Oxford Scholarly Editions Online

John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding

(1671 – 1686): BOOK II
Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding
Published in print: 1975 Published online: May 2013

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PG 104
BOOK II

CHAPTER I
Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

§ 1.

EVERY Man being conscious to himself, That he thinks, and

that which his Mind is employ'd about whilst thinking, being the
Ideas, that are there, 'tis past doubt, that Men have in their Minds
several Ideas, such as are those expressed by the words, Whiteness,
5 Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunken-
ness, and others: It is in the first place then to be enquired, How he
comes by them? I know it is a received Doctrine, That Men have
native Ideas, and original Characters stamped upon their Minds, in
their very first Being. This Opinion I have at large examined
10 already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the fore-going Book, will
be much more easily admitted, when I have shewn, whence the
Understanding may get all the Ideas it has, and by what ways and
degrees they may come into the Mind; for which I shall appeal to
every one's own Observation and Experience.

§ 2.

15 Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper,

void of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be fur-
nished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and
boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless
variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge?

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20 To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: In that, all our
Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self.
Our Observation employ'd either about external, sensible Objects; or
about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our
selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of
25 thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all
the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

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pg 105
§ 3.

First, Our Senses, conversant about particular sensible

Objects, do convey into the Mind, several distinct Perceptions of things,
according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect
them: And thus we come by those Ideas, we have of Yellow, White,
5 Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call
sensible qualities, which when I say the senses convey into the
mind, I mean, they from external Objects convey into the mind what
produces there those Perceptions. This great Source, of most of the
Ideas we have, depending wholly upon our Senses, and derived by
10 them to the Understanding, I call SENSATION.

§ 4.

Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience

furnisheth the Understanding with Ideas, is the Perception of the
Operations of our own Minds within us, as it is employ'd about the Ideas
it has got; which Operations, when the Soul comes to reflect on, and
15 consider, do furnish the Understanding with another set of Ideas,
which could not be had from things without: and such are, Per-
ception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and
all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being con-
scious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our
20 Understandings, as distinct Ideas, as we do from Bodies affecting our
Senses. This Source of Ideas, every Man has wholly in himself: And
though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external
Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd
internal Sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this RE-
25 FLECTION, the Ideas it affords being such only, as the Mind gets by
reflecting on its own Operations within it self. By REFLECTION

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 then, in the following part of this Discourse, I would be understood
to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations,
and the manner of them, by reason whereof, there come to be Ideas
30 of these Operations in the Understanding. These two, I say, viz.
External, Material things, as the Objects of SENSATION; and the
Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of REFLEC-
TION, are, to me, the only Originals, from whence all our Ideas
take their beginnings. The term Operations here, I use in a large
35 sence, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about

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pg 106
its Ideas, but some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them,
such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

§ 5.

The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least

glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these
5 two. External Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities,
which are all those different perceptions they produce in us: And
the Mind furnishes the Understanding with Ideas of its own Operations.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their

several Modes, Combinations, and Relations, we shall find to
10 contain all our whole stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in
our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any
one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his
Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original
Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senses; or
15 of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his Reflec-
tion: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be
lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see, that he has not
any Idea in his Mind, but what one of these two have imprinted; though,
perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the
20 Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

§ 6.

He that attentively considers the state of a Child, at his first

coming into the World, will have little reason to think him stored
with plenty of Ideas, that are to be the matter of his future Know-

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 ledge. 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnished with them: And
25 though the Ideas of obvious and familiar qualities, imprint them
selves, before the Memory begins to keep a Register of Time and
Order, yet 'tis often so late, before some unusual qualities come in
the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning
of their acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no
30 doubt a Child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few, even
of the ordinary Ideas, till he were grown up to a Man. But all that
are born into the World being surrounded with Bodies, that per-
petually and diversly affect them, variety of Ideas, whether care be
taken about it or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. Light,
35 and Colours, are busie at hand every where, when the Eye is but

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open; Sounds, and some tangible Qualities fail not to solicite their
proper Senses, and force an entrance to the Mind; but yet, I think,
it will be granted easily, That if a Child were kept in a place, where
he never saw any other but Black and White, till he were a Man, he
5 would have no more Ideas of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his
Childhood never tasted an Oyster, or a Pine-Apple, has of those
particular Relishes.

§ 7.

Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple

Ideas from without, according as the Objects, they converse with,
10 afford greater or less variety; and from the Operation of their Minds
within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For, though he
that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain
and clear Ideas of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way,
and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and.
15 distinct Ideas of all the Operations of his Mind, and all that may be.
observed therein, than he will have all the particular Ideas of any
Landscape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not
turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it. The
Picture, or Clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way
20 every day; but yet he will have but a confused Idea of all the Parts
they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to consider
them each in particular.

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 § 8.

And hence we see the Reason, why 'tis pretty late, before
most Children get Ideas of the Operations of their own Minds; and
25 some have not any very clear, or perfect Ideas of the greatest part of
them all their Lives. Because, though they pass there continually;
yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough,
to leave in the Mind clear distinct lasting Ideas, till the Under-
standing turns inwards upon it self, reflects on its own Operations, and
30 makes them the Object of its own Contemplation. Children, when
they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things,
which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, draw the mind
constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be

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pg 108
delighted with the variety of changing Objects. Thus the first
Years are usually imploy'd and diverted in looking abroad. Men's
Business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be
found without; and so growing up in a constant attention to out-
5 ward Sensations, seldom make any considerable Reflection on what
passes within them, till they come to be of riper Years; and some
scarce ever at all.

§ 9.

To ask, at what time a Man has first any Ideas, is to ask, when
he begins to perceive; having Ideas, and Perception being the same
10 thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that
it has the actual Perception of Ideas in it self constantly, as long as it
exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as
actual Extension is from the Body; which if true, to enquire after the
beginning of a Man's Ideas, is the same, as to enquire after the
15 beginning of his Soul. For by this Account, Soul and its Ideas, as
Body and its Extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.

§ 10.

But whether the Soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or

coeval with, or some time after the first Rudiments of Organisation,
or the beginnings of Life in the Body, I leave to be disputed by
20 those, who have better thought of that matter. I confess my self, to

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 have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to
contemplate Ideas, nor can conceive it any more necessary for the
Soul always to think, than for the Body always to move; the perception
of Ideas being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what motion is to the
25 Body, not its Essence, but one of its Operations: And therefore,
though thinking be supposed never so much the proper Action of
the Soul; yet it is not necessary, to suppose, that it should be always
thinking, always in Action. That, perhaps, is the Privilege of the
infinite Author and Preserver of things, who never slumbers nor sleeps;*
30 but is not competent to any finite Being, at least not to the Soul of
Man. We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think,

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pg 109
and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is some-
thing in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance
perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than
Experience informs us. For to say, that actual thinking is essential
5 to the Soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg, what is in Question,
and not to prove it by Reason; which is necessary to be done, if it
be not a self-evident Proposition. But whether this, That the Soul
always thinks, be a self-evident Proposition, that every Body assents
to at first hearing, I appeal to Mankind. 'Tis doubted whether I
10 thought all last night, or no; the Question being about a matter of
fact, 'tis begging it, to bring, as a proof for it, an Hypothesis, which
is the very thing in dispute: by which way one may prove any thing,
and 'tis but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats,
think, and 'tis sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch
15 thought all last night. But he, that would not deceive himself,
ought to build his Hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by
sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of
his Hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so: which way
of proving, amounts to this, That I must necessarily think all last
20 night, because another supposes I always think, though I my self
cannot perceive, that I always do so.

But Men in love with their Opinions, may not only suppose what
is in question, but alledge wrong matter of fact. How else could any
one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not
25 sensible of it in our sleep. I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because
he is not sensible of it in his sleep; But I do say, he cannot think at
any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being

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 sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and
to them it is; and to them it will always be necessary, till we can
30 think without being conscious of it.

§ 11.

I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without

thought, because it is the condition of being awake: But whether

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sleeping without dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man,
Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Consideration;
it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be
conscious of it. If the Soul doth think in a sleeping Man, without being
5 conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any
Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure
the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be
happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me
utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible, that the
10 Soul can, whilst the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoy-
ments, and Concerns, its Pleasure or Pain apart, which the Man is
not conscious of, nor partakes in: It is certain, that Socrates asleep,
and Socrates awake, is not the same Person; but his Soul when he
sleeps, and Socrates the Man consisting of Body and Soul when he is
15 waking, are two Persons: Since waking Socrates, has no Knowledge
of, or Concernment for that Happiness, or Misery of his Soul,
which it enjoys alone by it self whilst he sleeps, without perceiving
any thing of it; no more than he has for the Happiness, or Misery of
a Man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly
20 away all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensations, especially of
Pleasure and Pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will
be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity.

§ 12.

The Soul, during sound Sleep, thinks, say these Men. Whilst
it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of Delight or
25 Trouble, as well as any other Perceptions; and it must necessarily be
conscious of its own Perceptions. But it has all this apart: The sleeping
Man, 'tis plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose
then the Soul of Castor, whilst he is sleeping, retired from his Body,

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 which is no impossible Supposition for the Men I have here to do
30 with, who so liberally allow Life, without a thinking Soul to all
other Animals. These Men cannot then judge it impossible, or a
contradiction, That the Body should live without the Soul; nor
that the Soul should subsist and think, or have Perception, even
Perception of Happiness or Misery, without the Body. Let us then,
35 as I say, suppose the Soul of Castor separated, during his Sleep, from

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his Body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chuses for its
Scene of Thinking, the Body of another Man, v.g. Pollux, who is
sleeping without a Soul: For if Castor's Soul can think whilst Castor
is asleep, what Castor is never conscious of, 'tis no matter what
5 Place it chuses to think in. We have here then the Bodies of two
Men with only one Soul between them, which we will suppose to
sleep and wake by turns; and the Soul still thinking in the waking
Man, whereof the sleeping Man is never conscious, has never the
least Perception. I ask then, Whether Castor and Pollux, thus, with
10 only one Soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one,
what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not
two as distinct Persons, as Castor and Hercules; or, as Socrates and
Plato were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and
the other very miserable? Just by the same Reason, they make the
15 Soul and the Man two Persons, who make the Soul think apart,
what the Man is not conscious of. For, I suppose, no body will make
Identity of Persons, to consist in the Soul's being united to the very
same numerical Particles of matter: For if that be necessary to
Identity, 'twill be impossible, in that constant flux of the Particles
20 of our Bodies, that any Man should be the same Person, two days,
or two moments together.

§ 13.

Thus, methinks, every drowsy Nod shakes their Doctrine,

who teach, That the Soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who
do at any time sleep without dreaming, can never be convinced, That
25 their Thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their
knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the
middle of that sleeping contemplation, can give no manner of
account of it.

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 § 14.

'Twill perhaps be said, That the Soul thinks, even in the

30 soundest Sleep, but the Memory retains it not. That the Soul in a sleep-
ing Man should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next
moment in a waking Man, not remember, nor be able to recollect
one jot of all those Thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and
would need some better Proof than bare Assertion, to make it be
35 believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely
told so, imagine, That the greatest part of Men, do, during all their
Lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if
they were asked, even in the middle of these Thoughts, they could

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remember nothing at all of? Most Men, I think, pass a great part of
their Sleep without dreaming. I once knew a Man, that was bred a
Scholar, and had no bad Memory, who told me, he had never
dream'd in his Life, till he had that Fever, he was then newly
5 recovered of, which was about the Five or Six and Twentieth Year
of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances: At
least every one's Acquaintance will furnish him with Examples
enough of such, as pass most of their Nights without dreaming.

§ 15.

To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a

10 very useless sort of thinking: and the Soul in such a state of thinking,
does very little, if at all, excel that of a Looking-glass, which
constantly receives variety of Images, or Ideas, but retains none;
they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them;
the Looking-glass is never the better for such Ideas, nor the Soul for
15 such Thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking Man, the
materials of the Body are employ'd, and made use of, in thinking;
and that the memory of Thoughts, is retained by the impressions
that are made on the Brain, and the traces there left after such
thinking; but that in the thinking of the Soul, which is not perceived
20 in a sleeping Man, there the Soul thinks apart, and making no use of the
Organs of the Body, leaves no impressions on it, and consequently no memory
of such Thoughts. Not to mention again the absurdity of two
distinct Persons, which follows from this Supposition, I answer
farther, That whatever Ideas the Mind can receive, and contem-

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25 plate without the help of the Body, it is reasonable to conclude, it
can retain without the help of the Body too, or else the Soul, or any
separate Spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has
no memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its
use, and be able to recal them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect
30 upon what is past, and make use of its former Experiences, Reason-
ings, and Contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They,
who make the Soul a thinking Thing at this rate, will not make it a
much more noble Being, than those do, whom they condemn, for
allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of Matter. Charac-
35 ters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or Im-
pressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether

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as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a
Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for
ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature
never makes excellent things, for mean or no uses: and it is hardly
5 to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so
admirable a Faculty, as the power of Thinking, that Faculty which
comes nearest the Excellency of his own incomprehensible Being,
to be so idlely and uselesly employ'd, at least ¼ part of its time here,
as to think constantly, without remembring any of those Thoughts,
10 without doing any good to it self or others, or being any way useful
to any other part of the Creation. If we will examine it, we shall not
find, I suppose, the motion of dull and sensless matter, any where in
the Universe, made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.

§ 16.

'Tis true, we have sometimes instances of Perception,

15 whilst we are asleep, and retain the memory of those Thoughts: but
how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are; how
little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being,
those who are acquainted with Dreams, need not be told. This I
would willingly be satisfied in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks
20 thus apart, and as it were separate from the Body, acts less ration-
ally than when conjointly with it, or no: If its separate Thoughts be
less rational, then these Men must say, That the Soul owes the
perfection of rational thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a
wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous

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25 and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more
rational Soliloquies and Meditations.

§ 17.

Those who so confidently tell us, That the Soul always

actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those Ideas
are, that are in the Soul of a Child, before, or just at the union with
30 the Body, before it hath received any by Sensation. The Dreams of
sleeping Men, are, as I take it, all made up of the waking Man's Ideas,
though, for the most part, oddly put together. 'Tis strange, if the
Soul has Ideas of its own, that it derived not from Sensation or
Reflection, (as it must have, if it thought before it received any
35 impressions from the Body) that it should never, in its private

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thinking, (so private, that the Man himself perceives it not) retain
any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make
the Man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reasonable,
that the Soul should, in its retirement, during sleep, have so many
5 hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those Ideas it borrowed
not from Sensation or Reflection, or at least preserve the memory of
none, but such, which being occasioned from the Body, must needs
be less natural to a Spirit? 'Tis strange, the Soul should never once
in a Man's whole life, recal over any of its pure, native Thoughts,
10 and those Ideas it had before it borrowed any thing from the Body;
never bring into the waking Man's view, any other Ideas, but what
have a tangue of the Cask, and manifestly derive their Original from
that union. If it always thinks, and so had Ideas before it was united,
or before it received any from the Body, 'tis not to be supposed, but
15 that during sleep, it recollects its native Ideas, and during that
retirement from communicating with the Body, whilst it thinks by
it self, the Ideas, it is busied about, should be, sometimes at least,
those more natural and congenial ones which it had in it self, un-
derived from the Body or its own Operations about them: which
20 since the waking Man never remembers, we must from this Hy-
pothesis conclude, either that the Soul remembers something that
the Man does not; or else that Memory belongs only to such Ideas,
as are derived from the Body, or the Minds Operations about them.

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 § 18.

I would be glad also to learn from these Men, who so

25 confidently pronounce, that the humane Soul, or which is all one,
that a Man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, how they
come to know, that they themselves think, when they themselves do not
perceive it. This, I am afraid, is to be sure, without proofs; and to
know, without perceiving: 'Tis, I suspect, a confused Notion, taken
30 up to serve an Hypothesis; and none of those clear Truths, that
either their own Evidence forces us to admit, or common Ex-
perience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said
of it, is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think, but not always

...........................................................................................................................
pg 115
retain it in memory: And, I say, it is as possible, that the Soul may
not always think; and much more probable, that it should some-
times not think, than that it should often think, and that a long
while together, and not be conscious to it self the next moment
5 after, that it had thought.

§ 19.

To suppose the Soul to think, and the Man not to perceive it,
is, as has been said, to make two Persons in one Man: And if one
considers well these Men's way of speaking, one should be led into
a suspicion, that they do so. For they who tell us, that the Soul
10 always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, That a Man always
thinks. Can the Soul think, and not the Man? Or a Man think, and
not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of Jargon
in others. If they say, The Man thinks always, but is not always
conscious of it; they may as well say, His Body is extended, without
15 having parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that a body is
extended without parts, as that any thing thinks without being
conscious of it, or perceiving, that it does so. They who talk thus,
may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their Hypothesis,
say, That a Man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel
20 it: Whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking con
sists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, That a Man is
always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask, How they know it?
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man's own
mind. Can another Man perceive, that I am conscious of any thing,

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25 when I perceive it not my self? No Man's Knowledge here, can go
beyond his Experience. Wake a Man out of a sound sleep, and ask
him, What he was that moment thinking on. If he himself be
conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable
Diviner of Thoughts, that can assure him, that he was thinking:
30 May he not with more reason assure him, he was not asleep? This
is something beyond Philosophy; and it cannot be less than Reve-
lation, that discovers to another, Thoughts in my mind, when I can
find none there my self: And they must needs have a penetrating
sight, who can certainly see, that I think, when I cannot perceive

...........................................................................................................................
pg 116
it my self, and when I declare, that I do not; and yet can see, that
Dogs or Elephants do not think, when they give all the demon-
stration of it imaginable, except only telling us, that they do so. This
some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosecrucians; it seeming
5 easier to make ones self invisible to others, than to make another's
thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But 'tis but
defining the Soul to be a substance, that always thinks, and the
business is done. If such a definition be of any Authority, I know not
what it can serve for, but to make many Men suspect, That they
10 have no Souls at all, since they find a good part of their Lives pass
away without thinking. For no Definitions, that I know, no
Suppositions of any Sect, are of force enough to destroy constant
Experience; and, perhaps, 'tis the affectation of knowing beyond
what we perceive, that makes so much useless dispute, and noise,
15 in the World.

§ 20.

I see no Reason therefore to believe, that the Soul thinks

before the Senses have furnish'd it with Ideas to think on; and as those are
increased, and retained; so it comes, by Exercise, to improve its
Faculty of thinking in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by
20 compounding those Ideas, and reflecting on its own Operations, it
increases its Stock as well as Facility, in remembring, imagining,
reasoning, and other modes of thinking.

§ 21.

He that will suffer himself, to be informed by Observation

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 and Experience, and not make his own Hypothesis the Rule of
25 Nature, will find few Signs of a Soul accustomed to much thinking
in a new born Child, and much fewer of any Reasoning at all. And
yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational Soul should think so much,
and not reason at all. And he that will consider, that Infants, newly
come into the World, spend the greatest part of their time in Sleep,
30 and are seldom awake, but when either Hunger calls for the Teat, or
some Pain, (the most importunate of all Sensations) or some other
violent Impression on the Body, forces the mind to perceive, and

...........................................................................................................................
pg 117
attend to it. He, I say, who considers this, will, perhaps, find
Reason to imagine, That a Fœtus in the Mother's Womb, differs not
much from the State of a Vegetable; but passes the greatest part of its
time without Perception or Thought, doing very little, but sleep
5 in a Place, where it needs not seek for Food, and is surrounded with
Liquor, always equally soft, and near of the same Temper; where
the Eyes have no Light, and the Ears, so shut up, are not very
susceptible of Sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or
change of Objects, to move the Senses.

§ 22.

10 Follow a Child from its Birth, and observe the alterations

that time makes, and you shall find, as the Mind by the Senses
comes more and more to be furnished with Ideas, it comes to be more
and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on.
After some time, it begins to know the Objects, which being most
15 familiar with it, have made lasting Impressions. Thus it comes,
by degrees, to know the Persons it daily converses with, and dis-
tinguish them from Strangers; which are Instances and Effects of
its coming to retain and distinguish the Ideas the Senses convey to
it: And so we may observe, how the Mind, by degrees, improves in
20 these, and advances to the Exercise of those other Faculties of En-
larging, Compounding, and Abstracting its Ideas, and of reasoning
about them, and reflecting upon all these, of which, I shall have
occasion to speak more hereafter.

§ 23.

If it shall be demanded then, When a Man begins to have any

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25 Ideas? I think, the true Answer is, When he first has any Sensation.
For since there appear not to be any Ideas in the Mind, before the
Senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that Ideas in the Under
standing, are coeval with Sensation; which is such an Impression or
Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Per-
30 ception in the Understanding. 'Tis about these Impressions made
on our Senses by outward Objects, that the Mind seems first to
employ it self in such Operations as we call Perception, Remembring,
Consideration, Reasoning, etc.

§ 24.

In time, the Mind comes to reflect on its own Operations,

35 about the Ideas got by Sensation, and thereby stores it self with a new

...........................................................................................................................
pg 118
set of Ideas, which I call Ideas of Reflection. These are the Impres-
sions that are made on our Senses by outward Objects, that are
extrinsical to the Mind; and its own Operations, proceeding from
Powers intrinsical and proper to it self, which when reflected on by
5 it self, become also Objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said,
the Original of all Knowledge. Thus the first Capacity of Humane
Intellect, is, That the mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made
on it; either, through the Senses, by outward Objects; or by its own
Operations, when it reflects on them. This is the first step a Man
10 makes towards the Discovery of any thing, and the Groundwork,
whereon to build all those Notions, which ever he shall have
naturally in this World. All those sublime Thoughts, which towre
above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven it self, take their
Rise and Footing here: In all that great Extent wherein the mind
15 wanders, in those remote Speculations, it may seem to be elevated
with, it stirs not one jot beyond those Ideas, which Sense or Reflection,
have offered for its Contemplation.

§ 25.

In this Part, the Understanding is meerly passive; and whether

or no, it will have these Beginnings, and as it were materials of
20 Knowledge, is not in its own Power. For the Objects of our Senses,
do, many of them, obtrude their particular Ideas upon our minds,
whether we will or no: And the Operations of our minds, will not

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 let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man,
can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These
25 simple Ideas, when offered to the mind, the Understanding can no more
refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them
out, and make new ones in it self, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or
obliterate the Images or Ideas, which, the Objects set before it, do
therein produce. As the Bodies that surround us, do diversly affect
30 our Organs, the mind is forced to receive the Impressions; and
cannot avoid the Perception of those Ideas that are annexed to them.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 119
CHAPTER II
Of simple Ideas.

§ 1.

THE better to understand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of

our Knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed, concerning
the Ideas we have; and that is, That some of them are simple, and some
complex.

5 Though the Qualities that affect our Senses, are, in the things
themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no
distance between them; yet 'tis plain, the Ideas they produce in the
Mind, enter by the Senses simple and unmixed. For though the
Sight and Touch often take in from the same Object, at the same
10 time, different Ideas; as a Man sees at once Motion and Colour; the
Hand feels Softness and Warmth in the same piece of Wax: Yet the
simple Ideas thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly dis-
tinct, as those that come in by different Senses. The coldness and
hardness, which a Man feels in a piece of Ice, being as distinct Ideas
15 in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteness of a Lily; or as the taste of
Sugar, and smell of a Rose: And there is nothing can be plainer to a
Man, than the clear and distinct Perception he has of those simple
Ideas; which being each in it self uncompounded, contains in it
nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception in the mind, and
20 is not distinguishable into different Ideas.

§ 2.

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 These simple Ideas, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are
suggested and furnished to the Mind, only by those two ways above
mentioned, viz. Sensation and Reflection. When the Understanding is
once stored with these simple Ideas, it has the Power to repeat, com-
25 pare, and unite them even to an almost infinite Variety, and so can
make at Pleasure new complex Ideas. But it is not in the Power of the
most exalted Wit, or enlarged Understanding, by any quickness or

...........................................................................................................................
pg 120
variety of Thought, to invent or frame one new simple Idea in the mind,
not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the
Understanding, destroy those that are there. The Dominion of Man,
in this little World of his own Understanding, being muchwhat the
5 same, as it is in the great World of visible things; wherein his Power,
however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to
compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand; but
can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter,
or destroying one Atome of what is already in Being. The same
10 inability, will every one find in himself, who shall go about to
fashion in his Understanding any simple Idea, not received in by his
Senses, from external Objects; or by reflection from the Operations
of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any
Taste, which had never affected his Palate; or frame the Idea of a
15 Scent, he had never smelt: And when he can do this, I will also
conclude, that a blind Man hath Ideas of Colours, and a deaf Man
true distinct Notions of Sounds.

§ 3.

This is the Reason why, though we cannot believe it im-

possible to God, to make a Creature with other Organs, and more
20 ways to convey into the Understanding the notice of Corporeal
things, than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has
given to Man: Yet I think, it is not possible, for any one to imagine any
other Qualities in Bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can
be taken notice of, besides Sounds, Tastes, Smells, visible and
25 tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four
Senses, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the Fifth Sense,
had been as far from our Notice, Imagination, and Conception, as
now any belonging to a Sixth, Seventh, or Eighth Sense, can possibly be:
which, whether yet some other Creatures, in some other Parts of

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30 this vast, and stupendious Universe, may not have, will be a great
Presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the
top of all things; but will consider the Immensity of this Fabrick,
and the great variety, that is to be found in this little and incon-
siderable part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think,
35 that in other Mansions of it, there may be other, and different
intelligent Beings, of whose Faculties, he has as little Knowledge or
Apprehension, as a Worm shut up in one drawer of a Cabinet, hath
of the Senses or Understanding of a Man; Such Variety and
Excellency, being suitable to the Wisdom and Power of the Maker.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 121
I have here followed the common Opinion of Man's having but five
Senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more; but
either Supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

CHAPTER III
Of Ideas of one Sense.

§ 1.

THE better to conceive the Ideas, we receive from Sensation, it

5 may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the
different ways, whereby they make their Approaches to our minds,
and make themselves perceivable by us.

First then, There are some, which come into our minds by one
Sense only.

10 Secondly, There are others, that convey themselves into the mind
by more Senses than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from Reflection only.

Fourthly, There are some that make themselves way, and are
suggested to the mind by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection.

15 We shall consider them apart under these several Heads.

First, There are some Ideas, which have admittance only through one
Sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and
Colours, as white, red, yellow, blue; with their several Degrees or

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 Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the
20 rest, come in only by the Eyes: All kinds of Noises, Sounds, and
Tones only by the Ears: The several Tastes and Smells, by the Nose
and Palate. And if these Organs, or the Nerves which are the
Conduits, to convey them from without to their Audience in the
Brain, the mind's Presence-room (as I may so call it) are any of
25 them so disordered, as not to perform their Functions, they have no
Postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into
view, and be perceived by the Understanding.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 122
The most considerable of those, belonging to the Touch, are
Heat and Cold, and Solidity; all the rest, consisting almost wholly
in the sensible Configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more,
or less firm adhesion of the Parts, as hard and soft, tough and
5 brittle, are obvious enough.

§ 2.

I think, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular

simple Ideas, belonging to each Sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we
would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of
the Senses, than we have Names for. The variety of Smells, which are
10 as many almost, if not more than Species of Bodies in the World, do
most of them want Names. Sweet and Stinking commonly serve our
turn for these Ideas, which in effect, is little more than to call them
pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a Rose, and Violet,
both sweet, are certainly very distinct Ideas. Nor are the different
15 Tastes that by our Palates we receive Ideas of, much better provided
with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sowr, Harsh, and Salt, are almost all the
Epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of Relishes,
which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of
Creatures, but in the different Parts of the same Plant, Fruit, or
20 Animal. The same may be said of Colours and Sounds. I shall there
fore in the account of simple Ideas, I am here giving, content my self
to set down only such, as are most material to our present Purpose,
or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, though they are
very frequently the Ingredients of our complex Ideas, amongst
25 which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I shall
treat of in the next Chapter.

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 CHAPTER IV
Of Solidity.

§ 1.

THE Idea of Solidity we receive by our Touch; and it arises from

the resistance which we find in Body, to the entrance of any other

...........................................................................................................................
pg 123
Body into the Place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no Idea,
which we receive more constantly from Sensation, than Solidity.
Whether we move, or rest, in what Posture soever we are, we always
feel something under us, that supports us, and hinders our farther
5 sinking downwards; and the Bodies which we daily handle, make us
perceive, that whilst they remain between them, they do by an
insurmountable Force, hinder the approach of the parts of our
Hands that press them. That which thus hinders the approach of
two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call
10 Solidity. I will not dispute, whether this acceptation of the Word
solid be nearer to its Original Signification, than that which Mathe-
maticians use it in: It suffices, that I think, the common Notion of
Solidity will allow, if not justifie, this use of it; but if any one think
it better to call it Impenetrability, he has my Consent. Only I have
15 thought the Term Solidity, the more proper to express this Idea, not
only because of its vulgar use in that Sense; but also, because it
carries something more of positive in it, than Impenetrability, which
is negative, and is, perhaps, more a consequence of Solidity, than
Solidity it self. This of all other, seems the Idea most intimately
20 connected with, and essential to Body, so as no where else to be
found or imagin'd, but only in matter: and though our Senses take
no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause
a Sensation in us; Yet the Mind, having once got this Idea from such
grosser sensible Bodies, traces it farther; and considers it, as well as
25 Figure, in the minutest Particle of Matter, that can exist; and finds
it inseparably inherent in Body, where-ever, or however modified.

§ 2.

This is the Idea belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it to

fill space. The Idea of which filling of space, is, That where we
imagine any space taken up by a solid Substance, we conceive it so

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30 to possess it, that it excludes all other solid Substances; and, will
for ever hinder any two other Bodies, that move towards one another
in a strait Line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes
from between them in a Line, not parallel to that which they move
in. This Idea of it the Bodies, which we ordinarily handle, sufficient-
35 ly furnish us with.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 124
§ 3.

This Resistance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the

space which it possesses, is so great, That no force, how great
soever, can surmount it. All the Bodies in the World, pressing a drop
of Water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the Resistance,
5 which it will make, as soft as it is, to their approaching one another,
till it be removed out of their way: whereby our Idea of Solidity is
distinguished both from pure space, which is capable neither of Resist-
ance nor Motion; and from the ordinary Idea of Hardness. For a Man
may conceive two Bodies at a distance, so as they may approach
10 one another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till
their Superficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear
Idea of Space without Solidity. For (not to go so far as annihilation of
any particular Body) I ask, Whether a Man cannot have the Idea of
the motion of one single Body alone, without any other succeeding
15 immediately into its Place? I think, 'tis evident he can: the Idea of
Motion in one Body, no more including the Idea of Motion in
another, than the Idea of a square Figure in one Body includes the
Idea of a square Figure in another. I do not ask, Whether Bodies do
so exist, that the motion of one Body cannot really be without the
20 motion of another. To determine this either way, is to beg the
Question for, or against a Vacuum. But my Question is, Whether
one cannot have the Idea of one Body moved, whilst others are at
rest? And, I think, this no one will deny: If so, then the Place it
deserted, gives us the Idea of pure Space without Solidity, whereinto
25 another Body may enter, without either Resistance or Protrusion
of any thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the space it
filled in the Tube is certainly the same, whether any other Body
follows the motion of the Sucker or no: nor does it imply a contra-
diction, That upon the motion of one Body, another, that is only
30 contiguous to it, should not follow it. The necessity of such a motion,

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 is built only on the Supposition, That the World is full; but not on
the distinct Ideas of Space and Solidity: which are as different, as
Resistance and not Resistance, Protrusion and not Protrusion. And
that Men have Ideas of Space without Body, their very Disputes
35 about a Vacuum plainly demonstrate, as is shewed in another
Place.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 125
§ 4.

Solidity is hereby also differenced from Hardness, in that Solidity

consists in repletion, and so an utter Exclusion of other Bodies out
of the space it possesses; but Hardness, in a firm Cohesion of the
parts of Matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the
5 whole does not easily change its Figure. And indeed, Hard and Soft
are Names that we give to things, only in relation to the Consti-
tutions of our own Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us,
which will put us to Pain, sooner than change Figure by the pressure
of any part of our Bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which
10 changes the Situation of its parts upon an easie, and unpainful
touch.

