REVOLUTION

and
COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN CHINA

M.N. ROY

1986
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First Published 1946

First Reprint 1986
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 CONTENTS

Preface vii
Introduction 1
I. The Foundation of Chinese Society 11
II. The Structure of Chinese Society 40
III. The National Economy of China 70
IV. Foreign Aggression 83
V. The Taiping Revolt 107
VI. The Reform Movement 137
VII. The Boxer Uprising 155
VIII. The Passing of the Manchus 178
IX. The Rise and Fall of the Republic 185
X. Sun Yat-sen and His Three Principles 207
XI. The Kuo Min Tang 244
XII. The Establishment of the Nationalist Government 279
XIII. The Thirtieth of May, 1925 291
XVI. "Red" Canton 304
XV. The North Expedition 333
XVI. The Kuo Min Tang Splits 347
XVII. The Great Crisis 366
XVIII. On the Road to Peking 385
XIX. The Counter-Revolution 406
XX. The Communist Party 438
XXI. The Struggle for Power 477
XXII. An Experiment 508
XXIII. The Lesson 529
Epilogue 546
Bibliography 557
Index 561
 PREFACE

This book was written as far back as in 1930. It was published in German in the
following year. Before the arrangement for the publication of the English edition was
complete, I left Europe for India. Soon afterwards, I was arrested and spent six years in
prison. Upon my release at the end of 1936, I received pressing requests from different
quarters to arrange for the publication of the English edition, because the development of
events in China, in the meantime, had added importance to the book. But the
preoccupations of an active political life prevented me from devoting the necessary time
and attention to the matter. During the years of imprisonment, a part of the manuscript
had been lost. The rest was scattered in several places. I had to collect the parts and
complete the manuscript by translating several chapters from the German text. For all
these reasons, the book could not be published as soon as generally desired and as I
myself wished.
Ever since 1922, I had been closely connected with the political movement in China. I
contributed to the formulation of the policy of the Communists joining the Kuo Min Tang
with the purpose of promoting the cause of the outstanding bourgeois democratic revo-
lution. Later on, in application, the policy degenerated into opportunist deviations. When,
at the end of J 925, the Kuo Min Tang leaders openly began the preparation for the
eventual betrayal of the revolution, the Communist Party of China and those directing its
policy on the spot failed to press for a bold approach to the social problems on the pretext
of maintaining the unity anti-imperialist front. It was on my initiative that the Communist
International directed a correct application of the policy of developing the bourgeois
democratic revolution in the teeth of the opposition of the bourgeoisie, if necessary. I
went to China at the end of 1926 as the representative of the Communist International. I
was there until the middle of 1927, that is, throughout the great crisis of the Chinese
Revolution. A brief account of that period has already been published in "My Experience
in China". The same story is told in greater
Vlll

detail in the closing chapters of this book. Upon my return to Moscow, all the documents
(stenographic reports of the proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of
China, of all the meetings of its Central Committee during the period of my stay in China,
etc ) were published in a book called "These Chinese Revolution". It was published in
Russian by the State Publishing Department. The closing chapters of this book are based
on those official documents. My first book. "The Chinese Revolution", was never
published in other languages. On request from Moscow, I sent the manuscript back from
Berlin.
Many things happened in China since this book had been written. A new volume must be
written to deal with those events extensively. As those events have borne out my
contention about the collapse of 1927, and have corroborated my views about the
inevitable lines of development of the Chinese Revolution, I did not wish to add anything
to this book, so that its character as a historical document is in no way affected.
Nevertheless, a history of the Chinese Revolution appearing today would be incomplete
if it did not touch the events during the period since this book was written. Moreover, the
lessons of the experience made in China during those eventful years are not only of great
theoretical value, but are also of practical importance for us in India. Therefore, I have
added the last two chapters covering those events briefly.
The book, however, is more than a history of the revolutionary movement in
contemporary China. It gives the broad outlines of the social history of China from the
earliest days. A number of social problems, which appear to be typically Chinese, are
theoretically treated. In doing so, I had to make some investigations into the causes of
what is generally known as civilisation. The investigations have enabled me to make
some original theoretical contribution to the science of the history. Personally, I consider
that to be the real merit of the work. I have not yet had the time to follow up the
investigation in greater detail. Unfortunately, an active political worker is debarred from
such purely scientific work. 1 hope that my suggestions will stimulate others to undertake
the greater work which I may not be able to do.
****
The publication of the book was again delayed by the outbreak
 ix

of the war. Apart from the difficulty of making proper printing arrangement and the high
cost of paper, there were other, more serious, considerations. Nationalist China became
one of the United Nations in the war; Chiang Kai-shek was boosted as one of the top
leaders of the anti-Axis alliance. This book narrates the record of both, and it is not at all
a complimentary record. Its publication might create diplomatic difficulties; it might
even be prescribed as prejudicial to war efforts. I could not send it out to a publisher
abroad without submitting the manuscript to the censorship of the official expert on
Chinese affairs, and he was entitled to suppress it if he found it objectionable. I did not
take the almost sure risk.
Eventually, the Chinese bubble burst, as it was bound to. Foreign journalists began
to tell truths about nationalist China and its hero, instead of the previous flowery fictions.
There was no longer any political reason to hold up the publication of this book, which
predicted sixteeen years ago exactly what has been happening ever since in nationalist as
well as the so-called Communist China.
Even now, I do not wish to add anything to the book, nor do the subsequent events
warrant any revision of the views expressed in 1930, and than in 1939, when the last two
chapters were added. I have only recorded in a short epilogue some facts about the
present developments in China which drive home the lesson set forth in the last chapter.
Dehradun
March, 31st, 1946. M. N. ROY
 INTRODUCTION
To the Author

M.N Roy was in many ways a unique person. He distinguished himself both as a
man of action and as a man of thought. As a man of action, he was a devoted and
dedicated revolutionary. As a man of thought, he developed into a profound and original
social philosopher. He passed through three phases of political life. He started as an
ardent nationalist, became an equally ardent Communist and ended as a creatively active
Radical Humanist. He built up and propounded the philosophy of Radical Humanism
which may well become one of the most relevant philosophies of the future.
M.N. Roy was born on 21st March, 1887 in Brahmin family in a village in West
Bengal. His original name was Narendranath Bhattacharya. He started taking part in
underground revolutionary activity from the age of 14. He was involved in a number of
political offences and conspiracy cases. Under the leadership of Jatin Mukherjee, he and
his colleagues had prepared a plan for a armed insurrection for the overthrow of British
rule. When the first World War commenced, a promise was secured from certain German
agents for the supply of arms to Indian revolutionaries. In 1915, Roy went to Java in
search of arms from the Germans. That plan having failed, he went a second time to Java
for the same purpose. Thereafter he moved from country to country in pursuance of his
scheme to secure German arms. Travelling under different names and with fake
passports, he went from Java to Japan, from Japan to China, from China back to Japan,
and reached San Francisco in June, 1916. Soon thereafter, the United States joined the
World War, and Roy and some other Indians were charged in a conspiracy case instituted
in San Francisco. Roy evaded the American police and managed to go to Mexico. By that
time he had studied the basic books on socialism and communism and had become a
socialist. He joined the Mexican Socialist party and became its organising secretary. He
developed the party organisation and was elected its General Secretary. He converted the
Socialist Party into the Communist Party of Mexico at
xii

an extraordinary conference. He thus became the founder of the first Communist Party
outside Soviet Russia.
Roy was invited to Moscow to attend the Second Conference of the Communist
International which was to be held in July-August, 1920. Roy reached Moscow prior to
the conference and had discussions with Lenin on the national liberation movements in
colonial countries like India and China. He differed with Lenin to some extent on the
role of colonial capitalist classes in the movements for national liberation. On Lenin's
suggestion, the Theses on the National and Colonial Question prepared by him and those
prepared by Roy were both placed before the Second Conference of the Communist
International for acceptance. Both the Theses were adopted by the Conference.
Roy came to occupy a high position in all the policy-making bodies of the
Communist International. His main work at that time was to develop a Communist
movement in India. He managed to send a number of Communist emissaries as well as
literature to India. He has been recognised as the founder of the Indian Communist Party.
By 1927 Stalin had started his peculiar tactics for the liquidation or expulsion of
all persons of independent thinking from the Russian Communist Party and the
Communist International. Roy was one of the victims of those tactics. Roy wrote some
articles for the press of what was known as the German Communist Opposition,
criticising some of the policies adopted by the Communist International. For this offence
he was turned out from the Comintern in 1929.
Roy now decided to go to India, although he knew that he would be arrested in
India and would have to suffer a long term of imprisonment. He had been accused No. 1
in the famous Kanpur Conspiracy case of 1924, but could not be tried at that time
because he was out of India. Roy was prepared to pay the price of a long period of
incarceration in order to participate in the Indian freedom movement.
Roy came to India incognito in December, 1930, was arrested in July, 1931 and
was tried and sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years on the charge of conspiracy to
overthrow the British Government. The sentence was reduced to six years in appeal.
After completing his sentence Roy was released from Jail on 20th November,
1936. Immediately thereafter, he issued a public
 xiii

appeal asking the people to join the Indian National Congress in millions. At the same
time, he made it clear that the nationalist movement could not be strengthened unless it
underwent a process of radicalisation and democratisation. He urged that the Indian
National Congress should be built up from below by organising village and taluka
Congress Committees and by vitalising them on the basis of a socio-economic
programme of democratic freedom and radical agrarian reform. His idea was to develop
the Indian National Congress, with its net-work of village and taluka Committees, as a
State within the State. The plan was that at an appropriate time, the Congress as the
alternate State would give a call for convening a Constituent Assembly to frame the
constitution of free India and that the call would be the signal for the launching of the
Indian revolution for democratic freedom.
On the basis of this radical programme, the followers of Roy started work in a
large number of rural and urban centres in the country and within a couple of years they
became a force to be contended with. In 1940, however, Roy and his followers had to
part company with the Indian National Congress because of their difference on the issue
of India's participation in the Second World War.
When the "phony" stage of the Second World War was over and the Nazi armies
invaded France in April, 1940, Roy declared that the war had become an anti-Fascist
War and that it was necessary for the very survival of democracy throughout the world
that the war efforts of the Allied Powers should be supported at all costs. "If Fascism
succeeds in establishing its domination over the whole of Europe", Roy declared, "then
good-bye to revolution and good-bye to Indian freedom as well." He also confidently
predicted that ';the defeat of Faseism will weaken imperialism" and would bring India
nearer to the goal of democratic freedom.
The leaders of the Indian National Congress were, however, of a different opinion.
They declared that the Indian people would support the war efforts only if the British
Government agreed to set up a National Government in India with full autonomy over
defence and foreign affairs. Roy disapproved of this offer of conditional support, because
it implied that the war efforts would be opposed if the condition was not accepted. Roy
argued that since the success in the anti-Fascist war was necessary for India's democratic
freedom,
xiv

we could not put conditions on our offer to help in achieving that success. On this issue
Roy and his friends left the Indian National Congress and formed a separate party, called
the Radical Democratic Party, in December, 1940.
As early as in December, 1942 Roy expressed the view that the Fascist Powers
were going to be defeated in the war and that India would get national freedom as a result
of the socio-economic changes which were taking place in Great Britain and the allied
countries during the course of the anti-Fascist struggle. Roy's anticipations were proved
correct. Historians are agreed that India got national freedom largely as a result of the
liberating forces generated by the defeat of international Fascism.
When it became clear to him that the Fascist Powers were going to be defeated in
the war, Roy switched his attention to the post-war reconstruction of India. He got
prepared two basic documents in 1943 and 1944, one "Peoples' Plan for Economic
Development of India" and the second a "Draft Constitution of Free India". The
documents contained Roy's original contributions to the country's economic and political
problems. Contrary to the economic thinking which was then current, Roy gave priority
in the People's Plan to the development of agriculture and small scale industry.
Production under the Peoples' Plan was to be for use and not for profit, and the objective
of economic planning was to supply the primary needs of the people consisting of food,
shelter, clothing, education and medicine. The Indian State, according to the Draft
Constitution of Free India, was to be organised on the basis of a countrywide net-work of
Peoples' Committees having wide powers such as initiating legislation, expressing
opinion on pending bilis, recall of representatives and referendum on important national
issues. The idea of Peoples' Committees subsequently popularised by Jayaprakash
Narayan was mainly derived from Roy's Draft Constitution of Free India.
After the end of the war, Roy began to express his heretical views regarding
Communism and Marxism. He differed with Marxism mainly on the role of ideas in
human history and on the primacy of moral values. He summarised the philosophy which
he was propagating in a number of Theses. These came to be known as the 22 Theses of
Radical Humanism. He also issued a manifesto on New Humanism.
The 22 Theses outline the principles of the personal and social
 xv

philosophy of Radical Humanism. The basic values of freedom, rationalism and

morality are traced in the Theses to man's biological evolution. It is pointed out that
quest for freedom and search for truth constitute the basic urge of human progress. The
Theses emphasise the inseverability of political and economic freedom and indicate how
the comprehensive ideal of political and economic freedom may be achieved.
Further discussion of the principles enunciated in the 22 Theses and the Manifesto
led Roy to the conclusion that party politics was inconsistent with the ideal of democracy
and that it was liable to degenerate into power politics. Roy was of the view that political
power in a democracy should reside in primary organisation of the people such as
People's Committees and should not be usurped by any political party. He was further of
the view that particularly in countries like India, where a major section of the electorate
was illiterate, party politics was bound to become an unprincipled scramble for power.
These ideas led to the dissolution of the Radical Democratic Party in an All India
Conference held in December, 1948 and the launching of a movement called the Radical
Humanist Movement.
One of the new ideas developed by Roy during his Radical Humanist phase
related to the concept of "cooperative economy". In a cooperative economy, the means
of Production would not belong either to the capitalist class or to the State. They would
belong to the workers themselves. Roy was of the view that cooperative economy was
superior to both capitalism and State ownership.
Roy was an intellectual giant. He was a constant source of original ideas.
Throughout his life, he applied his great intellectual powers in the service of the ideal of
freedom. Freedom was the basic inspiration and consuming passion of his entire life.

—V.M. Tarkunde

New Delhi. 31. 5. 1982

 INTRODUCTION
This is not a treatise on Sinology. The very title of the book makes that
evident. Nevertheless, a general investigation in the history of the
country from the earliest days is necessary in order to place in a proper
perspective the social and political problems of contemporary China, a
treatment of which is the subject matter of the book. The book assumes a
scientific character inasmuch as a number of basic social and political
problems are dealt with theoretically, so that they could be treated
intelligently in their peculiar Chinese appearance. Much confusion has
been caused, for example, on the question of Feudalism, as well as by the
mechanical application of what Marx called the "Asiatic mode of
production", as an inflexible formula.
If bourgeois Sinology is a sterile controversy among pedants, Marxian
investigation of the history of China has hardly begun. What little Marx
and Engels themselves wrote about China was based upon very
insufficient material, and, therefore, cannot be accepted as the last word
on the subject. Still, mechanical quotations from the fragmentary
writings of the founders of scientific socialism have until now been the
point of departure of Marxist Sinology. Obviously, with such a method,
which is hardly Marxist, not much light can be thrown upon the dark
corners in the history of the Chinese society. Instead of setting up ill-
conceived, unfounded theories as the last word in Marxian Sinology, true
Marxists should do the spade-work. Materials should be collected and
systematized on the lines of Marxian methodology.
Not a few Marxian Sinologues are still over-awed by the imposing
learnedness of bourgeois Sinology. While combating it
2 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
apparently, they nevertheless remain bound to its unscientific metho-
dology. How the mist of bourgeois Sinology still hangs over the minds of
many Marxian Sinologues, is evidenced by the habit of seizing upon
phenomena like the age-long isolation and the system of artificial
irrigation as the keys to the Chinese puzzle. To describe these historical
phenomena and to point out what influence they had on the evolution of
Chinese society, do not bring us to the root of the problems. It is
necessary to ascertain how those peculiar phenomena came into
existence.
In the opening chapters of this book, an attempt has been made to
ascertain the cause of the specific features in the social organism of
China. This has been done, on the one hand, by disregarding the pedantry
of bourgeois Sinology and, on the other hand, by discarding the
empiricism of the so-called Marxist experts. Not being a treatise on
Sinology, this book does not concern itself with an examination of the
different theories set up regarding the history of China. Here the subject
is approached positively. For the purpose of the book, it is immaterial
whether Confucius lived six hundred years or eight hundred years before
Christ; whether his teachings are codified in five books or nine books;
whether he was the Prime Minister or the Minister of Finance of one of
the innumerable Clan-States of ancient China. Besides, there is no
established authority regarding these and other chronological details. It is
possible to state the fundamental principles of Confucianism without
entering into the hair-splitting scholasticism of bourgeois Sinology. That
has been done without profuse references to, and long quotations from,
the so-called standard works on China. The author has no desire to
impose the reader with a show of vast learning.
Then, my object is not to study Confucianism or Taoism or any other
school of thought in ancient China, as such. Marxism does not allow that.
The basic principles of the conflicting schools have been ascertained and
stated in brief only as evidence of the fierce class antagonism that grew
out of the dissolution of the tribal society. The next step is to investigate
what mode of production caused that antagonism. That brings us to the
decisive factor of the process, namely, endowments of nature at the
disposal of the ancient Chinese.
In establishing the deductions, I have referred to Morgan alone as the
authority. That does not imply that there is no other authority for the
deduction. Had I been engaged in a purely technical scientific
Introduction 3
investigation, I could call upon Waitz, Schweinfurth, Ratzel, Eyre,
Stanley, Burton and others for evidence in support of my view. But here
again, I have not followed the usual method of measuring unknown
regions with the yard-stick of established theories. In course of an
objective investigation, facts have been discovered, and deductions
drawn from them. Besides, the theory that at the dawn of civilisation the
mode of production, consequently the division of labour, and the entire
course of social evolution, is primarily determined by the endowments of
nature, constitutes the corner-stone of Historical Materialism, Marx
formulated the theory; Engels elaborated it on the basis of Morgan's
discovery of the clan-type of society. Later, in elucidating the
fundamental principles of Marxism, Plekhanov maintained it with the aid
of further knowledge, subsequently acquired, about ancient society.
Answering the question— "By what is this economic structure itself
datermined?" —Plekhanov wrote: "Marx's answer reduces the whole
problem of the development of economic structure to the problem of the
causes that determined the evolution of the productive forces of society.
In this latter form, the problem is primarily solved with reference to the
nature of the geographical environments." ("Fundamental Problems of
Marxism", page 32).
A clear knowledge of the natural conditions and forces of production
available to the ancient Chinese alone can enable us to discover the
fundamental laws of social evolution behind the peculiarities in the
history of the country. Approached with that knowledge, all the social
and political peculiarities in the past, and the problems of the present,
cease to be baffling.
Owing to their empirical approach to the problem, experts on China,
calling themselves Marxists, have set up and pulled down all sorts of
theories about the structure of Chinese society, not only of the past, but
even of to day. The greatest confusion has been created by the
controversy about the existence of Feudalism in China. To clear this
confusion, it is necessary to have a definition of Feudalism. It would be
futile to enter into a dispute over a thing which remains an abstract
conception. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the essence of the
social relation, traditionally called Feudalism, in order to have a standard
for the investigation of the evolution of Chinese society.
Then again, it is not the term Feudalism that is decisive. The
4 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
main thing is the relation of property in land as the principal means of
social production. The development of the form of landownership,
usually known as feudal, was determined by the conditions of production
in the preceding period. Those conditions, in their turn, were different in
different parts of the world, owing to the variety of geographical
environments and natural gifts. Therefore, the private property in land
and the class relation based upon it, could not possibly be realised in a
uniform appearance throughout the world. By studying the history of
China, we discover that social relations constituting the essence of
Feudalism did develop in that country, though not under forms generally
recognised as feudal.
If the structure of the contemporary Chinese society contains no element
of Feudalism, then, either this has been destroyed, or did not ever exist. It
has not been destroyed, because the bourgeois revolution which
ordinarily performs that historic task, has not yet been completed in
China. So, it follows that Feudalism never existed in China. What
happened, then, when the tribal social order decomposed? The
dissolution of primitive Communism inevitably leads to the creation of
private property in the means of production; and in that period of
antiquity, land is the main means of production. The class relation based
upon the pre-capitalist private property in land, no matter what form it
assumes, is the essence of the feudal social order. A convenient way out
of the dilemma is found in a mechanical quotation from Marx. A
sentence from the Introduction to "The Critique of Political Economy"
serves the purpose. The passage quoted is: "In broad outlines, the
Asiatic, antique, feudal and modern capitalist modes of production can
be depicted as the progressive epochs in the economic formation of
society." Long before social conditions in the Oriental countries were
subjected to Marxist examination, Plekhanov theoretically dealt with the
question of the "Asiatic mode of production" and Plekhanov's authority
as a Marxian theorist has survived his political debacle. According to
him, upon Morgan's discovery of the clan-type of social organisation,
"Marx modified his views as to the relation between the classical method
of production and the Asiatic method." ("Fundamental Problems of
Marxism", page 50). If the sentence in the Introduction to the "Critique
of Political Economy" contains the conclusive opinion of Marx, then,
"Asiatic mode of production", being a stage earlier than the antique mode
of production, must be coincident with primitive Communism.
Introduction 5
For, the antique society grew out of the dissolution of the primitive
Communist tribal order. Then, the "Asiatic mode" must eventually
develop into the antique mode of production. But when later on we find
Marx explaining what he meant by the "Asiatic mode of production", it
appears to be a stage of social evolution not only very far away from
primitive Communism, but well above the level of antique production. It
is based not only upon private property in land, but also in other means
of production created by man, and even partially upon primitive
capitalist production.
In that stage, the form of private property in land which, according to
Marx, "is quite suitable for becoming the basis of stationary conditions
of society, such as we see in Asia" is realised no longer in labour-rent,
but in the rent in kind. Further, "in this form of rent, it is by no means
necessary that rent in kind, which represents surplus labour, should fully
exhaust the entire surplus labour of the rural family. Compared to labour-
rent, the producer has rather more elbow room to gain time for some
surplus labour whose product shall belong to himself. This type of social
relation characterises the period of tramition from the feudal to the
capitalist mode of production. Under it, the peasant outgrows legal
serfdom, labour-rent being the classical expression of feudal relation; but
the entire process of his production still takes place under social relations
primarily determined by the pre-capitalist ownership of land. At the same
time, a part of the proceeds of his labour, performed over and above for
the production of his indispensable means of subsistence, tends to remain
in his possession. That is, he begins to acquire private property, and thus
there grows the possibility that the direct producer may acquire the
means to exploit other labourers."
The quotations in the above paragraph are all from "Capital", Volume III
(American edition, page 924). Instead of quoting more extensively, I
should refer the reader to the entire Section III on "Rent in Kind".
At the time of writing the Introduction to "The Critique of Political
Economy", Marx obviously meant something different by the "Asiatic
mode of production". Otherwise, the gradation of the epochs of social
progress, as stated then, would contradict his entire theory of Historical
Materialism. Evidently, what he had in mind was the theocratic type of
antique social order as obtained in Egypt and Babylon. Having at that
time not sufficient knowledge about
6 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the ancient history of other Oriental countries, Marx tended to think that
the theocratic type was common to them all. But the discovery of the
clan-type of ancient society proved that the Asiatic was not a distinct
stage of social evolution preceding the antique; that both of them grew
out of the dissolution of the clan social order, and were two parallel
types. On this, Plekhanov writes: "Each of these two types of economic
organisation appeared as the outcome of an increase in the forces of
production, an increase which had occurred within the social
organisation based upon the clan system, and ultimately led to the break-
up of this organisation. If the two types, the classical and the Oriental,-
respectively, differed greatly each from the other, this was because, in
both the respective cases, the development was influenced by the
geographical environments". ("Fundamental Problems of Marxism",
page 51).
This basic principle of Historical Materialism is stated also in the
Introduction to "The Critique of Political Economy" : "No type of social
structure ever perishes until there have been developed all the productive
forces for which it has room; and new and higher forces of production
never appear on the scene until the material conditions of existence
requisite for their development have matured within the womb of the old
society."
The ancient Babylonian and Egyptian society perished; but that was not
the case in China or India. A type of social organisation perishes only
when all the productive forces inherent in it are exhausted without
creating the germs of a new social order. This algebra of Marxism
permits the deduction that the ancient social order in China and India was
essentially different from that in Egypt and Babylon; in other words,
there is no such thing as a uniform type of Asiatic mode of production
antecedent to the antique. It is a historical fact that ancient society in
China and India did not go the same way as in Egypt and Babylon. It
could not remain stationary for ages without perishing. What, then,
happened to it?
Being only a parallel type of antique social order, it was bound to attain
the next higher stage—Feudalism. Here again, historical causes,
geographical environments and natural conditions of production affected
the progress and gave distinct appearances to the new social relations
which, nevertheless, were essentially feudal. Otherwise, the monistic
principle of Historic Materialism would be disproved, and the Marxian
perspective of history, that Communism
Introduction 7
is the common destiny of the human race, would be untenable.
Those who dispute the existence of Feudalism in China base
themselves on another fragmentary quotation from Marx. Dealing
with the creation of private property in land as the condition for
ground-rent, Marx writes: "Into Asia, it (the legal conception of free
property in land) has been imported by Europeans in but a few
places." ("Capital", Volume III, page 723). On the authority of this
single sentence, it is maintained that private property in land never
existed in China, and in the absence of this basic condition, there
could not subsist any feudal relation. Read in its full context, the
sentence, however, does not provide such a conclusive authority.
Firstly, in the preceding sentence, two distinct types of private
property in land are mentioned: one growing out of the dissolution of
the organic order of society, and the other out of the capitalist
production. It is not clear from the text whether, in connection with
Asia, Marx meant private property in land generally, or the latter type.
Most probably, he meant the latter type; for, the reference is made in
connection with the treatment of the process of the development of
capitalist ground-rent. Secondly, postulating that the dissolution of the
organic order of society is a condition for the growth of the legal
conception of private property in land, Marx could not logically assert
that this growth did not take place in Asia until the advent of the
Europeans. For, there the organic order of society had broken down, if
not completely, long before the Europeans came. He very likely
meant that the legal conception of capitalist private property in land
was imported by the Europeans into Asia. Thirdly, later on, in the
same treatise, he writes: "The owner (of land) may be the individual
representing the community, as in Asia." So, on the authority of
Marx, the absence of private property in land in China cannot be
proved. Private property in land in a specific form did exist in China.
It was not capitalist property. Consequently, the social relations
resulting from it were essentially feudal.
The confusion arises from the fact that pre-capitalist ownership of
land in China did not assume the form usually labelled as feudal. The
decisive factor, however, is not the outward form, but the underlying
relation of classes. Marx holds that the Asiatic form of landownership
does not essentially differ from the classical feudal system under
which "this private ownership in land may be merely
8 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
accessory to the ownership of the person of the direct producers by some
individual." ("Capital", Vol. III, page 743). There is no essential
difference, because in both the cases private property in land realises
itself in pre-capitalist rent absorbing practically the entire surplus labour
of the producer, who may or may not be bound legally by the conditions
of serfdom. Describing the conditions, under which peasants appear to
cultivate the soil as "free producer", that is, not legally in the state of
serfdom, as in China, Marx concludes: "Under such conditions, the
surplus labour of the nominal owners of the land cannot be filched from
them by any economic measures, but must be forced from them by other
measures, whatever may be the form assumed by them." ("Capital",
Volume III, page 918).
Finally, one more quotation from Marx conclusively proves that the
system of pre-capitalist relation of property in land in China is essentially
feudal. "If the direct producers are not under the sovereignty of a private
landlord, but rather under that of a State which stands over them as their
direct landlord and sovereign, then, rent and taxes coincide .... Under
these circumstances, the subject need not be politically or economically
under any harder pressure than that common to all subjection to that
State. The State is then the supreme landlord. The sovereignty consists
here in the ownership of land concentrated on a national scale. But, on
the other hand, no private ownership of land exists, although there is both
private and common possession and use of land." ("Capital", Vol. III,
page 918).
Having cleared away these theoretical questions, the book ceases to be
scientific, except as history. The principal thesis is political. It is a study
of the social character and perspective of the national revolution in
China. The study, however, transcends the limits of one single country,
and proceeds to ascertain the tactical and organisational principles of the
revolutionary movements in the colonial countries generally in the light
of the lesson learned in China. Nor is this of a detached academic nature.
It is the result of long revolutionary political activities in my own country
as well as in China. As a matter of fact, I have been associated with the
revolutionary movement in the entire colonial world, having for years
played a leading role in the activities of the Communist International in
that sphere. Even before the foundation of the Commu-
Introduction 9
nist International, I had visited China, the Dutch Indies, the Philippines
and Mexico, and took part in the revolutionary movements in those
countries.
The chapters dealing with the contemporary history of China are written
on the basis of personal knowledge and experience. I have had personal
contact with most of the leading figures of contemporary China. I had
already met Sun Yat-sen in 1916, and the criticism of his earlier social
and political views is largely based upon personal acquaintance. In the
opening months of 1927, when the national revolution reached its critical
stage, I was in China as the representative of the Communist
International. Personal interest, however, has not been permitted to mar
the objectivity of the study. How far I have succeeded in this, will be
judged by the reader. For example, Borodin is an old personal friend of
mine, and I still cherish him as such; yet, he comes in for unsparing
criticism. On the other hand, severe condemnation of the former leader
of the Communist Party of China, Chen Tu-hsiu, for the fatal tactical
mistakes committed, does not prevent me from appreciating his role as
the leading ideologist of the Chinese Revolution.
The concluding chapter*, added at the last moment, brings the history up
to date. The political prognosis and deductions, however, are contained
in the preceding chapters which were written last year. Subsequent
events have proved their correctness, showing that I have succeeded in
the task undertaken, namely, to draw the lessons of the Chinese
Revolution.
Berlin, July 1930. —M.N. ROY

* The reference is to Chapter XXI. Two more chapters and an Epilogue have been
added subsequently.
 CHAPTER I
THE FOUNDATION OF CHINESE SOCIETY
The present has its roots struck deep in the past. What exists today has
evolved out of the life of yesterday, and of the innumerable days
preceding. The present can be correctly understood and the future clearly
visualised, therefore, only with the aid of a proper appreciation of the
historical background.
The history of China vanishes in the dark ages. Side by side with the
Mediterranean and Semitic races, the Chinese entered the early stages of
human progress thousands of years ago. China is generally considered to
be the land of a very old civilisation. But in course of time, the people
inheriting the Semitic and the Mediterranean cultures strode ahead to
build the modern civilisation on the basis of the ancient heritage, while
the Chinese failed to keep pace. Mediaeval, even antique, social relations
still subsist in contemporary China. Modern civilisation has touched her
but on the surface, causing more evil than good to her teeming millions.
It is not an unusual phenomenon that peoples having reached a
comparatively high stage of progress in antiquity entirely disappeared
from existence. But China did not accompany Babylon and ancient
Egypt into the oblivion. She struggled ahead, but was left a long way
behind by others who appeared on the scene later. In view of that curious
caprice of history, China did not receive proper attention in the study of
human evolution except as a special case, difficult to understand; and
modern China has become a baffling problem for many. It is a "Chinese
Puzzle" which appears to defy the established laws of social progress.
But there is no puzzle in history which cannot be solved with the aid of
the modern method of treating historical problems as problems of
science, approaching them with the assumption that there is some cause
for each historical phenomenon, and that it can
12 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
be discovered.
The causes for the prolonged stagnation of the Chinese society are to be
found in the conditions under which its foundation was laid, thousands of
years ago. The fact that antique China survived destruction indicates that
she possessed a vitality altogether lacking in the case of the Babylonians,
Egyptians and the barbarians of the Western Hemisphere. But the vitality
at the same time was not great enough to overcome completely the
opposing forces of dissolution, as was the case with the Mediterranean
and Semitic races.
A scientific examination of the history of China shows that there is
nothing in it which is essentially different from the history of any other
civilisation. Whatever distinction appears to be there is rather of quantity
than of quality. The progress has been slower in China than in the
countries of the modern civilisation. The historians who find deep-rooted
peculiarities in the Chinese civilisation, do so with a motive. It is to
prove that, owing to her innate peculiarities, China is not able to absorb
the conquests of modern civilisation; that she is constitutionally
incapable of adopting modern economic and political institutions; and
that, therefore, she must remain a legitimate prey for the standard-bearers
of modern civilisation. That is not a scientific reading of history.
On the other hand, many of the Chinese themselves also believe in, and
preach, the cult of "special genius". Not able to understand the causes for
the deplorable stagnation of their national life, they make a virtue out of
it. Afraid of the spectre of racial inferiority, they idealise the past which
has brought about the present misery. But the backwardness of their
country is a fact. It cannot be removed by glorifying its causes. On the
contrary, the causes must be boldly discovered and ruthlessly extirpated.
The lingering faith in the infallibility and eternalness of their ancient
culture, on the part of even those Chinese who desire to see their country
progress on the road of modern civilisation, renders China a baffling
problem to grasp. Indeed, this ideological contradiction is a part of the
problem. After centuries of fossilised existence, old China is at last
disappearing to make room for a new one. The mediaeval structure of
society, sanctified by the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, has been
undermined, though slowly, by the rise of new forces and under the
impact of modern civilisation and culture from abroad. It is tottering. But
the ideology of new China in the throes of rebirth
The Foundation of Chinese Society 13
can no longer be the same as of the modern civilisation ushered in by the
Renaissance in Europe. The ideology of the centuries-belated Chinese
Renaissance cannot be that which no longer breathes the spirit of a rising
civilisation, but seeks to galvanise a decayed order of society. Hence the
ideologists of Chinese nationalism look wistfully back to the Golden
Age, just when the Chinese people are engaged in a gigantic struggle for
creating a social order higher than capitalist civilisation. Sun Yat-sen
formulated his "Three People's Principles", and the "Five-Power
Constitution" of the new State on the basis of the political philosophy of
Confucius and Mencius. The ideologists of Chinese nationalism find the
"Foundation of Modern China" in the debris of antiquity.
It is true that the present has its roots struck deep in the past, and the
builders of the future can draw inspiration from the past, but the tree
grows out of the seed only by destroying it. If the seed is lovingly
preserved for what it potentially contains, its pregnancy becomes
sterile—the tree never blossoms.
To conjure up the past is not a Chinese peculiarity. The ideological
pioneers of the European bourgeoisie, while heralding the rise of a new
social order, harked back to the pagan culture of ancient Greece. Indeed,
the bourgeois social order was reared upon the twin pillars of Hellenic
philosophy and Roman Law. The philosophers of ancient Greece and,
later, the law-givers of Rome were the ideologists of a revolution which
shifted the basis of human society from primitive communism to private
property. And bourgeois society, the high-watermark of human progress
based on private property, was born with the rich heritage of the Greek
and Roman cultures. Not only the men of the Renaissance, but even the
rationalist thinkers of the eighteenth century invoked a legendary
"Golden Age" while preaching the doctrine of social contract, as the
cardinal principle of the ideology of a new order, on the authority of the
philosophers of ancient Greece. Revolting against the authority of the
Roman Church. Martin Luther masqueraded as the reincarnation of the
very founder of that institution. The great French Revolution destroyed
feudal aristocracy and monarchist absolutism: yet, its leaders believed
that they were engaged in the task of creating a state on the model of the
Roman Republic which had laid the foundation of the very social
institutions they were abolishing. As a matter of fact, the bourgeoisie
have always conjured up the past as
14 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the authority for their revolutionary thoughts liquidating old traditions
and heralding new social relations.1 Themselves afraid of the great
potentiality of the revolution they were advocating, they invoked the
authority of the dead past for justifying their action.
If the European middle class, when they were still a revolutionary factor,
looked to the past for inspiration, it is no wonder that the Chinese middle
class should do the same now that their class throughout the world have
become a bulwark of reaction. The teachings of the Greek philosophers,
more than two thousand years after their time, provided the basis for the
ideology of the bourgeois social order in Europe. In China, Confucius
and his disciples, like their Greek contemporaries, also for the first time
recognised the necessity of political organisation of society and
enunciated the rudimentary laws for governing social relations. But their
teachings did not inspire subsequent thinkers to herald the rise of a
higher social order. The seeds of Renaissance and the resulting spiritual
progress of Europe were in the ancient culture of Greece. Confucianism
was not so happily pregnant. The misfortune was due not to any innate
inferiority of the Chinese mind, but due to the material conditions under
which the foundation of Chinese culture was laid. The responsibility for
the deplorable social stagnation of China is usually laid at the door of the
Confucian culture. But the correct interpretation of history should be to
reverse the relation. Having entered the first stages of civilisation
together with the fore-runners of modem European nations, the Chinese
people, nevertheless, lagged behind in centuries of social stagnation,
because of the defectiveness of the material basis of their civilisation.
The social stagnation, caused by defective endowments of nature, made
it possible that the progressive elements in Confucian culture were
overcome by the conservative.
Originally, Chinese culture did not differ essentially from the
contemporary Greek or Indian culture. In either case, the philosophical
foundation was the ideology of human society outgrowing tribal
organisation, based upon blood relations, and striving towards political
institutions governed by the relation of private property. The subsequent
growth of human culture was the result of the evolution of private
property. The evolution of private property, in its turn, was caused by the
development of the means of production. The progressive perfection of
tools in the hands of man—the development of the
The Foundation of Chinese Society 15
means of production—again is determined by physical conditions. Only
in the higher stages of civilisation, man invents powerful tools which can
overcome elemental conditions. In the primitive stages, production is still
largely governed by the endowment of nature, namely, the flora and
fauna of the country, geographical environments, animal resources,
supply of labour, etc.
The boundary between barbarism and civilisation is difficult to indicate.
Indeed, there exists no definite dividing line. The germ of civilisation
was in barbarism, and remnants of the latter persisted for a long time
while the former developed. The factor that clearly distinguishes
civilised society from barbarism is the growth of private property. It
revolutionises production, its mode and means, and therefore marks the
beginning of a new stage of human evolution. The growth of private
property begins only after man has acquired the knowledge of making
land bear fruit. So the cultivation of soil for producing food can be
reckoned as the first sign of civilisation. A group of human beings begin
to organise themselves territorially and politically only after they have
reached the stage of evolution in which they get their livelihood mainly
by cultivation of the earth. In that stage, man ceases to subsist, as in the
preceding stages of savagery and barbarism, almost entirely by his own
physical effort. For cultivation of the soil he supplements his labour by
employing animals which previously he killed to consume. The
transformation of animal from an article of consumption into the means
of production is a land-mark in the process of social evolution. It lays the
foundation of private property. By harnessing animal energy to
supplement his labour in the production of the means of subsistence, man
outgrows barbarism and enters the stage of civilisation.2
From the remotest days of history, the inhabitants of China got their
subsistence by cultivating the land. But the country was very poor in
such animals as could be domesticated to become means of production.
Here is the weak spot in the foundation of Chinese society. The Chinese
people entered the earlier stages of civilisation without possessing
precisely that gift of nature which, in that period, in addition to human
labour, is the basic means of production.3 The scarcity of cattle and
horses was a decisive factor in the earlier stages of the evolution of
Chinese society. Eventually, it contributed more to the prolonged
stagnation of national life than any other single factor.
16 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Limiting the margin of surplus produce, it obstructed the free
development of private property. Defective growth of private property, in
its turn, hindered the expansion of the productive forces. The mode of
production consequently assumed peculiar forms, placing a specific
stamp upon the whole process of social evolution for hundreds of years.
Primitive cultivation of land did not develop into field agriculture,
socialising human labour, first in the form of slavery, and then of
serfdom in the typical European sense. Agriculture developed not
extensively but intensively. Instead of bringing larger and larger areas
under cultivation, greater and greater amount of labour was concentrated
on limited areas in order to make them bear more and more fruit for
meeting the growing requirements of an expanding population. Garden
culture, artificial manuring and extensive irrigation became the specific
features of the Chinese mode of agricultural production, conditioned by
the defective endowment of nature.
China was not alone in the misfortune of not possessing cattle and horse
in the earlier stages of social evolution. The native races of America also
suffered from the same misfortune. Consequently, having attained a
well-advanced stage of barbarism, they perished. 4 Animals have more
than once settled the fate of entire peoples. The possession of horses, in
addition to fire-arms, was the decisive technical factor in the conquest of
Mexico and Peru by the Spaniards.
The roots of the proverbial conservatism of the Chinese people can be
traced to the conditions under which they entered the first stages of early
civilisation. Owing to the fact that the primitive Chinese inhabited a
country poor in animals adapted to domestication, nomadic habits did not
develop in them. In the absence of animals in abundance, hunting and
pasturage cannot become the means of subsistence of mankind. Most
probably, the fish and cereal periods were contiguous in the process of
social evolution of ancient China. They were not separated by the early
meat period in which animal becomes the means of subsistence (not yet
of production) of the primitive man. The primitive Chinese must have
wandered along the great rivers flowing from the Central Asiatic
mountains to the Pacific Ocean. Consequently, their main means of
subsistence must have been fish. Later on, thanks to the flat and alluvial
nature of the soil, and in the absence of any other means of subsistence
(meat and milk), it was possible for them to discover, perhaps sven when
other
The Foundation of Chinese Society 17
primitive human families were still leading a nomadic life, that the land
could be made to bear fruit by cultivation. The knowledge that the earth
could be cultivated to bear food marks the termination of the nomadic
period. The primitive Chinese most probably reached the stage of settled
conditions without passing through the stage of great migrations as in the
case of the Aryan and Semitic races.
Conservatism is the characteristic of any one possessing something to
conserve. Agriculture creates interest in land; as soon as man learns to
cultivate it, he becomes attached to it. He settles down in a fixed region,
claiming as his own the land which he can make bear him fruit.
Therefore, the knowledge to secure food by cultivating the earth can be
reckoned as the first rung in the ladder of civilisation, that is of organised
society. This knowledge eliminates the necessity of constant and
continuous migration in search of food and for grazing cattle. It renders
possible that a large number of human beings settle down definitely in a
certain region. There follows then the evolution of private property,
which eventually dissolves the tribal organisation based upon blood
relation, and the process of political organisation of society begins.
Thanks to the natural endowments of the country they inhabited
originally, the ancient Chinese most probably entered the stage of settled
existence earlier than any other race; China perhaps was the home of the
earliest organised human society. But the very condition which in that
early epoch placed her at the van of human progress, at the same time
constituted the weak spot in the foundation of her civilisation. The
Chinese society was born with an organic disease, so to say; its
subsequent evolution was crippled by that original misfortune.
Similar phenomena of social evolution are found in other parts of the
world as well. For example, the aboriginal races of America reached the
latter stages of barbarism when the inhabitants of the eastern hemisphere
had hardly emerged from savagery. While the latter had just left the
primeval forests and were still wandering with their domesticated
animals in search of food and pasture, the American races were well
advanced in the stage of farinaceous subsistence. They had learned to
produce food through the cultivation of the soil.5 Presently, the barbarian
of the eastern hemisphere also learned to cultivate land, and by virtue of
possessing domesticated animals not only overtook his American rival
but strode ahead to
18 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
civilisation while the other stagnated and eventually perished in the stage
of barbarism which he had attained earlier. Unequal endowment of
nature is the cause of such uneven progress of social evolution.
Man did not learn to domesticate animals and cultivate the soil
simultaneously. Neither the one nor the other primitive conquest alone
enabled him to emerge out of barbarism. The combination of both the
early achievements brought him to the gates of civilisation. The
foundation of civilised society is laid as soon as man learns to harness
animal energy to aid his own labour for cultivating the soil. By that
achievement, he creates conditions under which, for the first time in the
history of his evolution, his exertions are no longer devoted exclusively
to getting the means of a bare subsistence. A part of his energy is
released for other purposes—to create new values, which in their turn
stimulate further evolution of the means of production. The possession of
domesticated animals as the means of production eventually leads to the
possession of land. The possession of land and the ability to make it bear
fruit, in ever growing quantity, put an end to the habit of migration. The
ability of one man to cultivate more land than he could if he were to
depend exclusively upon his own labour and that of his human
dependents, creates the impetus for acquisition. The property in land,
first tribal, then patriarchal, later private, evolves; the basis of civilisation
is thus laid.
The use of domesticated animals for the cultivation of soil creates a
surplus of human labour as a precondition for the institution of slavery—
the pillar of antique civilisation. With the aid of animal power and
improved tools, a diminishing number of human beings is required to
produce food and other elementary necessities of the entire community.
Consequently, a growing number of men are thrown out of the process of
necessary production, and become available for use as chattels in the
primitive production of commodities. Possessing labour power in excess
of what is necessary for its subsistence and reproduction, a community
can employ the surplus human energy for further conquests, either of
nature or of the neighbouring human communities. In that condition,
slavery becomes the basis of economic progress and political expansion.
The surplus human labour becomes the object of sale and purchase by
the few owning the means of production, the main item of which, in that
early stage of civilisation, is land. Slavery is originally brought into
The Foundation of Chinese Society 19
existence by the displacement of human labour through the employment
of animal power in the production of the necessities of the primitive
society. It attains the classical form, as in Greece, the Semetic countries,
and Rome, when large numbers of prisoners are made in wars.
Man's knowledge and ability to make the land bear fruit did not create
fully all three conditions in ancient China. The cultivation of land by
itself is not a broad enough basis for a civilised society to be built upon.
It becomes so only when it represents a mode of production in which
human labour is supplemented by the employment of domesticated
animals. Like the American races, the Chinese in an earlier epoch
favoured by natural conditions, learned the art of cultivating land perhaps
earlier than other races. The achievement represented their entrance into
the initial stage of primitive civilisation, in so far as the knowledge and
ability to make the land bear fruit enabled them to settle down in a
definite region and consequently to lay the foundation of an organised
society. But just as in the case of American barbarism, early Chinese
civilisation was presently handicapped by the very same natural
conditions which had accelerated its progress in an earlier period. In the
absence of domesticated animals, particularly cattle, in ancient China,
agriculture did not release sufficient human labour from the process of
necessary production. The same cause obstructed the evolution of private
property in land. The evolution of property began to stagnate in the stage
of patriarchal ownership; for, by his own labour alone and with the very
primitive tool of that period, one man could hardly get his subsistence by
cultivating land. Joint labour was an indispensable necessity.
Insufficient impetus for the early accumulation of land seriously affected
the growth of slavery, and later on, of serfdom. Human labour not having
been displaced in a sufficient quantity from the process of necessary
production, the foundation of the system of slavery, as a distinct mode of
production, was not laid. As conditions were not favourable for the
concentration of land on the basis of private ownership, subsequently
feudalism failed to develop in the classical European form. And in a still
later period, the growth of manufacture was retarded by the fact that
practically the entire social labour was required for the production of
food.
Reared upon such a defective foundation, the Chinese society
20 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
evolved haltingly and painfully. Except for this innate weakness, caused
by the defective endowment of nature, Chinese civilisation in its early
stages had no other distinctive feature. Indeed, the conditions in China at
the time of Confucius were remarkably similar to those of contemporary
Greece. The mission of Confucius was the same as that of the ancient
Greek law-givers like Draco and Solon, namely, to lay the moral basis
for the political organisation of society. Yet the seed sown in the
countries around the Levant eventually blossomed forth into the modern
civilisation of Europe, while China laboured in dark ages which appeared
to be interminable. So we must put our finger on the defective spot in the
foundation of the Chinese society as the key to the "Chinese Puzzle". Nor
was the depressing darkness of the middle-ages a peculiarity of China.
During the centuries intervening between the fall of the Roman Empire
and the Renaissance, Europe also was plunged into mediaeval darkness.
When, after two thousand years of a painful history—of wars, invasions,
devastations, famine and bitter class struggle—the Chinese society
showed signs of surviving the defects of its birth, it was overtaken by yet
another misfortune. That was the obstruction of its normal development
through foreign intervention. The heirs of the ancient Greek civilisation
invaded China, as it were, to punish her for having in the remote past
been a nearly successful rival of fair Hellas.
Very little authentic is known of the two thousand years of Chinese
history before Confucius. The only record of that period is contained in
the Holy Books which, judged from their character and contents, can
hardly be granted the dignity of history. They can rather be compared
with the great Epics of Greece and India. They are a record of the
ideology of a primitive civilisation. Although there is sufficient evidence
as regards the spuriousness of some of the Classics, there cannot be
much doubt about it that fragmentary records of the intellectual life of
that remote period did exist in some form or other.* It is immaterial
whether Confucius compiled them, or edited them, or actually wrote the
Classics on the basis of the fragmentary records that came down to him.
The fact is that they do prove two things: that the ancient Chinese culture
was not irreligious as commonly believed; and that Chinese society about
a dozen
The Foundation of Chinese Society 21
centuries before Christ had definitely crystallised into tribal federations
and confederations based upon agriculture as the principal, if not the
only, mode of production.
The foundation of the pre-Confucian society was the Tsing Tien system
of land-holding. That was a consanguine organisation binding nine
families of the same clan into a productive unit. In the earlier part of the
Chow Regime (11th—3rd centuries B.C.), a territory of about a million
square kilometers was divided among 1,800 principalities which were
tribal organisations like the Greek phartries and the Roman curia. The
social pyramid was as follows: Five family groups made a kei, ten keis
made a If, four lis made a leh, and four lehs made a slang. The structure
bears a striking similarity to the tribal organisation in ancient Greece
which was: thirty families made a gen, thirty gens made a phartry, and
three phartries composed a tribe. That system of tribal organisation was
breaking up towards the end of the Chow Dynasty, although it persisted
in a fossilised form throughout the history of China. A considerable
element of it still persists even in the present system of land tenure.
Confucius lived in the period (6th century B.C.) when the Tsing Tien
system was decaying. The burden of his teachings was restoration of the
decayed clan system and, with it as the basic unit, to build up a political
state of benevolent despotism. Like the ideologists of the ancient Greek
civilisation, Confucius also evolved the philosophy of a state and society
based upon class relations. Advocate of a centralised state, he
represented the progressive tendency; but the progressive element in his
philosophy wai counter-balanced by his defence of a decayed social
system which was to be the basis of the centralised state. That
contradiction of Confucianism was the ideological reflex of the
contradiction in the motive forces of the antique Chinese civilisation.
Bolder thinkers challenged Confucius, and succeeded in overwhelming
him for the time being. For more than two hundred years the forces of
conservatism lost ground to those of disruption and dissolution. And
under the pressure of the same basic contradictions of the situation, the
ideologist of the plebeian revolt, Lao Tze, degenerated into pessimism
and pacifism. But the seeds sown by him found a fertile ground, and
eventually fructified in the revolutionary philosophy of the materialists
Mu Tze and Yang Tze, particularly the latter who can be called the
enfant terrible of ancient China. Finally,
22 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
in the third century B.C., rose Yang Chang. Inspired by him, the Chin
Revolution sought to abolish the Tsing Tien system and unite the country
under the absolutism of a feudal emperor. The Chin Emperor burned all
the writings of Confucius. But presently the Chin Revolution consumed
itself. The Chinese society gravitated back to the Tsing Tien system, and
five hundred years after his death Confucius was enthroned definitely as
the National Sage of China. Until today he sits on his dilapidated throne,
not even the formidable guns of foreign imperialism having been able to
shake seriously his position fortified by holy tradition.
Confucius and his philosophy survived the vicissitudes of centuries
because he preached reform. In his time conditions of China were not
ripe for a revolutionary change. The old system was decaying. But there
had not yet arisen a class so divorced from the old mode of production as
to be able to build a new social order. The germs of feudalism had indeed
been sown; slavery, serfdom and the rest of the specific features of the
age were there. But the incipient forces of revolution were organically
inter-woven with the basic social units of the consanguine family groups.
They were not strong enough to clear away the decayed system.
In its premature entry into the stage of civilisation, the Chinese society
had brought with it a heavy ballast of barbarism which seriously impeded
its further progress. The collapse of the Chin Revolution showed that,
though decayed, the Tsing Tien system was still the main spring of
China's national economy, and that the feudal mode of production was
not yet developed enough to replace it.
The country, however, was in a pitiable state. Taking place under a
disadvantage imposed by nature, the primitive accumulation of wealth
meant greater deprivation, destitution and oppression for the masses. The
absence of the beasts of burden was compensated by human beings who
remained tied to the barbarous bondage of blood. The growing greed of
incipient feudalism plunged the land into a state of chronic internecine
war. Confucius was the ideologist of some improvised system that could
save the country from ruin. Conditions, historic and objective, were not
ripe for a revolutionary change. The way out of the impasse must be
found in some readjustment of jarring relations. Confucius indicated the
way, and proposed the creation of a confederation of the semi-feudal,
semi-patriarchal states based upon the heritage of barbarism—the
consanguine clan organisation. He did
The Foundation of Chinese Society 23
not advocate the destruction of the decayed system. He was not a
revolutionary. Conservatism is the main principle of Confucianism. The
substance of his teachings was: don't plunge headlong into destruction;
make the best of a bad situation; and wait for better days. He was a
reformer, and as such he won his exalted position in Chinese history.
As a Minister of the Principality of Lu (modern Shantung), Confucius
tried to construct his ideal state. The main object of his reform was to
stabilise the undermined Tsing Tien system. He advocated some
modifications and measures designed to prevent too many men from
being withdrawn from production to swell the army. For that purpose,
the kingdom was divided into a number of family groups owning land
collectively. They were graded according to the amount of land they
held. Each family had to send one of its adult members to the army who,
however, did not become, as previously, a soldier by profession. He
served in the dual capacity of soldier and peasant in alternate terms. The
Confucian reform sought to curb the operation of the incipient feudal
elements. They, therefore, conspired against Confucius and soon turned
him out of office, to wander over the country in search of a "wise king".
His life proved that Confucius had undertaken a task not to be
accomplished. He died a disappointed man. His last words were: "No
wise king appears; no one in the kingdom wishes to make me his master.
It is time for me to die."7
The fall of Confucius in his life-time, and the defeat of his opponents two
hundred years later, show how extremely complicated the situation was.
The older order was decaying, but it still possessed great persistence. On
the other hand, the elements making for a new system, though gaining
ground, were still very far from the power of playing a decisive role.
Confucius himself testifies to the growth of feudal forces, and hints that
the salvation of the situation was in the restriction of those forces. Upon
his expulsion from the principality of Lu, he exclaimed in indignation:
"The princes nowadays have insatiable desire for riches and are
indefatigable in pleasure and extravagances. They are negligent and lazy;
they are haughty and arrogant. They exhaust the people and place
themselves against the multitude, and try to overthrow them who are
going the right way."8
Notwithstanding the dwarfed development of the new social
24 Revolution and Counter Revolution in China
forces, the age of Confucius was an age of bitter class struggle.
Internecine wars among the tribal chiefs had proceeded with such
ferocity that by the eighth century B.C. the number of principalities had
been reduced to twenty. Only four hundred years before, the number was
about eighteen hundred. In the midst of that holocaust stood the
theocratic Chow Dynasty claiming paramount power. The country was
laid desolate by a fierce struggle for supremacy. The people were
oppressed to the utmost limit. The aspirations of the dominant and
oppressed classes were expressed respectively by Confucius and Lao
Tze. While the former sought to save society from violent dissolution by
introducing his Draconian moral codes, the latter raised the voice of
primitive democracy. Lao Tze preached the doctrine of a plebeian revolt.
"Those that are stark and rigid are followers of death. Those that are
tender and weak are followers of life. A strong army does not (always)
win, and a strong tree grows to decay. The strong and great are coward,
the tender and the weak are uplifted. There is nothing under the Heaven
that excels water in tenderness and weakness, yet there is nothing that
surpasses it in efficiency when it attacks the hard and the strong. This is
known to everybody, that the strong is conquered by the weak, that the
rigid is conquered by the tender."9
As against the rigid social codes of Confucius, his opponent further
preached: "Men naturally follow the ways of the Tao (Heavenly Way).
Let them alone. Do not subject them to rules and formalities which,
being unnatural, distort their normal evolution. The more mandates and
laws are enacted, the more there will be thieves and robbers. I fan end
were put to sageness, and wisdom put away the great robbers would
cease to arise; if jade was put away and pearls broken to bits, the small
thieves would not appear."10
This doctrine of laissez fairs was a mighty challenge to the Confucian
social philosophy based on an elaborate system of duties and obligations.
The consanguine family was the corner-stone of Confucian society; the
children were to be completely subordinated to the parents. Confucius
ordained: "Serve the parents, be loyal to the Government, and establish a
good name for yourself." The individual was but an insignificant cog in
the ruthless wheel which was the expression of the jen.11 Such severe
codes of conduct were necessary to prevent the threatening social
disintegration. The independence of the tribal organisation should be
subordinated to a central authority,
The Foundation of Chinese Society 25
if society was not to disintegrate in consequence of the constant and
continued feuds amongst them. China stood faced with the historic
necessity of codified laws and defined power for public institutions. On
the other hand, to secure the subordination of the independent tribal
organisations to a central authority, it was necessary that the power, duty
and obligation of that authority should also be clearly defined. Therefore,
Confucius laid down codes of conduct not only for the people, but also
for the theocratic monarch himself. For the guidance of the latter, the
mythical example of the Three Divine Kings and Five Sovereigns was
held up. The portrait of those mythical personages was drawn in the Shih
Ching (The Book of History). Most probably those ideal characters were
drawn, at least heavily retouched, by Confucius himself. The social
significance of the Confucian "wise king" was essentially the same as
that of the "philosophers" in Plato's Republic. Both represented the
abstract ideal for a political state based upon written laws regulating the
relation of classes as against the anarchy of the decayed tribal social
order. In order to bring order out of chaos it was necessary to set up a
depository of all power. It was the State which, according to Confucius,
was the quintessence of all human relations. On the authority of the Holy
Book, he maintained that the fundamental principle of human society
was the subordination of the wife to the husband, of the children to the
parents, and of the subject to the ruler. He set up an Emperor at the apex
of his social pyramid. The cardinal doctrine of Confucian philosophy is
"the nature of man makes government the greatest and most important
thing in the world." By laying down this ideological foundation of the
political State, Confucius not only places himself on an equal footing
with Plato and Aristotle as one of the fore-runners of modern civilisation,
but even anticipates Locke and Montesquieu.
It is not only on the authority of the mythological "wise king" that
Confucius evolved his philosophy of the State. He reared it also upon a
system of cosmology. He was not an atheist; his philosophy was not
irreligious. It was evolved out of the background of natural religion just
as ancient Greek idealism. The prehistoric "divine kings", after whom the
head of the Confucian political State should model himself, were
theocratic monarchs. Confucian political philosophy retained a large
element of theocratic tradition, just as his moral codes were meant to
galvanise decayed patriarchal relations. In the
26 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Confucian State the Emperor is the High Priest, tribal chiefs and
patriarchal statesmen constituting the hierarchy. The theocratic nature
persisted in the Chinese State throughout history. The function of the
head of the State included making periodical offerings to the Heaven,
Earth, Ancestors, Confucius, Sun, Moon, the God of Rains and a whole
host of other divinities familiar to all natural religions. Even in the
nineteenth century, on the occasion of a great famine, the Chinese
Emperor at the head of his hierarchy prayed for rain in the following
words: "I, Minister of Heaven, placed over mankind and responsible for
keeping the world in order, etc., etc." The head of the Confucian State
was not God-appointed as in absolute monarchy, he was the Minister of
Heaven. That is a theocratic conception.
Confucian cosmology is dualistic. There are two principles in nature:
Yang and Yi, meaning respectively the strong and the weak, the male and
the female, the heaven and the earth. The Universe represents the
interplay of these two principles. The interplay is governed by fixed laws
which are enigmatically set forth in the Yi Ching (Book of Change), as
the sixty-three trigrams.12 The resemblance with the Pythagorean
numerical conception of the Universe is unmistakable. The doctrine of
two principles in nature bears resemblance to the fundamental doctrine of
the Sankhya system of Hindu philosophy. In all the three countries of
classical civilisation—Greece, India and China—approximately at the
same time, the evolution of society had reached the stage of outgrowing
natural religion and producing primitive materialism and speculative
philosophy. The dualistic conception of the Universe is the ideological
reflex of a society split up into classes. The growth of classes with
antagonistic interests creates the necessity for laws to govern the relation
between them.
The basic sanction of Confucian moral and political philosophy is the
assumption that the interaction of the two cosmological categories
definitely establishes a set of laws by which everything in this world is
governed. The mission of the wise man is to teach the people to act in
harmony with those universal laws. Some superficial students of Chinese
philosophy have characterised Confucius as a materialist. The basic
sanction of his philosophy, however, was a metaphysical assumption.
Therefore, he was an idealistic system, his philosophy was rooted in
religion.
In the time of Confucius there developed tendencies towards
The Foundation of Chinese Society 27
speculative thought which disputed the metaphysical assumptions of
religion. The leader of that tendency was Lao Tze, an elder contemporary
of Confucius. The tendency, however, was weak, and was overwhelmed
eventually by the conservative doctrines of Confucius. The social basis
of the speculative thought in ancient China was not the rising class of
traders as in antique Greece. The Chinese speculative thought and
mysticism were the ideological expression of the aspirations of the
peasant masses tied, on the one hand, to a decayed tribal organisation
and, on the other, crushed under the iron-heel of incipient feudalism.
Therefore, it could not be the stimulus for primitive materialism,
although it was not altogether sterile in that respect. Its main line of
development, however, was in the direction of mysticism, pessimism and
pacifism. The helpless victims of a decayed social order had no
perspective before them. Mercilessly oppressed, completely destitute and
without any hope for something better in this world, the semi-slave,
semi-serf peasant masses found the only consolation in mysticism. Later
they relapsed in the darkness of natural religion, the heritage of
barbarism. That tendency was strengthened by the incorporation of
ancestor-worship in the social institutions of Confucius. As the
Confucian State was built on the basis of consanguine family groups,
ancestor-worship was naturally one of its pillars. When the patriarchal
family constitutes the basis of social and political organisations, its unity
and continuity is preserved through the worship of the departed
ancestors.
Mysticism is the ideology of a society which finds itself in a blind alley.
Already in the classical period, agriculture had been highly developed in
China. But owing to the basic fact that, in the cultivation of soil, human
labour had not been supplemented by animal energy, the development of
the higher forms of production had been very slow. Consequently, when
in course of time the primitive agriculture was overtaxed to support a
society well advanced in the early stages of civilisation, but still retaining
the impediments of barbarous splendour, there had hardly appeared other
forces of production to relieve it. The peasantry was, therefore,
oppressed intolerably. It was restive and rebellious. But in the absence of
a new class possessing higher means of production, potentially ready to
create a new social order on the ruins of the old, the discontent of the
oppressed masses could not find constructive expression. It degenerated
into pessimism, and pessimism bred mysticism.
28 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Material conditions encouraging pessimism and mysticism were so very
ripe in the time of Confucius that he himself was affected by them in his
earlier years. Strong trends of mysticism are found in the Yi Ching (Book
of Change), which contains Confucian cosmology. But the task before
the ruling class of the epoch was to deal with the realities of physical life.
The established social system was breaking down. The burning problems
were: How should man live? How should social relations be readjusted?
How should the administration of the country be conducted? How should
national economy be saved from imminent ruin? Basing himself upon an
essentially religious cosmological conception, Confucius constructed a
moral and political philosophy, the fundamental principle of which was
that all human relations are governed by the auto-operation of an
absolute Divine Will (fen). Chaos characterised the epoch. The
established order depended, in the first place, upon the creation of a
stable central authority. The conception of the jen provided the sanction
for the required authority. Denned by Confucius as sympathy or fellow-
feeling, the jen resulted from the inter-play of the two cosmological
elements Yang and Yi. His philosophy grew out of the conditions and
necessities of the time. The society was split into two classes: their inter-
relation must be defined. The dissolution of society could be averted only
by harmonising the relation between the elements composing it. The
conception of a universal principle of fellow-feeling was evolved out of
an objective necessity. Confucius maintained that the jen was the
foundation of human society, and as such regulated all human conduct.
Out of a dualistic cosmology he evolved a monistic idealism as the
metaphysical sanction for his political philosophy of a unitary state to
harmonise the relation between antagonistic social classes.
Confucius propounds his philosophy of a unitary central authority with
the following augment: "There are no two suns in the sky; no two kings
in a land; no two princes in a State; no two chiefs in a family." The inter-
play of the two cosmological elements produces a universal moral
principle. Correspondingly, the interplay of the two social elements (wife
and husband, children and parents, subject and the ruler) also produces a
third factor, which is neither the one nor the other, but regulates the
relation between the two. That is the fundamental principle of the
Confucian theory of state, a theory which combines barbarous theocracy,
tribal patriarchy and incipient
The Foundation of Chinese Society 29
feudalism into a federal political structure.13
Confucius lived down his mysticism, and asked the leaders of
speculative thought: "How could we know death, when life is not yet
solved? Do not trouble yourselves with things super-natural. How could
we serve spiritual beings, while we do not know how to serve men?"14
He differed from the Taoists not as regards the existence of a Supreme
Being, or Divine Principle. The difference was regarding its nature.
While the Taoists maintained that it was metaphysical, transcendental,
Confucius held it to be moral. So, a conception of morality, derived from
the metaphysical assumption of a heavenly principle, was the peculiar
form that religion took in China. Several centuries after the death of its
founder, Confucianism, adulterated with a vulgarised form of Buddhism,
became the State religion of China. Confucius himself was included in
the galaxy of divinities, and received his share of the annual offering
which was one of the functions of the Chinese monarchy throughout the
ages.
All the Chinese sages agree on the existence of a Supreme Being which
is believed to regulate natural events and human conduct. But no
Godhead is set up as the judge of human beings. There is the Tien, or the
Tien Ming (Heavenly Way) which lays down the law governing all
earthly phenomena. Those who violate the Heavenly Way suffer. The
Heavenly Way is moral, and does not brook any contradiction to its will.
That is a primitive conception of the Natural Law of the post-
Renaissance European thought Nor is there any essential difference
between the absolute inviolability and infallibility of the Confucian
Heavenly Way and the Godhead of the great world religions.
All the great world religions, as distinct from the primitive, natural
religion, originally were the ideology of the oppressed class. Taoism was
the religion of ancient China in that sense. The class struggle in ancient
China was the social background of the fierce antagonism between
Taoism and Confucianism. That antagonism was the main feature of the
intellectual life of the country for three hundred years. The historic
struggle ended in the establishment of a socio-political system on the
suppression of a plebeian revolt. That was a landmark in the evolution of
Chinese society. That was also another weak spot in its foundation. The
suppression of the plebeian revolt, however, was predetermined. While
the earlier
30 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
stages of civilisation were marked by a fierce class struggle, there had
not appeared in the social organism a new force sufficiently strong to
lead the oppressed masses in their revolt against the decayed order. The
final defeat of Taoism indicated the collapse of the plebeian revolt.
Owing to the immaturity of its social basis, Taoism could not develop
into a great world religion. Confucianism came victorious out of a
prolonged wrestle, because it embodied both religion (recognition of a
supernatural force) and an idealistic moral philosophy (ideology of the
ruling class). In ancient Greece, classical idealism grew out of primitive
materialism; therefore, it was revolutionary and as such was the spiritual
fountain-head of all the forces of modern civilisation. In China,
Confucian idealism reared itself on the background of a barbarous
natural religion. Therefore, it was of a static character, and as such,
preventing the dissolution of the ancient society, subsequently became
the philosophy of national stagnation.
Confucius constructed his philosophical system on the assumption of an
abstract principle which is the beginning and regulator of everything.
The universal principle was endowed with innate goodness. The idea of
goodness was the highest idea. Hence the prominence given to
"humanness" and "righteousness" in the Confucian philosophy. It
maintained that all is good by the heavenly law. It was a concession to
the Taoists who proclaimed the doctrine of social equality on the strength
of their monist conception of the Universe. By that concession,
Confucius smuggled religion into his philosophy, and cut the ground
under the feet of the ideologists of the plebeian revolt—the would-be
founders of the abortive Chinese World Religion. That concession to
monism was presently made the source of moral deduction sanctioning
dualism in the social organisation. A monistic idealism, on a dualist
cosmological background, became the philosophy of class domination,
fortified by a unitary state.
The Confucian doctrine of the innate goodness of human nature is
elaborated as follows: "The feeling of fellowship is the primary altruistic
instinct of man which, in spite of his innate egoism, drives him out of his
narrow selfish limitation and which seeks its own satisfaction through the
negation of itself."15 This doctrine of primitive "social contract"
ostensibly was applicable to all and sundry; but just as with the theory of
social contract of a later period, in
The Foundation of Chinese Society 31
actuality, it also was a theory for its object, on the one hand, restraint
of the absolutism of a decayed class and, on the other, creation of
conditions for the domination of a new class. Starting from the
assumption that all human relations are governed by the operation of
the Heavenly Way, present in every human being as fellow-feeling,
Confucius constructed his elaborate system of duties, virtues and
proprieties. Applied to the ruling class, the doctrine of universal
fellowship revealed its real meaning; which was subordination of one
class to another, so that society could be saved from imminent dis-
solution. Confucius urged upon the ruling class his doctrine of
fellowship and humanness with this argument: "The good emperors of
old made the world peaceful, and people lived in harmony, the
inferior contented under the superior."16 Constant and continuous
internecine wars were ruining the people who consequently were
getting restive and rebellious, threatening the very existence of
society. Peace must be established as the first condition for social
reconstruction. Fellow-feeling amongst the warring princes was
needed for that purpose. Harmony between the ruling class and the
people, essential for the preservation and progress of society, was
conditional upon the harmony amongst the princes themselves. The
doctrine of fellowship, as far as the princes were concerned, was the
principle of class solidarity.
The operation of the Heavenly Way teaches everybody to find his
place in society and perform his duty. The duty of the princes is to
establish peace. They were exhorted to do so by the example of the
rulers of the Golden Age. "The ancients, who wished to spread virtue
throughout the world, first set their own States in order. Wishing to
rule their States well, they first regulated their families. Their States
being well ruled, there was peace in the world."17
The patriarchal foundation of the Confucian State is clearly
discernible here. Internal decomposition of the clan was the source of
all social evils. The clan was the family of the prince. The position of
the prince, who should be pillar of the centralised political state, could
not be stabilised unless the inter-relations of the consanguine family
groups composing the clan were regulated. Thus, Confucian laws
inevitably hindered the growth of private property. They galvanised a
decayed social system and strangulated the incipient forces of a new
order. The contradiction of the Confucian laws was the reflex of the
contradictions of the social conditions of the epoch.
32 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The Confucian definition of the attitude of the middle class reveals the
weakness of that class. Owing to that weakness, the middle class, which
otherwise would have destroyed the old order to establish a new, fawned
upon the clan chiefs. Sycophancy is a characteristic feature of the
Confucian philosophy. For the conduct of the literati, Confucius laid
down the following rules: "Not failing to treat the august master (prince)
with loyalty, and the venerable (ruling class) with respect, we shall be
able to make ourselves secure in our high positions."18 The duty of the
common people, according to Confucius, is "to do the necessary in every
season; to do the utmost to make the land as fertile as possible; and to be
frugal in their expenses."19
Evidently, the Confucian doctrine of fellowship does not admit of
equality. Confucian fraternity is not the twin sister of equality, and
tolerates only well regulated liberty. The uniform operation of the
Heavenly Way is an abstract conception. In practical life, it does not
imply equality. On the contrary, the difference of occupations and the
resulting division of society into classes are sanctioned by it as being the
nature of things. Hence the elaborate laws and regulations made to
defend them are moral.
As Greece needed Solon and Draco to formulate rigorous laws of social
conduct, so did China need Confucius with his moral philosophy and
social codes. The country was in a great crisis. As the ideology of the
downtrodden masses, Taoism was raising its ominous head. Lao Tze and
his followers were preaching a dangerously disruptive philosophy. The
advance of civilisation had made natural religion inadequate for
satisfying the spiritual needs of society. Speculative thought was tearing
down from their throne the elemental divinities set up by the ignorance
of tribal society in the state of barbarism. Social relations, established on
the authority of those divinities, sacerdotal and theocratic codes, were all
breaking down. The speculation about the cause of the world with its
sorrows and sufferings, the search for the origin of things, indicated the
dissatisfaction of the people with the established order. Taoism was
iconoclastic. Its basic principle as formulated by Lao Tze was: "The life
is a passing episode of the eternal existence which, being absolute, is free
from all inequalities."20 The principle developed in two distinct
directions: mysticism and passivity, on the one hand, and indignation and
revolt against the established order, on the other.
The Foundation of Chinese Society 33
Asserting that the phenomenal world was not real, Lao Tze concluded
that: "The wise remains free and unattached in the midst of this constant
change, he lives as if not living."21 At the same time, he taught,
obviously as a challenge to the Confucian doctrine of self-abnegation,
that the "basic principle of conduct is to enjoy the bliss of life."22 In either
direction it was potentially dangerous. One way it spelled social
dissolution; in the other it heralded a revolutionary upheaval.
Taoism was a mystic cult with a strong dose of stoicism. It was
predominantly the ideology of the dissolution of a decayed social order.
Ancient Chinese civilisation was on the verge of death from the disease
of its birth. It lacked the vitality that is generated from the possession of
progressively higher modes of production. The main source of
production was sapped by the employment of a greater and greater
number of men in the continuous internecine wars. On the other hand,
people were deserting the land, not being able to bear the burden
imposed upon them. Some of the "good kings" ploughed the field
themselves to set an example to the people; and their queens spun with
the same purpose. The ancient Greece with new blood in its veins
stamped out the disruptive doctrine of stoicism. But classical China was
swayed by Lao Tze, so dangerously near to dissolution was her social
structure. Scoffing at Confucius, he preached:
"When the Great Tao (Supreme Divine Principle) is obliterated, we have
humanness and righteousness. Prudence and circumspection appear, and
we have much hypocrisy. When family relations no longer harmonise,
we have filial piety and paternal love. When the country and clans decay
through disorder, we have loyalty and allegiance. Abandon your
saintliness, put away your prudence, and the people will gain a
hundredfold. Abandon your humanness, put away your righteousness,
and the people will return to filial piety and paternal love. Abandon your
scheming, put away your gains, and thieves and robbers will no longer
exist."23
But the decay and disorder were not to be remedied by letting things take
their own course. Lao Tze's indignation might be righteous; but it was
futile, because it did not indicate a way out of the chaos. He was not the
prophet of a new order. He did not speak on behalf of a new class. He
voiced the anger, despair and desolation of the oppressed masses. He was
a nihilist. His philosophy was revolutionary in so far as it attacked the
decayed established
34 Revolution and Counter- Revolution in China
order. As against him, Confucius was the defender of vested interests.
But in the given situation, the one appeared as the apostle of the
dissolution of a decayed civilisation, whereas the other represented the
striving for reconstruction.
Voicing the sentiment of the masses, groaning under the corroded chains
of patriarchal relations, Lao Tze exclaimed; "Give people as much
freedom as they want; let them not be encumbered with artificial
formalities and excrescent regulations; leave them alone as much as
possible; and lead them to the stage of primitive innocence and absolute
artlessness. This policy will secure peace and good order that prevailed
before the times of cord-knotting administration."24
The voice of the plebs of ancient China was raised still more defiantly by
Yang Tze—a younger contemporary of Lao Tze. He must have risen
from the plebeian ranks, for he was not counted as a philosopher, but as
an "eccentric soul disturbed by a pessimistic view of things". Probably a
member of the oppressed class, he had ample reason to be pessimistic.
The perspective before the distressed multitude was indeed very dark.
Contact with the rude realities of the situation did not allow indulgence
in detached mysticism and lofty Utopia.
Yang Tze bitterly upbraided the artificial restraint which the classical
doctrines of humanness and righteousness, codified by Confucius, sought
to impose upon the natural impulses of human beings. He advocated,
together with Lao Tze, that everyone should be free to go in his own
way. He ridiculed the Confucian doctrine that, in order to have a good
reputation after death, one should torture one's life under the yoke of
moral force. He exclaimed: "Desires are consuming our corporeal
strength, social traditions cripple our moral simplicity, national
prejudices strangle our freedom of action, and laws and regulations
bridle the expansion of our natural sentiments."25 He complained bitterly
how, under such intolerable conditions, could one enjoy life. He raised
the standard of open revolt by inciting disobedience against the artificial
regulations restraining human activities. He scoffed at the holy men as
monstrosities and cried: "Down with the doctrinaires, hypocrites,
moralists and vain aspirants after fame !" His bold advocacy of freedom
of thought and speech, and the bolder assertion that "sufficient food and
warm clothing are the things the human beings want", were indeed
revolutionary.
The Foundation of Chinese Society 35
Yang is recorded to have had great support among the masses. Mencius,
who lived more than two hundred years after Confucius and developed
the political and social aspect of his philosophy, cried in alarm: "The
doctrines of Yang and Mu are rampant. When the general public is not
swayed by Yang, they are swayed by Mu. Yang is so egoistic as to
ignore the existence of a ruler; Mu ignores the existence of the parents.
But when we do away with the ruler and the parents, we shall all be
beasts."26
As against the disruptive doctrines of the Taoist philosophers, Confucius
maintained: "If right principles were in force, it would not be necessary
to change the circumstances." The right principles of Confucius were
federal concentration of State power and its exercise with discretion. The
chaotic and rebellious conditions of the country had been produced by
the cupidity of the semi-feudal clan-chiefs; a restraint upon their power
was, therefore, the first requisite for any readjustment. The governmental
organisation should be so as would relieve the only source of national
income, namely, agriculture and put at least a part of the accumulated
wealth to productive use. With this object, Confucius laid down the
following principles to govern the conduct of the ruling class:
"Virtue is the root, wealth is the fruit. The ruler must at first care for his
personal virtue. Has he virtue, so he has the people. Has he the people, so
he has the land. Has he the land, so he has wealth. Has he wealth, so he
has abundance for use. If he makes the root (virtue) his secondary, and
the fruit (wealth) his primary object, he shall come in conflict with the
people, and cause them to rob. Therefore, the accumulation of riches is
the way to scatter people, and just distribution of wealth is the way to
gather them."27
Confucian political philosophy is benevolent despotism. It has obtained
in China throughout her history, even down to our days. No new force
capable of building a new order having emerged, the crisis of the antique
Chinese society could not be overcome. The remedy was found in a
reformation of the old. Threatened with complete destruction, the old
reformed itself, incorporating in its decayed organism the incipient germs
of a more progressive system. But the germs of the new were
subordinated to the moribund old. The result was a fossilised social
structure.
Confucianism does not advocate equal distribution either of land or of
wealth. It only proposes to limit the unproductive use of
36 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
wealth. Its principle of taxation is: Don't kill the goose that lays golden
eggs. Its conception of justice would moderate the exploitation of the
masses, so as to guarantee a state of contentment, so necessary to bring
order out of chaos. But at the same time, it would not permit any
encroachment upon the grandeur, comforts and privileges which,
according to it, are the share of the ruling class.
But the social crisis was so severe and deep-seated in ancient China that
the strivings for readjustment, expressed in the philosophy of Confucius,
were nearly overwhelmed. Confucianism could defeat the opposing
ideology of social dissolution only when, in course of time, it gave more
place to the strivings of the incipient new, although even then it reserved
the commanding position for the theo-patriarchal monarchy. It became
the State Religion of China after it had been improved upon by Mencius
more than two hundred years later. Mencius was the ideologist of
primitive commodity production. He did not make any concession to the
ideology of social dissolution. He lived in the fourth century B.C. By that
time, the germs of a new order had grown in the organism of the Chinese
society. The new forces, however, did not disrupt, but aided the old to
save the Chinese society from dissolution. Mencius was the philosopher
of that historic alliance.
On the other hand, the positive aspects of the teachings of Lao Tze were
developed by Mu Tze, who was a contemporary of Mencius. He
condemned the luxurious habits of the ruling class on the ground that
they involved unproductive consumption of wealth. He also advocated
abolition of the custom of costly funerals and prolonged mourning,
denouncing the latter as an impediment to production, for it kept away
people from work. He opposed war, for it destroyed the productive
forces of the country.
Mencius formulated the theory of the division of labour, and defended
the consequent class distinction as in the nature of things. He argued that
some worked with the mind, and others with the muscles; the
consequence of the difference in occupation was that the former ruled,
and the latter were ruled. The latter must care for the nourishment and
comfort of the former, who were justified in letting themselves to be so
taken care of. Developing the Master's ideas, Mencius held that, for the
multiplication of wealth, the number of producers must be greater than
non-producers. He insisted upon diligence in production and economy in
consumption. Mencius
The Foundation of Chinese Society 37
violently attacked Mu Tze: "So long as the teachings of Mu Tze and
Yang Tze are not suppressed, those of Confucius will not be made
manifest. The false doctrines are deceiving people, suffocating
humanness and righteousness. I solicit the preservation of the teachings
of the ancient Sages. It is my desire to keep Yang and Mu in check, and
to drive away their unrestrained utterances, so that the upholders of false
doctrines may not raise their head again."28
The furious outburst of Mencius was the ideological reflex of the fierce
class struggle that was shaking ancient Chinese society to its very
foundation. Mencius was the prophet of the would-be modern capitalist
China, which never blossomed forth in full glory, because it had the
load-stone of a semi-dead past tied round its neck. Mu and Yang were
the classical revolutionaries of ancient China, and as such, their teachings
are the heritage of the Chinese working class. They had their eyes fixed
on a distant future pregnant with immense possibilities, while their
opponents were wedded to the legendary Golden Age which was to be
saved by injecting new blood into its decayed veins. The class struggle in
ancient China can be very well visualised in the following figurative
comparison of the two contending schools of philosophy:
"One is dignified in mien, deliberate in speech and stately in movement;
the other, quite opposite to this, is free and unrestricted in every way. We
can mentally picture one donning a golden robe with the embroidered
figures of dragon and phoenix, and sitting with all kinds of brilliant
gems, and presiding over an assembly of noblemen, who reverentially
bow before the august personality which is singularly tempered with
humane expression. The other might be imagined as swinging himself in
a rustic hammock, among luxuriant summer greens, his old, almost
threadbare, dress loosely hanging about him, and with an expression,
which hardly betrays a trace of earthly concern, while his eyes are
rapturously raised towards a drifting cloud in the distant sky."29
The ideologists of the plebeian revolt in ancient China were so many
fingers of history pointed to the future. The standard of revolt raised in
that remote period of antiquity marked the beginning of a struggle, the
history of which coincided with the entire history of China. Emperors
came and emperors went; dynasties rose and dynasties fell; but the
struggle continued.
38 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Notes
1. "At the very time when men appear engaged in revolutionising things and themselves, in bringing
about what never was before, at such very epochs of revolutionary crisis do they anxiously conjure
up into their service the spirits of the past."—Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte".

2. "The differentiation of the Semitic and Aryan families from the mass of barbarians seems to have
commenced with the domestication of animals."

—Lewis Morgan, "Ancient Society", p. 22.

3. "The domestic animals supplementing human muscles with animal power contributed a new
factor of the highest value. In course of time, the production of iron gave the plow an iron point, and
a better spade and axe. Out of these, and the previous horticulture, came field culture: and with it, for
the first time, unlimited subsistence. The plow drawn by animal power may be regarded as
inaugurating a new art. Now for the first time came the thought of reducing the forest, and bringing
wide fields under cultivation. Moreover, dense population in limited areas now became possible.
Prior to field agriculture, it is not probable that half a million people were developed and held
together under one government in any part of the earth. If exceptions occurred, they must have
resulted from pastoral life on the plains, or from horticulture improved by irrigation, under peculiar
and exceptional conditions." (Italics are mine—Author).

—Lewis Morgan, "Ancient Society", p. 26.

4. "The American aborigines in the lower status of barbarism were in possession of horticulture one
entire ethnical period earlier than the inhabitants of the eastern hemisphere. It was a consequence of
the unequal endowments of the two hemispheres, the eastern possessing all animals adapted to
domestication, save one, and a majority of cereals; while the western had only one cereal fit for
cultivation. It tended to prolong the older period of barbarism in the former, to shorten it in the latter;
and with the advantage of condition in this period in favour of the American aborigines. But when
the most advanced tribes in the eastern hemisphere, at the commencement of the middle-period of
barbarism, had domesticated animals which gave meat and milk—their condition, without a
knowledge of the cereals, was much superior to that of the American aborigines in the corresponding
period, with maize and plants, but without domestic animals ....

