Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves: Rethinking the Public/Private Divide

Author(s): Barbara Arneil

Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique ,
Mar., 2001, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 29-54
Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science
politique
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 Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves:
Rethinking the Public/Private Divide

BARBARA ARNEIL University of British Columbia

Introduction

Modern Western political thought, from its inception, has been

founded on a division between public and private spheres. The gen-
dered nature of this divide has been most clearly demonstrated by sec-
ond-wave feminist critics, such as Susan Moller Okin and Carole
Pateman.' Their analysis has revealed an underlying dichotomy in
much of Western political theory among a political, public, sphere
populated by male citizens, and a non-political, private, sphere popu-
lated by their non-citizen wives. These feminist analyses, by unveiling
the gendered nature of the public/private division in Western political
theory, were ground-breaking. However, it is argued in this article that
their analysis of the private sphere must be taken further to include the
differences in power among different groups of women, in particular
the different levels of authority accorded to female servants, slaves and
wives. With a singular focus on women as "wives," feminist analysis
has ignored the divisions and hierarchy present in modern liberal the-
ory among different groups of women. As a result, feminist analysis

1 Carole Pateman, "Feminist Critiques of the Public Private Dichotomy," in S. I.

Benn and G. F. Gaus, eds., Public and Private in Social Life (New York: St. Mar-
tin's Press, 1983), 281-303; Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1988); Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women (Oxford: Polity
Press, 1989); Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Susan Moller Okin, "Feminism and
Political Theory," in Janet A. Kouraney, ed., Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Cri-
tiques and Reconstructions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),
116-44.

Barbara Arneil, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Van-

couver, British Columbia V6T 1iZI; [email protected]
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique
XXXIV: 1 (March/March 2001) 29-54
O 2001 Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique)
and/et la Socidtd qudbicoise de science politique

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30 BARBARA ARNEIL

has yet to analyze fully

the exercise of power wi
John Locke's Two Tre
for the analysis of th
sphere.2 It will be dem
sion between a public sp
izens' wives, to describ
lated by not only wiv
slaves and servants.3 H
group identity. Locke d
ing on their capacity t
the head of the househ
vate sphere each have a
and, therefore, a uniqu
the authority to which
tors, including race an
ferent groups of women
Having laid the foun
Locke's theory, we can
the public/private divi
as "wives" in the priva
divisions among wom
Pateman and Okin a st
between free citizens a
among different group

2 John Locke, Two Treatis

in the History of Politica
1988). Unless otherwise st
in the original.
3 There is a body of analy
free citizen, servant and sl
class differences; with very
to focus on men as wage l
and slaves, who can only b
private family. C. B. Macp
sis based on "male" serva
mercantilists, as opposed t
serfs or servants versus
back into the state of natu
ety he was fully aware, b
not-between owners and w
Macpherson's analysis, th
implicitly linked to publi
Second Treatise of Governm
[Indianapolis: Hackett Pub
Theory of Possessive Indiv
Press, 1962).

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Abstract. Critiques of the public/private divide in Western political thought do not go
far enough in analyzing the full range and character of relations in the private sphere as
demonstrated in this article, which analyzes John Locke's theorisation about the relative
authority of wives, servants and slaves. A third-wave feminist analysis is used to illus-
trate the theoretical relevance of group-based identities that, far from having a uniform
relation to the political power afforded to free (male) citizens, are hierarchically strati-
fied. Thus it is demonstrated that a basic problem within second-wave feminist analysis
of Lockean, and more broadly defined liberal thought, is the tendency to categorize
women as "wives" of free citizens, and not to analyze adequately other dimensions of
identity, thereby ignoring the explicit divisions and hierarchy among different groups of
women in one of the earliest accounts of the private sphere in liberal theory.

R~sumi. En se fondant sur la th6orie de John Locke quant A l'autorit6 relative des
6pouses, des domestiques et des esclaves, cet article drmontre que les critiques de la divi-
sion public/priv6 de la pensre politique occidentale ne font pas une analyse exhaustive
des relations priv6es entre hommes et femmes. I1 recourt g une analyse de la troisibme
vague du f6minisme pour justifier la pertinence de la these selon laquelle les identit6s
fondres sur le groupe, loin d'avoir une relation uniforme avec le pouvoir politique
accord6 aux citoyens (males) libres, sont hidrarchiquement stratifi6es. I1 est done
d6montr6 que le problbme de base avec l'analyse de la seconde vague du feminisme sur
Locke et plus g6n~ralement sur la pens6e lib6rale, est la tendence A catrgoriser les
femmes comme ?6pouses> de citoyens libres, en nrgligeant les autres dimensions de leur
identit6, une approche qui conduit g ignorer les divisions explicites et la hidrarchie entre
les diff6rents groupes de femmes admises par une des premieres prises en compte de la
sphere priv6e de la th6orie librrale.

the intersection between power and identity at the root of modern lib-
eral theory.
A third-wave feminist framework provides us with a theoretical
starting point for analyzing the diversity of experiences and contradic-
tory perspectives of women both theoretically and historically.4 The
question of who fulfills the role of citizen, wife, servant or slave is a
critical one posed by third-wave feminist analysis, which asks not only
about the differences between men and women, but the differences

4 The late 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the emergence of third-wave femi-
nism(s). Compared to second-wave feminist analysis, which often viewed
"women" as a singular and essentialist category caught in a dualistic world,
third-wave feminist analysis embraces the multiplicity, and potentially contradic-
tory, nature of identity in order to find new methods of empowerment. "People in
the world who are facing and embracing their contradictions and complexities
and creating something new and empowering from them are important voices
leading us away from divisiveness and dualism" (Rebecca Walker, ed., To Be
Real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism [New York: Anchor
Book, 1995], xxxv). For examples of some third-wave feminist analysis, see Bar-
bara Findlen, ed., Listen Up: Voices from the Next Feminist Generation (Seattle:
Seal Press, 1995); special issue of Hypatia: Third Wave Feminisms 12 (1997);
and Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, eds., Third Wave Agenda: Being Femi-
nist, Doing Feminism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). For
an overview, see Barbara Arneil, Politics and Feminism (Oxford: Blackwell,
1999), esp. chap. 6.

