MANU/SC/0212/1989
Equivalent/Neutral Citation: (1989)3C ompLJ149(SC ), (1989)3C ompLJ149(SC ), [1989(59)FLR375], 1989 INSC 224, JT1989(3)SC 296,
(1989)IILLJ466SC , 1989(2)LLN966(SC ), 1989(2)SC ALE200, (1989)4SC C 459, [1989]3SC R662, 1989(7)SLR444(SC ), 1989(5)SLR774(SC ),
1990(1)UJ13
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 548 of 1987
Decided On: 01.08.1989
Harbans Lal and Ors. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Ahmadi and K. Jagannatha Shetty, JJ.
Case Note:
Labour and Industrial - equal pay for equal work - Articles 14, 16 and 39 of
Constitution of India, Service Law and Companies Act, 1956 - petitioners
(carpenter) sought equal pay with those engaged in Government service -
alleged employer discriminated between regular employed carpenter and
petitioners - no regular carpenter employed by employer - petitioner cannot
be compared with Government employee being in different organization -
having regard to nature of job all carpenters even can not be kept at equal
footing as their work requires individual skill - minimum wages prescribed by
Deputy Commissioner not applicable as it was confined to Government service
only - held, petitioner claim had no substance in view of aforementioned
reasoning.
JUDGMENT
K. Jagannatha Shetty, J.
1 . The petitioners are carpenters 1st and 2nd grade employed at the Wood Working
center of the Himachal Pradesh State Handicraft Corporation (the "Corporation"). They
are termed as daily rated employees. In this petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution, they are seeking enforcement of their fundamental right to have "equal
pay for equal work". They demand payment in terms paid to their counterparts in
regular services. They want the same pay of the regular employees as carpenters or in
the alternative, the minimum wages prescribed by the Deputy Commissioner for like
categories of workmen. They also seek regularisation of their services with the benefits
of pension, gratuity, etc.
2 . The corporation has resisted the petitioners' claim. The case of the Corporation is
that the unit where the petitioners are working is a factory registered under the
Factories Act. The petitioners are treated as industrial workmen and are given all
benefits due to them under the various labour legislations. The Government has not
fixed the minimum wages payable to the petitioners engaged in the Corporation or other
like industries, but the Corporation has adopted the minimum wages payable for similar
work in the construction industry. They are being paid the same wages as are payable
to carpenters, painters and carpenters' helpers engaged in the construction industry.
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They are given bonus under the Bonus Act and provident fund benefits under the
Employees' Provident Fund Act. It is also stated that the petitioners are supplied with
the necessary tools for carrying out their work and also working uniforms like aprons
and overalls.
3 . The Corporation has clearly stated that there are no regular employees of the
petitioners' categories in its establishment and, as such, the question of payment to the
petitioners, the pay admissible to regular employees does not arise.
4. A little more information about the purpose and object of the Corporation would be
useful for proper understanding of the case. The Corporation is a company which has
been incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The main object of the Corporation
as seen from the memorandum of Association is to preserve the traditional arts and
crafts and also to popularise handicrafts and handloom items in the State of Himachal
Pradesh and other parts of the country and abroad. In order to achieve this primary
objective, the Corporation gives training to artisans, weavers and craftsmen in various
traditional arts and crafts. During the period of training, the trainees are paid a stipend
by the Corporation. Upto 31st March, 1987, the Corporation has imparted training to as
many as 1662 persons in different areas like carpet weaving, handloom weaving,
painting, metal crafts, wood carving etc. Apart from giving training, the Corporation
also ensures marketing support to the artisans and craftsmen by purchasing their
products at remunerative prices and sell them through the marketing network of the
Corporation. It is thus a service oriented organisation helping the village artisans and
craftsmen to produce and market their products on remunerative prices. It is said that,
the village artisans and craftsmen make different items on a piece rate basis and in
some cases, they execute the work in their own homes.
5. The financial aspects of the Corporation is stated to be not encouraging, and indeed,
it is disappointing. It has suffered huge loss and the total losses accumulated hitherto is
Rs. 69.77 lakhs. Nonetheless, for the purpose of preserving and promoting traditional
arts and crafts, the Corporation has been kept alive. But to avoid or minimise further
loss, it is stated that the Corporation has reduced its overheads and maintained only the
administrative staff in the production centers at different parts of the State and no
permanent craftsmen are employed.
6. With these facts, we may now turn to the principle upon which the petitioners' case
is rested. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not one of the fundamental
rights expressly guaranteed by our Constitution. The principle was incorporated only
under Article 39(d) of the Constitution as a Directive Principle of State Policy. Perhaps
for the first time, this Court in Rahdhir Singh v. Union of India MANU/SC/0234/1982 :
(1982)ILLJ344SC has innovated that it is a constitutional goal capable of being achieved
through constitutional remedies. There the Court pointed out that that principle has to
be read into Article 14 of the Constitution which enjoins the State not to deny any
person equality before the law or the equal protection of the law and also to Article 16
which declares that there should be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters
relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Randhir Singh
case was concerned with a driver-constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi
Administration. He claimed equal salary for equal work as that of other drivers. The
Court found that the petitioner therein performed the same functions and duties as other
drivers in the service of Delhi Administration. The Court, therefore, directed the Central
Government to fix the pay scale of the petitioner on par with his counterparts doing
identical work under the same employer.