But this Difficulty of changing the Situation of the sensible parts

amongst themselves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more
Solidity to the hardest Body in the World, than to the softest; nor is
15 an Adamant one jot more solid than Water. For though the two
flat sides of two pieces of Marble, will more easily approach each
other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if
there be a Diamond between them: yet it is not, that the parts of
the Diamond are more solid than those of Water, or resist more; but
20 because the parts of Water, being more easily separable from each
other, they will by a side-motion be more easily removed, and give
way to the approach of the two pieces of Marble: But if they could
be kept from making Place, by that side-motion, they would eter-
nally hinder the approach of these two pieces of Marble, as much as
25 the Diamond; and 'twould be as impossible by any force, to sur-
mount their Resistance, as to surmount the Resistance of the parts
of a Diamond. The softest Body in the World will as invincibly
resist the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put
out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest, that can

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30 be found, or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft Body well
with Air or Water, will quickly find its Resistance: And he that
thinks, that nothing but Bodies, that are hard, can keep his Hands
from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial, with
the Air inclosed in a Football. The Experiment, I have been told
35 was made at Florence, with a hollow Globe of Gold fill'd with

...........................................................................................................................
pg 126
Water, and exactly closed, farther shews the solidity of so soft a
body as Water. For the golden Globe thus filled, being put into a
Press, which was driven by the extreme force of skrews, the water
made it self way through the pores of that very close metal, and
5 finding no room for a nearer approach of its Particles within, got to
the outside, where it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before
the sides of the Globe could be made to yield to the violent com-
pression of the Engine, that squeezed it.

§ 5.

By this Idea of Solidity, is the Extension of Body distinguished

10 from the Extension of Space. The Extension of Body being nothing,
but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable Parts;
and the Extension of Space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable,
and immoveable Parts. Upon the Solidity of Bodies also depends their
mutual Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion. Of pure Space then, and
15 Solidity, there are several (amongst which, I confess my self one)
who persuade themselves, they have clear and distinct Ideas; and
that they can think on Space, without any thing in it, that resists,
or is protruded by Body. This is the Idea of pure Space, which they
think they have as clear, as any Idea they can have of the Extension
20 of Body: the Idea of the distance, between the opposite Parts of a
concave Superficies, being equally as clear, without, as with the Idea
of any solid Parts between: and on the other side, they persuade
themselves, That they have, distinct from that of pure Space, the
Idea of something that fills Space, that can be protruded by the
25 impulse of other Bodies, or resist their Motion. If there be others,
that have not these two Ideas distinct but confound them, and make
but one of them, I know not, how Men, who have the same Idea,
under different Names, or different Ideas, under the same Name,
can, in that case, talk with one another, any more than a Man, who
30 not being blind, or deaf, has distinct Ideas of the Colour of Scarlet,

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 and the sound of a Trumpet, could discourse concerning Scarlet-
Colour with the blind Man, I mention in another Place, who
fancied, that the Idea of Scarlet was like the sound of a Trumpet.

§ 6.

If any one asks me, What this Solidity is, I send him to his
35 Senses to inform him: Let him put a Flint, or a Foot-ball between

...........................................................................................................................
pg 127
his Hands; and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he
thinks this not a sufficient Explication of Solidity, what it is, and
wherein it consists; I promise to tell him, what it is, and wherein it
consists, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists;
5 or explain to me, what Extension or Motion is, which, perhaps,
seems much easier. The simple Ideas we have are such, as experience
teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour, by Words, to
make them clearer in the Mind, we shall succeed no better, than if
we went about to clear up the Darkness of a blind Man's mind, by
10 talking; and to discourse into him the Ideas of Light and Colours.
The Reason of this, I shall shew, in another Place.

CHAPTER V
Of simple Ideas of divers Senses.

THE Ideas we get by more than one Sense, are of Space, or Extension,
Figure, Rest, and Motion: For these make perceivable impressions,
both on the Eyes and Touch; and we can receive and convey into
15 our Minds the Ideas of the Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest
of Bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak
more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAPTER VI
Of simple Ideas of Reflection.

§ 1.

THE Mind receiving the Ideas, mentioned in the foregoing

Chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon it self,
20 and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from
thence other Ideas, which are as capable to be the Objects of its

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 Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 128
§ 2.

The two great and principal Actions of the Mind, which are
most frequently considered, and which are so frequent, that every
one that pleases, may take notice of'em in himself, are these two:

Perception, or Thinking, and

5 Volition, or Willing.

The Power of Thinking is called the Understanding, and the Power of

Volition is called the Will, and these two Powers or Abilities in the
Mind are denominated Faculties. Of some of the Modes of these
simple Ideas of Reflection, such as are Remembrance, Discerning,
10 Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, etc. I shall have occasion to
speak hereafter.

CHAPTER VII
Of simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection.

§ 1.

THERE be other simple Ideas, which convey themselves into

the Mind, by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection, viz.

Pleasure, or Delight, and its opposite.

15 Pain, or Uneasiness.
Power.
Existence.
Unity.

§ 2.

Delight, or Uneasiness, one or other of them join themselves to

20 almost all our Ideas, both of Sensation and Reflection: And there is
scarce any affection of our Senses from without, any retired thought
of our Mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or
pain. By Pleasure and Pain, I would be understood to signifie, what-
soever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of

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25 our Minds, or any thing operating on our Bodies. For whether we
call it Satisfaction, Delight, Pleasure, Happiness, etc. on the one
side; or Uneasiness, Trouble, Pain, Torment, Anguish, Misery, etc.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 129
on the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing,
and belong to the Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, Delight or Uneasiness;
which are the Names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts
of Ideas.

§ 3.

5 The infinite Wise Author of our being, having given us the

power over several parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at
rest, as we think fit; and also by the motion of them, to move our
selves, and other contiguous Bodies, in which consists all the Actions
of our Body: Having also given a power to our Minds, in several
10 Instances, to chuse, amongst its Ideas, which it will think on, and to
pursue the enquiry of this or that Subject with consideration and
attention, to excite us to these Actions of thinking and motion, that
we are capable of, has been pleased to join to several Thoughts, and
several Sensations, a perception of Delight. If this were wholly sepa-
15 rated from all our outward Sensations, and inward Thoughts, we
should have no reason to preferr one Thought or Action, to another;
Negligence, to Attention; or Motion, to Rest. And so we should
neither stir our Bodies, nor employ our Minds; but let our Thoughts
(if I may so call it) run a drift, without any direction or design; and
20 suffer the Ideas of our Minds, like unregarded shadows, to make
their appearances there, as it happen'd, without attending to them.
In which state Man, however furnished with the Faculties of
Understanding and Will, would be a very idle unactive Creature,
and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick Dream. It has therefore
25 pleased our Wise Creator, to annex to several Objects, and to the
Ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our Thoughts,
a concomitant pleasure, and that in several Objects, to several
degrees, that those Faculties which he had endowed us with, might
not remain wholly idle, and unemploy'd by us.

§ 4.

30 Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work, that

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 Pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid
that, as to pursue this: Only this is worth our consideration, That
Pain is often produced by the same Objects and Ideas, that produce Pleasure
in us. This their near Conjunction, which makes us often feel pain
35 in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new
occasion of admiring the Wisdom and Goodness of our Maker, who

...........................................................................................................................
pg 130
designing the preservation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the
application of many things to our Bodies, to warn us of the harm
that they will do; and as advices to withdraw from them. But he,
not designing our preservation barely, but the preservation of every
5 part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cases, annexed pain
to those very Ideas, which delight us. Thus Heat, that is very
agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it,
proves no ordinary torment: and the most pleasant of all sensible
Objects, Light it self, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond
10 a due proportion to our Eyes, causes a very painful sensation. Which
is wisely and favourably so ordered by Nature, that when any
Object does, by the vehemency of its operation, disorder the
instruments of Sensation, whose Structures cannot but be very nice
and delicate, we might by the pain, be warned to withdraw, before
15 the Organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its proper
Functions for the future. The consideration of those Objects that
produce it, may well perswade us, That this is the end or use of
pain. For though great light be insufferable to our Eyes, yet the
highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them: because
20 that causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious Organ
unharm'd, in its natural state. But yet excess of Cold, as well as
Heat, pains us: because it is equally destructive to that temper,
which is necessary to the preservation of life, and the exercise of the
several functions of the Body, and which consists in a moderate
25 degree of warmth; or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts
of our Bodies, confin'd within certain bounds.

§ 5.

Beyond all this, we may find another reason why God hath
scattered up and down several degrees of Pleasure and Pain, in all the
things that environ and affect us; and blended them together, in almost
30 all that our Thoughts and Senses have to do with; that we finding

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 imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all
the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to
seek it in the enjoyment of him, with whom there is fullness of joy, and
at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.*

§ 6.

35 Though what I have here said, may not, perhaps, make the
Ideas of Pleasure and Pain clearer to us, than our own Experience does,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 131
which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the
consideration of the Reason, why they are annexed to so many
other Ideas, serving to give us due sentiments of the Wisdom and
Goodness of the Soveraign Disposer of all Things, may not be
5 unsuitable to the main end of these enquiries: The knowledge and
veneration of Him, being the chief end of all our Thoughts, and the
proper business of all Understandings.

§ 7.

Existence and Unity, are two other Ideas, that are suggested
to the Understanding, by every Object without, and every Idea
10 within. When Ideas are in our Minds, we consider them as being
actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without
us; which is, that they exist, or have Existence: And whatever we
can consider as one thing, whether a real Being, or Idea, suggests to
the Understanding, the Idea of Unity.

§ 8.

15 Power also is another of those simple Ideas, which we receive

from Sensation and Reflection. For observing in our selves, that we
can, at pleasure, move several parts of our Bodies, which were at
rest; the effects also, that natural Bodies are able to produce in one
another, occurring every moment to our Senses, we both these ways
20 get the Idea of Power.

§ 9.

Besides these, there is another Idea, which though suggested

by our Senses, yet is more constantly offered us, by what passes in

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 our own Minds; and that is the Idea of Succession. For if we look
immediately into our selves, and reflect on what is observable
25 there, we shall find our Ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have
any thought, passing in train, one going, and another coming,
without intermission.

§ 10.

These, if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the most
considerable of those simple Ideas which the Mind has, and out of
30 which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by
the two forementioned ways of Sensation and Reflection.
Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious
Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the
Stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the World; that
35 extends its thoughts often, even beyond the utmost expansion of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 132
Matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible Inane.
I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any simple Idea, which is
not received from one of those Inlets before-mentioned, or any complex
Idea not made out of those simple ones. Nor will it be so strange, to
5 think these few simple Ideas sufficient to employ the quickest
Thought, or largest Capacity; and to furnish the Materials of all
that various Knowledge, and more various Fancies and Opinions of
all Mankind, if we consider how many Words may be made out of
the various composition of 24 Letters; or if going one step farther,
10 we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made,
with barely one of the above-mentioned Ideas, viz. Number, whose
stock is inexhaustible, and truly infinite: And what a large and
immense field, doth Extension alone afford the Mathematicians?

CHAPTER VIII
Some farther Considerations concerning our simple Ideas.

§ 1.

CONCERNING the simple Ideas of Sensation 'tis to be con-

15 sidered, That whatsoever is so constituted in Nature, as to be able,
by affecting our Senses, to cause any perception in the Mind,
doth thereby produce in the Understanding a simple Idea; which,

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 whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken
notice of, by our discerning Faculty, it is by the Mind looked on
20 and considered there, to be a real positive Idea in the Understanding,
as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it
be but a privation in the subject.

§ 2.

Thus the Idea of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, White
and Black, Motion and Rest, are equally clear and positive Ideas in
25 the Mind; though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them,
are barely privations in those Subjects, from whence our Senses
derive those Ideas. These the Understanding, in its view of them,
considers all as distinct positive Ideas, without taking notice of the
Causes that produce them: which is an enquiry not belonging to the
30 Idea, as it is in the Understanding; but to the nature of the things

...........................................................................................................................
pg 133
existing without us. These are two very different things, and care-
fully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive, and know
the Idea of White or Black, and quite another to examine what kind
of particles they must be, and how ranged in the Superficies, to
5 make any Object appear White or Black.

§ 3.

A Painter or Dyer, who never enquired into their causes, hath

the Ideas of White and Black, and other Colours, as clearly, perfectly,
and distinctly in his Understanding, and perhaps more distinctly,
than the Philosopher, who hath busied himself in considering their
10 Natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause
positive or privative; and the Idea of Black is no less positive in his
Mind, than that of White, however the cause of that Colour in the
external Object, may be only a privation.

§ 4.

If it were the design of my present Undertaking, to enquire

15 into the natural Causes and manner of Perception, I should offer this
as a reason why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce
a positive Idea, viz. That all Sensation being produced in us, only
by different degrees and modes of Motion in our animal Spirits,

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 variously agitated by external Objects, the abatement of any
20 former motion, must as necessarily produce a new sensation, as
the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new Idea, which
depends only on a different motion of the animal Spirits in that
Organ.

§ 5.

But whether this be so, or no, I will not here determine, but
25 appeal to every one's own Experience, whether the shadow of a
Man, though it consists of nothing but the absence of Light (and
the more the absence of Light is, the more discernible is the
shadow) does not, when a Man looks on it, cause as clear and posi-
tive an Idea in his mind, as a Man himself, though covered over with
30 clear Sun-shine? And the Picture of a Shadow, is a positive thing.
Indeed, we have negative Names, which stand not directly for
positive Ideas, but for their absence, such as Insipid, silence, Nihil, etc.
which Words denote positive Ideas; v.g. Tast, Sound, Being, with a
signification of their absence.

§ 6.

35 And thus one may truly be said to see Darkness. For

supposing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 134
'tis certain one may see the Figure of it, or it may be Painted; or
whether the Ink, I write with, makes any other Idea, is a Question.
The privative causes I have here assigned of positive Ideas, are
according to the common Opinion; but in truth it will be hard to
5 determine, whether there be really any Ideas from a privative cause,
till it be determined, Whether Rest be any more a privation than Motion.

§ 7.

To discover the nature of our Ideas the better, and to dis-

course of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish
them, as they are Ideas or Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are
10 modifications of matter in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in
us: that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they
are exactly the Images and Resemblances of something inherent in the
subject; most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the

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 likeness of something existing without us, than the Names, that
15 stand for them, are the likeness of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing,
they are apt to excite in us.

§ 8.

Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate

object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea;
and the Power to produce any Idea in our mind, I call Quality of the
20 Subject wherein that power is. Thus a Snow-ball having the power
to produce in us the Ideas of White, Cold, and Round, the Powers to
produce those Ideas in us, as they are in the Snow-ball, I call
Qualities; and as they are Sensations, or Perceptions, in our Under-
standings, I call them Ideas: which Ideas, if I speak of sometimes, as
25 in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those
Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us.

§ 9.

Qualities thus considered in Bodies are, First such as are

utterly inseparable from the Body, in what estate soever it be; such
as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be
30 used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as Sense constantly
finds in every particle of Matter, which has bulk enough to be

...........................................................................................................................
pg 135
perceived, and the Mind finds inseparable from every particle of
Matter, though less than to make it self singly be perceived by our
Senses, v.g. Take a grain of Wheat, divide it into two parts, each
part has still Solidity, Extension, Figure, and Mobility; divide it again,
5 and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the
parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all
those qualities. For division (which is all that a Mill, or Pestel, or
any other Body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible
parts) can never take away either Solidity, Extension, Figure, or
10 Mobility from any Body, but only makes two, or more distinct
separate masses of Matter, of that which was but one before, all
which distinct masses, reckon'd as so many distinct Bodies, after
division make a certain Number. These I call original or primary
Qualities of Body, which I think we may observe to produce simple
15 Ideas in us, viz. Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and

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 Number.

§ 10.

2dly, Such Qualities, which in truth are nothing in the

Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us
by their primary Qualities, i.e. by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and
20 Motion of their insensible parts, as Colours, Sounds, Tasts, etc.
These I call secondary Qualities. To these might be added a third sort
which are allowed to be barely Powers though they are as much
real Qualities in the Subject, as those which I to comply with the
common way of speaking call Qualities, but for distinction secondary
25 Qualities. For the power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or con-
sistency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities, is as much a
quality in Fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new Idea or
Sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, by the
same primary Qualities, viz. The Bulk, Texture, and Motion of its
30 insensible parts.

§ 11.

The next thing to be consider'd, is how Bodies produce

...........................................................................................................................
pg 136
Ideas in us, and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we
can conceive Bodies operate in.

§ 12.

If then external Objects be not united to our Minds, when

they produce Ideas in it; and yet we perceive these original Qualities in
5 such of them as singly fall under our Senses, 'tis evident, that some
motion must be thence continued by our Nerves, or animal Spirits,
by some parts of our Bodies, to the Brains or the seat of Sensation,
there to produce in our Minds the particular Ideas we have of them. And
since the Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion of Bodies of an
10 observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, 'tis
evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to
the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some Motion, which
produces these Ideas, which we have of them in us.

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 § 13.

After the same manner, that the Ideas of these original

15 Qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the Ideas of
secondary Qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible
particles on our Senses. For it being manifest, that there are Bodies,
and good store of Bodies, each whereof is so small, that we cannot,
by any of our Senses, discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as
20 is evident in the Particles of the Air and Water, and other extremely
smaller than those, perhaps, as much smaller than the Particles of
Air, or Water, as the Particles of Air or Water, are smaller than
Pease or Hail-stones. Let us suppose at present, that the different
Motions and Figures, Bulk, and Number of such Particles, affecting
25 the several Organs of our Senses, produce in us those different
Sensations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies,
v.g. that a Violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of
matter of peculiar figures, and bulks, and in different degrees and
modifications of their Motions, causes the Ideas of the blue Colour,
30 and sweet Scent of that Flower to be produced in our Minds. It
being no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such
Ideas to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than
that he should annex the Idea of Pain to the motion of a piece of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 137
Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that Idea hath no resem-
blance.

§ 14.

What I have said concerning Colours and Smells, may be

understood also of Tastes and Sounds, and other the like sensible Qualities;
5 which, whatever reality we, by mistake, attribute to them, are in
truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce
various Sensations in us, and depend on those primary Qualities, viz.
Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of parts; as I have said.

§ 15.

From whence I think it is easie to draw this Observation,

10 That the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them,
and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; but the

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 Ideas, produced in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of
them at all. There is nothing like our Ideas, existing in the Bodies
themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them, only
15 a Power to produce those Sensations in us: And what is Sweet, Blue,
or Warm in Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the
insensible Parts in the Bodies themselves, which we call so.

§ 16.

Flame is denominated Hot and Light; Snow White and Cold;

and Manna White and Sweet, from the Ideas they produce in us.
20 Which Qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those
Bodies, that those Ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of
the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by most Men be
judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet he,
that will consider, that the same Fire, that at one distance produces in
25 us the Sensation of Warmth, does at a nearer approach, produce in
us the far different Sensation of Pain, ought to bethink himself,
what Reason he has to say, That his Idea of Warmth, which was
produced in him by the Fire, is actually in the Fire; and his Idea of
Pain, which the same Fire produced in him the same way, is not in the
30 Fire. Why is Whiteness and Coldness in Snow, and Pain not, when
it produces the one and the other Idea in us; and can do neither,
but by the Bulk, Figure, Number, and Motion of its solid Parts?

§ 17.

The particular Bulk, Number, Figure, and Motion of the parts of

Fire, or Snow, are really in them, whether any ones Senses perceive
35 them or no: and therefore they may be called real Qualities, because

...........................................................................................................................
pg 138
they really exist in those Bodies. But Light, Heat, Whiteness, or
Coldness, are no more really in them, than Sickness or Pain is in Manna.
Take away the Sensation of them; let not the Eyes see Light, or
Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not Taste, nor the
5 Nose Smell, and all Colours, Tastes, Odors, and Sounds, as they
are such particular Ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their
Causes, i.e. Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts.

§ 18.

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 A piece of Manna of a sensible Bulk, is able to produce in us
the Idea of a round or square Figure; and, by being removed from
10 one place to another, the Idea of Motion. This Idea of Motion
represents it, as it really is in the Manna moving: A Circle or Square
are the same, whether in Idea or Existence; in the Mind, or in the
Manna: And this, both Motion and Figure are really in the Manna,
whether we take notice of them or no: This every Body is ready to
15 agree to. Besides, Manna by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion
of its Parts, has a Power to produce the Sensations of Sickness, and
sometimes of acute Pains, or Gripings in us. That these Ideas of
Sickness and Pain are not in the Manna, but Effects of its Operations on
us, and are no where when we feel them not: This also every one
20 readily agrees to. And yet Men are hardly to be brought to think,
that Sweetness and Whiteness are not really in Manna; which are but the
effects of the operations of Manna, by the motion, size, and figure of
its Particles on the Eyes and Palate; as the Pain and Sickness caused
by Manna, are confessedly nothing, but the effects of its operations
25 on the Stomach and Guts, by the size, motion, and figure of its
insensible parts; (for by nothing else can a Body operate, as has
been proved:) As if it could not operate on the Eyes and Palate, and
thereby produce in the Mind particular distinct Ideas, which in it
self it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the Guts and
30 Stomach, and thereby produce distinct Ideas, which in it self it has
not. These Ideas being all effects of the operations of Manna, on
several parts of our Bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion
of its parts, why those produced by the Eyes and Palate, should
rather be thought to be really in the Manna, than those produced by
35 the Stomach and Guts; or why the Pain and Sickness, Ideas that are
the effects of Manna, should be thought to be no-where, when they
are not felt; and yet the Sweetness and Whiteness, effects of
the same Manna on other parts of the Body, by ways equally as

...........................................................................................................................
pg 139
unknown, should be thought to exist in the Manna, when they are
not seen nor tasted, would need some Reason to explain.

§ 19.

Let us consider the red and white colours in Porphyre: Hin-

der light but from striking on it, and its Colours Vanish; it no
5 longer produces any such Ideas in us: Upon the return of Light, it

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 produces these appearances on us again. Can any one think any real
alterations are made in the Porphyre, by the presence or absence of
Light; and that those Ideas of whiteness and redness, are really in
Porphyre in the light, when 'tis plain it has no colour in the dark? It has,
10 indeed, such a Configuration of Particles, both Night and Day, as
are apt by the Rays of Light rebounding from some parts of that
hard Stone, to produce in us the Idea of redness, and from others the
Idea of whiteness: But whiteness or redness are not in it at any time,
but such a texture, that hath the power to produce such a sensation-
15 in us.

§ 20.

Pound an Almond, and the clear white Colour will be altered

into a dirty one, and the sweet Taste into an oily one. What real
Alteration can the beating of the Pestle make in any Body, but an
Alteration of the Texture of it?

§ 21.

20 Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be

able to give an Account, how the same Water, at the same time,
may produce the Idea of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the
other: Whereas it is impossible, that the same Water, if those Ideas
were really in it, should at the same time be both Hot and Cold. For
25 if we imagine Warmth, as it is in our Hands, to be nothing but a
certain sort and degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves, or
animal Spirits, we may understand, how it is possible, that the same
Water may at the same time produce the Sensation of Heat in one
Hand, and Cold in the other; which yet Figure never does, that
30 never producing the Idea of a square by one Hand, which has pro-
duced the Idea of a Globe by another. But if the Sensation of Heat
and Cold, be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion
of the minute Parts of our Bodies, caused by the Corpuscles of any
other Body, it is easie to be understood, That if that motion be
35 greater in one Hand, than in the other; if a Body be applied to the
two Hands, which has in its minute Particles a greater motion,
than in those of one of the Hands, and a less, than in those of the
other, it will increase the motion of the one Hand, and lessen it in
the other, and so cause the different Sensations of Heat and Cold,
40 that depend thereon.

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 140
§ 22.

I have in what just goes before, been engaged in Physical

Enquiries a little farther than, perhaps, I intended. But it being
necessary, to make the Nature of Sensation a little understood, and
to make the difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the Ideas
5 produced by them in the Mind, to be distinctly conceived, without
which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; I hope,
I shall be pardoned this little Excursion into Natural Philosophy, it
being necessary in our present Enquiry, to distinguish the primary,
and real Qualities of Bodies, which are always in them, (viz. Solidity,
10 Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion, or Rest; and are some-
times perceived by us, viz. when the Bodies they are in, are big
enough singly to be discerned) from those secondary and imputed
Qualities, which are but the Powers of several Combinations of those
primary ones, when they operate, without being distinctly dis-
15 cerned; whereby we also may come to know what Ideas are, and
what are not Resemblances of something really existing in the
Bodies, we denominate from them.

§ 23.

The Qualities then that are in Bodies rightly considered, are

of Three sorts.
20 First, The Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion, or Rest of
their solid Parts; those are in them, whether we perceive them or
no; and when they are of that size, that we can discover them, we
have by these an Idea of the thing, as it is in it self, as is plain in
artificial things. These I call primary Qualities.
25 Secondly, The Power that is in any Body, by Reason of its insensible
primary Qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our
Senses, and thereby produce in us the different Ideas of several Colours,
Sounds, Smells, Tasts, etc. These are usually called sensible
Qualities.

30 Thirdly, The Power that is in any Body, by Reason of the particular

Constitution of its primary Qualities, to make such a change in the
Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of another Body, as to make it
operate on our Senses, differently from what it did before. Thus the

...........................................................................................................................

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 pg 141
Sun has a Power to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid.
These are usually called Powers.

The First of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly

called real Original, or primary Qualities, because they are in the
5 things themselves, whether they are perceived or no: and upon their
different Modifications it is, that the secondary Qualities depend.

The other two, are only Powers to act differently upon other
things, which Powers result from the different Modifications of
those primary Qualities.

§ 24.

10 But though these two later sorts of Qualities are Powers barely,
and nothing but Powers, relating to several other Bodies, and
resulting from the different Modifications of the Original Qualities;
yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For the Second sort, viz.
The Powers to produce several Ideas in us by our Senses, are looked
15 upon as real Qualities, in the things thus affecting us: But the Third sort
are call'd, and esteemed barely Powers, v.g. the Idea of Heat, or Light,
which we receive by our Eyes, or touch from the Sun, are common-
ly thought real Qualities, existing in the Sun, and something more
than mere Powers in it. But when we consider the Sun, in reference
20 to Wax, which it melts or blanches, we look upon the Whiteness
and Softness produced in the Wax, not as Qualities in the Sun, but
Effects produced by Powers in it: Whereas, if rightly considered,
these Qualities of Light and Warmth, which are Perceptions in me
when I am warmed, or enlightned by the Sun, are no otherwise in
25 the Sun, than the changes made in the Wax, when it is blanched or
melted, are in the Sun. They are all of them equally Powers in the
Sun, depending on its primary Qualities; whereby it is able in the
one case, so to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of some of
the insensible parts of my Eyes, or Hands, as thereby to produce in
30 me the Idea of Light or Heat; and in the other, it is able so to alter
the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of the insensible Parts of the
Wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct Ideas of
White and Fluid.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 142

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 § 25.

The Reason, Why the one are ordinarily taken for real Qualities,
and the other only for bare Powers, seems to be, because the Ideas we
have of distinct Colours, Sounds, etc. containing nothing at all in
them, of Bulk, Figure, or Motion, we are not apt to think them the
5 Effects of these primary Qualities, which appear not to our Senses to
operate in their Production; and with which, they have not any
apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion. Hence it is, that
we are so forward to imagine, that those Ideas are the resemblances
of something really existing in the Objects themselves: Since
10 Sensation discovers nothing of Bulk, Figure, or Motion of parts in
their Production; nor can Reason shew, how Bodies by their Bulk,
Figure, and Motion, should produce in the Mind the Ideas of Blue,
or Yellow, etc. But in the other Case, in the Operations of Bodies,
changing the Qualities one of another, we plainly discover, that the
15 Quality produced, hath commonly no resemblance with any thing
in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of
Power. For though receiving the Idea of Heat, or Light, from the
Sun, we are apt to think, 'tis a Perception and Resemblance of such
a Quality in the Sun: yet when we see Wax, or a fair Face, receive
20 change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine, that to be the
Reception or Resemblance of any thing in the Sun, because we
find not those different Colours in the Sun it self. For our Senses,
being able to observe a likeness, or unlikeness of sensible Qualities
in two different external Objects, we forwardly enough conclude
25 the Production of any sensible Quality in any Subject, to be an
Effect of bare Power, and not the Communication of any Quality,
which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible
Quality in the thing that produced it. But our Senses, not being
able to discover any unlikeness between the Idea produced in us,
30 and the Quality of the Object producing it, we are apt to imagine,
that our Ideas are resemblances of something in the Objects, and not
the Effects of certain Powers, placed in the Modification of their
primary Qualities, with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced
in us have no resemblance.

§ 26.

35 To conclude, beside those before mentioned primary

Qualities in Bodies, viz. Bulk, Figure, Extension, Number, and

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 143
Motion of their solid Parts; all the rest, whereby we take notice of
Bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else,
but several Powers in them, depending on those primary Qualities;
whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our
5 Bodies, to produce several different Ideas in us; or else by operating
on other Bodies, so to change their primary Qualities, as to render
them capable of producing Ideas in us, different from what before
they did. The former of these, I think, may be called Secondary
Qualities, immediately perceivable: The latter, Secondary Qualities,
10 mediately perceivable.

CHAPTER IX
Of Perception.

§ 1.

PERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty of the Mind, exercised

about our Ideas; so it is the first and simplest Idea we have from
Reflection, and is by some called Thinking in general. Though
Thinking, in the propriety of the English Tongue, signifies that
15 sort of operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is
active; where it with some degree of voluntary attention, considers
any thing. For in bare naked Perception, the Mind is, for the most
part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

§ 2.

What Perception is, every one will know better by reflecting

20 on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, etc. or thinks,
than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in
his own Mind, cannot miss it: And if he does not reflect, all the
Words in the World, cannot make him have any notion of it.

§ 3.

This is certain, That whatever alterations are made in the

25 Body, if they reach not the Mind; whatever impressions are made
on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is
no Perception. Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other effect, than
it does a Billet, unless the motion be continued to the Brain, and

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 there the sence of Heat, or Idea of Pain, be produced in the Mind,
30 wherein consists actual Perception.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 144
§ 4.

How often may a Man observe in himself, that whilst his

Mind is intently employ'd in the contemplation of some Objects;
and curiously surveying some Ideas that are there, it takes no notice
of impressions of sounding Bodies, made upon the Organ of Hearing,
5 with the same alteration, that uses to be for the producing the Idea
of a Sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the Organ; but it
not reaching the observation of the Mind, there follows no per-
ception: And though the motion, that uses to produce the Idea of
Sound, be made in the Ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of Sen-
10 sation in this case, is not through any defect in the Organ, or that
the Man's Ears are less affected, than at other times, when he does
hear: but that which uses to produce the Idea, though conveyed in
by the usual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Understanding,
and so imprinting no Idea on the Mind, there follows no Sensation.
15 So that where-ever there is Sense, or Perception, there some Idea is actually
produced, and present in the Understanding.

§ 5.

Therefore I doubt not but Children, by the exercise of their

Senses about Objects, that affect them in the Womb, receive some few
Ideas, before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the
20 Bodies that environ them, or else of those Wants or Diseases they
suffer; amongst which, (if one may conjecture concerning things
not very capable of examination) I think the Ideas of Hunger and
Warmth are two: which probably are some of the first that Children
have, and which they scarce ever part with again.

§ 6.

25 But though it be reasonable to imagine, that Children receive

some Ideas before they come into the World, yet these simple Ideas
are far from those innate Principles, which some contend for, and we
above have rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of
Sensation, are only from some Affections of the Body, which happen

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30 to them there, and so depend on something exterior to the Mind; no
otherwise differing in their manner of production from other Ideas
derived from Sense, but only in the precedency of Time: Whereas
those innate Principles are supposed to be of quite another nature;
not coming into the Mind by any accidental alterations in, or
35 operations on the Body; but, as it were, original Characters

...........................................................................................................................
pg 145
impressed upon it, in the very first moment of its Being and
Constitution.

§ 7.

As there are some Ideas, which we may reasonably suppose

may be introduced into the Minds of Children in the Womb, sub-
5 servient to the necessities of their Life, and Being there: So after
they are born, those Ideas are the earliest imprinted, which happen to be the
sensible Qualities, which first occur to them; amongst which, Light is
not the least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how
covetous the Mind is, to be furnished with all such Ideas, as have no
10 pain accompanying them, may be a little guess'd, by what is ob-
servable in Children new-born, who always turn their Eyes to that
part, from whence the Light comes, lay them how you please. But
the Ideas that are most familiar at first, being various, according to
the divers circumstances of Childrens first entertainment in the
15 World, the order, wherein the several Ideas come at first into
the Mind, is very various, and uncertain also; neither is it much
material to know it.

§ 8.