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32 BARBARA ARNEIL

within both groups,

inhere in such differe
framework, with its em
into our understanding
ble to provide a deeper
the private sphere.

John Locke and Divis

Authority within the
authority because of hi
day of patriarchy or p
Filmer, argued that as
so kings have author
bequeathed this right
been passed down throu
and kings of political
power of man which co
child. Free men are "th
exercise patriarchal rig
It is this theory of pat
in the Bible and conf
human reproduction, t
Locke begins by claim
the state of nature b
made by a voluntary
so far as to say that w
bands. Despite this app
Locke does not base th
over the wife on ration
of nature: "But the hu
ings, will unavoidably
being necessary that t
placed somewhere, it n
and the stronger."' One
al consent as the basis
that wives, on recogn
stronger," would ration
He does not, even thou
authority away from

5 Sir Robert Filmer, Patri

versity Press, 1991).
6 Locke, Two Treatises, II
7 Ibid., II, para. 82.

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Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 33

wives, in relation to their husbands, become an e

ing Filmer's patriarchal natural authority, despit
uses them in the state of nature to help in the d
wives of citizens in civil society is so inconsisten
political theory that he eventually writes as if t
For example, in chapter 15 of the Second Treati
and Despotical Power," he distinguishes betw
authority based on the extent to which one can o
or the power of parents over children (potential pro
cal (between property owners) and despotic powe
(without any property). Despite the fact that other
are covered (slave and child), nowhere is the natu
bands have over their wives mentioned.8 For Lo
cult, if not impossible, to reconcile his need to
thereby give equal rights to mothers/wives in th
the natural authority of husbands which he wish
the social contract. Wives of citizens simply dis
conclusions about authority and power in civil so
While wives have disappeared from the latter
Treatise, one can implicitly read into his chapter
authority, a fourth authority-conjugal power
in the First Treatise. Here, he makes an explicit
the "subjection that is due from a Wife to he
which Subjects owe the Governours of Political
of power (conjugal versus political) which Locke
apart; the political being dependent on the owne
Locke is clear that wives have no rights, independ
to own "goods and lands": "Conjugal power [is] t
Husband hath to order the things of private Con
ily, as Proprietor of the Goods and Land there,
take place before that of his wife in all thin
Concernment."'o It is worth noting that Locke e
proprietary authority of the husband to "goods
will make the case, in the Second Treatise, that
have equal authority with their husbands over the
of persons in the private sphere. Thus husbands
see, have the same authority over their servants,

8 Ibid., II, para. 174. Servants are not mentioned in this c

be argued in the next section, they seem to be seen b
children and to be commanded as such, under a time limi
ity of the head of household (II, para. 85) in accordance
employment contract.
9 Ibid., I, para. 49.
10 Ibid., I, para. 48.

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 34 BARBARA ARNEIL

The difference for wives of citizens between the natural state and
civil society is most clearly manifested in the distinction Locke draws
between marriage contracts made in the state of nature and those made
"under positive law" in civil society. In the state of nature, Locke
states that the conjugal contract can be written in any number of ways:

Why [can] this Compact ... not be made determinable, either by con-
sent, or at a certain time, or upon certain Conditions, as well as any
other voluntary Compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the
thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for Life; I mean, to
such as are under no Restraint of any positive Law, which ordains all
such Contracts to be perpetual."

The natural rights in the state of nature, including the right to negotiate
any conditions within the marriage contract, are eliminated in civil
society with the introduction of a public/private split, the enforcement
of the subordination of women and, most importantly, the fundamental
goal of government to preserve the husband's right of private property,
all supported by civil law. So Locke concludes in the First Treatise,
"Any Authority to Adam over Eve, or to Men over their wives..,. only
foretells what should be the Woman's Lot ... that she should be sub-
ject to her husband, as we see that generally the Laws of Mankind and
customs of Nations have ordered it so."12 Locke decides that it is
because so many nations have "ordered" the subordination of wives to
husbands that he once again concludes this authority is natural: "[there
must be] a Foundation in Nature for it."'3
There is little in Locke's theory of the state of nature to provide a
"natural foundation" for this subordination. On the contrary, his anti-
patriarchal arguments and the invocation of a marital contract, seem to
point in the opposite direction. Yet in both treatises, he simply asserts
the natural authority husbands have over wives and the uniform nature
of the marriage contract that must be embraced by civil law. One might
assume that wives have been divested of all authority in the private
sphere of civil society. While this is true in relation to their husbands,
particularly when it comes to "final determinations" and "common
property," it is not true as we shall see, with regard to other persons
(namely children, servants and slaves) in the private sphere.
The second group of women implicit in Locke's theory is female
servants. It is clear that Locke recognizes groups of women beyond
"wives." For example, in the First Treatise, he distinguishes between
wives and concubines.14 Locke explicitly recognizes the existence of

