanned three distinct phases-two inter-war
periods and WWII. When war erupted in June 1950, many, including Ridgway, believed World War III
was imminent. Collins appointed Ridgway his chief adviser and expert on all matters related to the war.
He was the first to review every report that came out of theater; consequently, he was the most
knowledgeable officer on the Army Staff regarding the situation in Korea. During the next six months,
Ridgway maintained a withering schedule, working practically around the clock to provide a steady
stream of men and equipment to MacArthur and his field commanders. Ridgway believed America should
mobilize the country much as it did during WWII. The debate continued regarding the war in Korea and
the possibility of escalation to global war and American preparedness if such events occurred. In each of
these areas, Ridgway had formed definite views and he was a major contributor to this dialog in
Washington.

Regarding the tactical situation in Korea, Ridgway expressed his doubt about the competence of
many of the American senior field commanders. He was disappointed in their military leadership and the
performance of their staffs. Ridgway was unaware of his position on the command succession list;
however, with Walker’s unexpected death he would soon see firsthand the condition of the battered
Eighth Army.

Ridgway Takes Over

Ridgway met with MacArthur in Japan on December 26. His reputation was well known to the UN
commander. Now serving together for the third time in thirty-one years, Ridgway had earned the
complete trust and confidence of MacArthur, who told him, “Form your own opinions and use your own
judgment. I will support you. I will assume responsibility. You have my complete confidence.”26
MacArthur also revealed several marked changes in his point of view on two subjects of great
importance. First, he cautioned Ridgway that the ability of tactical air power to stop the movement of
enemy troops and supplies were greatly exaggerated. Second, MacArthur was now prepared to turn over
full control of military operations in Korea to Ridgway, which he had refused to do with Walker. At the
completion of the meeting, Ridgway asked his new commander, “General, if I get over there and find the
situation warrants it, do I have your permission to attack?” MacArthur replied, “Do what you think best
Matt. The Eighth Army is yours.”27 Ridgway would later write:

That is the sort of orders that puts heart into a soldier. Now the full responsibilities were
mine; not to be delegated, as authority may be delegated, but indivisibly and ceaselessly

L401 Reading C 7 October 2023

 mine, day and night, as every commander’s responsibilities are his alone, from theater to
infantry squad from five stars to two stripes. Command responsibilities for as long as it might
please God and my superiors to keep me on the job.28

MacArthur made it clear that Ridgway did not have to obtain permission from general headquarters
for any proposed operation, and Ridgway did not do so. In proper deference to his commander, however,
Ridgway always notified MacArthur of his intentions in advance of any major operation. MacArthur
never questioned Ridgway, which was in marked contrast to the tight control he had maintained over
Walker.29

Before leaving for Korea on December 26, Ridgway met with the senior air and naval commanders at
MacArthur’s headquarters, General Stratemeyer, and Admiral Joy, and gained their perspectives as to
what was taking place on the Peninsula. After this meeting, he flew to Korea. Already planning how he
intended to launch his army into a counterattack, he was more than surprised about what he found at
Eighth Army headquarters when he landed at Taegu at 4:15 P.M. on December 26, Korea time. The first
fact that struck him was the realization that the main command post was too far to the rear and too
populated with staff officers whom he firmly believed should have been much closer to the front and to
the fighting units.

Ridgway immediately issued a message to every member of Eighth Army:

I have complete confidence in our ultimate success—confidence born of your achievements

and the splendid spirit everywhere in evidence throughout this great inter-service allied team.
Having performed with great gallantry and skill under conditions as adverse as any United
States forces have encountered since Valley Forge, there is no shadow of doubt of the
character of this Army’s future conduct, teamed as it is with our own great services and our
allies. We face severe trials. We shall need dogged determination in attack and utmost
tenacity in defense. We shall need resourcefulness. The action of one single platoon or squad
may virtually affect the whole command. Never before have leaders both command and staff
had a greater challenge or a finer opportunity to show America at its best. May God be with
you in the coming year.30

Ridgway received a brief that night that the combat situation remained unclear. One reason for this
was that the Eighth Army broke contact with the CCF on or about December 5 and not regained it. The
“intelligence situation was deplorable,” Ridgway would later write. No one had any idea of how many
CCF troops had been committed to Korea or if they had crossed the 38th parallel in full force. On the
Eighth Army situation maps, Ridgway remembered, the staff depicted the CCF by a large red “goose egg”
with “174,000” scrawled on its center. In fact, the true number was closer to 300,000.31