We are farther to consider concerning Perception, that the

Ideas we receive by sensation, are often in grown People alter'd by the
20 Judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our
Eyes a round Globe, of any uniform colour, v.g. Gold, Alabaster, or
Jet, 'tis certain, that the Idea thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a
flat Circle variously shadow'd, with several degrees of Light and
Brightness coming to our Eyes. But we having by use been accus-
25 tomed to perceive, what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont
to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of Light, by
the difference of the sensible Figures of Bodies, the Judgment pres-

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 ently, by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into their
Causes: So that from that, which truly is variety of shadow or colour,
30 collecting the Figure, it makes it pass for a mark of Figure, and frames
to it self the perception of a convex Figure, and an uniform Colour;
when the Idea we receive from thence, is only a Plain variously col-
our'd, as is evident in Painting. To which purpose I shall here insert
a Problem of that very Ingenious and Studious promoter of real Know-
35 ledge, the Learned and Worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleased to

...........................................................................................................................
pg 146
send me in a Letter some Months since; and it is this: Suppose a Man
born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a
Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to
tell, when he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere.
5 Suppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be
made to see. Quære, Whether by his sight, before he touch'd them, he could
now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube. To which the
acute and judicious Proposer answers: Not. For though he has obtain'd
the experience of, how a Globe, how a Cube affects his touch; yet he has not
10 yet attained the Experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect
his sight so or so; Or that a protuberant angle in the Cube, that pressed his
hand unequally, shall appear to his eye, as it does in the Cube. I agree with
this thinking Gent. whom I am proud to call my Friend, in his
answer to this his Problem; and am of opinion, that the Blind Man,
15 at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, which was
the Globe, which the Cube, whilst he only saw them: though he
could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish
them by the difference of their Figures felt. This I have set down,
and leave with my Reader, as an occasion for him to consider, how
20 much he may be beholding to experience, improvement, and ac-
quired notions, where he thinks, he has not the least use of, or help
from them: And the rather, because this observing Gent. farther
adds, that having upon the occasion of my Book, proposed this to divers very
ingenious Men, he hardly ever met with one, that at first gave the answer to
25 it, which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced.

§ 9.

But this is not, I think, usual in any of our Ideas, but those
received by Sight: Because Sight, the most comprehensive of all our
Senses, conveying to our Minds the Ideas of Light and Colours,

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 which are peculiar only to that Sense; and also the far different
30 Ideas of Space, Figure, and Motion, the several varieties whereof
change the appearances of its proper Object, viz. Light and Colours,
we bring our selves by use, to judge of the one by the other. This in
many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent
experience, is performed so constantly, and so quick, that we take
35 that for the Perception of our Sensation, which is an Idea formed by
our Judgment; so that one, viz. that of Sensation, serves only to
excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of it self; as a Man who

...........................................................................................................................
pg 147
reads or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice
of the Characters, or Sounds, but of the Ideas, that are excited in
him by them.

§ 10.

Nor need we wonder, that this is done with so little notice,

5 if we consider, how very quick the actions of the Mind are performed:
For as it self is thought to take up no space, to have no extension; so
its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be
crouded into an Instant. I speak this in comparison to the Actions
of the Body. Any one may easily observe this in his own Thoughts,
10 who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an
instant, do our Minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a
demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we
consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by
step shew it another? Secondly, we shall not be so much surprized,
15 that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider, how the
facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes
them often pass in us without our notice. Habits, especially such as
are begun very early, come, at last, to produce actions in us, which
often escape our observation. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our
20 Eyes with our Eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the
dark? Men, that by custom have got the use of a By-word, do almost
in every sentence, pronounce sounds, which, though taken notice of
by others, they themselves neither hear, nor observe. And therefore
'tis not so strange, that our Mind should often change the Idea of its
25 Sensation, into that of its Judgment, and make one serve only to
excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

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 § 11.

This faculty of Perception, seems to me to be that, which

puts the distinction betwixt the animal Kingdom, and the inferior parts of
Nature. For however Vegetables have, many of them, some degrees
30 of Motion, and upon the different application of other Bodies to
them, do very briskly alter their Figures and Motions, and so have
obtained the name of sensitive Plants, from a motion, which has some
resemblance to that, which in Animals follows upon Sensation: Yet,
I suppose, it is all bare Mechanism; and no otherwise produced,
35 than the turning of a wild Oat-beard, by the insinuation of the

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pg 148
Particles of Moisture; or the short'ning of a Rope, by the affusion of
Water. All which is done without any Sensation in the Subject, or
the having or receiving any Ideas.

§ 12.

Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of Animals;

5 though in some, possibly, the Avenues, provided by Nature for the
reception of Sensations are so few, and the Perception, they are
received with, so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of
the quickness and variety of Sensations, which is in other Animals:
but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and
10 condition of that sort of Animals, who are thus made: So that the
Wisdom and Goodness of the Maker plainly appears in all the Parts
of this stupendious Fabrick, and all the several degrees and ranks
of Creatures in it.

§ 13.

We may, I think, from the Make of an Oyster, or Cockle,

15 reasonably conclude, that it has not so many, nor so quick Senses,
as a Man, or several other Animals; nor if it had, would it, in that
state and incapacity of transferring it self from one place to another,
be better'd by them. What good would Sight and Hearing do to a
Creature, that cannot move it self to, or from the Objects, wherein
20 at a distance it perceives Good or Evil? And would not quickness of
Sensation, be an Inconvenience to an Animal, that must lie still,
where Chance has once placed it; and there receive the afflux of

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 colder or warmer, clean or foul Water, as it happens to come to it?

§ 14.

But yet, I cannot but think, there is some small dull Percep-
25 tion, whereby they are distinguished from perfect Insensibility.
And that this may be so, we have plain instances, even in Mankind
it self. Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the
Memory of his past Knowledge, and clearly wiped out the Ideas his
Mind was formerly stored with; and has, by destroying his Sight,
30 Hearing, and Smell quite, and his Taste to a great degree, stopp'd
up almost all the Passages for new ones to enter; or, if there be some
of the Inlets yet half open, the Impressions made are scarce per-
ceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one (notwithstanding
all that is boasted of innate Principles) is in his Knowledge, and
35 intellectual Faculties, above the Condition of a Cockle, or an Oyster,
I leave to be considered. And if a Man had passed Sixty Years in
such a State, as 'tis possible he might, as well as three Days, I

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pg 149
wonder what difference there would have been, in any intellectual
Perfections, between him, and the lowest degree of Animals.

§ 15.

Perception then being the first step and degree towards Know-
ledge, and the inlet of all the Materials of it, the fewer Senses any Man,
5 as well as any other Creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the
Impressions are, that are made by them; and the duller the Faculties
are, that are employed about them, the more remote are they from
that Knowledge, which is to be found in some Men. But this being
in great variety of Degrees, (as may be perceived amongst Men,)
10 cannot certainly be discovered in the several Species of Animals,
much less in their particular Individuals. It suffices me only to have
remarked here, that Perception is the first Operation of all our
intellectual Faculties, and the inlet of all Knowledge into our
Minds. And I am apt too to imagine, That it is Perception in the
15 lowest degree of it, which puts the Boundaries between Animals,
and the inferior ranks of Creatures. But this I mention only as my
conjecture by the by, it being indifferent to the Matter in Hand,
which way the Learned shall determine of it.

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 CHAPTER X
Of Retention.

§ 1.

THE next Faculty of the Mind, whereby it makes a farther

20 Progress towards Knowledge, is that which I call Retention, or the
keeping of those simple Ideas, which from Sensation or Reflection it
hath received. This is done two ways. First, by keeping the Idea,
which is brought into it, for some time actually in view, which is
called Contemplation.

§ 2.

25 The other way of Retention is the Power to revive again in

our Minds those Ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or
have been as it were laid aside out of Sight: And thus we do, when

...........................................................................................................................
pg 150
we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being
removed. This is Memory, which is as it were the Store-house of our
Ideas. For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having
many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary
5 to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas, which at another time it
might have use of. But our Ideas being nothing, but actual Per-
ceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no
perception of them, this laying up of our Ideas in the Repository of the
Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in
10 many cases, to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this
additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.
And in this Sense it is, that our Ideas are said to be in our Memories,
when indeed, they are actually no where, but only there is an ability
in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were
15 paint them anew on it self, though some with more, some with less
difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus
it is, by the Assistance of this Faculty, that we are said to have all
those Ideas in our Understandings, which though we do not actually
contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and
20 be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of those sensible
Qualities, which first imprinted them there.

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 § 3.

Attention and Repetition help much to the fixing any Ideas in the
Memory: But those, which naturally at first make the deepest, and
most lasting Impression, are those, which are accompanied with
25 Pleasure or Pain. The great Business of the Senses, being to make us
take notice of what hurts, or advantages the Body, it is wisely
ordered by Nature (as has been shewn) that Pain should accompany
the Reception of several Ideas; which supplying the Place of Con-
sideration and Reasoning in Children, and acting quicker than
30 Consideration in grown Men, makes both the Young and Old avoid
painful Objects, with that haste, which is necessary for their
Preservation; and in both settles in the Memory a caution for the
Future.

§ 4.

Concerning the several degrees of lasting, wherewith Ideas are

...........................................................................................................................
pg 151
imprinted on the Memory, we may observe, That some of them have
been produced in the Understanding, by an Object affecting the
Senses once only, and no more than once: Others, that have more
than once offer'd themselves to the Senses, have yet been little
5 taken notice of; the Mind, either heedless, as in Children, or other-
wise employ'd, as in Men, intent only on one thing, not setting the
stamp deep into it self. And in some, where they are set on with care
and repeated impressions, either through the temper of the Body,
or some other default, the Memory is very weak: In all these cases,
10 Ideas in the Mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the
Understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining Characters
of themselves, than Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn; and the
Mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there.

§ 5.

Thus many of those Ideas, which were produced in the Minds

15 of Children, in the beginning of their Sensation (some of which,
perhaps, as of some Pleasures and Pains, were before they were
born, and others in their Infancy) if in the future Course of their
Lives, they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least

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 glimpse remaining of them. This may be observed in those, who by
20 some Mischance have lost their sight, when they were very Young;
in whom the Ideas of Colours, having been but slightly taken notice
of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some years
after, there is no more Notion, nor Memory of Colours left in their
Minds, than in those of People born blind. The Memory in some
25 Men, 'tis true, is very tenacious, even to a Miracle: But yet there
seems to be a constant decay of all our Ideas, even of those which are
struck deepest, and in Minds the most retentive; so that if they
be not sometimes renewed by repeated Exercise of the Senses, or
Reflection on those kind of Objects, which at first occasioned them,
30 the Print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen.
Thus the Ideas, as well as Children, of our Youth, often die before
us: And our Minds represent to us those Tombs, to which we are
approaching; where though the Brass and Marble remain, yet the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 152
Inscriptions are effaced by time, and the Imagery moulders away.
The Pictures drawn in our Minds, are laid in fading Colours; and if not
sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the Con-
stitution of our Bodies, and the make of our animal Spirits, are
5 concerned in this; and whether the Temper of the Brain make this
difference, that in some it retains the Characters drawn on it like
Marble, in others like Free-stone, and in others little better than
Sand, I shall not here enquire, though it may seem probable, that
the Constitution of the Body does sometimes influence the Memory;
10 since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its
Ideas, and the flames of a Fever, in a few days, calcine all those
Images to dust and confusion, which seem'd to be as lasting, as if
graved in Marble.

§ 6.

But concerning the Ideas themselves, it is easie to remark,

15 That those that are oftenest refreshed (amongst which are those that
are conveyed into the Mind by more ways than one) by a frequent
return of the Objects or Actions that produce them, fix themselves
best in the Memory, and remain clearest and longest there; and
therefore those, which are of the original Qualities of Bodies, viz.
20 Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest, and those that almost
constantly affect our Bodies, as Heat and Cold; and those which are

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 the Affections of all kinds of Beings, as Existence, Duration, and
Number, which almost every Object that affects our Senses, every
Thought which imploys our Minds, bring along with them:
25 These, I say, and the like Ideas, are seldom quite lost, whilst the
Mind retains any Ideas at all.

§ 7.

In this secondary Perception, as I may so call it, or viewing

again the Ideas, that are lodg'd in the Memory, the Mind is oftentimes
more than barely passive, the appearance of those dormant Pictures,
30 depending sometimes on the Will. The Mind very often sets it self
on work in search of some hidden Idea, and turns, as it were, the
Eye of the Soul upon it; though sometimes too they start up in our
Minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the Under-
standing; and very often are rouzed and tumbled out of their dark

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pg 153
Cells, into open Day-light, by some turbulent and tempestuous
Passion; our Affections bringing Ideas to our Memory, which had
otherwise lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be observed,
concerning Ideas lodg'd in the Memory, and upon occasion revived
5 by the Mind, that they are not only (as the Word revive imports)
none of them new ones; but also that the Mind takes notice of them,
as of a former Impression, and renews its acquaintance with them,
as with Ideas it had known before. So that though Ideas formerly
imprinted are not all constantly in view, yet in remembrance they
10 are constantly known to be such, as have been formerly imprinted,
i.e. in view, and taken notice of before by the Understanding.

§ 8.

Memory, in an intellectual Creature, is necessary in the next

degree to Perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is
wanting, all the rest of our Faculties are in a great measure useless:
15 And we in our Thoughts, Reasonings, and Knowledge, could not
proceed beyond present Objects, were it not for the assistance of our
Memories, wherein there may be two defects.
First, That it loses the Idea quite, and so far it produces perfect
Ignorance. For since we can know nothing farther, than we have the
20 Idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

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 Secondly, That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the Ideas, that it
has, and are laid up in store, quick enough to serve the Mind upon
occasions. This, if it be to a great degree, is Stupidity; and he, who
through this default in his Memory, has not the Ideas, that are really
25 preserved there, ready at hand, when need and occasion calls for
them, were almost as good be without them quite, since they serve
him to little purpose. The dull Man, who loses the opportunity,
whilst he is seeking in his Mind for those Ideas, that should serve
his turn, is not much more happy in his Knowledge, than one that
30 is perfectly ignorant. 'Tis the business therefore of the Memory to
furnish to the Mind those dormant Ideas, which it has present
occasion for, and in the having them ready at hand on all occasions,
consists that which we call Invention, Fancy, and quickness of Parts.

§ 9.

These are defects, we may observe, in the Memory of one

35 Man compared with another. There is another defect, which we may

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pg 154
conceive to be in the memory of Man in general, compared with
some superiour created intellectual Beings, which in this faculty
may so far excel Man, that they may have constantly in view
the whole Scene of all their former actions, wherein no one of
5 the thoughts they have ever had, may slip out of their sight. The
omniscience of God, who knows all things past, present, and to
come, and to whom the thoughts of Men's hearts always lie open,
may satisfie us of the possibility of this. For who can doubt, but
God may communicate to those glorious Spirits, his immediate
10 Attendants, any of his Perfections, in what proportion he pleases,
as far as created finite Beings can be capable. 'Tis reported of that
prodigy of Parts, Monsieur Pascal, that, till the decay of his health
had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done,
read, or thought in any part of his rational Age. This is a privilege
15 so little known to most Men, that it seems almost incredible to
those, who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themselves:
But yet, when considered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts
towards greater Perfections of it in superior ranks of Spirits. For
this of Mr. Pascal was still with the narrowness, that humane
20 Minds are confin'd to here, of having great variety of Ideas only by
succession, not all at once: Whereas the several degrees of Angels

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 may probably have larger views, and some of them be endowed
with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before
them, as in one Picture, all their past knowledge at once. This, we
25 may conceive, would be no small advantage to the knowledge of a
thinking Man; if all his past thoughts, and reasonings could be
always present to him. And therefore we may suppose it one of
those ways, wherein the knowledge of separate Spirits may ex-
ceedingly surpass ours.

§ 10.

30 This faculty of laying up, and retaining the Ideas, that are
brought into the Mind, several other Animals seem to have, to a great
degree, as well as Man. For to pass by other Instances, Birds learn-
ing of Tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them, to hit
the Notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have Per-
35 ception, and retain Ideas in their Memories, and use them for
Patterns. For it seems to me impossible, that they should endeavour
to conform their Voices to Notes (as 'tis plain they do) of which they

...........................................................................................................................
pg 155
had no Ideas. For though I should grant Sound may mechanically
cause a certain motion of the animal Spirits, in the Brains of those
Birds, whilst the Tune is actually playing; and that motion may be
continued on to the Muscles of the Wings, and so the Bird mechani-
5 cally be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the
Birds Preservation: yet that can never be supposed a Reason, why
it should cause mechanically, either whilst the Tune was playing,
much less after it has ceased, such a motion in the Organs of the
Bird's Voice, as should conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound,
10 which imitation can be of no use to the Bird's Preservation. But
which is more, it cannot with any appearance of Reason, be sup-
posed (much less proved) that Birds, without Sense and Memory,
can approach their Notes, nearer and nearer by degrees, to a Tune
play'd yesterday; which if they have no Idea of in their Memory, is
15 now no-where, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which
any repeated Essays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no
reason why the sound of a Pipe should leave traces in their Brains,
which not at first, but by their after-endeavours, should produce the
like Sounds; and why the Sounds they make themselves, should not
20 make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the Pipe,

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 is impossible to conceive.

CHAPTER XI
Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

§ 1.

ANOTHER Faculty, we may take notice of in our Minds, is

that of Discerning and distinguishing between the several Ideas it
has. It is not enough to have a confused Perception of something in
25 general: Unless the Mind had a distinct Perception of different
Objects, and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little
Knowledge; though the Bodies that affect us, were as busie about
us, as they are now, and the Mind were continually employ'd in
thinking. On this faculty of Distinguishing one thing from another,
30 depends the evidence and certainty of several, even very general
Propositions, which have passed for innate Truths; because Men
over-looking the true cause, why those Propositions find universal

...........................................................................................................................
pg 156
assent, impute it wholly to native uniform Impressions; whereas it
in truth depends upon this clear discerning Faculty of the Mind, whereby
it perceives two Ideas to be the same, or different. But of this more
hereafter.

§ 2.

5 How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating

Ideas one from another lies, either in the dulness, or faults of the
Organs of Sense; or want of acuteness, exercise, or attention in the
Understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural to some
Tempers, I will not here examine: It suffices to take notice, that
10 this is one of the Operations, that the Mind may reflect on, and
observe in it self. It is of that consequence to its other Knowledge,
that so far as this faculty is in it self dull, or not rightly made use of,
for the distinguishing one thing from another; so far our Notions
are confused, and our Reason and Judgment disturbed or misled.
15 If in having our Ideas in the Memory ready at hand, consists quick-
ness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able
nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but
the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of

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 Judgment, and clearness of Reason, which is to be observed in one
20 Man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some
Reason of that common Observation, That Men who have a great
deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest
Judgment, or deepest Reason. For Wit lying most in the assem-
blage of Ideas, and putting those together with quickness and
25 variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity,
thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the
Fancy: Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in
separating carefully, one from another, Ideas, wherein can be found
the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude,
30 and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of
proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion, wherein, for
the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which
strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore so acceptable to all
People; because its Beauty appears at first sight, and there is
35 required no labour of thought, to examine what Truth or Reason
there is in it. The Mind without looking any farther, rests satisfied

...........................................................................................................................
pg 157
with the agreeableness of the Picture, and the gayety of the Fancy:
And it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it, by the
severe Rules of Truth, and good Reason; whereby it appears, that
it consists in something, that is not perfectly conformable to them.

§ 3.

5 To the well distinguishing our Ideas, it chiefly contributes,

that they be clear and determinate: And when they are so, it will not
breed any confusion or mistake about them, though the Senses should
(as sometimes they do) convey them from the same Object different-
ly, on different occasions, and so seem to err. For though a Man in a
10 Fever should from Sugar have a bitter taste, which at another time
would produce a sweet one; yet the Idea of Bitter in that Man's
Mind, would be as clear and distinct from the Idea of Sweet, as if he
had tasted only Gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between
the two Ideas of Sweet and Bitter, that the same sort of Body
15 produces at one time one, and at another time another Idea, by the
taste, than it makes a confusion in the two Ideas of White and
Sweet, or White and Round, that the same piece of Sugar produces
them both in the Mind at the same time. And the Ideas of Orange-

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 colour and Azure, that are produced in the Mind by the same par-
20 cel of the infusion of Lignum Nephriticum, are no less distinct Ideas,
than those of the same Colours, taken from two very different Bodies.

§ 4.

The COMPARING them one with another, in respect of

Extent, Degrees, Time, Place, or any other Circumstances, is
another operation of the Mind about its Ideas, and is that upon which
25 depends all that large tribe of Ideas, comprehended under Relation;
which of how vast an extent it is, I shall have occasion to consider
hereafter.

§ 5.

How far Brutes partake in this faculty, is not easie to

determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree: For
30 though they probably have several Ideas distinct enough, yet it
seems to me to be the Prerogative of Humane Understanding, when
it has sufficiently distinguished any Ideas, so as to perceive them to
be perfectly different, and so consequently two, to cast about and
consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared.
35 And therefore, I think, Beasts compare not their Ideas, farther than

...........................................................................................................................
pg 158
some sensible Circumstances annexed to the Objects themselves.
The other power of Comparing, which may be observed in Men,
belonging to general Ideas, and useful only to abstract Reasonings,
we may probably conjecture Beasts have not.

§ 6.

5 The next Operation we may observe in the Mind about its

Ideas, is COMPOSITION; whereby it puts together several of
those simple ones it has received from Sensation and Reflection,
and combines them into complex ones. Under this of Composition,
may be reckon'd also that of ENLARGING; wherein though the
10 Composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet
it is nevertheless a putting several Ideas together, though of the
same kind. Thus by adding several Unites together, we make the
Idea of a dozen; and putting together the repeated Ideas of several
Perches, we frame that of Furlong.

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 § 7.

15 In this also, I suppose, Brutes come far short of Men. For

though they take in, and retain together several Combinations of
simple Ideas, as possibly the Shape, Smell, and Voice of his Master,
make up the complex Idea a Dog has of him; or rather are so many
distinct Marks whereby he knows him: yet, I do not think they do
20 of themselves ever compound them, and make complex Ideas. And
perhaps even where we think they have complex Ideas, 'tis only one
simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things,
which possibly they distinguish less by their Sight, than we
imagine. For I have been credibly informed, that a Bitch will nurse,
25 play with, and be fond of young Foxes, as much as, and in place of
her Puppies, if you can but get them once to suck her so long, that
her Milk may go through them. And those animals, which have a
numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any
knowledge of their number; for though they are mightily concerned
30 for any of their Young, that are taken from them whilst they are in
sight or hearing, yet if one or two of them be stollen from them in
their absence, or without noise, they appear not to miss them; or to
have any sense, that their number is lessen'd.

§ 8.

When Children have, by repeated Sensations, got Ideas fixed

35 in their Memories, they begin, by degrees, to learn the use of Signs.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 159
And when they have got the skill to apply the Organs of Speech to
the framing of articulate Sounds, they begin to make Use of Words,
to signifie their Ideas to others: These verbal Signs they sometimes
borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may
5 observe among the new and unusual Names Children often give to
things in their first use of Language.

§ 9.

The use of Words then being to stand as outward Marks of

our internal Ideas, and those Ideas being taken from particular
things, if every particular Idea that we take in, should have a
10 distinct Name, Names must be endless. To prevent this, the Mind

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 makes the particular Ideas, received from particular Objects, to
become general; which is done by considering them as they are in
the Mind such Appearances, separate from all other Existences,
and the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any other
15 concomitant Ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby
Ideas taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives
of all of the same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable
to whatever exists conformable to such abstract Ideas. Such precise,
naked Appearances in the Mind, without considering, how, whence,
20 or with what others they came there, the Understanding lays up
(with Names commonly annexed to them) as the Standards to
rank real Existences into sorts, as they agree with these Patterns,
and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the same Colour being
observed to day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday
25 received from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a
representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name
Whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever
to be imagin'd or met with; and thus Universals, whether Ideas or
Terms, are made.

§ 10.

30 If it may be doubted, Whether Beasts compound and enlarge

their Ideas that way, to any degree: This, I think, I may be positive
in, That the power of Abstracting is not at all in them; and that the
having of general Ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction
betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties
35 of Brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident, we observe no

...........................................................................................................................
pg 160
foot-steps in them, of making use of general signs for universal
Ideas; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the
faculty of abstracting, or making general Ideas, since they have no
use of Words, or any other general Signs.

§ 11.

5 Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit Organs, to frame

articulate Sounds, that they have no use, or knowledge of general
Words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such Sounds,
and pronounce Words distinctly enough, but never with any such

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 application. And on the other side, Men, who through some defect
10 in the Organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal
Ideas by signs, which serve them instead of general words, a faculty
which we see Beasts come short in. And therefore I think we may
suppose, That 'tis in this, that the Species of Brutes are discrimi-
nated from Man; and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are
15 wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For
if they have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machins (as some would
have them) we cannot deny them to have some Reason. It seems as
evident to me, that they do some of them in certain Instances
reason, as that they have sence; but it is only in particular Ideas,
20 just as they receiv'd them from their Senses. They are the best of
them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think)
the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of Abstraction.

§ 12.

How far Idiots are concerned in the want or weakness of any,

or all of the foregoing Faculties, an exact observation of their
25 several ways of faltering, would no doubt discover. For those who
either perceive but dully, or retain the Ideas that come into their
Minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will
have little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish,
compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand, and
30 make use of Language, or judge, or reason to any tolerable degree:
but only a little, and imperfectly, about things present, and very
familiar to their Senses. And indeed, any of the forementioned
Faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in
Men's Understandings and Knowledge.

§ 13.

35 In fine, the defect in Naturals seems to proceed from want of

quickness, activity, and motion, in the intellectual Faculties, where-

...........................................................................................................................
pg 161
by they are deprived of Reason: Whereas mad Men, on the other
side, seem to suffer by the other Extreme. For they do not appear
to me to have lost the Faculty of Reasoning: but having joined
together some Ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths;
5 and they err as Men do, that argue right from wrong Principles.

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 For by the violence of their Imaginations, having taken their
Fancies for Realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus
you shall find a distracted Man fancying himself a King, with a
right inference, require suitable Attendance, Respect, and Obedi-
10 ence: Others who have thought themselves made of Glass, have
used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle Bodies. Hence it
comes to pass, that a Man, who is very sober, and of a right Under-
standing in all other things, may in one particular be as frantick, as
any in Bedlam; if either by any sudden very strong impression, or
15 long fixing his Fancy upon one sort of Thoughts, incoherent Ideas
have been cemented together so powerfully, as to remain united.
But there are degrees of Madness, as of Folly; the disorderly
jumbling Ideas together, is in some more, and some less. In short,
herein seems to lie the difference between Idiots and mad Men,
20 That mad Men put wrong Ideas together, and so make wrong
Propositions, but argue and reason right from them: But Idiots
make very few or no Propositions, and reason scarce at all.

§ 14.

These, I think, are the first Faculties and Operations of the

Mind, which it makes use of in Understanding; and though they are
25 exercised about all its Ideas in general; yet the Instances, I have
hitherto given, have been chiefly in simple Ideas; and I have sub-
joined the explication of these Faculties of the Mind, to that of
simple Ideas, before I come to what I have to say, concerning complex
ones, for these following Reasons:
30 First, Because several of these Faculties being exercised at first
principally about simple Ideas, we might, by following Nature in its
ordinary method, trace and discover them in their rise, progress,
and gradual improvements.

Secondly, Because observing the Faculties of the Mind, how they

35 operate about simple Ideas, which are usually in most Men's Minds

...........................................................................................................................
pg 162
much more clear, precise, and distinct, than complex ones, we may
the better examine and learn how the Mind abstracts, denominates,
compares, and exercises its other Operations, about those which are
complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake.

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5 Thirdly, Because these very Operations of the Mind about Ideas,
receiv'd from Sensation, are themselves, when reflected on, another
set of Ideas, derived from that other source of our Knowledge, which
I call Reflection; and therefore fit to be considered in this place,
after the simple Ideas of Sensation. Of Compounding, Comparing,
10 Abstracting, etc. I have but just spoken, having occasion to treat of
them more at large in other places.

§ 15.

And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true History of

the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge; whence the Mind has its
first Objects, and by what steps it makes its Progress to the laying
15 in, and storing up those Ideas, out of which is to be framed all the
Knowledge it is capable of; wherein I must appeal to Experience and
Observation, whether I am in the right: The best way to come to
Truth, being to examine Things as really they are, and not to
conclude they are, as we fancy of our selves, or have been taught by
20 others to imagine.

§ 16.

To deal truly, this is the only way, that I can discover,

whereby the Ideas of things are brought into the Understanding: If other
Men have either innate Ideas, or infused Principles, they have reason
to enjoy them; and if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to
25 deny them the privilege that they have above their Neighbours.
I can speak but of what I find in my self, and is agreeable to those
Notions; which, if we will examine the whole course of Men in their
several Ages, Countries, and Educations, seem to depend on these
foundations which I have laid, and to correspond with this Method,
30 in all the parts and degrees thereof.

§ 17.

I pretend not to teach, but to enquire; and therefore can-

not but confess here again, That external and internal Sensation,
are the only passages that I can find, of Knowledge, to the Under-
standing. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the Windows by

...........................................................................................................................
pg 163
which light is let into this dark Room. For, methinks, the Under-

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 standing is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from light, with
only some little openings left, to let in external visible Resem-
blances, or Ideas of things without; would the Pictures coming into
5 such a dark Room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found
upon occasion, it would very much resemble the Understanding of
a Man, in reference to all Objects of sight, and the Ideas of them.

These are my Guesses concerning the means whereby the Under-

standing comes to have, and retain simple Ideas, and the modes of
10 them, with some other operations about them. I proceed now to
examine some of these simple Ideas, and their Modes, a little more
particularly.

CHAPTER XII
Of Complex Ideas.

§ 1.

WE have hitherto considered those Ideas, in the reception

whereof, the Mind is only passive, which are those simple ones
15 received from Sensation and Reflection before-mentioned, whereof the
Mind cannot make any one to it self, nor have any Idea which does
not wholly consist of them. But as the Mind is wholly Passive in the
reception of all its simple Ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own,
whereby out of its simple Ideas, as the Materials and Foundations of
20 the rest, the other are framed. The Acts of the Mind wherein it ex-
erts its Power over its simple Ideas are chiefly these three, 1. Com-
bining several simple Ideas into one compound one, and thus all
Complex Ideas are made. 2. The 2d. is bringing two Ideas, whether
simple or complex, together; and setting them by one another, so
25 as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one;
by which way it gets all its Ideas of Relations. 3. The 3d. is separat-
ing them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real
existence; this is called Abstraction: And thus all its General Ideas
are made. This shews Man's Power and its way of Operation to be
30 muchwhat the same in the Material and Intellectual World. For the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 164
Materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to
make or destroy, all that Man can do is either to unite them
together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them.

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 I shall here begin with the first of these in the consideration of
5 Complex Ideas, and come to the other two in their due places. As
simple Ideas are observed to exist in several Combinations united
together; so the Mind has a power to consider several of them
united together, as one Idea; and that not only as they are united in
external Objects, but as it self has join'd them. Ideas thus made up of
10 several simple ones put together, I call Complex; such as are Beauty,
Gratitude, a Man, an Army, the Universe; which though complicated
of various simple Ideas, or complex Ideas made up of simple ones, yet
are, when the Mind pleases, considered each by it self, as one entire
thing, and signified by one name.

§ 2.

15 In this faculty of repeating and joining together its Ideas, the

Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its
Thoughts, infinitely beyond what Sensation or Reflection furnished it
with: But all this still confined to those simple Ideas, which it
received from those two Sources, and which are the ultimate
20 Materials of all its Compositions. For simple Ideas are all from things
themselves; and of these the Mind can have no more, nor other than
what are suggested to it. It can have no other Ideas of sensible
Qualities, than what come from without by the Senses; nor any
Ideas of other kind of Operations of a thinking Substance, than what
25 it finds in it self: but when it has once got these simple Ideas, it is not
confined barely to Observation, and what offers it self from without;
it can, by its own power, put together those Ideas it has, and make
new complex ones, which it never received so united.

§ 3.

Complex Ideas, however compounded and decompounded,

30 though their number be infinite, and the variety endless, where-
with they fill, and entertain the Thoughts of Men; yet, I think, they
may be all reduced under these three Heads.

1. Modes.

2. Substances.

35 3. Relations.

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 165
§ 4.

First, Modes I call such complex Ideas, which however com-

pounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by
themselves, but are considered as Dependences on, or Affections of
Substances; such are the Ideas signified by the Words Triangle,
5 Gratitude, Murther, etc. And if in this I use the word Mode, in some-
what a different sence from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon;
it being unavoidable in Discourses, differing from the ordinary
received Notions, either to make new Words, or to use old Words in
somewhat a new signification, the latter whereof, in our present
10 case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

§ 5.

Of these Modes, there are two sorts, which deserve distinct

consideration. First, There are some which are only variations, or
different combinations of the same simple Idea, without the mixture
of any other, as a dozen, or score; which are nothing but the Ideas
15 of so many distinct Unites added together, and these I call simple
Modes, as being contained within the bounds of one simple Idea.
Secondly, There are others compounded of simple Ideas of several
kinds, put together to make one complex one; v.g. Beauty, con-
sisting of a certain composition of Colour and Figure, causing
20 delight in the Beholder; Theft, which being the concealed change of
the possession of any thing, without the consent of the Proprietor,
contains, as is visible, a combination of several Ideas of several kinds;
and these I call mixed Modes.

§ 6.

