1AC — FBK — R1

1AC
 Posturing---1AC
The Contention is POSTURING.
China’s military posture risks miscalculation.
Bradley ’10/24 [Sorcha Bradley, 10-24-2024, Sorcha Bradley is a writer at The Week. She joined in
2019 and then took up her current role with the digital team, where she covers UK current affairs and
politics. She covered topics ranging from artificial intelligence to the inner workings of tech giants such
as Amazon. She has also written for Sky News, The Sunday Times, and Grazia magazine, among others.
She has a master’s in newspaper journalism from City, University of London, where she specialised in
political journalism. For her undergraduate degree, she read English literature and classical studies at
the University of Bristol, “Is China going to invade Taiwan?”, The Week,
https://theweek.com/news/world-news/asia-pacific/954343/what-would-happen-china-attempt-
invade-taiwan, DOA: 10-24-2024] sumzom + WWU
Straits of Taiwan would be ‘transformed into a ferocious battlefield’ as Beijing looks to overwhelm self-governing island

China spent around 23 times more on its military than Taiwan in 2021

China has said its latest large-scale military drills around Taiwan are intended as a "stern warning" to
those seeking independence on the island.

Beijing ordered a record number of fighter jets and other warplanes around Taiwan on Monday and
Tuesday, after new President Lai Ching-te gave a speech vowing to protect the island's sovereignty in the
face of challenges from the mainland.

Beijing has always viewed the island as a

Taiwan split from the People's Republic of China during a civil war in the 1940s, but
rogue breakaway territory to be brought back under control, by force if necessary, making it arguably "the most
dangerous place on Earth", said The Economist.

'Grey zone'

China's latest exercises involving fighter jets, drones, warships and Coast Guard vessels simulated
military assaults and a blockade of the self-governing island and are just the latest in a "series of
recent war games" conducted by Beijing against its neighbour, said CNN.

Over the past two years, China has ramped up its so-called "grey zone operations", which represented
"activities that fall short of war" in the Taiwan Strait, said The Independent.

So while Monday's drills were "widely expected," said the BBC, the
"deployment and how close Chinese ships and
aircraft were to Taiwan – as well as the fiery rhetoric – could be seen as very aggressive behaviour".

"In any other context, it would have been seen as a dramatic escalation – but it came against the backdrop of tensions that
were already very high."
Risk of 'accidental confrontation'

For decades the governments in Beijing and Taipei had an unwritten agreement not to cross an
unofficial median line that divides the 110-mile-wide strait between them. Now "China is crossing it
almost daily, at sea and in the air", said Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, the BBC's Asia correspondent based in Taipei, last year.
Beijing's "persistent incursions" have provided a "powder keg", said CNN's Will Ripley.
China's "now-normalised presence around Taiwan raises the risk of an accidental confrontation", said
defence analyst Ben Lewis in The New York Times in February. "But over the longer term, it has also gradually created
a dangerous sense of complacency in Taipei and Washington, while giving China the crucial
operational practice it might one day need to seize the island."

As well as the deterioration in cross-strait relations, there is a fear that China's "growing military
modernization and assertiveness" could spark a conflict, said the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
When could an invasion happen?

top US military
Experts "disagree about the likelihood and timing of a Chinese invasion", said the think tank. Earlier this year, the
commander in the Indo-Pacific said that Beijing is maintaining its goal of being able to invade Taiwan
by 2027.

2027 is seen as "magical" because it marks the centenary of what was to become the People's Liberation Army (PLA), said Robert Fox
in London's The Standard.

US military support causes US-China confrontation.

1. STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY---Military support declares clarity which guarantees a
Chinese attack.
Harris ’24 [Peter Harris graduated from Oxford in classical Chinese and has a Ph. D. in Asian history,
Jared M McKinney PhD from Singapore's Nanyang Technological University, 5-7-2024, "Strategic clarity
or calamity? Competing logics of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait," OUP Academic
https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/100/3/1171/7663884 DOA: 10-2-2024] sumzom + Ewan
Problem three: simplifying China's operational calculus

What will happen if the United States continues to surge forces into east Asia as a means of convincing
Chinese leaders that they cannot expect to win a war over Taiwan at an acceptable cost? Proponents of such a build-
up argue that China will be deterred from attacking Taiwan. But there is another possibility: that China might perceive a narrowing
window of opportunity for such an attack. In other words, if the US joined a declaration of strategic clarity
with concrete moves (augmented forward deployments, particularly to Taiwan) designed to make strategic clarity
credible, then this might well incentivize China to invade Taiwan before those moves were completed.
Paradoxically, then, it might be better for Taiwanese security if China can maintain a low chance of seizing
Taiwan militarily—an unattractive ‘outside option’ that China's leaders do not want to exercise as their best option—than for China to
perceive itself being pushed into a world with a vanishing chance of seizing Taiwan by force, in which case
it might become rational for China to strike, no matter how bad the odds and how costly the endeavour.
The best defence of strategic clarity when considered in these terms is that, even if the US' adoption of strategic clarity forced China to
contemplate striking US forces first as part of an overall invasion plan, such calculations would raise China's expected costs of an invasion to
such an extent that deterrence would be re-established. But, in fact, a declaration of strategic clarity would not necessarily worsen China's
strategic position. On
the contrary, the luxury of being more certain about how the United States would
respond to an armed attack on Taiwan would simplify Chinese policy. Let us consider the following three scenarios,
which imagine how China might deal with the presence of US forces in east Asia under different levels of certainty about the United States'
intentions to intervene.

First, there is a scenario in which Chinese leaders have full confidence that the United States would stay out of a war over Taiwan. In these
circumstances, it follows that Beijing would not attack forward-deployed US forces and would instead seek to secure the continuance of
America's non-belligerent status, no matter how many US military assets were deployed in east Asia. This is China's best-case scenario.
Second, there is a scenario in which Chinese leaders are uncertain about a US response. Under such conditions, strategists in Beijing would face
a conundrum. Choosing
to attack US forward-deployed forces in a pre-emptive strike would deliver some
early operational successes, perhaps akin to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but would also
provoke a major power war in the process. Yet if they took a risk by wagering that the United States would not intervene on
Taiwan's behalf, Chinese strategists would forgo the chance to achieve operational successes (missed opportunities that could prove costly in
the event that the United States decided to intercede) but would preserve hope of securing the best-case scenario of keeping America out of
the war. Of course, attacking the US when the latter would otherwise have been inclined against intervention would be the definition of foolish.
However, not attacking and then facing a major US intervention would be the worst of all cases; US forces
would disperse from vulnerable locations (warships sailing into the high seas, fighters moving to an agile combat employment posture), and
the United States could sink many high-value Chinese naval assets (especially ferries and roll-on/roll-off vessels) in a
synchronized surprise attack that integrated navy, air force and army assets and drew on the US'
tradition of ‘shock and awe’ warfare. One version of China's Science of military strategy explains how dangerous this situation
would be to China, given its theory of victory in war: ‘If one loses at the beginning of a conflict, then it will become very difficult to reverse this
passive situation. Therefore, the first battle is incredibly important for winning the initiative in warfare .’29

Third, there is a scenario in which Chinese officials have high confidence that the United States would
intervene on Taiwan's behalf. In this case, leaders in Beijing would have no reason to bring about the worst-case scenario
outlined above. They would, instead, feel justified in launching a surprise attack against the US in hopes of
doing enough damage to delay America's effective entry into the war. The bulk of America's forward-deployed
forces would first be disrupted—their ‘system of systems’ degraded and dazzled—and a few symbolic American assets (aircraft carriers) sunk in
order to undermine US morale, disrupt the US ‘operational centre of gravity’, and prove that China has successfully exploited the contemporary
revolution in military affairs.30 The strategic bet here would be that after a series of Chinese successes, US leaders would decide to cut their
losses, or else conclude that the United States would recover too slowly to mount a defence of Taiwan.

