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It is magic! How impossible solutions prevent the discovery of obvious ones?

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DOI: 10.1177/1747021817743439

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10.1177_1747021817743439
research-article2017
QJP0010.1177/1747021817743439The Quarterly Journal of Experimental PsychologyThomas et al.

Original Article

Quarterly Journal of Experimental

It is magic! How impossible solutions Psychology

1­–7
© Experimental Psychology Society 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1747021817743439
https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021817743439
[email protected]

Cyril Thomas1, André Didierjean2 and Gustav Kuhn1

Abstract
When confronted with an insight problem, some factors limit our capacity to discover the optimal solution. Previous
research on problem solving has shown that the first idea that comes to participants’ minds can inhibit them from finding
better alternative solutions. We used a magic trick to demonstrate that this mind fixing effect is more general than
previously thought: a solution that participants knew to be incorrect and impossible inhibited the discovery of an easy
alternative. We show that a simple exposure to an obvious false solution (e.g., the magician hides the card in the palm of
his hand to secretly transfer it to his back pocket) can inhibit participants from finding the real secret of the trick (e.g., he
used a duplicate card), even if the magician proves that this false solution is impossible (e.g., he shows his hand is empty).
We discuss the psychological processes underlying this robust fixing effect.

Keywords
Magic; fixing effect; Einstellung effect; insight problem solving; misdirection; false solution; illusion

Received: 6 July 2017; revised: 5 October 2017; accepted: 14 October 2017

Introduction
Our progress and evolution are closely linked to our ability solved with the previously learnt familiar solution (the
to develop innovative ideas, and the best solutions are extinction problem), they were more likely to fail to find
often found by stepping outside the box. However, our the solution. It is important to note that these original
minds can often become fixated on one solution, which experiments involved a strict time limit, and those partici-
can inhibit us from discovering alternative and possibly pants previously exposed to the familiar solution failed to
better solutions. This fixing phenomenon is known as the solve the extinction problem because they were retesting
Einstellung effect and has typically been studied in the the familiar solution instead of searching for alternatives
problem-solving literature (Luchins, 1942; for other stud- and they simply ran out of time (they had only 2 min and
ies on the fixing effect, see also Chrysikou & Weisberg, 30 s to solve it). According to Luchins (1942), the similar-
2005; Duncker, 1945; Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993). ity between the new problem and the previous one
Luchins (1942) discovered the Einstellung effect by enhanced the activation of the familiar solution in partici-
conducting experimental studies in problem solving. He pants’ minds, making them blind to alternatives.
gave his participants water jar problems that could be Several decades later, Bilalić, McLeod, and Gobet,
solved using a fixed solution that was quickly learnt. After (2008a, 2008b, 2010) demonstrated that the Einstellung
a few training trials, participants were invited to solve a effect also affects people who are experts within their field.
final problem that had two solutions: the familiar solution
and a less-familiar but quicker alternative (optimal) solu-
1Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London,
tion. Participants typically found the familiar solution but
London, UK
failed to discover the optimal one. In contrast, participants 2Laboratoire de Psychologie and MSHE, Université Bourgogne-Franche-
who were not trained on the “familiar solution” discovered Comté, Besançon, France
the optimal solution more readily. This result illustrates
Corresponding author:
that exposure to the “familiar solution” inhibited them Cyril Thomas, Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of
from discovering the alternative. Moreover, when partici- London, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, UK.
pants were asked to solve a problem that could not be Email: [email protected]
2 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 00(0)