When Ridgway arrived in Korea, the Eighth Army consisted of almost 350,000 men, including
Almond’s X Corps, which was reorganizing and re-equipping south of Taegu. The three American corps
were comprised of seven American divisions, plus the 187th Airborne RCT. The ROK Army fielded three
corps consisting of nine divisions. The other major combat forces consisted of a British brigade, a
Commonwealth brigade, a Turkish brigade, with individual infantry battalions from Canada, Belgium,
France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Thailand along with a field artillery brigade from
New Zealand. In all, Ridgway commanded 163 infantry battalions, which was the equivalent of eighteen
infantry divisions. Eighth Army was about twice the size of the U.S. armies that operated in Europe
during World War II and was the largest field army ever commanded by an American general. 32

The greatest weakness Ridgway faced was that about half of the Eighth Army’s fighting strength was
composed of ROK units. According to noted Korea War historian Clay Blair, “At the beginning of the

L401 Reading C 8 October 2023

war the ROK officer corps had been weak and corrupt. In the fighting since, many of the most courageous
and competent ROK officers had been killed, incapacitated by wounds or captured.” Ridgway
remembered that the “experience level” of the average ROK division commander was about equivalent to
a “young U.S. Army captain.”33

At dawn on his second day in Korea, he flew to the Eighth Army Advanced Command Post in Seoul.
Stating there is “no substitute for personal reconnaissance,” Ridgway ordered his pilot to fly a roundabout
route, covering some sixty miles of rugged mountain country that allowed him to analyze the terrain and
the ridge lines that Eighth Army might have to stand and fight along. The rough, mountainous terrain
provided “little comfort to a Soldier commanding a mechanized army. The granite peaks rose to six
thousand feet, the ridges were knife-edged, the slopes steep, and the narrow valleys twisted and turned
like snakes. Scrub oaks and stunted pines covered the roads and trails, and the lower hills were covered
with, fine cover for an individual Soldier who knew how to conceal himself. It was guerrilla country, an
ideal battleground for the walking Chinese rifleman, but a miserable place for our road-bound troops who
moved on wheels.”34

Arriving at his advance command post, Ridgway was surprised to find only a handful of officers. The
vast majority were back at the main CP in Taegu, two hundred miles from the front—a situation Ridgway
intended to resolve. He also met the I and IX Corps commanders, MG Frank W. Millburn and MG John
B. Coulter, and the Eighth Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel William A. Collier. They discussed
various means of improving the combat potential of Eighth Army and the possibilities of holding a
bridgehead north of the Han River. Ridgway emphasized the necessity for better lateral communications,
particularly between Coulter’s IX Corps and the ROK III Corps, and close coordination in planning and
action between the I and IX Corps.

Ridgway then met with U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio, who delivered some startling information.
Muccio was informed that there was a gap in Eighth Army’s right rear, which presented a dangerous
threat from the direction of Wonju. Ridgway was incensed that he had to learn this critical intelligence
from the U.S. ambassador and not from his intelligence section. That said, Ridgway took immediate
action and ordered the 2d Infantry Division under Major General Robert B. McClure, to move up and
block the opening. The 2d Infantry Division arrived in its new position only hours before the Chinese
attempted to exploit the gap.

Muccio then escorted Ridgway to meet with the South Korean President, Syngman Rhee. “Mr.
President I am glad to be here. And I’ve come to stay” the new Eighth Army commander said boldly.35
Ridgway later wrote, “There was no bluster in the statement. I meant it from the heart. We were faced
with only two alternatives here. We could stand and fight and conquer. Or we could be driven into the
sea. And to the second possibility I never gave the slightest thought.”36

During this meeting and what followed over the course of the next three days Ridgway began the
hardest task of his military career: rebuilding the Eighth Army into an effective fighting force. One of the
first steps in the process was to evaluate the senior leadership of the units that made up the Eighth Army.
First, he wanted to meet his three corps and seven division commanders face to face. This was easier said
than done as his formation was spread out over the entire width and breadth of South Korea.

When he arrived in Korea, only three of the seven U.S. combat divisions were on the front line. The
24 and 25th Infantry Divisions were defending along the western corridor and were at about two-thirds
th

strength. The 1st Cavalry Division, also under-strength, was in blocking positions in the center of the line.
The 2d Infantry Division, having suffered heavy losses during the Chinese counter-offensive in late
November, was still reorganizing and refitting in the Eighth Army rear area. The 1st Marine Division had

L401 Reading C 9 October 2023

completed its movement to the Masan area along the south coast and the 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions
were refitting west of Pusan.