"The absence of animals adapted to domestication in the western hemisphere and the specific
differences in the cereals of the two hemispheres, exercised an important influence upon the relative
advancement of their inhabitants .... In the eastern hemisphere, the domestication of animals enabled
the thrifty and industrious to secure for themselves a permanent supply of animal food, the healthful
and invigorating influence of which upon the race was undoubtedly remarkable. It is at least
supposable that the Aryan and Semitic families owed their pre-eminent endowments to the great
scale upon which, as far back as knowledge extends, they have
The Foundation of Chinese Society 39
identified themselves with the maintainance in numbers of domestic animals."—Lewis Morgan,
''Ancient Society", pp. 22 and 24.
5. Lewis Morgan, "Ancient Society", p. 26.
6. The Chinese reformer Kang Yu-wei wrote in the closing years of the nineteenth century to prove
that Confucius himself composed the Classics as the background for his own teachings. He also
maintained that three of the five books were interpolations by the scholars of the Han Era.
7. Confucius, '"Analects",
8. Legge, "Chinese Classics".
9. Suzuki, "History of Early Chinese Philosophy".
10. Ibid.
11. Confucius held that the Tao, defined by Lao Tze and others as the thing-in-itself—the unknown
and unknowable, was the jen which meant something like sympathy or fellow-feeling.—Legge,
"Chinese Classics".
12. Legge, ''Chinese Classics".
13. A modern Chinese political writer characterises the political philosophy of Confucius as follows
: "Confucius can hardly be accused of hastening revolutions by building caitles in the air. He saw
that the quickest and fastest way of improving the political conditions of his people was to reinstate
the method which flourished in the Golden Age of the ancient regime. First a liaison between the
State and the famiiy was made. The ruler was a king-father, the mandarins parent-officials, and the
people children-people. By making this liaison, he endeavoured to imbue the organisation of the
State with some of the elements that made the famiiy system stable, and his attempt proved a
success. If one wonders how a centralised monarchy like that of China, without constitutional
limitation, could keep itself within reasonable bounds of liberalism for more than thousand years, the
patriarchal element of the institution gives the answer."—Hsieh Pao-chao, "The Government of
China".
14. Suzuki, "History of Chinese Philosophy".
15. "Analects".
16. Ibid.
17. Quoted by Wang Ching-dao in "Confucius and New China.".
18. "Analects".
19. Ibid.
20. Legge, "Chinese Philosophy".
21. Ibid.
22. Suzuki, "History of Chinese Philosophy".
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
CHAPTER II
THE STRUCTURE OF CHINESE SOCIETY
Even today the fundamental unit of Chinese society is not the individual
but the family. The Revolution of 1911, and the Republican State
established by it, did not alter essentially the patriarchal character of that
social institution. Under the Republic, new laws were given. But social
relations cannot be changed overnight through legislation so long as the
economic foundations of those relations are not subverted. Under the old
regime the father was the legal head of the family; by tradition he
enjoyed the right to dispose of the lives of his children.1 The Republican
laws changed the position of the Pater familias but partially. Individual
rights have been created, but the patriarchal foundation of society has not
been completely destroyed. The ownership of land—the main means of
production in China—still belongs to families, and even to clans. The
defective form of private property in the main means of production
hinders the individual from replacing the patriarchal family as the basic
unit of society.
In the capitalist society family is not abolished. It continues to be the
foundation of society. But its character changes. The monogamous
family is essentially different from the patriarchal family; it does not
push the individual to the background. It is a social institution which
rises in course of the evolution of private property. Individualism is the
fundamental philosophical principle of capitalism, the highest form of
private property. Therefore, individualism and monogamous family are
not mutually exclusive. They exist side by side, being two different
branches of the same social system founded upon private property. While
the monogamous family is the nucleus of bourgeois society, the
individual is the corner-stone of the capitalist
40
The Structure of Chinese Society 41
State. The right of the individual is the fundamental principle of
bourgeois political philosophy.
The republican form of government was introduced in China only in
name. The old political order broke down. But the social relations
underlying it remained intact to a large extent, resisting the strivings to
build up a republican system of government. Because of its weak social
foundation the Republic was eager to adjust itself to antiquated
conditions. Consequently, republican laws could not go even to the
extent of undermining the institution of the paterfamilias. They granted
to the individual the right of self-defence, although not to the extent of
killing. But the right is not valid in the case of an attack by an elder
relative.2 In a work on the new Chinese Penal Code, the famous jurist,
Wang Chiang-hui, former Chief Justice of the Peking High Court,
observes: "The Anglo-American laws lay special emphasis on the
individual and not on the family, while the Continental (European)
Codes have inherited something from the Roman family. The unit of the
Chinese society being the family, the Reform, naturally, tries to retain
this institution and modernise it as far as possible."3
After two thousand five hundred years the spirit of the old sage
Confucius still dominates the thinkers of modern China. They long for
something new; the old has become untenable: yet they try to clothe the
venerable skeleton with a few selected pieces of novelty. The reformers
undertake a hopeless task when they try to readjust patriarchal social
relations with bourgeois political and legal institutions. The hopelessness
of the task became evident during the dreary years of the futile struggle
for the defence of the Republic. The "modern State", as conceived by the
Chinese nationalists, is essentially Confucian. The initial period of its
creation is not to be revolutionary dictatorship, but a benevolent
despotism of a few persons claiming the right to educate the people with
the object of "developing their ability to exercise political rights, so that a
constitutional regime may be soon realised and political power delivered
to the hands of the people."4 So, according to the open admission of her
"modern" rulers, China is not that kind of State in which at least
theoretically the supreme political power belongs to the people
composed of individuals. In the "Republic" of the Chinese nationalists,
the relations are reversed; the political structure stands on its heads, so to
say. The
42 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
political power and, consequently, the right of sovereignty, are mono-
polised by an elite, who benevolently promise to pass them on to the
people in some indefinite future, when these will have qualified them-
selves for shouldering the responsibility. Since the self-appointed guar-
dians reserve to themselves the right of judging when the people will
have attained political maturity, it is not very likely that the promised
transfer of power will ever take place. Chinese "republicanism" does not
provide for a legislative body created by universal suffrage, of the kind
that formally constitutes the highest organ of the bourgois democratic
State. Its political ideology is determined by the patriarchal relation
which still underlies the major sector of the Chinese national economy.
Unable as well as unwilling to set up a revolutionary dictatorship with
the object of sweeping away all antiquated social relations, which hinder
the creation of a modern democratic State, the nationalist bourgeoisie
dress themselves up in the musty, threadbare, mantle of benevolent
despotism, and thereby demonstrate their own impotence.
The cause of all these contradictions and peculiarities of the political life
of modern China must be sought in the structure of her social system. In
spite of the unreliability of the Chinese census report, it can be
reasonably assumed that more than eighty-five per cent of the population
live on the land. Sixty million families are engaged in agriculture.5
Owing to this fact, the social structure of the village is the decisive factor
in the life of the nation. The political life of a country is determined by
the nature of, and the property right in, the prevailing means of
production. Land is the main means of production in China. Therefore,
the system of landownership constitutes the foundation of her social
structure. And all other branches of national economy are largely
influenced by the methods of cultivating land, that is to say, by the mode
of production of the main industry of the country.
The system of landownership is essentially patriarchal. Not only is the
land owned jointly by families, but often by family groups— clans.6
There are villages which are populated by the members of single clans.
Such villages are named after the clans. The landed property of the clan,
or of families, or of individuals, is mostly derived directly from the State.
It is a systam in which, theoretically speaking, private property in land
does not exist, or is on a very low level
The Structure of Chinese Society 43
of development. But practically, the superstructure raised on this
patriarchal foundation is, to a high degree, of feudal character. The
charges on land are expressly feudal, not only in their essence, but often
in form. However may the present system of Chinese rural economy be
theoretically appraised, feudal features in the history of the evolut'on of p
perty in land are unmistakable. The struggle between patriarchalism and
feudalism characterised Chinese history ever since the days of
Confucius. In the present form of landed property, elements of both the
systems are to be found, and the overlapping of the two systems, which
normally characterise different stages of social development, is the
peculiar feature of Chinese society. This hybrid, produced by the two
mutually exclusive social systems, was later penetrated by the mode of
capitalist production.
Thus, the economic life of the Chinese village is subjected to a threefold
exploitation: patriarchal, feudal and primitive-capitalist. Although large-
scale feudal estates or capitalist farms are rare except in Manchuria and
some of the northern provinces (Shantung and Chili), more than half of
the cultivated land bears landlords' rent. The peasants cultivating the soil
today are mostly either tenants or subtenants having no proprietory right
in the land. The rent is not fixed, and tenancy not permanent. Only in
about thirty-four per cent7 of the land is the proprietory right of the
cultivating peasant legally recognised. A considerable part of the
cultivated land is the property of ancestral shrines, temples and schools.
In these cases, originally the right was communal. But the traditional
right has been abolished in practice. Yet, the system of administering
these traditionally communal properties even now supports patriarchal
relations in rural economy and politics. The village elders have usurped
the proprietory right of these formerly communal lands. The peasants
who cultivate these lands have been expropriated, practically if not
legally. In consequence the village elders have really become landlords.
But the formal continuation of communal property in a considerable part
of the land invests them even now with patriarchal rights and power.
At the same time, primitive capitalism has penetrated this feudal-
patriarchal structure of rural economy. The result is the continuously
growing impoverishment of the peasantry and extraordinary backward-
ness of the entire system of national economy. Although it is long since
money has become the legal means for the payment of taxes to the
Government, the rent is paid by the tenants still mostly in
44 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
kind. This system of collecting rent in kind and paying taxes in money
makes traders out of the feudal-patriarchal landlords. The surplus of
agriculture passes into their possession. But their essential feudal-
patriarchal character prevents them from becoming capitalists. The
wealth accumulated in their hand does not become productive capital; it
is invested in semi-feudal landed property, which keeps national eco-
nomy in backwardness. On the other hand, subjected to pre-capitalistic
methods of exploitation, the peasantry cannot improve their means of
production so as to grow out of their practical serfdom. Thus, in a
precarious existence, the patriarchal family still coninues to be the
foundation of the social superstructure.
While hereditary property in land is not legally recognised, land
theoretically belonging rather to the State, rent-bearing tenancy is the
outstanding feature of the agrarian relation. Approximately sixty six per
cent of the cultivated land is subjected to the payment of rent to
landlords.8 So, for all practical purposes, even though not legally, private
property has been created in land, because private property in land
realises itself in the form of rent.9 But the essence of this property in land
is analogous neither to the allodium of the European middle-ages, nor the
socage in feudal Britain, nor again the freehold of modern England. The
right of this private property does not belong to peasants whose ancestors
received the land from the Crown; it belongs to a class which received
rent and, by virtue of that, has become the owner irrespective of any
written law. The growth of rent-receiving private property in land
transforms the peasant into a tenant; consequently, he becomes
dependent on another lord in addition to the State.
The classical feudal property in land was created through the
expropriation of free peasant proprietorship. But the process was not
uniform. Its essence was that between the king and the people there rose
a new class which, on the one hand, encroached upon the freedom and
rights of the people and, on the other hand, restricted the king's
prerogatives. The rise and operation of the new class were determined by
the relation previously subsisting between the king and the people. The
peculiar features of Chinese feudalism were determined by the fact that a
rent-receiving class appropriated the ownership of land, not by robbing
the right of the peasant, but thanks to the transfer of the property right by
the king to the court nobles, high officials and the patriarchal heads of
villages. With this type of feudalism the creation
The Structure of Chinese Society 45
of private property in land begins at the top of society; the rise of a land-
owning class between the king and the people is not the result of
expropriation, but represents the expansion of the basis of private
property. The supremacy of the king is not disputed; the nobility
continues to be subordinated to the monarch. Since land remains the
private property of the king, who incorporates the highest power (by the
grace of God, in Europe, and thanks to direct descent from Heaven, in
China), theoretically he is entitled to distribute it further from time to
time. This prerogative guarantees for the king undivided loyalty of the
people; it provides him with the possibility of checking high
concentration of land in prive possession, and, consequently, the
development of a powerful nobility. The most characteristic feature of
this type of feudalism, therefore, is not the serf toiling on manorial
estates, but the tenant cultivating the land which practically belongs to a
person standing between himself and the king, under such conditions of
production as deprive him of the entire surplus in the form of rent and
other charges.
In China private property in land did not grow on the basis of the right of
conquest. When the Germans conquered Gaul, the king shared the right
of conquest with all the members of the conquering race; that was
necessary for fortifying his position in a foreign land, still full of
enemies. The division of land by the king was a mere formality. In
reality, each member of the conquering race simply took possession of as
much land as he could cultivate. In order to secure the loyalty of his
followers, the conquering king simply endorsed their action. Private
property was created from the bottom. The transfer of the original private
property in land, which in any case constitutes the foundation of
feudalism, could not be an analogous process in the case of China,
because there it started from the opposite pole of society. Because of the
difference in the position of the two factors concerned, and in their
mutual relation, the nature of the struggle was bound also to be different.
In China also the distribution of land by the king to the people was a
mere formality, which simply sanctioned a system in force. But the
substance of the system, formally sanctioned by the king in China, was
fundamentally different from that in Gaul. In Gaul private property in
land was created by the conquering settlers; in China land came to be
cultivated by separate families, while the tradition of regarding it as
public property continued. The right of the Chinese
46 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
king was not the right of conquest. It was, so to say, an organic right
which could more easily claim divine origin. Since the land was not
conquered with the help of the entire people, not in the historical period
at any rate, there was no necessity for dividing it. The monarchy rising
out of the dissolution of tribal society ultimately developed into
patriarchal despotism based on that unrestricted right —of the ownership
of land. Under those conditions, the peasant could have the right of
cultivating land only by the grace of the Supreme Lord, and for his
benefit, receiving only so much as is necessary for subsistence and
reproduction. Thus, the development of private property in land invested
the patriarchal monarch with feudal attributes. He was no longer the head
of a free community, possessing and cultivating the Ia~d collectively. He
became the Lord and Master, and the people cam; to be composed of his
subjects instead of free men.
But the king could not retain for ever the primitive monopoly of feudal
rights. In course of time, the rights inevitably passed on to those standing
nearest to him in the social organisation. That transfer of rights was not
legally sanctioned; but the rise of a feudal nobility was a fact. In
consequence of its dependence on the king, this type of feudal
aristocracy constitutes the foundation of that special form of State which
is characterised as Asiatic despotism.
In China private property in land resulted from the decay of communal
ownership and cultivation. The older system decayed; but the ruins were
not swept away. Instead, they became the foundation of the new form of
property which, consequently, could not grow normally to the full
stature. The king distributed land to the people. But he did not transfer
the right of property, which remained vested in himself. Since private
property in land was created not by conquest but in consequence of the
dissolution of primitive communism, the king's share in the product of
agriculture assumed the character of ground rent in its most primitive
form.
In that period, rent represented the entire surplus labour; it absorbed
directly the whole surplus product, and, as such, corresponded
completely with surplus value. Surplus value tends towards circulation.
With the appearance of rent, the private property in land expanded. So
long as land belongs to the State, rent and tax are identical. The
administrators of State revenue gradually came to be tax-farmers; and,
under the given conditions, rent being inherent in
The Structure of Chinese Society 47
tax, they became landlords for all practical purposes.
The peasants had no right of ownership in land; they could not be
expropriated like their class in Europe. Consequently, in China serfdom
did not take the classical form. The specific Chinese forms of serfdom
were semi-slavery, forced labour and tenancy. The social position,
characterised by those peculiar appearances, however, essentially was
serfdom. For, the essence of serfdom is the obligation of the producers to
cultivate land which, though in their possession, is not their property, and
to deliver a part of the produce to the landlord. Whatever remains with
them, after the obligations to the landlord are discharged, might provide
them a little more than the necessities of bare existence and reproduction.
That depends on the conditions under which their labour is performed.10
In ancient and mediaeval China, natural conditions kept the surplus on a
very low level. Often there was none. Consequently, serfdom
approximated slavery, and the rise of capitalism within the limits of
feudal relations was greatly restricted.11
The system of communal ownership and collective cultivation of land
had decayed towards the end of the Chau period (400 B.C.) The germs of
private property had begun to sprout. The continuous struggle of tribal
chiefs had placed unbearable burden on the peasantry. They left their
fields and "wandered away" for selling their labour to others who had
land to cultivate. 12 Consequently, the preconditions of slavery had been
created. On the other hand, a large volume of labour, finding no
employment on land, had created the foundation for other industries.
Production for primitive trade had begun. But the main branch of
national economy was threatened with a severe crisis as the people began
to leave the land. If the people could no longer be kept bound to the land,
the dissolution of the established social system would be unavoidable. In
that crisis appeared Confucius and later his famous disciple, Mencius,
with their doctrines of social reform on the basis of a synthesis between
the tottering old and the rising new.
In the midst of those chaotic conditions, the first eflFort to build a new
social order was made in the kingdom of Chin (the modern province of
Shensi). The kingdom was very thinly populated; but, bordering on the
Mongolian pasture-lands, it possessed cattle and
48 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
other beasts of burden. So, there were conditions in which agriculture
could be the source of primitive accumulation and consequently lay the
foundation for further development of society. In 2iO B.C., the decayed
Tsing-Tien system—tribal ownership of land—was abolished in the
kingdom of Chin; the government appealed to the people of other States,
in chaos and decay, to come to Chin and settle on the land which would
belong to them. From the neighbouring territories, they streamed in, and
before long the kingdom of Chin became very prosperous. Sale and
purchase of land were allowed in Chin. Consequently, it concentrated
into large estates employing many labourers who, under the conditions of
the epoch, could not but be slaves. Prisoners taken in wars waged on the
west were also employed on land as slaves. Not only did agriculture
prosper; the surplus of the main branch of economy stimulated the
growth of handicraft and trade. The rest of the country was in decay and
disorder; therefore trade found its way to foreign lands. Routes of
caravan trade with Central Asia and Persia were opened. Out of that
advantageous position rose the guild of Shensi merchants which for
centuries, until today, played a leading part in the foreign trade of China.
Having consolidated its position at home, the Chin Dynasty became the
ruler of the entire country. After nine hundred years' existence, the
classical regime of the Chau Dynasty collapsed like a house of cards.
The people enthusiastically welcomed the new dynasty which had
brought about such prosperous conditions in its original territory. But a
decree of Chin Emperor, the Tsing-Tien system was abolished
throughout the country. He ordered the destruction of the works of
Confucius and his disciples. He subjugated the rulers of other States and
united the country under one centralised despotism. Far off territories,
like Tonking, Cochin, China, Burma and even Central Asia were
incorporated in the Chinese Empire which, during the reign of the Chin
Dynasty, embraced more than three million square miles. It was during
the reign of the Chins that the Great Wall of China was built to protect
the country against the invasion of the barbarians from the north and the
west. The country was divided into thirty-six provinces which were
governed by officials appointed by the Emperor. An Empire like the
Roman was built up. Roads were constructed, canals dug, not only for
the movement of armies, but also for the expansion of trade. The short
period of the reign of the
The Structure of Chinese Society 49
Chin Dynasty can claim to be the proverbial Golden Age of China.
But the Chins raised their imperial structure too rapidly on a loose
foundation. Unlike the Romans, they received little tribute from the
conquered provinces. Territories outside China were conquered only in
name. The Chinese power was not sufficiently consolidated to exact
tribute from there. The Chins acquired an Empire which was
economically exhausted and politically disrupted. The only bright spot
was their original kingdom. Revolutionary measures, so successfully
introduced there, could not be applied easily to the rest of the country
where the conditions were not nearly so favourable. The net consequence
of the short period of their reign was extraordinary burden on the people.
In addition to heavy taxation, yet another restriction was imposed upon
production. Hundreds of thousands of people were employed for the
construction of the Great Wall, as well as roads, canals and palaces. The
influx of slave labour from abroad was not nearly so copious as in the
case of Greece and Rome. Foreign territories conquered were not
extensive enough. Labour necessary for the gigantic construction could
be found only by withdrawing it from agriculture. Consequently, the
main branch of economy was nearly ruined. Owing to the absence, at any
rate great shortage, of the beasts of burden, practically the entire social
labour had to be applied to the cultivation of land, if this was to produce
some surplus over and above what was necessary for the maintenance
and reproduction of the people. Exhausted agriculture was heavily taxed
in order to cover the cost of imperial constructions. It is recorded that the
Emperor's share in the produce of the land was increased by several
times, and, in addition, an equally high pell-tax was levied. For the
purpose of disarming the people during the great unrest under the Chau
Dynasty, the production of iron and possession of horses had been
reserved to the State. Chin Chi-huangti made the monopoly of the
indispensable war materials still more severe. He increased the tax on
iron to twenty per cent.13
Owing to the insufficiency of slave labour, the Chin rulers introduced the
system of forced labour for public works. Their army was of half a
million. In the construction of the Great Wall alone, four hundred
thousand men were employed. Another seven hundred thousand were
employed in the construction of palaces, roads, canals, etc.1* Altogether,
more than a million and a half workers were withdrawn from production,
and the constructions in which they were
50 Revolution and Counter-Resolution in China
employed cost large amounts of money, raised by increasing taxes. In
those days, the total population of the country was hardly twenty
millions. Thus, about twenty-five per cent of all the adults, including
males and females, were taken out of production. The result was a great
catastrophe which was inevitable. "Men worked hard on large farming
estates, and yet did not have enough to eat. Women span, and yet could
not clothe themselves properly. Therefore, the people were fed up with
the Chin Dynasty, and rose in revolt against it.15
The mighty Chin Dynasty was overthrown by a peasant revolt led by
Chen Shen, himself a peasant. Very little is recorded about that Spartacus
of ancient China. Only one chapter in the Book of Han deals with him.
The exploited peasantry in those backward days were even less capable
of building a new social order than they are today. Therefore, the
rebellion overthrew the despotism of the Chins, but could not replace it
by a better system. The country was plunged into a period of chaos and
disorder, out of which feudalism grew. The fall of the Chin Dynasty
occupies in Chinese history a place analogous to that of the dissolution of
the Roman Empire in the annals of Europe. It closed the classical period,
and opened up the feudal middle-age.
The small States subjugated by the Chins joined the rebellion; upon the
fall of the Empire, they regained their position as independent feudal
principalities. After the short respite of only half a century, the country
again became the scene of civil wars amongst feudal princes lighting for
supremacy. "The people lost work, and there was a severe famine. They
ate human flesh, and more than half the population perished."16
Out of that dark background rose the new Dynasty of the Hans. But it
also could not ease the situation for any length of time. The
preconditions for the rise of feudalism had been created by the abolition
of tribal ownership of land—the Tsing Tien system. But owing to its
narrow basis, the birth-pangs of the new order were unusually severe and
protracted. The sufficiency of surplus product remained the fundamental
cause of all difficulties. The product of agriculture, which was carried on
almost exclusively with human labour, was hardly enough to meet the
barest needs of society. The economic equilibrium was so unstable that it
was dangerously dislocated by the slightest disturbance of normal
conditions. Every war
The Structure of Chinese Society 51
and every famine created a terrible economic crisis. Famine reduced the
number of mouths to be fed, but the productive power of the nation was
also reduced proportionately. And thanks to the ceprice of Mother Wang-
ho, the ancient home of the Chinese was so often devastated by floods,
that famine was rather the rule than an exception in the economic history
of the country.
The first signs of production for sale were to be noticed towards the end
of the Chau period (400 B.C.). The tribal chiefs levied taxes on
commodities which were brought to the markets, or transported across
their borders. When Mencius advised the abolition of that burden on
handicraft, the king replied: "I can not manage with the tenth of the
product of the land. I can not abolish the border and market taxes."17
Later, trade was altogether forbidden by the State. In the literature of
ancient China, there are volumes of laws restricting the freedom of the
people to dispose of their goods at their own will.18 Even as late as the
middle of the nineteenth century, the Government frowned upon trade,
and traders were looked down upon. Heavy taxes were imposed on trade,
and the methods applied for the collection of those taxes corrupted the
entire administrative machinery.
When the Han Dynasty rose out of the chaos which had followed the
dissolution of the Chin Empire, the country was completely exhausted.
There was no reserve. Cannibalism, let loose by the chronic insufficiency
of normal foodstuffs, further decimated the labour power of the country.
Land abandoned by tb,e hungry and destitute masses, was seized by
others who, in course of time, became feudal lords. But the creation of
large landed estates did not increase production. There was great scarcity
of labour for the cultivation of land. It is recorded that towards the end of
the Han Dynasty (300 A.D.), the population was reduced by thirty per
cent.19 The situation, indeed, facilitated the concentration of landed
property, so that feudal ownership could grow, but at the same time, it
was unfavourable to the rise of serfdom. The landlords appropriated as
their share as much as half the produce of the land. That drove the
peasants away from the land, and sharpened the economic crisis.
Continuous agrarian crisis, nevertheless, contributed to the development
of handicrafts. As a measure against famine, the first Han Emperor
legalised slavery. Parents were allowed to sell their children for bread.
Children thus sold grew up as slaves. On the
52 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
basis of slave labour, handicrafts developed notwithstanding high taxes
and other burdens. The general situation, however, hardly improved. A
minister of the Emperor Wen-ti exclaimed in wonder: "The surveyed
land is not less today, and the number of people has not grown bigger
than before. We should have greater surplus than in the olden days." He
came to the conclusion that the contradiction resulted from the fact that
more people were engaged in subsidiary occupations, and therefore
agriculture was suffering.20 But flight from the land continued. It became
so bad in the beginning of the Christian era that a contemporary scholar-
statesman, Chia Yi, sounded the alarm: "We must bring the people back
to the land, and insist that workers and artisans of all sorts should return
to the labour on land so that everybody can live on his own labour. Then
there will be enough saving, and everybody will be happy and
satisfied."21 For encouraging the people to return to the land, the Emperor
himself ploughed the garden of his palace and planted mulberry trees.
Scholars of the classical school thundered against the concentration of
land in feudal estates. Many plans were made to restrict their size. An
edict of Emperor of Ei-ti set the limit at 3000 mus22 of land, and 200
slaves. The feudal lords were growing too powerful; further growth of
their power must be checked by the Emperor. The entire middle-age of
Chinese history was characterised by the struggle between the Emperor
and the landowning nobility.
Side by side with feudalism, there grew, out of the dissolution of the old
order, yet another social force which was still more dangerous for
despotism; it was the trading class. The social character of the produce of
agriculture was changed by the concentration of land in great estates,
cultivated by slaves and serfs. A considerable part of the produce of
primitive agriculture became commodity. The new class a traders
appeared between the producer and the consumer. Through the control of
the exchange of commodities, the traders accumulated great wealth.
The ruling class naturally hated the traders. Abuse against them was the
main theme of contemporary literature. Chao Chor, a famous statesman
of the Han period, contrasted the prosperity of the traders with the misery
of the peasants. He wrote: ' The merchants are richly and artistically
dressed; they live luxuriously; they travel thousands of li on horseback,
exercise great influence over dukes and princes."23 Chao and others
maintained that the trades people were bound to
The Structure of Chinese Society 53
grow stronger and stronger, so long as the masses wandered away from
the land.
The people had been liberated from land by the abolition of the Tsing
Tien system, which bound the peasant to the soil with the chains of blood
relationships of the patriarchal family. When the oppression of the
monarch and feudal lords became intolerable, the people could leave the
land, so sell their labour power to those who would pay for their
subsistence. Human labour, freed from the obligation of cultivating land,
contributed to the growth of other forms of production. But these were
not yet sufficiently expanded to meet the financial requirements of the
State, which, as a matter of fact, derived little income from them. The
surplus of the new forms of production accumulated in the possession of
the traders. They were friendly with the nobles who participated in the
profit. All the contemporary scholars, therefore, maintained that, for the
financial stability of the State, the people should be brought back to the
land, and recommended that taxes should be reduced for the purpose.
Some of them went so far as to advocate the restoration of the Tsing Tien
system.
In spite of all the efforts of the Han Emperors to limit the size of feudal
domains, these kept growing at the cost of the tiller of the soil, who,
upon the abolition of the Tsing Tien system, had become owners of the
land. Once created, private property has the tendency of accumulating in
fewer and fewer hands. The exploitation of the peasants increased.
Finally, a new blow once again disturbed the precarious balance of
national economy established after decades of disorder. In the midst of
that new crisis, the Emperor Wang Mang restored the Tsing Tien system
as the panacea for all evils. Not only the feudal lords but also the
peasants resisted that reactionary step. Wang Mang was overthrown. The
Han Dynasty was reinstated. Feudalism had come to stay.
Private property in land had become too deep-rooted to be abolished by
an imperial decree. Although a reactionary measure, the restoration of
the Tsing Tien system, however, was quite plausible. The princess of
Han Dynasty and their tributary nobles had taken possession of the entire
land. The peasants had become free owners of the land they cultivated
only to be expropriated. They no longer possessed any land; they
cultivated it as tenants, and paid the lords with half the produce. Many
laboured as slaves for bare subsistence
54 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
on the estates of the lords. Nevertheless, before long, Wang Mang was
forced to amend his plan so as only to restrict the feudal domains, just as
the Hans had tried to do formerly. But reinforced feudalism would not
have its power curtailed, and tolerate any encroachment on its privileges.
Therefore, the feudal lords overthrew the usurper, even after he had
withdrawn the decree abolishing private property in favour of the
decayed system of tribal ownership.
During the second Han period feudalism further expanded. In that period,
the trade with West-Asia, established previously by the Shensi
merchants, reached the Mediterranean. Material welfare gave anew
impetus to the spiritual life of the nation. Scholars visited India, and
Buddhism was officially introduced in China. But before long,
triumphant feudalism came into conflict with handicraft and trade, which
contributed so much to the material welfare and spiritual re-birth of the
nation. The growth of handicraft attracted labour from the land. In the
long run, that process weakened national economy rather than
strengthened it. The production of food-grains declined. On the other
hand, manufacturing industry did not develop enough to produce for
export, so that necessary food-grains could be purchased abroad. One
crop destroyed by flood, and the perennial scarcity of foodstuff became a
dreadful famine. The country was plunged into a new period of political
unrest.
During the period of unrest, the feudal princes took to the war path. In
their struggle for supremacy, the country was divided into three
kingdoms engaged in mutual hostilities. The weakened Han Dynasty
went down in the chaos. During the centuries (200-588 A.D.) between
the fall of the Han Dynasty and the re-union of the country under
Northern Chows of barbarian descent, China experienced the darkest
period of her history. Bloody wars, barbarian invasions, famine and
depopulation were the characteristic features of that period. Flying before
the barbarian invaders, the Chinese left their original home and
emigrated en masse over the Yangtse to the South. They left the
Northern home, which had been devastated by periodical overflows of
the Yellow River, depopulated by recurring famines, and finally overrun
by barbarian invasions. In the new territories of the South, they relapsed
into the classical social order of patriarchal landownership. That was a
reaction to the fearful experience of the period of feudal anarchy.
Since those remote days, the social structure of Southern China
The Structure of Chinese Society 55
has differed from that in the North. The foundation of the difference is
the uneven development of private property in land and the divergent
forms of social relations resulting therefrom. The mass emigration from
the North created such an over-population in the South as prevented the
rise of large feudal domains, although it could not altogether hinder the
concentration of landed property. But the size of rent-bearing estates,
leased out to tenants, was very much circumscribed by the conditions of
the country. In the North, on the contrary, depopulation caused the rise
not only of large feudal estates, but also of peasant farms of relatively
considerable size.
The mass emigration left large feudal estates in the North not only
without enough people to cultivate them, but also without owners. The
landlords also had been killed off either in the civil wars or by the
barbarian invaders. The barbarian conquerors from the North settled the
wandering people on those extensive territories without clearly defining
the relation of property. A sort of allodial property was created by that
settlement. It eventually developed into peasant proprietorship, which is
found more frequently in the North than in the South. The decisive factor
was the kind of the settlers. They were not members of the conquering
race which remained attached to the military profession; they were native
Chinese. Consequently, their property right was not secure; it was not
derived from the right of conquest. In course of time, many of the settlers
quietly reverted to patriarchal relations. Consequently, in the North, there
developed side by side two forms of property in land; they exist even
today.
When in the sixteenth century the country was re-united under the
Northern Chows, the barbarian conquerors left intact the division of land
introduced in the South by the Chinese emigrants. Nevertheless, the
concentration of land continued, partly as the inevitable consequence of
objective conditions, and partly through the interference of the king who
wanted to establish his sovereignty. Finally, the next native Chinese
dynasty of the Tangs introduced a system of taxation which tacitly
legalised the position of the landlord. According to the new system, tax
was to be determined by the size of the landed property and its produce.
Formerly, the share of the State was taken from the family which,
theoretically, was obliged to cultivate a given piece of land in order to
render a certain amount of service to the king. Every member of the
family—man, woman and
56 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
child—was counted as a head to be taxed. The doctrine underlying the
old system of taxation was that the entire land, as the domain of the king,
was equally distributed to the people, grouped in families which
cultivated the soil, partly for their own subsistence and partly for the
king. The concentration of land in large estates showed that the
patriarchal relation of property had decayed. While the king still
remained the sole legal owner of land, there had arisen a class which
challenged the right reserved to him, namely, the monopoly of the
property in land. The new system of taxation introduced by the Tang
Dynasty legalised the conditions already in existence. Inasmuch as it
legally freed the peasantry from the worn-out patriarchal bondage to the
land, it facilitated the transfer of property in land. Whoever could not pay
the taxes, needed no longer to stick to the land and starve. He could give
up the iand, which passed on to the possession of the landlords. They
either allowed the landless peasants to labour on their estates as half-
slaves, half-serfs, or leased out the land to those who could pay the rent.
Under the new system, the burden on the peasants doubled; they had to
pay the tax to the Govenment and rent to the landlords. It is immaterial
whether the tax levied by the State still retained the character of primitive
rent. Perhaps it did, and hence the ambiguity of the legal position of
landed property in China. On the other hand, the owners of large landed
estates, who leased out their land to the peasants, embodied together the
modern semi-capitalist tax-farmer as well as the mediaeval feudal lord.
In any case, the growth of the system of land leased out by rent-receiving
lords represented the destruction of royal monopoly of the property in
land. The monopoly was no longer absolute, because the State must
share it with a class which had smuggled itself between the king and the
peasantry.
As long as the land belonged only to the king, the peasant, indeed, was
not an allodial owner. But nor was he a tenant holding the land in
dependence on another person. He was a subject of the king, and
cultivated the land practically for himself, so long as he delivered the
king's share. The theory of royal ownership and equal distribution of land
does not permit anybody to be driven out of land on some pretext. For, a
strong tradition of primitive communism is incorporated in this theory,
which is the ideology of social relations growing directly out of the
dissolution of the tribal organi-
The Structure of Chinese Society 57
sation. In contrast to that, tenancy is a very clearly defined and definitely
limited right. It is connected with continued possession only when that is
expressly provided in law. And that was never the case in China. It is not
so even today. As a matter of fact, the tenant is always a tenant-at-will.24
Favoured by the system of taxation, feudalism devastated the land.
Peasants left the exhausted land, from which they could hardly eke out
the barest subsistence. Unrestricted feudalism ruined national economy.
The Sung Dynasty, which followed the Tang, again took up the struggle
for limiting feudal possessions, and introduced the so-called "Modified
Tsing Tien" system. The system of family-ownership was restored
inasmuch as taxes were levied on heads as well as on the produce of
land. But the peasant was no longer obliged to labour on the communal
land for a specified time, in order to pay the share of the king. Now he
was legally the possessor of his entire labour power, a part of which was,
of course, to be devoted for the production of the surplus necessary for
meeting the tax obligations. So, the patriarchal forms of social relations
were associated with feudal exploitation in such a way as would hinder
the expansion of feudal landed property. At last, the "Ideal State" of
Confucius
was realised.
After centuries of bitter struggle, despotic monarchy triumphed over
feudal ambition. In course of the struggle, the claims had been so
modified from either side that it was finally possible to establish the
permanent alliance of both as advocated by the Old Saga. The relation of
property in land, established during the reign of the Sung Dynasty, not
only remained in force up to the revolution of 1911, but continued
essentially even under the Republic when the patriachal-feudal
conditions were superimposed by the methods of capitalist exploitation.
Consequently, there came into existence a social structure which could
not be shaken except by destroying all the three elements entering into its
being. The peculiarity of this fossilised social structure is the de facto
existence and operation of private property in land which is not i
ecognised fully by law. Many errors regarding the relation of classes in
modern China result from this peculiarity.
Had Chinese society not attained the stage of feudalism, its breakdown
would have been inevitable. It did reach there but with such a heavy
ballast inherited from the past as made the transition to
58 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the next higher stage a long and laborious process. Notwithstanding the
immaturity of feudalism, Chinese society came to be subordinated to
capitalist relations which, in their turn, were restricted by surviving
feudal conditions. Owing to these overlapping processes of evolution, the
present structure of Chinese society is so complex that its lost
equilibrium cannot be restored through the revival of old relations and
principles, indeed, not even by such a revolution as would leave its
foundation of private property intact.
The system of family-ownership pf land, with tax representing a part of
the produce payable to the State, and with the property in land
theoretically still belonging to the State—that unmistakably is a remnant
of patriarchal relations. The form of taxation however is clearly feudal.
The State theoretically still being the supreme landlord, ground-rent
coincides with tax. There exists private property in land, only it is
reserved to the State. But given private property, its transfer from one
hand to another cannot be prevented. So, even when the system of the
distribution of land by the State was re-introduced, as under the Sung
Dynasty, the process of concentration continued.
Finally, primitive forms of capitalist production grew out of the
background of those agarian relations. Already in the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the old stratification of the Chinese society was
disturbed. The gradation was no longer as it had been previously,
namely, the scholars, the peasantry, the artisans and the traders. But then,
the merchants and the bankers had climbed up the social ladder, having
been granted the place just below the scholars.25 Moreover, the peasants
had been relegated to the lowest rank, the artisans having superceded
them. The relation of property in land was naturally affected by the
growth of the capitalist mode of production which was reflected in those
dislocations hi social gradation. The legally established State-ownership
of land was undermined by the practically existing private property.
Agrarian produce had come under the laws of commodity production.
The peasants now could be driven out of the land which accumulated in
the possession of the capitalists. In the Srst half of the nineteenth century,
the scholars were often bankers, and most probably they had always
owned land.26
There is enough evidence to the effect that the feudal nobility thrived
rich and mighty during the Sung and Ming periods, when legally and
theoretically the system of distribution of land by the
The Structure of Chinese Society 59
State was in force. The state of affairs was not materially changed during
the short intervening period of Mongol invasion. The Ming Emperors
were engaged in a hopeless struggle against the noble "land-grabbers.''27
At the end of the Ming era, feudal estates were often larger then one
million mu. Moreover, those domains included the largest part of the
cultivated land of the entire country. The Manchus confiscated the
possessions of the Chinese nobles. The confiscated land was handed over
by the conquering dynasty to its soldiers and the eight tributary Tartar
clans. The latter were residents in Peking. They leased out their
possessions to the peasants. Even the soldiers received more land than
they could cultivate. A part of their land, therefore, was also leased out.
Consequently, tenancy came to be the characteristic feature of the
agrarian relations of modern China. About eighty per cent of the
peasantry are tenants28 holding the land either from the State or from
private owners, under conditions which, in essence and often also in
form, are feudal.
Until the seventeenth century, tax was levied ruthlessly per capita. In
course of time, that uneconomic system of taxation came in conflict with
incipient capitalism. In 1713, the head-tax was replaced by land-tax as
the main source of State revenue. From that time on, the object of
taxation was no longer the individual, regarded as a chattel in possession
of the ruling class; tax became a charge on labour-power as commodity.
The new tax was called ti-ting, which means, land and head-tax. That
part of the composite tax which represented a charge on agricultural
income, itself included all sorts of feudal levies. In addition, there was
the payment made instead of obligatory labour; transit tax; the payment
for securing release from military service, and the extra tax levied for
covering the deficit which often resulted when taxes were paid in kind.29
The lot of the tenants who held their land on lease from private owners
was still worse. Besides the payments they bad to make to the State
through the landlords and local officials, the latter themselves levied still
other charges which were indefinite and unlimited.30
The system of taxation represents pre-capitalist exploitation of the
peasantry; even today it is largely in force. The entire surplus is taken
away from the producer, and consequently he is deprived of the means to
improve the methods of production. This form of exploitation has
lowered the standard of living of the majority of the peasantry below the
starvation limit. This ex traordinary poverty of
60 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the bulk of the population is the fundamental cause of China's
backwardness The accumulation of capital is circumscribed by the
narrow margin of surplus which, consequently, hinders economic
development.
According to the latest estimates, the minimum necessity of a family of
five members could be covered by the produce of 4.7 acres of wheat-
growing land in the North, or 1.7 acre of rice-growing land in the South.
But 33 per cent of the peasant farms are on the average less than one acre
each; another 35 per cent less than 1.5 acres.31 Thus, 68 per cent of the
entire agricultural population live below the lowest level of subsistence.
An investigation in four typical provinces led to the conclusion that the
average annual income of 60 per cent of all peasant families is 150 silver
dollars or even less.32 In the opinion of the specialists of the Peking
Medical College, the indispensable necessities of an average peasant
family cannot be had for less than 185 dollars a year. The items of
necessity taken into account are food (without meat, fish or eggs), 150
dollars; clothing, 20 dollars; rent, light, medicaments, recreation, etc., 15
dollars.
In 1918 (the last year for which some statistical materials are available),
about 1500 million mu of land was under cultivation, employing about
sixty million families.33 If the land was equally distributed, the share of
each family would be 25 mu. But in reality, the average holding of sixty-
eight per cent of those sixty million peasant families is much smaller
than the minimum required to produce their barest subsistence. About
fifty million peasant families hold approximately 300 million mu, that is
about one fifth of the entire cultivated area. Making allowance for the
insufficiency of the statistical material, it can be concluded that by far the
greater part of the cultivated land is in the passession of a small rent-
receiving minority. Large landed estates are to be found even outside
Manchuria and the Northern provinces. For example, in the maritime
province of Kiangsu, there are landed estates as large as 300 thousand to
400 thousand mu. Smaller ones of the size of 30 to 40 thousand mu are
very common. 34 In view of the extraordinary small-ness of the average
peasant farm, the possession of a few hundred mu constitutes
landlordship, and a considerable part of the cultivated land is in the
possession of such petty landlords.
The landlords who still enjoy feudal rights and patriarchal privileges also
participate largely in capitalist exploitation. For
The Structure of Chinese Society 61
example, a family possessing 400,000 mu of land in the neighbouring
province of Kiangsu, also has extensive trading and financial interests in
Shanghai. It is the owner of the China Steam Navigation Company—a
modern capitalist concern. And that is not an exception. Throughout the
country, the landlords are also capitalists. They are all engaged in some
trade or other, mostly in agricultural produce which they take over from
the peasantry. The feudal-patriarchal relations serve the purpose of
primitive capitalist accumulation.
In China, the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of
production does not take place in the form of the process of the producer
becoming a trader—a capitalist;35 it takes place rather from the opposite
direction—traders not connected with the process of production first
appear as the medium for the circulation of commodities, and later
interfere in the process of production itself. This latter process, which
obstructs free economic development, could be observed also in the
earlier stages of capitalist development in Europe. It operated in certain
industries of England and France until the middle of the nineteenth
century. The difference is that China did not have the possibility of
breaking the chain by which trade-capital circumscribes the growth of
the capitalist mode of production. Foreign intervention reinforced the
position of the primitive capitalist traders of China who operated on the
basis of feudal relations. The product of the labour of Chinese peasants
could come to the world market only through the intermediary of those
traders. Chinese agriculture thus came to be subjected to two forms of
exploitation: the capitalist mode of production was deprived of the
possibility of growing within the limits of the semi-feudal, semi-
capitalist relations.
The characteristic feature of feudal economy is that the larger part of the
surplus product of social labour is appropriated by the ruling class not for
reinvestment in the process of production, but to be devoted to
unproductive, parasitic purposes. A higher mode of production can grow
within the framework of feudal relations, when an increasing part of the
surplus produce remains with the producer, thus enabling him to improve
his means of production. Therefore, when production is not directly
connected with land, that is, in the case of manufacture, feudal
restrictions upon free exchange of commodities a re still more rigorous.
In course of the struggle, taking place for several centuries and covering
a whole historical period—
62 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the middle-age—the productive forces, finally, break the cramping bonds
of feudalism and blossom forth in the capitalist social order. The duration
and result of this historical struggle depends on the magnitude of the
surplus that can be produced in the process of production still within the
limits and under the restrictions of feudalism.
Under feudal conditions, the peasant works either as a free producer, a
direct subject of the king, or as a serf on the feudal domain; the product
of his labour, over and above what is necessary for his barest subsistence,
is taken away from him in the form of rent, tax or other feudal levies.
The specific feature of feudalism is that the surplus value is realised
directly through the appropriation of the entire surplus product. The
production of surplus value becomes the foundation of the capitalist
mode of production only when a part of the surplus is absorbed as profit,
when surplus value is no longer realised in the simple form of direct
appropriation of the entire surplus produce. Then the entire surplus
product of social labour ceases to be the monopoly of the feudal
landlord. Profit represents a loss for the landlord, whether the State or the
feudal noble. There begins the struggle for the division of the surplus
value.
When, under the given conditions of production, a relatively large
surplus is produced, the share absorbed by profit is correspondingly
large, and consequently, a broad foundation is laid for the rising
capitalist mode oL production.36
The extraordinary insufficiency of the surplus produce of agriculture
retarded the development of Chinese society. The main concern in China
always was to have enough rice—the staple foodstuff. The measure of
good government was the ability to keep a reserve of rice for bad days.
The product of the entire social labour was hardly enough to ensure the
subsistence and reproduction of the immediate producers. That is to say,
the entire labour power was virtually socially necessary labour. The
surplus labour, which could be performed in the normal process of
production, was very narrowly limited by the conditions of production.
The slow development of private property in China was caused by those
peculiar conditions of production; under those conditions, surplus
produce did not represent normally performed surplus labour, but forced
labour. In other words, a part of the socially necessary labour had to be
applied to overcome the natural restrictions on surplus production. The
result
The Structure of Chinese Society 63
was extreme poverty of the masses, and permanent unstability of the
national economy. The most characteristic features of the situation were
recurring famines and civil wars which, in their turn, often destroyed the
larger part of the population.
The fluctuation of population is a remarkable feature of Chinese history.
In the first Han Period, feudalism prospered under the orderly conditions
reestablished after the chaos which followed the defeat of the Chin
Revolution. The population rose to sixty millions. During the following
period of Wang Mang reaction, it fell to twenty-one million, and rose
again to fifty million towards the end of the second Han period. During
the civil wars of the third century A.D. the population sank to the record
depth of eight millions. In the next century, it gradually went up to
sixteen millions, and later to forty-six millions in course of several
hundred years. In the tenth century, during the reign of the Sung
Dynasty, the population again fell to twenty-one million. After a steady
rise up to forty-five millions, it suddenly went down again to thirteen
millions in a few decades. From the thirteenth to the seventeenth century,
the population remained relatively stable; the fluctuation was within a
few millions; the general tendency was upwards. During the years of the
downfall of the Ming Dynasty, it again declined to twenty-one million.
After the establishment of the Manchu rule, there was no backward
movement of population.37 Historical investigation reveals the fact that
the periodical decline of population was always caused by famine, which
again either followed or preceded a civil war.
These figures, deduced from a large mass of historical material, prove
the thing. Until the eighteenth century, the level of production in China
was so low as did not ensure even the most minimum means of
subsistence for the immediate producers themselves. The land was
fertile; but devastating floods rendered large areas unworthy of
cultivation for long periods. And behind the tragic scene, there always
remained the fundamental weakness of the Chinese civilisation.
The scarcity of the beasts of burden in the North, and their absence in the
South, created conditions in which virtually the entire labour time had to
be employed for the production of the means for the barest subsistence of
the people. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that in the
olden days, it was a State monopoly to use horses and oxen for military
purpose. Therefore, agriculture
64 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
was not only dependent mainly on human labour; the absence of cattle
also diminished the fertility of land. Even today, in the South, cattle is
rarely employed in agriculture. Milk, butter and cheese are things seldom
to be found on the Chinese table.38 The dependence of agriculture
exclusively on human labour strengthened the position of the patriarchal
family. The absolute right of the father over the children was recognised
by law, in order to prevent the young people from wandering away from
land.39
The structure of the present-day Chinese society is the result of the
conditions of production which prevailed in the earlier stages of its
development. The conditions were not favourable for accumulation. For
a long time, right up to the eighteenth century, normal production left a
very narrow surplus. The part of the produce of social labour absorbed
by pre-capitalist rent, taxes levied by the despotic State, and feudal
charges, was not surplus product; it represented very largely forced
labour. Finally, there developed primitive capitalism on the basis of the
exploitation of intensified forced labour.
One of the causes of antagonism between capitalism and feudalism is
that capitalist profit encroaches upon the feudal landlord's rent. That is
specially the case when the pre-capitalist land rent directly represents the
entire surplus produce. Since primitive capitalism grew in China as a
social factor necessarily connected with feudal relations, it was not
absolutely antagonistic to the old mode of production. It only placed a
new burden on the process of production already so very heavily
encumbered. In mediaeval China, nascent capitalism was inseparably
dependent on the feudal mode of production. It is so even today. In the
beginning of the capitalist development in Europe also, this was
characteristic of trades capital. The oriental market, discovery of
America, influx of precious metals from Mexico, and the plunder of
India opened a new way before European capitalism which,
consequently, could free itself from the bondage of feudalism, and the
bourgeoisie only thereafter began the decisive struggle for political
power. The pioneers of the Chinese bourgeoisie found themselves in a
different situation; therefore, they could not travel the way of their more
fortunate European compeers, and before long became helpless victims
of plundering invaders.
The collection and transport of the Government's share in the product of
agriculture stimulated the growth of trades capital in
The Structure of Chinese Society 65
China. In the fifteenth century, a part of the taxes was paid in money, at
least formally.40 But by far the greater part of the State revenue was
collected then and later in kind. That is done even today; and since even
today a large part of the tribute, taken in the form of rent or taxes,
represents forced labour, the product of this forced labour should be
taken away from the producer somehow as early as possible; that is to
say, immediately upon the harvesting of the crops. Should time be
allowed for the crops to be transformed into money, one would always
run the risk of their being consumed at least partially. Always there is a
great hole to be filled up. Therefore, the Government must collect the
largest part of the revenue in kind as soon as the harvest is over, if it
wants to secure what, in its opinion, is its share. Then, there is the
antagonism between the State officials, who usually are also landlords
and big merchants, on the one hand, and petty traders, on the other.
Thanks to the system of payment of taxes in kind. State officials make a
threefold profit: firstly, from the monopoly of the grain trade which they
exercise through that system; secondly, from the transport of a part of the
grains collected in payment of taxes to the provincial and national
capitals, thirdly, from the exchange of the rest for money. Through this
system, the feudal officials dominate the entire economic life of the
nation, and they do so in the interest of trades capital.41 Payment of taxes
in money would place the small traders in the position to break the
feudal-capitalist monopoly. They would have the possibility of buying
the grain directly from the small peasantry.
Since 1919, there is no Central Government for the entire country.
Therefore, the budget of the Peking Government has no real significance.
In the earlier years of the Republic, the situation was hardly any better.
Yet, in the absence of more adequate and reliable information, the budget
of that period can be taken for an approximate representation of the
situation. In that, no less than sixty per cent of the State revenue is
derived from taxes which are delivered to the monopoly of the
reactionary feudal-capitalist alliance. With the exception of the salt tax,
practically all the other items of taxation fall directly or indirectly on
agriculture, and are- paid largely in kind.
Economic backwardness has hindered the development of the modern
means of transport, with the exception of the modest beginnings made
primarily for the urgent necessities of imperialist trade.
66 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The result of this backwardness of the means of transportation is the
territorial splitting of the natural economy which again hinders the rise of
a modern centralised State. The country is divided into a number of
isolated local markets monopolised by land-owning and trading State
officials. Thanks to the penetration of Imperialism, these isolated
markets, while still founded on semi-feudal production, have become
connected with the world market. The semi-feudal agrarian production
has been drawn into the sphere of the most modern capitalist
exploitation. Finally, out of this process, there has arisen a class which
tries to introduce real capitalist mode of production in China's national
economy. In consequence of the rise of the modern bourgeoisie, the
social structure of urban areas stands in sharp antagonism to the rest of
the country which still remains under feudal-patriarchal domination. But
the bourgeoisie, though they possess modern means of production in the
cities, cannot give a revolutionary expression to the antagonism between
the capitalist city and the feudal village. Because they themselves are still
rooted in the economy of the village with which they are connected as
the intermediary between the world market and the internal markets of
China. This contradiction, inherent in the very existence of the Chinese
bourgeoisie, is the fundamental problem of modern China. As this
problem results historically from the social structure of the country, its
solution can be found only in the complete subversion of the established
social order as a whole.
The feudal-patriarchal property in land is overburdened by capitalist
exploitation. The larger part of the accumulation taking place therefrom,
flows out of the country as imperialist tribute. The result of a fossilised
social system, embracing simultaneously manifold social relations which
appeared successively ever since the dawn of civilisation. They are
grown into, and overlap, each other. Consequently, one of them cannot
replace the others, even when it represents a progressive tendency.
Capitalism, for example, cannot destroy the feudal relations without
undermining its own foundation. That has been proved by the events
since the Revolution of 1911, and specially since the rise of the
Nationalist Government of Canton. The reconstruction of the Chinese
society cannot be carried through by a class which itself is rooted in the
established conditions. That can and will be done by a class which is the
heir of the revolutionary tradition of all the great social upheavals of the
past, which will lose nothing from
The Structure of Chinese Society 67
the complete dissolution of the present conditions beyond all reforms,
but will win a whole world. Therefore, the structure of the new Chinese
society in the throes of birth will neither be capitalist nor neo-Confucian,
as idealised by the petty-bourgeois nationalists. That can only be a
Communist society—the creation of the working class.
Notes
1. G. von Mullendorf, "Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Chinese Branch), No. 2,
1892-93.
2. The Penal Code of the Chinese Republic.
3. Dr. Wang Chiang-hui, "The New Penal Code of China". (The quotation is re-
translated from the German edition of this book).
4. "Fundamental Law of the National Government of the Chinese Republic",
proclaimed by the Kuo Ming Tang on October 4, 1928.
5. Report of the Ministry of Agriculture, 1919.
6. The formal collective ownership, however, does not prevent, as will be shown
later on, the subordination of the cultivator to the system of landlords' rent and
capitalist profit.
7. Report of the Agrarian Commission of the Kuo Ming Tang, 1926.
8. Ibid.
9. "Whatever may be the specific form of rent, there is one thing in common to all
types of rent; the appropriation of rent is the economic form in which property in
land is realised; land Jrent presupposes proprietory right in land—the ownership of
certain individuals of certain parts of the globe." (Karl Marx, "Capital", Vol. 3, Part
II.—All the quotations from Marx are the author's translation from the original
German).
10. Karl Marx, "Capital", Vol. 3, Part II.
11. At this point, the original English manuscript of the book contained a
comparative study of the development of feudalism in different parts of the world.
The study led to several important theoretical conclusions. That part was left out of
the German edition, because it dealt in some details with processes of historical
development generally known to well-educated European readers. Three chapters of
the original manuscript having been lost, they had to be retranslated from German.
This is one of those chapters. Therefore, that important treatise on feudalism cannot
be included in this edition. But I shall try to re-write it so that it can be added to the
next edition.
12. Quoted from Han Fi-tse, a contemporary writer, by Mabel Ping-Hua Lee in "The
Economic History of China".
13. Mabel Ping-hua Lee, "The Economic History of China".
14. Ibid.
15. Quoted from Ku Kin Tsi-Pin-liu by Mabel Ping-hua Lee in the "Economic
History of China".
68 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
16. The Book of Han.
17. Book of Mencius.
18. R. Montgomery Martin, "Politics, Trade and Finance of China".
19. The Book of Han.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. ,
22. One mu is equal to 6.74 acres.
23. Quoted by Lee in "The Economic History of China".
24. Pollock and Maitland, "History of English Laws".
25. Meadows, "The Chinese and Their Rebellions".
26. Ibid.
27. Lee, "The Economic History of China".
28. The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Chinese Branch), No 2, 1892-93.
29. Hsieh Pao-chao, "The Government of China".
30. "In addition to rent, there is the imperial grain tax; then, local officials levied
taxes to meet the cost of Government transport, for the maintenance of higher
inspecting officials, for the upkeep of roads and dykes, for patrolling highways, and
endless other charges, for example for the construction and repair of the village and
city walls, fairs, markets, theatres, field-watchmen, protection of springs, support of
schools etc. Most of the local taxes are collected by the village headman".—A.H.
Smith, "The Chinese Village".
31. Statistics of the Chinese Bureau of Economic Information,
32. Report if the International Famine Relief Commission, 1922.
33. Report of the Ministry of Agriculture, 1919.
34. "Land Tenure in China", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Chinese Branch).
35. "The transition from the feudal mode of production takes place in a twofold
manner. The producer becomes a trader and capitalist .... This is the really
revolutionary way. Alternately, the produce passes directly to the possession of the
trader. Although, historically, the latter also is the process of transition ... by itself it
does not bring about the subversion of the old mode of production, which it rather
conserves and retains as its own pre-conditions." (Karl Marx, "Capital", Vol. Ill, Part
I).
36. "The general conditions for the existence of surplus value and profit... are: the
immediate producers must work longer than the time required for (gaining the
means) reproduction of their own labour power, of themselves. They must perform
surplus labour. This is the subjective condition. But the objective (condition) is that
they can perform surplus labour, that the natural conditions are such that a part of
their labour time at their disposal suffices for their reproduction and subsistence as
producers, that the production of the necessities for their life does not consume their
entire labour time. The productivity of nature sets one limit, one point of departure,
one basis. On the other side, another limit is set by the development of the social
power of production of their labour. Regarded still more closely since the production
of food stuff is the primary condition of their life and of all production generally, the
labour applied to that production, that is to
The Structure of Chinese Society 69
say, agricultural labour in the widest economical sense, should be sufficiently
productive, so that the entire labour time available is not absorbed in the production
of foodstuff for the immediate producers; so that agricultural surplus labour and,
consequently, agricultural surplus produce may be possible." (Karl Marx, "Capital",
Vol. Ill, Part 2).
37. Lee, "The Economic History of China". All the figures are given in the nearest
round number.
38. "No labour is spent for the production of fodder, unless that can also serve the
purpose of human subsistence. Horses are seldom used for luxury or military
purposes, for travel or for the transport of goods; but mules, camels, ass and goats
are used on the north of the Yangtse for transport and other purposes ... In the
southern and eastern provinces, all animals are rare. The transport of goods and
passengers is done in boats or by human beings. The natives do not use butter, milk
or cheese. The few cattle find their feed on the wasteland round the village."
(Williams, "The Middle Kingdom".).
39. "The patriarch of three or four generations compels his sons and grandchildren to
stay with him; their houses must be next to his. They with their families constitute a
common social unit." (Ibid).
40. Chen Shao-kwan, "The System of Taxation in China".
41. "The product of land must support all Government officials, merchants, all Tartar
families, who hold the land in some or other form of feudal vassal-ship, and all the
farmers who do not do any work . . . Acquisition of land is the most popular means
for making capital productive; and throughout the East, there is no place where the
right of landownership is not respected." (Montgomery Martin, "Trade, Finance and
Society in China".).
CHAPTER III
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF CHINA
China proper, with her twenty-one provinces including Manchuria, has
an area of 1,896,500 square miles. The area of entire country, previously
called the Chinese Empire, and which (excepting Outer Mongolia) still
nominally belongs to the Republic, is 4,278,350 square miles. The
population of China proper, according to the latest available information,
is 436 millions, and that of the so-called Greater China (including Tibet,
Turkestan and Mongolia) is 447 millions.1 So, the density of population
is approximately 220 per square mile in China proper, and 100 if the
outer regions are taken into the calculation. The distribution of
population in China proper itself is also not uniform. For example, in the
territories adjoining Shanghai and Nanking, the density is as high as 875
per square mile, that is. higher even than in Belgium, the most thickly
populated country in the world. The pressure of population ia equally
great in Canton. The impression gathered at these places, frequently
visited by foreigners, is the basis of the prevailing notion that China is an
over-populated country. In contrast to the high pressure in those places,
the north-western province of Kansu has a population of 47 per square
mile, and the south-western province of Yunan, of 67 per square mile.
The most characteristic feature of the Chinese national economy is the
disproportionate distribution of social labour. An abnormally large
portion is absorbed in the production of food. In the countries which are
equipped with the modern means of production, on the average, thirty-
five per cent of the total social labour is employed in the food producing
sector of national economy. In China the proportion is as high as eighty-
five per cent. Yet China is not a food-exporting country. On the contrary,
she imports a considerable
The National Economy of China 71
amount of food-stuffs, and the amount has been increasing lately. In
1915, it war seventeen per cent of the total import. In 1925, it was
twenty-four per cent; in 1927, it was twenty-seven per cent.2
In view of the proverbial intensiveness of Chinese agriculture, it
appears anomalous that China should import food. More than one
crop is raised on the larger part of the cultivated land. The rich-lands
of the south are naturally very fertile. The amount of labour the
Chinese peasant puts into the cultivation of land is many times greater
than in any other country, It has been estimated that the surface of the
cultivated soil in China is actually treated several times a year with
human hands to the depth of about fifteen inches.3 This may sound
fantastic; but there is enough truth in it to indicate how hard the
Chinese peasant labours to make the land bear fruit. Foreign
observers have often admiringly written about the "amount of
efficient human labour cheerfully given for a daily wage of fifteen
cents U.S. currency."4 The world renowned habit of putting a
fabulous amount of labour in the tillage of soil has been instilled in
the Chinese peasant by the conditions of production which prevailed
in the country from the very dawn of civilisation. In the classical pest,
imperial injunction to the people was: "Keep your lands clean,
manure them richly, and make a farm resemble a garden."5 Ever since
the Chinese peasant has abided by that injunction; so much so that it
is correctly observed that agriculture in China is rather kitchen-
gardening than agriculture in the wider sense of the term.
In spite of the primitiveness of the mode of cultivation, the
productivity of soil in China does not compare very unfavourably
with other countries. This, of course, is a relative statement, meaning
that the produce of a given unit of land in China is not always less
than in other countries, if the labour employed in the process of
production is not taken into consideration, if it is measured not by
value, but by volume. The average yield for the wheat crop in the
United States of America is fifteen bushels per acre; in China it is
about twenty-five bushels. It has been calculated by experts that in
1900 the produce of a square mile of land in the United States could
maintain only sixty-one consumers (exclusive of animals employed in
the process of production); in China it supported 1783.6 This explains
the great difference in the standards of living in the two countries
compared. Nevertheless, it shows, making sufficient allowance for
possible exaggeration, that the productivity of the soil in China is
72 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
not lower than that required for maintaining her population on a tolerable
standard of living. In other words, China should not import food to meet
the very limited requirements of her population. Still she does. Why?
The reason is that Chinese agriculture is very intensive, not extensive.
Only a small fraction of the arable surface of the country is cultivated.
That being the case, all the calculations showing a high productivity of
Chinese agriculture are misleading. They do not present a true picture of
the situation.
The total area of arable land in China proper (excluding the vast regions
of Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan) has been estimated as between 800 to
900 million acres.' But the area actually under cultivation has never
exceeded one-third of the total. If the outer regions are taken into the
calculation, the proportion has always been not more than fifteen per
cent. Approximately, the area under cultivation was 150 million acres in
1890, 266 in 1914, and 233 in 1918. The statistical data for the
subsequent years are very incomplete; but the tendency appears to be
towards decline.8
It appears to be paradoxical that, in a predominantly agricultural country,
such a small portion of the total arable land should be actually under
cultivation. Plenty of land is available for cultivation. Labour also is
apparently abundant. There has been a steady increase of population ever
since the seventeenth century. The peasants are highly skilled in making
the land bear fruit in their primitive way. Yet only a small fraction of the
tillable land is made productive; and the fraction is so small that its
relatively high rate of produce cannot support the population of the
country even at a very low standard of living. The reason of this paradox
is to be found in the conditions of agricultural production in China. Land
is cultivated exclusively with human labour. Bovine animals are very
rare. There are practically no reliable statistics about live-stock. It has,
however, been estimated that the number of bovine animals—horses,
cattle, mules, asses, all told—does not exceed twenty-four millions in
China proper.9 Five millions of them are in Manchuria alone;
consequently, the supply for the rest of the country is very meagre. It is
approximately one head per twenty people. The comparison with a few
other countries, chosen at random, shows how extremely poor China is in
livestock, so essential for the cultivation of soil. This is a great handicap
for an agricultural country.
Germany has one head of bovine animal for three people;
The National Economy of China 73
Denmark one for one; Spain one for 3.6; France one for 2.3; Great
Britain one for 4.7; Hungary one for five; Italy one for five; Holland one
for 3.5; Yugoslavia one for 2.4; Poland one for 2.5; Romania one for 2.8;
and India one for 1.9.10
The scarcity of live-stock places great limitations on the method of
cultivating the soil in China. Even the primitive wooden plough is not the
common tool, spades being frequently used instead. When the plough is
at all used, it is often drawn by human beings. Under these conditions, it
takes twenty-four days (of twelve or more hours) of human labour to
raise one acre of wheat.11 In the United States of America, the labour
time required for the same purpose is only two days of less duration.
Taking the mean between the extreme backwardness of the Chinese
condition, on the one hand, and the most advanced mode of production in
the United States, on the other, it can be reasonably calculated that the
cultivation of soil in China absorbs eight to ten times more social labour
than it should under normal conditions. Consequently, more land cannot
be brought under cultivation, although plenty of it is available, and the
limited area of cultivated land must support many more people than it
normally could. The chronic poverty of the peasant masses, and the
incredibly low general standard of living, are the result of such a state of
national economy. The proverbial intensiveness of Chinese agriculture
means the obligation of the peasants to put in the greatest amount of
labour in making the smallest area of land bear the largest possible
quantity of food. The cultivation of land, taking place under such
unfavourable conditions of production, absorbs practically the entire
social labour, thereby restricting the free development of other industries.
The natural and historical limitations upon agricultural production could
be overcome through cattle-raising and the introduction of modern
machinery in the cultivation of the soil. That, however has been done
until now on a very insignificant scale. In the past, the feudal-patriarchal
relation of property in land deprived the peasant practically of the entire
surplus product which, under the given unfavourable conditions of
production, was very meagre. Even now the relation has hardly changed.
The peasant has no means to improve his mode of production. He can
buy neither live-stock nor modern implements. In course of time, the
small surplus product of agriculture ceased to be the monopoly of the
feudal-patriarchal
74 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
landlord (individual or the State). Trading capital became an important
factor of national economy and appropriated a part of the surplus value
as profit. Capital thus accumulated, however, did not revolutionise the
mode and means of production. To do so is not in the nature of trading
capital.12 Instead of freeing the peasantry from the feudal-patriarchal
bondages, it operates on the background of the old social relation,
thereby increasing the exploitation of the producing class. The profit of
trading capital represents a part of the surplus value produced under pre-
capitalist conditions of production. Therefore, trading capital does not
introduce really capitalist means and mode of production which are sure
to disrupt its social basis. As long as the entire surplus produce of the
peasants' labour remains in the control of the feudal-patriarchal landlords
and the trading bourgeoisie, it is not possible for agriculture to be
improved through cattle-raising and the introduction of modern
machinery.
From the very olden days, handicrafts developed in China, but only as a
subsidiary to agriculture. The peasant, having to devote practically the
whole of his labour power to the production of food, the growth of
handicrafts was bound to be very slow. All his surplus produce taken
away from him, the peasant could not develop into a free artisan. It has
been shown in the previous chapter how the process was discouraged,
and, when necessary, positively checked by the feudal-patriarchal ruling
class. Originally, handicraft production was for use. The peasant grew
cotton in his homestead, and his womenfolk spun and wove. Other
articles of primitive necessity, and rudimentary tools for the tillage of the
soil, were also manufactured by the peasants at home, But in course of
time, in spite of all difficulties and obstructions, handicraft production
ceased to be exclusively for use. It began to be exchanged, first inside the
village, and then between villages. Eventually, the self-sufficient village
became a thing of the past. Although handicraft still remained, to a large
extent, closely allied with agriculture, most of the artisans being
primarily, at least partially, peasants, its social character changed. The
produce of labour, performed under pre-capitalist conditions, became
commodities for exchange through the intermediary of trading capital.
A very small section of handicraft was, however, separated from
agriculture, to become an independent factor of national economy. At
present, in the national economy of China, handicraft occupies a place of
importance next only to agriculture. Still it remains largely
The National Economy of China 75
in the state of semi-dependence upon the latter. Most of the artisans are
still peasants, subject to feudal-patriarchal social relations, although an
increasing portion of their produce finds its way to the market—not only
national, but international—as commodity. It is the case not only with
what they produce as artisans, but with the produce of their labour as a
whole.
It is estimated that about ten million people are employed in handicraft
production.13 Compared with the total population of the country, it is a
very small number. Obviously, it is the number only of the urban
artisans, who are completely divorced from agriculture and produce
exclusively for exchange. The greater part of the Chinese handicraft
production still takes place not in urban workshops, but in the village
cottage, that is, in the home of the peasant, the whole family usually
performing the labour. As a rule, however, the raw material is no longer
produced by the same people. It is supplied by others who do not directly
participate in the process of production, but control it in one way or the
other.
Silk is the main product of Chinese handicraft. At present manufactured
and raw silk constitutes twenty per cent of China's export trade. Steam
filatures have been established at Shanghai, Canton, Hankow and other
smaller places. But about half of the silk is produced (reared and worked
up into fabrics) by the peasants in their home. The average total
production recently has been 200,000 piculs14 a year. (One picul is equal
to 60.5 kilos). About three-fourth of the quantity is exported.15 Thus the
characteristic feature of the Chinese national economy is that
commodities produced under -very backward conditions of production
have to compete in the capitalist world market. The result of this process
is disastrous. It causes such a redistribution of labour in the process of
production as pauperises the producing masses. They are completely
proletarianised, subjected to the worst kind of capitalist exploitation,
while still remaining in feudal-patriarchal bondage.
The total value of the foreign trade of China increased from 1000 million
taels in 1918 to 2000 million in 1926. During the same period, the value
of export grew from 480 millions to 850 millions. The great expansion in
value does not represent a true picture of the situation. It was largely due
to the drop in exchange rates. During the period under review, the gold
value of the tael depreciated nearly by fifty per cent. So, in reality, the
export trade of China remained stationary
76 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
during the period.16 Nevertheless, the volume itself is considerable when
it is kept in mind that during the same period the productive capacity of
the country did not improve appreciably. The situation is better
understood from an analysis of the export trade.
China's main exports are silk, tea, beans (and their products), oil-seeds,
animal products (skins, hides, fur and wool), cotton and minerals
(antimony, iron ore, manganese etc.). The great bulk of the export trade
is covered by the products of agriculture and allied industries. The area
under cultivation having not extended, the method of agriculture having
not improved, and the mode of production in the allied industries having
remained in the same primitive condition, there could not be any
substantial increase in the production of these commodities. Therefore, a
relatively large volume of export, which expands steadily though not
rapidly, means that contact with the world market drains out of China not
only her small surplus product, but a considerable portion of her
necessary produce. This does not always take place in a direct way, but
through a redistribution of labour, not from a backward to a higher mode
of production, but inside the same process of production. In other words,
the exigencies of the world market shift a large volume of social labour
in China from the production of food to the raising of nonfood crops.
That represents an encroachment upon China's necessary production.
Owing to the given conditions of production, eighty-five per cent of
social labour must be devoted to the production of food necessary for the
maintenance of the entire population; therefore, the labour withdrawn
from food production represents a corresponding inroad into necessary
production.
This can be illustrated by facts. During the period under review, beans
and other oil-seeds contributed more to the expansion of Chinese exports
than any other item. At the end of the period, they constituted twenty-
three per cent of the total export. During the period, in which these non-
food agricultural products increased their share in the export trade, the
import of food-stuff increased correspondingly. This proves that the
labour for the raising of beans and oil-seeds was produced by
withdrawing it from food production. Thus, the demands of the world
market caused a redistribution of labour in China in direct antagonism to
her own elementary interests. China imports manufactured articles. She
must pay for them by exporting goods in exchange. Owing to the
backwardness of the mode of production,
The National Economy of China 77
her exports contain many more units of labour than required for the
manufacture of her imports; so much so that, in spite of the inroad upon
her necessary production, she cannot export enough to cover the import.
Ever since her "free" contact with the world market, the balance of
international trade has always been unfavourable for China. This adverse
balance represents her indebtedness—foreign capital invested in the
country.
During the last three quarters of a century, ever since her doors were
forced open to international commerce, the foreign trade of China has
expanded to very large dimensions. In the middle of the nineteenth
century, the total value was hardly over 100 million taels; the present
value, calculated at the exchange rate of that period, is around a thousand
million taels. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this huge
growth of foreign trade has been caused by the development of
production in China. Modern industry constitutes an insignificant sector
of the Chinese national economy. China produces about twenty-five
million tons of coal per year—hardly hundred pounds per head of her
population. The quantity of iron ore extracted was 1,900,000 tons in
1920. Later on, it declined to 1.5 millions. The amount of pig-iron
produced was 427,000 tons in 1920; it declined to 370,000 tons in 1925.
The production of steel is practically negligible, about 100,000 tons per
year.17 The development of the modern means of transport inside the
country is equally restricted. There are hardly 8,000 miles of railways
and no more than a thousand miles of road suitable for any kind of
vehicular traffic. Cotton textile, and partially silk, are the only branches
of industry in which an appreciable expansion of production has taken
place. Of these the bulk of expansion has taken place in cotton textile,
which contributes very little to the export trade.
The total value of goods exported from China in 1927 was 940 million
taels. Of that, twenty millions were covered by coal, twenty-five millions
by articles under the heading "ores, metals and manufactures thereof",
and forty millions by factory products. All together these items
composed about 10 per cent of the entire export trade. The remaining
ninety per cent of the export was supplied by industries in which the
mode of production still remains very largely primitive, and
consequently whose productivity could not possibly have increased in
correspondence with the expansion of export trade. Well over fifty per
cent of the entire export is covered by agricultural and past-
78 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
oral products.18 The production in this sphere, except in the case of beans
and oil-seeds, has not increased. The next item is silk, providing 168
millions of the export trade. But the manufacture has also not expanded
appreciably. On the other hand, tea has practically disappeared from the
list of Chinese exports. Previously it used to be a large item.
Evidently, export trade has not expanded on the basis of an increasing
production of commodities. The expansion of trade in China represents
transfer of the entire surplus product from the possession of the producer
to the control of the trader. Not only is the producer deprived of his
entire surplus produce, but heavy inroads are made even upon his
necessary production. The surplus value produced, therefore, contains a
large amount of forced labour; that is to say, capitalist exploitation takes
place on the basis of precapitalist production, Under such circumstances,
the primary producer has no chance of ever growing into a capitalist.
Consequently, real capitalist development—revolution in the means and
mode of production, destroying old social relations—is impossible.
The economic development of China is hindered from two sides: by the
feudal-patriarchal elements in her social structure, and by imperialist
intervention. Native trading capital is the connecting link between the
twin forces of reaction. The natural resources of China are so great that,
once these mutually auxiliary forces of reaction are eliminated, her
national economy can develop by big strides, easily overcoming the
defective natural conditions of production. With an extensive application
of the modern mechanical means of production, the productive capacity
of labour can be immensely increased. In that case the proportion of
social labour absorbed in the necessary production will be greatly
reduced, labour will be withdrawn from the production of food without
injuring the elementary interests of society- Not only will land now
under cultivation be worked with much less labour, making it available
for other industries, the land at present lying waste will also be made to
bear fruit. The result will be an immense increase in the per capita rate of
agricultural production, and the surplus in that basic sector of national
economy will lay a broad foundation for the growth of manufacturing
industries.
Conventional economists ascribe all the miseries of China to her
supposed over-population. It has been shown that the theory of
The National Economy of China 79
over-population is a myth. China has a very large population, but she is
not over-populated. If all the arable land is cultivated a much larger
population can be maintained. When labour employed in the cultivation
of the soil will be reduced through the introduction of machinery, her
teeming millions will be the greatest asset of China's national economy.
The extreme backwardness of China's national economy, the dire poverty
of her masses, is due not to the supposed over-population, but to the most
primitive exploitation of labour, as a matter of fact, to an incredible
wastage of social labour which is the source of all national wealth.
A few facts about the natural resources of China indicate the
potentialities of her national economy. Possession of coal and iron is the
essential condition for modern economy. China has large deposits of
both the minerals. According to the latest geological survey, China's coal
deposits amount to 217,000,626 million tons, of which 43,953 million
tons are anthracite. Iron ore deposits have been estimated at 956,180
million tons, containing, on the average, about forty-five per cent of
metal.18 At present China has the practical monopoly of the world
antimony supply. She is also the largest producer of tungsten. Her
petroleum reserves have been roughly estimated at 10,000 million tons.
When to these basic materials are added tin, copper, manganese and
other materials of secondary importance, it cannot be doubted that China
is completely fitted with all the conditions to modernise her national
economy very rapidly as soon as it is free from the existing restrictions,
partly of historical and partly of external nature.
The question of capital needed for rapid industrial development of the
country has often been raised. It is maintained that China cannot become
a modern industrial country without the aid of foreign capital. The
corollary to this theory is that, in return for the aid, she must accept
political subservience to the more advanced countries. The lack of capital
has been taken for granted by the leading Chinese themselves. For
example, Sun Yat-sen made a fantastic scheme of industrialising China
with capital borrowed abroad. Only in the year before his death he came
to understend the implications of his ill-conceived policy of
modernisation. But there is room for doubt that he really changed his
belief in the helpful role of foreign capital. The Nanking Nationalist
Government proposes to carry out the scheme of economic
reconstruction, and it is frankly in favour of a free flow
80 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of foreign capital. Experience, however, should teach the Chinese a
different lesson. Foreign capital will not help China to solve her problem.
On the contrary, freedom from its yoke is the essential condition for a
really free economic development.
The capital required for the modernisation of China's national economy
is available in the country. A considerable amount of it is accumulated in
the possession of the trading class. The native joint stock banks alone are
capitalised at 560 million silver dollars, about sixty per cent of which
amount is actually paid up.20 Moreover, a large amount of Chinese
capital is employed in foreign trade. It is deposited with the foreign
banks. There still remain the small, but very numerous, private credit
institutions. Their resources are not negligible. Pratically the entire
internal trade passess through their hands; consequently, they reserve a
substantial share of the surplus of national economy. Although an
increasing part of this capital is finding investment in modern industrial
concerns, by far the greater bulk is still tied up with such unproductive
employment as trading in commodities produced in largely pre-capitalist
conditions, usury and landholding. If that great bulk of the capital
recources are made available for productive industrial investment,
China's dependence upon foreign capital will be very much reduced. The
very fact of such a displacement of capital from the unproductive to
productive employment will free the forces of national economy from all
restrictions.
The basic restriction upon the free employment of the Chinese national
economy is the feudal-patriarchal structure of society. Owing to the fact
that the wealth accumulating in possession represents the value created
by labour performed within the limits of that structure, indeed very
largely thanks to that structure, the Chinese middlemen cannot transform
their wealth into capital, they cannot invest their wealth for developing
such modes of production as will surely disrupt their own social
foundation.
These deep-rooted contradictions of the situation render it impossible
that the modernisation of Chinese national economy, in a broad sense,
would take place within the limits of the capitalist system, that is, on the
basis of the private ownership of the means of production. The
possibility of any alternative line of development is rejected by those
who believe that the modern mode of machine production is inseparable
from the capitalist system. Since it has
The National Economy of China 81
been so until now, it is assumed that for the modernisation of her
economy China must adopt the capitalist system. The existence of the
native trading class, the so-called compradores, as the dominant factor in
Chinese national economy, is necessary for the foreign exploitation of
the country. As long as a country's national economy is dominated by
trading capital, it cannot experience a real capitalist development.
Therefore, modernisation of Chinese national economy is conditional
upon its freedom from the control of trading capital. The forces of real
capitalism, namely, the revolutionising modes of production, being too
weak to disrupt the influence of reactionary trading capital, the task must
be accomplished by some other factor, should China's economic life be
freed from the bondage of mediaeva-lism. The task of modernising
China's national economy must be undertaken by the social classes which
suffer most from the prevailing conditions. The producing classes must
assert their ownership of the accumulated surplus production of national
economy which has been expropriated by the parasitic, reactionary,
trading class. Thus will be found the capital necessary for the
development of China's national resources. She will modernise her
national economy with a free and extensive application of the mechanical
means of production only by disrupting the social basis of production for
profit.
Notes
1. Report of the Chinese Post Office.
2. Report of the Inspector General of Maritime Customs, 1928.
3. P. Monroe, "China: A Nation in Evolution".
4. F.H. King, "Farmers of Forty Centuries".
5. Legge, "Chinese Classics".
6. Lee, "The Economic History of China".
7. King, "Farmers of Forty Centuries."
8. Report of the Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Informations.
9. D.K. Lieu, "China's Industries and Finance".
10. China Year Book, 1928.
11. Year Book of the International Agricultural Institute, 1928.
12. "It (trading capital) cannot by itself do much for the overthrow of the old
mode of production, but rather preserves it and uses it as its premise. . . . The
method is everywhere an obstacle to the real capitalist mode of production, and
declines with the development of the latter. Without revolutionising the mode of
production, it deteriorates merely the condition of the direct producers,
transforming them into mere wage-workers and proletarians under worse
conditions than of those who have already been placed
82 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
under the immediate control of capital, and absorbs their turplus labour on the basis
of the old mode of production." (Karl Marx, "Capital," Vol. Ill, P. 394, American
edition).
13. Report of the Nanking School of Agriculture.
14. Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, 1915.
15. The Chinese Bureau of Informations.
16. Report on the Foreign Trade of China, 1928.
17. Report on the Foreign Trade of China, 1928.
18. China Year Book, 1928.
19. Geological Survey of China, 1924.
20. China Year Book, 1928.
CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN AGGRESSION
Geographical situation restricted the contact of ancient China with
foreign countries. When navigation was known only to the West-Asiatic
and South-European people, the Pacific Ocean was an effective barrier
for China on the east. Extensive desert territories, inhabited by
traditionally hostile barbarians, made the overland communication to the
West hazardous except for the most adventurous travellers. High,
impassable mountains separated China from India. Living in such a
situation of geographical isolation, the inhabitants of ancient China
naturally developed a very conservative and suspicious attitude towards
foreigners and everything outlandish. Nevertheless, the anti-foreign
sentiment that characterised the public life of modern China and which
found the acutest outburst in the closing days of the nineteenth century,
is not to be traced all the way back into Chinese history. On the contrary,
the sages of ancient China taught toleration, hospitality and friendship
towards the foreigners. The classical Holy Books contain such
injunctions: "Be kind to strangers who come from afar." Confucius
taught that "all within the four seas are brethren." The anti-foreign
sentiment is a recent growth, and developed under very great
provocations. It was a reaction to the behaviour of the Europeans who
visited China ever since the sixteenth century.
In addition to the behaviour of the European visitors, there are other
historical reasons for the Chinese people to be suspicious and hostile to
foreigners. The struggle to keep the barbarian invaders off her western
and northern frontiers continued throughout the history of China. She
was not always successful in that historic struggle. Repeatedly, the
Chinese soil was overrun by barbarian hordes dealing death and
destruction far and wide. More than once, the barbarian invaders
established their domination over the country for periods
84 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of varied length. Although on all those occasions the invaders were
ultimately absorbed in the Chinese society, just as "captive Greece took
captive her rude conqueror", their advent, in the beginning, could not but
make an unfavourable impression upon the Chinese mind. Moreover, all
the invading races having been much lower in the scale of civilisation, it
was natural that the Chinese should regard all outsiders as inferior to
themselves. The behaviour of the early European visitors, with the
exception of the mediavel scholarly travellers like Macro Polo and the
Jesuits, was certainly not such as could possibly convince the Chinese
that the visitors represented nations at least as civilised as themselves.
It was but natural that the Chinese assumed an air of superiority to all
foreigners. The Tatars, Huns, Mongols and such like races, with whom
they had from time to time come into contact until the sixteenth century,
possessed decidedly lower types of culture. A similar attitude is to be
found in all the ancient races which developed their respective
civilisations with very little mutual contact. But, whenever any foreign
visitor merited a different attitude, he was received by the Chinese with
great consideration. For example, the Venetian traveller Marco Polo was
admitted and given a place of honour in the Court of the great Kublay
Khan. Many a Jesuit father also held high official positions during the
latter part of his regime and in the earlier years of the Manchu rule. The
Europeans, who visited the Chinese coasts from the sixteenth century
onward, generally were of a very low cultural level, being adventurers
recruited from the very riff-raffs of the European society, and acted
hardly any better than barbarians. An English colonial official, having
little sympathy for the Chinese, wrote: "The maritime strangers from the
Occident, who first appeared on the sea-board of China, had, as
adventurers and turbulent seamen, many of the outward qualities of the
continental peoples hitherto known." And he apologised that "it never
occurred to the Chinese that these men might be among the least
cultivated members of a large and orderly community; and they even did
not inquire whether the resemblances in the specimens before them were
anything but superficial."1 But history shows that the behaviour of those
adventurers and turbulent seamen was not a superficial unrefined ness, to
which the Chinese should have been more tolerant, but it represented the
aggressive policy of incipient imperialism. The behaviour of the
European governments and their exalted representa-
Foreign Aggression 85
tives in their relations with China was often highly provocative, which
could hardly make a good impression upon the Chinese.
***
In spite of the great geographical barriers, from the very early days,
ancient China did have some contacts with ether civilised countries of
the time. Trade relations with Cathay are referred to in the Bible. Already
in the closing centuries of the pre-Christian era, the emperors of China
sent able ambassadors to different mercantile countries, where "they
obtained bright pearls, gems, precious stones, yellow gold and various
other commodities."2 In the second century B.C., an embassy from the
Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius was cordially received in the Chinese
Court, and peaceful trade relations were established between the two
countries. Under the limitations imposed by geographical conditions, a
fair amount of trade between China and the Mediterranean countries was
carried on peacefully throughout centuries. In the seventh century, the
Nestorians from Syria found not only a refuge but a hospitable home in
China, where they propagated their faith without any hindrance. Only as
late as in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century, one British
ambassador after another could not accommodate himself with the
Chinese Court, and trading rights were subsequently wrested by ruthless
military expeditions.
Long before the Christian era, Indians and Malayans traded with China.
In the eighth century, the Arabs found the sea route to the Far East. They
as well as Buddhist missionaries from India received free admittance into
China. The latter had come there also by the sea route several hundred
years earlier with the zeal to make converts to their new religion. Canton
became a busy centre of overseas trade. Throughout the period between
the seventh and the seventeenth century, considerable foreign trade was
transacted from there. One of the most ancient Mosques of the world still
stands in Canton, where the Arabs first landed and from where they
earned on a brisk trade for centuries.
The Chinese population embraces many million Muslims. They have
never been subjected to any persecution for their belief. It is another
proof that China had all along been tolerant to all peaceful foreigners,
until their visit was accompanied by a high-handed haughtiness,
barbarous cruelty and lust for conquest.
The propagation of Christianity was not prohibited until the internal feud
of the Catholic Church was brought into China in the
86 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
shape of the struggle between the Jesuits and the Dominicans for the
hegemony of the Far-Eastern domain of the Pope. The Jesuits had
decided not to interfere with the native religious institutions, and
occupied themselves with educational work, which, when done with no
ulterior motive but scientifically, is the most eifective means to fight
traditional superstition. Consequently, they endeared themselves to the
Chinese. They were not only popular in the country at large but made
converts even in the imperial Court. It is recorded that, on the eve of the
downfall of the Ming dynasty, more than a hundred members of the royal
household had embraced Christianity as preached by the Jesuits. "For a
time it seemed to observers that China might become Roman Catholic.3
The Manchus also protected and patronised the Jesuits. Then broke out
the fierce quarrel between the Jesuits and the Dominicans in China.
Supported by the Pope, the latter, more conservative and less learned
than the Jesuits, gained the upper hand. They began to abuse the
privilege granted to the missionaries in China. They used their religious
liberty to interfere in the political affairs of the country. The Christian
nations were well advanced in the stage of capitalism, and were
manifesting imperialist ambitions. The Church became the advance
guard of incipient imperialism. Evident political purpose of the
missionaries led to their expulsion, not only from China, but also from
Japan, in the eighteenth century.
But the expulsion of the Christian missionaries was not an effective
check to the aggressive purpose with which the visitors from Europe
appeared on the coast of China. The sea route to China had been
discovered by the Arabs eight hundred years earlier. Soon after rinding
their way to India round the Cape of Good Hope, the Portuguese reached
China, following the footsteps of the Arabs, in 1515. On their way from
India, they took possession of Malacca which was a tributary of the
Chinese Empire. That act of aggression naturally did not make a very
good impression upon the Chinese. In view of such a beginning, they
could not possibly believe that the new visitors came with the purpose of
peaceful trade. When the Portuguese arrived at Canton, they were looked
upon as invaders, and as such could not be given a cordial welcome.
Upon that, they behaved in an insolent manner outraging the traditional
Chinese conception of politeness and ceremonies with which a foreign
visitor should approach the host. Having established their Empire in
India, and subsequently
Foreign Aggression 87
conquered Malacca, the Portuguese were overbearing towards the
Chinese, whom they treated with disrespect and shocking cruelty. 4
Unaccustomed to handling such a new kind of barbarians, the Chinese
officials ordered that the strange visitors "should be instructed for three
days regarding ceremonies, at the Mohammadan Mosque". 5 The
Portuguese disregarded that harmless injunction with shockingly bad
manners. "In consequence of disrespectful behaviour in the capital, the
interpreter was condemned to death, and the rest of the party sent back as
prisoners to Canton to be expelled from the country."6
Expelled from Canton, obviously for their own fault, the Portuguese
continued their aggression upon China. They used the Malay Peninsula
as the base of their prolonged operations. The Chinese had not been
wrong in suspecting their intentions after they had conquered Malacca on
their way for the first time to China. Gradually, the unwelcome visitors
succeeded in making their superior instruments of warfare prevail, and
found footings at Amoy, Foochow and Canton. But there again, they
behaved so intolerably that they were confined to the Peninsula of
Macao. The greatly different experience of China's early contacts with
modern Europe, firstly through the Jesuit missionaries, and later through
the Portuguese merchant-conquerors, shows that the attitude of China
was determined by the behaviour of the visitors. "Not content with trade,
the Europeans, from the first, treated the natives with cruelty, employed
high-handed methods and seized cities and land as bases for trade."7
Consequently, the Chinese could not be friendly disposed to visitors
whose motives were so evidently hostile.
After the Portuguese came the Spaniards with even greater over-bearance
towards non-European races, an attitude engendered by their conquest of
Mexico, Peru and subsequently the Philippine Islands. In view of the fact
that the Spaniards had brutally massacred the Chinese settlers at Manila,
they were very unwelcome in China. Their designs upon China were,
however, still less successful than those of the Portuguese. Nor were the
Dutch, who carne after the Spaniards, more successful in their venture. In
1622 they tried to capture Amoy, but were driven away. Thereafter they
settled on this island of Formosa, wherefrom they turned their attention
to Japan. Subsequently, the struggle with the English for the domination
of India and the concern for the possession of the Malay Archipelago
included the Dutch to leave China altogether.
88 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The period of systematic European aggression in China did not begin
until well after the English had appeared on the scene. Although English
traders had visited the Chinese coast ever since the beginning of the
seventeenth century, and had established small settlements under the
shelter of their cannon, they did not begin any concerted action until the
latter part of the following century. During those two hundred years, the
English were occupied with colonising America and conquering India.
At home, they were laying the foundation of modern imperialism. When
at last they turned their attention to China, the English were better
equipped for the job than their predecessors—the Portuguese, the
Spaniards and the Dutch. They began their operations in China not as
marauding bands of private adventurers, but as representatives of an
imperialist nation, with the full support of the home government. By the
conquest of India, they had created the pre-conditions for the success of
their venture in China.
The other serious menace to China was her relations with Russia, which
began in the latter part of the seventeenth century. The fall of the Ming
dynasty and the Manchu invasion plunged the country in chaos Taking
advantage of those conditions, Russia sought to annex Chinese
territories. The war between the two countries was brought to an end in
1689 by the mediation of the Jesuits. Under Peter the Great, Russia's
vision was diverted to the West, and her energies were concentrated upon
internal problems. For that reason, relations with China became friendly,
and there thrived a prosperous trade between the two countries. But in
the nineteenth century, Russia again changed her attitude, and she
became a leading factor in the general policy of foreign aggression in
China.
For two hundred years, the relations between China and the European
nations was (were) spasmodic. On the whole, it was not decisively
harmful to China. While politically their suspicion and hostility for the
European visitors were well founded, the policy of the ruling classes to
place restrictions upon trade in general was dictated by the social
structure of the country. It was necessary for maintaining the political
supremacy of the feudal aristocracy, the native Mings and the invading
Manchus alike. The reactionary policy of the Chinese ruling class served
as an ostensible justification for the use of violence by the Europeans to
secure the right of trade in China. On no pretext can the methods
employed by the Europeans be justified. The
Foreign Aggression 89
penetration, nevertheless, could have the objectively revolutionary
significance of an instrument for disrupting the reactionary feudal grip
upon Chinese national economy, if the European aggressors
subsequently did not back up the feudal ruling class against the native
forces of revolution.
The policy of European aggression in China was carried on by
supporting the feudal ruling class time and again against popular
upheavals—during the Taiping Revolt, the Boxer Rebellion, the struggle
for the Republic after the revolution of 1911, and the National
Revolution of the present time. Extraordinary rights were wrested from
the feudal ruling class, then the latter was helped to maintain its decayed
power so that foreigners could enjoy their privileged position with a
semblance of legality, and subject the masses to brutal exploitation. The
representatives of the European bourgeoisie did not attack the Chinese
feudal-patriarchal ruling class as such. They attacked it only in so far as
it hindered the expansion of their trade. As soon as they got what they
wanted, they allied themselves with the Chinese ruling class, for only
under an effete regime could they have special rights and privileges. So
the objectively revolutionary significance of the penetration of China by
modern capitalist trade was more than counterbalanced by the
consequence. The decayed feudal, semi-capitalist, national economy was
galvanised with the help of foreign imperialism.
It was in the nature of the feudal ruling class to be hostile to the
development of commercial activities. That was not a peculiar Chinese
characteristic. In Europe also, manufacturing industries and trade could
burst the bounds of feudal economy only after a bitter struggle of many
hundred years. The struggle in China was bound to be still more bitter
and protracted, owing to the fact that the natural conditions of production
there made the foundation of a higher form of economy very narrow and
shallow. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the early
European traders appeared on the Chinese coast, the national economy of
the country was still so delicately balanced that the slightest outside
interference would upset it. At that time, the Europeans had very little to
sell to the Chinese. They came mostly to buy Chinese manufactures
whose fame had reached Europe from the very ancient days. If export
trade was allowed unrestricted, increasing demands from abroad would
give impetus to manufacturing industries. Consequently, there would
take place a
90 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
displacement of labour. It would be withdrawn from the production of
food. And scarcity of foodgrains, indeed famine, with all its disastrous
outcome (revolution, overthrow of the ruling dynasty, and civil war),
threatened the country whenever there was the slightest disturbance of
the delicate equilibrium of national economy.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even later, the problem for the
ruling class of China was still to prevent the people from "wandering
away" from the land to "branch industries". Unrestricted admission of
foreign traders coming in quest of the product of Chinese handicraft,
would contribute to an expansion of this latter. That would draw more
and more labour away from the overcrowded land, whose production,
owing to the conditions under which it took place, left no surplus for the
producer after the share of the ruling class was paid. Handicraft
industries had grown in China from the very earliest days of history; they
served as an additional basis for the feudal-patriarchal social structure as
long as they remained inseparably allied with agriculture, as long as the
artisan remained primarily and essentially a peasant subjected to feudal
relations. But separation of the handicrafts from agriculture, as an
independent, new mode of production, would undermine the feudal-
patriarchal social organisation, just as it did in the countries of Europe.
Free exchange of commodities is the means for such a separation; the
coming of the European traders opened up greater possibilities for such
exchange. Therefore, the feudal State of China and its supporters sought
to place all kinds of obstacles to foreign traders entering the country.
The attitude of the ruling class was not of general hostility to foreigners
as such. It was the attitude of tottering feudalism towards the expansion
of trade which was sure to disrupt its decayed foundation. While the
Portuguese and the Spanish merchant-adventurers were repeatedly
expelled during the seventeenth century, the Jesuits had been freely
admitted and allowed to carry on their educational activities ever since
1583. That fact proved that the Chinese ruling class was not hostile to
foreigners as such. Further, the Jesuits were tolerated and even
patronised, whereas later on the Dominicans were expelled. The tolerant
attitude of the former towards the prejudices of the Chinese religious and
social institutions meant support for the feudal-patriarchal ruling class,
while the orthodoxy of the Dominicans contained a faint echo of the
Reformation in Europe, and therefore represented a threat to the position
of the Chinese ruling class, whose
Foreign Aggression 91
stability depended greatly upon the persistence of such socio-religious
customs as ancestor-worship. In other words, the social background of
the two sects of the Christian Church determined their respective
relations with the Chinese ruling class. Representing pure mediae-valism,
bitterly hostile to the Reformation, the Jesuits were welcomed in feudal
China. The Dominicans, on the contrary, were not tolerated, because they
were closer to the rising bourgeoisie and sympathised with the
Reformation. Objectively, they represented a menace to the stability of
the feudal-patriarchal ruling class. The social affiliation of the
Dominicans was reflected in their actions. Unlike the Jesuits, they
dabbled in the internal politics of China as the ideological pioneers of
nascent imperialism, whose armies, in the guise of mercantile brigands,
were battering on the doors of China.
A new impetus to the growth of modern industries would quicken the
development of the native bourgeoisie who, given the opportunity, might
eventually begin the struggle for political power. So, finally obliged, at
the point of guns, to grant European visitors the right to trade, the
Chinese ruling class placed all sorts of restrictions on the Chinese side.
Foreign trade was placed under the monopolist control of the feudal-
patriarchal State, just as the internal trade traditionally had been, It was
confined to one port. By an Imperial decree, issued in 1757, foreigners
were permitted to trade with China only at the port of Canton, and
obliged to deal exclusively with an official Board. The Board was headed
by a personal representative of the Emperer, whose business he
transacted.
Thus came into being the famous "Hong Merchants" who played such an
important role in China's early contacts with the modern world. The
compradores of our time are the descendants of the Hong merchants.
They became the parasitic medium of China's foreign trade. Growing out
of the feudal monopoly of foreign trade, the compradores even to-day
dominate the entire national economy of China as the connecting link
between imperialist finance and the largely pre-capitalist native
production.
China entered a higher stage of capitalist economy under the guidance of
non-producing traders, who remained an integral part of the feudal-
patriarchal State, and, by virtue of their new position, became the
instrument also of her exploitation by foreign imperialism. The contact
with the capitalist world, under such conditions, galvanised the fossilised
structure of Chinese society. It affected
92 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Chinese national economy only in one aspect, as far as distribution was
concerned. The basic aspect of national economy, namely, production,
continued in the old semi-feudal, semi-capitalist state. A revolutionised
system of distribution imposed upon a stagnant mode of production
meant greater exploitation of the producing masses. Internal trade had
developed on the basis of a largely pre-capitalist mode of production, by
depriving the producer not only of all his surplus produce, but also of a
considerable part of his necessary produce. In other words, reactionary
trades capitalism had grown within the scheme of feudal exploitation. At
that point, foreign traders intervened, greatly prejudicing the possibility
of Chinese national economy eventually bursting the bounds of feudal,
semi-capitalist, production, and entering the higher stage of industrial
capitalism. Foreign intervention had this reactionary effect upon Chinese
national economy: it strengthened the position of the classes which
obstructed revolutionisation of production. These classes were the feudal
aristocracy and the traders.
In the absence of an appreciable growth of production, expansion of
trade, caused by the contact with the world market, meant further
encroachment upon the necessary production of the country. The
producer was reduced to a position wherein he had still less possibility to
improve his means and mode of production. On the other hand, import of
articles manufactured abroad by mechanical means soon began to enter
the Chinese market, to destroy native handicraft. The peasant was pushed
back in the process of his evolution from a backward to a more advanced
stage of economy. The conditions for a revolutionary capitalist
development of the Chinese national economy had been maturing very
slowly and laboriously, owing to the disadvantageous natural conditions
of production. The process was further arrested by the forced contact of
Chinese national economy with the capitalist world market. Foreigners
could not make profit out of the Chinese trade except by hindering the
free development of the national economy of that country. That was so,
and still is largely so; the Chinese trade, both internal and foreign, is
distribution of commodities produced under largely pre-capitalist
conditions.
For nearly a century China's foreign trade was carried on under
monopolist conditions on both sides. At that time, European nations
carried on their overseas trade also through the great Chartered Com-
Foreign Aggression 93
panics, which eventually became founders of extensive empires. In the
earlier decades of the nineteenth century, China's contact with the world
market was practically monopolised by the British East India Company.
Thanks to their victory in India, the British drove the Dutch out of the
field. In 1833, the British Parliament abolished all monopoly rights in the
eastern trade. Development of capitalist production led to the
disappearance of the monopolist companies on the European side. Efforts
began to break down the barriers of monopoly also on Chinese side. A
revolution in the composition of the eastern trade made those efforts
necessary. Previously, European traders went to the eastern countries to
bring the products of their handicraft which were in great demand in
Europe. The payment was mostly made in precious metals and articles of
luxury. By the earlier part of the nineteenth century, the situation had
partially changed. At that time, tea and silk were the principal articles
brought from China, and the payment for them was made mostly in
opium grown in India, as a monopoly of the British Government. But the
revolution in trade had already begun. England was ready to export
manufactured goods, particularly cotton fabrics which are a staple
necessity of the East. She had already forcibly introduced her cotton
manufactures in India, and, in the process of acquiring the necessary
freedom of trade, had established an Empire. Now she turned her eyes
upon the vast masses of China. The feudal ruling class and the traders
allied with it thrived upon a system of national economy which
combined agriculture and handicraft into an indivisible whole. They were
normally hostile to the free admission into the country of goods which
were sure to disrupt the stagnant mode of native production. The hostility
was manifested in a letter of Emperor Chien Lung addressed to King
George III. The first English mission headed by Lord Macartney came to
China in 1793 with the object of "improving commercial relations
between the two countries." The English envoy was received in audience
by the Chinese Emperor who told the distinguished stranger that China
did not require anything from abroad; that she produced everything she
needed, but as Chinese products like tea, silk, porcelain etc., were
indispensable necesities in other countries, he would permit foreign
traders to come to buy these things in China.8
In 1813 a second British mission visited China. The result was no better.
After the abolition of the East India Company, England
94 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
took more energetic steps to secure the freedom of trade in China. Lord
Napier was sent to Canton "to supervise free trade, to open up China and
to assert national equality." He was expelled from Canton. The failure of
the Napier Mission led to the Opium War which was the beginning of a
concerned military aggression upon China. A controversy over the traffic
in opium was the immediate cause of the war, but the real cause was the
transformation of the character of trade. As long as the European traders
came to China to get her handicraft wares, they could deal with a special
body in certain specified places. But when they began to come with
manufactured goods to sell, and the nature of the goods was such as
made the Chinese authorities hostile to their free introduction in the
country, the European traders were no longer satisfied with the previous
position. Not only did they want to sell manufactured goods freely in
China. They no longer wanted to take handicraft wares from China
exclusively, but raw materials which could be transformed into manu-
factured articles in their home countries. The trade relations between
China and the industrial countries of Europe could no longer be restricted
by the arbitrary rules laid down in the letter of Emperor Chien Lung. As
the ruling class of China did not agree, the "freedom for peaceful trade"
must be conquered with violent means.
The English could oust other Europeans, particularly the Dutch, from the
Chinese market, because they had found a means of paying for the
articles exported from China. That was opium grown in India. As the
habit of smoking opium spread in China, the increasing volume of the
drug imported could not be paid with the export of commodities. The
scale of foreign trade turned against China. Previously foreign trade
represented a flow of treasure into China. It is estimated that during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries no less than 400 million silver
dollars reached China from Manila, the United States of America and
Japan. Large quantities of gold and silver also came from Siam and
Cochin China.9 From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
direction of the flow of treasure changed. Silver began to flow out of
China in payment for opium which could not be covered by the export of
commodities. During the half century preceding the first Anglo-Chinese
war of 1839, the East India Company had made a profit of 300 million
dollars from the opium trade.10 Obviously, opium trade was ruining
China.
The heavy drain of treasure brought State finance to the brink of
Foreign Aggression 95
collapse. Silver was the standard of exchange. Its price soared high.
Taxes collected in kind or in minute copper coins had to be converted
into silver before remission to the State Exchequer. The high price of
silver caused a heavy drop in the amount of State revenue. As the share
of the monarch could under no circumstances be reduced, the deficit had
to be made good by the native bankers and pawn-brokers who had the
monopoly of the conversion and transfer of the State revenue. Provincial
officials also participated in the business either as bribe-takers or as
actual share-holders. The two together had made huge profits previously;
now they began to complain and demanded that the State should take
measures to stop the drain of silver out of the country. The salt
monopolists were also injured. In response to the demand of those who
controlled the economic life of the country, and in view of the imminent
collapse of State finance, an imperial commissioner was sent to Canton
in 1839 with the instruction to suppress the opium trade. Canton was the
main centre of that pernicious traffic, although smaller quantities passed
also through other ports.
There was more than enough reason for the Government to take rigorous
measures for the suppression of the traffic. In addition to the grave
economic consequences of the traffic, opium was telling heavily upon
the moral stamina of the country. Practically all the State officials were
addicted to the vice; the consequence of that state of affairs was the
collapse of administration and prevalence of rank corruption.
According to an estimate made by the head of the British Colonial
Treasury, no less than twenty million people in China were given to the
vice.11 As few poor people could, afford the luxury except in cases of
extreme moral degeneration, the habit must have been confined to the
upper strata of society, in the first place, the officials participating in the
illegal traffic of the drug. Already in 1800, the import of opium had been
prohibited, and its cultivation in the country interdicted. But the traffic
went on in flagrant violation of the laws of the country. Hongkong
thrived as an opium smuggling centre. The balance of foreign trade had
been all along in favour of China. From 1830 it turned against her. Even
during the decade preceding the war, a favourable balance was
maintained in merchandise. But in consequence of the illegal opium
trade, the balance had really turned. A very heavy item of "invisible
export"
96 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
had entered into the calculation of China's international balance sheet.
The "invisible export" represented a copious drain of gold and silver as
illegal payment of the smuggled opium. The traffic in the pernicious drug
had gone to the extent where it injured not only the Chinese, it had even
become harmful to the interests of modern capitalism. More far-sighted
observers began to complain and advocated the abolition of opium trade.
A high official of the Colonial Treasury wrote from Hongkong: "The
drain of silver for opium has without doubt checked the trade between
England and China, and by impoverishing the Chinese has prevented the
sale of our manufactures."12 Imperialism was outgrowing the early period
of sheer robbery. Treasure drained out of India and China in that earlier
period had aided the industrial revolution in Britain. Now the operation
of imperialism should take a different form, that of finding markets for
the goods manufactured at home. The new period was the period of free
trade; and the wars that were waged against China to defend the
immediate interest of the opium trader had for their broader object the
conquest of market and acquisition of the sources of raw material. They
laid the foundation of modern imperialism in China.
On his arrival in Canton, the Imperialism Commissioner acted according
to his mandate. He prohibited all importation of opium and ordered the
destruction of the stock held by foreign traders. The latter refused to
comply with his orders. Thereupon the Chinese seized the contraband by
force; it was thoroughly within their competence to do so. About twenty
thousand chests of opium were seized and destroyed. The English traders
were not personally molested, although they had insolently resisted the
orders of the Government. They were allowed to go away. They called
upon the Home Government for help. England declared war upon China-
a war which had less justification than any other war ever waged. The
result could be foreseen. Possessing superior means of warfare, the
invaders easily captured a number of important ports, and their navy
sailed up the Yangtse.
The appeal from the opium smugglers was only the pretext which the
British Government had been looking for to declare war upon China with
an object much bigger than the protection of opium trade. That was
proved by the Treaty of Nanking which brought the war to an end. The
main demands of England, conceded by the treaty, were the cession of
Hongkong, the opening of five ports (Canton,
Foreign Aggression 97
Amoy, Foochow, Nimpoo and Shanghai) for free trade, extraterritorial
rights for British subjects, and an indemnity of twenty-one million
dollars. The question of opium was not even so much as touched in the
treaty. Yet that was the ostensible cause of the war.
When the foreign bourgeoisie, on the strength of the gains of the
industrial and economic revolution at home, were battering down the
forbidding walls of feudal China, great forces inside the country were
also marshalling themselves to overthrow the decayed old order. The
defeat of China in the first serious conflict with a foreign power exposed
the impotence of the Manchu monarchy. It encouraged popular
discontent to flare up into a gigantic revolution which might have
consumed old China, and a new China might have risen out of the ashes.
How a great revolution was suppressed with the willing aid of foreign
intruders, will be described in the following chapter. Here, only this
much can be observed that the defeat of the Taiping Revolt was mainly
the result of foreign intervention, and that unfortunate event gave another
lease of life to decrepit mediaevalism in China. The foreign invaders
represented a more progressive social class, and smarted under the
restrictions of feudal China. Nevertheless, in a critical moment, they
sided with the forces of reaction.
It is easier to write a treaty than to enforce it. A stubborn resistance to the
Treaty of Nanking was put up by the Cantonese. The resistance led to
another war in which England was not alone. Meanwhile, France had
entered the scene, and Russia had begun aggressive activities in the
North. The war of 1857-60 represented an international aggression upon
China. The United States of America also joined in, though not directly.
The accomplishment of the invading forces will always remain a
classical example of modern vandalism. The privileges ceded to the
invaders by the Treaty of Nanking were nothing as compared to those
wrested by the Convention of Peking, signed after the sepond war. In
addition to the sea-ports, the Yangtse also was opened to foreign trade;
the right of extra-territoriality for all foreigners was more clearly defined
in their favour; Christian missionaries got the freedom to go all over the
country as pioneers of economic penetration and political conquest by
their respective nations; the Chinese Government was deprived of the
right to levy customs duty higher than five per cent; and to all these, a
heavy indemnity in cash was added. During the war, France had taken
possession of Cochin China, to which she added Annam in
98 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
1883. Britain appropriated a belt of territory on the main land opposite to
the island of Hongkong. To Russia was ceded the entire maritime
province north of the Amur. The territorial aggression, thus commenced,
continued until China lost her sovereignty all but in name, and was split
up into the so-called "spheres of influence" of the different imperialist
powers.
Japan entered the list in 1871, casting hungry glances at the kingdom of
Korea which she eventually annexed. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894
and the Treaty of Shimonoseki which concluded it marked the
culmination of the period of foreign aggression—the period of forcing
open the doors of China for unrestricted penetration of imperialist trade.
During that period, all the outlying parts of the Chinese Empire had been
grabbed by foreign Powers. The method of seizing those extensive
territories was sheer robbery. The spoliation of Chinese territories is a
long, woeful, but familiar tale. It need not be detailed here more than
pointing out that, at the end of the nineteenth century, China had lost
entire Indo-China to France, Burma to Britain, Korea to Japan and all the
territories north of the Amur to Russia. Moreover, Turkestan and
Mongolia had been practically annexed by Russia; Tibet by Britain; and
the right to dominate Manchuria was disputed by Russia and Japan. Even
China proper was as good as annexed by international imperialism, the
right of extra-territoriality having given foreigners the proud status of
conquerors. On the basis of that right, acquired by the violation of all
international law and usage, there had grown inside the territories, where
Chinese sovereignty still existed nominally, a sort of small "imperium in
imperio". The Foreign Settlements, entirely independent of any Chinese
authority, had come into existence as so many strategic bases for further
operation against what still remained as a semblance of Chinese
sovereignty. Small areas, originally conceded for the settlement of
foreigners in each Treaty Port, had assumed the character of so many
outposts of imperialism.
The encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty stopped short of actual
annexation only owing to the rivalry amongst the imperialist Powers. In
the case of India, England was alone. The mediaeval Empires of the
Portuguese, Dutch and French collapsed in consequence of the decay of
their bases in the home countries. When India was conquered, England
was the only country which possessed the preconditions of modern
imperialism. But towards the end of the
Foreign Aggression 99
nineteenth century, other countries also attained a similar stage.
Consequently, China could not go the way of India, although most of
the pioneering work for her conquest had been done by the English.
She became a colony of international imperialism. That is the specific
feature of modern China; it greatly influences her economic and
political life.
Until the Sino-Japanese war, the inter-imperialist rivalry was not
pronounced. All the Christian Powers were united in their aggression
upon China. There was no serious friction over the partition of out-
lying territories. The question of partitioning China proper was raised
by the result of the Sino-Japanese war. Japan annexed the Liaotung
Peninsula; the Treaty of Shimonoseki marked the beginning of the
famous scramble for concessions. The United States of America also
intervened as an active factor. Ever since the acquisition of the
Philippine Islands, the Americans began to take more interest in the
affairs of China. American intervention started with the famous Hay
Doctrine of "open door". Divested of its diplomatic dubiousness, the
doctrine meant that Uncle Sam also wanted his share of the Chinese
spoils. It was the precursor of American hegemony in China, an
object realised after a quarter century. But at the time the doctrine was
formulated, American imperialism was still in its infancy. It could not
assert itself in the situation effectively. The scramble for concessions
went on feverishly to the extent of threatening the dismemberment of
the territorial integrity of China, in spite of the hypocritical
acceptance of the Hay Doctrine by all the Powers.
The possibility of the annexation of China by any one single Power
being out of the question, due to the presence of so many aspirants,
colonisation of China took the form of creating "spheres of
influence". The resistance to the out and out annexation of China no
longer came from China herself. She could be easily disposed of by
any imperialist invader. Formal annexation was prevented by the
rivalry amongst the imperialist Powers. The design on the part of any
one Power to annex China was sure to provoke inter-imperialist war.
So long as the rivalry was amongst the Christian Powers, any such
conflict was ruled out. Finally, Japan appeared on the scene, and by
her victory over Russia demonstrated her power. Thereupon, the
paramount Christian Power entered into a partnership with the
heathen upstart, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance since then regulated
inter-imperialist rivalry in the Far East until the tragic consequences
100 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of the world war upset the old balance of power. The Hay Doctrine, at
last, asserted itself effectively. In the Washington Conference of 1921,
American imperialism dictated the termination of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance. Under the conditions of an armed truce amongst themselves, the
imperialist Powers jointly subjected China to colonial exploitation.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the nature of China's foreign trade
had entirely changed. The balance of trade had definitely turned against
her. She no longer exported handicraft wares in return for gold and
silver. Even opium had lost its predominance in Chinese imports. It had
been replaced by cotton textiles. China had become a real colony,
exporting agricultural products in exchange for goods manufactured in
other countries. In 1900, the value of her total foreign trade had risen to
270 million dollars; in half a century, it had nearly quadrupled itself. By
far the greater part of the trade was in the hands of the English.
Meanwhile, industry had developed in other countries also. The colonial
trade could no longer be carried on the principle of free trade.
Monopolisation of market through the acquisition of colonies had
become a necessity. Capitalism had developed into modern imperialism.
The leading industrial countries of the world had begun to export
increasing amounts of capital, in addition to the export of manufactured
goods, with the object of enlarging the market for the latter.
At the end of the nineteenth century, China had been subjected to the
operation of modern imperialism. The policy of acquiring concessions
for the construction of railways and exploitation of minerals had replaced
the older policy of sheer plunder and open territorial aggression. The
location of the concessions acquired by the imperialist powers marked
their respective spheres of influence.
England, as the paramount Power, laid a heavy hand on the entire
Yangtse Valley, the centre of the economic life of China. Russia laid
claim to Turkestan, Outer Mongolia and Northern Manchuria, in addition
to the extensive territories she had actually annexed previously. Japan's
share was South Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and the province of Fukien
facing the island of Formosa. France appropriated Yunan, Kwangtung
and the adjoining territories of the South. Lastly, Germany took
Shantung. The United States of America, still occupied with the
enormous task of conquering a Continent and consolidating its position
in the New World, did not require any
Foreign Aggression 101
concession in China. It was still an agricultural country itself;
accumulated capital found plenty of profitable investment at home.
Indeed, America was still a debtor country; she borrowed capital. So the
American attitude towards China was that of a liberal lawyer holding a
watching brief—an attitude which was very useful for the gradual
conquest of the position of hegemony which she occupies in China to-
day.
After a considerable portion of the accumulated wealth had been drained
out of the country in the period of plunder, China found herself obliged
to accept foreign capital on very unfavourable conditions for the
improvement of her means of transport and exploitation of mineral
resources. Even that was not to be done in accordance with the needs of
her entire national economy, but for the promotion of imperialist trade.
The turn of the balance of foreign trade against her created a situation in
which she was obliged to grant extensive concessions for loans forced
upon her. The deficit in the balance of foreign trade made her indebted to
the countries selling her manufactured goods. The very narrow margin of
her surplus production made it impossible for her to liquidate the
indebtedness by increasing export. A rapid development of her national
economy through the introduction of the mechanical means of
production had been made well-nigh impossible by the drain of her
accumulated wealth. Previously, she had endeavoured to arrest the
importation of outlandish commodities as a measure to prevent this
critical state of affairs. But her door had been forced open in the sacred
name of the free exchange of commodities. The great harm done to her in
that process had placed her in a position wherein the exchange, as far as
she was concerned, was no longer free. It meant colonial subjugation,
though the chains might be of gold. China could square her accounts
with the foreign countries trading with her only by accepting from them
as loan the sums necessary to cover the deficit in her balance of overseas
trade. And as a country not able to pay for the goods she purchased
(although not voluntarily) her international credit sank so low that she
could not get forced loans except in return for valuable concessions
which represented not only great economic loss, but further
encroachment on what little was left of her political sovereignty.
The exhausting drain of the accumulated wealth, the loss of extensive
territories, and practical forfeiture of political sovereignty
102 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
were followed by something much more serious than all of these taken
together. It was the subordination of her entire national economy to the
interests of imperialist trade and finance. The consequence of that
position was economic stagnation and impoverishment of the people.
Imperialist Powers acquired extensive concessions for the exploitation of
minerals and construction of railways, but actually accomplished only
very little. Exporting the greater part of their surplus capital to other
fields, where competition was keener, they held China as the reserve.
Mutual suspicion prevented the imperialist Powers from making practical
use of the vast concessions they acquired at the expense of helpless
China. They failed to improve sufficiently the means of transport, so
very essential for their own interest—for the development of trade. Being
a joint colony of international imperialism, China could not even have
the indirect benefit that accrued from colonial exploitation. In the
colonies monopolised separately by the imperialist Powers modern
means of transport were introduced extensively; but in the case of China
they did very little in that direction. Here, they limited their "civilising"
mission to the most minimum necessary for carrying on a fair amount of
trade, such as, modern shipping facilities in a few ports and short
distance railways or steam navigation as feeder services. They were
averse to investing capital in constructing extensive systems of railways
as for example in India; because, under the given conditions, they could
not serve exclusively the monopolist interest of the particular Power
making the investment. The sources of raw materials to be made
accessible, and markets opened, by such enterprises would be inevitably
shared by rival Powers. That would be a violation of the very principle of
colonial exploitation which is monopoly. In China the contradictions of
imperialism stood out in their crassest form.
The backwardness of the means of transport places tremendous
restrictions on trade in China. For example, it costs much more to bring a
certain quantity of wheat to Hankow from Shensi, only three hundred
miles away, than from the United States or Canada or Australia.
Anthracite coal is sold in Shanghai at twenty dollars a ton, but it is
extracted in Shansi for a few cents. The great difference represents
largely the cost of transport. In such primitive conditions of transport,
trades capital thrives in close collaboration with feudal privileges, and
national economy is broken up into isolated local markets, dominated by
the semi-feudal trader. He greatly hinders the
 Foreign Aggression 103
development of production which actually stagnates. Twenty men's
labour Is wasted to bring into the export market the produce of one man's
labour. Consequently, the producer gets the smallest fraction of the value
created by his labour, a very large part being appropriated by the
parasitic trader who brings the commodities to the export market.
Modern means of transport would eliminate the parasitic middleman,
thereby increasing imperialist profit. Nevertheless, construction of
railways and other modern means of transport has proceeded very very
slowly in China. The present mileage is like a mere drop in the ocean.
Imperialist Powers holding concessions for railway building sat tight on
their stakes, waiting for the time when monopolist operation might be
possible. Meanwhile, the economic life of China stagnated, and the
imperialist booty contained a large element of forced labour. Inherent
contradictions obliged imperialism to fall back upon a mode of
production which militated against its own interest. In China imperialism
plays the dog in the manger.
The service of forced loans was placed under the control of banks
belonging to the creditor nationalities. Thus, the State revenues of China
were mortgaged to imperialism. Those banks gradually captured the
entire credit system of the country. Foreign trade being controlled by
those powerful banking institutions, native banks financing the internal
trade (as well as the internal transit of foreign trade both ways) also came
under their domination. Consequently, imperialist finance could dictate
the employment of native capital. Chinese traders, who brought the
native product from the remotest corners of the country to the ports, for
export, and carried the commodities of foreign origin to all parts of the
country, received ample credit and protection from the foreign banks.
But by the control of credit, the foreign banks put all kinds of obstacles
in the way of the the Chinese taking to industrial pursuits. In other
words, foreign domination of the Chinese national economy was secured
and maintained through the encouragement of reactionary, non-
productive, parasitic, trades capital which was an obstacle to a normal
capitalist development of the country.
The modern Chinese bourgeoisie grew largely out of the contact with the
imperialist Powers. They are the descendants of the Hong merchants. So
very closely linked up with the imperialist exploitation of the country,
they cannot promote any substantial improvement of national economy.
It is true that lately they are turning their attention
104 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
to industrial enterprises; but in these too they are dominated by
imperialist finance. Imperialist interest, which previously restricted them
to trade, now can permit them to travel a little in the new direction. In
any case, they are but instruments of imperialism. As an independent
factor, they are too weak to be assertive. Their revolutionary industrial
tendencies are overwhelmed by the more fundamental and dominating
trading function which is fostered by imperialism.
To what a great extent imperialism dominates the national economy of
China, is shown by the following facts. For the payment of the interest
on the Boxer Indemnity (450 million taels) and for the services of other
foreign loans, important items of State revenue such as railways, salt
gabelle and customs are pledged. 13 This by itself would not be so
objectionable, if the collection, custody and administration of the
revenues were not in the hands of foreigners. As these items cover about
half of the entire State budget, their mortgage is extremely prejudicial to
the whole system of State finance, and consequently seriously affects the
entire national economy.
Out of the 7700 miles of railways, nearly 7000 miles are owned by
foreigners, and the concession rights held by them preclude any
extensive construction of railways by the Chinese, even if they had the
resources necessary for the purpose. Foreign claims are staked almost on
all the known mineral deposits of the country. Only twenty-seven per
cent of the iron ore extracted belongs to Chinese concerns which, in their
turn, are financially controlled by foreign banks. Fourteen out of the
eighteen blast furnaces are owned by foreigners. Nearly half of the coal
is dug by Chinese concerns; but as coal is mostly exported, the whole
industry is controlled by banks financing foreign trade. Further, owing to
the lack of capital and credit, Chinese concerns extract coal with very
primitive methods. These methods are largely in operation also in
concerns directly owned by foreigners. They represent a pre-capitalist
form of exploitation. A few foreign banks with a total capital of 80
million pounds control the entire foreign trade of China and a very
considerable portion of the internal trade. They also dominate the State
finance. About eighty per cent of China's foreign trade is in the hands of
foreign shipping companies. A very considerable portion of river
shipping is also done in foreign vessels.
Had not foreign imperialism been so deeply involved in the
 Foreign Aggression 105
present conditions of Chinese national economy, it would not intervene
in the internal affairs of the country whenever there was any serious
threat to the established order. Foreign interests placed insurmountable
obstacles to any appreciable economic development of China. The
imperialist Powers then adopted the infamous ''gunboat policy" to hold
the unfortunate country in her present state of stagnation. The imperialist
exploitation of China takes place through the subordination of a largely
pre-capitalist mode of production to the highly developed capitalist
world market. Therefore, imperialism is vitally interested to maintain in
China a social organisation in which pre-capitalist production takes place
in direct contact with, and under the domination of, the capitalist world
market. Time and again, imperialism has openly played this sinister role.
It helped the suppression of the Taiping Revolt which promised to give
birth to a modern democratic China. It drowned the Boxer Rebellion in
torrents of blood, although that also was essentially a great democratic
movement. It captured the control of the customs during the troubled
days following the revolution of 1911, as a measure directed against the
young Republic. It helped the rank reactionary Yuan Shi-kai in his fight
against the democratic movement, and encouraged him in the abortive
attempt to restore the monarchy. It backed up the feudal war lords who
plunged the country in the bloody chaos of protracted civil war with the
object of preventing the rise of a democratic China which might not be
fully subservient to foreign capital. It helped the feudal militarists against
the nationalist bourgeoisie when the latter, under the pressure of the
masses, fought for revolutionary democratic freedom. More than once, it
massacred the masses when they protested against brutal exploitation and
intolerable conditions. Finally, it took the nationalist bourgeoisie under it
protecting wings as soon as they had betrayed the national revolution and
turned fiercely against the democratic masses. The record of imperialism
in China is black indeed.
Notes
1. T.T. Meadows, "The Chinese and Their Rebellions".
2. Morrison, "The Chinese Repository".
3. Monroe, "China: A Nation in Evolution".
4. "Only after display of that manner and of shocking cruelty was he (the early
European trader) relegated to one trading centre". (Monroe, "China: A Nation in
Evolution.")
106 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
5. Repi. rt of the Canton Mandarins to the Emperor.
6. Ibid.
7. Monroe, "China: A Nation in Evolution."
8. "As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no
value on ol jects strange and ingenious, and have no use for your country's
manufacture. But as tea, silk and porcelain, which the Celestial Empire
produce", are absolute necessities to European nations, we have permitted as
signal of favour that foreign Hongs should be established at Canton, so that your
want might be supplied and your country thus participate in our beneficence."
(Letter of the Emperor Chien Lung to King George III.)
9. Montgomery Martin, Report to the Home Government, 1842.
10. Monroe, "China: A Nation in Evolution."
11. Montgomery Martin, "Commercial, Financial and Social Conditions in
China".
12. Ibid.
13. Including the Boxer Indemnity, China's foreign indebtedness amounts
approximately to 215 million pounds, the actual payment to be made on the
maturity of the loan is as much as 350 million pounds. (J.R. Baylin, "Foreign
Loan Obligations of China"). Considering that China has an average annual
deficit of about 20 million pounds in the balance of foreign trade, and that her
budgeted revenue is less than 50 million pounds—not enough to cover the
national expenditure—this foreign indebtedness represents complete
colonisation of the country.
 CHAPTER V
THE TAIPING REVOLT
The bourgeois democratic revolution, subverting feudal relations and
establishing the capitalist social order, did not take place at the same time
even in the countries which, thanks to that experience, stood at the van of
modern imperialism. It covered a whole period of history—about four
hundred years. Beginning in the fifteenth century, with the rise of the
Italian Republics, it continued through centuries, until the Paris
Commune of 1871 opened up the era of proletarian revolution. The
outstanding landmarks left by that rising tide of bourgeois democracy,
were the European Reformation and the Peasant War in Germany, the
English Revolution of 1648-88, the Great French Revolution and the
revolutions of 1848. Even when capitalism developed into imperialism,
and ceased to be a revolutionary force in a number of countries, the
historic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution were still to be
accomplished elsewhere. The world, taken as a whole, entered the epoch
of the proletarian social revolution, when the bourgeois democratic
revolution was not yet completed in many countries. In the period of the
transition of human society from one historic epoch to another, certain
features of both overlapped. For example, the Russian Revolution of
1905 was essentially a bourgeois democratic revolution, although it was
greatly influenced by the proletariat; and the bourgeois democratic
revolution was not fully accomplished in Russia until 1917 when the
proletariat captured political power to begin the reconstruction of society
on the basis of socialism. Earlier or later occurrence of the bourgeois
democratic revolution in the various parts of the world was determined
by the grade of their economic development.
108 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The much-maligned, misinterpreted and little understood Taiping Revolt
represented the entrance of China into the period of the bourgeois
democratic revolution. Slow development of the capitalist mode of
production was the cause of the delay. But, after all, it was not so very
late. Europe was still fighting the battles of bourgeois democracy, when
the revolution began in China. The bourgeois democratic revolution
continued in Europe still later in the form of the national liberation
movements in Hungary, Poland and Italy. It was not accomplished in
Russia until as late as 1917. When the historic character of the Taiping
Revolt is properly appreciated, it becomes evident how rank reactionary
was the action of the Christian Powers in helping its suppression.
It is entirely misleading to apply the standard of the nineteenth century
political ideas in judging the historic character of the Taiping Revolt. By
tracing the history of the entire period of the bourgeois democratic
revolution, one detects a progressive clarification of its social outlook