Chinese invasion decision-making: three scenarios

Figure 2:Chinese invasion decision-making: three scenarios

One implication of articulating China's hierarchy of best-case and worst-case outcomes is that there
is not much difference
between China estimating, say, a 65 per cent chance of US armed intervention, or an 85 per cent
chance. In either case, China would be likely to proceed with a first strike against US forward deployments
in order to ensure operational success. The most propitious scenarios for the United States—by far—are
those in which Chinese leaders are uncertain about US resolve or believe that the United States has
determined not to intervene on Taiwan's behalf. These scenarios preserve the possibility that Beijing will err on the side of
caution, declining to launch pre-emptive attacks on US forces even as an invasion of Taiwan proceeded apace. Under such circumstances, the
United States could choose to stay out of the war (if its leaders decided this was in the US' national interest) or else could intervene with the
benefit of America's forward-deployed military assets being firmly intact, seizing the initiative and eliminating the PLA's high-value assets.
Under any scenario where China's answer to the question of whether America will intervene is ‘yes’ or
‘probably’, Chinese forces would almost certainly follow their own doctrine, which calls for a massive
first strike against adversarial logistics and communication hubs.31
Under today's policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, China might estimate that US entry into a war over Taiwan is more likely than not, but Chinese
leaders would almost certainly categorize the chance of a US intervention as below the level of ‘high confidence’. Changing US declarative
policy would nudge Chinese assessments of US intentions closer to ‘high confidence of intervention’. Although this might seem like it would
consequently reduce the likelihood of war by making China more cautious, our argument is that strategic clarity would also encourage China to
default to its optimal operational approach of a first strike, which paradoxically reduces operational risk by ensuring that the worst-case
scenario—of a synchronized and overwhelming US armed intervention that catches Chinese forces in the middle of the Taiwan Strait—does not
occur. To decision-makers, the costs of a prolonged great power war often feel uncertain and distant.32 In contrast, the costs of operational
failure, in this case failing to land powerful formations on Taiwan, loom large. The operational level of war should not be allowed to trump the
strategic, but it often does.33

The history of the First World War can offer some instructive lessons here. In some ways, the United States today may appear to China as Russia
appeared to Germany in 1914. Back then, German leaders were faced with the problem of how to successfully fight a war against France and
Russia simultaneously—a conundrum that became existential once Russia began to mobilize for war. German strategy had been formed around
the idea of quickly defeating France and then turning to Russia before its mobilization could be completed. But what this meant was that
Russian mobilization in July 1914 started the countdown for Germany's window of success; Berlin had to move quickly against France, and could
not delay in case it became vulnerable to a joint attack by France and Russia.34

Today, China would also want a short war over Taiwan (bringing about the speedy conquest of the island), but it must
know from the example of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, if from nothing else, that the United States will probably enjoy some
forewarning of Chinese invasion plans, and thus may begin elements of military mobilization, such as
sending fleets towards Taiwan. But China cannot load and disembark roll-on/roll-off vessels full of
soldiers and military equipment with American attack submarines, F-35s and destroyers in the vicinity, because
this would risk catastrophe (a ‘million-man swim’).35 Even under conditions of US strategic ambiguity, then, any sort of
sustained mobilization for war by the United States could be perceived by China, as Germany perceived Russian
mobilization in July 1914: as the beginning of the war, even if no shots had yet been fired. Knowing this, Chinese leaders would feel
significant pressure to play their cards first and to launch an overwhelming attack at the moment of
peak US vulnerability. Once US forces had been degraded, China would then turn to its true strategic objective, Taiwan. This would of
course be the opposite course of action to that taken by Germany in 1914: Germany planned to secure its true objective first (defeat France)
and then fight Russia to a standstill second, as a necessary but unfortunate consequence of the first action. The difference is not fundamentally
strategic but technological: because the United States has the military capabilities to stop China from attaining its primary objective (with a US
first strike), it would be incumbent upon China's leaders to neutralize the US threat before (or at the same time as) moving on Taiwan, if those
leaders perceived that an American intercession on Taiwan's behalf was very likely.

At the least, this suggests that, if US leaders ever do determine to adopt strategic clarity, they should be confident that other deterrents are in
place while the US is modifying its force structure to avoid creating an imperative for Chinese pre-emption, per the scenario described above.
More generally, US policy-makers should reflect on the strategic worth of ambiguity: the less certain China is of how the US will respond, the
less likely it is that Chinese action would begin with a first strike on US forces, enabling a more decisive US response, were America's leaders to
determine that it was in the national interest to fight. A decisive US move that destroyed Chinese high-value assets in the Taiwan Strait would
result in Chinese operational failure. Risk of such operational failure reduces the likelihood of a Chinese invasion.36 Paradoxically, strategic
clarity reduces this operational risk by guaranteeing a Chinese first strike. In contrast, strategic ambiguity presents China both with strategic risk
(of a long war with the US) and operational risk (of victory denial in the Strait).

The plan signals a shift in US policy towards ambiguity.

Harris and Gurtov ’23 [Scott Harris is co-founder and current executive producer of Between The
Lines, Mel Gurtov is Professor Emeritus of Political Science in the Hatfield School of Government 7-14-
2023, "The Urgent Need to Reduce Rising US-China Tensions and Avert Future Conflict", BTL,
https://btlonline.org/the-urgent-need-to-reduce-rising-us-china-tensions-and-avert-future-conflict/]
DOA: 10-10-2024 //Ewan + sumzom

While corporate media has been preoccupied with coverage of Russia’s war in Ukraine over the past year, U.S. relations with China
have deteriorated. The chill in diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing has been accompanied by dangerous maneuvers
involving U.S. and Chinese naval vessels and aircraft that each side blames the other for being “unnecessarily aggressive” and “provocative.”

Chinese officials have long condemned U.S. policy toward Taiwan, asserting there is only “one China,” with which it seeks eventual unification.
The Biden administration angered the Chinese, by appearing to depart from the decades-long policy of
“strategic ambiguity,” where the US is intentionally vague on how it would respond to any future Chinese attack on Taiwan.
After the U.S. military spotted what they described as a Chinese “spy balloon” in American airspace in February, Secretary of State Antony
Blinken cancelled a planned visit to China for talks, but that trip has now been rescheduled for June 18. It is hoped that the resumption of
diplomacy will help reduce tensions. Between The Lines’ Scott Harris spoke with Mel Gurtov, professor emeritus of political science at Oregon’s
Portland State University and author of the book, “Engaging China: Rebuilding Sino-American Relations.” Here, he talks about the urgent need
to reduce rising U.S.-China tensions in order to avert future conflict.

MICHAEL GURTOV: We tend to see Taiwan as separate from Beijing’s security interests. But that’s not correct, because we need to look at the
world through Chinese eyes as well as our own. Strategic ambiguity has a pretty long history, about 45 years dating back to when the U.S.
and China established formal diplomatic relations.
And from that time until now, it has actually served both sides pretty well. I mean, on one hand, for the United
States, it has suggested that the United States might or might not come to Taiwan’s protection in the event of a Chinese attack.
But it has stayed clear of making a formal statement on behalf of Taiwan’s defense because the U.S.
knew, at least until recently, that to do so would be to run smack up against Chinese national interests.

And so we keep things or have been keeping things ambiguous. Meanwhile, on the Chinese side, they have always said going back to Mao’s
time, that peaceful reunification would be the preferred way to bring about Taiwan’s unification with China. But on the other hand, they have
never said that the use of force would not be used.

In fact, more recently, they have been beginning

to say that they’re rethinking the whole policy of peaceful
reunification. They are essentially responding to changes in American policy toward China that has essentially
eroded the strategic ambiguity principle and especially with regard to the Republican right-wing , tried to
replace it with strategic clarity. And that clarity is precisely the sort of thing which, if carried through on a number of fronts, political and
military in particular, is going to result in war with China.

I mean, I have no doubt about that. And I think all my colleagues who are close observers of China would agree with that. For the right-wingers
and unfortunately supported by many liberals in both houses of Congress, that
clarity means that the United States would
actually be quite willing to see Taiwan become an independent country , which violates one of the central principles
that we have always subscribed to, namely that we believe in one China.

In fact, President Biden repeated that when he was with Xi Jinping in Bali. And so it would amount to accepting Taiwan and even advocating for
it as an independent country. It would mean that the U.S. would be fully upgrading its diplomatic ties to Taiwan. It
would mean that
the U.S. would be pumping even more military aid than it already is, which is quite substantial, into
Taiwan.
And in all those ways, it would turn the whole situation around in which Taiwan becomes an American protectorate. And, by the way, not
necessarily to the liking of the folks on Taiwan themselves. But that’s where things are headed, especially if the Republican right-wing gets gets
its way.

SCOTT HARRIS: What policy changes would you recommend the Biden administration undertake to ease tensions and improve relations
that would benefit both countries?

MICHAEL GURTOV: The easiest thing to do would be to revert back to where we were in in the Obama years with regard to Taiwan. That
is,
to reaffirm strategic ambiguity and demonstrate it by reducing military aid except for purely defensive reasons to
Taiwan, by not sending such high level people to to Taiwan. And significantly reducing the direct assistance that the
United States gives to Taiwan in the form of military advisors and trainers.
All of these things were not part of U.S. policy in the Obama years and there’s no reason to have them now. But at the same time that we do
that, we would also want China to agree to stop its air exercises that go over the median line between the mainland and Taiwan, or which go
into Taiwan’s air defense zone.

In other words, stop harassment of Taiwan. I truly believe that a deal can be worked out that would essentially produce the status quo anti-
Trump and would restore peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

2. ENTANGLEMENT---reduction resolves tensions and is the only way to prevents US

draw-in.
Thrall & Dorminey ’18 [A. Trevor Thrall was a senior fellow for Cato Institute’s Defense and Foreign
Policy Department, with expertise in international security and the politics of American national
security. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and
Government where he teaches courses in international security, Caroline Dorminey was a policy analyst
in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. She worked on issues pertaining to the US
defense budget, defense politics, force structure, and involvement in the international arms trade. She is
an Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade, March-13-2018, "Risky Business: The Role of
Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy," Cato Institute https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/risky-business-
role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy DOA: 10-13-2024] sumzom + Ewan
These examples of blowback demonstrate how difficult it can be to forecast the long-term outcomes of arms sales and how obvious it is that
selling weapons carries a number of risks. Predicting what exactly will happen is hard, but predicting that arms sales to clients with red flags are
likely to end badly is quite easy. Iraq was a fragile state ravaged by a decade’s worth of American intervention and rife with terrorism and civil
conflict; to transfer such large quantities of weapons to its military and police force under such conditions was to invite disaster.