It was largely because his subordinate units were so spread out geographically that Ridgway was only
able to meet with two of his three corps commanders and two of his seven divisions during his first few
days in country. After meeting with several of his senior commanders and their staffs he reflected later:

There was a definite air of nervousness, of gloomy foreboding, of uncertainty, a spirit of

apprehension as to what the future held. It was clear to me that our troops had lost
confidence. I could read it in their eyes, in their walk. I could read it in the faces of their
leaders from sergeants right to the top. They were unresponsive, reluctant to talk. I had to
drag information out of them. There was a complete lack of that alertness, that
aggressiveness, that you find in troops whose spirit is high.37

In fact, the situation was even worse than that. Eighth Army was under orders from MacArthur that
should the CCF attack, it would defend in successive positions (lines B, C, D, etc.), but as Ridgway
learned through his interviews and observations, not many Soldiers or their leaders had the spirit or
conviction to stand and fight. Many of them were under the impression that the Eighth Army was going
to withdraw further south to Pusan and then evacuate the Peninsula, like what the British had done at
Dunkirk eleven years before. “It was a defeated army, a disintegrating army. It was an army not in retreat
[but] in flight. It was something bordering on disgrace.”38

Ridgway also interviewed enlisted men whenever he stopped, interested in their candid points of
view. Traveling by light plane, helicopter, and jeep he evaluated the commanders, the Soldiers, and the
terrain; quickly ascertaining both the physical and psychological state of his new command. He
understood the ordeal his men had gone through over the preceding six months. They had been hurriedly
gathered from around the world and thrown together into units that had never been up to strength, nor
fully equipped, and had little cohesion. They had been sent to fight in a strange land that most had never
heard of in an undeclared war that they did not understand. Ridgway knew that the Army he had taken
command of was dispirited from the senior generals down to the private Soldier.

It was very apparent the attack he was planning in his head was not feasible until he could rebuild the
morale and fighting spirit of the Eighth Army. His visits also confirmed that there were other weaknesses
along the front that would have to be addressed, especially with the South Korean units. If that were not
enough, there was plenty of evidence that the CCF were preparing their own offensive during the coming
New Year holiday and the Eighth Army would have little time to prepare for this new offensive.

Ridgway estimated that the chances of Eighth Army stopping the CCF attack depended chiefly on the
commitment of the few reserves that he had available and on revitalizing the fighting spirit of his Army.
What really upset him was the lack of information on the types of CCF units, their locations, and their
capabilities.

The only solid reserve available to counter the impending CCF attack was the X Corps. As a
preliminary caution, Ridgway assigned the Second Infantry Division to Almond’s command with the
intent of moving the X Corps into the east-central Chongchon sector, held by the ROK III Corps. This
would narrow the front held by the ROK forces.

While preparing his Army for the oncoming Chinese assault, Ridgway “was quietly but firmly
bearing down on combat leaders and staff officers at all echelons to change their defeatist attitudes.”39
Ridgway began to imprint a new toughness into his Army. With his actions and words, he forced his
commanders and their men to shrug off the lethargy bred by defeat and continuous retreat. According to

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military historian James F. Schnabel, “Where toughness was required he was tough; where persuasion
was indicated, he persuaded; and where personal example was needed, he set the example.”40

Ridgway believed the defeatist attitude he found across the Eighth Army started at the top with what
he perceived to be poor leadership at the corps and division levels. He found a “lack of aggressiveness” at
those levels, Ridgway wrote Collins, so much so that he was convinced “he could not execute his future
plans” with some of the leaders he presently had. For that reason, “above all else,” he wrote, “we had to
learn to be ruthless with our general officers.” Ridgway firmly believed he had to have “young, vigorous
division commanders of greatest potential value for war service.”