11 Ibid., II, para. 81.

12 Ibid., I, para. 47.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., I, para. 123.

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 Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 35

both female and male servants in a quote he takes f

his attack on Sir Robert Filmer: "I am Abraham's Se
Lord hath Blessed my Master greatly ... and he h
Men-Servants and Maid-servants."15
At the time Locke was writing, females represen
of the servant population, particularly among those w
households ("in-servants") of families. In 1696, G
lished a census of the English population, income an
figures demonstrate that women constituted the ma
engaged in what Mildred Campbell calls the labour of
In Locke's theory, servants are under the domes
their master; but this authority has both a temporal
which does not apply to slaves. He speaks of these lim
contract between free-man and servant: "A Free-man makes himself a
Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service he
undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive: And though
this commonly puts him into the Family of his Master, and under the
ordinary Discipline thereof; yet it gives the Master but a Temporary
Power over him." '8 The moral limit placed upon masters' authorities
over servants forbids the use of "absolute arbitrary, despotical power."
Again, this limitation distinguishes servants from slaves.
Locke goes even further in the Reasonableness of Christianity, on
the need for masters to provide moral commands for their servants.19 It
is clear here that servants fall within the domestic authority of the pri-
vate sphere. Locke states of servants' labour: "The Service he under-
takes to do... puts him into the Family of his Master."20 Peter Laslett
comments: "servants in this paragraph, we must not forget, covered

15 Ibid., I, para. 135.

16 Gregory King, Natural and Political Observations and Conclusions upon the
State and Condition of England (1696) printed as an appendix to George
Chalmer, Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain ... (London,
1804) and also in Charles Davenant, Essay upon the Probable Methods of Mak-
ing a People Gainers in the Balance of Trade, cited in Macpherson, The Political
Theory of Possessive Individualism, appendix 1, 279. Macpherson notes at one
point: "Using King's figure of 560,000 in-servants ... 260,000 are male," in
order to discuss the issue of the male servant and the vote. He makes no mention
of the other 300,000 in-servants who are presumably female (Possessive Individ-
ualism, 284).
17 Mildred Campbell, The English Yeoman under Elizabeth and the Early Stuarts
(New York: A. M. Kelley, 1960), 398. Locke also refers to the work of the ser-
vant as "drudgery" (II, para. 24).
18 Ibid., II, para. 85.
19 John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures,
in The Works of John Locke, 10 vols. (Dublin: Thomas Tegg et al., 1823) Vol. 7,
146.
20 Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 85.

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 36 BARBARA ARNEIL

many now classed as ind

and all his contempor
authority is significant
these different social a
ter's family, servants s
tian morality. Thus serv
to either wives or slaves)
any reason at all, to ma
(as much as male servan
obedience, commanded
of reason to understand the Christian doctrine.

[For] the day-labourers and tradesmen, spinsters and dairy-maids ...

hearing plain commands is the sure and only course to bring them to
obedience and practice. The greatest part cannot know, and therefore
they must believe. And I ask, whether one coming from heaven in the
power of God, in full and clear evidence and demonstration of miracles,
giving plain and direct rules of morality and obedience be not likelier to
enlighten the bulk of mankind, and set them right in the their duties ...
that by reasoning with them from general notions and principles of
human reason?22

This form of authority over servants is different from slaves, who

would be seen as so deficient in reason as to be unable to benefit from
the lessons of Christianity commanded or otherwise. Wives are not
only not subject to this kind of authority but, according to Locke, wives
would constitute, along with their husbands, the few who "enlighten the
bulk of mankind" through "plain commands" to their servants.
So far we have discussed conjugal power exercised by male citi-
zens over their wives, and the power exercised by masters (and their
wives) over their servants. We will now consider the despotic power
which is exercised over slaves. For Locke, authority over slaves (both
male and female) is quite different from either wives or servants.
Unlike the marriage and employment contracts, slaves have no con-
tract with the free citizen, they are simply subject to him without any
contractual limits on that power. In defining slavery at the beginning
of the Second Treatise, Locke states that people can only be justifiably
enslaved when they are conquered in a "just war." Thus he speaks of

21 Ibid., II, para. 85 (note).

22 Locke, Reasonableness of Christianity, 146. Locke refers to "the lowest capaci-
ties of reasonable creatures" (emphasis added), again distinguishing children
and servants (who have a low capacity for reason) from slaves (who have no need
of moral instructions or commands as they have no capacity for reason at all).

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Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 37

those living in a "perfect condition of Slavery

Conquerour and a Captive."23
Having been captured, slaves relinquish all pro
themselves, their liberty and their goods. As suc
one group that has no part in civil society. "The
feited their Lives, and with it their Liberties, and
being in the State of Slavery, not capable of any Pro
state be considered as any part of Civil Society"2
the Second Treatise, Locke describes slaves as
just and lawful War, and such only are subje
Power."25 Therefore the only form of authority
for slaves is despotism.
Thus, for Locke, women exist as wives, serva
perhaps most critical to a full analysis of his vi
private sphere are the different levels of autho
three groups, for it is clear in the Two Treatises,
citizens (by virtue of their marriage contract w
enjoy the same powers as their husbands ove
within their household: "That the Master of the
tinct and differently limited Power, both as to
those several Persons that are in it; for exceptin
no Legislative Power of Life and Death over any
too but what a Mistress of a Family may have a
authority given to wives, in conjunction wit
direct orders from those in charge and the need
vants and slaves, in both the Two Treatises and
Christianity, create very different roles and leve
women in the private sphere. Much has been wr
authority over their children, but Locke clearly
in this paragraph to include servants and slaves.
male "servants" fall under domestic authority, "
zens have similar authority over male servants a
slaves. Such differences, and the authority enjo
zens over certain groups of men and other women
have been largely overlooked in feminist analysis
The importance of ethnicity and gender to th
slaves and wives are defined, as well as the level
any particular group, is brought into sharp relie
property. As Locke makes clear when he dist

23 Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 24.

