[G.R. No. L-34568. March 28, 1988.

RODERICK DAOANG and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, Petitioners, v. THE
MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-
AGONOY, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; ART. 335, (par. 1), CIVIL CODE; WORDS USED IN
ENUMERATING DISQUALIFIED TO ADOPT; CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. — We find, that the words used in
paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

2. ID.; A STATUTE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS NEED NOT BE INTERPRETED. — Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated
otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction.

3. CIVIL LAW; ADOPTION; OBJECT. — Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to
persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation
of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The present tendency, however, is geared more
towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.

4. ID.; CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CLUB; ADOPTION; HAVING A CHILD, NO LONGER A DISQUALIFICATION TO
ADOPT. — Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children
by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge * in
Spec. Proc. No. 37 of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of
which reads, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all
legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R.
Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel
Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos
and their family names ‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed with ‘Agonoy’, which is the family name of the petitioners.

"Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions
of the New Civil Code.

"Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners." 1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case,
entitled: In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-
Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the Office of
the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the
petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses
Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother, who died on 1
March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendered its decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and
Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.cralawnad

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

x x x"

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondent judge held that "to add grandchild or
grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is
expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included."

But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez, 6 that the adoption of Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the
reduction of their legitimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is
contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons
who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in
law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.cralawnad

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need
not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
the subject of statutory construction. 7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only
those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was
once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article
174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the
spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren,
the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was
changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their
own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where
none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the
welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is
sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec.
Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-12446 May 20, 1960

ELISEO SILVA, petitioner,

Rodolfo M. Medina for petitioner.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Eliseo Silva seeks the review of a decision of the Public Service Commission, dated September 20, 1956,
as amended on June 5, 1957, granting respondent Belen Cabrera a certificate of public convenience to install and
operate a 5-ton ice plant in the City of Lipa, and to sell her ice in said City, and in the municipalities of Cuenca,
Alitagtag and Ibaan, province of Batangas, for a period of fifteen (15) years from January 7, 1950.

Cabrera's application, filed on June 1, 1949, was a for a 15-ton ice plant and covered the municipalities of Sto.
Tomas, Tanuaan, Cuenca, Rosario, Alitagtag, San Juan de Bolbok and Ibaan, province of Batangas. Oppositions
were filed by: (1) Eliseo Silva, who operates a 5-ton ice plant in the City of Lipa, with authority to sell his ice therein
and in the municipalities of Malvar, Tanauan, Talisay and Sto. Tomas, Batangas; (2) Antonio Zaragosa, who operates
a 10-ton ice plant in San Juan de Bolbok, Batangas, with authority to sell his ice therein and in the municipalities of
Rosario, province of Batangas, and Candelaria, province of Quezon; and (3) Leoncio S. Opulencia and Leonor Lat,
who are, likewise, authorized to operate a 5-ton ice plant in Tanauan, Batangas.

On July 14, 1949, Cabrera excluded the municipalities of San Juan de Bolbok and Rosario from her application,
whereupon Antonio Zaragosa withdrew his aforementioned opposition. Subsequently, Cabrera and the remaining
oppositors presented their evidence before the Chief, Legal Division, Public Service Commission, Atty. Antonio
Aspillera, who had been delegated therefor by Public Service Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, and thereafter, or
on January 7, 1950, a decision was rendered authorizing Cabrera to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City. On
appeal taken by Silva, this decision was, on March 19, 1951, annulled by the Supreme Court (in G.R. No. L-3629),1
which ordered a rehearing before either the Commission en banc or one of the Public Service Commissioners
delegated therefor by the Commission, upon the ground that, under the Public Service Act then in force, such
function could not be otherwise delegated.

Meanwhile, or during the pendency of the appeal, Cabrera had installed her 10-ton ice plant and started operation
on March 15, 1950. After the rendition of said decision of the Supreme court, or on April 11, 1951, Cabrera applied
for a provisional permit to continue operating her ice plant, to which Silva objected. On May 31, 1951, at the
hearing of this incident and rehearing of the case, Commissioner Ocampo allowed Cabrera, over the objection of
Silva, to re-submit the evidence formerly introduced before Atty. Aspillera. On July 26, 1951, Commissioner
Ocampo granted Cabrera's petition for a provisional permit, subject to cancellation or revocation at any time and
without prejudice to such decision as may eventually be rendered on the merits of the case. A reconsideration of
this order having been denied, on October 17, 1951, Silva applied from the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-5162)2 for a
writ of certiorari for the purpose of having another rehearing and of annulling said order of July 26, 1951, as well as
of securing a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Cabrera from operating her ice plant, upon the ground that
the admission of the evidence already introduced before Atty. Aspillera violated the decision of said Court in case
G.R. No. L-3629, and was, therefore, null and void. By a decision, dated January 31, 1952, we denied said petition
for certiorari and ordered a trial de novo, in line with our decision in case G.R. No. L-3629, for the reason that the
Commission had not adhered thereto in admitting said evidence for the determination on the merits of the case,
but had not infringed any law in considering said evidence for the resolution of the petition for a provisional permit.
Thus, the order of July 26, 1951 granting the same was, in effect, affirmed.