Neither Milburn nor Almond met with Ridgway’s very high professional standards. Though Milburn
was well liked by his troops, he lacked the “spark of initiative.” Almond was the opposite; recklessly bold
as evidenced by the recent disaster east of the Chosin Reservoir. He was also “apt to be pretty rough on
other people’s sensibilities, cutting and intolerant.” Almond’s first meeting with Ridgway did not go well.
Ridgway notified him that from now on he was going to have to play it straight. No more bypassing
Eighth Army and coordinating directly with MacArthur and his headquarters. He would be allowed to
keep his command, but he would have to give up his job as MacArthur’s chief of staff. Almond was badly
shaken when he left his initial meeting with Ridgway. “He emerged quite deflated, still a corps
commander, but that and nothing more; a man who had just been told in a very tough way the new rules
of the headquarters and that he was no longer going to play games with the Eighth Army commander.”41

Ridgway decided that he could re-instill a new vigor and aggressiveness into Milburn’s leadership
style by co-locating his Eighth Army advanced CP with Milburn’s corps headquarters. At the same time
he would keep a close eye on Almond.42 Ridgway spared his old friend, the I Corps commander, but there
is evidence that he still believed that the I Corps staff required some attention to restore their
aggressiveness and initiative. After sitting through an operations update briefing by the I Corps G3, Col
John R. Jeter, who outlined the corps plans for “defending in successive positions,” Ridgway asked,
“Where were the corps attack plans?” Flustered, Jeter replied that there were no attack plans since the
corps was withdrawing. After the briefing, Ridgway directed Milburn to relieve Jeter. It was obvious
Ridgway was sending a message, but it caused much resentment within the I Corps staff. Jeter was very
popular and a proven combat leader who had commanded three different battalions from Normandy to
Germany in the last war. Most believed that in briefing the withdrawal of I Corps to Ridgway, Jeter was
merely carrying out what MacArthur’s headquarters had directed the corps to do. The incident spread like
wildfire throughout the corps and the entire Eighth Army.43

Realizing the CCF offensive was imminent; Ridgway laid out his plan for the defense of a Seoul
bridgehead and focused his attention on the dangerous situation in the center of the trans-peninsular line
held by the ROK corps and divisions. Ridgway ordered Almond to move his X Corps headquarters to
Wonju immediately to take charge of and reinforce the central sector. Ridgway believed that Wonju was
“second only to Seoul” in tactical importance. Almond would use the 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions. As
further back up, Ridgway shifted the 1st Cavalry Division to the northeast of Seoul under IX Corps control
to backstop the adjacent ROK divisions. His orders committed the six Army divisions in Korea but not
the 1st Marine Division, which was refitting in Masan and expected to be put in the rear to serve as the
rear guard for Eighth Army as it withdrew through all its defensive lines and evacuated South Korea at
Pusan.

Ridgway had no intention of evacuating South Korea and wanted to commit the Marine division into
the Eighth Army line as soon as possible. He summoned the 1st Marine Division commander, Major
General O. P. Smith, to Almond’s headquarters at Kyongju. He was very impressed with him. “Smith was
top flight, a splendid commander. Good tactical judgment and a gentleman. He was very calm and had
extreme consideration for his troops. If it hadn’t been for his moral courage and doing some of the things

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he did [at Chosin], which were not in full accord with the instructions he had received [from Almond],
he’d have lost a great part of his division.” Smith and his fellow Marines were also impressed with
Ridgway. Ridgway directed the Marines throw away the maps they had received for Eighth Army’s
withdrawal plans to Pusan. “He gave us a talk expressing his complete confidence regarding the outcome
in Korea. He had no orders regarding evacuation and hoped to be able to defend on some line and launch
limited counterattacks. He stressed the necessity for reconnaissance and maintaining contact, he wanted
less looking backwards. Ridgway brought a new fresh attitude, a new fresh breath of life to the whole
Eighth Army. Ridgway allayed Smith’s concerns when the Marine commander reiterated that the Marine
division would never again serve under General Almond. “As long as he, General Ridgway, commanded
the Eighth Army, the 1st Marine Division would never again be placed under command of the X Corps.” 44
Ridgway left Smith’s division in Masan for the time being but informed Smith that he was planning to
have the 1st Marine Division move forward toward the western front under the command of IX Corps.

Ridgway expected the CCF main effort to strike the UN forces in the western sector with the aim of
recapturing Seoul. He believed, like the previous NKPA attack that started the war in June, it would be
two-pronged, down the main Pyongyang-Seoul highway through Munsan and down the Uijongbu
Corridor. To blunt and stop this attack and prevent the capture of Seoul, Ridgway directed that I Corps
and IX Corps establish a main line of resistance along the Imjin River and be prepared to fall back on
Ridgway’s orders to a Seoul “bridgehead” in defensive positions created by tens of thousands of South
Korean laborers. To prevent CCF artillery from ranging Seoul and the Han River bridges, the defensive
perimeter was to be very large, extending northward as far as Uijongbu.