24 Ibid., II, para 85.
25 Ibid., II, para 172.
26 Ibid., II, para. 86. "Mistress of a Family" emphasiz
emphases added.

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 38 BARBARA ARNEIL

three different types of

chapter 15 of the Second
based on the capacity t
chapter is that only the
right to own property an
political power. All other
private sphere) are subje
capacity to own and man
servants are subject to a
"conjugal power" and s
groups are excluded by L
owning property (such
cussed.
In his well-known theory of property, Locke argues that it is the
labour of the free man that first creates the right to exclude others from
using either the fruit of the land or the soil itself. But it is only agrar-
ian labour or "tilling, planting, subduing" that underpins the right to
property in the land. This type of labour (through the application of
reason and industry) not only begins property ownership, but also
defines citizenship; thus the "Devonshire farmer" is the ideal citizen
in Locke's chapter on property.27 Claims to property made by other
ethnic groups, such as American Indians (for example on the basis of
occupancy or hunting grounds) are explicitly excluded. They cannot
therefore own land or claim any political power. They are not, in the
words of Locke himself, either "industrious or rational."28
Locke goes on to argue that it is not only the lack of industry and
reason that limits Aboriginal claims to land, but their lack of money:
What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Acres
of excellent Land, ready cultivated ... in the middle of ... America,
where he had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the World .... It
would not be worthy the inclosing, and we should see him give up again
to the wild Common of Nature, whatever was more than would supply the
Conveniencies of Life to be had there for him and his Family.29

27 Locke compares those inhabiting "the wild woods and uncultivated wast of
America... without any improvement" with those living on the land in "Devon-
shire where they are well cultivated," concluding that the latter are citizens in a
civil society worthy of government; the former continue to exist in a state of
nature, and are not yet ready for proprietorship or citizenship (II, para. 37). It
should be noted that the Devonshire farmer is compared not only to the American
Indian, but also to the Spanish conquistador, both in colonial documents of
Locke, as well as writings on trade in the Americas. For Locke, it is a specific
Protestant, English form of labour which begins property and citizenship.
28 Locke states: "God gave the World... to the use of the Industrious and Rational,
(and Labour was to be his Title to it)" (II, para. 34).
29 Ibid., II, para. 48.

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 Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 39

Thus, for Locke, it is the European colonialist, w

money and commerce, who has the right to
"thousands" of acres in America; Indians have th
for their families. Locke's colonial corresponden
on economics reinforce this point of view of pro
sion, citizenship.30 The long-term implication
female Aboriginal people(s) in North America, i
either land or citizenship are, needless to say, pro
tantly, the division between "Indian" and Europ
theory is likely to be a far more significant distinct
women, in both historical and contemporary term
of authority between husband and wife.
In Locke's theory, servants, either male or fem
prevented from owning property and exercisin
they do engage in agrarian labour, because the va
goods or land accrues to their master. In definin
industrious citizen, Locke states: "The Grass m
Turfs my servant has cut ... become my prop
was mine, removing them out of that common st
fixed my Property in them."32 Labour done by s
head of the household, and the products of thei
property of the freeman. Thus both female a
excluded from owning property beyond the w
result of a contract with their master. Again th
vants' exclusion from property and citizenship is
tract but the employment contract.

30 See for example: John Locke, "Notes for an Essay on

MS c. 30, Folio 18, 1674; "Notes on Trade in Sweden, D
land," Bodleian Library, MS c. 30, folio 38, 1696; and
the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raisin
Patrick Kelly, ed., Locke on Money, 2 vols. (Oxford: O
1991).
31 This is not to say that Aboriginal people do not have the potential to become
property owners, if they choose to be "industrious and rational," but as Locke
makes explicit in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in order to
become truly "rational," one must accept the first principles of understanding,
namely a monotheistic religion and the "arts and sciences" of European learn-
ing, as well as the principles of European commerce (Essay Concerning Human
Understanding [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975]). The difficulty is that in meet-
ing all the requirements of Locke's property owner, the Amerindian must in so
many significant ways become European. For a more extensive treatment of the
role of colonialism and America's First Nations in Locke's theory of property,
see Barbara Arneil, John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonial-
ism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
32 Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 28.

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40 BARBARA ARNEIL

Slaves are subject to d

erty at all." Slaves we
grounds: from his colon
etors in Carolina, Lock
and American "Indians
tions of Carolina, penne
"shall have absolute pow
ther, the Instructions
claim that slavery of Afr
a just war.34As Laslett
did so much to draft
enslaved because they w
feited their lives 'by so
self, held shares in the
temporary laws writt
addition to article 112
enslavement of "Indian
authority in the way th
was at least one group
be incorporated into th
prietor. But their rel
unique to their colonial
non-agrarian activities
had no real claim over p
Finally, it is clear tha
position in relation to p
property in goods and l
authority of the free c

33 Ibid., II, para. 24, note 2

tutions of Carolina," in B.
olina (New York, 1836). For
see Wayne Glausser, "Thre
of the History of Ideas 51
34 Peter Laslett, "John L
(1695-1698)," William and
American History, 1957), 1
35 Locke, Two Treatises, II,
and race in Locke's though
nell University Press, 19
Nations, see 86-88.
36 In 1674, Locke invested
200 pounds more the follo
phy [Oxford: Oxford Unive
37 "Temporary Laws to be
Carolina," Collections of t
1897), 367.