Subsequently a trial de novo, at which both parties introduced their respective evidence, was held. In the
meantime, Cabrera had further excluded from her application the municipalities of Tanauan and Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, to which the opposition of Leoncio S. Opulencia and Leonor Lat referred. On September 20, 1956, the
Commission rendered a decision granting Cabrera a certificate of public convenience to install and operate a 10-
ton ice plant in the City of Lipa and to sell her ice in that city and in the municipalities of Cuenca, Alitagtag and
Ibaan, province of Batangas, for a period of fifteen (15) years from January 7, 1950. On motion for reconsideration
and new trial filed by Silva on or about October 26, 1956, the Commission, by an order of June 5, 1957, denied the
new trial prayed for, but modified its decision of September 20, 1956 "in the sense that applicant Belen Cabrera
shall produce in her ice plant in Lipa City not more than 5 tons of ice daily instead of the 10 tons there authorized".
The case is now before us for the third time on appeal taken by Silva, who maintains that:
The Public Service Commission erred in granting the certificate of public convenience to the respondent since
there is no evidence to reasonably support the decision and the order of June 5, 1957. In fact, the meager evidence
adduced by the respondent as against the overwhelming evidence of the petitioner showing the lack of necessity
for the installation of an additional plant of any capacity in Lipa City in addition to the newly discovered evidence of
the petitioner which the Public Service Commission ignored, when construed by the Public Service Commission as
justifying the grant of a certificate of Public Convenience to the respondent, constitutes an abuse of discretion to
the prejudice and detriment of petitioner's business, which is entitled to reasonable protection against ruinous
competition. (Petitioner's brief, pp. 5-6.)

The issue thus raised by Silva is one of fact, which hinges on the credibility and weight of the evidence introduced
at the trial de novo. In this connection, the decision appealed from says:

Applicant's evidence is to the effect that Lipa is a growing and well populated city with new commercial
establishments which every day a considerable supply of ice have to be consumed; that the ice plant of the
oppositor which has produced only five tons since it was installed is inadequate for the requirements of the public;
that the people of Lipa have to get their ice from ice dealers and the latter have to go to other towns to buy their ice
and this results not only in a higher price paid by Lipa people for the ice which they need but also in an irregular and
undependable service; that not only the people of Lipa but also those of the towns which are proposed to be
served have a great demand for ice because these towns are close to Lipa and ice service from Lipa is easy if there
were enough supply of ice in the City of Lipa; that daily but more particularly on special occasions when there is an
extraordinary demand for ice, there is no way of obtaining this very necessary commodity; that many people
likewise go to Lipa every day for business, or personal reasons and they too add to the number of people who must
be provided with ice; that there is no ice plant either in Sto. Tomas, Cuenca or Alitagtag notwithstanding the big
demand for ice in these towns; that applicant has operated her plant continuously and the production of her plant
has been availed of totally except on occasions when the plant due too breakdown was not able to operate; that
the demand for ice in Lipa and the other towns can easily reach up to 20 or 25 tons so that the present production
of 5 tons is grossly inadequate; that applicant has continued to invest large amounts in the repair and improvement
of her ice plant in order to be able to operate the same to provide the public with the ice that it needs and that her
actual investment on the plant is over P100,000, and that public interests and convenience will be promoted by the
grant of a regular certificate to her to operate the ice plant in Lipa.

The evidence of the oppositor, on the other hand, is to the effect that there is no such demand for ice in Lipa and
the other towns as testified to by applicant's witnesses but even before the war and up to the present time
oppositor has never been able to sell the total output of his 5-ton plant; that there are really no businesses in Lipa
which require the use of ice; that applicant's plant itself frequently stops operation due to the fact that there is no
demand for ice is so little that there is no need for authorizing a new plant in Lipa to supply the requirements of
these other towns; that in Tanauan now there is a 10-ton plant operated by Opulencia and Lat and this plant
together with that of the oppositor provides all the ice that the public of Lipa and the other towns so that there is no
necessity for the operation of applicant's plant.