Entanglement. Arms
sales raise the risk of entanglement in two ways. First, they can represent early steps
down the slippery slope to unwise military intervention. Consider a case like the Syrian civil war or the many cases during
the Cold War in which the United States wanted to support rebels and freedom fighters against oppressive governments. 74 In the majority of
those cases, American leaders were wary of intervening directly. Instead, the United States tended to rely on
money, training, and arms sales. But by taking concrete steps like arms sales to support rebel groups,
Washington’s psychological investment in the outcome tends to rise, as do the political stakes for the
president, who will be judged on whether his efforts at support are successful or not. As we saw in the Syrian civil war, for example, Barack
Obama’s early efforts to arm Syrian rebels were roundly criticized as feckless, increasing pressure on him to intervene more seriously. 75

History does not provide much guidance about how serious the risk of this form of entanglement might be. During the Cold War, presidents
from Nixon onward viewed arms sales as a substitute for sending American troops to do battle with communist forces around the world. The
result was an astonishing amount of weaponry transferred or sold to Third World nations, many of which were engaged in active conflicts both
external and internal. The risk of superpower conflict made it dangerous to intervene directly; accordingly, the Cold War–era risk of
entanglement from arms sales was low.76 Today, however, the United States does not face nearly as many constraints on its behavior, as its
track record of near-constant military intervention since the end of the Cold War indicates. As
a result, the risk of arms sales
helping trigger future military intervention is real, even if it cannot be measured precisely.

The second way in which arms sales might entangle the United States is by creating new disputes or
exacerbating existing tensions. U.S. arms sales to Kurdish units fighting in Syria against the Islamic State, for example, have ignited
tensions between the United States and its NATO ally Turkey, which sees the Kurds as a serious threat to Turkish sovereignty and
stability.77 Meanwhile, ongoing
arms sales to NATO nations and to other allies like South Korea and Taiwan
have exacerbated tensions with Russia, China, and North Korea, raising the risk of escalation and the
possibility that the United States might wind up involved in a direct conflict.78
Regional Effects. Arms sales do not just affect the recipient nation; they also affect the local balance of power, often causing ripple effects
throughout the region. Though advocates of arms sales trumpet their stabilizing influence, as we have noted above, arms sales often lead to
greater tension, less stability, and more conflict. Because of this — and the complementary problem of weapons dispersion — the regional
impact of arms sales is less predictable and more problematic than advocates acknowledge.

Instability, Violence, and Conflict. First, arms

sales can make conflict more likely.79 This may occur because recipients of
new weapons feel more confident about launching attacks or because changes in the local balance of
power can fuel tensions and promote preventive strikes by others. A study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995, for example,
found that although arms sales appeared to have some restraining effect on major-power allies, they had the opposite effect in other cases,
and concluded that “increased
arms transfers from major powers make states significantly more likely to be
militarized dispute initiators.”80 Another study focused on sub-Saharan Africa from 1967 to 1997 found that “arms transfers
are significant and positive predictors of increased probability of war.”81 Recent history provides supporting
evidence for these findings: since 2011, Saudi Arabia, the leading buyer of American weapons, has intervened to varying degrees in Yemen,
Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar.

Second, arms sales can also prolong and intensify ongoing conflicts and erode rather than promote
regional stability. Few governments, and fewer insurgencies, have large enough weapons stocks to fight for
long without resupply.82 The tendency of external powers to arm the side they support, however
understandable strategically, has the inevitable result of allowing the conflict to continue at a higher level of
intensity than would otherwise be the case. As one study of arms sales to Africa notes, “Weapons imports are essential
additives in this recipe for armed conflict and carnage.”83
Third, this dynamic appears to be particularly troublesome with respect to internal conflicts. Jennifer Erickson, for example, found that
recipients of major conventional weapons are 70 percent more likely to engage in internal conflicts than other states. Though
halting
arms sales alone is not a panacea for peace and stability, arms embargoes can help lessen the
destructiveness of combat in both civil and interstate wars simply by restricting access to the means of
violence.84
Finally, because of their effects on both interstate and internal conflict, arms sales can also erode rather than promote regional stability. As
noted in the previous section, where the United States seeks to manage regional balances of power, arms sales often create
tension, whether because the American role in the region threatens others or because American clients feel emboldened. The Middle East,
for example, has seesawed between violence and tense standoffs for the past many decades, at first because of Cold War competition and
more recently because of the American war on terror. The notion that increased U.S. arms sales since 9/11 made the Middle East more stable is
far-fetched to say the least. Similarly, though many argue that American security commitments to countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea
have produced greater stability, there is a strong case to be made that the opposite is now true. American
support of South Korea
has driven North Korea to develop nuclear weapons; the presence of U.S. missile defense systems in
South Korea has aggravated China, and American support of Taiwan produces continual tension between
the two powers.85

3. DIPLOMACY---US military support prevents it.

Larison ’23 [Daniel Larison is a former senior editor at TAC, where he also kept a solo blog. He has
been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, World Politics Review,
Politico Magazine, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a
columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, 02-28-2023, "Why
sending more US military troops to Taiwan is so risky," Responsible Statecraft
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/28/more-overt-us-support-for-taiwan-is-fraught-with-risk/
DOA: 10-3-2024] sumzom + Ewan
The United States is reportedly planning to increase its military presence in Taiwan from nearly 40 to between
100 and 200 military personnel.

According to the first report by The Wall Street Journal last week, the additional troops will arrive in the coming months. The
small
number of U.S. forces in Taiwan has been growing steadily in recent years from less than two dozen at
the start of 2021 to what could be nearly ten times as many by the middle of this year. News of the larger troop
presence came on the heels of a high-level meeting between U.S. and Taiwanese officials in Washington last Tuesday. There are also separate
reports that 500 Taiwanese troops will be sent to the United States for combat training.

While the total numbers involved are still small, these moves represent significant increases in
cooperation between the two governments and could portend larger deployments in the future. As the
Journal article states, the planned increase would be “the largest deployment of forces in decades by the U.S. on Taiwan.” The United
States and Taiwan have had some military cooperation and unofficial ties despite the lack of formal
relations between the two, but the difference now is that these ties are becoming stronger and more
visible at the same time and therefore harder for the Chinese government to ignore.
The article suggested that the administration had been trying to keep the larger troop presence out of the public eye. According to the report,
the training program is one that “the Pentagon has taken pains not to publicize,” but the public also has a right to know about decisions that
the government is making that increase the direct U.S. commitment to Taiwan. If the Washington is going to deploy more troops to Taiwan
than it has in decades, the public should be aware of it and Congress should be asking pointed questions about the potential implications of
these decisions.

The increased troop presence is consistent with the Biden administration’s more overt signals of
support for Taiwan over the last two years. The president himself has repeatedly said that U.S. troops
would be sent to fight for Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, and in so doing he has made a
commitment that goes far beyond what the Washington is obligated to do. While administration
officials have stuck to the line that there have been no changes to U.S. policy with respect to China and Taiwan,
both their words and actions have been saying otherwise.

For its part, the Taiwanese government seems nervous enough about the reporting of the increase that it made a point of clarifying that U.S.
troops are not permanently stationed there. It’s true that U.S. troops have been rotated in and out, but this distinction may be lost on the
Chinese government when they see more American troops involved in training their Taiwanese counterparts. There needs to be greater clarity
about the administration’s plans.

As the United States intensifies its efforts to support Taiwan, it risks further damaging the relationship
with China and hamstringing its ability to advance U.S. interests on a wide range of other issues from
arms control to climate change. There is also the danger that an increased U.S. military presence in
Taiwan could trigger Chinese responses in the form of increased economic warfare and military
exercises that would create additional headaches and costs for Taiwan. Combined with Speaker McCarthy’s expected visit to Taiwan in the
spring, these moves may lead to another unnecessary confrontation. Insofar as they are perceived as further eroding U.S. commitments
to a One China policy, these actions could make the overall situation less stable rather than more.

All of this is happening against a backdrop of generally heightened tensions and a U.S.-led military
buildup in the region, including the expansion of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Despite brief hopes of a thaw in the
relationship after the breakdown resulting from then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taipei last summer, every attempt to repair ties has stalled before
it could even begin. As we saw with the overreaction to the incident with the Chinese surveillance balloon and the decision to cancel Secretary
Blinken’s visit to Beijing, accidents and mistakes that will sometimes happen with other major powers have become occasions for panic and
alarmism rather than the manageable problems that they are.