The son of an artilleryman, Ridgway had a fine appreciation for the power of artillery. He arrived in
Korea convinced that properly employed artillery fire, massed and coordinated, could do much to offset
the CCF manpower advantage. He was dismayed to find out that the Eighth Army had an acute shortage
of artillery. At Army level there was but one artillery battalion (the 17th, eight inch) and at corps level,
there were only three battalions (the 92d, 96th, and 999th with self-propelled or tractor-pulled 155s). By
tables of organization and equipment (TO&E), the seven American divisions were supposed to have the
normal complement of four artillery battalions each, but five of these twenty eight battalions had been
practically destroyed at Kunu and the Chosin Reservoir.45

Ridgway realized that no one would blame Eighth Army for this appalling situation. As Clay Blair
writes, “Part of it was due to Truman’s post-war military economy program; in part to the earlier
decisions to fight in Korea with limited forces; in part to the repeated, disgraceful loss of artillery to the
enemy; in part to the near impossibility of rapidly organizing, manning, and training American artillery
units from scratch.”46 That said, Ridgway called a conference of all of his senior artillery commanders in
Eighth Army and notified them that he wanted immediate and dramatic improvement in the employment
of the available artillery.

Prior to coming to take command of Eighth Army, Ridgway as the Army “G3” had ordered ten
recently activated National Guard and Army reserve artillery battalions to prepare for duty in the Far East.
The plan had been to send these units to Japan for more intense training, but Ridgway notified Collins
that he needed the ten battalions as soon as possible and their destination was changed to South Korea.
Five of the battalions arrived in January with the other five arriving between February and May.

In one of his initial meetings with the senior commanders of Eighth Army, Ridgway issued some very
specific oral instructions:

1. All division commanders were to get out of their command posts and spend much more time on
the front lines at battalion level or lower in order to “get to know” their subordinate commanders, the
terrain, and the situation intimately. Corps and division staff officers would do likewise and

L401 Reading C 12 October 2023

 henceforth prepare more precise firsthand and “honest” reports with “hard facts” and devoid of
“hearsay and speculation.”
2. Selected units would commence strong and aggressive reconnaissance and patrol actions to
establish contact with the CCF and keep it with “a bulldog grip.” When the opportunity arose, units
would attack for the purpose of disrupting CCF assemblies for attacks. Units would get off the road,
take the high ground, and button-up securely for the night. If the CCF succeeded in making nighttime
penetrations, commanders were “promptly and definitely to eliminate them with armor and infantry
teams after daylight, leaving no enclaves of enemy in the rear.”
3. All commanders will immediately start intensive training in night fighting and marches. Men
reared in rural areas should be designated to teach those from urban areas how to navigate over terrain
without light.
4. All engaged units will make greater use of available firepower. Ridgway had evidence that
infantry units were not using more than one-third of their available firepower. He did not want any
commander asking for help until he could prove that he was using every weapon he had every rifle,
machine gun, howitzer, anti-aircraft gun, and tank.
5. All commanders would make immediate efforts to provide the men in their units with the
following: cold-weather clothing; at least two hot meals a day, three if practicable; small potbelly
stoves and warming tents; writing paper. When sufficient fur caps were available, the cold, drafty
steel helmets were to be stored until the spring.
6. Commanders would visit the wounded and non-battle casualties in hospitals in an effort to instill
a desire in the men to return to their original units, if capable. “A man already trained was worth
several times a raw replacement.”
7. Commanders should decrease the “seemingly wholesale issues” of medals and awards. The
practice, rampant throughout Eighth Army, demeaned and trivialized the decorations. Where
appropriate, there should be a greater emphasis on awarding the Medal of Honor to the living rather
than the dead.
8. Commanders would employ allied units to provide “better utilization” of their specific talents.
For example, British and Commonwealth units should be used on defense rather than offense the
Turks on offense rather than defense.
9. No one, under any circumstances, was to abandon “precious equipment.” Any equipment,
Ridgway stressed, had to “come from nine thousand miles away.” It was expensive. He warned that
any man who “lost or threw away or needlessly damaged any piece of equipment or property was
going to be court-martialed.”47