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Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 41

be any disagreement between husband and wife.

daily authority over human property in the privat
the labour of servants and the lives of slaves) is share
and wife, and may be disposed of in accordance wit
will.
Thus Locke's hierarchy of authority, based on rac
der creates distinctions between groups in regard to
the private sphere. His theory seems to imply that
have ultimate authority, but it has been shown tha
similar authority within marriage over their childr
slaves (their shared human property within the pri
vants have rights over their own lives and wages (t
property) but not their labour (until the contract an
the domestic sphere of their master comes to an en
should not be enslaved into the domestic sphere of an
over basic subsistence (fruits and animals of the ear
property in land (for a variety of reasons) and, final
have no rights of property whatsoever and are to be
the private sphere (and therefore the group who can
jected to despotic power). It is crucial to note that i
three categories discussed (servant, Amerindian, Af
are both men and women, whose status in relation to
weighs the differences between them based on gend
the free citizen and his wife who are differentiated m
of gender.
One of the most important consequences of Lock
the different axes of power which are likely to for
begin to challenge the strictures imposed upon them
servants and female slaves will view both their male
females in other groups, in different ways. For exa
wife of the freeman, who sees her husband as the al
female servants, slaves, "Indians," and African sla
with their male counterparts a similar experience of
which may transcend any sense of difference based
creates, within a Lockean theoretical framework, bot
tial coalitions as one strives towards full citizenship,
ceptions as to who may be the obstacle to this g
wives who want greater freedom, in Locke's theo
wrestle power from their husbands as the main obst
dom. Female servants and slaves, or female "Indians
on the other hand, would likely see their male co
obstacles, but as comrades in any struggle for fr
likely view both free citizens and their wives as po
These distinctions are important to feminist analyse
theory with regard to both the perception of different

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42 BARBARA ARNEIL

as to the nature of th
nature of the relationsh
in bringing about the n
As we shall see in the
Two Treatises, most of
free citizen (when clear
and slaves), and concent
their husbands (while f
to their female servant
as the all-powerful pub
to men in the servant/
along both class and ra
wives.38

Second-Wave Feminist
Feminist critics of Wes
private divide to be o
women have been exclu
In 1974, a collection o
and Louise Lamphere en
simple premise:
In what follows it will b
and "public" provides the
identify and explore the
tural, social and econom
tion will be more or less
tems, it does provide a u
activities of the sexes.39

The impact of this grou

of a bifurcation of the
ciplines. Rosaldo, Lamph
book were searching f
"women everywhere la
authority," that is a un
nomenon. This quest fo

38 For an analysis of the m

Mills, The Racial Contract
basis of his own work, m
analysis" of the social cont
of the relations between th
address the specific experie
39 Michelle Zimbalist Rosa
Society (Stanford: Stanford

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Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 43

cultures has been challenged by many feminist schol

tally misguided. Linda Nicholson comments: "As fem
is not one fact but many, interlinked with specificit
also should we abandon the search for one cross-cult
Rosaldo herself, in later works, recognized the d
the search for universal meanings in all cultural fo
public/private dualism was employed in a more scal
effort to understand specific "Western" disciplines
such a dualism was considered to be more relevant. One such effort
was the work of Western feminist political theorists, who explored the
role of the public/private divide in order to explain the development of
Western political thought and its implications for the gendered prac-
tice of politics in Western societies.
Two of the classic second-wave feminist critiques of the public/
private divide were Susan Moller Okin's Women in Western Political
Thought and Carole Pateman's The Sexual Contract. Both of these
feminist theorists uncovered and made explicit the public/private
divide in Western political thought and, more importantly, began to
analyze the implication of this division on the relationship between
gender and politics. Many other feminists have built on this founda-
tion, developing a body of work around Ancient Greek, modern liberal
and Marxist political theories, which both deconstruct the various
manifestations of the public/private divide in these theories and con-
struct a feminist re-conceptualization of politics. A final feminist critic
whom we shall consider, is Elizabeth Spelman, whose Inessential
Woman, published several years after Okin's book and the same year
as Pateman's The Sexual Contract, began to address the question of
differences amongst women in Western political thought.42
Okin begins her Women in Western Political Thought, with the
claim that the private sphere is critical to the theoretical exclusion of
women in Western political theory.
First, the most important factor influencing the philosophers' concep-
tions of, and arguments about, women has been the view that each of
them held concerning the family. Those who have regarded the family
as a natural and necessary institution have defined women by their sex-
ual, procreative and child rearing functions within it. This has led to the

40 Linda Nicholson, Gender and History: The Limits of Social Theory in the Age of
the Family (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 102.
41 Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo, "The Use and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections
on Feminism and Cross-Cultural Understanding," Signs 5 (1980), 389-417.
42 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist
Thought (Boston: Beacon Press), 1988.

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 44 BARBARA ARNEIL

prescription of a code of
distinctlydifferent from

Okin's words belie the

"wife" of the free cit
rearing" and "procreat
tionship between husba
In reference to Locke
men's equals for some
mitment [he] concludes
legal and customary su
women in Lockean th
citizens. In the conclusion, she writes: "In the works of all the
philosophers discussed..,. the existence of a distinct sphere of private,
family life ... leads to the exaggeration of women's biological differ-
ences from men ... Male citizens in these ... societies own their
wives, and this is obviously untenable if men and women are t
equal."46 The reference to biological differences and the ease w
which Okin slips from women and men to male citizens and "wive
in this quotation again underlines Okin's assumption that "wife of f
citizen" equals woman.
Though Okin will go on to critique the definitions describ
above, she does not challenge the idea that her unit of analysis fo
gendered critique of Western political thought should be "the wif
as described by Locke and others. While it is true that Locke
"woman" and wife interchangeably on many occasions, it is
clear, as discussed in the previous section, that servants and sla
were recognized by Locke as both male and female. Thus, the probl
with second-wave analysis of Locke is that his explicit distinct
between servants, slaves and wives are not seen as important to a g
dered analysis.
Okin also often distinguishes between "slaves" on the one hand
and "women" on the other, as if the two groups were mutually exc
sive and there were no possibility that one could be a woman a

43 Okin, Women in Western Political Thought, 9. While Okin does not exam
Locke's writings as fully as other political theorists, she was included because
both the general importance of her contribution to Western political thought
the particular relevance of her views on slavery and marriage.
44 This is not to say that many female slaves and servants were not also subjec
sexual labour, as shall be discussed, but the general notion of pro-creation, ch
rearing within the context of the family is largely in reference to the free citize
wives role in the private sphere.
45 Okin, Women in Western Political Thought, 200.
46 Ibid., 274-75. The last part of this quote refers to Plato and Aristotle.