Chess masters were given a number of chess problems in instructed for a conditional alternative (“if your solution
which they had to find the shortest way to achieve check- was not the correct one, could you find another solution?”).
mate. In the first condition, there were always two solu- These results demonstrated that a single exposure to a false
tions: a familiar one, which took five moves, and an solution can inhibit participants from discovering the real
unfamiliar one, which took fewer moves. Most of the secret. The authors attributed this mind fixing effect to the
experts found the familiar solution but failed to find the concept of cognitive economy. That is to say, it can be more
optimal one. However, they were perfectly capable of dis- economic and efficient to direct our attention towards an
covering the solution in chess configurations where only apparently available solution (in this case, a false solution)
the optimal solution was possible. Moreover, eye move- than to investigate a hypothetical alternative that may not
ment recordings revealed that the chess masters continued even exist. However, once this unlikely false solution was
to fixate on the elements related to the familiar solution, explicitly ruled out, most of the participants were able to
even when they claimed to be searching for alternatives. identify the alternative solution, i.e., the true secret. In other
Recently, Thomas and Didierjean (2016) used a new words, after the participants considered the false solution to
type of insight problem, a magic trick (Danek, Fraps, von be incorrect, they ceased to fixate on it and were able to
Müller, Grothe, & Öllinger, 2013; 2014), to investigate the easily discover the true secret.
Einstellung effect. Manipulating people’s reasoning pro- This last result contradicts magicians’ assumptions
cess is an important element of magicians’ misdirection about the false solution, because a false solution should
principles (Kuhn, Caffaratti, Teszka, & Rensink, 2014), prevent observers from discovering the secret method
and magicians have arguably spent centuries developing even once this solution has been ruled out and considered
their intuitive knowledge of human cognitive limitations impossible (see Kuhn et al., 2014; Lamont & Wiseman,
(Kuhn, Amlani, & Rensink, 2008; Rensink & Kuhn, 2014, 2005; Thomas & Didierjean, 2016). According to Thomas
2015; Thomas, Didierjean, Maquestiaux, & Gygax, 2015). and Didierjean (2016), the nature of the false solution used
Although many misdirection principles involve manipu- in their experiment could explain the contradiction
lating spectators’ attentional and perceptual strategies, between their results and the assumptions of the magi-
some of the most effective techniques involve manipulat- cians. Thomas and Didierjean (2016) used an unlikely
ing reasoning, i.e., how the spectators subsequently inter- false solution (“he will use his gesture to influence my
pret what they have just seen. Beyond their use in magic choice”), and the experimenter explicitly informed partici-
performances, these principles can provide intriguing pants about this solution. Instead, magicians typically use
insights into everyday problem-solving processes. Among very obvious false solutions, which are implicitly implied
all the psychological tools often used by magicians to mis- through specific actions (e.g., I guess that an object is hid-
lead people’s mind, one in particular seems to be closely den in the magician’s hand). It is likely that an obvious and
linked to a fixing effect: the false solution (Kuhn et al., internally generated false solution will be more trusted/
2014; Lamont & Wiseman, 2005; Tamariz, 1988). The activated and thus harder to abandon compared with an
false solution corresponds to any method other than the unlikely/implausible false solution.
one used to produce the magical effect. During a magic The aim of this study was to investigate this hypothe-
trick (e.g., a magical transposition, where a playing card sis and to test whether an obvious false solution can pre-
appears to vanish from the top of a deck and then reappear vent people from discovering a simple alternative, even
in the magicians’ back pocket), the performer can suggest when this false solution has been shown to be impossible.
a false explanation of the trick (e.g., the card is secretly In our experiment, observers were led to believe an obvi-
hidden in the palm of his hand) to divert participants’ sus- ous false solution to a magic trick (“he concealed the card
picion away from the real secret of the trick (e.g., he uses in his hand and he will secretly place it into his pocket”)
a duplicate queen of clubs). that was later shown to be impossible (“he shows his
Thomas and Didierjean (2016) presented participants hand empty”). We predict that this false solution will pre-
with a short magic trick. The participants freely selected a vent participants from discovering a relatively simple
playing card from an array of six facedown cards. When solution, although they know that their initial solution
their card was turned over, the magician revealed that he was false/impossible.
had correctly predicted the identity of the card that they had
chosen. The secret of the trick was simple; all the cards
were identical. Before they were presented with the magic Method
trick, some participants were exposed to an unlikely false
solution: “I can influence your choice with my gestures.”
Participants
Participants who were exposed to this suggestion were less A total of 120 students (67 female, 53 male,1 Mage =
likely to correctly identify the real secret compared to those 22 years, SD = 2.9) from Goldsmiths, University of
participants who simply watched the magic trick. This London, United Kingdom, took part in the experiment. All
effect persisted even when participants were explicitly participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
Thomas et al. 3

