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Abstract .

The late 1960s saw the emergence of environmental awareness and concerns, and since the
1970s, a variety of accords, organisations, and systems for international environmental
governance have evolved. Almost all environmental challenges, whether local or global, are
closely related to the dynamics of economic and political decision-making. Many worldwide
political processes have dealt with the contentious field of sustainable development as well as the
related themes of environment and development since the late 1980s, and especially since the
1992 Rio Summit. While well-established viewpoints in the field of international relations theory
offer valuable insights into the nature and consequences of these endeavours, global
environmental concerns pose significant obstacles to national public policies. Gaining a better
understanding of the causes and effects of environmental change on a global scale is crucial to
improving our ability to devise effective responses. Changing development patterns to support
sustainability is the 21st century’s problem.
Introduction
Global environmental politics is a relatively new field of study within international relations that focuses on issues related to the
interaction of humans and the natural world. As early as the mid-19th century, scholars wrote about the role of natural resources
in global security and political economy. However, much of the literature prior to the 1980s related specifically to resource
extraction and development issues. It was only in the 1980s and into the 1990s that global environmental politics began to
establish itself as a distinct field with its own dedicated journals and publishers, and the focus of study expanded to include global
environmental problems such as ozone depletion, climate change, biodiversity loss, deforestation, and desertification. It has
emerged as a center of interdisciplinary work that integrates research from a range of fields, including geography, economics,
history, law, biology, and numerous others. The interdisciplinary approach makes it difficult to define the boundaries in this
rather immense field of study. The focus in this article will be on global environmental politics research that falls primarily
within the larger field of international relations. Global environmental problems present many unique challenges and have thus
spawned a range of subfields of study. Global environmental problems frequently involve substantial scientific complexity and
ambiguity. This fact has produced a wide-ranging scholarship on the relationships between science and policy. The very long
timeframes of both the consequences of environmental problems as well as the efforts to address them create a number of
governance challenges given the much shorter political timeframes of politicians and diplomats. In addition, because
environmental problems typically do not respect borders, they pose challenges for international cooperation, which has thus
produced a growing literature on global environmental governance. The widespread potential for massive economic, political,
and ecological dislocation from the consequences of global environmental problems as well as from the potential policies to
address those problems have led scholars to study global environmental politics from every paradigm within international
relations as well as drawing on research in numerous other disciplines. Finally, efforts to address the consequences of
environmental problems have raised controversial ethical and distributive-justice questions that have produced an important
philosophical literature within global environmental politics. Global environmental politics has thus emerged as a rich and
diverse area of scholarship.
Global environmental politics
Global Environmental Politics examines relationships between global political forces and
environmental change, with particular attention given to the implications of local-global
interactions for environmental management, as well as to the implications of environmental
change and environmental governance for world politics.

Environment is now a key component of international relations and,


given the rising attention climate change receives in particular
(Welzer, 2012), a matter that now has high priority in diplomatic
circles. With states in danger of disappearing below rising seas and
major disruptions to water supplies and food systems projected for
future decades if steps to curb greenhouse gas emissions are not
taken soon, environmental matters have become central to
contemporary international politics, and to their academic study
(Webersik, 2010). Environment emerged after the Cold War as a priority
matter for scholarly analysis because scholars are concerned with
matters of pollution, conservation and resources; but also because
there are interesting analytical puzzles surrounding how the
international system deals with them and the changes resulting from
the introduction of new modes of governance, institutions, agencies,
knowledge and norms. How all these aspects might be studied as
international relations is also not a simple matter, but given their
importance they have increasingly impinged on scholarship. Likewise,
the rise of International Relations as an Anglo-American ‘discipline’ – a
matter more closely related to the rise of industrial powers than
usually acknowledged (Ashworth, 2014) – has shaped the kinds of
questions asked about environment and the assumptions about how
environmental politics is to be included in the field. Frequently, this
has led to technical issues of regime design, compliance and funding
mechanisms being focused on matters of justice or perspectives from
marginal places. A partial response to this were interesting case
studies on social movements and how their norms have impinged on
the formal deliberations of states and intergovernmental agencies
(Lipschutz and Mayer, 1996), a matter of governance more widely
understood than the narrower concerns of formal state government
(Young, 1994).
Critics, who argue that environmental management arrangements that
focus on technical matters frequently occlude complicated processes
of global injustice and the displacement of marginal populations in the
global polity, have challenged this narrow analytic focus and raised
larger questions of global power, justice and conflict (Sachs and
Santarius, 2007). The result is an intense series of academic debates
in International Relations and cognate fields about what to study, for
whom and with what policy implications for governance broadly
conceived. Only sometimes do the traditional core themes of
International Relations concerned with war, peace and security
impinge directly on the environmental discussions.

‘The Environment’
Many of the themes now frequently included under the rubric
‘environment’ are not necessarily understood in these terms by those
who are affected by atmospheric change, water purity concerns,
species loss, industrial pollution, land appropriation, deforestation and
numerous other practices. The term ‘environment’ itself has also
recently encompassed longstanding human debates about the role of
nature in shaping the human fate and how humanity has in turn
transformed natural conditions (Marsh, 1864; Glacken, 1967; Robin et
al., 2013). Using environment as a term often lumps concerns with
industrial pollution, technical fixes to production systems criticised for
causing consumption (Dauvergne, 2008), and fears on the part of many
in the Global North that population growth will overwhelm agricultural
productivity, leading to famine and social disaster (Robertson, 2012).

There has been a long-standing suspicion, by at least some in the


Global South, that the formulation of environment is one that is used to
control Southern peoples; clearly, in many cases environmental
measures are used as a justification for undertaking development
projects that cause displacements and suffering for poor people all in
the name of universal causes (Miller, 1995). Traditional modes of
managing forests, limiting hunting, and other communal arrangements
are frequently not a good fit for state-based governance structures,
the entities that are usually the subject of international agreements.
The extensive use of the term sustainable development, now codified
in the recently adopted overarching 2015 United Nations (UN)
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), has long been a compromise
argument ostensibly dealing with environmental protection while
simultaneously offering aid and compensation to Southern states for
what is sometimes understood as forgone development opportunities.
Likewise, this rubric encompasses all sorts of technical innovations,
matters of ecological modernisation that supposedly allow industrial
processes to proceed without pollution. These discussions have been
key to the dominant concern in recent environmental matters, the
question of climate change, and how to tackle what is now understood
as a global problem (Bulkeley et al., 2014).

Most recently, as the sheer scale of human activities gradually dawns


on policymakers and the interconnections between various Earth
system processes become clearer, both in new historical research
(Davis, 2001; McNeill 2000; Hornborg, et al., 2007) and in scientific
assessments of global change (Ellis, 2011; Steffen et al., 2004; United
Nations Environment Program, 2012); the environment discussions
have increasingly focused on how the rich and powerful parts of
humanity will shape the future configuration of the planet. Clearly
there are numerous failures of governance in trying to tackle the
interconnected problems of what is increasingly called the age of the
Anthropocene (Galaz, 2014). Will rapid climate change lead to
deliberate attempts to change the atmosphere to slow or counteract
global warming as in geoengineering, or will the powerful states and
corporations act quickly to preclude the necessity of such drastic, and
potentially conflict causing measures? While it may be premature to
call current circumstances ‘the age of ecology’ (Radkau, 2014), such
considerations are increasingly shaping matters of global politics.

seeks to publish on a broad range of issues, from water to waste management to climate change.

San Diego is the busiest corridor for illegal crossings. But routes change...

How all these aspects might be studied as international relations is


also not a simple matter, but given their importance they have
increasingly impinged on scholarship. Likewise, the rise of
International Relations as an Anglo-American ‘discipline’ – a matter
more closely related to the rise of industrial powers than usually
acknowledged (Ashworth, 2014) – has shaped the kinds of questions
asked about environment and the assumptions about how
environmental politics is to be included in the field. Frequently, this
has led to technical issues of regime design, compliance and funding
mechanisms being focused on matters of justice or perspectives from
marginal places. A partial response to this were interesting case
studies on social movements and how their norms have impinged on
the formal deliberations of states and intergovernmental agencies
(Lipschutz and Mayer, 1996), a matter of governance more widely
understood than the narrower concerns of formal state government
(Young, 1994).

Critics, who argue that environmental management arrangements that


focus on technical matters frequently occlude complicated processes
of global injustice and the displacement of marginal populations in the
global polity, have challenged this narrow analytic focus and raised
larger questions of global power, justice and conflict (Sachs and
Santarius, 2007). The result is an intense series of academic debates
in International Relations and cognate fields about what to study, for
whom and with what policy implications for governance broadly
conceived. Only sometimes do the traditional core themes of
International Relations concerned with war, peace and security
impinge directly on the environmental discussions.