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 Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 45

slave simultaneously.47 bell hooks comments on

"black women" being made non-existent by the
rizing with regard to "black" and "women."
America has so had their identity socialized out
black women.... When black people are talked ab
to be on black men; and when women are talked
to be on white women." 48 Similarly, Okin's ana
male when she is referring to slaves, and wives w
to women, thus erasing the historical and th
female slaves.
Okin has addressed some of the critiques which have been raised
with regard to difference by other feminists, but she remains commit-
ted to the view that gender is paramount. "[Feminists should not]
jump to the conclusions that gender is simply one among many
equally important differences, that differences amongst women are as
or even more important than similarities, and that to generalize about
women is always, and necessarily, misleading and or oppressive to
some."49 She offers as a defence that "feminist analyses" cannot be
criticized for not focusing on "class, or slave status, or race, as on
gender" because "this is not what they set out to do."'5 Okin con-
cludes that feminists, like herself, are entitled to make the case that
sexism is "a discrete form of oppression," and secondly that theorists
who call for such a multiplicity of identities to be taken into account
must demonstrate how failing to do so "omits or distorts the experi-
ences of women other than those few the theorist is allegedly focused
on.,,51
To analyze the role of "women" in Western political theory with-
out considering the issues of class, slavery or race limits the analysis,
as has been shown, to a subset of women, that is "wives of free citi-
zens," and erases the specific nature of the oppression of other groups

47 Okin says, in relation to Aristotle, "the justification of slavery as natural ... the
same considerations apply to ... the natural position of women" (ibid., 81). In
the conclusion, she writes again of slaves and women as two different groups of
people: "Aristotle's entire political philosophy is founded ... on the premise that
all the other members of the population-slaves and artisans as well as women-
exist in order to perform their respective functions for the few free males who
participate fully in citizenship" (276; emphasis added).
48 bell hooks, Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism (Boston: South End
Press, 1981), 7; emphasis added.
49 Okin, "Feminism and Political Theory," 129. Some of this critique is also
included in the "Afterword" of Women in Western Political Thought (7th ed.,
1992).
50 Okin, "Feminism and Political Theory," 128.
51 Okin, "Afterword," Women in Western Political Thought, 327-28.

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46 BARBARA ARNEIL

of women.52 Moreover
that the wives of free
both historical and theo
Okin acknowledges tha
their slaves and servant
ful that the managemen
ried out as closely in acc
it were left entirely in
of the family."'53 Howe
ferentialmight mean to
The problem with Okin
their analysis to one sub
they claim to be exami
ism, and its implication
abeth Spelman's referen
ples that seem less rele
because the historical r
slavery that the issue o
thought generally, and
feminists who seek to in
The role of the family
citizens and their wives
fully analyzed by Carole
The way in which women
vate life and the public w
complicated reality is the
are properly subject to me
tic sphere. Men properly i
tial feminist argument is
ostensible individualism a
patriarchal reality of a soc
women by men.55

Pateman argues that Fi

subordination in the pr
ral based on him being
the governed (that is
society.56 Pateman conc

52 It should be noted that

bians and unmarried straig
Feminism, esp. chaps. 3 and
53 Okin, Women in Western
54 Okin, " Afterword," Wom
55 Pateman, The Disorder of
56 Ibid., 121.

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 Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 47

patriarchalist in his arguments concerning the

public authority (that is authority must be based
erned rather than authority of the father as Filmer
ertheless continues to support patriarchy when
within the private sphere or the family. To und
are excluded from the public sphere, it is necess
man, to understand two inter-related concepts: "
ual contract."
The social contract of Locke is, for Pateman, essentially based on
a fraternity (contract between equals or "brothers") rather than patri-
archy (authority based on the relationship between father and son).
Pateman makes the assertion that this fraternity includes "all men."
"Patriarchal right is extended in an orderly fashion to the fraternity
(all men) and given legitimate social expression. Civil individuals
form a fraternity because they are bound together by a bond as
men."57' Moreover, this fraternity excludes "women" in two important
ways: "Women are 'opposite' to and outside the fraternal social con-
tract and its civil law in two senses. First, they are ... excluded from
an agreement through which the brothers inherit their legacy of patri-
archal sex right and legitimize their claim over women's bodies and
ability to give birth. Second, the civil law encapsulates all that women
lack.'58" This fraternal contract is thus only possible, Pateman argues,
by virtue of a sexual contract between men governing access to
women, "the law of male sex-right," which creates the private sphere
and the patriarchal authority within families.59 Pateman makes clear
that patriarchy involves both paternal rule (over children) and conjugal
rule (over wives), the latter preceding, by definition, the former. "A
man's power as a father comes after he has exercised the patriarchal
right of a man (a husband) over a woman (wife)."60 This sexual con-
tract, Pateman argues, is "very hard to discern, because it is displaced
onto the marriage contract."61 Thus the social contract which founds
civil society in Locke's political theory is not a contract between free
and equal individuals in the state of nature (that is, all adults) but
explicitly a contract between male heads of households transforming
political authority from a patriarchy to a fraternity. At the same time,
the marital couple is both prior to and beyond the realm of politics in
social contract theory. And the authority between the couple continues
to be based on the natural, patriarchal right of the husband.

57 Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 113.

58 Pateman, The Disorder of Women, 45.
59 Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 2.
60 Ibid., 3.
61 Ibid., 110; emphasis added.