Secondly, The Ideas of Substances are such combinations of

25 simple Ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things
subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed, or confused Idea
of Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to
Substance be joined the simple Idea of a certain dull whitish colour,
with certain degrees of Weight, Hardness, Ductility, and Fusi-
30 bility, we have the Idea of Lead; and a combination of the Ideas of a
certain sort of Figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and
Reasoning, joined to Substance, make the ordinary Idea of a Man.

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 Now of Substances also, there are two sorts of Ideas; one of single
Substances, as they exist separately, as of a Man, or a Sheep; the
35 other of several of those put together, as an Army of Men, or Flock
of Sheep; which collective Ideas of several Substances thus put

...........................................................................................................................
pg 166
together, are as much each of them one single Idea, as that of a
Man, or an Unite.

§ 7.

Thirdly, The last sort of complex Ideas, is that we call

Relation, which consists in the consideration and comparing one
5 Idea with another: Of these several kinds we shall treat in their
order.

§ 8.

If we will trace the progress of our Minds, and with atten-

tion observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple
Ideas received from Sensation or Reflection, it will lead us farther
10 than at first, perhaps, we should have imagined. And, I believe, we
shall find, if we warily observe the Originals of our Notions, that
even the most abstruse Ideas, how remote soever they may seem from
Sense, or from any operation of our own Minds, are yet only such,
as the Understanding frames to it self, by repeating and joining
15 together Ideas, that it had either from Objects of Sense, or from its
own operations about them: So that those even large and abstract
Ideas are derived from Sensation, or Reflection, being no other than what
the Mind, by the ordinary use of its own Faculties, employed about
Ideas, received from Objects of Sense, or from the Operations it
20 observes in it self about them, may, and does attain unto. This I
shall endeavour to shew in the Ideas we have of Space, Time, and
infinity, and some few other, that seem the most remote from those
Originals.

CHAPTER XIII
Of simple Modes; and first, of the simple Modes of Space.

§ 1.

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 THOUGH in the foregoing part, I have often mentioned simple
25 Ideas, which are truly the Materials of all our Knowledge; yet having
treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the
Mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will
not be, perhaps, amiss to take a view of some of them again under
this Consideration, and examine those different Modifications of the
30 same Idea; which the Mind either finds in things existing, or is able

...........................................................................................................................
pg 167
to make within it self, without the help of any extrinsical Object, or
any foreign Suggestion.

Those Modifications of any one simple Idea, (which, as has been said,
I call simple Modes) are as perfectly different and distinct Ideas in the
5 Mind, as those of the greatest distance or contrariety. For the Idea
of Two, is as distinct from that of One, as Blueness from Heat, or either
of them from any Number: and yet it is made up only of that simple
Idea of an Unite repeated; and Repetitions of this kind joined to-
gether, make those distinct simple Modes, of a Dozen, a Gross, a Million.

§ 2.

10 I shall begin with the simple Idea of Space. I have shewed above,
c.4. that we get the Idea of Space, both by our Sight, and Touch;
which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless, to go to
prove, that Men perceive, by their Sight, a distance between Bodies
of different Colours, or between the parts of the same Body; as that
15 they see Colours themselves: Nor is it less obvious, that they can
do so in the Dark by Feeling and Touch.

§ 3.

This Space considered barely in length between any two

Beings, without considering any thing else between them, is called
Distance: If considered in Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I think,
20 it may be called Capacity: The term Extension is usually applied to
it, in what manner soever considered.

§ 4.

Each different distance is a different Modification of Space,

and each Idea of any different distance, or Space, is a simple Mode of this

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 Idea. Men for the use, and by the custom of measuring, settle in
25 their Minds the Ideas of certain stated lengths, such as are an Inch,
Foot, Yard, Fathom, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, etc. which are so many
distinct Ideas made up only of Space. When any such stated lengths
or measures of Space are made familiar to Men's Thoughts, they

...........................................................................................................................
pg 168
can, in their Minds, repeat them as often as they will, without
mixing or joining to them the Idea of Body, or any thing else; and
frame to themselves the Ideas of long, square, or cubick, Feet, Yards,
or Fathoms, here amongst the Bodies of the Universe, or else beyond
5 the utmost Bounds of all Bodies; and by adding these still one to
another, enlarge their Idea of Space as much as they please. This
Power of repeating, or doubling any Idea we have of any distance,
and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever
able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we
10 will, is that, which gives us the Idea of Immensity.

§ 5.

There is another Modification of this Idea, which is nothing

but the Relation which the Parts of the Termination of Extension,
or circumscribed Space have amongst themselves. This the Touch
discovers in sensible Bodies, whose Extremities come within our
15 reach; and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours, whose
Boundaries are within its view: Where observing how the Extremi-
ties terminate, either in streight Lines, which meet at discernible
Angles; or in crooked Lines, wherein no Angles can be perceived,
by considering these as they relate to one another, in all Parts of the
20 Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that Idea we call Figure,
which affords to the Mind infinite Variety. For besides the vast
Number of different Figures, that do really exist in the coherent
masses of Matter, the Stock, that the Mind has in its Power, by
varying the Idea of Space; and thereby making still new Com-
25 positions, by repeating its own Ideas, and joining them as it pleases,
is perfectly inexhaustible: And so it can multiply Figures in
infinitum.

§ 6.

For the Mind, having a Power to repeat the Idea of any length

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 directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same Direction,
30 which is to double the length of that streight Line; or else join it to
another with what Inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort
of Angle it pleases: And being able also to shorten any Line it
imagines, by taking from it ½ or ¼, or what part it pleases, without
being able to come to an end of any such Divisions, it can make an

...........................................................................................................................
pg 169
Angle of any bigness: So also the Lines that are its sides, of what
length it pleases, which joining again to other Lines of different
lengths, and at different Angles, till it has wholly inclosed any
Space, it is evident that it can multiply Figures both in their Shape,
5 and Capacity, in infinitum, all which are but so many different
simple Modes of Space.

The same that it can do with streight Lines, it can do also with
crooked, or crooked and streight together; and the same it can do
in Lines, it can also in Superficies, by which we may be led into
10 farther Thoughts of the endless Variety of Figures, that the Mind
has a Power to make, and thereby to multiply the simple Modes of
Space.

§ 7.

Another Idea coming under this Head, and belonging to this

Tribe, is that we call Place. As in simple Space, we consider the
15 relation of Distance between any two Bodies, or Points; so in our
Idea of Place, we consider the relation of Distance betwixt any thing,
and any two or more Points, which are considered, as keeping the
same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest; for
when we find any thing at the same distance now, which it was
20 Yesterday from any two or more Points, which have not since
changed their distance one with another, and with which we then
compared it, we say it hath kept the same Place: But if it hath
sensibly altered its distance with either of those Points, we say it
hath changed its Place: Though vulgarly speaking in the common
25 Notion of Place, we do not always exactly observe the distance from
precise Points; but from larger Portions of sensible Objects, to
which we consider the thing placed to bear Relation, and its
distance from which we have some Reason to observe.

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 § 8.

Thus a Company of Chess-men, standing on the same squares

30 of the Chess-board, where we left them, we say they are all in the
same Place, or unmoved; though, perhaps, the Chess-board hath
been in the mean time carried out of one Room into another,
because we compared them only to the Parts of the Chess-board,
which keep the same distance one with another. The Chess-board,
35 we also say, is in the same Place it was, if it remain in the same part of
the Cabin, though, perhaps, the Ship which it is in, sails all the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 170
while: and the Ship is said to be in the same Place, supposing it kept
the same distance with the Parts of the neighbouring Land; though,
perhaps, the Earth hath turned round; and so both Chess-men, and
Board, and Ship, have every one changed Place in respect of remoter
5 Bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But
yet the distance from certain Parts of the Board, being that which
determines the Place of the Chess-men; and the distance from the
fixed parts of the Cabin (with which we made the Comparison)
being that which determined the Place of the Chess-board, and the
10 fixed parts of the Earth, that by which we determined the Place of
the Ship, these things may be said properly to be in the same Place,
in those respects: Though their distance from some other things,
which in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they have
undoubtedly changed Place in that respect; and we our selves shall
15 think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those
other.

§ 9.

But this Modification of Distance, we call Place, being made

by Men, for their common use, that by it they might be able to
design the particular Position of Things, where they had occasion
20 for such Designation, Men consider and determine of this Place,
by reference to those adjacent things, which best served to their
present Purpose, without considering other things, which to
another Purpose would better determine the Place of the same thing.
Thus in the Chess-board, the use of the Designation of the Place of
25 each Chess-man, being determined only within that chequer'd
piece of Wood, 'twould cross that Purpose, to measure it by any

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 thing else: But when these very Chess-men are put up in a Bag, if
any one should ask, where the black King is, it would be proper to
determine the Place by the parts of the Room it was in, and not by the
30 Chess-board; there being another use of designing the Place it is now
in, than when in Play it was on the Chess-board, and so must be
determined by other Bodies. So if any one should ask, in what Place
are the Verses, which report the Story of Nisus and Eurialus, 'twould
be very improper to determine this Place, by saying, they were in
35 such a part of the Earth, or in Bodley's Library: But the right
Designation of the place, would be by the parts of Virgil's Works;
and the proper Answer would be, That these Verses were about the
middle of the Ninth Book of his Æneids; And that they have been
always constantly in the same Place ever since Virgil was printed:
40 Which is true, though the Book it self hath moved a Thousand

...........................................................................................................................
pg 171
times, the use of the Idea of Place here, being to know only, in what
part of the Book that Story is; that so upon occasion, we may know
where to find it, and have recourse to it for our use.

§ 10.

That our Idea of Place, is nothing else, but such a relative

5 Position of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think, is plain,
and will be easily admitted, when we consider, that we can have
no Idea of the Place of the Universe, though we can of all the parts
of it; because beyond that, we have not the Idea of any fixed,
distinct, particular Beings, in reference to which, we can imagine it
10 to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform
Space or Expansion, wherein the Mind finds no variety, no marks.
For to say that the World is somewhere, means no more, than that
it does exist; this though a Phrase, borrowed from Place, signifying
only its Existence, not Location; and when one can find out, and
15 frame in his Mind clearly and distinctly the Place of the Universe,
he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the
undistinguishable Inane of infinite Space; though it be true, that the
Word Place, has sometimes a more confused Sense, and stands for
that Space, which any Body takes up; and so the Universe is in a
20 Place. The Idea therefore of Place, we have by the same means, that
we get the Idea of Space, (whereof this is but a particular limited
Consideration) viz. by our Sight and Touch; by either of which we

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 receive into our Minds the Ideas of Extension or Distance.

§ 11.

There are some that would persuade us, that Body and
25 Extension are the same thing; who either change the Signification of
Words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely
condemned the Philosophy of others, because it hath been too much
placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful
or insignificant Terms. If therefore they mean by Body and Extension
30 the same, that other People do, viz. by Body something that is solid,
and extended, whose parts are separable and movable different
ways; and by Extension, only the Space that lies between the
Extremities of those solid coherent Parts, and which is possessed by
them, they confound very different Ideas one with another. For I
35 appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the Idea of Space be

...........................................................................................................................
pg 172
not as distinct from that of Solidity, as it is from the Idea of Scarlet-
Colour? 'Tis true, Solidity cannot exist without Extension, neither
can Scarlet-Colour exist without Extension; but this hinders not,
but that they are distinct Ideas. Many Ideas require others as
5 necessary to their Existence or Conception, which yet are very
distinct Ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without
Space; and yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion: Space can
exist without it, and they are very distinct Ideas; and so, I think,
are those of Space and Solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an Idea
10 from Body, that upon that depends its filling of Space, its Contact,
Impulse, and Communication of Motion upon Impulse. And if it be
a Reason to prove, that Spirit is different from Body, because
Thinking includes not the Idea of Extension in it; the same Reason
will be as valid, I suppose, to prove, that Space is not Body, because it
15 includes not the Idea of Solidity in it; Space and Solidity being as
distinct Ideas, as Thinking and Extension, and as wholly separable in
the Mind one from another. Body then and Extension, 'tis evident,
are two distinct Ideas. For,

§ 12.

First, Extension includes no Solidity, nor resistance to the

20 Motion of Body, as Body does.

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 § 13.

Secondly, The Parts of pure Space are inseparable one from

the other; so that the Continuity cannot be separated, neither
really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part
of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in
25 Thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing
the parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before
there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the
Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and
consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be
30 done in things considered by the Mind, as capable of being sepa-
rated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct Superficies,
which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of these
ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, com-
patible to pure Space.

35 'Tis true, a Man may consider so much of such a Space, as is

answerable or commensurate to a Foot, without considering the
rest; which is indeed a partial Consideration, but not so much as
mental Separation, or Division; since a Man can no more mentally
divide, without considering two Superficies, separate one from the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 173
other, than he can actually divide, without making two Superficies
disjoin'd one from the other: But a partial consideration is not
separating. A Man may consider Light in the Sun, without its
Heat; or Mobility in Body without its Extension, without thinking
5 of their separation. One is only a partial Consideration, terminating
in one alone; and the other is a Consideration of both, as existing
separately.

§ 14.

Thirdly, The parts of pure Space, are immovable, which fol-

lows from their inseparability; Motion being nothing but change of
10 distance between any two things: But this cannot be between
Parts that are inseparable; which therefore must needs be at
perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the determined Idea of simple Space distinguishes it plainly,

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 and sufficiently from Body; since its Parts are inseparable, im-
15 movable, and without resistance to the Motion of Body.

§ 15.

If any one ask me, What this Space, I speak of, is? I will tell
him, when he tells me what his Extension is. For to say, as is usually
done, That Extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only,
That Extension is Extension: For what am I the better informed in the
20 nature of Extension, when I am told, That Extension is to have parts that
are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i.e. Extension consists of
extended Parts? As if one asking, What a Fibre was; I should answer
him, That it was a thing made up of several Fibres: Would he
hereby be enabled to understand what a Fibre was, better than he
25 did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think, that my
design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to in-
struct him?

§ 16.

Those who contend that Space and Body are the same, bring
this Dilemma. Either this Space is something or nothing; if nothing be
30 between two Bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to
be something, they ask, whether it be Body or Spirit? To which I
answer by another Question, Who told them, that there was, or
could be nothing, but solid Beings, which could not think; and
thinking Beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean
35 by the terms Body and Spirit.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 174
§ 17.

If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this Space void of

Body, be Substance or Accident, I shall readily answer, I know not: nor
shall be ashamed to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, shew me
a clear distinct Idea of Substance.

§ 18.

5 I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver my self from those

Fallacies, which we are apt to put upon our selves, by taking Words

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 for Things. It helps not our Ignorance, to feign a Knowledge, where
we have none, by making a noise with Sounds, without clear and
distinct Significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the
10 nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are
signs of, and stand for determined Ideas. And I desire those who lay
so much stress on the sound of these two Syllables, Substance, to
consider, whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incompre-
hensible GOD, to finite Spirit, and to Body, it be in the same sense;
15 and whether it stands for the same Idea, when each of those three so
different Beings are called Substances? If so, whether it will not thence
follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agreeing in the same common
nature of Substance, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different
modification of that Substance; as a Tree and a Pebble, being in the
20 same sense Body, and agreeing in the common nature of Body,
differ only in a bare modification of that common matter; which will
be a very harsh Doctrine. If they say, That they apply it to God,
finite Spirits, and Matter, in three different significations, and that
it stands for one Idea, when GOD is said to be a Substance; for another,
25 when the Soul is called Substance; and for a third, when a Body is
called so. If the name Substance, stands for three several distinct
Ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct Ideas, or at
least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so im-
portant a Notion, the Confusion and Errors, that will naturally
30 follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so
far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use
it has scarce one clear distinct signification: And if they can thus
make three distinct Ideas of Substance, what hinders, why another
may not make a fourth?

...........................................................................................................................
pg 175
§ 19.

They who first ran into the Notion of Accidents, as a sort of

real Beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find
out the word Substance, to support them. Had the poor Indian
Philosopher (who imagined that the Earth also wanted something
5 to bear it up) but thought of this word Substance, he needed not to
have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to support it, and a
Tortoise to support his Elephant: The word Substance would have
done it effectually. And he that enquired, might have taken it for as

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 good an Answer from an Indian Philosopher, That Substance, without
10 knowing what it is, is that which supports the Earth, as we take
it for a sufficient Answer, and good Doctrine, from our European
Philosophers, That Substance without knowing what it is, is that
which supports Accidents. So that of Substance, we have no Idea of
what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

§ 20.

15 Whatever a learned Man may do here, an intelligent

American, who enquired into the Nature of Things, would scarce
take it for a satisfactory Account, if desiring to learn our Archi-
tecture, he should be told, That a Pillar was a thing supported by a
Basis, and a Basis something that supported a Pillar. Would he not
20 think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as
this? And a Stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in
the nature of Books, and the things they contained, if he should be
told, that all learned Books consisted of Paper and Letters, and that
Letters were things inhering in Paper, and Paper a thing that held
25 forth Letters; a notable way of having clear Ideas of Letters and
Paper. But were the Latin words Inhærentia and Substantia, put into
the plain English ones that answer them, and were called Sticking on,
and Under-propping, they would better discover to us the very great
clearness there is in the Doctrine of Substance and Accidents, and
30 shew of what use they are in deciding of Questions in Philosophy.

§ 21.

But to return to our Idea of Space. If Body be not supposed

infinite, which, I think, no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether, if
God placed a Man at the extremity of corporeal Beings, he could not
stretch his Hand beyond his Body? If he could, then he would put

...........................................................................................................................
pg 176
his Arm, where there was before Space without Body; and if there he
spread his Fingers, there would still be Space between them without
Body: If he could not stretch out his Hand, it must be because of
some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a
5 power of moving the parts of his Body, that he hath now, which is
not in it self impossible, if God so pleased to have it; or at least it is
not impossible for God so to move him:) And then I ask, Whether

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 that which hinders his Hand from moving outwards, be Substance
or Accident, Something or Nothing? And when they have resolved
10 that, they will be able to resolve themselves, what that is, which is
or may be between two Bodies at a distance, that is not Body, has
no Solidity. In the mean time, the Argument is at least as good,
That where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmost bounds of all
Bodies) a Body put into motion may move on, as where there is
15 nothing between, there two Bodies must necessarily touch. For
pure Space between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of
mutual Contact; but bare Space in the way, is not sufficient to stop
Motion. The truth is, these Men must either own, that they think
Body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm,
20 that Space is not Body. For I would fain meet with that thinking
Man, that can, in his Thoughts, set any bounds to Space, more than
he can to Duration; or by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of
either: And therefore if his Idea of Eternity be infinite, so is his Idea
of Immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

§ 21. [bis].

25 Farther, those who assert the impossibility of Space

existing without Matter, must not only make Body infinite, but
must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of Matter. No
one, I suppose, will deny, that God can put an end to all motion
that is in Matter, and fix all the Bodies of the Universe in a perfect
30 quiet and rest, and continue them so as long as he pleases. Whoever
then will allow, that God can, during such a general rest, annihilate
either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, must necessarily
admit the possibility of a Vacuum. For it is evident, that the Space,
that was filled by the parts of the annihilated Body, will still remain,
35 and be a Space without Body. For the circumambient Bodies being
in perfect rest, are a Wall of Adamant, and in that state make it a

...........................................................................................................................
pg 177
perfect impossibility for any other Body to get into that Space. And
indeed the necessary motion of one Particle of Matter, into the
place from whence another Particle of Matter is removed, is but a
consequence from the supposition of Plenitude; which will there-
5 fore need some better proof, than a supposed matter of fact, which
Experiment can never make out; our own clear and distinct Ideas
plainly satisfying us, that there is no necessary connexion between

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 Space and Solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other.
And those who dispute for or against a Vacuum, do thereby confess,
10 they have distinct Ideas of Vacuum and Plenum, i.e. that they have an
Idea of Extension void of Solidity, though they deny its existence;
or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much
alter the signification of Words, as to call Extension Body, and con-
sequently make the whole Essence of Body, to be nothing but pure
15 Extension without Solidity, must talk absurdly, whenever they
speak of Vacuum, since it is impossible for Extension to be without
Extension. For Vacuum, whether we affirm or deny its existence,
signifies Space without Body, whose very existence no one can deny
to be possible, who will not make Matter infinite, and take from
20 God a power to annihilate any Particle of it.

§ 22.

But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of Body

in the Universe, nor appeal to God's Omnipotency to find a Vacuum,
the motion of Bodies, that are in our view and neighbourhood, seem
to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid
25 Body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the
solid Parts to move up and down freely every way within the
bounds of that Superficies, if there be not left in it a void space, as
big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid Body.
And if where the least Particle of the Body divided, is as big as a
30 Mustard-seed, a void Space equal to the bulk of a Mustard-seed, be
requisite to make room for the free motion of the Parts of the
divided Body within the bounds of its Superficies, where the
Particles of Matter are 100,000,000 less than a Mustard-seed, there
must also be a space void of solid Matter, as big as 100,000,000 part
35 of a Mustard-seed; for if it holds in one, it will hold in the other,
and so on in infinitum. And let this void Space be as little as it will, it

...........................................................................................................................
pg 178
destroys the Hypothesis of Plenitude. For if there can be a Space
void of Body, equal to the smallest separate Particle of Matter now
existing in Nature, 'tis still Space without Body; and makes as great
a difference between Space and Body, as if it were Μέγα χάσμα,
5 a distance as wide as any in Nature. And therefore if we suppose not
the void Space necessary to Motion, equal to the least parcel of the
divided solid Matter, but to or of it, the same consequence

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 will always follow of Space without Matter.

§ 23.

But the Question being here, whether the Idea of Space or

10 Extension, be the same with the Idea of Body, it is not necessary to prove
the real existence of a Vacuum, but the Idea of it; which 'tis plain
Men have, when they enquire and dispute, whether there be a
Vacuum or no? For if they had not the Idea of Space without Body,
they could not make a question about its existence: And if their
15 Idea of Body did not include in it something more than the bare Idea
of Space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the
World; and 'twould be as absurd to demand, whether there were
Space without Body, as whether there were Space without Space, or
Body without Body, since these were but different Names of the
20 same Idea.

§ 24.

'Tis true, the Idea of Extension joins it self so inseparably with

all visible, and most tangible Qualities, that it suffers us to see no
one, or feel very few external Objects, without taking in impressions
of Extension too. This readiness of Extension to make it self be
25 taken notice of so constantly with other Ideas, has been the occasion,
I guess, that some have made the whole essence of Body, to consist
in Extension; which is not much to be wond'red at, since some have
had their Minds, by their Eyes and Touch, (the busiest of all our
Senses) so filled with the Idea of Extension, and as it were wholly
30 possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing, that
had not Extension. I shall not now argue with those Men, who take
the measure and possibility of all Being, only from their narrow and
gross Imaginations: but having here to do only with those, who
conclude the essence of Body to be Extension, because, they say, they
35 cannot imagine any sensible Quality of any Body without Exten-
sion, I shall desire them to consider, That had they reflected on
their Ideas of Tastes and Smells, as much as on those of Sight and
Touch; nay, had they examined their Ideas of Hunger and Thirst,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 179
and several other Pains, they would have found, that they included
in them no Idea of Extension at all, which is but an affection of

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 Body, as well as the rest discoverable by our Senses, which are scarce
acute enough to look into the pure Essences of Things.

§ 25.

5 If those Ideas, which are constantly joined to all others, must

therefore be concluded to be the Essence of those Things, which
have constantly those Ideas joined to them, and are inseparable
from them; then Unity is without doubt the essence of every thing.
For there is not any Object of Sensation or Reflection, which does
10 not carry with it the Idea of one: But the weakness of this kind of
Argument, we have already shewn sufficiently.

§ 26.

To conclude, whatever Men shall think concerning the

existence of a Vacuum, this is plain to me, That we have as clear an
Idea of Space distinct from Solidity, as we have of Solidity distinct from
15 Motion, or Motion from Space. We have not any two more distinct
Ideas, and we can as easily conceive space without Solidity, as we
can conceive Body or Space without Motion, though it be never so
certain, that neither Body nor Motion can exist without Space. But
whether any one will take Space to be only a relation resulting from
20 the Existence of other Beings at a distance; or whether they will
think the Words of the most knowing King Solomon, The Heaven, and
the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee;* or those more emphatical
ones of the inspired Philosopher St. Paul, In Him we live, move, and
have our Being,** are to be understood in a literal sence, I leave every
25 one to consider; only our Idea of Space is, I think, such as I have
mentioned, and distinct from that of Body. For whether we con-
sider in Matter it self, the distance of its coherent solid parts, and
call it, in respect of those solid parts, Extension; or whether con-
sidering it, as lying between the extremities of any Body in its
30 several dimensions, we call it Length, Breadth, and Thickness; or else
considering it as lying between any two Bodies, or positive Beings,
without any consideration, whether there be any Matter or no
between, we call it Distance. However named or considered, it is
always the same uniform simple Idea of Space, taken from Objects,
35 about which our Senses have been conversant, whereof having

...........................................................................................................................
pg 180

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 setled Ideas in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one
to another as often as we will, and consider the Space or Distance so
imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another Body
cannot come there, without displacing and thrusting out the Body
5 that was there before; or else as void of Solidity, so that a Body of
equal dimensions to that empty or pure Space, may be placed in it
without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there. But
to avoid Confusion in Discourses concerning this Matter, it were
possibly to be wished that the Name Extension were applied only
10 to Matter, or the distance of the Extremities of particular Bodies,
and the Term Expansion to Space in general, with or without solid
Matter possessing it, so as to say Space is expanded, and Body extended.
But in this every one has his liberty; I propose it only for the more
clear and distinct way of speaking.

§ 27.

15 The knowing precisely what our Words stand for, would, I

imagine, in this, as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the
dispute. For I am apt to think, that Men, when they come to
examine them, find their simple Ideas all generally to agree, though
in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another
20 with different Names. I imagine, that Men who abstract their
Thoughts, and do well examine the Ideas of their own Minds,
cannot much differ in thinking; however, they may perplex themselves
with words, according to the way of speaking of the several
Schools, or Sects, they have been bred up in: Though amongst un-
25 thinking Men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their
own Ideas, and strip them not from the marks Men use for them, but
confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrang-
ling, and jargon; especially if they be learned bookish Men, devoted
to some Sect, and accustomed to the Language of it; and have
30 learned to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two
thinking Men should really have different Ideas, I do not see how
they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be
mistaken, to think that every floating Imagination in Men's Brains,
is presently of that sort of Ideas I speak of. 'Tis not easie for the
35 Mind to put off those confused Notions and Prejudices it has
imbibed from Custom, Inadvertency, and common Conversation:

...........................................................................................................................
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 it requires pains and assiduity to examine its Ideas, till it resolves
them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they
are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have
or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon
5 another: Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions
of Things, he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles, and
will often find himself at a loss.

CHAPTER XIV
Of Duration, and its simple Modes.

§ 1.

THERE is another sort of Distance, or Length, the Idea

whereof we get not from the permanent parts of Space, but from
10 the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of Succession. This we
call Duration, the simple Modes whereof are any different lengths of
it, whereof we have distinct Ideas, as Hours, Days, Years, etc. Time,
and Eternity.

§ 2.

The Answer of a great Man, to one who asked what Time

15 was Si non rogas intelligo,* (which amounts to this; the more I set my
self to think of it, the less I understand it;) might perhaps perswade
one, That Time, which reveals all other things, is it self not to be
discovered. Duration, Time, and Eternity, are, not without reason,
thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But
20 however remote these may seem from our Comprehension, yet if
we trace them right to their Originals, I doubt not but one of those
Sources of all our Knowledge, viz. Sensation and Reflection, will be
able to furnish us with these Ideas, as clear and distinct as many
other, which are thought much less obscure; and we shall find, that
25 the Idea of Eternity it self is derived from the same common Original
with the rest of our Ideas.

§ 3.

To understand Time and Eternity aright, we ought with

attention to consider what Idea it is we have of Duration, and how

...........................................................................................................................

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 pg 182
we came by it. 'Tis evident to any one who will but observe what
passes in his own Mind, that there is a train of Ideas, which con-
stantly succeed one another in his Understanding, as long as he is
awake. Reflection on these appearances of several Ideas one after
5 another in our Minds, is that which furnishes us with the Idea of
Succession: And the distance between any parts of that Succession, or
between the appearance of any two Ideas in our Minds, is that we
call Duration. For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive
successively several Ideas in our Minds, we know that we do exist;
10 and so we call the Existence, or the Continuation of the Existence of
our selves, or any thing else, Commensurate to the succession of any
Ideas in our Minds, the Duration of our selves, or any such other
thing co-existing with our Thinking.

§ 4.

That we have our notion of Succession and Duration from this

15 Original, viz. from Reflection on the train of Ideas, which we find to
appear one after another in our own Minds, seems plain to me, in
that we have no perception of Duration, but by considering the
train of Ideas, that take their turns in our Understandings. When
that succession of Ideas ceases, our perception of Duration ceases
20 with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he
sleeps soundly, whether an hour, or a day; a month, or a year; of
which Duration of things, whilst he sleeps, or thinks not, he has no
perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment
wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think
25 again, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not but it
would be to a waking Man, if it were possible for him to keep only
one Idea in his Mind, without variation, and the succession of
others: And we see, that one who fixes his Thoughts very intently
on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the succession of Ideas
30 that pass in his Mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest
Contemplation, lets slip out of his Account a good part of that
Duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But if sleep
commonly unites the distant parts of Duration, it is, because during
that time we have no Succession of Ideas in our Minds. For if a Man,
35 during his Sleep, dreams, and variety of Ideas make themselves
perceptible in his Mind one after another, he hath then, during such
a dreaming, a Sense of Duration, and of the length of it. By which it is

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 to me very clear, that Men derive their Ideas of Duration, from their

...........................................................................................................................
pg 183
Reflection on the train of the Ideas, they observe to succeed one
another in their own Understandings, without which Observation
they can have no Notion of Duration, whatever may happen in the
World.

§ 5.

5 Indeed a Man having from reflecting on the Succession and

Number of his own Thoughts, got the Notion or Idea of Duration,
he can apply that Notion to things, which exist while he does not
think; as he, that has got the Idea of Extension from Bodies by his
Sight or Touch, can apply it to distances, where no Body is seen or
10 felt. And therefore, though a Man has no Perception of the length
of Duration, which past whilst he slept or thought not: yet having
observed the Revolution of Days and Nights, and found the length
of their Duration to be in Appearance regular and constant, he can,
upon the supposition, that that Revolution has proceeded after the
15 same manner, whilst he was asleep or thought not, as it used to do
at other times, he can, I say, imagine and make allowance for the
length of Duration, whilst he slept. But if Adam and Eve (when they
were alone in the World) instead of their ordinary Nights Sleep,
had passed the whole 24 hours in one continued Sleep, the Duration
20 of that 24 hours had been irrecoverably lost to them, and been for
ever left out of their Account of time.

§ 6.

Thus by reflecting on the appearing of various Ideas, one after

another in our Understandings, we get the Notion of Succession; which if
any one should think, we did rather get from our Observation of
25 Motion by our Senses, he will, perhaps, be of my Mind, when he
considers, that even Motion produces in his Mind an Idea of
Succession, no otherwise than as it produces there a continued
train of distinguishable Ideas. For a Man looking upon a Body really
moving, perceives yet no Motion at all, unless that Motion produces
30 a constant train of successive Ideas. v.g. a Man becalmed at Sea, out of
sight of Land, in a fair Day, may look on the Sun, or Sea, or Ship,
a whole hour together, and perceive no Motion at all in either;

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 though it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them, have
moved, during that time, a great way: But as soon as he perceives
35 either of them to have changed distance with some other Body, as

...........................................................................................................................
pg 184
soon as this Motion produces any new Idea in him, then he per-
ceives, that there has been Motion. But where-ever a Man is, with
all things at rest about him, without perceiving any Motion at all;
if during this hour of quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive
5 the various Ideas of his own Thoughts in his own Mind, appearing
one after another, and thereby observe and find Succession, where
he could observe no Motion.

§ 7.

And this, I think, is the Reason, why Motions very slow, though
they are constant, are not perceived by us; because in their remove
10 from one sensible part towards another, their change of distance is
so slow, that it causes no new Ideas in us, but a good while one after
another: And so not causing a constant train of new Ideas, to follow
one another immediately in our Minds, we have no Perception of
Motion; which consisting in a constant Succession, we cannot
15 perceive that Succession, without a constant Succession of varying
Ideas arising from it.

§ 8.

On the contrary, things that move so swift, as not to affect the

Senses distinctly with several distinguishable distances of their
Motion, and so cause not any train of Ideas in the Mind, are not also
20 perceived to move. For any thing, that moves round about in a Circle,
in less time than our Ideas are wont to succeed one another in our
Minds, is not perceived to move; but seems to be a perfect, entire
Circle of that Matter, or Colour, and not a part of a Circle in
Motion.

§ 9.