and political doctrines. Judged by the standard of the "Republic of
Reason", established by the Great French Revolution, the democratic
State of the Venetian merchants can hardly be recognised as the
beginning of the new era. The fathers of the First Reform Bill, in their
hearts, did not approve of the puritanism of Oliver Cromwell, who also
believed in the divine inspiration as did the Taiping Wang. Nor did a
Thiers believe any more in the "Golden Age" of Jean Jacques Rousseau.
Still less did Miliukoff or Kerenski consider himself to be a socio-
political progeny of Pugat-cheff, who already in 1773, as the leader of a
mighty peasant uprising, had made the first serious on-slaught on Tzarist
absolutism. The German Constituent Assembly, either of 1848 or of
1919, certainly did not find the scholastic dogmas of Martin Luther
correspond to its principles of democracy. Still all those people were
actors in the same great drama of history, appearing in different scenes
which were separated often by centuries. Only such a retrospective view
of history as a dynamic process enables one to appreciate correctly the
character of the Taiping Revolt.
The peasant revolt and the strivings of young capitalism to expand, are
the two basic factors which sooner or later lead to the bourgeois
democratic revolution. The task of bourgeois democratic revolution is to
oust feudal aristocracy from political power and to create legal
conditions favourable for the rapid growth of the capitalist
 The Taiping Revolt 109
mode of production. Both the factors help the accomplishment of the
task. The progress and the ultimate success of the revolution are
determined by the maturity of both. In a later stage, still another factor
enters the struggle and plays the decisive part in the realisation of the
final victory. It is the working class. But that, in its turn, is conditional
upon the maturity of one of the basic factors, namely, capitalism. The
initial stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Europe, marked by
the rise of the Italian Republics, was brought about mainly by the
operation of capitalism. The second factor entered the list with the
outbreak of the Peasant War in Germany. The third factor did not assert
itself until the Great French Revolution, although it had already
influenced history indirectly in England. The bourgeois democratic
revolution reached the period of decisive victory only after the third
factor had become actively operative.
The unevenness of the process, in which these factors attained maturity,
conditioned the beginning and the tempo of development of the
revolution in different countries. In some the revolution began earlier
than in others, but could not go farther than a certain stage. It was even
thrown back. In others it compromised with the feudal aristocracy. In the
rest, it began late, but its victory was decisive. That uneven development
was caused by the existence, evolution and operation of the revolutionary
classes in a greater or smaller degree. The Italian Republics practically
disappeared from the political scene after they had marked the beginning,
because they were confined in so many cities thriving on trade carried on
by a class of people having no direct connection with production which
took place in other and often far off countries. They had not grown out of
the dynamic surge of a peasant revolt, nor did their economic
organisation contain the germs of the proletariat. They were built upon
trades capital, and ceased to be the vanguard of the revolution as soon as
the industrial bourgeoisie appeared on the scene elsewhere. As this new
and more powerful factor came into existence in other countries, the
centre of the revolution was shifted from the Italian Republics, on which
dropped the curtain of history.
The Peasant War in Germany represented the maturity of the second
factor involved in the bourgeois democratic revolution. It also failed to
create the new order, because of the weakness of the other factor. In the
early sixteenth century, capitalism was still too weak
110 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
in Central Europe to take up a decisive fight against the feudal
aristocracy. So much so that its ideologist, Martin Luther, vehemently
condemned the revolutionary peasant uprising. In England, feudal
aristocracy saved much of its power and privileges by flirting with the
fickle goddess of democracy after she had beheaded a king. Owing to
that compromise, the bourgeois democratic revolution was never
completed in England. The revolution was not supported by a peasant
uprising, nor was the proletariat developed enough to prevent democracy
from selling herself to the aristocratic gallant, and to encourage her to
demand the head not of an individual, but of an entire class as was done
in France one hundred years later. In France, the revolution reached the
climax. All the three factors were operation. Therefore it triumphed.
The Taiping Revolt was a bourgeois democratic revolution in the stage in
which it is based mainly upon one factor, the other two being still very
undeveloped. It was that earlier stage of the bourgeois democratic
revolution which was represented by the Peasant War in Germany. Its
religious appearance and communist deviations obscured its social
character for the undiscerning or prejudiced eye. Such appearance and
deviations, however, are the specific features of a bourgeois democratic
revolution in a certain stage, under certain conditions.
The Peasant War in Germany was also an intensely religious movement,
and manifested strong tendencies to primitive communism. That was also
the case with the English revolution. Those tendencies were noticed even
in the numerous peasant uprisings that immediately preceded the French
Revolution. The democratic character of the Taiping Revolt is disputed
because it strove to set up a monarchy with a strong theocratic tinge.
That resulted from the religious appearance of the movement, and would
have faded away in course of time. Indeed, there was a great difference
of opinion among the Taiping leaders on this question. Monarchy might
not have been a transitory feature. It is not very likely that Republic
would have arisen out of the Taiping Revolt, had it been successful.
Complete overthrow of the monarchy, however, is not necessarily a part
of the programme of bourgeois democratic revolution, so long as it does
not come under the decisive influence of the working class as distinct
from the peasantry. To limit the power of the monarch, to take him out of
the reactionary setting of the feudal court, and to place him under
 The Taiping Revolt 111
the control of the rising capitalist class—these are the aspirations of the
bourgeois democratic revolution. That is so because the bourgeois
democratic revolution does not disturb private property. It simply
changes the relations of property. The king is the traditional symbol of
private property. The abolition of kingship, therefore, is a sinister omen
which frightens the goddess of bourgeois democracy. She would have
happily shared the crown with the Capets, had not the Parisian proletariat
put a red cap on her head, and kept her away from the corrupting
atmosphere of Versailles. In all other cases, until the Russian Revolution
of 1917 and the German Revolution of the following year, democracy
simply constitutionalised monarchy.
Thus, it is only prejudice and ignorance of history which disputed the
democratic character of the Taiping Revolt. Its monarchist tendency is
justifiable from yet another point of view. In addition to being a
bourgeois democratic movement, the Taiping Revolt was also a struggle
for national liberation. Hence its desire to set up national monarchy in
the place of the foreign dynasty. Moreover, the Taiping monarchy,
notwithstanding its circumstantial theocratic tinge, was limited, for all
practical purposes, though not constitutional, in the modern sense. The
mistake is to take it out of the setting of history and to regard history not
as a dynamic process of social evolution, but as a mechanical chronology
of facts.
A recollection of the outstanding features of the Peasant War in Germany
and their comparison with the main features of the Taiping Revolt makes
the social and historical significance of the latter clear. They both
represented the same stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution. The
famous Twelve Articles of Memmingen contained such demands as
limitation of feudal exactions, restoration of common land, free use of
the woods for the purposes of hunting, abolition of forced labour,
payment of wages for all labour performed, election of the pastor by the
community, abolition of death dues payable by the peasants, and only
one tax on corn. All these demands obviously were directed against the
privileged position of the feudal lords, spiritual as well as temporal.
Judged from the point of view of their basic significance, not only the
demands of the movement but the measures introduced in the Taiping
kingdom as well, were also directed against the power and privileges of
the landed aristocracy. Being an acute outburst of the movement
generally known as Reformation, the Peasant War in Germany was
heavily coloured with
112 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
religion. One of its most outstanding leaders was the Anabaptist Thomas
Muenzer. The peasants were inspired by a picture of primitive
communism held out before them on the authority of the Holy Scriptures.
Certain measures introduced by the Taipings were also communistic. The
measures reflecting the interests of nascent capitalism, however, were
more pronounced. On that token, the Taiping Revolt was even somewhat
more advanced than the Peasant War in Germany. In it the second factor
of the bourgeois democratic revolution, namely, capitalism, was more in
operation than in its European prototype. And precisely for that reason, it
held out so long and came so near to success, while the Peasant War in
Germany was so short-lived. Indeed, both the first and second factors of
the bourgeois democratic revolution were sufficiently mature in China
when the Taiping Revolt took place. But for the imperialist intervention,
the forces of revolution in China might have overwhelmed decrepit
feudalism and overthrown the corrupt monarchy.
The outstanding features of the great insurrection in China were
religiosity, tendency towards primitive communism, antagonism to the
landowning class, fierce hatred for the Manchu dynasty, efforts to
promote trade and industry, friendly attitude towards foreigners, and a
general social outlook decidedly liberal as compared to the prevailing
conditions of the country. Though noted for their war-likeness, the
Taipings were fervent advocates of peace. The very name of their
movement signified that. They named the territories under their control
"Tai-Ping-tien-kuo", which means "Heavenly Empire of Peace". They
were merciless towards their enemies. But once these had been
overwhelmed, they introduced measures under which all could live in
peace, Theirs was a brotherhood of man, inspired by certain teachings of
primitive Christianity, more or less on the pattern of the English
Roundheads. They proclaimed common ownership of land. Artisans
produced articles which were distributed under the supervision of the
State. The guiding principle of social economy was to provide equitably
for all and to have a reserve for the time of war and other calamities.
Educational reforms were also enforced. Under the Manchus, learning
was the privilege of the official classes. In the Taiping kingdom, people's
schools were opened, and even higher education was accessible to all.
Opium smoking was heavily penalised; slavery was abolished, and
prostitution forbidden. In religion, the Taiping movement was against
idolatry; politically, it was anti-Manchu; and socially, communistic.
 The Taiping Revolt 113
This brief summary of the principles, character and achievements of the
Taiping insurrection clearly shows that it was essentially a democratic
movement. Resembling the Peasant War in Germany in broad outlines, it
nevertheless came nearer to the subsequent stages of the bourgeois
democratic revolution. It fell short of the very last stages, because the
proletariat was still very weak in China. On the other hand, it had to meet
the opposition of an extraneous force which itself had grown out of the
bourgeois democratic revolution in other countries, namely, imperialism.
The weakness of the capitalist mode of production, and consequently of
the class connected with it, the immaturity amounting to practical
absence of the proletariat which also resulted from the inadequate
development of the capitalist mode of production, and lastly foreign
intervention—all these contributed to the defeat of the first great
movement which objectively tended towards the creation of a modern
China.
The Christian Powers, without whose aid reaction might not have
triumphed in China, were shocked by Hung Hsiu-tsung's1 claim to divine
inspiration. They considered it to be a flagrant violation of Christianity, a
quaint version of which the rebels professed. The Christian missionaries
looked upon him as a heretic like Jeanne d'Arc, and had the governments
of their respective countries stamp him out as barbarously and
unscrupulously as England had done with the mediaeval apostle of
French nationalism. Many other fore-runners of the bourgeois
democratic revolution in Europe also claimed to act on scriptural
authority and under divine inspiration. Towards the end of the fifteenth
century, Hans Boehm led the attack against mediaeval social order,
reared upon the twin pillars of the Church and feudalism, claiming to
have received the mission directly from Virgin Mary. Tha wide-spread
peasant revolts, which constituted the background of the Reformation,
also claimed divine ordinance from Virgin Mary and Saint John.
Muenzer led the rebellious peasantry in a war of death and destruction
equally with the belief that he was obeying the will of God
communicated directly to him. And finally, Oliver Cromwell declared
that he had personal counsel with, and received direct communication
from, God. He should have been sent to the stake as a heretic. In view of
these facts, it is evident that the charge against the Taiping emperor that
he was profaning the Christian Scriptures was only a pretext for a very
mundane action on the part of the Christian Powers. It was a pretext for
crushing a
114 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
movement, the essentially progressive and democractic character of
which markedly counter-balanced its transitory mediaeval and
superstitious features.
Even some of the Christian missionaries and European observers were
themselves forced to recognise the progressive and democratic character
of the Taiping movement. The English missionary Medhurst, who visited
Nanking and saw the Taipings in action from close quarters, wrote: "The
advantages to be anticipated from the success of the insurgents are the
opening of the country to religious and commercial enterprise, and the
introduction of scientific developments which will benefit both the giver
and the receiver. It would be sad to see Christian nations engaged in
putting down the movement, as the insurgents possess an energy and a
tendency to improvement and general reform. Should the imperialists
(Manchus), unaided by foreigners, prevail over the insurgents, of which
there seems little probability, they would become much more exclusive
and insolent."2 That is the evidence of an eye-witness who had no reason
to be preju- -diced in favour of the rebels. The evidence clearly proves
the democratic character of the rebellion. The religious preoccupation
and communistic deviations were but passing features, growing out of
the general social and cultural setting in which the movement took place.
In course of time, they were sure to be over-whelmed by the basic force
of the revolution, which was the new mode of production seeking the
freedom of development. That development would surely bring in its
train an expansion of trade, political progress, liberal social outlook and
disappearance of religious superstition.
Another foreign observer, who visited the Taiping capital as the
interpreter of the first British Expedition (1853), found the insurgents to
be men who were free from the feudal haughtiness which was such a
pronounced characteristic of the Chinese imperial officials. He reported
that the rebel leaders were men "who had all the natural sagacity and all
the acquired knowledge that was requisite to the organisation of a potent
government system." He found among them "men who have been able to
get an education, but are now at once poor, ambitious and friendless;
men once wealthy as well as learned, but who have been ruined by
Mandarin oppression; and men who have education, friends and
competence, but who have inherited a revenge."3
Obviously, the class of people whom Meadows found at the
 The Taiping Revolt 115
head of affairs in the Taiping capital, were the typical fore-runners of the
modern bourgeoisie. Neither religious fanaticism nor inclination to
primitive communism could be the inner conviction of such men. Those
impediments were imposed upon them by their followers. They generally
hailed from the trading class, well-to-do artisans ruined by feudal
exactions, and intellectuals who could not climb up the social scale
owing to the reservation of all positions of honour for the scions of the
feudal aristocracy. In short, they represented a social stratum which, in
such a period of transition, produces the ideologists and leaders of the
revolution. The Taiping emperor himself was a specimen of the type
described by Meadows.
Hung Hsiu-tsung was born in a Kwangtung peasant family. Besides his
basic occupation, his father was the teacher of the village school. He
desired his son to rise still higher in the social scale. He sent him to
Canton for getting education preparatory to the entrance into the Civil
Service. Two experiences in Canton seem to have influenced the life of
the young man: his acquaintance with Christian missionaries and his
failure in the Civil Service examination. The obstacle to the realisation of
his ambition naturally made him bitter towards the Mandarins, which
feeling found its expression in the desire to organise a popular movement
against the established order. In an elementary version of Christianity, he
found the ideology for the movement he wanted to start. In an agitated
state of mind, he fell sick. It is quite an explicable psychological
phenomenon that, in the delirium of his sickness, he had dreams which
provided the basis of the Taiping faith. He dreamt that an old man came
to him to present a sword which would slay the oppressors of the people.
After that experience, he was ready to begin his crusade against idolatry
and feudalism.
Much has been written about the role of Christianity in bringing about
the Taiping movement. It has also been maintained that the movement
degenerated when it deviated from the orthodox teachings of
Christianity. As a matter of fact, the connection between Christianity and
the Taiping movement was rather accidental. The iconoclasm of the
Taipings was not exactly of Christian origin. Moreover, Christianity
itself is hardly iconoclastic. Anti-idolatry was a specific feature of the
social upheaval which the Taiping insurrection represented. The anti-
idolatry of the Taipings was the Reformation of China; it was an integral
part of the coming bourgeois democratic
116 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
revolution. The Christian missionaries criticised the superstitions of the
Chinese religion; the Taipings also challenged the religion of the ruling
class. That was the point of contact between the two. There was no
organic relation. The anti-idolatry of the Taipings did not represent any
spiritual indebtedness to Christianity. It was inseparable from the social
character and historical significance of the movement itself.
Whatever may be the explanation of the events of his youth and of his
dream, Hung Hsiu-tsung did not create the movement. On the contrary,
he was the product of the then prevailing conditions out of which grew
the great movement he headed. He represented the class which
formulated the ideology and provided the leadership of the insurrection.
The fact that his agitation and propaganda found a response from the
poor peasantry indicated the basis of the movement. It is recorded that
with his disciples and associates he travelled all the way to the heart of
Kwangsi to find sufficient response to his preachings. He had to
approach the poorest strata of the peasantry to find materials ripe for the
insurrection.
The class antagonism, which broke out in the form of the Taip-ing
Revolution, was not exclusively as between the feudal aristocracy and
the peasantry. The latter itself was split up into two factions. The
territories at the junction of the three provinces, Kwangtung, Kwangsi
and Human, where the movement first began, were inhabited by
aboriginal tribes before the Chinese came from the north in the early
middle-ages. There were two tides of immigration, separated by several
hundred years. Those who came first took possession of the best land,
and within the formal limits of feudal-patriarchal relations grew into a
class of comparatively well-to-do peasantry. They looked askance upon
those coming later, and exploited them either as tenants or sub-tenants or
even as wage-labourers. Owing to the fact that much of the good land
had already been occupied, the newcomers took more to handicraft as a
subsidiary occupation. Thus, there grew up a distinct line of class
demarcation between the old settlers who called themselves "puntes"
(natives), and the newcomers who were branded as "hakkas" (strangers).
The rural population was similarly divided throughout the southern
provinces. The exploited and expropriated "hakkas" often revolted
against the powerful alliance of the feudal-patriarchal State, rich
landlords and well-to-do peasants. Beaten by a superior force, and
entirely without any productive means
 The Taiping Revolt 117
of livelihood, they wandered over the country as "bandits". Many
ventured out to the sea as pirates, and infested the Chinese coast during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Those on land naturally took to
the mountainous regions which provided them some protection against
the government forces. Kwangsi being very mountainous, accessible
with great difficulty, became the home of the "brigands". It was to
Kwangsi that the would-be leaders of Taiping went to find their base of
operation.
As soon as a sufficiently large number of expropriated peasants rallied
around him, Hung Hsiu-tsung captured the little town of Liu-tchu in
1850. There he was declared the spiritual and temporal head of the
"Kingdom of Peace" to come. The social position of his followers earned
for Hung the title of the "Coolie Wang"—the Proletarian King. The name
was conferred on him disdainfully by the Mandarins.
The first act of the insurgents was to destroy the temples which contained
the records of landholding. Like the Catholic Church in mediaeval
Europe, the temples in China also were the pillars of feudal absolutism.
Therefore, the rebellious peasantry attacked the temples and destroyed
the tablets of the ancestors which constituted the badge of patriarchal
power in the village. The cardinal principles of their programme were
formulated by the insurgents in the embryonic kingdom at the obscure
town of Kwangsi. They were: overthrow of the foreign Manchu dynasty;
religious reform through the eradication of idolatry; and return to the
primitive communist organisation of society. The first meant an attack
upon the feudal order represented by the ruling dynasty; the second
meant the overthrow of patriarchal power; and the third signified the
striving for a new social order which, when the other two points of the
programme were realised, was sure to be something entirely different
from that conceived in the primitive ideology of the insurgents.
In Liu-tchu, the Taiping Wang composed the famous Ode which
contained the ideology of the revolt.
"When in the present time disturbances abound
"And bands of robbers are like gathering vapours found,
"We know that Heaven means to raise a valiant hand
"To rescue the oppressed and save our native land.
"China was once subdued, but it shall never fall;
"God ought to be adored, and ultimately shall.
118 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
"The founder of the Ming in song discloses his mind,
"The Emperor of Han drank to the furious wind.
"From olden times, all deeds by energy were done,
"Dark vapours disappear on rising of the sun."4
This basic piece of Taiping literature has been subjected to various
interpretations. The author and his deeds have been dammed or deified
on its authority. One thing, however, is clear: The voice of the down-
trodden masses of China rings through this picturesque poem. It is tinged
with nationalism, and harks back to the mythical Golden Age, both of
which sentiments reflected the conditions of the epoch. Freedom from
the Tartar invaders was an ideal easily understandable and fully
justifiable. And the wistful glance at the past! Did not the ideologists of
the European bourgeoisie also do the same, even when the latter had
gone well ahead on the way of building up a new social order, entirely
different from the "Golden Age" of the past?
Divested of its religious terminology, the Taiping Ode clearly refers to
the expropriated and insurgent poor peasantry as the saviours of the land.
For the first time, they were not looked upon as a curse upon society—as
"bandits" and "brigands"—but were glorified as the indicator of the
Heavenly Will. The Ode clearly contained the ideology of a peasant
uprising, and as such was the harbinger of a bourgeois democratic
revolution.
A glance at the conditions of the country during the decades preceding
the rise of the Taipings reveals how broad and deep was the foundation
of the movement. Already in the closing years of the eighteenth century,
the so-called ''White Lily Society" had organised rebellion which spread
through many outlying provinces, and for a time affected even Central
China. The movement had an anti-Manchu appearance, but judged by its
social composition and the reforms demanded, it was a peasant revolt.
Taking place soon after the capture of the Crown by a foreign dynasty,
which presently reconciled the opposition of the native feudal aristocracy
by virtue of social affinity, all outbursts of class struggle in the backward
social conditions of those days were bound to lend themselves to anti-
dynastic, nationalist, sentiments. Essentially, they were struggles of the
oppressed peasantry against Chinese feudal absolutism, and objectively
heralded the rise of the bourgeoisie to build up a new social order on the
basis of the capitalist mode of production. The "White Lily"
 The Tatpfng Revolt 119
rebellion had been preceded by the appearance and extensive operations
of the formidable "Triad Society", also known as the "Society of Heaven
and Earth" (San Ho Huy).
The power of the Manchu conquerors was easily consolidated in the
northern provinces, where feudalism was not weakened by the relics of
patriarchalism, and where a class of well-to-do peasantry had developed
as the bulwark of reaction. The invading dynasty found there a social
base. But it was not so easy to subjugate the South where conditions
were so very different. In the absence of transport facilities, great
distances rendered military operation extremely difficult. Only important
centres could be occupied. The country at large resisted the penetration
of Manchu power. In the southern provinces, owing to the weakness of
feudalism, and thanks to the historical fact that trade relations with
foreign countries had mostly been from Canton,5 there had arisen the
fore-runners of the modern bourgeoisie, who were not to be so easily
reconciled with the Manchu absolutism as the Chinese feudal aristocracy
and the rich peasantry of the North. Moreover, the patriarchal structure
of agricultural economy had led to the destitution of large masses of
peasantry, who rose in open revolt from time to time, and when defeated,
took to banditry or piracy. All those factors together kept the southern
provinces in a state of perennial discontent and disturbance which was
very fertile for anti-dynastic agitation.
The powerful Triad Society incorporated all those factors of disturbance.
Its main source of strength was the so-called bandits on land and pirates
on sea. In spite of the general hostility to the foreign ruling dynasty, the
rich upper classes (landlords, government officials and traders), even in
the South, could eventually be won over as against a revolutionary
movement primarily based upon so subversive a social element as the
expropriated and pauperised peasantry. Consequently, the Triad Society
together with similar organisations of agrarian revolt were forced
underground—a state of existence very encouraging for superstitious
mysticism and mediaeval romanticism. The Triad Society was organised
on the principles of fraternity and strict secrecy. It marked the beginning
of the agrarian secret societies which abounded in China all along until
to-day.
After the advent of the Manchus, popular uprisings came to be very
frequent in China. They thrived in the conditions of social dissolution
which prevailed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
120 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
as the consequence of the decay of feudalism and the slow growth of a
new mode of production. Unable to suppress those uprisings which
commanded the sympathy of the great bulk of the population, the
Manchu rulers adopted the policy of winning over the rebel leaders
through bribe. So marked was the solicitude of the rulers to placate the
rebel leaders that some superficial foreign observers set up the tbeory
that to rebel against the constituted authority was not illegal in China.6
The solicitude, however, did not represent recognition of the "sacred
right of revolt". It only betrayed the weakness of the central authority,
and the revelation encouraged further spread of the revolt even when
some of its leaders were bought over.
The insurrections, so frequent and widespread during the decades
preceding the Taiping Revolt, were all of an outspoken class character,
although tinged with an anti-dynastic complexion. Meadows describes
the object of these insurrections as follows: "Even these appeals to force
are, however, as first not rebellious movements, but merely local
insurrections, having for their ultimate object the death of a certain
mandarin." In other words, in the state of general ferment and discontent,
the oppressed peasantry responded to the anti-dynastic agitation, but
were more concerned with their immediate demands which included
limitation of the power of the local feudal-patriarchal tyrants. Such
peasant revolts against feudal absolutism were very widespread; for
practical purposes, the central authority was defied everywhere; but the
movement was not yet mature enough to assault the feudal State with the
object of capturing supreme political power. The Taiping Revolution
represented the attainment of that state of maturity. It was the
culmination of the tide of peasant revolt which had been rising and
gathering strength for decades preceding it.
The preparatory stages of the Taiping Revolt being dismissed as mere
banditry and piracy, the revolutionary character of that great movement
could not be appreciated by most of its historians, either native or
foreign. It was regarded as one of the sporadic outbursts which always
infested China, only of an unprecedented magnitude and tenacity.
Indeed, the earlier stages of the remarkable revolutionary democratic
movement in China were purposely branded as "banditry and piracy".
That was done by foreign writers to provide justification for the eventual
imperialist intervention, but for which criminal act China might to-day
be a modern democratic country. Foreign writers
 The Taiping Revolt 121
characterised the insurgents as "pests", and declared that their exter-
mination was a part of the civilising mission of the Christian Powers.
Referring to the Chinese word "Tsih" which was wrongly translated, one
of them, however, made the following highly interesting observation: "Its
mistranslation into 'robbers and bandits' has been, and is likely to be, the
cause of a mistaken and most mischievous interference in Chinese
internal politics." He pointed out that the Chinese word has a much more
comprehensive meaning. It is "all persons who set the authorities at
defiance by acquisitive acts of violence".7 The writer was an interpreter,
and is reputed to have had a perfect knowledge of the Chinese language.
Evidently, contemporary Chinese observers did not make any mistake
about the social and political character of the widespread forces of
disturbance which culminated in the Taiping Revolt. No such mistake
could be possibly made in view of the fact that numerous bands of
peasant insurgents, carrying on a continuous struggle against the ruling
class, ultimately combined themselves into a mighty movement which
swept the entire country. The oppressed peasantry in a certain district
would revolt; troops would be rushed there: usually, the first outbreak
would be suppressed. As the suppression of the revolt was invariably
followed by brutal massacres, the defeated insurgents would take to the
neighbouring mountainous regions, where they could not be easily
attacked by the government forces. From the position of retreat, they
would continue their operations against the constituted authority, and rob
the rich people of the neighbouring territories for their maintenance.
Those insurgent peasants and plebeians rallied under the Taiping banner
when it was first raised in the mountainous districts of Kwangsi. The
slogan with which the embryonic revolutionary State was established in
the small town of Liutchu, naturally reflected the sentiments and
demands of the exploited, down-trodden and destitute masses. They had
been mercilessly driven out of their homes and deprived of their land by
the exactions of the landlords and gentry. They could have no respect for
religious institutions supporting the power and privileges of their
oppressors. How could they any longer worship the idols and pray at the
temples which had so signally failed to keep their traditional trust—to
see to it that the land inherited from Heaven, through the immortal
ancestors, provided the means of subsistence to the entire community?
The mandarins sucked the life-blood of
122 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the people and called in troops to massacre them when they rebelled.
They acted as the representatives of the Manchu dynasty. Hence the
hatred for the mandarins. The revolutionary State of the Taipings
professed Communism, because the expropriated peasants, who
supported it, wanted their land back; but, unable to foresee a better
system under which it could be bad securely, they dreamed of communal
ownership. The tradition of the primitive communal ownership was still
alive. The peasants desired re-establishment of the traditional system,
only freed from the trust of the gods and temples—the custodians of
communal ownership who had betrayed their trust.
The conditions of dissatisfaction and revolt, maturing over a whole
period of time, finally received an additional impetus from the
consequences of the Anglo-Chinese war of 1839-40. Disbanded soldiers
could not find employment; they also became "bandits"; that is, they
swelled the ranks of the insurgent peasantry. The crushing defeat in the
war with a foreign Power seriously impaired the prestige of the ruling
dynasty. Its weakness was further revealed. The inability of the
Government to check the economic ruin of the country, caused by the
constant drain of silver in payment for opium, confronted also the
middle-classes with the necessity of changing the administrative system
of the country. The social basis of the revolution was thus broadened.
The bourgeoisie began to look at the rebellious peasantry as a possible
instrument for the realisation of their ambition to replace the effetefeudal
aristocracy as the ruling class. Conditions were getting worse every day.
In 1846-47, the provinces of Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung were
visited by a famine. Destitute masses, in thousands, joined the "bandits".
The general atmosphere was of the collapse of the State machinery, the
corruption of the ruling class, the stagnation of national economy, the
dislocation of social relations, and disorder in every department of
national life. A revolution could never be more imminent. Indeed, it was
inevitable. The revolutionary nature of the Taiping Uprising is
undeniable in view of these historical facts.
The extraordinary swiftness of the spread of the insurrection testified to
its being a spontaneous popular upheaval. Within three years, beginning
at the obscure town of remote Kwangsi, it reached the heart of the
country, having spread like wild fire through the vast provinces of
Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei. It occupied such important political
and economic centres as Changsha, Woochang,
 The Taiping Revolt 123
Hanyang and other Yangtse ports. In the beginning, the revolutionary
army was no more than ten thousand strong. It swelled to over a hundred
thousand when it captured Nanking. It swept away government troops
like "broken reeds before a surging tide". Undoubtedly, such a
spectacular triumph would not be possible without widespread and
enthusiastic popular support.
As soon as the revolutionary government was established at Nanking, an
expedition was despatched to capture Peking. In half a year, the
expedition reached the neighbourhood of Tientsin. There the revolution
entered territory where the conditions were less favourable than in the
South. On the one hand, the comparatively rich peasants of the North
gave it only a lukewarm support. On the other hand, nearer to the capital,
the revolutionary army met greater and more effective resistance from
the government forces.
The "Tai-Ping-tien-kuo" (Heavenly Empire of Peace), with its
headquarters at Nanking, was established over a territory embracing nine
provinces; that is, nearly half of the country with a population of
approximately two-hundred millions. It still professed the socio-
economic principles formulated in the earlier stages of the movement. It
was a gigantic brotherhood. One of the first edicts of the revolutionary
government was: "Having fields, let them cultivate together; and when
they get rice, let them eat it together; so also with regard to clothes and
money; let them use them in common, so that everyone may share and
share alike, and everyone be equally well-fed and clothed."8 The striving
to re-establish primitive communism was still there. But in course of its
phenomenal development, the revolution had transgressed the limits it
had set for itself in the remote corner of Kwangsi, inhabited by primitive
peasants. Victorious expansion had placed before it tasks of a more
complicated nature, and the revolutionary State proved itself competent
to cope with them.
After it had dealt such a staggering blow to the decayed structure of the
feudal society, the revolution assumed, objectively, if not as yet quite
consciously, the historic task of building up a new social order on the
ruins of the old. It might still profess the desire to resurrect primitive
communism, a profession which reflected the sentiment of the backward
masses supporting it. But that desire was sure to vanish in proportion as
the revolution would grasp the real nature of its tasks. The constructive
task of the revolution could not
124 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
be accomplished, should its social basis remain confined to the
pauperised peasantry. It must draw other classes into its ranks. And those
classes would not subscribe to the programme of primitive communism.
It has been testified by contemporary observers that the leaders of the
movement hailed mostly from the non-agrarian classes. Although they
professed belief in communal ownership, their objective social outlook
was entirely different; it was in the direction of the development of
society on the basis of a still higher form of private property.
As soon as the initial stages of the revolution were accomplished under
the captivating banner of a mediaeval religious brotherhood, it began to
outgrow the limits of primitive communism, and manifest clear
tendencies towards bourgeois democracy. Trade flourished in the
Taiping capital, and artisans received encouragement to increase
production. By the abolition of feudal dues and the introduction of a
moderate taxation, peasants were induced to improve the methods of
cultivation and thereby iucrease the productivity of land. The barrier tax
seriously hindered a free exchange of commodities. It was abolished in
territories controlled by the revolutionary government. The result was a
great expansion of trade. The export of tea and silk from the Yangtse
Valley increased during the time it was occupied by the insurgents.
Engaged in a protracted war with superior forces, practically throughout
its existence, the revolutionary government was, of course, obliged to
impose heavy taxation. But the greater part of the burden fell upon those
who could bear it. Although the peasants could not be altogether spared,
they were much better oif than under the Manchus. In spite of the
emergencies of the revolutionary war, the produce of land was purchased
from the peasants at a fair price. On the other hand, under the supervision
of the State, urban artisans manufactured articles which could be freely
exchanged with the surplus production of the peasants. Inside a social
organisation, having the appearance of a religious brotherhood, the
capitalist mode of production received all possible encouragement.
Having emphasised upon its unavoidable destructive aspects, prejudiced
or hostile historians kept its positive achievements out of common
knowledge. A movement for the overthrow of an old social order must
inevitably be destructive. The Taipings, indeed, were merciless in
dealing with the feudal aristocracy and Manchu
 The Taiping Revolt 125
officials. But the other side of the picture was hardly ever presented by
the average chronicler. Many of them were indeed so very blinded by
prejudice that they themselves failed to perceive it. But there were
exceptions. A French missionary, who travelled widely through the rebel
territories, wrote at the end of 1852: "The people do not conceal their
desire for the advent ef the insurgents; and there is not a village but what
would gladly come under their government. The rebels pursue a course
of conduct truly wise. They abstain from pillage and make no trouble. On
capturing a town, they give no quarter to the Tartar soldiers; they put to
death the Manchu mandarins without mercy; and they also massacre the
Chinese mandarins. But they respect the mass of the people; the
merchant is left undisturbed in his affairs; and the traveller is permitted
to continue his route in peace. In my journey, the sum and substance of
what I hear was this: Would that the rebels of the South might come here
!"9
From the very beginning, the insurgents were quite friendly to the
foreigners, and prepared to give them freedom of trade on condition that
they did not help the Manchu. Therefore, the act of the Christian Powers
helping the suppression of the revolutionary movement was entirely
uncalled for and thoroughly outrageous. The friendly attitude of the
Taipings towards the foreigners brought into clear relief the progressive
character of the movement. The interest of the classes involved in the
movement would not be injured by an expansion of trade, provided that
the expansion took place simultaneously with, and in consequence of, a
radical readjustment of social relations inside the country. Such a
readjustment demanded in the first place the overthrow of Manchu
absolutism. Therefore, the insurgent government was fully entitled to
stipulate that foreigners should pledge themselves not to support the
ruling dynasty in return for the freedom of trade and movement granted
to them voluntarily. Subsequent events proved that the apprehension of
the revolutionary government about the intentions of the foreigners was
not unfounded.
It was not the interests of the Chinese people alone which demanded that
foreigners should be allowed freedom of trade only under a pledge. The
insurgents were not alone in asking the foreigners not to support the
reactionary Chinese ruling class. Meadows, for example, wrote the
following on the eve of the foreigners' taking side against the revolution:
"Those who believe that the extension of
126 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
commerce, the progress of civilisation, the diffusion of religion and the
gradual approach towards universal and lasting peace are indis-solubly
connected—that they must together be forwarded, or together be
retarded—will do their best to see that the present struggle in China is
not interfered with."
Those were wise and prophetic words, pronounced by a bourgeois
liberal. They represent a very damaging verdict against colonialism,
pronounced by one of its early ideologists. As a freetrader, Meadows was
an advocate of modern imperialism. But he failed to understand the
contradiction inherent in the rising system. Suppression of the Taiping
Revolution was an essential condition for the colonisation of China. A
free exchange of commodities with China, on the terms of the
revolutionary government, would have contributed to the final success of
the revolution. Manchu abolutism would have been destroyed; the social
reaction it stood for would have been overthrown; and a modern
democratic China would have been born. If those things were allowed to
happen, the imperialist conquest of China would be very problematical,
if not impossible. Therefore, the Christian Powers did not listen to the
well-meaning advice of muddle-headed liberals like Meadows, and acted
just as imperialism by its very nature must do.
If the Christian Powers were sincere in their profession, they should have
helped the insurgents. 'When, in October 1856, the British fleet, in
conjunction with the French, was bombarding Canton, ostensibly to
establish the right of free trade, the Taipings approached the foreigners
with a proposal for an alliance against the Manchus. They asked for a
loan in return for the right sought by the foreigners. But they were
rebuffed. The British officers pretended to be neutral—a neutrality which
before long was abandoned in favour of reaction. The object of the
repeated acts of imperialist aggression in China was to force the corrupt
and decrepit feudal ruling class to make concession after concession to
the foreign invaders, who, in their turn, undertook to help the decayed
reaction remain in power as far as the internal affairs of the country were
concerned. Such conditions were necessary for subjecting the Chinese
masses to the worst form of colonial exploitation. The right to exchange
commodities, without let or hindrance, could be had from the
revolutionaries, but they would not concede those rights to the extent of
forfeiting the political sovereignty and territorial
 The Taiping Revolt 127
integrity of the nation. A progressive democratic government, established
upon the final triumph of the revolution, would be as strong and popular
as the Manchus were weak and detested. The rise of such a government
in China would obviously be a check for imperialist designs.
Soon after the revolutionary government was established at Nanking,
England, France and the United States of America sent expeditions to see
what sort of conditions prevailed under the insurgents. The reports were
contradictory. The American commissioner, Robert McLane, who visited
Nanking in the middle of 1854, reported very unfavourably for the
rebels. In his opinion, the rebels "are composed almost exclusively of the
ignorant and unenlightened population in the interior. Whatever may
have been the hopes of enlightened and civilised nations of the earth in
regard to this movement, it is now apparent that they neither profess nor
apprehend Christianity, and whatever may be the true judgment to form
of their political power, it can no longer be doubted that intercourse
cannot be established or maintained on terms of equality." With all the
haughtiness and prejudice, which heavily coloured the report, it gives
away some truths about the situation. Firstly, the rebellion was not a
court intrigue but a great popular movement; secondly, it was not
actuated by a fanatic belief in a distorted version of Christianity; it was a
dynamic outburst of revolutionary social forces; and thirdly, the
revolutionary government was powerful. Being still novices in
imperialist adventure, the Americans did not know how to judge the
situation correctly. They were more intolerant than others with greater
experience. It is memorable that subsequently foreigners began their
direct attack upon the revolution through the instrumentality of an
American Adventurer.
The report of the British commissioner, Sir George Bonharn, was very
carefully prepared with the help of the Christian missionary Dr.
Medhurst, who spoke the Chinese language and knew the country very
well. He recommended the policy of wait and see. He admitted that
foreigners would get many advantages, should the rebels succeed;
nevertheless, he advocated neutrality towards them. It is reported that the
English as well as other visitors, who observed the minimum standard of
decorum and decency, were received by the rebels as "foreign brothers".
They were offered complete freedom of trade and movement throughout
the Taiping Empire, only on one condi-
128 Revolution and Counter~Revolution in China
tion—not to help the Machus. That was a very liberal offer. To assume
the non-committal attitude of neutrality in the face of such an offer
represented the desire to accept the offer without any condition. The state
of affairs found by the foreign visitors in the revolutionary centre was
convincing as regards the character of the movement. It was certainly not
of such a nature as could be possibly backed up against the Manchus, to
take the latter's place as a pliable tool in the hands of foreign Powers.
With all the advantages the movement immediately offered, it decidedly
represented a powerful effort to abolish conditions with rendered China
easily accessible to imperialist exploitation. Therefore, the upstarts must
go. The prudent policy recommended by the more experienced agent of
British Imperialism differed from that of the haughty, intolerant, hair-
brained American jingo only in that it suggested to wait and see if the
Manchus could do the dirty job. The hands of the Christian Powers need
not be unnecessarily soiled. Meanwhile, be neutral, since the rebels
commanded the trade route of the Yangtse.
Although the rebels could not be successful in the North, the efforts of
the imperial forces to dislodge them from the places they had occupied
were abortive. They laid siege upon the rebel headquarters at Nanking
throughout the eleven years (from 1853-64) of its existence. But it was a
fiasco. The revolutionary government conducted affairs in its extensive
territories from the beleaguered capital. The reason of that surprising
situation was that the soldiers of the besieging army sympathised with
the rebels, and let them pass freely in and out of the city. They even
delivered to the rebels arms and ammunition for small consideration.
Many of them deserted the imperial army and joined the insurgents. The
revolutionary government could easily induce the corrupt imperial
officers to supply food to the city they were supposed to besiege.
While the Taipings were still gathering strength in the remote province
of Kwangsi, there developed in the south-eastern maritime provinces a
formidable peasant uprising. After the conclusion of the first Anglo-
Chinese war, thousands of soldiers went away with their fire-arms. They
represented a great accession of strength for the secret revolutionary
societies which had existed in the regions ever since the Manchu
invasion. The result was an open uprising which spread throughout the
provinces of Kwang-tung. Kiangsi and Chekiang. To prevent the capture
of Shanghai by the revolutionary
 The Taiping Revolt 129
peasant army, commanded by Tien Te, the British and French fleets
bombarded the coast. But the "fire ships" and "blazing gourds" could not
check the advance of the rebels. They reached Shanghai in 1853. In that
very year, the Taipings captured Nanking from the other side.
Not desiring to provoke the foreign Powers, the Taipings left Shanghai
alone. But it wai attacked by insurgent peasants from the southern
maritime provinces. The occupation of Shanghai by the rebels from the
South provided the foreigners with the pretext to seize the right of
collecting the customs revenue, ostensibly in behalf of the Chinese
Central Government.
Thanks to its situation at the mouth of the main artery of trade, the great
Yangtse, Shanghai was replacing Canton as the centre of imperialist
activities. It was threatened to be caught in a vice by two mighty tides of
revolution surging from the South and West. The foreigners immediately
organised themselves into a volunteer army and fortified their settlement.
Upon the capture of the city by the rebels, the Manchu officials fled to
the fortified foreign settlement, where they received protection. The
customs house was also removed to the British Concession. At that time,
the Collector of Maritime Customs at Shanghai was a Hong merchant
from Canton, a most corrupt type of Manchu official, He was easily
bribed into signing an agreement with the British, Americans and French,
transferring the collection of the customs duties to a foreign commission.
That act of wanton robbery was justified on the ground that corruption
and incompetence of the Chinese officials disorganised trade. But it
represented a flgrant violation of Chinese sovereignty. The corrupt
official, who signed away to foreigners the control over an important
item of State revenue, had no competence to do so. The agreement was
never ratified by the Chinese Government. Subsequently, the Chinese
Government recognised the accomplished fact, but only under duress—
when it was forced to sign the next series of unequal and dictated treaties
upon its defeat in the war of 1860. Corrupt practices of the Chinese
officials served as the pretext for imperialist aggression: those practices
were encouraged by the Christian Powers when they could be used for
imperialist purposes. Not honesty, but hypocrisy proved to be the best
policy.
The imperialist Powers openly participated in the suppression of the
insurrection in the maritime provinces. Their professed neutrality
130 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
towards the Taipings had also been thoroughly hypocritical from the very
beginning. Neutrality was a policy of catching fish in troubled waters.
The customs revenue of Shanghai, for example, was a very large fish.
But the imperialist Powers violated their own neutrality by supplying war
materials to one combatant. As the reward for handing over the Shanghai
customs to the imperialists, the corrupt Manchu official, Woo, received
from them ample supplies to equip an expedition against the Taiping
capital. The "neutral" foreign settlement of Shanghai became the base of
operation of the imperial forces against the insurgents. Woo wanted ships
for transporting his troops. No ship under the flag of a major foreign
Power was lent to him. But out of the customs revenue robbed by the
Christian Powers, money was given to him to hire or purchase
Portuguese vessels.10 Before long, the counter-revolutionary policy of the
foreigners became still more manifest. "England and France were
fighting the Manchus in the North in 1860, but gradually it became clear
that they would aid the imperialists (Manchus) in the South."11
Intervention through the instrumentality of corrupt and incompetent
Manchu officials did not prove very effective. But the Powers were still
reluctant to intervene formally. Active intervention, therefore, began on
the initiative of private individuals burning with the zeal to fight the
rebels on the pretext that they were desecrating Christianity. Christian
missionaries went to Nanking to report about the "godlessness" of the
rebels, In spite of the fact that the visitors were received at the
revolutionary capital as "brother", they did not fail to make the desired
reports, contradicting those made by previous visitors. Gruesome stories
about the "irreligiousness", "brutality" and "degeneration" of the
insurgents were broadcast. On the other hand, European adventurers,
unemployed sailors and desperados in Shanghai, were encouraged, and
provided with the means to organise the notorious Foreign Legion under
the command of an American adventurer—Frederic Townsend Ward.
That bandit army, which eventually saved China for native reaction and
foreign imperialism, was financed from the customs revenue of
Shanghai.
Shanghai became the base of operation against the revolutionary
government. It threatened to become the centre of a greater storm. It
could no longer be left alone. The revolutionary government felt the
necessity of occupying it. The position was indeed very anomalous. It
was intolerable. Only a sincere desire on the part of
 The Taiping Revolt 131
the revolutionary government to have friendly relations with the
foreigners had persuaded it to tolerate the situation for such a long time.
The entire Yangtse Valley was controlled by the revolutionaries.
Foreigners were permitted to trade there freely, except when they were
caught actually carrying contraband for the counterrevolutionary troops.
But the customs duties, levied on that large volume of trade transacted in
the revolutionary territories, were not only foreited to the revolutionary
government, but actually supplied the sinews of war against it.
In 1860 the revolutionary army began operations for the capture of
Shanghai. Before long it became practically a beleaguered city. The
revolutionary peasants from the South had been expelled from the city
itself after they had been in possession of it from 1853 to 1856. The
British and French fleet had driven them from the coast, but they were
not destroyed. They remained a force to contend with not very far from
Shanghai, ready to return whenever a favourable moment arrived. When
the Taipings at last began their operations, Shanghai was cut off from the
hinterland practically on all sides. In that precarious situation, the
undertaking of the American adventurer Ward naturally received
unlimited support from all quarters. "Patriotic associations of merchants
and bankers, the foreigner and the native with equal readiness, tendered
their aid in support of the central authority, not so much that the foreign
residents desired the aggrandisement of the Manchus, but rather because
they saw all their material interests to be imperilled, and even civilisation
itself to be at stake. They promptly offered money and gun-boats and
artillery, and enlisted in drill clubs for the defence of Shanghai, and they
were pleased to observe that the gun-boats, when Ward was on board,
lost no time in coming to close quarters with the rebels."12
At last the unholy alliance against the revolution was openly formed. It
was composed of the corrupt, decayed and discredited feudal-patriarchal
monarchy, the predatory foreign imperialism, and the reactionary
parasitic native Hong merchants, closely connected with the latter. That
was a formidable combination against the revolutionary democratic
movement which, with all its great triumphs in the beginning, was still
very immature in its social composition, political programme and
organisational solidity. A similar alliance nearly crushed the Great
French Revolution. Therefore, it is no wonder that the Taiping
Revolution failed after a great struggle which
132 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
came so near to final triumph.
The war in the North ended in a catastrophic defeat of the Manchus. The
European forces of invasion occupied Peking, and the Manchus were
compelled to concede all the demands of the invaders. The new treaty
opened the Yangtse ports to foreign trade. Britain was granted valuable
concessions at Chinkiang, Hankow and Kiukiang. That new "Treaty
Right" brought the Christian Powers into direct conflict with the Taiping
Government. From the very beginning the latter had agreed to grant
foreigners complete freedom of trade on terms of equality. But its very
existence was an objective limitation to freedom of trade as the
imperialists interpreted it, that is to say, to the colonial exploitation of
China.13 Therefore, upon the satisfactory conclusion of the war against
the Manchus, the foreign Powers openly set about to deal firmly with the
objective menace to their aggressive designs. Once the truculent
Manchus were completely cowered, and made every concession
demanded by foreign imperialism, the policy of the latter came to
support them openly against the revolution.
With all the ready support he got officially and privately in the
beginning, Ward could do little to check the advance of the revolutionary
army, which reached within three miles of the Shanghai waterfront in
1862. Thereupon, the foreigners discarded their hypocritical mask of
neutrality which they had never really observed. A thirty miles-wide belt
of Chinese territory encircling Shanghai was declared to be neutral zone.
The revolutionary army was warned off from it. The Chinese quarters of
Shanghai could not be approached without touching that arbitrarily
created "neutral zone". Therefore, its creation was an open act of
belligerence on the part of the foreign Powers. The rebels had succeeded
in raising the siege of their capital for all practical purposes. They had
occupied the entire province of Chekiang, coming in direct contact with
the insurgent peasants of the South. They had captured the important port
of Ningpo and also the strategic city of Soochow, commanding
Shanghai. All that meant a direct threat to the position of imperialism.
The latter could no longer operate indirectly, under the cover of
fraudulent neutrality. In that tense situation, the Manchu monarchy
receded to the background as a mere shadow of reaction. The issue was
clearly between the revolution and foreign imperialism. Ever since those
fateful days the latter has stood at the vanguard of all the forces of
reaction in China.
 The Taiping Revolt 133
Ward died before the "ever victorious army" organised by him came
anywhere near victory. The foreign legion, formerly operating as a part
of the Chinese Imperial Army, became an undisguised army of foreign
intervention when, on the death of Ward, its leadership was taken over
by the "Chinese Gordon" who acted on the orders of the Commander of
the British fleet. Under Gordon the army of intervention was fully
supplied with the most up-to-date weapons. In cooperation with the
foreign fleets, it played the leading part in crushing the revolution, the
task in which the forces of native reaction had completely failed. In 1863
Nanking was attacked from three sides: The army commanded by
Gordon advanced from Shanghai. A Franco-Chinese army, commanded
by French officers, operated from the base at Ningpo which was
protected by foreign fleets. Lastly, there was the Chinese Imperial Army
coming up the Yangtse under the command of Tseng Kwo-fan. In those
days of decisive events, Li Hung-chang came down to Shanghai and
received the unconditional support of the foreigners for his attempt to
save the tottering monarchy. Nanking fell in 1864 after the revolutionary
government established there had defied the power of the Manchus for
eleven years, and extended its authority over nine vast provinces.
It is crystal clear to any unprejudiced student of history that foreign
intervention was solely responsible for the defeat of the revolution." The
brutal massacre that followed the occupation of important Taiping
centres was not surpassed even by the slaughter after the fall of the Paris
Commune. It is idle for the Christian Powers to plead not guilty of that
wholesale butchery. Had they not willingly aided the suppression of the
revolution, the massacre would not have taken place. The defeated
insurgents were butchered under the order of Li Hung-chang and Tseng
Kwo-fan. Those notorious reactionaries were in ultimate contact with the
foreign Powers.
A brief review of the situation in the whole country revealed that the
suppression of the Taiping Revolt represented a criminal outrage upon a
free development of the Chinese people. The review shows that the
Taiping movement was not a sporadic uprising, provoked by individual
ambition or religious fanaticism. It was the culmination of a seething
discontent which had permeated the entire Chinese society for a long
time. While in the heart of the country there was established a
revolutionary power which held its own against overwhelming odds for
such a long time, uprisings, insurrections,
134 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
rebellions and revolts were the order of the day throughout the country.
They indicated a decay of the existing order of society and imbecility of
the State based upon that order. In other words, the country was ripe for a
great revolution.
There was a powerful rebellion in Szechwan under the Taiping chief
Shih Ta-kek. The Muslims of Yunan were also in revolt. The vast
province of Kansu was the scene of a widespread rebellion which could
not be crushed for years. Turkestan raised the standard of revolt under
Yakub Beg, who for some time established an independent Muslim State
with Kashgar as its capital. The Chungaris in the mountainous regions of
Tien Shan not only drove the Chinese forces out of their country, but
themselves came down upon Kansu and even Shensi, whence they could
not be dislodged until 1878. The authority of the Manchu monarchy was
not secure even in the regions around Peking. The relatively well-to-do
peasantry of Honan and Shantung did not fully join the Taipings when
the latter attempted to capture the capital. The Hwang Ho basin,
nevertheless, was in a state of ferment, and the poor peasants openly
sympathised with the rebels. There was a peasant uprising in Shantung
which could not be suppressed by Government troops. Finally, there was
the mighty peasant revolt spreading throughout the south-eastern
provinces, which was powerful enough to capture Shanghai and hold it
for three years.
The feudal-patriarchal Empire of the Manchus was evidently on the point
of dissolution. Not only did the Taiping rebellion resemble the peasant
war in Germany, thus representing the earlier stages of bourgeois
democratic revolution. As a matter of fact, the situation in which it took
place can even be compared to some extent with that preceding the great
French Revolution. In the seventies and eighties of the eighteenth
century, France also was the scene of famines, mass hunger, riots,
revolts, "robbery" and peasant uprisings. Those events were regarded as
the symptons of a fatal disease wnich had overtaken the monarchy and
the social system it represented. If in one country they were the harbinger
of a revolution, there is absolutely no reason to place a different
interpretation on similar events in another country.
The stage for the memorable drama enacted in Paris and a few other
important cities was set by a whole series of events taking place
throughout the country. In the decade preceding the revolution, France
was infested by continuous uprisings of the expropriated, famished and
destitute peasantry. Those peasant insurgents
 The Tatping Revolt 135
were also branded as "robbers". Moreover, the popular uprising— of
Poitiers in 1782, of Vizille in 1786, of Gavennes in 1783, of Vivaris in
1785, of Geveauden in 1789, and the innumerable series of similar
revolts—also had a religious complexion.15 Some of them began as a
protest against the salt tax or exaction of the tithe. In other words, the
events leading up to the revolution were all more or less primitive,
elemental, revolts of the peasant masses.
Historically, the Taiping Rebellion in China was as much a bourgeois
democratic movement as the Great French Revolution Had it not been
crushed by a formidable international combination, it might have
outgrown its elemental aspects and ideological immaturity. The ground
was ready for a bourgeois democratic revolution; the decay and
decomposition of the old order were complete; the feudal State was
corrupt and impotent; and the forces of disruption were in operation
throughout the country. .
While still in its earlier stages, the bourgeois democratic revolution
suffered a severe defeat in China. That event left an indelible mark on the
entire history of the country since then. The weakness of the Chinese
bourgeoisie rendered that setback possible. In consequence of that
violent setback to the democratic revolution, the Chinese bourgeoisie
came under the corrupting and enervating influence of foreign
imperialism, and thereby forfeited their revolutionary mission. Owing to
a combination of factors resulting from the uneven development of
capitalism throughout the world, the bourgeois democratic revolution in
China could not be accomplished in the period when the bourgeoisie was
a revolutionary class. Whatever might have been the role subsequently
played by the Chinese bourgeoisie, the democratic revolution could not
be resisted for all the time, and the historic struggle, begun by the
Taipings, has been going on since their time.
Notes
1. The leader of the Taipiug movement.
2. Medhurst, "Taiping Rebellion".
3. T.T. Meadows, "The Chinese and Their Rebellion".
4. Lin Lee, "The History of the Taiping Revolution".
5. A British colonial official stationed at Hongkong gave the following des-
cription of Canton in 1848: "It is the scene of an active domestic and foreign
trade—where production from every part of the country may be exchanged for
those of any other region. Manufacturers at Canton are
136 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
numerous. There is no machinery, but the quantity of goods sent to market is very
considerable. There are at least 17,000 people engaged in weaving silk. The number
engaged in weaving cloth is 50,000; they occupy 2,500 shops, averaging twenty in
each shop. The shoe-makers are a numerous class. Those working at stone, brass,
iron, etc., are also numerous. The printing and book-trade are also considerable."—
Montgomery Martin, "Commercial, Political and Social Conditions in China".
6. Meadows, "The Chinese and Their Rebellions".
7. Ibid.
8. J.M. Mackie, "The Life of the Taiping Wang".
9. Callery and Yvan, ''History of the Insurrection in China".
10. Meadows, "The Chinese and Their Rebellians".
11. H F. MacNair, "Modern Chinese History".
12. R.S. Rantoul, "Frederic Townsend Ward".
13. "We issue this decree permitting you, the English, constant ingress and egress in
full accordance with your own inclination and wish, whether to aid us in the
extermination of the demons (Manchus) or to pursue as usual your commercial
avocation." (Address of the Taiping Government to the English Mission of 1853).
To this, the English Envoy replied : "I am now compelled to remind you that my
nation, by treaty entered into with the Chinese Government, has obtained the right of
trading in five ports, and that, it you or any other people, presume to injure in any
manner the persons or property of British subjects, immediate steps will be taken to
resent the injury in the same manner as similar injuries were resented ten years ago."
14. "It (the "ever victorious army") kept the rebels in check in the province of
Kiangsu throughout the year 1862, and in February 1863 the British Government
sanctioned the lending of Chinese Gordon to take command of that force which was
speedily to turn the tide of war in favour of the imperialists (Manchus) and
effectively to pave the way for Tseng Kwo-fan's final restoration of law and order. A
considerable number of Europeans, including a French Admiral, had given their
lives to win back China for the Manchu dynasty, although at the outset public
opinion was in favour of neutrality, and there were many even then who thought
China would be well rid of her degenerate rulers."—Bland and Backhouse, "China
under the Empress Dowager".
15. Jaures, "La Histoire Socialiste".
 CHAPTER VI
THE REFORM MOVEMENT
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the British Ambassador in
France wrote: "In short, all symptoms which I have ever met with in
history, previous to great changes and revolutions in government, now
exist and daily increase in France."1 Any intelligent observer could have
written the same about China a hundred years later. The great rebellion,
which all but overthrew the decayed Manchu monarchy, was indeed
repulsed, thanks to the anxiety of the Christian Powers to save a tottering
heathen dynasty from its inevitable doom. But the revolt had been
brought about by forces too deep-rooted and inexorable to be stamped
out. Like the proverbial thousand-headed hydra, they only thrived on
their own blood. Numerous foreign opium smugglers infested the
Chinese coast in the middle of the nineteenth century. Among them, not
one but many Wards could be found to take a good shot at the heathen
Chinaman for an ample recompense. 1 It was a profitable business to
supply those soldiers of fortune with up-to-date weapons for spilling the
blood of the Chinese peasants. Gordons also grew in every bush, when
the "civilising mission" of the Christian Powers was to be carried to the
four corners of the earth. All those and many other factors helped Tseng
Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang to repulse the rising tide of revolution. But
they could not do the impossible; they could not inject new blood in the
senile veins of the decayed old order.
Two basic factors go into the making of a revolution: The decomposition
of the old order and the revolt against the old with the object and ability
of creating something new in its place. The operation of the second
factor may by opposed for some time with varying degrees of success.
But it cannot be arrested indefinitely, so long as
138 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the other factor remains in operation. In the latter half of the nineteenth
century, any mending of the time-worm, fossilised, social system
represented by the Manchu monarchy, was much more difficult than to
do the same with the French monarchy a hundred years ago. The
inevitable passing of the Manchus was long overdue. It was delayed still
for some time by the intervention of extraneous agencies. It did not
happen so quickly and dramatically as in France. But it did happen, as
surely as a decayed tree is bound to fall or a mortally sick human body is
doomed to die.
The decay of the old order was so obvious that the danger was perceived
even by some members of the ruling class, whose eyes were not
altogether befogged by senile vanity. The danger was recognised by men
like Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang who, with the willing aid of
foreign imperialism, had headed off the first formidable attack upon the
established order. The doom could be delayed, the fatal day could be
staved off, only by infusing new blood into the withering veins of the old
order. Such a social surgery was performed successfully in the France of
Louis XIV, who managed to stabilise the undermined feudal monarchy
by enlisting the support of the upper strata of the rising bourgeoisie. In
China, the experiment failed. It was already too late. The Reform
Movement represented that experiment. It preceded the Boxer Uprising,
and for a time appeared in the forefront of the situation, immediately
after the catastrophic defeat in the war with Japan.
Although men like Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang perceived the
gravity of the situation, they failed to advocate a thorough overhauling of
the whole system. Their reforming zeal did not go beyond the army.
Anxious about the safety of the established order, they wanted to provide
it with modern arms, instead of the rusty paraphernalia so woefully
discredited in every single trial of strength. Creation of a modern army
was all they could suggest as a remedy; and that quackery only
aggravated the situation instead of relieving it. Their project meant
greater expenditure, and consequently heavier burden of taxation on the
people. The reiinposition of likin to defray the cost of Tseng Kuo-fan's
crusade against the Taipings only fanned the flame he sought to suppress.
The "model army" organised by Li Hung-chang's disciple and protege,
Yuan Shih-kai, drew heavily upon the depleted national exchequer. Big
foreign loans were contracted for the payment of indemnity to Japan to
meet the
 The Reform Movement 139
expenditure of the ambitious scheme of army reform. Their operation
totally disorganised the system of native finance. In short, ill-conceived,
half-hearted, reactionary measures, taken in defence of an untenable
system, only contributed to the chaos and hastened the inevitable fall.
A programme of reform, touching the basic problems of the day, though
rather superficially, was formulated by Chang-Chih-tung, the Viceroy of
Woochan. An aristocrat by birth, a State official by profession and
essentially conservative in social outlook, he was a pioneer of industrial
capitalism in China. As the Viceroy at Nanking, he had accomplished a
considerable part of the scheme of army reform, then so very fashionable
in the higher official circles. He built modern arsenals and roads. He was
the founder of naval and military academies. He was an enthusiastic
supporter of the plan to construct the Peking-Hankow Railway.
Therefore, he was appointed the chief administrator of the Middle-
Yangtse provinces. There, he acquired extensive mining interests,
established the iron works of Hanyang, and built cotton mills. In short,
Chang Chih-tung was eminently fitted for the role he assumed. It was to
reform the old order so as to avoid its downfall.
The credit of initiating the Reform Movement belongs to Chang Chih-
tung. His famous essay—"China's Only Hope", published in 1898, stated
the basic principles of the movement. Written in the classical Confucian
style, and inspired by the teachings of the Old Sage of feudal-patriarchal
China, the essay expounded the doctrine of the middle course. The object
of the author admittedly was to indicate the way for China to save herself
from the impending revolution. In his opinion, what was necessary "to
save China from revolution" was (1) to maintain and strengthen the
monarchy; (2) to conserve the holy religion; and (3) to protect the
Chinese race. The essay was an exposition of the ways and means for the
realisation of these three objects.
In it the reactionaries were criticised for tbeir short-sightedness, while
the liberals were ridiculed as a "confused flock of sheep". The former
were chided for their opposition to foreign intercourse and for their
reluctance to adopt modern military methods; the latter were upbraided
for "zeal without knowledge" and for the lack of sufficient respect for the
ancient teachings of Confucius. The advice to the progressive youth was
"go to learn abroad, but do not forget
140 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the traditions of your native land". Alarmed by the imminent
decomposition of the old order, the aristocratic reformer exclaimed: "Do
not let too much wisdom and ingenuity make you forget the holy sages."
He suggested that China should learn the modern method of government,
should acquire useful knowledge, ''but not hanker for western things". He
reaffirmed the old dictum: "It is necessary first that every man should
fulfil his duty to his parents and elders". He declared that the Confucian
theories of State were unchangeable, for they based upon the "Heavenly
Way". On the strength of those theories, he advocated constitutional
monarchy. A capitalist owning considerable industrial concerns, Chang
Chih-tung, of course, was a believer in competition as the only impetus
to power and progress. But he had no patience for the political
consequence of the theory of competition. He dismissed republicanism as
incompatible with the Confucian doctrine of "the obligation of subjects
to the sovereign."
Evidently, Cbang Chih-tung desired to play the modern Confucius
twenty-five hundred years after the Old Sage was dead. He sought to find
a synthesis between the old and the new, with both of which he was so
directly connected. But even that timid approach to the burning issues of
the day was not approved by the Court, which was displeased with the
behaviour of one from whom greater wisdom was expected. Chang Chih-
tung's essay remained the point of departure of the Reform Movement,
even after its author betrayed the cause in the first critical moment.
Immediately, the programme did not satisfy anybody. For the liberals, it
was too conservative. They represented the bourgeoisie as a class,
independent of the feudal aristocracy. Although they were still far from
demanding the overthrow of the monarchy, or the subversion of the
aristocracy, yet they were no longer satisfied with an existence on
sufferance. Indeed, they were also anxious to support the monarchy,
provided that it broadened its base, so as to promote them to the ruling
class. Chang Chih-tung's reform would satisfy only a small upper stratum
of the bourgeoisie, not the entire class. On the other hand, partial, weak
and conservative though they were, the proposed reforms meant some
limitation of the power of the monarchy, of the privileges of the Court
and of the position of the feudal aristocracy. The ruling class, therefore,
was displeased with the protagonist of the reforms, who appeared to
them to be a knight-errant.
 The Reform Movement 141
The Reform Movement, however, penetrated the Court itself, which was
split into two factions—the progressives and the conservatives. The
former represented the impact of the southern bourgeoisie upon the
forbidden city of feudal reaction. The conservative faction was headed
by the Empress Dowager and her entourage, whose corrupt and insane
policy had meant disintegration, defeat and disaster for the country. The
war with Japan rendered the position of the conservatives entirely
untenable. They proved themselves to be thoroughly bankrupt. The
advantge of the situation, the progressives began the offensive. The scale
turned definitely in favour of the progressives upon the defection of the
doyen of the imperial family. Prince Ling, from the reactionary clique of
the Empress Dowager. The time came for the bourgeoisie to show how
they could do better than the corrupt feudal nobility. On the recommen-
dation of the imperial tutor, Wang Tung-ho, who was the leader of
progressives in the Court, the Emperor received Kang Yu-wei, the leader
of the Reform Movement, in audience. That was a definite triumph for
the progressives. It marked the beginning of the open struggle of the
bourgeoisie for political power—not yet to capture it, but to participate in
it with the object of reforming the entire State organisation, so as to
circumscribe the power of the corrupt feudal aristocracy, and thus to
relax the stranglehold upon the economic life of the country.
Before he was received by the Emperor, Kang You-wei, together with
his disciple, Liang Chi-Chao, had founded the "Haio Hui" (Association
for the Study of National Power). It was a club supported by the
progressive Yangtse Viceroys—Liu Kung-yi and Chang Chih-tung. It
published from Shanghai the "Shi Wa-pao" (The News of the Times)
which contained translations of the classical works by European writers
and biographies of great men of the West, such as George Washington,
Peter the Great, Napoleon, etc. Kang Yu-wei was a great Confucian
scholar. The conservative class of professional literary men ironically
called him the "Modern Sage". Posthumously he has been glorified as the
Chinese encyclopedist. Undoubtedly, he was the ideologist of modern
China, with all the specific characteristics of the philosophers of the
bourgeois revolution in Europe. A close and critical examination of the
views of Kang Yu-wei is essential for a correct understanding of the
political and social movements in modern China. It was he who laid
142 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
down their ideological foundation. Chang Chih-tung and Wang Tung-ho
preceded him. Many others followed him. With all the superficial
political differences, Sun Yat-sen was a spiritual disciple of Kang Yu-
wei.
The philosophical doctrines of Kang Yu-wei will be examined in another
chapter. Here will be given an account of his political activities which
marked a very important, though tragic stage in the process of events
leading up to the downfall of the Manchus. In 1897, he published his
"Appeal to the Emperor on behalf of the Nation". It was in response to
that appeal that the Emperor called him in audience. The document was a
confession of political faith which was graphically summarised in its
title. The reception of Kang Yu-wei by the Emperor and his subsequent
appointment to a high office indicated the willingness of the feudal
ruling class to enlist the services of the bourgeoisie for saving it from the
catastrophic collapse staring it in the face. That willingness, however,
was not shared by the entire class. The reactionary Court clique allowed
the young Emperor to take that unprecedented step only as a stop-gap
measure. The Young Emperor, Kuang Hsue, was not the master of his
realm as Louis XIV was. The real ruler was the Old Dragon of the
Empress Dowager, surrounded by the most diehard reactionaries. The
disastrous defeat in the war with Japan has so completely discredited the
reactionary Court clique that it could no longer count on any support in
the whole of the country. In that precarious situation, it allowed the
young Emperor to indulge in his reforming whims, only to pounce upon
him at the first suitable opportunity. Had the entire ruling class stood
behind the Emperor when he tried to enlist the services of the
bourgeoisie, so eagerly offered only for a very beggarly recompense, the
history of China might have been differently written. But history as well
as its own misdeeds had doomed the monarchy to destruction. It had
forfeited all right to exist even in a modified form.
Kang Yu-wei represented the bourgeoisie as an entire class. But even he
did not have any more dangerous design against the monarchy than did
Chang Chih-tung. Though from different angles of vision, both reached
the same conclusion that constitutional monarchy was the salvation of
China. In his famous "Appeal", Kang Yu-wei characterised the Emperor
as the pivot of the State, and suggested reforms on the lines of those
introduced by Peter the
 The Reform Movement 143
Great and in Japan. The monarchy had certainly very little reason to be
afraid of such reforms, if their successful application was still permitted
by the conditions of the country. The misfortune of the Chinese ruling
class was not that they opposed reforms recommended for reinforcing
their position, but the impossibility of their application. The old order
was decayed beyond repair. On the other hand, the Reform Movement
also was doomed to failure by its pathetic inability to grasp the gravity of
the situation. Too weak and constitutionally incapable of carrying
through a great social revolution, the bourgeoisie took upon their
shoulders the thankless and impossible task of propping up the feudal
patriarchal monarchy, discredited by countless misdeeds of its own doing
and tottering to fall under the terrific pressure of the glaring
contradictions of its long outlived existence. All these factors taken
together made the Reform Movement a tragi-comedy.
Taking place under the majestic shadow of a great revolutionary
upheaval cast ahead, the Reform Movement of the timid bourgeoisie was
halting; frightened by the implications of its own first step, it took
several backwards.
The fire of the Taiping Rebellion had nearly consumed the old order, and
scared the nascent bourgeoisie out of wits by its communistic
appearance. The fire was still smouldering on the social horizon. On the
top of that, there was rising a new giant, with what devouring appetite
none could yet surmise. The bourgeoisie was mortally afraid of huge
powder magazine of a mass revolt which alone could destroy the putrid
structure of feudal-patriarchal reaction. All round there lay formidable
weapons with which the bourgeoisie could conquer the paradise of their
dream. But they did not have the courage even to touch them. They were
too weak to wield such powerful weapons. So when the effete feudal-
patriarchal monarchy was exposed in all its impotence by one mass
upheaval, and menaced by a new one, the bourgeoisie sought to dress it
up in the new clothes of a constitutional fraud. Through the "Appeal" of
their ideologist, Kang Yu-wei, they begged the Emperor, "to convoke a
council of the best men of the Empire", and suggested reforms on the
ground that their introduction would "again make China strong and
enable the Empire to continue in existence". They offered their services
to the monarchy even before any reform was introduced. They argued
that the "employment of the best men of the land even without reform"
144 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
would save the situation. Who were those best men, so very able to
perform the hat-trick? Those considered as such by the feudal ruling
class were all already in the saddle. Obviously, some representatives of
the trading, manufacturing and financial interests, not connected with the
feudal officialdom, were the would be saviours. They would do the
miracle even without reform! The Reform Movement exposed itself to be
such a willing agency for stabilising the tottering reaction, because the
atmosphere was heavily charged with a spirit of mass revolt.
But in a certain period of history, the bourgeoisie are connected with the
revolution in spite of themselves. They are either pushed, or drift into
actions which represent an attack upon the established order,
notwithstanding their anxiety to stabilise it. Rang Yu-wei's Appeal was
full of suggestions, all calculated to strengthen the established order. But
one little recommendation rendered the rest of the pious document
completely antagonistic to its expressed purpose. It was for the grant of
provincial autonomy. That measure would be the last blow to the
undermined structure of the feudal-patriarchal State. The corner-stone of
that structure was the personal responsibility of all provincial officials to
the Emperor. It was that personal allegiance to the head of the State
which held practically independent provincial governments subordinated
to a central authority. The slightest reversal of that relation would turn
over the precarious structure. Any responsibility downwards would
provide provincial rulers with the pretext to interpret liberally their
allegiance to the Emperor. The consequences were not difficult to
imagine. It was on this issue of centralism versus provincial autonomy
that the revolution finally swept away the Manchu monarchy almost with
a snap.
That dangerous demand crept into the otherwise harmless programme of
the Reform Movement because of the fact that the interests of the
bourgeoisie were antagonistic to those of the feudal aristocracy. There
was bound to be a rift in the lute. Revolution was in the air. And the
bourgeoisie could not help putting a spoke in their own wheel, on which
they wanted to join the merry-go-round of political power. The demand
for provincial autonomy distinguished Kang Yu-wei's programme from
that of his predecessor and patron, Chang Chih-tung. That apparently
innocuous demand demarcated the two programmes as respectively of
the two antagonistic classes which were bound to clash sooner or later,
 The Reform Movement 145
willingly or not. In France, the parlements were the hated thorn in the
side of the monarchy. In China, it was also the provincial assemblies
which subsequently became the instruments of revolutionary agitation.
By suggesting the reorganisation of provincial administration, the
Reform Movement objectively demanded the creation of provincial
assemblies as rivals to the Emperor for the control of local affairs. Under
certain circumstances, even reforms are inseparably connected with the
revolution. At the close of the nineteenth century, such circumstances
obtained in China.
When Kang Yu-wei became the guide, friend and philosopher of the
young Emperor, he proposed to carry out a programme of reform which
included: (1) reorganisation of the State finance; (2) efficient collection
of revenue; (3) imposition of indirect taxes; (4) increase of the salaries of
officials; (5) granting of concessions for the exploitation of mines and
construction of railways; (6) promotion and protection of commerce; (7)
revision of the law courts; (8) modern education; (9) reorganisation of
the army and navy and (10) amicable relations with foreign Powers.
Under the given conditions, the introduction of the proposed reforms
would go a long way to stabilise the situation. But the same conditions
rendered their effective introduction impossible without revolution. Not
seeing that implication of his programme, Kang Yu-wei expected to
realise the coveted heaven on earth by the simple means of imperial
edicts. They were issued in plenty during the "Hundred Days of Reform"
from June 11 to September 22, 1898. Old institutions were swept away,
and traditional customs abolished, if such drastic objects could ever be
attained by strokes of pen. The regime of reforms was inaugurated with
the following declaration: "It is the same evil that existed in the Sung and
Ming dynasties. Our present system is not of the slightest use. We cannot
in these modern days adhere to the ways of the Five Kings; even they did
not continue exactly after the manner of their respective predecessors. It
is like wearing thick clothes in summer and thin clothes in winter."3
That was a promising beginning. The proclamation spelt death to the
established order. The Chinese society was threatened with a break-away
from its old moorings, tied to which it had weathered the storm and stress
of centuries, The story of the glorious Sung period was to be forgotten.
The proud memory of the Mings was to be obliterated. The Five Kings
were to be pulled down from
146 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
their mythical place of adoration; thus, the bottom of the State religion of
China was to be knocked off. It was a perspective of ruthless iconoclasm,
opened up by a decree signed by the High Priest himself. China was to
be made all over again. Well might the ruling class gnash its teeth in
wrath against the young imbecile taken by the ear by a heretic from
Canton. Well might the "Old Buddha" lay aside her frivolities in the
gardens of the Winter Palace and hold counsel with the elder clansmen
about the necessity of taking back in her iron hands (now feeble) the
reigns of the State. Consternation led to conspiracy. The Dragon hissed:
"Lock up the young fool! He is gone mad. And burn that southern heretic
alive! The Celestial Empire must be saved, at any cost. How can it exist,
if the Five Kings were no more, and Confucius pulled down from his
pedestal?"
But wait. Let the first effervescence subside. A king, after all, is a king.
And his adviser? Oh, he is but an ideologist of the bourgeoisie, too weak
and timid to lead a revolution even when it is raging on all sides,
threatening to consume the putrid carcass of feudal reaction into white
ashes. Only a few days passed, and it was already possible to see how the
ground lay. In a new decree, the Emperor spoke more to the point.
"Lethargy and corruption are ruining the Empire. Reform of the
Government is needed to save the country. Therefore, it is decreed that
higher and more universal education should be spread among the people
for their betterment and for the strengthening and enrichment of the
Empire. For this purpose, we must bring Western learning and sciences
to our aid. Westerners are our superiors in this respect. Conservative
statesmen, who deprecate Western science of government, are ignorant.
The object of the Western science of government and system of
education is to improve the condition of the masses. The Westerners are
wise, for they have acquired wealth, comfort, longevity and command as
the result of their system of government. We have studied the benefits of
Western learning, and are determined to introduce them in our country."
The decree concluded with a reaffirmation of the heavenly descent and
divine right of the Emperor, and the duty of the imperial power was
declared to be to make its subjects happy.
The Court recovered its breath. When the Emperor still believed in his
heavenly descent and divine right, there was hope. To make the subjects
happy? That the ideal king of Confucius also undertook
 The Reform Movement 147
to do. The question, what is happiness? could be settled easily as long as
the teachings of the Old Sage were not scrapped. While standing on his
traditional ground, the crazy king, however, proposed many things which
were not admissible if all that went with absolute monarchy should also
be kept intact. The Emperor appeared to have entered into an alliance
with people outside the aristocratic pale. In return for the recognition of
his heavenly descent and divine right, he proposed to recast the teachings
of Confucius to suit the interests of the bourgeoisie. He was inclined to
be a bourgeois King. The threatening metamorphosis of kingship,
irrespective of the doctrine of heavenly descent and divine right, was
heralded by yet another decree which proclaimed that "commercial
matters are of the highest importance"; expressed great concern for the
promotion of trade; and appointed a Ministry of Commerce. It further
enjoined the officials "to consult the merchants for the most speedy and
satisfactory arrangement of commercial matters." The Son of Heaven,
the proud occupant of the Dragon Throne, admitting the importance of
trade which had been such an annoying agency of disturbance! Mixed
feelings prevailed in the Court. Things were obviously in the melting-
pot.
Reaction had reason to be nervous. By themselves, the decrees of the
reforming Emperor were nothing more than an expression of pious
desire, and as such could be ignored as long as the practical introduction
of the proposed measures did not happen. Nevertheless, they were
ominous indicators of the situation. Should the proposed reforms be put
into practice, the feudal-patriarchal ruliug class would be dislodged from
the key-position in the political and economic life of the country, and, in
that situation, the very institution of monarchy might be in danger. On
the face of it, the Reform Movement did not appear to be very
dangerous. But such a devastating development was quite possible under
the prevailing circumstances, if only the bourgeoisie would have the
courage to place themselves at the head of the storm of mass revolt
gathering all round. If the reactionary ruling class hesitated to take the
offensive, the situation might not depend on the choice of the
bourgeoisie. They might be forced to assert the "sacred right of revolt"
even against their own will. Such things had happened in other countries;
why not, then, in China? The reactionaries must take the bull by the
horns. The Reformers were taken by surprise, before they had the time to
look
148 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
around.
A summary of all the proposed reforms, announced through imperial
edicts, issued in quick succession during the "Hundred Days", shows that
the ruling class had ample reason to be alarmed. The following were
included in the formidable list: (1) Abolition of the old examination
system; (2) Foundation of a national university; (3) Establishment of an
Official Bureau of Mining, Agriculture and Railways; (4) Abolition of
sinecures; (5) The parasites thus deprived were to settle in the provinces;
(6) Plan for the preparation of a State budget on modern lines;
(7) Reward for technical inventions, industrial enterprises and
agricultural improvements; (8) Freedom for the official press organs to
criticise the Government. The situation came to a head when the
formidable list culminated in the grant of the right to the lower State
officials to memorialise the Throne in closed covers. All the measures
were clearly directed against the feudal officialdom, the all-powerful
mandarins. The ruling class was attacked from both sides. On the one
hand, the bourgeoisie were promised the right to encroach upon its
preserves; on the other, the monarch proposed to exercise his absolutism
practically by coming in touch directly with the people. That would
undermine the position of the mandarins, who ruled, robbed and ruined
the country with the authority derived from a mandate directly received
from the monarch. Thus deprived of their privileged position, they would
easily be pushed to the wall in the struggle with the rising bourgeoisie,
endowed with new political rights in addition to the economic power
they already wielded. The Reform Movement directly tended towards an
alliance of the monarchy with the bourgeoisie, at the expense of the
feudal aristocracy and the officialdom.
In one of his edicts, the Emperor rebuked the mandarins for disturbing
the relation between the monarch and his subjects, and the reforms
proposed by him clearly tended towards limiting the power and
privileges of the officials. Every item of the reforms cited above, if put
into practice, would deal blow after blow to the very existence of the
feudal-patriarchal ruling class, although all together they would
strengthen the monarchy with the support of the bourgeoisie claiming to
represent the entire people. The abolition of the old examination system
would mean nothing less than the end of the monopolist control of the
entire State apparatus by a class of conservative intellectuals, either
hailing directly from,
 The Reform Movement 149
or closely connected with, the feudal aristocracy. The proposed alteration
of the standard of the Civil Service Examination, by including in its
curriculum modern politics and economics, would not only throw open
the doors of officialdom to the scions of the bourgeoisie, but put the old
monopolists practically out of the run because of their ignorance. Then,
the penetration of the State apparatus by bourgeois upstarts, with new-
fangled notions of political organisation and financial administration,
would eventually reconstruct it into an instrument of power in the hands
of the bourgeoisie.
That would mean disarming of the feudal-patriarchal ruling class. In the
midst of a battle, disarming is the prelude to destruction. The foundation
of a national university for the teaching of modern knowledge would
sound the deathknell of the ancient Confucian learning which provided
the ideology of feudal-patriarchal domination. The abolition of sinecures
and the proposed dispersal of their holders to distant parts of the country
for earning a living would be a blow dealt directly to the Court which
was the centre of reaction. A budget on modern methods, calculating and
actually collecting all the items of revenue, would put an end to the
regime of corruption and misappropriation by the provincial officials.
Their position of power and privilege threatened from all sides, it was to
be expected that the reactionaries would not take the blows lying down.
Through the control of the State apparatus, they could prevent the
introduction of the reforms heralded in the imperial edicts. But the forces
for overthrowing the feudal-patriarchal Court as a condition for the
successful application of the proposed measures of reform, were also
there. They were raising their ominous heads from all sides. The
bourgeoisie might not wish to invoke those forces of revolution, even for
the realisation of their own programme. But they might be forced to do
so against their will. Reaction was indeed in danger. The country was in
the state of an acute revolutionary crisis.
Nevertheless, the monarchy itself was not in the least challenged. On the
contrary, the bourgeoisie appeared on the scene as plus royaliste que le
Roi. They proposed to save the monarchy which had been brought to the
very brink of the abyss of destruction by insane and imbecile actions of
the corrupt clique of the reactionary Court. They sought to ride into
power under the patronage of the discredited monarchy which they
proposed to rescue from the mins
150 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of the whole system it had represented for centuries. The Chinese
bourgeoisie, however, were not alone in taking up such a disgraceful and
cowardly attitude in the midst of an acute revolutionary crisis, when the
entire old order was breaking down under the weight of the
contradictions of its own existence. Never and nowhere in history have
the bourgeoisie by themselves gone to the extent of attacking the
monarchy. They always sought to reform it—to shift its social basis from
one class to another. Kang Yu-wei had a Turgot and a Necker for his
predecessors. Those representatives of the French bourgeoisie also
proposed to rescue the monarchy from the corrupting influence of the
Court. When in June 1789 the French Court was plotting a coup d'etat
against the refractory National Assembly, Necker pathetically took
shelter under the sinister shadow of the monarchy, and implored the king
to intervene personally in the situation which could no longer be saved
either by the king or by god.
Kang Yu-wei and his associates proved themselves to be typical
representatives of the bourgeoisie by devising means for saving the
monarchy and having reformist decrees issued by a practically deposed
king, also just when the Court was preparing a coup d'etat. Only they did
not go even so far as their fore-runners had gone in France a hundred
years ago. No't only did the Reform Movement fail to call upon the
revolutionary masses to defend it against the imminent attack of reaction;
it did not even demand the convocation of a parliament which could be
the organ of a revolutionary struggle in that critical moment. The belated
and timid effort of Kang Yu-wei to put the Empress Dowager under
arrest, was forestalled by quick action on the part of that imperial dame;
and the naive Emperor was pathetically deceived and betrayed when he
made a childish attempt to lay his hand on a section of the army. The
tragic inability of the Chinese bourgeoisie to carry through a revolution,
needed for the promotion of their class interest, was once again
evidenced subsequently by the fact that, when after all the monarchy did
collapse, the Republic was entrusted to the tender mercy of the same
arch-reactionary Yuan Shi-kai, who so shamelessly betrayed the
reforming Emperor .
"The Hundred Days of Reform'' concluded with the abdication of the
Emperor Kuang Hsue, the flight of Kang Yu-wei and the execution of six
leaders of the Reform Movement. The Boxer
The Reform Movement 151
Uprising followed immediately, revealing that crisis was much too deep-
rooted to be overcome by a Court counter-revolution. The bourgeoisie
failed to lead the revolution; but it marched on. It could not be crushed. It
was much too powerful for the native reaction. But for foreign
intervention, it would have swept away the debris of the decomposed
feudal-patriarchal order, and then the bourgeoisie could reap the benefit
of battles won by the masses. In the situation as it was, foreign
imperialism fished in troubled waters. By crushing the uprising it averted
immediate overthrow of the Manchus, but that very fact, at the same
time, represented yet another blow to the totteriog order. The Boxer
Indemnity, on the one hand, aggravated the bankruptcy of State finance
and, on the other, served as the pretext for further foreign penetration.
Foreign invasion forced the Manchu to introduce measures which
coincided with the demands of the Reform Movement, denounced and
defeated so very recently. For the service of foreign loans, contracted and
to be contracted in order to pay the indemnity to Japan, modernisation of
the State budget became inevitable. National finance must be put in order
if international credit was to be secured. A strict control of revenues,
collected throughout the country, was essential for the purpose. That
meant a shattering blow to the State organisation, which enabled the
Manchus to wield their power.
Under the Manchus, the State was constructed still according to the
theories of Confucius and Mencius, on a synthesis of the antagonistic
principles of centralism and local autonomy. It was indeed a classical
feudal State. The provincial satraps were free to do whatever they
pleased in their respective domains on paying formal homage and
swearing allegiance to the Emperor. The Manchus remained the absolute
rulers of China, because they ruled the least. Provincial governors were
the real rulers. They were all Manchu nobles or Tartar Generals.
According to the Confucian theory of State, the Emperor is rather the
High Priest than the Political head of society. The basis of his supremacy
is not the allegiance of his nobles, but the popular belief in his direct
descent from Heaven. That divine right he delegated to the provincial
rulers, who exercised it as practically independent sovereigns. The divine
halo, radiating from the Son of the Heaven, conferred upon the
provincial rulers an absolute power to pillage and plunder the country.
They sent to Peking annual tributes only as the token of their moral and
spiritual
152 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
allegiance. So, when the Central Government sent to the provinces
financial commissioners to control taxation and supervise the collection
and remittance of revenue to the national exchequer, the whole fabric of
the traditional theocratic-patriarchal-feudal State crumbled. It had
continued in a fossilised existence through centuries, ever since the holy
days of Confucius. But the impact of capitalism was irresistible. The
Confucian god must abdicate in favour of god capital, if not of native
birth, then of foreign origin.
Even the befogged vision of the stupidest reaction could not be
altogether blind to the rude realities of the situation. Threatened with
destruction, the Manchus swallowed their pride, and tried to buy the
loyalty of the native bourgeoisie at the cheapest price possible. When the
army of the allied foreign imperialism was still occupying Peking, the
Manchu Court, from its place of retreat at Hsian-fu, issued a decree
heralding the so-called "Conservative Reform". Once again in absolute
control of the affairs of the State, the astute Empress Dowager undertook
the very same mission for which she had put the young Emperor in
chains, driven Kang Yu-wei out of the country and beheaded his
colleagues. The mission was to consolidate the tottering feudal-
patriarchal monarchy by enlisting the support and services of the rising
bourgeoisie.
In an edict, issued on January 28, 1901, the necessity for a change in the
administrative system in accordance with new conditions was admitted,
but it was asserted that such a change could take place within the limits
of the Confucian principles of State. As the Reform Movement,
sponsored by the deposed Emperor Kuang Hsue, had also begun from a
similar point of departure, the distinction of the new edict was
emphasised by denouncing Kang Yu-wei and his associates as
"dangerous revolutionaries". They were even accused of having
encouraged the Boxer Uprising. The sanction for a compromise with the
hated upstart was found in the teachings of the Old Master. The edict
declared: "The precepts handed down by our ancestors, and which
correspond with the fundamental principles on which Western prosperity
and power are based, are 'high stations filled with indulgent generosity'
and 'liberal forbearance exercised in presiding over the multitude'." The
high ofiicials of the State were exhorted to "discover by what means the
prestige of the nation can be rehabilitated, national talent fostered,
internal revenue extended and military forces placed on a proper
footing."
 The Reform Movement 153
It is remarkable how slightly the old Empress Dowager lagged behind
the young Emperor in the zeal for reform. The reforms recommended in
the above mentioned edict promised to meet the demands of the
bourgeoisie on the questions of financial administration, monopoly of the
State apparatus by the feudal-patriarchal literati, and modernisation of
the army. Yet the original sponsors of these inadequate measures were
driven out and denounced as dangerous revolutionaries. The reason of
the apparent paradox was that, when the reforms were formulated by the
bourgeoisie, they objectively represented an expression of the forces of
revolution, and therefore were likely to outgrow the limits placed upon
them by the timid bourgeoisie. The reforms recommended by Kang Yu-
wei by themselves were not very dangerous. They could be adjusted to a
continuation of the old order. But the conditions under which they were
formulated made them pregnant which alarming possibilities. They did
not go much farther than those which the diehard leader of rank reaction
herself subsequently offered to concede. The ideology of Kang Yu-wei
was hardly free from the tradition of Confucianism. There was little
difference between his suggestion to rule the country by the "best men in
the land" and the Empress Dowager's theory of filling "high stations with
indulgent generosity". He proposed to prop up the tottering old order by
infusing the blood of the young bourgeoisie in the senile veins of
decayed feudalism. So desired also the Empress Dowager, when, in the
January Edict, she advised the Manchu rulers to "foster natural talent".
By that advice, she admitted that talent was no longer the monopoly of a
particular class; it was to be found outside the pale of that class; and,
wherever found, it should be harnessed for the service of the established
order.
The Reform Movement, headed by Kang Yu-wei and patronised by the
Emperor Kuang Hsue, could be so easily crushed because it was very
weak in consequence of its failure to draw consciously upon the social
forces objectively standing behind it. When the Empress Dowager
stepped into the shoes of Kuang Hsue as the patron-saint of reform, the
movement became a hot-house plant, totally isolated from the realities of
the situation. Consequently, the reforms promised failed to produce the
desired effect, in spite of the fact that they did not fall far short of the
original demands as formulated by Kang Yu-wei. It was a period of
revolutionary crisis. Things were moving fast. A feudal city, Peking was
the centre of never-ending
154 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Court intrigues and aristocratic decadence. Many a scene of the tragedy
depicting the fall of the Manchus were enacted there. But the real life of
the country pulsated elsewhere. In consequence of the penetration of
foreign trade, the operation of imperialist finance and the rise of the
native bourgeoisie, there had developed economic centres which
overshadowed the capital in importance. In the enervating atmosphere of
Court intrigues in Peking, the representatives of the southern bourgeoisie
could not keep pace with the development taking place so rapidly in the
economic centres of the country situated at great distances, made still
greater by the absence of the modern means of communication. So,
before long it was found that the fire, adroitly stolen from the guns of the
Reform Movement, was inadequate to hit the mark. The old order was
irreparably shaken.
Notes '
1. Chesterfield's Letters.
2. General Ward was a man of great wealth", wrote the American Minister in Peking,
Anson Burlingame, in a letter to the Secretary of State, communicating the news of
Ward's death.
3. Imperial Edict, June 11, 1898.
 CHAPTER VII
THE BOXER UPRISING
The defeat of the Taiping Revolt and the following reign of terror gave
the decayed feudal-patriarchal absolutism another short lease of a
precarious existence. But a social system so completely doomed to death
could not be reinvigorated. The process of its decomposition and
dissolution went on even more rapidly. The foreign Powers helped it
defeat the revolution. Now they contributed very considerably to its
imminent and inevitable downfall. And simultaneously with the
decomposition and dissolution of the old order, there developed the
forces of the new, in the face of all obstacles.
Owing to their immaturity as a class, the bourgeoisie did not play a
prominent role in the first outbreak of the democratic revolution. The
communistic deviations of the Taiping movement very much scared
them. Towards the end of the revolt, the bourgeoisie pronouncedly
sympathised with the forces of reaction.1
The attitude of the Chinese bourgeoisie represented a characteristic
feature of their class all over the world. They might claim the "sacred
right of revolt" as against political institutions and social relations
obstructing free development of the capitalist mode of production,
distribution and exchange. But they proved, time and again, in more than
one country, that this claim, theoretically insisted upon, in practice was
never pushed very far by their own efforts. The difference between
feudalism and capitalism being not qualitative but only quantitative, the
bourgeoisie by themselves would never destroy their predecessors root
and branch, except under the pressure of forces beyond their control.
Both the systems are based upon private property and the right of
exploitation of one class by another. Even when striving to subvert an
antiquated form of private property and
156 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the corresponding relation of classes, the bourgeoisie are averse to the
revolt developing into an attack upon the institution of private property
as such, or to any serious disturbance of "law and order" meant to
maintain society on the basis of class domination. From the point of view
of the bourgeoisie, the task of the democratic revolution is only to restrict
the powers and privileges of the feudal aristocracy to such an extent as
would render it amenable to a reconciliation with the new mode of
production.
Objectively, the Taiping Revolt represented an acute outburst of the
strivings of the bourgeoisie to create a higher social order. But at that
time the bourgeoisie in China were not developed enough to guide the
course of the revolution. The revolution, at least in appearance,
threatened to go farther than the bourgeoisie liked, because the forces
involved in it were composed overwhelmingly of classes with nothing or
very little to lose. It plunged the country into a state of civil war,
inevitably injuring for the time being trade with which the Chinese
bourgeoisie at that time were mainly concerned. Although the
revolutionary government did its best to promote trade and industry,
certain dislocation of normal business was unavoidable, because its very
existence meant war.
The regime of "law and order", re-established by the decayed feudal-
patriarchal State with foreign aid, could not, however, be conducive to
the real interests of the bourgeoisie. A free development of the higher
forms of production was not possible as long as Chinese national
economy on the whole remained subjected to feudal-patriarchal relations
and, in addition, was deeply penetrated by imperialist trade. Even trade
could not prosper. The suppression of the Taiping Revolt meant a great
expenditure. To recover that heavy loss, the State increased its exactions
so much as to place still more restrictions upon free exchange of
commodities not to mention production. Consequently, before long there
was a revival of the revolutionary movement, this time with the
bourgeoisie at the forefront, if not as a fighting force, at least as the
ideological leader. The bourgeois democratic revolution entered the
second stage in which the acute elemental outburst characterising the
earlier stage was, indeed, absent, but ideological clarity, political outlook
and social orientation attained a high level of development. These
attributes were potentially present also in the Taiping Revolt. Had it not
been defeated by a counterrevolutionary combination unprecedented in
the history of other
 The Boxer Uprising 157
countries, most probably those attributes would have asserted them-
selves, and the revolution might have developed from the elemental to
the positive stage without a break. However, the appearance of the
bourgeoisie as a force opposed to feudal-patriarchal reaction showed
that, though the revolution had been checked, it was not destroyed.
Revolutions, being in the nature of social progress, are inevitable. Due to
historical conditions, one may begin later; a combination of
circumstances may retard its free development; but it cannot be arrested
indefinitely.
The bourgeois democratic revolution in China suffered from both the
drawbacks. Historical conditions delayed it, and formidable forces were
arrayed against it when it finally began. Consequently, its development
became distorted. The Boxer Uprising was its second stage,
chronologically, but at the same time it revealed the distorted nature of
the process of revolutionary development. The most characteristic
feature of that stage was the schism between the two forces of the
revolution—between the progressive bourgeoisie and the revolutionary
masses. The schism was not caused by any such class antagonism as may
mark the very last stage of a bourgeois democratic revolution. Therefore,
it was all the more deplorable. That stage was reached later, when the
nationalist bourgeoisie supported feudalism as against the peasant
masses, and thus became an instrument of imperialism, threatened by a
democratic national revolution.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese bourgeoisie openly
advocated limitation of the power of the feudal-patriarchal monarchy,
and stood for the subversion of the social order it represented. Then they
operated as a revolutionary force. As such, they should have placed
themselves at the head of the peasant masses rebelling against the feudal-
patriarchal regime. But the intervention of a third factor from outside
seriously disturbed the relation of classes in China thereby distorting the
process of the development of revolution.
When they first began the struggle against feudal-patriarchal reaction, the
Chinese bourgeoisie unfortunately laboured under a wrong idea about the
role of foreign imperialism. They were misled by the fact that ostensibly
the foreigners were also struggling against the vagaries of the feudal-
patriarchal monarchy. They committed the error of seeking an alliance
with a factor which constituted the greatest hindrance to the realisation of
everything they stood for. They
158 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
took the foreigners for friends, because they had modern democratic
institutions at home, and believed that they were allies in a common
struggle. That ideological confusion on the part of the Chinese
bourgeoisie grew out of their economic position. During the preceding
hundred years, they had developed as an integral part of a system with
the help of which imperialism established its domination in China. It was
the system of trading in commodities produced within the limits of
feudal-patriarchal relations. The economic basis of the Chinese
bourgeoisie at that time was mainly trade, and trade was under
imperialist control. The Chinese bourgeoisie, therefore, began their
abortive struggle against feudal reaction with great illusions about the
role of the foreign Powers. Intolerable conditions, created by the
operation of the galvanised forces of reaction, encouraged the bour-
geoisie to appear as the ideological opponent of the established feudal-
patriarchal system. But when the wide-spread social discontent broke out
into a mass uprising, the bourgeoisie aligned themselves against it. The
progressive Viceroys of the Yangtze provinces—Llu Kun-yi (Nanking)
and Chang Chih-tung (Woochang)—were the fathers of modern
capitalism in China. In the critical days of the Boxer Uprising, they
entered into an alliance with arch-reactionaries like Li Hung-chang and
Yuan Shi-kai, who had so shamelessly betrayed the reformist emperor.
That unholy alliance, working in complete cooperation with the foreign
Municipal Council of Shanghai, succeeded in checking the spread of the
rebellion to the South, where it would have found a much more fertile
ground. Thanks to that unholy alliance, a revolutionary mass upheaval to
some extent came under the influence of the very reaction, to overthrow
which was its objective task. Consequently, the second stage of the
bourgeois democratic revolution in China also ended in defeat.
The suppression of the Taiping Revolt created the causes of the Boxer
Uprising. The alignment of forces was the same on both the occasions. It
was masses versus an alliance of foreign imperialism and native reaction.
During the intervening period, between the two popular uprisings, the
bourgeoisie had appeared on the scene. But their voice was lost in the
fierce clash of the Boxer Uprising. The suppression of the Reform
Movement, patronised by the young emperor, was one of the
innumerable immediate causes of the outburst.
Already in the latter stage of the Taiping Revolt, it was clear
 The Boxer Uprising 159
that the future of China had to be fought out between the people and
foreign imperialism. The native reaction was but a secondary factor. It no
longer represented the main hindrance to progress, the sinister role
having passed on to the new factor of a foreign origin. The development
of the bourgeois democratic revolution in China became such a distorted
process because it had to take place not only in opposition to a decayed
social system, but in the teeth of a formidable enemy, itself born out of
the bourgeois democratic revolution in other countries. The
contradictions of capitalism, accentuated by its uneven development,
stood out in their crassest form. The suppression of the first stage of the
revolution with the help of foreign intruders made it inevitable that, in its
subsequent stages, the revolution must take on an anti-foreign character.
The most outstanding feature of the Chinese revolution since then came
to be anti-imperialism. From the very beginning, owing to the occupation
of the throne by a foreign dynasty, the bourgeois democratic revolution
was also a struggle for national liberation. The appearance of modern
imperialism on the scene accentuated that nationalist character of the
struggle. It became the most outstanding feature of the revolution. The
Boxer Revolution made that very clear. The seeds sown by the
suppression of the Taiping Revolt began to bear fruit.
The history of modern China has been misinterpreted to serve the
purpose of imperialism. The misinterpretation is the most flagrant in the
case of the Boxer Uprising. In connection with the Taiping Revolt, the
inadmissible excuse of ignorance might be partially taken into
consideration. The misinterpretation of the Boxer Uprising was wilful. A
great popular upheaval was depicted as an artificial outbreak engineered
by reactionary Manchu officials. That current interpretation is belied by
the facts of the situation. The facts could be easily discovered by any
unprejudiced observer. The Boxer Uprising was a revolutionary popular
movement, because it was brought about by the conditions of feudal-
patriarchal exploitation. It could not possibly be patronised or promoted
by Manchu officials drawing their inspiration from the Court. As a
matter of fact, from the very beginning, the Manchu Court as well as all
the big officials throughout the country were afraid of the gathering
storm, and sought foreign assistance as a guarantee against it.
It is a common knowledge that the leader of the reactionary Court clique,
the all-powerful Prince Yung Lu, was decidedly hostile
160 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
to the movement. When Peking was surrounded by the rebels, and very
disquietening news were pouring in from all parts of the country, he sent
a circular telegram to all the provincial governors, directing them to take
every possible measure for stamping out the movement. That telegram
became a famous document of the history of the period. It was a clear
statement of the opinion of the Court about the insurgents.2 The Empress
Dowager was depicted as the devil of the drama. In her case also, facts
tell a different story. Alarmed by the situation in July 1900, she sent a
telegram to the king of England appealing for help to suppress the
rebellion.3 That document made it clear that she had no sympathy for the
Boxers. But the protestations of the Empress Dowager were dismissed as
"the repentance of the Old Buddha", when the game was up.
At the very height of the crisis, the Court did extend halfhearted support
to the anti-foreign aspect of the revolt. But even the belated protestations
of the Empress Dowager showed that the Court circle was mortally
afraid of the revolutionary social character of the movement from the
very beginning. In extending the halfhearted support to the anti-foreign
aspect of the movement, the Court acted reluctantly under the pressure of
the masses, brought to bear upon it through the instrumentality of its
members who were influenced by the reformist tendencies represented
by the young Emperor. The reluctant act was subsequently characterised
by the Empress Dowager as "the only mistake of her life." After the
tragedy, by way of explaining "the only mistake of her life", the Empress
Dowager made the following confession in course of a private conver-
sation: "Prince Tuen and the Duke Lan reported that all Peking had
become Boxer, and if we tried to turn them out, they would kill every
body including the Court."4
It is evident from those facts that the ruling class did not make any
mistake about the real nature of the movement. The conditions of the
country could not be altogether unknown to them. Therefore, they could
not possibly sympathise with a movement whose revolutionary social
character was determined by those conditions. With great fear the ruling
class had watched the storm gathering on all sides, but due to utter
impotence could not do anything to check it effectively. When the
seething fire broke out in a terrific flame, threatening to consume the
decayed and discredited structure of reaction, they made a desperate
effort to save themselves by reluctantly
The Boxer Uprising 161
sympathising with the anti-foreign nature of the revolt. The accidental,
half-hearted and momentary relation of the ruling class with the
revolutionary movement was but a by-product of the complicated
situation. The Manchus did not act according to any plan to expel the
foreigners. They sympathised with the anti-foreign sentiment of the
movement out of sheer anxiety to save themselves. It was an adventure—
a leap in the dark, while the house was on fire, hoping to land on
something more secure.
Even at the very last movement, Prince Yung Lu endeavoured to
dissuade the Empress Dowager against the adventurous policy of
encouraging the anti-foreign sentiment of a revolutionary popular
upheaval. His argument was: "These Boxers are all revolutionaries and
agitators; they are trying to get the people help them to kill the
foreigners, but he was very much afraid that the result would be against
the Government."5
After the bloody suppression of the movement through foreign
intervention, imperial edicts were issued denouncing the Boxers. Those
documents were dismissed by foreign historians as futile efforts of the
culprits to explain their previous acts. But they testified clearly to the fact
that the Court had acted reluctantly under popular pressure. For example,
in the edict issued on February 13, 1901, it was stated: "We have on
more than one previous occasion hinted directly at the extraordinary
difficulty of the position in which we were placed, and which left us no
alternative but to act as we did," That explanatory statement was fully
borne out by facts. The effete native reaction was not able to cope with
the rising tide of revolution. It actually appealed to foreigners for help.
But the latter waited, not out of any sympathy for the revolutionary
movement, but for the opportune moment when their intervention would
produce the most profitable result. Meanwhile, their acts of wanton
aggression completely discredited the ruling dynasty and enraged the
people.
The anti-foreign sentiment of the masses became a specific feature of the
Boxer movement thanks to a combination of circumstances.
Subjectively, the reactionary ruling class of China had little reason to be
fond of the foreigners. But the alignment of forces during a great
revolutionary struggle does not take place according to subjective
feelings. It is determined by objective conditions; the affinity of class
interest is the decisive factor. Having been bullied into disgraceful
submission by foreign invaders, the Chinese ruling
162 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
class was naturally bitter against them; at the same time, they could not
forget that, but for foreign intervention, the history of China from the
days of the Taiping Revolt might have been very different. The
reactionary ruling class of China, however, was not moved by any
gratitude for the foreigners. It was simple identity of interest which
actuated them. The reactionary Court grandee Kang Yi, in his wild fury
against the Reform Movement, exclaimed: "Far better it will be for us to
divide our possessions among our friends, the foreigners, than to permit
our slaves to rob us our heritage."6 Yet he has gone down in history as
the leading anti-foreign crusader!
The reactionary ruling class would not be what it was, if its well-
warranted bitterness against the foreign invaders coincided with the
popular anti-imperialist sentiment, which came to be the specific feature
of the revolutionary movement. There could not be any possible doubt
regarding the historic role of the feudal-patriarchal ruling class in relation
to an essentially democratic revolutionary movement. Not only would
the rank reactionaries of the Court rather capitulate entirely to the
foreigners than tolerate any revolutionary change in the established
conditions of the country. Even the progressive elements among the
provincial rulers, some of whom had extensive connection with capitalist
enterprises, were decidedly pro-imperialist in the face of the rising tide of
revolution. Viceroy Chang Chih-tung of Woochan was one of the early
ideologists of the Reform Movement, and a pioneer of modern industrial
capitalism in China. Yet he joined such staunch defenders of reaction as
Li Hung-chang, Liu Kun-yi and Yuan Shih-kai in their crusade against
the revolution. "The great Viceroys have been standing by us splendidly
for the last four months. But how much longer could they hold their
turbulent population quiet in the face of constant incitement?"7 All those
leading members of the feudal ruling class played important roles in
those fateful days of China. They were all alarmed by the deep-rooted
discontent of the people. Being in close touch with the realities of the
situation, they knew fully well that the effete ruling dynasty would be
altogether unable to cope with matters, if the wide-spread popular
discontent broke out into a revolutionary uprising. Therefore, they were
all eager to secure foreign help for strengthening the position of the
established order which they wanted to reform gradually.
Lord Beresford was the head of the British mission sent to
 The Boxer Uprising 163
China on the eve of the Boxer Uprising. He recorded the views of "the
great progressive administrators" on the realities and the perspectives of
the situation. They all expressed misgivings, and believed that the
salvation of the existing order was to be found in foreign aid. From his
conversation with Viceroy of Nanking, the British envoy came to know
that, to meet the increasing service of foreign loans, the Central
Government was heavily encroaching upon provincial finance; the
financial stringency was leading to the breakdown of provincial
administration; that armed forces sufficient to cope with the grave
situation, created by popular discontent, could not be maintained for the
lack of money; that additional taxation to replenish the provincial
treasury was sure to cause greater disturbance; and that the whole
country was dangerously unsettled.8 After his interview with the Viceroy
of Woochan, Beresford drew the folio wing picture of the situation: "The
Viceroy was afraid of disturbance in his provinces (Hunan and Hupeh);
he did not have sufficient forces to cope with a serious outbreak, nor did
he have the finance to increase his forces; and the people knew that they
were taxed more heavily than ever, for the foreigners have to be paid."9
Around the southern port of Swatow, the British mission found the
people violently opposing any new taxation. "The officials in this locality
are afraid of the people, and they cannot enforce unjust demands as they
have no troops whatever."10
The country was seething with discontent. The immediate cause of that
state of affairs was increased taxation to pay interests on foreign loans,
forced upon a feeble government. The masses realised how foreign
penetration intensified their exploitation and aggravated their misery.
They were determined to resist further taxation. But, on the other hand,
the Government, central as well as provincial, was financially bankrupt.
The administrative system was breaking down everywhere. The feudal-
patriarchal State was impotent before the gathering storm, and was
conscious of its impotence. The position of the ruling class was so
desperate that its more intelligent and far-seeing members realised the
necessity of reforms, to be introduced with the aid of the friendly foreign
Powers.
The situation, obviously, was ripe for a revolution. The Boxer Uprising
was the culminating point of a movement which grew all over the
country out of the desperate conditions of exploitation, destitution and
intolerable misery of the masses. Since the condi-
164 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
tions, by themselves not altogether new, had grown worse as a direct
result of the forcible penetration of imperialist trade and finance, it was
but natural that a revolt, essentially against the feudual-patriar-chal
reaction, should be embittered with hatred for the foreign invaders.11 The
anti-foreign appearance of the democratic revolution in China was the
inevitable consequence of the alliance between native reaction and
foreign imperialism.
One should start reading the history of the Boxer Uprising with the
question: Had the people of China reason to hate the foreigners?
Christian missionaries have been depicted as the brave victims of the
fanatic fury of a heathen people. China was their Calvary, where they
perished on the Cross, as true preachers of the Gospel. But a sober
examination of the facts of the situation deprives the fiction of much
grandeur. A close study of the stories of the so-called anti-Christian riots
in China reveals the fact that the Christian missionaries were objects of
attack when they acted as the vanguard of imperialism; they were not
molested for preaching their faith. Moreover, the provocation usually
came from the preachers of the Gospel who, if true to the faith they
professed, should present the other check when one was smitten. Foreign
writers, not at all sympathetic to the Chinese, have recorded how the
Christian missionaries flagrantly abused the privileges granted to them as
religious workers. They claimed for the native converts immunity from
the laws of the land. Very frequently, the corrupt imbeciles of local
officials could be bribed or bullied to concede to that illegitimate claim.
The result of the practice was the adoption of Christianity by the riff-
raffs of society, who carried on their nefarious trade under the protection
of the Church and the mighty Governments standing behind it. The anti-
Christian sentiment on the part of the ignorant rural population was a
very natural reaction to such a practice. The Catholics and the Protestants
have tried to blame each other for acts that can hardly be justified or
explained away. There was nothing to choose between the two. Making
allowance for individual cases, "the missionaries have been attacked
rather because they were foreigners than because they were propagators
of the Christian religion."12 That is the verdict of a protestant priest who
made great efforts to clear the shady record of the Christian missions in
China. Having failed to do so, he only made scape-goats out of the
Catholics.
Foreign intervention had defeated the Taiping Revolt, but the
 The Boxer Uprising 165
revolution could not be altogether crushed. Before long, it recovered
from the heavy blow. Serious and wide-spread movements of insur-
rection against the galvanised reaction went on in the outlying parts of
the country, as a direct continuation of the great revolt defeated in the
centre. And from that very defeat, their resulted conditions which gave
an impetus to the revolution.
In the territories occupied by the Taipings, the barrier tax (Hkiri) had
been abolished. To defray the costs of the counterrevolutionary
expedition, that feudal taxation on trade was revived. Introduced as an
emergency measure, it, however, remained in force, and feudal officials
throughout the country welcomed it as a fruitful source of income. The
situation gradually became so bad that rice, coming from Hunan to
Hankow, a distance of only two-hundred miles, was subjected to taxation
as often as ten times. Consequently, the price soared high. A serious
hindrance to trade, the barrier tax, in the first place, ruined the peasants
and the artisans. Their produce ultimately had to be sold in the
competitive market; therefore, the additional feudal charges were met by
reducing the price paid to the producers. As far as the internal market
was concerned, the renewed feudal exaction operated both ways at the
expense of the masses: the purchasing price was lowered, while the
selling price was raised. The collection of likin naturally provoked
disturbance everywhere. The situation was further aggravated when
presently the proceeds of the oppressive feudal levy became the share of
foreign imperialism. The forced indebtedness of China swelled so much
as could no longer be covered by the income from the maritime customs.
The likin was also pledged for the services of foreign loans. That could
not remain unknown to the victims of the hated tax. There was a direct
economic reason for the hostility against the foreigners.
While bitterly resenting the new consequence of foreign penetration, the
masses remembered that, a short while ago the Taiping movement had
abolished many burdens on them, and that it had been suppressed with
the help also of the foreigners. There still lived many peasants and
artisans who had participated in the Taiping Revolt. They remembered
how they paid less taxes and got better prices for their produce under the
Taiping regime. There was ample historical, as well as direct, reason for
them to hate the foreigners.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the total foreign loans
166 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
forced upon China amounted to about seventy million pounds. To that
was added another forty millions, borrowed to pay the indemnity to
Japan, according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Loans forced upon weak
and helpless countries usually bear a high rate of interest. Normally, that
itself might not be altogether unbearable. The worst of it was the
mortgage of the most productive sources of State revenue, and the
foreign control of its collection. The Government of the country was
obliged to levy additional taxes for keeping its head above the water of
complete financial bankruptcy. While an empty exchequer hastened the
disintegration and collapse of the entire State machinery, new burdens of
taxation, only a fraction of which ever reached the distressed exchequer,
fanned the fire of popular dissatisfaction. The army had been almost
completely destroyed in the war against France in the South, and
particulars in the Sino-Japanese war. Owing to financial difficulties, it
could not be reinforced. The Government was placed between the devil
and the deep sea: the riding tide of revolution on the one side, and
foreign invasion on the other. In that hopeless position, efforts were
made from all sides to persuade the Chinese Government to deliver the
control of its armed forces to foreign Powers. The Beresford Mission
went to China ostensibly on behalf of the British Chamber of Commerce.
In reality, it was highly political; its object was to counter the pro-
Russian policy of Li Hung-chang. High Chinese oflBcials were appro-
ached with the proposal of reorganising the Chinese army under British
supervision.
Internal disintegration on the one hand, and foreign penetration on the
other were all but complete. Only a revolution clearing away the debris
of the decomposed old order and determinedly checking the operation of
the sinister forces of foreign aggression, could save the country in that
situation. The Boxer Uprising heralded the necessary revolution. It is not
to be identified with the tragic episode, enacted in and around the
Metropolitan area under a certain amount of reactionary influence. It was
a gigantic mass movement, developing throughout the land during the
closing years of the century. Potentially, the movement was more mature
than the Taiping insurrection. This time the bourgeoisie had appeared on
the scene to provide it with a clearer ideology and a definitely
progressive political programme. In spite of the cowardice displayed by
the bourgeoisie in every critical moment, the Reform Movement led by
them was
 The Boxer Uprising 167
organically connected with the mass upheavel. Indeed, the suppression of
the Reform Movement was an immediate cause of the Boxer Uprising.
The cleverer elements of the ruling class coquetted with the anti-foreign
aspect of the revolution to isolate the progressive bourgeoisie which
entertained such a tragic illusion about the democratic governments of
Europe and America. While fleeing the country upon the collapse of the
Reform Movement, its leader Kang Yu-wei met Lord Beresford at
Hongkong to tell that he had advised the Emperor to secure the
assistance of Great Britain in his effort for the reformation of China.13
Poor specimen of a leader of Chinese Girondism! He failed to understand
that, by suppressing the Boxer Uprising, as previously the Taiping
Revolt, the Western Powers dealt much more severe blows to the
democratic movement in China than the Empress Dowager did by her
coup d'etat against the reforming Emperor. The reactionary ruling clique
of Peking blundered into a clever piece of manoeuvre which saved them
for the time being. They succeeded in splitting the democratic forces.
Firstly, a smashing blow was dealt to the weaker section, namely, the
bourgeoisie, and then the ground was prepared for foreign Imperialism to
handle the more difficult part of the job.
Because of its failure to see how the forces were really aligned, the
Reform Movement could be so easily checked. Its objectively
revolutionary significance was cancelled by its failure to appreciate
correctly the role of imperialism. It failed to see that the penetration of
imperialist trade undermined, indeed destroyed, its own social basis. Had
it appreciated the situation correctly, it should have welcomed the
disturbances, riots and insurrections as so many battles fought by the
masses for the triumph of its cause. But its leaders deplored those
revolutionary events, for they were disintegrating the Empire.
The masses were rising against foreign penetration, because imperialist
trade was ruining the economic life of the country. Commodities
manufactured with machines in far off lands reached the remotest corners
of China. Native artisans, still working with the most primitive means of
production, were driven to the wall in the competition with the imported
goods which could be sold more cheaply. Gradually, millions of them
were deprived of their means of livelihood. They could clearly see who
caused their ruin. They
168 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
hated the foreigners who took the bread away from their hungry mouths.
The destruction of handicrafts had a much more far-reaching effect. It
was harmful for the development of native capitalism, and therefore
injurious to the Reform Movement itself. The workers, displaced by the
penetration of imported goods, were not differently employed. They
were thrown out of the process of production. Consequently, so much
social labour was practically wasted, and national economy was
proportionately weakened. From time immemorial, Chinese handicraft
had developed as an adjunct to the basic industry of agriculture.
Therefore, the ruined artisan could not leave the village, where he
remained tied to a small piece of land utterly insufficient to provide him
and his family with anything like a human living. In other countries the
destruction of handicraft caused only a temporary social unsettlement.
The expropriated artisans were before long absorbed in modern
industries. But in China only the disruptive effects of the industrial
revolution were felt. She was prevented from benefiting by its
constructive consequences. That was partly due to the historical reasons
set forth in previous chapters, and partly to the operation of forces
produced and accentuated by the industrial revolution in other countries.
Those forces were the contradictions of capitalist production which gave
birth to modern imperialism.
The anti-foreign riots in China leading up to the out-break in the opening
year of the century, corresponded in certain respects with the machine-
breaking movement in the earlier stages of the industrial revolution in
Europe. Before the ruined artisans of China, there was no machine to
destroy. There were, however, the foreign traders and their accomplices,
who personified the ruinous effects of machines situated in far off lands.
The anti-foreign riots in China are no more condemnable than the
machine-breakers' movement in England. Neither of them was
reactionary, although immediately they appeared to be so. Both of them
represented the elemental force of a great revolution of the future. In
addition to their historical significance, the anti-foreign riots in China
were actually so many events in the process of a revolutionary
development.
One can write a whole volume to detail all the economic causes of the
anti-foreign movement that swept China in the last decade of the
nineteenth century, and since then became the predominating feature of
her national life. Only a few can be mentioned
 The Boxer Uprising 169
by way of bringing into relief the social and political nature of the Boxer
Uprising. In addition to the artisans, millions employed in the transport
system also suffered heavily in consequence of the penetration of foreign
trade. Lacking the beasts of burden, human labour was the means of
transport in China throughout the ages. Millions employed in the
primitive system of transport began to be deprived of the means of
subsistence by the introduction of steam-shipping on the rivers, and of
railways. It was not an accident that the Yangtse Valley and the
territories traversed by the Grand Canal were the scenes of constant
disturbance. Those being the main arteries of trade in China, the very
numerous class of boatmen was concentrated there.
The increased burden of taxation, lower prices for what they sold and
higher prices for what they bought, destruction of the means of
livelihood for millions, traditional conditions of scarcity, increasingly
accentuated by the employment of land and labour to the production of
non-food crops, and many other auxiliary causes were in operation to
bring about a situation which constituted the background of the Boxer
Uprising. As all those factors were directly or indirectly connected with
foreign aggression, it was inevitable that the revolutionary ferment
produced by them should have an anti-foreign character. Even writers
with no sympathy for the Chinese could not be altogether blind to the
realities of the situation. Analysing the causes of the outbreak, an English
missionary wrote: "Many of the innumerable sufferers from the steady
advance of civilisation into the interior of China have no appreciation of
the causes of their calamity. Yet, there are many others who know
perfectly well that before foreign trade came in to disturb the ancient
order of things, there was in ordinary years enough to eat and to wear,
whereas now there is a scarcity in every direction, with prospects of
worse to come. With an experience like this, in many different lines of
activity, the Chinese are not to be blamed for feeling a profound
dissatisfaction with the new order of things.11
At the same time, foreign aggression was also disintegrating the country
territorially. Since the doors of China were forced open by the Treaty of
Tientsin in 1860, foreign penetration proceeded rapidly in different
directions. The possibilities of trade in a country with a bankrupt feudal-
patriarchal national economy were soon
170 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
exhausted. The exploitation of the Chinese people through the exchange
of commodities reached the limit. Without a revolution in the national
economy of the country, any substantial increase in the exports of China
could hardly be expected. The inability to increase her exports
continuously placed a limit on China's capacity to purchase foreign
goods. Consequently, her relations with foreign countries changed again.
It entered a new period. From commercial transactions, it became
financial operations. Having secured complete freedom of trade,
imperialist policy in China developed into concession-hunting and the
establishment of spheres of influence.
In the sacred name of free trade, the imperialist Powers had violently
encroached upon the sovereignty of the Chinese Government. Having
forced China to open her doors to the foreign invaders, the latter now
tried to slam them in the face of each other. China was on the verge of
dismemberment. The situation alarmed even the foreign Powers who had
greater stakes in the country. Great Britain was particularly concerned.
She was anxious to prevent the policy of creating spheres of influence
from going to the extent of breaking up the country into colonies
belonging to the rival imperialist Powers. That would mean a great loss
for the Power with the largest capital invested in China, and England at
that period was the fiuancer of the world. Hence her anxiety to prevent
the break-up of China. Should the country be broken up, and the Central
Government disappear in the process, who would pay the interest on the
forced loans? The existence of a nominal Central Government was
necessary for the operation of foreign finance. There must be someone
who could, with a semblance of authority, grant concessions to foreign
banks. The disappearance of such an authority would render invalid the
concessions already granted by it. Therefore, the holders of those
concessions were vitally concerned with a formal maintenance of
authority. On the other hand, the shadow of a central authority provided
them with the legal instrument for fighting the forces of revolution.
Discussing the evil consequences of the imminent break-up of China, a
representative of British Imperialism wrote in 1899: "If spheres of
influence are marked out in China, and the resultant downfall of the
Chinese Government is brought about, who will pay the bond-holders,
and what security have they for their loans? What will become of China's
guarantee in the matter of railway loans? And even if these matters
 The Boxer Uprising 171
are amicably settled between the Powers grabbing at Chinese territories,
how can there be any security for interests being paid on loans by a
country plunged into anarchy and rebellion which must seriously disturb
trade, and diminish the customs receipts?"14
Here was the policy of modern imperialism formulated by a
representative of the leading Power. The previous policy of wanton
robbery had created conditions which provoked a revolutionary outbreak.
Finance capital is the basis of modern imperialism. Its interest demanded
that a central authority should formally exist in China, to be utilised as a
bulwark against revolution. The feudal-patriarchal reaction should be
galvanised with the aid of foreign finance, and in consideration of that
service, the latter should become the real ruler.
The anxiety of Britain as well as of the United States of America,
however, could not successfully cope with the situation. The scramble
for concessions, begun on the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war of
1894-95, went on merrily, defying the "liberalism" of Anglo-Saxon
finance. The mediaeval imperialism of semi-feudal Russia and Japan ran
amock in China. Behind Russia stood France, the traditional antagonist
of Britain. Territories grabbed by Russia provided a profitable field of
investment for French capital. Lastly, Germany entered the list,
brandishing her mailed fist.
The series of aggressive acts committed by the imperialist Powers
against a weak and defenceless China since the Treaty of Shimonoseki in
1895, were enough to justify even a more bitter hatred for foreigners than
expressed through the outbreak of 1900. No country could be placed in
that position of humiliation without resistance. The Boxer Uprising was
an act of self-preservation, and the defence of a people, plundered,
robbed, exploited, ill-treated, cajoled, cheated and insulted by foreigners
to whom no harm had been done. It was a battle for freedom and
democracy, if there had ever been any in the history of the world—a
battle fought against overwhelming odds, and therefore lost tragically.
But just like the Taiping Revolt, it was defeated—not crushed.
The easy victory of the upstart Japan in 1894 revealed that the ruling
class of the Celestial Empire was thoroughly worn out, and the country
could be divided among foreign Powers without provoking any effective
resistance. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki China ceded to Japan the entire
Liaotung Peninsula, Formosa and other smaller
172 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
islands; she recognised the independence of Korea, which thus became a
Japanese colony for all practical purposes; she agreed to pay a huge
indemnity. Alarmed by the great advance made by Japan, Russia
intervened, claiming Manchuria for herself. The European Powers had
forced Japan to disgorge the- Liaotung Peninsula in consideration for a
large increase of the sum to be paid by China as indemnity. But they now
backed up the Russian claim. The burden imposed upon China was
utterly disproportionate to her ability to pay. It was two-hundred million
taels—a sum which could not be possibly paid by a country with a total
revenue of eighty-five million taels and a yearly deficit of about fifty
millions in the balance of foreign trade. Consequently, the indemnity
represented an additional forced loan given to China in return for the
very same territory which Japan had been compelled to disgorge. The
apparent improvement in the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki meant
even a greater aggression on China. For guaranteeing the payment of the
indemnity, which China evidently could not pay out of her own
resources, Russia received the concession to build the Chinese Eastern
Railway through the province of Manchuria. That concession carried \v
ith it the surrender of Chinese sovereignty over an extensive territory
through which the railway was to pass. Russia herself was not in a strong
financial position. The loan promised by her to China was actually raised
in France on the guarantee of the Russian Government. The Russo-
Chinese Bank was established as a new instrument for the operation of
international finance in China. The great statesman of the tottering
Chinese reaction, Li Hung-chang, visited Russia, and was bribed by
Count Witte to sign the secret Russo-Chinese alliance, by which
Manchuria was practically ceded to Russia. For financing the Russian
project to annex Northern China and find a free access to the Pacific,
through Port Arthur, France received extensive mining, railway and
trading privileges in the southern provinces of Yunan, Kwangsi and
Kwangtung, adjacent to Annam which she had previously grabbed.
The next innings opened with Germany scoring heavily. For some time,
German battle-ships had been scouring the coasts of China, looking for a
"place in the sun". The Kaiser had openly announced his intention to
secure a naval base on the Chinese coast as a counter-move against
Russia. His navy selected Tsingtao and the adjoining Kiaochow Bay as
the desirable booty. But there must be an excuse for occupying it. It is
against imperialist ethics to take an
 The Boxer Uprising 173
aggressive step without a provocation, which has therefore got to be
engineered whenever necessary. Having attained the distinction of a first-
class imperialist Power, Germany also had sent missionaries as the
advance-guard for the conquest of China. Their task was to produce the
necessary provocation at the right moment. So, "fortunately for
Germany's scheme, two Roman Catholic missionaries were murdered in
Shantung."16 For the protection of Christianity, German marines instantly
seized the places already selected as suitable for the projected naval base.
Negotiations followed. Finally, by the Convention of Kiaochow, signed
in 1898, China conceded to Germany valuable mining and railway
concessions throughout the province of Shantung.
German action, in its turn, was a welcome provocation for Russia.
Within a year after the conclusion of the secret Russo-Chinese alliance,
Russia calmly took possession of Port Arthur, Talienwan and a
considerable part of the Liaotung Peninsula, flagrantly violating the
terms of the alliance. Russian battle-ships captured Port Arthur only a
week after the German seizure of Tsingtao, thus proving that those
moves and counter-moves of international imperialism on the chess-
board of China were made by a concerted plan. Obviously, they had been
holding themselves in readiness for an action previously decided upon.
Li Hung-chang and other high Chinese officials were again given
"valuable presents"17 for accepting the Russian terms about the
annexation of Port Arthur and the adjoining territories. In view of the
events taking plSce in the North, France could not let things alone in her
own sphere of influence in the South. Two weeks after the Russian
occupation of Port Arthur, the French Minister in Peking "persuaded the
Chinese Government to lease to France for ninety-nine years the Bay of
Kwangchow and the surrounding territories"; of course, in the meantime,
the desired spot had been captured by military force.
With great chagrin Britain watched the process of the disintegration of
China. But, being powerless to check it, she also joined in the merry-go-
round and "agreed to take the lease of Wei-hai-wei with the right to erect
fortifications and station troops."18 Although at the moment Britain's
stocks were rather low in China, the paramountcy having for the time
being passed on to Russia, she was playing a deeper game. While China
was threatened by a revolution from inside, and dismemberment by
foreign aggression, British dioplomacy was
174 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
seeking to acquire military as well as financial control of the Central
Government, in order to save China from both the dangers, and
incidentally to transform her into an exclusive possession of British
Imperialism. Beresford's proposal for the reorganisation of the Chinese
Army with the help of the British Government was favourably received
in the higher circles of Chinese officialdom. Those who welcomed that
sinister proposal were actuated partly by the fear of imminent collapse of
the Empire, and partly by the jealousy for Li Hung-chang, the uncrowned
king of the country, under Russian patronage. They also recognised the
imperative necessity of some reform, if the country was to be saved from
the threatening revolutionary upheaval. But, in spite of the support given
to it by the "progressive" sections of the Chinese ruling class, the plan of
British Imperialism miscarried. The reason, firstly, was the internal
contradictions of imperialism itself; secondly, it was the failure of British
Imperialism to back up effectively the progressive forces when they were
suddenly attacked and crushed by reaction.
The loss of sovereignty in the best sea and river ports of the country, the
threatening territorial dismemberment forced lease of important
economic and strategic places, foreign financial control, exercised
through the mortgage of the main items of State revenue, concessions
wrested by force, the generally privileged position of the foreigners—all
these factors, coupled with the deep-seated discontent against the feudal-
patriarchal reaction, contributed to the Boxer Uprising. The perennial
agrarian revolt was accentuated by increased taxation. On the top of that,
bad weather spoiled the crops for two successive years. Starvation drove
hundreds and thousands to banditry. Under such conditions an
insurrection takes place on the slightest provocation, and enough of
provocation was there. The outbreak occurred in Shantung and Chili,
because a devastating flood of the Hwang Ho in 1898-99 rendered great
multitudes destitute and homeless in those provinces. But the movement
was by no means confined to that region. During the whole decade, riots,
disturbances, insurrections, had been taking place all over the country.
The Taipings had come from the South. The Reform Movement was also
based there. But the Boxer Uprising did not spread to the South. This fact
has been seized upon by those who disputed the revolutionary nature of
the uprising. But the Reform Movement and the Boxer Uprising cannot
be regarded as two water-tight compart-
 The Boxer Uprising 175
ments of the national life of China, except by those who are utterly
unable to discover a dynamic process of social evolution in the back-
ground of the bewildering march of historical events. An identical
complex of social conditions inspired the Reform Movement and also
provoked the acute outburst of discontent in the form of the Boxer
Uprising. They were the decay and dissolution of the old social order,
and the inevitable growth of the forces of discontent and strivings for
progress. The bourgeoisie constituted the social basis of the Reform
Movement. But owing to their immaturity, they failed to appreciate the
significance of the entire complex of all the forces in operation. Just as
the Reform Movement and the Boxer Uprising were two different
expressions of the self-same revolutionary urge, just so was the relation
between the native reaction and foreign imperialism. Both these latter
were antagonistic to the forces of progress. The imperative necessity of
the moment was a combination of the struggle against native reaction
with a determined resistance to foreign penetration. But the bourgeoisie
did not take that view of the situation. They laboured under a tragic
illusion about the role of imperialism. Therefore, they failed to join the
masses when the latter began the anti-imperialist struggle.
The Reform Movement and the Boxer Uprising were counterparts of a
single process—that of the development of the bourgeois democratic
revolution. Nevertheless, the leaders of the former, held aloof from the
revolutionary action represented by the latter. The organic relation
between the two, however, is clear if history is analysed as a description
of the process of social evolution. Weakly formulated and timidly
expressed, the demands of the Reform Movement represented a
rudimentary programme of the maturing bourgeois democratic
revolution. The suppression of that movement was an attack upon the
revolution. The Boxer Uprising was a bold answer to that challenge of
reaction. The British Minister at Peking, Sir Claude Macdonald, wrote:
"There has been, since the so-called coup d'etat, very considerable
amount of unrest in the city, more specially since the execution of the six
leaders of the Reform Party."
There were many reasons why the second insurrection did not affect the
South. The severe blows for suppressing the Taiping Rebellion had fallen
more heavily on the southern masses; they had not yet fully recovered
when the popular forces in the North resumed the fight. The leadership
of the Taiping Rebellion had been provided
176 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
by the small traders, artisans and petty intelligentsia. Those classes were
cowered by the sudden attack upon the Reform Movement which
represented also their aspirations. The depressing consequences of a
severe defeat, suffered only a short time ago, and the failure of the petit-
bourgeoisie to provide.the leadership, prevented the southern masses
from joining the second uprising in large numbers and with sufficient
rapidity. Moreover, the upper strata of the bourgeoisie, being closely
connected with imperialism through the expansion of trade, sternly
discountenanced the virulent expression of anti-foreign sentiment which
was the characteristic feature of the Boxer Uprising. They hoped that
legal conditions, favourable for the development of their class, would be
created eventually through the constitutional efforts of the Reform Party.
Meanwhile, they did not want that trade should be dislocated by the
spread of a popular uprising.
The South had passed the initial stage of the bourgeois democratic
revolution, characterised by elemental mass upheavals, when the North
entered that stage. The South was mature for a higher stage of revolution
which commenced there only a few years afterwards. The Taiping
Rebellion represented the earlier stages of a bourgeois democratic
revolution. The Boxer Uprising marked the beginning of the national
democratic revolution. The element of nationalism (auti-imperialism)
was latent in the former. It became the predominating feature of the
latter. The Taiping Rebellion, the Reform Movement, the Boxer
Uprising, the rise of the nationalist revolutionary party— all those events
were connected with each other; they were so many links in the self-
same chain of the development of social forces in modern China.
Notes
1. "The bulk of the wealthy and well-to-do classes are in China as in most countries
averse to the extension of civil contests which, however patriotic or necesrary, to put
an end to general oppression, are very apt to cause the destruction or forcible
redistribution of special property. Now, the Taipings show, in matters of property,
marks of an intention to adopt institutions of equality and communism, and though it
is not a modern communism, but a compound of the communism of primitive
Christianity and of ancient China, and therefore stamped with the sanction of
religion and antiquity, still it sets the property holding classes as a body, whether
learned or unlearned, altogether on the side of the imperialists (Manchus)." —
Meadows, "The Chinese and Their Rebellions".
2. "Shall the fate of the dynasty be staked on a single blow ? It requires no peculiar