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 48 BARBARA ARNEIL

The two sides of Pate

ated by a social contra
men "as men," and the
by a sexual contract, ar
male fraternity ignore
are not bound togeth
men." bell hooks has
groups of men in one
equally in all forms of
power differences betw
der, and differences am
provides very little an
Many men are exclude
position, but also by ra
The private sphere of
failing to recognize t
example, female "Ind
sphere," as they are st
male counterparts. Thu
much as males for eith
with "friendship" an
spondence from Locke
"women" as defined by
particular group of wo
Finally, crucial distin
the private sphere of t
man, who writes at som
ferent kinds of contrac
and the marriage contr
common with slaves a
mately based upon desp
and wives all have essen
zen; oppression by a co
The employment cont
exchange; both contract

62 bell hooks, Feminist Th

1984), 68.
63 Shaftesbury tells Stephen Bull, his deputy in Carolina, that it would be "very
agreeable to our design ... to get and continue the friendship and assistance of
the Indians and make them useful without force or injury" (Letter from Shaftes-
bury to S. Bull, August 13, 1673, Shaftesbury's Papers, Public Record Office,
London, Bundle 48, No. 55, 136). It was also assumed that "Indian" women
would not be taken as wives of English colonists either, even though there are
some famous historical exceptions.

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 Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 49

social relations of subordination .... There are of co

to enforce both contracts; husbands use physical vio
impressive array of coercive measures, sanctioned
able to employers and the wider structure of patr
makes disobedience costly for both wives and worke

In the final chapter, she argues that wives and pr

unpaid labour of housework and the labour of p
ples of contracts which still harbour elements of
tude and male sex-right backed by coercive forc
claims to have overcome the contradiction of sl
and prostitution contracts, contracts to which w
party, have always been tainted by the odour of s
embarrassing reminder of 'brutal origins.' "65
Thus Pateman is arguing that while slavery h
its despotic "scent" can still be detected within t
By describing marriage, employment and slave
along a similar gradient of oppressive subordi
coercive force, Pateman minimizes the differenc
differential of wife, female servant, and most
slave.
Unlike Okin, Pateman does devote some atten
predicament of female slaves, beginning with G
that "the first slaves were women."66 For Patem
citizen's sex-right to the female slave, the same p
the marital contract, which defines the subordin
"The question of why men were killed and wom
admit of only one answer; women slaves could
than men slaves. Women can be used sexually by
being used as a labour force, and through sexual
force can be reproduced."67
In constructing all of these comparisons, Pat
differences between male and female slaves and the similarities between
female slaves and wives.68 Thus she concludes that since "sex-right to
women's bodies" is the critical thing that marks female slaves, the
foundation for the oppression of wives and female slaves is basically

64 Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 148. Pateman states: "The wife was the first slave
of the master" (125).
65 Ibid., 230.
66 Ibid., 65; emphasis in original.
67 Ibid., 65.
68 This is not to say that the difference of experience between male and female
slaves is not of importance in our understanding of the gendered nature of slav-
ery, rather, I am arguing that female slaves have similarities and differences with
both wives and male slaves; all aspects should be analysed if the female slave is
to be fully understood.

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 50 BARBARA ARNEIL

the same: the unfetter

and the ability to give
degree. Pateman's focu
acknowledge the full
slave, and consequently
and differences from
the forms of power to
that of male sex right.
towards his female slav
wife because of the au
and theoretically, in re
tado succinctly describ
America: white women were married to white men, black women
were owned by white men.69 Any offspring of these two different
types of unions would also have a completely different status. Hurtado
introduces the final, and perhaps most important gap in Pateman's
analysis of contractarianism: race, and, in particular, the role it plays
in the lines drawn between wives and female slaves. Pateman herself,
acknowledges that her analysis of contract fails to deal with the racial
dimension:

The story of the political genesis needs to be told again from yet
another perspective. The men who (are said to) make the original con-
tract are white men..,. and the slave contract [is that which] legitimizes
the rule of white over black. I have touched on the slave contract only
where germane to the retrieval of the story of the sexual contract.70

Her last sentence reveals the problem underpinning the construction of

the "sexual contract": that the relationship between masters and
female slaves can only really be "touched on" even though for female
slaves the central form of oppression is that of slavery or race rather
than gender.
To understand more fully the importance of Locke's theories and
their implications for different groups of women, one should consider
his theory of property in light of commentary by feminists who have
analyzed the historical relationship of women of colour, in particular
African-American women, to property, based on the "liberal" premises
found in Locke. When one begins a commentary by incorporating both
gender and race into an analysis of the private sphere, both historical
and theoretical differences between women become immediately clear.

69 Aida Hurtado, "Relating to Privilege: Seduction and Rejection in the Subordina-

tion of White Women and Women of Color," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society 14 (1989), 833-55, 841.
70 Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 221.

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 Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 51

Spelman's Inessential Woman, analyzes the

sion in feminist thought. While Spelman does no
ories in any depth, her chapter on Aristotle
female slaves:

What Aristotle says about free women is quite different from what he
says about the nature of slave women. An account of "Aristotle's views
about women" which doesn't inquire seriously into what he says about
slave women not only announces that the position of slave women is
theoretically insignificant, it also gives a radically incomplete picture of
what he says about women who are not slaves.7'

She reaches the conclusion that the problem is the way in which Aris-
totle defines "masculinity."
The crucial distinction in Aristotle ... is an explicit or implicit concept
of masculinity; what slaves and women lack are characteristically mas-
culine traits. Rationality is not male-but is masculine. And masculin-
ity is a gender concept. What finally separates those meant to rule, in
both Plato and Aristotle, is being characterized as masculine."72