Figure 1. Visual description of each condition (false solution control trick, no false solution trick, false solution extinction trick).
(a) False solution: palming action. (b) No false solution: the hand is shown empty. (c) False solution: palming action. (d) Extinction.
(e) Revelation.

acuity and provided informed consent by signing the ethics hand and spread it face up to show that all the cards were
forms. All participants were debriefed at the end of the different. He then removed the queen of clubs and placed
experiment. it face up on the top of the facedown deck. He explained
that he would magically transpose the queen of clubs from
the top of the deck into his back pocket. Unbeknown to the
Stimuli and procedure participants, the magician already had a duplicate queen of
Three versions of a magic trick were performed live by the clubs in his back pocket. The magician then openly pro-
same performer (first author), and each participant was ceeded to turn the queen of clubs face down on top of the
tested individually (see Figure 1 for a visual description deck and pantomimed the action of “secretly” concealing
and Appendix 1 for video links), watching only one ver- the queen of clubs in the palm of his left hand (this palm-
sion of the trick. The first version was intended to establish ing action is exaggerated, unnatural so as to be easily
whether participants would discover and report the false detected by the participants) (see Figure 1a). The aim of
solution in the absence of an extinction (false solution con- this fake palming action was to highlight the likely and
trol trick). The aim of the second version of the trick was obvious false solution, namely that the magician might
to establish the extent to which participants would dis- palm the card from the pack and secretly place it into his
cover the correct solution when it was presented without pocket. He then put this “suspicious” hand in his left back
this false solution (no false solution trick). The aim of the pocket and produced the queen of clubs (see Figure 1e).
third version of the trick was to establish the extent to After completing the trick, the magician asked participants
which participants discovered the solution when the false to verbally answer the following question: “What is the
solution was activated, but immediately and unquestiona- secret of the trick?” The real secret of the trick was that the
bly ruled out (false solution extinction trick). Each of our magician had a duplicate queen of clubs in his pocket.
120 participants was randomly allocated to watch one of Participants had unlimited time to give their answer.
these tricks, after which they were asked a question about In the no false solution trick, the magician carried out
how they thought the trick was done. the same actions as in the false solution control trick with
In the false solution control trick, the performer (with one exception. The magician did not go through the
his sleeves up) held a red-backed deck of cards in his right actions of pretending to palm the card. Instead, he showed
4 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 00(0)

Figure 2. Percentage of participants as a function of the type of solution and the condition (false solution control trick, no false
solution trick, false solution extinction trick).
FS = false solution.

that his left hand was empty (from both sides with his extinction trick, whereas these fingers are open in the no
fingers spread) (see Figure 1b), before producing the false solution trick. After the trick was completed, par-
queen of clubs from his back pocket (see Figure 1e). ticipants were asked the same set of questions as out-
After the trick, participants were asked the same question lined in the no false solution trick.
as outlined above. Additionally, they were asked to rate
their confidence in their answer on a scale from 1 to 7
(1 = not confident, 7 = very confident).2 The aim of these
Results
confidence ratings was to establish whether the false In the false solution control trick, 82.5% of the participants
solution only influenced the discovery of the real secret suggested that the magician palmed the card, illustrating
or whether it also influenced participants’ confidence in that the false solution was sufficiently obvious to pop into
this solution. most of the participants’ mind (see Figure 2 for more
The final version of the trick, the false solution extinc- details about participants’ answers).
tion trick, was likewise identical to the false solution Our main interest lay in the different responses pro-
control trick, with one exception. The magician initiated vided by the participants who watched the false solution
the fake palming pantomime with his left hand, just like extinction trick compared with those who watched the ver-
in the false solution control trick (see Figure 1c). sion without the false solution (see Figure 3a). As pre-
However, instead of reaching directly into his pocket, dicted, a significantly smaller percentage of participants
the magician suddenly froze and then spread the fingers discovered the correct solution in the false solution extinc-
of his left hand and turned it palm up, showing it to be tion trick (60%) compared with the no false solution trick
completely empty (see Figure 1d). This simple gesture (87.5%, χ² = 7.81, p < .01). It is important to highlight that,
proved that no card was hidden in his hand and that the unlike in Luchins’ (1942) extinction problem, in the false
false solution “palming the card” was impossible. This solution extinction trick, most of the participants who
version was designed to be visually simple and as simi- failed to discover the secret did not propose the false solu-
lar as possible to the no false solution trick condition tion as a potential solution (see Figure 2 for more details
(approximately the same duration, with similar moves) about participants’ answers).
to avoid any effect of the perceptual complexity. The There was no significant difference in confidence level
only visual difference between the two versions is the between those participants who discovered the correct
closed fingers (palming action) in the false solution solution in the no false solution trick (N = 35, M = 5.29,
Thomas et al. 5