It appears from the evidence that Lipa City and the towns of Tanauan, Cuenca, Alitagtag and Ibaan have a total
population of over 125,000 people. Lipa alone has a population of over 50,000. Oppositor Silva has a 5-ton plant
and is authorized to sell in Lipa, Malvar, Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Talisay. Oppositor's authorized territory would
concur with that proposed by the applicant in the towns of Lipa, Sto. Tomas and Tanauan. Our records show that
there is now a 10-ton plant in Tanauan operated by Opulencia and Lat and this operator is authorized, among other
towns, to sell in Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Lipa. We have gone over the evidence presented by both parties at the
rehearing very carefully and are of the opinion that the preponderance thereof establishes the need for permitting
the applicant to operate a 10-ton plant in Lipa. We are convinced that a 5-ton production in Lipa can not be
sufficient for the ice needs of the public considering the population of over 50,000 people of the City. There is also
the population of over 60,000 people in the other towns of Alitagtag, Ibaan and Cuenca, without counting the
population of Tanauan which is now served by an ice plant in that town. We are convinced that the operation of
applicant's 10-ton plant in Lipa will undoubtedly result in promoting public interests and convenience because
thereby the ice requirements of the public which can not be met by the present plant will be adequately served.
While it is true that ice is brought to Lipa by ice dealers, we are inclined to believe the evidence of the applicant that
the service of ice dealers results in higher price paid by the consumers and at the same time is not reliable and
regular because these dealers do not have the obligation of bringing ice regularly. Undoubtedly an additional plant
in Lipa to serve the proven needs of the public will be more beneficial and convenient to the people of Lipa than to
make them rely on service of ice dealers. We believe, however, that applicant should only be authorized a 10-ton
plant and that the town of Tanauan should not be included in her territory inasmuch as there is already in Tanauan
a 10-ton ice plant, and we do not believe that with a 10-ton ice plant, in Tanauan, it would be necessary for the
applicant to send her ice to that town.

Without denying the existence of evidence on the facts thus found by the Commission, it is urged that the proof to
the contrary introduced by appellant Silva is more weighty than that of appellee Cabrera. It is well settled, however,
that the findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, as long as there is evidence
reasonably supporting such findings (Javellana vs. La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., 37 Off. Gaz. 3110; Phil.
Ship-owners' Association vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 43 Phil., 328; Ynchausti Steamship Co vs. Public Utility
Commissioner, 44 Phil., 362; San Miguel Brewery vs. Lapi, 53 Phil. 539; Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Phil.
vs. Valero, et al., 85 Phil., 7; Halili et al. vs. Isip, L-2458 and L-2476, January 28, 1950; Lopez vs. Batangas Trans.
Co., et al., 105 Phil., 649., 56 Off. Gaz. [20]3646) A.L. Ammen Trans. Co. vs. Soriano, L-12350, May 26, 1959;
Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Guico, 106 Phil., 118; 57 Off. Gaz. [24] 4433; and the evidence on record, to our mind, are
sufficient to bear out the conclusions of fact made in the decision appealed from.

Indeed, the issue in this appeal boils down to whether the needs of the public in the area covered by the decision
appealed from are sufficiently met by the ice plant operators therein. Apart from the facts adverted in the appealed
decision, it appears that in April, 1947, Silva had applied for authority to increase the capacity of his ice plant, from
five (5) tons to ten (10) tons daily, upon the allegation that an increased production was demanded by the "rapid
rehabilitation and advancement of the fishing industry in and around Taal Lake; plus the increased volume of
agricultural products harvested in the province of Batangas and ... brought to Lipa City" as the "province's
commercial center," as well as by "the big increase of population in said municipality and in the municipalities of
Malvar, Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Talisay." This application (Case No. 24971) was dismissed on October 24, 1947,
on account of Silva's failure to appear on the date set for the hearing thereof. However, soon after Cabrera had
docketed her application, which is the subject matter of his appeal, or on June 13, 1949, Silva filed another
application (Case No. 50513) for authority to increase the capacity of his ice plant from five (5) to fifteen (15) tons,
on grounds substantially identical to those set forth in his application in Case No. 24971. In short, therefore, the
very appellant had urged the Public Service Commission to believe that the ice plant operators in the City of Lipa
and in the municipalities mentioned in the decision appealed from can not sufficiently supply the needs of the
public therein.

It may not be amiss to note, also, that, in view of the number of years this case had been pending and of the
incidents decided in relation thereto, the Commission had more than the average opportunity and time to
ascertain and elucidate the facts pertinent thereto. That it actually gave due consideration to the opposition filed
by appellant Silva and the evidence introduce by him is attested by the circumstance that in the light of the new
evidence he discovered, after the rendition of the decision of September 20, 1956, and disclosed in his motion for
reconsideration and new trial, the Commission modified said decision by reducing to one-half (1/2) the amount of
ice therein authorized to be produced by appellee Belen Cabrera.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner, Eliseo Silva. It so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.