Science and Politics


Prior to the 1960s there were precursors to the idea of a single global
entity that might be regulated and managed; such things as
conventions on migratory birds, like the one signed by the United
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), on behalf of Canada in 1918,
did attempt to grapple with what is now understood as the
international dimensions of nature conservation. But it is only in the
second half of the twentieth century that these became a focus for
widespread attention by academics and policymakers (see Brown,
1954; Thomas, 1956). This has been driven by a combination of rapid
economic growth, political pressure from domestic environmental
constituencies worried about pollution, population, parks and nature
protection, and growing international environmental organisations
epitomised by the rise of Greenpeace in the 1970s, as well as crucial
innovations in science that have focused attention on issues that
require international cooperation to address, perhaps mostly pointedly,
the depletion of stratospheric ozone.

The rise of concern about what became known as a global


environment is also in part a spin-off of Cold War concerns with
geophysics. The international geophysics year (in fact 18 months) in
1957/8 was driven in part by efforts and scientific cooperation across
the Cold War divide, but also by military concerns about dominating
and controlling atmospheric spaces. (What has become the iconic
graph of our times, the so-called Keeling curve of rising carbon dioxide
concentrations in the atmosphere measured atop a mountain in
Hawai’i, has its origins in the international geophysics year.) The
fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried around the earth by winds
made it clear that the global atmosphere was one interconnected
system. These concerns lead to the partial nuclear test ban treaty in
the early 1960s, a treaty that was simultaneously an attempt to
constrain the arms race between the superpowers, and one that was
also the first global atmospheric environmental treaty (Soroos, 1997).

As Edwards (2010) makes clear, these scientific endeavours, and in


particular the emergence of meteorology and weather forecasting, and
the subsequent invention of weather satellites have been crucial parts
of the rise of a global sensibility as the backdrop for human activities.
While global trade and television may have knitted the world together
in the processes we have now, after the Cold War, come to call
globalisation, some of the key factors have been environmental
sciences and the practical spin-off of relatively reliable weather
forecasts. Likewise, damage done to the stratospheric ozone layer
from high altitude nuclear tests raised further concerns about the
upper atmosphere in the 1950s. These issues of ozone depletion
subsequently came to a head in the 1980s when stratospheric
depletion over the Antarctic caused a flurry of scientific investigations
that confirmed that chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) were scavenging ozone
in the upper atmosphere and threatening terrestrial life due to the
increased penetration of solar Ultraviolet B (UVB) radiation. The
resultant scientific debate fed directly into negotiations to eliminate
CFC production globally and the Montreal Protocol of 1987 and
subsequent extensions of these arrangements to constrain other
ozone depleting substances (Litfin, 1994).

Science also drove rising concerns about pollution in the 1950s,


although the huge death toll from coal fire-generated smog in London,
in particular, did not need much scientific analysis to explain what
happened or prompt the passing of clean air legislation in the UK. In
the US, Rachel Carson’s (1962) book The Silent Spring, with its
analysis of the indirect damage that widespread pesticide use had
caused to ecosystems and bird populations, drew attention to the
unintended effects of the chemical industry and brought intense
pressure to bear to produce regulation of chemical pollution.
Automobile smog in Los Angeles emphasised the environmental
hazards of industrial production and suburbanisation, and connected
up with longstanding issues of urban reform and city planning
(Howard, 1898).

Concerns about resource depletion and shortage of key commodities


have long been at the heart of geopolitical concerns (Le Billon, 2012).
General fears of resource depletion have long preoccupied state
governments; in the late eighteenth century it was fears of wood
shortage and inadequate forestry management. Thomas Malthus
(1970) feared that the population would grow faster than its ability to
feed itself, and his famous essay has shaped many of the predominant
modern narratives that specify scarcity as the human condition, even
as the extraordinary productivity of industrial systems repeatedly
belies the assumption. Likewise, in the 1960s Paul Ehrlich (1968)
linked population concerns drawn from ecological studies of wildlife to
the larger angst over pollution and resource depletion in the US with
his bestseller ‘The Population Bomb’. Early attempts to model the
Earth system included such resource exhaustion patterns and
produced a hugely popular report on ‘The Limits to Growth’ (Meadows
et al., 1974). Richard Falk (1971) explicitly linked population,
inadequate food production and fears of nuclear apocalypse into a
discussion of international relations and global political reform.

These themes all interconnected in the 1960s in the US and the UK, in
particular, and generated what is now known as the environmental
movement (O’Riordan, 1976). The Greenpeace innovation of taking
non-violent direct action to the high seas and using television footage
of the confrontations created political dramas that highlighted the
politics of environment (Wapner, 1996). Simultaneously, the first
pictures of Earth from the Apollo moon programme showed a fragile
blue marble set against the dark backdrop of space confirming a
sensibility of global interconnectedness. A flurry of environmental
legislation was passed in the US at the end of the 1960s and in the
early 1970s. The first ‘Earth Day’ happened in 1970.

San Diego is the busiest corridor for illegal crossings. But routes change...

How all these aspects might be studied as international relations is


also not a simple matter, but given their importance they have
increasingly impinged on scholarship. Likewise, the rise of
International Relations as an Anglo-American ‘discipline’ – a matter
more closely related to the rise of industrial powers than usually
acknowledged (Ashworth, 2014) – has shaped the kinds of questions
asked about environment and the assumptions about how
environmental politics is to be included in the field. Frequently, this
has led to technical issues of regime design, compliance and funding
mechanisms being focused on matters of justice or perspectives from
marginal places. A partial response to this were interesting case
studies on social movements and how their norms have impinged on
the formal deliberations of states and intergovernmental agencies
(Lipschutz and Mayer, 1996), a matter of governance more widely
understood than the narrower concerns of formal state government
(Young, 1994).

Critics, who argue that environmental management arrangements that


focus on technical matters frequently occlude complicated processes
of global injustice and the displacement of marginal populations in the
global polity, have challenged this narrow analytic focus and raised
larger questions of global power, justice and conflict (Sachs and
Santarius, 2007). The result is an intense series of academic debates
in International Relations and cognate fields about what to study, for
whom and with what policy implications for governance broadly
conceived. Only sometimes do the traditional core themes of
International Relations concerned with war, peace and security
impinge directly on the environmental discussions.
Global Environment
All this generated considerable political attention outside the US too,
and the UN Conference on the Human Environment was convened in
Stockholm in 1972. The unofficial background report to the conference
was written by Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos (1972) and titled ‘Only
One Earth’. The NASA cover photograph of ‘Earth rising’ on the British
Penguin edition encapsulated the key message of the report. The
conference was boycotted by the Warsaw Pact countries and attended
by only a few heads of state, but generated considerable attention –
not least when Indira Gandhi insisted that poverty was the worst kind
of pollution and that developed states should not use environmental
arguments to stymie the development aspirations of poor and post-
colonial states. Perhaps the most important legacy of this conference
is that these matters were firmly placed on the international agenda
and the, admittedly very poorly resourced, United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) was established to move deliberations on how the
international community should respond ahead.

Subsequently, discussions on the international law of the sea and


notions of the common heritage of mankind broadened concerns about
environmental matters to cover the oceans as well as terrestrial, outer
space and atmospheric matters (Vogler, 1995). Environmental change
and geopolitics were once again interconnected in 1983, when
research into the possibilities of a nuclear winter in the aftermath of a
nuclear war between the superpowers suggested that prompt
fatalities from nuclear detonations would be followed by a dramatic
fall in global temperatures due to dust and smoke in the atmosphere
(Turco et al., 1983). The ecological consequences from this rapid
onset climate change might, it was argued, terminate civilisation.
These discussions once again linked climate to the central concerns
of international relations, and simultaneously made it clear that human
activity was capable of changing the basic geophysics of the planetary
atmosphere.

Nuclear winter concerns were supplemented by both the Chernobyl


nuclear reactor meltdown in 1986 and the growing alarm about ozone
depletion. Simultaneously, discussions of sustainable development
were afoot leading to the publication of the World Commission on
Environment and Development’s Our Common Future in 1987. The
‘Brundtland Report’ as it is often called, after the Norwegian chair of
the commission, set the stage for the huge UN Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, where the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
was launched. But critics were quick to point out that despite all the
hype about saving the world and dealing with development issues, the
rich and powerful states and corporations were primarily concerned
with business as usual rather than dealing with poverty or new modes
of economic activity that would make the future sustainable for
marginal peoples and places (The Ecologist, 1993).