Under these circumstances, there is a danger that previously routine activities that did not disrupt the
bilateral relationship in the past will now be perceived as provocations and lead to strong responses
from the other government. To the extent that every incident is treated as a “test” of resolve rather than an irritant to be smoothed
over, it becomes practically impossible to stabilize, much less repair, what many would consider to be the most significant bilateral relationship
in the world. The balloon incident showed how inadequate our governments’ preparations for crisis management are, and the instinct to cancel
diplomatic meetings in response to an incident does not inspire confidence that a more serious clash could be safely navigated.

U.S.-Chinese relations are as bad as they have been since at least the early 1990s, and they are arguably
worse than at any time since our governments normalized relations in 1979. During the long period of U.S.-China
détente, there would be tensions and sharp disagreements between our governments as there always will be, but the desire on both sides to
maintain a stable and productive relationship prevailed to make sure that these were only temporary setbacks. Today,
détente has
been replaced by a policy of actively pursuing rivalry and containment, which means that every
incident will cause an already poor relationship to deteriorate further.
The latest source of tension is the U.S. charge that the Chinese government is considering providing lethal aid to Russia’s war in Ukraine, which
Beijing has angrily denied. Washington and Beijing can’t move past the last breakdown in relations before the next problem crops up. The
“great power competition” framing of the relationship means that the emphasis is always on point-scoring and one-upping the other side
rather than de-escalation.

In general, the
United States needs to work on reducing tensions with China, and that definitely means
avoiding provocative actions in connection with Taiwan. Jessica Chen Weiss recently made the case for calming things
down in an op-ed for The Washington Post: “In the current atmosphere of intense distrust, verbal assurances have to be accompanied by
coordinated, reciprocal actions to reduce the risk of a catastrophic crisis.”

It is not enough simply to say that the United States doesn’t seek conflict or a new cold war. The United States has to back up those statements
by exercisingrestraint in what it does and how it talks about the relationship with China. To prevent tensions over Taiwan
from getting worse, Washington needs to worry less about building up its military strength in the
region and instead focus on reassuring the Chinese government that it does not want to abandon the
status quo that has kept the peace for more than 40 years.
The plan restores US-China diplomacy which solves Taiwan War and emerging tech
proliferation.
Thrall & Dorminey ’18 [A. Trevor Thrall was a senior fellow for Cato Institute’s Defense and Foreign
Policy Department, with expertise in international security and the politics of American national
security. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and
Government where he teaches courses in international security, Caroline Dorminey was a policy analyst
in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. She worked on issues pertaining to the US
defense budget, defense politics, force structure, and involvement in the international arms trade. She is
an Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade, March-13-2018, "Risky Business: The Role of
Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy," Cato Institute https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/risky-business-
role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy DOA: 10-13-2024] sumzom + Ewan

So far we have argued that arms

sales lack a compelling strategic justification, amplify risks, and generate a
host of unintended negative consequences. These factors alone argue for significantly curtailing the arms trade. But the case
for doing so is made even stronger by the fact that greatly reducing arms sales would also produce two significant benefits for the United States
that cannot otherwise be enjoyed.

The first benefit from reducing arms sales would be greater diplomatic flexibility and leverage. Critics
might argue that even if arms sales are an imperfect tool, forgoing arms sales will eliminate a potential source of
leverage. We argue that, on the contrary, the diplomatic gains from forgoing arms sales will outweigh the
potential leverage or other benefits from arms sales. Most importantly, by refraining from arming nations engaged in
conflict, the United States will have the diplomatic flexibility to engage with all parties as an honest
broker. The inherent difficulty of negotiating while arming one side is obvious today with respect to North and South Korea. After decades of
U.S. support for South Korea, North Korea clearly does not trust the United States. Similarly, U.S. attempts to help negotiate a peace deal
between the Israelis and Palestinians have long been complicated by American support for Israel. To
stop arming one side of a
contentious relationship is not to suggest that the United States does not have a preferred outcome in
such cases. Rather, by staying out of the military domain the United States can more readily encourage
dialogue and diplomacy.
Forgoing arms sales is likely to be a superior strategy even in cases where the United States has an entrenched interest. In the case of Taiwan,
for example, though it
is clear that Taiwan needs to purchase weapons from other countries to provide for its
defense, those weapons do not have to be made in the United States. Having Taiwan buy from other suppliers would help
defuse U.S.–China tensions. Even if Taiwan’s defenses remained robust, China would clearly prefer a
situation in which American arms no longer signal an implicit promise to fight on Taiwan’s behalf. This
could also promote more productive U.S.–China diplomacy in general, as well as greater stability in
the Pacific region. Most important, breaking off arms sales would also reduce the likelihood of the United States becoming entangled in
a future conflict between Taiwan and China.

The second major benefit of reducing arms sales is that it would imbue the United States with greater moral authority. Today, as the
leading arms-dealing nation in the world, the United States lacks credibility in discussions of arms control and
nonproliferation, especially in light of its military interventionism since 2001. By showing the world that it is ready to
choose diplomacy over the arms trade, the United States would provide a huge boost to international
efforts to curtail proliferation and its negative consequences. This is important because the United States has pursued
and will continue to pursue a wide range of arms control and nonproliferation objectives. The United States is a signatory of
treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, land mines , and cluster munitions,
not to mention the flow of conventional weapons of all kinds. The effectiveness of these treaties, and the ability
to create more effective and enduring arms control and nonproliferation frameworks, however,
depends on how the United States behaves.
This is not to say that unilateral American action will put an end to the problems of the global arms trade. States would still seek to ensure their
security and survival through deterrence and military strength. Other weapons suppliers would, in the short run, certainly race to meet the
demand. But history shows that
global nonproliferation treaties and weapons bans typically require great-
power support. In 1969, for example, Richard Nixon decided to shutter the American offensive-biological-weapons program and seek an
international ban on such weapons. By 1972 the Biological Weapons Convention passed and has since been signed by 178 nations.98 In 1991
President George H. W. Bush unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons. By 1993 the United States had signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention, which now has 192 signatories.99 Both
of these efforts succeeded in part because the United States
took decisive early action in the absence of any promises about how others would respond.100 Without U.S.
leadership, any effort to limit proliferation of major conventional weapons and dangerous emerging
technologies is likely to fail.

Dialogue is key.
Stimson 24, 1/08/2024, The Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank that analyzes issues
related to global peace, The US-China Military-to-Military Dialogue,
https://www.stimson.org/project/the-us-china-military-to-military-dialogue] DOA: 10/17/2024, sumzom

Military-to-military dialogues can be a valuable tool for countries to build greater understanding and
mitigate the chances of miscalculation, escalation, and conflict, particularly between countries with
complex, contentious, and tense bilateral relations.
Under the coordination of the EastWest Institute from 2008-2020, the U.S.-China Military-to-Military Initiative (formerly known as the Sanya
Initiative) regularly assembled retired U.S. and Chinese four-star generals and admirals to build greater military-to-military understanding
between the two countries. Delegations have discussed a wide spectrum of strategic security issues, including North Korea, maritime disputes
in the South and East China Seas, China’s military reform and counterterrorism.

The dialogues were transformed when the initiative transitioned from the EastWest Institute to the Stimson Center in 2020. Under Stimson
leadership, the U.S.-China Military-to-Military Initiative has been reshaped to support these frank closed-door interactions with updated
approaches and end goals.

Otherwise, miscalculation and nuclear holocaust.

Sulmaan Wasif Khan 24, 5/12/2024, Denison chair of international history and diplomacy at Tufts
University’s Fletcher School, China and the U.S. Are Numb to the Real Risk of War, Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/12/china-us-taiwan-strait-war-nuclear-weapons-military-biden-xi-
history, sumzom
On the morning of April 5, 2023, Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, met with then-U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in Simi Valley, California.
This was a meeting Beijing had warned against in the strictest of terms. It was therefore a meeting that both sides found necessary to have.
China had to be shown that it could not dictate whom either Taiwan or the United States met with. On this, both Taipei and Washington were
agreed.

China delivered on its promised forceful response by engaging in military drills and sending warships
and planes scudding around Taiwan. The median line and Taiwan’s air defense identification zone
were breached. One aircraft carrier, the Shandong, entered the waters just south of Japan. Violations of the “One China” principle,
Beijing had to make clear, were not going to be taken quietly. And in seeking to Commentators dismissed Beijing’s response to the Tsai-
McCarthy meeting as less intense than the one that had attended then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022. But the
dismissal itself highlighted the gravity of the problem. A certain level of military activity had become
normalized. It was as though the world now took for granted the presence of missiles and aircraft
carriers, the shows of force that demanded a response in kind. The week after the meeting in California, the United
States and the Philippines launched their largest joint military exercise to date. It was a way of showing China that there were other militaries
that could operate in the region. The
new normal meant more ships and planes operating in close proximity to
one another, mutual recrimination, and mutual suspicion.