At the conclusion of his whirlwind tour of units and commanders, Ridgway returned to his Eighth
Army advance CP in Seoul to make the final preparations for the impending CCF offensive, which he still
expected on New Year’s Eve. He was not certain that his initial “exhortation” of his commanders and
men had had the intended dramatic impact that he had hoped, but word of what he had done in his first
five days of command had reached the UN commander in Tokyo. MacArthur sent Ridgway a note
acknowledging the new commander’s efforts: “[I] cannot tell you how delighted I am at the energy and
effectiveness with which you have taken hold [of Eighth Army].”48

In just a few short exhausting days, Ridgway had begun the process of turning around a defeated
multinational force. He knew defeating the enemy meant inflicting maximum Chinese casualties with
superior American firepower. Ridgway knew he must turn the Korean War into a war of attrition. He
must revise the tactics in use, ordering road-bound American units to seize the high ground prior to any
advance. He would also rearrange unit positions in the defense so that they could support one another
with firepower, making it that much more difficult for the CCF to penetrate UN lines and positions. One
of most important changes was to ensure that there were closer communications between the Eighth
Army staff and subordinate units. To achieve this, he maintained a forward command post co-located
with one of his corps headquarters. He moved staff officers at all levels from the rear areas to the front so

L401 Reading C 13 October 2023

they would be closer to the battlefield where they could better grasp the situation. He also stressed good
liaisons with and publicity for all UN forces, not just America units. This also entailed stressing
awareness of the cultural differences that existed within the units that made up the Eighth Army. He
modified standard U.S. Army logistics to meet a wide variety of needs for each nationality and made
numerous dietary changes to improve morale in the non-U.S. contingents. For example, French and Dutch
units did not like American white bread, Filipinos wanted Philippine rice, the Thai wanted Siamese rice,
and the Turks got fresh fruit and spinach instead of sweet potatoes, lima beans, and corn, while the
Greeks insisted on receiving olive oil from Greece, not the United States.

Despite the dismal military situation, Ridgway remained in a positive and constructive mindset. After
being in command for less than four days, he wrote his wife, “have complete confidence in ultimate
success of this magnificent team here though some hard times are inevitable.”49

On Sunday, December 31st Ridgway notified his chief of staff that he was flying to his advanced CP
near Seoul and would remain there expecting the Chinese attack later that night. After visiting with the
staffs of the I and IX Corps, he spent two hours visiting Eighth Army defensive positions and talking to
unit commanders. One visit is noteworthy of mention:

“In the zone of the British Commonwealth Brigade, I came upon one magnificent young
British lieutenant, out with a working party, preparing a ridge-line defensive position. He met
me with a flourishing salute and a cheerful smile. I asked him if there was anything I could do
to help him. He said there was not a thing. ‘You think everything’s all right up here?’ I asked.
‘Splendid, sir,’ he said. Then as an afterthought: ‘It is a bit drafty, though.’ He was right. It
was drafty up there. He had a thousand yards to cover with a handful of men. But it couldn’t
be helped. Every other unit along that line was spread as thinly.”50

Two hours later, just after it became dark, the CCF crossed the 38 th Parallel and invaded South
Korea. As Ridgway and his staff had anticipated, their main effort was against the western front, down
the two roads leading to Seoul.

1
James F. Schnabel, “Ridgway in Korea.” Military Review, Volume XLIV, no. 3, (March 1964), 3.
2
On October 2, 1950 the Indian Ambassador to Beijing, K.M. Panikkar was told by Zhou En lai that if the
Americans crossed the 38th parallel, the Chinese would be forced to intervene on North Korea’s behalf. Edmund
Clubb, Director of the State Department’s Office of Chinese Affairs was notified of Zhou’s message by the
British and took it seriously. Though his superiors believed him to be an alarmist, the administration made a
single attempt to communicate with the Chinese through the American Ambassador to India but the Chinese
rejected the initiative. See also Halberstam’s The Coldest Winter, 334-338. MacArthur’s G-2 (Intelligence)
officer, Colonel Charles Willoughby, had convinced MacArthur that if the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF)
were going to becoming engaged in the war in Korea they would have done so earlier in the conflict such as
prior to or during the defense of Pyongyang and before the NKPA had been virtually destroyed. Clay Blair
posited that Willoughby believed it was illogical for the Chinese to intervene so late in the war when the
victorious Eighth Army was on the offensive and supported by massive air and naval forces. Willoughby
predicted that the UN forces were opposed by 82,799 North Korean soldiers and approximately 40,000 to
71,000 Chinese Communist Forces. See also Clay Blair’s The Forgotten War, 375-376; and The United States
Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year by James F. Schnabel (Washington D.C.,
Government Printing Office, 1972), 273.
3
Radio message, C69953, Commander in Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE) to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
November 28, 1950. National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.
4
Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman. (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1973), 492-493.