These rising concerns with environment, as the Cold War wound down,
followed many of the dominant themes in International Relations
scholarship at the time. These approaches continue to shape how
many studies are formulated. Partly their impetus comes from
international relations but it is important to emphasise that they are
also shaped by how environmental issues are framed in domestic
politics, and by larger political trends. The focus on international
organisations and liberal political economy has shaped much of the
discussion of international regimes and the importance of epistemic
communities in facilitating agreements (Keohane and Nye, 1977).
International Relations’ core concern has long been with warfare and
the dangers of and how to prevent international conflict. In the
aftermath of the Cold War conflict theorists looked at environmental
conflict and the possibilities of resource conflicts as a source of
warfare. Larger concerns with political economy have emphasised the
importance of global inequities and the role of production and trade in
shaping how pollution, land use and resource extractions play out
across the globe.
Climate Change
Thinking about climate change in terms of a regime similar to the one
that has successfully constrained ozone depletion (and in particular
restricted greenhouse gas emissions) – while dealing with the pattern
of demands from developing countries that developed ones provide
financial compensation for climate adaptation and forgone
development projects that might rely on carbon fuel systems – has had
limited success despite the Kyoto Protocol negotiated in the 1990s.
Much of the recent International Relations scholarship on climate
change has looked at the finer points of negotiation, the strategies of
bargaining at the Conferences of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC and
more recently the alliances between various international ‘clubs’
(Nordhaus, 2015).

Research has also focused on the financial mechanisms that have


been used as tools in attempts to deal with climate change, carbon
offsets and clean development mechanisms and related market
arrangements in the burgeoning cap and trade schemes around the
world (Newell and Paterson, 2010). But the inadequacy of these
arrangements have become a pressing issue in climate policy and
International Relations scholars have been looking at more complex
ideas of governance that spread well beyond the traditional arenas of
interstate relations (Bulkeley et al., 2014). In the process, they
challenge political scientists to think through what political incentives
might move climate policy forward more efficaciously (Keohane,
2015). This not least because of the continuing discrepancies between
Northern and Southern perspectives on what needs to be done and
who is to blame for climate change (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015).

All this seems to be necessary because there is obviously a large gap


between existing governance mechanisms and the tasks that need to
be tackled in a rapidly changing world (Galaz, 2014). To do so may
require that other aspects of international relations or global politics
engage with the current global situation. Recently, Ken Conca (2015)
has pointed out that within the UN system, environmental matters
have largely been disconnected from efforts to think seriously about
human rights and peace. Dealing with environment as a matter of
better laws between states and better forms of development within
them has ignored UN concerns with peace and with human rights.
Perhaps, Conca (2015) suggests, tackling environment in terms of
rights and peace making might lead to more useful advances in both
policy and scholarly inquiry.
Anthropocene Futures
While state sovereignty is a principle of world order that underpins the
current system, it has long been clear that environmental matters are
no respecter of frontiers (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008). This insight is
exemplified by the use of the term Anthropocene to emphasise that
the rich and powerful parts of humanity are causing the sixth
extinction event in the planet’s history (Kolbert, 2014), while
transforming numerous facets of the biosphere (Steffen et al., 2011).
This formulation is now key to innovative thinking that transcends the
intellectual strictures of the state system (Hamilton, Bonneuil and
Gemenne, 2015).

Campaigns to tackle climate change are taking shape in many parts of


the world, tied into protests against the depredations of mines, forest
clearing and dam building, and other extractivist projects (Klein,
2014). These protest campaigns in turn are once again raising
questions about the locus of authority in the global system and hence
leading to further work by scholars on the role of social movements
and global civil society in shaping international relations and a larger
critical evaluation of the limits of traditional approaches to
environmental politics (Death, 2014).

Failure to deal seriously with climate change, in particular, and the


larger transformations of other Earth system elements already
underway, in general (Steffen et al., 2015), is likely to lead to
arguments for artificially modifying Earth system temperatures by
such geoengineering projects as stratospheric aerosol injection (Burns
and Strauss, 2013). While this thoroughly alarms critics of
environmental modification, not least because of the potential of such
projects to exacerbate international tensions (Hamilton, 2013), the
future is likely to see such discussions rise in prominence in
international relations unless policies for dealing with global change
become much more effective soon.

Given the speed and scale of global transformations now in motion and
the failures to integrate matters of ecology into larger concerns with
peace, human rights and militarism (Amster, 2015), the old
environmentalist question of ‘who speaks for Earth?’ is an ever more
pressing issue for International Relations. Among the key new themes
for the current generation of scholars are questions of how to end the
fossil fuel era (Princen et al., 2015) and the urgent matter of
facilitating transitions to much more sustainable patterns of life.

Chronology of major
International initiatives :
1946. Regulating Whaling in International Law: the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling

In 1946, states gathered to regulate whaling, establishing a new institution that was
at the same time very conservative and radical to a certain degree (on history of the
negotiations of ICRW see Kurkpatrick Dorsey, Whales and Nations. Environmental
Diplomacy on the High Seas, University of Washington Press, 2014). Relying on
scientific expertise, the drafters of the Convention followed the more progressive
tradition of the United States in trying to reconcile the needs of industry with those of
the conservation of whale stocks (as exemplified in the Preamble to the Convention by
the reference to sustainable use). Acting United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,
declared that whales were ‘the wards of the entire world’, a ‘common resource’ that must
be conserved

. He emphasised the need for cooperation in the use of the world’s resources, arguing
that the conference illustrated ‘increasing cooperation among the nations in the solution
of international conservation problems.’ Against this background, the Convention’s
objective appears to have been to serve as a means towards achieving such cooperation
aimed at the conservation of whale stocks. The approach of the United Kingdom was not
so much focused on conservation of the world’s whales as on preservation of the whaling
industry. This attitude was by and large dictated by the postwar conditions prevailing in
United Kingdom, namely, scarcity, hunger, and want. It is also worth mentioning a
remark made by C. Girard Davidson, Assistant Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior, that science was the key to sustainable use. He also
explained his vision for the International Whaling Commission (the “IWC”), the central
body of the Convention, to be that of a body of scientific excellence, the vocation of
which would be the careful management of resources belonging to the whole world, thus
contributing to ‘a more peaceful and happy future for mankind.’ The negotiations of the
ICRW were eventful. Delegates agreed to two clauses from the United States
progressive-era laws: protection of aboriginal whaling, and authorisation for collecting
whales for scientific purposes, with both of these grounds for whaling being outside the
stipulated quotas. There were some unexpected events concerning the arrival of the
Soviet delegation, which, to ensure their participation in the Convention, gained some
concessions from the other delegates, such as an extended season 1946–47.

Two issues in particular caused a certain degree of disagreement amongst the


delegates: the tacit acceptance system of operation of the Convention (which involved an
opting-out procedure), and the two-thirds voting procedure for any amendment to the
agreed schedule of regulations. The former survived; while the latter was changed to
three-quarters of the parties to the Convention in order to make an amendment, thus
ensuring that a greater portion of the contracting parties was necessary to effect any
change. The Norwegian delegation advocated that the IWC be afforded competence to
adopt binding decisions. The United Kingdom also favoured a stronger IWC. However,
there were delegations which were fully satisfied with the IWC not being granted the
competence to take binding decisions, such as the French and Dutch delegations, both
of which were against a stronger IWC given that such a development would have been to
the detriment of their own interests, which were best served by their governments. The
opting-out system was considered necessary as the proposed model of the IWC created a
new agency that would have curtailed the freedom of action of states on the high seas
and therefore, would have had negative implications on the ability of states to pursue
their particular economic benefit unfettered. Without the inclusion of the opting-out
procedure, the United States, the Netherlands, France, and the Soviet Union would not
sign the ICRW. Dorsey has observed that, in retrospect, the failure to reject the opting-
out system had been the greatest mistake of the 1946 meeting. It is not a surprise to note
how opting-out mechanisms often led to the undermining of the collective efforts of a
group of states. For instance, it is not unknown for states to resort to the opting-out
mechanism in order to avoid implementing decisions detrimental to their interests. Still,
Dorsey’s reflections aside, the refusal to include any such mechanism could have
reasonably led to the alienation of some states, thus undermining whatever chances for
interstate cooperation and action may have existed at the time. Norwegian and British
position vis-à-vis the opting-out procedure was based on inaccurate projections with
regard to future developments. The Norwegian and the British had not foreseen the
expansion of Soviet whaling; and were of the view that Japan would not be admitted to
whaling on a permanent basis. Having miscalculated in their outlook, they adhered to a
vision of the future of the whaling industry in which Norway and the United Kingdom
dominated, to the exclusion of other serious whaling nations. The proposal to subject
the IWC to the oversight of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (the ‘FAO’) also did
not gain acceptance.

The delegates broke the negotiations into two parts: the first part was agreeing on a
new Protocol modelled on the 1945 Protocol to regulate the whaling season between
1947–48; and the second part was to negotiate a more complex convention – namely,
the 1946 ICRW– to establish the International Whaling Commission. Such an approach
would give more time to the signatories of the ICRW to ratify it. Most importantly, the
Convention retained the annual limit, established in 1944, of 16,000 blue whale units
(the ‘BWU’) in Antarctic waters. The United States, Norwegian and United Kingdom
delegates were of the view that such quota should be based on continuity, so that they
could establish a statistical basis on which to be able to determine the number of whales.
In addition, Remington Kellogg, the United States delegate, argued that the quota of
16,000 BWU was meant to set the limit that constituted two-thirds of the annual catch
in the last seven peaceful seasons, which had been too intensive. The quota did not
satisfy most delegates who considered it to be too high. The BWU was later criticised
and abandoned.