Beijing and Washington have become desensitized to the risk these circumstances pose. But in the
militarization of foreign policy and the failure to grasp the full significance of that militarization, the
pair are one accident and a bad decision removed from a catastrophic war. Mathematicians speak of the “edge of
chaos”: the final point separating order from doom. A system operating at this edge has no room for error . This is where
the accumulated weight of the past has brought the United States, China, and Taiwan. They walked right up to the edge of a
war that could go nuclear several times in the past: in 1954-55, 1958, and 1996. Now, they seem to be living
on that edge permanently.
In recent years, China’s policy has alienated Taiwan completely. As China has bullied, threatened, and displayed force at home and abroad, it
has made unification unacceptable to much of the Taiwanese electorate. And it has enjoyed only mixed success in trying to isolate Taiwan
diplomatically. It has managed to buy off many of Taiwan’s erstwhile allies, but its conduct over COVID-19 and support for Russia despite the
invasion of Ukraine have cost it friends, too—and those former friends have turned to the island across the strait.

Since at least 2021, Taiwan has had a seemingly endless parade of visitors, from Germany’s education minister to Liz Truss, the former U.K.
prime minister. In November 2021, the European Parliament sent its first official delegation to the island; the head of the delegation, Raphaël
Glucksmann, told Tsai, “We in Europe are also confronted with interference from authoritarian regimes and we came here to learn from you.”
In October 2022, Tsai received lawmakers from Lithuania and Ukraine; the former had recently established a representative office in Taiwan
despite Beijing’s anger, while the latter was making a gesture of solidarity with a country that, unlike China, had been sharp in its criticism of
Moscow. A Japanese parliamentary delegation that arrived in December 2022 spoke glowingly of Tsai’s defense plans and emphasized Japan’s
own determination to keep the status quo in the region from being “changed by force or unilaterally.” China has warned against or condemned
many of these visits.

Beijing has only itself to blame for Taiwan’s strengthened diplomatic position. Its wolf warrior nationalism and reluctance to break with
Moscow have cost it European support. If visits from foreign politicians were to translate into condemnation of China at the United Nations,
Beijing could veto a Security Council resolution. In this case, like Russia, China would find itself a pariah state—and unlike Russia, China cares
about how it is seen by the world. China’s own corrosive nationalism has eaten into its body politic, too. It has not torn itself apart in a bout of
political bloodletting, but it has certainly let loose the kind of jingoism that would allow that to happen. What it will decide to do in a crisis is
uncertain. Beijing itself does not know.

The United States, meanwhile, seems intent on reviving a defense treaty with Taipei that it once spent
more than a decade trying to break. Taiwan has become a means of showing China just how tough the United States can get.
Washington is not clear on how getting tough will alter Beijing’s conduct, but “deterrence” is the concept invoked most often. A show of force,
the thinking goes, will deter China from aggression. But what if deterrence fails? What if the show of force backs China into a corner
from which it feels it has no option but to lash out? To this, Washington has few answers beyond preparing for war.

Some U.S. pundits have waxed lyrical about how they would fight a war with China . Taiwan, they opined, will be
turned into a “porcupine” with hardened defenses. One former defense official suggested the use of “low-yield
tactical nuclear weapons” in the event of a conflict with China. (The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
qualify as low yield.) The possibility of Russian President Vladimir Putin using such weapons sent shock waves of horror through the world, but
the idea of employing them in a war with China became normal in some circles. There was no
guarantee that, once the nuclear taboo was breached, the weapons would stay “low yield.” But the
question of what would happen if the two powers escalated to higher-yield arms and plunged the
world into nuclear holocaust has been left unresolved.

It is as though the United States is being haunted by all the ghosts of its long past with China and
Taiwan, forcing it to relive questions it had once thought resolved. U.S. military leader Douglas MacArthur wanted to
wage war against China in 1950. President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered using nuclear weapons against China in 1955 and 1958. Today,
Washington abides by the “One China” principle, but it wants Taiwan to enjoy “self-determination.” It vows that it does not dispute the
formulation that Taiwan is a part of China, but it will help Taiwan resist Chinese coercion. It wishes to promote Taiwan’s presence in
international organizations, but it remains unwilling to recognize Taiwan itself. The United States has shifted from pure ambiguity to ambiguity
with a tilt in favor of Taiwan—and it has done so because it decided China is an enemy.
Like China, the United States is mired in jingoism and confusion. Like China, it has no idea what it would do if things go wrong. With
the
2024 U.S. presidential election heating up, the one thing every candidate, Democrat or Republican,
has done is to show how tough they could get on China. Republicans vying for the nomination got in on the act early;
former President Donald Trump has denounced French President Emmanuel Macron for “kissing Xi’s ass ,”
referring to Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Joe Biden, with the power of the incumbent, has not stopped at rhetoric.
Whether supporting a TikTok ban unless the app is sold or calling for increased tariffs on Chinese goods, his policies are calibrated to
demonstrate toughness on China.

Taiwan’s own presidential elections, held on Jan. 13, showed just how deeply the island’s electorate had turned against unification. At first,
William Lai, the candidate from Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), vowed not to alter the status quo, though he accused Beijing of
doing so. Taiwan, he argued, was already sovereign. There was no need to change what worked. But his caution soon vanished. While
campaigning, Lai defined success for Taiwan as its leaders being able to visit the White House. This was a gauntlet thrown down—Taiwanese
officials are blocked from visiting Washington. The Biden administration immediately demanded an explanation. This was not, U.S. officials
made clear, how the relationship worked. Where Tsai had been prudent, Lai was willing to push his luck.

The Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party, was not leaning toward Beijing, either. Its nominee, Hou You-yi, the mayor of New Taipei
City, said that he would reject both “one country, two systems” and a formal move for independence, but that if Taiwan were attacked, he
would face the challenge. Taiwan, according to Hou, needed to be ready to defend itself. On the crucial question of how to deal with China,
there was little difference between the policies Lai and Hou espoused.

A third candidate, Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party, was calculatedly vague on China policy. His campaign made clear that he was
depending on votes from traditional KMT supporters: those who would have favored a closer relationship with China. He claimed that he would
find the middle ground between the KMT’s appeasement of China and the DPP’s provocation of it; he would make Taiwan a bridge for Sino-
American communication rather than a front in a Sino-American war. How he proposed to do all this was left undefined.

Lai eventually won the presidency, but it was not the ringing triumph Tsai had won four years earlier. Lai scraped through with a mere 40
percent of the vote, his victory made easier by the fact that Hou and Ko had failed to join forces. As he prepares to take office on May 20, Lai
faces a deeply divided, volatile populace and a legislature in which the DPP is bereft of a majority.

This is a point China has been quick to underline. The DPP, it huffed after the election, is not representative of “majority public opinion.” What
is lost on Beijing is that the other candidates made clear that unification was not something they were willing to countenance either. Hou had
made a point of not inviting Ma Ying-jeou, the last KMT member to serve as Taiwan’s president, to his rallies; he knew that to associate himself
with Ma’s embrace of China would have doomed his candidacy. Beijing still does not understand Taiwan. Meanwhile,
the United
States continues to disavow support for Taiwanese independence while making plans for further
delegations to the island. With the U.S. presidential election going into fifth gear, the risk of
miscalculation will only rise.

At the edge of chaos, a single choice can make the difference between order and catastrophe. More than
80 years on from the Cairo Declaration, which held that Taiwan would be “restored to the Republic of China” at the end of World War II, we can
see that there were myriad moments that could have yielded different outcomes, for better or for worse. If President Franklin D. Roosevelt had
insisted on self-determination for Taiwan after World War II, if the Korean War had not happened, if Beijing had made “one country, two
systems” work, if Taiwan had developed a nuclear weapon, if Pelosi’s plane had indeed been shot at—if someone had made a different decision
at any of those moments, the world would be a radically different place.

When deterrence, toughness, and pride drive policy, the room for error diminishes to virtually nil.
China, Taiwan, and the United States are at a point where the choices they make could spell the
difference between peace and nuclear holocaust. Those choices are best made with the historical record—and all its
unrealized possibilities—firmly in mind.

Extinction.
Solomon ’22 [Norman Solomon, national director of RootsAction and the executive director of the
Institute for Public Accuracy, 7-3-2022, Nuclear War Could Mean Human Extinction. Biden and Congress
Should Stop Messing Around, Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/nuclear-war-could-mean-
annihilation-but-biden-and-congress-are-messing-around/ DOA: 10-14-2024]
In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy was more candid. Speaking at American University, he said: “A
single nuclear weapon contains almost 10 times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces
in the Second World War.” Kennedy also noted, “The deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would
be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet
unborn.” Finally, he added, “All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours.”
Kennedy was no dove. He affirmed willingness to use nuclear weapons. But his speech offered some essential honesty about nuclear war — and
the need to seriously negotiate with the Kremlin in the interests of averting planetary incineration — an approach sorely lacking from the
United States government today.

At the time of Kennedy’s presidency, nuclear

war would have been indescribably catastrophic. Now — with large
arsenals of hydrogen bombs and what scientists know about “nuclear winter” — experts have concluded that a
nuclear war would virtually end agriculture and amount to omnicide (the destruction of human life on
earth).

Without diplomacy, emerging tech causes extinction.

Ash Jain 20, xx/xx/2020, Senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; Strategic
Studies Quarterly, Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and
Defending a Rules-Based International System,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Present-at-the-Recreation.pdf]

The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed.
Foremost among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D
printing), quantum computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things
(IOT), 5G, space, cyber, and many others. Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise
great benefits, but also carry serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost
savings in the private sector. Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the
future, autonomous weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out
of harm’s way.

Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to
widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck
drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment
caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous
weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on
their creators, resulting in human extinction. The other technologies on this lisgt similarly balance
great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,”
reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time,
advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD
programs, spurring
arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of
disease through improved medicine, or wipe
out entire classes of people through genetically engineered
superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also
undermining global strategic stability.

AND US-China diplomacy solves climate change---current efforts fail.

Klare ’21 [Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire
College and a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. , 02-28-2021,
"Biden, climate change, and China", Responsible Statecraft,
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/02/28/biden-climate-change-and-china/] DOA: 10-14-2024
//Ewan + sumzom
Slowing the pace of climate change and getting “tough” on China, especially over its human-rights abuses and unfair trade practices, are among
the top priorities President Biden has announced for his new administration. Evidently, he believes that he can tame a rising China with harsh
pressure tactics, while still gaining its cooperation in areas of concern to Washington. As he wrote in Foreign Affairs during the presidential
election campaign, “The most effective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s
abusive behaviors and human rights violations, even as we seek to cooperate with Beijing on issues where our interests converge, such as
climate change.” If, however, our new president truly believes that he can build an international coalition to gang up on China and secure
Beijing’s cooperation on climate change, he’s seriously deluded. Indeed, though he could succeed in provoking a new cold war, he won’t
prevent the planet from heating up unbearably in the process.

Biden is certainly aware of the dangers of global warming. In that same Foreign Affairs article, he labeled it nothing short of an “existential
threat,” one that imperils the survival of human civilization. Acknowledging the importance of relying on scientific expertise (unlike our previous
president who repeatedly invented his own version of scientific reality), Biden affirmed the conclusion of the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) that warming must be limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels or there will be hell to pay. He then
pledged to “rejoin the Paris climate agreement on day one of a Biden administration,” which he indeed did, and to “make massive, urgent
investments at home that put the United States on track to have a clean energy economy with net-zero [greenhouse gas] emissions by 2050” —
the target set by the IPCC.

Even such dramatic actions, he indicated, will not be sufficient. Other countries will have to join
America in moving toward a global “net-zero” state in which any carbon emissions would be compensated for by equivalent carbon
removals. “Because the United States creates only 15 percent of global emissions,” he wrote, “I will leverage our
economic and moral authority to push the world to determined action, rallying nations to raise their ambitions and push progress further and
faster.”

China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases right now (although the U.S. remains number one historically),
would obviously be Washington’s natural partner in this effort. Here, though, Biden’s antagonistic stance toward that country is likely to prove
a significant impediment. Rather than prioritize collaboration with China on climate action, he chose to castigate Beijing for its continued
reliance on coal. The Biden climate plan, he wrote in Foreign Affairs, “includes insisting that China… stop subsidizing coal exports and
outsourcing pollution to other countries by financing billions of dollars’ worth of dirty fossil-fuel energy projects through its Belt and Road
Initiative.” Then he went further by portraying the future effort to achieve a green economy as a potentially competitive, not collaborative,
struggle with China, saying,

“I will make investment in research and development a cornerstone of my presidency, so that the United States is leading the charge in
innovation. There is no reason we should be falling behind China or anyone else when it comes to clean energy.”

Unfortunately, though he’s not wrong on China’s climate change challenges (similar, in many respects, to our own country’s), you can’t have it
both ways. If
climate change is an existential threat and international collaboration between the worst
greenhouse gas emitters key to overcoming that peril, picking fights with China over its energy behavior
is a self-defeating way to start. Whatever obstacles China does pose, its cooperation in achieving that 1.5-degree limit is critical. “If we
don’t get this right, nothing else will matter,” Biden said of global efforts to deal with climate change. Sadly, his insistence on pummeling China
on so many fronts (and appointing China hawks to his foreign policy team to do so) will ensure that he gets it wrong. The only way to avert
catastrophic climate change is for the United States to avoid a new cold war with China by devising a cooperative set of plans with Beijing to
speed the global transition to a green economy.

Why cooperation is essential

With such cooperation in mind, let’s review the basics on how those two countries affect world energy consumption and global carbon
emissions: the
United States and China are the world’s two leading consumers of energy and its two main
emitters of carbon dioxide, or CO2, the leading greenhouse gas. As a result, they exert an outsized
influence on the global climate equation. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China accounted for
approximately 22% of world energy consumption in 2018; the U.S., 16%. And because both countries rely so heavily on fossil fuels for energy
generation — China largely on coal, the U.S. more on oil and natural gas — their carbon-dioxide emissions account for an even larger share of
the global total: China alone, nearly 29% in 2018; the U.S., 18%; and combined, an astonishing 46%.

It’s what will happen in the future, though, that really matters. If the world is to keep global temperatures from rising above that 1.5 degrees
Celsius threshold, every major economy should soon be on a downward-trending trajectory in terms of both fossil-fuel consumption and CO2
emissions (along with a compensating increase in renewable energy output). Horrifyingly enough, however, on their current trajectories, over
the next two decades the combined fossil-fuel consumption and carbon emissions of China and the United States are still expected to rise, not
fall, before stabilizing in the 2040s at a level far above net zero. According to the IEA, if the two countries stick to anything like their current
courses, their combined fossil-fuel consumption would be approximately 17% higher in 2040 than in 2018, even if their CO2 emissions would
rise by “only” 3%. Any increase of that kind over the next two decades would spell one simple word for humanity: D-O-O-M.
True, both countries are expected to substantially increase their investment in renewable energy during the next 20 years, even as places like
India are expected to account for an ever-increasing share of global energy use and CO2 emissions. Still,
as long as Beijing and
Washington continue to lead the world in both categories, any effort to achieve net-zero and avert an
almost unimaginable climate cataclysm will have to fall largely on their shoulders. This would, however, require a
colossal reduction in fossil-fuel consumption and the ramping up of renewables on a scale unlike any engineering project this planet has ever
seen.

The Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Tsinghua University, an influential Chinese think tank, has calculated what
might be involved in reshaping China’s coal-dependent electrical power system to reach the goal of a 1.5-degree limit on global warming. Its
researchers believe that, over the next three decades, this would require adding the equivalent of three times current global wind power
capacity and four times that of solar power at the cost of approximately $20 trillion.

A similar transformation will be required in the United States, although with some differences: while this country relies far less on coal than
China to generate electricity, it relies more on natural gas (a less potent emitter of CO2, but a fossil fuel nonetheless) and its electrical grid — as
recent events in Texas have demonstrated — is woefully unprepared for climate change and will have to be substantially rebuilt at enormous
cost.

And that represents only part of what needs to be done to avert planetary catastrophe. To eliminate carbon emissions from oil-powered
vehicles, both countries will have to replace their entire fleets of cars, vans, trucks, and buses with electric-powered ones and develop
alternative fuels for their trains, planes, and ships — an undertaking of equal magnitude and expense.

There are two ways all of this can be done: separately or together. Each country could devise its own
blueprint for such a transition, developing its own green technologies and seeking financing wherever it could be found. As in the
fight over fifth generation (5G) telecommunications, each could deny scientific knowledge and technical know-how to
its rival and insist that allies buy only its equipment, whether or not it best suits their purposes — a
stance taken by the Trump administration with respect to the Chinese company Huawei’s 5G wireless
technology. Alternatively, the U.S. and China could cooperate in developing green technologies, share
information and know-how, and work together in disseminating them around the world.
On the question of which approach is more likely to achieve success, the answer is too obvious to belabor. Only those prepared to risk
civilization’s survival would choose the former — and yet that’s the choice that both sides may indeed make.

Why a new Cold War precludes climate salvation

Those in Washington who favor a tougher approach toward China and the bolstering of U.S. military forces in the Pacific claim that, under
President Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist regime has become more authoritarian at home and more aggressive abroad, endangering key
U.S. allies in the Pacific and threatening our vital interests. Certainly, when it comes to the increasing repression of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang
Province or pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong, there can be little doubt of Beijing’s perfidy, though on other issues, there’s room for debate.
On another subject, though, there really should be no room for debate at all: the impact of a new cold war between the planet’s two great
powers on the chances for a successful global response to a rapidly warming planet.

There are several obvious reasons for this. First,

increased hostility will ensure a competitive rather than
collaborative search for vital solutions, resulting in wasted resources, inadequate financing, duplicative
research, and the stalled international dissemination of advanced green technologies. A hint of such a future
lies in the competitive rather than collaborative development of vaccines for Covid-19 and their distressingly chaotic distribution to Africa and
the rest of the developing world, ensuring that the pandemic will have a life into 2022 or 2023 with an ever-rising death toll.

Second, a new cold war will make international diplomacy more difficult when it comes to ensuring
worldwide compliance with the Paris climate agreement. Consider it a key lesson for the future that cooperation between
President Barack Obama and Xi Jinping made the agreement possible in the first place, creating pressure on reluctant but vital powers like India
and Russia to join as well. Once President Trump pulled the U.S. out of the agreement, that space evaporated and global adherence withered.
Only by recreating such a U.S.-China climate alliance will it be possible to corral other key players into full compliance. As suggested recently by
Todd Stern, the lead American negotiator at the 2015 Paris climate summit, “There is simply no way to contain climate change worldwide
without full-throttle engagement by both countries.”