Spelman warns feminism against adopting an essentialist, that is,

undifferentiated, view of women: "Herein lies a cautionary tale for
feminists who insist that underneath or beyond the differences among
women there must be some shared identity ... the phrase 'as a
woman' is the Trojan horse of feminist ethnocentrism."73 It is the con-
tradictory and multifaceted nature of each person's identity within the
polis, dependent upon a number of cross-cutting factors that creates
the various groupings of individuals with different levels of power or
authority in relation to others which needs to be analyzed. As Leslie
Heywood and Jennifer Drake comment of the requirements of a third-
wave feminist analysis: "A third wave goal that comes directly out of
learning from these histories... is the development of modes of think-
ing that can come to terms with the multiple, constantly shifting bases
of oppression in relation to the multiple, interpenetrating axes of
identity."74
Such divisions among groups of women, and their relationship to
property, both theoretically and historically, have profound implica-

71 Spelman, Inessential Woman, 38.

72 Ibid., 54.
73 Ibid., 13. While Spelman rightly insists on the incorporation of multiplicity into
the feminist analysis of Aristotle and political theory generally, her own analysis
seems to return us to an essentialism based on the concept of masculinity.
Although she criticizes Western political theory for giving priority to masculinity,
can it not be shown that the distinctions made between Greeks and non-Greek
"barbarians" are important ethnic distinctions which cannot be reduced to the
purely gendered ideas of "masculinity" versus "non-masculinity?"
74 Heywood and Drake, eds., Third Wave Agenda, 3.

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 52 BARBARA ARNEIL

tions for the choice o

Donna Harraway argu
tance has different me
the United States. Fir
female wife and slave
role of slave as proper
ence is the root of dive
To give birth (unfreely)
to give birth (unfreely)
reason that "reproducti
States prominently hing
example, their freedom
ment, infant mortality,
quate housing, racist edu
wars. For American whi
the ownership of one's
has more readily focus
pregnancy, abortion, an
turned on the control of
tution of white females as women.75

Secondly, despotic power exercised over female slaves must also be

distinguished from that exercised over male slaves. Female slaves
were different from male slaves because such despotic power included
the unconditional sexual right to the bodies of female slaves by their
masters.

Black women were constituted simultaneously racially and sexually-

as marked female (animal, sexualized, and without rights), but not as
woman (human, potential wife, conduit for the name of the father)-in
a specific institution, slavery, that excluded them from "culture"
defined as the circulation of signs through the system of marriage.76

At the same time, as hooks argues, male slaves have a higher status
relative to female slaves, paralleling the relationship of citizens to the
wives. In both cases, it is the latter's closeness to the private sphere
which creates the difference in value. "Black men were not forced to
assume a role in colonial American society regarded as 'feminine' ...
few if any black men labored as domestics alongside black women in
the white household (with the possible exception of butlers, whose sta-
tus was still higher than that of a maid)."77 Finally despite the differ-

75 Donna Haraway, "Ecc Homo, Ain't (Ar'n't) I a Woman, and Inappropriat'd Oth-
ers: The Human in a Post-Humanist Landscape," in Judith Butler and Joan W.
Scott, eds., Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge), 86-100, 95.
76 Ibid., 93-94.
77 hooks, Ain't I a Woman? 22.

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Women as Wives, Servants and Slaves 53

ences between female and male slaves, either the

cally, their shared oppression creates a bond
emphasis by Pateman and other second-wave fem
links between wives and female slaves has always
links between female and male slaves, born of a c
despotic rule. hooks comments of the natural affin
women who share a similar form of historical opp
Their life experiences had shown them that they hav
with men of their race and/or class group than bourg
They know that sufferings and hardships women face
ties; they also know the sufferings and hardships m
have compassion for them. They have had the experi
with them for a better life.78

Conclusion

Locke makes various distinctions among different groups of individu-

als, based ostensibly upon their capacity for reason and (a specifi
form of) industry, but carrying with them differentiation based upo
gender, race and class. While class analysis has attempted to analyze
the economic distinctions among different groups of men in the publi
sphere and second wave-feminist analysis has attempted to examine
the gendered role of wives of free men within the private sphere, th
explicit divisions, in Western political thought, between different groups
of women in the private sphere, and the degree to which power i
attached to those differences, has been ignored.
Put simply, it is clear that the ground-breaking feminist analyses
of thinkers like Pateman and Okin need to be taken a step further t
analyze not only the gendered division between the free citizen and hi
wife, but also the multilayered divisions within the private spher
among wives, servants and slaves. In particular, recognizing the exis-
tence of female servants and slaves in Locke's theory is to incorporate
not only the diversity amongst women in the traditional private spher
of Western political theory, but the hierarchy of power which corre-
sponds to that diversity. Moreover, the theoretical and historical dis
tinctions drawn by Locke among groups of people (both male an
female) based on ethnicity, and their different relationships to the pr
vate or domestic sphere (for example, African slaves who were com-
pletely submerged within the private sphere, or American "Indians,"
who were never to be enslaved or incorporated into the private sphere
must be fully explored. These distinctions with regard to the privat
sphere, based on gender, ethnic and class differences, are the theoreti

78 hooks, Feminist Theory, 68-69.

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54 BARBARA ARNEIL

cal foundations upon w

built, and continue to b
precisely how empower
it is the distinction in t
authority over his wife
the higher levels of au
slaves, it is clear that fr
human property in the p
of these other groups i
varied, distinctions whic
nist analysis of Western

79 This analysis of different

sphere, is not an entirely a
private sphere in Western p
ple, in the discussions abou
hold work. Some feminist c
care workers can be defined
"the racialization of househ
tan, I see playgrounds filled
dren" (Danzy Senna, "To
analysis of this phenomen
ulis, eds., Not One of the F
University of Toronto Press,

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