25 Hence I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not

probable that our Ideas do, whilst we are awake, succeed one
another in our Minds at certain distances, not much unlike the
Images in the inside of a Lanthorn, turned round by the Heat of a

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 Candle. This Appearance of theirs in train, though, perhaps, it may
30 be sometimes faster, and sometimes slower; yet, I guess, varies not
very much in a waking Man: There seem to be certain Bounds to the
quickness and slowness of the Succession of those Ideas one to another in
our Minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten.

§ 10.

The Reason I have for this odd conjecture is, from observ-
35 ing that in the Impressions made upon any of our Senses, we can but
to a certain degree perceive any Succession; which if exceeding
quick, the Sense of Succession is lost, even in Cases where it is

...........................................................................................................................
pg 185
evident, that there is a real Succession. Let a Cannon-Bullet pass
through a Room, and in its way take with it any Limb, or fleshy
Parts of a Man; 'tis as clear as any Demonstration can be, that it
must strike successively the two sides of the Room: 'Tis also evi-
5 dent, that it must touch one part of the Flesh first, and another
after; and so in Succession: And yet I believe, no Body, who ever
felt the pain of such a shot, or heard the blow against the two
distant Walls, could perceive any Succession, either in the pain, or
sound of so swift a stroke. Such a part of Duration as this, wherein
10 we perceive no Succession, is that which we may call an Instant; and
is that which takes up the time of only one Idea in our Minds, without the
Succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succession
at all.

§ 11.

This also happens, where the Motion is so slow, as not to

15 supply a constant train of fresh Ideas to the Senses, as fast as the
Mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and so other Ideas of
our own Thoughts, having room to come into our Minds, between
those offered to our Senses by the moving Body, there the Sense of
Motion is lost; and the Body, though it really moves, yet not chang-
20 ing perceivable distance with some other Bodies, as fast as the Ideas
of our own Minds do naturally follow one another in train, the
thing seems to stand still, as is evident in the Hands of Clocks, and
Shadows of Sun-dials, and other constant, but slow Motions, where
though after certain Intervals, we perceive by the change of dis-

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25 tance, that it hath moved, yet the Motion it self we perceive not.

§ 12.

So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular Succession

of Ideas in a waking Man, is, as it were, the Measure and Standard of
all other Successions, whereof if any one either exceeds the pace of our
Ideas; as where two sounds or pains, etc. take up in their Succession
30 the Duration of but one Idea; or else where any Motion or Succession
is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the Ideas in our Minds, or
the quickness, in which they take their turns; as when any one, or
more Ideas in their ordinary course come into our Mind between
those, which are offered to the sight, by the different perceptible
35 distances of a Body in Motion, or between Sounds, or Smells,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 186
following one another, there also the Sense of a constant continued
Succession is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of
rest between.

§ 13.

If it be so, that the Ideas of our Minds, whilst we have any

5 there, do constantly change, and shift in a continual Succession, it
would be impossible, may any one say, for a Man to think long of
any one thing: By which if it be meant, that a Man may have one
self-same single Idea a long time alone in his Mind, without any variation at
all, I think, in matter of Fact it is not possible, for which (not knowing
10 how the Ideas of our Minds are framed, of what Materials they are
made, whence they have their Light, and how they come to make
their Appearances,) I can give no other Reason but Experience: and
I would have any one try, whether he can keep one unvaried single
Idea in his Mind, without any other, for any considerable time
15 together.

§ 14.

For Trial, let him take any Figure, any Degree of Light or
Whiteness, or what other he pleases; and he will, I suppose, find it
difficult to keep all other Ideas out of his Mind: But that some, either
of another kind, or various Consideration of that Idea (each of
20 which Considerations is a new Idea) will constantly succeed one

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 another in his Thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§ 15.

All that is in a Man's Power in this Case, I think, is only to

mind and observe what the Ideas are, that take their turns in his Un-
derstanding; or else, to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a
25 desire or use of: but hinder the constant Succession of fresh ones, I
think he cannot, though he may commonly chuse, whether he will
heedfully observe and consider them.

§ 16.

Whether these several Ideas in a Man's Mind be made by

certain Motions, I will not here dispute: But this I am sure, that
30 they include no Idea of Motion in their Appearance; and if a Man had
not the Idea of Motion otherwise, I think he would have none at all,
which is enough to my present Purpose; and sufficiently shews, that
the notice we take of the Ideas of our own Minds, appearing there
one after another, is that, which gives us the Idea of Succession and
35 Duration, without which we should have no such Ideas at all. 'Tis
not then, Motion, but the constant train of Ideas in our Minds, whilst

...........................................................................................................................
pg 187
we are waking, that furnishes us with the Idea of Duration, whereof
Motion no otherwise gives us any Perception, than as it causes in
our Minds a constant Succession of Ideas, as I have before shewed:
and we have as clear an Idea of Succession, and Duration by the train
5 of other Ideas succeeding one another in our Minds, without the
Idea of any Motion, as by the train of Ideas caused by the uninter-
rupted sensible change of distance between two Bodies, which we
have from Motion; and therefore we should as well have the Idea of
Duration, were there no Sense of Motion at all.

§ 17.

10 Having thus got the Idea of Duration, the next thing natural
for the Mind to do, is to get some measure of this common Duration,
whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and consider the
distinct Order, wherein several things exist, without which a great
part of our Knowledge would be confused, and a great part of
15 History be rendered very useless. This Consideration of Duration,

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 as set out by certain Periods, and marked by certain Measures or
Epochs, is that, I think, which most properly we call Time.

§ 18.

In the measuring of Extension, there is nothing more re-

quired, but the Application of the Standard or Measure we make
20 use of, to the thing of whose Extension we would be informed. But
in the measuring of Duration, this cannot be done, because no two
different parts of Succession can be put together to measure one
another: And nothing being a measure of Duration, but Duration; as
nothing is of Extension, but Extension, we cannot keep by us any
25 standing unvarying measure of Duration, which consists in a
constant fleeting Succession, as we can of certain lengths of Ex-
tension, as Inches, Feet, Yards, etc. marked out in permanent parcels
of Matter. Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure
of Time, but what has divided the whole length of its Duration into
30 apparently equal Portions, by constantly repeated Periods. What
Portions of Duration are not distinguished, or considered as dis-
tinguished and measured by such Periods, come not so properly
under the Notion of Time, as appears by such Phrases as these, viz.
before all time, and when time shall be no more.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 188
§ 19.

The diurnal, and annual Revolutions of the Sun, as having been

from the beginning of Nature, constant, regular, and universally
observable by all Mankind, and supposed equal to one another, have
been with Reason made use of for the measure of Duration. But the
5 distinction of Days and Years, having depended on the motion
of the Sun, it has brought this mistake with it, that it has been
thought, that Motion and Duration were the measure one of
another. For Men in the measuring of the length of time, having been
accustomed to the Ideas of Minutes, Hours, Days, Months, Years,
10 etc. which they found themselves upon any mention of Time or
Duration presently to think on, all which Portions of Time, were
measured out by the motion of those heavenly Bodies, they were apt
to confound time and motion; or at least to think, that they had
a necessary Connexion one with another: whereas any constant

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15 periodical Appearance, or Alteration of Ideas in seemingly equi-
distant Spaces of Duration, if constant and universally observable,
would have as well distinguished the intervals of Time, as those
that have been made use of. For supposing the Sun, which some
have taken to be a Fire, had been lighted up at the same distance of
20 time that it now every Day comes about to the same Meridian, and
then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the Space
of an annual Revolution, it had sensibly increased in Brightness and
Heat, and so decreased again; would not such regular Appearances
serve to measure out the distances of Duration to all that could
25 observe it, as well without as with Motion? For if the Appearances
were constant, universally observable, and in equidistant Periods,
they would serve Mankind for measure of time as well, were the
Motion away.

§ 20.

For the freezing of Water, or the blowing of a Plant,

30 returning at equidistant Periods in all parts of the Earth, would as
well serve Men to reckon their Years by, as the Motions of the Sun:
and in effect we see, that some People in America counted their Years
by the coming of certain Birds amongst them at their certain
Seasons, and leaving them at others. For a Fit of an Ague; the Sense

...........................................................................................................................
pg 189
of Hunger, or Thirst; a Smell, or a Taste; or any other Idea return-
ing constantly at equidistant Periods, and making it self universally
be taken notice of, would not fail to measure out the course of Succes-
sion, and distinguish the distances of Time. Thus we see that Men
5 born blind, count Time well enough by Years, whose Revolutions
yet they cannot distinguish by Motions, that they perceive not:
And I ask, whether a blind Man, who distinguished his Years, either
by heat of Summer, or cold of Winter; by the Smell of any Flower of
the Spring, or taste of any Fruit of the Autumn, would not have a
10 better measure of Time, than the Romans had before the Refor-
mation of their Calendar by Julius Cæsar, or many other People,
whose Years, notwithstanding the motion of the Sun, which they
pretend to make use of, are very irregular: and it adds no small
difficulty to Chronology, that the exact lengths of the Years that
15 several Nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing
very much one from another, and, I think, I may say all of them,

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 from the precise motion of the Sun: and if the Sun moved from the
Creation to the Flood constantly in the Æquator, and so equally
dispersed its light and heat to all the habitable Parts of the Earth, in
20 Days all of the same length, without its annual variations to the
Tropicks, as a late ingenious Author supposes, I do not think it very
easie to imagine, that (notwithstanding the motion of the Sun)
Men should in the Antediluvian World, from the beginning count
by years, or measure their time by Periods that had no sensible
25 marks very obvious to distinguish them by.

§ 21.

But, perhaps, it will be said without a regular Motion, such

as of the Sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such
Periods were equal? To which I answer, the Equality of any other
returning appearances might be known by the same way, that that
30 of Days was known, or presumed to be so at first, which was only
by judging of them by the train of Ideas had passed in Men's Minds
in the Intervals, by which train of Ideas discovering inequality in the
natural days, but none in the artificial days, the artificial days, or
Νυχθήμϵρα were guessed to be equal, which was sufficient to make

...........................................................................................................................
pg 190
them serve for a measure: tho' exacter search has since discovered
inequality in the diurnal Revolutions of the Sun, and we know not
whether the Annual also be not unequal: These yet by their pre-
sum'd and apparent Equality, serve as well to reckon time by,
5 (though not to measure the parts of Duration exactly) as if they
could be proved to be exactly equal. We must therefore carefully
distinguish betwixt Duration it self, and the measures we make use
of to judge of its length. Duration in it self is to be considered, as
going on in one constant, equal, uniform Course: but none of the
10 measures of it, which we make use of, can be known to do so; nor
can we be assured, that their assigned Parts or Periods are equal in
Duration one to another; for two successive lengths of Duration,
however measured, can never be demonstrated to be equal. The
Motion of the Sun, which the World used so long, and so confidently
15 for an exact measure of Duration, has, as I said, been found in its
several parts unequal: and though Men have of late made use of a
Pendulum, as a more steady and regular Motion, than that of the
Sun or (to speak more truly) of the Earth; yet if any one should be

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 asked how he certainly knows, that the two successive swings of a
20 Pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to satisfie himself, that
they are infallibly so: since we cannot be sure, that the Cause of
that Motion which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally;
and we are sure, that the Medium in which the Pendulum moves, is
not constantly the same: either of which varying, may alter the
25 Equality of such Periods, and thereby destroy the certainty and
exactness of the measure by Motion, as well as any other Periods of
other Appearances, the Notion of Duration still remaining clear,
though our measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to
be exact. Since then no two Portions of Succession can be brought
30 together, it is impossible ever certainly to know their Equality.
All that we can do for a measure of Time, is to take such as
have continual successive Appearances at seemingly equidistant
Periods; of which seeming Equality, we have no other measure, but
such as the train of our own Ideas have lodged in our Memories, with
35 the concurrence of other probable Reasons, to perswade us of their
Equality.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 191
§ 22.

One thing seems strange to me, that whilst all Men mani-
festly measured Time by the motion of the great and visible Bodies
of the World, Time yet should be defined to be the measure of Motion:
whereas 'tis obvious to every one, who reflects ever so little on it,
5 that, to measure Motion, Space is as necessary to be considered as
Time; and those who look a little farther, will find also the bulk of
the thing moved necessary to be taken into the Computation, by
any one who will estimate or measure Motion, so as to judge right
of it. Nor, indeed, does Motion any otherwise conduce to the
10 measuring of Duration, than as it constantly brings about the
return of certain sensible Ideas, in seeming equidistant Periods. For
if the Motion of the Sun, were as unequal as of a Ship driven by
unsteady Winds, sometimes very slow, and at others, irregularly
very swift; or if being constantly equally swift, it yet was not
15 circular, and produced not the same Appearances, it would not at
all help us to measure time, any more than the seeming unequal
motion of a Comet does.

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 § 23.

Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years, are then no more necessary to

Time or Duration, than Inches, Feet, Yards, and Miles, marked out
20 in any Matter, are to Extension. For though we in this part of the
Universe, by the constant use of them, as of Periods set out by the
Revolutions of the Sun, or as known parts of such Periods, have
fixed the Ideas of such Lengths of Duration in our Minds, which we
apply to all parts of Time, whose Lengths we would consider; yet
25 there may be other parts of the Universe, where they no more use
these measures of ours, than in Japan they do our Inches, Feet, or
Miles: but yet something Analogous to them, there must be. For
without some regular periodical returns, we could not measure our
selves, or signifie to others, the length of any Duration, though at
30 the same time the World were as full of Motion, as it is now, but no
part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant Revo-
lutions. But the different measures that may be made use of for the
account of Time, do not at all alter the notion of Duration, which is
the thing to be measured, no more than the different standards of a

...........................................................................................................................
pg 192
Foot, and a Cubit alter the notion of Extension, to those, who make
use of those different Measures.

§ 24.

The Mind having once got such a measure of Time, as the

annual Revolution of the Sun, can apply that measure to Duration,
5 wherein that measure it self did not exist, and with which in the
reality of its being, it had nothing to do: For should one say, That
Abraham was born in the 2712 year of the Julian Period, it is alto-
gether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the World,
though there were so far back no motion of the Sun, nor any other
10 motion at all. For though the Julian Period be supposed to begin
several hundred years, before there were really either Days, Nights,
or Years, marked out by any Revolutions of the Sun, yet we reckon
as right, and thereby measure Durations as well, as if really at that
time the Sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary motion it
15 doth now. The Idea of Duration equal to an annual Revolution of the Sun,
is as easily applicable in our Thoughts to Duration, where no Sun nor
Motion was, as the Idea of a Foot or Yard taken from Bodies here, can

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 be applied in our Thoughts to Distances, beyond the Confines of
the World, where are no Bodies at all.

§ 25.

20 For supposing it were 5639 Miles, or millions of Miles,

from this place to the remotest Body of the Universe, (for being
finite, it must be at a certain distance,) as we suppose it to be 5639
years, from this time to the first existence of any Body in the
beginning of the World, we can, in our Thoughts, apply this measure of
25 a Year to Duration before the Creation, or beyond the Duration of
Bodies or Motion, as we can this measure of a Mile to Space beyond
the utmost Bodies; and by the one measure Duration, where there
was no Motion, as well as by the other measure Space in our
Thoughts, where there is no Body.

§ 26.

30 If it be objected to me here, That in this way of explaining

of Time, I have beg'd what I should not, viz. That the World is
neither eternal, nor infinite; I answer, That to my present purpose,
it is not needful, in this place, to make use of Arguments, to evince
the World to be finite, both in Duration and Extension: But it
35 being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 193
liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the
contrary; and I doubt not but that every one that will go about it,
may easily conceive in his Mind the beginning of Motion, though not of all
Duration; and so may come to a stop, and non ultra in his Consider-
5 ation of Motion: so also in his Thoughts he may set limits to Body,
and the Extension belonging to it, but not to Space where no Body
is, the utmost bounds of Space and Duration being beyond the
reach of Thought, as well as the utmost bounds of Number are
beyond the largest comprehension of the Mind, and all for the same
10 reason, as we shall see in another place.

§ 27.

By the same means therefore, and from the same Original

that we come to have the Idea of Time, we have also that Idea which
we call Eternity; viz. having got the Idea of Succession and Duration,

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 be reflecting on the Train of our own Ideas, caused in us either by
15 the natural appearances of those Ideas coming constantly of them-
selves into our waking Thoughts, or else caused by external Objects
successively affecting our Senses; and having from the Revolutions
of the Sun got the Ideas of certain lengths of Duration, we can, in our
Thoughts, add such lengths of Duration to one another, as often
20 as we please, and apply them, so added, to Durations past or to
come: And this we can continue to do on, without bounds or limits,
and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual
motion of the Sun to Duration, supposed before the Sun's, or any
other Motion had its being; which is no more difficult or absurd,
25 than to apply the Notion I have of the moving of a Shadow, one
Hour to day upon the Sun-dial, to the Duration of something last
night; v.g. The burning of a Candle, which is now absolutely
separate from all actual motion, and it is as impossible for the Dura-
tion of that Flame for an hour last Night, to co-exist with any
30 Motion that now is, or forever shall be, as for any part of Duration,
that was before the beginning of the World, to co-exist with the
motion of the Sun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the
Idea of the length of the Motion of the Shadow on a Dial between
the Marks of two Hours, I can as distinctly measure in my Thoughts
35 the Duration of that Candle-light last night, as I can the Duration
of any thing, that does now exist: And it is no more than to think,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 194
that had the Sun shone then on the Dial, and moved after the same
rate it doth now, the shadow on the Dial would have passed from
one Hour-line to another, whilst that Flame of the Candle lasted.

§ 28.

The notion of an Hour, Day, or Year, being only the Idea I

5 have of the length of certain periodical regular Motions, neither of
which Motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the Ideas I have
of them in my Memory derived from my Senses or Reflection, I can
with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply it in my Thoughts
to Duration antecedent to all manner of Motion, as well as to any
10 thing, that is but a Minute, or a Day, antecedent to the Motion,
that at this very moment the Sun is in. All things past are equally
and perfectly at rest; and to this way of consideration of them, are
all one, whether they were before the beginning of the World,

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 or but yesterday; the measuring of any Duration by some motion,
15 depending not at all on the real co-existence of that thing to that
motion, or any other Periods of Revolution, but the having a clear
Idea of the length of some periodical known Motion, or other intervals
of Duration in my Mind, and applying that to the Duration of the thing
I would measure.

§ 29.

20 Hence we see, that some Men imagine the Duration of the

World from its first existence, to this present year 1689. to have been
5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual Revolutions of the Sun, and
others a great deal more; as the Ægyptians of old, who in the time of
Alexander counted 23000 years, from the Reign of the Sun; and the
25 Chineses now, who account the World 3,269,000 years old, or more;
which longer duration of the World, according to their Computa-
tion, though I should not believe to be true, yet I can equally
imagine it with them, and as truly understand, and say one is
longer than the other, as I understand, that Methusalem's life was
30 longer than Enoch's: And if the common reckoning of 5639 should
be true, (as it may be, as well as any other assigned,) it hinders not
at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the World
1000 years older, since every one may with the same Facility
imagine ( I do not say believe) the World to be 50000 years old,
35 as 5639; and may as well conceive the duration of 50000 years,
as 5639. Whereby it appears, that to the measuring the duration of
any thing by Time, it is not requisite, that that thing should be

...........................................................................................................................
pg 195
co-existent to the Motion we measure by, or any other periodical
Revolution; but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the Idea of the
length of any regular periodical Appearances, which we can in our Minds
apply to Duration, with which the Motion or Appearance never
5 co-existed.

§ 30.

For as in the History of the Creation delivered by Moses,

I can imagine that Light existed three days before the Sun was, or
had any motion, barely by thinking, that the duration of Light
before the Sun was created, was so long as (if the Sun had moved

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10 then, as it doth now,) would have been equal to three of his diurnal
Revolutions; so by the same way I can have an Idea of the Chaos, or
Angels, being created before there was either Light, or any con-
tinued motion, a Minute, an Hour, a Day, a Year, or 1000 Years.
For if I can but consider Duration equal to one Minute, before either
15 the Being or Motion of any Body, I can add one Minute more till I
come to 60; And by the same way of adding Minutes, Hours, or
Years, (i.e. such or such parts of the Sun's revolution, or any other
period whereof I have the Idea,) proceed in infinitum, and suppose a
duration exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add
20 whilst I will, which I think is the notion we have of Eternity, of
whose infinity we have no other notion, than we have of the infinity
of Number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§ 31.

And thus I think it is plain, that from those two Fountains

of all Knowledge before mentioned, (viz.) Reflection and Sensation, we
25 get the Ideas of Duration, and the measures of it.

For First, By observing what passes in our Minds, how our Ideas
there in train constantly some vanish, and others begin to appear,
we come by the Idea of Succession.

Secondly, By observing a distance in the parts of this Succession,

30 we get the Idea of Duration.

Thirdly, By Sensation observing certain appearances, at certain

regular and seeming equidistant periods, we get the Ideas of certain
Lengths or Measures of Duration, as Minutes, Hours, Days, Years,
etc.

35 Fourthly, By being able to repeat those Measures of Time, or

Ideas of stated length of Duration in our Minds, as often as we will,
we can come to imagine Duration, where nothing does really endure or

...........................................................................................................................
pg 196
exist; and thus we imagine to morrow, next year, or seven years
hence.

Fifthly, By being able to repeat any such Idea of any length of

Time, as of a Minute, a Year, or an Age, as often as we will in our

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5 own Thoughts, and add them one to another, without ever coming
to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of
Number, to which we can always add, we come by the Idea of
Eternity, as the future eternal Duration of our Souls, as well as the
Eternity of that infinite Being, which must necessarily have always
10 existed.

Sixthly, By considering any part of infinite Duration, as set out by

periodical Measures, we come by the Idea of what we call Time in
general.

CHAPTER XV
Of Duration and Expansion, considered together.

§ 1.

THOUGH we have in the precedent Chapters dwelt pretty

15 long on the Considerations of Space and Duration; yet they being
Ideas of general concernment, that have something very abstruse
and peculiar in their Nature, the comparing them one with another
may, perhaps, be of use for their illustration; and we may have the
more clear and distinct conception of them, by taking a view of
20 them together. Distance or Space, in its simple abstract conception,
to avoid confusion, I call Expansion, to distinguish it from Extension,
which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the
solid parts of Matter, and so includes, or at least intimates the Idea
of Body: Whereas the Idea of pure Distance includes no such thing.
25 I prefer also the Word Expansion to Space, because Space is often
applied to Distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist
together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these,
(viz.)Expansion and Duration, the Mind has this common Idea of
continued Lengths, capable of greater, or less quantities: For a
30 Man has as clear an Idea of the difference of the length of an Hour,
and a Day, as of an Inch and a Foot.

§ 2.

The Mind, having got the Idea of the length of any part of
Expansion, let it be a Span, or a Pace, or what length you will, can, as

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 has been said, repeat that Idea; and so adding it to the former,
enlarge its Idea of Length, and make it equal to two Spans, or two
Paces, and so as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts
of the Earth one from another, and increase thus, till it amounts to
5 the distance of the Sun, or remotest Star. By such a progression as
this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can
proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to stop
its going on, either in, or without Body. 'Tis true, we can easily in
our Thoughts come to the end of solid Extension; the extremity
10 and bounds of all Body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: But when
the Mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this
endless Expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end.
Nor let any one say, That beyond the bounds of Body, there is
nothing at all, unless he will confine GOD within the limits of
15 Matter. Solomon, whose Understanding was filled and enlarged with
Wisdom, seems to have other Thoughts, when he says, Heaven, and
the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee.* And he, I think, very much
magnifies to himself the Capacity of his own Understanding, who
persuades himself, that he can extend his Thoughts farther than
20 GOD exists, or imagine any Expansion where he is not.

§ 3.

Just so is it in Duration. The Mind having got the Idea of any

length of Duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond
its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal Beings, and all the
measures of Time, taken from the great Bodies of the World, and
25 their Motions. But yet every one easily admits, That though we
make Duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it
beyond all being. GOD, every one easily allows, fills Eternity; and
'tis hard to find a Reason, why any one should doubt, that he like-
wise fills Immensity: His infinite Being is certainly as boundless
30 one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to
Matter, to say, where there is no Body, there is nothing.

§ 4.

Hence, I think, we may learn the Reason, why every one

familiarly, and without the least hesitation, speaks of, and sup-
poses Eternity, and sticks not to ascribe Infinity to Duration; but 'tis
35 with more doubting and reserve, that many admit, or suppose the

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 198
Infinity of Space. The reason whereof seems to me to be this, That
Duration and Extension being used as names of affections belonging
to other Beings, we easily conceive in GOD infinite Duration, and we
cannot avoid doing so: but not attributing to him Extension, but
5 only to Matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence
of Expansion without Matter; of which alone we commonly
suppose it an Attribute. And therefore when Men pursue their
Thoughts of Space, they are apt to stop at the confines of Body: as
if Space were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or if
10 their Ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term
what is beyond the limits of the Universe, imaginary Space: as if it
were nothing, because there is no Body existing in it. Whereas
Duration, antecedent to all Body, and to the motions, which it is
measured by, they never term imaginary: because it is never
15 supposed void of some other real existence. And if the names of
things may at all direct our Thoughts towards the Originals of
Mens Ideas, (as I am apt to think they may very much,) one may
have occasion to think by the name Duration, that the continuation
of Existence, with a kind of Resistance to any destructive force, and
20 the continuation of Solidity, (which is apt to be confounded with,
and if we will look into the minute atomical parts of Matter, is little
different from Hardness,) were thought to have some Analogy, and
gave occasion to Words, so near of kin as Durare and Durum esse. And
that durare is applied to the Idea of Hardness, as well as that of
25 Existence we see in Horace, Epod. 16.ferro duravit sæcula. But be that
as it will, this is certain, That whoever pursues his own Thoughts,
will find them sometimes lanch out beyond the extent of Body, into
the Infinity of Space or Expansion; the Idea whereof is distinct and
separate from Body, and all other things: which may (to those who
30 please) be a subject of farther meditation.

§ 5.

Time in general is to Duration, as Place to Expansion. They are

so much of those boundless Oceans of Eternity and Immensity, as is
set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by Land-marks;
and so are made use of, to denote the Position of finite real Beings, in
35 respect one to another, in those uniform infinite Oceans of Duration
and Space. These rightly considered, are nothing but Ideas of deter-

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 pg 199
minate Distances, from certain known points fixed in distinguish-
able sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one
from another. From such points fixed in sensible Beings we reckon,
and from them we measure out Portions of those infinite Quantities;
5 which so considered, are that which we call Time and Place. For
Duration and Space being in themselves uniform and boundless,
the Order and Position of things, without such known setled Points,
would be lost in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an
incurable Confusion.

§ 6.

10 Time and Place taken thus, for determinate distinguishable

Portions of those infinite Abysses of Space and Duration, set out, or
supposed to be distinguished from the rest, by marks, and known
Boundaries, have each of them a two-fold Acceptation.

First, Time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite

15 Duration, as is measured out by, and co-existent with the Existence,
and Motions of the great Bodies of the Universe, as far as we know
any thing of them: and in this Sense, Time begins and ends with the
frame of this sensible World, as in these Phrases before mentioned,
before all time, or when time shall be no more. Place likewise is taken
20 sometimes for that Portion of infinite Space, which is possessed by,
and comprehended within the Material World; and is thereby
distinguished from the rest of Expansion; though this may more
properly be called Extension, than Place. Within these two are
confined, and by the observable Parts of them are measured and
25 determined the particular Time or Duration, and the particular
Extension and Place, of all corporeal Beings.

§ 7.

Secondly, Sometimes the word Time is used in a larger sense,

and is applied to Parts of that infinite Duration, not that were really
distinguished and measured out by this real Existence, and periodi-
30 cal Motions of Bodies that were appointed from the Beginning to be
for Signs, and for Seasons, and for Days, and Years,* and are accord-
ingly our measures of time; but such other portions too of that
infinite uniform Duration, which we upon any occasion do suppose

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 pg 200
equal to certain lengths of measured Time; and so consider them as
bounded and determined. For if we should suppose the Creation,
or Fall of the Angels, was at the Beginning of the Julian Period, we
should speak properly enough, and should be understood, if we
5 said, 'tis a longer time since the Creation of Angels, than the Creation
of the World, by 764 years : Whereby we would mark out so much
of that undistinguished Duration, as we suppose equal to, and
would have admitted, 764 annual Revolutions of the Sun, moving
at the rate it now does. And thus likewise, we sometimes speak of
10 Place, Distance, or Bulk in the great Inane beyond the Confines of
the World, when we consider so much of that Space, as is equal
to, or capable to receive a Body of any assigned Dimensions, as a
Cubick-foot; or do suppose a Point in it, at such a certain distance
from any part of the Universe.

§ 8.

15 Where and when are Questions belonging to all finite Exis-

tences, and are by us always reckoned from some known Parts of
this sensible World, and from some certain Epochs marked out to us
by the Motions observable in it. Without some such fixed Parts or
Periods, the Order of things would be lost, to our finite Under-
20 standings, in the boundless invariable Oceans of Duration and
Expansion; which comprehend in them all finite Beings, and in their
full Extent, belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to
wonder, that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our
Thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them, either abstractly
25 in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incompre-
hensible Being. But when applied to any particular finite Beings,
the Extension of any Body is so much of that infinite Space, as the
bulk of that Body takes up. And Place is the Position of any Body,
when considered at a certain distance from some other. As the Idea
30 of the particular Duration of any thing, is an Idea of that Portion of
infinite Duration, which passes during the Existence of that thing;
so the time when the thing existed, is the Idea of that Space of
Duration, which passed between some known and fixed Period of
Duration, and the Being of that thing. One shews the distance of the
35 Extremities of the Bulk, or Existence of the same thing, as that it is
a Foot Square, or lasted two Years; the other shews the distance of

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 pg 201
it in Place, or Existence from other fixed points of Space or Duration;
as that it was in the middle of Lincolns-Inn-Fields, or the first degree
of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord, 1671. or the 1000 year of the
Julian Period: All which distances, we measure by preconceived
5 Ideas of certain lengths of Space and Duration, as Inches, Feet,
Miles, and Degrees, and in the other Minutes, Days, and Years, etc.

§ 9.

There is one thing more, wherein Space and Duration have a

great Conformity, and that is, though they are justly reckoned
amongst our simple Ideas: Yet none of the distinct Ideas we have of
10 either is without all manner of Composition, it is the very nature of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 202
both of them to consist of Parts: But their Parts being all of the
same kind, and without the mixture of any other Idea, hinder them
not from having a Place amongst simple Ideas. Could the Mind, as
in Number, come to so small a part of Extension or Duration, as
5 excluded Divisibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible
Unite, or Idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more
inlarged Ideas of Extension and Duration. But since the Mind is not
able to frame an Idea of any Space, without Parts; instead thereof it
makes use of the common Measures, which by familiar use, in each
10 Country, have imprinted themselves on the Memory (as Inches, and
Feet; or Cubits, and Parasangs; and so Seconds, Minutes, Hours,
Days, and Years in Duration:) The Mind makes use, I say, of such
Ideas as these, as simple ones: and these are the component Parts of
larger Ideas, which the Mind, upon Occasion, makes by the addition
15 of such known Lengths, which it is acquainted with. On the other
side, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either, is look'd on as
an Unite in Number, when the Mind by division would reduce them
into less Fractions. Though on both sides, both in addition and
division, either of Space or Duration, when the Idea under Consider-
20 ation becomes very big, or very small, its precise Bulk becomes very
obscure and confused; and it is the Number of its repeated additions,
or divisions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily
appear to any one, who will let his Thoughts loose in the vast
Expansion of Space, or Divisibility of Matter. Every part of Dura-
25 tion is Duration too; and every part of Extension is Extension, both

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 of them capable of addition or division in infinitum. But the least
Portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and distinct Ideas,
may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple Ideas of
that kind, out of which our complex modes of Space, Extension, and
30 Duration, are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly

...........................................................................................................................
pg 203
resolved. Such a small part in Duration, may be called a Moment,
and is the time of one Idea in our Minds, in the train of their
ordinary Succession there. The other, wanting a proper Name, I
know not whether I may be allowed to call a sensible Point, meaning
5 thereby the least Particle of Matter or Space we can discern, which
is ordinarily about a Minute, and to the sharpest eyes seldom less
than thirty Seconds of a Circle, whereof the Eye is the centre.

§ 10.

Expansion, and Duration have this farther Agreement, that

though they are both considered by us as having Parts; yet their
10 Parts are not separable one from another, no not even in Thought:
Though the parts of Bodies, from whence we take our measure of
the one; and the parts of Motion, or rather the succession of Ideas
in our Minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may
be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by Rest, and the
15 other is by Sleep, which we call rest too.

§ 11.