Climate change causes extinction.

Kemp et al. ’22 [Luke Kemp, centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge and
Darwin College, et al, Chi Xu, Joanna Depledge and Timothy Lenton, “Climate Endgame: Exploring
catastrophic climate change scenarios,” August 1, PNAS, Vol. 119, No. 34,
https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2108146119] Justin
The Potential for Climate Catastrophe

There are four key reasons to be concerned over the potential of a global climate catastrophe. First, there are warnings from history. Climate
change (either regional or global) has played a role in the collapse or transformation of numerous previous societies (37) and
in each of the five mass extinction events in Phanerozoic Earth history (38). The current carbon pulse is occurring at an
unprecedented geological speed and, by the end of the century, may surpass thresholds that triggered previous
mass extinctions (39, 40). The worst-case scenarios in the IPCC report project temperatures by the 22nd century that last prevailed in the
Early Eocene, reversing 50 million years of cooler climates in the space of two centuries (41).

This is particularly alarming, as human

societies are locally adapted to a specific climatic niche. The rise of large-scale,
urbanized agrarian societies began with the shift to the stable climate of the Holocene ∼12,000 y ago (42). Since

temperature of ∼13 °C. Even today, the most economically productive centers of human activity are
then, human population density peaked within a narrow climatic envelope with a mean annual average

concentrated in those areas (43). The cumulative impacts of warming may overwhelm societal adaptive
capacity.

Second, climate
change could directly trigger other catastrophic risks, such as international conflict, or exacerbate
infectious disease spread, and spillover risk. These could be potent extreme threat multipliers.

Third, climate change could exacerbatevulnerabilities and cause multiple, indirect stresses (such as economic
damage, loss of land, and water and food insecurity) that coalesce into system-wide synchronous failures.
This is the path of systemic risk. Global crises tend to occur through such reinforcing “synchronous failures” that spread
across countries and systems, as with the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (44). It is plausible that a sudden shift in climate could
trigger systems failures that unravel societies across the globe.

The potential of systemic climate risk is marked: The most vulnerable states and communities will continue to be the hardest hit in
a warming world, exacerbating inequities. Fig. 1 shows how projected population density intersects with extreme >29 °C mean
annual temperature (MAT) (such temperatures are currently restricted to only 0.8% of Earth’s land surface area). Using the medium-high
scenario of emissions and population growth (SSP3-7.0 emissions, and SSP3 population growth), by 2070, around 2 billion people are
expected to live in these extremely hot areas. Currently, only 30 million people live in hot places, primarily in the Sahara Desert and
Gulf Coast (43).

Fig. 1. Omitted

Extreme temperatures combined with high humidity can negatively affect outdoor worker productivity and yields of major cereal
crops. These deadly heat conditions could significantly affect populated areas in South and southwest Asia(47).

Fig. 2 takes a political lens on extreme heat, overlapping SSP3-7.0 or SSP5-8.5 projections of >29 °C MAT circa 2070, with the Fragile States
Index (a measurement of the instability of states). There is a striking overlap
between currently vulnerable states and future
areas of extreme warming. If current political fragility does not improve significantly in the coming decades, then a
belt of instability with potentially serious ramifications could occur.
Fig. 2. Omitted
Finally, climate change could irrevocably undermine humanity’s ability to recover from another cataclysm,
such as nuclear war. That is, it could create significant latent risks (Table 1): Impacts that may be manageable
during times of stability become dire when responding to and recovering from catastrophe. These different causes for
catastrophic concern are interrelated and must be examined together .

China is a defensive realist, but offensive regarding the US---defense is riddled with
bias.
Jalil ’19 [Ghazala Yasmin Jalil is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Spring
2019, "China’s Rise: Offensive or Defensive Realism", JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48544287,
DOA: 10-13-2024] sumzom + Ewan
Under Mao (1949-1976), China had the policy of overturning all the imperialist regimes in Asia and the world. During this period, China actively
supported revolutions in many developing countries that it considered imperialist or saw them as imperialist proxies. This threatened China’s
neighbouring states especially the US allies.28 China essentially wanted to export its socialist ideology to other states. During this time, China’s
policy can be described as operating under the principles of offensive realism. At the same time, during this era, China was operating with
limited capabilities in an international environment characterised by bipolarity. It was operating within an environment where global politics
was driven by the intense Cold War rivalry of the two great powers ─ the US and the former Soviet Union.29

However, since the 1970s China’s policies have shown less revisionist tendencies. The country has
increasingly become a state that is embracing defensive realism. One thread of this evidence is that China has
toned-down its revolutionary rhetoric. It is also not supporting insurgencies in other countries. The second
thread of evidence is that since the late 1970s China has increasingly pursued a cooperative security approach in its
relations with regional neighbours and in the international arena. By and large, China has tried to forge friendly
relations with its neighbours. It includes ameliorating relations with states like India which is traditionally a rival. Their relations
did become strained in 2017 when there was a standoff between the Indian and the Chinese forces on the Doklam plateau. Dhoklam is a
territory claimed both by Bhutan (aligned with India) and China.

However, Indo-China relations improved as the two countries held an informal summit in China in April 2018.30 The two countries even held a
joint military exercise in December 2018, called Hand-in-Hand.31 Over the years, China
has also managed to resolve border
issues with so many neighbouring states. It has settled border disputes with countries like Myanmar, Nepal and
Pakistan initially and recently with Russia, bordering the Central Asian States and Vietnam.32 Moreover, China has territorial
disputes with India and Japan but it has never made these disputes a hurdle in forging friendly ties with these two countries. Avery Goldstein
dubs it a neo-Bismarckian grand strategy of China
whereby it is pursuing its interests by reassuring those who may
feel threatened and may form anti-China alliances.33 This, in his opinion, has resulted in a security environment that is conducive for
China as well as for the region as a whole.

Another indication that China does not show aggressive behaviour in its policies is that China has increasingly engaged and
integrated with the international community. Over the past 30 years, China has amply demonstrated this by its increasing
membership of international organisations and institutions as well as membership of treaties since the 1980s.

China has increasingly participated in the regional multilateral institutions over the years. In the last few decades, East Asia has seen a number
of regional institutions being formed. Topmost among those are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ( APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF); ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asia Summit. China is part of most of these multilateral institutions as well as an active member of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China was also a
key player in the sixparty-talks in getting North Korea to halt
and roll back its nuclear and missile programmes.

On the global front, China sought participation in global institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China is also playing a
very
active role in the UN. According to one figure, China’s membership of international governmental organisations doubled
(from 21 to 52) during the years 1977-1997. In the same time period, its membership of International Non-Governmental
Organisations (INGOs) increased from mere 71 to an impressive 1,163.34 Similarly, according to another account, China
signed less than 30 per cent of the arms control accords it was eligible to join in the 1970s compared to 80 per cent by mid-1990s. 35 China has
actively taken part in the treaties of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as those of aimed at non-proliferation of biological and
chemical weapons. It has also become a part of the voluntary non-proliferation groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 and
exercises strict export control policies. Since 2004, China has also shown interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime ( MTCR).

This is an indicator of China’s willingness to participate in international institutes and regimes, increasing comfort towards norms of
interdependent behaviour among states. It
has also exhibited the desire to somewhat shape the rules of the game
for regional cooperation. This is definitely an indication of its tendency towards the status quo. It also advances China’s
national interests and helps dispel concerns about its increasing economic and military power.36 This is
also an indicator that China is willing to work in the existing Western-dominated systems of international institution and regimes rather than
challenge the system or seek to break it up.

Moreover, China consciously pursued a good neighbour policy. The pursuit of good relations with its neighbour is the foundation of its strategy
for economic development. It
has the dual benefit of attracting foreign trade and investment while, at the same
time, it reassures its neighbours that it does not present a threat for them. Deng Xiaoping laid two paths for China’s
foreign policy in 1990 ─ anti-hegemonism and establishment of a new multi-polar international order of politics and economics. This meant that
China adopted a policy of active defence of China’s interest ─ of minding its own business and be neither a leader nor a challenger but a
participant or co-builder of the westerns international order.37 This remains the foundation of China’s foreign policy today.

Many analysts, however, argue that participation in the international institutions is not an adequate indicator but compliance with the norms,
rules and goals of these institutions is a better indicator of whether a country is a status quo state or not. Along these lines, Alastair Johnston
considers China’s compliance with five global normative regimes: these include sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control,
national self determination and human rights.38 As far as sovereignty is concerned he writes: “Today China is one of the strongest defenders of
a more traditional absolutist concept (of sovereignty).”39

Similarly, free trade is another international norm that is seen as an indicator of status quo behaviour. China has moved to support
the norms of global free trade. China’s membership of WTO in 2001 is a testament to its support for free trade. China’s tariff rates
have declined from over 40 per cent in 1992 to less than 20 per cent in 1997.40 In 2015, the tariff rate was 3.4 per cent.41 China has
gradually embraced global capitalist institutions and system. In the Belt and Road Forum that China held in May 2017,
hosting 30 world leaders, it released a communiqué, which was signed by all 30 world leaders present on the occasion that emphasised the
need to “build an open economy, ensure free and inclusive trade (and) oppose all forms of protectionism.”42 However, the ongoing
trade war with the US has forced China to increase its tariffs. Since 2017, the US had imposed three rounds of tariff on
the Chinese products worth US$250 billion. China has retaliated by imposing US$110 billion on the US goods. Beijing has accused
the US of starting the “largest trade war in economic history.” 43 This damages the global free trade
regime.