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7. In the immediate aftermath of the decision in Randhir Singh case, there were number
cases filed in this Court for enforcement of the right to "equal pay for equal work",
perhaps little realising the inbuilt restrictions in that principle. It may not be necessary
here to refer to all those decisions since almost all of them have been considered and
explained in the recent two decisions to which one of us was a party (K Jagannatha
Shetty, J.). Reference may be made to; (i)State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia
MANU/SC/0502/1988 : (1989)ILL J309aSC and (ii) Meva Ram Kanojia v. All India
Institute of Medical Sciences and Anr. MANU/SC/0316/1989 : (1989)IILL J578SC . In
Chaurasia case the question arose whether it was permissible to have two different pay
scales in the same cadre of Bench Secretaries of the Allahabad High Court who were for
all practical purposes performing similar duties and having same responsibilities. The
Court held that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical
application in every case of similar work. Article 14 permits reasonable classification
founded on rational basis. It is, therefore, not impermissible to provide two different
pay scales in the same cadre on the basis of selection based on merit with due regard to
experience and seniority. It was pointed out that in service, merit or experience could
be the proper basis for classification to promote efficiency in administration and he or
she learns also by experience as much as by other means. Apart from that, the Court
has expressly observed that the higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant
frustration for lack of promotional avenues may also be allowed.
8. Meva Ram Kanojia is the most recent decision which has exhaustively dealt with all
the principles bearing on the question of equal pay for equal work in the light of all the
previous decisions of this Court. There the petitioner was a "hearing Therapist" in the
All India Institute of Medical Sciences. He claimed pay scale admissible to "Senior
Speech Pathologist", "Senior Physiotherapist", "Senior Occupational Therapist",
"Audiologist", and "Speech pathologist". His case was based on the allegations that he
was discharging same duties and performing similar functions as "Senior Speech
Therapist", Senior Physiotherapist", "Senior Occupational therapist", "Audiologist" and
"Speech Pathologist". But the Court held that the principle of equal pay for equal work
cannot be invoked invariably in every kind of service particularly in the area of
professional services. It was also held that it is open to the State to classify employees
on the basis of qualifications, duties and responsibilities of the posts concerned. If the
classification has reasonable nexus with the objective sought to be achieved, efficiency
in the administration, the State would be justified in prescribing different pay scales.
9. Reference may also be made to the decision in All India Customs and Central Excise
Stenographers (Recognised) v. Union of India MANU/SC/0155/1988 : [1988]3SCR998
. There the Personal Assistants and Stenographers attached to the Heads of Department
in Customs and Central Excise Department of the Ministry of Finance made a claim for
parity of wages with the Personal Assistants and Stenographers attached to Joint
Secretaries and Officers above them in Ministry of Finance. The Court while rejecting
the claim expressed the view (at 100):-
But equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done, it cannot be
judged by the mere volume of work, there may be qualitative difference as
regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the
responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is
a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who
are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other
conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide,
reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object
of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is
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important to emphasize that equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of
Article 14 of the Constitution. But it follows naturally that equal pay for unequal
work will be a negation of the right.
10. Thus the law relating to equal pay for equal work has been practically hammered
out and very little remains for further innovation.
11. In the light of the aforesaid principles, we may now consider whether the equality
claims of the petitioners could be allowed. We have carefully perused, the material on
record and gave our anxious consideration to the question urged. From the averments
in the pleadings of the parties it will be clear that the Corporation has no regularly
employed carpenters. Evidently the petitioners are claiming wages payable to the
carpenters in Government service. We do not think that we could accept their claim. In
the first place, even assuming that the petitioners jobs are comparable with the
counterparts in the government service, the petitioners cannot enforce the right to
"equal pay for equal work". The discrimination complained of must be within the same
establishment owned by the same management. A comparison cannot be' made with
counterparts in other establishments with different management, or even in
establishments in different geographical locations though owned by the same master.
Unless it is shown that there is a discrimination amongst the same set of employees by
the same master in the same establishment, the principle of "equal pay for equal work"
cannot be enforced. This was also the view expressed in Meva Ram Kanojia v. A.I.I.M.S.
MANU/SC/0316/1989 : (1989)IILL J578SC . In the instant case, the petitioners are
employed by a company incorporated under the Companies Act. They cannot claim
wages payable to their counterparts in government services.
1 2 . Secondly, it may be noted that the petitioners are carpenters; better called as
craftsmen. By the general description of their job, one cannot come to the conclusion
that every carpenter or craftsmen is equal to the other in the performance of his work.
The two jobs by the mere nomenclature or by the volume of work performed cannot be
rated as equal. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. It requires the
consideration of various dimensions of the job. The accuracy required by the job and
the dexterity it entails may differ from job to job. It cannot be evaluated by the mere
averments in the self serving affidavits or counter-affidavits of the parties. It must be
left to be evaluated and determined by expert body. The principal claim of the
petitioners therefore fails and is rejected.
13. The next contention that the petitioners should be paid at least the minimum wages
prescribed by the Deputy Commissioner under Exhibit P.2 dated March 20, 1986 cannot
also be accepted. Ex. P.2 was issued by the Deputy Commissioner in the exercise of his
powers under the H.P. Financial Rules. It is applicable only to skilled and unskilled
workers in class IV employees in Government service. It has not been extended to
employees of the Corporation. The petitioners have been treated as construction
workers and they are being paid the minimum wages admissible to such workmen. The
Court, therefore, cannot direct the Corporation to apply the rates prescribed under Ex.
P.2 unless the Government makes it applicable to employees of the Corporation.
1 4 . As to the claim for regularisation of services of the petitioners, we express no
opinion, since the factual data is disputed and is insufficient. We leave the petitioners to
work out their rights elsewhere in accordance with law applicable to them.
15. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case,
we make no order as to costs.
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