Issues such as the complete protection of certain species (the ban on commercial
whaling or moratorium), the establishment of whale sanctuaries, and the organisation of
aboriginal whaling are inherited from these earlier Conventions. These legal approaches
correspond to the opposing views of the whale as a sacred object and the whale as a
utilitarian animal. Therefore in this inter-war period we have the beginning of
international law’s approach to a whale as an object of, on the one hand, an economic
exploitation and thus a subject to legal regulation; on the other, the totemic object; and
the object of, almost, worship.

The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling consists of the


Convention itself, as well as a Schedule that is an integral Part of the Convention text.
The Convention sets out the general regulatory scheme for the management of whale
stocks. The Schedule, according to Article V (1), introduces standards to be followed
regarding ‘conservation and utilization’ of whale species. It deals with the specific issues
relating to conservation, such as: open and closed seasons; whaling methods; size limits
for each whale; and inspection of whaling ships. Article III (2) sets out the procedure for
the amendment of the Schedule, which must be effected by a three-quarters majority of
voting members. There have been several subsequent amendments to the Schedule,
including the imposition of the Moratorium, the establishment of the Indian Ocean
Sanctuary and the Southern Ocean Sanctuary.

The ICRW does not actually include a generic definition of a ‘whale’. Instead, it lists
species under its protection in the Schedule to the Convention. The Schedule only lists
so–called “great whales”. Such totemic whales as the narwhal whale, which are medium-
sized, are probably outside of the remit of the ICRW. However, in order to preserve such
objects of beauty as the narwhal, many states claim that the International Whaling
Commission has a remit to deal with all whales. In practice, the Convention’s object of
regulation remains vague and difficult to determine.

The whaling regime under the Convention provides for three types of whaling:
commercial (at present zero ‘quotas’); aboriginal (indigenous whaling); and scientific
whaling.
UK CLEAN AIR ACT 1956 TO COMBAT SMOG

Problems with UK smoke control laws


There were flaws in early smoke control laws like the local acts of the 1840s, the Public Health
Act of 1875, and the Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Act of 1926. Flaws included:
An ambiguous “best practicable means” clause for smoke abatement. This did not encourage use
of the latest technology - but simply the apparatus industrialists were prepared pay for.
Insignificant fines. Legislation imposed low fines on offenders, effectively providing Britain’s
industrialists with a licence to pollute.
Exemptions. Failure to regulate emissions from fireplaces in homes, major polluters of city air,
was perhaps the biggest flaw. They could have reduced smoke significantly by burning fossil
fuels in closed stoves.
One reason laws were so lax was that smoke pollution was not viewed in a wholly negative light.
The public’s affection for the traditional blazing hearth was a major obstacle to smoke control.
Governments were unwilling to upset the electorate by passing legislation that interfered with
freedom to enjoy this popular British institution. There were no votes to be had in clearing the
skies.
The 1952 London smog disaster is thought to have claimed as many as 12,000 lives. It was the
catalyst for comprehensive air pollution controls in Britain.
Following this tragedy the government passed the Clean Air Act of 1956. This for the first time
regulated both domestic and industrial smoke emissions.
Historians widely considered the Clean Air Act a milestone in environmental protection. The
legislation included powers to establish smokeless zones, and provided subsidies to householders
to convert to cleaner fuels (smokeless solid fuel, gas and electricity).
But this energy transition did not happen overnight. It took around 3 decades, and another Clean
Air Act in 1968 to deal with slow-moving local authorities, before smoke control programmes
were finally completed.
By the 1980s the skies had cleared - improving health and quality of life in the cities of the
world's first industrial nation.
1954 POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY OIL

The Problem – Pollution of the sea by oil is a problem of national, regional and international
concern because of the deleterious effects it could have on marine environment unless
appropriate and timely steps are taken to prevent, mitigate, control, remove or combat the same.

International legislation evolution of international legislation – The problem of oil pollution of


the sea has long been recognized by the World Community and with the growth in the quantum
of oil transported by sea, the need for concerted action internationally has been appreciated.
Consequently an International Conference was held in London in 1954 & the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the sea by Oil, 1954, was adopted. This
Convention, modified in 1962, deals with prevention of deliberate operational discharge of oil
from ships. Further amendment to the provisions of this Convention have been adopted by the
IMO Assembly in 1969, which are yet to come into form. Subsequently, an International
Conference for the prevention of pollution of the sea was held in 1973 and a further International
Convention was drawn up. This Convention also covers pollution other than by oil. This
Convention further been amended by 1978 Protocol and in its present form is known as
MARPOL 73/78 and is in force.

International Conventions – The efforts of the International Conventions and national legislation
are directed towards the following objectives:

To provide for the complete elimination of the willful and International Pollution of the Seas by
oil;
To provide for minimization of the willful, intentional and accidental pollution of the seas by oil
and other substances from offshore facilities;
To provide for the complete elimination of the willful and intentional pollution of the sea by
activities such as tank washing and bilge discharge involving noxious and hazardous cargoes
other than oil;
To deal with minimization of spillage of oil or other noxious substances as a result of accidents;
To deal with dumping or other means of disposal of shore- generated waste and sewage in the
seas by ships and barges;
To deal with the safe carriage of dangerous goods;
To deal with the treatment of ships generating sewage or waste;
To deal with air pollution from ships;
.
ANTARCTIC TREATY 1959

Antarctic treaty – meaning


To understand what is the antarctic treaty, one must first understand the events leading up to it.
Antarctica is the only continent on earth with no human population. After the end of the second
world war, the united states of america sent military expeditionary forces to antarctica, intending
to establish a claim over it. Six other nations also joined the fight for a claim over Antarctica’s
sovereignty. In 1957, twelve countries set up scientific bases to conduct investigations about the
continent, thus heightening tensions surrounding antarctica.
Antarctic treaty – history
Amidst growing tensions surrounding the claim of sovereignty over antarctica, the presence of
scientific bases of twelve countries on the continent, and the looming fear of an upcoming cold
war, an antarctic conference was convened by president dwight eisenhower (usa). After meeting
and negotiating in two phases between 1958 and 1959, the antarctic treaty was formulated on 1st
December 1959.
The antarctic treaty of 1959 provided that antarctica could only be used for the peaceful purpose
of scientific investigation. It seeks to preserve antarctica forever by prohibiting military activity,
nuclear explosions, and radioactive waste disposals. The antarctic treaty is applicable to the area
south of the 60° south latitude, including all ice shelves and islands. The treaty entered into force
in 1961 and is therefore also referred to as the antarctic treaty of 1961.

Antarctic treaty – members


The members of the antarctic treaty have been listed below;
The antarctic treaty of 1959 was signed by twelve countries – Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Chile, France, japan, new Zealand, Norway, south Africa, the Ussr, the uk, and the us.
The treaty has since been acceded to by many other nations, and the total number of parties today
stands at 54.
India became a party to the treaty in 1983.
Antarctic treaty – rules

The antarctic treaty put in place some rules for the use of the resources in the region and the
conduct. They have been listed below;
Antarctica is to be demilitarised and used for peaceful purposes only. No military personnel can
be stationed, and military weapons cannot be tested on the continent.
Scientific research and collaboration can be carried out, and the findings are to be made freely
available to signatories of the treaty.
Any territorial claims over antarctic territory are put on hold while the treaty remains in force.
No nuclear testing can be carried out in antarctica or any radioactive waste dumped on it.
The treaty only applies to ice shelves and land, not the sea.
All signatories must provide information about expeditions, ship movements, or military
movements taken to antarctica, and designated inspectors can carry out inspections regarding the
same.
Mining of mineral resources except for the purpose of scientific research is prohibited.
The continent’s environment, flora, and fauna are not to be harmed.
The antarctic treaty of 1961 recently celebrated its 60th anniversary. It is an important treaty in
international law because it laid the foundation for a rules-based international order for a
continent without a permanent population. The antarctic treaty is gaining larger significance
today, with global warming and the increasing scarcity of resources. It remains to be seen
whether the member nations will continue to preserve the sanctity of antarctica.

Antarctica treaty of 1959 – current scenario


Despite a number of issues, the antarctic treaty has shown to be incredibly effective. More
nations are expressing interest in doing research in antarctica. 54 nations are currently parties to
the agreement. This is due to both the mass availability of rapidly changing technology and
climate change.
There are currently more nations that have staked out considerable claims in the area. The
prospect of mining has generated a great deal of discussion recently. Although mining is
prohibited in the region, nations will want to relax the prohibition soon as essential resources like
oil start to run out more quickly.