L401 Reading C 14 October 2023

 5
Robert J. Dvorchak, Battle for Korea: The Associated Press History of the Korean Conflict (Philadelphia, PA:
Combined Books, 1993), 113.
6
James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: The First Year. (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1972), 230.
7
James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: The First Year, 231.
8
CINCUNC to DEPTAR C50332, 12-3-50, Harry S. Truman Papers, Korean War File: Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri; James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, 282.
9
To evacuate the X Corps from North Korea, an amphibious fleet, commanded by Admiral Doyle, was sent to
Hungnam harbor. The operation, which required 193 ships of all types, went off very smoothly. Beginning on
December 11 all equipment and supplies of value were loaded aboard ship from the half-destroyed port. In total
more than 350,000 tons of cargo was salvaged, including 17,500 vehicles along. More than 105,000 UN troops
as well as 98,000 Korean civilians were evacuated from Hungnam, Songjin, and Wonsan. The evacuation took
two weeks and during the entire time the Chinese launched numerous attacks against the X Corp perimeter. To
defend the port area, protect the embarking troops, and permit the Navy to carry out its formidable task, general
Almond conducted a successful active defense. The last UN unit to embark was the rear guard of the 3rd
Infantry Division. Eight Army engineers then proceeded to destroy the port facilities, ensuring nothing that
remained could be used by the enemy. The last soldiers were loaded aboard troop transports on the afternoon of
December 24. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, commander of UN naval forces, complimented the men “who made
possible the greatest sea evacuation in American history.”
10
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, 393. JCS to CINCFE C50332, 12-3-50, Truman Papers, Korean War File,
Harry S. Truman Library.
11
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1969), 229-232.
12
MFR, 3 Dec 50, Subject: Korean Situation. See Memo, General Bolte for Cofs USA, 3 Dec 50, Subject:
Course of Action to be Taken as a result of developments in Korea, both in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 134.,
Department of the Army Records, Washington D.C.
13
Attlee argued the British position was that, in return for an armistice, the United Nations should recognize
Peking, support a People’s Republic of China seat in the UN, and abandon Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese
Nationalists, thus handing over Formosa to the communists. Truman, Acheson, Marshall and Bradley were
against this viewpoint and explained to Attlee and his party why those steps were unacceptable. The British
ultimately agreed to seek and accept a cease-fire on U.S. terms through the UN and other diplomatic channels.
Bradley and Blair, 610-611.
14
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, 233. After the briefing General
Collins informed reporters that MacArthur’s forces would be able to take care of themselves without further
losses. This was reported in the New York Times on December 7 and December 9, 1950.
15
Harry S.Truman, Memoirs, II, 415.
16
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, 415.
17
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, 414.
18
Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 126.
19
Foreign Relations, 1950, Korea, vol. VII, 1548; Truman, Harry S. 427-428.

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 20
Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 610.
21
By December 1950, sixteen countries beside the United States had military forces operating in Korea within
the United Nations Command: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom. In addition India, Italy, Norway and Sweden provided medical units. By the spring of 1951, the
Eighth Army, which constituted the ground force of the United Nations Command in Korea, had a reported
strength of 554, 577 soldiers. Organized into 4 corps, seven of its 17 divisions were U.S. and the rest were from
the ROK. In addition, there were 4 brigades, 1 separate regiment, and 9 separate battalions from sixteen UN
nations listed above. The specific strength figures were: 253,250 U.S. troops, 28,061 other UN troops, 260, 48
ROK soldiers and 12, 7218 Koreans who were part of the Korean Augmentation of the U.S. Army (KATUSA).
Edward I. Matray, Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 507-508.
22
Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life, 612. During this same period Truman and his
administration were attempting to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe.
23
Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life, 611-612.
24
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, 237. In his autobiography Soldier
Ridgway described the phone call he received from the Army Chief of Staff, J. Lawton Collins, and how he
would break the news to his wife. “We talked a moment longer, then I rejoined the others. Across the room I
saw Penny looking at me, a question in her eyes. I smiled and shrugged and shook my head. I had already
resolved that I would not trouble her sleep that night─the last night left to us together. Morning would come all
too soon, and that would be time enough to break this harsh news to her.” (195-196).
25
John Toland, In Mortal Combat: 1950-1953. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 376.
26
Jonathan M. Soffer, General Matthew B. Ridgway: From Progressivism to Reaganism, 1895-1993 (Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 117.
27
Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956),
201.
28
Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, 201.
29
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea, 238-239.
30
James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: The First Year, 236-237.
31
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 569.
32
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 569-570.
33
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 570. Ridgway on ROK Army: Interview of Ridgway by Major Matthew P.
Caulfield, USMC, and Colonel Robert M. Elton, USA, August 29, 1969.
34
Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, 203-204.
35
Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, 204.
36
Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, 204.
37
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea 241. In his book The Korean War,
Ridgway stated that beside gauging the morale and fighting spirit of the leaders and soldiers of Eighth Army, he
was also trying to determine how soon his new command could return to the offensive. “Fighting spirit is not
something that can be described or spelled out to you. An experienced commander can feel it through all of his