But yet there is this manifest difference between them, That

the Ideas of Length, which we have of Expansion, are turned every way,
and so make Figure, and Breadth, and Thickness; but Duration is but
as it were the length of one streight Line, extended in infinitum, not
20 capable of Multiplicity, Variation, or Figure; but is one common
measure of all Existence whatsoever, wherein all things whilst they
exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all
things, that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part
of their Existence, as much as if they were all but one single Being;
25 and we may truly say, they all exist in the same moment of Time.
Whether Angels and Spirits have any Analogy to this, in respect of
Expansion, is beyond my Comprehension: and, perhaps, for us, who
have Understandings and Comprehensions, suited to our own

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 Preservation, and the ends of our own Being, but not to the reality
30 and extent of all other Beings, 'tis near as hard to conceive any
Existence, or to have an Idea of any real Being, with a perfect
Negation of all manner of Expansion; as it is, to have the Idea of any
real Existence, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Duration:
And therefore what Spirits have to do with Space, or how they
35 communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that Bodies
do each singly possess its proper Portion of it, according to the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 204
extent of its solid Parts; and thereby exclude all other Bodies from
having any share in that particular portion of Space, whilst it
remains there.

§ 12.

Duration, and Time which is a part of it, is the Idea we have

5 of perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each
other in Succession; as Expansion is the Idea of lasting distance, all
whose parts exist together, and are not capable of Succession. And
therefore though we cannot conceive any Duration without
Succession, nor can put it together in our Thoughts, that any Being
10 does now exist to Morrow, or possess at once more than the present
moment of Duration; yet we can conceive the eternal Duration of
the Almighty far different from that of Man, or any other finite
Being. Because Man comprehends not in his Knowledge, or Power,
all past and future things: His Thoughts are but of yesterday, and
15 he knows not what to morrow will bring forth.* What is once passed,
he can never recal; and what is yet to come, he cannot make present.
What I say of Man, I say of all finite Beings, who though they may
far exceed Man in Knowledge and Power, yet are no more than
the meanest Creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite of
20 any Magnitude, holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite
Duration being accompanied with infinite Knowledge, and infinite
Power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more
distant from his Knowledge, no farther removed from his sight, than
the present: They all lie under the same view: And there is
25 nothing, which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases. For
the Existence of all things, depending upon his good Pleasure; all
things exist every moment, that he thinks fit to have them exist.
To conclude, Expansion and Duration do mutually imbrace, and

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 comprehend each other; every part of Space, being in every part of
30 Duration; and every part of Duration, in every part of Expansion.
Such a Combination of two distinct Ideas, is, I suppose, scarce to be
found in all that great Variety, we do or can conceive, and may
afford Matter to farther Speculation.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 205
CHAPTER XVI
Of Number.

§ 1.

AMONGST all the Ideas we have, as there is none suggested to

the Mind by more ways, so there is none more simple, than that of
Unity, or One: it has no shadow of Variety or Composition in it:
every Object our Senses are employed about; every Idea in our
5 Understandings; every Thought of our Minds brings this Idea
along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our Thoughts,
as well as it is, in its Agreement to all other things, the most uni-
versal Idea we have. For Number applies it self to Men, Angels,
Actions, Thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be
10 imagined.

§ 2.

By repeating this Idea in our Minds, and adding the Repe-

titions together, we come by the complex Ideas of the Modes of it.
Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex Idea of a Couple;
by putting twelve Unites together, we have the complex Idea of a
15 dozen; and so of a Score, or a Million, or any other Number.

§ 3.

The simple modes of Number are of all other the most distinct; every
the least Variation, which is an unite, making each Combination, as
clearly different from that, which approacheth nearest to it, as the
most remote; two being as distinct from one, as Two hundred; and
20 the Idea of Two, as distinct from the Idea of Three, as the Magni-
tude of the whole Earth, is from that of a Mite. This is not so in
other simple Modes, in which it is not so easie, nor, perhaps, possible

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 for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching Ideas, which yet are
really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between
25 the white of this Paper, and that of the next degree to it: Or can
form distinct Ideas of every the least excess in Extension?

§ 4.

The Clearness and Distinctness of each mode of Number from all

others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think,
that Demonstrations in Numbers, if they are not more evident and
30 exact, than in Extension, yet they are more general in their use, and

...........................................................................................................................
pg 206
more determinate in their Application. Because the Ideas of Numbers
are more precise, and distinguishable than in Extension; where
every Equality and Excess are not so easie to be observed, or
measured; because our Thoughts cannot in Space arrive at any
5 determined smallness beyond which it cannot go, as an Unite; and
therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least Excess cannot
be discovered, which is clear otherwise in Number, where, as has
been said, 91 is as distinguishable from 90, as from 9000, though 91
be the next immediate Excess to 90. But it is not so in Extension,
10 where whatsoever is more than just a Foot, or an Inch, is not
distinguishable from the Standard of a Foot, or an Inch; and in
Lines which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than
the other by innumerable Parts: Nor can any one assign an Angle,
which shall be the next biggest to a right one.

§ 5.

15 By the repeating, as has been said, of the Idea of an Unite, and

joining it to another Unite, we make thereof one collective Idea,
marked by the Name Two. And whosoever can do this, and proceed
on, still adding one more to the last collective Idea, which he had of
any Number, and give a Name to it, may count, or have Ideas for
20 several Collections of Unites, distinguished one from another, as far
as he hath a Series of Names for following Numbers, and a Memory
to retain that Series, with their several Names: All Numeration
being but still the adding of one Unite more, and giving to the whole
together, as comprehended in one Idea, a new or distinct Name or
25 Sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, and distin-

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 guish it from every smaller or greater multitude of Unites. So that
he, that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his
Tale, taking still with him the distinct Names belonging to every
Progression; and so again by substracting an Unite from each
30 Collection retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the Ideas of
Numbers, within the compass of his Language, or for which he
hath names, though not, perhaps, of more. For the several simple
Modes of Numbers, being in our Minds, but so many Combina-
tions of Unites, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other
35 difference, but more or less, Names or Marks for each distinct
Combination, seem more necessary, than in any other sort of Ideas.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 207
For without such Names or Marks, we can hardly well make use of
Numbers in reckoning, especially where the Combination is made
up of any great multitude of Unites, which put together without a
Name or Mark, to distinguish that precise Collection, will hardly
5 be kept from being a heap in Confusion.

§ 6.

This, I think, to be the reason why some Americans, I have

spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational Parts
enough,) could not, as we do, by any means count to 1000; nor had
any distinct Idea of that Number, though they could reckon very
10 well to 20. Because their Language being scanty, and accommodated
only to the few necessaries of a needy simple Life, unacquainted
either with Trade or Mathematicks, had no Words in it to stand
for 1000; so that when they were discoursed with of those greater
Numbers, they would shew the Hairs of their Head, to express a
15 great multitude, which they could not number; which inability, I
suppose, proceeded from their want of Names. The Tououpinambos
had no Names for Numbers above 5; any Number beyond that,
they made out by shewing their Fingers, and the Fingers of others
who were present [(α)]: And I doubt not but we our selves might
20 distinctly number in Words, a great deal farther than we usually do,
would we find out but some fit denominations to signifie them by;
whereas in the way we take now to name them by Millions of
Millions of Millions, etc. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at most
four and twenty decimal Progressions, without confusion. But to
25 shew how much distinct Names conduce to our well reckoning, or having

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 useful Ideas of Numbers, let us set all these following Figures in one
continued Line, as the Marks of one Number: v.g.

Nonilions. Octilions. Septilions. Sextilions. Quintilions. Quatrilions. Trilions.

Bilions. Milions. Unites.
857324. 162486. 345896. 437916. 423147. 248106. 235421. 261734.
368149. 623137.

30 The ordinary way of naming this Number in English, will be the

often repeating of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of
Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, (which is the denom-
ination of the second six Figures.) In which way, it will be very hard

...........................................................................................................................
pg 208
to have any distinguishing Notions of this Number: But whether,
by giving every six Figures a new and orderly denomination, these,
and perhaps a great many more Figures, in progression, might not
easily be counted distinctly, and Ideas of them both got more easily
5 to our selves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be
considered. This I mention only to shew how necessary distinct
Names are to Numbering, without pretending to introduce new
ones of my invention.

§ 7.

Thus Children, either for want of Names to mark the

10 several Progressions of Numbers, or not having yet the faculty to
collect scattered Ideas into complex ones, and range them in a
regular Order, and so retain them in their Memories, as is necessary
to reckoning, do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it
very far or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished
15 with good store of other Ideas; and one may often observe them
discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of
several other things, before they can tell 20. And some, through the
default of their Memories, who cannot retain the several Combina-
tions of Numbers, with their Names annexed in their distinct
20 orders, and the dependence of so long a train of numeral Pro-
gressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their
life-time, to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate Series of
Numbers. For he that will count Twenty, or have any Idea of that
Number, must know that Nineteen went before, with the distinct

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25 Name or Sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their
order; for where-ever this fails, a gap is made, the Chain breaks,
and the Progress in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon
right, it is required, 1. That the Mind distinguish carefully two Ideas,
which are different one from another only by the addition or
30 subtraction of one Unite. 2. That it retain in Memory the Names,
or Marks, of the several Combinations from an Unite to that
Number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact
order, that the Numbers follow one another: in either of which, if
it trips, the whole business of Numbering will be disturbed, and
35 there will remain only the confused Idea of multitude, but the Ideas
necessary to distinct numeration, will not be attained to.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 209
§ 8.

This farther is observable in Number, That it is that, which

the Mind makes use of in measuring all things, that by us are measur-
able, which principally are Expansion and Duration; and our Idea of
Infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing, but the
5 Infinity of Number. For what else are our Ideas of Eternity and
Immensity, but the repeated additions of certain Ideas of imagined
parts of Duration, and Expansion with the Infinity of Number, in
which we can come to no end of Addition? For such an inexhaustible
stock, Number, of all other our Ideas, most clearly furnishes us with,
10 as is obvious to every one. For let a Man collect into one Sum, as
great a Number as he pleases, this Multitude, how great soever,
lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any
nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of Number, where still
there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And
15 this endless addition or addibility (if any one like the word better) of
Numbers, so apparent to the Mind, is that, I think, which gives us
the clearest and most distinct Idea of Infinity: of which more in the
following Chapter.

CHAPTER XVII
Of Infinity.

§ 1.

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 HE that would know what kind of Idea it is to which we give
20 the name of Infinity, cannot do it better, than by considering to
what Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed, and
then how the Mind comes to frame it.

Finite, and Infinite, seem to me to be looked upon by the Mind,

as the Modes of Quantity, and to be attributed primarily in their first
25 designation only to those things, which have parts, and are
capable of increase or diminution, by the addition or subtraction of
any the least part: and such are the Ideas of Space, Duration, and
Number, which we have considered in the foregoing Chapters.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 210
'Tis true, that we cannot but be assured, That the Great GOD, of
whom, and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly Infinite:
but yet, when we apply to that first and supreme Being, our Idea of
Infinite, in our weak and narrow Thoughts, we do it primarily in
5 respect of his Duration and Ubiquity; and, I think, more figura-
tively to his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, and other Attributes,
which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, etc. For
when we call them Infinite, we have no other Idea of this Infinity,
but what carries with it some reflection on, and intimation of that
10 Number or Extent of the Acts or Objects of God's Power, Wisdom,
and Goodness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many,
which these Attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us
multiply them in our Thoughts, as far as we can, with all the
infinity of endless number. I do not pretend to say how these
15 Attributes are in GOD, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our
narrow Capacities: They do, without doubt, contain in them all
possible perfection: but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them,
and these our Ideas of their Infinity.

§ 2.

Finite then, and Infinite, being by the Mind look'd on as

20 modifications of Expansion and Duration, the next thing to be
considered is, How the Mind comes by them. As for the Idea of Finite,
there is no great difficulty. The obvious portions of Extension, that
affect our Senses, carry with them into the Mind the Idea of Finite:
and the ordinary periods of Succession, whereby we measure Time
25 and Duration, as Hours, Days, and Years, are bounded Lengths.

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 The difficulty is, how we come by those boundless Ideas of Eternity
and Immensity, since the Objects, which we converse with, come so
much short of any approach or proportion to that Largeness.

§ 3.

Every one, that has any Idea of any stated lengths of Space,
30 as a Foot, finds, that he can repeat that Idea; and joining it to the
former, make the Idea of two Foot; and by the addition of a third,
three Foot; and so on, without ever coming to an end of his
additions, whether of the same Idea of a Foot, or if he pleases of
doubling it, or any other Idea he has of any length, as a Mile, or

...........................................................................................................................
pg 211
Diameter of the Earth, or of the Orbis Magnus: for whichsoever of
these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise
multiplies it, he finds, that after he has continued this doubling in
his Thoughts, and enlarged his Idea, as much as he pleases, he has
5 no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such
Addition, than he was at first setting out; the power of enlarging
his Idea of Space by farther Additions, remaining still the same, he
hence takes the Idea of infinite Space.

§ 4.

This, I think, is the way, whereby the Mind gets the Idea of
10 infinite Space. 'Tis a quite different Consideration to examine, whether
the Mind has the Idea of such a boundless Space actually existing, since
our Ideas are not always Proofs of the Existence of Things; but yet,
since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are
apt to think, that Space in it self is actually boundless, to which
15 Imagination, the Idea of Space or Expansion of it self naturally leads
us. For it being considered by us, either as the Extension of Body,
or as existing by it self, without any solid Matter taking it up, (for
of such a void Space, we have not only the Idea, but I have proved,
as I think, from the Motion of Body, its necessary existence,) it is
20 impossible the Mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end
of it, or be stopp'd any where in its progress in this Space, how far
soever it extends its Thoughts. Any Bounds made with Body, even
Adamantine Walls, are so far from putting a stop to the Mind in its
farther progress in Space and Extension, that it rather facilitates and

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25 enlarges it: For so far as that Body reaches, so far no one can doubt of
Extension; and when we are come to the utmost extremity of Body,
what is there, that can there put a stop, and satisfie the Mind, that it
is at the end of Space, when it perceives it is not; nay, when it is
satisfied that Body it self can move into it? For if it be necessary for
30 the motion of Body, that there should be an empty Space, though
never so little, here amongst Bodies; and it be possible for Body to
move in or through that empty Space; nay, it is impossible for any
particle of Matter to move but into an empty Space, the same
possibility of a Body's moving into a void Space, beyond the utmost
35 Bounds of Body, as well as into a void Space interspersed amongst

...........................................................................................................................
pg 212
Bodies, will always remain clear and evident, the Idea of empty pure
Space, whether within, or beyond the confines of all Bodies, being
exactly the same, differing not in Nature, though in Bulk; and there
being nothing to hinder Body from moving into it: So that where-
5 ever the Mind places it self by any thought, either amongst, or
remote from all Bodies, it can, in this uniform Idea of Space, no-
where find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude
it by the very Nature and Idea of each part of it, to be actually
infinite.

§ 5.

10 As, by the power we find in our selves of repeating, as often

as we will, any Idea of Space, we get the idea of Immensity; so, by
being able to repeat the Idea of any length of Duration, we have in
our Minds, with all the endless addition of Number, we come by the
Idea of Eternity. For we find in our selves, we can no more come to an
15 end of such repeated Ideas, than we can come to the end of Number,
which every one perceives he cannot. But here again 'tis another
question, quite different from our having an Idea of Eternity, to
know whether there were any real Being, whose Duration has been
eternal. And as to this I say, He that considers something now
20 existing, must necessarily come to something eternal. But having
spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but
proceed on to some other Considerations of our Idea of Infinity.

§ 6.

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 If it be so, that our Idea of Infinity be got from the Power, we
observe in our selves, of repeating without end our own Ideas; It
25 may be demanded, Why we do not attribute Infinity to other Ideas, as
well as those of Space and Duration; since they may be as easily, and as
often repeated in our Minds as the other; and yet no body ever
thinks of infinite sweetness, or infinite whiteness, though he can
repeat the Idea of Sweet or White, as frequently as those of a Yard,
30 or a Day? To which I answer, All the Ideas, that are considered as
having parts, and are capable of increase by the addition of any
equal or less parts, afford us by their repetition the Idea of Infinity;
because with this endless repetition, there is continued an enlarge-
ment, of which there can be no end. But in other Ideas it is not so;
35 for to the largest Idea of Extension or Duration, that I at present
have, the addition of any the least part makes an increase; but to
the perfectest Idea I have of the whitest Whiteness, if I add another

...........................................................................................................................
pg 213
of a less or equal whiteness, (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot
add the Idea,) it makes no increase, and enlarges not my Idea at all;
and therefore the different Ideas of Whiteness, etc. are called Degrees.
For those Ideas, that consist of Parts, are capable of being augmented
5 by every addition of the least part; but if you take the Idea of
White, which one parcel of Snow yielded yesterday to your Sight,
and another Idea of White from another parcel of Snow you see to
day, and put them together in your Mind, they embody, as it were,
and run into one, and the Idea of Whiteness is not at all increased;
10 and if we add a less degree of Whiteness to a greater, we are so far
from increasing, that we diminish it. Those Ideas that consist not of
Parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion Men please, or be
stretched beyond what they have received by their Senses; but
Space, Duration, and Number, being capable of increase by
15 repetition, leave in the Mind an Idea of an endless room for more;
nor can we conceive any where a stop to a farther Addition or
Progression, and so those Ideas alone lead our Minds towards the
Thought of Infinity.

§ 7.

Though our Idea of Infinity arise from the contemplation of

20 Quantity, and the endless increase the Mind is able to make in
Quantity, by the repeated additions of what Portions thereof it

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 pleases; yet I guess we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when
we join Infinity to any supposed Idea of Quantity the Mind can be
thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite
25 quantity, (viz.) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: For our
Idea of Infinity being, as I think, an endless growing Idea, but the Idea of
any Quantity the Mind has, being at that time terminated in that
Idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is,) to
join Infinity to it is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk;
30 and therefore I think it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say, that
we are carefully to distinguish between the Idea of the Infinity of
Space, and the Idea of a Space infinite: The first is nothing but a
supposed endless Progression of the Mind, over what repeated Ideas
of Space it pleases; but to have actually in the Mind the Idea of a
35 Space infinite, is to suppose the Mind already passed over, and
actually to have a view of all those repeated Ideas of Space, which an

...........................................................................................................................
pg 214
endless repetition can never totally represent to it, which carries in
it a plain contradiction.

§ 8.

This, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we consider it in

Numbers. The infinity of Numbers, to the end of whose addition
5 every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one
that reflects on it: But how clear soever this Idea of the Infinity of
Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the absurdity
of the actual Idea of an Infinite Number. Whatsoever positive Ideas
we have in our Minds of any Space, Duration, or Number, let them
10 be never so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an
inexhaustible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and
wherein we allow the Mind an endless progression of Thought,
without ever compleating the Idea, there we have our Idea of
Infinity; which though it seems to be pretty clear, when we con-
15 sider nothing else in it, but the Negation of an end, yet when we
would frame in our Minds the Idea of an infinite Space or Duration,
that Idea is very obscure, and confused, because it is made up of two
Parts, very different, if not inconsistent. For let a Man frame in his
mind an Idea of any Space or Number, as great as he will; 'tis plain,
20 the mind rests and terminates in that Idea, which is contrary to the
Idea of Infinity, which consists in a supposed endless Progression. And

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 therefore, I think, it is, that we are so easily confounded, when we
come to argue, and reason about infinite Space or Duration, etc.
Because the parts of such an Idea, not being perceived to be, as
25 they are, inconsistent, the one side or other always perplexes, what-
ever Consequences we draw from the other, as an Idea of Motion
not passing on, would perplex any one, who should argue from such
an Idea, which is not better than an Idea of motion at rest; and such
another seems to me to be the Idea of a Space, or (which is the same
30 thing) a Number infinite, i.e. of a Space or Number, which the
Mind actually has, and so views, and terminates in; and of a Space
or Number, which in a constant and endless inlarging, and Pro-
gression, it can in Thought never attain to. For how large soever
an Idea of Space I have in my Mind, it is no larger than it is that
35 Instant, that I have it, though I be capable the next instant to
double it; and so on in infinitum: For that alone is infinite, which has

...........................................................................................................................
pg 215
no Bounds; and that the Idea of Infinity, in which our Thoughts can
find none.

§ 9.

But of all other Ideas, it is Number, as I have said, which, I

think, furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct Idea of infinity, we
5 are capable of. For even in Space and Duration, when the Mind
pursues the Idea of Infinity, it there makes use of the Ideas and
Repetitions of Numbers, as of millions of millions of Miles, or Years,
which are so many distinct Ideas, kept best by Number from run-
ning into a confused heap, wherein the Mind loses it self; and when
10 it has added together as many millions, etc. as it pleases, of known
lengths of Space or Duration, the clearest Idea, it can get of
Infinity, is the confused incomprehensible remainder of endless
addible Numbers, which affords no prospect of Stop or Boundary.

§ 10.

It will, perhaps, give us a little farther light into the Idea we

15 have of Infinity, and discover to us, that it is nothing but the Infinity of
Number applied to determinate parts, of which we have in our Minds the
distinct Ideas, if we consider that Number is not generally thought
by us infinite, whereas Duration and Extension are apt to be so;

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 which arises from hence, That in Number we are at one end as it
20 were: for there being in Number nothing less than an Unite, we
there stop, and are at an end; but in addition, or increase of Num-
ber, we can set no Bounds: and so it is like a Line, whereof one end
terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards beyond all
that we can conceive; but in Space and Duration it is otherwise.
25 For in Duration, we consider it, as if this Line of Number were
extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and
infinite length; which is evident to any one, that will but reflect on
what Consideration he hath of Eternity; which, I suppose, he will
find to be nothing else, but the turning this Infinity of Number
30 both ways, à parte ante, and à parte post, as they speak. For when we
would consider Eternity, à parte ante, what do we but, beginning
from our selves, and the present time we are in, repeat in our
Minds the Ideas of Years, or Ages, or any other assignable Portion of
Duration past, with a prospect of proceeding, in such Addition,
35 with all the Infinity of Number; and when we would consider

...........................................................................................................................
pg 216
Eternity, à parte post, we just after the same rate begin from our
selves, and reckon by multiplied Periods yet to come, still extend-
ing that Line of Number, as before; and these two being put
together, are that infinite Duration we call Eternity; which, as we
5 turn our view either way forwards or backwards, appears infinite,
because we still turn that way the infinite end of Number, i.e. the
Power still of adding more.

§ 11.

The same happens also in Space, wherein conceiving our

selves to be as it were in the Centre, we do on all sides pursue those
10 indeterminable Lines of Number; and reckoning any way from our
selves, a Yard, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, or Orbis magnus, by the
infinity of Number, we add others to them, as often as we will; and
having no more Reason to set Bounds to those repeated Ideas, than
we have to set Bounds to Number, we have that indeterminable
15 Idea of Immensity.

§ 12.

And since in any bulk of Matter, our Thoughts can never

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 arrive at the utmost Divisibility, therefore there is an apparent
Infinity to us also in that, which has the Infinity also of Number,
but with this difference, That in the former Considerations of the
20 Infinity of Space and Duration, we only use Addition of Numbers;
whereas this is like the division of an Unite into its Fractions,
wherein the Mind also can proceed in infinitum, as well as in the
former Additions, it being indeed but the Addition still of new
Numbers: though in the Addition of the one, we can have no more
25 the positive Idea of a Space infinitely great, than in the Division of
the other, we can have the Idea of a Body infinitely little; our Idea of
Infinity being, as I may so say, a growing and fugitive Idea, still in
a boundless Progression, that can stop no where.

§ 13.

Though it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd, as to

30 say, he has the positive Idea of an actual infinite Number; the
Infinity whereof lies only in a Power still of adding any Combination
of Unites to any former Number, and that as long, and as much as
one will; the like also being in the Infinity of Space and Duration,
which Power leaves always to the Mind room for endless Additions;
35 yet there be those, who imagine they have positive Ideas of infinite
Duration and Space. It would, I think, be enough to destroy any

...........................................................................................................................
pg 217
such positive Idea of infinite, to ask him that has it, whether he
could add to it or no; which would easily shew the mistake of such
a positive Idea. We can, I think, have no positive Idea of any Space or
Duration, which is not made up of, and commensurate to repeated
5 Numbers of Feet or Yards, or Days and Years, which are the
common measures, whereof we have the Ideas in our Minds, and
whereby we judge of the greatness of these sort of quantities. And
therefore, since an Idea of infinite Space or Duration must needs be
made up of infinite Parts, it can have no other Infinity, than that of
10 Number capable still of farther Addition; but not an actual positive
Idea of a Number infinite. For, I think, it is evident, that the
Addition of finite things together (as are all lengths, whereof we
have the positive Ideas) can never otherwise produce the Idea of
infinite, than as Number does; which consisting of Additions of
15 finite Unites one to another, suggests the Idea of Infinite, only by a
Power, we find we have of still increasing the Sum, and adding

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 more of the same kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of
such Progression.

§ 14.

They who would prove their Idea of Infinite to be positive,

20 seem to me to do it by a pleasant Argument, taken from the
Negation of an end; which being negative, the Negation of it is
positive. He that considers, that the end is in Body but the ex-
tremity or superficies of that Body, will not, perhaps, be forward to
grant, that the end is a bare negative: And he that perceives the
25 end of his Pen is black or white, will be apt to think, that the end is
something more than a pure Negation. Nor is it, when applied to
Duration, the bare Negation of Existence, but more properly the
last moment of it. But if they will have the end to be nothing but the
bare Negation of Existence, I am sure they cannot deny, but that
30 the beginning is the first instant of Being, and is not by any Body
conceived to be a bare Negation; and therefore by their own
Argument, the Idea of Eternal, à parte ante, or of a Duration without
a beginning, is but a negative Idea.

§ 15.

The Idea of Infinite, has, I confess, something of positive in

35 all those things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite
Space or Duration, we at first step usually make some very large
Idea, as, perhaps, of Millions of Ages, or Miles, which possibly we
double and multiply several times. All that we thus amass together
in our Thoughts, is positive, and the assemblage of a great number

...........................................................................................................................
pg 218
of positive Ideas of Space or Duration. But what still remains beyond
this, we have no more a positive distinct notion of, than a Mariner
has of the depth of the Sea, where having let down a large portion of
his Sounding-line, he reaches no bottom: Whereby he knows the
5 depth to be so many fathoms, and more; but how much that more
is, he hath no distinct notion at all: And could he always supply
new Line, and find the Plummet always sink, without ever stopping,
he would be something in the posture of the Mind reaching after a
compleat and positive Idea of Infinity. In which case, let this Line
10 be 10, or 10000 fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond

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 it; and gives only this confused, and comparative Idea, That this is
not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the Mind compre-
hends of any Space, it has a positive Idea of: But in endeavouring to
make it Infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the
15 Idea is still imperfect and incompleat. So much Space as the Mind
takes a view of, in its contemplation of Greatness, is a clear Picture,
and positive in the Understanding: But Infinite is still greater, 1.
Then the Idea of so much is positive and clear. 2. The Idea of Greater is also
clear, but it is but a comparative Idea. 3. The Idea of so much greater, as
20 cannot be comprehended, and this is plain Negative; Not Positive. For he
has no positive clear Idea of the largeness of any Extension, (which
is that sought for in the Idea of Infinite,) that has not a compre-
hensive Idea of the Dimensions of it: And such, no body, I think,
pretends to, in what is infinite. For to say a Man has a positive clear
25 Idea of any Quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reason-
able as to say, He has the positive clear Idea of the number of the
Sands on the Sea-shore, who knows not how many they be; but
only that they are more than Twenty. For just such a perfect and
positive Idea has he of an infinite Space or Duration, who says it is
30 larger than the Extent or Duration of 10, 100, 1000, or any other
number of Miles, or Years, whereof he has, or can have, a positive
Idea; which is all the Idea, I think, we have of Infinite. So that what
lies beyond our positive Idea towards Infinity, lies in Obscurity;
and has the indeterminate confusion of a Negative Idea, wherein I
35 know, I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too
large for a finite and narrow Capacity: And that cannot but be very-
far from a positive compleat Idea, wherein the greatest part, of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 219
what I would comprehend, is left out, under the undeterminate
intimation of being still greater. For to say, that having in any
quantity measured so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at the
end, is only to say, that that Quantity is greater. So that the Nega-
5 tion of an end in any Quantity, is, in other words, only to say, That
it is bigger: And a total negation of an end, is but the carrying this
Bigger still with you, in all the Progressions your Thoughts shall
make in Quantity; and adding this Idea of still greater, to all the
Ideas you have, or can be supposed to have of Quantity. Now
10 whether such an Idea as that, be positive, I leave any one to con-
sider.

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 § 16.

I ask those who say they have a positive Idea of Eternity,

whether their Idea of Duration includes in it Succession, or not? If
it does not, they ought to shew the difference of their Notion of
15 Duration, when applied to an eternal Being, and to a finite: Since,
perhaps, there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them
their Weakness of Understanding in this point; and acknowledge,
That the Notion they have of Duration, forces them to conceive,
That whatever has Duration, is of a longer continuance to day, than
20 it was yesterday. If to avoid Succession in eternal Existence, they
recur to the Punctum Stans of the Schools, I suppose, they will
thereby very little mend the matter, or help us to a more clear and
positive Idea of infinite Duration, there being nothing more in-
conceivable to me, than Duration without Succession. Besides, that
25 Punctum Stans, if it signify any thing, being not Quantum, finite or
infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak Apprehensions cannot
separate Succession from any Duration whatsoever, our Idea of
Eternity can be nothing but of infinite Succession of Moments of
Duration, wherein any thing does exist; and whether any one has,
30 or can have, a positive Idea of an actual infinite Number, I leave him
to consider, till his infinite Number be so great, that he himself can
add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt, he
himself will think the Idea, he hath of it, a little too scanty for
positive Infinity.

35 § 17.

I think it unavoidable for every considering rational

...........................................................................................................................
pg 220
Creature, that will but examine his own, or any other Existence, to
have the Notion of an eternal wise Being, who had no beginning:
And such an Idea of infinite Duration, I am sure I have. But this
Negation of a Beginning, being but the Negation of a positive thing,
5 scarce gives me a positive Idea of Infinity; which whenever I endeavour
to extend my Thoughts to, I confess my self at a loss, and find I
cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

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 § 18.

He that thinks he has a positive Idea of infinite Space, will,

when he considers it, find that he can no more have a positive Idea of
10 the greatest, than he has of the least Space. For in this latter, which
seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension,
we are capable only of a comparative Idea of Smalness, which will
always be less than any one, whereof we have the positive Idea. All
our positive Ideas of any Quantity, whether great or little, have
15 always bounds; though our comparative Idea, whereby we can
always add to the one, and take from the other, hath no bounds.
For that which remains either great or little, not being compre-
hended in that positive Idea, which we have, lies in obscurity: And
we have no other Idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one,
20 and diminishing the other, without ceasing. A Pestle and Mortar
will as soon bring any Particle of Matter to Indivisibility, as the
acutest Thought of a Mathematician: And a Surveyor may, as
soon with his Chain, measure out infinite Space, as a Philosopher, by
the quickest flight of Mind, reach it; or by thinking comprehend it,
25 which is to have a positive Idea of it. He that thinks on a Cube of an
Inch diameter, has a clear and positive Idea of it in his mind, and so
can frame one of ½ a ¼ ⅛, and so on till he has the Idea in his Thoughts
of something very little: but yet reaches not the Idea of that
incomprehensible Littleness, which Division can produce. What
30 remains of Smalness, is as far from his Thoughts, as when he first
began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and
positive Idea of that Smalness, which is consequent to infinite
Divisibility.

§ 19.

Every one that looks towards Infinity, does, as I have said,

35 at first glance make some very large Idea of that which he applies it

...........................................................................................................................
pg 221
to, let it be Space, or Duration; and possibly he wearies his Thoughts,
by multiplying in his mind that first large Idea: But yet by that he
comes no nearer to the having a positive clear Idea of what remains, to
make up a positive Infinite, than the Country-fellow had of the
5 Water, which was yet to come, and pass the Channel of the River
where he stood:

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 Rusticus expectat dum transeat amnis, at ille
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.*

§ 20.