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5-16


June 1972, Stockholm

The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm was the first
world conference to make the environment a major issue. The participants adopted a series of
principles for sound management of the environment including the Stockholm Declaration and
Action Plan for the Human Environment and several resolutions.
The Stockholm Declaration, which contained 26 principles, placed environmental issues at the
forefront of international concerns and marked the start of a dialogue between industrialized and
developing countries on the link between economic growth, the pollution of the air, water, and
oceans and the well-being of people around the world.
The Action Plan contained three main categories: a) Global Environmental Assessment
Programme (watch plan); b) Environmental management activities; (c) International measures to
support assessment and management activities carried out at the national and international levels.
In addition, these categories were broken down into 109 recommendations.
One of the major results of the Stockholm conference was the creation of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP).The meeting agreed upon a Declaration containing 26
principles concerning the environment and development, an Action Plan with 109
recommendations, and a Resolution.[10]

Principles of the Stockholm Declaration:[11]

1. Human rights must be asserted, apartheid and colonialism condemned


2. Natural resources must be safeguarded
3. The Earth's capacity to produce renewable resources must be maintained
4. Wildlife must be safeguarded
5. Non-renewable resources must be shared and not exhausted
6. Pollution must not exceed the environment's capacity to clean itself
7. Damaging oceanic pollution must be prevented
8. Development is needed to improve the environment
9. Developing countries therefore need assistance
10. Developing countries need reasonable prices for exports to carry
out environmental management
11. Environment policy must not hamper development
12. Developing countries need money to develop environmental safeguards
13. Integrated development planning is needed
14. Rational planning should resolve conflicts between environment and
development
15. Human settlements must be planned to eliminate environmental problems
16. Governments should plan their own appropriate population policies
17. National institutions must plan development of states' natural resources
18. Science and technology must be used to improve the environment
19. Environmental education is essential
20. Environmental research must be promoted, particularly in developing countries
21. States may exploit their resources as they wish but must not endanger others
22. Compensation is due to states thus endangered
23. Each nation must establish its own standards
24. There must be cooperation on international issues
25. International organizations should help to improve the environment
26. Weapons of mass destruction must be eliminated

The Stockholm Conference motivated countries around the world to monitor


environmental conditions as well as to create environmental ministries and agencies. [15][16]
[17]
Despite these institutional accomplishments, including the establishment of UNEP, the
failure to implement most of its action programme has prompted the UN to have
follow-up conferences.[18] The succeeding United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development convened in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (the Rio Earth Summit), the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg and the 2012 United
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) all take their starting point in
the declaration of the Stockholm Conference.

1973 MARPOL CONVENTION: A TOOL TO


PREVENT POLLUTION CAUSED BY SHIP AT SEA
During the first half of 20th century, oil pollution at sea was recognized as the major
problem. As a consequence of which UK called a conference and during that conference
OILPOL convention was adopted in the year 26th July, 1971. But after the Torry Cannon
Case (1967), IMO was concerned about the marine pollution and another conference
was called, during that conference certain amendments were made to the Annex 1 in
the year 1973. And a need to include other forms of pollution was felt. For these two
protocols were adopted: 1) Incidents involving Harmful Substances and 2) Arbitration.
But again, in the year 1967-1977 a Spate tanker incident took place. And again, a
conference was called by IMO on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention in they year
1978. During this conference it was made mandatory for the states to first implement
Annex 1 and after the span of three year; implement Annex 2, so that all the technical
problems in Annex 2 can be curbed during that span. And that’s why MARPOL
Convention is known as MARPOL 73/78 Convention.
The aim of the convention is,“The complete elimination of intentional pollution of the
marine environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimization of
accidental discharge of such substances.” So, to achieve it aim, the convention sets down
very specific regulation for ships to observe. To achieve its only aim the convention lays
down six annexes. These are:
1. ANNEX 1: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by oil (2nd Oct, 1983)
2. ANNEX 2: Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substance
in Bulk (2nd April, 1983).
3. ANNEX 3: Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances carried in Sea in
Packaged form (1st July, 1992)
4. ANNEX 4: Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ship (27th September, 2003)
5. ANNEX 5: Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships (31st December, 1988)
6. ANNEX 6: Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships (19th May, 2005)
1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982. It lays down a
comprehensive regime of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules
governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It embodies in one instrument traditional
rules for the uses of the oceans and at the same time introduces new legal concepts and regimes
and addresses new concerns. The Convention also provides the framework for further
development of specific areas of the law of the sea.
The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) of the Office of Legal Affairs
of the United Nations serves as the secretariat of the Convention on the Law of the Sea and
provides information, advice and assistance to States with a view to providing a better
understanding of the Convention and the related Agreements, their wider acceptance, uniform
and consistent application and effective implementation. The Division monitors all
developments relating to the Convention, the law of the sea and ocean affairs and reports
annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations on those developments. It also assists
the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea
in reviewing such developments.
Intergovernmental Conference on an international legally binding instrument under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine
biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ)
The United Nations General Assembly decided, in 2015, to develop an international legally
binding instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (UNGA resolution 69/292).
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
Vienna, 22 March 1985

The Vienna Convention, concluded in 1985, is a framework agreement in which States agree to
cooperate in relevant research and scientific assessments of the ozone problem, to exchange
information, and to adopt “appropriate measures” to prevent activities that harm the ozone layer.
The obligations are general and contain no specific limits on chemicals that deplete the ozone
layer.
During the Vienna Convention negotiations, countries discussed a possible protocol that would
provide specific targets for certain chemicals, but no consensus was reached. The UNEP
regional seas agreements had provided a precedent in which States negotiated a framework
convention and at least one protocol, which countries were required to ratify at the time they
joined the convention. The Vienna Convention went forward on its own, however, and was
opened for signature in March, 1985. A working group under UNEP began negotiations on a
protocol, and the Montreal Protocol was concluded in September, 1987, only nine months after
the formal diplomatic negotiations opened in December, 1986. It went into effect on January 1,
1989. A State must be party to the Vienna Convention in order to become a party to the Montreal
Protocol. The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol established the precedent in UNEP
for completing a framework agreement, followed later by one or more Protocols. This precedent
has been used frequently since then, as in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity.
The ozone agreements are remarkable, in that they are the first to address a long-term problem in
which the cause of the damage occurs today, but the effects are not evident for decades hence.
Decisions were taken on the basis of probabilities, since damage had not yet occurred. Since
scientific understanding of the problem would change, the agreements needed to be flexible and
capable of being adapted to accommodate new scientific assessments. No single country or
group of countries could address the problem of ozone depletion alone, so maximum
international cooperation was needed.
The Montreal Protocol reflects a convergence of interest of scientists who warned of growing
threats to the ozone layer, private industry that wanted a level playing field as companies
responded to new national legislation controlling the harmful chemicals, nongovernmental
organizations advocating environmental protection, and national governments that increasingly
saw an international agreement as in their own best interests.
The Montreal Protocol controls the production and consumption of specific chemicals, none of
which occur naturally: CFCs, halons, fully Halogenated CFCs (HCFCs), methyl bromide, and
similar chemicals. It sets specific targets for reduction and a timetable for doing so. The Protocol
originally required parties other than developing countries to freeze consumption and production
of CFCs at 1986 levels (the base year), to reduce them by 20 percent and then an additional 30
percent by 1999, and to freeze consumption of halons at 1986 levels. The formula of targets and
timetables has been subsequently employed in other international agreements controlling air
pollutants and in the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
1983. Brundtland Commission

The Brundtland Commission, formally known as the World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED), was established by the United Nations (UN) in 1983. The commission
was named after Gro Harlem Brundtland, the former Prime Minister of Norway, who was
appointed as its chairperson. The WCED’s primary objective was to study the impact of human
activities on the environment and to propose policies for sustainable development. The
commission released its report, called the Brundtland Report, in 1987, which has since become a
cornerstone of global sustainable development efforts.
Who was Gro Harlem Brundtland?
Gro Harlem Brundtland was a Norwegian politician who served as the Prime Minister of Norway
three times, from 1981 to 1986, 1986 to 1989, and 1990 to 1996. Brundtland was a medical
doctor by training, and during her political career, she championed public health and
environmental issues. In 1983, the United Nations appointed her as the chairperson of the newly
established World Commission on Environment and Development.
The Establishment of the Brundtland Commission
The establishment of the Brundtland Commission came at a time when environmental concerns
were gaining significant attention globally. The commission was formed in response to the urgent
need for action to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable development. The
commission was tasked with examining the complex interrelationships between economic
development, social equity, and environmental sustainability.
The Brundtland Report and the Popularization of Sustainable Development
In 1987, the Brundtland Commission released its report, titled “Our Common Future.” The report
defined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The report stressed the
need for a holistic approach to development, which considers environmental, social, and
economic factors. The Brundtland Report was widely influential and became a defining
document of sustainable development efforts.
The Legacy of the Brundtland Commission
The Brundtland Commission’s legacy is significant, as its work played a crucial role in shaping
the global sustainable development agenda. The commission’s report helped to popularize the
term “sustainable development,” and its definition has become widely accepted. The concept of
sustainable development has been incorporated into numerous international agreements,
including the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
The commission’s work also led to the establishment of the United Nations Environment
Programme and the adoption of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The Rio
Declaration, which was adopted at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, articulated principles for sustainable development, including the precautionary
principle, the polluter pays principle, and the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities.
Montreal protocol 1987
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an important Multilateral Agreement
regulating the production, consumption, and emissions of ozone-depleting substances (ODSs). It is an
important part of international environmental conventions and protocols. This article gives background to the
Montreal Protocol, shares some details on the Ozone layer, important points on the Montreal Protocol,
successes associated with the Montreal Protocol, and the association of India with the Montreal Protocol.
Ozone Layer Depletion