sagacity to see that these Boxers' hopes of success are nothing but
 The Boxer Uprising 177
shadow of a dream. The present crisis is all-serious, and although I have used every
effort to explain its danger, I have laboured in vain. I have already submitted seven
separate memorials denouncing these Boxers. They swarm in the streets of our
capital like plague locusts, and it will be extremely difficult to disperse them." —
Yung Lu's telegram, quoted in the diary of the Manchu noble Ching Shan.
3. "Ever since we opened up trade with the various countries, your noble country in
particular had from first to last placed value upon commercial considerations, having
in mind that, in China's commerce, your noble country really represents seven or
eight parts out of ten, and for those reasons the treaty ports have been on excellent
terms with your trading people. Now, by reasons of a mutual suspicion, that has
grown up, circumstances have changed, and it is possible that China will be unequal
to this strain. It is to be feared that, amongst the Powers, there must be those who, in
view of her extent and resources, may entertain rival ambitious designs, the
advantages and disadvantages of which to your noble country's principles of
founding a State policy upon a commercial basis, ought to be easily imagined. At the
present moment, China is at her wits end to raise funds for arms, and in order to get
out of the difficult tangle, can but have recourse to the assistance of your noble
country. We hope that you will evolve some plan, hold the bull's ear, and restore the
situation. It is also hoped that your excellent views may be kindly notified as they
are awaited with inexplicable anxiety."—Telegram of the Empress Dowager to the
Queen of England, published in the 'Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society' (Chinesa
Branch), 1916.
4. Princess Der Ling. "Two Years in the Forbidden City".
5. Ibid.
6. Pott, F.H.L., :'History of the Outbreak in China."
7. Thayer, W.R., "Life and Letters of John Hay".
8. Beresford, "Tha Break-up of China".
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. "All the trials and tribulations of sixty years, all the humiliations which the sea
had brought, all the weakness and evasion of the Court, had solidified into a
massive, uncontrollable, psychosis. The Earth God has risen to his wrath, and there
was blood in the angry sky '. Marching as in ancient days to an ominous drumming,
the sword and spear-armed cultivators covered the country-side and entered the
cities with terrible cry. Everything foreign was going—the dynasty as well as the
red-haired barbarians."—Putnam Weale, "The Vanished Empire."
12. Pott, "The Outbreak in China".
13. Beresford, "The Break-up of China".
14. Smith, A.H,, "China in Convulsion".
15. Beresford, "The Break-up of China".
16. MacNair, "Modern Chinese History".
17. Count Witte, "Memoirs".
18. Anglo-Chinese Convention of July 1898.
 CHAPTER VIII
THE PASSING OF THE MANCHUS
The diplomatic duel with and amongst the imperialist Powers, following
upon the suppression of the Boxer Uprising, focussed all attention on
Peking. Meanwhile, throughout the country, the disintegration of the old
order went on apace, and the bourgeoisie, recovering from the defeat of
the Reform Movement, gathered strength for the impending clash. In
1905 the country was promised a Constitution on the Western model.
Preparations were ordered for the convocation of a National Assembly
after several years. In 1907 the provincial governors were instructed to
convene local legislative assemblies. An imperial edict was issued
elaborately stipulating the details regarding the composition and
functions of those assemblies. They met two years later and, as was to be
expected, became active organs of a revolutionary agitation.
In the previous year, another decree had been issued postponing the grant
of the promised Constitution for nine years with the argument that the
inauguration of a new system of government must be preceded by an
adequate preparation. A deputation visited Peking to memorialise the
Emperor to put the proposed reforms into practice without any delay. It
was given a cold reception, being dismissed with the imperious
injunction that "the people shall patiently wait for the fulfilment of the
grant after a systematic preparation". The answer to that rebuff was the
gathering in Shanghai of the delegates from a number of provincial
legislative assemblies to pass a resolution soliciting the Emperor to
promulgate the promised Constitution within two years, instead of nine.
Fearing that further obduracy might force the bourgeoisie to an open
revolt, the Court tried for a compromise.
The Emperor ordered immediate convocation of a National Assembly
pending the meeting of the Parliament in 1913. In other
 The Passing of the Manchus 179
words, the Shanghai Delegates' Assembly was invited to meet in Peking,
where its behaviour could be under the watch of the Court. The object of
that half-measure was to split the bourgeoisie—to have the
representatives of the upper strata, closely connected with the established
order, in the corrupting atmosphere of the feudal capital, where they
could be bribed or bullied. But the situation in 1910 was very different
from that in 1898. The representatives of the bourgeoisie were no longer
isolated from their constituents, who had found an effective organ of
expression in the provincial legislative assemblies. The National
Assembly in Peking was mostly composed of conservative elements. It
was not a popular body. But it could not help focussing the discontent
ventilated through the provincial assemblies. Its first act disillusioned the
reactionary Court clique. The imperial decree convoking it had granted it
only a deliberative function. But once assembled, it assumed
considerable legislative power. It not only claimed to control the budget,
but even demanded that the whole executive should be submitted to its
supervision. It went to tbe extent of advocating the formation of a
government responsible to it. That was a definite challenge to absolute
monarchy. The war was declared, although it was still waged within
constitutional bounds. The Court was persuaded to give in a little. The
old Grand Council was abolished in favour of a Cabinet, but the latter
also was to be responsible only to the Emperor. It was an attempt to
retain the old institution with a new label. The National Assembly was
prorogued by an imperial decree before that fraudulent measure was
taken.
The National Assembly had met very pompously, but it made a feeble
protest only when it was dispersed after such a short time. It did not dare
to declare itself in permanent session, defying the authority of
monarchist absolutism. It did not have the courage to invoke the "sacred
right of revolt", as the Third Estate did in the beginning of the French
Revolution. Nevertheless, the doomed head of the Manchus could no
longer be spared. The fatal blow fell from other quarters, even when the
bourgeoisie was vacillating.
In consequence of recent economic developments in other parts of the
country, Peking had ceased to be the heart of the nation. Therefore, the
revolution broke out elsewhere. The clash took place in the far off
Yangtse Valley. But its mere echo was powerful enough to pull down the
decayed structure of the Manchu
180 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
monarchy and its parasitic Court. The South again became the scene of
revolution. It was there that the bourgeoisie had outgrown the limits of
feudal-patriarchal relations.
The southern provincial assemblies became organs of a revolutionary
agitation. Their very existence raised an issue which vitally affected the
structure of the feudal-patriarchal .State. The sore spot in the old regime
was exposed. The struggle raged on the old issue of centralism versus
provincial autonomy. A synthesis of these two antagonistic principles
was the corner-stone of the Manchu monarchy. The appearance of a new
class disturbed the synthesis. The very existence of the old system was
endangered. Indeed, provincial autonomy, almost amounting to
independence, had flourished under the protecting shadow of monarchist
centralism. But so long as the feudal nobility administered the provinces,
as practically independent domains, local autonomy did not conflict with
the central authority. On the contrary, the former supported the latter. But
the situation became entirely different when autonomy was claimed by
provincial assemblies, from which non-feudal elements could not be
excluded altogether.
The old system of local autonomy, flourishing under the imperial
shadow, had begun to operate in the reverse direction from the closing
years of the nineteenth century. Not a few provincial satraps had
blossomed forth into full-fledged capitalists. Some of those
metamorphosed feudal nobles were the poineers of the Reform
Movement. They naturally sought to save the monarchy. But when, in
course of time, no hope was left for the latter, they did not have much
scruple to leave the sinking ship. The old system of local autonomy stood
out in its disruptive character. The crisis came to a head when efforts
were undertaken to make a fact out of the fiction of centralism.
Provincial satraps, accustomed to rule practically as independent
sovereigns, bitterly resented the appearance of special finance
commissioners who came to take possession of the provincial purse for
the benefit of the central government. It was that conflict between the
centre of the Empire and its component parts which contributed more to
the easy triumph of the revolution of 1911 than any other single factor.
The Crown did not fall before an attack by the bourgeoisie. It toppled
over as soon as the delicately balanced social pyramid was shaken by its
internal contradictions. That peculiar class relation, constituting the back-
 The Passing of the Manchus 181
ground of the revolution of 1911, later on rendered the fight for the
Republic so very abortive.
Ever since the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Peking Government had
been settling its international accounts by contracting foreign loans in
return for the grant of concessions. Gradually, the operation of those
loans began to encroach even upon the sources of revenue, until then
considered by the provincial rulers to be their inviolable preserves.
The Court could do whatever it wanted with the political sovereignty
or territorial integrity of the country, The provincial rulers were more
or less indifferent in that respect. But they protested as soon as their
pockets were touched. They knew exactly how much was the worth of
the divine authority which they derived from the Son of Heaven in
return for their allegiance to him. They were not prepared to pay any
more. When they were required to do so, they joined the bourgeoisie,
instead of paying the higher price. They endorsed the demand for a
revolutionary change in the financial policy of the government. Their
demand, though not made in so many words, in practice was that,
instead of selling the country to foreign banks, the monarchy should
abdicate in favour of a native feudal-bourgeois alliance which would
pay the price for the power thus transferred to them by raising loans
inside the country. The situation was so revolutionary that the demand
was supported even by such a faithful monarchist as Chang Chih-
tung, who had shamelessly turned traitor to his reformist professions
in a critical moment. But blood is not always thicker than water.
Chang Chih-tung, of course, was a feudal lord by birth, a classical
mandarin by profession, and an orthodox Confucian by culture. But
all those attributes, glorified in tradition, counted for naught as against
his newly acquired role of a capitalist. He betrayed his own class,
culture, tradition and faith, and he was but a specimen of an entire
section of the feudal nobility and patriarchal officialdom which stood,
actively or objectively, behind the revolutionary agitation of the
provincial assemblies, demanding local autonomy as against
centralism. The forces operating through the provincial assemblies
had come into existence much earlier than the creation of the latter.
These had risen under the irresistible pressure of circumstances.
The alignment of classes underlying the political situation was indeed
very complicated. In revolt against the enforcement of the programme
of financial centralism, a section of the feudal nobility
182 Revolution and Cannier-Revolution in China
and officialdom found themselves allied with the bourgeoisie demanding
other reforms. On the other hand, the section of the bourgeoisie
connected with the State finance and the operation of foreign loans,
supported the reactionary policy of the Court. The final clash occurred
over the question of a railway loan. The rival imperialist Powers had
been bickering amongst themselves for the partition of the carcass of
China. Finally, in 1911, the Chinese Government was persuaded to
contract the so-called "Four Powers" Loan". The loan was given in return
for the concession to construct two railway lines: one joining Hankow
with Canton, and the other from Hankow up the Yangtse Valley. Ever
since 1907, the local bourgeoisie had agitated against the projected loan.
The provincial assemblies had served as the organs for that agitation.
Even previously, in 1899, Chang Chih-tung had advised the Court
against it. But the scheme was supported by a group of Chinese
financiers—the notorious Shensi bankers, who for centuries controlled
the State finance, and the compradores of Shanghai and Hongkong. The
bourgeoisie and the gentry of the provinces, through which the projected
railways were to pass, demanded the right to invest their own capital in
the profitable enterprises.1
The revolutionary movement acquired new strength from the fact that a
number of powerful provincial rulers lined up with the opposition to the
central government. The army, national in name, formally owing
allegiance to the Emperor, had always been an instrument in the hands of
the provincial governors. It went with them. The conflict over the
question of financing the projected railway construction found an echo in
the army stationed in the Yangtse Valley. Nothing could make the Court
appreciate more clearly the significance of the situation than the
defection of the army. The power of the Manchus was maintained by a
military dictatorship. When that dictatorship was no more, they had little
hope left. What could they do when their own blood revolted, and the
instrument of their own creation turned against themselves? The
bourgeoisie could not openly challenge the monarchy. They sought to
come to a compromise. When they were rebuffed by stupid reaction, they
could do little to drive their demands home. They were themselves afraid
of a revolution. They were as much hostile to a mass uprising as the
Manchus themselves. But the revolutionising advance of capitalism is an
objective force. It cannot be held back permanently by the timidity
 The Passing of the Manchus 183
of the bourgeoisie. Acting as the subjective force, the bourgeoisie can
hasten the triumph of capitalism. If they fail, the advance is delayed, but
it must take place sooner or later. The development of capitalism drove a
wedge in the camp of reaction. A section of the ruling class was forced to
be instrumental in the overthrow of the monarchy. They would have
never done that, had events been determined by subjective factors alone.
The weakness of the bourgeoisie was compensated by defection in the
camp of reaction itself.
Beginning in Woochang, the insurrection spread swiftly through the
centre and south of the country. Imperial troops, commanded by Yuan
Shih-kai, captured the Han Cities, but the revolution was not to be
crushed any more. Shanghai was the first to declare for a Republic
Nanking was soon captured by the Republicans, who assembled there in
a National Convention, and demanded abdication of the Manchu
dynasty. As a counter-move, the scrapped National Assembly was
recalled to meet in Peking. But the tide could no longer be checked. The
National Assembly met at Peking. Now it was encouraged by the march
of events in the South, and demanded that all the Princes of blood should
be excluded from the government which must be responsible to the
National Assembly. It further demanded immediate promulgation of the
Constitution. It also demanded freedom of political parties and amnesty
for political offenders. Faced with complete destruction, the Court
accepted all the demands. Its nominee, Yuan Shih-kai, was appointed the
Prime Minister. Thereupon, the National Assembly, in gratitude, passed
a resolution favouring the continuation of the Ching dynasty as a
constitutional monarchy.
But the National Assembly of Peking, meeting with the gracious
permission of the Court, was no longer the mouthpiece of the revolution.
More than half the provinces declared for the Republic. The revolt of the
army spread. Those two facts alone repudiated the representative
character of the Assembly. At that juncture, the ever-present and the all-
powerful third factor intervened. The revolution was disturbing the
Yangtse Valley—the main artery of trade. A prolonged war between the
southern republicans and northern monarchists would aggravate that
disturbance, and seriously injure trade. The foreign Powers intimated
Yuan Shih-kai that they desired a speedy conclusion of peace. The last
hope of the monarchy was gone. At last the foreign Powers gave their
casting vote against it.
184 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
They had saved it from destruction twice; but since then it had become
so very decayed and discredited that it was no longer worth saving.
Besides, there were sound conservative elements in the Republican
camp. A Republic with a man like Yuan Shih-Kai at the helm would be
no less undesirable than the decrepit Manchu monarchy which did no in
the least command the confidence of the nation, and consequently could
not longer serve as the means for giving a legal semblance to the
imperialist plunder of the country.
Reading the writing on the wall, the Manchu abdicated—not in favour of
the Republic, but turning over all civil and military power to their
nominee, Yuan Shih-kai.
Notes
1. The conclusion of the Hukuang Railway Loan, which meant the expropriation of
thousands of Chinese small capitalists who had invested in the railway that was to be
nationalised, now provided the direct grievance against the ruling dynasty,"—Tang
Liang-Ii, "The Foundations of Modern China".
"The nationalisation of the projected railway, which was to connect it (Szechuan)
with the Mid-Yangtse, was genuinely opposed by the people who had already
collected large funds for its construction."—Putnam Weale, "The Vanished Empire".
 CHAPTER IX
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE REPUBLIC
In the beginning of 1912 China became a Republic by the grace of the
monarchy which had ruled and ruined the country for so many years by
the grace of God. The Manchu dynasty was not overthrown. It simply
passed away after having persisted for years in an untenable and
impossible existence. The Manchus laid down the task of governing the
country, when it became evident that it was entirely beyond their power
to cope with the situation, but they did not relinquish their "divine right".
They simply transferred the trust to a nominee of theirs, on whose
faithfulness they could rely. The history of the ill-fated Republic, born
under such evil auspices, is a tragic story. It is the story of the nominee
discharging the trust inherited from his imperial masters. He regarded the
Republic as the stepping stone to the throne. He attempted to restore the
monarchy, not only as an ambitious individual, but as the representative
of an entire social class. His attempt was the logical sequel to the
circumstances under which the Manchus passed away. The decree of
abdication was, indeed, a warrant for restoration.
The Manchu monarch issued several decrees while abdicating. Critical
writers have described those documents as curious. They are much more
than that. They were tendencious. They made it crystal clear that the
decayed and discredited monarchy was advised by the astute and more
intelligent members of the ruling class to step aside, thereby making it
possible for them to handle the situation so as to stabilise the badly
shaken old order. The bourgeoisie failed to see through that great
swindle. They did not have the courage to attack the decrepit and
demoralised ruling class determination.
According to the first edict of abdication, the republican form
186 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of government was a gift of the benign monarch to his beloved people.
"From the preference of the people's heart, the Will of Heaven can be
discerned. Observing the tendencies of the age, on the one hand, and
studying the opinions of the people, on the other, we and His Majesty the
Emperor hereby vest the sovereignty in the people and decide in favour
of a republican form of constitutional government. Thus we would
gratify, on the one hand, the desires of the whole nation, who, tired of
anarchy, are desirous of peace, and, on the other hand, would follow the
footsteps of the ancient sages, who regarded the Throne as the sacred
trust of the nation. Let Yuan Shih-kai organise with full powers a
Provisional Republican Government, and confer with the republican
army as to the methods of union, thus assuring peace to the people and
tranquillity to the Empire."1
A really anti-monarchist movement could never be satisfied with such a
declaration which was anything but abdication of the ruling dynasty.
Nevertheless, not only the conservative National Assembly of Peking,
but also the revolutionary Convention of Nanking believed that a
Republic could be built upon the palpably deceptive foundation of that
declaration. No wonder that the Republic, thus born with the gracious
benediction of the Court, was so very ephemeral. It came into an unreal,
but stormy existence, under a sentence of death.
A real Republic does not result from the investiture of the sovereign right
upon the people by the abdicating monarch. To begin with, monarchy
must be overthrown. The monarchy is not overthrown, never to be
restored, unless the principle of sovereignty, on which it is based, is
repudiated. Monarchy is the form of State reared upon certain specific
class relations. It is overthrown only when they are subverted by the
growth of new forces of production. For sanctifying the class relations
which constitute the foundation of the monarchist State, sovereignty is
regarded as the divine right. So long as that principle regarding the
source of sovereignty is not challenged, the position of the monarch
remains unassailable. The monarch can be deprived of his position,
privilege and power only when it is claimed that these have not been
invested on him by the Providence, but delegated to him by the people.
Only then, democracy becomes legal and can claim a moral sanction.
The people can take away what they have delegated.
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 187
The relation is reversed in the decree of abdication of the Manchus. The
monarch is not dismissed by his employers for mismanaging the trust.
On the contrary, he delegates his sacred trust to the people. Therefore,
restoration any time would be legal. A Republic born with royal
permission, under the sinister shadow of divine right, to remain bound by
the traditional feudal-patriarchal social relations, could not be real. It was
not a decree of abdication that the Manchu monarch signed. It was rather
a will; it was a deed appointing one of his own choice to administer his
trust. The sovereignty was not transferred to the people, but to Yuan
Shih-kai. The second decree of abdication made the position still clearer.
In that it was declared that the Emperor resigned only his political power,
but the "Imperial Title is not abolished".2
The articles of abdication, drawn up by the Cabinet headed by Yuan
Shih-kai, were fully satisfactory for the royal dynasty. The supreme and
very significant function of the High Priest of society was felt to the
Emperor. The Emperor lived side by side with the Republic. That fact
itself was the indication of the real position. The function of the Emperor
as the High Priest of society was the corner-stone of the feudal-
patriarchal social relations, on the basis of wbich the Chinese monarchist
State had been constructed. The political power of the monarch grew out
of that exalted social office. Therefore, the resignation of political right
could be only temporary, so long as the monarch was left in his basic
social function. The Republic was to be a capitalist State. It could not
possibly be built upon feudal-patriarchal social relations. The decay of
those relations created the necessity for the rise of the Republican State.
Still, the Chinese bourgeoisie believed in such an impossibility.
The feudal-patriarchal principles, expounded in the first two decrees, are
emphasised in the third as warranting the abdication of the ruling
dynasty. The imperial wish was the reflection of the Heavenly Will.
Therefore, the members of the royal family, nobility, high State officials
and military commanders were to abide by it. The people's will was
altogether out of the picture. It was still the imperial wish which dictated.
Armed with power, received from the monarchy, which abdicated— only
to be restored at the earliest possible opportunity—Yuan Shih-kai began
his fight against the revolution. The Republic could not survive that
clash. Indeed, no Republic grew out of the collapse
188 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of the monarchy. What followed that inevitable event was anarchy. It
gave birth to the ugly demon of militarism which devoured China for
years. Though the threadbare mantle of the discredited monarchy fell
upon Yuan Shih-kai's shoulders, that was not sufficient to make a
dictator of him. On the collapse of the monarchy, the delicate thread of
allegiance to the Son of Heaven snapped. It had held the country together
under the nominal authority of a centralised State. The disruptive
principles of the feudal-patriarchal State thus freed from the only factor
of cohesion, the forces of decentralisation ran amok. The factors
contributing to the revolution had developed disproportionately. While
disintegration of the old order was complete, the forces making for the
new were still but insufficiently in operation. They were still too weak to
be the master of the situation. Chaos and anarchy were inevitable in such
a situation, which was made still worse by the operation of an extraneous
factor, namely, foreign imperialism.
The monarchy having withdrawn itself in the Forbidden City, with ample
provision for a comfortable existence, 3 there began the struggle between
an incipient dictatorship and the feeble strivings for a representative
government. The would-be dictator, Yuan Shih-kai, commenced his
abortive Napoleonic career as the Prime Minister of the new
Government. He was theoretically responsible to the National Assembly.
But he was raised to that exalted position by an imperial decree, on the
tacit understanding that his mission was to save the monarchy.
As a protege of Li Hung-chang, young Yuan had a successful career. But
after the fall of his powerful patron, he was suddenly hurled down from
the height of office. His treachery towards the ill-fated Emperor Kuang
Hsue had not been forgotten by the less reactionary members of the
Court, and his insatiable ambition was regarded with suspicion and
alarm. On the death of the Empress Dowager, he was dismissed from
office. Thereupon, he retired to his native village in Honan. He lived in
affluence upon the vast fortune he had made while in office, and watched
events, waiting for his chance. The "model army" he had organised under
the patronage of Li Hung-chang was there, still faithful to him. With that
powerful trump in his hand, the would-be dictator watched the game.
When the revolution broke out, it was to Yuan Shih-kai that
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 189
the Court appealed, just as he had expected. Before emerging from his
retreat as the saviour of the situation, Yuan made his terms. If the Empire
could be saved only by him, he should be its actual ruler. The Court
conceded to everything Yuan demanded. His first act was to betray his
patrons, He was prepared to abide by the monarchist principle, and was
determined to defend the feudal-patriarchal social relations. But he
wanted to be the supreme ruler himself.
Although his "model army'' succeeded in capturing the Han Cities, Yuan
was not slow to appreciate the gravity of the task he had undertaken. He
was reluctant to push farther his initial victory— to the centre of the
revolution. On the contrary, he ordered his troops to evacuate Nanking.
Superficial observers were mystified by his behaviour. The Court was
puzzled. But he was acting according to a plan known only to himself.
He was not sure how his "model army" would fare if it went too far in
the revolutionary territories. Armies, hitherto considered to be faithful to
the monarchy, were defecting. There was no reason to be confident that
his army would always remain an exception. Its integrity was his trump
card. He was reluctant to speculate with it. Holding it in reserve, he could
dictate terms to others. Secondly, he wanted the monarchy to disappear,
not to be replaced by a real Republic, but to clear the road for the
realisation of his own ambition. With these considerations, Yuan Shie-
kai acted deliberately. On the other hand, he betrayed the monarchy
which had placed itself at his mercy; and on the other, he prepared for
the betrayal of the new-born Republic which also was delivered presently
to his trust.
Challenging the authority of the resurrected National Assembly of
Peking, the revolutionary Convention of Nanking declared the
inauguration of the Republic. Sun Yat-sen had just returned from exile.
He was elected the Provisional President. It was in reply to that move of
the bourgeoisie, bidding for power, that Yuan Shih-kai induced the
Manchus to abdicate, transferring the sovereign power to himself. The
arch-reactionary, devout monarchist, over-night became a staunch
Republican. His telegram informing the Provisional Government of
Nanking that the Ching dynasty had abdicated was a suggestion for the
latter to wind itself up. Behind that gentle suggestion, stood his "model
army" and all the forces of reaction which had abandoned the Manchu
monarchy as a
190 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
sinking ship.4
Nothing more than a mere hint was needed for making the bourgeoisie
cower. Replaying to the telegram announcing the abdication of the ruling
dynasty, Sun Yat-sen, on behalf of the revolutionary Convention and its
constituents, expressed pleasure to the development in the North, and
congratulated Yuan Shih-kai upon his conversion to the Republican faith.
But the Provisional President of the new-born Republic dared question
the right of the abdicating monarchy to name the head of the Republican
Government.5 However, in the same telegram, Sun Yat-sen declared his
willingness to resign in favour of Yuan Shih-kai. He invited to come to
Nanking for a conference with the object of settling all matters. Sun Yat-
sen even did not wait for an answer to his offer to resign. He did so
immediately after sending the telegram to the would-be dictator. That act
of his was greatly praised as a noble example of idealistic patriotism. In
reality, it represented sheer cowardice on the part of the bourgeoisie,
which surrendered without a struggle. The resignation of Sun Yat-sen6
meant the fall of the Republic. Having made a feeble protest against the
prerogative of the fallen manarchy to set up a Republican Government,
the bourgeoisie humbly accepted the position of subservience, and killed
the Republic at the behest of the incipient dictator.
While resigning, Sun Yat-sen warmly recommended Yuan Shih-kai for
the presidentship of the Republic. "Should he (Yuan) be elected to serve
the Republic, he would surely prove himself a most loyal servant of the
State. Besides, Mr. Yuan is a man of political experience, to whose
constructive ability our united nation looks forward for the consolidation
of its interests. Therefore, I venture to express my personal opinion, and
invite your honourable Assembly carefully to consider the future welfare
of the State, and not to miss the opportunity of electing one who is
worthy of your election."7 Such was the behaviour of the chosen leader
of the more radical section of the bourgeoisie. Only a few hours after
having made a futile protest against the right of the fallen Manchus to
turn over all power to an individual, the Provisional President of the
Republic recommended that very individual as the most suitable head of
the new-born Republic. There was absolutely no ground to believe in the
sincerity of Yuan Shih-kai's sudden conversion to the Republican faith.
His whole career and social affiliation made his
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 191
allegiance to the Republic very doubtful. Even after his appointment as
the Prime Minister, charged with the task of organising a constitutional
Government, he stated publicly that "the institution of a Republic would
mean the instability of a rampant democracy, of dissension and
partition", and that it would create chaos, injuring the interests of the
Empire.8 Yet, only three months after he had so definitely expressed his
hostility to Republicanism, Sun Yat-sen recommended him as the best
custodian for the young Republic!
How did that happen? The explanation is to be found in Sun Yat-sen's
letter of resignation. He resigned on the ground that "according to the
telegram that our delegate, Dr. Wu, was directed to send to Peking, I was
to undertake to resign in favour of Mr. Yuan, when the Emperor had
abdicated, and Mr. Yuan had declared his political views in support of
the Republic." So, after all, the prophet of petit-bourgeois radicalism did
not resign as an act of personal magnanimity. He was forced to do so by
the bourgeoisie and the southern military commanders who had given
only a halfhearted support to the Republic.9 As soon as a "Republican
Government" was sanctioned by the Son of Heaven, the one growing up
from the bosom of the mother earth had to commit suicide. It could avoid
that disgraceful fate only by mobilising the masses in its support. But
that way it would not travel. Therefore, its bourgeois defenders were
obliged to swallow all constitutional scruples, and reconcile themselves
to the continuation of the old order under a fraudulent label.
The blood suppression of the Boxer Uprising had left the country in a
state of great demoralisation. A seething mass discontent was still there;
but it could find no powerful expression. It was no longer the old-
fashioned native army which confronted the defeated forces of the
revolution. Hundreds of the most up-to-date foreign guns were levelled
upon the country, ready to crush any revolutionary outbreak. Dozens of
battle-ships, equipped with formidable instruments of destruction, kept a
constant watch not only over the sea-ports, but patrolled the inland
waters as well. Foreign troops were held in readiness to invade the
country on the slightest pretext, to spread death and destruction, far and
wide. Before such a formidable array of forces, the defeated and
disorganised forces of revolution were naturally terrorised. But fear is
not an effective check upon discontent, when there is nothing or not
much to lose.
192 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
So, even in the atmosphere of terror, the masses continued in a rebellious
mood. The burden on them had grown even more crushing than in the
closing days of the last century. Hunger, famine and destruction were as
widespread as ever, if not more so.
That perennial, incurable discontent of the masses contributed to the
rapid spread of the Republican movement during the year preceding the
revolution of 1911. The rebelliousness of the masses was reflected in the
stout opposition to autocratic centralism put up by the Provincial
Assemblies as soon as they were inaugurated as a reformist measure. The
army was also in the process of disintegration. There were numerous
cases of defection, desertion and mutiny, individually as well as en
masse. The situation reached the climax when, in 1910-11, crops failed
in the central and southern provinces, and "the Yangtse Valley was
overrun with swarms of homeless and starving people".10 Such was the
background on which the revolution was staged.
The bourgeoisie, however, sought to set up a Republic not with the help
of the revolutionary masses but with the approval of, and in alliance
with, the less reactionary section of the feudal nobility and officialdom,
which recognised the impossibility of maintaining the old order any
longer under an absolute monarchist regime. Upon its inauguration, the
Provisional Republican Government of Nanking issued an appeal
"To^Our Foreign Friends", which was a statement of its entire policy.
Therein, it was indicated which course the bourgeoisie were going to
choose. The Provisional Republican Government of the bourgeoisie not
only dissociated itself from mass revolt, the only factor it could rely
upon; it declared its determination to combat all revolutionary mass
outbreaks. It was eager to enlist the patronage of foreign imperialism, on
the one hand, and to reassure the quasi-monarchist supporters of the
Republic, on the other. "We have controlled the forces of evil in a
manner which should characterise this revolution as the least sanguinary
in the history of the world, when the sins of the country and the nature of
the masses are taken into consideration. We have striven for order, and
created no chaos in the provinces, cities and towns that have of their own
volition come under our banner. We have, in short, taken every possible
step to protect vested interests, safeguard international obligations,
secure the continuance of commerce, and shield educational and
religious institutions; and what is even more
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 193
important, we have striven continually to maintain law and order, sustain
peace, and promote a constructive policy upon sound and enduring
ground."11
That damaging declaration predetermined the action of the bourgeoisie.
It doomed the Republic to an ignominious death before it was hardly
bora. Instead of laying down the foundation of a democratic Republic, to
be built upon the principle of popular sovereignty, it pledged the
bourgeoisie to support the caricature Napoleonism of Yuan Shih-kai, in
which form the old order subsequently continued. It paved the way for
the resignation of the popular representative in favour of the imperial
nominee. It pledged the agreement of the bourgeoisie that the Republic
should not be the conquest of democracy, but a gracious gift of the
discredited Son of Heaven.
It was not unprecedented for the Chinese bourgeoisie to betray the
revolution. Their class acted similarly even during the Great French
Revolution. When the multitude of Paris was threatening to make a clean
sweep of the old order, a task the middle-class representatives assembled
at Versailles were so reluctant to tackle, Mirabeau made his famous
speech in the first joint meeting of the Three Estates, declaring in
essence: Better the King and the Court, than the people in revolt.12 He
categorically disassociated himself and those he represented, from the
people to whom they had until then been appealing for support in the
struggle against the Court clique. He warned the members of the
National Assembly to be on their guard against "seditious auxiliaries".
He called upon the Assembly to help the maintenance of law and order,
threatened by the imminent uprising of the people. As declared by its
accredited leader, the National Assembly undertook "to maintain order,
to preserve public tranquillity, and to defend the authority of law and of
the Ministers." The spokesman of the bourgeoisie even appealed to the
deputies to rally round the King in the face of the popular revolt.
There is a striking resemblance between that speech of Mirabeau and the
Manifesto of the Provisional Republican Government of China. But there
was a great difference as well. In France, the bourgeoisie had their
demands already accepted; the Third Estate had won the position of
equality in the Estates General. Only then the bourgeoisie turned their
back upon the democratic principles, so proudly pronounced by their
leader in the outcaste Assembly meeting
194 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
in the Tennis Court of Versailles. But the Chinese bourgeoisie sur-
rendered before the fight had scarcely begun.
The anxiety of the French bourgeoisie could not save the old order. They
proposed to save the monarchy and defend the established order through
the instrumentality of its reactionary laws. But the Parisian proletariat
was there to dispose. In China, the situation did not develop in a similar
way. A mass revolt was there as the background of the struggle for the
overthrow of the old order. The working class, however, was not mature
enough to determine the development of the struggle. Therefore, the
Republicanism of the radical wing of the bourgeoisie could not give birth
to Jacobinism. It surrendered before Girondism, which proposed to
maintain the decayed old order, although the monarchy could no longer
be saved.
Sun Yat-sen resigned in favour of Yuan Shih-kai, because the
bourgeoisie wanted him to do so. The future of Chinese politics was
determined neither by the reactionary National Assembly of Peking, nor
by the revolutionary Convention of Nanking, It was decided in a secret
conference at Shanghai between an envoy of Yuan Shih-kai and the
representative of the bourgeoisie, Wu Ting-fang. The latter, as the
Foreign Minister of the Provisional Republican Government, had drafted
the historic Manifesto just before he went to the conference. Then, there
were the consular representatives of foreign Powers, whose desire,
expressed in no uncertain terms, influenced the situation decisively. They
made it clear to the Chinese that their respective Governments would not
tolerate any disturbance of peace; so very necessary for trade. The
representative of the Provisional Republican Government could point out
that the side he represented had already announced its agreement with
the necessity of maintaining peace at all cost, even ac the cost of the
revolution and the Republic.
In the Manifesto, issued just a month ago, the Republican bourgeoisie
had with pride claimed credit for the accomplishment that they had not
permitted "the forces of evil" to assert themselves. What were those
"forces of evil"? They were the rebellious masses, who alone could make
a success of the revolution, sweep away the old order, and establish a
real Republic. The bourgeoisie also congratulated themselves upon
having guaranteed that the Chinese revolution would be bloodless, the
least sanguinary, at any rate, They believed to have found that guarantee
by curbing the operation of
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 195
the rebellious masses, by condemning the latter as the "forces of evil".
But in their anxiety to make the revolution bloodless, they helped the
creation of a state of affairs, in which the entire country was flooded with
blood for decades to come. Opposed to the least disturbance of the
reactionary laws of the old order, the bourgeoisie were instrumental in
plunging the country in a fierce wilderness of chaos and disorder, in
which reaction thrived, but the Republic was lost. The revolution was
bloodless, in so far as it did not spill a drop of ruling class blood; but
from the point of view of the masses, no such credit can be granted to it.
The bourgeoisie appealed for the patronage of foreign imperialism on the
ground that they had protected vested interests; to do that in that crisis
was to kill the revolution. To protect vested interests at that time was to
spare reaction. The object of the revolution was to disrupt the decayed
pre-capitalist property relations. Pre-revolutionary vested interests were
inseparably connected with those relations. Of course, the bourgeoisie
primarily meant capitalist property; but the promotion even of that
demanded the disruption of feudal-patriarchal social relations. By their
own profession, the bourgeoisie were opposed to such revolutionary
measures as were indispensable for creating conditions in which a
Republic could rise. The readiness to "safeguard internaiional
obligations" was still worse. "International obligations" had ruined China
economically, disrupted it politically, and were responsible for
obstructing all progress. To safeguard those obligations, therefore, was to
sell the revolution for securing foreign support for an imaginary
Republic. Repudiation of foreign obligations, was in the very nature of a
revolution having for its object the overthrow of a corrupt monarchy,
which had contracted those obligations.
Already then, the upper strata of the bourgeoisie were consciously
counter-revolutionary. In, the Manifesto "To Our Foreign Friends", they
admitted that "the sins of the country and the nature of the masses" made
bloodshed justifiable. But respect for "vested interests", foreign
obligations" and the laws of reaction induced them to be opposed to a
radical change of social relations which was warranted by the "sinful"
acts of the ruling class and the conditions of mass revolt created by those
acts. They were afraid of calling a thing by its proper name. The feudal-
patriarchal ruling class had sinned unpardonably against the masses and
the interests of the nation as a whole. Instead of indicting the sinner
boldly, the bourgeoisie hid
196 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
themselves behind false generalisations, laying at the door of "the
country" the responsibility for the sins committed against itself. The
welfare of the country demanded severe punishment of the sinners. The
conditions of the country cried aloud for the extermination of feudal-
patriarchal reaction and for freedom from the galling obligations
imposed by its ally, foreign imperialism. The masses were ready to take
revenge. The bourgeoisie did not fail to notice the "nature of the masses."
But instead of allying themselves with the forces of revolution, they
turned their face against mass revolt, and thus supported the sinners
against the interests of the country.
It is reported that, in the Shanghai conference, the representative of the
bourgeoisie, Wu Ting-fang, insisted upon the replacement of the
monarchy by a Republican form of government. But the concessions
made by himself on all the vital demands of the revolution rendered the
insistence upon a Republican Government a sham. The bourgeoisie,
therefore, could not get even a sham Republic. They had to capitulate
completely before the monarchy agreed to abdicate conditionally. The
resignation of Sun Yat-sen was decided at the Shanghai conference
which agreed with the imperial edict of December 28, 1911, that the
form of government should be chosen by a National Convention.13
Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie must forego all claim to power, which
should be held in trust by the arch-reactionary Yuan Shih-kai as the
chosen heir of the monarchy; and not only Sun Yat-sen should resign,
but the Provisional Republican Government should also be dissolved,
and the revolutionary Convention make a pilgrimage to Peking to be
slaughtered by the new High Priest on the altar of the Son of Heaven. Sut
Yat-sen resigned according to that decision made without consulting
him. After that decision, his feeble protest against the prerogative of the
abdicating monarch to appoint the head of the Republican Government
did not in the least improve the situation. It was utterly ineffective, as it
was bound to be. The Republic was a still-born child.
Fhe monarchy was not overthrown; yet it consented to abdicate. That
proved that the old regime was thoroughly untenable. On the other hand,
the abject capitulation of Republicanism before native reaction and
foreign imperialism exposed the impotence of the bourgeoisie. They
were unable to rescue the country from the ruins of the old order. The
consequence unavoidably was chaos and anarchy. The imbecility of the
bourgeoisie resulted from their fear of the revolution.
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 197
They wanted political power without a struggle. They tried to set up a
Republic by betraying the revolution.
Sun Yat-sen's resignation has been glorified as a splendid act of self-
abnegation. It certainly did represent self-abnegation on the part of the
bourgeoisie. But it was not an act of magnanimity; it was cowardice.
The alignment of forces was clear. The desire of the provincial rulers of
the South to abandon the sinking ship of reaction was the immediate
cause of the revolution. Once the monarchy was out of the way, those
more intelligent reactionaries would naturally not submit themselves to a
Republican Government controlled by the bourgeoisie. They would
rather support Yuan-Shih-kai, who represented their class. If the
Provisional Republican Government stood firmly by the professed
principles of democracy and constitutionalism, the schism in the camp of
reaction would be closed up, and the Republic must be defended in a
ruthless class struggle. It had been demonstrated more than once in
history that in such a crisis the bourgeois revolution can be saved only by
the action of the masses against the bourgeoisie themselves.
Earlier in the period of bourgeois revolution, the working class does not
act as an independent force. Its active support is enlisted by the radical
section of the bourgeoisie, who later on, under the pressure of the
masses, go farther than they would go by themselves. Such was the case
during the Great French Revolution. Later in the period, the working
class acts as an independent factor, and the bourgeoisie as a class ally
themselves with reaction against the revolution, it was so in the Russian
Revolution of 1905, and partially even during the European revolutions
of 1848. In China, it was neither this nor that. The development of
classes, and consequently of the political situation, corresponded with
that in the earlier stages of the period of world bourgeois revolution. The
working class was not yet ready to act independently. But even the
radical section of the bourgeoisie, represented by Sun Yat-sen, was
unwilling to lead the rebellious masses in a revolutionary struggle.
A real Republic could rise in China only out of a fierce struggle with the
purpose of annihilating decomposed feudal-patriarchal reaction, root and
branch. The radical bourgeoisie were afraid of that perspective.
Therefore, they capitulated, and Sun Yat-sen resigned. His refusal to
resign would have precipitated a situation in
198 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
which Republicanism must identify itself with mass revolt. The radical
bourgeoisie could defend their Republicanism only by placing them-
selves at the head of a revolutionary struggle of the masses. The
Republic could be saved only by the rise of Jacobinism. But bourgeois
radicalism failed to develop into Jacobinism. Sun Yat-sen resigned to
avoid a civil war. The tragedy, however, is that the civil war was not
avoided On the contrary, a whole period of devastating civil war was
opened up by the capitulation of the bourgeoisie.
The revolutionary abortion of 1911 created conditions for the birth of
militarism, that monstrous child of superannuated reaction which ate into
the very vitals of the country for years to come. Only a triumphant
revolution could establish a Republican State in the place of the vanished
Empire. The failure of the bourgeoisie to lead the revolution left the
country without any effective central authority. The caricature
Napoleonism of Yuan Shih- kai, so readily and liberally supported by
foreign Powers, ended in a despicable debacle. A triumphant bourgeois
revolution is the basis of Napoleonism which rises to sweep away the
debris of the old order. The object of the military dictatorship of
Napoleon was to consolidate the position of the bourgeoisie. It was not a
fraudulent continuation, but the grave-digger, of the old order. Yuan
Shih-kai, on the contrary, tried to set up a military dictatorship with the
object of galvanising the old order. So his ambition was doomed to
Failure. His failure, indeed, was not due to any effective opposition of
the bourgeoisie. The conditions which had rendered the existence of the
monarchy utterly untenable, operated also against the attempt to
perpetuate a disintegrated social system in a slightly altered form. The
Manchu monarchy collapsed not before an attack from outside. Its
downfall was due to the operation of the centrifugal tendency inherent in
its own structure. Therefore, the monarchy as a central authority
disappeared. But all its evils remained intact, running rampant in a wild
fury. The country was soon broken up into various regions under military
dictators, constantly engaged in ruinous civil wars.
On the resignation of Sun Yat-sen, the Republican Convention at
Nanking obediently betook itself to Peking. Yuan Shih-kai declined to
accept the invitation to grace by his presence the seat of the transitory
Republic. Even after the capitulation of the bourgeoisie, the atmosphere
in the central and southern provinces remained uncertain. Yuan's model
troops had been easily disarmed in Nanking
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 199
by the Republican army recruited from the rebellious masses. The
Republic surrendered itself to his tender mercies; but the masses were
still there in an ugly mood. So Yuan Shih-kai decided to stay out of the
danger zone until he had the situation well in hand. He had a little revolt
staged among his own troops stationed in Peking as a plausible pretext
for his refusal to make the promised pilgrimage to the shrine of the
Republic. The visitors from Nanking persuaded themselves to accept the
explanation and quietly dispersed, leaving with the would be dictator the
prerogative to convene the National Convention which was to decide
what form of government the country needed. Yuan Shih-kai was thus
fully entrusted with the conduct of State affairs, even without taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic.
The National Convention assembled in April 1913, and became the scene
of a battle between the tendencies of local autonomy and centralism. The
struggle between the first Parliament of China and Yuan Shih-kai is
generally interpreted as a tussle between popular representatives and an
unscrupulous individual aspiring for dictatorial power. The main issues
involved in the struggle were the election of the President and the so-
called Reconstruction Loan, the latter being the more important. In order
to establish his dictatorship, Yuan Shih-kai needed money. He must buy
over the support of the practically independent rulers of the central and
southern provinces. Their disaffection had brought down the monarchy,
and it was with their military aid that the bourgeoisie had set up the
transitory Republic. The foreign Powers had promised him a loan of
twenty-five million pounds. But his competence to secure the offered
financial assistance for laying the foundation of his dictatorship was
conditional upon his election to the Chief Magistracy of the country.
There was difficulty on the way. He did not have a majority in the new
Parliament. He overcame the difficulty with a little coup de main, in
which he was fully aided by the foreign Powers.
An advisory council had been set up to act as the Provisional
Government, pending the election of the Parliament. Upon the latter
assembling, the advisory council automatically ceased to exist. Yet, on
the unconstitutional authority of that non-existing body, Yuan Shih-kai
signed the Reconstruction Loan. Faced with that accomplished fact, the
Parliament could either rise in open revolt against the usurper, or
abdicate. It chose the latter alternative. The anti-Yuan
200 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Republican Bloc was composed of heterogeneous elements. It fell to
pieces as soon as Yuan came into possession of the means to buy up the
dubious supporters of the Republic. Consequently, the Parliament elected
an avowed monarchist to the presidency of the shadow Republic. The
bourgeoisie were once again beaten by decayed reaction, for they would
not lead a revolution. They hoped to establish a Republican Government
with the support of a section of the feudal ruling class representing the
tendency to break away from the nominal central authority for the sake
of their own aggrandisement. The Republican bourgeoisie voted for
Yuan Shih-kai for the same reason as had persuaded Sun Yat-sen to
resign. They feared that, defeated by the Parliament, Yuan would openly
oppose and overthrow the Republic. They would rather kill the Republic
themselves than let him have the credit. It did not occur to them that the
possible revolt of reaction could be overwhelmed by the forces of
revolution which were there, ready to be led. Their dubious allies went
over to Yuan Shih-kai as soon as the latter was in a position to satisfy
them. Thus deserted, the bourgeoisie could save the Republic only by
appealing to the masses to rush to its defence. But the bourgeoisie again
shrank before a revolutionary civil war, and thus allowed Yuan Shih-kai,
not a victory, but a simple walk-over.
The provincial officials were however afraid that, with financial
resources at his command, Yuan Shih-kai might try to deprive them of
the independence of a costly central authority, gained on the fall of the
monarchy. Therefore, they supported the bourgeoisie in opposing the
Reconstruction Loan. The issue of the Hukuang Railway Loan had
precipitated the First Revolution of 1911. The controversy over the
Reconstruction Loan provoked the uprising of July 1913, which came to
be known as the Second Revolution. Again, it was not a revolt for
asserting the principles of representative government as against the
usurpation of autocratic power by an ambitious individual; it was simply
the old struggle between the forces of a dictatorial centralism and the
disruptive tendency of local autonomy—both born of decayed reaction.
In addition to the opposition to the Reconstruction Loan, there was
another cause for the July uprising. As the President of the Republic,
Yuan Shih-kai began to remove from their posts those military
commanders and provincial officials who had either actively supported,
or tacitly sympathised with, the revolution of 1911.
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 201
The vacant posts were filled with men of his choice, whose loyalty was
secured with the money provided by foreign banks. The Second
Revolution was a military mutiny organised with the cooperation of army
officers sacked by Yuan. It was easily suppressed. The rebels were very
badly equipped. There was no money to pay the soldiers. Even then, the
masses were not called upon to defend the Republic. On the other side,
Yuan Shih-kai not only had his "model army", but possessed plenty of
money which he spent liberally for causing defections in the rebel camp.
For example, when the Northern Army was attacking Nanking, the rebel
forces were deserted by all the leaders. Still, they resisted heroically. The
defence of Nanking was, indeed, the most brilliant event of the Second
Revolution. In the beginning, the navy supported the rebels. Its defection
finally turned the scale. It declared "neutrality". The neutrality of the
navy was purchased with money supplied by the foreign banks of
Shanghai, not as a loan, but on account of their own administrative
expenses.1*
Upon the collapse of the Second Revolution, Sun Yet-sen and other
leaders of the Republican movement fled from the country. The failure of
the First as well as of the Second Revolution was due to the inability and
unwillingness of the bourgeoisie to connect the Republican movement
with the widespread and deep-rooted discontent of the masses. Neither
the agitation conducted by the Provincial Assemblies during the year
immediately preceding the revolution, nor the Provisional Constitution
adopted by the revolutionary Convention of Nanking, nor the struggle of
the Parliament against Yuan Shih-kai, nor again the revolt against his
caricature Napoleonism, touched the vital social problems which lay at
the very root of all the troubles. As a matter of fact, the bourgeoisie were
always very anxious to run away from those problems; repeatedly, they
declared their hostility to mass movements which they themselves
fomented by their own agitation. Economic questions, vitally concerning
the masses of the people, had no place in the Republican programme.
Ruinous taxation, unbearable feudal exactions, soaring prices, brutal pre-
capitalist exploitation, and innumerable other questions of similar nature,
did not receive any attention from the bourgeoisie. Indifferent to their
causes, the bourgeoisie were determined to check the "forces of evil", by
which they meant mass revolt.
202 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The basic task of a bourgeois revolution is not simply to secure the
abdication of monarchy; it is to abolish the social system buttressed by
the monarchist State. It is to destroy feudalism or any other form of pre-
capitalist social relations. It was not the Declaration of Rights that laid
the foundation of the Republic in France. That revolutionary task was
accomplished by the decrees abolishing feudal prerogatives issued under
the pressure of peasant revolt. During the French Revolution also the
bourgeoisie was reluctant to make a clean sweep of feudalism until they
were forced to do so by the revolutionary action of the masses.
In the China of 1911-13 conditions were not sufficiently ripe for the
bourgeois revolution to come under the influence of the revolutionary
masses. The bourgeoisie remained in their unholy alliance with one
section of the feudal ruling class, in a feeble and half-hearted struggle
against the other. In every critical moment, the schism in the camp of
reaction closed up, and the bourgeoisie were forced to submission. In the
absence of the spontaneously revolutionary action of the toiling masses,
operating as the driving force of the situation, petit-bourgeois radicalism
could not develop into Jacobinism. It degenerated into futile intrigues
devoid of all social significance.
The Provisional Republican Constitution became the bone of contention
between Yuan Shih-kai and the National Assembly. It had been framed
by the revolutionary Convention of Nanking dominated by radical
Republicanism. That rather lengthy document of fifty-six articles
prescribes in detail the formal, legal and political rights of the people,
emphasises upon their duty to pay taxes and serve in the army; but it
contains not one single word about relieving the unbearable economic
burden on the masses. It occupies itself with elaborating checks and
balances upon the executive power with the object of opening the doors
of the State apparatus for the bourgeoisie. The toiling masses composing
the overwhelming majority of the people are entirely forgotten. They are
left perishing under the iron-heel of feudal-patriarchal exploitation. The
pseudo-Republican Constitution concerned itself exclusively with high
politics, reflecting the ambition of the bourgeoisie to enter the heaven of
political power. Consequently, it was but natural that the masses
remained more or less indifferent to the dispute over issues which had no
direct relation with the realities of the situation
The Rise and Fall of the Republic 203
as far as they were concerned. Unlike the Taiping Revolt and the Boxer
Uprising, the Revolutions of 1911 and 1913 were more or less isolated
from the masses. The former two, particularly the Taiping Revolt, had
raised vital social issues, and had therefore embraced the masses of the
people. The roots of the monarchy had been smashed by those earlier
revolutions. ]n 1911 the bourgeoisie inherited the victory of the earlier
revolutionary mass movement; but the victory proved to be a dead-see
fruit, even for themselves, as they failed to carry on the revolution.
The defeat of the Second Revolution completely disrupted the
Opposition Bloc in the National Assembly. Consequently, it elected
Yuan Shih-kai President for five years. An unholy alliance had brought
the shadow republic to a precarious existence. It was falling asunder even
before the Second Revolution. When the radical bourgeoisie, led by Sun
Yat-sen and Huang Hsing began to agitate for a revolt against Yuan's
projected dictatorship, the official elements dissented; they had joined
the Republican movement for their own purpose. They not only stepped
out of the alliance with people whose political ideas they had half-
heartedly shared, but openly went over to the other side. Some of the
southern Governors, who had previously sympathised with the
Republican movement, telegraphed to Yuan Shih-kai complaining
against the activities of the radical bourgeoisie. On the eve of the Second
Revolution, thirteen provincial Governors sided with Yuan Shih-kai;
only four still remained doubtfully loyal to the Republic. Even the big
bourgeoisie decamped. The merchants of Shanghai and the Yangtse
Valley denounced the "seditious propaganda" of the Kuo Min Tang, and
appealed to the National Assembly to suppress it. In response to that
appeal, the representatives of the big bourgeoisie in the Parliament
disassociated themselves from the Tung Ming Hui (the Opposition
Block), and formed a new party under the leadership of the veteran of the
Reform Movement, Liang Chih-chao. The new party openly supported
Yuan Shih-kai on every question and called for the suppression of the
Kuo Min Tang. Under constant provocation, the radical bourgeoisie went
a little farther than they had originally dared; but still not far enough.
Even then, they did not dare to touch the social problems of the
revolution, and consequently could not come in contact with the masses,
whose action alone could make a clean sweep of the old order and
establish the Republic. Taking place in the
204 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
condition of such an unequal distribution of forces, the Second
Revolution was easily defeated.
Yuan Shih-kai felt himself secure in the saddle. He had the radical
members of the National Assembly unseated on the ground of their
complicity in the July insurrection. The Kuo Min Tang, deserted by its
discrediting allies, was dissolved. Before that Yuan Shih-kai secured his
election to the presidentship for ten years, with the right of re-election.
On that occasion, he openly proclaimed his intention to assume
dictatorial power. He wanted to "rule without interference, in accordance
with ancient traditions". He complained that "restrictions have been
placed on my authority", and warned that he would no longer tolerate
such restrictions.
The Republic was no more. The ghost of the monarchy usurped the
presidential chair. The King had passed away, but ancient tradition still
remained in force as the guiding principle of the State. The Parliament
was replaced by the Council of State. It scrapped the Republican
Constitution, and adopted a new one, giving all power to the President.
What still remained to be done, was to efface the shadow of the
Republic. Resurrection of the monarchy commenced. The first act was to
reinstate the worship of Confucius and the annual ceremonial offering in
the Temple of Heaven as an official State function. While abdicating
politically, the Manchu Emperor had reserved these functions to himself.
Once the religious rights, reserved' to the monarch, were resurrected, a
King could no longer be dispensed with. Yuan Shih-kai was there as the
most favoured candidate. He had worked untiringly for the purpose.
Bourgeois liberals like Liang Chih-chao had supported Yuan Shih-kai in
his struggle against the danger of revolution: they were staggered by his
scheme to ascend the throne. But it was not an unexpected development.
Having not been overthrown by a triumphant revolution, sweeping away
its social foundations, a monarchy is bound to be restored. The
Republicanism of the Chinese bourgeoisie, even of the radical wing
standing behind the Kuo Min Tang, was a sheer mockery, because it fell
so far short of advocating a social revolution for which the conditions of
the country cried aloud.
For enlisting the support of the bourgeoisie, Yuan Shih-kai did not rely
entirely on "ancient traditions". He wanted to justify his plan for the
restoration of monarchy also with the modern
 The Rise and Fall of the Republic 205
concepts of government. His American adviser, Dr. Goodnow, testified
that Republican Government was not suitable for China. The stage was
set for Yuan Shih-kai to be crowned as the founder of a new ruling
dynasty. The dictator was stricken down when he had almost ascended
the throne with the active help of foreign imperialism and the co-
operation of the subservient native bourgeoisie. Forces sufficiently
strong had not yet developed to build a new order in China out of the
ruins of the decayed feudal-patriarchal reaction, which was maintained in
a fossilised existence with the aid of foreign imperialism. But its
consolidation was rendered impossible by its own contradictions. Forces
of disintegration had brought down the monarchy. They operated also
against the establishment of a dictatorship or the restoration of
monarchy.
The military ruler of Yunan joined the radical bourgeoisie in a revolt
against Yuan Shih-kai's plan to be the founder of a new ruling dynasty.
To prevent the spread of the movement, called the Third Revolution of
1915, Yuan's friends and supporters, foreign and native, advised him to
abandon his scheme. Defeated in his long laid plan, and discredited in
consequence, Yuan Shih-kai died of a broken heart. Some believe that he
was quietly removed by those who found in him an embarrassment for
themselves. It is immaterial how he died. With him ended the attempt to
stabilise reaction. The country became a prey to militarism, the product
of the tendency of decentralisation which had brought down the
monarchy. Yuan Shih-kai's failure to restore monarchy, however, did riot
help the Republic. It also disappeared in the holocaust of death and
destruction which followed the abortive bourgeois revolution. A
Republic, established by the monarch, could be born only to die. It did
die, to be resurrected as a reality only by the efforts of the revolutionary
masses, which alone could free it from the damaging alliance with
reaction—an alliance contracted by the bourgeoisie, and which killed the
Republic before it was born.
Notes
.1. Edict of Abdication, February 12,1912.
2. Second Edict of Abdication, February 12, 1912.
3. A pension of four million dollars was granted to the Emperor after his abdication.
He continued to reside in the luxurious palaces which remained his private property.
The imperial household with its numerous retinue was to be maintained from the
Exchequer of the Republican State.
206 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The extensive private domains of the Emperor and the ruling dynasty were not touched :
on the contrary, the Republic guaranteed their inviolability. The imperial guards were
retained, the Republican Government, paying for their maintenance. Members of the
royal dynasty and the nobility retained their titles and properties under the protection of
the Republican Government. (Third Edict cf Abdication, February 12, 1912,
countersigned by the members of the Republican Government under Yuan Shih-kai).
4. The Constitution of Nineteen Articles, calling for a limited monarchy, had been
endorsed by all the Northern Generals.
5. But the Republican Government cannot be organised by any authority conferred by the
Ching Emperor." (Sun Yat-sen's telegram to Yuan Shih-kai, February 14, 1912).
6. The Wanchus abdicated on February 12, Sun-Yat-sen resigned on February 14.
7. Sun Yat-sen's letter of resignation, addressed to the revolutionary Convention.
8. Interview with the Correspondent of the London Times, November 20, 1911.
9. The followers of Sun Yat-sen themselves now disclose the truth of the situation. They
testify that the Provisional President resigned ''under the pressure of his right wing, but
really against his better judgement". —Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern
China".
10. Report of the British Minister at Peking, Sir J. Jordan, October 16, 1911.
11. "To Our Foreign Friends"—A Manifesto of the Nanking Provisional Government,
issued on November 17. 1911.
12. Louis Blanc, "History of the French Revolution".
13. "The Cabinet has presented Bs a memorial from Tang Shao-yi. According to that
memorial, the representative of the People's Army (that is, the revolutionaries), Uu Ting-
fang, steadfastly maintains that the mind of the people is in favour of the establishment of
a Republican form of government as its ideal. Since the trouble at Wuchang, we have
fulfilled the desires of the people, having accepted the Nineteen Articles of the
Constitution, and sworn before the spirit of our ancestors to rule in accordance with these
Articles. There is still dispute on political matters. Therefore, it is advisable to call a
Provisional National Convention, and leave the issue for the Convention to decide."—
Imperial Edict, December 28, 1911.
14. Putnam Weale, "The Flight for the Republic of China".
 CHAPTER X
SUN YAT-SEN AND HIS THREE PRINCIPLES
"As the Confucian classics became the unwritten Constitution of
Imperial China, so will modern China be politically and socially based
on the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen .... His social and political
philosophy, with all their apparent contradictions, is now the political
Bible of modern China."1 An examination of the Sun Min Chui—"Three
People's Principles"—therefore is an important part of the study of the
Chinese Revolution.
It is, however, a bold statement that the social and political views of Sun
Yat-sen are universally accepted in China. Denial of the fact of class
struggle is inherent in those principles. According to Sun Yat-sen, the
ancient culture of China obviated all social antagonism. The peasantry
together with the urban toiling masses constitute more than eighty per
cent of the population of modern China. This majority is subjected to all
sorts of economic exploitation and social oppression, its very existence,
therefore, represents the repudiation of a fundamental principle of the
doctrine of Sun Yat-sen. The Communist Party of China was expelled
from the Kuo Min Tang on the ground that it did not faithfully abide by
the teachings of Sun Yat-sen. At the time of its expulsion, the
Communist Party commanded the confidence of millions throughout the
country. The Kuo Min Tang began its fierce attack on the revolutionary
labour and peasant movement with the pretext of saving Sun Yat-senism.
That evidently was an admission that the cult was not acceptable to the
majority of the nation. The tremendous mass movement, which has been
sweeping the country for a decade and more, draws its strength from the
revolt of the exploited peasantry against the antiquated system of feudal-
patriarchal landownersbip.
On the other hand, the upper strata of the bourgeoisie accepted
208 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the views of Sun Yat-sen with reservation. A considerable section of that
class never joined the Kuo Min Tang; another betrayed it in every
revolutionary crisis. In the stormy days of 1927, the Kuo Min Tang split
in consequence of a fierce controversy over the interpretation of the
teachings of its founder. Even now those who consider themselves to be
the most faithful followers of Sun Yat-sen, are persona non-grata with
the Nationalist Government of Nanking, which also claims to be acting
according to the teachings of the self-same master. Elimination from the
effective leadership of the Kuo Min Tang of many a close collaborator
and follower2 of Sun Yat-sen provas that the bourgeoisie have rejected
the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen. His three principles constitute the
quintessence of his thories. They represent the ideology of the petit-
bourgeoisie.
The nature of Sun Yat-sen's ideology was very largely determined by the
social origin. As a small landonwer, his family was closely connected
with the feudal-patriarchal structure of the Chinese society. In addition to
the basic occupation, his father took to tailoring as a subsidiary trade. 3
Thus, Sun Yat-sen's youth was passed in the atmosphere of a mingling of
the pre-capitalist and capitalist relations. That atmosphere, so typical of
contemporary Chinese social conditions, left an indelible^impression
upon his mind; and the views of reform he subsequently expounded were
heavily influenced by the impressions of his youth.
The path of capitalist development blazed by his father was pursued with
great success by his elder brother who emigrated to the Hawaiian Islands
and got rich by trading. He increased his fortune still more by trafficking
in human labour. He imported to Hawai Chinese labourers "obtaining his
reward from the bounty of hundred dollars per head paid by the King of
Hawai."4 While still very young, Sun Yat-sen was taken to Honolulu by
his prosperous brother. There he fell under American influence.
Previously, at home, he had begun to resent that a foreign dynasty should
rule China; but in Hawai he found the foreign rule to be beneficial for the
natives. He was very much impressed by the law and order established
there by American Imperialism. The father of Chinese nationalism was
on the point of becoming an admirer of foreign Imperialism. But he was
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 209
saved because his faith in the superiority of the Confucian culture
remained unshaken. Later on, Sun Yat-sen went to Hongkong for
studying medicine. There he came under the influence of Christianity,
and developed a great admiration for English Liberalism which super-
ficially coloured his political views for the entire life. In the realm of
Chinese thought his preference was clearly for the Confucianism of the
Mandarins. The Taoism of the plebeians he detested. He accepted the
ruling class interpretation of Chinese culture, and on that foundation
constructed his ideological system.
Until very late in his life social questions did not bother Sun Yat-sen.
Even then he touched them only superfically. Though born and brought
up in the midst of revolting social conditions, he began his political
career with a political object which had no direct bearing upon the
realities of the situation. His own family was a victim of the inequities of
a decayed social system. For all practical purposes, the ancestral land had
ceased to belong to them. Nevertheless, they were held responsible for
collection of tax on that land.5 Sun's hatred for the Manchus was most
probably caused by that injustice done to his family.
Sun Yat-sen began his political career as a conspirator. No influence of
the Taiping Revolt can be traced in his youthful activities. He inherited
from it only the hatred for the Manchus, but failed to appreciate the great
social significance of that upheaval. In spite of the fact that grievous
social evils cried out all around for remedy, and discontent with
unbearable conditions was rife among the masses, Sun Yat-sen was hard
put to it to find a political platform for his ambitious struggle to
overthrow the Manchus. Isolated from the masses, he searched for a way
out of the dilemma in the wilderness of mental abstraction. Ground down
by the rude realities of daily life, the masses could be mobilised in a
political movement only if it had a direct bearing upon their immediate
surroundings. They could not be expected to join the wild-goose-chase of
a fight against a dynasty living somewhere at a very great distance. But a
political movement involving the masses was conditional upon a
revolutionary social outlook, which Sun Yat-sen did not possess until the
late years of his political career. His earlier activities remained limited to
small groups of middle-class youths hatching romantic schemes for
armed uprisings.
So utterly devoid of any perspective were those early activities
210 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
that, once asked by his associates what did he propose to set up in the
place of the Thorne, Sun found it very difficult to give a clear answer.
The substitute offered by him, after much cogitation, was "reverence for
the law alone".6 It was hopeless to inspire a movement with such an
abstract ideal. The confusion about his political ideal was due to the fact
that Sun Yat-sen was still far from identifying the monarchy with the
entire established order of feudal-patriarchal despotism. He would have
Law enthroned in the place of the Manchu monarch; but the vital
question was, what was that new political deity? One might assume that
Sun's "reverence for law" represented an instinctive approach to
Montesquieu's "L'Esprit de Loi". But the assumption would be rather far-
fetched. Because, he did not specify that the new political godhead of his
choice was to be a new system of law, established by a revolution, for
governing a new system of social relations. He could not do so unless he
recognised the necessity of disrupting the established social order. There
is no evidence that, at that time, he had any such revolutionary
perspective. His alternative, therefore, was reverence for the existing
law. But the monarchy could not be seriously threatened if the laws
holding it up should be reverentially observed. The political ideal of
young Sun Yat-sen was not only impractical but positively reactionary.
With no revolutionary social outlook, he groped in the darkness of an
intellectual confusion until he tumbled upon making the so-called
"Declaration of Independence". The Declaration was "Tien Ming Wu
Chang"—"Divine Right does not last for ever". Those, indeed, were
words with grave implication. They might indicate an approach towards
a democratic ideology. But the Declaration was still only negative.
Divine Right was not yet confronted with the right of the people. The
principle of Divine Right cannot be effectively contested except by
attacking the entire social system constituting the basis of monarch
claiming that right. Because of his failure to see that a modern China
could not be built without making a clean sweep of the old. Sun Yat-sen
never stood firmly on the ground of revolutionary democracy. He never
preached the sovereignty of the people as against the sovereignty of the
Crown. He tried to organise revolt against the Manchu monarchy. But he
never preached "the sacred right of revolt" of the people against the
established socio-political system of oppression and exploitation.
Following in the footsteps of Confucius, he endeavoured to find a
formula of com-
Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 211
promise between the social institutions of ancient China and the political
conquests of mc-dern democracy. That formula is set forth in his Three
Principles, which were not formulated in a coherent form until 1924. Sun
Yat-sen was not a revolutionary; he was a reformer, and even as such he
lacked an inspiring vision, and found his ideals in the traditions of the past.
The three principles are popularly stated as Nationality, Democracy and
Socialism. Thanks to the fact that Sun Yat-sen never produced a theoretical
treatise elaborating coherently his views on social and political questions, all
kinds of interpretations have been placed upon the three principles. He
himself interpreted them differ-rently in different periods of his life. It is
claimed by his disciples that he formulated his three principles already in the
earlier years of the century. They maintain that, on his first visit to Europe,
he was not favourably impressed by the working of the democratic govern-
ments. After having studied them, he is believed to have come ''to the
conclusion that a representative government alone would not solve the
Chinese problem".7 From that belief, it is deduced that his principles are
more revolutionary than political democracy. The fact, however, is that until
the revolution of 1911 and even lor years afterwards, Sun Yat-sen's political
ideas were hardly more radical than formal parliamentarism. Indeed, he
never fully accepted even the political principles of bourgeois democracy.
Admiring commentators usually read more in the teachings of the master
than the latter really meant. Therefore, they claim that the starting point of
the three principles was realisation of the inadequacy of political democracy.
But a critical examination of principles shows that, instead of being an
advance upon bourgeois democracy, they do not go even as far as that.
The ideologists of the big bourgeoisie, Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chih-chao,
were great scholars. In contrast to them, Sun Yat-sen was remarkably sterile
in original thought. He borrowed his ideas either from the philosophers of
ancient China, or from the liberal political thinkers of the West. One need
not be ashamed of learning from others; but Sun Yat-sen did not learn from
great thinkers in order to improve upon their teachings. As a matter of fact,
he did not think; he only schemed. He has been characterised as a dreamer.
The more correct characterisation, however, would be a schemer. He was
not an ideologist of social reconstruction or even political reform H; was a
constitutional draftsman. Therefore, he failed to pro-
212 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
vide the movement with a comprehensive programme.
Not only did he ignore the burning social questions agitating the growing
forces of revolution; his politics completely lacked the background of a
theoretical understanding. Never in his life did he evolve a political
theory out of the negative formula he had tumbled upon in his youth—
"Divine Right does not last for ever". His inability to find new principles
of government to replace the traditional was the cause of his submission
to the reactionary Yuan Shih-kai in the revolutionary crisis of 1911. In
that crisis, he made a feeble protest, but could not resist the temptation
that the Republic should also inherit the Divine Right. An effective
resistance could be put only by those advocating the sovereignty of the
people, and teaching the sacred right of revolt for asserting that
sovereignty.
Even when he became the Provisional President of the Republic, Sun
Yat-sen did not fully subscribe to the principles of bourgeois democracy.
He believed in paternalism, professed traditionally by absolute monarchs
claiming to rule on Divine Right. The oath of the Provincial President
was "to plan and beget blessing for the people, and to perform duty in the
interest of the public",8 The spirit of Confucian paternalism, the basic
principle of the patriarchal Chinese State for centuries, was smuggled
into the Republican Constitution. The head of the Republican State
would "plan and beget the blessing for the people". From whom did he
get his benevolent mission? He would perform his duty in the interest of
the public. But what were those interests? Who should define them? In
the absence of any specification to the contrary, the mission is supposed
to be derived from the moral sense of the new ruler who presumed to be
the best judge of what was good and what was bad for the people. That
conception of government was not very different from the hypothesis of
Divine Right, and was very far behind even bourgeois democracy.
Sun Yat-sen was still haunted by the spirit of Confucian paternalism,
even when at last he definitely formulated his principles and wrote the
Constitution of the Kuo Min Tang. Regarding the sovereignty of the
people as an abstract conception, he set it aside in practice. The future
government of the country, envisaged by him, was to be in charge of
men specially qualified for the task. The sovereignty would be
transferred to the people in some remote future, after they had been
politically educated by their self-appointed guar-
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 213
dians. Trusteeship, preparatory to the transfer of political power to the
people, is the corner-stone of the neo-Confucian State of Sun Yat-sen.
The doctrine of trusteeship is a complete negation of the theory of
bourgeois democracy, according to which the sovereign right of the
people is inalienable Sun Yat-sen visualised sovereign right as a distant
goal to be attained by the people after having qualified themselves for the
honour and responsibility under the tutelage of benevolent despots. That
being the case, the birth of the Republic by the grace of the monarch was
not repugnant to Sun Yat-sen's theory of sovereignty. The monarch also
admitted that he had exercised the sovereign right as a trust; on
abdicating, he did not surrender the right of sovereignty to the people; he
only handed the trust over to others equally worthy, ia his opinion. The
paternalist republicans stepped into thj sho;s of the monarch as the
custodians of the sovereign right theoretically belonging to the people;
but the latter would be admitted in the Kingdom of Heaven only after
they had been taught by the benevolent custodians how to behave there.
Posthumously, his admirers assert that Sun Yat-sen began to evolve his
Three Principles as an improvement upon Western political democracy
early in the opening years of the century But as the provisional President
of the Republic in 1911 he was without any political principle. Called to
that exalted office, he was pathetically incapable of giving a lead to the
country. Having until then been exclusively engaged in conspirative
activities with the object of smuggling arms and raising money for
purchasing them as well as some officers in the army, Sun Yat-sen had
neither time nor aptitude to formulate any political programme. He
seems to have learned nothing from the experience of the two preceding
stages of the Democratic Revolution in China. He had inherited only
contempt for "the longhaired rebels",9 and completely failed to
understand the social significance of the Boxer Revolt. On the other
hand, he had little connection with the Reform Movement It was later on
asserted that he had disagreed with the moderatism of Kang Yu-wei and
his followers. But there is no evidence of Sun Yat-sen ever fighting
ideologically the theories of constitutional monarchy advocated by them.
He might have disagreed with them but was not able to put up a
revolutionary programme as against their reformism. As a matter of fact,
when great original thinkers like Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chih-chao
were battering down the empty traditions of
214 Revolution and Counter- Revolution in China
Confucianism, Sun Yat-sen retained his faith in those antiquated social
theories. He always maintained the opinion that modern political
democracy could be introduced in China only in so far as it was
adaptable to the Confucian conception of State. Not only did he retain
this view until the last days of his life, but actually elaborated it as late as
1924 when he gave the final shape to his Three Principles.
If Sun Yat-sen really disagreed with Kang Yu-wei's theories of
constitutional monarchy, he certainly did not preach revolutionary
Jacobinism as against Chinese Girondism. On the contrary, Kang Yu-wei
and his followers raised vital social questions and preached an
objectively revolutionary ideology, while they demanded radical social
reforms. Sun Yet-sen, on his part, did not connect political radicalism
with social problems. His politics hung in the air. The Republic was born
only to die. and the passing of the Manchus did not improve the situation
of the country in the least.
Sun Yat-sen began his political activities with the slogan: "Down with
the Manchus!" It is said that in the Tokyo Conference of 1905 which
founded the Tang Meng Hui, Sun Yat-sen proposed a sort of a political
programme to supplement the original slogan. The programme included
the following demands: I. Overthrow of the Manchus; 2. Establishment
of a Democratic Republic on the American model; 3 Redistribution of
land through the nationalisation of unearned increments; and 4.
Maintenance of friendly relations with all foreign Powers,
especially*Japan.10 The second and third items were positive demands
which could serve as the basis for a comprehensive treatment of political
and social conditions in an elaborated political programme. But they
were opposed by the conference and dropped by the sponsor. The
conference was a gathering of political conspirators hailing exclusively
from the urban petit-bourgeoisie. The attitude towards the semblance of a
social and political programme revealed that the supporters of Sun Yat-
sen did not want to commit themselves to a democratic government in
the modern sense. They wanted the hated Manchus to go, but were not
sure that monarchy as an institution could altogether be dispensed with.
Nor were they willing to depose Confucius for Abraham Lincoln, whose
doctrine of government "of the people, for the people and by people" was
then the political summum bonum for Sun Yat-sen. Moreover, the
amateurish reference to the agrarian question was something altogether
strange to them. They failed to see what conceivable relation land
 Sun Yat-sen and his Three Principles 215
could have with the overthrow of the Manchus. They were all directly or
indirectly connected with the prevailing system of landholding, which
was not disadvantageous even for the smallest non-cultivating rent-
receiver.
It is difficult to say whether Sun Yat-sen raised the agrarian question
earnestly, or for simply impressing the conference with something new-
fangled he had picked up in his travels abroad. In view of the fact that he
dropped the matter so easily and put it aside for nearly twenty years, it
can scarcely be believed that he was earnestly approaching the agrarian
question. Had it been the case, he should have reverted to it at least when
he became the head of the Republic. But the fact is that until the last
years of his political career he was never known to have made a serious
study of this all-important question of the political movement in China;
and even then he advocated only a patchwork. Presumably, while visiting
America, he had made a superficial acquaintance with the single-tax
theory of Henry George. The nationalisation of land-rent proposed by
Henry George had a remarkable resemblance with the system of land-tax
in China. That must have greatly impressed Sun Yat-sen. Very probably,
he did not fully understand the implication of the reform he fathered. In
any case, the theory of single-tax occupied a large place in the third
principle which is unwarrentedly dubbed as "Socialism." Through
paternalist redistribution of land, Sun Yat-sen hoped to resurrect the
disrupted patriarchal family.
If it is true that Sun Yat-sen had worked out his principles during the
years preceding the revolution of 1911, he certainly forgot them, or
quietly set them aside, when he became the Provisional President of the
Republic. On assuming that exalted position, he issued a proclamation
which contained the programme of the new Government. The historic
document expressed satisfaction at the "speedy success of the revolution
unprecedented in history", and announced the task of the Republic to be
to "realise unity of territories, unity of races,11 unity of finance, unity of
military administration; and to establish friendly relations with foreign
Powers",1- None of the principles, possibly except the first— of
nationalism, based upon racial unity—could be traced in that declaration
of the Provisional President, which indeed was a declaration of political
bankruptcy.
A combination of circumstances—split in the camp of reaction,
216 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
operation of the forces of decentralisation, and anxiety of the big
bourgeoisie to save the monarchy—placed the leader of petit-bourgeois
radicalism at the head of the Republic. In that exalted position, he was
faced with social and economic problems bristling with difficulties,
problems which he had never visualised in his life. He had hoped that
everything would happen according to his mechanical scheme as soon as
a military coup d'etat removed the Manchus from the Throne. That
condition was fulfilled, but only to reveal the great magnitude of
problems to be boldly faced and resolutely solved, if the Republic was to
be a reality, if a democratic State was to be established in the place of the
old autocratic regime. Even then the petit-bourgeoisie failed to grasp the
vastness of the task of revolution. Their spokesman became the head of
the Republic. But entirely oblivious of the basic social and political
problems demanding a revolutionary solution, he indulged only in vague
generalities. No wonder that he was presently obliged to make room for a
stronger man—the nominee of the abdicating monarch. The debacle of
the Tang Meng-hui, and the disgraceful abdication of its leader in favour
of Yuan Shih-kai in tlie revolutionary crisis of 1911 revealed the
shallowness of the movement. The rise of the still-born Republic did not
mark the triumph of a revolution. It was brought into being by the
manoeuvre of the cleverer reactionaries as the last effort to preserve a
decayed and disintegrating socio-political system in a new guise. The
movement was intellectually sterile, politically naive, theoretically
bankrupt, and ideologically reactionary. Having roots in none of the
principal classes of society, it was utterly devoid of a social outlook.
Already during the Taiping Revolt, it had become evident that the
decayed monarchy was not the main obstacle to the historically
necessary revolution. The rise of modern China was no longer hindered
primarily by the native monarchy, but by foreign Imperialism. The
decisive battle for the freedom of the Chinese people had to be fought
out with the latter. The Boxer Uprising made this all-important lesson of
the Taiping Revolt still more evident. The bourgeoisie, however, failed
to learn the lesson even when it was written all across the country with
the blood of the masses. On the contrary, they took foreign Imperialism
for their friend. In their struggle against native reaction, they sought an
alliance with foreign Imperialism. That was an illusion. The result of that
illusion was the
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 217
tragedy of the Reform Movement and the abortion of the revolution of
1911. Being still less realistic than their big brothers, the petit-
bourgeoisie naively ran after a shadow, completely ignoring the vital
issues of the situation. They believed that the removal of the Manchus
would mean restoration of the Old Sage whose threadbare mantle of
morality, mended with a few stitches of modern political institutions,
would tolerably bedeck the withering body of China. The big bourgeoisie
wanted to borrow revolutionary ideas from the West- But they were
realistic enough to behold the danger of imperialist penetration. Even
such a highly conservative pioneer of the modern Chinese bourgeoisie as
Chang Chin-lung was opposed to the free admission of foreign capital.
Ever since the middle of the last century, the real enemy of the
developing revolution in China was not the effete native monarchy. That
place of power was occupied by foreign Imperialism. But the real
relation of forces was not understood by the superficial political
radicalism of the petit-bourgeoisie, devoid of a revolutionary social
orientation. In their quixotic fight against the shadow of the decayed
monarchy, the petit-bourgeoisie not only failed to see the real enemy, but
lovingly invited it as the saviour of China.
Sun Yat-sen and his followers had organised a movement with the
simple cry, "Down with the Manchus!". They had declared a war to the
knife against a sinister shadow, and were left in utter bewilderment as
soon as that phantom disappeared. The passing of the Manchus left them
without a definite object, without a clear perspective. The ugly realities
of the situation should have been noticed by them at that juncture. That
was the opportunity for Sun Yat-sen to formulate a programme of real
radicalism. But he was unable to do so. The old shadow was replaced by
a new reality. Yuan Shih-kai took the place of the Son of Heaven, and
again gave petit-bourgeois radicalism a futile political occupation. By the
grace of the arch-reactionary nominee of the passing Manchus, Sun Yat-
sen was relieved of the difficult task of leading a revolution as the head
of the Republic. He reverted to his favourite pastime-conspiracy with the
object of overthrowing something which he cannot substitute for the
better. There followed the dreary story of the abortive Second Revolution
and "Punish Yuan Expedition". The real power behind the monarchist
President of the Republic was foreign Imperialism. But Sun Yat -sen still
failed to appreciate the role of that sinister
218 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
power. While seeking to overthrow its protege, Sun Yat-sen was
extremely solicitous to be in the good books of foreign Imperialism, and
even proposed to reconstruct China with the aid of its worst enemy.
Having failed to evolve any radical social theory, to formulate a definite
political programme, and to lead the revolution when he was called upon
to do so, Sun Yat-sen gave free reins to his imagination. His only
coherent literary work was a book entitled "International Development of
China". It was a mechanical scheme of fantastic dimensions. Nothing
testifies more eloquently to his utter inability for grasping the problems
of China. The country was to be economically developed with the aid of
foreign capital! The implication of his scheme was to deliver the country,
body and soul, to the tender mercies of international Imperialism which,
for more than half a century, had plundered, pillaged and partitioned it.
Presumably, Sun Yat-sen did not know what he was talking about, so
staggering were the contradictions and fallacies of his scheme. If even
realised, it would unceremoniously bury the ghost of Father Confucius.
For, China would become a highly industrialised capitalist country, no
hot-house in which the withering plant of the patriarchal family could
possibly be preserved. Sun Yat-sen thirsted for the new wine of
Capitalism; but it must be put into the old bottle of the Confueian society
which he idealised. The result of that proposed operation could be easily
imagined. But the prolific schemer had no imagination.
Sun Yat-sen began his quarrel with the Manchus because they could not
defend the country against foreign aggression. Now he proposed to give
gratuitously to the foreigners incomparably much more than the
Manchus conceded under duress. That remarkable book was written
during the great imperialist world war. Its English rendering was
published as late as in 1921. He could not possibly have hatched that
suicidal scheme if his principles were older. The most important of his
principles is nationalism. It had a revolutionary significance, because it
implied and called for the overthrow of foreign Imperialism. Had he been
inspired only with the ideal of revolutionary nationalism, he could not
possibly produce the fantastic scheme of developing China with the aid
of foreign capital. The principle of nationalism and the scheme of Sun
Yat-sen were completely irreconcilable. But his petit-bourgeois
followers, who
Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 219
would canonise him as the Saint of modern China to be enshrined by the
side of the Old Sage, are equally incorrigible. In his very contradiction,
they find the greatness of their hero. Reluctant to admit that the bankrupt
petit-bourgeois political radicalism of Sun Yat-sen could play a
revolutionary role only when it came under the influence of the masses,
his uncritical admirers make themselves ridiculous by reversing the
sequence of historical events. They maintain that the Chinese Revolution
is a child of Sun Yat-sen; that but for him it would never have been. The
historical fact, however, is that the revolution would certainly never have
been, if Sun Yat-sen could kill it by his signal failure to lead it in the
earlier stages of his political career. A critical interpretation of the history
of the Chinese nationalist movement reveals the fact that Sun Yat-sen
became a half-hearted revolutionary when a quarter of a century of
failures forced him to turn to the masses and establish an alliance with
the working class. Under the pressure of the revolutionary masses, he
discarded, rather laid aside, some of his old reactionary ideas and made a
praiseworthy effort to come out of the dreary wilderness of illusion in
which he had wasted the best part of his life.
Before taking up the examination of the three principles, as formulated in
1924, some attention should be given to Sun Yat-sen's scheme for the
"international development of China". The basic idea was to promote a
rapid industrial development of the country with the aid of foreign
capital. For our present purpose it is not necessary here to discuss the
technical aspects of this scheme. It is the political implication of the
scheme which is of supreme importance for our purpose, and as such
deserves attention. It throws a flood of light upon the social significance
of Sun Yat-senism.
The book was written in 1918, expressedly with the object "to assist the
readjustment of post-bellum industries." The economic fabric of the
capitalist world had been shattered by the war. Sun Yat-sen proposed a
recipe which would cure the evils of the world. He cordially invited
world capitalism to exploit the untouched natural resources and the vast
labour power of China as the way out of the impasse. He proposed
extensive construction of railways, roads, harbour, power stations,
canals, iron and steel works, development of min es and agriculture,
reforestation of Central and North China and co lonisation of the desert
territories. That gigantic plan was
220 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
to be carried out not only by foreign capital, but under the supervision of
foreign experts. Either Sun Yat-sen did not understand what he was
talking about, or he was advocating the colonisation of his country by
international finance. The scheme was conceived evidently with no sense
of the realities. At that time, the Imperialist Powers, with the exception
of America, were not in a position to provide the vast amount of capital
necessary for the realisation of the scheme. Then, should the required
capital be available, and those possessing it be willing to invest it in
China, it would not be employed as Sun Yat-sen desired. He should have
known from the bitter experience of his own country that philanthropy
did not enter into the philosophy of Capitalism except as a means of
exploitation. By making that fantastic scheme, Sun Yat-sen once again
demonstrated his inability to understand the nature of Imperialism.
One must have been astoundingly naive to expect that international
finance, with powerful imperialist governments behind it, would
undertake to carry on a gigantic revolution in China under the command
of a fictitious native authority. The provision that the proposed industrial
development of China with foreign capital should take place under the
supervision of the government of the country was the only point which
distinguished the scheme from a deed of sale of the country to
international finance. But at that time, the Government of China was but
a fiction; therefore, the realisation of the scheme would mean
colonisation of the country.
The scheme represented an admission by the Chinese bourgeoisie of their
failure to carry through the social revolution, only out of which the
modern China of their dream could arise. The Manchus had disappeared.
But the feudal-patriarchal system of social relations had still to be
abolished. The bourgeoisie proved unequal to that revolutionary task.
The effort to set up a Republican State, while pre-capitalist social
conditions still remained in force, was bound to end in a fiasco. The
country was falling into ruins even more rapidly in the conditions of
chaos, anarchy and civil war that followed the fall of the Manchus.
Foreign Imperialism alone made profit out of that tragic situation, ft
tightened its grip on the economic life of the country thereby rendering
the task of its reconstruction more baffling. The native bourgeoisie stood
naked in their pathetic impotence. A section of them thrived on the
crumbs from the imperialist table, and looked hopelessly on the situation.
The less fortunate
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 221
among them tried to hide their imbecility in a pompous illusion. They
hoped, while there was absolutely no warrant for such hope, that foreign
Imperialism would do for them what they themselves had so signally
failed to do. They declared their readiness "to welcome the development
of our country's resources, provided that it can be kept out of Mandarin
corruption and ensure the mutual benefit of China and of the countries
co-operating with her."13 They had failed to fight the Mandarins
effectively. In alliance with Imperialism, the Mandarins had blocked all
progress during more than half a century. Now the heroes of an abortive
revolution appealed to foreign Imperialism to bestow upon China the
blessings of a bourgeois revolution.
Having failed disgracefully to create a modern democratic State, Sun
Yat-sen produced a fantastic scheme "for the consolidation of all the
national industries of China into one gigantic trust, owned by the Chinese
people and financed by international capital for the good of the world in
general and the Chinese people in particular."14 The all-important
question of political power was forgotten. How were the Chinese people
to exercise the ownership of the dreamland, when they did not possess a
central organ of power? The thorny question was begged. The petit-
bourgeoisie, with all their superficial political radicalism, did not have
the courage to attack the feudal-patriarchal reaction in order to create the
initial condition for the establishment of a democratic State and the
economic reconstruction of the country. Like unrepentant sinners, they
now proposed to sell the country to foreign Imperialism. The result of
Sun Yat-sen's scheme, if ever realised, could not be anything else. The
control of the Powers behind the international finance so cordially
invited would be a stern reality; on the other hand, in the absence of
effective political power, the ownership of the Chinese people could not
be anything but a fiction. "The International Development of China,"
desired by Sun Yat-sen, would unavoidably mean the victory of the
reality of absolute control by international finance over the fiction of
national ownership. It would mean complete colonisation of China. Yet
the followers of Sun Yat-sen interpreted the scheme as a plan to establish
Socialism in China with the help of international capital.15 That was an
amazing interpretation, ft was worse than illusion.
The scheme was submitted to the Versailles Peace Conference
accompanied by the naive suggestion that a half of the sum spent in a
222 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
day during the war be applied for its execution. It was further proposed
that "the war machinery, organisational skill and constructive forces of
the Western nations" could be profitably employed for modernising
China. The contemptuous treatment received by the Chinese delegation
at Versailles was a rude shock to Sun Yat-sen. He had pinned his faith on
Wilsonian idealism. He was painfully disillusioned about it. China got
absolutely nothing for having aided the crusade against the Kaiser. The
victorious Powers flatly refused to consider the suggestion that the
principles professed by them might possibly be applied to China. On the
contrary, still further encroachments were made upon her sovereignty by
the cession of the entire province of Shantung to Japan. Rude realities
mocked at the scheme of modernising China with the help of the
"democractic nations of the West." China must modernise herself; the
forces necessary for the purpose must grow out of her own social
organism. The defeat in the struggle with native reaction and the illusion
about the role of foreign Imperialism proved that the bourgeoisie were
not able to build a new China out of the ruins of the old. But the long
overdue bourgeois democratic revolution must be carried through even
on the default of the bourgeoisie.
When the politics of the bourgeoisie ended in a blind alley, and the
perspective before Chinese nation appeared to be hopeless, the sanguine
voice of the rising working class made itself heard. In December, 1918, a
professor of the Peking University, Chen Tu-hsiu began the publication
of the Weekly Review which heralded the rise of the proletariat to take
the place abdicated so helplessly by the bourgeoisie. The journal, edited
by a Marxist intellectual, soon became the focus of "the advanced
revolutionary opinion in the country."16 For years Chen Tu-hsiu had been
carrying on a single-handed struggle against the reactionary social
outlook of the nationalist bourgeoisie. He told the younger generation
that China must forget her Confucian tradition if she wanted to have a
clear vision of her future. For that heresy he had to leave his position in
the Peking University which was the source of spiritual inspiration for
the modern Chinese bourgeoisie. But he had acquired a great influence
upon the younger generation. He came to be the connecting link between
the radical petit-bourgeoisie and the new social force entering the
political field, namely, the working class. He boldly held up the light of
Marxism so that things could be seen in their proper
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 223
perspective. "During the period of agitation which followed China's
refusal to sign the Versailles Treaty, hundreds of periodicals modelled
after the one sheet of the Weekly Review were published by the students'
organisations in various provincial centres."17 The ideology of the
imminent bourgeois democratic revolution was at last crystallising under
the guidance of those inspired with the philosophy of Marxism. The
petit-bourgeoisie were at last finding their way towards the revolution
under the pressure of the rising proletariat.
The year 1919 marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the
Chinese revolution. The protest against the Versailles Treaty, first made
by the students of the Peking University, still under the influence of the
revolutionary propaganda of Chen Tu-hsiu, developed into a gigantic
mass movement spreading throughout the country. In that movement,
students were joined by the workers and the mighty echo of the Boxer
Uprising was heard in the thunderous cry: "Down with Imperialism!" At
last the revolution found the right way. Things were seen in their proper
places. China would become a modern nation not with the assistance and
under the guidance of international finance, but by liberating herself
from the tentacles of foreign Imperialism. That could be done only
through a revolutionary fight on two fronts. Side by side with foreign
Imperialism, its allies and instruments inside the country must also be
destroyed.
The heroism of the Taipings had not been in vain; the martyrdom of the
Boxers was not to be forgotten. After the miscarriage of the Reform
Movement and the abortion of the revolution of 1911, the Chinese people
came to their revolutionary heritage. The mass movement with anti-
imperialist slogans spread like wilde-fire throughout the country. It was
under the pressure of that new force that Sun Yat-sen formulated his
Three Principles as the programme of the Chinese National Revolution.
Fond hopes, entertained throughout his futile political career, so cruelly
shattered, Sun Yat-sen at last changed his views about Imperialism.
Pocketing quietly his fantastic scheme of modernising China with the aid
of international finance, he spoke bitterly about "the economic designs"
of foreign Powers against China, and he declared that "economic
oppression is more severe than Imperialism or political oppression."18
Still unable to understand correctly the nature and role of Imperialism, he
was, however, changing his attitute towards it In 1912 he had believed
that
224 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the "democratic nations of the West" sympathised with the Republican
movement in China. He held on to that ill-conceived and misplaced
belief until it became totally untenable. Finally, the logic of events
showed that a democratic mass movement alone could make a reality of
the Republic, and that popular force could not develop except as an anti-
imperialist movement.
In 1924 Sun Yat-sen delivered a series of lectures at Canton. On that
occasion, he formulated his Three Principles for the first time. He
maintained that in China the slogans of the classical bourgeois
revolution—liberty, equality and fraternity—should be replaced by
"Min-tsu, Min-chuan and Min-sheng." The English rendering of these
slogans of Sun Yat-sen is "People's Nationalism, People's Sovereignty
and People's Livelihood.'' So, contrary to the propagandist interpretation,
the Three People's Principles do not correspond with nationalism,
democracy and socialism, if these latter terms are to be understood in
their generally accepted meanings. The Three Principles represent Sun
Yat-sen's views on these latter subjects. In his book "San Min Chu-I" he
states what, according to him, is a nation, what true democratic
government, and how the welfare of the people can be best achieved. On
the first two subjects, his ideas are a mixture of certain features of
modern bourgeois democracy and the traditions of ancient China. The
result is self-contradictory theories which are essentially reactionary. On
the third subject, Sun Yat-sen does not have anything new to say. He
simply repeats the worn-out principles of bourgeois liberalism. Yet this
principle has been interpreted as Socialism!
By nationalism Sun Yat-sen meant unification of the country, including
Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan, under a strong centralised government.
And he was of the opinion that the modern Chinese nation should be
built on the basis of the still existing family and clan organisation. He
realised that militarism, extra-territorial rights enjoyed by the foreigners,
unequal treaties dictated by Imperialist Powers, and concessions given to
foreigners were obstacles to national unity. Therefore, his principle of
nationalism involved a struggle for the removal of those obstacles. Sun
Yat-sen considered two things to be essential for the salvation of the
Chinese people. The first was realisation of the danger of their position,
and the second was "consolidation of the deep-rooted sentiment
prevailing in the family and clan into a powerful national spirit." The
etymological meaning of
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 225
the Chinese term Min-tsu is not "People's Nationalism," but "People's
Clanisrn."
The second principle, "People's Sovereignty", begins with a criticism of
political democracy as obtaining in the capitalist countries of the West
and also of the philosophical radicalism of the bourgeoisie. According to
Sun Yat-sen, genuine democracy, particularly applicable to China, was to
be found in the political doctrines of Confucius. China should not blindly
imitate the West. Science and technique she must learn from the latter;
but as regards politics, she should take only as much as could be fitted
into her ancient traditions. He maintained that the doctrine of popular
sovereignty was not a new thing in China: the Confucian State had
always been based on a democratic principle. The most important
question was, how could the people exercise the sovereign right? Sun
Yat-sen's reply to this question was a plan of an elaborate machinery of
government, en the model of that existing in ancient China. The function
of the machinery was to educate the people. The government was to be
conducted by experts. It should have five departments—legislative,
executive, judicial, examining and censorial. The old system of
examination was meant to place the State machinery under the monopoly
of the Confucian literati. It had been abolished by the reformist Emperor
Kwang Hsue. According to Sun Yat-sen's scheme of a new government,
it should be revived.
The "genuine democracy" of the neo-Confucian State would not mean
immediate application of the principle of people's sovereignty. The
advance towards that direction should be by stages. In the beginning,
there will be the period of unification of the country by military action.
The first principle of nationalism should be realised as the condition for
the establishment of the people's sovereignty. That, however, should not
take place even after the unification of the country. There will follow the
period of tutelage in which the people will be educated about their
political rights and duties. That will be a period of paternal dictatorship
of the experts. Finally, political power will be transferred to the people.
Since no limit is set to the preparatory period of tutelage, the fitness of
the people to assume sovereignty will presumably be judged by the
experts of the paternal dictatorship. Consequently, the principle of
people's sovereignty is liable to remain an ideal never to be attained in
practice.
Just as the second principle implies the rejection of political
226 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
democracy, the third principle—People's Livelihood-is meant rather to
be a criticism of Socialism than a positive formula of social
reconstruction. In elaborating his views concerning the third principle,
Sun Yat-sen differed from Marx on the question of class struggle, and
asserted that it could be avoided in China. The assertion was supported
by an argument which is altogether irrelevant in a criticism of the
Marxian theory. Sun Yat-sen maintained that the fundamental problem of
social reconstruction in China was not distribution but production. The
argument is irrelevant because, in Marxian economics, distribution is not
regarded as independent of production. Production is the fundamental
problem of economics. However, Sun Yat-sen held that in China
capitalist methods of production should be introduced in order to quicken
the economic development of the country; but he maintained that class
struggle could be avoided by placing heavy industries under the control
of the State. On the agrarian question, equal distribution of land should
be realised through "the nationalisation of the increase of land values".
The cryptic formula is nowhere elaborated. Taken on its face value, it
only echoes the antiquated theory of the nineteenth century land
reformers. Quite clearly, the third principle of Sun Yat-sen does not
propose the abolition of private property in land. Therefore it is
altogether unwarranted to read Socialism in it. As a matter of fact, while
elaborating his alternative scheme of social reconstruction, Sun Yat-sen
categorically ruled out Communism as not applicable to China. That was
in 1924.
Inasmuch as any serious blow to Imperialism will hasten the downfall of
capitalism, the nationalist movement in a semi-colonial country like
China is intimately connected with the struggle for Socialism.
Notwithstanding that objectively revolutionary significance of the
movement headed by Sun Yat-sen, all his principles represented a
decidedly reactionary social outlook. The reconstruction of China into a
modern nation being a revolutionary task, it could not be accomplished
without destroying all the factors, foreign as well as native, hindering
such reconstruction. But even when he came to realise the necessity for
the struggle against foreign Imperialism, Sun Yat-sen still remained
under the influence of Chinese traditions and therefore incapable of
organising an effective fight against the social forces of native reaction.
Politically, it was a great progress when at last he came to realise
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 227
that a modern free Chinese nation could not come into existence with the
sympathy, sanction and support of foreign Imperialism. His social views,
however, did not undergo a corresponding change. The programme of
fight against militarism was conceived with as little understanding of its
social character as was the case with the previous movement for the
overthrow of the Manchus. Militarism was nothing but the ugly ghost of
the Manchu monarchy. That bloody pest was bred in the pool of social
stagnation which constituted the basis of the Manchu monarchy. Until
that disease disappeared, the ugly symptom of militarism could not be
possibly cured. Therefore, the programme of fight against militarism was
bound to miscarry. The country could not be unified through a military
dictatorship. It would be easy enough to set up a military dictatorship
with nationalist pretensions: but the desired unification of the country
would not happen. So long as social institutions providing a basis for the
reactionary forces of disruption were not wiped out, centralisation of the
country would remain a dream. On the oher hand, the existence and
operation of those forces would be helpful to imperialist designs. The
blow had to be dealt at the root of all evils. That was not intended by Sun
Yat-sen.
His modern nation was to be reared precisely on those very social
organisations which had hindered the growth of national unity, and
whose decayed existence infected the whole body politic of the country.
The signal failure of the Nanking Government, even with the discrediting
patronage of imperialist Powers, to unify the country is the most
damaging verdict against the principle of nationalism as propounded by
Sun Yat-sen. One set of militarists has been eliminated; but a new set has
come into existence in course of the process of eliminating the old. The
monstrous hydra cannot be slain unless the blow is dealt at the source of
its strength.
The modern nation is a comparatively new thing. Political nationhood is
the specific feature of certain stage of social evolution. Only a country
with a centralised State can be the home of a modern nation. Many
factors go into the making of a nation. Unity of race, religion and
language is a favourable condition : but it is not essential, The essential
condition is economic unity. Development in that direction is an
irresistible factor contributing to the growth of a people into a modern
nation. A centralised modern national State is created mainly by the
necessity of capitalist production and distribution. In the pre-capitalist
mediaeval and antique ages, masses
228 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of people were coalesced into political units, often very large. Those
political organisations, however, were not national entities. They were
Empires or Kingdoms. The difference between the imperial or
monarchical States of the past and the modern national State lies in their
respective social foundations. The former were based upon feudal
relations—absolute subordination of the toiling masses to the landlords,
and the allegiance of the latter to the Emperor or the King. The latter is
the political superstructure of the capitalist social relation, the basic
principle of which is the freedom of labour. Therefore, the rise of a
modern national State pre-supposes not only the overthrow of mediaeval
Empires or Kingdoms, but also the destruction of social relations on
which the latter were based. The individual is the basic unit of the
structure of the modem national State. The mediaeval Empires, on the
contrary, were built upon the pillars of patriarchal clan-chiefs or feudal
nobility. A modern nation is composed of individuals. But Sun Vat-sen's
principle of nationalism does not admit of individualism. Therefore, it is
reactionary.
Sun Yat- sen began with the admission that "in China, there have been
family-ism and clanism, but no real nationalism."19 He further admits
that "the unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and
has not extended to the nation."20 But he considered those unfortunate
phenomena to be the peculiar features of China, and proposed to build
the future of the country precisely on the basis of what has been its
misfortune in the past.
Family groups and clan organisations are not the peculiar features of
China. Representing a certain stage of social evolution, they existed, in
superficially varied forms, in every country, and were disruoted in
consequence of the growth of newer instruments and higher modes of
production. Family groups and clan organisations flourish in the
backward conditions of production which are conducive to a self-
sufficient local economy. Effective political centralisation is not possible
under those conditions. Therefore, the existence of family groups and
clan organisations, however useful they might have been in the past, is
not compatible with the creation of a modern nation. Under the backward
conditions of production, characterised by the existence of self-sufficient
local economic units, extensive territories could be brought under an
Emperor or a King receiving tributes from subsidiaries who were
practically independent
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 229
in their respective domains. But an organic unity was not there. It was
not possible. Political centralisation can take place only to meet the
necessity of economic centralisation. The unification of a people into a
modern nation, therefore, pre-supposes the disappearance of self-
sufficient local economy and consequently of the social relations on
which the latter is based.
But Sun Yat-sen proposed to develop nationalism out of the worthy
sentiment of clanism. He did not mean that a modern Chinese nation
should rise out of the ruins of the decayed clan-organisation of society.
His proposition flagrantly contradicted the facts of the situation he had
himself recognised. He fallaciously came to the conclusion that, "if the
worthy clan sentiments could be expanded, we might develop
nationalism out of clanism." It is an entirely different question whether
the clan sentiment is worthy or not. The relevant question, however, is:
Can the sentiment be expanded undar the present conditions of the
country? If the answer is in the affirmative, then it is admitted that the
conditions for a modern national State are not yet ripe in China. The
situation, however, is not so unfortunate. The rise of the bourgeoisie with
the object of overthrowing the Manchu monarchy, based upon the family
and clan system, proved that Sun Yat-sen's proposition was reactionary,
because it did not correspond with the objective requirements of the
situation.
Whatever might have been his subjective inclination, Sun Yat-sen's
whole life nevertheless was a negation of his principle of nationalism.
The strivings for the creation of a modern national State began in the
closing decades of the nineteenth century. They represented a challenge
to the family and clan system. If "familyism and clanism" had in the past
prevented the rise of real nationalism, as Sun Yat-sen himself admits,
they cannot possibly serve as the basis for a modern national State. The
peculiar feature of China was that those antiquated social institutions
survived there much longer than in other civilised countries. Instead of
accepting them simply as immutable special features, one should try to
explain those peculiar phenomena. Why did the unity of the Chinese
people stop short at clanism? Are the Chinese people constitutionally
unfit to develop into a modern nation? If this imperialist contention is
admitted, then the Chinese nationalism movement has no reason to exist;
and Sun Yat-sen's whole life was a mistake. Neither the followers of
230 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Sun Yat-sen nor his critics would allow that conclusion. Therefore, the
latter must reject the fallacious proposition of Sun Yat-sen, even if the
former won't. The family and clan system persisted in China longer than
in other countries because of the very slow development of social forces
destined to disrupt it, and create the conditions for modern nationhood.
The slow growth of revolutionary social forces was due to the backward
conditions of production.
The rise of a nation is a very long process. Beginning historically at the
disruption of primitive communism, it culminated in the victory of the
bourgeois revolution. The duration of the process depends primarily
upon the natural conditions of the country in which it takes place. In the
second place, it is influenced, quickened or retarded, by the operation of
extraneous factors. In China, it was very long and laborious. In the
beginning, it was hindered by the defective conditions of production;
later on it was violently obstructed by foreign intervention. But
eventually, the forces making for the creation of a modern Chinese
nation acquired sufficient strength to begin the struggle for freeing
themselves from all impediments, internal and external. The cry "Down
with the Manchus!" was the signal for that historic struggle. That cry was
raised for the first time not by Sun Yat-sen, but by the Taipings half a
century before his time. The objective significance of that cry was an
attack upon the social institutions and cultural traditions which Sun Yat-
sen proposed to preserve as the foundation of a modern Chinese national
State. That was the basic contradiction of all his principles. A critical
study of the history of his own country, in the light of the knowledge of
social science, would have disclosed to him the fact that the continued
existence of family and clan system had precluded the rise of a modern
national State in China; he would have realised that the latter could not
come into existence without destroying the former. Owing to his failure
to understand the laws of social dynamics, Sun Yat-sen's political
struggle against the monarchy ended in a fiasco. The fall of the Manchus
was caused by the irreparable decay of their social foundation. It was the
pre-capitalist mode of production, embodied in the family and clan
system. A modern national State could be established in the place of the
vanished mediaeval Empire only by the boldness of clearing away its
debris. The betrayal of the Republic in 1912 showed that the bourgeoisie
lacked that boldness. Even in 1924, Sun Yat-sen was
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 231
not able to learn from his defeat as the Provisional President of the
Republic. His principle of nationalism, formulated in that year, still
lacked the revolutionary social outlook, the absence of which prevented
him from acting boldly in the fateful days of 1912.
The movement for overthrowing the Manchus with the object of building
a modern Chinese national State on the very social foundation of that
mediaeval monarchy could not but end in a blind-alley. Though foreign
in origin, the Manchus had not introduced anything new in the country
they conquered. They simply placed themselves at the apex of the
Chinese social pyramid whose internal structure remained as before.
They had completely adopted the Chinese culture. The relations of
society and the organisation of State under the Manchus were fully in
accord with the doctrines of Confucius. Like the previous native
dynasties, they also worshipped Confucius as the Patron-Saint.
Therefore, to overthrow the Manchus and spare Confucianism, was an
impossibility One must go with the other. Sun Yat-sen's principle was to
smuggle in by the backdoor what was thrown out of the front. An
admirer of the cultural and social foundation of the fallen monarchy, he
could only be a very bad Republican. His Republicanism lacked a
revolutionary social outlook not only in 1912, when he cut such a sorry
figure as the head of the Provisional Government; even in 1924 he
proposed to unite China under a Confucian patriarchal State.
The contradictions of Sun Yat-sen's ideology reflected the class struggle
raging in the country. He represented the strivings of the bourgeoisie
when he advocated overthrow of the Manchus, made plans for a rapid
industrialisation of the country, and proposed the establishment of a
centralised State. But at the same time, his desire to reconstruct decayed
social institutions and retain reactionary cultural traditions represented
the frantic resistance of a dying social order to the verdict of death
pronounced by history. Owing to the weakness of the bourgeoisie, the
class struggle, as reflected in the ideology of Sun Yat-sen, was bound to
be indecisive. They wanted something, but did not have the strength and
the courage to lead the struggle for conquering what they wanted.
Indeed, it is in the nature of the bourgeoisie to be afraid of the great
revolutionary change demanded by their own interest. Never in history
have they taken the initiative in carrying through a revolution. It is also
characteristic of the bourgeoisie to hark back to an
232 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
imaginary Golden Age when they are engaged in the creation of
something which has never existed before.21 But Sun Yat-sen's homage
to the worn-out doctrines of Confucius, and glorification of the Golden
Age of the Hans and Sungs, cannot be justified on the ground that he
sought the semblance of the unknown new in the fam iliar pictures of the
old. The result of a bourgeois revolution was no longer a terra incognita.
The kingdom of capitalist heaven had been realised in other countries.
The Chinese bourgeoisie were not required to explore unknown grounds.
Yet, they held on frantically to the sheet-anchor of past traditions,
because they were terror-stricken by the rise of the revolutionary
working class.
In the beginning of their struggle against the monarchy, the bourgeoisie,
as represented by Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chih-chao, showed distinctly
revolutionary social tendencies. Later, they made a feeble attempt to set
up a Republican State on the principles of modern democracy. It was
after the working class had appeared on the political scene as a
dominating factor of the revolutionary movement, that the bourgeoisie
definitely turned their eyes to past traditions, obviously with the object of
finding some possible guarantee against the dreaded future pregnant with
fearful potentialities. They would welcome the advantageous results of a
democratic revolution, if it was somehow accomplished. But the result of
the revolutionary movement in contemporary China could not be expec-
ted to be analogous to those of the classical bourgeois revolution. The
bourgeoisie wanted the revolution, but were afraid that it might go
farther than they desired. Hence their terror about the possibilities of the
movement they pretended to lead.
It is not an accident that Sun Yat-sen's programme of national
reconstruction rejected the philosophical principles of bourgeois
democracy, while providing for the capitalist development of the
country. His principle of nationalism was the ominous shadow of
Fascism, cast ahead. In the period of proletarian revolution, nationalism
tends to lose its historically revolutionary significance, and become an
instrument of reaction. Sun Yat-sen's principles anticipated the
development of Chinese nationalism. It created the platform on which a
counter-revolutionary alliance could be formed by the treacherous
weakling of the bourgeoisie and the feudal-patriarchal reaction. The
bourgeoisie failed to carry on the revolution; but when the working class
came forward to take up the historically
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 233
necessary task which they had so disgracefully failed to accomplish, they
went over to the camp of counter-revolution.
The revolutionary anti-imperialist role of the Chinese nationalist
movement has been very largely counter-acted by the essentially
reactionary principle of Sun Yat-sen. Acting on that principle, the Kuo
Min Tang subsequently abandoned the struggle against Imperialism in
order to wreak fierce vengeance upon the working class which stood
loyally by the National Democratic Revolution. But even apart from its
relation to the revolutionary masses, Sun Yat-sen's principle of
nationalism was reactionary because it would preserve patriarchal social
relations at the cost of the individual; it would revive the Confucian
codes of morality, sanctifying precapitalist exploitation; it would rear the
National State on the subordination of the son to the father, and of the
family to the clan. It was not even bourgeois nationalism, because it went
against the interests of the bourgeoisie themselves. On such a social
basis, it is not possible to build a modern National State which would
create legal conditions for a free capitalist development. One who
believes, as Sun Yat-sen did, that "China's Government in the past was
based on justice and humane relatiots",82 can never have a revolutionary
outlook on the future.
With the belief that the patriarchal family was the model social
institution, and his hostility to individualism, Sun Yat-sen could not
possibly be a democrat. He was not. His principle of People's
Sovereignty is simply a glorification of the Confucian benevolent
despotism. Believing that the Confucian philosophy of State was the
highest pitch of political wisdom ever reached by man, Sun Yat-sen laid
down that, for the foundation of a genuine democracy, it was not only
necessary "to secure for the people a complete system of political rights,
but also to embody in the machinery of government the principle of
intellectual leadership."23 In his philosophy of ideal democracy, liberty
and equality are but secondary things. The sovereign right of the people,
abstractly conceded, should be hemmed in by the executive power vested
in an aristocracy of intellectuals. The ardent propagandists of this
philosophy of paternalism unwittingly indicate what would be its
pernicious effect: the eternal wisdom of the immortal Confucius
endowed upon the Chinese people the bliss of "genuine democracy";
modern China should not be deprived of that blissful heritage. In the
blissful "genuine democracy" of the dark middle-ages, the Chinese
people
234 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
were so free that in their language there does not exist a word expressing
the idea of liberty, which "has no meaning for the Chinese people".24 The
usual Chinese expression for liberty means "running wild without
bridle".25 No commentary on the real nature of the Confucian social
codes and political philosophy could be more damaging. The ugly urchin
of liberty has no place in the ideal China of Confucius, so very crowded
with the imposing figures of loyalty, filial devotion, kindness, love,
faithfulness, justice, harmony and peace. And the sage of modern China
interprets People's Sovereignty as the duty of paying homage to these
traditional deities. Liberty, of course, is incompatible with such a
conception of people's sovereignty. Improving upon the master, a
disciple of Sun Yat-sen writes : "What the Chinese people really need is,
not to fight for more personal freedom, which has no meaning in the
minds of the common people, but to sacrifice some of their personal
freedom, in order to gain freedom for the nation".28 The common people
of China are accustomed to slavery; they have no conception of liberty.
Let us be grateful to father Confucius for having laid the foundation of
this moral civilisation! The prophets of modern China do not propose to
change this deplorable state of affairs. On the contrary, they believe that
China will be a happy country, if her people can be sunk farther down in
the depths of ignorance, and the deprived of the semblance of freedom
that might have accrued to them without their knowing it.
The idea of liberty is naturally foreign to a social system which makes no
room for the individual. Democracy is not to be dreamt in a political
philosophy which proposes to build a modern nation on the foundation of
the patriarchal family. Therefore, Sun Yat-sen's principle of people's
sovereignty does not imply freedom of the individual. He and his
disciples all along stoutly criticised the conception of personal freedom
as a "Western innovation", not acceptable to China. According to them, it
is not the individual, but the head of the family, who has to be reckoned
as the unit of the socio-political fabric of modern China. The individual
should be subordinated to the head of the family; the relation between the
two should be governed by the codes of conduct formulated nearly three
thousand years ago. Observation of the moral codes laid down by
Confucius and Mencius reduces the individual to a slave. A nation built
upon the foundation of patriarchal families is, therefore, like a
corporation
 Sim Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 235
of slave-holders. Sun Yat-sen's neo-Confucian State is meant to be such a
corporation. He thought "that in the relation between the citizens in
China and their State, there must first be family loyalty, then clan loyalty
and finally national loyalty".37 He failed to see that a social system thus
graded into stereotyped categories could not possibly serve as the basis
of modern political nationhood. Such a system was the background of
mediaeval autocratic States.
The Republicanism of the Chinese bourgeoisie was wrecked on the rock
of this reactionary conception of social relations. They were still wedded
to social relations which constituted the foundation of the monarchist
State; therefore, they could set up a shadow republic only to betray it.
The Republican State is the political expression of a social system having
the individual for its basic unit. Individualism is not the specific feature
of any particular geographical area. No social institution or theory is
Individualism was the philosophy of the rising bourgeoisie. Its object
was to free human labour from uneconomic exploitation. Should the
Chinese bourgeoisie overthrow the monarchy, resist imperialist
domination and capture political power through the creation of a
centralised State, they must scrap the patriarchal family for
individualism. Confucianism is the philosophy of a class which stands in
the way of everything the bourgeoisie strive for, whereas individualism
is the philosophy of the bourgeoisie. The marked hostility to
individualism shows that the principles of Sun Yat-sen were far from
being even the ideology of a bourgeois revolution.
The negation of individual liberty logically leads one to question the
theory of legal equality—another ideological canon of the bourgeois
revolution. Sun Yat-sen disagreed with the doctrine of "natural right".
But he was not inspired by a more revolutionary outlook. He disagreed
with that fundamental principle of bourgeois revolution from a
reactionary standpoint. He contested the doctrine of legal equality on the
ground that inequality was the natural condition: it could not be removed.
Equality was not possible. The only thing possible to do would be to take
off the edge of natural inequality by benevolence on the part of the
superior and loyalty on the part of the inferior. Refuting Rousseau's
theory that equality is the gift of nature, Sun Yat-sen maintained that the
contrary was the fact: that human beings are unequally endowed by
nature. He divided them into bad, stupid, common-place, talented, wise
and the prophetic. Oa the authority of the ancient sages, he asserted that
the latter
236 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
categories must rule over the former. According to him, social conditions
produced by such a regulation of human relations are the ideal. The basic
principle of the government of modern China, as planned by Sun Yat-
sen, was laid down by Mencius over two thousand years ago. It is:
"Those who labour with the mind are the rulers, and those who labour
with the body are the ruled."28 Of course, just on the point of assuming
the leadership of a mass upheaval, Sun Yat-sen could not refer to the
outspoken doctrine of class domination He sought out from the
repository of ancient wisdom ambiguous metaphysical passages for his
text. But the teachings of the old sages which, according to him, laid the
basis of ideal democracy, could all be boiled down to the dictum of
Mencius formulated with a bold directness. People's sovereignty is a
metaphysical conception. It becomes completely non-existent when
individual liberty and legal equality are given no place in a political
philosophy. In that case, its practical expression is no longer
representative government. The sovereignty belongs to the people; but
they are not able to exercise it. Therefore, the task of administering
public affairs should be entrusted to a special class of people. The
transfer of power does not take place from the bottom—through the
election of a parliament in which the sovereignty of the people is vested,
and under whose control an executive administers public affairs. With
Sun Yat-sen, the process is reverse. A certain privileged class, "those
who labour with the mind", assumes this trust, as it were, by the grace of
God. It undertakes the mission of educating the people. There is no
democracy in such a system of government. It is benevolent despotism. It
gives preference to hypothetical "good government" at the cost of self-
government.
Sun Yat-sen was of the opinion that "the foundation of the government
of a nation must be based upon the rights of the people, but the
administration of the governmental machinery ought to be entrusted to
experts".29 It is not stipulated that the experts should work under the
control of, and be constantly responsible to, some superior organ
embodying popular sovereignty. That would be a very near approach to
bourgeois democracy. Sun Yat-sen demanded that the experts should be
given a free hand, and maintained that only on that condition could the
government of a country be "efficient and harmless". It is as likely as not
that such a dictatorship of the chosen elite would be efficient. But it
Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 237
is a bold assertion to make that it would be harmless.
The dictatorship of the elite, not chosen, but self-appointed, will be
supported by an exceeding cumbersome bureaucracy, hardly to be
distinguished from that of the old regime. Sun Yat-sen's "Five-Power
Constitution" is supposed to be a great improvement upon the
"uncontrolled democracy" of the West. But it makes no provision for the
exercise of popular sovereignty. It is a mechanical plan of distributing
power inside the ruling clique. The legislative, judicial, executive,
examining and censorial branches are not so many organs of the State.
They are mere departments of the government. A monstrous bureaucratic
machinery is to be set up for the mutual control of the members of the
ruling clique. Such a structure is appropriate to a State which
incorporates powerful factors of decentralism. Such a top-heavy
machinery is needed when some sort of a central authority has got to be
created in the midst of conflicting forces. In other wards, it is the
structure of a feudal State. Having no organic connection with the
people, drawing its authority from nowhere, responsible to none, the
five-barrel government of Sun Yat-sen is autocratic in Constitution,
dictatorial in outlook and impotent in practice. This has been proved by
the fiasco of the Nanking Government, where the nationalist bourgeoisie
endeavoured to set up an administrative machinery on the lines laid
down by Sun Yat-sen.
The essence of the first two principles of Sun Yat-sen is class
domination. But he did not advocate that the bourgeoisie should replace
the feudal-patriarchal aristocracy as the ruling class. That would be a
revolutionary proposition. His was the ideology of an alliance for the
perpetuation of the class domination. Unable to create a new social order,
afraid of revolution, the Chinese bourgeoisie sought to make a
compromise with feudal-patriarchal reaction. Sun Yat-sen was the
ideologist of the compromise. As such, he can be compared with
Confucius who also was a philosopher of compromise. The difference is
that Confucius produced original thoughts, whereas his distant progeny
dished out undigested ideas borrowed from others. That was a petit-
bourgeois characteristic. The outlook of the petit-bourgeoisie was
clouded and confused because they were not the possessor of the modern
means of production which would eventually destroy pre-capitalist social
relations. The big bourgeoisie, concentrated in the industrial centres like
Shanghai, had no patience
238 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
for Sun Yat-sen's reactionary extravagances. They would completely
wipe out all old traditions. If they did not make any serious attempt, that
was not because of any love for old ideas and antiquated institutions. The
fear of revolution stayed their hand. Not having the strength to
accomplish the task by themselves, they also Jacked the courage to seek
an alliance with the revolutionary masses for the purpose. But they did
not idealise the dead past; they only waited for it to be cleared away.
The third principle of Sun Yat-sen has been subjected to the most
amazing interpretation. A mere glance over his lectures on "People's
Livelihood" would be enough to absolve him of the least deviation
towards socialism. How could one not believing even in democracy, ever
be a Socialist? Sun Yat-sen was not a Socialist, and he made it very
clear. His role and the social significance of his views, however, are to be
judged not by his criticism of the Marxian theory, but by his
disagreement with the fundamental principles of the bourgeois
revolution. Faithful to his class, he naturally opposed the theory of the
proletarian revolution. But at the same time he failed to serve his own
class when he asked modern China to remain wedded to Confucian
traditions and reject the doctrines of the philosophers of the bourgeois
revolution. Criticism of the doctrines of Rousseau, for example, is
revolutionary when it leads to an agreement with Marx. Otherwise, it is
reactionary. But Sun Yat-sen did not criticise the doctrines of the
philosophers of the bourgeois , revolution with a greater revolutionary
spirit. He could not possibly agree with Marx, because his ideas and
social outlook were even more backward than those of the early pioneers
of the bourgeois revolution. Sun Yat-sen should be judged by his failure
to advocate a bourgeois revolution.
His third principle should be examined not to ascertain whether he was a
Socialist or not; the object of examination should be to find out if his
doctrine of "People's Livelihood" implied any radical change in the
established feudal-partiarchal relations of property. Taking his cue from
the bourgeois liberals of other countries, Sun Yat-sen laid-down
elaborate plans for composing the antagonism between capital and
labour. But he failed to face other problems of the Chinese Revolution.
He could not possibly solve the question of the livelihood of the Chinese
people without finding a way to free the basic industry of the country
from pre-capitalist forms of exploitation.
 Sun Yat-Sen and his Three Principles 239
He did talk vaguely of "the equal distribution of land". But here again, he
started from the old paternalist point of view. He did not advocate
abolition of feudal rights and transfer of the ownership of land to be
cultivator. He only proposed nationalisation of land value as the way to
effect the equal distribution of land."30 That ambiguous programme was
liable to elastic interpretations. When a few years later the agrarian
problem became acute, the peasants began to take possession of the land,
the followers of Sun Yat-sen, acting on his authority, declared war upon
them. Sun Yat-sen's principle evidently did not imply transfer of the
proprietorship of land from the parasitic owner to the toiling peasant. He
was opposed to the basic task of the bourgeois revolution. He could not
be otherwise; for, in that case, his theory of nationalism and his
conception of State organisation would be all upset. He glorified the past
because he was opposed to the revolution which alone could throw the
doors of future development open before the Chinese people.
Distribution of land, in the sense of transferring the ownership to the
peasantry, would mean the disruption of the family and clan organisation
which were to be preserved as the foundation for the Non-Confucian
Chinese National State. Such a change of property relations would
replace the family by the individual as the basic unit of society. The
conditions for the rise of the democratic State would be created. Sun Yat-
sen was opposed to such a revolutionary reconstruction of society.
By "equal distribution of land", he obviously meant reversion to the old
tribal system under which the King as the absolute owner distributed the
land to be collectively cultivated by family groups. His five-barrel
government, feudal in outlook and democratic not even in formal
Constitution, would take the place of the monarch as the modern pater
familias. It would inherit the right of the feudal King, and by virtue of its
being composed of "experts" of the governing class, would administer
national property. Since the basis of the nation, and its "genuinely
democratic Government", would still be the patriarchal family,
individual ownership of land could not be legalised. The legal admission
of the individual's right to own land would eliminate the family as the
unit of the socio-political structure of the country. Therefore, the equal
distribution of land, advocated by Sun Yat-sen could not go to the extent
of transferring ownership to the peasant. He suggested "nationalisation of
the increase of land
240 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
value" to hinder concentration of land in large estates. That is also an old
story. The patriarchal monarchs of China constantly struggled throughout
the ages against the aggrandisement of the feudal lords.
While holding fast on to the sheet-anchor of the feudal-patriarchal social
relations, Sun Yat-sen nevertheless cast wistful glances on the
possibilities of the capitalist development of China. Indeed, the essence
of his policy was not to abandon the old hulk, which was still afloat,
though precariously, until the new vessel was steady on the stormy sea.
But the successful march of Capitalism, coveted by him in his heart of
hearts, was conditional upon the ruthless destruction of traditional values
and institutions he nevertheless idealised. After all, the underlying
motive was the hankering for the flesh-pot. But he shrunk before rude
realities. He had fantastic ideas about the capitalist development of the
country. That again was a petit-bourgeois characteristic,—to count
chickens before the eggs are hatched. His ideal was Henry Ford whose
achievements, in his opinion, refuted the theory of Karl Marx. His plan
of developing modern industries under State ownership or Government
control has been dubbed State Socialism. In that way, he proposed to
endow upon China all the benefits of Capitalism free from its evils. But
the result of State ownership is determined by the class character of the
State. Sun Yat-f en's neo-Confucian State being free from all effective
popular control, industries owned by it could not have the slightest
socialist character. He frankly said that China's problem was rather of
creation than of the distribution of wealth. Collective production can be
independent of democratic distribution only when the means of
production are not collectively owned. The "State Socialism" of Sun Yat-
sen presumably did not include such ownership. Otherwise, he could not
separate the production from distribution.
Discarding the revolutionary aspects of the bourgeois ideology, Sun Yat-
sen joyfully adopted its reactionary implication. He criticised the
revolutionary doctrines of Rousseau, but was in love with the reformism
of Bertrand Russell. He was not against Capitalism, he simply wanted to
reform it. He proposed to do so in China as has been done in the West
through social and industrial legislation, State ownership of public
utilities, income tax and co-operative societies.31 That was Sun Yat-sen's
"State Socialism", the introduction
 Sun Yat-sen and his Three Principles 241
of which would confer upon his country only the blessings of
Capitalism.
The brief analysis of the main features of Sun Yat-sen's "Three
Principles" shows that the sombre ghost of the ancient sage, who
lived in the period of the dissolution of a primitive civilisation, still
hovers over the accursed head of the modern China of the nationalist
bourgeoisie. It shows how utterly unable have the bourgeoisie been to
face and solve the problems growing out of the dismal background of
a stagnant civilisation, and subsequently getting extremely compli-
cated in consequence of foreign intervention. It explains why the
bourgeoisie had tragically failed to free the Chinese society from the
fetters of feudal-patriarchal relations, and reconstruct it on the basis of
the capitalist mode of production. It enables one to understand the
"Chinese puzzle", and makes it clear that only the approach from the
point of view of the toiling masses can lead to its ultimate solution. In
short, this analysis opens up the real perspective of the present
situation in China.
A class, destined to lead a revolution in a particular period of history,
produces a revolutionary socio-political theory as the token of its
fitness for the role conferred upon it. Threatening the disruption of the
established social order, the rise and development of the new class
take place under the banner of a new revolutionary ideology. | In
order to destroy the old, it becomes objectively necessary to challenge
the morality of its reason to exist. The principles of Sun Yat-sen did
not represent such a challenge to the old order. Inasmuch as these
principles are professed by the Chinese bourgeoisie, and are the
gospel of nationalism, that class and their political movement cannot
be expected to play a revolutionary role. They have failed to produce
a revolutionary social theory, because of their inability to lead a social
revolution. As a matter of fact, it is not necessary for them to
originate revolutionary ideas. That task has been accomplished for the
entire world by the bourgeoisie when they played a revolutionary role
in other parts of the world. If the Chinese bourgeoisie were destined
to be a revolutionary factor, they would have appropriated the
common heritage of revolutionary ideas which then would have
inspired nationalism to become a liberating force.
The principles of Sun Yat-sen are not subversive. They are highly
conservative. They do not represent the ideology of a revolutionary
class on the offensive. They are the ideology of a class on the
242 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
defensive. Sun Yat-sen had not occupied himself seriously with social
problems until the modern working class appeared on the political scene
of China. When he ultimately turned his attention to those problems, he
perceived the ominous clouds of revolution gathering on the horizon.
With that potential danger staring him in the face, his concern was to
save the established social order. With that purpose he expounded
fallacious theories of a deceptive reformism.
Notes
1. Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China".
2. Wang Chin-wei, who was chosen by Sun Yat-sen as his successor to the
leadership of the Kuo Min Tang and Chairmanship of the Nationalist Government, is
living abroad (in 1930), (He later became head of the Japanese puppet government in
the north and died recently.)
3. Lineberger, Paul : "Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic".
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China".
8. MacNair, "Modern Chinese History".
9. The Taipings were so-called because they wore long hair as sign of asceticism.
10. Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China".
11. In this connection. Sun Yat-sen was of the following opinion : "After the
overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of the Republic, on the territories
populated by the five races (the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tatars and Tibetans),
many reactionary and religious tendencies manifested themselves. Here is the root of
those evils. These people do not possess enough power of self-defense; they must be
united with the Chinese . under one centralised State. If the four hundred million
inhabitants of China cannot as yet be united in one nation, under one State, that is
her misfortune, and at the same time proves that we have not yet been able to realise
the first principle and, therefore, must struggle still farther. We must create one
united Chinese Republic so that the five races would constitute a united powerful
nation. As an object lesson, I can refer to the United States of America which is a
powerful aggregate, although it is composed of different nationalities. Such a
nationalism is possible, and we must strive for it."—"Memoirs of a Chinese
Revolutionary".
 Sun Yat-sen and his Three Principles 243
12. Proclamation of the First Provisional President of the Republic of China, January
2, 1912.
13. Sun Yat-sen, "The International Development of China".
14. Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China".
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Sun Yat-sen, San Mfn Chu-I (Three Principles)
19. SanMinChu-1
20. Ibid.
21. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte "
22. Tang Liang-Ii, "The Foundations of Modern China"
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. 76/W.
26. Ibid.
27. SanMinChu-I.
28. Book of Mencius.
29. Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China".
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
 CHAPTER XI
THE KUO MIN TANG
For nearly a century, foreign Imperialism has been a formidable enemy
to all the forces of progress in China. Nevertheless, its impact served as
the midwife assisting the birth of modern China. "Complete isolation was
the prime condition of the preservation of old China."1 Inasmuch as it
broke down that isolation, imperialist impact upon China had objectively
a revolutionary significance.
The stagnant national economy of China was irreparably disturbed by the
penetration of capitalist trade. Consequently, the social organisation,
reared upon the corner-stone of patriarchal family-groups, was
undermined. Moral codes and political principles, evolved two thousand
years ago, to maintain a patriarchal social organisation, became
meaningless. The family-groups were held together by domestic
production. It was disrupted by the circulation of capitalist commodities
imported from abroad. Millions of artisans were thrown out of the
process of production, and were left without any means of livelihood.
The product of land alone could not support them. They remained inside
the family-groups so long as these combined agriculture with pre-
capitalist manufacturing industries. With the ruin of handicrafts, the
existence of family-groups as self-contained social units became
untenable. Unemployed members could not be held together when, on
the basis of the old relations, no means of livelihood were to be found for
them.
"The advent of the Western merchant and industrialist in the nineteenth
century succeeded in tearing asunder the Chinese social and economic
structure."" Forced contact with the capitalist world economy sounded
the death-knell of the system of self-contained local economy which had
persisted in China for centuries. The silk raised by the peasant in far-off
Kansu, for example, migrated all the
 The Kuo Min Tang 245
way to London, New York or Paris to find the consumer. Conversely, the
cotton cloth worn by the same peasant was manufactured in Lancashire.
The old China, in which everything necessary for human existence was
produced inside the family-groups, the small surplus being exchanged in
the local market shut up from the rest of the world, was no more. China
could persist upon living in her "four hundred family-groups", only to
perish. She must come out of that time-honoured abode, if she wanted to
live and progress. She must scrap Confucius or commit suicide.
Once the age-long stagnation was broken, new life began to pulsate in
her withered system. The free exchange of commodities brought into
being a new class of people who found the old social institutions
obstructing their interests. The wide-spread unemployment and
destitution, caused by the disruption of self-contained domestic
production, created the basis for such gigantic mass upheavals as the
Taiping Revolt. With capital accumulated through trade, and labour
released from feudal-patriarchal relations, thanks to the disruption of the
system of domestic production, there developed capitalist industry along
the sea-coast and the great rivers. At long last, a new China began to rise
out of the ruins of the old.
Since the new China could grow only on the dissolution of the old, she
must, therefore, be armed with a new ideology. In that respect, again,
forced contact with the outside world was the starting point. The
activities of Christian missionaries, though conducted with a different
purpose, contributed to the dissolution of the old Chinese culture. As the
ideological pioneers of Imperialism, they could not help doing that when
Imperialism itself was playing an objectively revolutionary role. It was
by the Christian missionaries that modern thoughts were introduced into
China. Many young Chinese intellectuals enthusiastically hailed that new
light. For their own purpose, the Christian missionaries found fault with
the Chinese civilisation, culture and social system. But their activities
produced a positive result. The young Chinese intellectuals were
encouraged to take a critical attitude towards established institutions and
traditional values. The foundation for the ideology of a new China was
thus laid.
The rising tide of Capitalism could undermine feudal-patriarchal China
only when the walls of her isolation were battered down by foreign guns.
Similarly, an intellectual impetus from outside stimu-
246 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
lated the revolt against the Confucian ideology of old China.
When the old order finally broke down under the impact of foreign
Imperialism, and the old wisdom of Confucius was disputed by Christian
missionaries, the Chinese bourgeoisie began the historic struggle for the
liberation of their class. The first shot against the national sage was fired
by Kang Yu-wei in 1891. In a book entitled "The Spurious Classics of
the Hsin Dynasty", the greatest ideologist of the Chinese bourgeoisie
declared that the old Classics were all interpolations by scholars who
lived about six hundred years after Confucius. The legendary, semi-
divine, authority of the Confucian doctrines was disputed. But that was
only an indirect attack upon Confucius himself. Nevertheless, it was a
staggering blow to traditional culture. Its very bottom knocked off by a
scienific historical research and a bold criticism. Confucianism was
doomed to go down in the stormy sea of revolution. Kang Yu-wei
pointed out that the cardinal principles of the Confucian social and
political philosophy were enunciated in those spurious Classics. By that
exposure, it was proved that the wisdom of the Old Sage, after all, was