There are some I have met with, that put so much differ-
10 ence between infinite Duration, and infinite Space, that they per-
suade themselves, that they have a positive Idea of Eternity; but that
they have not, nor can have any Idea of infinite Space. The reason of
which mistake, I suppose to be this, That finding by a due Con-
templation of Causes and Effects, that it is necessary to admit some
15 Eternal Being, and so to consider the real existence of that Being, as
taking up, and commensurate to their Idea of Eternity: But on the
other side, not finding it necessary, but on the contrary apparently
absurd, that Body should be infinite, they forwardly conclude, they
can have no Idea of infinite Space, because they can have no Idea of
20 infinite Matter. Which Consequence, I conceive, is very ill collec-
ted; because the Existence of Matter is no ways necessary to the
Existence of Space, no more than the Existence of Motion, or the
Sun, is necessary to Duration, though Duration uses to be measured
by it: And I doubt not but a Man may have the Idea of 10000 Miles
25 square, without any Body so big, as well as the Idea of 10000 Years,
without any Body so old. It seems as easy to me to have the Idea
of Space empty of Body, as to think of the Capacity of a Bushel
without Corn, or the hollow of a Nutshel without a Kernel in it: It
being no more necessary, that there should be existing a solid Body
30 infinitely extended, because we have an Idea of the Infinity of Space,
than it is necessary that the World should be eternal, because we
have an Idea of infinite Duration: And why should we think our Idea
of infinite Space, requires the real existence of Matter to support it,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 222
when we find, that we have as clear an Idea of infinite Duration to
come, as we have of infinite Duration past? Though, I suppose, no
body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has existed in
that future Duration. Nor is it possible to join our Idea of future
5 Duration, with present or past Existence, any more than it is
possible to make the Ideas of yesterday, to day, and to morrow to be
the same; or bring Ages past and future together, and make them
contemporary. But if these Men are of the Mind, That they have
clearer Ideas of infinite Duration, than of infinite Space, because it is

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10 past doubt, that GOD has existed from all Eternity, but there is
no real Matter co-extended with infinite Space: Yet those Philoso-
phers who are of Opinion, That infinite Space is possessed by GOD's
infinite Omnipresence, as well as infinite Duration by his eternal
Existence, must be allowed to have as clear an Idea of infinite Space,
15 as of infinite Duration; though neither of them, I think, has any
positive Idea of Infinity in either case. For whatsoever positive Ideas a
Man has in his Mind of any Quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to
the former, as easy as he can add together the Ideas of two Days, or
two Paces, which are positive Ideas of Lengths he has in his Mind,
20 and so on, as long as he pleases: whereby, if a Man had a positive
Idea of infinite, either Duration, or Space, he could add two In-
finites together; nay, make one Infinite infinitely bigger than
another, Absurdities too gross to be confuted.

§ 21.

But yet if after all this, there be Men, who persuade them-
25 selves, that they have clear positive comprehensive Ideas of In-
finity, 'tis fit they enjoy their privilege: And I should be very glad
(with some others, that I know, who acknowledge they have none
such,) to be better informed by their Communication. For I have
been hitherto apt to think, that the great and inextricable Diffi-
30 culties, which perpetually involve all Discourses concerning Infinity,
whether of Space, Duration, or Divisibility, have been the certain
marks of a defect in our Ideas of Infinity, and the disproportion the
Nature thereof has to the Comprehension of our narrow Capacities.
For whilst Men talk and dispute of infinite Space or Duration, as if
35 they had as compleat and positive Ideas of them, as they have of the
Names they use for them, or as they have of a Yard, or an Hour, or

...........................................................................................................................
pg 223
any other determinate Quantity, it is no wonder, if the incompre-
hensible Nature of the thing, they discourse of, or reason about,
leads them into Perplexities and Contradictions; and their Minds
be overlaid by an Object too large and mighty, to be surveyed and
5 managed by them.

§ 22.

If I have dwelt pretty long on the Considerations of

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 Duration, Space, and Number; and what arises from the Contem-
plation of them, Infinity, 'tis possibly no more, than the matter
requires, there being few simple Ideas, whose Modes give more
10 exercise to the Thoughts of Men, than these do. I pretend not to
treat of them in their full Latitude: it suffices to my Design, to
shew, how the Mind receives them, such as they are, from Sensation
and Reflection; And how even the Idea we have of Infinity, how
remote soever it may seem to be from any Object of Sense, or
15 Operation of our Mind, has nevertheless, as all our other Ideas,
its Original there. Some Mathematicians, perhaps, of advanced
Speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their Minds
Ideas of Infinity: But this hinders not, but that they themselves, as
well as all other Men, got the first Ideas, which they had of Infinity,
20 from Sensation and Reflection, in the method we have here set
down.

CHAPTER XVIII
Of other Simple Modes.

§ 1.

THOUGH I have in the foregoing Chapters, shewn how from

simple Ideas taken in by Sensation, the Mind comes to extend it self
even to Infinity. Which however it may, of all others, seem most
25 remote from any sensible Perception, yet at last hath nothing in it,
but what is made out of simple Ideas: received into the Mind by the
Senses, and afterwards there put together, by the Faculty the Mind
has to repeat its own Ideas. Though, I say, these might be instances
enough of simple Modes of the simple Ideas of Sensation; and suffice
30 to shew, how the mind comes by them: yet I shall for Methods sake,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 224
though briefly, give an account of some few more, and then proceed
to more complex Ideas.

§ 2.

To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, and
abundance others, that might be named, are Words, which are no
5 sooner heard, but every one, who understands English, has presently
in his Mind distinct Ideas, which are all but the different modifica-

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 tions of Motion. Modes of Motion answer those of Extension: Swift
and Slow are two different Ideas of Motion, the measures whereof
are made of the distances of Time and Space put together, so they
10 are complex Ideas comprehending Time and Space with Motion.

§ 3.

The like variety have we in Sounds. Every articulate word is

a different modification of Sound: by which we see, that from the sense
of Hearing by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with
distinct Ideas, to almost an infinite Number. Sounds also, besides the
15 distinct cries of Birds and Beasts, are modified by diversity of
Notes of different length put together, which make that complex
Idea call'd a Tune, which a Musician may have in his mind, when he
hears or makes no Sound at all, by reflecting on the Ideas of those
Sounds, so put together silently in his own Fancy.

20 § 4.

Those of Colours are also very various: Some we take notice

of, as the different degrees, or as they are termed, Shades of the same
Colour. But since we very seldom make assemblages of Colours,
either for Use or Delight, but Figure is taken in also, and has its
part in it, as in Painting, Weaving, Needle-works, etc. those which
25 are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mixed Modes, as
being made up of Ideas of divers kinds, viz. Figure and Colour, such
as Beauty, Rainbow, etc.

§ 5.

All compounded Tastes and Smells, are also Modes made up of

these simple Ideas of those Senses. But they being such, as generally
30 we have no names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set
down in writing; and therefore must be left without enumeration,
to the Thoughts and Experience of my Reader.

§ 6.

In general it may be observed, that those simple Modes, which

are considered but as different degrees of the same simple Idea; though they
35 are in themselves many of them very distinct Ideas; yet have

...........................................................................................................................

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 pg 225
ordinarily no distinct Names, nor are much taken notice of, as distinct
Ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether
Men have neglected these modes, and given no Names to them, as
wanting measures nicely to distinguish them; or because when they
5 were so distinguished, that Knowledge would not be of general, or
necessary use, I leave it to the Thoughts of others; it is sufficient to
my purpose to shew, that all our simple Ideas come to our Minds
only by Sensation and Reflection; and that when the Mind has
them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new
10 complex Ideas. But though White, Red, or Sweet, etc. have not been
modified, or made into complex Ideas, by several Combinations, so as
to be named, and thereby ranked into Species; yet some others of
the simple Ideas, viz. those of Unity, Duration, Motion, etc. above
instanced in, as also Power and Thinking have been thus modified
15 to a great variety of complex Ideas, with Names belonging to them.

§ 7.

The Reason whereof, I suppose, has been this, That the great
Concernment of Men being with Men one amongst another, the
Knowledge of Men, and their Actions, and the signifying of them
to one another, was most necessary; and therefore they made Ideas of
20 Actions very nicely modified, and gave those complex Ideas names,
that they might the more easily record, and discourse of those
things, they were daily conversant in, without long Ambages and
Circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to
give and receive information about, might be the easier and quicker
25 understood. That this is so, and that Men in framing different
complex Ideas, and giving them Names, have been much governed
by the end of Speech in general (which is a very short and expedite
way of conveying their Thoughts one to another) is evident in the
Names, which in several Arts have been found out, and applied
30 to several complex Ideas of modified Actions, belonging to their
several Trades, for dispatch sake, in their Direction or Discourses
about them. Which Ideas are not generally framed in the minds of
Men not conversant about these Operations. And thence the words
that stand for them, by the greatest part of Men of the same
35 Language, are not understood, v.g. Coltshire, Drilling, Filtration,
Cohobation, are words standing for certain complex Ideas, which

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 pg 226
being seldom in the minds of any but those few, whose particular
Imployments do at every turn suggest them to their Thoughts,
those names of them are not generally understood but by Smiths,
and Chymists; who having framed the complex Ideas, which these
5 words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them
from others, upon hearing of these names in communication readily
conceive those Ideas in their Minds; as by Cohobation all the simple
Ideas of Distilling, and the pouring the Liquor, distilled from any
thing, back upon the remaining Matter, and distilling it again.
10 Thus we see, that there are great varieties of simple Ideas, as of
Tastes and Smells, which have no Names; and of Modes many more.
Which either not having been generally enough observed, or else
not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the Affairs and
Converse of Men, they have not had names given to them, and so
15 pass not for Species. This we shall have occasion hereafter to con-
sider more at large, when we come to speak of Words.

CHAPTER XIX
Of the Modes of Thinking.

§ 1.

WHEN the Mind turns its view inwards upon it self, and
contemplates its own Actions, Thinking is the first that occurs. In it
the Mind observes a great variety of Modifications, and from thence
20 receives distinct Ideas. Thus the Perception, which actually ac-
companies, and is annexed to any impression on the Body, made
by an external Object, being distinct from all other Modifications of
thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct Idea, which we call
Sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any Idea into the
25 Understanding by the Senses. The same Idea, when it again recurs
without the operation of the like Object on the external Sensory, is

...........................................................................................................................
pg 227
Remembrance: If it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and
endeavour found, and brought again in view, 'tis Recollection: If it be
held there long under attentive Consideration, 'tis Contemplation:
When Ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the
5 Understanding, it is that, which the French call Reverie; our Lan-
guage has scarce a name for it: When the Ideas that offer themselves,

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 (for as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there
will always be a train of Ideas succeeding one another in our minds,)
are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the Memory, it is
10 Attention: When the mind with great earnestness, and of choice,
fixes its view on any Idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be
called off by the ordinary sollicitation of other Ideas, it is that we call
Intention, or Study: Sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these.
And Dreaming it self, is the having of Ideas, (whilst the outward
15 Senses are stopp'd, so that they receive not outward Objects with
their usual quickness,) in the mind, not suggested by any external
Objects, or known occasion; nor under any Choice or Conduct of
the Understanding at all: And whether that, which we call Extasy,
be not dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examined.

20 § 2.

These are some few instances of those various Modes of

thinking, which the Mind may observe in it self, and so have as
distinct Ideas of, as it hath of White and Red, a Square or a Circle. I do
not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set
of Ideas, which are got from Reflection: That would be to make a
25 Volume. It suffices to my present purpose, to have shewn here, by
some few Examples, of what sort these Ideas are, and how the mind
comes by them; especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to
treat more at large of Reasoning, Judging, Volition, and Knowledge,
which are some of the most considerable Operations of the mind,
30 and Modes of thinking.

§ 3.

But, perhaps, it may not be an unpardonable Digression, nor

wholly impertinent to our present Design, if we reflect here upon
the different State of the Mind in thinking, which those instances of
Attention, Resvery, and Dreaming, etc. before mentioned, naturally
35 enough suggest. That there are Ideas, some or other, always present

...........................................................................................................................
pg 228
in the mind of a waking Man, every one's Experience convinces
him; though the mind employs it self about them with several
degrees of Attention. Sometimes the mind fixes it self with so much
earnestness on the Contemplation of some Objects, that it turns

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5 their Ideas on all sides; remarks their Relations and Circumstances;
and views every part so nicely, and with such intention, that it
shuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary
Impressions made then on the Senses, which at another Season
would produce very sensible Perceptions: At other times, it barely
10 observes the train of Ideas, that succeed in the Understanding,
without directing, and pursuing any of them: And at other times,
it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows, that
make no Impression.

§ 4.

This difference of Intention, and Remission of the mind in

15 thinking, with a great variety of Degrees, between earnest Study,
and very near minding nothing at all, Every one, I think, has
experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the
mind in Sleep, retired as it were from the Senses, and out of the
reach of those Motions made on the Organs of Sense, which at
20 other times produce very vivid and sensible Ideas. I need not, for
this, instance in those, who sleep out whole stormy Nights, without
hearing the Thunder, or seeing the Lightning, or feeling the
shaking of the House, which are sensible enough to those, who are
waking. But in this retirement of the mind from the Senses, it often
25 retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which
we call Dreaming: And last of all sound Sleep closes the Scene quite,
and puts an end to all Appearances. This I think almost every one
has Experience of in himself, and his own Observation without
difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude
30 from hence is, That since the mind can sensibly put on, at several
times, several degrees of Thinking; and be sometimes even in a wak-
ing Man so remiss, as to have Thoughts dim and obscure to that
degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and at
last in the dark retirements of sound Sleep, loses the sight perfectly
35 of all Ideas whatsoever: Since, I say, this is evidently so in Matter of
Fact, and constant Experience, I ask, whether it be not probable,
that thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul? Since the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 229
Operations of Agents will easily admit of intention and remission;
but the Essences of things, are not conceived capable of any such
variation. But this by the bye.

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 CHAPTER XX
Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

§ 1.

AMONGST the simple Ideas, which we receive both from

5 Sensation and Reflection, Pain and Pleasure are two very considerable
ones. For as in the Body, there is Sensation barely in it self, or ac-
companied with Pain or Pleasure; so the Thought, or Perception of
the Mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with Pleasure or
Pain, Delight or Trouble, call it how you please. These like other
10 simple Ideas cannot be described, nor their Names defined; the way
of knowing them is, as of the simple Ideas of the Senses, only by
Experience. For to define them by the Presence of Good or Evil, is
no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect
on what we feel in our selves, upon the several and various Opera-
15 tions of Good and Evil upon our Minds, as they are differently
applied to, or considered by us.

§ 2.

Things then are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or

Pain. That we call Good, which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or
diminish Pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve us the possession of any
20 other Good, or absence of any Evil. And on the contrary we name that
Evil, which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure
in us; or else to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleasure
and Pain, I must be understood to mean of Body or Mind, as they
are commonly distinguished; though in truth, they be only differ-
25 ent Constitutions of the Mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in
the Body, sometimes by Thoughts of the Mind.

§ 3.

Pleasure and Pain, and that which causes them, Good and
Evil, are the hinges on which our Passions turn: and if we reflect on
our selves, and observe how these, under various Considerations,
30 operate in us; what Modifications or Tempers of Mind, what

...........................................................................................................................
pg 230
internal Sensations, (if I may so call them,) they produce in us, we

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 may thence form to our selves the Ideas of our Passions.

§ 4.

Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the

Delight, which any present, or absent thing is apt to produce in
5 him, has the Idea we call Love. For when a Man declares in Autumn,
when he is eating them, or in Spring, when there are none, that he
loves Grapes, it is no more, but that the taste of Grapes delights him;
let an alteration of Health or Constitution destroy the delight of
their Taste, and he then can be said to love Grapes no longer.

10 § 5.

On the contrary, the Thought of the Pain, which any thing

present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call Hatred.
Were it my business here, to enquire any farther, than into the bare
Ideas of our Passions, as they depend on different Modifications of
Pleasure and Pain, I should remark, that our Love and Hatred of in-
15 animate insensible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleasure
and Pain which we receive from their use and application any way
to our Senses, though with their Destruction: But Hatred or Love, to
Beings capable of Happiness or Misery, is often the Uneasiness or
Delight, which we find in our selves arising from a consideration of
20 their very Being, or Happiness. Thus the Being and Welfare of a
Man's Children or Friends, producing constant Delight in him, he
is said constantly to love them. But it suffices to note, that our Ideas
of Love and Hatred, are but the Dispositions of the Mind, in respect
of Pleasure and Pain in general, however caused in us.

25 § 6.

The uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the absence of

any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the Idea of Delight with
it, is that we call Desire, which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is
more or less vehement. Where by the bye it may perhaps be of some
use to remark, that the chief if not only spur to humane Industry
30 and Action is uneasiness. For whatever good is propos'd, if its
absence carries no displeasure nor pain with it; if a Man be easie and
content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it;
there is no more but a bare Velleity, the term used to signifie the
lowest degree of Desire, and that which is next to none at all, when

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35 there is so little uneasiness in the absence of any thing, that it

...........................................................................................................................
pg 231
carries a Man no farther than some faint wishes for it, without any
more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. Desire also is
stopp'd or abated by the Opinion of the impossibility or unattain-
ableness of the good propos'd, as far as the uneasiness is cured or
5 allay'd by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts farther
were it seasonable in this place.

§ 7.

Joy is a delight of the Mind, from the consideration of the

present or assured approaching possession of a Good; and we are
then possessed of any Good, when we have it so in our power, that
10 we can use it when we please. Thus a Man almost starved, has Joy
at the arrival of Relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it:
and a Father, in whom the very well-being of his Children causes
delight, is always, as long as his Children are in such a State, in the
possession of that Good; for he needs but to reflect on it to have that
15 pleasure.

§ 8.

Sorrow is uneasiness in the Mind, upon the thought of a

Good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the sense of
a present Evil.

§ 9.

Hope is that pleasure in the Mind, which every one finds in

20 himself, upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a
thing, which is apt to delight him.

§ 10.

Fear is an uneasiness of the Mind, upon the thought of

future Evil likely to befal us.

§ 11.

Despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any Good,

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25 which works differently in Mens Minds, sometimes producing un-
easiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.

§ 12.

Anger is uneasiness or discomposure of the Mind, upon

the receit of any Injury, with a present purpose of Revenge.

§ 13.

Envy is an uneasiness of Mind, caused by the consideration

30 of a Good we desire, obtained by one, we think should not have had
it before us.

§ 14.

These two last, Envy and Anger, not being caused by Pain
and Pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed
Considerations of our selves and others, are not therefore to be
35 found in all Men, because those other parts of valuing their Merits,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 232
or intending Revenge, is wanting in them: But all the rest termina-
ted purely in Pain and Pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all Men.
For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of Pleasure; we
hate, fear, and grieve only in respect of Pain ultimately: In fine all
5 these Passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the
Causes of Pleasure and Pain, or to have Pleasure or Pain some way or
other annexed to them. Thus we extend our Hatred usually to the
subject, (at least if a sensible or voluntary Agent,) which has pro-
duced Pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a constant pain: But
10 we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because
Pleasure operates not so strongly on us, as Pain; and because we
are not so ready to have hope, it will do so again. But this by the
bye.

§ 15.

By Pleasure and Pain, Delight and Uneasiness, I must all

15 along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean, not only
bodily Pain and Pleasure, but whatsoever Delight or Uneasiness is felt
by us, whether arising from any grateful, or unacceptable Sensation

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 or Reflection.

§ 16.

'Tis farther to be considered, That in reference to the

20 Passions, the removal or lessening of a Pain is considered, and operates
as a Pleasure: And the loss or diminishing of a Pleasure, as a Pain.

§ 17.

The Passions too have most of them in most Persons

operations on the Body, and cause various changes in it: Which not
being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the Idea of
25 each Passion. For Shame, which is an uneasiness of the Mind, upon
the thought of having done something, which is indecent, or will
lessen the valued Esteem, which others have for us, has not always
blushing accompanying it.

§ 18.

I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Dis-

30 course of the Passions; they are many more than those I have here named:
And those I have taken notice of, would each of them require a
much larger, and more accurate Discourse. I have only mentioned
these here, as so many instances of Modes of Pleasure and Pain
resulting in our Minds, from various Considerations of Good and

...........................................................................................................................
pg 233
Evil. I might, perhaps, have instanced in other Modes of Pleasure
and Pain more simple than these, as the Pain of Hunger and Thirst,
and the Pleasure of Eating and Drinking to remove them; The pain
of tender Eyes, and the pleasure of Musick; Pain from captious un-
5 instructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation
with a Friend, or of well directed study in the search and discovery
of Truth. But the Passions being of much more concernment to us,
I rather made choice to instance in them, and shew how the Ideas
we have of them, are derived from Sensation and Reflection.

CHAPTER XXI
Of Power.

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10 § 1.

THE Mind, being every day informed, by the Senses, of the

alteration of those simple Ideas, it observes in things without; and
taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and
another begins to exist, which was not before; reflecting also on
what passes within it self, and observing a constant change of its
15 Ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward Objects on the
Senses, and sometimes by the Determination of its own choice; and
concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been,
that the like Changes will for the future be made, in the same things,
by like Agents, and by the like ways, considers in one thing the
20 possibility of having any of its simple Ideas changed, and in another
the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that Idea
which we call Power. Thus we say, Fire has a power to melt Gold, i.e.
to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts, and consequently
its hardness, and make it fluid; and Gold has a power to be melted;
25 That the Sun has a power to blanch Wax, and Wax a power to be
blanched by the Sun, whereby the Yellowness is destroy'd, and
Whiteness made to exist in its room. In which, and the like Cases,
the Power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable
Ideas. For we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or

...........................................................................................................................
pg 234
operation upon any thing, but by the observable change of its
sensible Ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by
conceiving a Change of some of its Ideas.

§ 2.

Power thus considered is twofold, viz. as able to make, or able

5 to receive any change: The one may be called Active, and the other
Passive Power. Whether Matter be not wholly destitute of active
Power, as its Author GOD is truly above all passive Power; and
whether the intermediate state of created Spirits be not that alone,
which is capable of both active and passive Power, may be worth
10 consideration. I shall not now enter into that Enquiry, my present
Business being not to search into the original of Power, but how we
come by the Idea of it. But since active Powers make so great a part
of our complex Ideas of natural Substances, (as we shall see here-
after,) and I mention them as such, according to common appre-

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15 hension; yet they being not, perhaps, so truly active Powers, as our
hasty Thoughts are apt to represent them, I judge it not amiss, by
this intimation, to direct our Minds to the consideration of GOD
and Spirits, for the clearest Idea of active Power.

§ 3.

I confess Power includes in it some kind of relation, (a relation to

20 Action or Change,) as indeed which of our Ideas, of what kind so-
ever, when attentively considered, does not? For our Ideas of Exten-
sion, Duration, and Number, do they not all contain in them a
secret relation of the Parts? Figure and Motion have something
relative in them much more visibly: And sensible Qualities, as
25 Colours and Smells, etc. what are they but the Powers of different
Bodies, in relation to our Perception, etc. And if considered in the
things themselves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Figure, Texture,
and Motion of the Parts? All which include some kind of relation in
them. Our Idea therefore of Power, I think, may well have a place
30 amongst other simple Ideas, and be considered as one of them, being
one of those, that make a principal Ingredient in our complex Ideas
of Substances, as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe.

§ 4.

We are abundantly furnished with the Idea of passive Power,

by almost all sorts of sensible things. In most of them we cannot

...........................................................................................................................
pg 235
avoid observing their sensible Qualities, nay their very Substances
to be in a continual flux: And therefore with reason we look on them
as liable still to the same Change. Nor have we of active Power
(which is the more proper signification of the word Power) fewer
5 instances. Since whatever Change is observed, the Mind must
collect a Power somewhere, able to make that Change, as well as a
possibility in the thing it self to receive it. But yet, if we will con-
sider it attentively, Bodies, by our Senses, do not afford us so clear
and distinct an Idea of active Power, as we have from reflection on the
10 Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to Action, and there
being but two sorts of Action, whereof we have any Idea, viz.
Thinking and Motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest
Ideas of the Powers, which produce these Actions. 1. Of Thinking,

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 Body affords us no Idea at all, it is only from Reflection that we have
15 that: 2. Neither have we from Body any Idea of the beginning of
Motion. A Body at rest affords us no Idea of any active Power to move;
and when it is set in motion it self, that Motion is rather a Passion,
than an Action in it. For when the Ball obeys the stroke of a Billiard-
stick, it is not any action of the Ball, but bare passion: Also when by
20 impulse it sets another Ball in motion, that lay in its way, it only
communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses
in it self so much, as the other received; which gives us but a very
obscure Idea of an active Power of moving in Body, whilst we observe
it only to transfer, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very
25 obscure Idea of Power, which reaches not the Production of the
Action, but the Continuation of the Passion. For so is motion in a
Body impelled by another: The continuation of the Alteration made
in it from rest to motion being little more an Action, than the con-
tinuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the same blow is an
30 Action. The Idea of the beginning of motion, we have only from re-
flection on what passes in our selves, where we find by Experience,
that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the Mind, we can
move the parts of our Bodies, which were before at rest. So that it
seems to me, we have from the observation of the operation of
35 Bodies by our Senses, but a very imperfect obscure Idea of active
Power, since they afford us not any Idea in themselves of the Power
to begin any Action, either motion or thought. But if, from the
Impulse Bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one

...........................................................................................................................
pg 236
thinks he has a clear Idea of Power, it serves as well to my purpose,
Sensation being one of those ways, whereby the mind comes by its
Ideas: Only I thought it worth while to consider here by the way,
whether the mind doth not receive its Idea of active Power clearer
5 from reflection on its own Operations, than it doth from any ex-
ternal Sensation.

§ 5.

This at least I think evident, That we find in our selves a

Power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our
minds, and motions of our Bodies, barely by a thought or prefer-
10 ence of the mind ordering, or as it were commanding the doing or
not doing such or such a particular action. This Power which the

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 mind has, thus to order the consideration of any Idea, or the for-
bearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the
body to its rest, and vice versâ in any particular instance is that which
15 we call the Will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any
particular action, or its forbearance is that which we call Volition or
Willing. The forbearance or performance of that action, consequent
to such order or command of the mind is called Voluntary. And
whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind
20 is called Involuntary. The power of Perception is that which we call
the Understanding. Perception, which we make the act of the
Understanding, is of three sorts: 1. The Perception of Ideas in our
Minds. 2. The Perception of the signification of Signs. 3. The
Perception of the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Dis-
25 agreement, that there is between any of our Ideas. All these are
attributed to the Understanding, or perceptive Power, though it be
the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand.

§ 6.

These Powers of the Mind, viz. of Perceiving, and of Preferring,

are usually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary way of
30 Speaking is, That the Understanding and Will are two Faculties of the
mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all Words should be,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 237
so as not to breed any confusion in Mens Thoughts, by being
supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real Beings
in the Soul, that performed those Actions of Understanding and
Volition. For when we say the Will is the commanding and superior
5 Faculty of the Soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the
inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the Understanding,
etc. though these, and the like Expressions, by those that carefully
attend to their own Ideas, and conduct their Thoughts more by the
evidence of Things, than the sound of Words, may be understood
10 in a clear and distinct sense: Yet I suspect, I say, that this way of
Speaking of Faculties, has misled many into a confused Notion of so
many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and
Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions,
as so many distinct Beings; which has been no small occasion of
15 wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in Questions relating to them.

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 § 7.

Every one, I think, finds in himself a Power to begin or

forbear, continue or put an end to several Actions in himself. From
the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the
actions of the Man, which every one finds in himself, arise the Ideas
20 of Liberty and Necessity.

§ 8.

All the Actions, that we have any Idea of, reducing them-
selves, as has been said, to these two, viz. Thinking and Motion, so
far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not
to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind,
25 so far is a Man Free. Where-ever any performance or forbearance are
not equally in a Man's power; where-ever doing or not doing, will
not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it,
there he is not Free, though perhaps the Action may be voluntary.
So that the Idea of Liberty, is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do
30 or forbear any particular Action, according to the determination or
thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd to the
other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be

...........................................................................................................................
pg 238
produced by him according to his Volition, there he is not at Liberty,
that Agent is under Necessity. So that Liberty cannot be, where there is
no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there
may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no Liberty. A little
5 Consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.

§ 9.

A Tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a Racket,

or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent. If we
enquire into the Reason, we shall find it is, because we conceive not
a Tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any Volition,
10 or preference of Motion to rest, or vice versâ; and therefore has not
Liberty, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Rest, come
under our Idea of Necessary, and are so call'd. Likewise a Man falling
into the Water, (a Bridge breaking under him,) has not herein
liberty, is not a free Agent. For though he has Volition, though he

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15 prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that Motion
not being in his Power, the Stop or Cessation of that Motion follows
not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a Man
striking himself, or his Friend, by a Convulsive motion of his Arm,
which it is not in his Power, by Volition or the direction of his Mind
20 to stop, or forbear; no Body thinks he has in this Liberty; every one
pities him, as acting by Necessity and Constraint.

§ 10.

Again, suppose a Man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a

Room, where is a Person he longs to see and speak with; and be
there locked fast in, beyond his Power to get out: he awakes, and is
25 glad to find himself in so desirable Company, which he stays
willingly in, i.e. preferrs his stay to going away. I ask, Is not this
stay voluntary? I think, no Body will doubt it: and yet being locked
fast in, 'tis evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not free-
dom to be gone. So that Liberty is not an Idea belonging to Volition, or
30 preferring; but to the Person having the Power of doing, or for-
bearing to do, according as the Mind shall chuse or direct. Our Idea
of Liberty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For where-
ever restraint comes to check that Power, or compulsion takes away
that Indifferency of Ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting,
35 there liberty, and our Notion of it, presently ceases.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 239
§ 11.

We have instances enough, and often more than enough in

our own Bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates,
which 'tis not in his Power by any Thought or Volition to stop; and
therefore in respect of these Motions, where rest depends not on his
5 choice, nor would follow the determination of his Mind, if it should
preferr it, he is not a free Agent. Convulsive Motions agitate his
Legs, so that though he wills it never so much, he cannot by any
power of his Mind stop their Motion, (as in that odd Disease called
Chorea Sancti Viti,) but he is perpetually dancing: He is not at
10 Liberty in this Action, but under as much Necessity of moving, as a
Stone that falls, or a Tennis-ball struck with a Racket. On the other
side, a Palsie or the Stocks hinder his Legs from obeying the de-

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 termination of his Mind, if it would thereby transferr his Body to
another Place. In all these there is want of Freedom, though the
15 sitting still even of a Paralytick, whilst he preferrs it to a removal,
is truly voluntary. Voluntary then is not opposed to Necessary; but to
Involuntary. For a Man may preferr what he can do, to what he
cannot do; the State he is in, to its absence or change, though
Necessity has made it in it self unalterable.

20 § 12.

As it is in the motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts

of our Minds; where any one is such, that we have power to take it
up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the Mind, there we
are at liberty. A waking Man being under the necessity of having
some Ideas constantly in his Mind, is not at liberty to think, or not to
25 think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his Body shall touch
any other, or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation
from one Idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is
in respect of his Ideas, as much at liberty, as he is in respect of Bodies
he rests on: He can at pleasure remove himself from one to another.
30 But yet some Ideas to the Mind, like some Motions to the Body, are
such, as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their
absence by the utmost effort it can use. A Man on the Rack, is not
at liberty to lay by the Idea of pain, and divert himself with other
Contemplations: and sometimes a boisterous Passion hurries our
35 Thoughts, as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 240
liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse.
But as soon as the Mind regains the power to stop or continue,
begin or forbear any of these Motions of the Body without, or
Thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to preferr either to the
5 other, we then consider the Man as a free Agent again.

§ 13.

Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to

act or forbear according to the direction of Thought, there Necessity
takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the begin-
ning or continuation of any Action is contrary to that preference of
10 his Mind, is called Compulsion; when the hind'ring or stopping any

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 Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called Restraint. Agents that
have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing necessary
Agents.

§ 14.

If this be so, (as I imagine it is,) I leave it to be considered,

15 whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I
think, unreasonable, because unintelligible, Question, viz. Whether
Mart's Will be free, or no. For if I mistake not, it follows, from what
I have said, that the Question it self is altogether improper; and it
is as insignificant to ask, whether Man's Will be free, as to ask,
20 whether his Sleep be Swift, or his Vertue square: Liberty being as
little applicable to the Will, as swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or
squareness to Vertue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of
such a Question, as either of these: because it is obvious, that the
modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of
25 Figure to Vertue: and when any one well considers it, I think he
will as plainly perceive, that Liberty, which is but a power, belongs
only to Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the
Will, which is also but a Power.

§ 15.

Such is the difficulty of explaining, and giving clear notions

30 of internal Actions by sounds, that I must here warn my Reader
that Ordering, Directing, Chusing, Preferring, etc. which I have made
use of, will not distinctly enough express Volition, unless he will
reflect on what he himself does, when he wills. For Example, Pre-
ferring which seems perhaps best to express the Act of Volition, does

...........................................................................................................................
pg 241
it not precisely. For though a Man would preferr flying to walking,
yet who can say he ever wills it? Volition, 'tis plain, is an Act of the
Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes it self to have over
any part of the Man, by imploying it in, or witholding it from any
5 particular Action. And what is the Will, but the Faculty to do this?
And is that Faculty any thing more in effect, than a Power, the
power of the Mind to determine its thought, to the producing,
continuing, or stopping any Action, as far as it depends on us? For
can it be denied, that whatever Agent has a power to think on its

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10 own Actions, and to preferr their doing or omission either to other,
has that Faculty call'd Will. Will then is nothing but such a
power. Liberty, on the other side, is the power a Man has to do or
forbear doing any particular Action, according as its doing or for-
bearance has the actual preference in the Mind, which is the same
15 thing as to say, according as he himself wills it.