1. This refers to the thinning of the protective ozone layer in the atmosphere.
2. This happens when certain chemicals come into contact with ozone and destroy it.
3. Chemical compounds that cause ozone layer depletion are called Ozone Depleting Substances
(ODSs).
4. Examples of ODSs are chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), carbon
tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, hydrobromofluorocarbons, halons, etc.
5. Chlorofluorocarbons are the most abundant ODSs.
6. The indiscriminate use of these chemicals causes ozone layer depletion.
7. These ODSs are also powerful greenhouse gases (GHGs) and have a long life as well.
8. There are also a few natural causes which cause ozone depletion such as volcanic eruptions, sunspots,
and stratospheric winds. However, these do not cause more than 1 – 2% of the ozone depletion.
Montreal Protocol – Important Points
The Protocol was signed in 1987 and entered into force in January 1989. The protocol gives provisions to
reduce the production and consumption of ODSs to protect the ozone layer.

It phases down the use of ODSs in a stepwise, time-bound manner.


It gives different timetables for developing and developed countries.
All member parties have specific responsibilities related to the phasing out of various groups of ozone-
depleting substances, controlling ODS trade, reporting data annually, controlling export and import of ODs,
etc.
Developing and developed countries have equal but differentiated responsibilities.
However, both groups of nations have time-bound, binding, and measurable commitments under the protocol,
making it effective.
Under the protocol, there is a provision for it to be amended and adjusted according to the new scientific,
economic, and technological advancements made.
The Protocol has undergone nine amendments or revisions.
The governance body for the protocol is the Meeting of the Parties. Technical support is given by the Open-
ended Working Group. Both meet once every year.
The Parties are aided by the Ozone Secretariat, which is based at the headquarters of the UN Environment
Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi.
It has been ratified by 197 Parties (196 member states of the UN plus the EU) making it the first United
Nations treaty to be ratified by every country in the world.
Basel Convention 1992
What is the aim of Basel Convention?
The Basel Convention aims to protect the environment by bringing measures to control and regulate hazardous
and other waste disposals. The negotiations for the convention were started in the late 1980s under the auspices
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

Salient Points of Basel Convention:

1. It came into force in 1992.


2. The Basel Convention secretariat is situated in Geneva, Switzerland.
3. It applies Prior Consent Approval procedure to regulate the transboundary movement of the
hazardous and other wastes.
4. Non-parties cannot transport hazardous waste to and from each other unless specially agreed.
Basel Convention states such transportation, illegal.
5. The member nations to the convention are required to have domestic legislation for both prevention
and the punishment of the illegal trafficking of such hazardous wastes.
6. It ensures that the member nations control the generation, storage, transportation, treatment, reuse,
recycling, recovery and final disposal of hazardous wastes.
7. Conference of Parties (COP) is a primary organ of the Basel Convention and is responsible to make
decisions about the operations of the convention. It meets biennially.
8. Official site – http://www.basel.int/

What is waste under the Basel Convention?


Basel Convention defines waste as something that needs to be disposed of by the provisions of the national
law. Annexes I defines hazardous waste while Annex II defines the other waste.

Apart from the waste, the Basel Convention also handles some topical issues like:

1. Electronic and electrical waste (e-waste) such as mobile phones and computers
2. Ships destined for dismantling
3. Mercury and asbestos wastes
4. Illegal dumping of hazardous wastes

Important Facts about the Basel Convention


1. Ban Amendment to the Convention – It was adopted in 1995 which added a new annex VII, and it
entered into force on 5th December 2019.
2. COP 14 – The COP 14 to Basel Convention has been the latest meeting which took place in April-
May 2019. It brought new entries into the convention, which will be effective from 1st January 2021
onward.
3. COP 15 to Basel Convention will take place in July 202 at Geneva.
4. Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal – It has been adopted in 1999 and is yet to
come into force. India has yet not signed this protocol.
5. Radioactive Wastes & Wastes derived from normal operations of the ships are excluded from the
list of hazardous wastes of Basel Convention.
6. Milestones of Basel Convention:
1. Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal was adopted by COP 5 in 1999.
2. Strategic Plan for the implementation of the Basel Convention for the period 2002 to 2010
was adopted in 2006.
3. Bali Declaration on Waste Management for Human Health and Livelihood was adopted by
COP 9.

Members of Basel Convention


There are 188 members of the Basel Convention.

Is India member of Basel Convention

Yes, India is a member of the Basel Convention. It ratified the convention in June 1992 and brought it into
force on 22nd September 1992.

India’s Domestic Legislation for Waste Management

1. The Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change (MOEF&CC) introduced Hazardous and Other
Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules of 2016. Recently in 2019, these rules were
amended. The amendments were:

 Prohibition of the import of the solid plastic waste including in the special economic zone (SEZ)
and export-oriented units (EOU).
 Exemption to Silk Waste Exporters – They will no longer need permission from the Ministry.
 Defective electrical and electronic assemblies and components can be imported back within one
year of export without obtaining permission from the ministry.
 Exemption of Industries from Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary
Movement) Rules of 2016 – Those industries that are already exempted from requiring consent under
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act 1981 are now exempted for the same from Hazardous and Other Wastes Rules too.
Rio Summit 1992
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio de

Janeiro Earth Summit, Rio Summit, Rio Conference, and Earth Summit (Portuguese: ECO92), was a

major United Nations conference held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) from 3 to 14 June 1992. 172 governments
participated, with 116 sending their heads of state or government. Rio Summit
Some 2,400 representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended, with 17,000 people at the
parallel NGO “Global Forum” (also called Forum Global), who had Consultative Status. A significant
accomplishment of the summit was an agreement on the Climate Change Convention which in turn led to
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Another agreement was “not to carry out any activities on the
lands of indigenous peoples that would cause environmental degradation or that would be culturally
inappropriate”.
Rio Summit 1992 – Important Outcomes
The Rio Summit 1992 is also called the Earth Summit. This summit led to the development of the following
documents:

1. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development


2. Agenda 21
3. Forest Principles

The first document called the Rio Declaration, in short, contained 27 principles that were supposed to guide
countries in future sustainable development. Agenda 21 is an action plan concerning sustainable development,
but it is non-binding. The Forest Principles is formally called ‘Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement
of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All
Types of Forests’. It makes many recommendations for conservation and sustainable development forestry and
is non-binding.
Kyoto protocol 1997
The Kyoto Protocol was an international treaty signed in 1997 to extend the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (1992). It committed state parties to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and arrived at a
scientific consensus on its role in climate change. It took place in Kyoto, a prefecture in the region of Kasai,
Japan. Countries all over the globe came together in 1992 at the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change) in Rio to discuss climate change and the

History of Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol, established in 1997 and enforced in 2005, is a pivotal international treaty addressing
climate change. It mandated binding emission reduction targets for 37 industrialized nations and the EU,
employing mechanisms like emissions trading and the Clean Development Mechanism. Despite the absence of
key players like the U.S., its influence resonates in subsequent agreements, such as the 2015 Paris Agreement.
Though not without challenges, the Kyoto Protocol stands as a foundational milestone in the global fight
against climate change.