not eternal and immutable. In the past, it had been fraudulently
interpreted to suit particular purposes. If it could be open to
interpretation, then, there is no reason why it should not be interpreted
again for similarly selfish motives.
Kang Yu-wei further developed his revolutionary thoughts in a second
book, "The Reform of Confucius". The traditional belief was that the
Scriptures were only compiled and edited by Confucius. In his second
book, Kang Yu-wei maintained that they were really written by
Confucius, and that he attributed legendary character to those works of
himself with the object of creating an unchallengeable authority for his
own doctrines. Kang Yu-wei's critical reconstruction of ancient history
exploded the doctrine of the Heavenly Way. The teachings of Confucius
did not express the Heavenly Will; they were formulated according to the
social needs created by the conditions of the epoch. That was a highly
revolutionary approach to cultural history. Kang Yu-wei was not a
materialist; most probably he had never read Marx. Nevertheless, he not
only gave a materialistic interpretation to China's cultural history, but
himself embodied yet another evidence that thoughts are created by the
material conditions of the epoch.
Kang Yu-wei's revolutionary ideas were subsequently incorpora-
 The Kuo Min Tang 247
ted in the first Reformation Edict of the Emperor Kwang Hsue, in which
it was stated that conditions had changed, calling for a corresponding
readjustment of social relations and political institutions. To the great
consternation of the ruling class, it was further asserted in the Edict that
the Divine Kings of the Confucian Scriptures themselves did not all act
alike, having been influenced by changing conditions. From those
premises, it was concluded that the ways of the Divine Kings of yore
could not be blindly followed so many thousand years afterwards.
Having deposed him so completely, Kang Yu-wei only proposed to
reform Confucius. A typical ideologist of the bourgeosie, he had to find
his inspiration in the past. Besides the Chinese bourgeoisie could inherit
from Confucius just as much as the European bourgoisie did from Plato
and Aristotle. In both the cases, the heritage was a philosophy of class
domination. Kang Yu-wei proposed to reform Confucianism so that from
a philosophy of feudal-patriarchal aristocracy, it would be the ideology
of the bourgeoisie. Confucius had taught that one class should be
subordinated to another. The bourgeoisie were quite prepared to accept
that teaching of the Old Sage. Only, they wanted that the relation of
classes should be changed in view of the changed conditions. In these
days, all other classes should be subordinated to the bourgeoisie.
This philosophy of revolutionary reform was elaborated in Kang Yu-
wei's third work, "The Book of the Great Commonwealth". Ideas
developed in that book were remarkably similar to the philosophical
radicalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. The picture
of an ideal society was discovered in the old Scriptures to serve as the
standard for a criticism of the old social order to be subverted. The
"unnatural" conditions of the present conflicted with the strivings for the
realisation of the ideal society. They, therefore, must be removed.
Arguing on this line, Kang Yu-wei came to the conclusion that the
abolition of the patriarchal family was inevitable.3 He advocated the
abolition of family as a step towards the realisation of the Utopian "Great
Commonwealth". Whatever might be the ultimate object, the disruption
of the patriarchal family was demanded in the interest of the bourgeoisie.
It would not lead to the "Great Commonwealth" of Kang Yu-wei's
dream, but to capitalist democracy. That was a typical example of
conjuring up the legendary past as the model of something that never
existed before.
248 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
But Kang Yu-wei did not present an alluring Utopia to be reached by one
jump. He had the perspective of an entire process of future social
evolution. He stated clearly that the immediate result of the reforms
would be the creation of a National State protecting trade and industry.
He also admitted that there weuld be no equality in that State, nor would
wealth be equally distributed. Private property would remain intact. So
order must be maintained by force. That was his picture of the bourgeois
society which should be built in the place of the Confucian feudal-
patriarchal order. Evidently, Kang Yu wei anticipated a revolution. In
order to invest that dreaded spectre with a halo of morality, it was
suggested as a step towards the "Great Commonwealth". Historically, it
would, of course, be a step in that direction. But the "Great
Commonwealth" (the Communist society) will be ultimately realised not
as the bourgeois philosophers dreamt, nor will it be a reversion to
idealised primitive conditions. The speculation of Kang Yu-wei, like that
of his European predecessors (Thomas More, William Godwin, Thomas
Paine and others), was simply the logical conclusion of the philosophy of
bourgeois radicalism which represented the ideological attack upon pre-
capitalist society.
The catastrophic defeat in the war with Japan revealed the rottenness of
the established order in China. In 1895, Kang Yu-wei founded the
Reform Party, and petitioned the Emperor "to reform and save China".
With his philosophical radicalism and remarkable dialectical
understanding of history, Kang Yu-wei was the ideologist of a class still
organically connected with the established order. Therefore, he remained
devoted to the god whose clay-feet he exposed so mercilessly. Like
Hegel, he also betrayed his dialectical approach to history by discovering
an abstract principle transcending all phenomenal changes. That
principle was the "essence of Confucianism". Objectively, a propounder
of positively disruptive ideas, Kang Yu-wei personally failed to
appreciate the full implication of his own ideas. He thought that the
Manchu Dynasty could be reformed through the revival of the "essence
of Confucianism". Even after the destruction of his party by the ruthless
Empress Dowager, he was not cured of his illusion. Believing in the
essential morality of Confucianism, he remained a conservative
notwithstanding the revolutionary significance of his own thoughts.
But the Chinese intellectuals, who subsequently criticised Kang
 The Kuo Min Tang 249
Yu-wei, ostensibly from a more radical point of view, failed to come up
to the standard reached by him. The petit-bourgeois pseudo-radicals
remained wedded to a cultural tradition whose reactionary character had
been exposed by Kang Yu-wei. They criticised him, but themselves
could not do any better than he had done. Sun Yat-sen was the apostle of
that essentially reactionary pseudo-radicalism, and the Kuo Min Tang
was its political expression. Experience has cruelly exposed the
reactionary implications of Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen. Yet, even
now his disciples fail to appreciate the revolutionary significance of the
ideas of Kang Yu-wei. Together with him, they also believe in "the
essence of Confucianism which transcends the changes of time"; but at
the same time, they condemn him as a conservative, because "he was
unable to divorce himself from the feudalistic tingle which tainted the
moral philosophy of Confucius".4 Feudalism is not a foreign tinge that
clouded the clear crystal of abstract Confucianism. Essentially,
Confucianism was the ideology of a feudal-patriarchal society. All
believers in the transcendental "essence of Confucianism", therefore, are
apologists of the feudal-patriarchal social order. If Kang Yu-wei's
proposal to reform Confucianism contradicted his criticism of the
Chinese culture, his petit-bourgeois critics stultified themselves
intellectually by criticising and idealising the same thing at the same
time.
The correct interpretation of the debacle of a great thinker like Kang Yu-
wei is that the implications of his own thoughts scared him into
conservatism, which compelled him to discover something absolute in
Confucianism after he had himself exposed that there was nothing
absolute in it. His debacle was lamentable. But it has objective reasons.
A through and through revolutionary ideology can be developed only by
a revolutionary class. For historical reasons, the Chinese bourgeoisie
could never be so thoroughly revolutionary. As a matter of fact, in no
country the bourgeoisie have ever been so.
The social revolution caused by the rise of the bourgeoisie is only
relative. The establishment of capitalist society does not necessarily
require complete destruction of the old order. Under the predominance of
capitalist economy, bourgeois society can accommodate deposed and
emasculated feudalism, and even leave to it some of its traditional power
and privileges. In England, for instance, the feudal aristocracy remained
in possession of considerable power and privileges long after the
bourgeois revolution. It
250 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
was the same in Germany. Strictly speaking, the bourgeois revolution
was not accomplished in those countries. The bourgeoisie are forced to
go beyond the limit of a compromise with the old ruling class only by an
effective intervention of the revolutionary democratic masses. That was
the case in France. The revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie is relative,
because, the social transformation demanded by their interests need not
be greater than a readjustment of class relations. Classes are not
abolished. Society remains split up into antagonistic classes, one
exploiting and oppressing another. Private property still remains the
corner-stone of the entire social structure. Therefore, the revolutionary
significance of the ideological pioneers of the bourgeoisie is bound to be
relative everywhere and in all circumstances. Kang Yu-wei was not an
exception.
In the light of the history of the bourgeois revolution, the debacle of
Kang Yu-wei does not appear to be very surprising. In some other
countries, the bourgeoisie was much better equipped and situated than in
China. Yet, they failed to carry through the revolution. 'I hat failure,
however, does not minimise the objectively revolutionary significance of
the philosophy of bourgeois radicalism, which is inherited by the
working class to be improved into a more definitely revolutionary
ideology. At the end of the nineteenth century, the working class in
China was not sufficiently developed to force the bourgeoisie to put into
practice the social principles of Kang Yu-wei. Even during the abortive
revolution of 1911, they could not influence the situation. So, the
bourgeoisie sought to realise their ambition on the line of least
resistance—through a gradual transfer of power. Nor did any effective
pressure on the bourgeoisie to steer a more stormy course come from the
lower middle-class, although pseudo-radical intellectuals hailing from
that class presumed to pass adverse judgment on Kang Yu-wei posthu-
mously. They could not drive the bourgeoisie into a revolutionary
struggle, because their social outlook was as reactionary as Kang Yu-
wei's was revolutionary. Indeed, the petit-bourgeois pseudo-radicals
signally failed to attack the old order even as courageously as he had
done. They could improve upon him only if they had the courage to
snatch from his faltering hands the standard of revolt he had raised. But
their pretentious criticism of Kang Yu-wei coincided with a retracing of
the steps he had so boldly taken.
A proper appreciation of the objective merit of Kang Yu-wei's
The Kuo Min Tang 251
philosophy came from the ideological pioneers of the rising proletariat.
Inheriting the revolutionary thoughts of the bourgeoisie, they boldly
indicated the way which the propounder of those thoughts himself feared
to visualise and to travel. While petit-bourgeois pseudo-radicalism was
conspiring with mercenary militarists to create a neo-Confucian State
upon the decayed foundation of patriarchal relations, the ideological
pioneer of the proletariat, Chen Tu-hsiu, buried Confucius, already
slaughtered by Kang Yu-wei. He pointed out that to sanctify the feudal-
patriarchal social relations did not represent a "degeneration of
Confucianism" as maintained by the neo-Confucian scholars of the
Peking National University; that it was the essence of Confucianism to
do so. Deprived of the function of providing moral authority for feudal-
patriarchal social relations, Confucianism could have no place in society.
Eventually, under the leadership of the Communist Party founded by
Chen Tu-hsiu, the working class declared war upon the decayed old
order, and tried to assume the leadership of the unaccomplished
bourgeois democratic revolution. In that critical moment, the petit-
bourgeois pseudo-radicals rushed to the defence of feudal reaction,
holding high the reactionary banner of Sun Yat-senism.
The Kuo Min Tang was the political party of the essentially reactionary
petit-bourgeois pseudo-radicalism. Rejecting the revolutionary heritage
of philosophical radicalism preached by Kang Yu-wei and his disciple
Liang Chih-chao, it failed to assume the leadership of the bourgeois
democratic revolution. Owing to its reactionary ideology, it shamelessly
betrayed the revolution in 1911, and later on it ran pell-mell into the arms
of reaction as soon as, under the pressure of the working class, it came
dangerously near to Jacobinism.
The disruptive tendency of philosophical radicalism represented by Kang
Yu-wei and Liang Chih-chao was opposed by the militant revivalism
preached by the pundits of the Peking National University, led by Tsai
Yuan-pei and Ku Hung-ming. In defending passionately the ancient
Chinese civilisation whole hog, the latter carried the war into the enemy's
camp. He ran down Western civilisation. The social significance of his
"militant nationalism" stood out clearly, when, denouncing the
revolutionising aspects of the capitalist civilisation of Europe, he
glorified its worst consequences. He had nothing but contempt for the
fathers of "Anglo-Saxon commercia-
252 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
lism". But in Bismarck and Disraeli he found the only saving grace of a
civilisation accursed by its association with Hume, Bentham and their
like. 5
The defence by Ku Hung-ming was extremely damaging for
Confucianism. The ardent neo-Confucianist had no patience for
democracy. At the feet of the Prussian professors of Jena, Ku Hung-ming
had learnt to admire militarism "as essential and beneficial to safeguard
civilisation against the anarchy and vulgarity of the mob".
Tsai Yuan-pei, the leading ideologist of petit-bourgeois radicalism, was
also an apologist of the ancient Chinese culture, though not so rabid a
reactionary as Ku Hung-ming. Nevertheless, he opposed the tendency
represented by Kang Yu-wei, not for its conservatism in politics, but on
the ground that it threatened to "denationalise and deculturise China".
The school of Tsai Yuan-pei maintained that in material affairs the
Western civilisation was superior to the Chinese; but the latter was more
advanced spiritually. The claim to spiritual superiority was advanced on
the ground that morality was given a prominent place in the Chinese
civilisation. It was conveniently overlooked that no philosophy could set
up an eternal standard of morality unless it placed reason at a discount.
No permanent standard of morality could be set up except on the
authority of some super-human agency. Abstract morality is inseparable
from religion which claims reason for its sacrifice. However, it is not
historically true that morality was given a higher place in the Chinese
civilisation. The Western civilisation is also based on an abstract
conception of morality. Nevertheless, young China, brought up in the
Peking National University, would cure the evils of the "materialistic"
Western civilisation by administering large doses of Confucian morality.
They were the self-appointed messiahs of a new civilisation which would
be superior to both. They admitted that the Reform Movement of Kang
Yu-wei also set to itself the same task, but complained that "in practice,
the Chinese basis of this new civilisation was forced entirely into the
background".6
That was a highly damaging confession, though unwittingly made.
Mankind can attain a higher stage of civilisation only by taking its stand
on the highest level hitherto reached. The critics of Kang Yu-wei
themselves take pride in the fact that he evolved his radical philosophy
without having any knowledge of the modern
 The Kuo Min Tang 253
Western thought. That being the case, it should be admitted that
"denationalisation and deculturisation" need not be the consequence of a
blind imitation of the materialist West. It was an inevitable process. In
any real striving for reaching a higher stage of civilisation, the ancient
Chinese culture must inevitably be pushed to me background. The germs
of the new are imbedded in the old: but they cannot blossom in the
fulness of their glory without bursting the shell which protected them in
the past. As the greatest independent thinker of modern China, Kang Yu-
wei understood this imperious law of social evolution. If petit-bourgeois
intellectuals could learn from him, they might develop real radicalism,
and build up their political party, the Kuo Min Tang, as an instrument for
the revolutionary struggle.
But unfortunately, the founders of the Kuo Mm Tang failed to appreciate
the revolutionary significance of Kang Yu-wei's philosophy and sought
inspiration from the revivalist Tsai Yuan-pei. Indeed, not even the latter
was the spiritual leader of young China as represented by the Kuo Min
Tang. Its real ideologist was the militant reactionary Ku Hung-ming.
According to the authoritative popu-larisers of the doctrines of Sun Yat-
sen, "the substance of Ku Hung-ming's criticism directed against the
Western system must be admitted as valid, and accepted as a useful
corrective to the enthusiasm for Western ways and means of living.7 The
validity of that criticism is refuted by the fact that a Chinese, able to
think independently, developed ideas similar to those constituting the
cardinal principles of modern Western culture. The critics themselves are
proud of this fact, although they are too reactionary to appreciate the
ideas of Kang Yu-wei. However, that great thinker of modern China
personified the proof that the evolution of thought is not determined by
geographical location. It is determined by the exigencies of social
development. The paradise of capitalism is coveted no less by the Kuo
Min Tang moralists than by the "denationalised" renegades of the
Reform Movement. But in order to enter that paradise, China cannot be
free from the contamination of modern thoughts, either of native origin,
or imported from abroad, which are bound to relegate Father Confucius
to his proper place of honour in the gallery of antiquity.
By obstructing the economic development of China, foreign Imperialism
also obstructed the growth of revolutionary thought.
254 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Since it brought so much mischief to China, it was natural for the
Chinese to be suspicious of the system of thought associated with the
politico-economic order constituting the basis of Imperialism. The
modern Western thought was mistakenly identified with Imperialism.
Consequently, the Chinese bourgeoisie rejected ideas which should
ordinarily grow out of their strivings for economic and political progress.
The fight against Imperialism can be a liberating movement only when it
is inspired with revolutionary ideas which heralded the rise of modern
Europe. Those ideas are nobody's private property. They are a common
human heritage. Their rejection renders a nation powerless in the fierce
struggle for existence. The Kuo Min Tang discarded that common human
heritage, and consequently failed to lead the Chinese people to freedom
from foreign Imperialism and native reaction. The nationalist prejudice
against modern Western thought is an ugly bastard of Imperialism. But
revolutionary democratic nationalism should be able to distinguish
between Imperialism and the modern social and political thought evolved
in the European countries not by virtue of any innate superiority, but
owing to the fact that they were more fortunately situated to act as the
vanguard of human progress in a particular period of human history.
The lack of a revolutionary social outlook put the stamp of futility upon
the earlier political activities which led to the formation of the Kuo Min
Tang. Later on, a decidedly reactionary social ideology mocked at its
apparent political radicalism. The plan to establish capitalism with the
help of imperialist finance and the sanction of the Confucian tradition
could only end in a fiasco. The ideologist of the Kuo Min Tang, Ku
Hung-ming, condemned Western civilisation as inferior to the Chinese,
because its criterion was comfort. The doctrine that the measure of a true
civilisation is not comfort, that is, material well-being for the masses,
was subsequently preached by Sun Yat-sen as the principle of securing a
livelihood to the people under a regime of benevolent despotism
controlling the entire economic life of the nation. His "Socialism" was
evidently an anticipation of the totalitarian economy of the Fascist State.
The Kuo Min Tang rejected bourgeois democracy and individualism in
favour of that fraudulent brand of Socialism. Rejecting the idea of
material well-being of the masses for the abstract conception of the
"human principle", the Kuo Min Tang committed itself to the reactionary
task of perpetuating the decayed feudal-patriarchal system
The Kuo Min Tang 255
as the foundation of modern capitalist exploitation. All its objectively
progressive tendencies hemmed in by reactionary preoccupations, it
could lead the bourgeois democratic revolution no more creditably than
the Reform Party.
The germs of the future Kuo Min Tang were contained in the Shing
Chung Hui (China Revival Society), founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1894.
The very name of that organisation revealed its real character. It did not
look into the future. Its eyes were turned towards the past. A revivalist
society cannot have any revolutionary ideal. For thirty years, until the
Kuo Min Tang under the pressure of the masses entered into a short
period of revolutionary struggle, it passed through a succession of
readjustments, organisationally as well as regarding its political outlook.
The object of the Shing Chung Hui was "to unite the patriotic Chinese
people to cultivate the arts of wealth and power for the purpose of
reviving China and securing her unity". Founded at Honolulu with the
financial support of well-to-do emigrant merchants, it was clearly
materialistic, in the vulgar sense. It expressed the ambition for "wealth
and power" of a class of people who had no roots in the soil of the
Chinese society. Notwithstanding the name it chose for itself, the society
visualised an Americanised China. Whatever might have been the
subjective predilections of its founders, the society objectively had no
use for the Confucian junk which had to be cleared away if its ambition
was ever to be realised. At the very beginning of his political career, Sun
Yat-sen thus stood in a crassly contradictory position.
For the realisation of the object of the society, it was necessary to
overthrow the Manchus. The first attempt in that direction was made in
1895, when a plot was hatched to capture the Yamen (seat of
Government) of Canton. The attempt failed, and Sun Yat-sen again went
abroad in quest of further financial support from the emigrant merchants.
The Shing Chung Hui recruited its members exclusively from the
emigrant merchants and Chinese students in foreign Universities. Except
the couple of years at the very end of his life, Sun Yat-sen had all along
mainly depended upon the Chinese merchants overseas, with whose
financial support he tried to enlist the services of military officers in a
conspirative movement against the Manchus. That limited field of
activity prevented him from having a broad social outlook and a clear
political perspective. The emigrant merchants were
256 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
indeed uprooted from the feudal-patriarchal society of China; but at the
same time, they were not connected with the process of production in the
country. Promotion of their material interest therefore was not directly
connected with a revolutionary change in China. They were a parasitic
class, devoid of any intellectual vision.
That artificial social background determined the organisational methods
and the political activities of the Kuo Min Tang in the earlier period of its
existence. Having no basis inside the country, it occupied itself with
plottings, usually with mercenary military elements. It remained so
occupied even when the entire country was experiencing the
revolutionary ferment which broke out in the Boxer Revolt. The abortive
attempt to capture the Yamen of Canton and similar other activities of
the Shing Chung Hui, took place in the midst of a seething mass
discontent, on the very eve of the Boxer Revolt; yet they were in no way
connected with that revolutionary movement. When the Boxer Revolt
actually broke out, the China Revival Society made another effort to
capture Canton, but not as an integral part of the general uprising. It did
not do anything to express its solidarity with the Boxers. On the contrary,
it shared the treaty-port view of the movement, attributing it to "the
fanaticism of the ignorant mob incited by the Court". That view was
known to be inspired by foreign Imperialism; it was uncritically accepted
by the parasitic Chinese merchants connected more with imperialist trade
than with the productive forces in China.
Even to-day the heroes of the Kuo Min Tang fail to appreciate the
historically revolutionary significance of the Boxer Uprising. But it is no
longer possible to dispute the fact that the Boxer Uprising was the first
elemental mass protest against the imperialist penetration of China.
Therefore, they magnanimously exonerate "the folly and stupidity of
these Boxers", since their motive was "essentially patriotic".8
Nevertheless, they still dismiss the movement as a machination of the
Manchus. If even to-day the leaders of the Kuo Min Tang are unable to
appreciate the historic significance of the Boxer Uprising, how much less
could they do so when they lived as emigrants in Honolulu or Singapore
and believed that the Manchus could be overthrown by smuggling a few
dozen guns, or with the aid of a few disgruntled military officers. The
attempt to capture Canton was an isolated event, an expression of the
romanticism of a handful of student paid by the emigrant merchants.
 The Kuo Mm Tang 257
The year 1905 marked another stage in the process leading up to the
formation of the Kuo Min Tang. By then, Japan had become the base of
operation of all Chinese revolutionaries. Tokyo was the headquarters of
the followers of Kang Yu-wei as well as of the Shing Chung Hui. From
there Liang Chih-chao agitated for a constitutional monarchy through his
organ "Sing Ming Hsung-pao". He was of the opinion that China needed
a Peter the Great to be saved from her miserable plight. The press organ
of the Shing Chung Hui was also published from Tokyo. It advocated the
overthrow of the Manchus and appealed to the students to undertake that
task. In revolutionary social and political thought, it was sterile. It
agitated for the overthrow of the Manchus, but did not know exactly
what should be set up in their place. It is interesting to recollect that in
those days the forerunners of the Kuo Min Tang had not as yet
discovered the moral superiority of the Chinese civilisation. At that time,
they were not ashamed of learning from the West. Ill-digested lessons of
the French and American Revolutions found a prominent place in their
propaganda. They preached such non-oriental political doctrines as
democracy, liberty, natural rights etc. They were still voicing the aspira-
tions of emigrant merchants for "wealth and power". They had not yet
come in contact with the intricate problems of the revolution in China.
Other organisations with the object of overthrowing the Manchus had
also come into existence. The most noteworthy of them were Hua Hsin
Hui and Kuan Fu Hui, led respectively by the redoubtable Huang Hsing
and the scholar Chang Tai-yen. The former had considerable influence
among the Chinese military students in Japan, and through them had
established revolutionary nuclei in the Chinese army. The credit for the
insurrection of 1911 belongs mainly to him and his secret military
groups.
In 1905, a conference was held in Tokyo to unite all those revolutionary
groups into one organisation. The Tang Ming Hui (United League of
Revolutionaries) was formed. Although the active members of the united
organisation were mostly students and young army officers, it received
direct or indirect support from high Chinese officials who bad
sympathised with the Reform Movement. The subsequent downfall of
the Manchus was not due so much to the activities of the Tang Ming Hui
as to the refusal of those high State officials to defend the tottering
monarchy. That opportunist alliance
258 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
with the disgruntled feudal-patriarchal officials to bring down the
Manchus influenced the social orientation of the future Kuo Min Fang. It
would be perfectly correct as tactics to utilise all available forces in the
attack upon the common enemy, provided that the attack was made with
a clearly defined revolutionary purpose. But the fore-runners of the Kuo
Min Tang only chased a shadow, and in that wild-goose chase sacrificed
their soul for a discrediting alliance. They did not understand that the real
enemy of the Chinese people was no longer the effete Manchu Dynasty,
but the established social system. The high officials who connived with
the downfall of the monarchy were stout pillars of that system, and
therefore could not be reliable allies for a revolutionary movement-
Nevertheless, the alliance might have been useful for the revolution had
the Tang Ming Hui been armed with a clear programme of socio-political
reconstruction. That was not the case. Under the pressure of the new
allies, its social outlook changed imperceptibly, though radically. Until
then, it represented the ambition of thoroughly "deculturised" emigrant
merchants, having no direct connection with the established social
system in China. The new allies were organically connected with the
decayed feudal-patriarchal social relations, though developing an
appetite for the profits of capitalist exploitation. The connivance of the
allies was the determining factor to cause the downfall of the Manchus.
Consequently they acquired a dominating position in the social
background of the united party. In politics, superficial republicanism was
replaced by neo-Confucianism. The ideological leadership was left to the
petit-bourgeoisie who glorified social reaction in the guise of pseudo-
radicalism and militant nationalism.
None of the groups represented in the Tokyo Conference had any
political programme. They were united on one simple demand— the
overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty. The records of the conference are
very defective. The early history of the Kuo Min Tang, therefore, is
composed mostly from memory and of the personal reminiscences of its
fore-runners who participated in that conference. Two different versions
of the programme adopted by the Tokyo Conference are given in two
recently published books,9 both written from the orthodox Kuo Min Tang
point of view. According to one, by T.C. Woo, the Tang Mini Hui
adopted the following articles at the Tokyo Conference: (1) To
overthrow the present wicked Government; (2) To establish a Republican
form of Government; (3) To maintain
 The Kuo Min Tang 259
peace of the world; (4) To nationalise land; (5) To promote friendship
between the peoples of China and Japan; and (6) To ask other countries
to support the work of reform (in China).
As against this, Tang Liang-li says that Sun Yat-sen proposed the
following three points as the programme of the party; the first was
accepted, the second was found too radical; the author does not mention
what happened to the third. The points proposed by Sun Yat-sen were:
(1) The overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a
democratic Republic on the American model; (2) The redistribution of
land through the nationalisation of unearned increment: and (3)
Maintenance of friendly relations with all the Powers, specially Japan.
From the discrepancy between the two versions, the absence of any
authentic record is obvious. None of the authors can be suspected of
wilful misinterpretation. Nevertheless, the second book should be
regarded as more reliable, because it was sponsored, if not actually
written, by Wang Chin-wei. In any case, the obvious absence of a clear
record proves that there was general laxity as regards a political
programme. There must have been some loose talk, but no clear
programme was formulated. All the versions of a programme supposed
to have been adopted by the conference are presumably later
interpolations. Now, the historians of the Kuo Min Tang read whatever
they respectively like in those loose talks narrated from memory. Such a
primitive organisation, mainly of petit-bourgeois youths, steadily became
an instrument of the forces of decentralisation growing out of the
decomposition of the feudal-patriarchal bureaucratic order. Under the
influence of its questionable allies, who were in reality more of patrons,
the newly formed party drifted away from the vague ideals of liberty and
democracy entertained originally by the various component groups.
The sudden downfall of the Manchus confronted the Tang Ming Hui
with social and political problems it had never envisaged before. It was a
simple matter to agitate for the overthrow of the Manchus and even to
demand the establishment of a Republic. The first part of the programme
was easily realised: the Manchus were not overthrown; they simply
disappeared. The demand constituting the second part of programme was
positive. A Republie could not establish itself. The Tang Ming Hui
proved itself to be entirely unequal to the task of enforcing the positive
demand. The Republic of iis dream was indeed there, as if dropped from
the heaven; but those who had clamoured
260 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
for it only deserted it at the critical moment. The first revolutionary crisis
exposed the impotence of petit-bourgeois radicalism.
Unable to resist the reactionary designs of Yuan Shih-kai, the Tang Ming
Hui sought alliance with other opposition groups. Its ranks were flooded
with new recruits from the old officialdom who acted with no other
motive than jealousy for the ambitious and powerful monarchist
president of the still-born Republic. The new combination was so packed
with conservative elements that Yuan Shih-kai had no misgiving in
taking in his Cabinet five representatives of it. Even the Premiership
went to one of them, Tang Shao-yi. Its nominal representatives had little
in common; they failed to present a united front; the Tang Ming Hui was
outmanoevered by Yuan Shih-kai; before long, its representative were
forced to resign from the Cabinet. Thereafter it was split up into a variety
of tendencies representing the diverse interests of its heterogeneous
components.
One section represented high officials engaged in trade and through it
allied with foreign Imperialism. They advocated unconditional
capitulation to Yuan Shih-kai. They were averse to a civil war which
would inevitably follow any determined resistance to his reactionary
designs. In behalf of industrial bourgeoisie, the second group suggested a
policy of marking time—cowardly opportunism. They were also in
favour of capitulation, but justified it as a temporary measure. Owners of
the new means of production and of capital accumulating rapidly, they
were not altogether devoid of a perspective. They were confident of
establishing their supremacy sooner or later. But they also did not want
to risk a revolution which implied a civil war. This group dominated the
Provisional Government of Nanking and forced Sun Yat-sen to deliver
the Republican baby to the none too reliable nurse, Yuan Shih-kai. The
third group was composed of those who had played the decisive role in
the drama of the downfall of the Manchus. They were potentially the
most dangerous. They included Provincial Governors and military
Commanders who could not possibly have any sympathy for the
revolution. They represented the tendency to split up the country into a
number of practically independent States each grinding its own axe. That
group did not care how the Central Government was composed. They
would be satisfied if unrestricted autonomy were granted to the
provinces. Eventually, that most dangerous tendency triumphed and
blossomed forth into militarism. The fourth group representing the
impotent petit-bour-
 The Kuo Min Tang 261
geoisie tried to hold high the discredited banner of Republicanism. But
theirs was a quixotic venture.
The composition of the Tang Ming Hui was bad enough. It was a
heterogeneous body got together on a negative issue, hopelessly differing
as regards the positive aspect of the programme. The position was made
still worse by the inclusion of several other groups, yet more
conservative. That step was taken in view of the coming election. The
niw combination formed in August 1912 called itself the Kuo Min Tang
(People's National Party). The programme of the new party was: (1)
Establishment of a democratic government of five departments; (2) Local
autonomy for the provinces; (3) Political equality for the five races
inhabiting the old Empire; (4) Friendly relations with foreign Powers;
and (5) Reform of the economic structure of the Chinese society. The
Republic disappeared from the programme of the Kuo Min Tang.
"Democratic Government" did not necessarily exclude a constitutional
monarchy. But the programme did not leave much room for doubt about
the nature of the "Democratic Government". The demand to reorganise
the Chinese Government on modern lines (American model, advocated
by the Tang Ming Hui) was abandoned in favour of a neo-Confucian
State. That is visualised in the first item of the programme. The
important change in the political outlook took place in consequence of
the amalgamation with other groups which had not supported the
Republic. To secure the approbation of the class of professional officials,
the new government must be a monstrous bureaucracy in the guise of the
so-called Five-Power Constitution. To satisfy the bourgeoisie, economic
reform was promised, but its nature was left undefined. Not a word was
said about the future of the feudal rights and privileges. Patriarchal
relations were not to be legally abolished. Even the most elementary civil
rights were not granted to the people. The programme adopted on the
inauguration of the Kuo Min Tang represented a long step backward. The
left wing of the Tang Ming Hui had included in its programme some
popular democratic demands.
The newly formed Kuo Min Tang won the election held in the beginning
of 1913. It captured a clear majority in the new parliament which
assembled in April. By way of a commentary upon the social
composition of the Kuo Min Tang, it may be pointed out that its majority
was much bigger in the Upper House than in
262 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the Lower. The electorate of tbe former was composed of privileged
classes. The "People's Party" had more supporters in those quarters than
among the democratic masses wnich elected the Lower House.
Armed with a long purse, Yuan Shih-kai was prepared for the fight. He
had contracted a foreign loan over the head of the parliament. He would
brook no interference with his power. It must be absolute. He believed,
not without reason, to have inherited it as a gift of the Manchus.
Therefore, he naturally wanted to put the parliament in a position of
subservience. Only a party with a clear programme, consciously backed
by the people, could effectively resist the designs of the would-be
dictator. Such a party the Kuo Min Tang was not. Consequently, in the
first clash it fell to pieces. Its representatives in the parliament voted
Yuan Shih-kai to the presidency.
In despair, the left wing started the agitation for an insurrection against
the designs of the would-be dictator. Other sections of the party
disassociated themselves from the agitation and denounced it as
unpatriotic. That was an encouragement for Yuan Shih-kai. He took
military measures to suppress the revolutionary agitation. The Kuo Min
Tang could not put up any resistance. For all practical purposes it split
into two antagonistic factions. The conservative majority tacitly, if not
openly, made common cause with Yuan Shih-kai as against the
disturbing activities of the petit-bourgeois left wing. "The Chinese
bourgeoisie, on whom Sun had been relying for financial support, were
apathetic and opposed further fighting, preferring material prosperity to
constitutional liberty."10
When the petit-bourgeois left wing, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen
and Huang Hsing, was finally driven to a premature armed insurrection,
it was completely isolated. It was deserted by allies won at the cost of
political principles. On the other hand, it had not done anything to enlist
the support of the masses. For that purpose, the programme of political
democracy must be supplemented by demands for the abolition of social
relations oppressing the masses. Petit-bourgeois radicalism did not go at
all in that direction . Under the influence of a reactionary alliance, it had
not even pressed the demand for political and civil rights for the people.
The so-called "Second Revolution" was an effort made exclusively by
the isolated petit-bourgeois left wing of the Kuo Min Tang. It was
crushed, and
 The Kuo Min Tang 263
with it was destroyed the Kuo Min Tang itself. Immediately after the
insurrection was suppressed, Yuan Shih-kai issued a decree unseating
even all those Kuo Min Tang members of the parliament who had gone
over to him. The traitors were paid in their own coin. Thus closed the
first tragic chapter in the history of the Kuo Min Tang.
Under the staggering blow of defeat, the Kuo Min Tang went to pieces. It
was split up into countless groups representing conflicting social
tendencies which had united into a precarious coalition only to bring the
Manchus down and to resist Yuan Shih-kai's Napoleonism, all so very
ineffectively. But the petit-bourgeoisie had still not learned the lesson.
Sun Yat-sen again tried to reorganise the party on the same principle of
opportunist alliance which had just ended in such a disaster. In 1914, he
proclaimed the reorganisation of the defeated party with a new name—
Chung Kuo Min Tang (the Revolutionary Party of China). But one could
not go very far only with a pretentious title. The half-hearted
republicanism of the petit-bourgeoisie could not fight reaction any more
effectively than the conservative constitutiona lism of the big
bourgeoisie.
The reorganised party could operate only illegally. Before it could
acquire any strength, it was again confronted with a very difficult
problem. In the beginning of 1915, Japanese Imperialism presented the
infamous "Twenty-one Demands" to China. The acceptance of those
demands would imply China's unconditional subordination to Japanese
Imperialism. All political groups in China had to define their attitude as
regards that great danger. On that issue, the Kuo Min Tang again split up
into two clear factions. One openly advocated unconditional support to
the Yuan Shih-kai Government against Japanese aggression. The other
still insisted upon opposition to the dictator. The leaders of the former
group were naturally granted amnesty and permitted to return home from
exile. Continuing its ineffective opposition to Yuan Shih-kai, the other
faction came under the influence of Japanese imperialism. its leaders
found asylum in Japan, as enthusiastic supporters of the Pan-Asia
movement inspired by the Japanese Government.
Sun Yat-sen himself believed in the liberating mission of Japan. He
argued that it was Japan's own interest to help the Asiatic peoples free
themselves from European domination. He was of the opinion that China
should make every concession to Japan, so that the latter could drive all
other imperialist Powers from the field. Later on,
264 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
China would settle her accounts with Japan on the basis of cultural
unity.11
That was a counsel of despair. The petit-bourgeoisie was completely
bankrupt politically. They confessed their imbecility. They would invite
a foreign imperialist Power to do the work they had so signally failed to
perform. Sun Yat-sen's plan for "The International Development of
China" was a logical conclusion of that defeatist attitude. Only, having
been disillusioned in his belief in the liberating mission of Japan, he
appealed to international Imperialism for help. Incidentally, the readiness
to sell China to Japanese Imperialism revealed the great danger inherent
in the cult of the cultural unity of Asia. Pan-Germanism was the ideology
of German Imperialism. Similarly, the Pan-Asia movement was an
instrument of Japanese Imperialism. Yet, Sun Yat-sen enthusiastically
supported it.
It was not love for the betrayed Republic which induced the left wing of
the Kuo Min Tang to insist upon the opposition to Yuan Shih-kai. It
acted under the influence of Japanese Imperialism. On the pretext of
opposing Yuan Shih-kai, it practically connived with Japanese
aggression on China. The fight against foreign Imperialism is not
incompatible with the struggle against native reaction. But only a
revolutionary party can conduct such a fight on two fronts. Later on,
under the pressure of the revolutionary masses, for a time, the Kuo Min
Tang conducted such a fight. In 1915, as a purely petit-bourgeois
organisation having no mass basis, it abjectly capitulated all along the
line, on both the fronts. The failure of the Kuo Min Tang to support the
so-called Third Revolution of December 1915 exposed the hollowness of
its opposition to Yuan Shih-kai.
To oppose Yuan Shih-kai's plan to restore the monarchy, the Governor of
Yunan rose in revolt in conjunction with other rulers of the Yangtse
provinces. He was a follower of Liang Chih-chao, not a simple militarist
adventurer. It was a genuinely Republican movement with the
progressive bourgeois tendency represented by Liang Chih-chao.
Nevertheless, Sun Yat-sen disapproved of the insurrection and, under his
leadership, the Kuo Min Tang kept aloof from a movement which might
have changed the history of China. The motive of that strange behaviour
has nowhere been explained. Factional jealously has been suspected.
Imperialist rivalry seems to have been the real cause. At that time, taking
advantage of the European war, Japan was trying to annex the whole of
China, for all
The Kuo Min Tang 265
practical purposes. The Kuo Min Tang was the protege of Japanese
Imperialism. On the other hand, the bourgeois group led by Liang Chih-
chao sympathised with the Entente Powers, particularly France. The
province of Yunan is adjacent to the French colony of Indo-China. Its
access to the sea is the French-controlled railway. The revolutionary
movement there evidently had to count upon French support. The
movement was against Yuan Shih-kai; but if it succeeded, the Japanese
plan of dominating China might be frustrated. Therefore, it can be
reasonably assumed that the imperialist Powers antagonistic to Japan
stood behind the movement. However, Sun Yat-sen's disapproval of that
open revolt against the plan of monarchist restoration revealed how
hypocritical was the pretension of the Kuo Min Tang to oppose Yuan
Shih-kai even if that amounted to helping Japanese Imperialism.
In spite of the ineffective opposition of the petit-bourgeoisie, then at the
service of Japanese Imperialism, Yuan Shih-kai went ahead with his
plan. He dissolved the refractory parliament destroyed the Kuo Min
Tang, driving it under-ground and its leaders to exile and won over the
support of the big bourgeoisie. The latter wanted a strong central
government, to put an end to the chaos, and establish law and order.
They organised themselves into the Chin Pu-tang (Progressive Party)
under the leadership of Liang Chih-chao. They looked upon Yuan Shih-
kai as the lesser evil, or the necessary evil, because at that moment he
alone seemed to have the power to establish an effective central
government. Consequently, Liang Chih-chao was compelled to
compromise his previous revolutionary social orientation. He now
maintained that, in establishing a strong central government, the
traditions of the country, the character of the people and their institutions
should be taken into consideration. The new system of government
should not entirely break with the past. The Kuo Min Tang opposed that
point of view of the big bourgeoisie, though subsequently it was
incorporated in the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen.
The opposition to the conservative "Progressive Party" of the big
bourgeoisie appeared to be radical. But behind that apparent radicalism
of the petit-bourgeoisie, there lurked the ominous shadow of dying
reaction. As against the demand of the big bourgeoisie for a strong
central government, the Kuo Min Tang advocated decentralisation. That
was the demand of the reactionary provincial Governors
266 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
who wanted to function as independent potentates, in their respective
jurisdictions. Many high officials of the old school, not a few provincial
Governors, and military Commanders stationed in the remotest parts of
the country, were against Yuan Shih-kai not as a matter of any principle,
but for sheer jealousy. To oppose Yuan Shih-kai, the Kuo Min Tang
allied itself with those withering limbs of decomposed reaction. It had
not learned from the same mistake committed in the fight against the
Manchus. Incapable of confronting the reactionary centralism of Yuan
Shih-kai with the programme of creating a modern democratic
centralised State, the Kuo Min Tang became the instrument of the forces
of disruption—the forces which presently assumed the ugly form of
militarism, to ravage the country for years to come. It was an irony of
fate that the Kuo Min Tang should be instrumental in the rise of an an
evil which it had to fight later on. By opposing the creation of a
centralised State, so necessary for the capitalist development of the
country, and at the same time talking noisily of a revolution, which it
could not lead, the Kuo Min Tang forfeited the support of the
bourgeoisie while not yet finding its way to the masses.
After the death of Yuan Shih-kai, in the beginning of 1916 the "Short
Parliament" of China assembled. Its main task was to promulgate a
permanent Constitution on the basis of the provisional instrument
adopted by the National Convention of 1912. The Kuo Min Tang was no
longer the united majority bloc in the parliament. During the intervening
years of storm and stress, it had been seriously depleted. Its fight against
the movement for Restoration had been particularly futile. It had been
crying itself hoarse about the Republic; but at critical moment when
Yuan Shih-kai proclaimed his intention to found a new royal dynasty on
the ruins of the Republic, handed over to him by Sun Yat-sen, it was
from the conservative^ progressive, constitutional-monarchist, Liang
Chih-chao, that an ideological defense of a democratic governmjnt was
forthcoming. Sun Yat-sen organised his childish "Punish Yuan
Expedition," which ended in a fiasco. It was the ideologist of the big
bourgeoisie who formulated the programme for a political movement in
support of republicanism. For all those reasons, thj K.UJ Min Tang could
not play a prominent role in the "Short Parliament," which was domi-
nated by the Progressive Party, its leader having elaborated a
comprehensive programme of republicanism. 12 Under the leadership
The Kuo Min Tang 267
of Liang Chih-chao, the parliament subscribed to the philosophical
radicalism of Kang Yu-wei, and deposed Confucius from the throne of
the National Saint. That was an ideological revolution. It remained for
the Kuo Min Tang to go back upon it.
While Peking was basking in the fleeting glory of the "Triumphant
Republic," reaction gathered strength in its very neighbourhood. The
supporters of Yuan Shih-kai united themselves in the Military Party with
the object of overthrowing the parliament and bringing the Central
Government under their control. They succeeded in forcing the Acting
President Li Yuan-hang to dissolve the parliament. But immediately
afterwards, they fell out among themselves. Reaction ran rampant, and
the country was plunged into a bloody civil war. That was the
culmination of the tendency of decentralisation with which Kuo Min
Tang republicanism was fatally allied.
Beaten everywhere, eliminated from national politics, the Kuo Min Tang
concentrated its activity again in the place of its birth. Sun Yat-sen
decided to begin all over again, and returned to Canton. That would have
been an admirable resolution, had he learnt from the bitter experience of
his political career and the woeful debacle of the Kuo Min Tang. But
petit-bourgeois romanticism is incorrigi-ble. He had not learnt anything.
His point of departure was again the same old military intrigue and
opportunist combination with questionable allies. At the end of 1917,
leftist Kuo Min Tang members of the defunct parliament assembled at
Canton under the banner of the Provisional Constitution of Nanking.
Under the patronage of the military Governor of Kwangtung, and
counting upon the promised support from the militarists in the adjoining
provinces, a rival government was set up. The doubtful character of Sun
Yat-sen's new allies is admitted by his own admirers. An official
historian of the Kuo Min Tang writes : "Dr. Sun himself had hardly any
influence in this (Canton) Government, the members of which were too
much concerned with their personal problems."13
The revolution was completely routed; counter-revolution reigned
supreme; the Central Government disappeared in the chaos of civil war;
the big bourgeoisie withdrew to the treaty-ports, there to make money
under the protection of foreign Imperialism; and the Kuo Min Tang
became an instrument of the reactionary militarists.
In the midst of that dismal situation, there appeared a new force. It was
the working class. Petit-bourgeois intellectuals had
268 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
all along been the most active element in the Kuo Min Tang. They were
drawn into a mass movement, and consequently came under the
influence of the working class. That revolutionary influence rescued the
petit-bourgeoisie from the quagmire of political bankruptcy, and enabled
the Kuo Min Tang eventually to take up an effective struggle for national
liberation. But the beneficiaries now try to forget or re-write that
memorable chapter in the history of the Chinese Revolution. In writing
the history of their own rise and fall, the petit-bourgeoisie put the cart
before the horse. They cannot dispute the fact that the revolutionary
labour movement infused life into the prostrate body of the discredited
Kuo Min Tang. But they maintain that the new force was the creation of
Kuo Min Tang ideologists. This theory contradicts historical facts; but it
must be maintained in self-defense. Eventually, the Kuo Min Tang
turned traitor to the working class after they had supported it valiantly in
the abortive struggle for a bourgeois democratic revolution. That
shameless treachery is now justified on the pretext that the Kuo Min
Tang had the right to destroy what it had created. The labour movement
however, was not a creatien of the intelligentsia.
In 1919, strikes occurred in all the important industrial centres of the
country. The great strike on the Peking-Hankow Railway in 1920
introduced the proletariat in the political arena. Two years later, the
seamen of Hongkong challenged the power of British Imperialism—a
thing the Kuo Min Tang had never dared in its life While the anti-
Japanese boycott in 1919 had produced no practical result, the Hongkong
strike dealt a severe blow to the purse and prestige of British
Imperialism. One was the action of the students while the other of the
working class. In 1920, the Communist Party came into existence as the
conscious vanguard of the rising revolutionary class. Those were the
most outstanding features of a new situation in which the Kuo Min Tang
persuaded itself to seek an alliance with the new revolutionary force.
Important changes had taken place also in the international situation,
obliging the Kuo Min Tang to turn its eyes upon the awakening masses.
The Versailles Treaty and the Washington Conference had rudely shaken
its misplaced faith in Wilsonian Liberalism The plan of modernising
China with the help of foreign Imperialism stood condemned by its own
contradiction. On the other hand a new force had appeared on the
international horizon in consequence of
The Kuo Min Tang 269
the Russian Revoluton of 1917. A revolutionary proletarian State had
risen on the ruins of an imperialist Power which had been China's worst
enemy. The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics repudiated all Tzarist
claims upon China, and extended a hand of friendship to the Chinese
people in their struggle for national freedom. The Chinese working class
was no longer a negligible factor. Apart from its intrinsic potentiality,
already demonstrated in a series of successful strikes, it represented the
united strength of the proletariat of the entire world. All those facts and
considerations opened the eyes of the Chinese petit-bourgeois
intellectuals, and led to the reorganisation of Kuo Ming Tang into a
revolutionary party of the masses.
With the help of the working class, a Nationalist Government, not
entirely under the domination of reactionary militarists, was finally
established at Canton. The left wing of the Kuo Min Tang perceived in
the rapidly growing labour movement a new ally. They also recognised
in the Soviet Republic a friend who could be relied upon. The position of
the left wing was strengthened by the result of the Hongkong strike and
by the U.S.S.R. renouncing all the privileges and concessions acquired in
China by the Tzarist Government. The Communist Party of China
declared its determination to co-operate with the Kuo Min Tang in the
common fight against foreign Imperialism and native reaction. It carried
on agitation to rally the workers and peasant masses under the banner of
the National Revolution. At the same time, it criticised the weaknesses of
the Kuo Min Tang which had been responsible for previous defeats. It
pointed out the way for eliminating those weaknesses, and for the Kuo
Min Tang to become a powerful mass organisation. It worked out a
comprehensive programme of National Revolution, which had not been
done until then by any other political party. It called upon the Kuo Min
Tang to broaden its social basis and advised it to include in its pro-
gramme the eradication of social and economic evils. The propaganda of
the Communist Party included a searching analysis of the social
conditions. It was explained how political unification and economic
reconstruction of the country were not possible before destroying the old
social order, root and branch. By demanding a clean sweep of the relics
of patriarchal relations, the abolition of feudalism and the promotion of
the immediate interests of the workers and peasants, the Communist
Party appeared as the leader of the democratic masses, and in that
capacity offered to the Kuo Min Tang its
270 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
co-operation in the struggle for national liberation and democratic
reconstruction of the country. The propaganda of the Communist Party
greatly influenced the radical intellectuals who had always been the most
active element inside the Kuo Min Tang. The ground was thus prepared
for the re-organisation of the Kuo Min Tang as a political party of the
people with a revolutionary programme.
In 1922, Sun Yat-sen had again been driven out of Canton by his
militarist allies. From his exile in Shanghai, he tried to come to some
understanding with the pro-Japanese Peking Government. But the latter
also was presently swept away by the democratic mass movement
developing since 1919. In the critical moment of his life, Sun Yat-sen
met Joffe, the diplomatic representative of the Soviet Republic. From
every side, the Kuo Min Tang as well as its leader came under a
revolutionary influence.
The basic principles for the reorganisation of the Kuo Min Tang were
formulated in a conference held at Canton in January 1924. There, Sun
Yat-sen made a critical survey of the past with the object of finding the
correct way for the future. Among other things, he admitted: "After the
revolution of 1911 was accomplished, we were at a loss as to the
methods we should use for reconstruction." He submitted for the
consideration of the conference two important documents, drafted
beforehand in consultation with the Communist leaders, particularly
Michael Borodin, who had come to Canton, on the invitation of Sun Yat-
sen, to act as the adviser to the Nationalist Government. Those
documents opened up an entirely new chapter in the history of the Kuo
Min Tang. The decisive factor which opened a new perspective before
the Kuo Min Tang, however, was the objective conditions of the
moment—the broadening of the social basis of the National Democratic
Revolution in consequence of the political awakening of the masses. The
Communists helped Sun Yat-sen and other leaders of the Kuo Min Tang
to appreciate the new factor appearing on the scene. Should they fail to
rise up to the occasion, they would be eliminated from the leadership of
the revolution. The Communist explained to them the great potentiality
of the new conditions, and suggested how the Kuo Min Tang could be re-
born by readjusting itself to them.
The first document endorsed by the conference was subsequently issued
as the Manifesto of the First Congress of the Kuo Min Tang. The second
was the Constitution of the reorganised party. The Mani-
The Kuo Min Tang 271
festo contained an exhaustive anaylsis of the conditions of the country,
the formulation of the "Three People's Principles," and the Platform of
the party. In the analysis, some of the past mistakes of the party were
admitted. For example, dealing with the failure to reconstruct the country
after the downfall of the Manchus, it was said that "the fact that
revolutionary comrades were not able to beat him (Yuan Shih-kai) was
due to their earnest desire to avoid the prolongation of the civil war as
well as to the lack of a party that possessed organisation and discipline,
and understood its own mission and aim." It was further declared that
"since to them (Northern militarists) the revolutionary comrades had
consigned power, it was small wonder that defeat was the outcome." The
analysis correctly appreciated the nature and role of foreign Imperialism,
thus preparing the way for an earnest fight against it. The dangerous
charcter of the forces ol decentralisation was also recognised, and a
determined fight against militarism was placed before the party as one of
its initial tasks.
The analysis discovered four main political tendencies m the country,
and classified them as follows: 1. Constitutionalism, which contended
that China needed a strong central authority to establish conditions
governed by law; 2. Feudalism, which held that autocracy resulted from
the over-centralisation of power, and suggested local autonomy as the
remedy for the situation; 3. The tendency to seek a settlement through
peace conferences of discordant elements; and 4. The tendency to set up
a government by the mercantile class. All those tencies were rejected,
and the following declaration was made: "Although one cannot be
opposed to a merchant government as such, our demand is that the
masses of the people will organise the government themselves to
represent the interests of the whole people." It was further postulated that
the "Government must be one which is independent, and does not seek
the help of others. It must depend upon the will of the whole mass of the
people." The final conclu-~sion was that a super-class people's
government was to be established through the application of the Three
People's Principles.
What are known as Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles were for the first time
definitely formulated in the second part of the Manifesto. There, they
were called the Three People's Principles, and were set forth in their
essentials; the result of their successful application was also indicated.
The point of departure was that, for the realisation of its aims, the Kuo
Min Tang must have "the support of the masses
272 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of the country, namely, the intellectual class, the peasants, the labourers
and the merchants." As regards the composition and organisation of the
party, a complete break with the past was made by the statement that "the
guarantee for the attainment of national independence of the country can
only be found in close contact of the Kuo Min Tang with the masses."
An interpretation of the principle of "People's Sovereignty" placed the
struggle against foreign Imperialism in the forefront of the programme.
That was a revolution in the political outlook of the Kuo Min Tang.
Previously, overthrow of the Manchus as well as of those native
reactionaries who subsequently took their place, had been considered to
be the only thing necessary for the realisation of the principle of
nationalism. It was conceived as the union of the five races inhabiting the
old Empire under a democratic State, but the latter was not defined and
was interpreted differently by different intersts. At last, the finger was
placed on the sore spot. The role of Imperialism was properly
appreciated. Since the advent of foreign Imperialism galvanised all the
forces of decayed native reaction, it had come to be the main obstacle to
the creation of a modern National State. Therefore, the primary condition
for the realisation of the principle of nationalism was liberation from
imperialist domination. The ideology of the Kuo Min Tang still remained
defective. The new programme was not a great advance in that respect.
Yet, by virtue of taking up the struggle against Imperialism, the Kuo Min
Tang became an instrument of revolution. The exigencies of that struggle
drove it closer and closer to the masses; without their active support, the
struggle could not be effective. Consequently, the Kuo Min Tang found
itself obliged to take up a radical attitude politically, though there was no
essential change in its reactionary social outlook. Indeed, it was only to
win the support of the masses that the principle of "People's Livelihood"
was conceived and given some concrete shape. But there was nothing of
Socialism in it. At best, it was a half-hearted reformism in economic
matters.
In the period of bourgeois revolution, it is usual with the petit-bourgeois
Utopians to talk vaguely of Socialism. That was done by not a few
ideological pioneers of the European bourgeoisie. Pseudo-socialist
doctrines are then evolved with a double-purpose: The doctrine of "social
justice" gives a moral sanction to the attack upon the antiquated forms of
property; on the other hand, the plan for the
 The Kuo Min Tang 273
introduction of humanitarian reformist measures takes off the edge of
capitalist exploitation. The theories of "nationalising land values," of
single-tax, and even of the nationalisation of land, were all preached
consciously or unconsciously with the same double-purpose. Not a few
classical bourgeois economists were associated with them.
In his youth, Sun Yat-sen had made some acquaintance with popular
versions of modern economic ideas. Therefore, it was not surprising for
him to talk about Socialism and taxation of land values, when he came to
realise that such humanitarian and reformist doctrines would serve the
political purpose of securing the support of the masses. But all along, the
Kuo Min Tang had been associated with such reactionary social elements
who could not possibly brook even such superficial deviations. Vital
questions of national economy, with the only exception of State finance,
had never found any place in Kuo Min Tang propaganda. But no
democratic movement could develop without raising those questions.
Finally, they were raised by the masses. The people themselves began
the fight for their livelihood. In that situation, it became a convenient
policy to take up the question of people's livelihood. At last realising that
the peasantry constituted the overwhelming majority of the Chinese
people, the Kuo Min Tang naturally wanted to win them over. In the
Manifesto of the First Congress, it declared to the peasants: "As China is
an agricultural country, where the peasantry suffer more than all other
classes, the Kuo Min Tang demands that the landless peasants and
tenant-holders obtain from the State, land and the means for carrying on
their agriculture. For this purpose, the State should form a land fund,
comprised of the land belonging to the big landholders, or to those
landowners who do not work on the land, but who fleece the peasantry
both in monetary rent as also in kind."
At last the very core of the situation was touched. The Kuo Min Tang set
to itself a task which could not be accomplished except through a social
revolution. But it placed itself in that position without knowing what it
was doing. That was made evident by subsequent events. Approaching
the question of national freedom from the correct point of view, namely,
anti-imperialist struggle, it found itself advocating a social revolution
against all its convictions. But the bourgeoisie and feudal-patriarchal
elements still dominated it. Under their pressure, the Kuo Min Tang also
specified in its new programme the guarantee against a real social
revolution. That initial
274 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
contradiction contained the seed of its eventual destruction.
The first guarantee was the class composition of the Nationalist State. As
specified in the new Constitution, it was sure to act as a brake upon the
enforcement of agrarian programme in all its implications. The ideal
democratic government, based upon the sovereignty of the entire people,
according to the new programme, should be attained after two
preparatory stages had been passed. They were the periods of military
dictatorship and of educative government. It was not specified how long
those intervening periods should last. The judgment was left to the
"Government of Experts," which would benevolently lead the Chinese
people to the heaven of ideal democracy. Under the given conditions, the
proposed Government of Experts could not be anything but a
government of the upper, property-owning, classes. Such a government
would be a reliable guarantee against any extreme interpretation of the
social programme.
The second guarantee was the source of inspiration for the Three
People's Principles. It still remained the traditional Confucian ideology,
which excluded any revolutionary interpretation of the programme. The
Kuo Min Tang committed itself to a programme of political democracy,
agrarian revolution and economic reconstruction, but all those ideals
were to be realised strictly according to the "moral and humane" doctrine
developed to adjust the social conditions of two thousand and five
hundred years ago. The new programme was divided into two parts: the
principles and the platform. They contradicted each other. But that
fundamental defect of the programme was pushed to the background by
the immediate consequences of the reorganisation of the Kuo Min Tang.
Notwithstanding all the contradictions of the new programme and the
reactionary ideology underlying it, the Kuo Min Tang, for a time,
became the rallying ground of all the forces of the National Democratic
Revolution.
Public utilities and practically all the key industries were owned by
foreign capitalists. That economic advantge was the basis of imperialist
domination. To strike at the very root of the imerialist domination, the
Kuo Min Tang declared in favour of the nationalisation of public utilities
and key industries. It was stated in the new programme that "all
enterprises which, either by their nature monopolise the whole branch of
a given industry, native or foreign, or else which are too large in size to
be directed by private entrepreneurs, such for instance as banks,
railways, water-ways, etc., should be at the disposal
The Kuo Min Tang 275
of the State." Since most of these specified enterprises were owned by
foreigners, the implication of the programme was rather political than
economic. Moreover, the statement itself was very ambiguous. It was not
nationalisation that was proposed; it was State control. State-ownership
of railways and control of central banks are not necessarily socialist
measures. As a matter of fact, those measures are integral parts of the
system of capitalist economy in the highest stage
of its development.
The economic part of the new programme with its apparent reformism,
was eminently capitalist. There was nothing wrong in it. A bourgeois
democratic revolution cannot possibly have any other programme. But
the objectionable feature was the political part—the social composition
of the "ideal democratic State," which made the eventual realisation of
the economic programme very doubtful. Nevertheless, immediately, it
had a revolutionary effect. In order to carry out the threat of striking at
the economic roots of Imperialism, the Kuo Min Tang must possess a
powerful striking force. That could be found only in the masses. They
must be mobilised in a powerful movement against foreign Imperialism.
Political mobilisation of the masses on such a large scale was not
possible without advocating certain improvements in their conditions of
life. It was not the vague reference to Socialism, nor the vision of an
ideal democracy to be realised some time in the remote future, that
rallied the masses under the banner of the Kuo Min Tang. The support of
the masses was enlisted by including in the programme redress of their
immediate economic grievances.
Even that relative revolutionisation of the Kuo Min Tang did not take
place without resistance. The bourgeoisie were full of misgivings, and
gave in only to prevent the party from breaking entirely away from their
control. On the question of the relation with the Communist Party, the
resistance was very stubborn. Apart from the peasantry, the Kuo Min
Tang wanted to capture also the labour movement which was playing the
leading role in the anti-imperialist struggle. But the labour movement
was from the very beginning organised and led by the Communist Party.
The petit-bourgeois radical elements in the Kuo Min Tang desired a
close alliance with the Communist Party for yet another reason. Through
its tireless propaganda of revolutionary nationalism as distinct from the
confused agitation of the Kuo Min Tang, the Communist Party had
acquired a
276 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
very great influence upon the young intellectuals. Therefore, close co-
operation with it was an essential condition for the Kuo Min Tang to
enlist the support of the revolutionary masses.
The greatest service of Sun Yat-sen to the Chinese Revolution was that
he understood the potential importance of the Communist Party, and
resolutely maintained that the Kuo Min Tang must establish a close
relation with it. He had no inclination whatsoever towards Communism,
He made it quite clear, when he advocated cooperation with the
Communist Party and friendly relations with the Soviet Republic. Far
from being under any Socialist influence, he formulated his principle of
People's Livelihood on the basis of a criticism of the doctrines of Karl
Marx. His social outlook remained coloured by an incompatible mixture
of Confucian patriarchalism and capitalist liberalism. His policy of
cooperation with the Communist Party wrs not the result of any
agreement with, or sympathy for, either its philosophy or its programme.
In his last days, Sun Yat-sen showed a belated tendency towards
Jacobinism, and even that was very defective.
Perceiving teat the working class was rising in a revolt against foreign
Imperialism and native reaction, Sun Yat-sen made a feeble attempt of
imitating Marat in the critical days of June 1793. Just as the latter
appeared before the insurgent proletariat of Paris to tell them that they
needed a leader, insinuating that he was their man, so did Sun Yat-sen try
to place himself at the head of the mass revolt, and divert it in the
direction of promoting the interest of the bourgeoisie. But there was a
great difference between the two. While Marat, inspired by the vision of
a new social order, completely identified himself with the revolutionary
masses, Sun Yat-sen considered himself to be the modern Confucius,
come to make once again a happy compromise between the decayed old
and the nascent new. He succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the
bourgeoisie, and carried through the policy of associating the Kuo Min
Tang with the revolutionary working class. But he bequeathed to it also
the heritage of his reactionary ideology. The germs of Jacobinism were
contained in the new programme; but the development of the Kuo Min
Tang in that revolutionary direction was presently checked by the
heritage of its reactionary ideology.
There is no ground for speculation about what would have happened to
the Kuo Min Tang had its fouuder lived longer. Sun
 The Kuo Min Tang 277
Yat-sen died. But his spirit lived. And inspired by that spirit, the Kuo
Min Tang before ]ong went back upon the programme adopted in 1924
and became a fierce organ of counter-revolution. As a matter of fact, it
did not go back upon its programme. It acted according to it, which was
so imperfectly and ambiguously formulated as to be open to
diametrically opposed interpretations. The programme proposed to set up
a military dictatorship. That has been done. The Nationalist Government
of Nanking is a military dictatorship. The programme of 1924 included
the establishment of a "Government of Experts" to educate the people
concerning the exercise of political rights. That also has been done,
though partially. The Nanking Government is a close corporation of a
clique of professional politicians who are responsible to none, and are
themselves the judge of their ability to govern. It may be called a
Government of Experts, but it certainly does not perform the function
prescribed for it in the programme. It has not done anything to educate
the people concerning the exercise of political rights. It has not shown
the least inclination to introduce the most elementary measures of
democracy. According to the departed leader's principle of the "Five
Power Administration", it is a monstrous bureaucracy which is subject to
no popular control, and rent internally by mutual jealousy among its
more ambitious individual members.
Framed according to Sun Yat-sen's "moral and humane" principles, the
programme of the Kuo Min Tang was not to abolish classes, but to
prevent class struggle. To prevent class struggle in a society composed of
classes means only one thing—the subordination of the exploited to the
exploiting class. So, when eventually the Kuo Min Tang turned fiercely
upon the revolutionary workers and peasants, to massacre them with an
unparalleled fury, it did not betray any principle; it acted faithfully
according to the fundamental principles of its programme. Sun Yat-sen
could have no objection to actions which were only the practical
application of doctrines and principles he had preached all his life. The
revolutionary masses refused to submit themselves to a military
dictatorship sanctified by neo-Confucianism. A reactionary social
orientation did tot permit the Kuo Min Tang to tolerate the danger of a
social revolution. The Kuo Min Tang became counter-revolutionary not
by betraying Sun Yat-senism; by following the principles of Sun Yat-
sen, it could not act otherwise, and to-day it is exactly what it was
destined to be from the very beginning.
278 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Notes
1. Karl Marx, ''The Revolution in China and Europe", New York Tribune, 1882.
2. Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China".
3. "The central idea of his system is the abolition of the family," R. Wilhelm Sinica,
No. 2, 1927.
4. Tang Liang-li, Ibid.
5. Ku Hung ming, "China's Defence against European Ideas".
6. Tang Liang-li, Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. T.C. Woo, "The Kuo Ming Tang and the Future of the Chinese Revo- . lution".
9. "The Kuo Ming Tang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution", by T.C. Woo;
and "The Foundations of Modern China" by Tang Liang-li.
10. Tang Liang-li, Ibid.
11. This view was expressed by Sun Yat-sen personally to the author in the spring of
1916.
12. Liang Chih-chao's pamphlet against the restoration of monarchy and in defense
of Republican Government is the most remarkable document in the political
literature of modern China.
13. Tang Liang-li, Ibid.
 CHAPTER XII
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONALIST
GOVERNMENT
The effort for the creation of an effective central authority ended with the
death of Yuan Shih-kai in the beginning of 1916. A Government
continued to exist in Peking nominally. But its authority did not extend
much beyond the walls of the city. The country was broken up into
several de facto independent areas, controlled by warlords engaged in a
spasmodic struggle amongst themselves. The tendencies of
decentralisation inherent in a feudal State were fully released by the
disappearance of the monarchist regime. The Republic had been brought
about, and again brought down by those same tendencies. The rival
military groups began a fierce and endless struggle for supremacy, and
particularly for the control of the maritime and Yangtse provinces. The
group in power in Peking proclaimed itself as the Government of the
entire country, and on the strength of its nominal authority granted
valuable and extensive concessions to foreigners in exchange for loans.
The money thus acquired was used for strengthening the army which was
to devastate the country. But the larger grew the army, the more was the
money necessary for keeping it up. In order to raise more money, it was
necessary to control the Yangtse Valley and the coastal provinces. The
great bulk of the foreign trade was carried on in those regions. Whoever
ruled those provinces, could lay claim to the customs revenue.
In the midst of that chaos and preparations for a devastating civil war, a
sacond effort was made to restore the monarchy. But the feudal war-lords
had tasted blood. They would no longer have a Son of the Heaven to rule
over them. The new effort to reinstate the monarchy was again frustrated,
not by the bourgeoisie but by a rival group of feudal chiefs. For resisting
the return of the monarchy,
280 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
they swore by the spirit of the dead Republic. Yuan Shih-kai wanted to
ascend the Dragon Throne with the blessings of the United States of
America.1 The nominal Republic of the bourgeois counter-revolutionary
Tuan Chi-jui, on the other hand, was supported by the semi-feudal
Japanese militarism.2 At the same time, the war-lord who ruled the rich
Yangtse Valley was an instrument of British Imperialism. Thus, China
was divided, on the one hand, by the mutually warring native militarists
and, on the other, by the rival imperialist Powers.
The attempted restoration in 1917 was opposed not only by the military
groups fighting for the control of Peking, but also by all the feudal chiefs
throughout the country. Seven southern provinces formed an alliance to
send to Peking an expeditionary army with the object of freeing the
national capital from the monarchist clique. The Southern Confederation
continued even after the defeat of the Restoration Movement in Peking.
Its true aim was not only to resist the restoration of the monarchy, but to
fight against the emergence of any central government. The alignment of
the counter-revolutionary forces of decentralisation was taking place on a
background of wire-pulling by unseen hands. Japanese influence was
gaining ground in Peking. The monarchists were defeated by Tuan Chi-
jui's Anfu clique, backed by Japan. It received a big loan in return for
recognising Japanese Imperialism as the premier Power in China. The
major part of the loan was spent in Japan for the purchase of war
material. The Southern Confederation was the counter-move of British
Imperialism. Therefore, it continued even after its ostensible object of
resisting the restoration of monarchy had been attained. It did not do
anything in that respect.
The bourgeois constitutionalists, who had been driven out of Peking by
victorious feudalism, decided to join the Southern Confederation. Sun
Yat-sen returned from his Japanese exile and went to Canton. His
illusion about the "liberating mission of Japan" having been shattered, he
reverted to the love of his youth, British Imperialism. With the help of
his old feudal-autonomist allies, and the support of British Imperialism,
he hoped to revive the Republic. In January 1918, a conference took
place in Canton. There it was decided to establish a Directorate as the
government of the seven provinces constituting the Southern
Confederation. Sun Yat-sen joined the Directorate. The head of the new
Government was the
 The Establishment of the Nationalist Government 281
robber-chief Chen Chiu-ming, who happened to be then the military ruler
of Kwangtung. Such known reactionaries and traitors as Wu Ting-fang
and Tang Shao-yi were members of the Directorate. The former was the
leader of the conservative big bourgeoisie, which had compelled Sun
Yat-sen in 1912 to deliver the Republic to the arch-reactionary Yuan
Shih-kai; and the latter was a close collaborator also of Yuan, whom he
represented at the Shanghai Conference which conspired against the
Republic. The remaining members of the Directorate enjoyed a still more
doubtful reputation. That strange combination of bourgeois reactionaries
and militarist adventurers eventually became the "Nationalist
Government of Canton".
The logical consequence of the formation of the Southern Confederation
appeared to be a war with the military clique established in Peking with
the help of Japanese Imperialism. But the war was avoided under the
pressure of the powerful rulers of the Yangtse provinces. The wire was
pulled again by British Imperialism. It supported the formation of the
Southern Confederation as a counterblast against the growth of Japanese
influence in the North. But a war between the North and South could not
be welcome, because that would certainly cause a serious dislocation of
trade in the Yangtse Valley. That profitable traffic was still a monopoly
of the British merchants.
The plan of British Imperialism was to mobilise public opinion against
the Peking Government which was accused of selling the country to
Japan. It was proposed that a Peace Conference should be held in
Shanghai in order to settle the conflict between the North and the South.
Tang Shao-yi was the representative of the Southern Confederation at the
Shanghai Conference. He proposed that the Peking Government should
free itself of the Japanese influence. The Northern delegate could not
possibly accept the proposal. The nominal Government in Peking could
not exist without the support of Japan. The conference ended in a fiasco.
But Japan had grown into a real danger for the interests of other
imperialist Powers in China. While they were engaged in the war in
Europe, Japan had entrenched herself very securely in China. As soon as
hostilities stopped in Europe, the Western imperialist Powers rushed to
safeguard their interests in the Far East. They were determined to check
the growth of Japanese influence. The First Peace Conference of
Shanghai was held under their pressure. They demanded
282 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
that the conference should be held again. Instigated by the Western
imperialist Powers, the Southern delegates repeated the proposal that the
Peking Government should rid itself of the Japanese influence. As
Japanese Imperialism was not likely to allow its protege to give in, a war
between the North and South appeared to be imminent.
At that juncture, the bourgeoisie were once again betrayed by their feudal
allies. A number of Generals belonging to the Southern Confederation,
including the Generalissimo himself, were bribed by the Peking
Government. They let it be known that, in the imminent war, the Canton
Government could not count upon their support. The position of the
Peking Government thus strengthened, its delegates at the Shanghai
Conference rejected the demand of the Southern Confederation. But the
treacherous Generals of the South did not stop short at sabotaging the
Confederation at the critical moment. They rose in opon revolt against
their bourgeois allies, and drove Sun Yat-sen out of Canton.
Yet another illusion was gone for Sun Yat-sen. Even the love of his
youth betrayed him. She preferred the robber-chief Cheng Chiu-ming.
Full of disappointment, Sun Yat-sen again cast wistful glances at Japan.
Betrayed by his own feudal allies, he himself played traitor to his
bourgeois companions. On his arrival at Shanghai, he carried on secret
negotiations with the Northern delegation behind the back of the
representative of the Southern Confederation. With the split in the camp
of Southern militarism, and the fickleness of lower middle-class
radicalism, the position of the big bourgeoisie became untenable. Even
the backing of Anglo-American Imperialism was of no avail for them in
that critical moment. The Shanghai Conference broke down. Japan
scored a victory over British Imperialism. Her occupation of Shantung
and the predominating position in Manchuria were recognised by the
Peace Treaty of Versailles.
That agreement between the rival groups of Imperialism at the cost of
China had an unexpected repercussion. The Chinese bourgeoisie,
particularly the radical intellectuals, had set high hopes on the Wilsonian
principle of self-determination of nationalities. The Treaty of Versailles
destroyed that hope. The result was the beginning of a revolutionary
nationalist movement in China. A tremendous mass movement against
foreign Imperialism developed with amazing rapidity. Japan and the
Peking Government were the chief
 The Establishment of the Nationalist Government 283
objects of attack. The urban petit-bourgeoisie, particularly the younger
intellectuals, took a leading part in that movement. The Kuo Min Tang
had always based itself on that social stratum. Nevertheless, in the
beginning, it held itself aloof from the movement. Its social outlook was
as circumscribed as ever; its political convictions were too unstable for it
to grasp the importance of new movement. Just when the country was
being swept by a mighty wave of anti-imperialism, the Kuo Min Tang
was trying to shift its moorings from one imperialist Power to another. It
had just been driven out of Canton where, with British help, it had built
castles in the air. Still under the shadow of that disgrace, Sun Yat-sen
was seeking an alliance with Japanese Imperialism, to be expressed in an
understanding with the puppet government of Peking. The democratic
mass movement was directed primarily against those two. Consequently,
the Kuo Min Tang had to keep out of the movement which fortunately
came under the influence of the revolutionary ideology of the proletariat.
The leadership of the movement was assumed mostly by students who
had received their political education from the Marxist Professor Chen
Tu-hsiu at the Peking University.
The mass movement against Japan and the puppet government in Peking
encouraged the formation of a rival military group in the North with the
help of Anglo-American Imperialism. It exploited the popular anti-
Japanese sentiment and succeeded in overthrowing the clique which
controlled the Peking Government. The anti-Japanese movement won.
But Imperialism as such was not weakened. A setback for Japan meant
advantage for the rival imperialist Powers. The deciding factor of the
situation was the democratic mass movement. But it was deprived of the
fruits of victory, because it was without an organised leadership.
Meanwhile, the social composition of the movement had changed. In the
beginning, the movement took the form of the boycott of Japanese
goods. Naturally, it was concentrated in the big trading centres,
particularly in Shanghai. There, it was reinforced by the appearance of
the working class. After that it went beyond the original form of boycott
and developed into mass demonstrations and strikes. In the beginning the
merchants had supported the movement. Now they began to took upon it
with suspicion and withdrew their support. Since the boycott of Japanese
goods freed the market for their goods, even Chinese mill-owners had
supported the movement. They also
284 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
deserted the movement as soon as it developed other methods of struggle
under the leadership of the students influenced by Communist
propaganda. The most immediate achievement of the movement was that
it brought the students close to the working class. On the other hand, the
latter was given an intellectually equipped leadership. The desertion by
the big bourgeoisie and the defection even of the petty trading class, did
not really weaken the movement. Encouraged by the downfall of the pro-
Japanese Peking Government, it developed into a powerful democratic
mass movement with general anti-imperialist slogans. Shanghai became
its main centre. That was the home of the most advanced section of the
Chinese working class.
At that movement the Kuo Min Tang became associated with the new
movement by a sheer accident. The secret negotiations of Sun Yat-sen
had failed. Upon the overthrow of the Peking Government, there
remained none to negotiate with. For the same reason, on the other hand,
the anti-Japanese movement could not have any further spontaneous
development. It must have a positive character. It must be given a
comprehensive programme, an organised leadership, and a certain
organisational form. In other words, a revolutionary political party must
evolve out of that spontaneous mass upheaval. Sun Yat-sen, with his
reputation, was present on the scene. The students proclaimed him as the
leader of the movement. The democratic masses annexed the Kuo Min
Tang. The latter had a re-birth. It could not find its way to the masses;
finally, the masses found their way towards the revolution and made the
Kuo Min Tang their own, in order to build it up into the historically
necessary revolutionary party of the people. The students and other
members of the lower intelligentsia joined the Kuo Min Tang in
thousands. In one city after another, Kuo Min Tang branches came into
existence. Political propaganda was carried on in every school
throughout the country under the banner of the Kuo Min Tang.
The inspiration of that regeneration of the Kuo Min Tang did not come
from the principles of Sun Yat-sen.3 As a matter of fact they were not yet
formulated. The inspiration came rather from the modern political and
economic literature which was read widely either in the original foreign
languages or in Chinese translation. The teachings of Karl Marx had
reached the Chinese youth and made upon many a very deep impression.
Finally came the message of the Russian Revolution. The Chinese saw
how the teachings of Marx could be
 The Establishment of the Nationalist Government 285
carried into practice in a neighbouring country. Lenin, not in person, but
through repute, appeared on the scene to compete with Sun Yat-sen for
the reverence of the Chinese youth.
Encouraged by the powerful mass support, the Kuo Min Tang recovered
its base of operation. Sun Yat-sen returned to Canton in 1921. There, he
gathered a number of members of the old parliament dissolved in 1917,
and established a Nationalist Governmant. He became its President. Its
programme was: 1. Destruction of militarism; 2. Unification of the
country through military operations; and 3. Abolition of the unequal
treaties with foreign Powers.
The contradiction in its own coiiposition again brought the Kuo Min
Tang to grief. On account of its programme, the new Government came
into conflict with the feudal military Governors of Kwangtung and the
neighbouring provinces. They had not only formally acknowledged the
authority of the new Government, but some of them had actually entered
the Kuo Min Tang.
Destruction of militarism implied the abolition of feudalism, the
conditions created by the decay of the latter being the social basis of the
former. Unification of the country could not be achieved except through
a successful struggle against the tendencies of decentralisation, which
also resulted from the decomposition of the feudal society. The Kuo Min
Tang had all along allied itself with those very forces. Ever since 1917, it
had been supporting the Southern militarists against their Northern rivals.
The first Cantonese Government was the result of that rivalry. But this
time its programme was positive. It declared war upon militarism as
such; the unification of the country was conditional upon a successful
termination of that war against militarism which had broken up the
country into practically independent regions. Finally, the militarists could
not possibly participate in a struggle against Imperialism which was their
patron. Consequently, the Governor of Kwangtung refused to sanction
the programme of the new Government. He was a member of the Kuo
Min Tang, and was the head of the first Nationalist Government estab-
lished in 1917. He and the class he represented could not possibly vote
for their own destruction. In vain did Sun Yat-sen try to convince him.
Owing to his sudden change of front, the Kuo Min Tang was deserted by
its former allies and supporters. They accused it of treachery and
declared war upon it.
Meanwhile, epoch-making events were taking place outside the
286 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
narrow circle of the Kuo Min Tang to aggravate its internal contra-
dictions, which eventually brought about the downfall of the Second
Cantonese Government. The anti-Japanese movement of 1919 had
broadened itself into a general anti-imperialist movement. The working
class had come to the forefront. Strikes took place in all foreign-owned
enterprises. The movement reached its climax in the famous Hongkong
Strike of 1922. In the beginning of that year, 30,000 Chinese seaman had
declared a strike to enforce their demand for increased wages. For two
months, the port of Hongkong lay idle. The Government interfered. The
Seamen's Union was banned. Its leaders were arrested, and martial law
was declared. The workers retaliated by declaring a general strike in
which more than 200,000 workers participated, completely paralysing
the economic life of that prosperous British colony. The heroic struggle
of the Hongkong workers against powerful British Imperialism aroused
great enthusiasm throughout the country. The workers in all the other
industrial centres, Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, Tientsin, etc., declared
solidarity with their comrades in Hongkong. A mighty wave of protest
strikes and mass demonstrations swept the country. Even the bourgeoisie
supported the movement with sympathy and finance. The students joined
the strikers in demonstrations. Merchants subscribed funds to the strike.
British Imperialism followed the Japanese in suffering a heavy defeat,
and the consequent loss of prestige, at the hands of the democratic
masses of China. But this time, the fruits of victory were reaped by the
workers themselves. The Hongkong seamen received a twenty per cent
increase of wages; they also enforced their claim for a fifty per cent
payment of the wages for the entire period of the strike. The Cantonese
Government supported the strike. The seat of the Seamen's Union was
shifted to Canton, from where it directed operations more or less with the
support of the Government. The Kuo Min Tang, operating through the
Cantonese Government, was at last actually engaged in a struggle against
Imperialism. British Imperialism, on the other hand, regarded the
Cantonese Government as an enemy, and helped the reactionary
Governor of Kwangtung to overthrow it. Sun Yat-sen was again driven
out of Canton, and went to Shanghai.
The bitter experience convinced the Kuo Min Tang of the necessity of
fighting native reaction and foreign Imperialism together. On his return
to Shanghai Sun Yat-sen came in contact with the
 The Establishment of Nationalist Government 287
representative of the Soviet Republic, who helped him to learn the lesson
of the recent experience. He advised that the Kuo Min Tang should be
reorganised in such a way that it could become the leader of the
revolutionary democratic masses and carry on the struggle for freedom
on two fronts. Fullest support of the revolutionary working class, on the
national as well as the international scale, was offered to the Kuo Min
Tang.
In the beginning of the year 1924, the Kuo Min Tang was reorganised.
Previous to that, with the powerful support of the working class and
material assistance from the new international ally, namely, the Soviet
Union, Sun Yat-sen had again succeeded in setting up a Nationalist
Government in Canton. Having a mass basis, the new Nationalist
Government was no longer at the mercy of treacherous allies, and could
firmly deal with its enemies. The year before it had been overthrown by
the militarists. But now it succeeded in crushing a counter-revolutionary
revolt engineered again from Hongkong.
The social foundation of the Nationalist Government, however, was still
not fully cemented. The Kuo Min Tang had not taken up the struggle
against foreign Imperialism on its own accord. It had been driven to that
position under the pressure of the revolutionary action of the democratic
masses. The development and ultimate success of that struggle, in the
last analysis, depended upon a radical change in the social orientation of
the Kuo Min Tang. The reorganisation consolidated it as a political party,
gave it a partially political programme, but it was not yet entirely
detached from the alliance with classes opposed to the bourgeois
democratic revolution. It tried to hold the balance between feudalism and
the revolutionary drmocratic masses. The continued relation with
feudalism did not allow it to take up a determined fight against
militarism. It still allied with one military clique in order to fight another.
The social basis of militarism was the economic conditions created by
the decomposition of the old feudal-patriarchal social order. Disruption
of the pre-capitalist conditions of production and the slow and
unsatisfactory development of modern industries together created wide-
spread unemployment, causing practical destitution for the masses of the
population. Millions were permanently unemployed, and there was no
chance of their earning a livelihood in any normal and legitimate way. In
that desperate situation, they had only two
288 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
alternatives: either to take to banditry, or enter the armies of the war-
lords. There was little difference between the two. The profession of the
war-lords themselves was rather pil lage and plunder than warfare. By
joining their armies, destitute peasants could get the barest means of
subsistence even if they received no regular salaries. The armies were
mercenary bands, but as a rule the soldiers were not paid. They were
prepared to help themselves as long as the General supplied them with
arms. These, in their turn, were supplied to the Generals by the
imperialist Powers. Consequently, in the last analysis, the armies of the
war-lords were instruments of Imperialism; their very existence
aggravated the exploitation and misery of the country. Decayed
feudalism and imperialist exploitation together produced the monster of
militarism. Therefore, it could not be slain without destroying both the
factors that gave birth to it.
It was obvious from this analysis of the peculiarly Chinese phenomenon
of militarism that the task of the Kuo Min Tang was to carry through an
agrarian revolution. The country must be cleared of the ugly ruins of
feudal-patriarchal relations before it could return to a normal economic
state. Of course, the economic condition of the country could not be
substantially improved or the poverty of the masses appreciably
alleviated, except through the development of modern industries, so that
large masses of the unemployed population could be absorbed in the
process of production. But that could not be done overnight. It would
take some time. Meanwhile, the immediate task was reorganisation of
agriculture on the basis of a radical readjustment of agrarian relations.
Elimination of all the pre-capitalist forms of exploitation would enable
the peasantry to improve their mode of production. Agriculture, thus
rationalised, would give some employment to the landless masses. The
result could be achieved only through a redistribution of land. Finally,
the extensive uncultivated areas could be brought under cultivation, thus
absorbing millions of the unemployed. Pauperised and destitute peasant
families would willingly emigrate to those distant parts if they were
guaranteed the fruits of their labour, and given the initial help by the
Government for them to settle down. The programme of the Nationalist
Government evidently could not be carried out except through the
adoption of measures calculated to produce the above effects. In other
words, the execution of the programme involved an agrarian
revolution—the abolition of the power and privileges of decayed
feudalism. But the
 The Establishment of Nationalist Government 289
Kuo Min Tang still attached the greatest importance to military
operations for the unification of the country. Consequently, the
Nationalist Government remained entangled in the alliance with feudal
militarists who were avowed enemies of any radical change in the
established agrarian relations. The Nationalist Government, even after it
had been established with the support of the revolutionary democratic
masses, stultified itself owing to its inability to realise that one could not
conduct a revolutionary struggle in alliance with the enemies of the
revolution.
The Nationalist Government was established under the auspices of two
conflicting forces: the revolutionary democratic mass movement and a
military dictatorship aspiring to bring the entire country under its
domination. The second was an older force which had always been the
mainstay of the Kuo Min Tang. But with that alone a stable Nationalist
Government could not be established. That was done only when the
former force came into operation. These two conflicting forces struggled
for supremacy within the Kuo Min Tang right from the moment of its
reorganisation. In the beginning, the revolutionary democratic tendency
appeared to develop faster, forcing the Nationalist Government to go
farther than the opposing forces would allow. But before long a decisive
fight between the two became unavoidable. The conflict inside the Kuo
Min Tang was only a reflex of the fierce clash of class interests in the
country at large. During the short period of revolutionary activity, in its
long chequered history the Kuo Min Tang became the scene of a bitter
class struggle. It could have come out of that crisis as a fully
revolutionised political party of the democratic masses. But in that crisis,
the forces of reaction proved to be more powerful, and the Kuo Min
Tang went to pieces. It gave up its transitory revolutionary role and came
out openly as the organ of counter-revolution.
Nevertheless, the establishment of the Nationalist Government was an
important event in the history of the Chinese Revolution For a time, it
was an organ of the anti-imperialist struggle, and as such served as a
powerful lever for developing the revolutionary democratic movement.
290 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Notes
1. Professor Goodnow of the John Hopkins University, a friend of President
Woodrow Wilson, came to act as the Adviser of Yuan Shih-kai. The constitutional
justification for the restoration of monarchy, planned by the latter, was provided by
that American Liberal.
2. The Japanese loans to the Tuan Chi-jui Government amounted to 200 million
Yens. (China Year Book 1928)
3. About the relation of Sun Yat-sen with the democratic mass movement, one of his
devoted followers writes: "Sun himself was unpopular with the broad section of the
population from his acceptance of the presidentship of the Southern Republic in
1921 up to his return to Canton in the year 1923. He had emphasised over the purely
military aspect of his reconstruction plan, and in his zeal of an armed struggle he
paid little attention to the degradation in which the Chinese peasantry found itself. In
this respect, Sun Yat-sen unconsciously became the instrument of the Chinese
reaction." (Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China").
 CHATER XIII
THE THIRTIETH OF MAY 1925
No single day can be picked out as a turning point of history. But events
taking place in a whole period often reach their climax in the happenings
of a particular day which thus stands out as a milestone of singular
importance on the road of history. Such a place is occupied by the
thirtieth of May, 1925, in the history of the Chinese Revolution. What
happened on that day marked a definite turn in the development of the
struggle of the Chinese people against foreign Imperialism and native
reaction. The happenings of that day were the culmination of events
taking place previously, and led up to others of even greater importance.
The crushing defeat of China in the war with Japan and the unrestricted
foreign aggression that followed the Treaty of Shimon-oseki, were the
immediate cause of the Boxer Uprising. Twenty years later, China found
herself in the throes of another wave of anti-imperialist revolt provoked
by the Treaty of Versailles. Thanks to the social development during the
intervening period, and political experience gained at the same time, the
movement of 1919 was not so elemental as its predecessor. Though, in
the beginning, it was not so stormy apparently, it was politically more
mature. Therefore, it led to developments much more stormy than the
Boxer Uprising. Owing to its political maturity, the movement of 1919
could not be misled as the previous anti-imperialist upheavel had been.
The military clique, which ruled in Peking as the instrument of Japanese
Imperialism, went down before that great popular onslaught. The fall of
its protege meant a defeat for Japanese Imperialism. The economic
consequence of the anti-Japanese boycott was meagre, but its political
significance was great.
The anti-imperialist movement in the opening year of the cen-
292 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
tury was an upheavel of the ignorant peasantry, easily susceptible to
religious superstition and the fanaticism that usually results therefrom. At
that time the democratic middle-class failed to appreciate the revo-
lutionary significance of the upheavel, and foolishly kept aloof from it.
They went to the extent of disapproving it. Twenty years later they stood
at the head of the movement as the owner of the social and political
heritage of the Boxer Uprising.
The urban democracy, led by the students, was the most active factor in
the anti-imperialist movement which developed as a protest against the
Japanese annexation of Chinese territory sanctioned by the Versailles
Treaty. Petty manufacturers, small traders, artisans, intellectuals and
employees were all oppressed politically and economically. They aspired
for political rights and economic advancement of the country. They
participated in the anti-imperialist movement to express their discontent
with the existing conditions. But presently it became evident that the
movement could not freely develop towards victory without hurting the
immediate interest of certain sections of their class.
The boycott of Japanese goods was the main weapon wielded at the
beginning of the movement. It was a doubled-edged sword. It could not
seriously injure Japan without making enemies of the native merchants
dealing in Japanese goods. Had it been without a deeper social
foundation, the movement would have succumbed to that contradiction.
But behind the urban democracy, there stood the toiling masses who had
initiated the struggle against Imperialism when the bourgeoisie was still
living in a fool's paradise—while the latter still entertained an illusion
about the nature of Imperialism. The contradiction of the boycott
movement was a political education for the progressive intellectuals. It
taught them to turn their eyes upon the toiling masses as the reservoir of
revolutionary energy. Most of the pioneers of the revolutionary labour
and peasant movement received their first political schooling in the
boycott movement of 1919. It was out of that movement that the Kuo
Min Tang grew as a powerful organ of revolutionary struggle for
national liberation.
The first effect of the anti-Japanese boycott was dislocation of trade.
That not only annoyed the compradores, bankers and wholesale dealers
in foreign goods; it touched also the interest of small dealers who, at that
time, happened to be an active factor in the anti-imperialist movement. It
became evident that the urban democracy, depending on the support and
sympathy of the big bourgeoisie,
 The Thirtieth of May 293
could not alone carry on an effective struggle against Imperialism. The
more advanced section of the petit-bourgeoisie, namely, the declassed
intellectuals, looked out for other forms of struggle less hampered by
contradictions. They discerned a new perspective in the sporadic strikes
expressing the seething discontent of the working class. They realised
that the overthrow of Imperialism and the establishment of a democratic
government could not be realised except through a revolutionary struggle
of the masses. That was a valuable lesson.
The deterioration of the economic conditions of the petit-bourgeoisie was
not essentially a result of imperialist domination. On the contrary, the
economic interests of the petit-bourgeoisie were closely connected with a
prosperous foreign trade. The injury to the interests of the petit-
bourgeoisie, urban as well as rural, was caused by the feudal character of
national economy and the chronic civil wars waged by the militarists.
Feudal economy hindered the expansion of the internal market, and the
feudal character of the State apparatus obstructed trade in numerous
ways. Militarism imposed heavy burdens upon rural traders and often
practically destroyed trade. Feudal militarist autocracy deprived the
middle-classes of all political rights. The background of the anti-
imperialist movement was a revolt against those conditions. A direct
attack upon Imperialism, however, rebounded upon the immediate
economic interests of the middle-classes. The lesson of the experience,
therefore, was that Imperialism must be attacked from a different
position. Feudal relations not only choked the economic life of the
country, but at the same time provided the social basis for imperialist
exploitation. The subversion of those relations would, therefore,
undermine Imperialism. But the petit-bourgeoisie by themselves could
not find, and did not have the courage to travel, that revolutionary road
leading to their own salvation. For that purpose, they had to come under
the influence of the working class. The most important result of the
movement of 1919 was that the democractic petit-bourgeoisie realised
the revolutionary potentialities of the working class.
Between 1919 and 1922 the situation developed in two directions. On the
one hand, the pro-Japanese Anfu Clique was overthrown by another
combination of militarists, who in their turn fell out among themselves
after driving their rivals from power. They split into warring factions led
respectively by Chang Tso-lin and Wu
294 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Pei-fu. The latter drove the former out of Peking and compelled him to
withdraw to Manchuria. There he came under Japanese influence.
Victorious Wu Pei-fu was hailed by Anglo-American Imperialism as the
"enlightened" war-lord who should be helped in his strivings to bring
order out of chaos in his unfortunate country. In the war between the two
war-lords, the bourgeoisie sided with
Wu Pei-fu.
Simultaneously with the civil war, there developed a new force. All the
industrial centres became scenes of recurring strikes. While the country
was being broken up by bloody civil wars, frustrating all schemes of
unification, the action of the working class represented a new tendency
of cohesion. Until then, the very existence of the working class had not
been recognised in the political activities of the country. But now it could
no longer be ignored.
The strikes during the years 1919 to 1922 took place as integral parts of
the general anti-imperialist movement. Taking place mostly in foreign-
owned enterprises, they received the sympathy of the nationalist
bourgeoisie. They took place in foreign-owned enterprises, because the
latter, being the centres of modern industry in China, employed the most
advanced section of the working class. Essentially, the strikes heralded
the beginning of the proletarian class struggle. It was a coincidence of
history that they constituted parts of the nationalist struggle. The relation,
however, was not altogether accidental. Inasmuch as the nationalist
movement was a struggle against Imperialism, the working class was
vitally interested hi the movement. Because, Capitalism and Imprialism
happened to be identical in China. The apparent accident of the
proletarian class struggle assuming a nationalist complexion had a very
revolutionising effect upon the whole situation It helped the petit-
bourgeois intellectuals to act according to the lesson they had learnt from
the contradictions of the boycott movement of 1919. It helped them to
find their way to the revolutionary masses.
In the beginning, the strikes were all spontaneous. The employers were
taken unawares and, therefore, had to give in more often than not. The
spontaneous nature of the movement proved that it was not the creation
of the nationalist intellectuals, as maintained by the Kuo Min Tang
theoreticians. The spontaneous revolt of the working class opened up a
new perspective before the democratic intellectuals. It showed them the
way out of the impasse brought about by the
 The Thirtieth of May 295
contradictions of the anti-Japanese boycott movement of 1919 For the
foreign employers, the strikes were like bolts from the blue. Who had ever
heard of the Chinese coolies demanding to be treated as human beings,
asking for higher wages and better working conditions, refusing to sell their
labour power unless a fair price was paid in return!
The history of China is full of instances of elemental mass outbreaks with
primitive political significance. The Boxer Uprising was the latest. But
strikes for enforcing upon the all-powerful foreign employers, supported by
mighty Governments at home and battleships on the spot, concrete economic
demands, was something entirely new They were not the expression of the
blind fury of an oppressed people. They were the revolutionary action of a
class, conscious of its interests and determined to defend them.
The strikes spread rapidly from one industrial centre to another Taken
unawares by the spontaneous and swift action of the workers, the employers
were obliged to give in. Most of the strikes between 1919 and 1922 were
partially or entirely successful. The culminating point was the Hongkong
seamen's strike which developed into a successful general strike. The
success of the strike movement, in contrast to the meagre result of the
boycott movement of 1919,'was yet another object lesson for the urban
democracy. They saw'that the workers, until then completely ignored in the
nationalist movement, could dictate terms to proud imperialists. Other
classes had failed to agree upon a common platform and to create a united
national organisation. In contrast to that failure, the workers came out of the
first round of a victorious combat as a cohesive force with a remarkable
spirit of solidarity. In the midst of the civil war tearing the country to pieces,
that first victory of the workers laid the foundation of the political party
which was to lead them in future struggles. The consequence of that victory
also was to set up a centralised organisation to conduct the struggle of the
workers for immediate economic demands throughout the country.
The Communist Party of China was founded in 1920. Its pioneers were the
leaders of the democratic movement of 1919. Jts programme was not only to
defend the interests of the working 'class but to free the entire Chinese
people from imperialist exploitation and oppression by native reaction.
Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the labour organisations set
up in the industrial
296 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
centres, scattered all over the country, were united in the Trade Union
Federation. In 1922, two hundred representatives of the newly organised
labour met in a conference at Canton to declare the determination of the
working class to conduct a relentless fight against the imperialist
exploitation of China. That was nearly two years before the Kuo Min
Tang reorganised itself with a programme which placed the struggle
against Imperialism in the forefront. It is an unmistakable lesson of
history that the Kuo Min Tang reorganised itself into a revolutionary
mass party under the pressure of the working class. The resolution of the
Canton Labour Conference was not an empty threat. It was the voice of a
class that had already come to close gripj with powerful Imperialism, and
came out victorious.
Imperialism was not slow to discover its deadly enemy in the working
class. The economic demands of the working class threatened the profits
of foreign capital invested in China, their action promised to infuse a
new life in the nationalist movement. Imperialist interest demanded
suppression of the working class. The native bourgeoisie also found their
interests coincide with those of foreign Imperialism. The two composed
their differences and made a united front against the common enemy.
The Chinese bourgeoisie joined Imperialism in a crusade against the
working class, because, in course of its development, the strike
movement had transgressed its superficial nationalist limit and had
extended to enterprises owned by native capital.
At that time, the native bourgeoisie were allied with the warlord Wu Pei-
fu. The latter placed his military forces at the disposal of his allies for the
suppression of the working class. The attack began in the coal-fields of
Chili. In October 1922, workers were massacred there by the armed
police. The scene of the next battle was the Peking-Hankow Railway.
That important line of communication was owned by British capital. But
for the moment, it was controlled by Wu Pei-fu, the protege of British
Imperialism. The workers on that line, having organised themselves in
several local unions, wanted to form a central organisation. The
amalgamation was to take place in a conference. The preparations for the
conference went on publicly for two months. There was no restriction. At
the last moment Wu Pei-fu issued an order prohibiting it, when some of
the delegates had already assembled and the rest were on the way. The
conference decided to meet defying the order. But
 The Thirtieth of May 297
troops had surrounded the building in which it was to meet. At the head
of a large number of workers, the delegates forced their way into the hall
and declared the conference open. The first act of the conference was to
pass a resolution vehemently condemning militarism. Hs was to be
expected, the conference was stormed by troops. The workers put up a
heroic resistance, but could not possibly hold out against a powerful
armed attack. The conference was dispersed. Its leaders were arrested
and summarily punished.
The high-handed action of the militarists provoked great indignation
among the workers. As a protest, a general strike was called. In four day
the traffic of the entire line was held up. The movement spread to other
lines. The democratic middle-class sympathised with the workers who
demanded freedom of association, and punishment of persons
responsible for the attack upon the conference. The situation appeared to
be pregnant with grave possibilities. The bold action of the workers in
defence of elementary civil liberties drove all the forces of reaction to
unite in an open attack against them. Foreign Consuls and the directors
of the railway met the Generals of Wu-pei-fu in a conference to agree
upcn measures to be taken for handling the situation. By one brave blow,
the working class exposed the close connection between foreign
Imperialism, the native bourgeoisie and militarism. On the orders of
foreign Imperialism, and to defend the interests of native capitalism, the
militarists attacked the strikers with brutal ferocity. All along the line,
nearly seven hundred miles long, workers were slaughtered by the
soldiers of Wu Pei-fu. The arrested leaders were executed in the open
street in the typical mediaeval fashion.
The massacre on the Peking-Hankow Railway was the signal for a
general attack upon the workers in all the industrial centres throughout
the country. Trade-unions were broken up by the militarists. The labour
movement was then hardly two years old. Would it be able to survive
such a terrible attack? It was feared that it would be thoroughly
demoralised and completely destroyed. But at last, foreign Imperialism
and native reaction were confronted with a force which was entirely
different from others they had to deal with previously. The working class
could be defeated, but not demoralised, much less destroyed. Under the
staggering blow, the young labour movement was driven underground; in
that condition it soon developed even a greater striking power.
298 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
On the other hand, the process of decomposition in the camp of
militarism went on apace. Wu Pei-fu was betrayed by his chief
lieutenant, Feng Yu-hsiang. Thus weakened, he was heavily defeated by
his rival, the Manchurian war-lord. The wave of democratic mass
movement reached the headquarters of reaction, Peking. After their
brilliant victory at Hongkong, the working class suffered a defeat in the
rest of the country. But its action encouraged the middle-class to expand
the democratic struggle. In the beginning of 1925, the bourgeoisie made
a feeble attempt to capture power in Peking. As usual, they depended
upon the support of some militarists. The "Christian General" coquetted
with the democratic movement in Peking, while he was conspiring
against his own chief. Upon the realisation of his own ambition, he did
not prove to be any different from others of his ilk.
But in the mean time, the storm-centre had shifted. Peking was no longer
the political centre of China. Events there were not of decisive
importance. Shanghai had come to be the real metropolis of China, and it
was there that the next round of the battle was fought. The revolutionary
action of the Shanghai workers became the outstanding feature of
Chinese politics. It being the economic centre of modern China, the
control of that city was the key to power. In consequence of the
elimination of Wu Pei-fu and the debacle of the "Christian General",
Shanghai passed under the control of a partisan of the Mancburian clique
behind which stood Japanese Imperialism. But Shanghai was no longer
to be a happy hunting ground of military adventurists. In the period of
illegality, following upon the massacre of 1923, strong working class
organisations had been created there under the leadership of the
Communist Party. At the same time, the labour movement had developed
freely in Canton after the establishment of the Nationalist Government.
Shanghai, however, was the Paris of China. It must be conquered. What
Shanghai says to-day, entire China will say to-morrow. It is not in the
nature of the working class to take the line of least resistance. Shanghai
was protected by a formidable array of imperialist battle ships and
garrisoned by a huge Chinese army. Nevertheless, the working class
prepared for a grand battle there.
In May 1925, there was a strike in the Japanese cotton mills of Tsingtao.
The Governor of Shantung was a creature of Japanese Imperialism. He
immediately sent troops to crush the strike. The
The Thirtieth of May 299
workers in the Japanese mills of Shanghai rushed to the aid of their
comrades and declared a sympathetic strike demanding better treatment
and regular payment of wages In Shanghai also the workers were
attacked by the Japanese police and Chinese troops. The strike leader,
Kuo Chung-hung, was arrested and summarily executed. Great
indignation prevailed, and the strike spread to other mills with a lightning
rapidity. The workers called upon the entire population to join the
struggle against Imperialism. Acting upon the lessons learned from the
experience of 1919, the students responded enthusiastically. A powerful
democratic mass movement developed under the initiative and hegemony
of the working class. Some leaders of the movement were arrested by the
British police. A huge demonstration was organised to protest and
demand immediate release of the arrested leaders. The demonstrators
marched down the Nanking Road where luxurious shops catering to the
foreign and the Chinese bourgeoisie mocked at the miserable conditions
of the masses. The demonstration approached the British Police Station
where the arrested men were detained, and threatened to release them by
force. It was fired upon. Many were killed and more wounded. That was
on the thirtieth of May, 1925. That incident caused the development of a
great mass movement which opened up a new era in the history of the
Chinese Revolution.
The massacre of May 30 was retaliated with a general strike in which all
the workers of Shanghai participated. Students and small traders
followed the workers. Schools and shops were closed down. The Foreign
Settlement was placed under an economic blockade. Under the
leadership of the working class, there developed a new form of struggle
challenging the power of Imperialism. The police could not handle the
situation. It was so very revolutionary that the Chinese troops could not
be trusted to cope with it. Recruited from the destitute peasantry, they
were susceptible to revolutionary propaganda carried on from the point
of view of the exploited masses. The movement demanded abolition of
the special privileges enjoyed by the foreigners. The basic political
demand was supplemented by the demand for the freedom of assembly,
release of the arrested leaders and suspension of the martial law.
Simultaneously with the political demands, reflecting the interests of the
entire people, the working class demanded higher wages and better living
conditions. Alarmed by the gravity of the situation, Imperialism branded
its mailed fist. In the
300 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
beginning of June, armed marines were landed from the imperialist
battle-ships. The Chinese City was subjected to a reign of terror. The
University and other public buildings were the headquarters of the
movement. They ware occupied by armed forces. Meetings and
demonstrations were dispersed, and firing on crowds became a usual
practice.
What could not be achieved by the frontal attack of Imperialism, was
done through the underhand tactics of splitting the ranks of the
movement. Its driving force was the working class. Therefore, the policy
of Imperialism was to isolate them, and then crush them completely. A
successful struggle against the united forces of international Imperialism,
willingly backed up by native allies, whose brutality knew no bounds,
was conditional upon endless sacrifice and unflagging determination.
The readiness to sacrifice and the determination to fight, however, were
not shared equally by all the classes participating in the movement. As a
covered attack upon the movement, the Electric Works owned by British
capital declared that, owing to the strike, they could no longer supply
power and light to the Chinese cotton mills which had been working
during the strike. The patriotism of the bourgeoisie was put to test and
found wanting. As soon as their pocket was touched, they opened
negotiations with the foreigners for terminating the general strike. The
big bourgeoisie betrayed the movement first. The petit-bourgeoisie
followed. While the working class was thus left alone to fight the battle
of China against foreign Imperialism, Chang Tso-lin sent down
reinforcements under the command of his worthy son to establish peace
and order in Shanghai. Thus betrayed by the mill-owners, bankers and
big merchants, deserted also by the middle-class, with imperialist guns
bristling all around, and in the teeth of the militarist barbarity, the
proletariat carried on the struggle for three months. Their heroism,
sacrifice and determination inspired the entire country. A great anti-
imperialist tide surged over the land; the working class was found at the
forefront of the movement everywhere.
One of the consequences of the events of Shanghai was the second
Hongkong Strike, for the association with which the Nationalist
Government of Canton was dubbed "red". Thus, as a part of the entire
process, the movement in Shanghai, between May 30 and the beginning
of October, did not end in a defeat. The struggle, begun by the Shanghai
workers, was carried on farther by their comrades
 The Thirtieth of May 301
situated in a better position. The Hongkong Strike added great strength to
the Kuo Min Tang and the Nationalist Government. It once again
demonstrated the power of the working class and its ability to mobilise
the democratic masses in the struggle for national freedom.
When the news of the Shanghai shooting reached Canton, a great protest
demonstration was organised. The masses assembled in front of the
island of Shameen, on which the Anglo-French Settlement of Canton is
situated. They were immediately fired upon by the Settlement Police. To
retaliate, the domestic workers of the Settlement together with the
workers of Hongkong went on strike. The tiny Settlement in the heart of
Canton took on the aspects of a beleaguered fortress surrounded by
barbed-wire fences and covered by a dozen gun-boats. Serious efforts
were made to break the strike in Hongkong. Leaders were arrested,
unions were closed down, and meetings were suppressed. Thereupon
followed one of the most memorable events in the history of the Chinese
struggle for freedom. All the Chinese workers left Hongkong. They were
followed by the small traders, intellectuals and employees. The island
was entirely cut off from the mainland. The strike and blockade lasted
for fifteen months, during which period British trade in China was
reduced by half. That was a severe blow to the power and prestige of
Imperialism.
The whole movement was conducted from Canton by a Strike
Committee. Since the movement was no longer a mere strike but an all-
round struggle against Imperialism, the Strike Committee grew into a
powerful political organ, compelling the Nationalist Government to
move far in the direction of freeing itself from the domination of feudal-
bourgeois elements. As a matter of fact, for a time, the Strike Committee
exercised all the functions of a government. It did not supercede the
Nationalist Government. As the militant organ of the working class in
action, it wielded political power to the extent of dictating the policy of
the Nationalist Government. For example, the function of the Workers'
Guards (armed formation of the strikers) included "assistance to the
Nationalist Government to suppress the counter-revolutionary
movement, to defend the workers from robbery and violence of the
bandits". Wherever and whenever the Nationalist Government vacillated
in taking decisive measures, urgently needed in that critical moment, the
Strike Committee stepped in and did the needful.
The Workers' Guards constituted the nucleus of the Nationalist
302 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Army. In the beginning, the army of the Canton Government was largely
inherited from the feudal Generals who had joined the Kuo Min Tang for
their own reactionary purpose. The officers trained in the Wampoa
Military Academy were still too few to transform the social character of
that mercenary army. The soldiers remained attached to their Generals;
they would fight for or against anyone at the command of the Generals.
When thousands of strikers entered the army, the whole atmosphere
changed. The new officers found a base of operation, so to say. The
workers became the most active element in the army, and functioned as
the revolutionary ferment. The peasant movement, which subsequently
became the backbone of the revolution, also received a great impetus
from the Hongkong Strike. All the strikers could not be employed at
Canton. Thousands of them scattered into the surrounding villages,
where they quickened the political life with their experience in an actual
fight against Imperialism. They inspired the peasantry with the courage
to stand up for the right to the fruits of their labour.
By the end of 1925, the nature of the nationalist movement had changed
very greatly. That occurred mostly in consequence of the great sacrifice
made and brave battles fought, often against overwhelming odds, by the
working class. The fight against foreign Imperialism and native reaction
was no longer carried on through futile conspiracies and discrediting
combinations. It was now conducted by the masses, and the Kuo Min
Tang was the leader of the revolutionary struggle.
In Shanghai the middle-class nationalists had failed to keep pace with the
workers in the struggle against Imperialism. They deserted the movement
as soon as it demanded some real sacrifice on their part. But the
Hongkong Strike took place under different circumstances. The
Nationalist Government was compelled to stand by the strikers.
Otherwise, it would have forfeited all distinction from other cliques also
aspiring to be the supreme authority of the country. It had come into
existence with the avowed object of freeing China from foreign
domination. Therefore, it could not possibly deny support to the working
class when they were engaged in a heroic struggle against Imperialism.
Had it deserted the workers in the midst of the struggle, as the
bourgeoisie did in Shanghai, it would have been thoroughly discredited,
and there would be no place for it in the history of the Chinese
Revolution. Failing to enlist the confidence of the masses by
 The Thirtieth of May 303
supporting the struggle initiated by them, the Nationalist Government
would have been reduced to a position of extreme weakness, and
consequently it could be easily overthrown by enemies all around
waiting for a chance. Under those circumstances, the bourgeoisie were
pushed in a way which they would have never travelled on their own
initiative. That revolutionary push came from the great momentum
gathered by the democratic mass movement from the events taking place
ever since the thirtieth of May.
 CHAPTER XIV
"RED" CANTON
In January 1923 in Shanghai, Sun Yat-sen met Joffe, the Envoy of the
Soviet Republic. The year before, he had been driven out of Canton by
the treachery of his feudal-militarist allies. His negotiations with the pro-
Japanese Peking Government had also ended in nothing, owing to the
downfall of the latter under the attack of the democratic mass movement.
It was in that movement of despondency that Sun Yat-sen came in
contact with revolutionaries. Under the impact of the democratic mass
movement, the Kuo Min Tang was being driven towards a re-birth. With
no initiative from its side, it was simply taken possession of by the
growing forces of revolution. On the one hand, the democratic movement
hailed Sun Yat-sen as its leader and, on the other hand, his conversations
with the representatives of the Workers' Republic helped him to have a
broader view of the national and international problems.
It was commonly believed that that historic meeting converted Sun Yat-
sen to Communism. Since then all the enemies of the Chinese Revolution
denounced him as an agent of Bolshevism. The truth, however, was
entirely different. Joffe did not think of making a communist out of Sun
Yat-sen. He could not have forgotten Lenin's wise advice not to paint
nationalist revolutionaries red, to justify the Communists helping them.
What Joffe tried to do was to explain to the leader of the Chinese
nationalist movement that the attitude of the Proletarian State of Russian
differed not only from that of Tzarist Russia, but also from the attitude of
other foreign Powers. Having explained the reason of that difference, he
reassured Sun Yat-sen that the Soviet Republic sympathised with the
aspirations of the Chinese people and would give them every possible
help
 "'Red" Canton 305
without any condition. While declaring the sympathy and promising the
help of the Workers' Republic he, however, emphasised upon the
necessity of the Chinese people themselves knowing how to fight
effectively for their object. He told Sun Yat-sen what the latter should do
if he desired to lead the Chinese people in the struggle for national
freedom. He must have pointed out to Sun Yat-sen the futility of military
combinations and political intrigues as weapons in a great revolutionary
struggle. Those questionable weapons of his choice had just failed him
once again. Therefore, Sun Yat-sen was open to conviction as regards
their futility.
The conversation culminated in the publication of a joint statement. The
principles of the subsequent alliance between the Proletarian State of
Russia and the revolutionary National ist Government of China were laid
down in that document. At the same time, it was made clear that neither
did the one seek to convert the other to Communism, not did the latter
accept it. The first clause of the joint statement was: "Dr. Sun Yat-sen
holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot
actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the
conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or
Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the
opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve
national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding
this task he assured Dr Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy
of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia." Later on,
while expounding his Three Principles, Sun Yat-sen defined his attitude
towards Communism more categorically. He rejected the Marxian
conception of social evolution, and expressed his faith in liberal
reformism. Sun Yat-sen's disagreement with the fundamental principles
of Marxism, and particularly his condemnation of class struggle, should
be kept clearly in mind while studying the very interesting history of
"Red" Canton.
The object of the revolutionary struggle waged between 1924 and 1926,
with Canton as its base, was not to establish a proletarian dictatorship. If
in that short period, Canton occasionally appeared to be "red", that was
with a faint glow of Jacobinism. Sun Yat-sen was not converted to
Communism, but the Kuo Min Tang, during those two years, developed
Jacobinist tendencies. Canton was the centre of a revolutionary struggle
for the creation of a democratic
304 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Only in course of the struggle for the overthrow of Feudalism, and for
the abolition of other pre-capitalist social relations, could the bourgeoisie
lead the agrarian revolution. But Wang Chin-wei still remained an
implacable opponent of class struggle. The Chinese bourgeoisie would
not undertake a struggle for destroying feudal reaction; therefore, they
could not assume the leadership of the insurgent peasantry engaged in
the historical task of carrying through the agrarian revolution. That being
the case, Wang Chin-wei's plan remained only a plan; it could not be put
into practice-
In view of his readiness to sacrifice his party on the altar of militarism,
the democratic gesture of the leader of petit-bourgeois radicalism was
absurd. For years he had combated his rival, Chiang Kai-shek, with the
slogan that the party authority should prevail over the government and
the Military Command. Now he proposed that the party should be
restored to its pristine purity, but at the same time abandoned the demand
for the control of the state and Army by the party. That voluntary
renunciation was necessary in order to placate the 'Tiilitarists, who had
not the least desire to subordinate themselves to a clique of incompetent
petit-bourgeois politicians. The projected government to dispute the
authority of Nanking should not be subordinated to any control; it would
be composed of such "talents" as Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and
even Chang Hsue-Liang who, in their turn, would win over Wang Chin-
wei in order to make themselves popular.
But all those counter-revolutionary combinations were presently
disturbed by the growing forces of revolt on which they were to be"
built. In the spring of 1930, the revolutionary peasants' army began to
march towards the North through the provinces of Kiangsi and Hunan.
The Government troops having been withdrawn to be engaged in the
campaign in the North, the revolutionary force encountered very little
resistance. Only July 28, they occupied the city of Changsha. Panic
reigned in the middle-Yangtse region. Strong detachments of armed
peasants marched also upon Nanchang and Hankow. Foreign battleships
were again despatched up the Yangtse. Japanese and British marines
landed at Hankow which was about to fall before the insurgents.
The resurgence of revolution drove underground the conflicts inside the
counter-revolutionary camp. Still speaking about a Northern Alliance,
Wang Chin-wei nevertheless hastened to declare that in
"''Red" Canton 305
without any condition. While declaring the sympathy and promising the
help of the Workers' Republic he, however, emphasised upon the
necessity of the Chinese people themselves knowing how to fight
effectively for their object. He told Sun Yat-sen what the latter should do
if he desired to lead the Chinese people in the struggle for national
freedom. He must have pointed out to Sun Yat-sen the futility of military
combinations and political intrigues as weapons in a great revolutionary
struggle. Those questionable weapons of his choice had just failed him
once again. Therefore, Sun Yat-sen was open to conviction as regards
their futility.
The conversation culminated in the publication of a joint statement. The
principles of the subsequent alliance between the Proletarian State of
Russia and the revolutionary National ist Government of China were laid
down in that document. At the same time, it was made clear that neither
did the one seek to convert the other to Communism, not did the latter
accept it. The first clause of the joint statement was: "Dr. Sun Yat-sen
holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot
actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the
conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or
Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the
opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve
national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding
this task he assured Dr Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy
of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia." Later on,
while expounding his Three Principles, Sun Yat-sen defined his attitude
towards Communism more categorically. He rejected the Marxian
conception of social evolution, and expressed his faith in liberal
reformism. Sun Yat-sen's disagreement with the fundamental principles
of Marxism, and particularly his condemnation of class struggle, should
be kept clearly in mind while studying the very interesting history of
"Red" Canton.
The object of the revolutionary struggle waged between 1924 and 1926,
with Canton as its base, was not to establish a proletarian dictatorship. If
in that short period, Canton occasionally appeared to be "red", that was
with a faint glow of Jacobinism. Sun Yat-sen was not converted to
Communism, but the Kuo Min Tang, during those two years, developed
Jacobinist tendencies. Canton was the centre of a revolutionary struggle
for the creation of a democratic
306 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
China. The object of the revolutionary struggle was to destroy native
reaction and overthrow foreign imperialist domination. In course of that
struggle, for once in its chequered career, the Kuo Min Tang became
necessarily involved in class struggle; but it was the class struggle which
underlies the bourgeois revolution. In that revolutionary struggle, the
Kuo Min Tang was fully supported by the working class, not only of the
country, but of the entire world. The essential significance of the alliance
with the Soviet Republic was that the revolutionary struggle of the
Chinese Nationalist Government received the support of the international
proletariat. The support was given on a clear understanding of the nature
of the Chinese Revolution, and neither the Kuo Min Tang nor the
Nationalist Government was expected to do anything more than they
were historically required to do in pursuance of their programme.
The relation with the Soviet Republic gave occasion for all sorts of
misunderstanding of the character of the Nationalist Government of
Canton. Owing to that relation, all Chinese Nationalists, inclined towards
revolution, came to be branded as "Bolshevik agents". The relation,
however, was established on very clearly denned principles. The Chinese
nationalists were attracted by the Soviet Government not owing to any
sympathy for its social ideals. They were impressed by its actual deeds of
friendship towards their country. They did not even understand that the
sympathy and friendly acts of the Soviet Republic towards China and
other subject nations were determined by its social ideals. To offer the
Chinese people help in their struggle for freedom, irrespective of their
attitude towards Communism, was neither a deceptive policy nor a clever
diplomatic move on the part of the Soviet Republic. Nor was it
sentimental humanitarianism. The policy was determined by the Marxian
understanding of history. The struggle of the subject people for national
freedom is a part of the greater world-wide struggle for the realisation of
Socialism. The Russian Soviet Republic represented the first conquest of
the working class as a world force. It was, therefore, vitally interested in
the struggle for the freedom of the subject nationalities. Its interest was
not that of a National State. It acted as an organ of political power
wielded by the working class of the entire world. Its friendship and
support for the Chinese Nationalist Government were not conditional
upon the latter's acceptance of Communism, because any such accep-
tance would be palpably hypocritical. Whatever might be the
 "Red" Canton 307
attitude of the Chinese nationalists, the success of their struggle would be
a step forward towards the real isation of Communism on the world
scale.
Communism is not a heaven hankered by visionaries. Eventually, human
society will reach Communism as a stage in the process of its evolution.
On the way, it must pass through various stages. The struggle to attain
these intervening stages is objectively a part of the struggle for
Communism. With this dialectical understanding of history, the
Communists hold that the working class must support the subject peoples
in their fight for national freedom.
The establishment of Communism is conditional upon a minimum
development of the forces of production. The abolition of social and
political conditions, which prevent the development of the forces of
production to the level where the establishment of Communism becomes
necessary and possible, therefore, advances the cause of Communism.
Such conditions obtain in countries subjected to colonial exploitation. By
virtue of having attained a high stage of capitalist production earlier than
others, some nations establish their domination over the rest of the world.
That is Imperialism. Under imperialist domination, productive forces in
the colonial countries could not develop freely. By holding a major
portion of human society in a backward stage, Imperialism became the
greatest enemy of Communism. The downfall of Imperialism, therefore,
is the first condition for a successful struggle for the realisation of
Communism. The struggle of the subject peoples for national liberation
thus becomes an integral part of the international struggle for
Communism. For overthrowing Imperialism, all those exploited and
oppressed by it should participate in a joint action. The proletarian
struggle in the capitalist countries should be co-ordinated with the
movement for national liberation in the colonies. Both are to be regarded
as complementary factors in the self-same struggle for the eventual esta-
blishment of the World Socialist Commonwealth.
The Marxian interpretation of history is not fatalistic. The capitalist
mode of production creates conditions for Communism. But the latter
does not grow painlessly out of the former, [n one period of history, the
capitalist mode of production brings human society out of the chaos of
feudalism; eventually, it loses its progressive character and itself
becomes a bulwark of reaction. Under capitalism, the means of
production develop tremendously. In course of
308 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
time, the limit is reached. No further development is possible within the
bounds of the capitalist mode of production. At the moment, it is in the
interest of capitalism to check the very progress which it has previously
promoted. Therefore, further progress becomes conditional upon the
liberation of the means of production from the fetters of private
ownership. Technical development having socialised production, it
becomes necessary, for general welfare, to socialise the ownership of the
means of production. The ownership of the means of production places a
particular class in the position of power and privileges. That class is
naturally opposed to the disappearance of its ownership and the
socialisation of the means of production. It puts up a stubborn resistance
to the transformation of the existing social order. The common
ownership of the means of socialised production is necessary for the
continued progress of human society. But that cannot take place without
a struggle. In order to build the capitalist social order, the bourgeoisie
overthrew the feudal aristocracy from its position of power and privilege.
The working class must do the same thing with the bourgeoisie for
freeing the forces of production from a system of ownership which has
ceased to have any social usefulness.
In the historic struggle for overthrowing the bourgeoisie from the
position of power, the working class must ally itself with all the forces
antagonistic to its enemy. Modern Imperialism being the highest form of
capitalism, forces operating against it are auxiliaries in the working class
struggle against the bourgeoisie. Subject nationalities are held by
Imperialism in varying grades of social backwardness. Therefore, their
fight for liberation involves classes not directly interested in
Communism, and in earlier stages it is led usually by social elements
consciously hostile to Communism. That was the case with the Chinese
nationalist movement in 1923, when it came into contact with the Soviet
Republic.
The social background of the movement was still predominantly
bourgeois, the working class being still an auxiliary factor; the leader-
ship, as personified by Sun Yat-sen, was decidedly opposed to Com-
munism. Nevertheless, the Soviet Republic offered its support. As the
victorious vanguard of the international proletariat, it could not do
otherwise. The historic importance of the National Revolution in the
colonial countries is its anti-imperialist character. Its social composition
is of secondary consideration. In so far as it contributes
"Red" Canton 309
to the downfall of Imperialism, it helps the proletarian revolution. That
being the case, there was no attempt on the part of the Soviet Republic to
convert the Kuo Min Tang to Communism as the condition for the
alliance between the two. The programme of the bourgeois democratic
nationalist revolution—the overthrow of foreign Imperialism and
destruction of native reaction—was a broad enough basis for the alliance.
In the past, bourgeois revolutions had always received the support of the
toiling masses. The working class was the driving force of the bourgeois
revolution even when it created conditions favourable for a more
intensive form of class exploitation. In the present period, a bourgeois
revolution can be accomplished only as the immediate prelude to a more
far-reaching social transformation. Therefore, it is bound to be still more
dependent upon the action of the working class. In the present period of
capitalist decay, a bourgeois revolution is not likely to produce the same
consequences as previously, when the capitalist mode of production was
an instrument of progress. A revolution places in power a particular class
which, in the given period, leads the forces of social progress, whose
triumph quickens the material and cultural advance of society as a whole.
Capitalism has long ceased to be an agency of progress. To-day, it is a
force of reaction, blocking human progress in every direction, throughout
the world. If it has that significance in the centres of capitalist
production, it is incomparably more so on the periphery of the capitalist
world, namely, in the colonial countries. The nationalist revolution in the
subject countries only represents the destructive aspect of the bourgeois
revolution. It is bourgeois revolution because, in the struggle against
Imperialism, it destroys pre-capitalist conditions hitherto preserved for
the exigencies of colonial exploitation. But on the positive side, it is
bound to transcend the limits of the bourgeois revolution. Objectively
and essentially, being a fight against capitalist reaction, it is not likely to
end by enthroning its enemy. The success of the nationalist revolution in
China would mean a severe blow to Imperialism. Capitalism grew out of
the debris of feudalism; but it is not likely to resurrect out of its own
ruins.
Of course, here again, the objective possibilities cannot be fatalistically
relied upon. The subjective factor must play the decisive role. The last
word regarding the future of China, as well as of any other subject
country, belongs to the domestic masses But for
310 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the presence of the proletariat, much more conscious of their class
interest than in the past, the bourgeois revolution might possibly set up a
capitalist order of society in the backward countries of the colonial
world. The situation, however, happens to be different. In the bourgeois
nationalist revolutions in those countries, the working class is a
dominating factor. The Chinese nationalist movement established
friendly relations with the Soviet Republic just at the moment it was
developing into a revolutionary struggle owing to the active participation
of the working class. The nationalist bourgeoisie betrayed the revolution
as soon as it became evident that its victory would not place them in
power. But the betrayal of the nationalist revolution did not stop the
democratic revolution. In spite of the treachery of the bourgeoisie, it will
clear away the relics of pre-capitalist social relations and introduce
higher means of production, but not as the basis of a bourgeois social
order. Its success will mark the beginning of a process of social
reconstruction leading directly up to the establishment of Socialism.
Canton between 1924 and 1926 was "red", bacause it was the scene of
events marking a radical turn in the development of the Chinese
Revolution. The turn was towards Jacobinism which historically is the
fore-runner of Bolshevism, even when it is the banner of a successful
bourgeois revolution. Already at the close of the eighteenth century,
Jacobinism was a fore-runner of Bolshevism, although the two were
separated by more than a hundred years. Developing in alliance with
Bolshevism, after it had triumphed in one part of the world and was
staring the rest challengingly in the face, Jacobinism could no longer be a
successful midwife of capitalism. To-day, it would be the ominous
shadow of Bolshevism cast ahead, not more than a hundred years, but
only a few, Canton will always occupy a proud place in the history of the
Chinese Revolution as the scene of the short-lived Chinese Jacobinism
which thrived under the shadow of Sun Yat-senism mocking at its
reactionary character.
***
Sun Yat-sen did not take the friendly offer of the Soviet Republic very
seriously in the beginning. His eyes were still riveted upon the capitalist
world. Throughout 1923, he continued his secret efforts to get arms from
America or England for setting up a military government in the South.
Failing in that quarter, he even approached
"Red" Canton 311
defeated Germany for help. But presently things took a new turn. The
Soviet Republic sent a new Ambassador to China. He made the offer of
friendship publicly to the Chinese people. In a banquet given to the new
Ambassador, the Foreign Minister of the Peking Government expressed
the hope that "the new regime in Russia will follow the noble example of
America in its relation with China". Karakhan did not miss that golden
opportunity for exposing before the people how survile were the Chinese
bourgeoisie in their relation with the imperialist Powers. In his reply, he
said: "I reject decidedly the honour of treading the path of American
policy in China. Russia will never claim the right of extra-territoriality,
nor establish Courts of Administration on Chinese territory." That frank
declaration of Soviet policy in China was followed up by another speech
of the Ambassador at the National University of Peking. Addressing the
young radical intellectuals, he frankly said that the salvation of their
country must be worked out through a revolutionary movement, and that
without the active participation of the masses, there could be no success.
He concluded his speech with the following declaration: "We have
driven Imperialism out of our country; but only then shall we be satisfied
when there will be not a single oppressed nation in the world. When you
will be strong enough to start the battle against Imperialism, which is
oppressing your country, you may be assured of the sympathy with your
cause of the people of the Soviet Union."
The intellectual vanguard of the Chinese people saw a new vision. Sun
Yat-sen did not have the courage to take the hand of friendship stretched
out by the Soviet Union. But the young radical intellectuals were not
slow to do so enthusiastically. The democratic nationalist movement
became inspired with sympathy for the Soviet Union. The powerful
Russian Empire had in the past been the most feared enemy of China.
Now an equally powerful friend had taken the place of that dreaded
enemy. China was no longer without a sincere friend in her international
relations. An alliance with the Soviet Republic became a slogan of the
popular movement.
Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen had returned to C anton to revert to futile
military intrigues. His efforts to secure help either in America or England
or Germany had proved fruitless. Consequently, he had no hope of
winning the support of one or other army chief. On the other hand, a
revolutionary alliance between the democratic mass
312 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
movement of China and the Soviet Republic was being formed over the
head of the Kuo Min Tang. The accomplished fact could no longer be
ignored. Sun Yat-sen at last made up his mind to risk a revolutionary
alliance, nationally as well as internationally. Rebuffed by Anglo-
American Imperialism, he was obliged to fall back upon the offered
friendship of the Soviet Republic; abandoned by the cowardly
bourgeoisie and repeatedly betrayed by the feudal-militarists, at home he
had no other alternative than to come closer to the revolutionary masses.
Class prejudice had so long held him back from that alliance, although
political opportunism had been tempting him for some time in that
direction. He was ultimately forced into that relation, because the
Chinese masses demanded it. After the declarations of Karakhan, the
Kuo Min Tang could not possibly ignore the friendship of the Soviet
Republic without forfeiting the claim to the leadership of the Chinese
people. The alliance between the Nationalist Government of Canton and
the Soviet Republic was not an opportunist diplomatic relation It was
brought about by the will of the masses. It was a united front of the
proletariat as a world force and an oppressed people in the fight against
Imperialism.
Even when he finally requested the Soviet Ambassador to send to Canton
a representative for establishing practical relations, Sun Yat-sen wrote: "I
affirm that no criticism of the order or ideas, for which you stand, can or
will prevent me from holding with you that the real interest of our
respective countries demands the formulation of a common policy which
shall enable us to live on terms of equality with other Powers, and free
from the political and economic servitude imposed under an international
system resting on force and working through the method of economic
Imperialism." So, on the point of entering into an alliance with the Soviet
Republic, Sun Yat-sen once again made it clear that he had no sympathy
for Communism.
Since the Kuo Min Tang came under the revolutionary influence of the
democratic mass movement, its social composition had been undergoing
a change. Consequently, its political vision had also been growing
broader. The revolutionary union of the radical petit-bourgeoisie and the
working class had pushed the opportunist combination of bourgeois
politicians and feudal-militarists to the background. All those reasons
made the reorganisation of the Kuo Min Tang inevitable. The fact that
actual reorganisation was delayed until 1924 proved that the leaders
could not keep pace with the masses.
"Red" Canton 313
The latter strode ahead in seven-league boots, while the former were
woefully slow to come out of their old ruts. The events at Canton during
the year 1924 showed why the leaders of the Kuo Min Tang had been so
reluctant to travel the road they were finally forced to take.
The movement was at the parting of ways. A revolutionary orientation,
nationally and internationally, was sure to create a crisis inside the Kuo
Min Tang. It was financed by the reactionary compra-dore bourgeoisie;
the feudal militarists supported it for their reactionary purposes. A
revolutionary orientation would forfeit the Kuo Min Tang the support of
both those classes. In order to travel the new way, under the pressure of
the masses, and as the leader of a revolutionary democratic movement, it
must break with its disreputable past as regards organisation as well as
ideologically. But even then it would not make a decisive choice. It still
sought to ride on two horses, a dangerous exploit in which it eventually
broke its neck.
At last the reorganisation took place upon the background of a
developing class struggle inside the ranks of the Kuo Min Tang. True to
his principle of avoiding class struggle, Sun Yat-sen attempted to
reorganise his party on a platform of compromise between conflicting
class interests. In his heart of hearts, he still relied upon the feudal
militarists and the patriarchal old school officials rather than on the
masses. In order to satisfy those questionable allies, he sacrifice political
democracy. At the behest of the bourgeoisie, he committed the Kuo Min
Tang to a social reformism which placed it on the road to counter-
revolution. The very resolutions of the Reorganisation Conference
contained the germs of the counter-revolutionary policy adopted by the
Kuo Min Tang later on. The policy formulated in them was indeed an
advance upon the past, particularly, in respect of the attitude towards
Imperialism. But so long as it was based upon reactionary social
principles, political radicalism could not go far. Then, even the political
radicalism of the Kuo Min Tang was defective. It did not touch the
internal situation. Confusion was the main feature of the policy adopted
at the Reorganisation Conference. And the confusion was a smoke-
screen for reaction.
The Kuo Min Tang was reorganised under the pressure of the masses.
But the pressure failed to be decisive. The pressure was brought to bear
upon the situation through the Communist Party. It was still very young,
politically inexperienced and ideologically
314 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
immature. It failed to appreciate the real nature of the principles of Sun
Yat-sen. Instead of insisting upon the adoption of a clear programme of
bourgeois democratic revolution, the Communists were carried away by
the deceptive ultra-radicalism of the petit-bourgeoisie. They believed that
there could be such a thing as a superclass party and a super-class State.
They allowed the ambiguous category "people" to push classes to the
background. They made the capital mistake of believing that the way to
proletarian dictatorship was open simply by the rejection of
parliamentary democracy.
When the working class rejects parliamentary democracy, they set before
themselves the immediate goal of a revolutionary dictatorship as the
means for establishing a higher form of democracy. But the perspective
could not be the same when a different class is concerned with the
situation. In that case, the rejection of parliamentary democracy is a
reactionary step. It opens the way to dictatorship, but an entirely different
nature, that of the reactionary classes.
The mistake committed by the Communists in the beginning of their
relation with the Kuo Min Tang affected the development of the
revolution in the subsequent period. It was a mistake to believe that, with
the reactionary principles of Sun Yat-sen, a State could be created which
would be the organ of revolutionary dictatorship. The correct beginning
should have been a critical approach to those principles. The democratic
mass movement provided a broad social basis for an attack upon social
reaction masquerading as political radicalism. The working class could
have pushed the petit-bourgeoisie in a decisive struggle against social
reaction. In that case, Jacobinism would not degenerate into Sun Yat-
senism. It was not possible to steal a march towards proletarian
dictatorship. The road lay through bourgeois democracy. The length of
the road would be determined by the conditions, national as well as