China has gone even a step further and initiated projects like the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is envisaged as a
journey towards economic regionalisation. The CPEC is a framework of regional connectivity which is expected to be beneficial for China and
Pakistan as well as the regional states like India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Its
primary aim is to promote geographical
linkages and improve infrastructure connectivity. It would also result in a higher flow of trade and
businesses in the region.44 Its ultimate aim is to have a well-connected region, promote harmony and
accelerate economic development. This is also a clear indication that China is focused on economic development and
regionalisation instead of displaying aggressive hegemonic behaviour.

As far as China’s non-proliferation record is concerned, it has a fair record, with no blatant violations of international nuclear non-proliferation
norms. The prevailing concerns mostly centred on the transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s.
However, China has not signed the 1987 MTCR, so it does not amount to any violations of China’s treaty obligations. On the positive side, in
1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which a major nuclear non-proliferation proponent like the US has not done till
date.45 It has been cooperating with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and has installed four new International
Monitoring System (IMS) stations, bringing the total number of certified stations in China, to five.

Furthermore, it is also a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the time that it was signed. Moreover, along with Russia, China
has long been trying to get a treaty negotiated to ban the stationing of offensive weapons in outer-space. For nearly two decades, now there
have been the Chinese and Russian efforts to negotiate a treaty for Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Many proposals have
been put forward including the two Chinese working papers and a joint China-Russia working paper in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
However, PAROS remains blocked due to the US refusal to negotiate any such treaty because it goes against its missile defence and space
plans.46

China has also played a stabilising role in the North Korean nuclear issue. It acted as a lynchpin in hosting and
conducting the six-party talks, which were meant to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Even after the breakdown of the six-party
talks in 2009 and the recent high tensions on the Korean Peninsula in 2017 with the US, China played the role of a stabiliser, urging both
sides to show restraint and emphasising that war was not an option for any country. China has, thus, helped
strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation norms.
Also, China’s growing soft power47 or its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is another indicator that it is not an aggressive,
power maximising state. Its economic progress has been accompanied by its increasing cultural and
diplomatic influence around the globe. Its growing soft power is not only evident in Southeast Asia but also in Beijing’s economic
partnerships in Latin America and Africa.48 The fact that China is able to attract and appeal the states in the region
through its soft power is an indicator that its neighbours are increasingly viewing China as less of a
threat.
However, this has stirred the concerns of waning the US influence in the region. In many parts of Asia, Africa and the Latin America, the “Beijing
Consensus” which advocates a mix of authoritarian government and market economy, is overtaking the “Washington Consensus” of market
economics and democratic government which was popular in the past.49 With signs that the US is placing emphasis on hard power under
President Donald Trump, China seems to be positioning itself as a champion of globalisation and economic integration. It seems to be placing an
emphasis on soft power.

Taiwan issue is one instance where China’s policies are viewed by the West as a non-status quo. However,
the issue can be seen in terms of a security dilemma between the US and China. In the last few decades, America continued selling
advanced weapons to Taiwan,50 mainland China considers these developments to encourage Taiwan’s
independence and a threat to its interests. According to Yiwei Wang, “on the Taiwan issue, America’s logic is that peace comes
from “balance of power.” China has time and again protested the matter of arms sales to Taiwan with the US but to
no avail. China sees these moves as an effort to change the distribution of power in the region. In turn,
China has threatened Taiwan against moves for independence and deployed missiles on the mainland as
well. Consequently, this makes the US suspicious of China’s revisionist intentions towards Taiwan – locking the two powers in a security
dilemma.

Another area where China has been accused of displaying revisionist tendencies is in the South China Sea.
The dispute centres on territorial claims over two island chains the Paracels and the Spratlys and surrounding oceans. The
area provides valuable trade passage and fishing ground, as well as holds hydrocarbon resources ranging
from 25,000 Mboe to 260,000 Mboe.51 China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims. The dispute
has existed for centuries but things got tense in the last few years. China has been island-building since 2014 and has also increased naval
patrols.

It can be argued that China’s actions are defensive in nature. The US has had increased interference in the
area. Under the garb of “freedom of navigation” operations, the US sent planes and ships in the disputed area to keep
access to key shipping and air routes.52 In February 2017, the US deployed the aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, strike force to the
South China Sea under the garb of “freedom of navigation.”53 In December 2018, there was a trilateral anti-submarine warfare exercise by the
US, Britain and Japanese forces. Another week-long US and British Naval exercise took place in January 2019.54 These are meant to send a
signal to China to rescind claims over the disputed area. These exercises have angered China.

The US has also been sending hundreds of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions to the South
China Sea every year that have caused friction between the US and China and, which the latter sees as a
threat to its security. This clearly amounts to the US interference in China’s area of influence. This has heightened China’s
threat perceptions and it is bound to act more assertively to defend its interests in the region. As a result, the
area is becoming a flashpoint, with growing tension between China and the US over control of the disputed waterway.
China does not have expansionist or hegemonic designs in the South China Sea. It claims over the two island chains are not something new.
Beijing has adjusted its strategy to safeguard its interests, as it becomes increasingly powerful. However, a military conflict over the dispute is
not an option. Moreover, the US influence over other claimants of the territory complicates matters for China. This
has resulted in
China acting more assertively in the South China Sea in order to defend its interests. In fact, the US would act more
aggressively if any country was to interfere in matters close to its borders.

Overall, from the above analysis, it can be summarised that China has so far behaved more as a status quo power rather
than as an aggressive revisionist power. This is apparent in China’s engagement with its neighbours, its participation in the
regional and international institutions, it is in compliance with most of the international norms as well as its emphasis on projecting its soft
power.
 2AC — FBK — R1
Their evidence says Trump causes prolif. Inserted below
No Author, The Economist, 08-15-2024, "What if South Korea got a nuclear bomb?," https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/08/15/what-
if-south-korea-got-a-nuclear-bomb // MH

But if Donald Trump, who in the past threatened to pull American troops out of South Korea, is re-
elected, the calculus will change. Many will ask if America can be trusted to defend South Korea, especially
now that North Korea’s intercontinental missiles put American cities at risk. “If Trump is president in America , it’s all the more reason
for us to have nukes,” says Mr Kim. “I’m afraid that America won’t take any action that will cost it anything.” It is an acute form of
a fear all American allies will face under an America First president.

South Korea has many reasons not to go for the bomb. North Korea, China and Russia would respond with economic pressure or sabre-rattling,
and perhaps with outright aggression. Exiting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could damage South Korea’s international standing. Its
trade-dependent economy would suffer if sanctions are imposed. Elites are less gung-ho about going nuclear than average voters, who may not
be as aware of the risks: one-third of 175 South Korean experts and officials surveyed this year by CSIS, an American think-tank, support an
independent nuclear arsenal.

Mr Trump may not prove as disruptive as many fear. The relationship with South Korea enjoys bipartisan support in America. Congress could
complicate plans to move troops by refusing to fund their relocation. Camp Humphreys, south of Seoul, is America’s biggest overseas military
installation and would be impossible to replicate elsewhere in Asia. Mr Trump may be satisfied if South Korea pays much more to host
America’s troops—and submitting to his notion of alliances as a protection racket may prove simplest for South Korea.

But Mr Trump could also stoke doubts about America’s commitment, fuel fears about entangling South Korea in a broader war with China, or
seek a deal with Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s tyrant. Mr
Trump halted large-scale military exercises with South Korea
during previous negotiations with Mr Kim, and, say former officials, had to be stopped from withdrawing
troops from South Korea. In a second administration staffed with loyalists, Mr Trump would have a freer
hand. A mere tweet might dent confidence in America’s extended deterrence. In the CSIS survey, more than half of the South
Korean experts opposed to going nuclear say their support would increase if America were led by an
America First president.
There is a clear prequel to this show. In the early 1970s, with America facing defeat in Vietnam, Richard Nixon pulled out 20,000 of the 63,000
American troops stationed in South Korea and asked allies in Asia to take more responsibility for their own security. “There was huge
uncertainty about the staying power of the United States,” says Richard Lawless, who served as a CIA officer in Seoul at the time. North Korea
did not have nuclear weapons, but it outgunned the South in conventional terms. Park Chung-hee, then South Korea’s president, launched a
secret effort to obtain nuclear-weapons technology. When Mr Lawless helped uncover the programme, American officials used pressure and
security assurances to block it. South Korea joined the NPT in 1975.

Rest was analytics.