Greenhouse Gases as per the Kyoto Protocol 1997

 Carbon dioxide (C02)


 Methane (CH4)
 Nitrous oxide (N20)
 Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
 Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)
 Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)

Objectives of the Kyoto Protocol


The Kyoto Protocol objective was to operationalise the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC). The Kyoto Protocol was endorsed at the third session of the Conference of the Parties
(COP 3), in December 1997. The primary agenda of the Kyoto Protocol is to commit industrialized countries
and economies in transition to limit and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by agreed individual targets.
The Kyoto protocol was extended up to 2020 at the Doha

Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol


Clean Development Mechanisms

 The CDM permits a nation with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment to


implement an emission-reduction project in developing nations under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B
Party).
 Hypothetical CDM Example: In exchange for carbon credits, Australia implements or supports an
environmental project in India (solar electricity, wind power, afforestation, etc) with certified emission
reduction credits.
 It now shows the rest of the world how it aims to meet its Kyoto goals by displaying the carbon credits
it has earned.
 These initiatives could result in tradable Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits, each of which is
worth one tonne of CO2 and can be used to meet Kyoto commitments.
 Simply, wealthier countries produce more CO2 and lose carbon credits as a result.
 They give poor and least developed countries financial aid to help them produce clean energy (solar,
wind, etc.) and earn carbon credits, allowing them to meet their Kyoto Quota (Kyoto units) of
emissions without breaking the Kyoto Protocol.
 A developed country with a Kyoto quota of 100 carbon credits can emit 100 tonnes of CO2.
As a result of its recklessness, it emits 110 tonnes of CO2, resulting in the loss of 10 carbon credits
(Kyoto Quota violation).
 The country must now make up for the carbon credits it has lost in order to avoid a penalty.
 As a result, it invests money (equal to 10 carbon credits) in developing and least-developed countries
to build renewable energy infrastructures such as solar plants and wind farms, so compensating for the
10 carbon credits it has lost and avoiding the penalty.
2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference

The 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference, commonly known as the Copenhagen
Summit, was held at the Bella Center in Copenhagen, Denmark, between 7 and 18 December.
The conference included the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 5th session
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP 5) to the Kyoto
Protocol. According to the Bali Road Map, a framework for climate change mitigation beyond
2012 was to be agreed there. The Copenhagen Accord was drafted by the United
States, China, India, Brazil and South Africa on 18 December, and judged a "meaningful
agreement" by the United States government. It was "taken note of", but not "adopted", in a
debate of all the participating countries the next day, and it was not passed unanimously. The
document recognised that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of the present day and
that actions should be taken to keep any temperature increases to below 2 °C. The document is
not legally binding and does not contain any legally binding commitments for reducing
CO2 emissions.[8] The conference was preceded by the Climate Change: Global Risks,
Challenges and Decisions scientific conference, which took place in March 2009 and was also
held at the Bella Center. The negotiations began to take a new format when in May 2009 UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon attended the World Business Summit on Climate Change in
Copenhagen, organised by the Copenhagen Climate Council (COC), where he requested that
COC councillors attend New York's Climate Week at the Summit on Climate Change on 22
September and engage with heads of government on the topic of the climate problem.
Nagoya Protocol 2010

About Nagoya Protocol


The Nagoya Protocol was adopted at the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties on 29
October 2010, in Nagoya, Japan, however it went into effect on October 12, 2014.
The protocol is a supplementary document to the United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity (UNCBD).
The main aim of the protocol is to operationalize one of the three objectives of the UNCBD
namely conservation, sustainable use, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the
utilization of biological resources and knowledge associated with them.
It seeks to ensure that owners or guardians of genetic resources receive a “fair share” of benefits
arising from any research conducted with the help of those resources.
As of April 2022, 137 parties had ratified the Nagoya Protocol, including 136 UN member states
and the European Union.
India, too, is a member of the Nagoya Protocol.

Aims and Objectives of the Nagoya Protocol


The objective of this Protocol is as under:

 It aims at ensuring fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of
genetic resources,

 It ensures appropriate access to genetic resources and appropriate transfer of relevant


technologies,

 It takes into account the rights over these resources and to technologies, and

 It aims at conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components by
appropriate funding.

Goals and Targets of Nagoya Protocol

The goal and targets of the protocol are as under

 Become more aware of the values of biodiversity and the knowledge people have developed to
understand and use it. Consider what and who has access to biodiversity resources and associated
knowledge, and what are immediate and long-term benefits that can stem from these.
 Obtain Prior Informed Consent (PIC). Before accessing genetic resources and/or traditional
knowledge, articulate the intended purpose of your work and its potential benefits. Seek competent
national and local authorities to give PIC.
 Develop mutually agreed terms (MAT). This includes a framework for how to share benefits and
access to data, results, or collections, whether there are any restrictions, and whether certain situations
may require renegotiation of the MAT. This helps benefits be shared across the research and provider
communities.

India and Nagoya Protocol


India signed the protocol on 11 May 2011.
The Protocol was approved in October 2012 at the CBD’s 11th Conference of Parties (COP),
which was held in Hyderabad.
The Biological Diversity Act of 2002, framed in pursuance of putting into operation the
UNCBD, contains provisions that fulfil the obligations set out in the protocol for the party to the
Protocol.
The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) has been designated as the
National Focal Point (NFP) and the NBA as the Competent National Authority (CAN), as
required under Article 13. Designation of these national-level authorities as NFP and CAN
ensure coordination, transparency, facilitation of procedures and processes, and sharing of
information as mandated under the protocol.

Significance of Nagoya Protocol


The significance of the Nagoya Protocol is as follows:

The Nagoya Protocol holds undeniable importance in attempting to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, ensuring that the benefits of genetically modified products are distributed
equitably between all parties.
By providing incentives for conservation and responsible use of genetic resources, the Nagoya
Protocol increases the contribution of biodiversity to growth and human well-being.
The protocol encourages benefit sharing, which improves genetic resource conservation and its
sustainable use in the longer term.
It improves legal transparency and clarity for producers and users of genetic resources.
It creates more dependable terms for access to genetic resources.
It further contributes to the Indigenous and local communities and their traditional knowledge
associated with genetic resources by establishing a legal system.

Criticisms of Nagoya Protocol


The criticisms of the Nagoya Protocol are as follows:
Article 2 of the CBD defines genetic resources as "genetic material of actual or potential value",
with "genetic material" material with heredity units. However, this definition still needs more
precision both legally and scientifically.
Some Parties to the Nagoya Protocol still need to publish the required information on the ABS
Clearing-House, hindering its implementation.
Challenges include creating ABS measures that ensure benefit-sharing while remaining legally
clear and avoiding complexities, delays, and added user costs, especially considering limited
human resources.
The Nagoya Protocol applies its obligations to all Parties without distinguishing between
resource users and providers.
Issues concerning indigenous peoples and local communities encompass determining their role at
the national level, their rights to genetic resources and traditional knowledge, the diversity and
organization of these groups, and linking traditional knowledge to its holders.
Concerns exist that bureaucracy may impede research, conservation, global responses to
diseases, and biodiversity monitoring and collection.
COP26 – Achievements and Scope

The recently held COP26 was widely hyped as the last chance to save the planet. The meeting began
with a bang, but ended on a more modest note. Notwithstanding, it did make some progress even if
much less than was needed.

The summit had to deal with the disturbing prospect that the world was set to reach nearly +3°C by
the end of the century, above the 2015 Paris Agreement target of “well below 2°C" and ideally
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

In this global problem of climate change, a much larger role is yet to be fulfilled by the world’s three
largest emitters, the developed nations and undoubtedly India.

Minutes of the Meeting: Achievements & Setbacks


 New Global and Country Targets: The Glasgow Summit has urged countries to
consider strengthening their 2030 targets by COP27 to be held in Egypt in 2022.
o The summit targeted global warming not to exceed +1.5°C and got about
140 countries to announce target dates for bringing emissions down
to net zero.
 The achievement is significant as in the Paris Agreement, the
developing countries did not agree to reduce emissions but
just the “emissions-intensity" of GDP.
o India has also joined the consensus and announced its net-zero target of
2070.
 This is a step ahead from India’s past position where it never
accepted the need to reduce emissions.
 Glasgow Breakthrough Agenda: A potentially important development which emerged
out of COP26 (but outside the COP process) is the Glasgow Breakthrough
Agenda endorsed by 42 countries (including India).
o This is a cooperative effort to accelerate the development and
deployment of clean technologies and sustainable solutions in areas such
as clean power, road transport, steel and hydrogen.
 Phasing-Down Coal Consumption: Coal is the dirtiest of fossil fuels and an early
phasing out of coal is clearly desirable. European countries have pushed hard for its
phase out; however, developing countries have resisted this.
o A middle path, as suggested by India, was referred to at the COP26
calling for a “phase-down" of coal-based power.
 Best Case Scenario: An early assessment by Climate Action Tracker (CAT), an
independent organisation, suggests that the targets declared, if fully achieved, could
limit global warming to around +1.8°C.
o However, it also warns that the targets for 2030 are insufficiently
ambitious. Unless significantly tightened, the world is more likely to end
up seeing global temperatures rise by 2.1°C to 2.4°C.
 Setbacks of the Meeting:
o Voluntary Targets: The targets set at the meeting are voluntary with no
mechanism for enforcement or penalties for non-compliance.
Many targets are conditional on availability of adequate financial
support.
o Lack of Specific Details and Actions: Many countries have not
provided details on specific actions to be taken which would determine
the actual trajectory to net zero which creates uncertainty about what will
be achieved.
o Failure in Securing Climate Finance: The summit’s mild
admonition only urges the developed country parties to scale up their
provision of climate finance. It failed to firmly secure funding
commitments from developed nations.
o Unequal Distribution of Carbon Budget: The world’s top three largest
emitters (China, USA, Europe) which account for about 30% of the
world’s population, would take up 78% of the carbon budget.
 China intends to hit peak emissions only by 2030, before
going down to net zero in 2060; it would take up 54% of the
global carbon budget against a global population share of
only 18.7%.
 The US, with 4.2% of the total population,
would take up 14.2% of the budget and
Europe, with 6.8%, would take up 9.5%.
 This problem reflects the fact that focusing on net-zero
dates does not ensure a fair apportioning of the available
carbon space if the initial position in terms of emissions
varies so greatly.
UNFCCC COP 27
Confronted by the growing energy crisis, expanding greenhouse gas concentrations, and rising number of
extreme weather events, COP27 seeks renewed solidarity among member countries, to deliver on the
landmark Paris Agreement, for people and the planet.