international, in which the revolution was to take place. Under the given
situation, the road was very likely to be short in China. Nevertheless, it
had to be travelled. The radicalism of the petit-bourgeoisie appeared to
be a desire to jump over that unavoidable stage. It was deceptive. It
represented reluctance to take up a really revolutionary struggle. The
tragedy of the Chinese Revolution is that the Communists were deceived
by the radicalism of the petit-bourgeois nationalists. Its reactionary
nature should have been clear in the light of Marxism.
The triumph of a reactionary petit-bourgeois ideology, how-
"Red" Canton 315
ever, did not spare the Kuo Min Tang rude shocks of reality.
Immediately after the reorganisation, there developed a fierce class
struggle, defying the principle of a super-class State. The Communists
had committed previous mistakes. The Kuo Min Tang had not been
forced to adopt a clear programme of bourgeois democratic revolution.
Nevertheless, it had come in close contact with the masses. The
exigencies of the situation had committed it to a fight against foreign
Imperialism. That could not be done effectively without attacking native
reaction simultaneously. The old guard of the party representing the
patriarchal literati, old-school officials, feudal-militarists and the
compradore bourgeoisie, were alarmed by the perspectives of
development. They had put up a stubborn opposition to the admission of
the Communists into the Kuo Min Tang. They had been defeated in that
first round of the internal struggle. In the years preceding the
Reorganisation Conference, the social basis of the Kuo Min Tang had
broadened. It could no longer be completely controlled by the old guard.
The Reorganisation Conference revealed the alarming change in the
alignment of forces. The old guard anticipated the danger and decided to
act before it was
too late.
The Communist Party provided them with the scarecrow. The mistake
committed by the Communists supplied them a political platform. Tdey
seized upon the undemocratic features of the resolutions of the
Reorganisation Conference, and interpreted them as representing the plan
of the Communists to set up a dictatorship under the domination of
Bolshevik Russia. An ill-considered action on the part of the
Communists thus enabled the reactionaries to appear as the defenders of
democracy and opponents of foreign
domination.
Towards the end of August 1924, that is, hardly half a year after the
Reorganisation Conference, anti-Communist demonstrations took place
in the streets of Canton; large quantities of leaflets were distributed
inciting the citizens to rise up in arms against the Communists; and they
were accused of having usurped the power of government. At that time,
the Nationalist Government was still composed mostly of the Old Guard.
It was suspected that several members of the Government were behind
the anti-Communist movement. The suspicion was strengthened by the
failure of the Government to take any measure against the demonstrators
inciting an armed
316 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
insurrection. But the situation could not be allowed to drift. The working
class again took the initiative. A general strike was declared. Thereupon
the Government acted promptly, under the pressure of the Old Guard. It
ordered immediate termination of the general strike, and the city was
placed under martial law. The workers refused to surrender the streets to
the counter-revolutionaries, whose activities were not to be checked by
any government action. Under the pressure of the masses, the petit-
bourgeois radical members of the Kuo Min Tang stiffened up their back.
The anti-strike orders were withdrawn. The Old Guard suffered a defeat
in the first encounter.
Sun Yat-sen's son, Sun Fo, was then the Mayor of Canton. He was the
leader of the anti-Communist group in the Kuo Min Tang. In a few days,
all the leaders of that group, together with Sun Fo, left Canton. Defeated
there, the reactionaries withdrew to a safer place from where they could
mount a counter-offensive. The merchants connected with foreign banks
organised themselves into an armed militia, financed and otherwise
supplied from Hongkong. In October 1924 there was an armed
insurrection in Canton. Previously, during the Hongkong seamen's strike
in 1922, the Nationalist Government had been driven out by a band of
armed reactionaries acting under the instigation and with the help of
British Imperialism. But since then, the position of the Nationalist
Government had been greatly strengthened with the support of the
masses. It was no longer entirely dependent upon the mercenary troops
of unreliable Generals. With the support of armed workers, it could
easily deal with the Fascist "Paper Tiger" revolt in 1924. That victory
increased the prestige of the Nationalist Government in the eyes of the
people. It was a victory against the combined forces of native reaction
and foreign Imperialism. It was a definite steps towards the realisation of
the programme of the Kuo Min Tang.
While reaction suffered a defeat in Canton, the political situation
throughout the country was developing rapidly. The ruling classes were
alarmed by the stormy development of the mass movement. They made
another effort to terminate the civil war, so that a united front could be
presented against the danger of the impending revolution. In the
beginning of 1925, the Peking Government proposed to call a conference
with the object of unifying the country under one central authority. The
Kuo Min Tang was also invited
"Red" Canton 317
to the proposed conference. Upon the defeat of the Old Guard, the petit-
bourgeois left wing had become predominating in the councils of the
Kuo Min Tang. Although Sun Yat-sen himself was in favour of
accepting the invitation, the majority of his followers were opposed to it.
Nevertheless, it was generally agreed that Sun Yat-sen personally should
visit Peking. His departure from Canton gave the left wing more freedom
to act. Canton became "red" in a faint glow of Jacobinism, only after the
departure and subsequent death of Sun Yat-sen.
The proposal for the conference was supported by the right-wing leaders
of the Kuo Min Tang, who had left Canton after their defeat in
September 1924. They assembled in Peking when Sun Yat-sen arrived
there. Soon after his arrival at Peking, Sun Yat-sen fell ill, and died on
March 12, 1925. Upon his death, the right-wing leaders declared
themselves to be his legitimate successors to the leadership of the party
They took possession of the headquarters of the party at Shanghai, and
disputed the authority of the Central Committee at Canton. Just a year
after its reorganisation, and just when it had become the leader of a
powerful mass movement, the Kuo Min Tang split along the line of class
antagonism within its own ranks. The conflict of class interests had
grown too sharp to keep it together in the old loose formation. The right-
wing was composed of the representatives of the big bourgeoisie and the
feudal aristocracy. It took its stand on the platform of a fight against
Communism and Russian influence. Taking their cue from the principles
of the dead leader, the right-wingers denounced class struggle, declared
that Communism could have no place in China, and condemned the
Communists as the enemies of Chinese nationalism. They called them-
selves the "White Kuo Min Tang" in contrast to the left wing, denounced
as "red revolutionaries". They advocated rupture of the relation with the
"bloody Bolsheviks", and favoured an alliance with the "democratic
Powers of the West" in a fight against the Communist menace.
Encouraged by the action of the right wing, the reactionaries again raised
their head in Canton. As soon as the news of the death of Sun Yat-sen
reached Canton, there bagan a scramble for power among the various
cliques inside the Kuo Min Tang. One of Sun Yat-sen's old-school
followers, General Tang Chih-yao, proclaimed his intention to become
the head of the Government. He sent a
318 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
telegram to the right-wing headquarters announcing that be had assumed
the office. He also came to terms with Chen Chiu-ming who, since is
defeat at the end of 1923, had taken to banditry ravaging the Eastern
districts of Kwangtung.
The Canton Kuo Min Tang challenged the pretension of the reactionary
General and denounced him as an enemy of the revolution. But the
situation was not only complicated, it was dangerous. Nationalist ranks
were still infested with the forces of the enemies of the revolution. The
army of the Nationalist Government was still commanded by
reactionaries. While all the faithful troops were away to fight the robber-
chief Chen Chiu-ming, a large number of mercenary soldiers, under the
command of Tang Chih-yao and his trusted lieutenants, was garrisoned
at Canton. The Government itself was headed by Hu Han-min — a
representative of the compradore bourgeoisie.
Canton was in a situation similar to that of Paris at the end of May 1793.
The revolution could not be saved unless all the Girondists were
ruthlessly removed from power. Like Paris, Canton was also glaring
focus of the fight going on all over the country between the Sansculottes
and vested interests. The revolution was standing with her back to the
wall. Only resolute action could save her. In that crisis, a step towards
revolutionary dictatorship was taken. The Central Executive Committee
of the party assumed decisive power. Measures were taken for creating
the nucleus of a really revolutionary army. The cadets of the newly
established Wampoa Military Academy and the raw recruits trained there
by revolutionary nationalist officers served the purpose. That small
nucleus of a reliable military force, supported by the revolutionary
workers, took the mercenary troops by surprise. The authority of the
Nationalist Government was reestablished at Canton. Then came the
decisive blow. By an order of the Central Executive Committee, 124
leading members of the party suspected of right-wing sympathy and
complicity with counter-revolution were expelled from the party. Not
only was the open attack of counter-revolution repulsed: there were far-
reaching readjustments inside the party itself. It was almost entirely freed
from reactionary control. Although Hu Han-min still remained the formal
head of the Government, for all practical purposes, he was superceded by
Liang Chung-hai and Wang Chin-wei. The supreme power was vested in
those two men who, for some time, were to
"Red" Canton 319
play the parts respectively of Marat and Robespierre in the Chinese
Revolution.
The victory of the left wing was celebrated in a resolution passed by the
Cental Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang on May 23, 1925. It
was decided to break off all connection with the government in Peking.
Unification of the country was no longer to be attempted through
negotiations with reactionary cliques or opportunist alliances. It must be
realised through a revolutionary struggle; and the Nationalist
Government of Canton assumed the leadership of that struggle.
While still swearing by the political testament of Sun Yat-sen, the Kuo
Min Tang practically repudiated the policy which he had pursued all his
life. Only three months ago, in spite of the opposition of his more radical
followers, he had gone to Peking with the object of coming to terms with
the warring reactionary cliques. That last act of political opportunism on
the part of Sun Yat-sen was repudiated by the Canton Kuo Min Tang by
the resolution of May, 1925. At last, it definitely committed itself to a
resolute fight against reaction. It was declared in the same resolution
"that the only government in the world to-day with which the Kuo Min
Tang can work hand in hand is that of Soviet Russia, which has always
been in sympathy with the aspirations of the Chinese people.
Consequently, the party should devote its efforts to secure the co-
operation of Soviet Russia for the emancipation of the Chinese people
and the reform of the Chinese Republic". Another tradition of Sun Yat-
sen was thus discarded only two months after his death in a meeting of
his followers, which was opened ceremoniously by paying homage to his
venerable memory.
Having resolved at last to lead a revolution, the Kuo Min Tang could not
continue the futile policy of seeking the support of "Western
democracies" who had all along obstructed that resolution much more
effectively than native reaction. Even after he was disillusioned about the
sympathy of the Western democracies, and realised the importance of an
alliance with the Soviet Republic, Sun Yat-sen could not make up his
mind to cross the Rubicon. He flirted with the idea of an alliance with the
Soviet Republic, while not entirely abandoning the hope of finding a
more preferable ally. Even on his death-bed, he entertained the illusion.
In his political testament, he recommended to his followers "co-operation
with those
320 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
nations which treat us on the basis of equality". Evidently, he was not
convinced that the Soviet Republic was the only party from whom, under
the given conditions of the world, China could expect such a treatment.
But his younger followers were less connected with compromising
traditions, and therefore were more susceptible to revolutionary
influence. They did not inherit his illusions about the Western
democracies, and therefore share his hesitation about the Soviet
Republic. They were obliged to break away from the traditions of their
beloved leader, because it was no longer possible to vacillate. One must
choose side, or go down. Events taking place throughout the country,
since the beginning of the year, had once again exposed the true face of
Imperialism. Counter-revolutionary conspiracies inside the ranks of the
Kuo Min Tang had brought it home to the left-wing leaders that they
must either fight resolutely, or be beaten.
The Chinese Girondists protested against the developments at Canton.
They denounced the Canton Committee of the Kuo Min Tang as an
instrument of Bolshevism. All "true Kuo Min Tang men who desired to
be faithful to the principles of the dead leader" were called upon to rally
round the right wing in the fight against the "Bolshevik usurpers of
Canton". The Canton Committee retorted by expelling another group of
right-wing sympathisers. That group included Robert Norman, the
American Adviser to the Nationalist Government. He was replaced by
the Russian Communist, Michael Borodin, who had come to Canton in
the middle of 1923 on the invitation of Sun Yat-sen.
The development in Canton was not an isolated event. It reflected the
situation throughout the country. Ever since the beginning of the year,
the working class had been engaged in a general attack upon
Imperialism. Originating as strikes to enforce economic demands, the
movement had assumed a political character disclosing the close co-
operation between foreign Imperialism and native reaction as against all
the forces of progress. The movement had led up to the Shanghai
massacre on May 30, and the subsequent events. The general strike
sweeping the entire country as protest against the massacre of Shanghai
workers and students assumed the acutest political form in the boycott of
Hongkong. In course of that heroic struggle against powerful British
Imperialism, the working class became the most dominating factor of the
situation, influencing the
"Red" Canton 321
councils of the Kuo Min Tang and policies of the Nationalist Govern-
ment. The actual leader of the struggle was not the Nationalist
Government nor the Kuo Min Tang; it was the Strike Committee set up
to enforce the boycott of Hongkong.
The relation of the Strike Committee and the Nationalist Government of
Canton was somewhat analogous to that between the Paris Commune
and the National Assembly in the earlier part of 1793. On both the
occasions, the former was the driving force of the revolution. The Canton
Strike Committee was the General Staff commanding a well-disciplined,
partly armed, army of over one hundred thousand workers. It supported
the left wing of the Kuo Min Tang in its fight against the counter-
revolutionary Old Guard. The reactionary right-wing leaders were driven
out of Canton; but their agents still sat in the inner circles of the party
and the Nationalist Government. Sun Fo, for example, returned to
Canton. Thanks to his parentage, he could easily hide his real political
complexion.
Like all boycotts, the boycott of Hongkong also proved to be a double-
edged weapon. Dealing a severe blow to the purse, power and prestige of
British Imperialism, it affected the interests of the Chinese merchants
also. They tried to bring pressure on the Kuo Min Tang and the
Nationalist Government for ending the boycott. The counter-pressure
was exerted by the Strike Committee. But for its resolute leadership, the
Nationalist Government would have given in to the pressure of the
merchants; the petit-bourgeois left wing would have surrendered to the
feudal-bourgeois elements. The right wing leaders, assembled in the so-
called "Western Hill Conference", again declared the Canton Committee
illegal. They were representing the big bourgeoisie, and counted upon the
support of foreign Imperialism. On the other hand, the robber-chief,
Chen Chiu-mmg. again began his operations against Canton, amply
supplied with the sinews of war from Hongkong. In that critical moment,
the petit bourgeois radicals could rely only upon the support of the
working class. The Strike Committee placed at the disposal of the
Nationalist Government the services of a hundred thousand disciplined
men, determined for a revolutionary fight. In those circumstances, the
left wing could not but make concessions to the masses. Not only in
Canton, but throughout the province under the jurisdiction of the
Nationalist Government, workers and peasants were organised by the
322 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Communists to defend and promote their immediate interests. The
number of organised workers and peasants rose to hundreds of thou-
sands. Class struggle developed side by side with the struggle for
national liberation. Native reaction was attacked simultaneously with
foreign Imperialism. The peasants opened attack upon Feudalism. Trade-
unions dictated terms to the capitalists. In the countryside, political
power was practically captured by the Peasant Unions which were
identical with the local Kuo Min Tang organisations. There was a great
hue and cry against "Bolshevism". The Nationalist Government was
denounced as a "Soviet Dictatorship". The right-wing leaders, who were
still at Canton, echoed the cry of the counterrevolutionaries, and
endeavoured to persuade the party to change its policy and the
Government to punish the Communists and break off the relation with
Russia. Some more of them were thereupon forced to leave Canton. Sun
Fo was among them. The classical type of a petit-bourgeois radical,
Wang Chin-wei, replaced the representative of the compradore
bourgeoisie, Hu Han-min, not only as the leader of the party, but also as
the head of the Government.
The revolution, however, was just beginning. Reaction was still far from
being beaten. Before long, it again raised its ugly head. Thanks to his
long association with Sun Yat-sen, Wang Chin-wei was the formal leader
of the left wing. Sun Yat-sen had nominated him as his successor. But
the real leader of Chinese Jacobinism was Liao Chung-hai. As Minister
of Finance of the Nationalist Government, he entirely dominated the
situation. He was a staunch supporter of the alliance with the Soviet
Republic. It was on his initiative that the creation of a revolutionary army
had begun. He recognised the hundred thousand Workers' Guard as the
most reliable and soundest nucleus of a really revolutionary army. He
was the political director of the military forces of the Nationalist
Government. In that capacity, be was the virtual Commander of the
Wampoa Military Academy. Naturally, it was he who should be selected
as the first object of counter-revolutionary attack. He was assassinated in
August 19, 1925. It was not difficult to trace the origin of the crime. Hu
Han-min's hand was clearly visible behind it. He had managed to stay in
the inner circle of the Nationalist Government with the object of
checking its revolutionary actions. Liao Chung-hai was his most
powerful opponent The left wing was staggered by the assassination of
its leader. The blow was unexpected. It threatened to demoralise
"Red" Canton 323
the left wing. But the working class again took the initiative and pushed
the petit-bourgeois radicals forward in a revolutionary struggle. They
demanded revenge for Liao Chung-hai's death. The entire democratic
masses supported the demand. Hu Han-min was banished from Canton.
With the expulsion of the last of the Girondists from the Nationalist
Government, yet another step was taken towards a revolutionary
dictatorship.
Liao Chung-hai was the chosen victim of counter-revolution, because he
advocated the policy of ameliorating the economic conditions of the
workers and peasants as the means of mobilising the masses under the
banner of the revolution. As if to honour and commemorate its martyred
leader, the Kuo Min Tang gave a more definite shape to the "labour and
peasant policy" of the party. That was done by the Second Congress of
the party held in January 1926. The Reorganisation Conference had
vaguely referred to the masses, and talked of the necessity of enlisting
their support; but it had not adopted any definite programme regarding
the immediate economic interests of the workers and peasants. During
the intervening period of two years, the masses had fought in the
frontline of the struggle against foreign Imperialism and native-reaction.
In course of that fight, and by virtue of the leading part it played therein,
the working class acquired considerable political power. But the burning
social questions were left untouched in the Kuo Min Tang programme.
The roots of reaction remained intact. Increasing revolutionary activity
on the part of the working class, and the widespread political awakening
of the peasantry only sharpened class antagonism, and precipitated a
severe political crisis.
In that crisis, the youthful Communist Party committed another mistake
which subsequently proved fatal for the revolution. The first mistake had
been to refrain from exposing the reactionary significance of Sun Yat-
senism while approaching the Kuo Min Tang with the proposal for the
formation of a united nationalist democratic front against foreign
Imperialism and native reaction. The second mistake of the Communist
Party was the failure to exercise the political power acquired in course of
the struggle. The Workers' Guard, created by the Strike Committee
during the Hongkong boycott, and which served the Nationalist
Government as the most dependable military force in the fight against
armed reaction, was allowed to be pushed aside and gradually
emasculated. The peasants were organised
324 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
in mass formations. But they were not led to enforce their demands
irrespective of whatever the Nationalist Government said or did.
Supported by the democratic masses, the Peasant Unions practically
ruled the country-side. They were the basic units of the Kuo Min Tang,
being practically identical with its local organisations. They were under
Communist leadership. They were not allowed to attack feudal-
patriarchal privileges. The Communists believed it to be wise tactics to
stay the attack upon Feudalism until that might be sanctioned by the
petit-bourgeois radicals. That was a grave mistake. The Nationalist
Government was entirely dependent upon the working class, because the
Workers' Guard v, as the only reliable striking power at its command. In
that situation, it would have been obliged to sanction any revolutionary
action of the peasantry, had the Communists led them in a wholesale
attack upon Feudalism. The Nationalist Government itself would have
consolidated its position by sanctioning the revolutionary action of the
peasantry. Its relation with the masses would have become organic; the
victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution would have been
guaranteed. The failure of the Communist Party to act with courage and
determination in that opportune moment was responsible for the
regrettable fact that the elimination from power of the feudal-bourgeois
right wing happened to be only superficial. As long as its social basis
was not exterminated, its political eclipse could be only temporary.
The Western Hill Conference of the right wing, even after the
assassination of Liao Chung-hai, had denounced the Canton Kuo Min
Tang as traitors to the principles of Sun Yat-sen, because of its relation
with the Communists. Therefore, the relation with the Communist Party
became the main issue in the Second Kuo Min Tang Congress. The
attack of the right wing was retorted by emphasising upon the necessity
of co-operation with the Communist Party The Communists openly
participated in the Congress, and played a prominent role in its
deliberations. They were not only granted full right of membership of the
Kuo Min Tang, but a few of them were elected to the highest organs of
the party. The Communists considered that to be a substantial victory
over the counter-revolutionary right wing, and did not think it to be
tactically wise to raise other issues- The vital questions of social
revolution were allowed to be perfunctorily dealt with by the Second
Congress. The real issues were confused by radical phrases concerning
the relation with the
"Red" Canton 325
Communist Party. The latter were deceived. The resolution on the
"Labour and Peasant Question" was couched in the following vague
language: "The success of all revolutions must depend on the extensive
participation of the masses; the labour and peasant elements are specially
indispensable. The failure of the Nationalist Revolution in the past was
due to the fact that in it only the intellectual class participated, so that
there was no broad basis for it, and the force was small. In the Nationalist
Revolution to-day and to-morrow, we must preach its significance in the
farm and in the factory, and organise these classes in the struggle against
Imperialism". The resolution not only ignored the immediate economic
demands of the workers and peasants: it even avoided the basic task of
the bourgeois revolution. The importance of the masses was recognised,
and it was proposed to enlist their support, but their interests were
entirely ignored. In that fateful moment, the Communists should have
remembered Plekhanov's famous injunction: "The revolution for the
masses, not the masses for the revolution."
Not until the end of the year did the Kuo Min Tang programme include
some definite redress of the burning grievances of the workers and
peasants. But even then it was petty reformism, dominated by the
ambiguous principle of "People's Livelihood". The peasantry were
promised twenty-five per cent reduction in land rent, a uniform system of
taxation, abolition of illegal levies, prohibition of the collection of rent
and taxes in advance, distribution of waste lands, and limitation of the
usurers' interests to twenty per cent. Those measures were never
enforced. They could not be. They represented serious encroachments
upon the privileges of Feudalism, and therefore could not be enforced
without breaking its power. The Republic had died before it was born,
because its prophets were loyal adherents to the traditions of
Confucianism. Petit-bourgeois radicalism could make only a feeble
advance towards Jacobinism, because it was encumbered with the
adherence to the reactionary principles of Sun Yat-sen.
The new Central Executive Committee, elected by the Second Congress,
revealed that the party was far from being free ot right-wing influence. In
the highest organ (the Political Bureau), composed of nine members, the
presence of one Communist was counterbalanced by the inclusion of two
outspoken right-wing leaders (Sun Fo and C. C. Wu), who had been
previously expelled from Canton.
326 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Hu Han-min, banished for complicity with the assassination of Liao
Chung-hai, two feudal-militarists (Tan Yen-kai and Chu Pei-teh) and a
scion of the Shanghai bourgeoisie (T. V. Soong). As against that
formidable array of reactionaries, there stood the lone apostle of petit-
bourgeois radicalism, Wang Chin-wei, seconded by Chiang Kai-shek
who was still an unknown category. Only ten out of the thirty-four
members of the Central Executive Committee itself were whole-' hearted
supporters of the left wing. The Western Hill Conference was
condemned as a "a revolt against the party"; but the party was delivered
to the rebels. Only a few rank counter-revolutionaries were expelled
from the party, while its highest organ was packed with those who still
remained inside. Evidently, the tide was on the point of turning. The
blow fell sooner than expected. Just two months after the Second
Congress had passed resolutions couched in radical phrases, Canton was
the scene of a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat which ended the short-
lived, half-hearted imitation of
Jacobinism. , . .
The coup d'erat of March 20, 1926 was the work ot Chiang Kai-
shek who, since then, became a prominent figure in Chinese politics.
He was born of a bourgeois family in Ningpo. As usual in China, his
family was connected with modern capitalist enterprises, having at
the same time stakes in feudal landed property. He joined the Kuo
Min Tang before the revolution of 1911, but did not take much active
part in politics. After the defeat of the second revolution, he practi
cally abandoned politics, and turned to business. From that
time he became very closely associated with Chang Ching-Kiang, a
native of the same province. The latter belonged to a rich compra-
dore family, and used to finance largely the earlier ventures of Sun
Yat-sen. The business association during the youth of the two men
continued in politics later on. The two together represented the
classes which constituted the social basis of reformist nationalism. In
1923, Sun Yat-sen, after his meeting with Joffe, sent Chiang Kai-
shek'to Moscow for looking over the situation there. On his return to
Canton, he joined the army, and in 1924 was appointed the head of
the newly established Wampoa Military Academy. There he played
second fiddle to Liao Chung-hai. Upon the assassination of the
latter, there was a rumour of a counter-revolutionary outbreak in
Canton. Taking advantage of that situation, Chiang occupied the
city with a large detachment of Wampoa cadets, supported by the
"Red" Canton 327
Workers'Guard. The military command of the capital served him as the
stepping stone to eventual dictatorship in all affairs.
The Second Congress of the Kuo Min Tang had prepared the ground for
the coup d'etat of March 20. Since an overwhelming majority in the
highest organ of the party was given to those frankly hostile to the
Communists, it was inevitable that sooner or later an attempt would be
made to exterminate the latter. The imminent attack was directed
ostensibly against the Communists. 1 he real object was to free the
Nationalist Government from the revolutionary influence of the masses.
The Kuo Min Tang had become the organ of revolutionary nationalism
under the pressure of the masses. Supported by the working class, the
Nationalist Government had carried on a heroic struggle against foreign
Imperialism. The next step of attacking native reaction must be taken.
The Nationalist Government could not stop where it had been driven. It
must either go farther, or retrace its steps. In order to do the latter, it must
be free from revolutionary influence of the force which has pushed it to
that uncomfortable position. Not willing to destroy their creditable record
with their own hand, the petit-bourgeois radicals readmitted the right-
wingers into the leadership of the party. Thus, in spite of its apparent
radicalism, the Second Congress of the Kuo Min Tang prepared the way
for the betrayal of the revolution.. The betrayal began with the coup
d'etat of March 20. The success of the plan of the right wing to recapture
the leadership of the party was conditional upon the removal of the
Communists from the strategic positions they had occupied by untiring
political activity and unstinted service to the cause of the revolution. But
the Communists were so deeply rooted in the movement that they could
not be removed from their positions by simple administrative measures.
They were the most active elements in every department of public life.
Consequently, they were not only the indisputable leaders of the workers
and peasants organisations, but wielded great influence even on the rank
and file of the Kuo Min Tang. Their influence inside the Kuo Min Tang
resulted from the fact that its members were very largely recruited from
the workers and peasants, whose organisations politically were integral
parts of the Kuo Min Tang. Finally, the Communists had established
themselves firmly also in the newly created Nationalist Army by virtue
of active work in its Political Department. Political propaganda among
the officers as well as the ranks was the charac-
328 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
terisiic feature of the newly created Nationalist Army. The removal of
the Communists, therefore, necessitated a regular coup d'etat. Some
pretext must be found for that purpose. Having acquired the military
command of Canton, Chiang Kai-shek, in collaboration with practically
all the members of the Political Bureau of the Kuo Min Tang, was on the
lookout for a plausible pretext.
All of a sudden, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the arrest of a number of junior
officers of a gun-boat. They were accused of having been engaged in the
preparation of an insurrection against the Government. On the pretext of
precaution against any possible disturbance that might follow upon the
arrest of the naval officers, a number of repressive measures were swiftly
taken. The Workers' Guard was disarmed; several units of the newly
created revolutionary army were similarly treated; and a number of
Russian military advisers were arrested. The Kuo Min Tang had its
representatives in each military unit for carrying on political propaganda.
Most of those representatives happened to be Communists. As a
Commander-in-Chief of the army, Chiang Kai-shek ordered their arrest.
1 he political director of the Wampoa Military Academy was himself
placed under detention, being suspected of sympathy for the
Communists. The plan had been prepared so carefully and the blow was
so swift that "all were utterly unprepared and did not even dream that the
coup was coming."1 All the measures were taken within half a day, and
by the evening of the twentieth of March, Chiang Kai-shek was
completely the master of the situation. There was no opposition, fear and
surprise having paralysed everybody.
Practically all the members of the Political Bureau of the Kuo Min Tang,
with the sole exception of the Communist Tan Ping-san, supported the
coup d'etat. The hero of petit-bourgeois radicalism, the head of the
Nationalist Government, the chosen leader of the Kuo Min Tang, Wang
Chin-wei, was completely isolated. His behaviour in that crisis, for all
practical purposes, amounted to an abetment of the crime against the
revolution. Afraid of the working class striding rapidly towards
revolution, he bad condemned the plan of welcoming the reactionaries
back to the leadership of the party, while indulging in radical phrases.
Nevertheless the triumphant counter-revolution would not spare him. He
was driven out of the country.
An emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Kuo
"Red" Canton 329
Min Tang was convened to consider the situation created by the coup
d'etat of March 20. It passed the following resolution: Since Chiang Kai-
shek has always struggled for the revolution, it is hoped that he will
realise his mistake in this event, but in view of the present situation it is
desired that the comrades of the left should temporarily retreat."2 That
was virtual dismissal of Wang Chin-wei. After a few days, he left for
Europe, because he "considered that the best way to solve the situation
was for him to retreat and to allow Chiang to take charge of affairs for
the time being."3 On his departure, he wrote to Chiang imploring him "to
keep to the revolutionary path." Wang Chin-wei acted just as Sun Yat-
sen had done in 1911. Only the Republic deserted by the latter was
hardly born; but Wang Chin-wei fled when there was no reason for him
to do so if he would only have the courage to lead the revolutionary
democratic masses, ready for a decisive struggle.
In spite of the debacle of petit-bourgeois radicalism and the defeat of the
Communists owing to their own mistake, the mass movement was still
there. It had the potentiality of throwing up new leaders to take the place
of those removed either by their own cowardice or by counter-
revolutionary violence. Chiang Kai-shek did not consider his position as
yet secure enough to make a frontal attack upon the revolutionary mass
movement as a whole. Having dealt the first blow, he decided to win the
confidence of the masses with the object of utilising them for his own
purposes. In a manifesto addressed to the workers and peasants, he
offered an explanation of the events of March 20. He told that the raid on
the headquarters of the State Committee was due to a misunderstanding,
and promised to take those responsible to task. Some junior officers were
formally punished; but that was immaterial, because the Workers' Guard
remained disbanded, and the Strike Committee was no longer allowed to
function as before.
All the right-wing leaders, expelled from the party or driven out of
Canton, began to come back. A plenary session of the Central Committee
of the Kuo Min Tang met on May 15. It was to celebrate the victory of
counter-revolution. An atmosphere of tension was created by circulating
rumours about a Communist attempt to overthrow the Government. That
served as a pretext for declaring martial law on the eve of the meeting of
Central Committee. The danger of revolution was still there. Therefore,
precaution was
330 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
necessary.
Chiang Kai-sbek himself moved a special resolution "for the
readjustment of party affairs". The whole object of the resolution was to
restrict the activities of the Communists and to dislodge them from all
positions of power inside the party as well as the army. The Communists
were required "not to entertain any doubt on, or criticise, Dr. Sun or his
principles." The Communist Party was required to hand over to the
Executive of the Kuo Min Tang a list of its members inside the latter. It
was decided that not more than one third of the seats on any Committee
of the Kuo Min Tang should be occupied by Communists. Communists
were prohibited from being the heads of any party or Government
department. Members of the Kuo Min Tang on the other hand, were
forbidden to join any other political organisation or participate in any
activities initiated by such organisations. Finally, it was also resolved
that the Central Committee of the Communist Party should not issue any
instructions to the members of the party before submitting them for the
approval of a joint committee of both the parties. The resolution was
passed by an overwhelming majority. The left-wing leaders having dis-
credited themselves by their own cowardice, the reactionaries had no
difficulty in regaining their supremacy.
Another serious result of the coup d'etat was the destruction of the
authority of the "Military Council"—a Committee of the Kuo Min Tang
set up with the purpose of exercising political control over the armed
forces. The Executive Committee formally elected Chiang Kai-shek to
the leadership of the party. He appointed his friend, the rich merchant
Chang Ching-kiang, as the chairman of the Central Executive
Committee. All the Government and party offices were subordinated to
Chiang Kai-shek as the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army.
The Nationalist Government was transformed into a military
dictatorship.
The downfall of petit-bourgeois radicalism was complete. Mistakes
committed by the Communists contributed to the victory of reaction.
Nevertheless, Canton still contained dangerous germs of revolution
which could not be altogether destroyed. The blockage of Hongkong
continued. The masses were still engaged in the struggle against
Imperialism. It would be foolish for the bourgeoisie to cut the branch on
which they were sitting. Deprived of the support of the masses, the
Nationalist Government would be overthrown any
"Red" Canton 331
day by the feudal-militarists hovering on the horizon, always confident
of liberal support from Hongkong. The bourgeoisie considered it to be
tactically wise to temporise after dealing a staggering blow to the
vanguard of the working class. The Communists had been disarmed.
Petit-bourgeois radicalism had been demoralised. Now bourgeoisie could
manoeuvre, pending the creation of conditions in which they expected to
act with greater freedom. In order to relieve the tenseness of the
situation, and get out of the revolutionary atmosphere of Canton, the
Nationalist Government, under the dictation of Chiang Kai-shek, decided
upon the policy of territorial expansion. An additional reason for military
action north-wards was offered by the movement of Wu Pei-fu's troops
towards Canton. All other issues were forgotton in the agitation for the
"North Expedition". That was in accordance with the original programme
of the National Government. The unification of the country must be
brought about through military conquest. The Kuo Min Tang reverted to
its tradition of military combinations.
The experience of Canton, however, had taught the Kuo Min Tang a
valuable lesson. Even its most reactionary leaders came to realise the
great potentiality of mass action. They had no sympathy for the interests
of the masses. They were not prepared even to go to the extent of solving
the problems of the bourgeois revolution. Yet they planned to wield the
formidable weapon of mass action in order to carry through the policy of
territorial expansion. But the masses could be mobilised into effective
action only by the Communists. So the bourgeoisie decided to make a
truce with the Communist Party, of course on their own conditions. In
order to secure the co-operation of the Communists in the projected
military expedition, Chiang Kai-shek sacrificed a few of his counter-
revolutionary associates. The Garrison Commander of Canton was
imprisoned. He had played a prominent part on March 20. The Foreign
Minister C. C. Wu, the most reactionary representative of the big
bourgeoisie, left for Shanghai—to inform the right-wing leaders that the
situation in Canton was well in hand. Sun Fo was degraded from his high
office. As if to compensate for the apparent and temporary setback to the
forces of reaction, Hu Han-min returned from exile to resume his high
place in the councils of the party. The truce between the Kuo Min Tang
and the Communist Party was concluded in the meeting of the Central
Executive Committee of the former held in May
332 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
1926. Chiang Kai-shek, in behalf of the feudal-bourgeois right wing,
agreed to tolerate the Communists inside the Kuo Min Tang. For the
meritorious service of retaining the co-operation of the Communists even
after driving them out of all positions of power, the Central Committee
of the Kuo Min Tang invested Chiang Kai-shek with dictatorial power.
The bourgeoisie recaptured the leadership of the Kuo Min Tang to
transform it into an active agency of counter-revolution. Previously, it
had failed to take up any revolutionary fight. From March 20, 1925, it
began to fight actively against the revolution.
So terminated the short history of "Red" Canton. Chiang Kai-shek's
military dictatorship was not Napoleonism. It was not the outcome of a
successful bourgeois revolution. On the contrary, it was the grave-digger
of a belated bourgeois revolution. But the efforts to stop the bourgeois-
democratic revolution only contributed to the development of a greater
revolution. Military victories strengthened the position of the feudal-
bourgeois elements inside the Kuo Min Tang. But the mass movement,
fomented to make those victories possible, at the same time, increased
the fighting ability of the masses. In consequence, class struggle
sharpened. The feeble voice of petit-bourgeois radicalism was throttled
by triumphant reaction. But the forces of the revolution marched ahead,
and the Kuo Min Tang was carried to power by mighty waves of a mass
upheavel.
Notes
1. Hua Kang, "Great Chinese Revolution".
2. Li Chih-Jung, "The Resignation of Chairman Wang Chin-wei."
3. Tang Liang-li, "The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution".
CHAPTER XV
THE NORTH EXPEDITION
While, under the pressure of the mass movement, the Kuo Min Tang
made a reluctant advance towards revolution, there appeared a new
factor on the political horizon. It was the so-called "left militarists". The
new factor grew out of the decomposition of militarism. The situation
had changed in such a way as made it impossible for this or that war-lord
to establish even the semblance of a central government commanding the
recognition by a number of provinces for any length of time. Having
brought down the monarchy, the process of decentralisation had gone
farther. Since the rise and fall of the Republic, several war-lords had
been ruling, plundering and pillaging the country. But the revolutionary
awakening of the masses shook the social foundation of militarism.
Mercenary armies were no longer always reliable. Soldiers, recruited
from the pauperised peasantry, were liable to be infected by the spirit of
revolt spreading through the peasant masses. Minor militarists tried to
exploit that psychological atmosphere for promoting their own ambition.
They declared their adhesion to the Kuo Ming Tang and the anti-imperia-
list movement, in order to retain the loyalty of their soldiers and secure
the support of the peasantry as against the bigger war-lords.
Previously, the bourgeoisie had allied themselves with the feudal forces
of decentralisation in their struggle against monarchist absolutism. Tn the
new situation, they made a coalition with the "left militarists", hoping
thereby to strengthen their position. But with such allies, the unification
of the country was not possible. Immediately an impetus to the
development of the revolution, the new alliance was made with the
purpose of checking it eventually. The object was to free the Kuo Min
Tang from the domination of the
334 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
revolutionary democratic masses. When the feudal-bourgeois elements
regained the control of the Kuo Min Tang and the Nationalist
Government, they launched upon the North Expedition with the object of
forming a counter-revolutionary bloc with the "left" militarists.
The Nationalist Government had been established with the object of
unifying the country under one central authority. That was demanded in
the interest of the bourgeoisie. Trade was seriously injured by the never-
ending civil wars. Exactions by the militarists ruined the economic life of
the country. Ever since the passing of the Manchus, the bourgeoisie had
failed signally to create a centralised modern State. They had supported
this or that feudal war-lord, hoping that he would do this work for them.
Finally, there appeared on the scene the new force with the support of
which the bourgeoisie could realise their aspirations. But a centralised
modern State, created with the support of the masses, was sure to be an
instrument of a great social revolution which the bourgeoisie did not
favour. They desired certain changes in the conditions of country; but the
changes should not go to the extent of a revolution. Consequently, the
programme of the Nationalist Government about the unification of the
country remained in abeyance. As long as the feudal war-lords controlled
large areas, the nationalist bourgeoisie did not dare challenge their
position.
The opportunity came when allies could be found inside the ranks of the
militarists. Ever since 1924 the process of decomposition had been
noticeable. In 1926 militarism was seriously weakened by eternal
quarrels. Apart from its internal contradictions, its rear was threatened
everywhere by the awakening of the masses. The peasantry were tired of
destructive civil war. They heard the echo of the mighty voice raised by
the urban democracy. Taking advantage of the situation, smaller
Generals began to revolt against the warlords, splitting up the forces of
militarism. The Kuo Min Tang welcomed them in its ranks, and in
coalition with them extended the authority of the Nationalist Government
as far as the Yangtse.
The most representative type of left militarists was Feng Yu-hsiang. He
was a social phenomenon. Born of a peasant family in the province of
Anhwei, he enlisted himself as an ordinary soldier while still very young.
He was driven into the army by the dire destitution
The North Expedition 335
of his family. But it was not until 1915 that he acted as anything more
than a soldier, obeying orders given by no matter who. In that year, he
was sent to Szechuan with the task of defending that province against the
attack of the revolutionaries from Yunan. There he revolted against Yuan
Shih-kai, when the news reached him that the latter had decided to found
a new ruling dynasty. But still, Feng did not join the general revolt. He
reflected the sentiment of the comparatively well-to-do peasantry who,
tired of civil war, desired peace, but were too conservative to favour a
revolution. That social background distinguished Feng from the usual run
of militarist rulers.
Eventually, he became the Governor of the province of Shensi under Wu
Pei-fu. It is reported that as Governor of Shensi, Feng departed from the
usual method of the militalists' rule. Instead of being a feared, but hated,
parasite, as the militarists invariably were, he endeavoured to win the
support of the people. With that purpose, he showed some concern for
public welfare. In the absence of a central Exchequer, armies could be
maintained and wars waged only by fleecing the people. Feng's policy of
winning the support of the people, therefore, could not go to the extent of
freeing them from the heavy burden of militarism. He only sought to
introduce a regulated system of taxation by prohibiting indiscriminate
exactions and banditry. In order to keep the soldiers away from robbery,
he made it a point to pay them regularly.
Feng's distinction from other militarists was attributed to his profession
of Christianity. He might have been influenced in that way; but the real
reason of his distinction was different. The desire of the conservative
peasantry to be left in peace, undisturbed either by reaction or by
revolution, produced Feng Yu-hsiang and his army which combined the
historical significance of the German Peasants' War, the puritanism of
the English Roundheads and the primitive democratic tendency of the
native Taipings. Cromwell became the ideal of Feng Yu-hsiang who, at
the same time, inherited some traditions of the Taiping Revolt.
In 1922, Feng Yu-hsiang was appointed the Inspector General of the
forces under the command of Wu Pei-fu. In that capacity he was
stationed in Peking. There he came under the influence of the democratic
movement developing ever since 1919. The uarrow-visioned peasant in
him came in contact with the bourgeoisie aspiring
336 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
for power. Still averse to do anything that might contribute to the
disturbance, so hated by the rich peasantry, Feng nevertheless came to
understand that peace and order, coveted by the class he represented,
could not be established piecemeal. His "roundheads" were of no avail
unless they could be the instrument for capturing political power. As
Commandant of the Metropolis, he was in a very favourable position to
strike the decisive blow. After two years' preparations, he finally did that
in October 1924.
While his chief, We Pei-fu, was engaged in a huge trial of strength with
the rival war-lord Chang Tso-lin, Feng turned against him and captured
Peking. That was a staggering blow. Wu Pei-fu was completely routed.
The victorious Manchurians swept down as far as the Yangtse. But Feng
held Peking with the central and western provinces. He imprisoned the
rank reactionary Tsao Kun, who had become the President of the
imaginary Republic by bribery. He went farther and expelled the boy-
Emperor from the Forbidden City. But those actions were not followed
up by any positively revolutionary measures. Instead of destroying the
defeated militarism by a swift attack, Feng chose to maintain only the
military control of the Capital, while entrusting the task of attending to
political affairs to the discredited elder statesman Tuan Chi-jui. The latter
proposed to convene a conference for the unification of the country on a
mutual understanding of the contending parties. He entered into
negotiations even with Chang Tso-lin, the most reactionary of all the
militarists. Under his advice, Feng agreed to ally himself with Chang,
and even Sun Yat-sen inclined towards joining that unholy alliance. It
was to settle the details of that affair that Sun Yat-sen visited Peking just
before his death.
The arch-reactionary Chang Tso-lin, however, did not trust Feng, and
with the help of Japan made preparations to drive him out of Peking. In
November 1925, he moved large forces towards the city. But it was the
turn for his camp to decompose. No sooner had the compaign begun than
the loyalty of his allies south of Tientsin was found to be undependable,
and he was easily driven back by Feng Yu-hsiang. The trouble was not
confined to the outskirts of his territories. It broke out at the very centre
of his domain. A group of his Generals demanded that he should lay
down the Cbmmand and return to Mukden. The demand was presently
backed up by the revolt of a section of his army commanded by Kuo
Sun-lin who
The North Expedition 337
marched upon Mukden. Just at that moment, there was an attempt in
Peking to overthrow the Government of Tuan Chi-jui and establish a
democratic regime on the lines of the Canton Nationalist Government.
While in occupation of Peking, Feng had all along been supported by the
democratic movement. His revolt against Wu Pei-fu had been
condemned as treachery by other militarists and the foreign powers. But
the urban democratic masses under the leadership of the Communists
recognised the objectively revolutionary significance of his military
action. It was expected that he would place his military forces at the
disposal of the democratic movement. Counting upon his military
support, it was planned to overthrow the Tuan Chi-jui Government by an
insurrection of the democratic masses. But at the crucial moment, he
failed to come forward with the expected help. The insurrection was
easily suppressed.
The reactionaries were not slow to detect that Feng Yu-hsiang was half-
hearted in his alliance with the revolutionary democratic movement.
They decided to act quickly to drive him out of Peking before it was too
late, before he came more under the revolutionary influence. The military
Governor of Tientsin had not supported Chang Tso-lin in his campaign
against Feng. Evidently on the instigation of foreign Imperialism, he now
took the initiative and issued a manifesto to the Chinese people
denouncing the "Christian General" as an agent of Bolshevism, and
declaring his intention to drive Feng out of Peking for the sake of saving
China from "red ruin". Feng could no longer remain inactive. He moved
his troops against Tientsin and occupied the headquarters of his
adversary who withdrew southward in a veritable rout.
The debacle of Wu Pei-fu, the decomposition of the forces of Chang
Tso-lin, and the rout of the anti-red hero of Tientsin, proved that, had
Feng acted with determination and rapidity from the very beginning,
reactionary militarism could have been altogether destroyed. In the
campaign against Tientsin, his troops were assisted by the working class,
by attacking the enemy from the rear. But Feng's strategy was never
Nepoleonic. He always acted on the principle of not risking a battle until
there was no way out of it. He was guided by the sentiments of the
conservative peasantry who disliked disturbance. Desirous of
establishing peaceful and orderly conditions, he was reluctant to do what
his social supporters resented. He sought to win the confidence of the
peasantry not by
338 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
advocating revolutionary measures against the forces of their oppression,
but by showing that he did not initiate civil war. The comparatively well-
to-do peasant proprietors of the northern provinces had something to
lose; therefore, they approved of Feng's cautious policy. Anxious to act
according to the desire of the conservative rural masses, he failed to be
faithful to his urban supporters. Reluctant to carry on a revolutionary war
while the conditions were all favourable, he was bound to be beaten.
Chang Tso-lin's position in Manchuria was saved by the intervention of
Japanese Imperialism. Under the walls of Mukden the rebels were beaten
by the Japanese troops. Their leaders were executed with exemplary
cruelty. On the other hand, with the help of Anglo-American
Imperialism, Wu Pei-fu had again raised a large army. Before long Feng
Yu-hsiang began to feel the uncomfortable result of his dilatory tactics.
The two bigger war-lords entered into an alliance against the common
enemy, and Peking was attacked from three sides. With the cry of
"Bolshevik danger", the well-to-do peasants of Central China were
incited to revolt against the Second People's Army, an auxiliary to Feng's
forces. His rear being thus endangered, Feng withdrew from Peking,
which was occupied by the reactionary alliance in March 1926. Thus
ended the first stage in the development of left militarism.
The second group of left militarists appeared in the Yangtse Valley, its
leading figure being General Tang Shen-chi of Hunan who subsequently
played a prominent part in the Nationalist Government of Hankow. At
that time, there were five principal military constellations in China.
Chang Tso-lin ruled in the Manchurian provinces and, in collaboration
with Wu-Pei-fu, regained the control of the Peking Government. The
latter dominated the central provinces with his headquarters in Hunan.
Shanghai, together with the five maritime provinces, were under Sun
Chuan-fang. Shantung was under Chang Tsung-chang whose power
extended to the metropolitan province of Chili. Finally, Feng Yu-hsiang,
though expelled from Peking, still retained the control of the western
provinces. In addition, there was Yen Hsi-shan, the so-called "model
tuchun" of Shansi.
When Wu Pei-fu was driven out of power by Feng Yu-hsiang, his former
lieutenants in the Yangtse provinces became independent lords of their
respective domains. After Wu Pei-fu had rehabilitated his position, they
were no longer willing to owe allegiance to their
The North Expedition 339
former chief. The Governor of Hupeh, for example, in 1924 extended
hospitality to his defeated chief, but would not countenance his scheme
to regain power. Tang Shen-chi captured the rich province of Hunan. In
the other Yangtse provinces, lesser military lights also wanted to fish in
troubled waters; they became independent potentates while their chief
was in difficulty.
All those "left militarists", directly or indirectly, openly or secretly,
expressed their sympathy with the Nationalist Government of Canton.
With the object of securing popular support to the struggle for the
realisation of their individual ambitions, they began to talk of revolution,
and assumed an apparently benevolent attitude towards the masses.
There was a plan to form a Southern Federation to resist the domination
of the northern militarists controlling the nominal central Government in
Peking. History was on the point of repeating itself— after a decade. The
first stone in the foundation of the Nationalist Government of Canton
was laid in 1917, when the Governors of several southern provinces
made an alliance against the reactionaries of Peking. That confederacy
did not materialise into anything of political value, although it received
the support of the bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding the apparent similarity,
the situation in 1926 was different. The motive force of the movement
was no longer the ambition of provincial satraps supported by the
opportunism of the cowardly bourgeoisie. Those factors were still in
operation, but a popular awakening made all the difference in the
situation.
The decomposition of militarism created conditions in which the
bourgeoisie could take the initiative for unifying at least a part of the
country under a central Government. There were two factors which could
be utilised for that purpose. On the one hand, there was the revolutionary
awakening of the masses and, on the other, the readiness of lesser
militarists to owe formal allegiance to the Nationalist Government in the
struggle to overthrow the bigger warlords. The astounding success of the
North Expedition was due to the fact that, for a time, the two factors
could be wielded together without any great hitch. There was nothing in
common between the two. The} were actuated by entirely different
motives. But, for the moment, they could unite against a common enemy.
The bourgeoisie wanted to make use of both the factors for aggrandising
their power through territorial expansion. The process, nevertheless,
coincided
340 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
with a stormy development of the mass movement. The result was that
the logic of revolutionary development defeated the object of the
bourgeoisie. As soon as the first stage of territorial expansion was
completed, there began the struggle for power between the bourgeoisie
and their left militarist allies. That struggle again was cut across by a
greater struggle—between the democratic masses and all the other
components of the united nationalist front taken together. Finally, the
bourgeoisie and the left militarists composed their differences in the face
of the common danger,—the revolutionary masses. The alliance of two
classes with antagonistic interests could not be without a hitch; but the
fear of revolution and hatred for the working class were the cement that
held it together in the revolutionary crisis.
The North Expedition started from Canton in July 1926. Amazing the
world, it swept the entire south of the country in two months, and
reached the Yangtse in September. The Han Cities in the centre of the
country were captured. The progress towards Shanghai was not so rapid.
Nevertheless, in March 1927, the Nationalist Army occupied Shanghai as
well as Nanking. In course of the Expedition, enemy Commanders, one
after another, joined the Nationalist Army. Within six months from the
beginning of the Expedition, the Nationalist Army grew ten times larger.
The newly acquired forces were all mercenary, and their officers were no
friends of the revolution. The potential danger to the revolution,
however, was counteracted by the development of another force with
equal rapidity. Not only the urban democratic masses, but peasants
throughout the newly occupied provinces were mobilised in the struggle
against foreign Imperialism and native militarism. Side by side with the
growth of the Kuo Min Tang and the Communist Party, there developed
auxiliary organisations with mass membership. At the beginning of 1927
the total membership of the trade unions was more than two millions.
The number of the organised peasants was several times as much. The
most remarkable feature of the whole campaign was the enthusiastic
support it received from the popular masses. The army had always been a
dreaded and hated thing in China. But the Nationalist Army was hailed
by the people everywhere as the liberator. The forces of the enemy were
thus caught between two fires. Surrounded by the hostile people, they
flew in all directions, even before being attacked by the nationalist
troops. Many enemy
The North Expedition 341
commanders declared their adherence to the nationalist cause, that being
the only means by which they could hold their forces together.
Notwithstanding the motive with which the military expedition had been
launched, it became a means of developing the revolution.
The programme of the Kuo Min Tang was circulated and broadcast to
win the support of the'masses. The second Congress of the party had
raised the issue of an agrarian revolution. It had declared that "in order to
strengthen the foundation of the revolution, the Kuo Ming Tang must
first of all seek the participation of the peasants; that the policy of the
party must be in the first instance to pay attention to the interests of the
peasants; and the action of the Government must be directed to the
liberation of the peasantry." That declaration of the Kuo Min Tang
reached the peasant masses even ahead of the Nationlist Army.
Consequently, they were ready to welcome the army as their deliverer.
The army, though still largely mercenary in composition, was itself
affected by revolutionary enthusiasm. It was fighting for an ideal. To
each unit, there was attached a political commissar who conducted
propaganda among the troops. Wherever it was stationed, the army was
brought into close touch with the masses of the people through public
meetings and demonstrations. It was no longer an instrument of exaction
and oppression. It became a part of the people, fighting with their whole-
hearted support, for their interest. In short, the spectacular success of the
expedition was due partly to the defection in the enemy camp and very
largely to the revolutionary ferment among the masses. The
decomposition of militarism itself was due to this latter cause.
The first stage of the expedition reached its climax in the occupation of
the British Concession at Hankow. The expedition started from
Kwangtung in two columns, one through Human towards Hankow and
the other through Kiangsi having Shanghai for its objective. The former
was substantially reinforced by the adhesion of Tang Shen-chi who
revolted against his former chief Wu Pei-fu. The Nationalist Army was
commanded by the Governor of Human himself when it occupied the
provincial capital. It marched upon the Han Cities (Woochang, Hanyang
and Hankow). The first, being the capital of the province of Hupeh, was
strongly garrisoned by Wu Pei-fu's troops. It had been invested by
another column of the Nationalist- Army before Changsha was taken.
But, being strongly garrisoned, Woochang could not be captured so
easily while the main body of the enemy forces was engaged in
defending Woochang, Tang
342 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Shen-chi, marching from his base in Hunan, crossed the Yangtse and
took possession of Hanyang with its great arsenal. The Commander of
the newly occupied city also went over to the nationalists and was
rewarded with a high post. Thereafter, Hanow was captured practically
without any resistance. Surrounded from all sides, Woochang held out
still for another month. The only real battle of the whole campaign took
place for the capture of that old, strongly walled, city.
The hero of that battle was the so-called "Iron Army" which was the
nucleus of a really revolutionary force. The "Iron Army'' had been
recruited largely from the Workers' Guards formed during the boycott of
Hongkong. It was officered entirely by cadets from the Whampoa
Academy. Its driving force was a division commanded by the youthful
Communist Yeh Tin. Tang Shen-chi's plan was to have that
revolutionary nucleus of the nationalist forces destroyed in the battle
against overwhelming odds at Woochang. At any rate, while the "Iron
Army" kept the main body of Wu Pei-fu's forces engaged, the "left"
militarists carried the prize of Hanyang and Hankow. They were firmly
established in power before the revolutionary army could prevent them
from doing so.
But the scheme of the veiled counter-revolutionaries met obstruction
from the workers of Hankow. While the nationalist forces were marching
upon the Han Cities, great mass demonstrations were taking place there
against native militarism and foreign Imperialism. Those demonstrations,
backed up by a general strike of nearly a quarter of a million workers,
had the effect of an attack upon the rear of Wu Pei-fu's forces when these
had to face the Nationalist Army. It was the working class,
enthusiastically supported by the urban petit-bourgeoisie (students,
artisans, small traders, employees etc.), that frustrated the plan of Tang
Shen-chi, and created at Hankow the base for a struggle against the
feudal-bourgeois right wing of the Kuo Ming Teng on the point of
betraying the revolution.
In view of the fact that the right wing, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was
regaining dictatorial power in the party as well as in the Government, the
petit-bourgeois left wing of the Kuo Min Tang encouraged the action of
the working class, not only in the Han Cities, but all along the Yangtse.
The provinces of Hunan and Hupeh became the scene of a powerful mass
movement, in the face of which the "left" militarists did not dare capture
power openly. The old China was
The North Expedition 343
no more. In the new situation, a General could not do what he pleased.
His troops were placed in the midst of a surging sea of revolutionary
mass movement. The soldiers were themselves affected by the
revolutionary awakening. In that atmosphere, no army was immune from
decomposition. Consequently, the "left" militarists considered it to be the
best policy to submit themselves ostensibly to the Kuo Min Tang and
wait for development.
The real power fell in the hands of the working class which was partially
armed. In the beginning of December 1926, the British Concession at
Hankow was captured by the masses. The nationalists scored a great
victory, not only over the militarist Wu Pei-fu, but also over foreign
Imperialism. Finding it a very risky adventure to defend its ill-gotten
privilege against a whole nation in revolt, British Imperialism agreed to
the Nationalist Government taking over the Concessions at Hankow and
Kiukiang. Wuhan, the collective name given to the Han Cities, became
the new centre of the democratic revolution which had suffered a defeat
at Canton on March 20, 1926.
The main column of the Nationalist Army, commanded by Chiang Kai-
shek himself, met greater resistance on the way to its coveted goal—
Shanghai. Its march through the province of Kiangsi had not been very
effectively opposed. Nanchang, the capital of the province, was captured
simultaneously with the occupation of Wuhan. But then began the real
Sght. Although his camp also was not free from defection, Sun Chuan-
fang could count upon foreign aid which was not so easily available for
Wu Pei-fu, owing to the fact that the latter's forces were located far away
from the sea-coast. That advantage, however, was counter-balanced by
the fact that Shanghai was the home of the revolutionary proletariat
which assailed Sun Chuan-fang's forces from the rear while they were
attacked by the Nationalist Army on the front.
At the end of 1926, Shanghai was in a state of siege. The Nationalist
Army had closed up, cutting all connections inland to the south and west.
At that juncture, the Governor of Chekiang declared the independence of
his province. He was in secret alliance with the Shantung war-lord Chang
Tsung-chang who was a rival of Sun Chuan-fang for the control of
Shanghai. On the other hand, a formidable force of international
Imperialism was concentrated on the sea with the object of defending
Shanghai against any possible revo-
344 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
lutionary attack. In those circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek showed great
reluctance to press upon Shanghai. He was averse to displease the
imperialist Powers, and forfeit the sympathy of the Shanghai
bourgeoisie. While the working class began to assail the rear of the
enemy, Chiang Kai-shek's army was in no hurry to strike. There went on
mysterious negotiations for joint control of Shanghai. Sun Chuan-fang
withdrew his troops from Shanghai which passed under the control of his
rival. One by one, a number of enemy Generals went over to the
nationalists. The key to that bewildering situation was the anxiety of the
nationalists to come to some agreement with all concerned with the
control of Shanghai, namely, foreign Imperialism, the native bourgeoisie
and the militarists. The plan was to bring about a nationalist occupation
of Shanghai by means other than revolutionary. The naval and military
forces of Imperialism, with whom rested the last word about the fate of
China's economic metropolis, would not permit any change in the control
of that important position except on their own conditions.
While the nationalist leaders were involved in that effort to find the line
of least resistance, there developed in Shanghai a powerful mass
movement seriously challenging foreign Imperialism as well as native
reaction. On February 19 a general strike was declared to celebrate the
nationalist occupation of the province of Chekiang. The strike quickly
developed into an insurrection against the retreating forces of Sun
Chuan-fang. That was a period of transition, Shanhai having for the
moment no established authority. Sun Chuan-fang was withdrawing, to
be replaced by his rival. The working class made a bold effort to take
advantage of the moment for establishing a democratic city government
elected by the people. The democratic masses rallied round the working
class; the Nationalist Army was only twenty miles away from the city,
and there was no obstacle before it. But it refused to act. Under the
deepening frown of the imperials! fleet, on the one hand, and before the
advancing army of Chang Tsung-chang, on the other, a democratic
government came into existence in Shanghai. Having acted so heroically
for aiding the victory of the Nationalist Army, the working class was
betrayed by the latter in that critical moment. Single-handed, the
Shanghai working class could not hold the position for a long time
against such overwhelming odds. With the help of foreign Imperialism
and all the native reactionaries, the "Shanghai
The North Expedition 345
Volunteer Corps" was formed. The working class was declared to be the
real enemy of vested interest. That was the signal for the militarists to
strike at the hated enemy. Shanghai became the scene of an orgy of
bloody repression. Workers were arrested in hundreds, and their leaders
simply beheaded in public.
Only after the revolutionary democratic movement had been thus
crushed by the greatly superior forces of reaction with exemplary
barbarity, did the Nationalist Army march into Shanghai, but even then
not to avenge its heroic allies; it followed up its treachery by an open
attack against the democratic forces of revolution. The first act of the
Nationalist Army on its arrival at Shanghai was to turn upon the
revolutionary working class with fierce cruelty, which even surpassed
that committed by the hangmen of Chang Tsung-chang. It became
obvious that the Nationalist Army was allowed by international
Imperialism to reach the coveted goal on condition that it would
ruthlessly suppress the revolutionary movement. The nationalist Generals
ordered wholesale shooting of the workers; a ferocious attack was made
upon the Communist Party, because the latter demanded that political
power should not be usurped by the militarists, but remain vested in the
democratic "City Council" elected by the people.
The success of the North Expedition thus coincided with a fierce clash
between the two forces that had contributed to that success. The
Nationalist Army, having reached the Yangtse Valley, from Wuhan to
Shanghai, the Kuo Min Tang had to choose between the revolutionary
democracy and left militarism. In course of the campaign, both had
increased in power, claiming the right to determine the character of the
further development of the nationalist movement. The bourgeoisie could
retain the leadership of the movement by allying with either of the
contending forces, respectively of revolution and counter-revolution.
There was no hesitation on their part. They had launched upon the policy
of territorial expansion with the object of freeing the Nationalist
Government from the influence of the revolutionary masses. At the
critical moment, upon the conclusion of the North Expedition, they
preferred the alliance with feudalism represented by the left militarists.
But the petit-bourgeois left wing of the Kuo Min Tang hesitated. In the
half-hearted struggle against the feudal-bourgeois right wing, the petit-
bourgeois radicals tried to ride on two horses which could never make a
harmonious team. The
346 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
desire to retain the support of left militarism seriously disturbed their
alliance with the revolutionary masses; they were eventually obliged to
break that alliance and thus betray the revolution.
Following the success of the North Expedition, the National Democratic
Revolution was overtaken by a severe crisis, which destroyed the Kuo
Min Tang. It ceased to be the organ of a revolutionary struggle. Mocking
at the principle of Sun Yat-sen, class struggle inside its own ranks broke
out into a fierce conflict. The bourgeoisie was the first to attack. They
had begun it already at Canton. Arriving at their base in Shanghai, they
discarded all pretence, and made it clear that, should the Nationalist
Revolution go farther than they wished, they would turn against it.
National interest was subordinated to class interest. The petit-bourgeoisie
tried to play the ostrich game They sought to ignore unpalatable realities
which rudely challenged their pet doctrines of neo-Confucianism. But
there is no neutrality in a revolutionary struggle. Not willing to stand
faithfully by the revolutionary masses, they presently found themselves
in the other camp. A consolidation of the forces of counter-revolution
under the leadership of the Kuo Min Tang was the net outcome of the
North Expedition.
CHAPTER XVI
THE KUO MIN TANG SPLITS
An organisation embracing a variety of social elements with conflicting
interests can never be a cohesive political party. Until its reorganisation
in 1924, the Kuo Min Tang was the party of the bourgeoisie, although it
entered into opportunist alliances with certain sections of the feudal
aristocracy and patriarchal officials. Since all those classes could not
agree on all questions at all times, the Kuo Min Tang remained a very
loose combination without any definite political programme. After the
reorganisation, its social composition became still more heterogeneous.
Its ranks were swelled by the influx of workers and peasants, while the
reactionary social elements standing to the right of the bourgeoisie
continued to be in it. Strictly speaking, the Kuo Min Tang ceased to be a
political party. It became an alliance of several classes ostensibly with a
revolutionary purpose. Nevertheless, the exigencies of the revolutionary
struggle forced upon it the form of a political party.
The Kuo Min Tang represented the specific form of political organisation
produced by the conditions of a colonial country. The social character of
the Nationalist Revolution in colonial countries being bourgeois-
democratic, it is bound to take place on the basis of a broad coalition of
classes. As a matter of fact, the bourgeois revolution under all
circumstances involves a variety of classes which are interested in the
overthrow of feudalism. When it is given the additional task of fighting
foreign Imperialism, the coalition of classes, constituting its basis,
necessarily becomes still broader. The nationalist revolution in the
colonial countries primarily involves the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and
the proletariat. But under certain circumstances, other social elements, in
so far as Imperialism is antagonistic to their
348 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
interest, may be drawn into the alliance. But such a combination is bound
to be temporary, liable to fall apart as soon as class contradictions
become manifest in course of the anti-imperialist struggle. Owing to the
instability of its composition, the anti-imperialist alliance finds itself
constantly in a state of flux, and is shaken from time to time by internal
conflicts.
That was the case with the Kuo Min Tang. Its reorganisation in 1924 was
soon followed by a crisis. The broadening of its social basis was
vehemently opposed by the bourgeoisie under the pressure of their
feudal-patriarchal allies. These elements had dominated the politics of
the Kuo Min Tang until then. Ostensibly the struggle was on the question
of admitting the Communists into the Kuo Min Tang. Essentially, the
issue was different. It was concerning the hegemony in the struggle for
national liberation. Should national liberation be interpreted in terms of
the sectional interests of the bourgeoisie, or should it conform with the
requirements of the masses? In the latter case, the movement for national
liberation would be committed to an object no less than a complete
bourgeois democratic revolution. The overthrow of foreign Imperialism
should synchronise with the destruction of native feudalism and all other
forms of precapitalist social relations. By admitting the revolutionary
vanguard of the working class into its fold, the Kuo Min Tang logically
committed itself to the latter course. Naturally, the Old Guard did not
approve of that step. That inner conflict eventually culminated in a split
of the party.
The process of the split coincided with the short advance towards
Jacobinism. That was an instance of the dialectics of historical
developments. The intensification of revolutionary struggle necessarily
accentuated the conflict of the interests of the various classes involved in
it. The struggle could develop further in the revolutionary direction by
ending the conflict at the cost of the elements trying to break it. The
other alternative was a composition of the internal conflict on the terms
of those opposed to the advance in the revolutionary direction. Those
terms necessarily included severe restrictions on the activities of the
revolutionary classes. In the beginning of the process of differentiation,
the development was in the former direction. The advance towards
Jacobinism coincided with a formal expulsion from the party of the anti-
revolutionary elements. But because the expulsion was only formal, the
anti-revolutionary elements
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 349
successfully conspired against their opponents, and before long regained
the control of the party. The end of the short period of Jacobinism
marked a reunion of the conflicting elements. But it was a superficial and
deceptive unity. The result of the North Expedition again opened up the
old wound. It became evident that the conflict of classes was
irreconciable. In consequence of the territorial expansion and the stormy
development of the forces of revolutionary democracy, the conflict of
classes inside the Kuo Min Tang became extremely acute, much more so
than ever before.
The new crisis developed on the background of a more complicated
situation. In course of the military operations, a third factor had entered
the arena. It was the so-called left militarists. Through their formal
adherence to the Kuo Min Tang, the armed forces of the Nationalist
Government came largely under their control. They acted as the agent of
feudalism. The appearance of that new factor enormously strengthened
the tendency towards the establishment of a military dictatorship. It
confused the situation because owing to its interference the struggle
between the right and left wings for the leadership of the party ceased to
be on a class line. Both the wings allied themselves with militarists.
Nevertheless, the struggle ostensibly was between the principle of the
party control of the Government and military dictatorship. The left wing
contended that not only the civil Government but the military affairs as
well should be guided collectively by the party. The right wing was
accused of violating that principle. The right wing on its part maintained
that it had not violated the principle, and accused the petit-bourgeois
radicals of subservience to the Communists. In spite of the formalistic
bickerings, both were equally inclined towards military dictatorship,
inasmuch as it was a part of the programme of the nationalist movement.
The revolution was to be accomplished in three stages, the first of them
being unification of the country through military action. The first stage of
the revolution was still far from being completed. The country was not
yet united under one central authority. Therefore, military dictatorship
was on the order of the day. No believer in Sun Yat-sen's political
doctrines could be free from the inclination to military dictatorship. The
difference was that, while the big bourgeois right wing could set up its
own dictatorship, the petit-bourgeois pseudo-radicals were not able to do
so. They allied themselves with
350 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the ''left militarists", who sought to capture supreme power by the
pretension of being stout defenders of the principle of party control. But
in reality the "left militarists" were also defenders of feudalism. Through
the control of the military forces in the leftist camp, those agents of
feudalism transformed the Nationalist Government into a military
dictatorship.
In the last analysis, the dispute was not over military dictatorship. All
were in favour of it. The question was, who should exercise it. The
struggle took place in a situation which was extremely complicated by all
these currents and cross-currents. There were no less than four sets of
conflicts in operation. There was the old conflict about the leadership of
the party. Secondly, the new factor, namely, the left militarists,
contended with the bourgeoisie for the exercise of military dictatorship.
In the third place, there was the conflict between the petit-bourgeois
radicals and Communists for the leadership of the revolutionary struggle.
The former resented the fact that, by the logic of events, the hegemony of
the revolutionary struggle had passed to be the proletariat. In order to
really loyal to the revolution, they must give up the pretension to be the
saviours of the masses, and act according to the will of the latter. Finally,
there was the basic conflict between the exploiting and exploited
classes—a conflict that cut across the whole situation.
Owing to such complicated cross-currents in the background, the new
schism in the Kuo Min Tang was entirely different from the old. The
struggle over the alliance with the Communist Party had been clearly on
class lines. The Old Guard, composed of feudal lords, patriarchal literati,
officials of the old school, and big merchants, opposed a broadening of
the social basis of the party. They were afraid that the new social
orientation and its reorganisation would weaken their hold on the party.
As against them, the left wing, composed of young intellectuals and
representing the awakening urban democracy, welcomed an ally with
whose aid they expected to capture the leadership of the party. The coup
d'etat of March 20 was an outbreak of that original struggle on a clear
class line. The right wing regained its supremacy.
The immediate cause of the coup d'etat was the struggle between Chiang
Kai-shek and Wang Chin-wei for the control of the Wampoa Mititary
Academy. At that time both belonged to the same group
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 351
inside the Kuo Min Tang. The former was the head of the Academy as
regards military instruction, while the latter was the political director.
According to the generally accepted principle that all affairs should be
under party control, Wang Chin-wei's function was supreme. He was the
chosen leader of the party, and in that capacity claimed the political
direction also of the military affairs. His overthrow indicated which way
the wind was blowing. The new military force created by the Nationalist
Government, owing unconditional allegiance to it, tended to become a
weapon in the hand of the bourgeoisie. Chiang Kai-shek acted as the
representative of the bourgeoisie as against Wang Chin-wei whose
radical nationalism was heading towards revolutionary democracy.
As soon as the nucleus of a new military force came under the control of
representatives of the bourgeoisie inside the party, the right wing was
eager to remove it from the revolutionary atmosphere of Canton. The
North Expedition was a necessary consequence of the coup d'etat of
March 20. Military operations and territorial expansion provided the
right wing with an opportunity for building up a fairly cohesive army
around the nucleus created at Canton. Possessing something of its own, it
could assimilate the left militarists won over during the campaign,
seldom by political conviction, but often by very questionable means
such as bribery.
As the Commander of the firm nucleus of the Nationalist Army, Chiang
Kai-shek could claim and maintain his supreme authority over the armed
forces inflated rapidly through the adhesion of questionable elements. He
was well on the road to a military dictatorship. His petit-bourgeois rival
had to depend entirely upon the left militarist allies. Chiang Kai-shek's
military dictatorship was resented not only by his old political rivals—
the followers of Liao Chung-hai and Wang Chin-wei. Many right-
wingers, associated with him in the struggle against Jacobinism at
Canton, also became jealous of him when he began to acquire too much
power. Unable to control him from inside, they went over to the
opposing camp, which took over the fraudulent label of the "left wing".
After the split, resulting from the North Expedition, the "left wing"
counted among its leaders an inveterate right-winger like Sun Fo, a
typical member of the Old Guard like Tan Yen-kai, a scion of the big
bourgeoisie like T. V. Soong, a hard-boiled reactionary like the ex-
Christian Bishop Hsu Chien, and a Victorian liberal like Eugene Chen.
Those new acqui-
352 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
sitions, added to the feudal militarists, until a few days ago lieutenants of
the war-lord Wu Pei-fu. made the left wing a motley crew. The struggle
inside the Kuo Min Tang was developing on the background of an acute
conflict of classes. But the split did not take place along the line of that
conflict. Superficial issues of personal jealousy and clique-rivalry for
power overshadowed serious political issues. Consequently, the split
made the situation even more complicated.
Wuhan was the first important city on the Yangtse reached by the
Nationalist Army. Soon after it was captured, the Central Executive
Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, still at Canton, decided that the seat of
the Government should be removed there. Large expansion of territories
under its jurisdiction, and inflation of the military forces by the adhesion
of new elements, required that the Government should be situated in a
place from where all affairs could be guided practically and effectively.
The Central Executive Committee had an overwhelming right-wing
majority. It had supported Chiang Kai-shek first in his attack upon the
incipient forces of Jacobinism, and then in the policy of increasing the
power of the bourgeoisie through territorial expansion and alliance with
left militarism.
The decision was in complete accord with the requirements of the
situation. The place chosen for the new seat of the Government was of
great economic importance and strategic value. It was situated in the
middle of the country. At that moment, no better place could be found.
For traditional reasons, Nanking might have been preferable for the
nationalist headquarters. But the campaign in Kiangsi had not been until
then successful. Consequently, Nanking was still far beyond reach. It is
doubtful whether the capture of Shanghai was in the original plan of the
campaign. If Shanghai remained in the control of hostile forces, Nanking
would be a very insecure place for the seat of the Nationalist
Government. The original plan of the campaign was to march right up
towards Peking with the object of joining forces with Feng Yu-hsiang
and the ''model tuchun" of Shansi, who in the mean time had also
declared his adherence to the Kuo Min Tang. Wuhan would be the ideal
base for carrying on the campaign towards Peking. At the same time, it
could also be the base of operation down the Yangtse for helping the
capture of Nanking. The army of Chiang Kai-shek, struggling in Kiangsi
with very
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 353
bad means of communication with the base at far off Canton, would
be very greatly reinforced by the transfer of the headquarters to
Wuhan.
From all these considerations, it is evident that the decision of the
Central Executive Committee to move the headquarters to Wuhan did
not represent even remotely a revolt against the incipient military
dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. All speculation in that respect was
set aside by the selection of Commissioners who were to proceed to
Wuhan with the task of organising the new headquarters. They were
Sun Fo, Hsu Chien, T.V. Soong and Eugene Chen. None of them
could be suspected of any radical sympathy. They never belonged to
the left wing. Indeed, they were selected for their clear social bias.
They could be relied upon to counter-balance effectively any possible
revolutionary aberration on the part of left-wingers like Tang Yen-tab
and Chen Kum po, who had accompanied the military expedition.
Borodin accompanied the Commissioners. That fact has been
interpreted as evidence of a conspiracy against Chiang Kai-shek. But
it was a matter of course that the Chief Adviser of the Government
should accompany it to its new seat.
The Commissioners of the Central Executive Committee,
accompanied by their adviser Borodin, arrived at their destination by
the end of December 1926. On January 1, Wuhan was declared as the
capital of Nationalist China. But meanwhile, things had happened
independently of the decision of the Central Executive Committee of
the Kuo Min Tang. Those events decisively influenced the develop-
ment at Wuhan from the very beginning. Left militarism began to
assert itself decisively on the situation.
The real rival to Chiang Kai-shek appeared on the scene in the person
of Tang Shen-chi. The latter aspired for the supreme command of the
nationalist forces. Wuhan had been captured by the army under his
command. With that achievement to his credit, he resented that the
supreme command of the nationalist forces should still belong to
Chang Kai-shek who had until then rendered such a poor account of
military talent. On the other hand, the stormy development of mass
movement had encouraged the petit-bourgeois radicals to make a bid
for regaining power. Finally, there was the personal ambition of the
Commissioners themselves. On arriving at Wuhan, they found the
situation very favourable for themselves to assume supreme power,
instead of acting as the deputies of an
354 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
incipient military dictator. But the decisive role for the moment was
played by the Communists who had again become the dominating factor
of the situation. They had not forgotten the past record of Chiang Kai-
shek. The latter was certain to turn upon them as soon as he had realised
his scheme. So the Communists agreed to support the rivals of Chiang
Kai-shek irrespective of their social complexion. That was another fatal
mistake on their part.
The developing struggle against Chiang Kai-shek had a social basis. It
was obscured by the intervention of the factors of personal ambition and
factional rivalry. Instead of getting involved in the superficial aspects of
the struggle, the Communists should have stood firmly on the basis of
class conflict. Their policy in that period of transition should have been
to narrow down the social basis of the revolutionary coalition; to give the
fullest support to petitbourgeois radicalism as against the agents of the
right wing and of feudal reaction; and to demand the arming of the
masses in return for that support. That policy would have forced the
impending split of the Kuo Min Tang on the line of class conflict;
Jacobinism, suppressed at Canton, might have revived with greater
vigour in conditions much more favourable; and the success of the
Nationalist Democratic Revolution would have been practically assured.
Unfortunately, the Communists adopted an opportunist policy which
bore striking resemblance to the traditions of the Kuo Min Tang, as if
close association with the Kuo Min Tang had obscured the vision of the
Communist Party. It entered into an alliance with elements whose
counter-revolutionary character was evident either from record or from a
critical analysis of the possible motives. Neither a representative of the
compradore bourgeoisie, as Sun Fo had repeatedly proved himself to be,
nor a youthful banker like T.V. Soong, nor again a defender of feudalism
personified in Tang Shen-chi, could possibly be honestly interested in a
struggle against the feudal-bourgeois bloc conspiring against the
revolution.
The Communists could not have possibly failed to surmise the objective
of Chiang Kai-shek. Yet, they did not take the initative of fomenting a
revolt against him as soon as the necessary forces were available.
Borodin distrusted Chiang Kai-shek. He also failed to see that the
boldness of leading the revolutionary democratic masses in a frontal
attack upon incipient military dictatorship was the only guarantee against
the impending disaster. Instead of basing the fight
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 355
for the overthrow of the would-be dictator upon the revolutionary mass
movement, he sought to carry it on through the instrumentality of an
opportunist combination of elements who were no less hostile to the
revolution than Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuo Min Tang was split not as the
result of the process of differentiation between the revolutionary and
reactionary classes composing it. It broke into two factions both of which
inherited everything from the mother organisation. In the place of one,
there arose two nationalist combinations, both essentially feudal-
bourgeois in social composition, the superficial difference being a thin
veneer of bankrupt petit-bourgeois radicalism on the part of one.
Swearing by the reactionary principles of Sun Yat-sen, both were not
only hostile to the revolutionary mass movement but were opposed to the
development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. For a Chiang Kai-
shek in one camp, the other could boast of a Tang Shen-chi.
At the time of his return to politics, Chian-Kai-shek was suspected of
Communist sympathy. Before long, he surprised uncritical observers by
a sudden change of front. He rose to power as the crusader against
Communism. He distinguished himself as a defender of pure Sun Yat-
senism which he maintained could flourish only upon the corpses of the
Communists. Finally, he was beginning the massacre of the workers and
peasants whose reuolutionary action had made the spectacular nationalist
successes possible. His rival, Tang Shen-chi, could also boast of a career
no less chequered. Until recently a youthful lieutenant of the feudal war-
lord Wu Pei-fu, he revolted against his chief to be the paramount ruler of
the rich province of Hunan under the shadow of the "White Sun on the
Blue Sky".1 In order to win the support of the peasantry for the
realisation of his personal ambition, he had subscribed to the programme
of the Kuo Min Tang, which promised the peasants some amelioration of
the unbearable conditions of their existence. He had permitted the
Communists to organise in his province hundreds of thousands of
peasants in unions which threatened to be the local organs of political
power. He had even gone farther, and actually expressed his desire to
join the Communist Party. Besides being a fervent adept to the principles
of Sun Yat-sen, he was an orthodox Buddhist. While utilising the mass
movement for his personal aggrandisement, particularly for overthrowing
his rival from power, he connived with his lieutenants who were
preparing for the massacre
356 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of the working class.
Behind those two military leaders, there were to be found, in both the
camps, representatives of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie,
reactionary feudal lords and conservative patriarchal literati. C. C. Woo,
in one camp, could vie with Sun Fo, in the distinction of a veteran right-
winger who had always opposed revolution. The youthful Wampoa cadet
Pai Sung-chi, on the one side, could be well matched by a Ho Chien, on
the other. Both eventually demonstrated their military ability by
massacring the working class, one in Shanghai and the other in Wuhan.
The elder statesman, a rich compradore, Chang Ceingkiang, adding
authority to the ambition of Chiang Kai-shek, could be admirably paired
off with the old Buddha of Wuhan, Tang Yen-kai. The comparison could
be continued very far, showing the artificial nature of the split which
took place on the back-ground of a sharpening class struggle.
Wuhan's claim to leftism was primarily due to its acceptance of the
leadership of Wang Chin-wei who, the year before, had been driven out
of the country by Chiang Kai-shek. The same bunch of opportunist
feudal-bourgeois politicians who had supported the counter-
revolutionary venture of Chiang Kai-shek, now became the sponsors of
the "left wing" and acclaimed Wang Chin-wei as the saviour of China,
the faithful standard-bearer of Sun Yat-senism. The demand for the
return of Wang Chin-wei, however, was not put forward by the turn-coat
leaders of the Wuhan group. For enlisting the support of petit-bourgeois
radicalism to secure the success of the North Expedition, the right-wing
Central Executive Committee had resolved already at Canton to request
Wang Chin-wei to come back to assume the leadership of the party. The
same resolution directed the arch-reactionary Chang Ching-kiang to go
abroad to bring Wang Chin-wei back home. The hypocritical nature of
that resolution was exposed by the fact that the envoy remained where he
was—at the head of the party. But for the masses, the resolution would
have been forgotten, and Wang Chin-wei would never have returned
home. For him personally, it might have been more convenient. He
returned only to go into exile again, more discredited than ever. But the
logic of revolutionary development demanded complete discredit of
petit-bourgeois radicalism. The revolution could not develop farther
unless the bubble of Sun Yat-senism was burst. The tragic debacle of
Wang Chin-wei was necessary for the liberation of the forces of
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 357
revolution from the illusion about the principles of Sun Yat-sen. Not only
did the masses worship Sun Yat-sen as their saviour, the petit-bourgeois
neo-Confucian ideology contained in the San Min principles
surreptitiously influenced even the Communist Party.
The real demand for the return of Wang Chin-wei came from the masses.
The demand was first put forward hi a manifesto issued from Canton on
February 27, 1926 on behalf of the Communist Party, supported by a
number of other democratic and working class organisations. The object
of the move was to sharpen the conflict inside the Kuo Min Tang on
class lines, to push the petit-bourgeois radicals to assume the leadership
of the process of rallying the revolutionary democratic masses still under
the banner of the Kuo Min Tang and thus isolate the feudal-bourgeois
right wing conspiring against the revolution.1 But it was too late. The
Communist Party had not acted in time. The opportunist alliance was
already concluded at Wuhan, with the fraudulent label of the left wing.
The masses, however, responded with enthusiasm, and the demand for
the return of Wang Chin-wei became the popular slogan throughout the
nationalist territory. That demand was a challenge to Chiang Kai-shek, a
challenge much more powerful than the petty intrigues of the clique of
politicians at Wuhan.
Since in the beginning they did not have the slightest idea of revolting
against Chiang Kai-shek, the politicians at Wuhan had not initiated the
movement demanding the return of Wang Chin-wei. They joined the
movement against Chiang Kai-shek only when they saw that it opened
before them the road to power. But even in that hesitant move, the
initiative was taken by Tang Shen-chi, who acted not out of any
revolutionary motive, but to promote his personal ambition. He
compelled the Wuhan group to join the anti-Chiang movement which,
however, was an expression of the popular sentiment of the moment.
Ever since the coup d'etat of Match 20, the masses regarded Chiang Kai-
shek with suspicion. During the campaign in Kiangsi, his officers began
to show their ugly teeth to the revolutionary workers and peasants. That
news spread quickly throughout the nationalist territory. Taking
advantage of the situation, Tang Shen-chi's agents began the agitation to
stir up feelings against his rival. The movement began in Hunan which
was completely under Tang Shen-chi's control. The revolutionary task of
the moment was to resist
358 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the striving of the feudal-bourgeois right wing to stop the revolution, and
to frustrate Chiang Kai-shek's scheme to set up a military dictatorship.
Although working with their own selfish purpose, Tang Shen-chi's
agents, fomenting the anti-Chiang movement, objectively helped the
accomplishment of the revolutionary task of the moment. The movement
spread rapidly. Chiang was accused of violating the party authority.
Even then, the Wuhan leaders, though engaged in secret intrigues,
outwardly maintained a non-committal attitude. But their hands were
forced. Chiang Kai-shek's army was on the point of entering Shanghai
after having allowed the retreating Northern militarists time enough to
massacre the revolutionary workers, whose heroic vanguard-action made
the nationalist occupation of the city possible. The democratic masses
throughout the country were shocked by that shameful betrayal of the
Shanghai workers. Feelings ran very high at Wuhan. Suddenly, one
morning there appeared on the walls of the city placards denouncing the
Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army as a traitor to the party,
and calling for his overthrow. The bomb burst at a very opportune
moment. The Wuhan leaders were afraid that their chief would presently
demand an account of their behaviour, now that he was out of the woods,
crowned with the most brilliant achievement of the North Expedition. He
would not believe that they could be innocent, while such a powerful
movement was developing against him at Wuhan.
The open denunciation of Chiang Kai-shek and the declaration of war
against him burned the bridge behind the intriguing Wuhan group. In that
precarious situation, those camouflaged agents of the feudal-bourgeois
right wing had no other alternative; they put on the war-paint of left
radicalism. They had already betrayed their chief. While he had been
labouring under the handicap of a none too successful military operation,
the commissioners of the Central Executive Committee, sent to Wuhan
as his agents, had conspired to remove him from power. They had allied
themselves with his military rival in a secret plot to oust him. Those
intrigues were not altogether unknown. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek
would not believe them even if they hesitated to associate themselves
with the open declaration of war against him. As a matter of fact,
suspecting treachery on the part of the commissioners at Wuhan, Chiang
had set up his rival nationalist centre at Nanchang—the headquarters of
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 359
his army. There he gathered around himself a number of Central
Executive Committee members including such prominent and
authoritative figures as the chairman of the party himself, the venerable
Tan Yen-kai and the widow of Sun Yat-sen. In addition, he was, of
course, backed up by the outspoken right-wing leaders who had never
recognised the authority of the Canton Central Executive Committee.
As against that imposing combination, the Wuhan group could not
muster a quorum for a meeting of the Central Executive Committee. Had
it not been for the presence of a considerable military force commanded
by Tang Shen-chi, controlling the important provinces of Hunan and
Hupeh, the struggle would not have gone to the extent of a split. Tang
Shen-chi was so firmly established at Wuhan that, should Chiang Kai-
shek approve of the establishment of the Nationalist Government there,
as originally planned by the resolution of the highest party organ, he
would be compelled to submit to a political leadership which, though not
more friendly to the revolution than himself, was no longer under his
domination. In that situation, he could not act according to the resolution
of the Central Executive Committee. That would mean for him foregoing
the position he had acquired by the coup d'etat of March 20.
On the other hand, the commissioners sent to Wuhan could not retrace
their step in the hope of regaining the confidence of the chief they had
betrayed. So, both the sides were forced to go farther and farther away
from each other, although politically there was so little difference. The
rivalry between Chiang Kai-shek and Tang Shen-chi for power was the
decisive factor of the situation. The real issue of the situation was
overshadowed by political intrigue centred around that rivalry. The
influx of left militarists shattered the Kuo Min Tang to pieces.
Notwithstanding the short period of revolutionary experience, it would
not break away from its own tradition. It reverted to the old policy of
military combinations, a policy never abandoned completely.
The Communist Party was accused of fomenting the agitation against
Chiang Kai-shek. Unfortunately, the Communist Party, in so far as it was
represented by its top leaders, did not deserve the accusation. They had
not taken the initiative in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. It was
done in spite of their opposition, and the movement developed
spontaneously. Had the Communists acted
360 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
otherwise, the movement could not be used as a means for the promotion
of personal ambition, and it would have developed in an entirely
different direction. In that case also, the Kuo Min Tang would have split.
The split was inevitable. It was necessary. It was a condition for the
further development of the revolution. The split resulting from the
development in a different d irection would have meant purging out of
the ranks of the Kuo Min Tang all the counterrevolutionary feudal-
bourgeois elements. That would not be its destruction, but its second re-
birth, this time as a compact alliance of all the revolutionary democratic
forces, namely, the urban petit-bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the
proletariat. Indeed, the new party rising out of that possible and
necessary split would have been Kuo Min Tang only in name.
By supporting the demand for the return of Wang Chin-wei, the
Communist Party did raise the question about the future of Chiang Kai-
shek. But it failed to press the issue further—to the point where it would
be understood by the masses. The struggle against Chiang Kai-shek was
the revolutionary task of the moment. He was not an individual. His was
not a personal ambition. He represented a class; and his ambition to
military dictatorship represented the striving of an entire class to stop the
revolution. Therefore, further development of the revolution was bound
to coincide with the struggle for the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek. As
the leader of the revolutionary democratic masses, the Communist Party
should have initiated that phase of the struggle. Unfortunately, it let the
leadership slip out of its hand, and fall in the hand of Tang Shen-chi, who
converted the struggle of the revolutionary democracy against feudal-
bourgeoisie reaction into a struggle between two individuals.
Consequently, the return of Wang Chin-wei lost all revolutionary
significance. He returned into an atmosphere of political intrigues,
dominated by the military dictatorship of Tang Shen-chi. To rise above
such an atmosphere, was not in the power of petit-bourgeois radicalism.
The events leading up to the establishment of two rival Nationalist
Governments showed clearly that the split of the Kuo Min Tang did not
take place along the line of social cleavage widened by the results of the
North Expedition. The split was but a temporary discord in the camp of
feudal-bourgeois reaction. It did not take place upon the establishment of
the Nationalist Government at
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 361
Wuhan. As a matter of fact, the Nationalist Government was established
at Wuhan according to a formal resolution of the Central Executive
Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, dominated by the right wing and
controlled by Chiang Kai-shek. The latter himself visited Wuhan soon
after the commissioners had reached there and the Government had been
formally established. The Wuhan Government entered into international
negotiations. It was recognised by foreign Powers as the de facto
Government of China. In December 1926, the remaining members of the
Central Executive Committee left Canton for Wuhan. Previous to that,
Chiang Kai-shek had visited the new centre, and returned with grave
suspicion about the behaviour of his colleagues there. He planned to test
the loyalty of his associates. On the way to Wuhan, the Central Executive
Committee visited the headquarters of the Nationalist Army at
Nanchang. On that occasion, Chiang Kai-shek persuaded the chairman of
the party to call a meeting of the Central Executive Committee there.
Tang Shen-chi, on his side, suspected that the plan of his rival was to
move the nationalist centre away from Wuhan. He naturally did not want
that to happen. He countered Chiang's move by fomenting the agitation
against him. On the other hand, he instigated the commissioners at
Wuhan to stiffen up their back in view of the fact that they constituted
the Nationalist Government which had already received the de facto
recognition of foreign Powers. Why should they surrender that position
of advantage and return under the domination of Chiang Khai-shek? The
commissioners contended that the proper place for the meeting of the
Central Executive Committee was Wuhan, which had been declared the
new nationalist headquarters by its own resolution. Tang Shen-chi
encouraged them by placing his military forces at their disposal. Left
militarism functioned as the decisive factor of the situation. The
Nationalist Government became an instrument for the realisation of Tang
Shen-chi's personal ambition.
When it became evident that the commissioners at Wuhan had betrayed
him by allying themselves with his rival for power with the object of
overthrowing him, Chiang Kai-shek declared Nanchang to be the real
Nationalist Centre. The feudal-bourgeois reaction was rent asunder by
internal squabbles. Each side accused the other of violating the authority
of the party. The Nanchang fraction entered into surreptitious
negotiations with the Northern militarists and foreign Imperialism.
Although some of their trusted representatives
362 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
such as Sun Fo, T. V. Soong, etc.. were important members of the
Wuhan Government, the Shanghai bourgeoisie favoured the Nanchang
group. They were confident that the prodigals of Wuhan would repent
sooner or later, and return to the family-fold. Upon the settlement of the
delicate question regarding the occupation of Shanghai, it was no longer
necessary for Chiang Kai-shek to temporise. He was the chosen one of
the Shanghai bourgeoisie; they had recommended him to foreign
Imperialism. With such powerful backing, Chiang felt his position to be
secure. He declared war against Wuhan, and established a new
Nationalist Government at Nanking.
The Wuhan group retorted by dismissing him from the post of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army, and expelling him from
the party. But the significance of that retort depended on what was meant
by the Nationalist Army and the Kuo Min Tang. A simple resolution
could not deprive one of the command of an army, so long as it remained
loyal to him. The resolution would have had great significance, had it
provided for the creation of a new military force by arming the
revolutionary workers and peasants. That it did not. Consequently, the
real significance of the resolution was to place the Wuhan group—party
as well as the Government—under the control of the military forces of
Tang Shen-chi, instead of those of Chiang Kai-shek. The change did not
touch the essentials of the situation. Indeed, it was rather a change for the
worse.
Chiang Kai-shek represented the bourgeoisie. The military dictator of
Wuhan was a feudal militarist trying to fish in troubled waters. As
regards his position in the party, Chiang Kai-shek could not possibly be
expelled from the Kuo Min Tang, so long as it remained the political
organ of the class he represented. Instead of being expelled, he simply
took the party along with himself. The Wuhan group claimed to act upon
the authority of the Kuo Min Tang and the principles of Sun Yat-sen; but
on the very same authority, it was declared an outlaw by its rival. The
expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek was meaningless, unless it meant the
expulsion of the bourgeoisie from the Kuo Min Tang. In other words, the
expulsion would have had a far-reaching significance, if it marked the
beginning of the process of transformation of the Kuo Min Tang into a
revolutionary democratic party waging war upon feudal-bourgeois
reaction as well as foreign Imperialism. That was not the case. The "left"
Kuo Min Tang of Wuhan represented a precarious coalition of
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 363
the bankrupt petit-bourgeois radicals and opportunist feudal militarists;
ambitious agents of the reactionary big bourgeoisie also participated in it.
The squabble over the authority of the party soon subsided. There was a
much greater issue. It was the old question of the relationship with the
Communist Party. In other words, it was the question concerning the
social basis of the political party to lead the Nationalist Democratic
Revolution. It was the vital question about the future of the revolution.
Confronted with that question, all those who were opposed to a further
development of the revolution could not weaken themselves by mutual
quarrel. Therefore, they must compose their differences, to be powerful
enough for attacking the forces of revolution which had been growing in
the meantime.
From the point of view of the bourgeoisie, the object of the North
Expedition was to free the Nationalist Government from the
revolutionary influence of the democratic masses. The fundamental
political questions of class relations and of the leadership of the revo-
lution presented themselves in the acutest form upon the completion of
the Expedition in the military sense. The revolutionary democratic forces
had grown tremendously in course of the Expedition undertaken with the
object of freeing the Nationalist Government from their dangerous
influence. Since the bourgeoisie could not run away from the spectre of
revolution, it became necessary for them to take the bull by the horn, if
the dreaded danger was to be avoided. The counter-revolutionary task of
the moment was to break the power of the working class which, in course
of the struggle, had captured the leadership of the democratic masses.
Chiang Kai-shek accused the Wuhan group not only of usurping the
party authority; the main charge was that the Wuhan group was acting
under the influence of the Communists. To impress the native
bourgeoisie and foreign Imperialism with his distinction from his rivals
at Wuhan, Chiang Kai-shek began a ferocious attack upon the working
class, and violently severed relations with the Soviet Union, whose
generous help had contributed so much to his military success.
The disruption of the united anti-imperialist nationalist front, represented
by the Kuo Min Tang, did not result from the squabble for power among
the various factions of feudal-bourgeois reaction. The real split took
place in one camp as well as in the other. The
364 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
only difference was that Chiang Kai-shek violently broke the alliance
with the working class a few weeks earlier than his rivals did at Wuhan.
The expression of the real split was the bloody suppression by Chiang
Kai-shek of the revolutionary democratic movement at Shanghai, as well
as the massacre of the workers and peasants by the Generals at Wuhan.
While Chiang Kai-shek based his campaign against the Wuhan group
mainly on the allegation that the latter was acting as the instrument of the
Communists, the Wuhan group fought him on the flimsy issue of party
authority. The vertical cleft, created by the lack of cohesion in the camp
of counter-revolution, closed up in proportion as the irreparable
horizontal cleavage widened.
The feudal-bourgeois elements in both the camps closed up their ranks,
to turn ferociously upon the democratic masses, particularly upon the
revolutionary working class. The anti-imperialist coalition of classes
formed in 1924, on the platform of the reorganised Kuo Min Tang, was
broken up by the bourgeoisie who, terrified by the spectre of revolution,
closed up their ranks to face the common danger represented by the
revolutionary democratic masses. Personal ambitions, group interest, and
the intervention of left militarism, created discord in the ranks of the
bourgeoisie. But the Kuo Min Tang split only when the coalition of
classes represented by it broke down. The conflict of class interest,
sharpened by the stormy development of the mass movement, rendered
the old coalition untenable. It was bound to break up. It had served its
purpose. The future of the revolution depended upon how the inevitable
break happened. The leadership, until then vested in the coalition, might
be captured by the class which had the courage to take the offensive first.
It was evident that the capture of the leadership by the bourgeoisie would
mean a setback for the revolution. Therefore, its further development
demanded offensive on the part of the revolutionary classes. Objective
conditions were all favourable for the offensive. Unfortunately, the
vanguard wavered, giving the enemy time to manoeuvre for a strategic
position from which they delivered a fierce attack before long. The
Communist Party got involved in the factional squabbles amongst the
reactionaries. It permitted the real issue of the situation to be pushed to
the background. While quarrelling among themselves, the feudal-
bourgeois elements in both the camps prepared for the real split. It took
place before long, they taking the offensive. Having failed to attack when
in a favourable position, the working class was easily
The Kuo Min Tang Splits 365
beaten, and the revolutionary democratic masses were left without
any leadership in that critical moment.
The net result of the North Expedition was complete capture of the
Kuo Min Tang by the bourgeoisie hi alliance with the feudal
militarists. The Kuo Min Tang thereupon ceased to be the organ of a
revolutionary struggle against foreign Imperialism and native
reaction. But at the same time, the revolutionary democratic masses
had been so well mobilised as to throw up a new leadership. To the
Kuo Min Tang was allotted the shameful role of fighting the very
force which, only a few years ago, had rescued it from the morass of
political bankruptcy. Consequently, it became the party of the
counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie allied with feudalism, acting as the
willing tool of foreign Imperialism. The Kuo Min Tang did not split.
Its revolutionary role played out, it was destroyed by the contradiction
of its social composition and ideological outlook.
Notes
1. The Emblem of the Kuo Min Tang.
2. The move was suggested and the manifesto drafted by the author of this book who
had arrived at Canton earlier in the year as the representative of the Communist
International; The Canton Committee of the Communist Party was very reluctant to
take the step, because even then the Communists did not think that it would be wise
to oppose Chiang Kai-shek openly.
CHAPTER XVII
THE GREAT CRISIS
In the beginning of 1927, events happened in China with an amazing
rapidity. The situation was as exciting as it was bewildering. The eyes of
the world were fixed upon China. The world was staggered by the
stormy development in one of its vast back-waters. Within eight months,
ten out of the twenty-one provinces were brought under the authority of
the Nationalist Government whose jurisdiction, before that short period
of time, had been confined to the southern-most province of Kwangtung.
The territory newly acquired by the Nationalist Government was well
over half a million square miles in area, and had a population of about
two hundred millions. A number of other provinces, though not yet
directly under its authority, owed allegiance to it. The nationalist flag
flew over the entire Yangtse Valley—the main economic artery of the
country. Large and well-equipped armies, commanded by such
redoubtable war-lords as Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-
chang, were beaten by the Nationalist Army which possessed hardly a
piece of heavy artillery. The whole achievement seemed to be a miracle.
How did it happen?
The sleeping giant was awake. The miracle was performed by the
masses. With their enthusiastic support, the Nationalist Government had
established a solid base at Kwangtung. On the strength of the same
revolutionary force, the Nationalist Army reached the Yangtse Valley
with the irresistible momentum of a tidal wave. It was again the
revolutionary action of the masses which created the new base of the
nationalist power by a successful frontal attack upon foreign Imperialism
at Hankow. The capture of the British Concession in that city was an act
unprecedented in the history of China's relation with foreign Powers.
None even dreamt until then that such an event
The Great Crisis 367
could ever take place in China. But a new force had appeared on the
scene; it could defy gun-boats and landing parties. It was the revolu-
tionary enthusiasm and energy of the masses.
Ever since 1919, the face of China had been changing in consequence
of the appearance of the new force. In many battles against native
reaction and foreign Imperialism, it had tried its mettle and gained
momentum. Finally, it performed the miracle which amazed the
world. Not only in Hankow, but right in Shanghai also it was
demonstrated how the revolutionary determination of the masses
could defy the greatest danger. When hundreds of imperialist guns
from scores of battle-ships were levelled against that economic heart
of China to keep the Nationalist Army away, it was again the prole-
tariat which placed itself at the forefront of the battle, and led the
democratic masses to a glorious victory.
In that situation, it was evident that further development of the
situation in the spring of 1927 was conditional upon the nature of the
relationship between the Nationalist Government and the revolu-
tionary masses. Will the former have the courage to continue wielding
the formidable weapon which had performed such miracles? That was
the supreme question of the moment.
The nationalists had scored a great victory; but it was only the
beginning. A defeat bad been inflicted upon the first lines of the
enemy; the enemy was in disgrace, but still far from being destroyed.
Indeed, military victory had brought the nationalists to a situation
which was beset with the grave danger of hostile forces operating
within their own ranks. The operation of those sinister forces had
already been evident in the discord and rivalry among the nationalist
leaders. The awakening of the masses had decomposed the social
basis of reaction; but the latter was smuggling itself in the nationalist
movement with the object of corrupting it. The age-long social
stagnation was disturbed; an undermined social structure had been
held together in a precarious, fossilised form by force of habit; at last
it was rudely shaken; the ground was prepared for the final collapse.
A decisive blow must be dealt. That was the essence, and the
fundamental task of the situation in the beginning of 1927.
It was an illusion to believe that militarism was destroyed. The
monster thrived upon deep-rooted social evils. They still remained
intact. They could not be eradicated by simply driving the mercenary
368 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
hordes of Wu Pei-fu across the Yangtse. China could never rid herself
of Wu Pei-fu and his likes until the social conditions which enabled them
to raise an army as if by hat-trick were not radically cured. The battle
must be waged ruthlessly in the numberless villages, where the roots of
militarism were struck deep in the structure of a decayed society. The
established social relations meant unrestricted exploitation, expropriation
and pauperisation of the peasant masses. So long as those relations
remained in force, the hydra-head of the monster of militarism was sure
to reappear soon in another place after it was struck down in one. The
armies of the war-lords had been routed before the onslaught of the
nationalist forces; but militarism was smuggling itself into the nationalist
ranks.
The victory over Imperialism was equally deceptive. Unexpectedly
attacked by the masses, Imperialism had only beaten a strategic retreat,
to prepare for a counter-offensive. The collapse of the armies of the war-
lords had brought the nationalists face to face with the forces of
Imperialism. The danger of open foreign intervention was imminent.
Without the formality of declaring a war, international Imperialism had
blockaded the coast of China. Shanghai was guarded by a formidable
array of foreign fleets. Hongkong harboured dozens of transport ships
carrying an army of invasion. The Philippines and Singapore loomed
menacingly in the offing as the bases of possible naval operations on a
large scale. Japan stood near at hand, ready to strike as soon as the
sanction of Anglo-American Imperialism was available. The Yangtse, as
far as it was navigable, was littered with battle-ships large and small.
One tenth of the naval forces concentrated at Wuhan alone would be
enough to demolish the nationalist headquarters in a few hours.
Behind the imposing demonstration of the mailed fist, Imperialism also
sought to corrupt and decompose the Nationalist Government of Wuhan
by the lure of diplomatic recognition. On the other hand, Japanese agents
surreptitiously visited the headquarters of Chiang kai-shek. On Japanese
initiative, some right-wing Kuo Min Tang leaders met representatives of
Northern militarism secretly in Peking. Plans for the occupation of
Shanghai, jointly by the southern and northern forces, were being
canvassed. At the same time, American Imperialism pressed the scheme
of "neutralising Shanghai"—a scheme which signified nothing less than
the annexation of the economic metropolis of China by international
Imperialism. But all the aggressive schemes of Imperialism were
frustrated by the
 The Great Crisis 369
bold action of the democratic masses organised on the initiative of the
revolutionary proletariat. The occupation of Shanghai by the nationalist
forces had to be ostensibly conceded.
But there could be no doubt that the nationalists were allowed to enter
Shanghai only when they agreed to respect the privileged position of
foreign Imperialism. The masses had dealt a severe blow to the prestige
of Imperialism. But its power was not yet broken. The power of
Imperialism in China was based upon the monopolist control of the
entire economic life of the country. For defending its position of
privilege, Imperialism would readily utilise a new weapon if the old
broke down irreparably. Failing to crush the revolutionary mass
movement with the old instrument of native militarism, the imperialist
Powers did not mind seeking alliance with the nationalist bourgeoisie on
condition that the latter would turn against the revolution. Open armed
intervention was a questionable policy.
In the beginning of 1927, China was the scene of a mass movement
enormously more potential than its predecessors—the Taiping Revolt
and the Boxer Uprising. It was no longer an elemental upheaval with
primitive democratic tendencies; nor was it a blind fury against foreign
aggression. It was a consciously revolutionary movement with a definite
social objective to be reached through the realisation of a clearly
formulated political programme. It was a revolutionary movement of the
masses, led by a party, revolutionary in ideology, compact in
organisation and resolute in struggle. That was the Communist Party.
In such a condition, armed intervention by foreign Powers could only be
a threat. It was easy to terrorise the nationab'st bourgeoisie. But the threat
failed to have any effect on the masses. The latter attacked the very roots
of imperialist power, just when formidable forces were marshalled for
defending it. Knowing that the power of Imperialism was based upon its
monopoly over the economic life of the country, the Communist Party
demanded not only the abrogation of unequal treaties and confiscation of
Concessions, but went further to demand nationalisation of the railways,
mines, heavy industries and banks, all mostly owned by foreigners. The
struggle for national freedom developed into an attack upon Capitalism.
The development was naturally not to the liking of the nationalist
bourgeoisie. Imperialism was quick to detect the cleavage in the
nationalist ranks, and sought to drive a wedge with the object of
widening it. It dec-
370 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
lared its readiness to compromise with the nationalist bourgeoisie. That
policy proved more effective than armed intervention.
Until then, the democratic masses were the backbone, the driving-force
of the nationalist movement which, nevertheless, still remained under the
leadership of the bourgeoisie. The more the working class pushed
forward, the more the nationalist bourgeoisie inclined towards a
compromise with Imperialism. Finally, the critical point was reached.
The military victories for the nationalists exposed how the ground really
lay. China could be rid of the curse of militarism only by clearing away
the ugly ruins of feudal-patriarchal reaction. On the other hand, her
struggle for freedom from imperialist domination inevitably involved a
struggle against Capitalism. The nationalist struggle was inter-connected
with class struggle. Therefore, remaining faithful to the principles of Sun
Yat-sen, the Kuo Min Tang could no longer lead the struggle for national
freedom. Anxious to see that the sacred home of Confucious was not
soiled by the reality of class struggle, the Kuo Min Tang betrayed the
Nationalist Revolution. The revolution could be betrayed; but the
realities that produced it mocked at the principles of Sun Yat-sen and
exposed the imbecility of his followers. At the behest of the Kuo Min
Tang, the masses could not relapse into the slumber of servitude after
they had suffered, sacrificed, fought and won in dozens of battles during
the years of revolutionary development. They stood faithfully by the
revolution, determined to strike at the roots of native reaction and foreign
Imperialism, even when the nationalist bourgeoisie feared, wavered,
compromised and capitulated.
Military success and territorial expansion brought the nationalists up
against the social problems which could no longer be evaded if the
revolution was to go farther. It became evident that the nationalist
democratic revolution—the overthrow of imperialist domination and
destruction of militarism—was identical with an agrarian revolution.
Thanks to the nationalist movement identifying itself with the
revolutionary awakening of the masses, militarism had been dealt a
heavy blow, and the privileges of Imperialism challenged seriously for
the first time. The revolutionary awakening of the masses was a revolt
against social conditions which produced militarism served the purpose
of imperialist domination. That being the case, the immediate task of the
nationalist revolution in the spring of 1927 was evident. It was to make a
clean sweep of the ruins of the
The Great Crisis 371
feudal-partiarchal social system. That was not an extraordinary task. It is
the basic task of a bourgeois democratic revolution to abolish feudalism
and any other form of pre-capitalist production. But in China, the
nationalist bourgeoisie shrunk before that historic task. While still in
Kwangtung, they had deferred the solution of the agrarian! problem on
the pretext that in the stuggle against Imperialism the united nationalist
front should be formed on the broadest possible social basis. It was then
argued that the Kuo Min Tang would lose the support of the landowning
classes, should it hurry to put in practice its programme of agrarian
reform. That anxiety to retain the support of the landowning classes was
unwarranted because the nationalist revolution had never really had it,
nor could it ever expect to have it.
The Kuo Min Tang had entered into an alliance with the feudal
militarists before it was transformed into an organ of revolutionary
struggle by the awakening of the masses. Its old allies declared war upon
it as soon as it came under the influence of revolutionary dem-cracy. In
Canton, the Nationalist Government had to defend itself constantly
against the intrigues and open revolts of feudal reactionaries. Since
feudal relations obstructed the free development of capitalist production
and trade, it was strange that the bourgeoisie should be so reluctant to
disrupt them. The reason for that reluctance was that in China the
bourgeoisie themselves were very closely connected with forms of
exploitation taking place under feudal relations.
The awakening of the rural masses was but remotely connected with the
struggle against Imperialism. Directly, it heralded an attack upon the
feudal landlords and the whole system of semi-capitalist rural economy.
The outstanding feature of the national economy of China is the
subordination of largely pre-capitalist modes of production to the highest
form of capitalist exploitation, through trade. In that system of national
economy, foreign Imperialism, the native trader, the village shopkeeper,
the rural usurer, the landlord, the State official and the militarist, are so
many links in the long chain which binds the Chinese masses to their
servitude. Thanks to the prevailing system of landownership, under
which rents and taxes are still paid largely in kind, practically the entire
surplus produce accumulates in the hand of the landowner who, together
with the State official and village usurer, exercises monopoly over the
entire national economy.
372 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The situation is rendered still worse by the fact that often all these three
functions—of landlord, trader and usurer—are united in the self-same
person. Being mostly engaged in trade, the Chinese bourgeoisie can
hardly be expected to tread on the toes of the mighty landlord. They
derive their profit from the traffic in commodities produced under the
conditions of a decayed social order. Therefore, they could not be any
less averse to its subversion that the feudal-patriarchal-militarist
corporation monopolising rural economy. The bourgeoisie join the revolt
against feudalism when they are connected only with the capitalist mode
of production. Operating with trades capital, they are bound to be allies
of feudal reaction.
On the other hand, the Chinese bourgeoisie are connected also with
imperialist exploitation. The compradores (middle-men in wholesale
trade) and the bankers in the treaty ports are agents of imperialist
finance. They never joined the nationalist movement. The industrial
bourgeoisie are very weak and small numerically. Moreover, even they
are controlled by foreign banks. Nevertheless, Imperialism being
primarily responsible for the industrial backwardness of China, the
interests of the Chinese industrial bourgeoisie are objectively
antagonistic to it. Since pre-capitalist social conditions restrict free
economic development of the country, the industrial bourgeoisie would
also welcome their abolition. But they are too weak to lead a revolution,
demanded by the interests of their class. In the beginning, they
sympathised with, and materially supported, the democratic movement.
Then the working class entered the scene.
Oppressed, on the one hand, by imperialist finance, and handicapped on
the other by the pre-capitalist nature of the national economy, modern
industry in China counts upon only one favourable factor. It is the
extremely cheap labour. The awakening of the working class threatened
to deprive it also of that advantage, at least partially. In the beginning,
the awakening had a distinctly nationalist complexion. The strikes were
mostly in concerns owned by foreigners. Modern industries and transport
in China, being mostly owned by foreign capital, the striving of the
working class for some improvement of the intolerable conditions of
their life was primarily an attack upon foreign Imperialism. In course of
the development of the movement, the attack grew stronger, until it
assailed the very foundation of Imperialism by demanding the
nationalisation of railways, basic industries and banks The awakening of
the working class was
The Great Crisis 373
the commencement of the inevitable struggle between capital and labour.
When the Chinese workers began the struggle to secure greater value for
their labour, they could not discriminate between foreign capital and
native capital. The nationalist complexion faded away in proportion as
the essential class character of the movement became evident.
With the nationalist bourgeoisie also, class interest predominated
national interest. The industrial bourgeoisie began to disassociate
themselves from the nationalist movement in proportion as it became
revolutionary in consequence of the awakening of the working class. The
anxiety for immediate sectional interest made them blind to the much
greater benefit that might accrue to their class from the victory of the
revolution. Foreign Imperialism and native reaction militated against the
broad interest of their class. The awakening of the working class
represented an attack upon both those factors. Therefore, enlightened
self-interest should have persuaded the industrial bourgeoisie to ally with
the working class. But they failed to do so. They acted on the principle
that a bird in hand was worth more than two in the bush. Better find
some guarantee for the present profit, with the expectation of increasing
it eventually than run the risk of a revolution. When they were required
to define their attitude towards the working class, the industrial
bourgeoisie made their decision. They joined hands with foreign
Imperialism and native reaction in order to arrest the development of the
Nationalist Democratic Revolution.
Developing on the background of such complicated relations of classes,
the Chinese Revolution found itself in a great crisis in the spring of 1927.
Already Kwangtung, contradictions inside the nationalist ranks had
become manifest. The Kuo Min Tang was even then confronted with the
social tasks of the revolution. It launched upon the policy of avoiding the
task by diverting the attention of the masses to the secondary issues of
military victory and territorial expansion. But the revolution could not be
separated from its social tasks. Military victory, territorial expansion,
political unity were but means to the solution of its basic social task. The
task of a revolution is to lay the foundation of a new social order, and for
that purpose clear away the ruins of the old. In the spring of 1927, it
became evident that the programme of the bourgeois democratic
revolution could not be realised in China without attacking the imme-
374 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
diate interests of the bourgeoisie. An agrarian revolution was the only
weapon to eradicate militarism; a ruthless subversion of the decayed
feudal-patriarchal relations was necessary for freeing national economy
from pre-capitalist limitations. And development of class struggle was
the only effective attack upon Imperialism. The revolution did not wait
while the bourgeoisie were trying to emasculate it. The bourgeoisie
having failed to lead the democratic revolution, the working class had
come forward to shoulder the responsibility. That again was not
something new. The condition for the success of any bourgeois
revolution has always been the initiative and the pressure of the toiling
masses. The difference in the case of China was that, when the working
class took the initiative, the bourgeoisie turned against the revolution,
instead of placing themselves on the crest of the tide as their class had
done in other countries in a previous period of history. The difference
was due to the social structure of the country, the intervention of an
outside factor (Imperialism) and the conditions of the contemporary
world. All those three causes contributed to the creation of a situation in
which the bourgeois democratic revolution in China was not likely to
stop by ushering in the period of capitalist development. There was the
possibility of its being followed immediately by a more far-reaching
social revolution.
The situation in the spring of 1927 clearly opened up the perspective of
the Chinese Revolution transcending the limits of the bourgeois
democratic revolution. The perspective had been visible already in "Red"
Canton. The coup d'etat of March 20 was the first definite move of the
bourgeoisie to stop the revolution. In the beginning of 1927, it was clear
that, irrespective of all the efforts of the bourgeoisie, the revolution had
developed in a dangerous direction. It had found a more determined and
courageous leader in the working class. In that critical situation, the
bourgeoisie could no longer temporise, manoeuvring for position. They
had to act decisively. The issue was very clear : For or against the
revolution.
The bourgeoisie turned against the revolution. Immediately upon the
occupation of Shanghai, the Nationalist Army violated the alliance with
the working class. Labour organisations were dissolved; their leaders
were massacred; the relation with the Soviet Union was broken up; and a
fierce campaign against the Communists became the dominating feature
of the situation. In Wuhan the turn was not so sharp. The
The Great Crisis 375
attitude of the group there was influenced by the internal struggle for
power which had wrecked the Kuo Min Tang. Engaged in a struggle
against the rival group led by Chiang Kai-shek, the Wuhan group
demagogically disapproved of his counter-revolutionary action. Con-
sequently, in spite of the fact that its class composition and social
outlook were essentially similar to those of the rival faction, it became
the pivot of a revolutionary alliance.
The split left the Wuhan group with the smaller share of the gains of the
North Expedition. Out of the ten provinces brought directly under
nationalists, only two were practically controlled by the Wuhan
Government. Its military forces were also inferior to those of the rival.
Besides, the larger part of the army, formally owing allegiance to it, was
commanded by Tang Shen-chi and other Generals who were very recent
recruits to the nationalist cause. The leader of the opposing camp, Chiang
Kai-shek, commanded an army of his own. Except one army corps, the
bulk of the new military forces created at Canton went with him.
Economically, the position of the Wuhan groups compared also very
unfavourably with that of its rival. It could be easily blockaded from the
outside world. In short, the position of Wuhan was that of a beleaguered
city, like Paris in 1793. Like Paris, it also could come out of the tight
corner only by holding high the standard of revolution. The situation was
favourable for the purpose. The working class, nationally and
internationally, supported Wuhan as against the rival group which had
openly betrayed the democratic revolution; its hands were dripping with
the blood of the means. Democratic and liberal world opinion was also
favourable to the Wuhan group, because of its leftist pretension. Petit-
bourgeois radicalism claimed Wuhan as its own. Even in the provinces
controlled by its rival, the Wuhan group had the support of the
democratic masses. But, on the other hand, in the internal struggle for
power, it had been outmanoeuvered by the rival faction. The Wuhan
group appreciated the gravity of its position. There was no way back. It
must hold out somehow until fortune came. That could be done only by
winning the confidence of the masses. So, it decided the play the role of
left radicalism. But the days were gone when it was possible to operate
with vague promises and radical phrases. The masses supported the
Wuhan Government, but demanded that promises made previously be
fulfilled, and radical phrases be translated into revolutionary deeds.
376 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
In the manifesto issued by the Reorganisation Conference of 1924, the
Kuo Min Tang had declared: "In China today, poor peasants and over-
worked labourers are to be found everywhere. The position of these two
classes and their sufferings are such as provoke in them a powerful will
to revolt against Imperialism. Therefore, the success of the nationalist
revolution must depend upon the participation of the peasants and
labourers. The position of the Kuo Min Tang is, on the one hand, to help
with all its strength the economic development of the peasants and
labourers, so that the effective power of the nationalist revolution be
increased; and, on the other hand, to make every eflort for securing the
participation of the peasants and labourers in the Kuo Min Tang, so as to
speed up the advance of the nationalist revolutionary movement. For, the
Kuo Min Tang is now engaged in the struggle against Imperialism and
militarism—that is, against the special classes opposed to the interests of
the peasants and of the labourers, and to secure their emancipation. In
short, it,Js a struggle for the peasants and labourers, and it is one in
which the peasants and the labourers struggle for themselves."
Three years passed since this declaration had been made. In those three
years, the workers and peasants had performed their part of the contract.
They had participated in the nationalist revolutionary movement, had
fought every battle in the front lines, and made great sacrifices demanded
of those occupying such a position. At the time of its establishment at
Canton, the Nationalist Government had promised to introduce certain
measures of agrarian reform. The programme was not clearly defined;
but it did hold out before the peasant masses the hope that the Nationalist
Government would redress some of their very burning grievances. The
Nationalist Government also undertook to make laws protecting the
interests of the labouring masses, guaranteeing them a minimum standard
of living, and granting them liberty of organisation.
Two years later, the Second Congress of the Kuo Min Tang gave definite
shape to the principles outlined in the manifesto of the Reorganisation
Conference. In the meantime, the toiling masses had become conscious
of their interest, and could not be satisfied only with vaguely formulated
general principles. They pressed definite demands. Those demands had
to be fulfilled if the Kuo Min Tang wanted to act upon the principles
enunciated with the object of enlisting the support of the masses. In view
of the tremendous sacrifice
The Great Crisis 377
made by the working class in the intervening period, the demands were
very moderate. The urban workers demanded that, in the nationalist
territory, they should enjoy the conditions for which they had struck in
Hongkong. The Chinese employers, however, were not willing to
concede to the demand. The peasants, on their part, expected that the
Nationalist Government should relieve them of the illegal taxes and
innumerable other forms of exaction by the village reactionaries who
were always conspiring against it.
The Nationalist Government having failed to give them the promised
protection, the toiling masses went to the extent of taking the law in their
own hands. They felt themselves to be the masters of the situation.
Without their support, the Nationalist Government could not exist for a
day. They had given their support, at great sacrifice. They were
conscious not only of their interest, but also of their power to enforce
their demands. Terrified by that revolutionary mood of the masses, the
feudal-bourgeois elements in the Kuo Min Tang began to prepare for
breaking the alliance inaugurated by the Reorganisation Conference. But
until a convenient way out of the situation was found, they were
compelled to retain the support of the working class. Therefore, while
delivering the leadership of the party back to the reactionary feudal-
bourgeois right wing, the Second Congress nevertheless endorsed the
demands of the masses. It was a promise made in bad faith. The
enforcement of the demands of the masses was conditional on an attack
upon the interests of the upper classes. While re-establishing the
leadership of those classes, the Second Congress of the Kuo Min Tang
could not honestly visualise an attack upon their interest.
Nevertheless, the Second Congress resolved: 1. To set up a maximum
limit to landlord's rent; 2. To fix the minimum price of grains; 3. To
abolish illegal taxes and vexatious exactions; 4. To prohibit the
collection of rent and taxes in advance; 5. To limit the rate of interest
charged by the usurer; 6. To prohibit profiteering at the cost of the
peasants; and 7. To pass laws protecting the interests of the peasantry.
Those measures, if introduced, would be beneficial not only to the
peasantry; their introduction was necessary for the promotion of
capitalism. Agriculture being the basic industry of the country, measures
calculated to relieve it from the burdens of precapitalist exactions were
the most elementary condition for any economic development. The
peasant would have the impetus to
378 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
produce more if he was guaranteed a greater share in the produce of his
labour. The increase of agricultural production, in its turn, would foment
trade. The money left in the possession of the peasantry, in consequence
of reduced rent, restricted feudal charges and limited usurers' due, would
presently go into circulation, contributing to the increase of capitalist
profit.
The resolution made political provisions for the enforcement of those
economic measures. It had been found out in practice that introduction of
measures beneficial for the peasantry was obstructed by the reactionary
classes, all-powerful in the country-side. So the Second Congress
declared that "a certain class of people who obstruct the interests of the
peasants must be punished, namely, the militarists, the compradores, the
corrupt bourgeoisie and the bad gentry." It was further resolved that "the
armed organisations that oppress the peasants must be dissolved, the
monopoly of the gentry in the local governments must be broken down,
and the peasants helped to organise self-government."
Had the resolution been honestly made by the Kuo Min Tang, there
would have been no occasion for the great crisis which overtook it as a
result of the success of the North Expedition. If the resolution had been
enforced, at least partially, during the North Expedition, the reactionary
classes would have been weakened, and the Kuo Min Tang immensely
strengthened by greater confidence on the part of the masses. In that
case, the feudal-bourgeois right wing would not dare to attack the
revolution, and the relation of classes would be overwhelmingly
favourable to a further development of the revolutionary struggle.
During the campaign, the peasants everywhere attacked the social basis
of militarism. The ostensible object of the North Expedition was the
destruction of militarism, which was an instrument of imperialist
domination and hindered the unification of the country. The
revolutionary action of the peasantry was evidently helpful for the
attainment of that object. The peasantry trusted that the Nationalist Army
would support their revolutionary act. Had the Nationalist Army acted
according to the expectation of the peasant masses, the resolution of the
Kuo Min Tang would have been put into practice, an agrarian revolution
would have been accomplished, militarism would have been destroyed,
and a long step would have been taken towards the unification of the
country under a modern democratic
The Great Crisis 379
State. But it was not to be so. The resolution was meant not for
enforcement, but for deceiving the masses—for enlisting their support
with false promises. The success of the North Expedition was due much
more to the revolt of the peasantry than the valour of the Nationalist
Army. Without the enthusiastic co-operation of the peasantry, the
Nationalist Army could not have progressed much. Nevertheless, it failed
to act as an instrument of revolution. On the contrary, before long, it was
converted into a weapon which the Nationalist Government could use
against the peasant masses, to hinder the execution of the programme of
the Kuo Min Tang itself. The crisis was caused by the refusal of the
Nationalist Government to act according to the resolution of the Kuo
Min Tang.
Internal discord wrecked the Kuo Min Tang. It has been shown in the last
chapter that there was no difference of view regarding the enforcement
of its social programme. Both the rival groups were dominated by
reactionaries equally opposed to any revolutionary measure.
Nevertheless, it was in consequence of that discord, produced by
factional struggle for power, that the Wuhan group was obliged to appear
as the defender of the principles and traditions of the revolution, and
accused the rival group of violating and betraying them. Therefore, it
was at Wuhan that the crisis assumed the crassest form. The other group
had logically followed up the policy inaugurated by the coup d'etat of
March 20. It broke the alliance with the democratic masses, and made a
united front with all the forces of reaction, including Imperialism, to
oppose the revolution. Pretending to stand faithfully by the revolutionary
alliance with the democratic masses, the Wuhan group had to face the
responsibility of tackling the social tasks of the revolution. Having no
honest intention of discharging that responsibility, it acted in a fraudulent
manner which precipitated the crisis. The Wuhan period could be called
the period of the greatest crisis of the Chinese revolution. The history of
that period was damning for petit-bourgeois radical nationalism and
exposed the real nature of Sun Yat-senism.
The hidden cause of the great crisis is disclosed in a book written from
the point of view of the "left" Kuo Min Tang, and under the patronage of
Wang Chin-wei. "In a way, the reaction in Nationalist China is but the
natural consequence of the militant policy of force and direct action
adopted by the peasants and workers under Communist leadership
against the Chinese employers and
380 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
landlords. The seizure of land in Hunan in the months of April and May
of 1927, and the outbreak of strikes in industrial centres were not only
politically inexpedient, but they could be justified only by reading into
the Three People's Principles a meaning which was not intended or
contemplated by Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun realised that the basis of
economic and social transformation of China is the agrarian revolution,
but land distribution must be brought about by peaceful means and not
by forcible confiscation; he explicitly repudiated the policy of class
struggle."1
That is a justification of counter-revolution on the authority of Sun Yat-
sen. The justification itself is made on the authority of the discredited
prophet of petit-bourgeois radicalism. Wang Chin-wei was the leader of
the Wuhan group. In that critical moment, there were two clear
alternatives before petit-bourgeois radicalism represented by him: To
liberate itself from the reactionary principles of Sun Yat-sen in order to
support the masses, carrying out the resolution of the Kuo Min Tang; or
to capitulate before feudal-bourgeois reaction. True to the principles of
Sun Yat-sen, the petit-bourgeois nationalist radicals travelled the second
road, straight into the camp of counterrevolution.
The destruction of the feudal landowning class, together with all its
reactionary allies, was the first condition for the success of the nationalist
democratic revolution. This statement was made in the resolution of the
Kuo Min Tang itself. The Nationalist Government had failed to do
anything in pursuance of that resolution. Yet, when the peasantry laid
their hands on the privileges of feudal-patriarchal reaction, the "left"
Nationalist Government of Wuhan rushed to the aid of the latter. It
enjoined the revolutionary peasantry to wait patiently until their
exploiters could be persuaded to be a little kind. Since experience could
not allow the peasantry to believe any longer that their grievances would
ever be redressed by a Government dominated by feudal militarists, they
acted on their own initiative. They began the enforcement of the
measures promised by the Kuo Mia Tang. The action of the Chinese
peasantry was not unprecedented in history. An agrarian revolution never
took place in a different way. The peasantry must always take the
initiative. When the bourgeoisie still function as a revolutionary class,
they endorse the action of the peasantry. The Chinese bourgeoisie did not
act that way. They were no longer a revolutionary class. The action of
the
The Great Crisis 381
Nationalist Government, supported by petit-bourgeois leftism, proved
that the peasantry had every reason to disbelieve its motive. The "left"
Nationalist Government of Wuhan sanctioned the bloody suppression of
the peasantry by its mercenary army under the command of feudal-
militarist Generals.
The support of the masses was the only advantage of the Wuhan group in
the struggle against the otherwise superior forces of the rival faction. The
Wuhan group was naturally very reluctant to lose it. But class struggle
broke out into an open civil war in its territory. The offensive was taken
by the reactionary classes which controlled all the military forces of the
Nationalist Government. Apart from the fact that the army of the
Nationalist Government was largely controlled by feudal-militarist
officers, there existed in the villages large armed forces under the
command of landlords and the local reactionary officials. The peasant
organisations were attacked by those local armed forces of reaction. In
self-defence, the peasants armed themselves as best as they could under
the given conditions. Every village became the scene of two antagonistic
forces trying to destroy each other. The Kuo Min Tang and the
Nationalist Government spent weeks in idle discussions with the object
of finding a peaceful solution of the problem, even after the situation had
reached such an acute stage. The Communist Party, which was still
giving them the fullest support, to the extent of participating in the
Government, pleaded that the defence of the revolution demanded
endorsement of the action of the peasantry. It was pointed out that during
the French Revolution the Jacobins could survive royalist intrigues and
overcome Girondist reaction by legalising the attack of the peasantry
upon the privileges of the feudal aristocracy. But the relation of classes
and alignment of forces happened to be entirely different in China.
Owing to historical reasons, the petit-bourgeoisie were not only
reactionary in social outlook; to make the situation still worse, they were
involved in an unholy alliance with an ugly product of feudal reaction,
namely, the so-called left militarism. Consequently even when the trail
was blazed by the masses, they failed to travel the road of democratic
revolution needed for the salvation of their own class.
The petit-bourgeois left-wingers once again tried to avoid the burning
social issues raised by the development of the revolution. They began the
agitation for the continuation of the North Expedition with the object of
capturing Peking. They argued that the military and
382 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
political tasks of the revolution should be accomplished before the social
problems could be successfully solved. There raged a great controversy
about the nature of the base of the revolution. Should it be social or
territorial? Those anxious to sabotage the agrarian revolution contended
that Wuhan, being surrounded by enemies, was no longer a safe base for
the revolution which, therefore, should be shifted to regions not so
vulnerable. They argued that, for this purpose, new territories must be
acquired in the North-Western part of the country; new military forces
should be won over to the side of the "left" Kuo Min Tang; and all
energy should be devoted to the projected drive in the direction of
Peking.
The opposing point of view was that not only any further development,
but the safety of the revolution, was conditional upon the consolidation
of its social base. For that purpose, the peasant revolt should be backed
up by all means; the territories in the South should be recovered, because
the revolutionary mass movement was more advanced there; and that the
enemies of the revolution should be struck at their roots, which were to
be found inside the nationalist territories. Those pressing the latter view
pointed out that the crisis of the revolution, being internal, could not
possibly be overcome through territorial expansion. They also pointed
out that the geographical base of the revolution would be equally open to
attack everywhere, so long as the social roots of reaction remained intact.
They warned against the danger of the Nationalist Government coming
under increasing domination of the so-called left militarists, whose
power was sure to grow in consequence of the projected territorial
expansion.2 But no argument was of any avail. The petit-bourgeoisie
were scared at the rising tide of revolution and were anxious to run away
from it. The feudal militarists were also afraid of the revolution and
wanted territorial expansion as the means of increasing their power for
attacking the revolutionary masses as soon as possible.
The leaders of the Communist Party supported the plan of military
operation for acquiring new territories with the object of consolidating
the base of the revolution geographically. Nevertheless, they were
persuaded to insist that the solution of the social problems need not wait
until the programme of territorial expansion was completed. The two
tasks should be tackled simultaneously. It was contended that the
agrarian revolution in the nationalist territories
The Great Crisis 383
would place the Government in a very solid position, from which it could
conduct military operations on all sides. The compromise formula was
acceptable to all. But the masses were awake. They could no longer be
deceived by promises, not meant to be kept. The second North
Expedition attracted all attention. The social tasks of the revolution
remained unaccomplished. The class struggle sharpened in the villages
throughout the nationalist territories. In that atmosphere of sharpened
class struggle, the relation between the Kuo Min Tang and the
Communist Party reached breaking point. The "leftists" of Wuhan
prepared for attacking the revolutionary masses, following the foot-steps
of the rightists of Nanking.
The refusal to support the revolutionary masses in an irrecon-ciable
struggle with the feudal-bourgeois reaction led the Wuhan group
unavoidably towards the break with the working class, and the
consequent betrayal of the revolution. Accusing the Communists of
instigating the masses to press impossible demands, the petit-bourgeois
radicals made a bid for the leadership of the working class. They argued
that the programme of the Kuo Min Tang was "to guide and organise"
the masses so that they might participate in the revolution under its
control. In support of that argument, they cited the resolution of the
Second Congress. That resolution actually contained a clause which
placed certain restrictions on the revolutionary demands incorporated in
it. The Communists refused to read such a meaning in the resolution.
Their attitude was interpreted as the desire to break the alliance with the
Kuo Min Tang. Thanks to their timidity to act, lacking the courage to
break a tactical agreement, even when it had outlived its usefulness, the
Communists were pushed to the position of tacitly agreeing to check the
development of class struggle. The Communists committed yet another
fatal mistake which contributed to their disastrous defeat before long.
But revolutionary events could not be arrested; they happened according
to their own logic. Urban workers pressed their economic demands. The
peasantry continued the resistance to the efforts of feudal-bourgeois
reaction to deprive them of the freedom of organisation they had
conquered in course of the revolution. Finding that political freedom
could not be consolidated unless the economic foundation of reaction
was disrupted, the peasantry began the confiscation of land just as during
the French Revolution. The French Revolution triumphed when it
legalised similar action of the
384 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
peasantry. The Chinese bourgeoisie not only failed to carry through the
democratic revolution, but turned against it because, themselves being
connected with the pre-capitalist system of land-ownership, they refused
to endorse its abolition by the revolutionary action of the peasantry.
It was a crisis of leadership that the Chinese Revolution experienced in
the spring of 1927. Even after its debacle at Canton, petit-bourgeois left
nationalism received yet another chance of leading the democratic
revolution against the opposition of the bourgeoisie. It once again failed
to rise up to the occasion, because it would not face the reality of the
class struggle that constituted the social background of the struggle for
democratic national freedom.
Notes
1. Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China".
2. The latter plan was advocated by the author of this book. But it did not secure the
support of the Chinese Communist leaders.
CHAPTER XVIII