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 senses, in the posture, the manner, the talk, the very gestures of the men on the fighting front.” Matthew B.
Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), 85-86.
38
Colonel John Johnson, Commander, 8th Cavalry Regiment. Quoted in Clay Blair’s The Forgotten War, 571.
39
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea 242-243.
40
James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: The First Year, 308.
41
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and The Korean War. (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 497-
498. In his The Forgotten War, Clay Blair quotes Colonel William J. McCaffrey, Almond’s Deputy Chief of
Staff as saying: “I didn’t sit in on this critical first meeting with Ridgway and Almond. But Ridgway was smart
enough and sure enough of himself and his position that he wouldn’t permit that ridiculous situation to go on [X
Corps operating as a separate unit and not underneath Eighth Army control]. He was going to operate Eighth
Army as a unified army. Almond came out of the meeting a very sober guy. My opinion is that Ridgway told
him how things were going to go in Eighth Army from now on. Almond got the point, and that’s how it went.
There wasn’t any question who was the Army commander. Ridgway straightened out that ridiculous situation
that first day.”
42
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 57-572.
43
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 574-575.
44
Blair, The Forgotten War, 578-579.
45
The total loss of artillery pieces since the North Korean invasion through the Eighth Army’s retreat and X
Corps disaster at the Chosin Reservoir were nearly catastrophic. American forces had lost 143 artillery pieces,
of which 115 were 105mm howitzers, 27 were 155mm howitzers, and one was an eight-inch howitzer. Of these,
36 pieces had been lost by the 24th Infantry Division in July 1950 (Task Force Smith); 11 pieces lost by the 25th
Infantry Division in August 1950; 21 pieces lost by the 1 st Cavalry Division at Unsan and the Chongchon
Reservoir in November 1950; 62 pieces lost by the 2d Infantry Division and 12 pieces lost by the 7 th Infantry
Division with Task Force MacLean/Faith in December 1950. Total ROK Army and American artillery losses in
the first six months of the war were 238 pieces, enough to equip thirteen regular artillery battalions with the
then normal complement of eighteen howitzers each.
46
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 576-577.
47
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 586-587.
48
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 587.
49
George B. Mitchell, Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen (Mechanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 2002), 55.
50
Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, 209.

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 Appendix 1: Eighth Army Organization for Combat, December 31, 1950.

U.S. Eighth
U.S. Eighth Army,
Army, The 3d & 7th US divisions
in X Corps had evacuated
December 31,
December 31, 1950
1950 from Hungnam and were
located near Pusan when
the Chinese offensive
began on 31 Dec. Walker
anticipating an attack by
LTG Matthew B. 25 Dec had previously
Ridgway ordered 2d Div to reinforce
Cdr, Eighth Army the ROK right flank

MG Frank W. MG John B. MG Edward M.

Millburn Coulter Almond
I Corps IX Corps X Corps

MG John H. MG Robert H. MG Robert B.

Turkish
Church Soule McClure
Brigade
24th ID 3rd ID 2d ID

MG William B. MG Hobart R. MG David

Kean Gay Barr
25th ID 1st CAV 7th ID

ROK 1st ID ROK 6th ID ROK 3rd ID

29th Brigade MG O.P. Smith

27thBrigade ROK Capital
BG Thomas 1st MAR DIV
BG Basil A. Coad Div
Brodie Army Reserve

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