 COP27 will build on the outcomes of COP26 and deliver action on a series of issues that are critical to
tackling the climate emergency. This would include reducing greenhouse gas emissions, building
resilience, adapting to the inevitable climate change impacts, and delivering on the commitments to
finance climate action in developing countries.
 COP27 was termed an ‘implementation CoP’ by the Egyptian Foreign Minister and President.

 This implies effective implementation of all the provisions of the Paris Agreement,
and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to keep the temperature goal within reach
and prevent further negative impacts.
 COP27 must send the message, loud and clear, that be it war or peace, poverty or plenty, securing the
world’s future comes at a price that only gets costlier every passing day.
 For more than a decade, wealthy nations have rejected official discussions on what is referred to as
loss and damage, or funds provided to support poor countries in dealing with the consequences of
global warming. However, the issue has been put on the formal agenda for the first time in COP27.

Major initiatives announced in the COP 27 meeting:

 International Climate Change University:

 The President of Sri Lanka Ranil Wickremesinghe has proposed to set up an international
climate change university in Sri Lanka, with an ancillary institution in the Maldives. It was
reiterated that Sri Lanka and Maldives as island nations are vulnerable to the adverse impacts
of climate change.

 UAE-Egypt Deal:

 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt have struck a deal on the sidelines of the summit
to develop one of the world’s largest wind farms.

 Once completed, the 10 GW onshore wind project in Egypt will produce approximately
47,790 GWh of clean energy annually. This would offset nearly 9% (23.8 million tonnes) of
Egypt’s current carbon dioxide emissions.

India’s Participation in COP27:

 The Environment Minister of India Shri Bhupender Yadav is leading the Indian delegation to COP-27.
 India would press developed countries to fulfil their commitment to delivering $100 billion of climate
finance annually.
 It would also press for enhanced transparency and more institutional mechanisms to make these funds
available to developing countries that are most vulnerable to climate change.
UNFCCC COP 28
COP28 stands for the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, which is
scheduled to take place in Nov – Dec 2023.

o This event is a global gathering where representatives from almost 200 countries convene
to discuss and negotiate policies and actions to combat climate change.
o Why is it Important?
o The primary objective of COP28 is to address the pressing issues of climate
change , including the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, adaptation to
climate change impacts, and mobilizing financial resources for climate action.
o The conference provides a platform for countries to set climate targets, share
effective practices, and pledge commitments to fight climate change.
o COP28 plays a pivotal role in promoting international collaboration and
coordination to address the climate crisis and achieve the objectives outlined in
the Paris Agreement .
o Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber has recently been appointed as the new President of COP 28.

The Bonn Climate Conference is set to take place in June 2023, which will lay the groundwork
for the discussions that will occur at COP28.

Highlighting the Key Points emphasized by the COP28 president-designate


Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber:

o Methane Emissions and Net-Zero Plans :


o He has urged the oil and gas industry to eradicate methane emissions by 2030
completely and align their operations with net-zero emission plans by 2050.
o He stressed the importance of reducing and ultimately eliminating the carbon
intensity of hydrocarbon usage, given their continued global consumption.
o Methane emissions are one of the leading contributors to global warming,
with fossil fuel operations accounting for more than a third of all human-
generated methane emissions, according to the International Energy Agency
(IEA).
o Therefore, tackling methane emissions is seen as one of the most effective
actions that the energy sector can take to combat climate change.
o Inclusive Energy Transition and Climate Justice:

o
o He highlighted the vital role that developing countries play in the battle against
climate change.
o He advocates for an inclusive energy transition and climate justice, ensuring
that developing nations are not left behind.
o There is a need to develop and implement new technologies for effective climate
action and energy transition worldwide.
o Maximizing Technology Adoption and Climate Finance :
o Developing countries should not be left behind in technology adoption, as they
represent a significant portion of the world’s population.
o The public, multilateral, and private sectors need to enhance climate finance to make
it more available, accessible, and affordable.
o Technology is essential in helping vulnerable communities build capacities and
transition to a low-carbon economic development model.
o Renewable Energy Capacity and Hydrocarbons :
o He advocates for a rapid increase in global renewable energy capacity, aiming to
triple it to 11,000 GW by 2030 and double it again by 2040.
o He acknowledges that hydrocarbons still play a necessary role as a bridge to a new
energy system.
o Reducing the carbon footprint, investing in low-carbon-intensive barrels of oil, and
reducing intensity are crucial for hydrocarbon usage.
o Carbon Capture Technologies and Industrial Emissions:

o
o He emphasizes the need to seriously consider carbon capture technologies to
achieve realistic net-zero emissions scenarios.
o Policy incentives should be in place to encourage technology companies to
commercialize various carbon capture methods.
o The expansion of carbon capture technologies and the transformation of captured
carbon into usable products can contribute to emission reduction.
o Breakthroughs in Battery Storage, Nuclear Energy, and Fusion :
o Continued advancements in battery storage technology are crucial for integrating
renewable energy sources.
o He supports the expansion of nuclear energy and investment in new energy pathways
like fusion.
o A focus on agricultural technology is necessary as food systems and agriculture
contribute significantly to global greenhouse gas emissions.
CONCLUSION
Although climate change has tended, since the late 1980s, to be the pre-eminent
Issue on the global environmental agenda, it is by no means the only important
Issue. Indeed, over very much the same period, non-renewable resources, and
Particularly energy resources, have come to be seen as having a growing bearing
On matters such as security, development and conflict. In fact, in many ways,
Climate change and resource security have become counter-balancing priorities
For states. For example, while climate change encourages states to reduce their
Use of fossil fuels, the quest for resource security encourages them to seek and to
Exploit new fossil fuel reserves. On the other hand, environmentalists have
Presented investment in renewable resources and non-carbon technologies as a
‘green’ road to resource security, although this only applies if such alternatives
Genuinely have the capacity to generate the same energy levels as fossil fuels.
What is clear, though, is that concerns over the adequacy of natural resources to
Sustain human populations and ensure national power long predate concerns
Over climate change. They can be traced back to Thomas Malthus’ (see p. 408)
Gloomy prediction that, due to the ‘principle of population’, living standards in
Any country would always return to subsistence levels. Although technological
Innovation and the discovery of new resources have tended to keep Malthusian
Pessimism at bay, history has been characterized by periods of anxiety, some-
Times bordering on panic, over scarce resources. For example, in the nineteenth
Century the earliest industrial powers scrambled for control over sources of iron
And coal, while after WWI the major European powers engaged in a desperate
Search for foreign sources of petroleum.
Anxieties about resources, nevertheless, subsided during the 1970s and 1980s,
Due both to the discovery of new, and seemingly abundant, fossil fuel supplies and
Because accelerated globalization appeared to have created larger and more
Responsive markets for energy and other resources. However, they have revived
With particular force since the 1990s, moving the issue especially of energy secu-
Rity significantly up the international agenda. A growing number of wars, for
Example, appeared to be resource wars (Klare 2001). Geopolitics, once thought
Dead, had suddenly revived. Why did this happen? At least three developments
Help to explain it. First, the demand for energy, particularly oil, gas and coal, rose
Sharply through the arrival of new contenders on the global resources playing-
Field, notably China and India, but also, to a lesser extent, Brazil and other emerg-
Ing economies. Second, the world’s leading energy consumer, the USA, became
Increasingly concerned about its dwindling supplies of cheap domestic oil and itsgrowing
reliance on increasingly expensive, and less secure, foreign oil. Third, just
As demand pressures intensified, anxieties concerns resurfaced. Fears grew gener-
Ally that the world’s stockpile of essential commodities had started to shrink, and
These focused particularly on oil (Deffeyes 2005). Concern was raised not only by
The seeming failure of new oil supplies to keep pace with burgeoning demand, but
Also, more alarmingly, by predictions (debunked by some) that the moment of
Peak oil may soon be reached. The world’s oil may be running out, without any
Alternative energy source, renewable or non-renewable, appearing to be capable
Of replacing it. Such developments have both contributed to important shifts in
Global power as well as created turbulence and often conflict in countries ‘blessed’
By abundant supplies of oil and other resources.

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