ON THE ROAD TO PEKING

On Apnl 12, 1927, the Nationalist Government of Wuhan decided to
despatch a military expedition to the north along the Peking-Hankow
Railway. The object of the new military campaign was to join forces
with Feng Yu-hsiang who, during the preceding months, had been slowly
advancing eastwards from Shensi along the Lunghai Railway.^ The
decision of the Nationalist Government was based upon the argument
that Chang Tso-lin's forces, then massed on the Yellow River for a drive
southward along the Peking-Hankow and the Tientsm-Pukow Railways,
should be immediately attacked. Those advocating the new military
expedition were of the opinion that the Wuhan forces were strong
enough to drive Chang Tro-lin back to Manchuria, capture Peking and
Tientsin, and then menace Shanghai from all sides. It was, indeed, a very
plausible plan, provided that the Wuhan Government was really in a
position to execute it. But the forces at its command were not nearly
strong enough for the gigantic task; and the supporters of the plan had in
view something entirely different from what they gave out as their osten-
sible object.
The father of the plan was Tang Shen-chi. His ambition to be the military
dictator of Nationalist China had suffered a set back, his rival, Chiang
Kai-shek, having come out of the factional struggle for power much the
stronger. Tang Shen-chi's power was confined to two provinces which
were the centre of a revolutionary mass movement threatening the very
social foundation of militarism. So he insisted upon a new military
campaign, hoping that that would give him the opportunity to enlarge his
forces. During the campaign in the previous year, his army had increased
nearly ten times. His claim to the supreme leadership of the Nationalist
Army was based
386 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
upon the fact that troops under his command had captured the Han cities,
while the main nationalist forces commanded by Chiang Kai-shek made
slow progress towards Shanghai. But subsequently, the credit for the
capture of Hankow had been eclipsed by the success of Chiang Kai-shek
in occupying Shanghai and Nanking. Tang Shen-chi, therefore, desired to
retrieve his prestige and position. That he could do as the first to hoist the
nationalist flag in Peking.
After the fall of Hankow, Wu Pei-fu had withdrawn his headquarters to
Chengchow. For years Wu Pei-fu had been the ruler of the provinces
north of the Yangtse valley, and had disputed with Chang Tso-lin the
overlordship of China. But the approach of the Nationalist Army to the
Yangtse valley forced the formation of the so-called Aukuochun (army
for the pacification of the country) under the supreme command of the
Manchurian War-Lord. In December 1926, he came to Peking to direct
operations. Sun Chuan-fang, Chang Tsung-chang and Yen Hsi-shar were
appointed his chief lieutenants. The Ankuochun leaders invited Wu Pei-
fu to join the alliance, but the invitation was rejected. Thereupon, the
Ankuochun crossed the Yellow River and easily defeated the
disorganised forces of Wu Pei-fu, a number of whose Generals as usual
proved to be undependable in the time of need.
The main concern of the Northern Alliance, however, was to keep the
nationalists away from Shanghai. Most of its forces were concentrated on
the Tientsin-Pukow Line, leaving the defense of the Peking-Hankow
Line mostly to the care of the Generals of Wu Pei-fu's army who had
deserted their chief. But they had also entered into secret negotiation
either with Feng Yu-hsiang or Tang Shen-chi, and were ready to declare
their adherence to the Nationalist Government. In the beginning of the
year, Feng's army had occupied the highly strategic Tungwan Pass on the
Shensi-Honan border, and was slowly advancing towards Chengchow
along the Lunghai Railway. Thus, any Northern Army moving
southward along the Peking-Hankow line would have its right flank open
to attack by Feng, who had been appointed one of the High Commanders
of the nationalist forces. But there was no serious obstacle for the
Ankuochun marching southward along the Tientsin-Pukow line.
In the middle of April 1927, it reached the Yangtse at a point just across
Nanking which had already been captured by the nationalist forces under
the command of Chiang Kai-shek. So, for the
On the Road to Peking 387
moment, the constellation of contending forces was favourable to Tang
Shen-chi's ambition. Still another consideration went into the making of
his plan. It was to prevent a junction of the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and
Chiang Kai-shek. Should that event take place, he would be cut off from
Peking, and consequently his ambition would be decisively frustrated.
He planned to capture the eastern sector of the Lunghai Railway, joining
the two trunk lines, calculating that, cut off from the nationalist forces
under Chiang Kai-shek, Feng would agree to march upon Peking
together with the Wuhan Army under his command.
The political leaders of the Wuhan Group acquiesced in Tang Shen-chi's
plan of a new military campaign, although they had been conducting
their opposition against Chiang Kai-shek ostensibly with the purpose of
defending the principle of party authority as against military dictatorship.
Why did they do that? Wuhan had become a place too uncomfortable for
them. It was no longer possible to postpone the fulfilment of the
promises that the Kuo Min Tang had made to the masses. Either the
promises had to be fulfilled by supporting the revolutionary action of the
masses, or it would become evident that those promises had not been
honestly made. Both the ways were equally uncomfortable for petit-
bourgeois pseudo-radicalism.
Following one, it would be obliged to break with the "left" militarists.
The Nationalist Government could not retain the support of those
doubtful and treacherous allies, should it sanction the confiscation of
land by the peasants and the establishment of revolutionary democratic
power in the villages with the declared intention of destroying feudal-
patriarchal reaction. On the other way, that is, by coming out openly
against tbe revolutionary action of the masses, the Wuhan Group would
forfeit the claim to any distinction from the rival clique of Nanking.
Therefore, they welcomed the plan of Tang Shen-chi which promised
them a way out of the dilemma.
They vociferously agitated for the continuation of the North Expedition,
and exhorted the masses to abstain from sharpening the class struggle
when the first stage of the revolution was still incomplete. They
maintained that unification of the country was the first task of the
revolution, and declared that the Nationalist Government would act
according to its promises to the masses as soon as Peking was captured.
But the true face of petit-bourgeois radicalism was
388 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
clearly visible through that thin veil of demagogy. Its accredited leader,
Wang Chin-wei, on the authority of Sun Yat-sen, publicly opposed the
confiscation of land by the peasants. He argued that Sun Yat-sen had
advocated redistribution of land to the peasants by the Government. The
application of that principle to practice was conditional upon the
liberation of the Nationalist Government from the domination of social
elements having a stake in the existing system of landownership. But the
endorsement of Tang Shen-chi's plan by the "left" Kuo Min Tang proved
that the Nationalist Government had capitulated completely to its feudal-
militarists allies It could not do otherwise, unless it abandoned the
patriarchal notion of agrarian reform, and assumed the leadership of the
bourgeois-democratic revolution by legalising the action of the peasantry
against the economic privileges and political powers of feudal reaction.
The principles of Sun Yat-sen, however, were not those of the bourgeois-
democratic revolution. They were positively reactionary, visualising re-
establishment of the mediaeval system of land distribution by a
patriarchal State. As the political principle of Sun Yat-sen was paternal
depotism, petit-bourgeois radical nationalists professing that principle
were bound to support the military dictatorship of feudal Generals. They
betrayed not only the masses, but proved their inability to help the
accomplishment of the bourgeois democratic revolution.
The success of the first North Expedition—occupation of the country as
far as the Yangtse valley -had placed before the Kuo Min Tang the task
of consolidating the revolutionary democratic forces. The
accomplishment of that task was the only guarantee against military
dictatorship which was raising its ominous head from all sides. New
military campaigns obviously would not help the accomplishment of the
basic task of the moment. On the contrary, there was every reason to
believe that it would strengthen the position of the military factor as
against the revolutionary democratic forces.
The success of the projected drive towards Peking was conditional upon
the adhesion of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. Consequently, in
Peking, the Nationalist Government would find itself in a position much
more dominated by the military elements than in Wuhan. In the place of
one, there would be no less than three warlords to contend with. For all
these considerations, the new military campaign was obviously not the
way for the Nationalist Government
On the Road to Peking 389
to travel, if it desired to accomplish the tasks of the revolution.
Any further development of the revolution demanded, above all, three
measures: 1. Disruption of the social basis of feudal-patriarchal
reaction in the nationalist territory; 2. Capture of political power by
the revolutionary democratic masses; 3. Creation of a genuinely
revolutionary army. Conditions in the territory under the control of
the Wuhan Government were ripe for the introduction of all these
measures. In Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Kwangtung, the peasant
masses were mightily assailing the citadel of feudal-patriarchal
reaction. That revolutionary action of the peasantry objectively was a
characteristic feature of bourgeois-democratic revolution, the
historical task of which is to remove the obstacle to capitalist
production and to create legal conditions for the unrestricted
development of this latter. It has been shown in previous chapters
how an antiquated system of relations of property in land obstructed
development of capitalism in China. The action of the peasantry for
changing that established system, therefore, was a measure for
developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The innumerable
forms ef feudal-militarist restriction upon the economic life of the
country were to be removed before modern modes of production
could be introduced.
In thousands of villages, throughout the territories under the control
of the Wuhan Government, the peasant masses, under the leadership
of the local Kuo Min Tang Committees, were engaged in the struggle
for the capture of political power. The Peasant Unions were the
rallying ground for the rural democratic masses, exploited and
oppressed by an alliance of landlords, usurers, bureaucratic officials
and militarists. In the urban areas, the democratic masses were
mobilised in the organisation of students, artisans, small traders and
poor intellectuals, in addition to the trade-unions which stood at the
forefront of the struggle. These democratic mass organisations
conducted a ceaseless struggle against foreign Imperialism and native
reaction. In the countryside as well as in the towns, there was deve-
loping the struggle for the capture of political power by the demo-
cratic masses.
Those mass organisations provided the solid basis for the creation of a
genuinely revolutionary army. By arming the poor peasantry engaged
in the struggle against the Min Tuan,a the Nationalist Government
could lay the foundation of an army which
390 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
could soon be invincible. The French peasantry helped Napoleon for
twenty years to wage war against feudal Europe, because the revolution
had given them the land. The support of the peasantry made it possible
for the Soviet Republic of Russia to defend itself against a world of
enemies. Had the Nationalist Government of Wuhan endorsed the
revolutionary action of the peasantry, and armed them in their struggle
against feudal reaction, its position would have been invincible.
Instead of taking that revolutionary course, the Nationalist Government
favoured the plan of continuing military operations until Peking was
captured. In view of the fact that military operations provided the pretext
for suspending all social struggle in the national -list territories, the plan
was clearly counter-revolutionary.
As soon as the decision was made, the Nationalist Government called
upon the masses to suspend all activities on the pretext that these would
weaken the rear of the army fighting against northern militarism. Instead
of fulfilling its previous promises, it asked the masses to make further
sacrifices, so that new military victories could be won While industrial
workers were prohibited to strike for improving their economic
conditions, they were obliged to labour for longer hours to keep the army
well supplied. Even the struggle against Imperialism was suspended on
the pretext that the Nationalist Government should avoid international
complications so long as it was engaged in the war against the northern
militarists. In short, the plan of military advance northwards provided the
Nationalist Government with the opportunity to prepare for the counter-
revolutionary offensive which was to take place before long.
The real motive of the plan became clearly evident when the "Iron
Army"3 was selected as the first to be sent to the front. That was the only
military unit on which the Nationalist Government had any control. The
"left" militarists, who had joined the nationalist ranks in course of the
campaign for the capture of Wuhan, did not want to move their troops
away from the provinces in the throes of an agrarian revolution. They
were afraid that, taking advantage of their absence, the "Iron Army"
might openly go over to the revolutionary peasantry. In any case, the
presence of nearly twenty thousand troops, steeled in many battles
officered by young intellectuals with revolutionary conviction, connected
with the rebellious masses and owing allegiance not to any individual,
but to
On the Road to Peking 391
the Kuo Min Tang and the Nationalist Government, was an obstacle to
the ambition of Tang Shen-chi. With them as the nucleus, a dependable
army could be created easily by distributing weapons to the workers and
peasants, should the Kuo Min Tang or any other political party want to
liberate the revolution from the curse of "left" militarism. Therefore,
Tang Shen-chi planned to get the "Iron Army" out of the way.
In the beginning of June, 1927, the Wuhan troops reached Chengchow at
the crossing of the Peking-Hankow and Lunghai Railways. Meanwhile,
Chiang Kai-shek had also succeeded in repulsing the army of Sun
Chuan-fang which had, in the middle of April, occupied Pukow, facing
Nanking just across the Yangtse. His forces advanced rapidly along the
Tientsin-Pukow line. There began a race between the two rivals for the
capture of Peking. But it was Feng Vu-hsiang who held the trump-card;
and there was still the "model Tuchun" (Yen Hsi-shan, the Governor of
Shansi), to be taken into account. Only at the end of the previous year,
Yen Hsi-shan had joined the Northern Alliance as one of the chief
lieutenants of the Manchurian War-Lord. Nevertheless, since then he had
declared together with Fang Yu-hsiang, his adhesion to the nationalist
cause. But none of them had openly taken side in the conflict between
Wuhan and Nanking. It was, however, known that Feng had been in
constant communication with Chiang Kai-shek, and approved of his
attack upon the revolutionary workers' and peasants' movement. Yet, he
was out in the market to sell his support to the highest bidder. He did not
want any of the rival nationalist groups to reach Peking. He wanted that
proud place as the prize for his adhesion to the nationalist cause. Of
course, he must settle accounts with Yen, who also cast greedy glances
upon the national metropolis. But to begin with, Feng must have one or
the other of the nationalist groups to place him at the command of the
army that was to capture Peking.
All the Wuhan leaders went to Chengchow to meet Feng on the latter's
demand—on an "invitation". The plan for further military operation was
to be elaborated in that conference. Feng had a surprise for the Wuhan
leaders. He did not appear at the conference as an officer reporting to his
Government. Only two months ago, the Central Executive Committee of
the Kuo Min Tang had appointed him the Commander of a section of the
Nationalist
392 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Army. But he came to the conference obviously to dictate his terms.
Leaving his train of luxurious saloon cars, in which his staff was lodged,
some miles outside the "Christian General" rode into Chengchow on an
open truck together with the ill-clad ordinary soldiers. He appeared in the
gathering of the pompous politicians and gorgeous Generals in an
ordinary soldier's uniform, munching a chunk of dry bread.
There was no prolonged negotiation. He laid down the following terms:
The newly acquired province of Honan should be under his control; the
Wuhan Government must pay him a large subsidy in return for formal
inclusion of his troops in the Nationalist Army; the command of the
expedition to Peking should be given to him; and the Wuhan group must
forthwith enter into negotiations with the Nanking clique for unification.
The road to Peking was blocked for Tang Shen-chi. Should he dare
pursue his ambition, his troops would be caught between those of Feng
from the West and of Chiang from the East. Not willing to draw the
chestnuts out of the fire for Feng, he decided to return to his base. The
decision was forced upon him by yet another event. As previously in the
campaign for the capture of woochang, so in the battles for the conquest
of Honan, the "Iron Army" did most of the real fighting. But its victories
did not belong to it. On the contrary, it was outnumbered in the midst of
a mercenary horde which increased in size and influence in course of the
campaign. It was evident that, should the expedition be continued, the
"Iron Army" would be again placed in the forefront. No longer willing to
fight other people's battles, the Commander of the "Iron Army" pre-
emptorily decided to return to Wuhan which, in the meantime, was
seriously menaced from all sides. That emergency provided the "Iron-
Army" with a plausible pretext to withdraw from a thankless task.
The feudal-militarist Generals of Tang Shen-chi, left behind to defend
the nationalist base, had been busily preparing a coup d'etat. They had
established contact with the Nanking clique which was moving troops up
the Yangtse. An army stationed to the West of Wuhan, commanded by
General Yan Sen, was also in communication with Nanking, and began
to march upon the nationalist capital. At that juncture, Tang Shen-chi
could not wait a minute when the "Iron Army" began to move back
towards Wuhan. The whole counterrevolutionary plan, engineered by
himself, was in the danger of being
 On the Road to Peking 393
frustrated. He rushed his troops back towards the base.
From Chengchow, Feng went to meet Chiang at Hsuchow—the junction
of the Lunghai and Pukow-Tientsin Railways. Two of the Wuhan
leaders4 notoriously hostile to Chiang Kai-shek, accompanied him.
Feng's intervention disrupted the Wuhan group. There was no longer any
doubt about his intention. He had decided to join hands with Chiang,
even if the Wuhan group conceded to all his demands. Wuhan's position
became very precarious. In the military sense, it could not possibly hold
its own against such a formidable combination. Politically, it had hardly
any ground to stand upon. It had forfeited the credit of any essential
difference from the rival group by opposing the peasantry attacking the
social roots of feudal-militarist reaction and by the anxiety to restrain the
urban democratic masses from developing the anti-imperialist struggle.
Nothing but personal ambitions and jealousies stood on the way to the
fusion of the two rival groups into one united feudal-bourgeois bloc
against the revolution.
The only bone of contention was that the Wuhan group still maintained
that formal relation with the Communists. While maintaining that formal
relation, only to distinguish itself from the rival faction, the Wuhan
Government also freely condoned the action of its Generals against the
workers' and peasants movement. Even that formal distinction was on the
point of breaking. The demand for breaking the relation with the
Communists was pressed not only by the "left militarist" allies; most of
the civilian members of the Government also supported the demand.
The petit-bourgeois left wing of the Kuo Min Tang was put to the crucial
test. Break with the Communists would most certainly be the prelude to a
bloody suppression of the revolutionary mass movement, and
consequently there would no longer be any resson for the Wuhan Group
to have a separate existence. In that event, the leadership of the Kuo Min
Tang and the control of the Nationalist Government would be captured
completely by the feudal-bourgeois right wing. The petit-bourgeoisie
would be eliminated from the political field, unless they were prepared to
play a minor role in the counterrevolutionary drama. In view of that
depressing perspective, Wang Chin-wei endeavoured to avoid the break
with the Communists; but he asked the latter to make all the concessions
necessary for continuing a coalition of classes which had been rendered
untenable
394 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
by the development of the revolution.
In that critical moment, the petit-bourgeoisie could avert their political
elimination only by a closer alliance with the masses; the object of the
alliance should be to intensify revolutionary activities, and that would
require a complete break from the big bourgeoisie and the feudal
militarists. What Wang Chin-wei wanted, however, was to maintain the
old broad coalition of classes by arresting the development of the
revolution. His proposal was that the Communist Party should cease to
be the revolutionary vanguard of the working class, the spearhead of the
bourgeois-democratic revolution, so that the petit-bourgeois left wing of
the Kuo Min Tang could continue the co-operation with it. The situation
demanded that the petit-bourgeoisie should liberate themselves from the
reactionary principles of Sun Yat-sen, if they wanted to lead the
revolution in co-operation with the working class. The principles of Sun
Yat-sen were the ideology of those who wanted to defend patriarchal
tradition and its economic basis of precapitalist production. Holding on
to those principles, the petit-bourgeois left wing of the Kuo Min Tang
went over to the camp of counter-revolution.
In the Hsuchow Conference, held at the end of June, Feng Yu-hsiang
persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to postpone the drive towards Peking
pending the composition of the differences inside the nationalist camp.
He wanted to consolidate his power in the province of Honan, and
occupy such strategic positions as would place his army in the forefront
of the nationalist forces advancing on Peking. In other words, he wanted
the situation to develop in such a way as would place him in command of
Peking when it would be finally captured. The Nanking leaders, on their
part, could see as well as Feng that further extension of nationalist
territories should be conditional upon the suppression of the
revolutionary movement in the southern provinces. All the northern
militarists were uniting to resist the nationalist advance upon the
metropolis. They were amassing formidable forces along the Yellow
River. Foreign Powers were also preparing for active intervention to
prevent the nationalists from capturing Peking.5 In that situation, unity in
the nationalist camp was the essential condition for further military
operations. All the available forces must be employed for the attainment
of the goal. On the other hand, the despatch of all the nationalist forces
towards the north would be a move fraught with grave dangers, as long
as
On the Road to Peking 395
the revolutionary movement in the south was not crushed. With the great
bulk of the armed forces far away on the northern front, the nationalist
base in the southern provinces would be exposed to attack by the
revolutionary masses. The suppression of the Communist Party, and the
disruption of the Kuo Min Tang as the rallying ground of all the
revolutionary democratic forces, were the only guarantee against that
danger.
From Hsuchow. Feng sent an open telegram to the Wuhan Government
urging the necessity of unifying all the nationalist forces in the struggle
against northern militarism, while pointing out that Wuhan's insistence
upon maintaining relation with the Communists was the only obstacle to
that unity. In the telegram, he demanded that the Wuhan Government
should immediately dismiss its Russian advisors and suppress the
Communist Party. The demand was backed up by the thinly veiled threat
that Feng would attack Wuhan from the north in case his advice was not
accepted. The telegram strengthened the hands of those leaders of the
Wuhan group who had been pressing for the break with the Communists
and suppression of the revolutionary mass movement.
The petit-bourgeois left wing stood naked in its political bankruptcy. The
Communists made a last effort to maintain the revolutionary democratic
coalition in a narrowed-down class basis. Addressing the petit-bourgeois
left wing of the Kuo Min Tang, they suggested that in that critical
moment there should be a clear standard to judge whether a class or a
party or an individual was the friend or enemy of the National
Revolution. They pointed out that there was much ambiguity on the
question. Reactionary feudal militarists, massacring workers and
peasants and suppressing the revolutionary democratic mass movement,
called themselves not only nationalists but revolutionaries. They justified
their murderous deeds as committed in the defence of the National
Revolution. The Nationalist Government of Wuhan as well as its rival at
Nanking sought compromise with Imperialism. It delivered itself
completely to the mercies of the counter-revolutionary "left" militarists
and sanctioned the massacre of the toiling masses. Still it called itself
revolutionary. The left wing of the Kuo Min Tang declared itself
opposed to all the demands of the workers and peasants. It tended to a
reunion with the feudal-bourgeois right wing which had openly betrayed
the Nationalist Revolution. The Wuhan Government was
396 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
conspiring with the feudal militarists against the workers' and peasants'
movement, while still claiming to be the leader of the Nationalist
Revolution.
Pointing out all these facts, the Communists insisted that a definite
platform of National Revolution should be the standard by which the
character of a class, party or individual should be judged. Those
unwilling to stand on that platform should be declared enemies of the
revolution. The platform of the National Revolution proposed by the
Communists had for its object the mobilisation of all democratic forces
still under the banner of the Kuo Min Tang, provided that the petit-
bourgeois leaders were prepared to conduct a revolutionary struggled
against foreign Imperialism as well as the feudal-bourgeois bloc of native
reaction. The Communists pointed out that the enemy of the revolution
was not Chiang Kai-shek personally. The enemy was the feudal-
bourgeois-militarist combination, headed by him and supported by all the
reactionary forces throughout the nationalist territories; and behind that
combination stood foreign Imperialism. To destroy the counter-
revolutionary centre of Nanking, was the immediate task of the
revolution. But in order to accomplish that task, the Wuhan Government
must win over the support of the masses in the territory under the control
of Nanking. That could be done by putting into practice in the provinces
under the jurisdiction of the Wuhan Government the resolutions of the
Kuo Min Tang concerning the interests of the workers and peasants.
With these considerations, the Communists proposed the following as the
main planks in the Platform of the National Revolution: 1. Confiscation
of land as stipulated in the resolutions of the Kuo Min Tang and of the
Fifth Congress of the Communist Party6- 2 Reduction of rents and taxes;
3. Protection of the peasantry against the armed forces of rural reaction;
4. Checking the counter-revolutionary plans of the officers of the
Nationalist Army; 5. Submission of the army and Provincial
Administrations unconditionally to the Nationalist Government; 6.
Responsibility of the Provincial Governments to Assemblies elected by
the democratic masses; 7. Establishment of democratic self-government
in the villages; 8. Creation of Peasants' Militias for the destruction of the
power of the landlords and their agents; 9. Complete freedom for the
workers' and peasants' movement; 10. Immediate compliance with the
On the Road to Peking 397
demands of the workers for eight hours' day, minimum wages and social
legislation; 11. Organisation of Workers' Guards to fight counter-
revolution; 12 Maintenance of the alliance with the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics; 13. Ruthless struggle against Imperialism, not
precluding tactical manoeuvres for splitting the united imperialist front;
and 14. Close relation with the exploited classes and oppressed peoples
of the world.7
This was an irreducible minimum standard. Of course, the feudal
militarists and the agents of the big bourgeoisie inside the Wuhan Group
could not be expected to measure up to this standard. But it was meant to
be a test for petit-bourgeois radicalism. Would it have the courage to
fight for a revolutionary democratic programme, based upon the
resolutions of the Kuo Min Tang itself? Were those resolutions ever
meant to be put into practice? If that was so, the standard should be
acceptable to the left nationalist leaders. The readiness to stand on the
Platform of National Democratic Revolution would compel them to part
company with the feudal militarists and their bourgeois allies conspiring
against the revolution. The result would be a revolutionary democratic
alliance of the urban petit-bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the proletariat,
to conduct the struggle against foreign Imperialism and native reaction.
But the left-wing leaders of the Kuo Min Tang contended that the
enforcement of some measures even of agrarian reform would drive the
army against the Nationalist Government. In the critical days of the
spring of 1927, practically all the Communist leaders including Borodin
also shared the fear of the petit-bourgeois nationalist leaders.8 The
dangers inherent in the situation created by tactics of increasing the
military forces of the Nationalist Government by the inclusion of
questionable elements were pointed out as the justification for delaying
any agrarian reform. But a way must be found out of the impasse, if the
revolution was not to be betrayed to retain the deceptive loyalty of the
reactionary feudal militarists. There was no possibility of feudal military
officers ever changing their attitude towards the programme of agrarian
reform. There were but two alternatives: Either to liberate the Nationalist
Government from the domination of the counter-revolutionary
militarists, or to betray the interests of the masses. The latter had begun
to take care of their interests themselves. The solicitude for the loyalty of
the military officers, therefore, would necessarily force the
398 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Nationalist Government to suppress the mass movement violently. Thus,
the Nationalist Government could retain the deceptive adhesion of the
"left" militarists only by betraying the revolution. For, suppression of the
mass movement would be the death-blow to the revolution.
The situation, however, was not so hopeless. The revolution was in a
severe crisis, in consequence of grave mistakes committed in the past.
The crisis could be overcome by the rectification of those mistakes. It
was not true that the entire army was hostile to the agrarian revolution.
The soldiers were all recruited from the pauperised peasantry; they
would be enthusiastic supporters of the revolution if the significance of it
was explained to them. Any possible hostility on their part to the
demands of the peasantry was the result of their ignorance, exploited by
the higher officers who were all landlords. But as against these, the lower
officers were mostly recruited from the oppressed and exploited middle-
class, many of them possessing progressive ideas and revolutionary
ideals. They could be expected to sympathise with the revolutionary
movement, and even support it actively when the proper time came. The
agrarian reform visualised in the resolutions of the Kuo Min Tang and
demanded by the peasantry immediately, did not touch the interests of
small owners. On the contrary, the destruction of the monopoly, which
big landlords, the military bureaucracy and reactionary officials
exercised over rural economy, would relieve the position of the small
owners and producers. Abolition of the privileges of the big landlords,
overthrow of the autocratic officials, and disappearance of the exorbitant
exactions by the militarists would free the forces of production from
throttling restrictions. Politically, the result of such a revolution would be
transfer of power to the democratic masses, including the lower middle-
class. Therefore, not only the soldiers, but a majority of the under-
officers of the Nationalist Army could be won over for the programme of
a radical agrarian reform. By forcing a process of class differentiation
inside the Nationalist Army, the position of the counter-revolutionary
militarists could be weakened. Revolutionary propaganda on the basis of
the Platform of National Revolution would win the democratic elements
in the army for the Nationalist Government.
Moreover, the Nationalist Government could easily create an army of its
own if it really wanted to lead the revolution. The
On the Road to Peking 399
petit-bourgeois left-wing leaders admitted that the militarists were the
enemies of the revolution, when they contended that agrarian reform
could not be enforced owing to the hostility of the military officers. Yet
they would not fight the enemies of the revolution. Their reluctance in
this respect laid their loyalty to the revolution open to serious doubt.
They had agreed with the militarists' plan of self-aggrandisement,
although the plan was evidently counter-revolutionary. Now that the plan
failed, owing to the intervention of more powerful military factors, the
left-wing leaders were placed in a position where their real face could no
longer be hidden. The Communists offered them help in the struggle to
save the revolution. But the proposal of the Communists to raise a new
army from the revolutionary workers and peasants, and to overthrow the
agents of the right wing from the leadership 'of the Wuhan Group, were
not only rejected by the left leaders but interpreted as a plan to overthrow
the Nationalist Government, to destroy the Kuo Min Tang and to set up a
Communist dictatorship.9
At last the Rubicon was crossed. The left-wing leaders openly joined the
crusade against the Communists, fully shared the feudal-militarist hatred
against the revolutionary mass movement, and agreed to the fusion of the
two rival nationalist groups under the reactionary flag of Sun Yat-
senism.
In the middle of April 1927, the Wuhan Government had dismissed
Chiang Kai-shek from the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Nationalist Army; he had been expelled also from the party, accused of
twelve offences against the revolution. The charges against him were
summarised as follows: "Chiang Kai-shek is found guilty of massacre of
the people, and oppression of the party, and he deliberately engages
himself in reactionary acts and his crimes and outrages are obvious."
In view of that bombastic decision, the prodigals of the Wuhan Group
could not favour reunion without completely discrediting themselves
before the members of the party, unless some concession was made from
the side of Chiang Kai-shek. He had to step aside for a time, so that the
mutually desired counter-revolutionary reunion could take place without
any hitch. Unless the breach in the nationalist camp was fundamentally
repaired, the return of the Wuhan leaders would be of little use for the
big bourgeoisie who, supported by international Imperialism, desired a
concentration of all the
400 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
forces of counter-revolution.
The Wuhan-Nanking quarrel had taken place on the background of a
process of class differentiation in the nationalist ranks. The split did not
take place along that line of differentiation, owing to the intervention of
the military factor. Nevertheless, the masses of the urban petit-
bourgeoisie sympathised with the Wuhan Group; and it was that class
which always constituted the social basis of the Kuo Min Tang.
Therefore, the creation of a counter-revolutionary united front under the
false colour of Nationalism was not possible so long as the Wuhan
leaders stood out. The main obstacle was their own action under the
pressure of the bourgeoise and the feudal militarists. Now, some
concession must be from the other side. The retirement of Chiang Kai-
shek was the concession. That concession not only made it possible for
the Wuhan leaders to enter into negotiations for unity with the Nanking
clique; Tang Shen-chi could also be placated by that move.
Threatened by the more powerful combination of Feng Yu-hsiang and
Chiang Kai-shek, the Wuhan military dictator had abandoned his
ambitious plan to capture Peking. He had withdrawn all his forces to the
base with two objectives: (1) To crush the revolutionary movement in the
two provinces of Hupeh and Hunan under his control; and (2) To take
offensive measures as guarantee against any possible attack from
Nanking. Wuhan was not seriously menaced from the north. Feng could
not attack Wuhan so long as the northern forces remained still unbeaten,
and were concentrated along the Yellow River. On the pretext of
attacking Nanking, Tang Shen-chi sent the "Iron Army" away from
Wuhan. Other troops, not under his personal control, were also ordered
down the Yangtse. That move, made by Tang Shen-chi to instal himself
as the undisputed lord of the provinces under Wuhan, was, however,
interpreted at Nanking as an attack upon itself. The result was the
withdrawal of the bulk of Chiang Kai-shek's army from the northern
front, opening the road for Chang Tsung-chang to sweep southwards. He
drove back the depleted Nanking forces, and re-occupied Pukow in the
middle of August. At the same time, Sun Chuan-fang's forces also
pressed upon Shanghai from Kiangsu. Before that danger of northern
invasion, the necessity of composing the differences in the nationalist
camp became urgent. After the Wuhan Group had severed the relation
with the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek was the only obstacle
On the Road to Peking 401
on the way to the much needed unity. He way, therefore, forced to step
aside by his own supporters.
When, in June 1927, the northern forces had been driven to the Yellow
River by the nationalists advancing along the two railways from the
Yangtse, the "model Tuchun" of Shansi intervened in the situation. He
appealed to the Manchurian War-Lord Chang Tso-lin to accept the three
principles of Sun Yat-sen, and declare his adhesion to the Kuo Min Tang.
There followed a conference of the northern militarists to consider the
appeal of Yen Hsi-shan. Meanwhile came the news that the nationalists
had been repulsed on the front. So the northern War-Lords stiffened up
their backs and refused to accept the advice of Yen Hsi-shan. Their
previous agreement to consider the appeal had, however, proved that
there was nothing in the principle of Sun Yat-sen essentially antagonistic
to their interests, and that their adhesion to the Kuo Min Tang was not
altogether out of question. Nevertheless, they would not formally
subordinate themselves to a central authority, when there was any chance
of retaining the position of independent feudal potentates in their
respective spheres of influence. The defeat of the southern forces and the
dissensions in the nationalist camp encouraged them to continue the
resistence to the efforts of creating a central authority out of the chaos of
a prolonged civil war.
Ever since the abortive revolution of 1911, the feudal militarists, aided
by foreign Imperialism, had frustrated the attempt of the bourgeoisie to
create a centralised modern State. In course of time there came into
operation revolutionary forces having for their object the abolition of
social conditions which bred the cause* of chronic civil wars. At last the
social foundation of militarism was attacked. Its very existence in peril,
militarism split horizontally in two sections. The process had been in
operation, parallel to the development of the democratic mass movement.
One section, the so-called left militarists, sought an alliance with the
object of splitting the democratic forces. It has been seen how the Kuo
Min Tang was wrecked on the rock of alliance with left militarism. Feng
Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan were the most outstanding figures to grow
out of the decomposition of militarism. They represented the tendency of
of the reactionary Bonapartism of Nepoleon III—a striving to set up a
centralised dictatorship, supported by the financial and commercial
bourgeoisie, but primarily based on the conservative peasant pro-
402 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
prietor. The object, on the one hand, was to drive a wedge of
differentiation in the ranks of the peasantry, to pit the upper strata against
the lower; on the other hand, it was to divert the tendency towards
centralisation so that it might not totally disrupt the position of feudal
militarism.
The leadership of the struggle for the capture of the national metropolis
passed to the representatives of left militarism. The struggle continued
for nearly a year, the fortunes of war changing sides many times.
Meanwhile, dissensions in the nationalist camp were composed. The
reactionary feudal-bourgeois bloc succeeded in defeating the forces of
revolutionary democracy. The establishment of a united Nationalist
Government at Nanking signified defeat of the revolution. But a
centralised modern State can be created only upon the victory of the
bourgeois revolution, the basic task of which is the destruction of
Feudalism.
The Nanking Government did not represent a union of the democratic
forces. It was an alliance of the bourgeoisie with feudal reaction, the
worst enemy of democratic centralisation. The situation was made still
worse by the fact that the Nanking Government sought for, and received,
the benediction of foreign Imperialism. For nearly a hundred years
foreign Imperialism had been the unfailing ally of reaction in China. It
could not possibly support the Nanking Government, had it represented
the forces of democracy and progress.
Having ceased to be the revolutionary alliance of the democratic forces,
the Kuo Min Tang won the adhesion of feudal militarism at home, and
the patronage of the imperialist Powers abroad. When the Nationalist
Government proved itself to be a ruthless enemy of revolution, it secured
the allegiance of the feudal war-lords, one after another, until the worthy
son of Cbang Tso-lin himself brought up the rear of the pageant. A year
ago, Imperialist Powers had taken belligerent measures when the
Nationalist Army advanced towards Peking. The Kuo Min Tang and the
Nationalist Government underwent such a metamorphosis in the mean
time that, in the middle of 1928, the road to the national metropolis was
open to them.
In June of that year, Chiang Kai-shek had returned to his place, much
strengthened by the complete capitulation of the petit-bourgeois left
wing, whose discredited leader again went into exile. Things at the base
all settled in his favour. Chiang's final march to Peking was
On the Road to Peking 403
more successful than before. Now he was leading the army of a
government which though still nationalist in name, had declared war
upon the revolution and made peace with Imperialism. The remnants of
northern militarism no longer received the support of foreign Powers to
keep the nationalists away from Peking. These were no longer
dangerous. On the contrary, under the new conditions, they could be
more useful allies of Imperialism than the decrepit and discredited
militarists. But even then, Chiang was allowed to enter Peking only after
Feng and Yen had become the real masters there. The nationalists
captured Peking after they had been captivated by the spirit of that old
centre of feudal-patriarchal reaction.
No commentary on the principles of Sun Yat-sen could be more
damaging than the fact that they were now accepted even in the feudal
realm of Manchuria with the sanction of Japanese Imperialism which
reigned supreme there. The complete collapse of the Kuo Min Tang, its
transformation into an instrument of counter-revolution, was celebrated
by the hoisting of its flag on Mukden. On the road to Peking, the
nationalist bourgeoisie found allies to help them stop the march of the
revolution. It was also on the same fateful road that petit-bourgeois
radicalism parted company with the revolutionary masses, and became a
willing instrument of reaction and active agent of counter-revolution.
Notes
1. The Lunghai Railway runs east to west cutting across the central province
of Honan. It joins the two trunk lines from Peking to the Yangtse valley, and
stretches westward to the Tungwan Pass on the border of Shensi.
2. The Min Tuan were the armed forces of rural reaction. In addition to regular
troops of the Government, the landlords together with other reactionary classes in
the country-side maintained large armed forces ostensibly as protection against
banditry, but really for maintaining their autocratic position. These forces were
recruited either from the village rowdies or well-to-do upper strata of the peasantry.
They were, therefore, entirely dependable instruments for defending the existing
order of things in the village. It was estimated by the Peasant Department of the Kuo
Min Tang as well as by the Communist Party that the Min Tuan was so strong
numerically that they could be counted in tens of thousands. In the province of
Kwangtung alone, they were over fifty thousand. The Nationalist Government did
not take any steps for destroying that formidable weapon of counter-revolution. As
soon as the Peasant Unions became active, attacking the privileges of the landlords
and their allies, they naturally came into conflict with the Min Tuan.
404 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
3. The Fourth and the Eleventh Armies of the Nationalist forces acquired the proud
title for their valiant deeds throughout the campaign from Canton to the Yangtse
valley. They ware recruited at Canton and constituted the original nucleus of the
nationalist forces. The Commander-in-Chief was Chang Fa-kwei, a left-wing
member of the Kuo Min Tang. Most of the officers were cadets of the Whampoa
Academy. In contrast to the bulk of the nationalist forces, those two armies were not
mercenary, owing allegiance to this or that individual militarist. They were subordi-
nated directly to the Nationalist Government and owed allegiance to the Kuo Ming
Tang.
4. Hsu-Chen and Kuo-Min-wu accompanied Feng. The former had been a Christian
Bishop, the first Chinese to attain that dignity. He had been the chaplain of the
"Christian General's" army. He joined the Wuhan Nationalist Government as the
Minister of Justice and became the leader of the anti-Chiang faction. He was the
chairman of the Wuhan Committee of the Kuo Min Tang until the return of Wang
Chin-wei. Kuo Min-wu was one of the ideologists of the Kuo Min Tang. He had
always been a leading figure of the left radical faction. At Wuhan, he was the head
of the Propaganda Department of the party. The behaviour of both those ''leftists"
proved that they did not approve of the developments at Wuhan, although they had
not dared to speak out their mind. As soon as the opportunity came, they decamped,
exposing how hypocritical had been the radicalism of the Wuhan Group.
5. "The advance of the nationalist forces up to the Tsinpu Railway led to
apprehension for the safety of Peking and Tientsin, The foreign garrisons in these
cities were, therefore, reinforced. The American Government sent up 3,500 marines.
The British sent a second battalion to Tientsin, and the French and the Japanese also
brought in reinforcements. The Japanese Government also despatched troops to
Tsingtao for the protection of its nationals in Shantung." (The China Year Book,
1928).
6. The resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party was against
wholesale confiscation. Only large estates were to be confiscated. There was a
controversy over the definition of a "large estate". The Ku^ Min Tang set the limit at
500 mus, while the Communists insisted that it should be lowered down to 100,
7. The author as the representative of the Communist International suggested that the
Communist Party should address an Open Letter to the left-wing leaders of the Kuo
Min Tang, setting forth the Platform of National Revolution. Unfortunately, the
suggestion did not find favour with the leaders of the Communist Party and others
guiding its policy. The platform with a preamble setting forth the facts recorded in
the preceding paragraph was, however, drafted by the author and was published
without the official sanction of the Executive of the Communist Party.
8. "Owing to the opposition of the military men, the resolution (about the
confiscation of land) could not be promulgated. The majority of the officers come
from middle and small landowning families, and are therefore
On the Road to Peking 405
against agrarian revolution. Ninety per cent of the National Army are Hunanese.
They are all opposed to excesses in the peasants' movement. In such a situation, not
only the Kuo Min Tang, but also the Communist Party is obliged to adopt a policy of
concessions. It is necessary to correct excess and to moderate the activities about the
confiscation of land." (From a telegram to the Executive Committee of the
Communist International, sent on June 15, 1927 by Chen Tu-hsin on behalf of the
Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China.)
9. The proposal was not pressed by the leaders of the Communist Party
wholeheartedly. It was made by the author on his personal initiative, and was
subsequently endorsed from the Headquarters of the Communist International.
CHAPTER XIX
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
Secret revolutionary organisations have always been a characteristic
feature of the Chinese village. For hundreds of years, there existed in
China illegal peasant organisations with the object of resisting the
oppression and exactions by the landlords, State officials, usurers and
militarists. After the Reorganisation Conference of the Kuo Min Tang,
the peasantry in the province of Kwang-tung, which was then under the
power of the National Government, was allowed to organise themselves
for improving their conditions of life and taking part in the National
Revolution. The peasants did not hesitate to make use of the newly
gained freedom. Peasant unions grew up "like bamboo shoots in the
spring". Before long it was evident that they represented a powerful
threat to reaction.
Foreign Imperialism, native landlords, militarists, corrupt officials,
usurers, traders and the entire army of smaller parasites prospered mostly
on the labour of the peasant masses. Agriculture being the main branch
of national economy, the peasantry was the primary object of
exploitation. Therefore, the striving of the peasant masses to improve
their conditions of life provoked the hostility of all those who derived
benefit from their exploitation. Owing to its extraordinary backwardness,
Chinese agriculture produces very little surplus. The existence of the
numerous kinds of parasites, big and small, foreign and native, could be
maintained by robbing the peasantry not only of the entire surplus
produce but also of a considerable part of what little they required for
their own subsistence. Hence the periodical famines which consume
millions of human lives. Hence also is the stubborn resistance of the
exploiting classes even to the slightest improvement of the conditions of
the peasantry, not to speak of the revolutionary demand that the entire
fruit of their
The Counter-Revolution 407
labour should belong to the peasants. Even the reform, so urgently
necessary for the development of national economy as a whole, only to
the extent that the peasants be no longer deprived of what they need for
their physical existence and reproduction, will blow up the present
structure of the Chinese society.
The perspective of a change in the existing conditions of precapitalist
exploitation was welcomed by the peasantry as enthusiastically as it was
feared by those who are profiting by these conditions. As soon as the
Kuo Min Tang opened that perspective before them, the peasants
enthusiastically flocked around it and soon became the driving power of
the National Revolution. The support of the peasant masses enabled the
Nationalist Government to beat down the counterrevolutionary uprisings,
step by step, and to extend its power throughout the entire province of
Kwangtung.
The enthusiasm of the peasantry over the agrarian programme of the Kuo
Min Tang showed that they were willing to support the bourgeoisie in the
struggle for removing all the hindrances to capitalist production. But this
enthusiasm of the peasantry terrified the bourgeoisie, instead of
encouraging them. The cause of this peculiar situation is to be found in
the economic system of the country. In addition to their primary
capitalist function, the bourgeoisie are connected with the pre-capitalist
modes of production as feudal landlords and also as traders. Under the
given conditions, an alliance of the bourgeoisie with the peasantry is
impossible. The bourgeois revolution is an unavoidable stage of social
progress. It must be accomplished, whether the bourgeoisie will or not.
In order to free themselves from the bonds of pre-capitalist exploitation,
the peasant masses fight the battles of bourgeois revolution. The history
of China between 1924 to the middle of 1927 was the history of a
bourgeois revolution which developed against the will of the bourgeoisie.
Attacked by the stormy uprising of the peasantry, the reactionary
elements in Kwangtung were defeated, but not destroyed. The
Nationalist Government did not allow the peasantry to go farther in the
struggle against rural reaction. The struggle inside the Kuo Min Tang,
resulting in the capture of the leadership by the democratic left wing,
indicated the danger that the bourgeois revolution might develop in the
face of the resistance of the bourgeoisie. That danger drove the feudal
reaction to attack the democratic Nationalist
408 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Government. The attack began with the assassination of Liao Chun-hai
in the autumn of 1925. Then followed a general offensive against the
peasant movement. The peasant unions became the object of fierce
oppression. "Corrupt officials, greedy traders, illegally maintained armed
forces, bandits, militia, riff-raffs—all these, supported by Imperialism,
began the suppression of the peasant movement, in different ways, with
different means : Peasants were murdered, their homes plundered, their
women outraged. They were wild, only because the peasants took part in
the National Revolution in order to win freedom "* But the revolutionary
energy of the peasant masses was too powerful to be broken easily. The
peasants defended their organisations and strengthened them in the face
of wild reaction. Although the Nationalist Government failed to take any
measure to check the activities of the counter-revolutionaries, these did
not succeed to beat down the peasant movement. Thereupon, the re-
actionaries adopted different tactics. Feudal landlords, corrupt officials
and traders, who had previously resisted the Nationalist Government
with arms, now entered the Kuo Min Tang. In the villages, they set up
peasant unions which were composed of conservative rich peasants,
usurers and the rural riff-raff.2
The mass of peasantry was suspicious of the new unions, and stayed
away from them. The new, yellow peasant unions thereupon began a
campaign of lies and calumny against the old revolutionary
organisations. These were branded as the nests of bandits and
Bolsheviks, who wanted "to confiscate all property and practise free
love". The landlords and reactionary officials, who had just recently
entered the Kuo Min Tang, echoed this propaganda of lies inside the
party. They asserted that the peasantry was against the unions of the
"bandits and Bolsheviks" and that, therefore, it was the duty of the
Nationalist Government to suppress them. Under the leadership of the
Kuo Min Tang, the revolutionary peasants still remained in the
defensive. They strengthened their organisation and educated their
members, even when the situation called for a decisive offensive as the
surest defense.
But organisations of the masses, who for hundreds of years bad lived
under intolerable conditions, could not be expected to practise the virtue
of patience for ever. The grievances of the peasantry were so numerous
and burning that their redress could not be postponed indefinitely. In
some districts, the peasant unions demanded reduction
The Counter-Revolution 409
of rent and proposed that the money thus saved should be spent by the
peasantry for the purpose of education. Even such moderate demands
met the resistance of the parasitic classes. Unions making such demands
were bloodily suppressed by private militias. And the Nationalist
Government did nothing to prevent its own armed forces from being
utilised by the counter-revolutionaries. Landlords, rich peasants, usurers
and rural officials tried to get into the peasant unions with the object of
decomposing the revolutionary peasant movement. Naturally, there was
objection to the admission into the unions of those against whose
oppression and exploitation they had been created. That objection
became a new ground for fierce attack upon the peasant unions. One of
those attacks ended in such a massacre of peasants "that the dead bodies
put together looked like a small hill".3 As the conflict sharpened, the Kuo
Min Tang did not support the revolutionary peasants against the enemies
of democratic freedom; on the contrary, it hindered all action on their
part. "Meanwhile, the feudal resistance against the revolutionary
movement grew continually."4
The influence of the landlords and old-school officials changed the
relation of forces inside the Kuo Min Tang. The continuous attack upon
the rural revolutionary movement led to the coup d'e'tat of March 20,
1926. Defeated in the urban areas by the democratic mass movement, the
forces of reaction carried on their activities in the villages. So a
determined offensive against the rural reaction became the only means to
secure the future of the revolution. Ihe peasantry was ready for the
offensive. In its report to the Second Delegates' Conference of the Kuo
Min Tang in the beginning of 1926, the Kwangtung Federation of
Peasant Unions declared: "Although military power has destroyed
counter-revolution in the cities, the feudal reaction continues its activities
in the countryside; the very existence of the peasant movement is
threatened. It cannot be defended without subverting the social relations
in the village.'' The report emphasised: "The peasants must be freed from
the feudal power not only for their interest, but also for the defense of the
Kuo Min Tang and of the Nationalist Government against counter-
revolution."
But the nationalist bourgeoisie conspired with the enemies of the peasant
movement. The coup d'etat of March 20 indicated which way the wind
was blowing. The bourgeoisie decisively refused to
410 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
make an alliance with the peasantry in the struggle for democratic
freedom. The weakness of the petit-bourgeois left wing was exposed by
the fact that it also failed to support the peasantry in the revolutionary
struggle against feudal reaction. Therefore, it was so easily driven out of
its position of power, which it had acquired with the help of the
revolutionary masses. Encouraged by the coup d'etat of March 20, rural
reaction increased its activity. The resolution of the Central Committee
of the Kuo Min Tang, adopted soon after the coup d'etat, was rightly
interpreted by the landowning class as a declaration of the Nationalist
Government in favour of the dissolution of the peasant unions and
abandonment of the policy of relying upon the support of the democratic
masses. Neither the Kuo Min Tang nor the Nationalist Government
repudiated such an interpretation of the resolution. The offensive against
the peasant movement developed everywhere. Violent destruction of the
peasant unions by rowdies, and assassination of their revolutionary
leaders came to be current events in Kwangtung in 1926. On the plea that
all energy should be applied to the preparation of the North Expedition,
the Kuo Min Tang and the Nationalist Government overlooked the
fateful fact that counter-revolution was raising its head in their own
house.
Just as the Nationalist Government could maintain itself in Kwangtung
only with the help of the masses, similarly, thanks to the operation of the
same revolutionary factor, could the Nationalist Army sweep everything
before it and in a few months penetrate into the heart of the country. But
the triumph of the Nationalist Army coincided with the victory of the
counter-revolution in the rear. While the peasant masses in Hunan,
Kwangsi and Hupeh were enthusiastically welcoming the Nationalist
Army as their liberator, in Kwangtung the peasant movement was
bloodily suppressed. Upon the departure of the North Expedition, the
Chief of the General Staff of the Nationalist Army, Li Chai-sun, became
the ruler of Kwangtung. He was a typical representative of the feudal
military reaction, who had entered the nationalist ranks with the object of
destroying the revolution. Soon after the departure of the North
Expedition, the Hongkong Boycott was raised. The Nationalist
Government and the headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang were still in
Canton. The boycott had not only dealt a staggering blow to the power
and prestige of British Imperialism; it had also touched the money-bag of
the Chinese traders. Under their pressure, the boycott was ended. When
little
The Counter-Revolution 411
Li Chai-sun became the ruler of Canton, he forbade all revolutionary
activities. He sharply reined in the democratic freedom introduced by the
Nationalist Government, and heaped his wrath on the peasant movement.
When the National Revolution reached the climax in the spring of 1928,
the peasant movement in Kwangtung was ruthlessly suppressed, the
peasant unions were deprived even of the right of legal existence, just
like under the Manchus, and the militarist regime established after their
downfall.
The National Revolution in colonial countries has two tasks: to
overthrow imperialist domination and to destroy the forces of native
reaction Throughout the process of the development of the National
Revolution, the Kuo Min Tang tried to avoid the second task. Since it did
not want to attack the native forces which served as the instrument of
imperialist exploitation, it necessarily weakened itself in the struggle
against Imperialism. In the beginning, the bourgeoisie welcomed the
awakening of the masses; but soon it became clear that Imperialism
could not be overthrown, nor Militarism destroyed, without abolishing
the social conditions in which the bourgeoisie themselves were also
interested. Therefore, the nationalist bourgeoisie were bound to betray
the struggle against Imperialism. Hostile to the only force, which, as
shown in experience, could attack the citadel of imperialist power
successfully, the bourgeoisie were not in a position to conduct the
revolutionary struggle against Imperialism. On the other hand
Imperialism was not altogether unwilling to come to some understanding
with the nationalist bourgeoisie, provided that the latter broke their
alliance with the revolutionary masses. As soon as one faction of the
nationalist bourgeoisie, led by Chiang Kai-shek, broke away from the
revolutionary mass movement, Imperialism altered its attitude towards
them very remarkably. When the Nationalist Army was marching
towards Shanghai, powerful imperialist forces were concentrated there
for keeping the nationalists away. But two months later, the Nationalist
Army marched into Shanghai without any resistance. Presumably, that
could only happen with the approval of the imperialist Powers. And that
approval could be had only in return for the Nationalist Army
undertaking to respect all the imperialist privileges. That was
capitulation. The main condition of that capitulation was to break the
backbone of the National Revolution.
The Nationalist Army stood by, while the Shanghai proletariat faced the
fire of imperialist guns and braved the hangmen of the
412 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
militarists. It remained passive, in order to show that it did not recognise
the revolutionary working class as its vanguard. Upon entering Shanghai
eventually, with the permission of Imperialism, the first act of the
Nationalist Army was to shoot down the revolutionary workers and
suppress the democratic movement.
The nationalists adhered to the conditions of their capitulation so loyally
as to win open recognition from Imperialism. The North China Daily
News, notorious for its hatred of the nationalist movement, wrote in April
1927: "We should not underestimate in the least what General Chiang
Kai-shek has done. Under the conditions prevailing here, a fortnight ago,
it was not possible to act otherwise than drastically and to shoot down
the Communists ruthlessly. In view of the situation, in which General
Chiang Kai-shek then found himself, it was necessary to possess a good
amount of moral courage to take the step with the decisiveness that he
demonstrated. We also fully admit the truth of the old saying that Rome
was not built in a day. Yet, much more must be done by General Chiang
Kai-shek and the Kuo Min Tang, before their assurances can be
unquestionably accepted."5
Although Moloch wanted much more workers' blood, he was for the
moment satisfied with his new worshipper, and did not refuse to reward
his meritorious services. A few days later, the English Inspector-General
of the Customs Administration delivered to Chiang Kai-shek three
million dollars as the first instalment of the amount due to China from
the increase of import duty permitted by the Washington Conference.
The control of the customs, which is the mainstay of China's State
finance, is the most powerful means of imperialist domination. No
Government can have its share of the customs revenue, if its policy is not
approved by Imperialism. For years Shanghai had been the apple of
discord between the rival militarists, because the control of that city
brings one within the reach of the customs revenue which accumulates
there. The desire of the nationalist faction under Chiang Kai-shek to
reach Shanghai was dictated by the appetite for the customs revenue
which, however could be grabbed only with the approval of Imperialism.
The delivery of a part of the customs revenue signified the recognition of
the nationalists by Imperialism. One does not voluntarily deliver large
amounts of money to those regarded as enemies. Imperialism was still
the master of the situation, and awarded a prize only for merit-
 The Counter-Revolution 413
orious services. Yesterday it had given the price to Sun Chung-fang or
Chang Sung-chang. To-day, Chiang Kai-shek was the happy receiver.
The same stormy development of the mass movement, which compelled
the bourgeoisie to give up the struggle against Imperialism, persuaded
the latter itself to change its policy. Its main object was to plunder China,
to make the largest possible profit out of the misery of the Chinese
people. It is immaterial through which means that could be done.
Unhesitatingly, Imperialism discards one instrument in favour of a more
efficient one. The development of the mass movement and the
consequent easy triumph of the Nationalist Army over the militarists
showed that these had become antiquated as instruments of imperialist
domination. Therefore, when the North Expedition was nearing its goal,
British Imperialism announced its readiness to enter into negotiations
with a "real and legal'' Nationalist Government. Having regard for
changed conditions, the old forms of domination—unequal treaties,
extra-territorial rights, concessions, etc.—could be possibly modified.
These brutally acquired privileges were no longer decisive for the
maintenance of imperialist supremacy. They had become antiquated, and
could be easily replaced by newer and subtler methods of exploitation.
Through superficial concessions regarding the forms and methods of
exploitation, the nationalist bourgeoisie could be won over as the new
instrument of imperialist domination. These considerations persuaded
Imperalism to declare its willingness to recognise a "real and legal"
Nationalist Government in place of the old militarist allies. Chiang Kai-
shek must fulfil certain conditions to prove that the Nationalist
Government represented by him was "real and legal".
The Nationalist Army commanded by Chiang Kai-shek marched into
Shanghai on March 22, 1927. It was a small army, composed
approximately of three thousand soldiers. But Shanghai had already been
conquered. The proletariat had done that. The uprising of the
revolutionary democratic masses, under the leadership of the working
class, had driven the troops of Sun Chuan-fang out of Shanghai, having
inflicted on them heavy casualties and consequently discredited them.
While leaving Shanghai, the Northern militarists, protected by
Imperialism, had taken revenge upon the workers, who had operated as
the shock-troop of the Nationalist Army. Although the Nationalist Army
did not march into Shanghai, even when the
414 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
way was open, obviously to let the proletariat be massacred by the
withdrawing Northern militarists, the working class held the conquered
position with unparallelled heroism.
Chiang Kai-shek found the Chinese part of the city of Shanghai under a
People's Council elected by the democratic masses. The responsibility he
had undertaken in return for the imperialist permission for his entry into
Shanghai, was to overthrow the revolutionary administration. Although
this was democratic by composition, and supported even by the Chinese
big merchants, industrialists and financers, who had no sympathy for the
revolution. It had been brought to existence by the action of the working
class. Thoroughly democratic, the City Council had a working class
majority. Consequently, the Executive, controlled by such a democratic
council, could not be corrupted. It was not to be persuaded to sacrifice
national interest to the group interest of the bourgeoisie, who would
make a compromise with Imperialism for certain concessions. But a
frontal attack on the City Council was not permissible. Such a step would
reveal the real character of Chiang Kai-shek much too early. The big
merchants, industrialists and bankers were with him. But the urban petit-
bourgeoisie, the social basis of the Kuo Min Tang was under proletarian
influence. Wanting to operate still under the banner of the Kuo Min fang,
Chiang Kai-shek must win the petit-bourgeoisie over to his side; he must
split the revolutionary democratic bloc. Besides, he did not have under
his command sufficient troops to risk a frontal attack upon those who had
dealt a staggering blow to the powerful army of Sun Chuan-fang, and
had resisted the united forces of international Imperialism.
In the meantime, Nanking was occupied by the Sixth Nationalist Army
commanded by Chen Chien, who sympathised with the Wuhan group.
The control of Nanking was of great importance for the plans of the
clique led by Chiang-Kai-shek. Somewhere else, another nationalist
centre must be created in order to dispute the authority of Wuhan.
Shanghai was not the suitable place. Chiang Kai-shek could not estabish
a government in Shanghai which was virtually under the protection of
foreign troops and foreign battleships. Set up under such conditions, a
"Nationalist Government" could not possibly veil its real character.
Nanking was a more suitable place for the purpose. Therefore, Chiang
Kai-shek had to send away all available troops, on whose loyalty he
could rely, to prevent Nanking
The Counter-Revolution 415
from siding with Wuhan.
In the first days, Chiang Kai-shek behaved very cautiously in
Shanghai, in order to convince the petit-bourgeois masses of his
loyalty to the Kuo Min Tang. He heartily welcomed Wang Chin-wei,
whom only a year ago he had driven out of the country. The leader of
the petit-bourgeois left wing was easily taken in. Instead of
proceeding directly to Wuhan, as planned, Wang Chin-wei stopped in
Shanghai for a conference not only with Chiang Kai-shek, but also
with those right-wing leaders who had combated the Kuo Min Tang
since 1924, that is, every since it was reorganised. The conference
revealed that the counter-revolutionary conspiracy extended to the
innermost circle of the "left" group of Wuhan. The Finance Minister
of the Wuhan Government, T.V. Sung, participated in the conference.
He was closely connected with the banking world of Shanghai. Tha
conference revoked the proclamation of the Wuhan group against
Chiang Kai-shek, and resolved that an extraordinary party conference
should be held at Nanking with the object of settling the differences.
That was a diplomatic victory for Chiang Kai-shek. His position was
politically strengthened. Now he was ready to act.
The presence in the conference of such intellectual leaders of modern
China as Tsai Yuan-pai, Wu Tse-hui and Li Shen-tsen, in addition to
Wang Chin-wei, removed all suspicion ol the petit-bourgeoisie about
Chiang Kai-shek's loyalty to the Kuo Min Tang. Then the big
bourgeoisie withdrew from the revolutionary City Council of
Shanghai. The Chinese Banker's Union promised Chiang Kai-shek a
loan of twenty million dollars; three million were directly paid, so that
he could set up the "real and legal" Nationalist Government which
would win the confidence of the imperialist Powers. The petit-
bourgeoisie also went the same way and left the City Council, which
consequently became a purely proletarian body; now it could be
attacked by the nationalist militarists as "the nest of Communist
intrigues against the Kuo Min Tang". Tactical mistakes committed by
the Communists helped Chiang Kai-shek.9
In order to make up for the inadequacy of the available military forces
Chiang Kai-shek secretly brought in bands of village ruffians from the
neighbouring countryside. With the cry "against the Communist
danger!" he succeeded in winning over the support of the well-to-do
peasantry in the adjoining provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang.
416 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The upper strata of the peasantry were won over for the counter-
revolution through the lying propaganda that the Communists wanted to
confiscate everything— the land of small proprietor, tools, women,
altogether everything.
Thus strengthened from every side, Chiang Kai-shek went over to the
offensive. The General Council of the Trade-Unions was forbidden to
organise strikes or demonstrations. The Workers' Militia, which had so
successfully operated as the vanguard of the Nationalist Army in the
capture of Shanghai, was disarmed. In protest, the General Council of the
Trade quarters of Chiang Kai-shek to protest against the repressive
measures. The deputation was fired upon, and the General Council was
declared an illegal body. That was the signal for a general offensive in
which hundreds of revolutionary workers were brutally massacred.
During the latter part of March, the proletarian quarters of Shanghai were
the scene of a fierce counter-revolutionary terror.
Another signal for counter-revolution was the violent rupture of relations
with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. While entering into the
short period of revolutionary struggle, the Kuo Min Tang had concluded
an alliance with the Workers' Republic. The betrayal of that alliance
logically followed from its turning against the revolution. One should
remember that, while entering into friendly relations with the Soviet
Republics, the Kuo Min Tang had not adopted the Communist
programme; the Soviet help for the Chinese nationalists was only
conditional upon the struggle against Imperialism. As long as the
Chinese nationalists conducted the struggle against imperialist
domination, the Soviet Republic was the only foreign Power on whose
sympathy and support they could count. When, terrified by the
development of the revolution in their own house, they abandoned that
struggle, the alliance with the Workers' Republic was no longer
necessary. On the contrary, the repudiation of that alliance was an
essential condition for the desired understanding with Imperialism. As a
matter of fact, the Imperialist demanded complete break with the
U.S.S.R. before they would have any relation with the Chinese
Nationalist Government. The rupture of relations with the U.S.S.R.
unavoidably followed from the bloody suppression of the mass
movement, the betrayal of the democratic National Revolution.
Engaged in the bloody massacre of the Shanghai proletariat,
The Counter-Revolution 417
Chiang Kai-shek was characterised by the Communist International as
traitor to the cause of national freedom. Enraged at being called what he
really was, the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army followed
the foot-steps of the rank reactionary Manchurian war-lord Chiang Tso-
lin7; he raided the Soviet Consulate in Shanghai. In that act of flagrant
violation of international law, not to mention the disloyalty to a proved
friend, the nationalists were fully supported by the imperialist Powers.
The Soviet Consulate was situated in the International Settlement, which
could be invaded by Chinese soldiers only with the permission of the
foreign Consuls. The object of the raid was to provide the nationalists
with plausible excuses for their crusade against the Communists. It was a
search for evidence to prove that the Communists were supported by the
U.S.S.R. in their "conspiracy" for overthrowing the nationalists. The
documents, alleged to have been found in the Soviet Embassy in Peking,
"proved the conspiracy"; but they had been proved to be forged.
Nevertheless, they were good enough to serve the purpose of the
nationalists. The raids on the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the
Consulate in Shanghai, in one place under orders from Cliang Tso-lin
and in the other from Chiang Kai-shek, showed that, in their attack
against the revolutionary masses, the nationalists were hardly to be
distinguished from the reactionary militarists. From that time, the
struggle of the Nationalist Army against Militarism was only a comedy.
Before long, the Kuo Min Tang flag was to be hoisted in Mukden, where
the spirit of Chang Tso-lin still reigned in the person of his worthy son.
The behaviour of the nationalists, after they had reached the Yangtse
valley, was so counter- revolutionary even from the bourgeois point of
view that they opened the door of the Kuo Min Tang to the Manchurian
militarists, and permitted the Nationalist Government to establish
friendly relations with the son of Chang Tso-lin.
Without the help of the Soviet Union and the support of the revolutionary
masses, the nationalists could never attain their military victory. The
troops of Chiang Kai-shek were equipped with arms supplied by the
Workers' Republic. The officers of the Nationalist Army were trained in
the Military Academy of Whampoa, which was established and
conducted with help from the same source. Citizens of the U.S.S.R.,
heroes of the civil war in their own country, stood shoulder to shoulder
with the Chinese soldiers in every field of battle. Without the military
talent of his Russian adviser Galen, Chiang
418 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Kai-shek, with his staff of youthful amateurs, could not possibly plan and
carry out the Expedition. He himself admitted that when he tried to retain
Galen's services even after he had turned against the revolution.
It has already been shown how the ground for the advance of the
Nationalist Army had been prepared by mass uprisings. Ever since 1917,
under the personal leadership of Sun Yat-sen, theKuo Min Tang had
made repeated efforts to send a military expedition towards the North.
The attempt always ended in a fiasco. None of the expeditions could
advance farther than a few miles from the base. Two conditions had to be
created before the nationalist North Expedition could be successful: The
growth of the revolutionary mass movement, and foreign help, which at
the same time would not be a bondage. Those conditions were created as
soon as the Kuo Min Tang reorganised itself in the beginning of 1924
into a democratic revolutionary Party. In the first half of 1927, just when
the National Democratic Revolution was within an ace of success, the
Kuo Min Tang violently broke away from those very conditions for its
success, and consequently became' an active instrument of counter-
revolution.
The counter-revolution was not confined to Shanghai. On orders from his
chief, Li Chai-sun opened the general offensive against the revolution in
Canton also, on the pretext of suppressing the Communist movement. On
the night of April 15, Canton was declared to be in a state of siege.
Hundreds of buildings were raided by soldiers. Nearly two thousand
people were arrested either as Communists or their sympathisers. Among
them were many cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy. Many girl
students were also among the victims of the white terror. Not only the
trade-unions, but even the headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang were
occupied by soldiers. Those present there were either arrested or driven
away. More than half of the arrested were summarily executed, many
beheaded in the open street. Martial law was proclaimed. For wearing the
hair short, many girls were arrested and even shot down in the streets as
Communists. A decree was issued ordering all Communists to report
themselves to the military headquarters within ten days. The failure to
obey that order was punishable by shooting on sight. The order obviously
was a trick. If the Communists could be shot on sight, on their failure to
delive r themselves to the hangman, evidently they were
The Counter-Revolution 419
already known to those who ordered them to do so. Why were they not
then arrested forthwith? The decree was meant to be an excuse for
indiscriminate shooting of all undesirables. The dead are dumb. So all
the victims of white terror could be conveniently branded as
Communists.
The climax of the counter-revolutionary offensive in Canton was also the
raid of the Soviet Consulate, on the pretext that Communists were hidden
there. In defending their immunity, several Consular officials were
killed. The rest were arrested and deported.
On May 7, the British Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain informed
the Parliament that the nationalists, represented by Chiang Kai-shek, had
satisfied Imperialism and had proved themselves capable of establishing
a "real and legal" Nationalist Government. The speech referred to the so-
called excesses of Nanking. When, in the middle of March, the
Nationalist Army occupied Nanking, several foreigners had been killed,
and some property of foreigners destroyed. The events might be
regretted; but they were altogether unavoidable. In view of the standing
provocation through the presence of foreign military and naval forces in
the heart of China, it is a matter of surprise that, in course of the
revolutionary war, many more lives and property of foreigners were not
destroyed. But Imperialism has its own logic. The Powers sent to the
Nationalist Government of Wuhan a very sharply formulated joint note,
in which they demanded compensation for the losses suffered at
Nanking. Specially, the British Government threatened drastic measures,
unless the demanded compensation was made without delay. So, the
world was somewhat surprised when, even before the demanded
compensation had been made, the British Foreign Minister declared that
"Great Britain would no longer press her demands because the Nanking
excesses have already brought upon the culprits punishment meted out
with such a dramatic swiftness, as is seldom in the field of international
relations."8
That was sufficiently significant; the punishment mentioned by the
British Foreign Secretary evidently was the counter-revolutionary terror,
which had, in the meantime, been established by the nationalists. It is of
great interest to trace the devious course of imperialist diplomacy during
the first critical months of 1927. It shows how Imperialism fomented .the
crystallisation of the counter-revolutionary forces. In the beginning of the
year, when the Nationalist Army with the help of revolutionary mass
movement was advancing towards the
420 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Yangtse valley, the Imperialist Powers declared their readiness to come
to some understanding with a "real and legal" Nationalist Government.
That was a clumsy hint for the right wing of the Kuo Min Tang. It was
on that hint that Chiang Kai-shek marched towards Shanghai with the
object of uniting with the extreme right wing, composed of the big
merchants, industrialists and bankers, who had always strongly
disapproved of the revolutionary aberration of the Canton Nationalist
Government.
Another move of imperialist diplomacy was the appeal of Great Britain
to all the Powers for giving up the opposition to the increased customs
duties introduced by the Chinese Government according to the
recommendation of the Washington Conference. In the International
Customs Conference of Peking in 1925-26, the Imperialist Powers had
refused to agree with the Chinese Government's policy of higher tariffs,
unless certain pre-conditions were fulfilled. In view of that fact, the
policy now advocated by the British Government was clearly a
concession to the Chinese bourgeoisie. The British Foreign Minister
actually submitted to the Nationalist Government of Wuhan a draft of the
projected agreement. The willingness to negotiate with it, a revision of
old treaties, and the suggested understanding about the transfer of the
Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang to a Chinese Administration
meant de facto recognition of the Wuhan Government by Great Britain.
Those diplomatic moves strengthened the hands of the bourgeois
elements in the Wuhan group who successfully prevented the left wing
from acting under the pressure of the masses and go farther in the
struggle against Imperialism. Besides, the offer about the increased
customs duty whetted the appetite of the Wuhan Government. It
strengthened the the tendency towards a union with the rival group,
because the benefit of a higher tariff would largely go to those who
dominated Shanghai. It was that bait which lured the Finance Minister of
the Wuhan Government, T.V. Sung, to Shanghai just when his Govern-
ment was planning a war against those who were in possession of that
city.
British displomacy flirted with the Wuhan Government when Chiang
Kai-shek was still fighting his way towards Shanghai. As soon as,
through the intermediary of the Shanghai bourgeoisie, the relation with
his faction was established, British Imperialism changed its attitude
towards Wuhan which was placed under an economic
The Counter-Revolution 421
blockade and a standing threat of armed intervention. Yet, so long as
there was no other Government, some relation, though very uncertain,
had to be maintained with Wuhan. The Nanking accident was a gift of
God. It enabled British Imperialism to beat the Wuhan Government
down.
The army which occupied Nanking was under the command of Chiang
Kai-shek. He should have been made responsible for the "excesses"
committed by his army. Indeed, he was still the Comman-der-in-Chief of
the entire Nationalist Army. But the relation was only formal. He had
rebelled against the Wuhan group and did not recognise it as the
Nationalist Government. In all other questions, the Imperialist Powers
were secretly in relation with him. Nevertheless, they held Wuhan
responsible for the "excesses" at Nanking and pressed it for
compensation. Obviously, the object was to create difficulties for
Chiang's opponents, so that his position could be strengthened9.
In the meantime, another Nationalist Government was established at
Nanking. The demand for the compensation for the "excesses" should
now be addressed there. But that would be against the adopted course of
imperialist diplomacy. Therefore, the generous declaration of the British
Foreign Secretary that the demands for compensation for the "excesses"
of Nanking would no longer be pressed. But another speech of the same
dignitary, made a week later, gave away the game. According to the
second speech, the former declaration did not concern the Wuhan
Government, which continued to be accused of deliberate indifference
about its obligation to hold itself responsible for the Nanking incidents.
Chiang Kai-shek was the head of the new Government; he had washed
away his previous sins in a stream of workers' blood. So he had made
himself a. persona grata with Imperialism. But the matter was entirely
different with the Wuhan Government which must still be driven on the
bloody road of atonement. Therefore, the spokesman of British
Imperialism shook the mailed fist against recalcitrant Wuhan, while he
smiled faintly upon Nanking. He declared that the British Govern- -ment
was considering the reoccupation of the Hankow Concession, that the
Wuhan Government did not represent anybody, and therefore the British
diplomatic representative would be withdrawn from there. The next day
the British representative left Wuhan. A new Nationalist Government
had arisen: it was definitely counter-revolutionary and was, therefore,
easily to be influenced by Imperialism.
422 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
It was no longer necessary to flirt with Wuhan. The best method for
helping the crystallisation of the counter-revolutionary forces was the
transfer of the patronage to the rival.
When the counter-revolution was marching forward in the South, East
and North, the Wuhan Government was not altogether immune from it.
The representatives of trade, industry and finance, striving for an
agreement with Imperialism, were also in the Wuhan Government. The
military forces of Wuhan were dominated by feudal landlords who were
full-blooded counter-revolutionaries. Behind the comedy of a struggle
against Chiang Kai-shek, the Wuhan group also was preparing for the
counter-revolution. In contrast to the bloody acts of its rival, its
behaviour, in the beginning, was not so clear. Its first act was to restrain
the anti-imperialist struggle with the object of coming to some
understanding with the foreign Powers.
The following order was issued on April 23rd through a Manifesto of the
Central Committee of the Wuhan Kuo Min Tang: "It is the duty of all the
supporters of the Nationalist Government to see to it most scrupulously
that the foreigners are not provoked. . . . Their persons and properties
must be carefully protected, and, specially, everything possible must be
done in order to help them in promoting their commercial interests"10.
The Manifesto was issued immediately upon the arrival of imperialist
battleships at Hankow. But that was not the real reason. A strike had
broken out in the Japanese textile mills. The employers had refused to
redress the grievances of the workers; these, therefore, demanded boycott
of the Japanese Concession. That development was very undesirable for
the Government which desired to win over the support of Japanese
Imperialism, while the rival clique had secured the patronage of other
imperialist Powers. The appearance of the battleships gave the Kuo Min
Tang the opportunity to argue that the imperialist Powers were looking
for a pretext for an armed intervention. It was declared that, if the strike
in the Japanese mill was not immediately called off, then Japan, with the
backing of all the Powers, would take military measures. The trade-
unions were taken in; not only the strike was called off, but they
endorsed the Manifesto of the Kuo Min Tang. In a proclamation issued
on April 23rd, the Hupeh General Council of Labour prescribed a whole
series of punishments for workers who would not obey the decree of the
Kuo Min Tang as regards the pro-
The Counter-Revolution 423
tection of foreign property and the promotion of foreign trade. The day
after, yet another Manifesto was issued by the same body. It restricted
the power of trade-unions and was counter-signed by the Central
Committee of the Kuo Min Tang. Until then, the trade-unions had
wielded considerable power in the municipal administration.
The danger of immediate intervention was not great. The imperialist
Powers wanted only to terrorise the nationalists, and force them to give
in. It was a ridiculous sight; more than a dozen battle-cruisers standing
before a city which could not possibly withstand the operation of any
single of them. Even the economic blockade was a double-edged sword.
It could not be kept up indefinitely without injuring the interests of the
blockaders just as much as of the blockaded. Getting its means of
subsistence from the hinterland, Wuhan was sure to come victorious out
of a struggle of long duration. The masses were ready for the struggle,
ready to make the necessary sacrifice. But other factors also contributed
to the situation; a long blockade demanded sacrifice not only from the
masses; the patriotism of the upper classes, particularly the traders, was
to be tested. It was under their pressure, in the first place, that the Kuo
Min Tang gave up the struggle against Imperialism. The masses should
sacrifice— not for the revolution, but for the counter-revolution. They
could obey the order to help the foreigners carry on their trade, an order
issued on the pretext of "revolutionary discipline", only if they were
prepared to give up all claims to better conditions of life. Any demand of
the workers for the slightest increase of wages or improvement of labour
conditions was replied by the employers, foreign as well as native, with
the closing of mills and factories. That obstructed trade. The workers
must sacrifice, so that the Imperialists and their native agents could fill
their pockets without any difficulty. There was no limit to the
suppression of the workers. For instance, the workers on the quays and
rickshaw coolies were forbidden to ask for more than given voluntarily.
This order was issued on the ground that, whenever the coolies asked for
more than offered, there was conflict with foreigners, and such conflicts
could easily lead to unrest and agitation giving occasion for armed
intervention.
But the threat of foreign intervention was not the real danger for the
Revolution and the Nationalist Government; it came from the intrigues in
their own risks. While still conducting a campaign of
424 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
words against Chiang Kai-shek, the agents of the bourgeoisie and the
feudal-militarists inside the Wuhan group were themselves preparing to
travel in his foot-steps. In course of time, internal decomposition became
more pronounced. In the cities, traders and industrialists demanded
suppression of the labour movement; in the countryside, the power was
still in the hands of the landowning classes. Supported by the military
forces of the Nationalist Government, they declared war upon the
peasantry. Soon it came to be an open secret that the Nationalist Army
was conspiring against the Nationalist Government. The Wuhan
Generals established clandestine contact with the Nanking Group, and,
instigated by the latter, busily prepared for a counterrevolutionary coup
d'etat.
In the middle of May, Hsia Tao-yin, Commander of a regiment stationed
on the railway line between Wuhan and Changsha (the capital of Hunan),
rebelled. He marched towards the seat of the Nationalist Government in
order to overthrow it. The attitude of the Nationalist Government was
such as gave rise to the suspicion that it connived with the revolt against
itself. Hsia Tao-yin. with a pitiable army of hardly 2000 men, reached
the outskrits of Woochang without any resistance. Helplessly, the
Nationalist Government awaited its fall on the pretext that it had no
power to resist the rebels, all the available forces having been sent to the
North. The situation revealed the motive of the hasty expedition towards
Peking. Wuhan should be disarmed to facilitate the counter-revolutionary
attack. In reality, however, the Nationalist Government was by no means
so helpless as it pretended to be. There was a sufficiently strong garrison
at Hankow. But it obviously sympathised with the rebels; the latter had
dared start on the adventure with such a small force precisely because
they knew that the Hankow garrison would join them in the decisive
moment. There could be no doubt about what was to be done, provided
that the Nationalist Government itself was not a party to the conspiracy.
Either the Hankow garrison was loyal; in that case, it must obey the order
to suppress the counter-revolutionary uprising. Or, it was suspected of
sympathy for the rebels, in which case it should have been disarmed
immediately. The Government did neither this nor that, thereby exposing
its complicity with the counter-revolutionary conspiracy.11 In that critical
moment, it became quite clear that the Kuo Min Tang, in the interest of
the revolution, should break away from compromising allies, and stand
alone
The Counter-Revolution 425
with the support of the masses. When there was uprising against the
Nationalist Government, and military forces, formally owing allegiance
to it, were conspiring with the rebels, then the only way out was to arm
the masses which had demonstrated their loyalty to the revolution.
The workers in the Hanyang Arsenal laboured day and night, so that the
Nationalist Army at the front could be kept supplied. If they were given
only a part of the weapons they manufactured, the workers could easily
disarm the counter-revolutionary garrison. An open declaration by the
Kuo Min Tang that the military officers were rebelling against the
Nationalist Government, because the latter wanted to give land to the
peasants, would have won over the soldiers who were all landless
peasants. But the Kuo Min Tang neither wanted to arm the workers, nor
give land to the peasants. Consequently, it could not defend the
revolution and joined the conspiracy against it.
Nevertheless, the conspiracy was frustrated by the joint action of the
Communists and revolutionary intellectuals. Practically all the troops had
been sent away from Woochang, obviously to make the way clear for the
rebels. The city was defended by a couple of hundred soldiers; but the
garrison commander happened to be a Communist. The rebels appearing
on the outskrits of the city, the Communist commander could no longer
wait for the instruction of the Nationalist Government, the headquarters
of which were situated just on the other side of the river. As there was no
chance of any reinforcement coming from Hankow, the garrison
commander Yeh-tin acted on his own initiative. He got together an
irregular army of about 1500 men, including several hundred students
from the local military school. They were mostly petit-bourgeois
intellectuals, all members of the Kuo Min Tang. After a week's hard
fight, the rebels were driven back. During that historic struggle, the Kuo
Min Tang and the Nationalist Government were still further exposed.
The Communist Party proposed the publication of a Proclamation in
which the mutinous officers should be declared rebels, and the soldiers
called upon not to obey them. The nationalist leaders refused to accept
that proposition; presumably, they were afraid that such an appeal would
decompose not only the rebel troops, but the entire Nationalist Army. So
nothing was done to decompose the insurgent camp. The tragedy of the
situation was that even many Communist
426 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
leaders shared the opinion of the Nationalist Government.
The nationalist leaders tried to justify their treacherous attitude with the
argument that neither Hsia Tao-yin nor the subsequent insurgents were
rebelling against the Nationalist Government; that they were against
Communism. It was a very weak argument which could not convince
anybody with the least insight of the situation. Of course, the insurgents
did not declare openly that they would overthrow the Nationalist
Government; their battle-cry was "down with the Communists". But why
did they want to kill the Communists? Because these defended the
interests of peasants. The Communist Party supported the demand of
peasantry that the Nationalist Government should carry through the
agrarian programme of the Kuo Min Tang. The masses (peasants,
workers, artisans, small traders, poor intellectuals etc.) under the
leadership of the Communist Party, emphatically demanded the
realisation of the programme of Democratic Revolution, while the Kuo
Min Tang vacillated, and conspired with reaction. The insurgents were
counter-revolutionaries, because they wanted to hinder the
accomplishment of the bourgeois democratic revolution. The objectively
arrayed themselves against the Kuo Min Tang and the Nationalist
Government, in so far as these could be regarded as the organs of
bourgeois democratic revolution. Had the Kuo Min Tang acted as the
courageous leader of the bourgeois democratic revolution, then, it would
be condemned by its feudal allies as the instrument of Communism. The
spectre of Communism, however, was a myth. The Communists became
the target of the counter-revolutionary fire, because they took over the
leadership of the bourgeois democratic revolution when it was betrayed
by the Kuo Min Tang.
In that moment, the Communists were fighting for a clearly democratic
programme. Confiscation of land, demanded by them, excluded the
property of small holders and officers of the Nationalist Army12. The
peasant unions, under Communist leadership, cooperated with all the
dimocratic elements for the creation of village self-governments as the
organs of the revolutionary struggle against feudal-patriarchal reaction.
In the cities, the Communists championed the interests of the middle-
classes together with those of the proletaiiat. The demand for higher
wages and better working conditions was linked up with the demand for
the lowering of high taxes which placed great burden on the small traders
and artisans. As
The Counter-Revolution 427
a matter of fact, the Communist Party made so many concessions as
approximated to a betrayal of the working class and the revolution.
At the end of May, that is, soon after the defeat of Hsia Tao-yin's revolt,
there happened something much more serious. Again the war-cry,
"Down with the Communists", was raised. But this time, it was an open
uprising against the Kuo Min Tang and the Nationalist Government. The
officers of the Nationalist forces stationed at Changsha, capitals of the
province of Hunan, made a coup d'etat. They overthrew the Provincial
Government, but its members in prison, dissolved the local committee of
the Kuo Min Tang, closed the political school conducted by the Peasants
Department of the Kuo Min Tang, and adopted all the usual repressive
measures against the mass organisations and the Communists. The
insurgents were direct subordinates of the Commander-m-Chief of the
Nationalist Army, Tang Shen-chi. From the front, he remained in
telegraphic communication with them. The Kuo Min Tang as well as the
Nationalist Government found themselves in a very precarious position.
Only they could do little, even if they wanted. Presently the Government
endorsed the action of the insurgents, evidently under the pressure of
Tang Shen-chi. The Provincial Government set up by the insurgents was
recognised, several members of the old, overthrown, Government
entered it. But the local committee of the Kuo Min Tang was not
restored. On the demand of the insurgents, a commission was set up with
dictatorial powers to purify the party, as the condition for the new
election of the Provincial Committee.
The feudal militarist rebels, thus completely backed by the Nationalist
Centre, began the bloody suppression of the peasantry. Against the
groundless assertion that the nationalist leaders had to turn against the
Communists owing to the latter's excesses, it must be mentioned that, in
the bitter struggle just begun in Hunan, all the local organisations of the
Kuo Min Tang joined the peasantry in the effort to overthrow the
counter-revolutionary clique of Chanesha There were Communists in
those organisations. But the majority of the members came the middle-
classes. It was, therefore, no struggle between the nationalists and the
Communists, as the Kuo Min Tans leaders asserted. It was a struggle
between the leaders and the membership of the Kuo Min Tang itself.
Workers, peasants, artisans traders, employees, students, teachers,
together composing the
428 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
overwhelming majority of the nation, wanted to carry the revolution
forward, in order to subvert the conditions of social stagnation, political
suppression and cultural backwardness. Opposed to them were the feudal
militarists who had joined the nationalist movement for strengthening
themselves. They were bitterly opposed to any alteration of the
established social relations. The bourgeoisie did want certain changes of
those conditions. But they shrank from any far-reaching measure. In the
first place, they themselves were interested in the pre-capitalist
exploitation of the village; in the second place, mass awakening
threatened to reduce their profits from industry and trade; thirdly, they
were afraid that the revolution would go so far as to prevent them from
being the only beneficiaries thereof. Foreign Imperialism, native
Capitalism and Feudalism had antagonisms among themselves; but they
came together in the common struggle against the revolution which
threatened them all.
It cannot be maintained that the Nationalist Government remained
passive against the advance of counter-revolution only out of cowardice;
it was a betrayal of the revolution. If the Wuhan clique was really the left
wing of the Kuo Min Tang, if it really represented the membership of the
party against its feudal-bourgeois leadership, then, it would have
behaved differently. Then, it would find no complication in the demands
of the workers and peasants; on the contrary, it should have used those
demands as the lever for organising a movement strong enough to
overthrow Imperialism and destroy native reaction. Then it would have
recognised in the Communists true brothers-in-arms, instead of attacking
them and with them the revolution itself. The atmosphere of the feudal-
bourgeois Wuhan clique kept the petit-bourgeois leaders like Wang
Chin-wei away from the pressure of the masses. They became positively
counter-revolutionary, even when the welfare of the social elements
represented by themselves still required the revolution.
The leader of petit-bourgeois radicalism, Wang Chin-wei, was in a
quandary. He was a tragic figure standing helplessly on board the sinking
ship of National Democratic Revolution. The foolish tactics of the
Communists—Borodin's policy of a military combination under Tang
Shen-chi's leadership—had driven Wang Chin-wei into the embrace of
the reactionary clique. But it was difficult for him to turn his coat all of a
sudden. His position was not based
The Counter-Revolution 429
upon the control of armed forces; nor had he come to prominence
through factional intrigues. He was the chosen successor of Sun Yat-sen.
Democratic radicalism was the basis of his tremendous popularity. He
could trifle with his political creed inherited from Sun Yat-sen only at the
risk of his political life. Such a figure could not be disregarded, when
very available weapon should be used for what it was worth to avert the
disaster which appeared to be imminent. The odds were turning against
the Communists who had so vigorously disarmed themselves. Besides,
the attack was not upon the Communists alone. It was against the
National Democratic Revolution. Objectively, the urban petit-bourgeois
masses were also under attack. In such a situation, efforts should be
made for a closer fighting alliance with the urban petit-bourgeois masses
to resist the march of counter-revolution. Such an alliance was still an
objective necessity. Counter-revolution might still be checked, if the
effort could be made successfully.
But Borodin's policy of giving predominance to the "left" militarists had
driven Wang Chin-wei to the background. He had returned to China on
the advice of the Russians to place himself at the head of the Wuhan
Government. But in Wuhan, he found himself in an ambiguous position.
He was the formal head of the Government, which however was at the
mercy of the "left" militarists. He began to feel that the Communists had
deceived him. In that equivocal position, he was naturally bitter and
wavering. He was still the idol of the democratic masses. A radical
opposition to overthrow the reactionaries could not possibly be organised
except with him as the leader. Therefore, it was all-important to restore
his confidence and reassure him of the support promised to him in
Moscow.13
The bourgeoisie turning against the revolution, the lower middle-class
could either go over to the camp of counter-revolution, or make closer
alliance with the working classes. As a matter of fact, the democratic
middle-classes, in course of the development of the revolution, had come
closer and closer to the toiling masses. When reaction started the
offensive, in the beginning, they stood with the workers and peasants.
Petit-bourgeois leaders like Wang Chin-wei went over to the counter-
revolution, because they did not know the tendencies of their own
following. Cut off from their own social base, in the critical moment they
became the ideologists of fcudal-bour-
430 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
geois reaction. They swore by the principles of Sun Yat-sen and declared
against class struggle; thereby they endorsed the reactionary strivings for
suppressing the peasantry. Wang Chin-wei knew that his opposition to
the agrarian reform must lead to a betrayal of the bourgeois-democratic
revolution. Therefore, he made the ridiculous effort to prove that the
Chinese Revolution was different not only from the Russian Revolution,
but also could not follow the course even of the Great French
Revolution. He maintained that the main task of the Chinese Revolution
was the overthrow of foreign Imperialism, and that the accomplishment
of this task required the united front of all revolutionary nationalist
elements. All other tasks of the revolution, which may disturb the anti-
imperialist united front, must therefore be set aside.
Lest the support of the exploiting parasitic minority might be forfeited,
Wang Chin-wei openly broke the promise which the Kuo Min Tang had
made to the masses in order to win them over for the National
Revolution. The precarious unity of the nationalist ranks must be
maintained on the terms of a small minority which always placed its
sectional interest above the interest of the nation. The majority must
make sacrifices. Should the masses not agree with the logic of the petit-
bourgeois theoretician of reaction, then, they must be suppressed; and the
bloody violence of counter-revolution also served the interest of National
Revolution! The united front, established in this way, was naturally not
the unity of all national-revolutionary forces. These were excluded from
the alliance which came to be an alliance of the bourgeoisie with the
feudal-militarists against the National Revolution and, therefore, an
instrument for maintaining the imperialist domination in a slightly
altered form.
According to Wang Chin-wei, the most elementary demands of the
masses hindered the anti-imperialist struggle; therefore, they should not
be supported. The Communists also regarded the overthrow of
Imperialism as the immediate task of the revolution; but as they would
not agree that sanction of the unrestricted exploitation of the masses was
a condition for united front, they were damned as enemies of the Kuo
Min Tang.
Revolutions are mile-stones on the way of social progress. They solve
the social problems of the given epoch. In China, there were great social
problems to solve. The Chinese National Revolution could be compared
with the Great French Revolution, and even with
The Counter-Revolution 431
the Russian Revolution, because, essentially, it had to solve the same
social problems as done by both. The overthrow of Imperialism is a
political task, the accomplishment of which will create the conditions for
the solution of fundamental social problems. Experience shows that the
political and social tasks of the Chinese National Revolution could not be
separated. They are interwoven with each other, and must be solved
together. When a nationalist movement seeks to avoid its fundamental
social tasks, it defeats its own political object; it capitulates before
Imperialism and becomes counter-revolutionary.
In the period of 1924-27, the Chinese Revolution differed from the
classical bourgeois revolutions only in so far as it had to fight, in addition
to the native feudal reaction, an external force which was very closely
allied with the internal enemy. But Wang Chin-wei maintained that the
revolutionary struggle in China must assume different forms, because
"the Chinese revolution has objects diflerent from those of the French
Revolution".14 According to him, the object of the Chinese National
Revolution was neither the destruction of feudal-patriarchal reaction, nor
the establishment of democratic freedom. Its only object was to end
foreign domination. But what would happen when that object was
attained? As a loyal disciple of Sun Yat-sen, Wang Chin-wei gave a clear
answer. "The masses must have the necessary revolutionary training; for
this purpose, they must remain under the leadership of the Kuo Min Tang
which will guide them through the period of civil war as well as the
period of trusteeship. The establishment of a Constitutional Government
can begin when the situation will be free from all possible danger."
According to this programme, the Chinese people, for an unlimited time,
must be subordinated to the dictatorship of the Kuo Min Tang, which had
proved itself in action to be just as bitter an enemy of the masses as
Imperialism and Militarism. For this object, the foreign domination
should be ended.
Since the dream of dictatorial power could not be realised until
Imperialism was overthrown, and since experience had shown that
without the support of the masses the Kuo Min Tang was powerless,
Wang Chin-wei tried to deceive the workers and peasants with petit-
bourgeois demagogy. He declared that the National Revolution must
develop with two slogans: "Support of the workers and peasants", and
"Workers, peasants, traders, students and [soldiers—unite!" Had he
honestly acted according to these slogans, he would not have
432 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
betrayed the revolution. But he wanted to deceive not only the workers
and peasants, but also the oppressed middle-classes. The abiding
confidence of the masses could not be won by a party which might shout
the first slogan, but at the same time violently suppress the workers and
peasants movement. In order to explain the .crass contradiction between
the words and the deeds of the Kuo Min Tang, Wan Chin-wei
emphasised that "political power must be defended with revolutionary (!)
means. After the accomplishment of this task, the peaceful solution of
economic problems will begin, namely, the division of land and State
supervision of capitalist industries".
Violence is justified as a "revolutionary means" when it is employed
against the strivings of the toiling masses for ameliorating their
unbearable conditions of life. But the exploited masses were deprived of
the right to fight for land and bread. They should patiently wait, and
work for national liberation; starve and fight, until peaceful times would
return, that is to say, until the bourgeoisie, with their feudal allies, had
consolidated their power under the patronage of foreign Imperialism.
After they had carried through the struggle for the overthrow of
Imperialism, the toiling masses should live under the trusteeship of the
Kuo Min Tang, continue labouring and starving as ever, so that the
capitalists and landlords could grab still more than under unrestricted
imperialist domination.
Wang Chin-wei's second slogan—"Workers, peasants, traders, students
and soldiers, unite!"—was suitable to the situation. But the desired unity
could no longer be realised under the flag of the Kuo Min Tang, which
was dominated by feudal-bourgeois reaction, had made peace with
Militarism, and was striving for a compromise with foreign Imperialism.
The National Democratic Revolution was still far from complete
triumph. But the Kuo Min Tang could lead it farther only if it would
revolutionise itself. The petit-bourgeoisie could still play an important
role in the struggle for national freedom, but not as the handmaid of
feudal-bourgeois reaction, providing theoretical justification for its
bloody crusades against the revolutionary working class. The petit-
bourgeoisie could play that role only as an ally of the proletariat.
They were marching in that direction. All the local organisations of the
Kuo Min Tang were under Communist influence. Socially, they were
composed just as Wang Chin-wei desired. The Communists were
fighting not immediately for Socialism, nor for the establishment
The Counter-Revolution 433
of a proletarian dictatorship. They were fighting as the vanguard of the
National Democratic Revolution—for destroying feudal-patriarchal
reaction, for conquering democratic freedom, and for the overthrow of
the imperialistic yoke. The Communists knew that the oppressed middle-
classes, resisting feudal-bourgeois reaction, could not be organised in the
party of the proletariat. Therefore, they were making the effort to save
the Kuo Min Tang—by revolutionising it. This purpose of the
Communists corresponded with the will of the oppressed middle-class.
The antagonism between the membership and the leading clique of the
Kuo Min Tang had become so acute that the party could no longer serve
as a weapon in the struggle for national freedom, unless it liberated itself
from the domination of the big bourgeoisie and the dictation of the feudal
militarists.
The effort of the Communists to save the Kuo Min Tang was condemned
as conspiracy by Wang Chin-wei and his like. The left nationalist leaders
betrayed the oppressed middle-classes, when the Communists were
defending their interests. The Communists proposed to develop the
revolution with Wang Chin-wei's Slogan—Workers, peasants, traders,
students and soldiers, unite!" They proposed that the leadership of the
Kuo Ming Tang should be taken over by a revolutionary democratic Bloc
that the Nationalist Government should be purged of the counter-
revolutionary elements, and create a military force of its own. To
proceed in this line would have meant the replacement of Chiang Kai-
shek by Wang Chin-wei as the real leader of the Kuo Min Tang. The
tactics recommended by the Communists was the logical consequence of
the conflict inside the Kuo Min Tang.
But the fate of the Kuo Min Tang was sealed by the debacle of the hero
of petit-bourgeois radicalism, the seagreen incorruptible of the Chinese
bourgeois revolution, the true torch-bearer of Sun Yat-senism. It was no
more to be saved. It had come to be an active , organ of counter-
revolution, not because it had betrayed the principles of Sun Yat-sen as
Wang Chin-wei and other leftists complained later, when they were
driven out of power by the coalition of the big bourgeoisie and
Militarism. Every bloody act of the Kuo Min Tang and its Nationalist
Government could be justified by the principles of Sun Yat-sen, and was
so justified. The left leaders of Wuhan marched to the Counter-
revolutionary camp of Nanking, holding high the banner of Sun Yat-
senism. The territories under the Wuhan Government also became a
scene of shameful
434 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
oppression, just as the spheres of influence of its rivals and enemies. Just
when the militarists of Wuhan were vying with Chiang Kai-shek at
Shanghai, Li Chai-sun at Canton and even Chang Tso-lin, in the butchery
of workers and peasants, just then petit-bourgeois nationalist
theoreticians like Wang Chin-wei and Kuo Min-yu preached the dogma
of the Master, that in the holy land of ancient wisdom, there should be no
class struggle.
The climax was reached towards the end of June 1927. The Wuhan
Government received a telegram from Feng Yu-hsiang who suggested
that some of its members should be sent abroad for the sake of health,
that the Russian advisers should be relieved of their duties, and that the
Communists should be expelled from the Kuo Min Tang. There followed
an ultimatum from Chiang Kai-shek. That was the signal for some
Wuhan militarists to act. Events followed as if previously planned. The
Workers' Militia was disarmed; trade-unions were closed;
demonstrations were forbidden on the threat of shooting; Communists
were arrested en masse. The decisive blow had been so well prepared for
weeks that there was very little resistance. In the cities, the mass
movement had been demoralised and disorganised by restrictions placed
upon its activities on all possible pretexts. The peasant uprising in Hunan
was suppressed, in the beginning with its sanction and then by the
Nationalist Government itself. The local organisations of the Kuo Min
Tang were taken aback by the somersault of the leader in whom they had
so firmly believed.
The small detachment of the Nationalist Army, which perhaps could put
up a resistance against the counter-revolutionary offensive, had been
nearly annihilated in the premature advance upon Peking; it had cleared
the way for Feng Yu-hsiang and Chiang Kai-shek to unite their forces.
The rest of the Iron Army was so exhausted that it wanted to go back
home—to Kwhagtung. It had very little fighting power left. Thus, the
decisive blow of counter-revolution met with practically no resistance.
But the militarists did not trust the superficial calm. They would have no
peace until the hated Communists were completely crushed. And they
applied themselves to the task with despatch and determination.
The ground was prepared for the happy re-union of the rival nationalist
cliques. Representatives of both the sides met in a conference which was
the scene of a long embittered struggle of
The Counter-Revolution 435
conflicting personal ambitions and group interests. Out of that
conference rose the united National Government of Nanking with the
mission of consolidating counter-revolution. But the revolution was not
yet completely defeated. Many bloody battles had still to be fought
before the counter-revolution could secure to some extent its position of
power. The history of China throughout the year 1927 was the history of
mass murder unparallelled in its ferocity and in the number of its victims.
In comparison to it, even the terrible massacre after the defeat of the
Taiping Uprising sinks into insignificance. In modern history, perhaps
there is only one parallel—the massacre of Vendee in 1793. Owing to the
extraordinary backwardness of the means of communication in China, it
is impossible to estimate even approximately the number of those who
fell victims to the blind rage running wild throughout the year 1927,
beginning from March until the early months of the next year. However,
it is reported that more than twently-five thousand Communists were
killed. And in view of the fact that three million workers and nine million
peasants were organised in the struggle under Communist leadership, it
would not be an exaggeration to assume that no less than a quarter of a
million non-Communists also met the same fate. The brutality of that
butchery defies all description. Out of that orgy of terror rose the
Nationalist Government of Nanking which swore loyalty to the memory
and principles of Sun Yat-sen, and wanted to unite the country under the
authority of the bourgeoisie. We shall see how far it was successful.
Notes
1. Report of the peasant unions of Kwangtung to the Second Delegates' Conference of the
Kuo Min Tang, Canton, February, 1926.
2. Although outside of Manchuria and some of the Northern Provinces, large capitalist
farms are seldom to be found in China, yet concentration of landed property takes place
through the operation of the usurers' capital. Indebtedness compels the peasantry to sell
the land. But owing to the backwardness of large-scale modern industry, only a small part
of the peasants thus expropriated can find employment in the cities as wage-slaves.
Consequently, they infest the country-side as soldiers (regular or irregular), bandits or the
rural riff-raff. Every Chinese village has its riff-raff or the rural lumpen-proletariat. They
are utilised by the ruling classes as the weapon for terrorising the peasantry.
3. Report of the peasant unions to the Kuo Min Tang Conference, February, 1926.
4. Ibid.
436 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
5. Retranslated from German.
6. See Chapter XXI.
7. On April 6, 1927, the troops of Cheng Tso-lin raided the Soviet Embassy in Peking,
the offices of the Russian East-Asiatic Bank and of the Chinese Eastern Railway. All
those buildings were in the "Embassy Quarters" which, according to the stipulations of
old treaties, was not Chinese soil. Therefore, the raid must have been sanctioned by the
foreign Diplomatic Corps. The fact that the Commander of the raiding troops was armed
with a document signed by the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, proves that Chang Tso-
lin's act of violence was fully approved by international Imperialism. More than twenty
Chinese employees of the raided offices were arrested as Communists, and most of them
were directly executed. Among the victims was Professor Li Ta-chao, a founder of the
Communist Party and one of the intellectual leaders of modern China. He was strangled
to death.
8. Chamberlain's speech in the British Parliament on May 7, 1927. (Retranslated from
German).
9. The proof that the Powers acted with this motive is delivered by observers who cannot
be suspected of anti-imperialist tendency : "The Nanking episode had another, very
unexpected result. Instead of being discredited with the Powers, Chiang Kai-shek was
hardly involved in the affairs; that was thanks to his quick and energetic action against
the Communists. All demands for compensation from the foreign Powers were, on the
contrary, made from the Government at Hankow, and some of these demands it could not
possibly fulfill even if it wanted, because it had no power over Chiang or his officers and
his troops." (H.O. Chapman, "The Chinese Revolution, 1926-27", Retranslated from
German).
10. The Peeples Tribune, Hankow, April 23rd, 1927.
11. A weak attempt was made to disarm a regiment of the Eighth Army stationed at
Hanyang. But that was not done on the order of the Nationalist Government. The garrison
commander, himself known to be a
counter-revolutionary, gave the order most probably to hide the real game with that
gesture.
12. That was provided for in the resolution on the agrarian question adopted by the Fifth
Congress of the Communist Party, held in the beginning of May 1927. In subsequent
resolutions of the Central Committee, special emphasis was laid on this limitation of the
programme of land confiscation.
13. "On'this way back to China, he (Wang Chin-wei) had passed through Moscow. There
he was promised full support of the Soviet Government as well as of the Communist
International......! managed to send a radio
message to Moscow demanding the reassurance. On the other hand, to him I proposed a
concrete plan of action which should be undertaken to re-establish his effective
leadership of the Wuhan Government. He agreed with the plan, provided that the
necessary help would be forthcoming.
"The substance of the plan was : Local conference for setting up the platform of National
Revolution; an emergency Party Congress of delegates elected at the local conferences;
endorsement by the emergency
The Counter-Revolution 437
Congress of the platform of National Revolution; re-election of the party leadership
and exclusion from the new leadership of all who did not unconditionally agree to
stand on the platform of National Revolution. The main planks in the platform of
National Revolution were : Confiscation of landed property over a fixed minimum
limit; to empower the peasants' unions to carry out the confiscation and to distribute
the confiscated land to the actual cultivators; freedom of the peasantry from all
charges and levies except a unitary land tax ; abolition of the Llkin (internal
customs); disarming of the military forces of the rural reaction: formation of village
militia out of the members of the peasants' unions ; investing of peasants unions with
the functions of village self-government; nationalisation of mines and railways ;
eight hours day and minimum wages for the industrial workers ; establishment of
Workers' Councils in factories, etc. ; formation of a Workers' Militia ; creation of a
revolutionary army directly under the Nationalist Government : struggle against the
traitors of Nanking : and vigorous prosecution of the anti-imperialist fight." (M.N.
Roy, "My Experience in China", pp. 70-72).
A few days later, a telegram came from Moscow with the desired reassurance.
Among other things, it suggested the following : ''Confiscate the land ; destroy the
present unreliable generals, arm twenty thousand Communists, and select fifty
thousand worker and peasant elements to create a new army ; put new worker and
peasant elements in the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Ming Tang to take
the place of the old members; and organise a revolutionary Court with a well known
member of the Kuo Ming Tang as its Chairman to try the reactionary officer."
(Stalin, "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question").
"It was almost too late when the urgently needed reassurance came. Meanwhile,
believing that the Communists had betrayed him, Wang Chin-wei had entered into
negotiations with the light wing which was clamouring for the blood of the
Communists to propitiate Chiang Kai-shek...... I
thought at that juncture, a final effort must be made to regain the confidence of
Wang Chin-wei. I communicated to him the message from Moscow......It was a
repetition of the promise made to him personally in
Moscow...... Besides, the plan was already known to him. He had
expressed his agreement with it. He was willing to stand by his agreement if I could
produce definite proof that the necessary help would be forthcoming......It is reported
that he showed the telegram to his associates
who were already in communication with Nanking...... The counterrevolution was in
the open offensive in Wuhan itself many days before the arrival of the telegram.
Associates of Wang Chin-wei, known reactionaries like Sun Fo, Eugen Chen, Tan
Yan-kei, trusted by Borodin and the leaders of the C.P. as left-wingers, had come to
a secret understanding with Chiang Kai-shek and were only waiting to take Wang
Cbin-wei along into the camp of counter-revolution". (M.N. Roy, "My Experience in
China", pp. 72-73).
14. This and the following quotations are taken from a series of articles written by
Wang Chin-wei in the official organ of the Kuo Min Tang in the spring and early
summer of 1927:
 CHAPTER XX
THE COMMUNIST PARTY
The collapse of the Wuhan Government, the destruction of the Kuo Min
Tang by the petit-bourgeois left-wing leaders going over to camp of
feudal-bourgeois reaction, marked the close of a stage in the
development of the Chinese Revolution. There followed a period of
transition. In the historical sense, the revolution still remained bourgeois-
democratic. The historic tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution
were not yet accomplished in China. The pre-capitalist relations of
property in land were not yet abolished. The patriarchal family was not
yet replaced by the individual as the basic unit of society. There was no
democratic government as yet. The centralisation of the country under
one modern democratic State was a task which still remained to be
accomplished. Militarism was not yet destroyed; only, one group of
militarists replaced another. Lastly, imperialist domination was not yet
overthrown. China still continued under conditions which rendered
normal economic development impossible. The nation was not yet free.
The legal and political pre-conditions for the unhampered development
even of productive (as against parasitic trading) capitalism were still to
be created. The nationalist bourgeoisie, in alliance with feudal landlords
and the new militarists, would stop the revolution at that stage.
But the bourgeois democratic revolution is historically necessary not
only for the bourgeoisie. Although, immediately and in the first place, it
benefits the bourgeoisie, a successful bourgeois democratic revolution
raises the entire society on a higher level of development. It creates
conditions in which a struggle for the higher forms of freedom can be
undertaken. Therefore, the exploited masses carry the bourgeois
revolution farther even when the bourgeoisie turn against it. Not only in
China was it so. The Great French Revolution
The Communist Party 439
itself could succeed only after overcoming the resistance of the big
bourgeoisie. It destroyed the ancient regime and created a new order only
after it had outgrown the leadership of the Girondists. The toiling masses
were the driving force of Jacobinism. It was more so in China, because
there the bourgeoisie, for historical reasons, could not go even nearly so
far as the European bourgeoisie in the period of the classical bourgeois
revolution. In France, for example, the petit-bourgeois leaders also
hesitated; they were driven forward under the pressure of the masses. In
China, they turned against the revolution when the masses wanted to go
ahead against their will. The working class, until then the driving force of
the revolution, now became its leader. The change in the leadership
influenced the social character of the revolution. The bourgeois
revolution ordinarily establishes the capitalist order because it is led by a
class which owns the means of capitalist production. If it is carried
through under the leadership of a class which is opposed to capitalist
exploitation as well as to Feudalism, then, the bourgeois revolution
cannot stop at the establishment of bourgeois democracy. In so far as it
abolishes the pre-capitalist social relation, it still retains objectively the
character of a bourgeois revolution. But its consequences go farther than
Capitalism. They lead directly towards the construction of Socialism
through a period of transitional economic development. In China, the
revolution assumed certain proletarian-socialist features already before
the completion of its bourgeois-democratic tasks.
In order to play the role allotted to it by history, nearly, to carry through
the democratic revolution, betrayed by the bourgeoisie, the working class
needed an organ of struggle of its own. That was the Communist Party.
When, in the first month of 1927, the National Revolution reached its
climax, there were about 2,500,000 workers organised in trade-unions;
the membership of the peasant unions was nearly three times as much.
That powerful army of the organised masses was led by the Communist
Party. The growth of the party itself had been phenomenal. Founded in
1920, the party remained a small under-ground group until it made an
alliance with the Kuo Min lang in 1924. The great mass movement of
1925 opened before it an immense field of activity. It became the leader
of that movement. Since then, it grew rapidly in membership as well as
political influence. The astonishing rapidity of its growth is evidenced by
the following facts: The membership of the party increased twenty times
440 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
between 1925 to 1927. At the end of 1924 the party had 953 members.
The Fifty Party Congress held in May 1927 at Wuhan represented more
than 50,000 members. In addition, the Communist Youth League had
35,000 members. The Communists led not only the powerful army of
organised workers and peasants, counted in millions; they were also the
most active element inside the Kuo Min Tang. Practically all the local
organisations of the Kuo Min Tang were under Communist leadership.
The amazing growth in number and political influence showed that the
Communist Party was deeply rooted in the conditions of the country. It
had come into existence because the situation demanded it.
The entry of the Communists into the Kuo Min Tang furthered the
growth of both to a large extent. It was a powerful incentive for the
development of the revolution. With that step, the Communists came out
of their illegal existence; they found contact with the political life of the
country; and the masses were brought under the banner of the Kuo M in
Tang mainly through the activity of the Communists.
In the beginning, the Communists were opposed to entering the Kuo Min
Tang. Under the leadership of Chen Tu-hsiu, it declared that the Kuo
Min Tang was the party of the bourgeoisie, in which there was no place
for the exploited masses. In the discussion on this question, the role of
the Communist Party, under the given conditions, was cleared defined. It
had to be the vanguard of the struggle for national liberation. That task
could be accomplished only when the Communists stood in close contact
with all the forces of National Revolution. But these could not be all
organised in the Communist Party. The Kuo Min Tang was the common
platform for all. Therefore, the entry of the Communists into the Kuo
Min Tang was a necessary step. As long as the bourgeoisie were engaged
in the struggle against foreign Imperialism, they must be supported with
all means, because it was often evident that, left to themselves, they
would not go very far. Only under the pressure of the masses could the
nationalist bourgeoisie be driven to a struggle against Imperialism. For
this purpose, it was necessary that the masses must enter the Kuo Min
Tang. Should the masses do so, then the Communists as their leaders
could not remain outside the Kuo Min Tang. They must be, there where
the masses were. If the Communists called upon the masses to join the
Kuo Min Tang, but themselves
The Communist Party 441
remained out, then the masses would be exposed to the influence of the
bourgeoisie. As the struggle against foreign domination was the burning
issue of the day, the masses would certainly flock under the banner of the
Kuo Min Tang as soon as it adopted a democratic programme of national
liberation. The Communists would be isolated from the masses if they
stayed away from the Kuo Min Tang.
The ultimate object of the Communist Party in any country is the
realisation of Socialism. This object is attained upon the process of social
evolution having passed through the various preparatory stages. For
many reasons, the pre-conditions for Socialism were not yet created in
China. Imperialist domination was the most important immediate reason.
Therefore, the overthrow of Imperialism was the first condition for the
realisation of the ultimate goal of the Communist Party. That being the
case, the Communist Party could endorsed the programme of the Kuo
Min Tang without in least deviating from the path to its own ultimate
goal. The realisation of the programme of the Kuo Min Tang, indeed,
would be a step forward towards the ultimate goal of the Communist
Party.
The Communist Party entered the Kuo Min Tang on two conditions: that
it was entitled to maintain its own independent organisation; and that it
had the freedom to propagate its own views and, when necessary,
criticise the Kuo Min Tang.
It endorsed the programme of the Kuo Min Tang and pledged itself to
work for its realisation, without the latter undertaking any corresponding
responsibility. The programme adopted by the Kuo Min Tang, when the
Communists entered it, was the programme of the National Democratic
Revolution; at the moment, it could be the minimum programme of the
Communist Party. But it was not yet the radical programme of
revolutionary democracy. It was only a tendency in that direction, and
accommodated the feudal-patriarchal social outlook which was
incompatible with the fundamental principles of the bourgeois
democratic revolution. Nevertheless, the declaration to conduct the
struggle against Imperialism and to support the minimum demands of the
toiling masses was regarded by the Communists as an acceptable point of
departure. Working in the ranks of the Kuo Min Tang, the Communists
could try to convert this party into a national-revolutionary party with a
clear democratic programme.
The Old Guard of the Kuo Min Tang was composed of the
442 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
literati of the classical Confucian School, higher officials, landlords and
representatives of the trading bourgeoisie (Compradores), closely
associated with Imperialism. They opposed the inclusion of the
Communists in the Kuo Min Tang and, failing to prevent it, left the
party. So the first result of the Communists' entering the Kuo Min Tang
was that the latter was driven to the left. The process of class
differentiation inside its ranks was expedited, since the masses, mobili-
sed under its banner in course of the struggle against Imperialism,
became more and more class conscious.
After three years' co-operation, the Kuo Min Tang not only expelled the
Communists, but attacked them with unparalled brutality, on the pretext
that they had conspired for the overthrow of the National Government.
Nothing was farther from the truth. In the preceding chapter, it has been
described why the Kuo Min Tang turned against the Communists. Now it
will be shown that the Communist Party and the revolution could suffer
such a defeat because the Communists, since their entry into the Kuo
Min Tang, made a whole series of political and organisational mistakes
which seriously weakened their position. The sudden callapse of the
Chinese Revolution, after a period of stormy upheaval, confronted the
world with a puzzle. The Communist Party of China had grown in the
midst of a powerful revolutionary struggle; it was composed of the best
revolutionaries of the country, representatives of the millions of
organised workers and peasants. It was very difficult to understand how
that party could all of a sudden suffer such a catastrophic defeat.
Imperialist intervention, the treachery of the bourgeoisie, the barbarism
of feudal-militarist reaction, the betrayal of the petit-bourgeois leaders—
all these contributed to the defeat. But yet another factor was responsible
for it. That was inexperience on the part of the young Communist Party
which vacillated between opportunist timidity and romantic heroism. It
was to be expected that the leadership of the National Democratic
Revolution would, in course of time, pass on to the working class. A
survey of the situation in the light of history should have made the
character and perspective of the Chinese Revolution sufficiently clear.
The Communist Party as the leader of the working class had to keep that
perspective in view, and prepare itself accordingly. The entry into the
Kuo Min Tang was a step in the right direction. The original negative
attitude of the Communist leaders was an ultra-leftist stupidity. Had not
that mis-
The Communist Party 443
take been corrected under the guidance of the Communist International,
then, the Communist Party of China would have remained a small sect,
isolated from the political life of the country. After the entry into the Kuo
Min Tang, the Communist leaders swung to the other extreme. They
forgot the object of the policy. That was opportunism. Of course, the
Communist Party maintained its own organisation which developed
numerically by leaps and bounds. Its political influence also spread like
wild-fire because the Communists were the most active factor of the
movement, and in each battle placed themselves in the foremost ranks,
and surpassed all others in heroism and sacrifices. But in field of
organisation, which is of the greatest importance in the midst of a fight,
the Communists failed to prepare themselves for the crisis which was
sure to come. In the critical days of the spring of 1927, when the Kuo
Min Tang betrayed the revolution step by step, the Communist leaders
made fateful errors for the anxiety to maintain the united front. The end
was sacrificed for the means. Then again, when they were driven to the
wall, the Communists swung back to other extreme. They went over to
the offensive when defence for saving a defeated army would be the right
tactics.
If the years 1924 and 1925 everything went well. The first was the year
of preparation. The next was a year of powerful development of mass
movement. Both the parties, the Kuo Min Tang and the Communists,
worked together: there was a certain measure of harmony. Both were in
the period of growth. They supplemented each other. Towards the end of
1925, the relation between the two began to experience difficulties. The
social composition of the movement, developing under the banner of the
Kuo Min Tang, and the logic of revolutionary development, gave the
Communists a position which did not please the bourgeois leaders of the
Kuo Min Tang. The Communists were the recognised leaders of the
masses, formally organised under the banner of the Kuo Min Tang. The
striving of the bourgeoisie to drive the Communists out of their positions
of vantage, to free the nationalist movement from the domination of the
revolutionary working class, reached its climax in the coup d'etat of
March 20, 1926. It made a breach in the national united front. In the
period of reaction, from the coup d'etat of March 20, up to the beginning
of the North Expedition, the Communists were so very anxious for the
maintenance of the united front, already broken by
444 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the bourgeoisie, that they neglected their main task. It was to reinforce
their position. The secret of the strength of the Communists was not the
tolerance of the bourgeoisie, but the confidence of the masses. They
could gain still more confidence of the masses if they conducted further,
uncompromisingly, the struggle for defending the immediate interests of
the masses, if they fought relentlessly the class struggle already declared
by the bourgeoisie.
The national united front was still a necessity. The revolutionary role of
the Kuo M in Tang was not yet played out completely. But there were
more than two parties in the game. Between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat stood the middle-classes which, in a backward country like
China, are of great importance, numerically as well as politically. In the
first place, there was the peasantry. Whoever had the support of the
peasantry could dominate the political situation in China. The
bourgeoisie attacked the Communists precisely because they commanded
the confidence of the peasantry. The Communist counter-offensive,
therefore, should have been to champion the demands of the peasantry
still more energetically. Then, there was the numerous class of urban
petit-bourgeoisie which was also politically oppressed and economically
exploited, and, therefore, could go still far in the fight for democratic
freedom. When the bourgeoisie were threatening to break the united
front, evidently to prevent the working class from occupying a strong
position, the united front could not, and should not, be saved by giving in
to their counter-revolutionary demands. In that critical moment, the
correct tactics would be to unite the revolutionary oppressed classes
more firmly together with the object of isolating the big bourgeoisie. The
urban petit-bourgeois masses could be drawn closer to the working class
by explaining it to them that the attack upon the Communists was sure to
weaken the National Revolution.
But the Communists failed to differentiate the big bourgeoisie from the
very numerous oppressed middle-classes. Instead of adopting an
aggressive policy with the object of detaching the oppressed middle-
classes from the big bourgeoisie, the Communists made great
concessions to this counter-revolutionary class. The economic demands
of the peasantry were practically given up, on the ground that the
development of class struggle in the countryside would alienate the
sympathy of the landowning classes for the Kuo Min Tang. On entering
the Kuo Min Tang, the Communists bad reserved
The Communist Party 445
the right of criticism; that right also was waived, so that the feudal-
bourgeois leaders, conspiring against the revolution, might not be
irritated. By speaking out fearlessly that the anti-Communist activities of
the feudal-bourgeois leaders amounted to a betrayal of the National
Democratic Revolution, the middle classes could be brought closer to the
proletariat. In brief, over-estimation of the importance of the big
bourgeoisie necessarily led to an under-estimation of the necessity of
retaining the middle-classes in the national united form; the result of that
mistake was that, in the critical moment, the middle-classes followed the
bourgeoisie to the camp of counter-revolution—in Shanghai in March
1927, and later in Wuhan. The proletariat was isolated.
Other mistakes were made during the North Expedition. The
Communists did not realise that the feudal-bourgeois wing of the Kuo
Min Tang had undertaken the military campaign with the object of
strengthening its own position, in order to prepare for the decisive
struggle against the rising forces of an urgently required social revo-
lution. It was quite correct for the Communists to support the North
Expedition and to mobilise the masses for guaranteeing its success:
because that was a means for spreading the revolution. But it should have
been foreseen that, upon the success of the military campaign, the
revolution would find itself in a crisis. The class struggle was bound to
be sharpened. The feudal-bourgeois elements would not hesitate to
destroy the united front and turn against the masses. Preparations should
have been made for the decisive revolutionary action necessary in that
inevitable crisis.1
During the military compaign, large masses of people were set in
movement. Hundreds of thousands of workers and millions of peasants
were organised. The more advanced section of the working class and
revolutionary intellectuals swelled the ranks of the Communist Party
which became the political organ of the masses. In the remotest villages
of Hunan, Kiangsi and Hupeh, pictures of Karl Marx and Lenin shared
the place of honour with that of Sun Yat-sen. The revolutionary wave
rose to an alarming height. But the policy of the Communist leaders was
"to broaden the revolution, not to deepen it." They maintained that, if the
latter course were taken, the national united front would break.
The Propaganda Department of the Nationalist Army was largely
manned by Communists. They refrained from carrying on
446 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
revolutionary agitation among the soldiers. The propaganda was
conducted exclusively on orthodox Kuo Min Tang lines: Denouncement
of Imperialism as the source of all the evils in China, and condemnation
of the militarists as agents of foreign Imperialism. The propaganda did
not appeal to the ignorant masses, whose revolt was, indeed, not directly
against Imperialism; they hardly knew what that strange animal exactly
was. The masses rebelled in the first place against their mediaeval
oppressors, against landlords, usurers, the local officials and the rest of
the host of parasites. They would not care to fight for driving the old
militarists away so that the nationalist Generals might take their place.
They helped the nationalists to drive the militarists away, because they
believed that the appearance of the nationalist army heralded the end of
all the evils—high taxes, illegal exactions, forced labour, oppression by
the landlords and expropriation by the usurers. Indeed, the backward
masses can hardly conceive of any national interest unless it is identified
with their immediate social and economic well-being.
The failure of the Communists to arm the masses and to organise them
militarily was a fatal mistake which contributed very largely to their
defeat. The Nationalist Army enlarged itself in course of the North
Expedition not by the influx of revolutionary workers and peasants;
mercenary troops from the enemy's camp came over. The armies
commanded by reactionary feudal Generals grew in number during the
campaign, but the only division with a Communist command was hardly
a man stronger when it arrived at Woochang on the Yangtse. There were
various ways for arming the masses if the Communists wanted to do that.
For the North Expedition, the Nationalist Army received large supplies
of arms and ammunitions from the U.S.S.R. A part of that supply could
be reserved for arming the masses. A considerable amount of arms could
be taken away from the soldiers of the defeated armies. A good harvest
could be derived by disarming the irregular armies maintained by the
rural ruling class. Then, there are many other ways of getting arms,
known to those who are determined to do so. When, in the next year, the
Communists went over to armed uprising, the situation was much more
unfavourable. Nevertheless, guerilla hands could be supplied with arms.
Finally, revolutionary agitation among the soldiers of the Nationalist
Army, with slogans representing the immediate demands of the peasantry
from which all the soldiers were recruited, would
The Communist Party 447
have completely changed the character of the army. Such an agitation
would have eventually succeeded in detaching the soldiers, with a
considerable section of the lower officers, from the reactionary
commanders. In this way, the reactionary feudal-bourgeois bloc could
have been possibly disarmed, seriously weakened at any rate, before it
turned against the revolution.
In consequence of the North Expedition, the Kuo Min Tang itself was
thrown into a severe internal crisis. The process of class differentiation in
its ranks became sharp. A split of the Kuo Min Tang along the line of
class differentiation would have met the requirements of the situation.
Such a split would have reinforced the revolution. It would not have
destroyed the united front. On the contrary, freed from the elements of
discord, the ranks of the revolution would have been consolidated. The
expulsion of feudal-bourgeois elements would have ended to a large
extent the antagonisms and conflicts inside the nationalist ranks. In
consequence, these would have become a united fighting coalition of the
oppressed and exploited masses.
The class contradictions among the different component groups of the
Kuo Min Tang were confused by personal jealousies and group interests.
The Chinese bourgeoisie are not a homogeneous class. Compradores,
bankers, industrialists and traders have conflicting interests. The situation
was further confused by the presence of feudal militarists who controlled
the decisive organ of power. Under these conditions, the feudal-
bourgeois wing of the Kuo Min Tang adopted no uniform tactics when it
turned against the revolution. Some were for open offensive on the
pretext of combating the "Communist Menace". Others preferred to
remain inside the revolutionary ranks with the object of sabotaging their
actions. Thus, the revolution was threatened from two sides: Frontal
attack of feudal-bourgeois reaction^ and intrigues of the traitors inside its
own ranks. In order to guarantee the future of the revolution, the traitors
must be exposed and expelled. That was an essential condition for a
decisive struggle against the enemy who had already thrown down the
mask. In other words, to split the Kuo Min Tang along the line of the
contradiction between the interests of the masses of its members and
those of the feudal-bourgeois leading clique, was the task of the moment.
That was the task of the Communist Party. A mechanical conception of
united front politics, wrong estimation of the roles of the different
classes,
448 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
prevented the Communist Party from rising up to its task.
It acted as the heroic vanguard of the revolution when, to help the
advance of the Nationalist Army, the Communist Party led the Shanghai
proletariat in the uprising. But at the same time, it should have
anticipated what the leaders of the Nationalist Army, and the class
represented by them, were aiming at. They had already shown their hand.
Yet, owing to their false idea about united front, the Communists failed
to expose the designs of Chiang Kai-shek. They did not explain it to the
working class and the petit-bourgeois masses that he wanted to occupy
Shanghai with the object of using it as the base of future counter-
revolutionary operations. On the contrary, the Communists organised a
great mass demonstration to "welcome the leader of the victorious
Nationalist Army", even when he was already preparing for the massacre
of the working class. The fear of a break with the bourgeoisie, conspiring
openly against the revolution, hindered the Communists to win over the
democratic middle-classes. The proletariat was isolated just when the
blow fell, because the democratic masses did not understand that the
militarist attack on the working class was a death-blow to the National
Revolution.
Shanghai was an extraordinarily difficult and dangerous place for the
Communists. As the greatest industrial centre of the country, it was
naturally the stronghold of the Communist Party. But the enemy was also
very strong there. It is not altogether excluded that the counter revolution
would have triumphed in Shanghai even if the Communists had adopted
a correct tactical line. But even in that case, the revolutionary vanguard
of the proletariat could possibly have been saved from destruction.
Forces could have been spared until the situation was favourable.
The situation was altogether different in Wuhan where the Communists
occupied a very advantageous position. There, circumstances from the
very beginning were favourable for the adoption of offensive tactics with
the object of transforming the Kuo Min Tang into a coalition of the
oppressed and exploited classes, and the Nationalist Government into an
organ of revolutionary democracy. Instead of working with that
perspective, the Communists regarded the entire Wuhan Group as the left
wing of the Kuo Min Tang. They overlooked the fact that, in social
composition, that group differed very little from the rival group. The
Wuhan Group was supported by the revolutionary democratic masses;
but it was also dominated by
The Communist Party 449
a clique of feudal-bourgeois politicians. In Wuhan, nevertheless, the
situation was very favourable for the development of the revolution
along the line of class antagonism between the feudal-bourgeois leaders
and the democratic participants of the nationalist movement. But the
false idea of united front still prevailed. The Communist leaders
maintained that the struggle against the right wing could serve as the
common platform. That was right. But one should have also realised that
the agents of the right wing in the inner circles of Wuhan were still more
dangerous than Chiang Kai-shek. The Communist leaders did not realise
that. They allowed class antagonisms to be confused by the squabble
between the two rival groups of feudal-bourgeois reactionaries. That
fateful mistake on the part of the Communists enabled the latter to attack
the revolution from both sides and ultimately transform the entire Kuo
Min Tang into an instrument of counter-revolution. Strictly speaking, the
reactionaries first destroyed the Kuo Min Tang and then began the
murderous attack upon the National Democratic Revolution under the
flag of the Kuo Min Tang. Since its reorganisation, the Kuo Min Tang
had been the instrument for unifying the masses. Side by side with the
large mass of the oppressed middle-classes (petit-bourgeois intellectuals,
students, employees, artisans, small traders, etc.), the Kuo Min Tang
embraced millions of organised workers and peasants. Its destruction by
the conspiracy and treachery of its feudal-bourgeois leaders was a
staggering blow for the revolution. The Communists could not hinder the
tragic destruction of that powerful force of democratic revolution even
when the conditions were so very favourable for its consolidation.
The characteristic feature of the Wuhan period was the dominating
position of the working class. Yet, the Communist Party played second
fiddle to the Kuo Min Tang. The predominating influence of the toiling
masses compelled the Kuo Min Tang to invite the Communists to take
part in the Government. The acceptance of that invitation by the
Communists was the subject of a heated discussion. It was, however, a
correct policy for the Communists to enter the Wuhan Government. With
the control of the Ministry of Agriculture (which included the Ministry
of Home Affairs—police, local self-government, etc.), and of the Labour
Ministry, the Communists could bring the pressure of the organised
masses to bear upon the Nationalist Government ever more effectively.
Through the former
450 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the organisation of village self-government could be promoted. That
possibility alone gave the Communists considerable political power.
The Wuhan Government was not a coalition government in the usual sense-
It was a new creation of the revolution. There was no existing State
apparatus; it was still to be created. On the contrary, there was a powerful
mass movement which could influence the policy of the Government In such
a situation, the participation of the Communists, that is, of the leaders of the
revolutionary working class in a newly created Government meant opening
up of new channels for exerting mass influence. But the Communists made
little use of the great possibilities According to the general policy of the
party of unconditionally obeying the orders of the Kuo Min Tang, the
Communist Ministers held that they should do nothing except in agreement
with all the other members of the Government.
On assuming office, the Communist Minister of Agriculture, Tan Ping-san,
outlined a programme of Agrarian Reform, which accorded more with the
principles of the Kuo Min Tang than those of the Communist Party. Two
weeks later, on June 15th, the leader of the party, Chen Tu-hsiu, endorsed
the attitude of Tan Ping-san in a telegram addressed to the Executive
Committee of the Communist International. "Tan Ping-san's inauguration
speech is ambiguous. It was delivered immediately after the revolt of Hsia
Tao-yin. The Kuo Min Tang had resolved to postpone the solution of the
agrarian question and to put down Hsia Tao-yin. As a member of the
Government, Tan Ping-san openly could not defend any other point of
view". A few days later, with the sanction of the political Bureau of the
Central Committee of his party, Tan Ping-san accepted the charge, given to
him by the Nationalist Government, to go to Hunan as the head of a
commission "to check the excesses of the peasant movement"; that is to say,
to combat the forces of the agrarian revolution.
Having regard for the entire history of the Communist Party of China, it
cannot be maintained that its leaders fell into this dangerous opportunism
only after participation in the Government. In office, the Communists simply
continued the policy—of towing the lines of the Kuo Min Tang -which they
had followed previously. The participation in the Government should have
only been the means for creating a solid revolutionary bloc of the democratic
masses with the object of isolating the feudal-bourgeois leaders of the
Wuhan Group, and then to drive them away. Unfortunately, the Communists
The Communist Party 451
were not equal to the task of the moment they failed to accomplish it either
inside or outside the Government. Preoccupied with a wrong idea of united
front, they insisted upon supporting the entire Wuhan Group, and thereby
failed to act according to the requirements of moment.
The attitude towards the so-called Second North Expedition, the advance of
the Wuhan Army towards Peking, was a typical expression of that policy.
The Communist Party was directed to mobilise the masses in support of the
plan made by the ruling clique of the Kuo Min Tang. The danger inherent in
the plan was so very great that not a few Communist leaders, in the
beginning, expressed misgivings. Nevertheless, the Central Executive of the
Communist Party endorsed the plan, because it was a definite decision of the
Kuo Min Tang. That was in the beginning of April. At that time, the Wuhan
Govern.nent could be forced to give up the dangerous plan, if the
Communists had opposed it on the ground that it would endanger the
territorial as well as the social basis of the revolution. The Wuhan
Government would not dare take such a serious step without being sure of
mass support; and the masses were under Communist leadership. But the
Communists themselves shared the opinion of the Kuo Min Tang leaders
about the development of the revolution. During the controversy over the
plan of sending a military expedition for occupying Peking, Chen Tu-hsiu
expounded the theory that the "broadening" of the revolution should precede
its "deepening"; that is to say, territorial expansion was the task of the
moment. The solution of the social problems of the revolution should be put
off until after the accomplishment of that task. This theory was only a
logical consequence of Sun Yat-sen's plan, which mechanically divided the
revolution into three stages: Unity, Trusteeship and Democracy. The theory
entertains the idea that the union of China under one modern State is
possible before the annihilation of the social forces of decomposition, that a
capitalist State could be established without accomplishing the fundamental
tasks of the bourgeois revolution. Victims of an opportunist conception of
class alliance, the Communists shirked the responsibility of combating the
reactionary ideology of petit-bourgeois nationalism.
The argument in favour of supporting the military advance towards the
North was that thereby the Nationalist Army would be still more enlarged. It
was further argued that the National Revolu-
452 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
tion must secure the alliance with the left militarists; that the union with the
forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan must be realised. There still
remained the remnants of the army of Wu Pei-fu scattered all over the
province of Hupeh. They must also be incorporated in the Nationalist Army.
The Russian Chief Adviser of the Nationalist Government, Borodin,
defended the plan, although he himself admitted that the immediate outcome
of the projected expedition would be the union of all the military elements
under the flag of the Nationalist Government. Such a union could be desired
only by those who were consciously conspiring against the revolution. For
the Communists, it should have been clear that mercenary troops,
commanded by professional militarists, who until the day before had been in
the enemy's camp, could not be won over, really to be transformed into a
revolutionary weapon.
In the spring of 1927, it was no longer necessary to discuss this question
theoretically. One should have already learnt from bitter experience. The
expedition from Kwangtung to the Yangtse had brought so many "left
militarists" into the camp of the Nationalist Government that the relation of
forces in its ranks was dangerously disturbed. The revolution itself was
seriously threatened by the newly acquired military allies who ostentatiously
swore allegiance to it. The influence of the counter-revolutionary feudal
militarists had reinforced the position of the bourgeoisie, who had been
nearly driven from the leadership of the nationalist movement by the
awakening of the masses. It was clear that the continuation of this process
would endanger the future of the revolution. Nevertheless, the Communists
supported the plan of military expansion.
The anxiety to avoid the social tasks of the revolution was intimately
connected with the desire for its territorial expansion. By supporting the plan
of military advance towards the North, the Communist leaders endorsed the
politics of the ruling clique of the Kuo Min Tang as regards the burning
question of Agrarian Revolution. They repeated the old argument: During
military operations against the enemy, it is not advisable to sharpen the class
struggle in the rear. The officers of the Nationalist Army were mostly
landlords; confiscation of land, therefore, could not be carried through
without provoking their displeasure. It was a veritable vicious circle. The
adhesion of "left" militarists bound the hands of the Kuo Min Tang. Should
the development of the revolution be made conditional
The Communist Party 453
upon the winning over of more such elements, then, the chains would
only be strengthened. If the process went a few steps farther, then, it was
all over with the revolution.2
Sun Yat-sen's idea of military expansion is inseparably connected with
his dictum that class struggle must be prevented. The peasants should not
take the land. They should wait patiently until a benevolent Government
found it possible to give it to them without taking it away from the
landlords. Having failed to criticise Sun Yat-sen's theories, the
Communists found their hands bound by his dogmas. In course of time,
they were placed in a very uncomfortable situation. They were
compelled to advocate postponement of class struggle in cities as well as
in villages, so that the rear of the army advancing northwards might not
be endangered. They were haunted by the nightmare of a break with the
Kuo Min Tang. They did not see that the feudal-bourgeois clique was
destroying the Kuo Min Tang and that this could be saved only by
overthrowing its counter-revolutionary leaders. In that critical moment,
the Communists could have reinforced their relation with the Kuo Min
Tang, that is to say, with the revolutionary democratic masses, only in
one way - by declaring war against the ruling clique. They failed to do so
and, consequently, strengthened the position of the enemies of the
revolution inside the Wuhan Group.
But class struggle could not be suspended. It had broken out furiously
throughout the country. The exploiting class was everywhere on the
offensive. The peasants began to confiscate land only when enraged
reaction threatened the very existence of their revolutionary
organisations.
Some of the leading figures of the Communist Party simply did not see
the chances for revolutionary action. They mostly came from the petit-
bourgeois intelligentsia and were closely connected with the Kuo Min
Tang politicians. They made serious mistakes. But only the leaders were
responsible for the mistakes. The ordinary members of the Communist
Party stood by the masses and acted according to their revolutionary will.
They were not disturbed by the phantom of a break with the Kuo Min
Tang. They were organically connected with the revolutionary masses.
They could not be excluded from the Kuo Min Tang so long as it really
existed. Thus mistakes on the part of the leaders, almost amounting to a
betrayal of the working class, could not remove the "Communist
Menace". But there was a great
454 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
confusion and demoralisation, which always happens whenever a powerful
mass movement is continually curbed by its own leaders. That afforded
counter-revolution the opportunity to strike. The first blow fell on the
Communists. A few facts will give some idea of the confusion which was
created by the series of mistakes committed by the Communist leaders.
The Nationalist Government did nothing against the counterrevolutionary
uprising at Changsha. The newly established Provincial Administration there
began the suppression of the peasant movement with the tacit support of the
Nationalist Government Almost all the Communist leaders believed the
stories about the "excesses" of the peasants and declared that the most
effective method of combating counter revolution would be to check them.
The Communist Minister of Agriculture, Tan Ping-san, was ready to go to
Hunan with that object.3 But on the spot things appeared differently. There
the Communists, together with the members of the Kuo Min Tang, prepared
for an armed attack upon the insurgents. More than twenty-thousand
peasants marched upon Changsha from all sides. Nearly at the gates of the
city, they were ordered to go back and dissolve their military formations.
The instruction came from the Communist headquarters at Wuhan.4 In the
mean time, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wuhan Army, Tang Shen-chi,
had declared that he was personally going to Changsha, in order to establish
order there. The counter-revolutionary insurgents there were his
subordinates. The Communist leaders allowed themselves to be deceived by
the unmistakably dishonest manoeuvre; they decided to call off the armed
uprising, since Tang Shen-chi had taken the matter in his own hand. A
sudden, unwarranted, retreat is extremely demoralising even for a regular
army it is more so for an improvised force. The mobilised peasants retreated
in a chaotic manner. The counter-revolutionary insurgents availed
themselves of the opportunity. They attacked the retreating peasants and
massacred them ruthlessly. That, naturally, created a deep demoralisation
throughout the entire peasant movement.
The massacre of the peasants caused a great commotion among the workers
in Wuhan. From all sides, retaliatory measures were demanded.6 It was
proposed in the Central Committee of the Communist Party that the workers
in the Hanyang Arsenal should be called upon to declare a strike to protest
against the massacre of
The Communist Party 455
peasants in Hunan, and that the strike in the arsenal should be extended to a
general strike if the demand for retaliatory action was not accepted by the
Nationalist Government. The demands were: Removal of the counter-
revolutionary administration at Changsha; and an appeal to the peasant
masses of the province to undertake this task if the Nationalist Government
could not dispose of sufficient troops necessary for the purpose. The far-
reaching implication of the proposed measures terrified the Communist
leaders. If the demands for retaliatory action were seriously pressed, that
would be a step for the overthrow of the Nationalist Government which had
proved itself to be a willing tool in the hands of the counter-revolutionary
militarists. The situation was such that only a bold step like that could lead
to the salvation of the revolution.
Tang Shen-chi ambition had been thwarted by the failure of the advance
towards Peking; he was on the point of taking his army back to Wuhan. If
the situation could be radically changed when the greater part of the counter-
revolutionary army was still far away, then, the revolution might be saved. A
general strike, occupation of the arsenal, arming of the workers,
establishment of a revolutionary democratic government, sanctioning the
expropriation of land by the peasants—those were the steps to be taken for
developing the revolution. Such a development would naturally have
repercussions on the Nationalist Army. Its movements could be hampered by
inciting the soldiers to mutiny against the officers. But the Communist
leaders would not travel that way. They were still afraid of the break with
the Kuo Min Tang. They still stuck to the argument that a strike in the
arsenal would be a stab in the back of the Nationalist Army and a rebellion
against the Government, and such a rebellion would make any relation with
the Kuo Min Tang untenable. After a heated discussion for days, the Central
Committee rejected the proposal.
The atmosphere was heavily laden. Suddenly, the Communist Party called a
demonstration for welcoming the nationalist leaders returning from the front.
That worked like a cold douche. Pessimism, defeatism, demoralisation, and
even disgust, spread far and wide. The situation was so ripe for the counter-
revolutionary offensive that no serious resistance of the masses need be
feared. In the last days of June, events moved fast at Wuhan. Workers were
completely disarmed; trade-unions were dissolved; meetings and
demonstrations were forbidden; and the entire city was in a state of siege.
On July 3,
456 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the Communist Party performed its last tragic act in an atmosphere of
triumphant counter-revolution. An extraordinary meeting of the Central
Committee adopted the so-called "programme of retreat", which practically
nullified all the resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the party held only two
months ago.6
But the counter-revolution was implacable. It thirsted for blood. So long as
the mass movement was not completely suppressed, the Communist Party
was not fully crushed, the situation was not safe. The Communists were
driven out of all positions; hundreds were arrested, many executed. Finally,
there was an end to the relation with the Kuo Min Tang, for the sake of
maintaining which the Communist leaders had committed mistake after
mistake, one more fatal than the other. The Communists were driven out of
the Kuo Min Tang.
To conduct the offensive against the revolution without any possible
resistance, the Iron Army was sent away from Wuhan with the order to
march down the Yangtse, otensibly to begin operations against Nanking. In
the beginning of August, it occupied Nancbang. At that moment, the
Communist Party decided to go over to the offensive. The open counter-
revolutionary action of the Kuo Min Tang leaders could no longer be
tolerated on any pretext. One detachment of the Iron Army under
Communist command raised the banner of revolt against the counter-
revolutionary Government of Wuhan. The insurgents occupied Nanchang
where a Revolutionary Committee was set up as the provisional government.
Simultaneously, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued the
declaration that, having broken away from the toiling masses, the Kuo Min
Tang had become an organ of counter-revolution. It was further declared
that opposition to the agrarian revolution meant betrayal of the struggle
against Feudalism, without the destruction of which it was impossible to
overthrow Imperialism. The Communist Party proclaimed its determination
to carry on the fight against Imperialism, Militarism and Feudalism, in close
cooperation with the masses of the Kuo Min Tang membership. It also
proclaimed that only through such a cooperation would it be possible to
prevent the betrayal of the revolution by the Generals and vacillating
politicians who were taking shelter behind the banner of Sun Yat-sen.
It was all too late. But even then, the Communists did not realise that the
banner of Sun Yat-sen was the banner of counter-
The Communist Party 457
revolution. Even if they were of that opinion, they did not consider it to
be tactically advisable to speak it out. That was a new mistake. The
illusion about Sun Yat-senism kept the democratic middle class under the
influence of the feudal-bourgeois wing oftheKuoMin Tang. That illusion
had to be dispelled. No revolutionary practice was possible within the
limitations of a reactionary ideology.
However, the offensive began much too late. The counterrevolution had
already occupied all important positions. The mass movement had been
demoralised by fierce terror. Any protest strike could be broken very
easily. The power of resistance of the working class had sunk very low.
They had been very heavily bled, even before the desperate struggle for
the defence of the revolution was taken up. In the middle of August, the
insurgents had to evacuate Nanchang. They marched southwards, in
order to recover Kwang-tung. They heroically fought their way through
the province of Kwangsi infested with counter-revolutionary troops. But
the fact that their number did not increase showed that the peasant
masses were reluctant to join them actively. They found strong sympathy
on the way; otherwise, they could not have possibly held their own
against overwhelming odds. But it was a passive sympathy. The peasants
were no longer ready for an armed uprising. A year's bloody suppression
had terrorised and demoralised them. The Communists fought with
admirable bravery, great spirit of sacrifice and revolutionary idealism.
But the political effect of those acts should not be overestimated.
In the middle of September, the revolutionary army penetrated the
eastern parts of the province of Kwangtung, which were the centres of a
strong peasant movement. They captured the important port of Swatow
where a Revolutionary Committee was set up. Its first act was to declare
war against the counter-revolutionary Governments of Wuhan and
Nanking: its programme was reconquest of the province of Kwangtung
and the organisation there of a base of the revolution. The Revolutionary
Committee declared in favour of the confiscation of land by the peasants.
Soon imperialist battleships appeared on the scene for "saving the life
and property of foreigner", but, in reality, to cut off any possible supply
of the urgently needed provisions for the revolutionary army. On the
land, troops were sent from Canton. Thus, threatened from two sides, the
revolutionary army aoandoned Swatow in the beginning of October. In
the eastern
458 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
neighbourhood of Canton, there was a peasant uprising: it was suppressed
with gruesome barbarity. More than a thousand rebellious peasants were
massacred.
In the beginning of December, the rear-guard offensive reached the climax.
On the 10th Canton became the scene of an uprising which led to the
establishment of a Workers' and Peasants' Government. The insurgents held
the city for three days. With the help of foreign Powers, the insurrection was
drowned in blood. Foreign battleships on the river served as cover for the
counter-revolutionary army. An entire part of the city was demolished by
bombardment with artillary operating from behind the foreign battleships.
Nobody knows how many were the casualties of the open fight: after the%
re-occupation of the city, more than two thousand people were immediately
executed by the counter-revolutionaries.
In November 1927, even after the revolutionary forces had been dislodged
from Swatow, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, then situated
at Shanghai, issued an incredible instruction to the Kwangtung provincial
organisation. The instruction ran: "The worker-peasant masses of
Kwangtung have only one way out, that is to utilise the opportunity of the
civil war. ... in order resolutely to expand the uprisings in the cities and
villages .... to agitate among the soldiers, to stage mutinies and revolts, and
in the time of war swiftly to link such uprisings into a general uprising for
the establishment of the rule of the Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers'
'Delegates' Councils (Soviets)."7 Acting on that instruction, on November
26, the Communists at Canton decided to have the insurrection on December
10. Apart from the fundamental mistake of the policy of an offensive on the
whole front immediately after a crushing defeat, the Canton uprising was
based on such palpably wrong calculations that its failure was
predetermined.
According to the report of the Communist Military Commander, Yeh Ting,
only 4,200 persons participated in the insurrection. The only military force,
on which the insurrection could count was the Cadet Regiment of 1,200
men, a good many of whom were Communists. As against this, again Yeh
Ting reports, the Government had more that 7,000 well armed men available
in the city itself. In addition, there were armed forces of about 50,000 men
either
The Communist Party 459
on the outskirts of the city or within easy striking distance. Generally, Yeh
Ting reports: "The masses took no part in the insurrection. All shops were
closed, and the employees showed no desire to support us. Most of the
soldiers we disarmed dispersed in the city. The insurrection was not linked
to the difficulties of the railway workers. The reactionaries could still use the
Canton-Hankow link. The workers of the power-plant cut off the light, and
we had to work in the dark. The workers of Canton and Hongkong as well as
the sailors did not dare join the combatants. The river sailors placed
themselves shamefully at the service of the Whites. The railway workers of
the Hongkong and Canton-Hankow line transmitted the telegrams of tlie
enemy and transported their soldiers. The peasants did not help us by
destroying the tracts, and did not try to prevent the enemy from attacking
Canton. The workers of Hongkong did not display the least sympathy for the
insurrection".8
The German Communist, Heinz Neumann, acted as the representative of the
Communist International on the spot. He was the most enthusiastic advocate
of the idea of insurrection. He was its prime mover. In his report to the
Communist International, he disputes details of Yeh Ting's report, but
admits that the latter was correct on the whole. Neumann's defence was:
"But if one considers that the troops of the bourgeoisie were surrounded on
all sides by revolutionary ferment, and that the commanding staff could not
rely on them politically, one can say that the military forces in Canton were
equal." But later on, in the same report, he admitted: "The great majority of
the proletariat and the petit-bourgeoisie did not give sufficient support to the
new power. The railway workers, the municipal workers, the sailors of
Hongkong, and others did not stop work. The petit-bourgeoisie, for the most
part, adopted a waiting attitude. At the moment of the insurrection, there was
no important revolutionary movement among the peasants adjacent to
Canton. The peasants were completely isolated; no aid could be expected
from them." Yet, according to Neumann, "the Communist leaders were
profoundly convinced that all the conditions for victory were present, and
that success was assured."
Before long, even the most ardent believers in the sure success of the
Chinese revolution began to realise that fatal mistakes had been committed.
The head of the Red International of Labour Unions Lozowsky, for example,
wrote: "It is true that there were sharp
460 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
struggles developing between Chang Fah-kwei and Li Chi-sen, but the
insurrectionists should have known that, as soon as the banner of revolt
was raised, the quarrels in the camp of the counter-revolution would
immediately come to an end. . . . We had done no preparatory work to
disintegrate the enemy troops. This predetermined the outcome of the
insurrection".9
Immediately before the Nanchang uprising, Lominadze came to China as
the new representative of the Communist International. The disastrous
policy of leading the defeated and demoralised forces of revolution in the
offensive all over the front was introduced under his direction. The
responsibility of the Canton uprising directly belongs to him. Even he,
though only a year later, admitted. "Obviously, we far too greatly
exaggerated the extent of the development of the peasants' uprising at
that time".10
Yet, "the Significance and Lessons of the Canton Uprising" was
appraised by the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, on
January 3, [929, as follows: "Only cowardly opportunists can call such
an uprising a premature act, a putsch, a military conspiracy. Such
opportunism did not exist in the Canton section of the Communist Party
or among the members of the Central Committee. The Canton uprising in
mid-December was an inevitable outgrowth of the development of the
class struggle as a whole and the conjuncture of the objective conditions.
The working class had no other outlet but to rise directly to capture the
revolutionary power".11 It should be mentioned that both Neumann and
Lominadze were present in the meeting which expressed the above
opinion. The resolution was most probably drafted by one of them!
After a month, the Canton insurrection came up for discussion in the
Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International. In the resolution adopted warning was given against
"putschist tendencies". Nevertheless, it was affirmed that the Canton
insurrection was not a putsch. It was "the heroic attempt of the proletariat
to organise Soviet Power", although it suffered from "several errors of
leadership, absence of broad political strikes, and absence of an elected
Soviet as the organ o.' the uprising".12
The Canton Commune came into being, indeed, in a rather extraordinary
manner. Four days before the insurrection, fifteen men had been selected
in a secret meeting of the Communist Party to constitute what was to
become the "Canton Council of Workers',
The Communist Party 461
Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies". Nine of them represented trade-unions
under Communist influence: three, the Cadets' Regiment; and other
three, peasants. It is reported that the latter failed to appear in the
Inaugural Session of the Commune. The Soviet was to be enlarged to a
membership of 300 after the capture of power.13
Nearly a year afterwards, Lominadze wrote: "The greatest political
mistake of many Chinese Communists was that for several months after
the defeat of the Canton uprising, they thought that this uprising was the
direct beginning of a new, higher, revolutionary wave all over China, and
accordingly they were for the direct organisation of armed uprisings".14
Lominadze was the representative of the Communist International in
China when "the greatest political mistake" was committed, not by the
Chinese Communists on their own initiative, but according to the
directions of the Communist International. That mistaken policy was
continued for several years, during which time resolutions endorsing and
encouraging that mistake were repeatedly passed by the Executive
Committee as well as the Sixth Congress of the Communist
International.
The causes of the failure of the Canton uprising have been set forth
above sufficiently in detail. Apart from the fundamental mistake of the
much too belated offensive, undertaken only after a crushing defeat, the
contributing cause was the amateurishness of the organisers who seem to
have lacked all sense of responsibility. Even the most glaring facts of the
situation were simply disregarded. "The armed forces of the ruling class
stationed in Canton exceeded by five or six times the forces of the
insurrectionists."15 The indispensable step of calling a general strike as
the prelude to the uprising was dismissed, "because it seemed to the
Revolutionary Committee that, if they did not succeed in taking the
enemy unawares by a sudden night attack, the chances of victory would
singularly diminish". 16 So, it was unanimously decided to give the signal
for the uprising without even attempting to call a general strike,17 which
is usually done to test the situation. The general strike was not attempted
because from very recent experience the organisers of the insurrection
knew that the workers would not respond. The last resistance of the
Canton works had been broken down bloodily less than two months ago.
Even later, the Workers' Volunteer Corps, which had played such an
important role ever since the boycott of Hongkong in 1925-26, was
disbanded and driven out of their barracks practically
462 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
without any resistance. But all those and many other highly significant
events did not mean anything to the Communist leaders, all bent upon
armed uprising. The following quotation from an ardent supporter of the
policy of offensive on the whole front depicts the background on which
the tragedy was staged. "The Communist Party was not capable of
organising strikes. They could not stop the economic life of the whole
city. They could not attract the proletarians in the factories and handicraft
shops to the movement. Only when the roar of guns and rifles was heard
and barricade fighting was already in progress, did the working masses
begin to know that an insurrection was going on".18
The Canton uprising was the most tragic event in the entire history of the
Chinese Revolution. It was the greatest mistake ever committed because
its bloody suppression was inevitable It was a foolhardy, ill-conceived,
dilettantly prepared offensive; it was a typical adventure. The Nanchang
insurrection had its historical significance. It marked the break of the
Communist Party from its fateful opportunistic past. But since the break
took place much too late, it should not have been the starting point for an
offensive on the whole front. The mistakes in the past could not be
rectified by plunging headlong into a desperate offensive; the proper
course for the moment was to beat a strategic retreat with the object of
saving the defeated and demoralised forces and marshalling them for an
eventual offensive in the next favourable opportunity. The impossibility
of holding Nanchang, the fact that the peasants did not join the
insurgents':* army during its long march through Kiangsi, the abortive
occupation of Swatow—all these showed that the Communist slogans of
"general armed uprising" and "Soviet Republic" did not find the
necessary response from the masses. In those circumstances, it was a
serious mistake to go in for an uprising in Canton under the banner of
"Soviets". While admiring the heroism of the fallen insurgents of Canton,
and honouring their memory, it must nevertheless be said that the
mistake did incalculable harm to the revolution. It completed the
defeated of the working class and placed it out of combat for a long time.
The new policy of the Communist Party, initiated since the Nanchang
uprising, was based on the theory that, in consequence of the betrayal of
the bourgeoisie, the National Revolution must develop directly to a
proletarian Socialist revolution. Events proved that
The Communist Party 463
the theory was wrong. The masses did not respond to the slogan of
Soviets. In Canton itself, hardly ten thousand workers participated
actively in the uprising and supported the Commune. 19 Yet the belated
policy of an adventurous offensive was continued even after the severe
defeat at Canton. Throughout the year 1928, local peasant uprisings were
organised in Kwangtung, Kiangsi and Hunan. Thanks to the primitive
means of transportation, and immense expenses of the country, those
insurrections could not be easily suppressed by the counter-revolutionary
troops. Nevertheless, they did not develop into a united mass movement;
the insurgents functioned as isolated guerilla bands. Their operations
were restricted to certain districts of Hunan, Kiangsi and Kwangtung.
Yet, that steril but very costly policy was formulated by the Sixth World
Congress of the Communist International in July 1928, more than half a
year after the tragedy of Canton. "At the present time, the party must
everywhere propagate among the masses the idea of Soviets, and the
inevitability of the coming revolutionary mass armed uprising. ... It must
consistently and undeviatingly follow the line of seizure of State power,
organisation of Soviets as organs of insurrection. . . . The future growth
of the revolution will place before the party as an immediate political
task the preparation for, and carrying through of, armed insurection as
the sole path to the completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution,
and to the overthrow of the power of the Kuo Min Tang".1'0 If this policy
was adopted a year earlier, the whole history of China might have been
different. Indeed, the light had dawned as early as in August 1927, but
even then only after criminal opportunism had permitted the most
favourable opportunity for striking to pass by. After counterrevolution
had completely triumphed, on August 9, 1927, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union declared the following in a
resolution: "The national bourgeoisie is incapable of solving the inner
problems of the revolution for the reason that it not only fails to support
the peasantry, but actually combats them. . .. It is almost impossible for
the bourgeoisie to enter into any compromise with the peasantry, since in
China even the scantiest land reform would involve expropriation of the
gentry and small landlords, an action of which the bourgeoisie is
absolutely incapable. The Communist Party must declare that the victory
over Imperialism, the revolutionary unification of China, and its
emancipation from the
464 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
yoke of Imperialism, are only possible on the basis of the class struggle
of the workers and peasants against the feudal lords and capitalists".
Even Borodin, the preceptor of the policy which killed the Chinese
Revolution, is reported to have returned from the ruins, largely his own
creation, a repentant sinner. On his way back to Moscow, only a few
days after he had sacrificed the Chinese Revolution on the altar of an
alliance with the "left" militarists, he was constrained to express the
following opinion: "The big bourgeoisie can never unify China because
they are not really against the ~ Imperialists; they are allied with them
and profit by them. The small bourgeoisie cannot unify China because
they vacillate between the workers and peasants, on the one hand, and
the big bourgeoisie, on the other hand, and in the end, go over to the
latter. The workers and peasants did not unify China because they trusted
too much in the small bourgeoisie."21 The wisdom, unfortunately, come
too late. Borodin, of course, could no longer do anything to save the
situation. The Communist International could. But its new direction to
the Communist Party of China, as formulated by the Sixth World
Congress, was reckless adventurism which led to the complete
destruction of the forces of revolution, heavily defeated thanks to the
earlier policy of opportunism. Upon the inauguration of the new policy,
the deposed leader of the Communist Party of China, Chen Tu-hsiu,
bitterly remarked that, having "learned in the past only how to
capitulate", they were not given a chance to "understand that it was
necessary to retreat" after such a disastrous defeat.22
Having imbibed the first form of opportunism during the formative
period of their political life, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party
readily adopted the new policy, hailing it with the cry "Long live the
victorious (?) Chinese Revolution!"23, which they had callously killed
only the year before. Forgetting the tragic experience of the Canton
uprising, and disregarding the utter futility of the adventure carried on
even after that, the Chinese delegate to the Sixth World Congress
declared: "The Comintern brought forward resolutely the slogan of
armed insurrection for the establishment of the Soviet Regime. This
alone has enabled our party to consolidate our ranks, win new forces,
rally hundreds of thousands, nay, millions of workers around its
slogans."24 The actual situation in China was, however, entirely different.
In an adventurist offensive, the defeated forces
The Communist Party 465
of the revolution had been completely destroyed; the Communist Party,
in the middle of 1928, existed only in name. That was revealed in a
circular of the Central Committee of the party issued on November 8,
1928, reviewing the political work of the party after the Sixth Congress.
In that realistic document, one reads the following: "The trade-union
organisations have shrunk to almost nothing. The party organisations in
the cities are scattered and smashed. In the whole country, there is not
one healthy nucleus of industrial workers." A party in such a state of
prostration could not possibly shoulder the task of leading a revolution.
Yet, a few months later, the Executive Committee of the Communist
International issued the following instructions: "The party should destroy
the power of all militarist factions, turn the militarist war into a civil war;
prepare for the political general strike."25 Some more facts will show that
the Communist Party of China was not in a position to carry out these
instructions.
Just when the Communist Party was calling for "political strikes",
''general strikes" and "armed uprising", "the workers feared to have the
Communists come to them, and implored them not to wreck their
struggle". They used to say: "Your words are quite correct, but we cannot
carry them out now. It will be a good thing for us if we can get our wages
raised a little and not get fired"26 These very significant facts were not
unknown to the Communist International. They were stated in an official
document more than a year before.. "In most of the cities, even in great
working class centres, like Wuhan, Tientsin and Canton, no work has
been done. In the big and important enterprises, there are no nuclei
whatever."27 Nevertheless, the policy of offensive continued. The
warning came again, a few months later, this time from the leader of the
Chinese party himself. "Even where our comrades participated, our
influence and slogans bore no fruit. Local organisations do not exist in
the important centres."28 No heed was paid. Armed insurrection was still
the thing. Nothing less than "Soviets" could save the revolution which,
by that time, was dead like Queen Anne. In 1926, the National Labour
Federation had a membership of nearly three millions. In 1930, it had
fallen to 64,000. That also was an inflated figure, because the total
membership in all the principal cities and industrial centres taken
together did not come up to 6000.29 A few months later, a leader of the
Communist Party revealed: "Now there are no real red unions; they have
been wiped out.
466 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
All work has been abandoned."30 The Japanese invasion in the year 1931
infused some life in the labour movement. There were strikes and
widespread agitation. But even then the Communist Party was
completely isolated. "The struggles were sporadic, spontaneous, lacking
organisation and leadership. The great difficulty is that we have no good
cadres in the factories. Our organisation does not understand very well
what the conditions are in the factories, so that we are not able to put
forward the most pressing demands of the workers. We have not
succeeded in organising a single anti-imperialist strike."31
In view of these facts, it is no wonder that the slogans of armed uprising
and Soviets found very little response from the masses. Only nominally
the Communist Party survived the prolonged reign of terror which was
established expressly for its extermination. It was driven into an illegal
existence throughout the country, except in the remote limited areas
where it could function spasmodically through armed bands. Its leading
cadre was nearly destroyed. Consequently, it almost ceased to be an
effective factor in the political life of the country. It was defeated, very
heavily, though not altogether destroyed.
The policy of the Communist Party since the middle of 1927 was sterile,
while that of the previous period had been fatal. Not only the workers
and peasants, but also the poor intellectuals, artisans, small traders etc.,
betrayed by the nationalist bourgeoisie, were looking for a new
leadership of the still incomplete struggle for national democratic
freedom. If the Communists even then realised that they were making a
series of new mistakes in order to rectify old ones, and adopted tactics
suitable to the requirements of the situation, the passive sympathy of the
democratic masses would transform itself into active support- But
unfortunately that did not happen.
The Chinese Revolution, indeed, is a part of the world-wide struggle for
overthrowing capitalism. Nevertheless, it does not outgrow the
democratic stage and become a struggle for Socialism simply because the
nationalist bourgeoisie had turned against it. It must still go through a
period of transition, in which the non-proletarian and semi-proletarian
elements should be mobilised under the hegemony of the proletariat for
the realisation of the programme of bourgeois-democratic revolution,
namely, subversion of the
The Communist Party 467
pre-capitalist social relations and establishment of democratic freedom.
There are numerous classes—the urban petit-bourgeoisie and the
peasantry—which are active factors of the revolution, in addition to the
proletariat. Indeed, in a democratic revolution, the former are of great
importance, constituting its social basis, though in the given situation the
latter can greatly influence its leadership and perspective of
development. The treachery of the big bourgeoisie, the debacle of petit-
bourgeois radicalism, the exposure of Sun Yat-senism as a counter-
revolutionary cult,—all these factors drive the democratic masses closer
to the Communist Party. But they would not accept the Communist
programme. If they rally round the Communist Party, that is because
they expect from it a bolder leadership in the struggle for democratic
freedom. Soviets and Red Army are not the suitable organs for that
struggle. In any case, they are wrong names given to organs of struggle
created by the democratic masses. The mistake of choosing those wrong
slogans restricts the scope of the movement under Communist
leadership, because they do not attract the democratic masses objectively
involved in the revolution in the present stage of development.
Its own metamorphosis should have helped the Communist Party to have
a realistic appreciation of the relation of social forces actually in
operation. From 1928 to 1930, the social composition of the party itself
changed very remarkably. Already in the beginning of 1929, the bulk of
its membership was in the village. It lost pratically all footing in the
cities—the social base of operation of a truly Communist Party. Even if
it is argued that terror hindered the reorganisation of the party in the
cities, where repression could be more effective than in remote rural
areas, yet it must be admitted that by 1930 the Communist Party, in its
social composition, had virtually become a peasants' party. In the urban
areas, thirty per cent of the membership was recruited from the petit-
bourgeoisie—artisans, small traders, employees, poor intellectuals etc. It
can be reasonably assumed that also in the rural areas these elements
were equally represented in the party. Admittedly, the bulk of its
membership being in the rural districts, the party must have been mostly
composed of petit-bourgeois elements including^the peasantry.
During this period, great increase in the membership of the party was
reported. In the earlier part of 1927, the party had a membership of
50,000. During a year of white terror, which followed
468 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the triumph of counter-revolution, no less than 25,000 Communists had
fallen. A large number of petit-bourgeois intellectuals, who had joined
the party in the period of revolutionary upheaval, had left its ranks in the
days of bloody suppression. Yet, in the middle of 1929, the party claimed
a membership of 130,000. If that was true, then, more than a hundred
thousand new members must have joined it just when the party stood
under the heavy fire of terror which drove it away from the cities and
industrial centres. Obviously, there was much exaggeration in the report
about the increase of membership. But making due allowance for that,
there is no reason to believe that the reports were altogether imaginary.
The very significant deduction to be made from it is that the new mass
influx into the party was of an entirely different social composition. The
large membership figures can be explained only on the assumption that,
wherever a Soviet was established, practically the entire adult population
of the poorer classes declared their adhesion to the Communist Party.
Such a party was no longer a proletarian party, although it was certainly
still a revolutionary party. The very significant radical change in the
social composition of the party is revealed by official reports and other
documents. The proletarian element in the party declined from ten per
cent in 1928 to three per cent in 1929, two per cent in 1930, by the end of
which year, it almost disappeared.32
From these facts, it is evident that the party was then Communist only in
name. But just when it became practically ineffective as the fighting
organ of the revolutionary proletariat, just at the moment non-proletarian
and semi-proletarian masses flocked under its banner. Important political
deductions should have been made from that fact. That was not done, and
the party failed to adopt a tactical line suitable to the social conditions,
and revise its political orientation. Its task was to create a platform for
the semi-proletarian, petit-bourgeois masses (including the peasantry)
engaged in a revolutionary struggle. The way followed since the
Nanchang insurrection ended in a blind alley, because the Communist
Party disregarded the social character of the forces accepting its
leadership, because it did not adapt itself to the peculiar circumstances
under which the struggle for democratic freedom must be conducted,
step by step until the capture of power.
The overwhelming majority and the most active elements of the
revolutionary army came from the peasantry; the revolution unmis-
The Communist Party 469
takably was still in the democratic stage. Its immediate task, therefore,
was to organise the non-ptoletarian and semi-proletarian revolutionary
forces in the first place—together with the proletariat. Inasmuch as this
organisation takes place under the leadership of the Communist Party, it
represents an advance towards the capture of power by the revolutionary
democratic masses under the hegemony of the proletariat. The tragic and
costly experiment since the disaster in the summer of 1927 proved that
the indiscriminate armed uprising and the establishment of "Soviet
Republics" did not correspond with the conditions under which the
revolutionary struggle in China had to be conducted.
Moreover, the Soviet system of State itself must be adapted to the
peculiar conditions of the country and the characteristic features of the
revolution. The creation of the People's Council during the Shanghai
insurrection in the beginning of 1927 showed the way in which the
organs of popular power could rise in China. The Council was composed
of representatives of the organisations of workers, artisans, employees,
students and traders, and was dominated by the proletariat. It seized
political power even before the Nationalist Army had occupied the city.
Even earlier, throughout the nationalist territories, to a very large extent,
political power had been captured by the peasant unions which included
all the rural democratic elements (artisans, small traders, students etc.) in
addition to the peasants. The City Council of Shanghai was a really
democratic body, which differed from a bourgeois parliament in that it
was organically connected with the organised masses, and was directly
subordinated to their control. The rise of such an organ of power of the
popular masses creates the condition for an armed uprising and
guarantees its success. When the nationalist bourgeoisie desired to set up
a military dictatorship, the counter-move of the Communists should have
been an agitation for the creation of such popular organs of power. In
that case, they would not be driven to the romantic policy of establishing
"Soviet Republics" in the wilderness of mountainous regions. The
agitation would have secured for the Communist Party the support of the
masses throughout the country, and would have led to the mobilisation of
forces for preparing the ground for a Successful capture of power. Had
the Communist Party directed its activities on this line, suitable to the
conditions under which the struggle is to be conducted, then, it could
have not only prevented the
470 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
annihilation of its best forces in hopeless adventures, but also could have
organised an effective resistance against the counter-revolutionary
offensive of the bourgeoisie.
The immediate task of the revolution is to overthrow the military
dictatorship of the so-called Nationalist Government of Nanking. A
democratic mass movement is the way to the accomplishment of that
task. Only a correct tactical line on the part of the Communists can
mobilise the democratic masses in a revolutionary struggle. The Nanking
Government has not introduced any democratic freedom; nor would any
rival nationalist clique do that if it came to power. They all preach the
principles of Sun Yat-sen, according to which there must be an unlimited
period of trusteeship before the right of self-government could be
bestowed upon the people. For historical reasons, and owing to the
character of Chinese national economy, the bourgeoisie are incapable of
creating a modern democratic State. They can only try to set up a
military dictatorship in alliance with the native feudal reaction and
foreign Imperialism for oppressing and exploiting the masses. Therefore,
the mobilisation of the democratic masses in a struggle against the
nationalist military dictatorship is the immediate task of the revolution.
The overwhelming majority of the popular masses throughout the
country would join the struggle, by leading which the Communists could
recover their position as the dominating factor of the situation. Only in
that way can the democratic revolution, betrayed by the nationalist
bourgeoisie, further develop under the hegemony of the proletariat.
An agitation demanding the election of People's Councils by the so-
called "people's organisations"33—the organisations of the workers,
peasants, artisans, students, employees, small traders, etc.,—will
effectively stimulate the mass struggle against military dictatorship. Such
Councils should be first created locally; then, the demand should be
pressed for their electing delegates to a National Assembly to function as
the central organ of revolutionary democratic power. The National
Democratic Revolution will triumph; foreign Imperialism will be
defeated; native feudal-bourgeois reaction will be driven out of power;
and the country will be brought under a centralised government to
undertake its economic reconstruction on a line that will go directly
towards the establishment of Socialism.
The Communist Party 471
Notes
The meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in
November 1926 adopted a new thesis on the Chinese question, the central point of
which was that the Chinese Revolution must from that time be developed as an
agrarian revolution. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party as well as the
representatives of the C.I. in China were of a different view. They still maintained
that the nationalist bourgeoisie should be helped to lead the revolution and class
struggle should not be accentuated for the sake of national unity. 1 was alone to
advocate the different point of view that the Chinese Revolution had reached a
critical moment in which it must strike out a new course and a fetish should not be
made of the alliance with the Kuo Min Tang. The Executive of the C.I. adopted my
point of view, which was opposed in the beginning by Stalin himself. But Stalin was
brought around to my view and the Thesis adopted by the E.C.C.I. was drafted by
me. Immediately afterwards, I left for China as the head of a new delegation of the
C.I. Soon after'my arrival there, the Fifth Congress of the C.P. of China met at
Hankow in May 1927. The leadership of the C.P. were opposed to the new directions
of the C I. But I persuaded the Fifth Congress to endorse the new line in spite of the
opposition of practically all the leaders of the party. In a book published officially in
Moscow in 1932, that is three years after I had ceased to be a member of the C.I.P.
Mif wrote : "It was Roy who gave the young Chinese party for the first time a real
Leninist prognosis of the events taking place. From Roy, the party heard for the first
time a thoroughly thought-out perspective of the movement, and received directives
on a series of cardinal questions. Roy gave the young Chinese Party the experience
of world Bolshevism."
Mif was a worker in the Eastern Department of the Comintern. In the beginning of
1926, he was sent to China for organising party schools. Later on, in 1930, Mif
became the representative of the C.I. in China. On his return to Moscow, he wrote
his book "The Chinese Revolution" from which the above quotation is taken. No
book, dealing particularly with party politics, can be published in Moscow without
official approval.
The following quotation is from another book "The Chinese Revolution" by Chiu
Chiu-pei. He was a leading member of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China at
the time of the Fifth Congress. Describing the tendencies in the Fifth Congress, he
wrote : Borodin's line was retreat and the slackening of the agrarian revolution; con-
cessions to the so-called industrialists and merchants; concessions to the landlords
and gentry; alliance with Feng Yu-hsiang to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek; and with
such a policy lead the left leaders against the right reactionary forces of Wuhan and
Nanking. Roy was for relative concessions to the businessmen; against conceding
anything to the landlord and gentry class; for small concessions to all small
472 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
landlords and the revolutionary generals. The Central Committee of the party was
for complete concessions to the businessmen, complete concessions to the landlords
and gentry, considering that the agrarian revolution could not be realised
immediately, but required an adequate period of propaganda, considering it best to
let the Left Kuo Min Tang to lead and for us to go off the path a bit so that the
revolution should not be prematurely advanced."
Chiu Chiu-pei was a special favourite of Borodin. Together with the other members
of the old Central Committee, he was condemned by the C.I. for the opportunist
policy pursued during the crisis of 1927. In the above book, written afterwards, he
admitted the mistakes made by himself and the Central Committee in spite of the
advice I gave as the representative of the Communist International—Author. 2. On
these grounds I opposed the new military campaign and advised the Communist
Party to advocate an alternative plan of action. It was to deepen the social base of the
Wuhan Government by carrying on the agrarian revolution in the provinces under its
control. Concrete measures I suggested were : (1) Extermination of the reactionary
forces in the countryside, namely, the landlords, money-lenders and the village
gentry; (2) Extension of its effective power to the southern provinces of Kwangtung
(the original base of the nationalists) and Kiangsi; and (3) Movement of the
revolutionary troops under the actual control of the Nationalist Government
southward with the purpose of helping the realisation of these objects.
"A powerful mass movement had developed in those four provinces (with a total
population of nearly 100 millions) on the occasion of the march of the Nationalist
Army from Canton to the Yangtse. There were about a million workers and five
times as many peasants organised. General political consciousness was very
advanced. Firmly established in these provinces, the Wuhan Government would be
almost invulnerable. Having taken up that strategic position, it would be able to
encircle Shanghai from inland, and to defeat ihe combined forces of Chiang Kai-
shek and international Imperialism. Meanwhile, Feng Yu-hsiang might be asked to
advance eastward to threaten the flank of Chiang, should he march to Peking, on the
Tientsin-Pukow Railway, Holding the Lunghai Railway, that joins the two trunk
lines connecting Peking with the Yangtse valley, as his base, Feng could press
towards the north. That would be a bait to keep him away from Chiang Kai-shek.
''The Communist leaders would not accept the alternative plan of action. They
argued that refusal to support the second North Expedition would amount to a break
with the Left Kuo Min Tang. Borodin propounded a defeatist theory. He argued that
Wuhan could not be held because the revolutionary forces were very weak.
Therefore, he advocated that the remains of the ruins must be safely withdrawn to a
new base in the north-west. That was a fantastic proposition which revealed
The Communist Party 473
a remarkable lack of faith in the masses," tragically shared by the entire leadership of
the C.P. His other astounding proposition was to set a conglomeration of military
forces in motion with the hope that something positive might come out of the chaos.
Fatalism, still another fountain-head of opportunism! The Communist Party, being
controlled by opportunists, who in the revolutionary crisis exposed themselves as
such hopeless imbeciles, it would have been a veritable miracle if the almost certain
disaster had been averted.
"Even such a miracle could possibly have been worked, had the Communist leaders
at the eleventh hour shown some understanding of revolutionary tactics. Had the
Wuhan Government been given clearly to understand that the Communist Party
would not endorse the military adventure, the plan might have been abandoned; for,
without the support of the masses, the campaign could not have been undertaken
with any hope of success. The Communists still held the key-position. Instead of
dictating terms, while they still could do so, they capitulated. They called upon the
masses to support a consciously counter-revolutionary military adventure. The old
theory of first broadening the revolution was again expounded. It was contended that
insistence upon the solution of the agrarian problem in the nationalist territories
would mean war with the Kuo Min Tang.
"I referred the disputed question to Moscow. The answer was ambiguous. It was in
favour of doing both the things simultaneously: to carry on the military plan, and
develop the revolution in the territories of the Wuhan Government. That was an
impossibility. It proved to be so in experience before long." (M.N. Roy, "My
Experience in China", pp. 42-44, 2nd edition, Calcutta).
3. "I vigorously objected to the Communist undertaking the task of checking the
revolutionary action of the peasants, in order to placate the reactionary army officers.
I pointed out that the suicidal policy of restraining the development of the agrarian
revolution on the plea of not disturbing the rear, when the army was fighting on the
front, had already enabled the forces of reaction to go over to the offensive. Further
restraint would demoralise the peasants' movement, and encourage counter-
revolution to raise its bloody head in the villages. But my objection was disregarded.
"Thereupon, I suggested that Tan Ping-san might go with the instruction that, when
on the spot, his mission should be not to check the "excesses" of the peasants'
movement, but to set up village self-government, investing the peasants' unions with
the necessary political power. That would be setting up Soviets in fact, if not in
name. The peasants' unions were the rallying ground of the rural oppressed and
exploited masses. In his capacity of the Minister of Interior, Tan Ping-san was in
charge of local self-government and police. The action proposed^ therefore, was
within his official competence. Properly and courageously guided, the peasants'
unions could easily become basic units of revolutionary State, disarm the rowdies
and ruffians in the pay of the landlords}
474 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
and create a militia as the nucleus of a real revolutionary army.
"The rank and file Communists, working in the villages, were eagefr for such a line
of action, but they were restrained by orders of the Central Committee of the party.
Many of them lost patience, and acted independently under the pressure of the
masses." (Ibid., p, 44).
4. The instructions were sent without my knowledge even when the plan reported in
the next foot note was being discussed. —Author.
5. It was no longer possible for the Communists to continue playing the second
fiddle. It was no longer mere opportunism. It would be a criminal and rank betrayal
of the revolution. I proposed that the Central Committee of the C.P. should address
an Open Letter to the Kuo Min Tang, exposing the latter's counter-revolutionary
crimes of commission and omission. The Open Letter should be an ultimatum, and
the signal for a general revolutionary offensive under the independent leadership of
the C.P.
"For concrete action, I proposed: 1. The peasants to be led in an attack upon
Changsha, supported by a quickly raised irregular army commanded by Communists
and revolutionary nationalists; 2. Strike in the Hanyang arsenal with the demand that
25 per cent of the arms and munitions produced should be handed over to the trade-
unions for the purpose of creating a workers militia as a guarantee against counter-
revolution ; 3. A mass demonstration in support of the demand of the arsenal
workers, to endorse the Open Letter of the Communist Party, and to demand that the
Nationalist Government and the Kuo Min Tang should immediately call upon the
peasants to overthrow the counter-revolutionary insurgents of Changsha, and to
destroy rural reaction; 4. General strike to enforce the demand formulated by the
demonstration. Finally, an armed uprising, to begin with the capture of the arsenal.
"The plan of action appeared fantastic to the Communist leaders, trained in the
school of systematic opportunism. Instead of listening to my arguments in favour of
determined offensive, the only creditable way out of the situation, thsy yielded to all
the counter-revolutionary demands of the "Left" Kuo Min Tang. . . .
"In despair, I tried to act over the head of the impossible Political Bureau of the
Communist Party. I demanded a plenary meeting of the Central Committee to be
attended by local leaders. The demand was opposed on the plea that important
members of the party could not leave their respective posts in those critical days.
The top leaders were against the plenary session, because local workers were
impatient for decisive action and would have surely endorsed my plan. As the last
resort, I sought to act with the co-operation of individual comrades, Chinese as well
as Russian. Galen (the Chief Military Adviser to the Nationalist Government) was
fully in agreement with me. Many other Russian comrades had also come around to
my view by that time. But all power was centred in the hands of Borodin. Moscow
had backed
The Communist Party 475
me up politically as against his opportunism. Nevertheless," in other respects, he wa
s still left in the controlling position, and consequently functioned as the dictator of
the Communist Party. Being mostly his disciples, and ideologically akin to his way,
the top leaders of the C.P. of China followed him, disregarding repeatedly the
instructions of the InternationaL and in defiance of its representative on the spot.
"It was possible to raise an irregular force, several thousand strong for temporary
operations against Changsha, pending the formation of the revolutionary army with
peasant volunteers. To secure the services of the improvised force, it was necessary
to pay the troops a month's wages in advance. Borodin controlled the purse-strings.
In the beginning he promised to supply the required money. When all arrangements
were made, in spite of the criminal non cooperation of the leaders of the C.P., and
the peasants' unions had been instructed to besiege Changsha, he failed to keep his
promise. Consequently, the plan had to be abandoned.
"At Wuhan, there was a demonstration, but not with the original purpose which was
to give the signal for the planned insurrection. The plan was to declare a one-day
general strike on the occasion of the return of the representatives of the Government
to the Conference with Feng Yu-hsiang at the front. All the workers of the three
cities were together at the meeting to be addressed by the nationalist leaders. From
the platform, the representative of the Communist party was to demand action
according to the resolution of the party, and, the nationalist leaders failing to
sanction it, to take them prisoners as the signal for the planned insurrection. Ten
thousand workers in the nearby Hanyang arsenal were ready to take possession of it
on that signal. But the demonstration turned out to be a welcome to the commanders
of the 'victorious' army." (Ibid., pp 45-48).
6. I did not attend the meeting having declined to act any longer as the representative
of the C.I.—Author.
7. Deng Chen-tsah, "The Canton Commune and the Tactics of the Communist
Party", page 39. 8 Yeh Ting's Report on the Canton Insurrection.
9. Lozowsky, "Canton Commune".
10. Lominadne, "The Anniversary of the Canton Commune".
11. Chiu Chiu-pei, "Chinese Revolution".
12. The resolution on the Chinese question, adopted by the Ninth Plenum of
theE.C.C.I.
13. Huang Ping, "Canton Commune".
14. Ibid.
15. Wang Min, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, "The Lessons of
the Canton Commune".
16. Neumann's report.
17. Huang Ping, "Canton Commune".
18. Lozowski, "Canton Commune".
 CHAPTER XXI
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
The fusion of the two rival nationalist factions was a very devious and
protracted process. The revolution having been betrayed by both the
groups with equal ferocity, there began the endless struggle for power.
The dominating factor of the new situation, however, was neither of
them. The leadership of the process of the consolidation of counter-
revolution was assumed by the so-called Western Hill Conference group.
The big bourgeoisie appeared on the scene as soon as their agents in both
the Kuo Min Tang factions had accomplished the dirty job of killing the
Communists and massacring the revolutionary masses.
In 1911, the big bourgeoisie had succeeded in inducing Sun Yat-sen to
deliver the new-born Republic to the tender mercies of the monarchist
Yuan Shih-kai. The bankers, industrialists and compradores, represented
by the Western Hill Conference group, had then opposed the
reorganisation of the Kuo Min Tang on a broad popular basis and with a
democratic programme. But in 1924, nationalism had found a mass basis,
and Sun Yat-sen was forced to act contrary to the counsel of the counter-
revolutionary bourgeois politicians. Having failed to stop its
reorganisation, the latter had left the Kuo Min Tang. But their agents
remained inside the party with the object of checking its development
into an organ of revolutionary struggle. Later on, most of them also were
driven out. Finally, in 1925, they met in the so-called Western Hill
Conference and constituted themselves as the "White Kuo Min Tang",
with the declared object of fighting Communism and Russian influence.
During the short period of 1925-26, when under the pressure of the
masses the Kuo Min Tang conducted a revolutionary struggle, it was
entirely beyond the control of the "Old Guard". They looked upon
478 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
the stormy march of events with great misgivings, but could hardly do
anything to arrest it. They had to be content with counterrevolutionary
intrigues, and bide time.
As last, their opportunity came. By declaring war upon the Communists
and betraying the democratic masses, both the rival Kuo Min Tang
factions again accepted the leadership of the "Old Guard". On the
conclusion of the feud between the two factions, in August 1927, the big
bourgeoisie reappeared on the political scene to thrive lik worms on the
dead body of the revolution.
Chiang Kai-shek was the first to win the patronage of the "Old Guard".
As the reward for his bloody suppression of the revolutionary mass
upheaval he received a loan of thirty million dollars from the Shanghai
bankers. The White Kuo Min Tang extended to him political support
also. "No governmental group in China started under better auspices than
that which composed the Nanking Government. . . . The Shanghai
Chinese bankers and merchants were willing to support and finance the
new Government on the understanding that the Communists should be
suppressed."1 Chiang Kai-shek qualified himself for further patronage by
ruthlessly carrying through the campaign for "purging the party". On the
one hand, the Communists were massacred and all other revolutionary
elements were expelled from the party; on the other hand, the
representatives of the counterrevolutionary big bourgeoisie were not only
readmitted, but were allowed to capture its virtual leadership. The
representative of the Hongkong compradores, Hu Han-min, who had
been driven out of "Red" Canton for his complicity with the assassination
of Liao Chung-hai, not only was welcomed back into the party but was
appointed the civil head of the Nanking Government. The arch-
reactionary C.C. Wu, an accomplice of Chiang Kai-shek in the loupd'efat
of March 20, 1926, and later driven out of Canton, denounced by the
latter himself as an agent of British Imperialism, also returned to become
the Foreign Minister of the new Government. The big bourgeoisie not
only regained the control of the discredited Kuo Min Tang but took
possession of the Nationalist Government of Nanking to use it for their
own purpose.
At the end of August 1927, a delegation from Wuhan, headed by Wang
Chin-wei, came to the "Unity Conference" of Kiukiang. The Nanking
group was represented by C.C. Wu. Two weeks later,
The Struggle for Power 479
the redoubtable reactionary C.C. Wu, denounced only a year ago
publicly as an agent of British Imperialism, conducted the discredited
leader of petit-bourgeois radicalism, the standard-bearer of "pure Sun
Yat-senism", into the inner conclave of bourgeois counter-revolution.
Chaperoned by C.C. Wu, accompanied by the Mandarin General Tan
Yen-kai, and the bourgeois politician Sun Fo, he went to Shanghai to
make amends for his sins. The atonement demanded of him was self-
elimination. The counter-revolutionary conclave was not too exacting.
They made it possible for the repentant prodigal to swallow the bitter
dose without losing face. To enable Wang Chin-wei to perform self-
effacement gracefully, they had already sent their pet protege Chiang
Kai-shek away for a temporary holiday. On August 12, the latter had
resigned the post of the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army,
and had announced his desire to go abroad "for study".
Wang Chin-wei, in his turn, also played th? part allotted to him. In an
address to the party he declared: "The present meeting and cooperation
of our Nanking and Hankow comrades were the result of a telegram
dated August 8 from our Nanking comrades to which the Wuhan
comrades replied on the 10th. Our Nanking comrades confessed to
having been careless in their action, and having erred in many instances;
while our Wuhan comrades confessed to having delayed in the resistance
to, and suppression of, the Communists. Now our comrades of both
Wuhan and Nanking, in a spirit of self-denunciation and of tolerance,
with the wish of remedying the entire situation, are unanimous in their
aim to restore the shattered party its original organisation, The reason
why I, Chin-wei, having already blundered, did not resign sooner, was
because it has been my hope to bring about the cherished union of the
party. Today it is almost achieved, and I, Chin-wei, therefore recognise
that the time for me to retire has arrived."
In another telegram, addressed at the same time to the Central Committee
of the party, the repentant sinner bitterly reproached himself for the
tardiness in acting against the Communists, and declared his intention to
punish himself to justify his comrades. The message was concluded with
the following declaration of abject surrender: "This is the time for me to
retire and to wait for your judgment. I further respectfully request that
you deal with me strictly, in order to do justice to my comrades. I
humbly await your verdict."
480 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
That was an unconditional recantation of whatever the petit-bourgeois
left wing had done ever since it was forced by the revolutionary
democratic masses to assume the leadership of the Kuo Min Tang. By
lovingly .referring to the Nanking faction as "our comrades", Wang
Chin-wei emphasised that there was no basic difference between the two
rival groups. Obviously under the dictation of the "Old Guard", the
repentant prodigal fully endorsed all the actions of his rival, Chiang,
whom he had so vehemently condemned during the preceding year. He
even asked for punishment, so that his "comrades", namely, Chiang and
others who had preceded him in the massacre of the workers and
peasants, might be vindicated. Finally, he handed over the leadership of
the entire Kuo Min Tang to the counter-revolutionary "Old Guard" by
advocating the restoration of the "original organisation" of the party. He
delivered the heritage of Sun Yat-senism to its rightful heirs. Such was
the pitiable swan song of petit-bourgeois radical nationalism.
Having forfeited the support of the revolutionary democratic masses and
having betrayed the friendship of the Soviet Union, no Kuo Min Tang
Government could exist without the patronage of the big bourgeoisie;
and behind the latter there stood international Imperialism. Pending the
interminable negotiations for the fusion of the two rival factions, the
position of the Nationalist Government, at Wuhan as well as Nanking,
became very precarious. In the former place the Government had
practically ceased to exist. All the political leaders went away to confer
with the rival group in Shanghai. Tang Shen-chi alone was left as the
undisputed master of the situation. The position of the Nanking
Government was no better. Tang Shen-chi sent an expedition down the
Yangtse to invade the territories under its ccntrol. In order to resist that,
and to suppress the Nanchang insurrection, Chiang Kai-shek was obliged
to withdraw most of his troops from the northern front. That opened the
road for Chang Tsung-chang. His army swept back down the Tientsin-
Pukow Railway and regained possession of the southern terminus on the
Yangtse, just across Nanking. On the other hand, Sun Chuang-fang's
troops were threatening Shanghai from the North. In the southern
provinces themselves, the authority of the Nanking Government was
only nominal. Kwangtung and Kwangsi were practically autonomous. In
such a situation, mercenary troops were the only mainstay for the
Nanking Government. It needed money for the purpose, and money
The Struggle for Power 481
in sufficiently large amount could come only from the bankers of
Shanghai. So the latter became the real dictators of the situation.
The self-effacement of Wang Chin-wei opened the way for the return of
Chiang Kai-shek. He was the chosen of the big bourgeoisie, the aspirant
to Chinese Bonapartism. Upon the departure of Wang-Chin-wei, the
Unity Conference held its final session at Nanking during the third week
of September 1927. Its first act was to expel from the Kuo Min Tang the
few minor left-wing leaders who had not completely capitulated. The
vacancies caused on the Central Executive of the party by the massacre
of the Communists and expulsion of the recalcitrant left-wingers, were
filled up by the "White" Kuo Min Tang men who had fought against the
party ever since 1924. The body, thus purged and packed, arbitrarily
constituted itself as the "Central Special Committee", and invested itself
with emergency power until the meeting of the Third Party Congress. As
the counter-revolutionary "Special Committee" was to prepare for and
convene the Congress, there could be no doubt about its outcome. Its
function would be only to throw a pseudo-constitutional mantle on the
doughty shoulders of the military dictatorship backed up by the counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie.
The power assumed by the "Special Committee" was sweeping. It
declared itself as the only party authority, thus putting an end to the
aspiration of the Wuhan group, some of whose leaders had found place
in the high council of dictatorship. The following passage from one of its
resolutions shows how dictatorial was the power assumed by that self-
appointed conclave of counter-revolutionaries: "That, since the central
party headquarters and the Nationalist Government have both been
reorganised by this committee, the Nationalist Government hitherto in
function, and their allied organs, and the central party headquarters
hitherto in function and all their allied organs, be declared to cease
functioning and be taken over by the newly organised party headquarters
and Government."2 If one looks for any legal foundation of the
Nationalist Government of Nanking, this arbitrary decree, issued by a
self-constituted counter-revolutionary dictatorship, is the only document
available.
As soon as the dictatorship was formally established, Chiang Kai-shek
returned from his holiday in Japan to be its figure-head. Arriving at
Shanghai on November 10, he declared publicly that he had abandoned
his intention to go abroad for study on the urgent
482 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
request of the party, and particularly on the appeal of Wang Chin-wei.
The latter returned from Canton to welcome personally his rival back to
power. After a few days, Chiang Kai-shek resumed his office as the
Generalissimo of the Nationalist Army. Instigated by his immediate
followers, Wang Chin-wei made a last effort to pit the discredited party
against the dictatorial "Special Committee". The result was the issue of a
secret order for his arrest. He escaped and went abroad.
In the beginning of 1928, the bourgeoisie appeared to be rather well
seated in the saddle of dictatorship. They believed to have killed the
revolution successfully, and hoped to build up a centralised State with
the patronage of foreign Imperialism. As soon as the tide of events
definitely turned, and the couuter-revolutionary forces recaptured the
leadership of the nationalist movement, a benevolent smile replaced the
ominous frown of the Imperialist Powers. The British Foreign Secretary,
Chamberlain, had taken the lead in mobilising the forces of international
Imperialism against the Chinese Revolution. He was also the first to
make the gesture of benevolence towards the counter-revolutionary
Chinese bourgeoisie. Speaking at Birmingham on January 19, 1928, he
made the following declaration about the future relations between Britain
and China: "The active anti-foreign phase of the revolution has passed
with the passing of Russian influence from the nationalist party. We
cannot permit ourselves to be deprived, by forceful action, of our treaty
rights, but we are ready at any moment in a generous spirit to negotiate
with anyone, yho can speak for the Chinese people and can make
engagements in their name and fulfil engagements made, in order to
adjust old treaty rights to the new position, and give a generous
satisfaction to the legitimate demands of the Chinese for the development
of their nationality and independence."
Chamberlain did not make the statement of policy before getting well
acquainted with the trend of events in China. Sir Frederick Whyte, head
of the British delegation to the Conference of Pacific Relations, held in
Honolulu in the middle of 1927, had spent the closing months of the year
in China. On his return to England, he expressed the following opinion in
an interview to the press: "The situation in China, I can sum up in a few
sentences. The Chinese Revolution has reached a definite turning point,
and the next few months will decide whether it shall develop along the
evolutionary
The Struggle for Power 483
lines of European liberalism, or the revolutionary lines of Soviet Russia.
No doubt the action of the liberal Western Powers, Great Britain in
particular, within the next month or two, will be an important factor in
helping China to make the decision."
In a series of articles, contributed to the "Times" of London, Sir
Frederick Whyte further pointed out that the followers of Sun Yat-sen
were eager to receive foreign financial assistance for the development of
their country, as visualised by their departed leader. About the same
time, the American banker, Lament, also paid a visit to China. On his
return, he declared that the Chinese nationalists could count upon the
support of American finance, should they make serious efforts to set their
house in order. Regarding Lament's statement as an invitation, the
Nanking Government sent its Foreign Minister, C.C. Wu, as the special
envoy to Washington, where he was cordially received. Shortly
afterwards, a report was sent out from Washington, according to which a
plan for the economic reconstruction of China was on foot. The plan
"probably will involve the biggest banking transaction in the world's
history"3. Evidently, the special envoy of the Nanking Government had
made a good impression in Wall Street.
Imperialism was willing to help the Chinese bourgeoisie to establish
some sort of order in their country, so that foreign capital could be
invested there with greater security. Militarism had been too discredited
to serve any longer as the weapon of imperialist domination. It should be
discarded in favour of a new agency more suitable to the changed
conditions of China as well as of Imperialism itself. The crisis of
capitalism had raised the question of foreign markets more acutely than
ever. China would provide a vast market, if she came out of the chaos of
civil wars and be united under a central authoritry capable of establishing
peaceful conditions. Moreover, the market was largely potential. Its
development required investment of large capital. That again could not
be available unless adequate security was available. The Nanking
Government promised to create all these conditions necessary for an
intensified exploitation of China in the interest of foreign Imperialism.
Therefore, from the beginning, its foreign relations were favourable.
Soon after the occupation of Peking and the formal liquidation of the
imaginary Central Government there, it received de jure recognition
from one imperialist Power after another. Following upon the
establishment of
484 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
diplomatic relations, new customs, conventions were concluded, granting
China some tariff autonomy according to the decision of the Washington
Conference.
Inside the country also things looked rosy for the bourgeoisie. The
authority of the Nationalist Government of Nanking appeared to be
established beyond all serious contest. Practical!} the whole of the
country, with the exception of the three Manchurian provinces, owed
allegiance to it. Even the ruler of Manchuria, Chang Hsue-liang, agreed
to hoist the national flag over his domain provided that there would be no
objection from Japanese Imperialism. Not only Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen
Hai-shan, absolute rulers of the territories respectively controlled by
them, accepted high offices under the Nanking Government; the worthy
son of the Manchurian War-Lord himself proclaimed his faith in the
Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen, and consequently became an adherent
of the Kuo Min Tang and a pillar of the Nationalist Government.
The victory of the bourgeoisie, however, was very superficial; the unity
in the camp of counter-revolution was very precarious. The conditions
for the creation of a centralised modern State were still very far from
being realised. As soon as the bourgeoisie tried to rule actually, the mere
formality of the jurisdiction of their Government became evident. The
feudal-militarist rulers of the outlying provinces would owe formal
allegiance to the Nanking Government, but not tolerate the least
encroachment upon their power and privileges. The bourgeoisie
themselves were split up into antagonistic factions byj sectional interests.
The leaders of the "united party" were consequently divided among
themselves, representing a variety of conflicting capitalist interests.
Trading capital, drawing unlimited profit from the mediaeval structure of
national economy, opposed the plan of economic reconstruction which
would disrupt the conditions favourable for its operation. The interest of
trading capital cut across the aspirations of the industrial bourgeoisie
who wanted to break down all barriers to a free exchange of com-
modities. The bankers allied themselves with one or the other tendency,
according to the enterprise in which they happened to be financially
interested. Among themselves, t)iey were divided into two main groups,
one favouring American, and the other English orientation in the foreign
policy of the Nationalist Government. Because one group was connected
with American, and the other group
The Struggle for Power 485
with British Imperialist finance.
The instability of counter-revolution revealed itself as soon as the
Nanking Government touched the burning problem of reconstructing the
country ruined by a protracted civil war. Even if the bourgeoisie could
possibly put aside their sectional interests for the consolidation of the
position of their entire class, they were still very far from wielding
effective power over their feudal allies. The situation became still worse
and more complicated when, in the struggle for power, not only parasitic
trading capital, but even the defeated and discredited petit-bourgeois left
wing of the Kuo Min Tang joined hands with feudal reaction in order to
resist the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. At the first test, it became
evident that the authority of the Nanking Government was a fiction.
Ever since its inauguration, the Nanking Government had been living on
loans from the Shanghai bankers. Although it claimed to be the central
authority of the entire country, even in the middle of 1929, it could
collect revenue only from the two provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang
adjoining Shanghai. But it had to spend money in all the provinces
nominally under its jurisdiction. The allegiance of the Generals actually
controlling the affairs of those provinces could be retained only so long
as ample subsidy for the upkeep of their armies was given from Nanking.
In May 1929, the Nanking Government was indebted to the Shanghai
bankers for 126,000,000 dollars bearing an average interest of 9.5 per
cent, and secured by the revenue to be derived from the 2.5 per cent sur-
tax on customs duties granted by the Washington Agreement. The actual
income of the Government at that time was about five million dollars a
month, collected in the two provinces under its effective control. The
monthly expenditure in those two provinces alone was approximately
nine million dollars. So, financially, the Nationalist Government was
altogether insolvent. Illusory military victories, fictitious political
authority and bombastic plans of economic reconstruction were poor
assets. They could command no credit either at home or abroad. The
Shanghai bankers held their purse-strings tight, refusing to grant further
loans, unless the finances of the Nationalist Government were placed on
a solid basis. In that situation, there could be no hope of a foreign loan.
The imperialist Powers smiled approvingly when the Chinese
bourgeoisie betrayed the Democratic Revolution. They held out tempting
prizes for that
486 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
meritorious deed; but actual money or political concession was not
available. To deserve that, the Nationalist Government must prove that it
was really the master of the situation. And facts presently proved that the
contrary was the case. The power of the Nanking Government was a
fiction. It was aspiring to set up a counterrevolutionary dictatorship
(political tutelage a la Sun Yat-sen) on a foundation of fleeting sand. It
was building castles in the air.
While it was in such a precarious plight, the Shylock of Shanghai
damanded his pound of flesh. The big bourgeoisie had helped the
counter-revolutionary nationalists to set up a Government to act as the
weapon for extending their power throughout the country. Development
of capitalism required pacification of the country, reduction of military
expenditure, removal of feudal restrictions on trade, centralisation of
national finance, and curtailment of the arbitrary power wielded by the
feudal-militarist provincial potentates. The task of the Nanking
Government was to carry through those measures. But such a task could
be accomplished only by an organ of political power growing out of a
victorious bourgeois democratic revolution. Thriving on the prostrate
body of the revolution, the Nanking Government could not possibly be
equal to the task. Its founders had defeated the revolution in alliance with
those very social forces, and for defending those very social conditions,
the destruction of which was necessary for a normal capitalist
development of the country. Its crimes against the revolution rendered it
unable to further the interests even of the bourgeoisie.
In June 1929, representatives of the banking, commercial and industrial
interests from all parts of the country met in Shanghai with the object of
formulating the financial and economic policy of the Nationalist
Government. The Finance Minister of the Nanking Government, T. V.
Soong, himself intimately connected with the banking world of
Shanghai, was present at the conference to take orders from the task-
master of his Government. The antagonistic Interests of the different
sections of the bourgeoisie clashed, almost wrecking the conference. A
general agreement was reached only on one point, namely, the reduction
of military expenditure and employment of the disbanded soldiers in
productive labour. In the very beginning of its constructive effort, the
Nanking Government came up against the basic problem of the situation.
The future of the country depended on the solution of that problem. But
the solu-
The Struggle for Power 487
tion was a revolution. The imbecility of a counter-revolutionary
Government was bound to stand naked before the vital problem of social
reconstruction.
The bourgeoisie, however, were very exacting. They set the baffling
problem to the Nanking politicians, and ordered them to tackle it as the
condition for further support. Acting upon the peremptory order of the
bourgeoisie, the Nanking Government adopted a very bombastic
Reconstruction Plan. The following were its main items: (1) The armed
forces of the country to be reduced to a standing army, directly under the
command of the Government, of 500,000. (At that time there were nearly
a million and a half men under arms throughout the country). (2) The
national budget for the army and navy not to exceed 192,000,000 dollars.
(3) Construction of roads and improvement of waterways for employing
the disbanded soldiers. (4) Settlement of demobilised soldiers on the
waste-lands in the outlying provinces. (5) Unification of currency. (6)
Abolition of the likin (internal transit tax); and (7) Centralisation of
national finance.
The interests of the bourgeoisie demanded those measures; their
introduction would revolutionise the country. In his report to the
National Economic Conference, the Finance Minister, T.V. Soong,
estimated the total national revenue to be 450,000,000 dollars. Of that,
only about 600,000,000 were actually collected by the Nanking
Government. The rest was appropriated by the provincial and local
rulers. The total military expenditure of the country was estimated at
380,000,000 dollars. That huge sum was raised by the feudal militarists
who were absolute monarchs of territories respectively occupied by
themselves. "Illegal, extraordinary and irregular taxes and financial
measures have come into existence during the whole course of the civil
warfare. Few of them are in the category of national taxes, but have been
imposed by militarists and provincial officials".4 The internal transit tax
was a profitable source of income for the feudal-militarist and provincial
rulers. There were more than five hundred likin stations throughout the
country. The total amount of levy taken at those numerous stations could
never be accurately estimated; but the nominal share of the Central
Government had never been more than forty million dollars a year. It
was commonly believed that at least that much more was pocketed by the
officials on the spot; and only a fraction of the nominal share of the
Govern-
488 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
ment ever actually reached the National Exchequer. Likin was ruinous
for the development of internal trade. Therefore, its abolition was
pressingly demanded by the bourgeoisie.
But the main demand of the bourgeoisie was the limitation of the army
which absorbed, according to the report of T.V. Soong, nearly eighty-
five per cent of the entire national revenue. Without a drastic reduction
of the military expenditure, any financial rehabilitation of the country
evidently was not possible. Even if, by some miracle, the entire national
revenue could be taken into the Central Treasury, the Government would
still be very far from financial solvency, so long as the military budget
was not substantially retrenched. After the military bill was footed, only
seventy million dollars would be left in the Treasury. That would not be
nearly enough for paying the interests on foreign and internal loans
which amounted to 130,000,000 dollars a year. In such a state of
hopeless financial insolvency, the Nationalist Government could not
expect any further loan, either from the native bankers or from abroad;
and without money, all its bombastic plans would remain on paper.
So, the reduction of military expenditure, through the disband-ment of
the bulk of the armed forces, became the central problem for the
Nationalist Government. The last word again belonged to feudal
Generals. In order to make a bid for real power, the bourgeoisie must
have a trial of strength with their feudal allies. In the beginning, there
prevailed great optimism about the disbandment of troops. The "Big
Five" controlling the military forces in the provinces formally under the
jurisdiction of Nanking, met in a conference there. Deliberations took
place behina closed doors. Finally, a Communique was issued stating
that the war-lords had agreed to place their armies directly at the disposal
of the Nationalist Government which would set up a Disbandment
Commission. On the face of it, that was a very good resolution. The
Nanking Government appeared to be the central authority of the country,
not only in name, but in reality as well. The bourgeoisie appeared to be
the masters of the situation— in real power so as to dictate terms to the
feudal war-lords who had ruled and ruined the country for fifteen years.
The Nationalist Finance Minister, representing the bourgeoisie, told the
assembled Generals that the country was on the verge of ruin; that' the
Government was financially bankrupt; that no further taxation was
possible; that no new loans could be raised before old obligations
The Struggle for Power 489
were met; and that substantial reduction of military expenditure was the
only way out of the impasse. He demanded that "the Ministry of Finance
must have complete control of the national revenue, full power to appoint
and dismiss officials, and adequate protection against interference by the
militarists." In other words, he exhorted the real rulers of the country to
abdicate, so that the bourgeoisie could inherit political power
automatically.
The hard-headed war-lords listened patiently to the eloquence of the
youthful section of the ambitious bourgeoisie, and stolidly signed an
agreement which, if meant to be observed, was nothing less than
abdication of power and self-elimination. The substance of the agreement
was that the armed forces should be reduced by half, costing no more
than 192,000,000 dollars a year (representing forty-one per cent of the
estimated total of national revenue); that the national revenue should be
centralised, and the reduced army paid from the Ministry of Finance; that
all the arsenals of the country should be placed under the control of the
Central Government and the manufacture of arms and ammunitions
should cease; that the older officers and men should be pensioned off;
and that the rest would be disbanded in proportion as productive
employment was found for them.
Evidently, the agreement was signed by the Generals without the least
intention of observing it. It implied huge disbursements from the
National Exchequer before the latter could be practically benefited by the
operation of the agreement. It would take plenty of time to build up an
efficient State apparatus for bringing the national revenue actually in the
Central Exchequer. Meanwhile, 192,000,000 dollars a year should be
found for the military budget. As under the given financial condition the
Central Government could not possibly find the money, the agreement
did not bind the hands of the Generals who could go ahead indefinitely,
as before, on the plea that the other party did not fulfil the contract. Then,
in the absence of sufficient capital necessary for the purpose, productive
work for the disbanded soldiers could not be created. According to the
estimate of T.V. Soong, at least 250,000,000 dollars of initial capital was
required to finance public works, settlements, colonisation of waste-
lands, etc., on a sufficiently large scale to absorb nearly a million men to
be disbanded according to the agreement. Evidently, the plausible
resolution of the Disbandment Conference was not to be realised. It was
a very
490 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
}