Figure 3. (a) Percentage of participants who found the real secret of the trick (duplicate card) as a function of the condition (no
false solution trick, false solution extinction trick). (b) Confidence mean score for participants who found the real secret of the trick
as a function of the condition (no false solution trick, false solution extinction trick). Error bars represent the standard errors of the
mean.
FS = false solution.

SD = 1.53) and those who discovered it in the false solution that, in the context of problem solving, this false informa-
extinction trick (N = 24, M = 4.92, SD = 1.50, t(57) = 0.92, tion continues to exert its influence. This effect can persist
p = .36) (see Figure 3b). following a deliberate extinction, even if participants do
not endorse the false information themselves (see Figure
2). Unlike most of the other studies in this field, the event
Discussion and the retraction happened in front of participants’ eyes
It can be difficult to relinquish old ideas to discover new and not in an imaginary/artificial context (e.g., a printed
ones, and we investigated whether a potential solution to a text). Thus, the retraction was sufficiently salient not be
problem can prevent people from discovering the true ignored, which is illustrated by the fact that hardly any of
solution, although, they know that the first solution is our participants proposed the false solution after it had
impossible and wrong. To do that, we used an original type been ruled out. Moreover, in most of the studies on misin-
of insight problem: a magic trick (Danek et al., 2014). We formation, participants are invited to recall some parts of a
showed that if observers were given an obvious solution story, rather than actively search for a solution to a prob-
about how the trick can be done, they were significantly lem. Thus, we assume that the continuous influence of
less likely to discover the true solution, even after the first misinformation relies on different cognitive processes than
solution was shown to be impossible. Previous research on those involved in the mind fixing effect we observed here.
problem solving has shown that the first idea that comes to According to Knoblich and colleagues’ representational
mind can prevent a better alternative from being discov- change theory (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius,
ered (see Bilalić et al., 2008a, 2008b, 2010; Luchins, 1942; 1999; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001), to find the opti-
Thomas & Didierjean, 2016). Our results are novel and mal/only solution to an insight problem, it is often necessary
surprising in that even when participants were fully aware to think “outside of the box,” outside of a first representation
that their solution was wrong and that an alternative solu- of the problem. Along similar lines, we propose a peripheral
tion must exist, they were still inhibited from discovering representation hypothesis, whereby a false solution can acti-
plausible alternatives. We will now discuss in more detail vate a peripheral representation of the problem. This (false)
how this false solution could influence participants’ rea- peripheral representation can remain active, even after the
soning, even when it is ruled out. central false solution has been ruled out, and thus it can con-
Previous studies on misinformation have shown that tinue to activate implicit constraints and false assumptions
participants can maintain and recall information after its (Danek et al., 2014). For example, in the case of our experi-
retraction (e.g., Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, ment, pantomiming the action of palming the card might
2011; van Oostendorp & Bonebakker, 1999; for a review, activate a specific representation of the problem in which “a
see Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, unique queen of clubs will travel from the top of the deck to
2012). However, our study goes one step further. We show the magician’s back pocket hidden in his hand.” Even after
6 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 00(0)