adroit move on the part of the feudal militarists to sign the contract. By
doing so they simply mocked at the imbecility of the ambitious
bourgeoisie.
Having signed the face-saving agreement, the war-lords returned to their
respective domains. They checkmated the bourgeoisie in the struggle for
power around the conference table. Now the stuggle was to break out in
the open, and lead to a new period of civil war.
The clash occurred first between the two factions inside the clique which
originally constituted the basis of the Nanking Government. The
dictatorship growing out of the counter-revolution of 1927, represented
an alliance of the bourgeoisie and the so-called "Kwangsi Group",
composed of the feudal militarists and compradores of the South. While
the provinces north of the Yangtse, formally adhering to the Nanking
Government, remained under the control of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen
Hsi-shan, the southern provinces were divided between the two factions
composing the Nanking ruling clique. The danger of revolution having
been warded off, the bourgeoisie tried to push the Kwansi feudals out of
the Nanking dictatorship. As a counter-move, the Kwansi Group
established itself in the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung and
Kwangsi, with its headquarters at Hankow.
Much too preoccupied with the task of taking Peking and settling
accounts not only with Feng and Yen, but also with the Manchurian
War-Lord, Chiang Kai-shek could not prevent the consolidation of the
rival faction. But he turned his attention into that direction as soon as the
affairs in the North were ijxed up, foreign relations satisfactorily
established, and the occupation of Shantung by Nanking troops thwarted
Feng's ambition to have an access to the sea. But the Kwangsi Group
acted in anticipation. Suspecting that the Governor of the rich province
of Hunan was in secret negotiation with Nanking, they removed him
from his post on the pretext of his leniency towards the Communists. The
Nanking Government severely censured that action as violation of the
central authority. The rebels retorted by asserting that the provincial
authorities had the right to appoint and dismiss officials in their
jurisdiction. They moved troops in positions of defence, thus heading off
the planned attack from Nanking. The fictitious character of the
unification of the country under the Nanking Government was revealed.
Hardly a month ago the Generals had signed the agreement to place their
troops under the
The Struggle for Power 491
supreme command of the Nationalist Government. The worthlsssness of
that agreement became evident much earlier than expected.
A few days later, in his speech to the Third Congress of the Kuo Min
Tang, Chiang Kai-shek complained : "It is not possible to say that China
is now really united; for provincial Governments are acting
independently, buying arms and recruiting troops without the sanction of
the central authority, and often dictating terms to this latter by virtue of
their military strength." He pointed out the revolt of the Kwangsi faction
as the most recent case. The Congress being packed with his nominees,
Chiang Kai-shek could easily cause the expulsion of the Kwangsi leaders
from the party. The Congress empowered him to take the field against
the rebels. Anxious to maintain a Central Government, which had won
the approbation of international Imperialism, the bourgeoisie agreed to
finance the campaign against the Kwangsi Group. The rebels evacuated
Hankow, and withdrew to their base in the provinces of Hunan and
Kwangsi. From there they could not be dislodged. Those rich provinces
no longer owned even a nominal allegiance to the central authority.
The revolt of the Kwangsi Group was only the beginning. The campaign
brought Nanking up against its own Minister of War, Feng Yu-hsiang.
There was sufficient reason to believe that he had instigated the action of
the rebels. On the pretext of sickness, he absented himself from the Party
Congress. While the Congress was sitting, he sent in his resignation from
the post of the Minister of War. Then, there followed a manifesto issued
by the non-existing Kuo Min Tang organisations in the provinces
controlled by him (Honan, Shensi and Kansu), sharply criticising the
leadership of the party and declining to abide by the decisions of the
Congress. The most remarkable feature of the manifesto was the demand
for return of Wang Chin-wei to the leadership of the party. The feudal
militarists were up in arms for resisting the plan of the bourgeoisie to
create a centralised State as the organ of their dictatorial power. In that
struggle for power, reactionary feudal militarism sought, and easily
secured, the alliance (rather subservience) of the discredited petit-
bourgeois elements in the Kuo Min Tang. The resistance to the creation
of conditions necessary even for the capitalist development of China was
to be organised under the soiled flag of Sun Yet-senism, and under the
political leadership of his most orthodox disciple.
In action, Feng proved to be as dilatory as ever. Pretending
492 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
still to support the Nanking Government in its campaign against the
Kwangsi rebels, he moved his troops towards Hankow, but did not move
quickly enough. Chiang's troops captured the city. Elated by their
unexpectedly easy victory, the bourgeoisie decided to push the fight
further, hoping to demoralise feudal-militarist resistance by dealing swift
blows. Feng was the next on the list. Having captured Hankow, Chiang
Kai-shek declared his intention to continue "the punitive expedition until
all the counter-revolutionary elements have been eliminated, and none
remained to dispute the authority of the Central Government." As he did
not show any inclination to push his way inside the territory of the
Kwangsi rebels, it was obvious whom he wanted to strike next.
While Chiang Kai-shek had been conducting operations against the
Kwangsi rebels, Feng marshalled his troops in battle-array along the
Lunghai Railway, and blew up bridges to impede the progress of forces
which might be sent to dislodge him from the strategic position.
Generalissimo of the "united forces", Chiang demanded of Feng an
explanation for his actions in moving troops without orders from the
headquarters and for destroying national property. The demand for
explanation was backed up by preparations of an attack upon Feng's
army simultaneously from the south, east and north. His answer was
another public declaration, signed by a number of his lieutenants.
In the declaration, Chiang Kai-shek was condemned for having destroyed
the Kuo Min Tang for his personal ambition,*misappro-priated national
funds, and assumed dictatorial power. The signatories to the declaration
demanded Chiang's resignation, and urged their leader Feng to command
a "punitive expedition" against the Com-mander-in-Chief of the National
Army. Two days later Feng addressed a message to the diplomatic
representatives of the foreign Powers, asking them to remain neutral in
the struggle against "the illegal Nanking Government". That was an open
declaration of war— a serious challenge to the pretension of the
bourgeoisie to assume supreme power. The Nanking Government, of
course, declared Feng Yu-hsiang a rebel, expelled him from the Kuo Min
Tang, deprived him of all high offices, and ordered his arrest.
Feng was in a disadvantageous position, financially as well as militarily.
The provinces under his control were very poor, devastated by civil war.
Having no access to the sea, he could not easily get
The Struggle for Power 493
sufficient supply for his troops. The Nanking army, on the contrary, was
well equipped with arms supplied from abroad on credit, and it could still
draw upon the financial sources of Shanghai. Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-
shek did not hasten to take any serious military measures against the
rebel. There began a puzzling period of secret negotiations, unscrupulous
intrigues and hypocritical protestations. An actual clash of arms would
completely burst the bubble of a central authority. Nanking could not
possibly destroy Feng; at best he could be driven back into the western
provinces, where he would certainly declare himself independent of the
Nanking Government, would instigate the Kwangsi faction which still
held the southern-western provinces, and even encourage Yen Hsi-shan
to set up a rival National Government in Peking in conjunction with the
Manchurian militarists. Thus, pushing its ambition too far, Nanking
might altogether lose the position of the formally recognised central
authority of the country. Its policy, therefore, was to make the best of the
bad game, somehow to get out of the fray without losing face.
At first, a number of Feng's Gererals were bought off with bribes. Then,
strenuous efforts were made to detach Yen Hsi-shan from his ally and
neighour. But the affection of the "little-brother" proved to be
surprisingly fast. He modestly received all his posts, honours, titles and,
of course, the lucre, from the Nanking Government; but he was always
very tardy to do his part, namely, to fight Feng. As a matter of fact, all
the time he worked upon his cherished design of bringing about a new
combination of the northern militarists with himself as the central figure.
The comedy played by the crafty twins (Feng and Yen)—now "retiring
hand in band'' in some temple in the mountains; then, suffering from
stomach-trouble; then again, Feng going to study abroad leaving the
"little-brother" in charge of his forces and territories; and finally, both
Tweedledum and Tweed-ledee going to see the world together—amused
and puzzled the world for months. Re-establishment of the status quo
ante bellurn eventually ended the drama. For a very substantial sum of
money, Feng let Chiang have the empty glory of occupying Loyang, and
withdrew his forces intact into the security of the western provinces,
where he continued to rule supreme. The money received enabled him to
re-equip his troops with the object of taking up the struggle in future.
The victory of the bourgeoisie was not only nominal, but very short-
lived. At the end of 1928, they had appeared to be well estab-
494 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
lished in power. Hardly a year had passed, and the myth of national
unification was gone. The country was again broken up into several
practically independent regions. Political authority of the Nanking
Government remained confined to the two provinces immediately
adjacent to Shanghai. By far the larger part of the country was occupied
by three main feudal-militarist combinations. They all defied the
authority of the Nanking Government, although from time to time owing
allegiance to it. The high-sounding plans of military disbandment,
political centralisation, financial rehabilitation and economic
reconstruction, to which the feudal lords imperturbedly added their
signature, remained on paper. Instead of being reduced, the armed forces,
sucking the life-blood of the country, actually swelled further in course
of the new period of civil war. The year 1930 found the country split up
into four armed camps, feverishy preparing to destroy one another, if not
yet actually engaged in war.
The internal transit-tax had not been abolished. More than
eighty per cent of the national revenue was still collected and spent
locally, independent of any control by the titular Central Government.
And there was no reason to believe that the situation would improve
in the near future, unless the revolution recovered from defeat, to
challenge the dictatorial ambition of the imbecile bourgeoisie as well
as the power of feudal militarist reaction. .
The apparent retreat of Feng Yu-hsiang before the shower of silver-
bullets from Nanking by no means put an end to the state of civil war.
There followed only a short period of armed truce. Even for that, the
Nanking Government had to pay a very heavy price. The undisputed
control of Peking and the adjacent provinces had to be conceded to Yen
Hsi-shan for his neurality, that is, in order to induce him not to join
openly his forces with the "elder brother" in the crusade against Nanking.
In Manchuria, Chang Hsue-liang was encouraged in the adventure of
provoking a conflict with the U.S.S.R. over the Chinese Eastern Railway,
so that an all-inclusive Northern Alliance against Nanking might not be
formed. Meanwhile, the situation in the southern provinces went from
bad to worse. The Kwangsi rebels again raised their head, and the "Iron
Army", which previously had contributed so much to the Nationalist
victory, went over to them. The petit-bourgeois "left" Kuo Min Tang, led
by Wang Chin-wei, joined the new anti-Nanking coalition. In the middle
of 1929, when the Nanking Government was attacked on all sides, the
petit-
The Struggle for Power 495
bourgeois "left" leaders reappeared on the political horizon with a plan of
reorganising the Kuo Min Tang on the principles of Sun Yat-sen. They
claimed the Kwangsi feudal militarists and the rebellious "Iron Army" as
their own; started secret negotiations with Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-
shan; and proposed either to set up a rival nationalist Government at
Canton or support one in Peking, headed by Yen Hsi-shan.
The bankrupt petit-bourgeois politicians could consolidate the forces of
counter-revolution no more successfully than the big bourgeoisie. The
Nanking Government could survive repeated revolt of feudal militarists,
not by virtue of any greater strength, but thanks to the lack of cohesion in
the ranks of the rebels. They had only one thing in common, namely, the
will to resist the plan of the bourgeoisie to build up a centralised State.
But that one common interest was more than counter-balanced by mutual
discord, suspicion and rivalry. The plan of the petit-bourgeois politicans
to link up the feudal-militarist forces of dismemberment into a solid bloc
against Nanking was, therefore, doomed to failure. The pompously
begun campaign of the "reorganisationists" fizzled out very soon. The
failure of the feudal militarists to unite in their resistance to Nanking
enabled the latter to continue in a precarious existence. But the resistance
itself did not cease. It went on, now from one side, then from another,
effectively frustrating the plans of the Nanking Government, exposing
the imbecility of the bourgeoisie, and proving that a modern capitalist
State could not be established before the reactionary cumbrances of the
past were ruthlessly destroyed. The disease was organic. It could not be
cured by palliatives. It required a radical remedy which the bourgeoisie
failed to apply.
Unable and unwilling to lead a revolutionary struggle for liquidating pre-
capitalist social relations, the Chinese nationalist bourgeoisie could not
even accomplish what was indispensable for the promotion of their own
interest. Overthrow of feudalism is the condition for a free development
of capitalism. But actually that revolutionary task is never accomplished
by the bourgeoisie. That is done by the action of the peasantry. The
bourgeoisie can snatch political power from the senile hands of feudal
absolutism, when they support the revolutionary action of the peasant
masses. There is no other way for the bourgeoisie to come to power. By
turning against the peasantry, while they were going to deliver the death-
blow to the
496 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
foundation of the feudal-militarist reaction, the Chinese nationalist
bourgeoisie forfeited their claim to power. Had the rural democratic
forces been allowed by the Nationalist Government to develop organs of
local self-government, then, the frame-work of a centralised State would
have been created throughout the country. In that case, the Nationalist
Government would not be hanging in the air, depending for its very
existence on mercenary troops financed and equipped with the grudging
help of native bankers and damaging subsidy from foreign Imperialism.
Then, it would have its roots struck deep in the social soil, and therefore
would be able to carry out the unification of the country under a
revolutionary democratic State. But the nationalist bourgeoisie of China
would not travel the revolutionary way. Consequently, they were bound
to find themselves in a blind-alley.
Nor could the "left" wing of the Kuo Min Tang, although it represented
the more advanced section of the bourgeoisie, be expected to rescue the
unfortunate country from the impasse. They also had supported the
landlords against the rebellious peasantry, and endorsed the bloody
suppression of the latter. Even now, though they pretended to disapprove
of the bureaucratic dictatorship of Nanking, thly were outspoken in the
hostility to the revolutionary action of the peasantry. They still stuck to
paternalist principle of Sun Yat-sen, that the peasants should not
confiscate the land, but wait patiently until the Nationalist Government
would distribute it to them. Experience had shown that that could never
happen. The Nationalist Government had no power to give the land to
the peasantry, even if it wanted. The only thing it could do was to
support the revolutionary action of the peasantry. The "left wing"
nationalists refused to do that when they were in a favourable position.
Therefore, the centralisation and democratisation of the country could
not take place under their leadership. Still, they demagogically talked
about capturing power for ''transforming the existing system of military-
feudalism into a sound socialist democracy".5
The dearly bought neutrality of Yen Hsi-shan, the bribed retreat of Feng
Yu-hsiang, the decomposition of the Kwangsi clique, and the abject
failure of the "left" wing to do anything effective—all these taken
together did not help the Nanking Government very much. Its position
remained as precarious as ever. New troubles broke out in December
1929. This time it was very dangerously near home,
The Struggle for Power 497
seriously threatening the position of the fictitious central authority. Apart
from Kiangsu and Chekiang, the practical jurisdiction of Nanking
extended partially to the adjoining province of Anhwei. The
governorship of that province had to be given to a lieutenant of Feng Yu-
hsiang as the price for betraying his chief. The new revolt was led by that
costly ally. It further revealed that Feng's craftiness knew no bounds. He
had ordered his subordinate to betray him, so that he could acquire a high
place inside the enemy's camp. Nanking, on its part, was not entirely
blind to the stratagem of the foxy foe, and did not have much illusion
about the new ally. So it ordered that the troops at the command of the
new Governor of Anhwei should go down south for defending Canton
against the attack from Kwangsi. It was an attempt to disarm the enemy
who had smuggled himself into a strategic position. The camouflaged
enemy was thus forced into premature action; that nevertheless,
threatened to assume alarming proportions. Both the railways from
Peking to the Yangtse Valley were occupied by the rebels who pushed
their way down to Pukow, just across Nanking. In a few days the
rebellion spread throughout the northern and central provinces, the "twin
brothers" obviously pulling the strings behind the scene. The situation
became so menacing that the nationalist Government was about to
evacuate Nanking. At the eleventh hour, it was saved by Chiang Kai-
shek declaring his intention to resign. Ostensibly, he was the target of all
attacks.
The crisis, however, was again overcome by other, more potential,
means. Three factors were brought to bear upon the situation. Bribery
decomposed the enemy camp which never had a principle in common.
Dozens of Generals actually were bandits, going over from this side to
that with bewildering nimbleness. They were out in the market for selling
their questionable adhesion to the highest bidder. Secondly, in order to
hold his base of operation at all cost, Chiang Kai-shek withdrew all his
forces from the south and threw them on the northern front. That move
left Canton at the mercy of the Kwangsi rebels; but Nanking was saved.
To hold Nanking was of supreme importance; its loss would mean the
death of the Nationalist Government, even as a fiction. Finally, the third
factor, which really saved Nanking, was the foreign fleet. As soon as
Pukow was occupied by the insurgents, foreign battleships appeared on
the Yangtse which must be crossed before Nanking could be taken.
Afraid of getting embroiled into a conflict with the foreign
498 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Powers, the rebels did not attempt to cross the river; thus, Chiang Kai-
shek had the time for bringing up his reserves from the south.
Behind all these partial revolts and local skirmishes, the stage was being
set for the grand finale. On the settlement of the conflict with the
U.S.S.R. over the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Manchurian War-Lord
again became an active factor in the situation. A northern military
alliance against Nanking was again formed by the beginning of 1930.
Presently, the original plan of the usual military action was given a
definite political complexion. The new plan was to set up a rival
Government in Peking with Wang Chin-wei as the civil head, and
supported by the three northern war-lords. If such a Government came
into being, it would control at least temporarily territories much larger
than under the jurisdiction of Nanking, with as much apparent authority
as the latter possessed in its domain. In that case, Sun Yat-senism, that is,
counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie nationalism, would be back in its
spiritual home—the mandarindom of patriarchal Peking: the standard-
bearer of pure Sun Yat-senism heading a mandarin-militarist
Government! That would be the last and conclusive evidence of the utter
inability of the bourgeoisie to build up a new China out of the stinking
ruins of the old. Another result of the establishment of a rival
Government in Peking would be re-opening of the whole question of
foreign relations. The imperialist Powers accorded diplomatic
recognition to the Nanking Government, because for the time there was
no other serious rival for the distinction. The appearance of a
Government in Peking with Wang Chin-wei as its head would give them
a plausible pretext to reconsider their decision about the object of their
patronage.
It was not an accident that the Chinese bourgeoisie, from the very
beginning of their struggle for power, in one way or another, counted
upon foreign support. The Reform Movement at the end of the last
century expected that the "democratic Powers" of the West would help it
in the fight against monarchist absolutism, and was bitterly disappointed
to find the expected help given to the decrepit old regime. Sun Yat-sen's
scheme for building up a modern China with the aid of "foreign capital
and technical experts" was a monument to the inability of the Chinese
bourgeoisie to work out the salvation even of their own class. Previously,
monarchist absolutism could survive powerful popular upheavals as long
as it was favoured with foreign support; later on, the very existence of
bourgeois counter-
The Struggle for Power 499
revolution was conditional upon the assistance of international
Imperialism. When the nationalist bourgeoisie turned against the
democratic revolution, foreign Imperialism benevolently approved of
their bloody deeds, and held out the temptation of financial assistance to
their efforts for bringing order out of chaos through the establishment of
a counter-revolutionary dictatorship. Not only did the Nanking
Government propose to execute its bombastic Reconstruction Plan with
the aid of foreign capital, the rival group of the bourgeoisie, represented
by the left wing," would also do exactly the same.
While, in the middle of 1929, the "reorganisationists", in alliance with
the feudal-militarist Kwangsi clique, were planning the establishment of
a rival Nationalist Government at Canton, their leader, Wang Chin-wei,
outlined his programme in a special interview to the "Daily Herald" of
London. Regarding the question of foreign relations, he made the
following very significant statement: "While carrying out our policy of
national independence, we shall restore friendly relations with all
nations. In this, we hope to have the sympathy of the best elements
among the British people." At the end of 1929, when the fall of the
Nanking Government appeared to be imminent, the official
representative in Europe of the "left" Kuo Min Tang made the following
statement regarding the foreign policy of the prospective Government to
be set up by his group: "In foreign affairs, the Left is of course
committed to the policy of recovering all China's lost privileges and
sovereign rights. But it hopes to carry this out in an atmosphere of peace
and amity and not by arbitrary seizure. To attain this aim, a close
cooperation between China and Great Britain is essential."6 The anxiety
even of the "left" nationalist leaders to enlist the friendship of England
showed that the struggle for power among the various groups of the
Chinese ruling class took place on the background of, and was closely
connected with, the struggle for supremacy among the imperialist
Powers.
If the reconstruction of China was to be realised with the aid of foreign
capital, the domination automatically would pass to America. The huge
amount of capital7 required for the purpose could at that time be supplied
only from the Wall Street. Therefore, ever since its foundation, the
foreign policy of the Nanking Government was orientated towards
America. That naturally alarmed the British. They would also welcome
the rise of a central authority in China. But if
The Struggle for Power 501
degree, they were the masters of the situation in their country. They
failed to do that, and there seemed to be little chance of their succeeding
in the future. It was a vicious circle; the only way out was a revolution
which might destroy the bourgeoisie together with all the remnants of the
past obstructing the realisation of their ambition.
Instead of being an organ of power, the Nanking Government became a
dead-weight around the neck of the nationalist bourgeoisie. They had
sunk so much money in it that they were all along obliged to put in more,
so that everything was not irrecoverably lost. They staked their fortune
on a horse which appeared to run madly, but never came in sight of
victory. But, for that wild speculation, they could not get the foreign aid
on which they counted. Very little American capital actually came to
China. The nationalist bourgeoisie began to complain that "there is much
diplomacy, but little investment". They were rather resentful that the
Americans were not in a hurry to help them thrive upon the dead body of
the revolution. "American citizens have about thirty-nine outstanding
contracts with the Chinese Government. Most of them are only on
parchment. . . . If the Americans had availed themselves of the
opportunity offered to them and had rendered the contracts into steel
rails, sleepers, and freight-cars, they would have secured numerous
practical trade, financial and other advantages"9 Thus wrote a nationalist
economic expert.
But the opulent Uncle Sam would not so naively walk into the parlour of
John Chinaman, until and unless the latter set his house in such an order
as would give sufficient guerantee for his investments. The Wall Street
magnate, Lament, had held out great temptations to the Chinese
bourgeoisie when these were revelling in the gore of the revolutionary
workers and peasants. A year and a half later, he spoke in a different
tone. In the Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce, held at
Amsterdam in July 1920, Lament said: "I warn the Chinese friends that
their credit is at a low ebb, and that American or European loans are not
to be thought of until financial and political stability is re-established in
their country."
Thus were the Chinese nationalist bourgeoisie left in the lurch by their
international patrons, after they had betrayed the revolution. Their
struggle for power was a forlorn battle. They must drag on their
precarious existence until the revolution arrested by them recovers from
the defeat, and mercilessly buries the ugly ghost of Father
502 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Confucius, not to enshrine Uncle Sam in his place, but to lay the
foundation of a really free China striding forward in the path of progress
with the epoch-making conquests of man at her disposal. History having
doomed the bourgeoisie to an incorrigible imbecility, the future of China
belongs to the toiling masses. Her rehabilitation will begin only when the
latter capture power to employ modern machines for her rapid economic
transformation; not for private
profit, but for the common benefit of her teeming millions.10
***
In June 1930, the united forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan
revolted against the Nanking Government. At the same time, Changsha,
capital of the province of Hunan, was occupied by the revolutionary
army from the South. On both the fronts, Nanking troops were driven
back. In the North, Yen Hsr-shan captured Tientsin; on the other hand,
Hankow was seriously threatened from the South. In that critical
moment, Wang Chin-wei appeared in Peking with the plan of uniting the
Kuo Min Tang as a partner in the North Coalition against Nanking. The
plan included: (1) Convening of a National Assembly, composed of
representatives from all classes and professions; (2) Drafting of a
Constitution to be submitted to the National Assembly (the principles of
Sun Yat-sen should be the foundation of the proposed Constitution); (3)
Establishment of the organs of local self-government supported by the
masses, but the Communists should be prohibited from sharpening class
antagonism; (4) Creation of a government subordinated to the control of
the party which, in its turn, should not directly interfere in political
matters; (5) Union of all the available talents in the projected
government; and (6) Maintenance of a balance between local and central
powers, instead of centralisation.
It should be noticed that the National Assembly proposed by Wang Chin-
wei very closely resembled the City Council established at Shanghai in
the beginning of 1927. During its resurgence in the year 1929, the
peasant movement created a similar type of local self-governing
institutions. Sun Yat-sen's scheme of a paternal dictatorship was
challenged by a powerful wave of revolutionary democracy. Therefore,
the standard-bearer of "pure Sun Yat-senism" undertook efforts to bring
the local organs of democratic power, created in the midst of a
revolutionary mass struggle, under the domination of the counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie.
The Struggle for Power 503
Ordinarily, parliamentary democracy is the organ of domination of the
bourgeoisie. But under special circumstances, during a revolutionary
crisis for instance, the bourgeoisie may wield power through different
forms of popular representation. During the German Revolution of 1918,
and even the March Revolution in Russia, the Workers' and Soldiers'
Councils were misused as instruments of bourgeoisie democracy.
Similarly, in China the "Soviets", created in the midst of a peasant
insurrection, could be the means for the bourgeoisie to exercise power.
By their social composition, those "Soviets" were not organs of
proletarian dictatorship; they were revolutionary democratic bodies. In
China a centralised State could arise only as the federation of such
"Soviets" created throughout the country. The social character of the
centralised State would be determined by the class under whose
leadership the federation might come into being.
The local organs of power spontaneously grew out of the struggle of the
peasantry. They were named "Soviets" by the Communists who
participated in the process of their creation. But they did not rise under
the leadership of the proletariat which had not yet recovered from the
staggering defeat of 1927. The proletariat could lead the agrarian
revolution as an integral part of its own struggle for power; but there was
no indication of the Chinese proletariat having resumed that struggle. As
a matter of fact, the bitter experience and costly experiment, during the
years 1928 and 1929, raised the question whether the proletariat could
alone take up the leadership of the still to be accomplished democratic
revolution. The revolutionary peasant movement was of a spontaneous
nature and, therefore, could be the foundation for bourgeoisie
democracy, if the conditions in China were not so unfavourable
otherwise. If the bourgeoisie seriously advocated the convening of a
National Assembly, as suggested by Wang Chin-wei, then they could
greatly influence the democratic uprising of the rural masses.
Another point in Wang Chin-wei's programme shows that he was casting
wistful glances towards the countryside. The plan to create organs of
local self-government with the support of the masses represented the
wish to take the "Soviet;" under the paternal protection of "pure Sun Yat-
senisin". But that desire must remain unfulfilled owing to the peculiar
conditions of the country. The peasant masses were in the midst of an
agrarian revolution which had assumed gigantic proportions,
notwithstanding the resistance of the bourgeoisie.
The Struggle for Power 505
view of the serious revolutionary danger it was advisable to postpone the
establishment of a rival National Government in Peking, so that all the
forces could be united against Communism.
Alarmed equally by the rising tide of peasant revolt, both the rival
cliques of Nanking and Peking simultaneously courted for the favour of
the Manchurian War-Lord Chang Hsue-liang. The latter in his turn, must
obey the instructions of Japanese Imperialist. In the beginning of
September (1930), he suddenly set large masses of troops in motion
towards Peking, The Nothern Alliance regarded that as an action in its
support, and proclaimed the establishment of a new government in
Peking. Naturally, an outstanding place in the new government was
reserved for the Manchurian War-Lord. Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang
and Wang Chin-wei became the President, Commander-in-Chief and
Prime Minister respectively. However Japanese Imperialism must have
had reason to keep its protege still out of the game. To the great surprise
of Wang Chin-wei, one of the "talents", Chang Hsue-liang, crowned by
him, unexpectedly declared his loyalty for the opposite camp. Having
failed to secure financial assistance either from Britain or from America,
Chiang Kai-shek had entered into secret negotiations with Japan, offering
it tempting concessions.
The defection of the Manchurian ruler made the position of the Peking
Government untenable. The forces arrayed against it were powerful. It
could not possibly hold its own against simultaneous attacks from the
North and the South. Only a few days after its pompous formation, it
collapsed. Once again, Wang Chin-wei went abroad, a defeated,
disappointed and discredited man.
Soon it came to be known that Nanking had won over not only the
Manchurian War-Lord, but also Feng-Yu-hsiang, who was the real
creator of the North Coalition. His troops suddenly began to withdraw
westwards, presumably under a shower of silver-bullets from the enemy's
lines. Without the slightest scruple, he turned against his erstwhile ally,
Yen Hsi-shan, who evacuated Tientsin and Peking in a hurry. The
agreement between Nanking and Mukden was celebrated by the
installation of Chang Hsue-liang as the Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the
Nationalist Army—a place of honour until then occupied by Yen Hsi-
shan. It was, however, possible for Feng to lead his forces back intact to
his base in the Western provinces which still remained the undisputed
domain of the defeated
506 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
"Christian General."
The rapid disruption of the Northern Alliance was celebrated in Nanking
as yet another long step towards the unity and liberation of the country
under its domination. In reality, however, the country still remained
broken up into independent regions, for all practical purposes hostile to
any central authority. Apart from the Manchurian provinces, an extensive
area (about six provinces) remained under the domination of the
Kwangsi Group; then, there were the Far-Western provinces under Fen's
suzerainty.
Moreover, the latest victory did not overcome the crisis inside the
Nanking Group; on the contrary, it was sharpened. That was evidenced
by the declaration of T.V. Soong who desired to retire from the post of
Finance Minister of the Nanking Government. He was the recognised
representative of the Chinese bankers of Shanghai who until then had
supplied the Exchequer of Nanking. Therefore, Soong's declaration did
not signify anything less menacing than a financial blockade. The
bourgeoisie began to doubt whether the money advanced to Nanking
Government was a profitable investment. Realistically enough, they
seemed to admit the impossibility of ever uniting a considerable portion
of the country, not to speak of the entire country, under a government
dominated by themselves. That attitude of the bourgeoisie drove Chiang
Kai-shek still nearer to the Manchurian clique under the protectorate of
Japanese Imperialism. As the price for the prospective alliance, Chang
Hsue-liang demanded that the Finance Ministry of Nanking should be
given to one of his nominees. On the other hand, the Chinese bankers of
Shanghai got tired of the expensive luxury of Chiang's military
dictatorship, and encouraged the man of their confidence, T.V. Soong,
who resigned from the Finance Ministry with the object of capturing the
higher power—for replacing Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the Nanking
Government.
That drove Chiang definitely into the arms of Japanese Imperialism. It
seems that, in agreement with the Nanking clique, also encouraged by
the Anglo-American policy of encircling the U.S.S.R. with a cordon
sanitaire, Japanese Imperialism decided to annex Manchuria, instead of
continuing to rule there through Chang Hsue-liang. Having conquered
the Manchurian provinces in 1931, Japanese Imperialism invaded
Shanghai. There was no resistance 'to the invaders. The Nanking
Government adopted the policy of "non-
The Struggle for Power 507
resistance". It had to pay heavily for securing the Japanese support for
the crusade against Communism, on which pretext the nationalist
militarists tried to crush the forces of democratic revolution during the
years 1930 to 1934.
Notes
1. The China Year Book, 1928.
2. Despatch of the Kuo Min News Agency, Nanking, September 16, 1927.
3. The China Weekly Review (New China Edition), October 20, 1928.
4. T.V. Soong's speech at the Shanghai National Economic Conference, June, 1929.
5. Tang Liang-li, "The Foundations of Modern China".
6. The Daily Herald, London, December 7, 1929.
7. It was estimated that the execution of the nationalist plans of reconstruction might
easily absorb one thousand million dollars in rive years.
8. In those days, Britain had very little surplus capital to export.
9. B.H. Tan, The China Weekly Review, (New China Edition), Oct. 10, 1928.
10. The book, written in the earlier part of 1930, finished at this point. Events happening
while it was in the press are recorded in the latter part of the chapter. Chapters XXII and
XXIII added in 1939 for this edition, gives a general survey of the developments in the
intervening period, particularly with the purpose of pointing out that criticism and
prophesies made ten years ago have been born out by subsequent events.—Author
CHAPTER XXII
AN EXPERIMENT
By the end of 1931, the bankruptcy of the Nanking Government was
complete. The counter-revolution had not only failed to unite the country
under a military dictatorship, but had exposed its weakness so as to
encourage Japanese Imperialism to launch upon a plan of large-scale
territorial expansion. Continuous civil war having discouraged Anglo-
American Imperialism to extend the promised financial support to the
Nanking Government, the field was clear for Japanese Imperialism.
Knowing that China had no power to resist, and given to understand that
it was free to act against the Soviet Union, Japanese Imperialism began
the formal conquest of Manchuria in 1931. In 1932 Shanghai was
invaded. The heroic resistance put up by the Nineteenth Route Army was
overwhelmed by superior forces. The Nanking Government signed an
agreement dictated by Japanese Imperialism. Neither in Shanghai nor in
the North did Japanese invasion meet any resistance from the
nationalists. On the contrary, their energy was devoted to the suppression
of all spontaneous resistance to foreign invasion.
The Nanking Government adopted the humiliating policy of '"non-
resistance" to Japanese invasion, because it was gathering all its forces to
combat the danger of peasant revolt. The forces of revolution, defeated in
1927, and seriously decimated by the bloody terror which raged
throughout the year 1928, showed signs of recovery. Having failed to
unite the country under a counter-revolutionary dictatorship, and utterly
impotent in the face of Japanese invasion, the nationalists again raised
the bogey of Communism and plunged the country in a bloody civil war
which ravaged it for several years. During that time, Japanese
Imperialism pushed ahead with its plans °f annexation, and by 1935
conquered the whole of Manchuria and
An Experiment 509
established its domination over a considerable portion of the northern
provinces around Peking.
The experience of the short period (1925-27) of revolutionary mass
mobilisation had encouraged the more courageous among the
destitute peasantry to act on their own initiative instead of enlisting
themselves as soldiers in the mercenary armies of the feudal-
militarists particularly those who had been partially armed during the
revolutionary days of the summer of 1927, and survived the reign of
terror in the following year by fleeing to the inaccessible mountainous
regions, where they necessarily took to banditry. That sort of banditry
was not unprecedented in the history of China. It was guerilla
operation on the part of destitute peasantry against the social order
which made no room for them to exist on productive labour. Destitute
peasantry in open revolt against the established socio-political order
was the social basis of the Taiping Rebellion. The tradition of the
most outstanding event in the history of modern China was still alive,
particularly in the central provinces which were the scene of that great
revolutionary movement. Those parts again became the scene of an
armed peasant uprising. The peasant guerilla bands were reinforced
by two other factors.
During the years of revolutionary upheaval, the nationalist armies
could not remain altogether immune from the dangerous ferment.
When they were employed for suppressing the peasant revolt, some
detachments, particularly those under Communist or radically minded
youthful nationalist commanders, revolted. But unable to resist the
fierce attack of the great bulk of mercenary troops, they also withdrew
to the mountainous regions, there to join hands with the armed
peasant bands. The third factor was the Communists who, either
individually or in small bands, escaped the bloody vengeance of
counter-revolution after the disastrous defeat at the end of 1927. All
those three factors, together representing the defeated and dispersed
forces of revolution, went into the making of the so-called "Red
Armies".
Much romantic and lyrical literature has been produced about the
heroic feats of the "Red Armies" and the achievements of the Chinese
"Soviets". The experiment, begun in 1929, has ended. The history of
the Chinese Soviets and Red Armies is certainly a record of great
heroism. But the accomplishments of a revolutionary movement are
to be judged by other standards. It was a very costly
510 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
experiment. It will be justified, if only its lessons will be helpful for the
future development of the Chinese Revolution. For the purpose of
learning the lesson, the history of the experiment must by critically
recorded.
The concentration of the remnants of the defeated and scattered forces of
revolution took place almost exactly in the regions which had been the
birth-place also of the Taiping movement. It was the mountainous
country on the border of the provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. In the
former, the peasant movement had developed the greatest striking power
in 1927. Therefore, it could not be altogether crushed.
The chairman of the Federation of Peasant Unions, Mao Tse-tung, in the
critical days of 1927, represented the extreme right-wing view in the
leadership of the Communist Party. He had gone to Hunan with the
object of "checking the excesses" of the Peasants Unions. But in the
following days of fierce attack on the insurgent peasantry, and during the
subsequent reign of terror, counter-revolution would not show any mercy
even to the blundering Communist leaders but for whose fatal mistakes
the forces of revolution might have come victorious out of the crisis. It
seems that, in the eleventh hour, Mao Tse-tung had no other alternative
than to place himself at the head of some armed peasant band, and
withdraw to the mountainous country to be beyond the reach of the fury
of triumphant counterrevolution. There, his band was gradually joined by
other groups of fleeing armed peasantry and also by detachments of
troops deserting the Nationalist Armies. Finally arrived a small group of
Communists at the head of an army of two thousand men. It was
commanded by Chu Teh.
After the tragedy of the Canton Uprising, Chu Teh had led the troops
loyal to the Communists to the eastern part of Kwangtung, and had
established a temporary base at Hailufeng. But before long, the
Communists were driven out from there by the counter-revolutionary
troops from Canton. Thereupon, Chu Teh performed his first remarkable
military feat. At the head of a handful of troops, he cut across the whole
province of Kiangsi infested with the armed forces of Chiang Kai-shek
wreaking vengeance on the peasant masses. But even that great courage
could not perform a miracle, The small Communist army could not
capture any place in order to create a new base of operation. The
experience showed that the peasantry
An Experiment 511
were thoroughly demoralised, and it was for the moment impossible to
mobilise them into a new offensive action. Finally, having fought its way
through the forces of counter-revolution, Chu Teh's small army reached
the mountainous fastness where other remnants of the defeated forces of
revolution had found a temporary refuge. There, the "Red Army" was
constituted in April 1928 under the command of Chu Teh. Mao Tse-tung
became the political leader. The headquarter of the Red Army was
established in a small place called Chingkingshan. According to a report
subsequently published by the Communist Party, the Army was
composed of ten thousand men, nearly a quarter of whom were armed
with rifles.1 The great bulk of the "Red Army" seems to have been
composed of local "bandits". Its revolutionary nucleus was composed of
less than two thousand men led by Chu Teh from Kwangtung. That was
the remnant of the armies commanded by Yeh Ting and Ho Lung which
had revolted against Nationalist Government, at Nanchang in August
1927. During the intervening nine months, the armed forces commanded
by the Communists had been destroyed almost completely.
The first disagreeable experience of the Red Army was the
demoralisation of the peasantry in the surrounding districts. Making
occasional sorties from its headquarters in the mountainous fastness, the
Red Army captured larger or smaller areas of the adjoining territories.
There, revolutionary peasant committees were set up to function as the
local government. Since the peasants were too discouraged and
demoralised to become active soldiers of the revolution, the Red Army
scarcely grew numerically. In order to bring additional territories under
its control, detachments of the Red Army had to move on after setting up
revolutionary peasant commitees in the already occupied territories. But
as a rule, as soon as they moved on, the peasant committees collapsed.
The result was that the line of communication between the detachments
of the Red Army in operation and its base was often at the mercy of the
enemy. Under such circumstances, extensive operations became
impossible, and the power of the newly created revolutionary centre
remained
confined to a small district immediately adjacent to the base of the Red
Army.
On the other hand, the rural reaction in the surrounding country was on
the alert and received reinforcements from the Provincial Government.
The Red Army consequently found itself practically
512 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
besieged. While offering valuable possibilities for defense, the moun-
tainous vastness at the same time proved to be a disadvantage. Necessary
supplies were not available on the spot. Gradually, it became a very risky
affair to forage for them in the surrounding districts which were already
being protected by troops sent by the Provincial Government. Before
long winter set in. Confronted with starvation and the hardships of severe
cold, guerilla bands composed of destitute peasantry from the
neghbouring territories began to melt away. The peasants would rather
risk a return home than undergo privations and hardships which could be
defied only by firm revolutionary conviction.
By the end of the year, the base at Chingkingshan became utterly
untenable. If sure destruction was to be avoided, another supremely
heroic effort must be made to lead the revolutionary nucleus out of the
besieged mountainous place in search of a better base. A few thousand
starving and freezing, ill-armed and ill-clad men marched southwards,
led by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung. They were to make even more bitter
experience. "The masses completely failed to understand what the Red
Army was. In many places, it was even attacked like a bandit gang. The
Red Army had no support from the masses. There were great difficulties
in finding encampments, carrying on military operations, and securing
information. We marched across snow-covered and icy mountains,
closely pursued by the enemy. We sometimes covered ninety li* in a
single day. Our sufferings increased. We were defeated in battle four
times."3
Finally, a veritable miracle happened. In the middle of February 1929,
when after several week's desperate march as described above, there
appeared to be no hope left for the brave band, it suddenly came upon a
whole division of Government troops. That was in a valley in the
southern part of the province of Kiangsi. One of the most heroic deeds of
the whole period of adventure was committed. It was heroism of despair.
During the march, the Red Army had several times adroitly avoided a
conflict with Government troops. This time an entirely different tactic
was adopted. The enemy was attacked with a desperate fury. Taken
completely unawares, he could not put up any effective resistance. The
red troops had some rifles, but very little ammunition. They are reported
to have attacked with stones and branches rof trees, and used empty"
rifles as sticks.
An Experiment 513
That unexpected victory gave the Red Army the direly needed respite. It
settled down to create the new base on the very spot, and presently
captured Juichin and Ningtu, two small towns in the neighbourhood. At
that time, the Red Army counted less than three thousand men. But in the
new base it found the peasantry somewhat more responsive. Before long
a sufficiently large-area was brought under its control. The landlords
were driven away. The land was distributed to the peasantry. The new
territory was called "The Central Soviet District".
Remnants of the defeated forces of revolution bed been operating in a
similar way in several other places in distant parts of the country. A band
of armed peasantry, commanded by the Communist Fang Chih min, was
carrying on guerilla operations in the northeastern parts of Kiangsi, right
across the province from the place where the Central Soviet District was
situated. The legendary Ho Lung had reappeared in Hupeh to conduct
lightning attacks and forced marches which made him famous. In the
mountainous region at the junction of the boundaries of Honan, Anhwei
and Hunan, another "Red Army" had been formed. Small territories,
occupied by irregular armies, operating in distant parts of the country,
without any centralised command, were called "Soviet China." The new
base, created by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, claimed to be its central
authority.
Although it functioned nominally under the leadership of the Coumunist
Party, the latter as an organised force had been practically eliminated
after the final defeat at Canton and subsequent reign of terror. Formally,
the headquarter of the party was situated underground in Shanghai, from
where there could possibly be no standing contact with the armed bands
operating in distant parts of the country. It appears from old party records
that in the beginning the official party leadership did not approve of the
military activities conducted formally in the name of the party. As a
matter of fact, the guerilla activities were condemned by the official
party leadership. In a letter addressed to all members of the party, the
leaders marooned in Shanghai warned: "If the danger of peasant
psychology is not vigorously corrected, the revolution will be liquidated
entirely, and the party will die."4 The warning was entirely theoretical. It
was based on the assumption of the Communist Party, as the party of the
proletariat, should live in order to save the revolution. But the
perspective
514 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of the situation was determined not by theoretical assumptions, but by
actual events. Instead of condemning "peasant psychology" as a danger,
it was necessary to analyse the new phenomenon and find out its cause. It
was highly significant that, after the defeat, any revolutionary activity
was possible only among the peasantry. Instead of determining the
strategy and tactics for the future in the light of that significant fact, the
leadership of the Communist Party, in the beginning, tended to dissociate
itself from the only element which could still be mobilised in
revolutionary action.
The Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of China, held at the end of
1928, far away in Moscow, condemned the activities of the Red Armies
as "aimless plundering and burning" and characterised them as "the
reflection of lumpen proletarian psychology."5 Another official report of
the party described the guerilla bands as "red bandits, burning, killing
and robbing", and deplored the "bandit pschology, degeneration into a
bandit existence of killing and plundering."6 Even as late as in the
beginning of 1930, the Central Committee of the party complained that
"in many of the partisan bands, lumpen proletarian ideas persist, often
expressing themselves in unorganised burning, plundering and killing."7
The description in those reports was not very incorrect. But an entirely
different lesson should have been drawn from those facts. The elements
available for the creation of a revolutionary army did not provide the
social basis either for a Soviet Republic or for a Red Army. Nevertheless,
the "pure proletarian" disdain for those ugly realities only revealed
inability to grasp the actual problems of the situation. The revolution was
still bourgeois-democratic. Therefore, the peasantry was still the basic
revolutionary factor. But the fighting forces even of a purely peasant
uprising are not supplied by the well-to-do peasantry; they corre always
and almost exclusively from the poorer strata which are often destitute
and pauperised, and therefore driven to "banditry, plundering and
killing".
The failure to appreciate correctly the revolutionary possibilities of the
given situation led to ruinous adventures of the so-called "Li Li-san
Line". The belated offensive, after the defeat in 1927, had begun with the
slogan of proletarian dictatorship. The tragedy of Canton did not teach
any lesson. The destruction of the Communist Party in the urban areas
and the radical change in the socia
An Experiment 515
composition of its memberships also went unnoticed. The Communist
leaders still believed that, having betrayed the revolution, the bourgeoisie
had changed its social character, and China had entered the stage of
proletarian revolution, and the establishment of Socialism was the
immediate task before her. If the urban workers happened to be too
demoralised by the defeat to take up any revolutionary action, the
peasantry might be allowed to take the initiative, but the revolution
begun in the villages must be imported to the cities, with the object of
establishing proletarian dictatorship!
"The Soviets established in the Chinese territories occupied by Red
Armies can establish connection with the big industrial centres, and
under the leadership of the Communist Party establish a Soviet
Government of Workers and Peasants. The revolution is in a critical
stage. The proletariat will not lead the peasantry; the latter will bring the
revolution to the cities."8 Characterising the formation and operation of
armed peasant bands as "the peculiarity of a new revolutionary upsurge",
a resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International
declared the following: In the initial stage, there is a certain weaknesss
namely, the fighting masses cannot at the very beginning occupy the
industrial centres. Only in the process of the further development of the
revolutionary struggle, can the peasant war, led by the proletariat, expand
to new territory. In the future, according to political and military
circumstances, one or several political or industrial centres can be
occupied".9
Nearly a year ago, the Executive of the Communist International had
directed the Communist Party of China to "overthrow the power of the
landlord-bourgeois bloc, to establish a workers' and peasants'
dictatorship, to unfold mass political strikes and demonstrations, to
expand the partisan warfare, and to turn the militarist war into a class
civil war".10 In the meantime, experience had shown that the policy
contained in the above direction could not be executed. Heavily defeated
and completely demoralised, the urban workers would not respond to
repeated calls for "mass political strikes and demonstrations". Yet, acting
upon the direction reaffirmed by the subsequent resolution of the
Political Secretariat of the Communist International, the Communist
Party of China, under the leadership of Li Li-san, in the middle of 1930,
launched upon an adventurous policy. "The aim of the local uprisings is
to capture local cities. The perspective must inevitably be to converge
upon the central cities
516 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
to accomplish the victory of the insurrection in the whole country".11 The
Red Armies received orders to march on the cities. Li Li-san is reported
to have undertaken to mobilise a hundred million people within three
days. The resolution quoted above issued the call: "The time for
insurrection has come! Organise yourself!" According to the call, a "Red
Guard" was formed in Shanghai, as preparatory to the fourth uprising.
"One hundred and seventy-six workers could be induced to enlist!"12
The Utopian adventure of the "Li Li-san Line" ran wild in the
opportunity afforded by the outbreak of a new civil war between the two
hostile nationalist camps. In June 1930, the united forces of Feng Yu-
hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan revolted against the Nanking Government.
There was a plan of setting up a rival Government in Peking with Wang
Chin-wei as its head. While the "North Coalition'' was being formed
against Nanking, "the country found itself on the eve of a revolutionary
crisis. It is evident that over large areas the peasantry is driven by their
terrible conditions of life to revolt, and out of despair is conducting a sort
of war against the Government officials and landlords. The peasant
movement has no source of strength, on the basis of which it could
march forward; therefore a strong Government can easily suppress it.
Nevertheless, if the Provincial Governments remain interchangeably in
the hands of rival militarists, then, the workers' and peasants' movement
can acquire irresistible powers."13
Taking advantage of that crisis in the camp of counter-revolution, the
Communists decided to regain their position in the cities. The Fifth Red
Army, commanded by the Communist Peng Teh-huai, marched
westward from the "Central Soviet District" and occupied Changsha, the
capital of Hunan, on July 28, 1930. The plan of the Communists was to
capture Wuhan and set up the Central Soviet Government there. But the
plan miscarried, showing that it had been based on a woefully wrong
calculation. The march of the Fifth Army through Kiangsi and the easy
occupation of Changsha were due to the fact that practically all the
Government troops had been withdrawn for the campaign in the North.
Once iu Changsha, the Red Army was confronted with a very difficult
situation. Contrary to expectation, the urban democratic masses did not
rise up in revolt and join the revolutionary army. Consequently, the city
could not be held even for a few days. It was recovered by the
Government troops
An Experiment 517
on August 1. Of course, forces of Imperialism promptly intervened and
helped the counter-revolutionaries to recover the city. American British,
Japanese and Italian gun-boats were rushed up the Siang River, and
bombarded the city. Unable to hold the city without support of the
masses, the Red Army withdrew with a booty of nearly a million dollars.
The peasants could attack and even defeat the forces of reaction in the
countryside. In limited areas they could set up a sort of democratic
administration. But in big cities they were helpless. They could occupy
them for a short time, plunder and destroy them but they could never take
over political power there. A revolutionary regime could be set up in the
cities only by the urban democratic masses. In Changsha, they were not
prepared for such an action They lacked the will and the organisation to
take up the struggle for the capture of power, even when armed forces
were available for the purpose.
"There was insufficient connection between the attack of the Red Army
and the mass struggles in Changsha".11 Later on in course of a discussion
of the "Li Li-san Line", the following facts were revealed. "In Changsha,
there was no mass Soviet elected by factories or streets. Red flags were
torn down all over the city A mass meeting was called, but only three
thousand people attended Another effort two days later was not any more
successful. The army was impregnated with the fundamental strategy of
the peasant partisan. Its position was not consolidated. No city power
was organised".15 During the occupation of the city, about two thousand
workers had been recruited in the army. They went away with the main
army when the latter evacuated the city. So, instead of carrying the
revolution to the city, the latter was deprived of its best revolutionary
elements. Consequently, after it was recaptured by the counter-
revolutionaries, the population was subjected to unrestricted terror. The
urban masses were suspected of having sympathised with the
revolutionary army, and were slaughtered in thousands Heaps of corpses
blocked the streets. .The mad fury abated only when order came from
Nanking on the appeal of the local Chamber of Commerce An
extraordinary tax was levied for refunding to the Chamber of Commerce
the million dollars taken away by the Red Army
Detachments of insurgent peasantry also appeared in the neighbourhood
of big cities like Hankow and Nanchang. But they, being
518 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
better garrisoned than Changsha, could not be captured. There also the
working class remained passive, and the democratic masses were
completely demoralised. An effort to organise a strike on the Peking-
Hankow Railway failed. When efforts were made to establish the capital
of the Central Soviet Government in Wuhan, the Communist Party in
that industrial centre did not have more than two-hundred members and
the trade-unions had a membership of hundred and fifty.16 Nevertheless,
attempts to capture the cities continued throughout the summer, and
ended only in provoking a recrudescence of counter-revolutionary terror
in the urban area. In September another effort was made to occupy
Changsha, but it failed. Finally in October, an important city in Kiangsi,
Kian, was captured. It was held longer than Changsha, but was evacuated
after a few weeks. Here also the same experience was made.
"Organisation of the masses was completely ignored, and the leaders of
the Red Army were concerned only with recruiting new soldiers."17 From
Kian a part of the army was despatched to attack the provincial capital
Nanchang and another important city, Kiukiang. They were repulsed.
Those costly experiences showed the adventurous nature of the Li Li-sen
Line, which, after all, was the application of a policy formulated by the
Communist International. However, it was realised that urban areas
could not be captured by the "Red Armies." The policy was given a new
orientation. In a letter to the Communist Party of China in November
1930, the Executive Committee of the Communist International directed
that it was now necessary "to concentrate the best forces of the party for
creating a real workers' and peasants' Red Army", and suggested that a
Central Soviet Government should be established in one of the existing
Soviet districts as the basis for future expansion.
By way of drawing lessons from the recent experiments, it was admitted
that "the Central Committee has had some mechanical conceptions,
thinking that the Central Soviet Government had to be established in
Wuhan, or at least in Changsha or Nanchang". Having expressed the
Utopian desire that "it would be better to get established in the bigger
cities than in the smaller ones", the outstanding disparity of revolutionary
development in the rural and urban areas was simply dismissed as "a
secondary question". Then, the following declaration was made: "We
must consolidate the present scattered Soviet Districts, weld them
together, strengthen and centra-
An Experiment 519
lise the leadership of the Red Armies, set broader peasant masses in
motion, and establish a Central Soviet Government to develop towards
the industrial cities".18
Although the party leader, Li Li-san, was rebuked for having
"overestimated the tempo", and committed "isolated tactical mistakes",
the disastrous line associated with his name was still declared to have
been "in complete harmony with the Comintern".19 However, the tactics
of indiscriminate armed uprisings, and the policy of setting up Soviet
Governments in cities without the least support from the democratic
masses had proved to be so disastrous that it had to be completely
discarded. That was done on the direction of the Executive Committee of
the Communist International, received in November 1930. In a meeting
of the Central Committee of the party, the old leaders were removed, and
the party was given a completely new leadership. The new policy was to
leave the urban areas alone and to organise the insurgent peasantry into a
powerful armed force of the revolution. The new orientation was correct,
inasmuch as it recognised the reality of the situation. But the initial
blunder of developing a recolutionary movement against feudal-
patriarchal reaction under the banner of Soviet Republics and Red Army
were not corrected. More costly experiments were still to be made before
sound lessons could be learned, and the correct perspective of
revolutionary development could be found.
On November 7, 1931, a Provisional Central Soviet Government was set
up in the small town of Juichin in the mountainous regions of southern
Kiangsi. Then followed three years of bloody civil war, during which the
Nanking Government sent no less than five "Anti-Communist
Expeditions" for suppressing the perennial peasant revolts in the remote
parts of the country. While the northern provinces and the coastal towns
of the country were steadily conquered by Japanese Imperialism, the
Nanking Government put more than half a million men on the field in its
futile struggle against the forces of revolution. In that bloody mission it
was liberally supported by foreign Imperialism. The anti-Communist
crusades of Chiang Kai-shek were equipped with the most up-to-date
weapons. Aeroplanes, supplied from America, Britain and Italy, often
piloted also by foreigners, rained bombs on thousands of Chinese
villages in the remote provinces of Kiangsi, Hunan etc. If the romantic
struggle of those three years did not succeed in building up a stable
revolutionary power, the credit does not belong to the Nanking
Government. The well-
520 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
equipped armies of the latter suffered defeats after defeat, and the result
of the whole costly campaign was frustration and discredit for the
counter-revolutionary dictatorship. The revolutionary experiment, carried
on under the flag of the Soviet Republic and Red Armies, failed because
of the initial mistake of choosing those banners, and internal weakness of
the movement which could be eliminated only by developing it with
more realistic tactics and appropriate slogans.20
Much romantic literature has been written about the Chinese Soviets and
Red Armies. But the real history of that experiment is still to be written.
That is not attempted here. Only a brief analysis of the most recent
events is necessary to complete this book which is a history of the
Chinese Revolution.
The facts available about the strength of the Chinese "Red Armies" and
the extent of territories covered by the "Soviet Republic" are very
contradictory. Not only one official report often contradicts another; it is
not unusual even for one report to include contradictory facts. A critical
examination of all available data establishes that between 1932 to 1934
from sixty to seventy of the eighty-one districts of the province of
Kiangsi were occupied by the Red Army in one time or another. It also
emerges from a similar examination that outside the Central Soviet
District, in the immediate neighbourhood of Juichin, the Red Army could
not hold places for any considerable length of time. According to
statements made by Mao Tse-tung from time to time, as well as by other
authoritative spokesmen of the Communist Party, the Central Soviet
territory embraced about seventeen districts spreading over Kiangsi as
well as the province of Fukin, with a total population of about three
millions.21 The Soviet districts in other provinces -Hupeh, Hunan,
Anhwei and Honan—were much smaller areas, and their stability in time
was also very uncertain.
As regards the numerical strength of the Red Army, reliable data do not
permit to place the total strength above 150,000 men, nearly three
quarters of whom were armed with rifles. In the best days, Chu Teh
commanded an army of seventy thousand. But Ho Lung's army seldom
exceeded ten thousand. As a matter of fact, its numerical smallness was
the cause of its extraordinary mobility. The strength of the Red Armies,
however, was not in numbers. They were not only supported by the
peasantry, but were organically con-
An Experiment 521
nected with them. The remoteness of the Soviet districts and the almost
complete absence of railways or road also contributed very largely to the
victories of the Red Armies. But the attitude of the peasantry was the
decisive factor. It was friendly to the Red Armies because in reality they
were armed detachments of insurgent peasants. On the other hand, it was
decidedly hostile to the Government troops. The Nanking Minister of
War complained that "the peasants supported the Reds and made it
difficult for the invading armies to secure food or transport".22 Two years
later, Chiang Kai-shek himself admitted that "the punitive forces found it
impossible to draw any line between a good citizen and a red partisan,
and felt that the enemy is lurking everywhere".23
Wherever peasant revolts broke out, land was confiscated and distributed
to the poor peasantry. Documents establishing the right of proprietorship
were destroyed. Other exploited and oppressed sections of the rural
population (agricultural workers, artisans, small traders, poor
intellectuals etc.) made common cause with the insurgent peasantry.
Deserters from the Government armies brought along not only rifles and
ammunition, but sometimes machine-guns also. The decrees of the
Soviet Government regularised the distribution of land, abolished
indebtedness of the peasantry and all oppressive taxes. Describing the
exploits of the Red Armies, an organ of liberal American opinion,
published from Shanghai, wrote: "The Red Armies outmanoeuvered and
defeated five successive Kuo Min Tang campaigns. Because of the
incomparable advantage of the support of the population, their superior
mobility and generalship, their knowledge of the terrain, the Reds cut off
and defeated Division after Division of Chiang Kai-shek's best troops,
and armed themselves exclusively with the weapons they captured. The
slogans of 'Land to the peasants' ploughed like tanks through the columns
of Chiang Kai-shek's hired soldiers."24
Though the troops of the Nanking Government could not penetrate the
regions directly under the control of the Central Soviet Government, they
gradually closed in from all sides and placed the Soviet territories in the
iron ring of an economic blockade. Thrown back on the local resources,
the Soviet Government was confronted with almost insoluble economic
problems. The internal weakness of the movement began to assert itself.
All imports from outside having been stopped, prices of local
commodities began to rise. Measures
522 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
for controlling prices were resented by the peasantry. On the other hand,
wages could not be increased, because that would give the richer
peasants an excuse to demand higher price for their produce. Under the
pressure of economic difficulties, the Soviet Government came under the
domination of the richer section of the peasantry. "The agrarian
revolution's most important tasks have not been solved. Not only rich
peasants, but even small landlords make their way into the Soviets. . . .
The rich peasants seek to steal the fruits of agrarian revolution. The rich
peasants' slogan—to distribute land according to productive
implements—has not been met with adequate resistance. In some places,
it was proposed to confiscate only the lands of the landlords holding
more than fifty mu. Elsewhere, there was a slogan for payment of debts
to landlord usurers owning less than fifty mu. Equal division of land is
the most important task of the agrarian revolution, but it has been carried
out in very few places. The organisation of the poor peasants has not
even begun. Coolies and agricultural labourers have not been organised
into unions "25
These difficulties, evident already in the beginning of the experiment,
ultimately rendered the very position of the Soviet Government
untenable. The fundamental mistake was about the social character of the
revolution. Efforts were made to develop it with slogans of the
proletarian revolution. They were bound to fail, because the tasks of the
bourgeois-democratic revolution were still to be accomplished. The
peasantry as a class, even the poorer strata of the landowning class, were
involved in the revolution. This fact was not taken into consideration in
the beginning. It was noticed later on, but impractical slogans of the
proletarian revolution had already disrupted the unity of the forces of the
bourgeois democratic revolution. Consequently, the experiment failed,
and it was only afterwards that the initial mistakes were rectified.
Immediately al'ter its establishment at the end of 1931, the Provisional
Central Soviet Government had passed a Labour Law which was to
introduce an eight hour day and double the wages. But before long, it
was felt that labour laws suitable for "big cities and large-scale
production cannot be completely and mechanically applied in the
economically backward Soviet districts".26 In practice, the law became a
dead letter, and feeling themselves neglected, the agricultural workers
were very dissatisfied. The Communists themselves realised that the law
was impractical. The local Party Committee
An Experiment 523
condemned and combated the tendency, but it could not be checked. The
popular plea against the limitation of working hours was that there was
no clock to reckon time. That was not a frivolous, but a very significant
argument. Absence of clocks meant extreme social backwardness The
revolution had to be adjusted to those conditions. The effort to make it to
order was bound to fail.
The problems of the situation were stated as follows: "The result was that
the peasants were dissatisfied and the labourers were sceptical about our
leadership. It was necessary to improve the conditions of the agricultural
labourers. But such improvements must also be regarded by the peasants
as necessary and practicable. I have here the petitions of many merchants
and employers from which you can see that the mechanical application
of the labour law will inevitably be the decline of industry and
commerce."27 In the beginning of 1932, it was evident that the
experiment was breaking down under the weight of the contradictions of
the situation in which it was taking place. The social atmosphere was
even more backward than that in which a bourgeois democratic
revolution takes place. It was simply impossible to introduce proletarian
leadership there. The Communist Party, as the party of the praletariat,
had no place in that atmosphere of social backwardness. The tasks of the
revolution were entirely different. They could be accomplished by a
movement developing with entirely different slogans. The classes
involved had nothing in common with the proletariat. Neither the
proletarian ideology nor the programme of the proletarian revolution had
any appeal to them. A Communist leader on the spot wrote: "The party in
the Soviet districts ignores proletarian hegemony. Everywhere we see the
serious phenomenon of the ignoring of the trade-union movement. Prole-
tarian leadership exists in words in party documents."28
The Soviet districts were caught up in an acute economic crisis which
inevitably had political results. High prices, low wages and
unemployment increased the hardships of the masses. Their enthusiasm
flagged. There was a general desire for peace. The Red Army began to
be depleted by continuous desertions. Defeatism naturally was the
prevailing mood. The Communist leader of Fukin, Lo Min? appeared as
the spokesman of the defeatist tendency. He is reported to have declared
publicly: "Even if our best leaders were to come, or to bring Stalin
himself, or even resurrect Lenin, and were to speak all together to the
masses, I do not think it will help change
524 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
their moods."28
The "Lo Min Line" spread throughout the Soviet territories. Even
functionaries of the Communist Party fled from their posts. The Red
Armies could not get new recruits. "The partisan bands not only rarely
grow, but are shrinking daily. Desertions with rifles and betrayals are
constantly occurring. Corruption and degeneration constantly appear."30
When the Soviets and the Red Army were thus very seriously weakened
from inside, Chiang Kai-shek decided to deliver the last blow. The
Communist Party made a supreme effort to keep the forces together in
that last trial of strength. The representative of the Central Committee.
Chou En-lai, made a passionate appeal for "struggle against all kinds of
wavering, pessimism, passivity, despair, weariness and capitulation".51
Repeated defeats had persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to abandon the old
tactics of frontal attack. With a huge army of nearly half a million men,
he encircled the Soviet territory which was attacked only from the air.
Starvation on earth and death from the air finally broke the morale of the
embattled insurgents, and another chapter in the history of the costly
experiment was closed.
The following chapter records the end of the adventure. But that was
certainly the grand finale, characterised by bravery and remarkable
military feats, unsurpassed not only by the previous exploits of the
Chinese Red Army, but generally recognised as unparallelled in all
history.
In the summer of 1934, it was decided to abandon the base in Kiangsi
and lead the more stable part of the Red Army to some other part of the
country, where it could have a more dependable source of supply, and
could not be surrounded from all sides. Only the north-western provinces
offered such possibilities. For one thing, there the revolutionary base
would be so very far away that the armed forces of the Nanking
Government would not be able to attack it easily. Secondly, supplies
from the Soviet Union could be made more easily available through
Mongolia. But the problem was, how to reach there. The half-starved, ill-
equipped army must march practically across the entire country, through
half a dozen large provinces mostly infested with counter-revolutionary
armed bands. But a desperate attempt must be made if sure destruction
was to be avoided. Almost superhuman courage was required, even to
make that decision. In August an army of ten thousand picked men
commanded by Hsiao
An Experiment 525
Keh was despatched as the vanguard. It broke through the lines of
Chiang Kai-shek's army and marched westwards. Two months later, the
main body of the Red Army, commanded by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung,
also started out on that grandest of military adventures of all times.
On November 10, the counter-revolutionary army occupied the
evacuated seat of the Soviet Republic. For three years that small area had
been defended against continued attacks from all sides by a well-
equipped army of half a million men. After three years, the episode
ended, not in a victory of counter-revolution, but a failure of an Utopian
experiment. Militarily, the laurels must all go to the Red Army. Political
mistakes, however, rendered those military achievements fruitless. At
last the bitter and costly experience was to force the rectification of those
fatal mistakes.
For a whole year the Red Army marched across the provinces of Hunan,
Kweichow and Yunan, pursued by the most mobile divisions of Chiang
Kai-shek's army. But it was never caught, all the time its Commanders
showing amazing tactical skill which completely frustrated all the efforts
of the enemy operating with incomparably superior weapons. It moved
"like flowing water and moving clouds ', as insurgent peasant bands had
been traditionally described in Chinese history. In a way it became a
Chinese institution. Although, for a variety of reasons, it could not
establish a stable base anywhere, there can be no doubt that all along the
way it received the sympathy, support and furtive co-operation of the
peasant masses. Otherwise, it could not have performed the miracles that
it did. After some months, it appeared in the western parts of the remote
province of Szechwan, on the borders of Tibet. There it was reinforced
by another detachment of armed peasantry which had been operating
there as a Red Army for two years. Having taken a brief respite, the
united forces of the Red Army marched northward over high mountain
passes and finally reached the north-western province of Shensi,
bordering on Mongolia, in October 1935. There, the authority of the
Nanking Government did not reach. The titular ruler of those parts was
Feng Yu-hsiang who was at that time eager to receive Russian support
for one of the periodical campaigns for extending his power over the
whole of the north of the country. Consequently, the Red Army could at
last settle down unmolested, and recuperate itself with directly needed
rest and new supplies.
526 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Once again, counter-revolution appeared to be finally triumphant. On the
pretext of pursuing the Red Army, his troops had established themselves
in the south-western provinces of Kweichow, Yunan and Szechwan
which had until then been practically independent of the Nanking
Government To celebrate his victory, Chiang Kai-shek made an
extensive air-tour through the newly acquired territories and went as far
as the north-western province of Shansi and even Inner Mongolia which
had been annexed by Japan for all practical purposes.
But that was a demonstration also against Japanese Imperialism.
Although during the years of civil war the National Government of
Nanking and the Japanese invaders were united in the determination to
free China from the Communist menace, the former did not receive much
actual support from the latter for the anti-Communist crusade which .left
the north and east of the country open to Japanese invasion. The real help
for the holy cause came from the Christian Powers. The German
General, von Seeckt, came to China with a large number of Prussian
officers to train the legions of Chiang Kai-shek which were sent against
the Communists. Not only modern weapons were supplied freely from
America, England, Italy and Germany, but American and Italian fliers
were employed to bomb defenceless Chinese villages. Internal water-
ways of the country were guarded by scores of foreign battleships which
kept the insurgent peasantry away from the urban areas and main
industrial centres. Communists were arrested in the foreign Settlements
and callously handed over to the hangmen of the Nanking Government.
The anti-Communist campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek were financed with
loans given by American and British banks. In 1933 fifty million dollars
came from Wall Street. The next year the bullion basis of the Chinese
currency was undermined by the American policy of purchasing silver.
In 1935, British finance came to the rescue and the Chinese dollar was
pegged to the pound sterling. Following the visit of Sir Frederick Leith-
Ross, as representative of the British Treasury, money became easy again
in the Shanghai market, and in the beginning of 1936, the Chinese banks
could finance manufacturing enterprises to the extent of a hundred
million dollars. There was a negotiation for a thirty million pounds loan
from England.
All that valuable, and to a certain extent vicarious, aid enabled the
Nanking Government to carry on its ruinously costly struggle
An Experiment 527
long enough to drive the Red Army to the remotest parts of the country.
But it was to pay for it in a different way. Japan had established her
domination in China almost to the extent of encroaching upon the vested
interests of the rival imperialist Powers. Since these were not in a
position to risk a war with Japan, the Nanking Government was
instigated to stiffen its back and put up a resistance against Japanese
aggression, as soon as it was freed from the menace of the Red Army
which had haunted it like a nightmare for several years.
There was a realignment of forces. The latest triumph of counter-
revolution immediately forced a split in its own ranks. As soon as the
Nanking Government showed the tendency of resisting further Japanese
aggression, the northern war-lords seized the opportunity of revolting
against it, hoping to be backed by Japanese Imperialism. On the other
hand, Chang Hsue-liang had been driven out of Manchuria upon its
formal annexation by Japan. But with his large army, he was still a force
in the north-western provinces. To fight Japan he was seeking the
support of the Soviet Union. So the circumstances were all favourable for
the creation of a new revolutionary base where the Red Army had finally
reached after its spectacular march through nine provinces. The
headquarter of the Central Soviet Government was established in the
small town of Ningsha on the northern extremity of Shensi, near the
border of Mongolia.
Notes
1. Military Bulletin of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China, January 15, 1930.
2. About three // make an English mile.
3. Military Bulletin of the Central Committee of the C.P. of China, January 15, 1930.
4. Letter to All the Comrades, November 1.1, 1928.
5. Resolution on the Peasant Question.
6. Report of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee.
7. Report on the History and Present Condition of the Chu-mao Red Army.
8. Molotov's report to the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet,
1930.
9. Resolution adopted by the Political Secretariat of the E. C. C. I., July 23, 1930.
10. Letter of the E. C. C. I., to the Communist Party of China, October 26, 1929.
528 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
11. Resolution on The New Revolutionary Wave, adopted by the Political Bureau of
the Communist Party of China, June 11,1930.
12. Lo Mai, Speech to the Shanghai active workers, December 3, 1930.
13. China To-Morrow, Shanghai, May 1930. (Retranslated from German).
14. Resolution of the Central Committee, Communist Party of China, September
1930.
15. Discussion on the Li Li-san Line by the Presidium of the E. C. C. I., December
1930.
16. Letter of the E. C. C. I., to the Communist Party of China, published in the Truth,
December 14, 1920.
17. Chiu Chiu-pi, "Capture and Loss of Kian", Truth, December 9, 1930.
18. Chou En-lai's report, September 24, 1930.
19. Ibid.
20. Already in 1930, when the world was being regaled with reports about Red
Armies conquering province after province, I protested against that romantic
adventure. Every Marxist acquainted with the conditions in China could see that it
was foredoomed to collapse. I advocated that the Communist party should abandon
military adventures and return to the field of political activity as the champion of the
demand of the democratic masses, including the urban petit-bourgeoisie. Guerilla
warfare in the more backward parts of the country was not the proper method of
combating the reactionary nationalists and the military dictatorship of Chiang Kai-
shek. The fight must take place throughout the country, particularly in the important
political, industrial and commercial centres. To be able to function there as an
effective political force, the revolutionary party must regain the confidence of the
urban democratic masses. A National Assembly, elected by universal suffrage to
frame the Constitution of a democratic State, would be the suitable demand with
which a powerful popular movement could be developed to challenge the military
dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. I recommended that course of action already in
1929." (M.N. Roy, "My Experience in China", pp. 68-69).
21. The Struggle, Juichin, May to November 1933.
22. Shanghai Evening Post, November 10, 1931.
23. Chung Yang-kung Lien, June 1933.
24. China Forum, Shanghai, January 20, 1932.
25. Letter of the E. C. C. I., to .the Communist Party of China, November 1930.
26. Lo Fu (Member of the Soviet Government), "The Examination of the Execution
of the Labour Laws", May 1, 1933.
27. Lo Fu, U>id.
28. Teng Yen-tsao, "Examination of the Struggle for Strengthening the Proletariat"
in Struggle, February 4, 1933.
29. Po Ku "For a Bolshevik Line in the Party", Struggle, February 23, 1933.
30. Lo Mai, "For a Bolshevik Turn", Struggle, August 22, 1933.
31. "Smash the Fifth Campaign", Struggle, August 29, 1933.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE LESSON
A correct analysis of the social forces involved in the revolution would
have spared China the frightfully costly experiment. Political movements
need no longer be completely empirical. Not for Marxists, at any rate.
Having regard for the characteristic features of the situation, one could
hardly speak of "Red Armies" and "Soviets" in China. The latter are
organs of proletarian dictatorship, specific creations of the proletarian
revolution. A Red Army also is created by the working class in power.
Whatever possibility there was of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution
outgrowing the bourgeois democratic limits under the hegemony of the
proletariat, that perspective completely disappeared after the defeat of
1927. The destruction of the Communist Party was bound to determine
the future development of the revolution. Counter-revolutionary terror
broke the organised power of the working class, and drove the revolution
to the village. There it resisted all efforts to destroy it. But there was a
shift in its social foundation. It became a purely peasant movement.
Since 1928 the insurgent peasantry of China fought more or less under
Communist leadership. But they were certainly not fighting for
Communism. The serious defeat of 1927 threw the revolution back to a
stage even prior to ths bourgeois revolution. The revolutionary
movement in the years of civil war was rather analogous to the Peasant
Wars of Europe. After its recovery from defeat, the revolution might
have regained the lost ground very quickly; for the time being, it was
developed with slogans, programme and forms of organisation adapted to
the atmosphere of social backwardness to which it was confined.
The peasantry did not fight for Communism; the local organs of power
created by them were not organs of proletarian dictatorship. The
character of the "Red Army" was determined by its social com-
530 Revolution and Comter-Revolution in China
position. It was fifty-eight per cent poor peasants, twenty-seven per cent
deserters from Government armies (they were also poor peasants) eleven
percent village paupers and four percent workers (most probably land-
labourers and more or less destitute artisans).1 Armed forces thus
composed socially could not be compared with an army created by the
proletariat after the capture of power. The specific feature of the latter is
that the cad re of officers and the nucleus are exclusively proletarian.
That was certainly not the case with the Chinese "Red Armies".
Therefore, it was a misnomer. Political terminologies are not mere
words. They have definite social content.
As regards the "Soviets", they were also something entirely different.
They were created after certain districts were occupied by the Red
Armies. Evidently, they did not rise as the organs of political power
captured by the proletariat. Created by the Red Armies, the Soviets could
only be the organs of a State, the political character of which must be
determined by the social composition of the creator.
The entire movement was not led by the proletatiat. The participation of
Communists, even in leading positions, could not change that fact. The
peasant uprisings "spread often spontaneously, without being led by the
Communist Party. Wherever guerilla bands operate, the Soviets are built
from below. First, the peasants organise themselves; then, the land is
distributed; finally begins the attack on the cities."2 Admittedly, the
movement as a whole was not always and everywhere even formally
under the leadership of the Communist Party which itself, by that time,
had ceased to be the party of the proletariat. Agricultural wage-earners
participated in the organs of power created by the insurgent peasantry.
But they were dominated by the latter.
The peasants revolted against intolerable conditions created by the
decayed feudal-patriarchal social system, made still more oppressive by
primitive capitalism. They were oppressed and exploited by parasitic
trading capital, usury and high taxation. In addition, there were
extortions by the militarists and bandits, the latter themselves being a
creation of the entire social system. The maximum demand of the
peasantry, not yet consciously made, was the entire abolition of all those
conditions. But that would not mean the establishment of Socialism. That
would rather promote economic reconstruction on the basis of the so-
called capitalistic mode of production. That
The Lesson 531
perspective of economic development could not be radically altered by
the failure of the bourgeoisie to lead the peasantry in their revolutionary
struggle. The revolution, demanded for the welfare of the peasantry
themselves, could not succeed until it embraced the urban areas also. In
other words, the peasants could not free themselves exclusively by their
own action, however powerful that might be. So long as the counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie, supported by the Imperialism, held power in
the cities and controlled the industrial centres and the main commercial
arteries of the country, peasant uprisings could not have any decisive
revolutionary consequence. And the peasantry could not carry the
revolution to the cities. That should have been known beforehand.
However, it was proved by experience.
Almost completely destroyed by counter-revolutionary terror, the
Communist Party withdrew into the mountainous regions, there to
organise guerilla bands, and set up "Soviet Republics" in isolated
districts, occupied temporarily. It lost almost all influence in the
industrial centres where counter-revolution raged unchallenged. The
curse of militarism rests so heavily on China that even the Communists
could not escape it. Instead of trying to utilise all possible legal channels
of agitation, propaganda and organisation, the Communists set up the
theory that in China any movement, even one based upon the minimum
demands of the workers and peasants, must directly develop into an
armed struggle.
"Even in undertaking a struggle with small demands, we must, from the
very beginning, be prepared for an armed struggle. Whoever thinks that
in .China it is possible to restrict a struggle to daily demands, supports
the kulak line. The kulaks (rich peasants) and those small peasants who
come forward as the leaders of the agrarian movement, march together
with the peasant masses, to the cities, there they present petitions to the
official and thereby win some success with the local authorities. The task
of our party organisation must be to confront the kulak movement with
our line—of deepening the struggle which leads to armed uprising.
Whoever denies such a possibility, is a liquidator of the struggle in the
Chinese villages."3
Experience shows that it was the "party line"—of establishing Soviet
Republics with village paupers—which contributed to the liquidation of
the experiment of the Central Soviet District. The result of that line was
that the movement embraced mostly the village
532 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
paupers, exactly the element which for years had served as the cannon-
fodder for militarism. That is a very insecure foundation for a
revolutionary movement. On such a foundation, a powerful army could
possibly be created, provided that necessary arms and other supplies
were available. But "Soviets" established by such armies could be
abiding if they embraced practically the entire rural population. The
activity of the rich peasants objectively represented the striving of the
bourgeoisie to reap the fruits of the agrarian revolution. The guarantee
against that danger was to be found in the support and confidence of the
small peasant-proprietors who constituted the main factor of agrarian
production. They must be detached from the well-to-do peasantry and
small landlords. That could be done only if the Communists participated
in the movement based upon the immediate minimum demands of the
peasantry as a whole. In the earlier stages, even the rich peasantry could
not be, and should not be, excluded from the movement. Experience
drove the Communists in the Kiangsi Soviet districts to come to that
conclusion. But it was too late. The utopion experiment of making a
proletarian revolution with village paupers had already gone too far. The
alternative policy of leading the entire peasantry in a movement with
minimum partial demands would have developed the revolutionary
peoples' committees (called Soviets) into local organs of democratic
power which alone could unite the rural masses in a large scale,
sustaining struggle against reaction. That policy would have succeeded in
reorganising the forces of revolution soon after the defeat.
But the Communist Party preferred to base itself on the village paupers,
necessarily inclined towards banditry. Consequently, it failed to develop
the peasant uprising as a part of the still-to-be accomplished democratic
revolution. Dislodged from its appropriate social base in the industrial
areas, isolated from the urban democratic masses, the Communist Party
overestimated the value of military action and neglected the task of re-
mobilising the defeated and demoralised urban democratic masses in a
political struggle. The devotion, heroism and determination of the
Communists succeeded in creating a powerful army out of the insurgent
peasantry. The accident of some of them possessing extraordinary
military talent made the experiment so very imposing, for the time being,
that the internal weakness of the movement and the political mistakes of
its
The Lesson 533
leaders were not detected before it was too late.
The Nineteenth Route Army, betrayed by Chiang Kai-shek for its
heroic defense of Shanghai against Japanese aggression in 1932, was
partially under Communist influence. The action of the army aroused
great enthusiasm among the democratic masses. That helped the
Communists to realise the possibility of developing a broad mass
movement under the nationalist banner of opposing Japanese
Imperialism. The Communist Party called upon the Chinese people to
declare a war against Japan. In the beginning of 1933, the Red Army
proclaimed its readiness to join hands with any other armed forces
with the purpose of defending the country against imperialist
invaders. The proposed united front was to be made on the following
terms:
1. Cessation of the anti-Communist campaign; 2. Grant of democratic
rights to the people; and 3. Arming of masses. The offer not only
created a good impression among the disinterested democratic
elements, sick and tired of continued civil wars; even many officers of
the Nationalist Army thought that it merited consideration. But
Chiang Kai-shek believed that he was on the point of final victory.
Nor was he as yet sufficiently indebted to Anglo-American finance to
forfeit the patronge of Japanese Imperialism. In a conference of the
Generals of the Nationalist Army he declared that "until the
Communists are exterminated, it is useless to speak about resistance
to Japan." On the same occasion he threatened that severe punishment
would be given to anybody advocating an anti-Japanese united front
with the Red Army.4
That was a step in the right direction on the part of the Communists.
Chiang Kai-shek turned down the ofier of united front and went ahead
with his anti-Communist crusade. The offer, however, appealed to the
nationalist sentiment of the democratic masses! Further advance in
the right direction was delayed by the success of Chiang Kai-shek in
dislodging the Red Army from its original base. The step in the right
direction was definitely takenwh en the Red Army was making the
historic march from the south to the north-west.
In August 1934, a document entitled "The Basic Programme of the
Chinese People in a War Against Japan" was issued over the signature
of Mme. Sun Yat-sen and more than three thousand prominent
persons from all walks of life. Although no direct relation between the
two moves could be traced, yet it is evident that the
534 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
latter represented the popular response to the earlier offer of the
Communists for a united anti-imperialist front. The progamme called for
the arming of the whole population and mobilisation of all resources of
the nation for a determined struggle against Japanese invasion.
At the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, held in
July 1935, the leader of the Communist Party of China, Wang Min, made
the following declaration: "The Communist Party has no other means for
the general mobilisation of the entire Chinese nation for the sacred
national revolutionary war against Japanese Imperialism than the tactics
of the anti-imperialist front. For this purpose, an appeal should be made
to all the people, all parties, groups, troops, mass organisations, and to all
prominent political and social leaders, to organise together with us an
All-China United People's Government of National Defence and an All-
China United Anti-Japanese National Defence Army."6 The radical
change of policy brought about by a belated correct appreciation of the
problems is evident when one recollects a declaration made by the same
authoritative person two years earlier. In 1933, Wang Min had declared
that "the overthrow of the Kuo Min Tang as the Government of national
betrayal and national disgrace as a condition of the successful carrying
out of the national revolutionary war could be realised only by the Soviet
Government and by the Red Army."6 The characterisation of the Kuo
Min Tang was correct. But the Communists were still labouring under
the illusion that the national revolutionary war could be conducted
without mobilising the entire democratic masses. They had not yet
learned that the Soviet Government and the Red Army were not the
appropriate instruments for the purpose. Two more years of bitter and
costly experience drove the lesson home. The response to the first halting
move, as expressed in the appeal of Mme. Sun Yat-sen and others,
showed that a bold advance in that direction alone could save the
revolution.
But flushed with his victory over the Red Army, Chiang Kai-shek was
not yet in the mood to share power with anybody. Consequently, while
consolidating their new base in the north-west, the Communists carried
on the propaganda for the formation of the united front against Japanese
aggression. The propaganda found increasing response, and the
democratic masses throughout the
The Lesson 535
country began to assert themselves through the development of an anti-
Japanese movement. Chiang Kai-shek's rivals in the nationalist camp
seized upon the demand for unity as a pretext to revolt against him. Some
of his important lieutenants, controlling the southern and middle-Yangtse
provinces, declared their sympathy and support for the anti-Japanese
movement. At that moment, progressive and democratic nationalist
elements, mostly hailing from the urban middle-class, formed an
organisation called the "National Salvation Association". In an Open
Letter to the Communist Party, it made the following appeal:
"We hope that the Chinese Communist Party will show by concrete acts
that it is sincere in its desire to unite with other parties. In the districts
occupied by the Red Army, the (peasant) proprietors and merchants must
receive liberal treatment. Every effort must be made to avoid conflicts
between workers and employers in the big cities, so as not to impede the
expansion of the united front for the salvation of the country. The
Committees for National Salvation and other mass organisations
frequently include young people who advocate such slogans as 'class
against class' and 'struggle against the Kuo Min Tang', to the great
prejudice of the united front. Detachments appear here and there which
call themselves Communist partisans and take the law into their own
hands. If these undisciplined detachments are under the control of the
Communist Party, the latter must take stringent measures against them,
or otherwise declare that it is in no way connected with them."7
The reply of the Communists was given in an official statement by Mao
Tse-tung in his capacity as the head of the Soviet Government. He wrote:
"We have already adopted a decision not to confiscate the land of the
rich peasants. We are not confiscating the property and the factories of
the big and small merchants and capitalists. We protect their enterprises.
As for the active anti-Japanese officers and big landowners, we can state
that their estates and property are not subject to confiscation. The former
laws about workers' control and leadership in various enterprises have
been repealed. The workers have been advised not to put up demands
which may be in excess of what can be granted. In the non-Soviet
districts, it is our intention not to accentuate the anti-capitalist struggle.
The common interests of both capitalists and workers are grounded in the
struggle against imperialist aggression. What
536 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
we are most interested in, and consider most important, is that all parties
and groups should treat us without animosity and bear in mind the
objective of the struggle against Japan for the salvation of the country."8
In the same letter, it was announced that the "Workers' and Peasants'
Government" and the "Workers' and Peasants' Army'' had been renamed
the "People's Soviet Government" and the "People's Red Army"
respectively.
Mao Tse-tung's letter was followed up by a declaration of the
Communist Party, addressed to the Kuo Min Tang: "We are prepared to
form a strong revolutionary united front with you, as was the case during
the Great Chinese Revolution of 1925-27. You have not forgotten the
glorious history of collaboration between the Communist Party and the
Kuo Min Tang. Our national oppressors were very much afraid that our
collaboration might lead to final victroy and the complete emancipation
of China. Therefore, they sowed the seeds of strife between us and set in
motion all possible means, threats and temptations, as a result of which
one side gave up its collaboration and buried the united front. Do you
feel no pricks of conscience when you recall this to-day?"8
Although the conciliatory attitude of the Communists was welcomed by
the more progressive nationalist who pressed for the cessation of civil
war, and united anti-Japanese front, the Nanking Government still
believed that its position had been sufficiently consolidated. With that
belief, it refused to accept the offer of the Communists. But, on the other
hand, it could not resist the growing popular demand for resistance to
Japanese aggression. Its Anglo-American patrons were also making the
same demand. Consequently, in September 1936, Chiang Kai-shek
rejected the terms of Japanese Imperialism for "co-operation against
Communists". At the same time, he reaffirmed his determination to carry
on his campaign against the Communists. He is reported to have said: "I
will never talk about this (unity) until every red soldier in China is
exterminated, and every Communist is in prison. Only then would it be
possible to co-operate with Russia."10 That was his reply to the
proposition made by Chang Hsueliang that for an effective resistance to
Japan the civil war must stop, and an alliance be made with the Soviet
Union.
But events moved fast, eventually forcing Chiang Kai-shek's hand. His
unexpectedly hostile attitude provoked Japan to move the
The Lesson 537
Manchurian troops towards Peking. As previously, the armies of the
Nanking Government failed to put up any serious resistance. But the
provincial forces acted on their own initiative, and the Japanese attack
was repulsed. That event gave a big fillip to the anti-Japanese movement
throughout the country, and the demand for the suspension of civil war
was pressed more vigorously. Chiang Kai-shek retorted by ordering the
arrest of seven leaders of the National Salvation Association, and
breaking up anti-Japanese students demonstrations in Shanghai. On the
other hand, he accused the North-Western Army, which had just repulsed
the Japanese invasion, of insubordination to the central authority, and
ordered it to begin operation against the Communists. He suffered a
severe defeat in that last anti-Communist expedition. Thereupon, he
himself flew to Sian in order to enforce his authority, and to despatch the
rebellious North-Western Army to the south. But there was a surprise in
store for him. The Generalissimo of the National Army was received by
a revolt of the Sian .garrison which took him prisoner on December 11.
From his captivity, Chiang Kai-shek appealed to the Nanking Generals
not to take any military measures for his release. The spirit against him
was so strong that nobody expected him to return alive. That famous
incident of Sian still remains shrouded in mystery. But all available data
go to show that his life was saved on the intervention of the Communists,
and that, in order to save his life, he accepted the Communist offer for a
national united front against Japanese Imperialism. A Communist writer
testifies that the Chinese Communists on the spot exerted "great
influence with the Manchurian Army to preserve Chiang and send him
back as national leader to Nanking."31 However, it is a fact that a
prominent leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Chou En-lai, met
Chiang Kai-shek in his captivity at Sian and persuaded him to accept the
offer of unity in the anti-Japanese struggle. The new policy of the
Communist Party having been authoritatively explained to him, Chiang
Kai-shek "became more convinced, not only of the sincerity of his
immediate captors, but also of the Reds, in their opposition to civil war
and their readiness to assist in the peaceful unification of the country
under his own leadership, provided he defined a policy of armed
resistance to Japan."12
Chiang Kai-shek was released on the Christmas day, and flew
538 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
straight to Nanking. Presumably, he had agreed to the proposition of the
Communists, backed up by the North-Western Army. On his return he
found that the movement for united resistance to Japan had grown much
stronger. The press organs of Anglo-American Imperialism, such as the
Shanghai Evening Post and the North-China Daily News, openly
supported the demand, and advised Chiang Kai-shek to make up with the
Communists since the latter had changed their policy so very radically.
The former, for example, wrote: "It does appear to be more and more
generally realised that the Communists of China are not now
Communists in any essential What is there about the so-called
Communist Programme of the present day which warrants refusal to
make peace with a group no longer committed to anything fundamentally
Communistic?''13
Chiang could no longer be obstinate. He convened a meeting of the
Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang which met at
Nanking on February 15, 1937. On that occasion, a telegram was
received from the Communist Party which declared that it had already
changed its policy and was prepared to act on the following lines: 1. To
cease the civil war against the Nanking armies, except in defence; 2. To
change the Soviet Government into the Government of the Special
Region of the Republic of China; 3. To place the Red Army under the
direct command of the Central Government and the Military Affairs
Commission of Nanking; 4. To enforce a thorough democratic system of
universal suffrage within the areas under the jurisdiction of the
Government of the Special Region; and 5. To abandon the policy of
expropriating the landlords. The letter concluded with an appeal to the
Kuo Min Tang to adopt in return the following programme: 1.
Suspension of civil wars of all kinds and concentration of the national
strength for united resistance to external aggression; 2. Freedom of
speech, assembly and organisation; 3. Release of all political prisoners;
4. Convocation of a Congress of all parties, military groups and
organisations in order to select leaders capable of carrying out the
salvation of the country; 5. Immediate accomplishment of the
preparatory work for a war of resistance against Japan; and 6.
Amelioration of the living conditions of the people.
The Kuo Min Tang Executive Committee thereupon passed a resolution
formulating four conditions for a reconciliation with the Communists.
The conditions were: 1. Abolition of the Red Army
The Lesson 539
and its incorporation into the nation's armed forces under a unified
command; 2. Unification of Government power in the hands of the
Central Government and dissolution of the so-called Chinese Soviet
Republic and other organisations detrimental to governmental unity; 3.
Absolute cessation of Communist propaganda; and 4. Stoppage of the
class struggle. Obviously, the Kuo Min Tang leaders wanted to
temporise. In view of the growing popular demand for unity and
cessation of civil wars, so that the country could be defended against the
Japanese invaders, they did not dare to turn down the Communist offer
which was very conciliatory. The conditions they made had already been
accepted voluntarily by the Communists.
On March 15, the Communist Party formally accepted the terms of the
Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang. The Soviet
Government of China voluntarily abdicated in favour of a national
bourgeois democracy after a decade of such a bitterly fought civil war as
the world had never experienced before. More than a million lives had
been sacrificed in that war. The territory under the jurisdiction of the
defunct Soviet Government was renamed "The Bordering Districts of
Shensi, Kansu and Ningsha" as an integral part of the still to be
established Chinese Republic with its headquarters at Nanking. The Red
Army was assigned by order from Nanking to a "Garrison Area" in North
Shensi, and was granted a subsidy. Thus ended definitely the attempt to
build a Soviet Republic in the midst of social conditions which could
generate the forces only for a bourgeois democratic revolution.
Meanwhile, the Japanese invaders pressed forward from all directions. In
July they again began operations m North China with the object of
capturing Peking. Violating all his previous declarations, Chiang Kai-
shek pursued the policy of local settlement with Japan and ordered the
withdrawal of Chinese forces from the Peking-Tientsin area. But the
North-Western Army, under the influence of Communist propaganda,
had been inspired with the spirit of resistance. At the same time, the
Japanese became active also on the Shanghai front. Chiang Kai-shek
could no longer hesitate and temporise. Nanking itself was threatened by
the foreign invader. In the beginning of September the negotiations for
the establishment of the national united front with the Communists were
formally concluded. On September 10 the Red Army was formally
incorpora-
540 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
ted in the Nationalist Army under the supreme command of Chiang Kai-
shek, as the Eighth Route Army. From its headquarters at Fushih in
Shensi, the Communist Party issued a proclamation on September 22,
dissolving the Soviet Republic. A foreign visitor reported that the most
popular slogan in the Communist Headquarters was: "Let us support
General Chiang to lead the anti-Japanese war."14 The Communist Youth
Congress held at Yenan in Shensi was reported to have elected Chiang
Kai-shek its Honorary President, together with Chu Teh and Mao Tse-
tung.
A foreign journalist observing the transformation on the spot, wrote:
"The struggle for the Soviets in China is half as old as the U.S.S.R.,and
has been almost as bloody. Here is a revolutionary army of some
hundred thousand men, the nucleus of which has fought nearly every day
for ten years against everything which the Kuo Min Tang uniforms have
represented. This army lives on a basis of pure war-communism while it
carries out orders of the Communist Party to support the ruling classes of
China in a war, although most of their families have been massacred by
that ruling class. How is this phenomenon possible? It is not merely a
united national front against Japanese aggression. The whole question
was decided two years ago, as a result of a change of views regarding the
nature of the Chinese Revolution. Is this giving up the Soviets; is it a
defeat or merely a strategy? It is not viewed in these terms, but is looked
at in a very unemotional matter-of-fact way. Everyone seems to accept it
as a part of historical determinism as a new stage in the development of
the unaccomplished Chinese Revolution which they now regard as a
bourgeois democratic revolution. The question why this has not been so
ten years ago, is not discussed. Some look at the change as one step
backward to achieve two steps forward. Others say they should never
have tried to have Soviets in 1928, or at least given them up in 1932."15
The questions raised by the above observer were answered by Mao Tse-
tung in the Congress of the Communist Party held in May 1937. He said:
"We support the theory of the transformation of the revolution. The
democratic revolution will change to Socialism. In this democratic
revolution, there are stages of development, but all are under the slogan
of the Democratic Republic, not under that of a Soviet Republic. We are
for passing through all necessary stages of the Democratic Republic to
reach Socialism." The Communist
The Lesson 541
Party adopted a new programme of the following ten points:
1. To fight Japan thoroughly and decisively and drive Japanese
Imperialism out of China. 2. To stop all diplomatic negotiations with
Japan and oppose the compromising and wavering attitude of the
Nanking Government. 3. To mobilise the armies of the whole nation on
the front to fight against the Japanese. 4. To mobilise the whole body of
the masses to join the war front against the Japanese, to give the people
the freedom of patriotic activity and the freedom to arm themselves. 5.
To organise a National Defence Government of all parties, clearing out
the traitors and other forces of Japanese Imperialism in China. 6. To
establish an anti-Japanese diplomatic policy, enter into a military
agreement with the U.S.S.R., and into a Pacific Anti-Japanese
Agreement with England, America and France. 7. To adopt an anti-
Japanese financial policy; the principle of this financial policy being that
everybody who has money must support the nation, and that all the
property of Japanese Imperialism must be confiscated. The principle of
the economic policy should be to boycott the use of Japanese goods and
to increase the use of national goods. 8. To improve and reconstruct the
life of the people, including the removal of the many unjust sur-taxes,
decrease of taxes and rents. 9. To develop the anti-Japanese national
defence education. 10. To organise a united front of the whole country
with the unification of the two parties (Kuo Min Tang and Communist)
as the basis for the struggle against the Japanese. Declaring the
programme publicly, Mao Tse-tung remarked : "If we can realise them
(the ten points), we san strike down Japanese Imperialism; if not, China
will perish."
The Kuo Min Tang leaders made the united front with great mental
reservations. Even a radical change in the perspective of the Communist
Party regarding the development of the revolution was not sufficiently
reassuring for them.
However, events moved swiftly. The cessation of civil war and the
formation of an united front to resist Japanese aggression inspired
confidence in the final victory, replacing the general hopelessness and
despondency which had demoralised and paralysed the Chinese army
continually retreating before the invader. The Eighth Route Army,
commanded by Chu Teh and his Communist Staff became the spearhead
of the counter-offensive. To inspire new courage and a militant spirit in
the hard-pressed peasant-soldiers, all the members
542 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
of the family of a soldier were exempted from labour service; their rents
were reduced by one quarter; landowners were strictly forbidden to take
the land away from them.
On the other hand, the Chinese resistance was very greatly reinforced by
material help from the Soviet Union coming through Mongolia- The
regular troops, ably supported by numerous guerilla bands, made the
position of the Japanese invader insecure and dangerous. Everywhere,
Japanese troops were attacked from the rear and harrassed on their way.
They were dislodged from one position after another. The Chinese
bourgeoisie, however, still depended rather on the support of the rival
imperialist Powers than on the revolutionary forces inside the country
and the unconditional support of the Soviet Union. There were rumours
of a big financial deal with some American firm.
Participating in the United National Front, as its most active factor, the
Communists, however, endeavoured to mobilise the masses so as to
resist any future betrayal of the nationalist movement by the reactionary
elements. The policy of the Communists was outlined by Yen Peh-hsi,
the head of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army, as
follows: "Our primary task is to establish close and friendly relations
between the troops and the population. At the same time, we arm the
population in order that they may fight with us. Among the armed
population, there are two groups: guerillas and self-defence troops. The
latter are not released from their ordinary work. We are also devoting
considerable attention to improving the standard of living of the people.
Rents and rates of interest are being reduced. Land and other taxes are
being abolished as far as possible. We give aid to the refugees. They are
placed with families in the safety zone. They too are mobilised and
armed, and often go back to their towns and villages. First we must
abolish all taxes and levies, for we cannot expect poor people to fight
against the Japanese robbers and at the same time pay taxes and levies.
But the rich people must give money."
According to the policy formulated in the above declaration, the defence
of the country was no longer the task only of the regular army. The
masses of the people were armed and mobilised to fight against Japanese
Imperialism. At the same time, the demands of the popular masses were
directly linked with the fight of the nationalist troops against foreign
aggression. A popular movement thus deve-
The Lesson 543
loped was bound to sweep away eventually native exploiters as well as
the foreign oppressors. That prospect naturally inspired the Chinese
masses with new courage and determination.
The situation, though hopeful, is however not without danger. The
Communists are paying heavily for national unity, they seem to be
throwing the baby out with the bath water. The reunited nationalist
movement remains almost completely under the leadership of the same
reactionary clique which carried on a bloody civil war against the forces
of revolution for a whole decade. They do not trust the Communists who
are only tolerated. "The visitor to Hankow first observes that Chinese
Communists have just begun to attain that same legality and freedom
which Communists enjoy in the United States. They have secured the
release of their political prisoners and the right to make occasional
speeches supporting the war against Japan. Two or three times a year,
their Central Committee issues Open Manifestoes regarding the proper
method of winning the war and improving the livelihood of the people;
these are usually played down, or entirely omitted in Kuo Min Tang
newspapers, but have increasingly wide repercussion among Chinese
intellectuals and eventually reach the Kuo Ming Tang rank and file. In
return for this rather moderate toleration, the Communists have called off
their ten years' opposition to the Central Government of China, and
formed with it a united anti-Japanese front. Instead of stirring up class
war between peasants and landlords, they stress the slogan 'Chinese do
not fight Chinese'. They have organised the rural population in two
provinces of North China so that, instead of yielding passively to the
invader, they have become a hard nut for the Japanese to crack. They
have donated to their country an extremely efficient method of mobile
warfare, developed through ten years of civil war."16
In the same article by a Communist journalist, the representative of the
Communist Party in the Nationalist capital is reported to have declared:
"We consider that China needs the Kuo Min Tang. Our Communist Party
represents the working class: it does not claim to, and cannot, represent
the whole people. For a considerable time to come, China needs a party
representing many other classes— merchants, intellectuals, landlords.
Our hope is that the Kuo Min Tang will strengthen itself by getting rid of
corrupt officials, reactionaries and traitors."
544 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
The danger of bending the stick in the other direction is evident. The
welcome zeal to learn from the bitter experience of the recent years
should not make one forget the equally bitter experience made
previously. The belated realisation that the party of the working class
could not lead a revolution involving other classes having no sympathy
for Socialism, should not lead to the repetition of older mistakes. If the
party of the working class could not assume the sole leadership of the
revolutionary movement, that could be done much less by a party which
would embrace not only the reactionary merchants but also feudal
landlords.
Developments since the formation of the national united front have not
borne out the hope that the Kuo Min Tang will strengthen itself by
getting rid of the reactionaries in its ranks. It has continued the renewed
co-operation with the Communists because thereby it is reinforced
nationally as well as internationally. Having been driven to resist
Japanese invasion, the Nationalist Government requires unstinted support
from outside. That did not come from the rival Imperialist Powers. It
comes from the only source which was so very helpful to the Chinese
Nationalists once previously, namely, from the Soviet Union. On the
other hand, thanks to the activity of the Communists, the masses have
been mobilised in self-defence. The resistance to Japan is no longer
conditional upon the attitude of treacherous and fickle-minded military
leaders. The modern army of Japanese Imperialism has dealt blow after
blow to Chinese resistance. During the last two years, it has occupied
practically the entire eastern part of the country. The Nationalist
Government has been driven out from one important city after another
and has withdrawn to the remotest part.
Nevertheless, the resistance continues. The danger is not the power of
Japanese Imperialism, which is bound to collapse in the long run; the
danger is in possibility of the ruling clique of the Kuo Min Tang and the
Nationalist Government again betraying the revolution. That possibility
will always remain as long as the leadership of the movement continues
to be in the control of reactionaries who by their own acts have proved
themselves to be enemies of the revolution. If the zeal for unity precludes
the developing of the movement so as to outgrow its reactionary
leadership, then, ultimately, the experience of 1927 may be repeated.
Political mobilisation as well as arming of the masses under local
Communist leadership offer a
The Lesson 545
guarantee against that danger. But the social composition of the national
leadership must eventually change. There is reason to fear that the
Communist leaders, behaving like burned children, are inclined towards
a relapse into opportunism which may be justified as a clever strategy. It
is not enough to recognise that the Chinese revolution is still in the
bourgeois democratic stage. It must also be realised that a bourgeois
democratic revolution requires a revolutionary leadership. Past
experience has amply proved that the bourgeoisie are incapable of
leading the revolution. But a bourgeois revolution triumphing in the teeth
of the opposition of the bourgeoisie themselves, is not unprecedented in
history. The only condition for the triumph is that it must have a
revolutionary leadership, in the democratic sense. Communism may be a
far cry; but Jacobinism is the order of the day. In order to succeed, the
revolutionary movement in China must develop in that direction.
Notes
1. These figures were given by Hang Tsuen in an article in the International Press
Correspondence, No. 63, July 29, 1930.
2. Report of the Communist Party of China, published in the Communist International,
Nos. 22/23, June 1929.
3. Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, published in the
Communist International, Nos. 22/23, June 1929.
4. China Forum, Shanghai, May 21, 1932 and April 13, 1933.
5. Report to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International.
6. Wang Min, "Revolutionary China To-day", 1933.
7. "Essential Conditions and Minimum Demands for United Resistance", in "The March
Towards Unity", published in New York, 1937.
8. Letter to the Members of the All-China National Salvation League, August 10,1936.
9. "China: The March Towards Unity", published in New York, 1937.
10. Edgar Snow, "Red Star Over China".
11. Harry Cannes, "When China Unites", New York, 1937.
12. Edgar Snow, "Red Star Over China".
13. Shanghai Evening Post, December 29, 1936.
14. "China To-Day".
15. NymiWales, "The Passing of the Chinese Soviets", Asia, New York, January, 1938.
16. Anna Louise Strong, Asia, August 1938,
 EPILOGUE
The swing of the pendulum of Communist politics in China, indicated by
the events in 1937, did lead to a new orgy of opportunism, as was
apprehended by critical observers. It degenerated into nationalism. An
all-embracing national front against Japanese Imperialism became the
new slogan of the Communist Party. The cruel history of ten years' civil
war was brushed aside, and Chiang Kai-shek was fervently invited to
assume the leadership of the National Front. Thanks to Communist
propaganda, the world forgot the bloody record of nationalist China, and
hailed Chiang Kai-shek as a great leader of a united people fighting
valiantly against Japanese aggression, and subsequently on the side of
world democracy in the war against Fascism. To lionise Chiang Kai-shek
as one of the top leaders of the international anti-fascist alliance was the
greatest absurdity of contemporary history. Even during the war, the
politics of the Kuo Min Tang and the behaviour of the Chungking
Government were hardly distinguishable from Fascism. The outside
world might not know the truth about China. But the Chinese
Communists could not plead ignorance. Yet, all along they plumped for
an all embracing national front under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, and
English and American journalists of leftist persuasion did a good deal of
drum-beating for nationalist China.
Successive military reverses during the earlier part of 1944, and finally
the Stilwell episode, created abroad the feeling that there was something
wrong in China. The Chinese experts among foreign journalists, again
particularly those of leftist persuasion, with an inexplicable suddenness,
began to tell "the truth about China". In May 1944, an anonymous
correspondent wrote from Chungking: "Many Chinese are becoming
aware of a change in British and specially U.S. public opinion about
China. For years they were used to hearing nothing but unqualified praise
of the Chinese war efforts, in terms which idealised China beyond
recognition. I have asked many
The Epilogue 547
Chinese what they thought of the recent change of foreign opinion and of
increasing criticism of Government policy. A liberal friend m
Government service said: "I am happy that the previous sugary
Hollywood conception of China is now giving way to realism. Foreign
criticism coincides with the increasing domestic demand for freedom of
speech, press and assembly and political organisation and with a growing
popular movement in favour of constitutional government.
But the lid was definitely blown off the "cauldron of Cathay" at the end
of the year, by Theodore White of the American Time and Life and Stuart
Gelder of the London News Chronicle; Brooks Aikmsono? the New York
Times also contributed to the blow-off. The first two were curious cases
of conversion. White paid a short visit to India during the stormy days of
August 1942. He was a vehement defender of the congress policy and
fully sympathised with the sabotage movement. Apprehensive of certain
tendencies at Chungking, he nevertheless supported Chinese nationalism
as against Anglo-American Imperialism. Stuart Gelder is more known
and loved in India for the role he played as the willing instrument of
Gandhi trying to extricate the Congress from the consequences of its pro-
Axis politics. The Indian National Congress and the Kuo Min Tang are
birds of the same feather. Yet, immediately after breaking a lance for
Indian nationalism, Gelder proceeded to China to debunk Kuo Min Tang
politics. At the end of December 1944, he reported:
"The facade so carefully built up by the Chinese Propaganda Department and the
most accomplished of all Public Relations Directors, Madame Chiang Km-shek, has
crumbled in the face of the continuous success of Japanese arms. t-or years, the Kuo
Min Tang party leaders, who form the one-party government of China, have allowed
the rest of the world to think of it as a twentieth century country. To millions of
people in Europe, America, India and elsewhere, China has been personified for
years in the sophisticated figure of America-educated Madame Chiang Kai-shek.
The truth is that she no more represents China than an Indian Maharaja represents
India: no more than the commercial cities of Shanghai, Hongkong, Kankow, Tientsin
and the cultural centre of Peking represent the four hundred million Chinese who
occupy the hmterland of the country and are indeed China."
Having given a graphic picture of the intolerable conditions in nationalist
China, and trying to explain them, Gelder further wrote:
"It is an explanation which should have been given by her (China's)propa-gandists,
including the most distinguished of all-Madame Chiang Kai-shek— instead of the
fantastic bunkum which is now being debunked throughout the
548 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
world. Of course, it is largely true that the reason for this is that the present-day
rulers of China wish to give the impression that their power is for the good of the
Chinese people, and therefore they must paint a pretty picture of the result of it. The
interesting time is coming when the Chinese people will discover how they have
been sold a fake."
That is a powerful condemnation of nationalism, and an admission of the
mistake of having appreciated and supported it as a liberating force even
in this period of international civil war. Stuart Gelder and others like him
may live to report similarly about the Indian National Congress and its
National Government about which they still entertain illusions. This
debunking of the Kuo Min Tang and the Chungking Government
exposed how very misplaced was the Communist hope of building a
united anti-imperialist front again under the tattered and blood-stained
banner of nationalism and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The neo-
nationalism of the Communists only enabled the Kuo Min Tang to regain
its prestige, and Chiang Kai-shek to play the popular hero, and
consequently hindered the growth of a revolutionary democratic
movement, instead of helping it. Nationalism, which conducted a bloody
civil war against the people for a decade, did not change its colour. Its
intention was not quite unknown. Stuart Gelder reported at the end of
December I 944: "The Kuo Min Tang progressives say that the
reactionaries do not want the Communists to be armed, because after the
Japs have been beaten, the then well-equipped Kuo Min Tang forces will
have a chance to crush them once and for all."
Whether their neo-nationalism was an opportunist deviation or meant to
be a tactical move, in the territories controlled by them the Communists
finally adopted the policy which should have been theirs long ago.
Quietly setting aside the Utopian idea of establishing a proletarian
dictatorship in the midst of mediaeval conditions, they raised the banner
of revolutionary democracy. The remarkable success of the new policy
of the Communists, as evidenced by their ability to mobilise the popular
masses in an effective resistance to Japanese aggression, proved that at
last, after years of bitter experience, the right approach to the problems of
the Chinese revolution had been found. With the programme of
revolutionary democratic freedom, the Communists could have directly
approached the people throughout the country, instead of advocating a
united front with counterrevolutionary nationalism. The adventurous
policy of indiscriminate
The Epilogue 549
armed uprising having been discarded in favour of the programme of
political mass mobilisation under the banner of democratic freedom
Chiang Kai-shek could have no longer continued his military crusade
against the Communists. So, they were in a position to appear in the
political field as an independent factor, and thus provide a rallying
ground for all the democratic and progressive forces in the country.
That straight forward policy would have isolated reactionary nationa-
lism, and exposed Chiang Kai-shek and his clique in their true colour
and thus made it impossible for them to fool the democratic world for
several fateful years.
However, while pursuing the tortuous course of neo-nationalism the
Communists, in the territories under their control, did lay the pattern
of the Chinese revolution. The revolutionary democratic system
established there is bound to extend all over the country in course of
time.
In an address to some foreign journalists, who, with great difficulty,
obtained the permission of the Chungking Government to visit Yenan
at the end of 1944, the leader of the Communist Party Mao Tse-tung,
outlined the policy of his party as follows:
"To support Generalissimo Chiang; to insist on cooperation between the Kuo Mm
Tang and the Chinese Communists and among the Chinese neoniP and to struggle for
the overthrow of Japanese Imperialism and the establish' ment of an independent
democratic China."
In the same address, he deplored the conditions, in the face of which
the policy of united front outlined by him was evidently unwarranted
and even wrong. He said:
'There is shortcoming in China, and rather serious shortcoming too. This
shortcoming is the lack of democracy. The Chinese people urgently need
democracy, because it is only through democracy that there can be streLth
the war of resistance. What we hope the National Government, the Kuo M «
Tang Party and other political parties, will do is to realise democracy in everv
way. But China lacks the democratic system that is necessary for puS
forward the war. No doubt, we need unification, and there must be umficat on
in every way But this must be established on the basis of democracy We
need political unification but it cannot be a strong political unification unless*
is established on the basis of freedom of speech, press, assembly and orgaSsa
tion, and of a government elected democratically by the "
550 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
to get over doctrinaire preoccupations and adjust their action to the
realities of the country. To shelve the ill-conceived slogan of proletarian
dictatorship will improve the position of the Communists even in the
European countries. There also, they are now advocating broad-based
democratic governments instead of proletarian dictatorship.
Mao Tse-tung's passionate advocacy of democracy is as refreshing as his
hope about a regeneration of the Kuo Min Tang is pathetic. To support
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was obviously inconsistent with the
object of establishing "an independent democratic China." For Mao Tse-
tung, of all people, to entertain such an illusion about the Kuo Min Tang
and Chiang Kai-shek, was indeed curious. He got over one doctrinaire
preoccupation, to be captivated by another— united national front.
Should the tragic history of China repeat itself? No. Experience will help
the Chinese Communists to get over their new doctrinaire preoccupation
also.
One of the foreign journalists, who visited Yenan, Issac Epstein,
representing the New York Times, wrote :
"The administrative systam prevailing in these areas is, unlike in the Kuo Min Tang
controlled regions, thoroughly elective and democratic, starting from the lowest
village units In some matters, pure democracy prevails in the village, when the
whole village population, acting together, discuss and decide a question. The
Communist policy in China at present is not to introduce Communism or Socialism,
but to mobilise all groups in a democratic alliance for the task of national liberation.
Their institutions and actions flow not from mechanical application of formulae, but
from detailed study of actual conditions prevailing in China. The communists are not
preaching Communism, and the maximum is a reduction of rent in the liberated
areas."
Epstein is known to be very close to the Communists. His views
expressed publicly might herald a new orientation of the policy of the
Chinese Communists. It did, as subsequent events proved.
The all-important economic and social programme of the Chinese
Communists was described in January 1945 by the London Economist as
follows: "The regime at Yenan is not so much Communist as radical
agrarian. The guerilla areas too are predominantly agricultural. The new
radicalism is apparently not doctrinaire. The Communists have
concentrated on reform of rents and taxes, not on expropriation."
That is certainly not Communism, although it is a social revolution—the
kind needed by China. Only a Communist Party is not
The Epilogue 551
required to lead such a revolution. More than ninety per cent of the
people are directly concerned with the revolution. Therefore, the so-
called Communist Party has ceased to be the political organisation of the
working class. It no longer pursues the object of setting up a proletarian
dictatorship to establish Socialism. It strives for democratic freedom, to
be reared upon economic democracy. Consequently, for all practical
purposes, in form as well as content, the Communist Party of China has
become a party of the people—a Radical Democratic Party.
According to reports published in the beginning of 1945, the Communist
Party claims a membership of a million and a quarter. That figure
represents a very large fraction of the entire adult population of the area
directly under the jurisdiction of the Yenan Government. There are not
many thousand industrial workers in that area; nor are there many
Communists outside that area.* The class composition of the Communist
Party, therefore, is overwhelmingly non-proletarian. Why, then, call it a
Communist Party? Experience will most probably compel the leaders of
the revolution to discard the inappropriate denomination also. The task of
the revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries now is to establish
Radical Democracy. The suitable name for a party leading that
revolution is therefore the Radical Democratic Party.
The metamorphosis of the Chinese Communist Party and the change of
its programme and policy are influencing the international relation of
forces as regards China. The Kuo Min Tang conducted its bloody
crusade against the Communists not only with the help of Japan; it had
the sympathy and material support of all the imperialist Powers. Even
during the war, when the so-called Red Armies were doing as much
fighting (often more) as Chiang Kai-shek's armies, the Chungking
Government alone received all the benefits of the Lease-Land
arrangement. Its anti-Communist policy, which indeed was anti-
democratic, was practically condoned by the Anglo-American allies.
Towards the end of the war, there was a marked change. The press in
Britain and America began urging the Chungking Government to make
up with the Communists. Presumably, diplomatic pressure was brought
to bear upon Chiang Kai-shek to take some steps in that direction. But
the Communists pressed for a full-fledged coalition
* That was nearly a year before the Communist armies, on the defeat of Japan,
occupied large tracts of North China and Manchuria.
552 Revolution and Counterrevolution in China
government, and the end of Kuo Min Tang totalitarianism. Chiang would
not agree. The negotiations broke down. Thereupon, the U.S.
Ambassador, General Hurley, took a hand. He visited Yenan, and soon
afterwards went to Washington to advise, as reliably reported that
Chiang Kai-shek should be compelled to make up with the Communists
on terms of equality. What he saw in Yenan must have convinced the
American Ambassador that the "Reds" are quite respectable people, not
engaged in confiscating property and nationalising women, but
successfully establishing a democratic order for the first time in the
history of China.
The changed policy, particularly of the United States, encouraged the
Chinese Communists to stiffen their attitude towards Chungking. The
fervent advocacy of an all-embracing national front under the leadership
of Chiang Kai-shek has been fruitless, as it was bound to be.
Communism is a far cry; Radical Democracy is the new way to that
distant goal. But civil war is an actuality. The Kuo Min Tang under the
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek has been waging it ruthlessly ever since
1926 and he intends to carry it on covertly for the moment, and again
overtly as soon as the opportunity will come. In that situation, a united
national front is an impossibility. Democracy is not identical with
nationalism. The neo-nationalist degeneration of the Chinese
Communists was not necessary for their taking a realistic view of the
tasks of the revolution. Indeed, to establish democratic freedom, they
must fight nationalism which, in the present time, is bound to degenerate
into Fascism. That happened in China since 1927. Therefore it was so
very grotesque to boost the Chinese Fuehrer as a leader of the world anti-
fascist front. The same thing will happen in other countries where the
antiquated cult of nationalism still dominates public life.
On March 1st, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek made a public announcement that,
next November a National Assembly would be called to establish a
constitutional government. The Communists had been agitating for this
all these years. But now an official spokesman of the Yenan Government
struck an entirely different note. In an interview to the Associated Press
of America he said: "The National Assembly proposed by Chiang Kai-
shek will be a Congress of slaves; Chiang is plotting to swallow the Red
Army. He is a despot and a dictator. He should be removed from his high
position and punished."
The Epilogue 553
That marked the beginning of a new chapter in the: history of the Chinese
Revolution. The Communists seem to have realised that a united front
under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek will only serve the purpose of
counter-revolution. After doctrinaire Communism, reactionary
nationalism must also be discarded. The final stages of the long fight for
the freedom of the Chinese people will take place under the banner of
Radical Democracy -Twentieth Century Jacobinism.
* ***
The collapse of Japan in August 1945 changed the relation of
international forces in the Far East, and consequently the perennial civil
war in China threatened to break out again in flames of actual fighting.
There was a fierce controversy between the Communists and the
Chungking Government over the question of accepting Japanese
surrender. The Communists claimed that the Japanese armies in the
territories covered by the operations of the Chinese Red Army should
surrender themselves and their arms to the latter. Chiang Kai-shek, on
the contrary, ordered that only officers appointed by him were entitled to
accept the surrender of the Japanese army. The object of both the parties
was palpable. Chiang wanted to prevent the Communist armies growing
stronger by capturing large quantities of arms from the defeated
Japanese. The Communists, on their part, were equally anxious to have
exactly that advantage. The American Supreme Command backed up
Chiang's claim. The Communists were defiant, and the fate of China
trembled in the balance.
The Sino-Soviet Treaty, concluded at that juncture, promised to save
China from the threatened outbreak of civil war. The Communists would
not precipitate a clash without the consent of the Russians, because in
that impending clash America stood behind Chungking, and powerful
American forces were actually in China. On the other hand, if America
intervened in the Chinese civil war the Soviet Union could not stand
aloof. Hence the Russians were anxious to head off any such fateful
clash. By signing the treaty with the Chungking Government, they went
more than half-way—to the extent of letting down the Communists, for
the moment at least. But at the same time, in return for sweeping
concessions to the Chinese Government, which had never been very
friendly to Moscow the Russians demanded democratisation of China
and a close Sino-Soviet alliance. The demand implied that Kuo Min
Tang Fascism
554 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
should end, and Chiang's reactionary clique be removed from power.
The success of Soviet diplomacy would also scuttle the American plan of
practically establishing a protectorate over nationalist China. The
generous terms offered by the Russians strengthened the hands of the
progressive elements inside the Kuo Min Tang. Chiang could openly
oppose the treaty only by risking isolation. The treaty thus influenced the
relation of forces in the political life of China. According to it, the
Chungking Government was to be reconstructed as a coalition of parties,
the Communists having a fair representation. Their claim of equal share
in the Government was, indeed, waived. But the Communist Party would
be a party in the State, on a footing of equality with other parties,
including the Kuo Min Tang. Functioning as the leader of Chinese
democracy, which would mean its being Communist only in a name, it
would grow in influence, and entrench itself throughout the country as
deeply as it had done in some limited areas.
But the success of Soviet statesmanship depended on the response from
China. The Chungking Government signed as well as ratified the treaty.
For the moment, the war clouds on the horizon appeared to disperse. The
controversy over the question of Japanese surrender, however, was still
not settled. Chiang Kai-shek invited the head of the Yenan Government,
Mao Tse-tung, to Chungking for a personal discussion of the
controversial questions. Thereupon followed protracted negotiation
behind closed doors. It was to settle all outstanding disputes between the
two parties, and prepare the ground for the formation of a coalition
government. After several weeks, during which time the expectant world
was puzzled by conflicting news reports, the negotiation broke up. The
Communist leader left the nationalist capital, denouncing Chiang Kai-
shek as a fascist dictator. That was the signal for the outbreak of a verbal
warfare serving the purpose of a smoke-screen behind which both the
parties manoeuvered for positions in the field of civil war. The
Coummunists refused to participate in the meeting of the National
Assembly which was to promulgate a Constitution as the basis of the
coalition government.
The Sino-Soviet Treaty itself was pushed into the background by the new
controversy over the question of Russian evacuation of Manchuria.
Having realised that moral support given through the treaty did not
enable the democratic and progressive elements inside
The Epilogue 555
the Kuo Min Tang to gain the upper-hand, and shake Chiang's
dictatorship, the Russians fell back on the policy of assisting the
Communists, directly and indirectly, to strengthen their armed forces and
take up strategic positions under the cover of the Soviet army, throughout
North China and Manchuria. On the other hand, Chiang received the
fullest support of the American iniljtary authorities as well as the new
Ambassador, General Marshall, in the effort to establish his rule
throughout the country, including Manchuria. The result of that parallel
development was that the stage was set for a civil war on a much larger
scale than ever. By the spring of 1946, China was split up into two
openly hostile camps—the Communists controlling strategically the
entire North almost down to the Yellow River, and the Nationalists,
backed by the Americans, embattled to enforce their authority.
The unhappy country thus made yet another round in the vicious circle of
revolution and counter-revolution. Perennial civil war is the feature of
that unstable state. It could not be ended simply by the Communists
becoming passionate patriots. In the Soviet Union, Communism could be
patriotic for the very simple reason that there the people have a patria;
the country belongs to them. In other countries, where the patria is the
property of a minority, and the majority is entirely dispossessed, it is
absurd to preach patriotism to the people. The Communists have still to
learn that the Russians cannot be imitated everywhere, under all
circumstances.
The Communists suddenly discovered fascist ambitions in Chiang Kai-
shek, having for years lionised him as the leader of the patriotic war. Ihe
Nationalists, on their part, accused the Communists of disloyalty and
conspiracy to disrupt national unit. The Japanese invitation had forced a
semblance of national unity; but it was to be expected that, on the
disappearance of that extraneous factor, the smouldering fire of civil war
would again break out into flames.
The experience of China should answer one of the outstanding questions
facing the post-war world, namely, can democratic freedom be
reconciled with Nationalism? The civil war in China has not been, and
will not be, a struggle between Communism and Nationalism. It is a
tussle between Nationalism and Democracy; between reaction and
progress; between vested interests and the urge for a social
reconstruction needed for promoting the welfare of the people as a
whole. Had Nationalism been democratic, the Communists could
556 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
not capture the leadership of the masses. Having learned from ex-
perience, the Communists in China to-day are Communists only in name.
In effect, they stand for democratic freedom, and have established it
wherever they had the power to do so. As champions of democracy in
practice, as well as in theory, they have been proclaimed enemies of the
nation by the Nationalists. Nationalism thus proposes to wage war
against democracy. How can a civil war be avoided in such a situation?
Thus, by the middle of 1946, twenty years after the betrayal of the
National Democratic Revolution by the nationalist bourgeoisie, and
many more decades of a continuous tussle between revolution and
counter-revolution, China stood at cross-roads, awaiting the verdict of
history.
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Shih Ching (The Book of History).

 INDEX

Academy, Wampoa Military, 350,

417, 418 Agrarian problem, 174, 371
reform 371, 375, 388, 450
revolution 340, 370, 374, 378, 380-82,
39J, 450
Agreement, Washington, 485 Alliance against Taipin? Revolt, 131
of bourgeoisie with feudalism, 345
of petit bourgeoisie with left
militarists, 345
question of, with Kuo Min Tang
and Communist Party, 350 America, 16, 19, 64, 100, 166,214, 219,
499-500. 501, 505, 506-08, 516, 547.
553-54 American adviser to the Nationalist
Govt., 320 21
bankers, 482-83, 499-501
Commissioner, 127
Capital, 482-83, 499-501
Imperialism, 98-99, 312, 338, 368
races, 16, 17-18, 18-19 Amasterdam, 501 Ancient China, Social basis, 27-28
mysticism 26-27 Anfu Clique, 294 Anglo-American Imperialism, 288,
312,338, 368,506-07 Anglo-Chinese War, 95, 122,129 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 99-
100 "Anglo-Saxon commercialism, 251 Anhwei, 335, 496-97, 513 Animals, bovine,
72 Ankuochun, 3S6, 387 Anna Louise Strong, 543-44 Annam. 98
Anne, Queen, 465-66 Anthracite coal, 102-3 Anti-chaiang movement 357-58 Anti-
Christian riotes, 164 Anti-Communist demonstration
expeditions, 315 Anti-foreign sentiment, 83 Anti-Imperialism movement, 292-93
Economic causes, 167-68 Anti-Japanese boycott, 291, 293,
294-95 Arabs, 86 Aristotle, 25-26 Army, Iron, 390, 392, 393, 494-95
"Model", 201
Nationalist, 344-45, 385, 391-392,
469, 478-79, 482, 490-91, 505, 509-10
Nineteenth Route, 508
Northen, 201
of Feng Yu-Shiang, 394
of Sun Chauan-fang, 391
Red, 467, 509-514, £16-17
revolutionary, 388-89
Wuhan 386-87 Artisans, 389 Assembly, Provincial, 201-202
National, 320, 470, 552-53, 554-555 Atkinson Brooks, 546-47 Australia, 103
Banks, 373
Babarism and civilisation, 15 Basic Industries, 373 Battle for Honan, 392 Bentham,
251
Beresford, Lord, 162-63, 173-74 Mission, 166-67
562 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Betrayal of the revolutiou 327
Bible, 84
"Big Five", 488-89
Birmingham, 251
"Bloody Bolsheviks" 317
"Bolshevik Agent", 306
danger, 238
usurpers of canton, 320 Bolsheviks, 408-09 Bolshevism, 302, 319, 322, 337
Jacobinism, 310, 311 Bonapartism, 401
Chinese, 480-81 Bonham George, 127 Borodin, Michael, 8-9, 270, 320, 353,
354-55, 397, 429, 445, 451-452-453,
455-56, 464 Bourgeois democratic revolution,
107-13,324,347,371,373-74,
387-89, 393-94, 439, 463, 467, 486,
514-15 Bourgeosis revolution, character of,
309 Bourgeoisie, 314, 369, 371-72, 380-8],
463-66, 467-69. 477, 478-81, 492-83
484-85, 486-88, 489, 491-92, 493, 94,
494-495, 498-501, 506
alliance with imperialism, 368-70
& native reaction, 216-17
attitude towards revolution, 372-74
capture Kuo Min Tang, 365
Class interest of 372-73
industrial, 371-74
revolutionary role of, 249-50
turn against revolution, 374
unite against revolution, 364 Boxer Indemnity, 103-04, 151
Rebellion, 88-89, 105
Revolt, 213, 216, 221-23, 256 Boxer Uprising 159 et seq. 191-92,
202,203,291,292,294,295
& British mission, 162-64
& the Empress Dowager, 159-61 Boy Emperor, 335-36 Boycott of Japanese goods, 291-
92 Breakdown of monopolist companies,
92-93
Britain, 98, 131-32, 173-74, 481-82,
499-501, 504-05, 516 British Colonial Treasury, 95-96
Commissioner, 127
Concession at Hankow, 341-42, 343
Foreign Minister, 418-19, 421. 481-83
Emperialism, 127, 173-74, 267-68, 279-80, 316-17, 342-43, 410-11, 413-14, 420-22
Mission, 93-94,162-63
Police, 299 Buddhism, 53-54 Burma, 98 Burton, 2-3
C.C. Wu, 418-19, 482-83, 499-500 Cadets, Regiment, 460-61 Campaign for Woochang,
392 for Wuhan, 390-91 in Kiangsi, 357-58 military, 385-87, 388-89 Canada, 102-03
Canton 85-86, 94-95, 126-27, 128-29, 256-57, 318, 319-23, 325-26, 327-28, 329-32, 338-
39, 343, 345-46 351, 353-54, 371, 375-76, 384, 410-11, 417-19, 433-34, 460-63, 464-66,
478-79, 482, 495, 496-98, 499, 510-11, 513, 514-15
"Bolshevik Usurpers of", 319-20 Committee of Kuo Min Tang, 320,
321
Conference (Jan 1918), 280-81 "Council of Workers, Peasants &
Soldiers' Deputies", 460-61 Directorate, 280-81 insurrection, 458-59 Kuo Min Tang, 318-
19, 323-24
Resolution, 318-19 Labour Conference, 296 "Nationalist Govt. of 280-81, 287,
318-19, 420-21, 336-37, 339 "Red", 304-32, 478 Strike Committee, 320-21, 510-11
Uprising, 510-11
Cantonese Government (Second) 285-86 Capital, 79, 372-73, 389
Capitalism 308-09, 438-39, 481-82,
483-84, 486, 494-95, 495-96
attack on, 369-70 Central China, 338
Committee of Communist Party,
463, 464-65, 479-80, 481, 513-14
Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, 410-11
Exchequer, 334-35, 489-90
Executive Committee, 318, 319, 325-26, 328-330, 331-32, 352-53
Government, 488-89, 489-90, 490-91 494
"Soviet District" 513, 516, 531-32 Chamberlain, 418-19, 481-82 Chan Period, (400
BC), 50-51 Chang Chin-Kiang, 326, 330, 356-57 Chang Chin-tung, 138-41 142-43,
144-
45, 158,161-62,180-81,217 Chang Fah-kwei, Chang Hsue-liang, 483-84, 494, 504-
07
526-27, 536-37 Chang Tai-yen, 257-58 Chang Tso-lin, 293-94, 300, 335-38,
385, 401, 402, 416-17, 433-36 Chang Tusung-Chang, 338, 344-45,
366, 400-01, 412-13, 480-81 Changed policy of U.S.A., 551-2 Changsa, 341-42,
424, 426-28, 502,
504-05, 516-17
uprising, 453-54 Chao-Chor, 52-53
Chekiang, 343-44, 415-16, 485, 496-97 Chen Chien 414 Chen Chin-Ming, 318, 321-
22 Cheng Chow, 391-92, 392-93 Chen Eugene-see eugene Chen Chen Kum-po, 352-
53 Chen Shen, 50 Chen Tu-hsiu, 222, 250-51, 356, 450-
51, 464
Chia Yi, 51-52 Chin Chi-huangli, 49-50 Chiang Kai-Shek, 325-26, 327-28,
330-32, 342-44, 350-52, 355-58, 361-
63, 368-69, 375, 385-87, 390-94
399-400, 402-403, 411-21, 423-24,
Index 563
432-35, 447-48, 478-79, 480-81, 481-82, 490-93, 497-98, 503-04, 505-06, 510-11,
546
accepts foreign help, 526-27 accepts German help, 525-26 attacks working class,
363-64 betrayed by Wuhan group, 358-60 betrays 19th Route Army, 532-33
Captured by Sian garrison, 537 combination against, 352-55 convenes executive
committee
of Kuo Min Tang, 538-39 declares Nanchang as nationalist
centre, 361-62
encircles Chinese Soviets, 524 expulsion from Kuo Min Tang,
362-63 massacre of workers and peasants
by, 355-56
movement against, 357-58
Plays popular hero, 548-49 1
proposes National Assembly, 552-53
reply to appeal for united front,
536-37 severs relation with Soviet Union,
363-64 struggle against Wuhan Group,
358-59
sudden change of front, 355-56
vs. Wuhan, 363-64 Chili, 174-75, 338
coal fields of, 296 Chin Dynasty, 47-9 China, ancient & modern 11,12
and Greek civilisation, 20
and Greek tribal organisation, 20-21
cultivation and livestock, 73
history before Confucius, 20 j
population & density, 70 '
Chinese Bonapartism, 480-81
bourgeoisie, 541-42
& Imperialism, 481-82-83
& Republicanism, 334-35
Capital, 80
civilisation & animals, 15-20
conservatism, 16
culture & private property, 14-lS
564 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Eastern Railway, 172, 494, 497-98
feudalism, features of, 44-45
Girondist, 319-20
"Gordon" 132-33
Imperial Army, 132-33
under Tsing Kwo-fan, 133
Jacobinism, 310-11, 322
merchants, 321-22
middle class, 13-14
missionaries, 345-46
nationalist Revolution, 529-31
Renaissance, 12-15
Republic, 318-19
Revolution, 429-430, 442, 438, 461-62, 464-65, 466, 481-83, 509-10
self-contained economy, breaking of, 344-45
village economic life, 43 Chief Political Adviser, 500-01 Ching Emperor, 189-90
Chingking Shan, 510-11, 512 Chou En-lai, 524, 529 Chow Regime, 20-21, 24, 47, 48-49,
50-51
Chows, Northern, 55-56 "Christian General" 297-98, 337-38
Missionaries, 86, 97, 130, 131, 164
Powars, 98, 112-14, 124, 125 Christianity, 91, 208, 209, 235 Chu Pei-teh, 325 Chu Teh,
510-12, 524, 525 Chunking, 546-49, 551 Chung Kuo Min Tang, 263 "City Council",
345-46, 414, 469, 470,
502, 503
Civil War, 197-99, 333-35, 380, 381 Civilisation, Chinese and European,
12, 14 Class struggle, 373, 380-83, 387, 388
in ancient China, 37
inside Kuo Min Tang, 345, 34S Coal, 77
Coalition, north (Plan for), 502 Cuchin China, 94, 97 Colonial Country, character of
nationalist revolution in, 347
exploitation, 126
form of political organisation in,
347
Commandant of Metropolis, 335, 336 Committee, Executive, 318, 319, 326,
332
Central of Kuo Min Tang, 319-22, 328,329
Strike, 320-24, 330 Committees, of local Kuo Min Tang,
389 Commune, 460-63
Inaugural session of the, 460. 461
Paris, 320, 321 Communism, 304-7, 425-27, 477, 504-
508
and Radicalism, 550, 551 Communist International, 8, 9, 416,
417, 442, 443, 461-66, 515, 533, 534 "Communist Menace", 447, 537 Communist Party,
205, 298, 313-16,
326, 340, 332, 340, 341, 364, 381-83,
393-97, 439-50, 460, 461, 509-16,
546, 549-54
adopts new programme, 540, 541
and Chiang Kai-shek, 359, 360, 046
and Radical Democratic Party, 551
attack in Shanghai on, 345, 346, 355, 357, 370
question of relation with, 362, 363
Kuo Min Tang,
Mistake of the, 323, 334, 330
propaganda of, 269, 270 Communist Youth Congress, 539, 540
League, 439 Communists, 321-332, 336, 337, 349,
350, 363, 374, 375, 393-400, 415-19,
425-35, 439-450, 461, 464-70, 477-81
490, 502, 503, 509-16
and neo nationalism, 547-49
accused by petit bourgeois radicals, 383
alliance with counter revolutionary elements, 353, 355
mistake of, 383
quest on of admission into Kuo

Index 565
Min Tang, 348 Compradores, 90, 91
Conference Canton, 280, 281
Chengchow, 391, 392
Hsuchow, 394
National Economic, 486, 487
Pacific Relations, 482, 483
Reorganisation, 323, 375, 377
Shanghai, 280-83
Third Party Congress, 481
Unity, 478-81
Washington, 412, 413, 483, 484
"Western Hill", 321,326 Confucius, 2, 12, 19-23, 41, 47, 48, 83,
139, 140, 146, 147, 204, 208-11, 237,
238, 245, 246, 501, 502
and feudal forces, 23
and human relations, 31
and middle class, 31, 32
his philosophy of State, 21
philosophy, doctrine of, 25, 26
philosophy of uniting central authority, 28, 30 Confucian culture, 14
cosmology, 25, 26, 28
and Pythagorian conception, 26, 27
doctrine of fellowship, 31, 32
(Heavenly Way), 29
"Ideal State", 57
Confucian, moral & political philosophy, 26
paternalism and Sun Yat sen, 212, 213
political philosophy, 33, 34
School, 441, 442
Society, 24, 25
theory of State, 28, 29, 139,140 Confucianism, 2, 14, 15, 21, 22, 152, 153, 252, 325,
326
and individualism, 235, 236
and Taoism, 29, 30, 36
essence ol, 248, 249, 251, 252 Congress, Indian National, 546, 547 International
Chamber of Commerce 501, 502
Kuo Min Tang (2nd), 376-378 Constitution of Nineteen Articles, 189,
90n, 196 Constitutionalism, 196,197
Convention of Kiaochow, 172, 73
of Peking, 97 "Coolie Wang", 116, 117 Corruption among Manchu officials,
128-31 Council, Grand (abolition), 178,179
"Military", 330
of State, 203, 204 Count Witte, 172 Counter Revolution, 346, 390, 393,
394
Justification by Wuham Group,
379, 380 Coup d'etat, 392
countsr revolutionary, 326, 329
of March, 16, 350, 352, 374, 379 Cromwell, 335, 336 Customs Administration, 412
Daily Herald, 499
Decision of the left, 319, 320
"Declaration of Independence", 210 of Rights, 201,202
Democracy, 189, 196-97, 211
Democratic Revolution, 212-13, 383, 384
Delicate equilibrium of Chinese economy, 89,90
Denationalisation and decentralisation of China, 253
Development of handicrafts, 51, 52 of trade of China, 47, 48
Dictatorship, Military, 349-50, 386-89
Disbandment Commission, 488-90
Disraeli, 251-52
Distribution, 91
Divine Right, 186-87, 210-11
Dominicans, 85, 90
Drace, 20, 24, 32, 33
Dragon Throne, 147, 279-80
East India Company, 93-95 Economic development of China, 78,
79
Effect of foreign intervention, 91 Egypt, 6, 11 Elite, dictatorship of, 237
566 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Emperor Chin Lung, 93, 95
Eit-ti, 52, 53
Kwang Hsue, 246-47
Wenti, 51, 52
Wang-Mang, 53, 54 Empress Dowager, 140-42, 150-54 English Roundheads, 335-36
Engels, 1, 2 Epstein, Issac, 550-51 Estate General, 193, 194 Eugene Chen, 351-53
Expedition, military of Peking, 385,
392
North, 345-46, 388 Exports of China, 76-78 Expulsion from Kuo Min Tang, 318,
348-49
Fall of Han Dynastry, 54
Fang Chih min, 503
Famine in Hunan, Kwangsi and
Kwangtung, 122
Fascist "Paper Tiger" revolt, 316-17 Federation of Peasant Unions, 509-10 Feng Yu-
hsiang, 297, 298. 335-39,
352, 385, 388-89, 391-92, 394-95,
401, 433-35, 451-52, 483-84, 490-97,
502, 504-6, 516 Feudal absolutism, 495-96
Generals, 388
Militarists, 331, 371, 382-83, 387-88 430-33,447,481-88, 491-92, 494-499, 509
Patriarchal reaction, 387-90
relations, 287-88, 323-24 Feudalism, 323-26 Fifth Congress of C.P., 396-97 Five Kings,
145-46 "Five Power Administration, 276-77 First Reform Bill, 107-8 Forbidden City,
335-36 Foreign banks, 200-1
capital, 79, 372-73
Imperialism 21, 22, 291, 320-22, 323, 324, 327, 337, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 372-74.
analysis of. 271
intervention. 267-79
Region, uneer Frederic T. Ward,
130, 131, 132, 133 powers, 394, 395 trade of China, 75, 77, 78 Four Powers loan, 180-82
France, 72, 97, 98,100,101, 109, 110 125, 126,128,130,131, 134,135, 136, 137, 150, 165,
166, 171-74 193, 194, 201, 202, 439 Franco-Chinese army, 133 Frederick Whyte, Sir,
482,483,500,
501
French peasantry, 389, 390 Revolution, 13, 14, 107, 134, 135, 381, 382, 383, 384, 431
Galen, 417,418
Gandhi, 547
Gaul, 44-46
Garrison Commander of Canton, 331
General Council of Trade-Unions,
415, 416
General Staff, 320, 321 General Taug Chih-Yao 3i7
YanSen, 392 Generals, feudal, 388, 389
of TangShen-chi, 392 German imperialism in China, 172
Peasant's War, 335, 336
Revolution, 502, 503 Girondism, 167, 168,193, 194
Chinese, 214 Girondists, 318, 323,439 Golden Age, 12-14, 30, 31, 48, 49,
108,117, 118 Goodnow Dr. 204, 205 Government, Central, 487, 488, 489,
490, 491, 492, 494
of "Experts", 273, 274
Nanking, 402, 434, 435, 470, 478, 480-502, 505-508, 516
Nationalist, 320, 321, 396-96, 401-11, 413-16, 418-22, 424-28, 433-35, 442, 448, 449,
469, 470, 478-81, 484-91,494-505,510,511 Government, Peking 281-84, 319
Wuhan, 352,353,419-22,428, 429 Governor of Chekiang, 343, 344
ofHupeh, 338,339
of Hunan, 341, 342
ofKwangtuug, 267 Great Wall of China, 48, 49 Guard, "Old", 320, 321, 478, 480
"Red" 516
Workers, 322-24, 327-30, 342, 396-
97 Guerilla bands, 529, 530, 541, 542
Hatlufeng, 510, 511
"Haio Hui" 141
Han Cities, 189, 339-43, 386
Dynnsty, 50-54,
Period, 52,54-56 Handicraft in China, 73, 74
industries, 90 HangTsuen, 528530 Hanknow,182; 358, 331-43, 366, 367,
420-22, 424, 478, 379, 490-92, 502,
504, 505
Concession, 420-22
Nationalist Govt. of, 421,422 HansBoehm, 113, 114 Hanyang, 341, 342
arsenal, 425 Harry Cannes, 537 Hawaiian Islands, 208, 209 Hay Doctrine, 98-100 Hegel,
248 HsuChien, 351-53 Henry George, 214, 215 HoChien, 355, 356 Ho Lung, 510-11,513
Honun, 188, 392, 394 490, 49], 513 Hong Kong, 166,167, 182, 208, 209,
321-331, 367, 368, 461, 462, 478,
499, 500
blockade of, 330
boycott of, 320, 323, 324, 342, 410, 411
Seamens' strike, 295
sttike (second), 300, 302, 303
strike (1922), 285,286 "Hong Merchants", 90, 91
Index 567
Honolulu, 208, 209, 482, 483 Hsiao Keh, 524, 525 Hsia Toa-yin, 424-27, 533, 534
Hsuchow, 393, 395
Confererence, 394 Hu Han-min, 318, 319, 322, 323, 325,
332, 478, 499, 500 Hua Hsin Hui, 256, 257 Huang Hsing, 203, 256, 257, 262, 263
Hukuang Railway Loan, 202, 203 Hume, 251 Human, 338, 339, 341, 342, 355, 356,
357-359, 389, 400, 410, 424, 426,
427,434,435, 445, 446, 462, 463,
490, 491, 502, 504, 505, 509, 510,
513, 516 "Hundred Days of Reform", 145,
1-.6, 150
Hung Hsiu-sung, 113-15 Hupeh, 339, 342, 358, 359, 389, 400
401, 410, 445-46
General council of labour, 422-23
Imperial Edict, 196 Imperialism, 307-08, 389-90, 407-08, 463-64, 470, 480-84, 490-91,
499, 508,516-17
alliance with bourgeoisie, 368-70 Amercian, 208-09 Anglo-American, 289, 338 attack
on, 366, 367 British, 289, 321, 342, 343, 410-11,
413, 420-32, 478-79, 484-85, 499-
501

compromise with, 395 foreign, 195-97, 205, 208, 209, 216-

20, 223-25. 320-24, 327, 337, 340-
42, 343-45, 367,401-405,410-13,
416-17, 419-23, 428, 430-32, 439-
42, 445-46 analysis of, 271 German, in China, 172 International, 344-45, 368-69, 399,
400, 414, 480-81 Japanes, 339, 399, 400, 422-23,
483-84, 505-09 Imperial Commissioner, 30, 96, 97

568 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China

Imperialism role of, 272 Imperialist Fleet, 344-45 Imperialist Powers, 498 Inaugural
session of the Commune, 460-91
India, 6, 20, 26, 64-5, 72-3, 83, 85-7
93-6, 98-99, 546-48 Indian National Congress, 546-47 Individualism, 234-35 Indo-
China, 98 Insurrection, July, 204 International, Chamber of Commerce
501-02
Customs Conference, 420
obligations, 195
"Invisible export", 65-96 Iron, 79
"Iron Army", 342, 390-93, 400-01,
434-35, 494-95 Italian Republics, 106, 108-10
Jacobinism, 193, 194, 197, 198, 201, 202, 214, 309-10, 316-17, 325-26, 348-49,
353-54, 439, 552-53 Jacobins, 197, 198, 202, 276, 381-82 Japan, 86-88, 94, 97-101,
137-39, 151, 165-66, 171-72, 215-16, 222, 258-59, 263-65, 336-37, 368-69, 481-82,
505, 537-39, 549-53
Japanese Concession, 422, 423
Imperialism, 263-65, 291, 338, 402-03, 422-23, 483-84, 505-509, 533, 534, 537,
541, 544-46, 549, 550
Invasion, 508,555
militarism, 280
Police, 298
Textile mills, 422-23 Jeanned'Arc, 112, 113 Jena, 255 Jesuits, 84-88, 90-1
Missionaries, 87 Joffe, 269-70, 304, 305, 326 John Chinaman, 501-2 Jordon, Sir J.,
192n Juichin, 513, 519 July Uprising, 200-1, 204
Kaiser, 172
Rang Yi, 161-62
Kang Yu-wei, 141-46, 166-67, 211,
214, 245-54 Kansu, 490-91 Karkhan, 310-13 Karl Marx, 225-26, 237-38, 230, 246-
47, 284-85, 445 Kerenski, 108 Kiachow Bay, 173 Kiangsi, 341-42, 352, 345-46
campaign in, 357-58 Kiangsu, 400-1, 415, 416, 485, 488 Kiukiang, 343, 420, 478-79
Korea, 98, 171, 172 Ku Hung-ming, 251-55 Kuan Fu Hui, 257
Kuang Hsue, 142, 188
Kublakhan, 84
Kuo Chung-hung, 298
Kuo Min Tang, 203, 205, 232, 244-77, 284-88, 292-96, 300, 311-35, 340-49, 353-
57,362,363,368-75, 378, 386-428, 432-53, 463, 477-81, 485, '490-496, 499, 502, 546
after the death of Sun Yat sen,
317
and the Indian National Congress, 547
and the Reorganisation Conference 313-15
and the USSR, 553, 554
birth of, 261
capture of, 365
class struggle inside, 345, 348, 351, 351
conditions for reconciliation with Communists, 538, 539
conflict inside, 289
First Congress, 270, 271
First Manifesto, 270, 274
guarantee against revolution, 273, 274
question of admission of Communists into, 348, 350

Index 569
programme of, 260, 261, 273
pseudo-radicalism of, 251, 252
reorganisation of, 347
revolutionisation of, 275
revolutionary task of, 287, 288
right wing leaders, 317
second Congress of, 376-78, 379-81,
383 Kuo Min Tang, Social Composition,
345
split in, 345, 358, 359, 380, 363, 364
split into right and left wing, 317, 318
struggle for military dictatorship in,
349-52 Kuo Min Tang, White, 317, 318, 477,
478, 481
Kuo Min-yu, 433, 434 Kuo San Lin, 336, 337 Kwangsi, 116, 117, 121-23, 410, 480,
481,490,492,493
clique, 499
faction, 490, 491
group, 490,491,505,506
rebels, 491, 492, 494, 495, 497,498 Kwangsung, 284-86, 318, 341, 342,
366, 371, 373, 374, 389, 406, 407,
408, 410, 411, 434, 425, 462,463,
480, 481, 490, 510, 511
Labour, 372,373
& "Peasant Question", 324, 325
& peasant policy, 324
in land, 70, 71
organisation dissolution of, 374 Lament, 482, 483, 499-502 Lan, Duke, 160, 161 Land,
area of arable, 71, 72
confiscation by peasantry of, 383, 387. 388, 396
distribution system in China and Gaul, 44-46
redistribution of, 387, 388
property relations in, 387-89 Landlords, 380, 381, 389 Lao Tze, 21, 22, 24, 32-4, 36, 37
Lease Lend, 551 Left Militarists, 333,334, 338, 339,
342, 343, 348-52, 382, 390, 391 "Left" Nationalist Government, 380
suppression of peasantry, 381 Lenin, 304,445,446 Li Chai-sun, 410, 411, 433, 434 Li
Chi-sen Li-Hung Chang, 133, 137, 138, 158,
162, 163, 166, 167, 172, 188 Li-Li San,
"Line"
Li Shen-tsen, 414, 415 Li-Yuan hang, 267 Liang Chi-chao, 141 Liang Chih chao, 202,
203, 211, 213,
214, 232, 251, 252, 256, 257 Liang Shung, hai, 318, 319 Liao Chung-hai, 322-26, 351,
352,
407, 408, 418
Liberalism, English, 208, 209 Lin Kung-yi, 141, 158, 162, 163 Lineberger, Paul, 207,
208 Lincoln, Abraham, 214 Liu-tchu, 116-18, 121, 122 Locke, 25, 26 Lo Min, 523, 524
Lominadze, 459-61 London, 482, 483, 499
News Chronicle, 547
Economist, 550, 551 Louis Blanc, 192, 193 Louis XIV 136,142 Loyang, 493, 494
Lozowasky, 459, 460 Lunghai Railway, 385, 390-93, <91-92
Macao, 87
Macartney, Lord, 93, 94
Macdonald, Sir Claude, 175, 176
Malacca, 86, 87
Malay Archipalago, 88, 89
Peninsula, 87 Malayans, 85, 86 Manchu Emperor, 204 Manchuria, 70, 72, 73, 98, 171-73,
335, 336, 338, 339, 385, 483,484,
494, 506-09, 554, 555 Manchurian clique, 505-506
570 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
Militarists, 493-94
War Lord, 386, 401, 416, 417, 483,
484, 490, 497, 478, 504, 505 Manchus, 113, 114, 119, 124-26, 128,
137, 138,142, 150, 153, 154, 179-84,
186, 187, 189-91, 208-10, 214-18,
230, 232, 255, 256, 334, 410, 411,
505, 506 Mandarins, 148, 149, 208, 209, 220,
221 Mauifesto, demanding return of,
Wang Chin-wei, 357
of Kuo Min Tang, 270, 271, 273
of Reorganisation Conference, 375, 376
"To Our Foreign Friends", 192,
193, 195
Manila, 87, 88, 94 Mao Tse-tung, 509-13, 520, 521, 524,
525, 535, 536. 540, 549, 550, 554-55 Marco Polo, 84 Marcus Aurelius, 84, 85 Marshal,
General, 554, 555 Martin Luther, 108-10 Marx, Karl, 1-3, 225, 226, 337-39,
240,244, 246, 247, 276, 384, 385,
445, 446, 500, 501 Massacre of toiling masses, 396
on the Peking Hankow Railway, 296-98
Shanghai, 322-27 May, 24, 291, 299 Meadows, 114, 115, 120, 125, 126 Medhurst, 113,
114 Mediterranean, 53, 54
race, 11, 12 Mencius, 12, 13, 34, 35, 45, 46, 50,
51, 151, 234-36 Mexico, 8, 9, 16, 64, 87 Miff, 444, 445, 454-56 Miliukoff, 108
Militarism, 197, 198, 333-42, 367, 368,
370, 373, 374, 385, 388, 389, 401-03,
410,411,417,433,434,438
Left, 338, 339, 342, 343, 390, 391
social basis of, 287, 288
Military Academy of Wampoa, 417-
19
"Council", 330
Expedition to Peking, 385, 394 Militia, 396, 397, 415, 416 Min Tuan, 390 Ming
Dynastry, 63, 85-8, 145 Ministry of Argriculture, 549,550
of Finance, 488-90, 505, 506
of Home Affairs, 549-50
of Labour, 549-50
of War 490-91 Mirabeau, 192-95 Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, 547-48
Sun Yat Sen, 500-01 "Model" Army, 138-39, 188-89
tuchun, 338, 352, 391-92, 400-01 Modernisation of China, 80, 81 Moloch, 412-13
Monarchy, 186, 196-99 Monarchist absolutism, 333 Mangolia, 70-73, 100-01, 224, 225,
524
Mongols, 84, 85 Montesquieu, 210 Morgen, 2-5 Moswow, 323,429,445 Movement of
(1919), 292-94
Revolutionary Mass, 385, 391, 393-96
Mu Tze, 21, 22, 34-7
Muenzer, Ill-It
Mukden, 336-38, 402-03, 417, 505
Municipal Council of Shanghai, 158,
Muslims of Yunan, 133, 134
Nanchang. 358, 359, 361, 461-63, 468, 469, 480, 481, 504, 505, 510, 511
Nanking, 189, 190, 198-201, 339, 340, 352, 353, 385-87, 391, 392, 396, 402, 414, 415,
418-24, 433, 434, 469, 470, 478-81, 485, 488-502, 504-6, 516 Army, 492, 493 clique,
387, 388, 392, 394, 490, 499,
500, 506, 507 dictatorship, 499, 500
Index 571
convention of, 194, 195, 201, 202,
499, 500
Government, 227, 228, 401-2, 434, 435, 470, 478-502, 505-8, 516, 536, 537, 541
and Nationalist Bourgeoisie, 501-2 Nationalist Govt. of, 207-8 Napier, Lord, 93
Mission, 93
Napoleon, 141, 198, 389-90 Napoleon HI, 401 Napoleonism, 192, 193, 198, 201, 202,
332
National Assembly, 78, 79, 183-89, 193, 194, 202-4, 320, 321 Bourgeois Democratic
Revolution, 406-8, 410-12, 416-18, 425-30, 432, 438, 470, 502-4 Congress, Indian, 547
Convention, 196, 199 Democratic Revolution, 270, 271, 274, 275, 345, 346, 353, 354,
362, 363, 373, 374, 380, 395, 396, 440, 442, 444-49, 470
Economy of China, 70-81, 371-72 Exchequer, 487-89 Labour Federation, 465-66
"Salvation Association", 534, 355 Nationalism, 399, 400
and Sun Yat Sen, 224, 225, 227-33 Nationalist Army, 301, 303, 328, 330, 339-46, 366,
367, 374, 379, 386, 391-92, 396-403, 410-14, 416-20, 424-27, 434-35, 445-48, 469, 47S,
479, 482, 492, 505, 510, 511 Commander-in Chief of the, 330,
399, 400, 421
Nationalist Government, 279-89, 306, 316, 317, 322, 324, 327-35, 338, 339, 342, 343,
348, 349, 351-64, 368, 369, 375-83,385,387-99, 401, 402. 411, 413-28, 433-35, 442
acquires territory, 366 American adviser to, 320, 321 of Canton, 318, 320-22, 338, 339
and Soviet Republic, 312 of Hankow, 338
of Nanking, 276, 277 Native Reaction, 291, 322-27 Necker, 150 Neo-Confucian State,
212, 213, 225,
234,235,260,261 Nesterians of Syria, 84, 85 Neumann Heinz, 458, 459 Nineteenth Route
Army, 508
Betrayed by Chiang, 532 Ningpe, 326 Ningsha, 527 Ningtu, 513
Norman, Robert, 320, 321 North Coalition, 502, 505 North Expedition, 331, 333-46, 348-
52,
357, 358, 362, 365, 374, 378, 311-82,
410-13,417,418,443-47 .
second, 382, 383 Northern Alliance, 391, 392, 494, 504,
506 Nym Wales, 540, 541
Old Buddha, 146, 160, 161
Old Dragon, 142
Old Guard, 315-16, 320-21, 348-51,
441, 478-80 Old Sage, 147, 217 Oliver Cromwell, 108, 113, 114 Opium War, 93-97
Pacific Relations Conference, 482-83 Pai Sung chi, 355
Pan-Asia movement by Japan, 263-64 Paris Commune, 105, 107, 133, 320-21 Parliament
of China (First), 199, 200 Peasant(s) Department of Kuo Min
Tang, 427-28
Kwang Tung Federation of, 409
Militias, 396-97
Revolts, 380-82, 521
Unions, 322-24, 389, 406-9, 426-27,
439-40, 509, 510 Peasant(s) uprising in Shantung, 134
War in Germany, 107-13
Yellow, 408-9 Peasantry, 378, 379, 384, 339-91, 393
confiscation of land by, 383, 3S7
572 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
measures beneficial to, 377, 378 Peking, 186, 189-91, 196, 199, 266, 267 279, 280, 297,
298, 335-38, 352, 381, 385-95, 400-03, 417, 420, 434, 492, 497-98, 502-5, 509, 516
Government, 281-84, 338, 505 Hankow Railway, 138-39, 296-98,
385, 390-91
National University, 250, 251 Pro-Japanese Govt. 269, 270 Restoration Movement, 279,
280 University, 222 Peng Teh-huai, 516 People's Army, 196n, 338 Council, 414, 469-70
Government, 271 "Livelihood", 224-26
Sovereignty, 271 Peter the Great, 141, 143 Petit bourgeoisie, 345-46, 349-50, 354,
380-82, 384, 386-87, 393-96, 438,
467
Radicals, 323-24, 327, 383, 388-89
Radicalism, 191,203, 217-21, 325-32, 353-54, 386, 387, 396, 397, 402, 403, 428, 467,
480, 503-4
and Sun Yat Sen, 218-19 Phillipines, 367, 368 Plato, 25, 26 Platform of National
Democratic
Revolution, 397-99 Plebian Revolt, 29, 30, 37, 38 Plekhanov, 325-26 Plenary session,
329 Plundering of China, 100, 101 Poland, 72, 75, 108 Political Bureau, 325-29
Department, 328-29 Pope, 85-87
Portuguese invasion, 87 Pre-Confucian Society, 21
Christian Era, 85 Primitive Communism, 123, 124 Prince Ling, 141
Tuen, 160, 161 Principality of Lu, 22, 23 Port Arthur, 172,173
Production, 50, 51, 91, 92, 394-95 "Programme of Retreat", 455-56 Proletariat, 250, 251,
268, 276, 502,
503, 514, 515, 529, 530 Provisional Constitution, 201, 202
Government, 189-90, 193-200
National Convention, 196
President, 189-92n Pseudo-Radicals, 249-52 Pseudo-Socialistic Doctrines, 273
Pugatcheff, 108 Pukow, 393-94, 400, 480, 497 Punish Yuan Expedition, 217 "Puntes",
116 Pythagorian, 26, 90
Radical Democracy, 542, 551-52
Radical Democratic Party, 542-51
Railway, Chinese Eastern, 494, 497 Lunghai, 385-87, 390-93, 491-92 Peking Hankow,
38, 86, 87, 390-91 Peking Yangtse Valley, 497 Tientsin Pukov, 385-87, 391-93,
480-81 Loan, 200
Railways, 104, 372-73
Ratzal, 3
Reconstruction Loan, 199-201 Plan, 486-87
Red Army, 426-27, 509-28, 530, 533-36, 551-53 exploits of, 320-21 incorporation with
nationalist army
539-40
social composition of, 530 strength of, 520, 521 Canton, 305-6, 374, 478
''Revolutionary", 317 "Ruin", 337
Reform, agrarian, See Agrarian Reform Movement, Chap. VI, 158, 162, 166-67, 174-78,
180-81, 203, 213-15, 223-24
Reformation (in Europe), 90
Reorganisation Conference, 185, 313-15, 323, 338
Republic, 325, 326, 329
 Index 573
"of Reason", 108 Republican army, 198 Constitution, 202, 204, 211-12 Convention at
Nanking, 198 Government, 188n, 191-92, 196-97,
200, 204-5
movement, 200-1, 203 Social, 204-5 Republicanism, 193-97, 230-31, 224,
235, 260-61, 264, 266 Resolution for the adjustment of party affairs, 329 of Kuo Min
Tang, 396 of Second Congress, 375, 377-78,
383 of Wuhan Group dismissing
Chiang, 362 on Labour and Peasant Question,
32425
recalling Wang Chin Wei, 356 Revolution, agrarian, 274-74, 340-41, 570, 452-53
American, 257 Bourgeois, 141, 125-97, 201-2, 309-
10, 407, 439 Bourgeois Democrntic, 107-11, 134-
36, 156, 169, 268, 332, 373-74,
388-89, 429-30, 438, 463, 467,
485 Chinese, 307, 218-19, 222-23, 238-
239
Chin, 22, 23 Enfilish, 107 European, 197-98 First (1911), 109-111, 134-35, 180-81,
200-03, 215-16, 269, 326 French, 131, 192-93, 197-98, 201,
242, 256-57, 381-84, 430-31 National, 88-89, 223, 224, 269, 270,
307-8, 390, 400, 406-411, 416-17,
429-31, 439-41, 444-48, 452, 462,
463 National Democratic, 233, 274-75,
345-46, 373-75, 418, 429, 432-33,
441-45, 448-49, 470, 556 Revolution, Russian, 107, 110, 111,
197, 198, 268-69, 284-85, 430-31,
502-03
Second (1913) 200-03, 217, 262-63
Third (1915) 204-05,264 Revolutionary Committee, 456-67,
461-62
Crisis, 212,216
Government of Nanking, J23 Right-wing (Kuo Min Tang), 342-50,
353, 396 Romantic literature about Chinese
Soviets, 519-20 Rome, 12, 13, 18, 19, 354-55 Raman Catholic, 86
culture, 13, 14
curia, 21
Empire, 20, 40-50
family, 41
law 12, 13
Republic, 13, 14 Rousseau, 108, 235, 238 Roy, M.N. 445-46, 453-54, 505 Rebicon, 319-
20, 394 Russia, 88, 89, 97-100, 107, 171-73,
322, 390, 502-03 Russian Advisers, 395
Ambassador of Peking, 310-11
attitude towards China, 304
claim, 172 Russo-Chinese Treaty, 172
Bank, 172
"Secred right of revolt", 120
San Min Chui, 207, 224, 228, 234-35,
257
Schweinfurth, 3 Second Congress, 323-26
North Expedition, 451 Seeckt Von, 526 Semitic countries, 19
familities, 15-17
race, 11, 12 Shanghai, 194, 201, 203, 225, 226,
332, 338-41, 343-46, 352, 357, 358
367-69, 400, 411, 414-18, 420, 444-5,
448, 469, 478-80, 482, 485-86, 494,
574 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China
503, 507, 513, 514
Bankers, 485, 506
capture by working class of, 345
Conference, 196, 280-81
Delegates Assembly, 179
Evening Post, 538
Massacre, 320-21 Shanghai, repression of working class
in, 345
shooting, 301
workers, 298
Shanshi, 338, 352, 391, 400 Shangtung, 338, 343-44, 590 Shenshi, 330, 385
"ShiWa-pao" 141 Shi Ta-kek, 134 ShingChing, 25 Shing Chung Hui, 254-55, 257
"Short Parliament of China", 266-67 Shylock of China, 486 Saim, 94
Siang River, 516-17 Silver, 94,95
"Sing Ming Shung-pao" 257 Singapore, 368
Sino-Japanese War, 98, 99, 199, 171 Sino-Saviet Treaty, 553-55 Sixth Nationalist
Army, 414 Snow Edgar, 539-37 Solon, 20, 32-3 Socialism, 107, 111, 115, 121, 124,
126, 273, 275, 439, 443, 470, 517-15 Soong, T.V., 325, 351-56, 361-62,
415, 420, 482-89 495-96, 606 Southern Confederation, 280
Federation, 339
Provinces, 394-95 Sovereignty 186-87 Soviet, 461-63,465-67, 502-04, 509,
510, 513
China, 417
Consulate, 418-19
District (Central), 531-32
Embassy, 418-19
Government (Chinese), 521, 538-39
Republic, 268-60, 304, 307-13, 319-
20, 322, 390, 416-17, 462-63, 469-70, 514-15
Russia, 311-12, 315-16,318-19,417, 463, 480-83, 508, 553-55
Spain, 16, 72, 87, 88, 90
Spartacus, 50
Special Committee, 481-82
Stalin, 445
Stanley, 3
Stilwell, 546
Stuart Gelcier, 547-48
Strikes, 373 Committee, 293-95, 301, 320-24,
329-30
Hongkong (1922), 285, 301 Tsingtao, 298
Students, 298-9, 389
Sun Chuan fang, 343-45, 366, 400-1, 412-14, 480
Sun Fo, 315-16, 321-23, 325-26, 332, 351-56, 361-62, 478-79. 500
Sun Yat-sen, 8, 8, 79, 189-93, 196-98, 200, 203, 207-12, 276-77, 284-87, 304-5,
308, 310, 318-26, 445-46, 370, 380, 387, 393-97, 417, 418, 428-36, 470, 477, 483-
86, 496-98, 500-03 Provisional Presideat of the Republic, 215
Scheme for international development, 218, 219, 264 & Nationalism, 224-25, 231,
232 and Confucius, 225, 231- 232 difference with Marx, 226 on people's
sovereignity, 235, 236 five power constitution, 237 on socialism, 240-42, 254-5 in
Tokyo Conference, 258, 259 and Russia, 308, 311-12
Sun Yat sen, Mme, 358-59, 533
Sun Yat senism, 205, 206
Sung Dynasty, 57, 58, 63, 145
Swatow, 163, 457, 462
Szechuan, 334-35
Taipings, 112, 114, 116, 118-19, 124-29, 133-36, 143
Taiping Rebellion, 133-5,143, 175-76,
509, 510
Emperor, 114, 115
Revolt, 88, 89, 97,105, 108, 110-12, 114, 120-25, 151-62, 165-67, 171, 172, 202,
216, 224, 225, 245, 335, 369-70
Uprising, 434-35 Taiping Ten kuo, 123 Tan Ping san, 328-29, 454 Tan Yen Kai,
325-26, 351, 358-59,
478-79
Tangs, 55, 56 Tang Chih yao, 318 Tang Dynasty, 55, 56 Tang Liang li, 191, 207,
211, 221-22,
233, 236-39, 245, 249, 252 Tang Ming Hui, 214, 216, 257-61 Tang Ping san, 450,
454 Tang Shao yi, 196, 260, 280-82 Tang Shen chi, 338, 341-42, 353-62, ,,375, 385-
93, 400, 427-29, 454-55,
480
Tang Yen-tab, 353 Talienwan, 173 Taoism, 2, 24, 29,-33, 208, 209
& Confucianism, 29, 30, 35 Taoists, 28, 30 Tartars, 58, 59, 83, 84,151 Third Estate,
193, 194 Thomas Muenzer, 111-12 Three Estates, 192-93
Peoples, formulations of, 270-71, 287-88
Principles, 305 Tibet, 70, 71, 98, 224 Tien Te, 128, 129 Tienstin, 336, 384, 466,
480-81, 502,
505
Pukow Railway, 385, 391, 502 Ti-ting, 59
Tokyo Conference, 214, 258-59 Tonking, 48^19 Traders, 52, 53, 141 Treaty of
Nanking, 96-97
of Shimonoseki, 98, 99, 165, 166, 171, 172, 180, 291
Index 575
of Tienstin, 169, 170
of Versailles, 268-60, 292
Russo-Chinese, 172 Triad Society, 118-19 Tsai Yuan Pai, 251-53, 414-15 Tsao Kun,
335 Tsingtao, 173 Tsing Tien, 20, 22, 47-53 Tu-hsie, 451
Tuan Chi Jui, 279-80, 336-37 Tuen Prince, 160 Turkestan, 70, 72, 98, 100, 133-134,
224-225 Twelve Articles of Memmingen, 111,
112
"Twenty one demand", 263 Turgot, 150 Tzarist Russia, 220-21
U.S.A. 71-73, 94, 97-99, 102-03, 127,
279-80 U.S.S.R. 268-69, 390, 396-97, 416-17,
432-34, 446, 495, 497, 506, 507, 540,
541
United Party, 484-85 Unity Conference, 778-81 Union Chinese Bankers, 414-15
Peasants, 322-24, 389, 406-09, 426-27
Seamen's, 286
Trade, 321-22,389,
Yellow Peasants, 408-09
Vendee massacre of, 434-35 Versailles, 192-93
Peace Conference, 222
Treaty of, 222-23, 268-69, 291-92 Vivaris, 134-35 Vizile, 134-35
Waitz, 3
Wall Street, 482-83, 499-501,
Wampoa Military Academy, 301-02
318, 322-23, 326-28, 342-43, 418-19 Wang Chiang-hui, 41 Wang Chin wei, 207-08,
259, 321,
325-26, 328-29, 350-52, 356-57, 360,
576 Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China

379-80, 387-88, 393-94, 414-15, 428-32, 478-82, 491-92, 495, 498-99, 502-505
Wang Mang, 63 overthrow of, 53 reaction, 63 Wang Min,
Wang Tung-ho, 141-42 Ward, Frederic Townsend, 129-33 Washington, 482-83
Agreement, 485
Conference, 99-100, 268-69, 412-13 Washington, George, 141 Weal Putnam, 170-71
Western Democracies, 318-19 Hill Conference, 321-26, 470 Hemisphere, 11-12 Powers,
167, 482-83 Wilsonian Ideal, 222, 268-69 White Kuo Ming Tang, 478, 481 Lily society,
118-19 terror, 418-19 White, Theodore, Whyte, Sir Fredrick, 483-84 Woo, the Manchu
Official, 129, 130 Wco, T.C., 258-59 Woochang, 341-42, 392, 424-25, 446 Workers
Guard, 301-02, 322-24, 326-30, 396-97
Militia, 415-16, 443-44 Workers'Republic, 304-05,416-18
Volunteer Corps, 461-62 Working Class, 373-74, 388-94 & the bourgeois democratic
revolution, 309-10 capture of Shanghai by, 344-45
in Chinese revolution, 302-3
repression in Shanghai, 309-10 World Socialist Commonwealth, 307 Wu, C.C,, 190-91,
325, 478-79, 482,
499-501
Pie-fu, 294, 331, 334-43, 351-56, 365-70
Ting-fang, 194-96
Tse-hui, 414-15 Wuhan, 342-46, 352, 358-64, 368-74,
383-89, 403, 414-24, 428-34, 439-45,
448-50, 465-66, 478-80, 516
Yakub Beg, 133-34
Yamen of Canton, 256
Yang Chang, 21, 22
Yang-Tze, 21, 22, 34-37, 279, 280, 334-
36, 497, 503 . Yangtse, 382-83, 192, 203, 279, 334-46,
365-69, 386-92, 401, 417, 480-81 Yeh Tin, 341, 425, 458, 510 Yellow River, 385, 394,
555 Yellow Peasant Unions, 408-09 Yen Hsi Shan, 388-92. 401, 483,484,
494-97, 502-5, 516 Yen Peh-hsi, 542 Yenan, 549-52
Govt. 561-55 Yi Ching, 26 Yuan Shipkai, 105, 162, 182. 191-98,
205, 211-12,216-17, 260-63,270-71
279-81, 334-35, 478 Yugoslavia, 72-73 Yunan, 334-35 Yung Lu, 159-60