peripheral representations) once they are informed it is

wrong.
Our results also suggest that the fixing effect only influ-
enced the discovery of the correct solution but not partici-
pants’ confidence in the solution. When participants
discover the real secret of the trick, it could create an “Aha!
Experience” that is linked to a strong and sudden feeling of
pleasure, certainty, and obviousness (see Danek et al.,
2013, 2014; Danek & Wiley, 2017; Thomas et al., 2015).
This “Aha! Experience” might facilitate the total deactiva-
tion of the false solution and increase participants’ confi-
dence in the new alternative.
Figure 4. Visual representation of the peripheral Magic tricks provide us with a toolkit to explore power-
representation hypothesis. ful failures in cognition, and although the false solution is
typically used in conjuring tricks, we believe that mind
the false solution is ruled out, the peripheral part of the false fixing effects play an important role in non-magical prob-
representation might still be active: “the queen of clubs is lems and everyday reasoning. Our results raise an impor-
unique, and it will travel from the top of the deck to the tant and potentially alarming issue on how we solve
magician’s back pocket hidden behind a mask (not his everyday problems: if the simple exposure to an idea that
hand).” Because this peripheral representation does not con- is unquestionably ruled out can actively influence the way
tain the true solution (the queen of club is not unique/dupli- we represent a simple problem, how do our everyday erro-
cated), participants face an impasse (Ohlsson, 1992) (see neous beliefs influence our reasoning capacity? It is likely
Figure 4). This peripheral representation hypothesis can that representations linked to maladaptive ideas that have
explain why most of the participants who struggled to dis- been activated for years can have profound and detrimen-
cover the secret of the trick did not propose the central false tal impacts on our ability to find better solutions.
solution as a potential secret of the trick. To find the correct
solution, the false representation of the problem needs to be Acknowledgements
changed by, for example, relaxing some crucial constraints We wish to express our sincere gratitude to Matt Tomkins for his
(e.g., the card is not unique) (Knoblich et al., 1999). proofreading and his precious help during the reviewing process.
However, it may be more economical to focus our attention
on the activated representation/constraints of the problem Declaration of Conflicting Interests
(even if it is closely linked to the ruled out solution) than to The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
relax these constraints and investigate a hypothetical better to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
alternative representation (Simon, 1990; Thomas &
Didierjean, 2016). Funding
Our results differ from those of Thomas and Didierjean The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support
(2016) in that the false solution exerted its influence even for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article:
after participants knew it was impossible. One of the main Supported by Fyssen Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship, 194
differences between the current experiment and the previ- Rue de Rivoli, 75001 Paris, France.
ous study is that our false solution was simply implied,
rather than explicitly stated. Unlike in the previous study, Notes
our participants were required to construct the false solu-
1. In all, 18 males and 22 females for the false solution control
tion (i.e., the magician hides the card in the palm of his trick, 17 males and 23 females for the no false solution trick,
hand) based on their own observation (i.e., hand looks as if and 18 males and 22 females for the false solution extinction
it is concealing a card), and thus our false solution will trick.
have engaged a deeper and more complex level of process- 2. The confidence score was not measured in the false solution
ing. It is likely that this deeper level of processing results control trick because the only aim of this first version was to
in stronger activation of the peripheral representation of control that the false solution we used in the false solution
the problem space, which may explain its persistent influ- extinction trick was sufficiently obvious to pop up in most
ence, even once the main false solution has been ruled out. participants’ minds.
Moreover, during a problem-solving task, an unlikely
solution (see Thomas & Didierjean, 2016) can be accepted References
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Appendix 1
Kuhn, G., Caffaratti, H. A., Teszka, R., & Rensink, R. A.
(2014). A psychologically-based taxonomy of misdirection. False solution control: https://youtu.be/jbgXTWQA
Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1392. nkk
Lamont, P., & Wiseman, R. (2005). Magic in theory: An intro- No false solution: https://youtu.be/-EOXweY5oUE
duction to the theoretical and psychological elements of
conjuring (pp. 28–46). Hertfordshire, UK: University of False solution extinction: https://youtu.be/pgnO3IY
Hertfordshire Press. dhPc

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