§ 16.

'Tis plain then, That the Will is nothing but one Power
or Ability, and Freedom another Power or Ability: So that to ask,
whether the Will has Freedom, is to ask, whether one Power has
another Power, one Ability another Ability; a Question at first
20 sight too grosly absurd to make a Dispute, or need an Answer.
For who is it that sees not, that Powers belong only to Agents, and
are Attributes only of Substances, and not of Powers themselves? So that
this way of putting the Question, viz. whether the Will be free, is in
effect to ask, whether the Will be a Substance, an Agent, or at least
25 to suppose it, since Freedom can properly be attributed to nothing
else. If Freedom can with any propriety of Speech be applied to
Power, it may be attributed to the Power, that is in a Man, to
produce, or forbear producing Motion in parts of his Body, by
choice or preference; which is that which denominates him free,
30 and is Freedom it self. But if any one should ask, whether Freedom
were free, he would be suspected, not to understand well what he
said; and he would be thought to deserve Midas's Ears, who know-
ing that Rich was a denomination from the possession of Riches,
should demand whether Riches themselves were rich.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 242
§ 17.

However the name Faculty, which Men have given to this

Power call'd the Will, and whereby they have been led into a way of
talking of the Will as acting, may, by an appropriation that dis-
guises its true sense, serve a little to palliate the absurdity; yet the
5 Will in truth, signifies nothing but a Power, or Ability, to prefer or
chuse: And when the Will, under the name of a Faculty, is considered,
as it is, barely as an ability to do something, the absurdity, in
saying it is free, or not free, will easily discover it self. For if it be

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 reasonable to suppose and talk of Faculties, as distinct Beings, that
10 can act, (as we do, when we say the Will orders, and the Will is
free,) 'tis fit that we should make a speaking Faculty, and a walking
Faculty, and a dancing Faculty, by which those Actions are produced,
which are but several Modes of Motion; as well as we make the
Will and Understanding to be Faculties, by which the Actions of
15 Chusing and Perceiving are produced, which are but several
Modes of Thinking: And we may as properly say, that 'tis the
singing Faculty sings, and the dancing Faculty dances; as that the
Will chuses, or that the Understanding conceives; or, as is usual,
that the Will directs the Understanding, or the Understanding
20 obeys, or obeys not the Will: It being altogether as proper and
intelligible to say, that the power of Speaking directs the power of
Singing, or the power of Singing obeys or disobeys the power of
Speaking.

§ 18.

This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as

25 I guess, produced great confusion. For these being all different
Powers in the Mind, or in the Man, to do several Actions, he exerts
them as he thinks fit: But the power to do one Action, is not
operated on by the power of doing another Action. For the power
of Thinking operates not on the power of Chusing, nor the power
30 of Chusing on the power of Thinking; no more than the power of
Dancing operates on the power of Singing, or the power of Singing
on the power of Dancing, as any one, who reflects on it, will easily
perceive: And yet this is it which we say, when we thus speak, that
the Will operates on the Understanding, or the Understanding on the Will.

35 § 19.

I grant, that this or that actual Thought may be the

occasion of Volition, or exercising the power a Man has to chuse;

...........................................................................................................................
pg 243
or the actual choice of the Mind, the cause of actual thinking on this
or that thing: As the actual singing of such a Tune, may be the
occasion of dancing such a Dance, and the actual dancing of such a
Dance, the occasion of singing such a Tune. But in all these, it is not
5 one power that operates on another: But it is the Mind that operates,

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 and exerts these Powers; it is the Man that does the Action, it is the
Agent that has power, or is able to do. For Powers are Relations, not
Agents: And that which has the power, or not the power to operate, is that
alone, which is, or is not free, and not the Power it self: For Freedom,
10 or not Freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has, or has not a
power to act.

§ 20.

The attributing to Faculties, that which belonged not to

them, has given occasion to this way of talking: but the introduc-
ing into Discourses concerning the Mind, with the name of Faculties,
15 a Notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our
Knowledge in that part of our selves, as the great use and mention
of the like invention of Faculties, in the operations of the Body, has
helped us in the knowledge of Physick. Not that I deny there are
Faculties both in the Body and Mind: they both of them have their
20 powers of Operating, else neither the one nor the other could
operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and
that is not able to operate, that has no power to operate. Nor do I
deny, that those Words, and the like, are to have their place in the
common use of Languages, that have made them currant. It looks
25 like too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and Philosophy it
self, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet when it appears in
publick, must have so much Complacency, as to be cloathed in the
ordinary Fashion and Language of the Country, so far as it can
consist with Truth and Perspicuity. But the fault has been, that
30 Faculties have been spoken of, and represented, as so many
distinct Agents. For it being asked, what it was that digested
the Meat in our Stomachs? It was a ready, and very satisfactory
Answer, to say, That it was the digestive Faculty. What was it that
made any thing come out of the Body? The expulsive Faculty. What
35 moved? The Motive Faculty: And so in the Mind, the intellectual

...........................................................................................................................
pg 244
Faculty, or the Understanding, understood; and the elective Faculty,
or the Will, willed or commanded: which is in short to say, That the
ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and the
ability to understand, understood. For Faculty, Ability, and Power,
5 I think, are but different names of the same things: Which ways
of speaking, when put into more intelligible Words, will, I think,

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 amount to thus much; That Digestion is performed by something
that is able to digest; Motion by something able to move; and
Understanding by something able to understand. And in truth it
10 would be very strange, if it should be otherwise; as strange as it
would be for a Man to be free without being able to be free.

§ 21.

To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I think the

Question is not proper, whether the Will be free, but whether a Man be free.
Thus, I think,

15 1. That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his

Mind, preferring the existence of any Action, to the non-existence
of that Action, and, vice versâ, make it to exist, or not exist, so far
he is free. For if I can, by a thought, directing the motion of my
Finger, make it move, when it was at rest, or vice versâ, 'tis evident,
20 that in respect of that, I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my
Mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words, or silence,
I am at liberty to speak, or hold my peace: and as far as this Power
reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the determination of his own Thought
preferring either, so far is a Man free. For how can we think any one
25 freer than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as any
one can, by preferring any Action to its not being, or Rest to any
Action, produce that Action or Rest, so far can he do what he will.
For such a preferring of Action to its absence, is the willing of it:
and we can scarce tell how to imagine any Being freer, than to be
30 able to do what he wills. So that in respect of Actions, within the
reach of such a power in him, a Man seems as free, as 'tis possible for
Freedom to make him.

§ 22.

But the inquisitive Mind of Man, willing to shift off from

himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by
35 putting himself into a worse state, than that of fatal Necessity, is

...........................................................................................................................
pg 245
not content with this: Freedom, unless it reaches farther than this,
will not serve the turn: And it passes for a good Plea, that a Man is
not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act, what he

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 wills. Concerning a Man's Liberty there yet therefore is raised this
5 farther Question, Whether a Man be free to will; which, I think, is
what is meant, when it is disputed, Whether the will be free. And as
to that I imagine,

§ 23.

2. That Willing, or Volition being an Action, and Freedom

consisting in a power of acting, or not acting, a Man in respect of
10 willing, or the Act of Volition, when any Action in his power is once pro-
posed to his Thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason
whereof is very manifest: For it being unavoidable that the Action
depending on his Will, should exist, or not exist; and its existence,
or not existence, following perfectly the determination, and pref-
15 erence of his Will, he cannot avoid willing the existence, or not
existence, of that Action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the
one, or the other, i.e. prefer the one to the other: since one of them
must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the
choice and determination of his Mind, that is, by his willing it: for if
20 he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of
willing, a Man in such a case is not free: Liberty consisting in a
power to act, or not to act, which, in regard of Volition, a Man,
upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to
prefer the doing, or forbearance, of an Action in a Man's power,
25 which is once so proposed to his thoughts; a Man must necessarily
will the one, or the other of them, upon which preference, or voli-
tion, the action, or its forbearance, certainly follows, and is truly

...........................................................................................................................
pg 246
voluntary: But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two,
being that which he cannot avoid, a Man in respect of that act of
willing, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless Necessity
and Freedom can consist together, and a Man can be Free and
5 Bound at once.

§ 24.

This then is evident, That in all proposals of present Action,

a Man is not at liberty to will, or not to will, because he cannot forbear will-
ing: Liberty consisting in a power to act, or to forbear acting, and in
that only. For a Man that sits still, is said yet to be at liberty, because

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10 he can walk if he wills it. A Man that walks is at liberty also, not
because he walks, or moves; but because he can stand still if he wills
it. But if a Man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he
is not at liberty; so likewise a Man falling down a precipice, though
in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion, if
15 he would. This being so, 'tis plain that a Man that is walking, to
whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether
he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or no: He
must necessarily prefer one, or t'other of them; walking or not walk-
ing: and so it is in regard of all other Actions in our power so pro-
20 posed, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast
number of voluntary Actions, that succeed one another every
moment that we are awake, in the course of our Lives, there are
but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the Will, 'till
the time they are to be done: And in all such Actions, as I have
25 shewn, the Mind in respect of willing has not a power to act, or not
to act, wherein consists Liberty: The Mind in that case has not
a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some determination con-
cerning them, let the Consideration be as short, the Thought as
quick, as it will, it either leaves the Man in the state he was before
30 thinking, or changes it; continues the Action, or puts an end to it.
Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one in preference
to, or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continua-
tion, or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 247
§ 25.

Since then it is plain, that in most cases a Man is not at

liberty, whether he will Will, or no; the next thing demanded is,
Whether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or
Rest. This Question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in it
5 self, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced, that Liberty
concerns not the Will. For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to
will either Motion, or Rest; Speaking, or Silence; which he pleases,
is to ask, whether a Man can will, what he wills; or be pleased with
what he is pleased with. A Question, which, I think, needs no
10 answer: and they, who can make a Question of it, must suppose one
Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determinate
that; and so on in infinitum.

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 § 26.

To avoid these, and the like absurdities, nothing can be of

greater use, than to establish in our Minds determined Ideas of the
15 things under Consideration. If the Ideas of Liberty, and Volition,
were well fixed in our Understandings, and carried along with us
in our Minds, as they ought, through all the Questions that are
raised about them, I suppose, a great part of the Difficulties, that
perplex Men's Thoughts, and entangle their Understandings,
20 would be much easier resolved; and we should perceive where the
confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing
caused the obscurity.

§ 27.

First then, it is carefully to be remembred, That Freedom

consists in the dependence of the Existence, or not Existence of any Action,
25 upon our Volition of it, and not in the dependence of any Action, or its
contrary, on our preference. A Man standing on a cliff, is at liberty to
leap twenty yards downwards into the Sea, not because he has a
power to do the contrary Action, which is to leap twenty yards
upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free, because he
30 has a power to leap, or not to leap. But if a greater force than his,
either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free
in that case: Because the doing, or forbearance of that particular

...........................................................................................................................
pg 248
Action, is no longer in his power. He that is a close Prisoner, in a
Room twenty foot-square, being at the North-side of his Chamber,
is at liberty to walk twenty foot Southward, because he can walk,
or not walk it: But is not, at the same time, at liberty, to do the
5 contrary; i.e. to walk twenty foot Northward.

In this then consists Freedom, (viz.) in our being able to act, or

not to act, according as we shall chuse, or will.

§ 28.

Secondly, We must remember, that Volition, or Willing, is an

act of the Mind directing its thought to the production of any
10 Action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid
multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word

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 Action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any Action proposed;
sitting still, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are pro-
pos'd, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determina-
15 tion of the Will, and being often as weighty in their consequences,
as the contrary Actions, may, on that consideration, well enough
pass for Actions too: But this I say, that I may not be mistaken, if
for brevity's sake I speak thus.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 249
§ 29.

Thirdly, The Will being nothing but a power in the Mind to

direct the operative Faculties of a Man to motion or rest, as far as
they depend on such direction. To the Question, what is it deter-
mines the Will? The true and proper Answer is, The mind. For that
5 which determines the general power of directing, to this or that
particular direction, is nothing but the Agent it self Exercising the
power it has, that particular way. If this Answer satisfies not, 'tis
plain the meaning of the Question, what determines the Will? is this,
What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its
10 general power of directing, to this or that particular Motion or
Rest? And to this I answer, The motive, for continuing in the same
State or Action, is only the present satisfaction in it; The motive to
change, is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the
change of State, or upon any new Action, but some uneasiness. This is
15 the great motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action,
which for shortness sake we will call determining of the Will, which I
shall more at large explain.

§ 30.

But in the way to it, it will be necessary to premise, that

though I have above endeavoured to express the Act of Volition, by
20 chusing, preferring, and the like Terms, that signify Desire as well as
Volition, for want of other words to mark that Act of the mind,
whose proper Name is Willing or Volition; yet it being a very simple
Act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it
by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it does, when it
25 wills, than by any variety of articulate sounds whatsoever. This
Caution of being careful not to be misled by Expressions, that do not

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 enough keep up the difference between the Will, and several Acts
of the mind, that are quite distinct from it, I think the more neces-
sary: Because I find the Will often confounded with several of the
30 Affections, especially Desire; and one put for the other, and that by
Men, who would not willingly be thought, not to have had very

...........................................................................................................................
pg 250
distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about
them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and
mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be
avoided. For he, that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what
5 passes in his mind, when he wills, shall see, that the will or power of
Volition is conversant about nothing, but our own Actions; ter-
minates there; and reaches no farther; and that Volition is nothing,
but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by
a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop
10 to any Action, which it takes to be in its power. This well con-
sidered plainly shews, that the Will is perfectly distinguished from
Desire, which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary
tendency from that which our Wills sets us upon. A Man, whom I
cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which at
15 the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him.
In this case, 'tis plain the Will and Desire run counter. I will the
Action, that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and
that the direct contrary. A Man, who by a violent Fit of the Gout in
his Limbs, finds a doziness in his Head, or a want of appetite in his
20 Stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his Feet or
Hands (for where-ever there is pain there is a desire to be rid of it)
though yet, whilst he apprehends, that the removal of the pain may
translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never
determin'd to any one Action, that may serve to remove this pain.
25 Whence it is evident, that desiring and willing are two distinct Acts
of the mind; and consequently that the Will, which is but the power
of Volition, is much more distinct from Desire.

§ 31.

To return then to the Enquiry, what is it that determines the

Will in regard to our Actions? And that upon second thoughts I am
30 apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in
view: But some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 251
a Man is at present under. This is that which successively deter-
mines the Will, and sets us upon those Actions, we perform. This
Uneasiness we may call, as it is, Desire; which is an uneasiness of the
Mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body of what
5 sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness: And with this is
always join'd Desire, equal to the pain or uneasiness felt; and is
scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an
uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt,
ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call
10 it desire, no body feeling pain, that he wishes not to be eased of, with
a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this
desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good, and
here also the desire and uneasiness is equal. As much as we desire any
absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good
15 does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledg'd to
have, cause pain equal to that greatness; as all pain causes desire
equal to it self: Because the absence of good is not always a pain, as
the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked
on, and considered without desire. But so much as there is any where
20 of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

§ 32.

That Desire is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects

on himself, will quickly find. Who is there, that has not felt in
Desire, what the Wise-man says of Hope, (which is not much
different from it) that it being deferr'd makes the Heart sick,* and that
25 still proportionable to the greatness of the Desire, which sometimes
raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes People cry out, Give
me Children, give me the thing desir'd, or I die?** Life it self, and all
its Enjoyments, is a burden cannot be born under the lasting and
unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 252
§ 33.

Good and Evil, present and absent, 'tis true, work upon
the mind: But that which immediately determines the Will, from
time to time, to every voluntary Action, is the uneasiness of desire,

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 fixed on some absent good, either negative, as indolency to one in
5 pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneasiness,
that determines the Will to the successive voluntary actions,
whereof the greatest part of our Lives is made up, and by which we
are conducted through different courses to different ends, I shall
endeavour to shew both from Experience, and the reason of the
10 thing.

§ 34.

When a Man is perfectly content with the State he is in,

which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness, what industry,
what action, what Will is there left, but to continue in it? of this
every Man's observation will satisfy him. And thus we see our All-
15 wise Maker, suitable to our constitution and frame, and knowing
what it is that determines the Will, has put into Man the uneasiness
of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their
Seasons, to move and determine their Wills, for the preservation of
themselves, and the continuation of their Species. For I think we
20 may conclude, that, if the bare contemplation of these good ends,
to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses, had been
sufficient to determine the will, and set us on work, we should have
had none of these natural pains, and perhaps in this World, little or
no pain at all. It is better to marry than to burn, says St. Paul;* where
25 we may see, what it is, that chiefly drives Men into the enjoyments
of a conjugal life. A little burning felt pushes us more powerfully,
than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure.

§ 35.

It seems so establish'd and settled a maxim by the general

consent of all Mankind, That good, the greater good, determines
30 the will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I first publish'd my

...........................................................................................................................
pg 253
thoughts on this Subject, I took it for granted; and I imagine, that
by a great many I shall be thought more excusable, for having then
done so, than that now I have ventur'd to recede from so received
an Opinion. But yet upon a stricter enquiry, I am forced to con-
5 clude, that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknow-
ledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised

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 proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. Convince a
Man never so much, that plenty has its advantages over poverty;
make him see and own, that the handsome conveniencies of life are
10 better than nasty penury: yet as long as he is content with the
latter, and finds no uneasiness in it, he moves not; his will never is
determin'd to any action, that shall bring him out of it. Let a Man
be never so well perswaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as
necessary to a Man, who has any great aims in this World, or hopes
15 in the next, as food to life: yet till he hungers and thirsts after righteous-
ness;* till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be
determin'd to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good;
but any other uneasinesses he feels in himself, shall take place, and
carry his will to other actions. On the other side, let a Drunkard see,
20 that his Health decays, his Estate wastes; Discredit and Diseases,
and the want of all things, even of his beloved Drink, attends him
in the course he follows: yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his
Companions; the habitual thirst after his Cups, at the usual time,
drives him to the Tavern, though he has in his view the loss of
25 health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life: the least
of which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he confesses, is far
greater, than the tickling of his palate with a glass of Wine, or the
idle chat of a soaking Club. 'Tis not for want of viewing the greater
good: for he sees, and acknowledges it, and in the intervals of his
30 drinking hours, will take resolutions to pursue the greater good;
but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns, the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 254
greater acknowledged good loses its hold, and the present uneasiness
determines the will to the accustomed action; which thereby gets
stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion, though he at
the same time makes secret promises to himself, that he will do so
5 no more; this is the last time he will act against the attainment of
those greater goods. And thus he is, from time to time, in the State
of that unhappy Complainer, Video meliora proboque, Deteriora
sequor:* which Sentence, allowed for true, and made good by con-
stant Experience, may this, and possibly no other, way be easily
10 made intelligible.

§ 36.

If we enquire into the reason of what Experience makes so

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 evident in fact, and examine why 'tis uneasiness alone operates on
the will, and determines it in its choice, we shall find, that we being
capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once,
15 the present uneasiness, that we are under, does naturally determine
the will, in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our
actions: For as much as whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot
apprehend our selves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and uneasiness
being, by every one, concluded, and felt, to be inconsistent with
20 happiness; spoiling the relish, even of those good things which we
have: a little pain serving to marr all the pleasure we rejoyced in.
And therefore that, which of course determines the choice of our
will to the next action, will always be the removing of pain, as
long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step towards
25 happiness.

§ 37.

Another reason why 'tis uneasiness alone determines the will,

may be this. Because that alone is present, and 'tis against the nature
of things, that what is absent should operate, where it is not. It
may be said, that absent good may by contemplation be brought
30 home to the mind, and made present. The Idea of it indeed may be
in the mind, and view'd as present there: but nothing will be in the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 255
mind as a present good, able to counter-balance the removal of any
uneasiness, which we are under, till it raises our desire, and the
uneasiness of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till
then the Idea in the mind of whatever good, is there only like other
5 Ideas, the object of bare unactive speculation; but operates not on
the will, nor sets us on work: the reason whereof I shall shew by and
by. How many are to be found, that have had lively representations
set before their minds of the unspeakable joys of Heaven, which
they acknowledge both possible and probable too, who yet would
10 be content to take up with their happiness here? and so the pre-
vailing uneasinesses of their desires, let loose after the enjoyments of
this life, take their turns in the determining their wills, and all that
while they take not one step, are not one jot moved, towards the
good things of another life considered as never so great.

15

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 § 38.

Were the will determin'd by the views of good, as it appears

in Contemplation greater or less to the understanding, which is the
State of all absent good, and that, which in the received Opinion
the will is supposed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not see
how it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal Joys of Heaven,
20 once propos'd and consider'd as possible. For all absent good, by
which alone barely propos'd, and coming in view, the will is thought
to be determin'd, and so to set us on action, being only possible,
but not infallibly certain, 'tis unavoidable, that the infinitely
greater possible good should regularly and constantly determine
25 the will in all the successive actions it directs; and then we should
keep constantly and steadily in our course towards Heaven,
without ever standing still, or directing our actions to any other
end: The eternal condition of a future state infinitely out-weighing
the Expectation of Riches, or Honour, or any other worldly
30 pleasure, which we can propose to our selves, though we should
grant these the more probable to be attain'd: For nothing future is

...........................................................................................................................
pg 256
yet in possession, and so the expectation even of these may deceive
us. If it were so, that the greater good in view determines the will,
so great a good once propos'd could not but seize the will, and hold
it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good, without ever
5 letting it go again: For the will having a power over, and directing
the thoughts, as well as other actions, would, if it were so, hold the
contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.

This would be the state of the mind, and regular tendency of the
will in all its determinations, were it determin'd by that, which is
10 consider'd, and in view the greater good; but that it is not so is
visible in Experience. The infinitely greatest confessed good being
often neglected, to satisfy the successive uneasiness of our desires
pursuing trifles. But though the greatest allowed, even everlasting
unspeakable good, which has sometimes moved, and affected the
15 mind, does not stedfastly hold the will, yet we see any very great,
and prevailing uneasiness, having once laid hold on the will, lets it not
go; by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the
will. Thus any vehement pain of the Body; the ungovernable
passion of a Man violently in love; or the impatient desire of

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20 revenge, keeps the will steady and intent; and the will thus deter-
mined never lets the Understanding lay by the object, but all the
thoughts of the Mind, and powers of the Body are uninterruptedly
employ'd that way, by the determinations of the will, influenced by
that topping uneasiness, as long as it lasts; whereby it seems to me
25 evident, that the will, or power of setting us upon one action in
preference to all other, is determin'd in us, by uneasiness: and
whether this be not so, I desire every one to observe in himself.

§ 39.

I have hitherto chiefly instanced in the uneasiness of desire,

as that which determines the will. Because that is the chief, and
30 most sensible; and the will seldom orders any action, nor is there
any voluntary action performed, without some desire accompanying

...........................................................................................................................
pg 257
it; which I think is the reason why the will and desire are so often
confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which
makes up, or at least accompanies most of the other Passions, as
wholly excluded in the case. Aversion, Fear, Anger, Envy, Shame, etc.
5 have each their uneasiness too, and thereby influence the will. These
Passions are scarce any of them in life and practice, simple, and
alone, and wholly unmixed with others; though usually in discourse
and contemplation, that carries the name, which operates strongest,
and appears most in the present state of the mind. Nay there is, I
10 think, scarce any of the Passions to be found without desire join'd
with it. I am sure, where-ever there is uneasiness there is desire: For
we constantly desire happiness; and whatever we feel of uneasiness,
so much, 'tis certain, we want of happiness; even in our own
Opinion, let our state and condition otherwise be what it will.
15 Besides, the present moment not being our eternity, whatever our
enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and desire goes with
our foresight, and that still carries the will with it. So that even in
joy it self, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment
depends, is the desire to continue it, and fear to lose it: And when-
20 ever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind, the will
presently is by that determin'd to some new action, and the present
delight neglected.

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 § 40.

But we being in this World beset with sundry uneasinesses,

distracted with different desires, the next enquiry naturally will be,
25 which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the
next action? and to that the answer is, that ordinarily, which is the
most pressing of those, that are judged capable of being then
removed. For the will being the power of directing our operative
faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time be moved
30 towards what is judg'd at that time unattainable: That would be
to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to

...........................................................................................................................
pg 258
lose its labour; for so it is to act, for what is judg'd not attainable;
and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are
judg'd not capable of a Cure: They, in that case, put us not upon
endeavours. But these set a-part, the most important and urgent
5 uneasiness, we at that time feel, is that, which ordinarily determines
the will successively, in that train of voluntary actions, which make
up our lives. The greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action,
that is constantly felt; and for the most part determines the will in
its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us,
10 that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours,
and nothing else. For we producing nothing, by our willing it, but
some action in our power, 'tis there the will terminates, and reaches
no farther.

§ 41.

If it be farther asked, what 'tis moves desire? I answer hap-

15 piness and that alone. Happiness and Misery are the names of two
extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; 'tis what Eye
hath not seen, Ear hath not heard, nor hath it entred into the Heart of Man to
conceive.* But of some degrees of both, we have very lively impres-
sions, made by several instances of Delight and Joy on the one side;
20 and Torment and Sorrow on the other; which, for shortness sake,
I shall comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain, there
being pleasure and pain of the Mind, as well as the Body: With him
is fullness of Joy, and Pleasure for evermore:** Or to speak truly, they
are all of the Mind; though some have their rise in the Mind from
25 Thought, others in the Body from certain modifications of Motion.

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 § 42.

Happiness then in its full extent is the utmost Pleasure we

are capable of, and Misery the utmost Pain: And the lowest degree
of what can be called Happiness, is so much ease from all Pain, and
so much present Pleasure, as without which any one cannot be
30 content. Now because Pleasure and Pain are produced in us, by the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 259
operation of certain Objects, either on our Minds or our Bodies;
and in different degrees: therefore what has an aptness to produce
Pleasure in us, is that we call Good, and what is apt to produce Pain
in us, we call Evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness to pro-
5 duce Pleasure and Pain in us, wherein consists our Happiness and
Misery. Farther, though what is apt to produce any degree of
Pleasure, be in it self good; and what is apt to produce any degree of
Pain, be evil; yet it often happens, that we do not call it so, when it
comes in competition with a greater of its sort; because when they
10 come in competition the degrees also of Pleasure and Pain have
justly a preference. So that if we will rightly estimate what we call
Good and Evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison: For the
cause of every less degree of Pain, as well as every greater degree of
Pleasure has the nature of good, and vice versâ.

15 § 43.

Though this be that, which is called good and evil; and all
good be the proper object of Desire in general; yet all good, even
seen, and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every
particular Man's desire; but only that part, or so much of it, as is
consider'd, and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness. All
20 other good however great in reality, or appearance, excites not a
Man's desires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness,
wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfie himself. Happi-
ness, under this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires what
makes any part of it: Other things, acknowledged to be good, he
25 can look upon without desire; pass by, and be content without.
There is no Body, I think, so sensless as to deny, that there is
pleasure in Knowledge: And for the pleasures of Sense, they have
too many followers to let it be question'd whether Men are taken
with them or no. Now let one Man place his satisfaction in sensual

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30 Pleasures, another in the delight of Knowledge: Though each of
them cannot but confess, there is great Pleasure in what the other

...........................................................................................................................
pg 260
pursues; yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his
happiness, their desires are not moved, but each is satisfied without
what the other enjoys, and so his will is not determined to the
pursuit of it. But yet as soon as the studious Man's hunger and
5 thirst makes him uneasie, he whose will was never determined to any
pursuit of good chear, poinant Sauces, or delicious Wine by the
pleasant tast he has found in them, is, by the uneasiness of Hunger
and Thirst, presently determined to Eating and Drinking; though
possibly with great indifferency, what wholesome Food comes in
10 his way. And on the other side, the Epicure buckles to study, when
shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his Mistress, shall
make him uneasie in the want of any sort of Knowledge. Thus, how
much soever Men are in earnest, and constant in pursuit of happi-
ness; yet they may have a clear view of good, great and confessed
15 good, without being concern'd for it, or moved by it, if they think
they can make up their happiness without it. Though, as to pain,
that they are always concern'd for; they can feel no uneasiness
without being moved. And therefore being uneasie in the want of
whatever is judged necessary to their Happiness, as soon as any
20 good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness, they
begin to desire it.

§ 44.

This, I think, any one may observe in himself, and others,

that the greater visible good does not always raise Men's desires in
proportion to the greatness, it appears, and is acknowledged to
25 have: Though every little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to
get rid of it. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our
happiness and misery it self. All present pain, whatever it be, makes a
part of our present misery: But all absent good does not at any time
make a necessary part of our present happiness, nor the absence of it
30 make a part of our misery. If it did, we should be constantly and
infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness, which

...........................................................................................................................
pg 261
are not in our possession. All uneasiness therefore being removed, a

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 moderate portion of good serves at present to content Men; and
some few degrees of Pleasure in a succession of ordinary Enjoy-
ments make up a happiness, wherein they can be satisfied. If this
5 were not so, there could be no room for those indifferent, and
visibly trifling actions, to which our wills are so often determined;
and wherein we voluntarily wast so much of our Lives; which
remissness could by no means consist with a constant determination
of will or desire to the greatest apparent good. That this is so, I
10 think, few People need go far from home to be convinced. And
indeed in this life there are not many, whose happiness reaches so
far, as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean Pleasures,
without any mixture of uneasiness; and yet they could be content
to stay here for ever: Though they cannot deny, but that it is
15 possible, there may be a state of eternal durable Joys after this life,
far surpassing all the good is to be found here. Nay they cannot but
see, that it is more possible, than the attainment, and continuation
of that pittance of Honour, Riches, or Pleasure, which they pursue;
and for which they neglect that eternal State: But yet in full view of
20 this difference, satisfied of the possibility of a perfect, secure, and
lasting happiness in a future State, and under a clear conviction,
that it is not to be had here, whilst they bound their happiness
within some little enjoyment, or aim of this life, and exclude the
joys of Heaven from making any necessary part of it, their desires
25 are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills
determin'd to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.

§ 45.

The ordinary necessities of our lives, fill a great part of

them with the uneasiness of Hunger, Thirst, Heat, Cold, Weariness with
labour, and Sleepiness in their constant returns, etc. To which, if
30 besides accidental harms, we add the fantastical uneasiness, (as itch
after Honour, Power, or Riches, etc.) which acquir'd habits by Fashion,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 262
Example, and Education have setled in us, and a thousand other
irregular desires, which custom has made natural to us, we shall
find, that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these
uneasinesses, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent
5 good. We are seldom at ease, and free enough from the sollicitation
of our natural or adopted desires, but a constant succession of

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 uneasinesses out of that stock, which natural wants, or acquired
habits have heaped up, take the will in their turns; and no sooner is
one action dispatch'd, which by such a determination of the will we
10 are set upon, but another uneasiness is ready to set us on work. For
the removing of the pains we feel, and are at present pressed with,
being the getting out of misery, and consequently the first thing
to be done in order to happiness, absent good, though thought on,
confessed, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this
15 unhappiness in its absence, is jostled out, to make way for the
removal of those uneasinesses we feel, till due, and repeated Contem-
plation has brought it nearer to our Mind, given some relish of it,
and raised in us some desire; which then beginning to make a part
of our present uneasiness, stands upon fair terms with the rest, to be
20 satisfied, and so according to its greatness, and pressure, comes in
its turn to determine the will.

§ 46.

And thus, by a due consideration and examining any good

proposed, it is in our power, to raise our desires, in a due proportion
to the value of that good, whereby in its turn, and place, it may
25 come to work upon the will, and be pursued. For good, though
appearing, and allowed never so great, yet till it has raised desires
in our Minds, and thereby made us uneasie in its want, it reaches not
our wills; we are not within the Sphere of its activity; our wills being
under the determination only of those uneasinesses, which are present
30 to us, which, (whilst we have any) are always solliciting, and ready
at hand to give the will its next determination. The balancing,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 263
when there is any in the Mind, being only, which desire shall be
next satisfied, which uneasiness first removed. Whereby it comes to
pass, that as long as any uneasiness, any desire remains in our Mind,
there is no room for good, barely as such, to come at the will, or at all
5 to determine it. Because, as has been said, the first step in our
endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the confines
of misery, and to feel no part of it, the will can be at leisure for
nothing else, till every uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed:
which in the multitude of wants, and desires, we are beset with in
10 this imperfect State, we are not like to be ever freed from in this
World.

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 § 47.

There being in us a great many uneasinesses always solliciting,

and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the
greatest, and most pressing should determine the will to the next
15 action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For the
mind having in most cases, as is evident in Experience, a power to
suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all,
one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them;
examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies
20 the liberty Man has; and from the not using of it right comes all that
variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into, in the
conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we
precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon
before due Examination. To prevent this we have a power to suspend
25 the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily may
Experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty;
in this seems to consist that, which is (as I think improperly) call'd
Free will. For during this suspension of any desire, before the will be
determined to action, and the action (which follows that deter-
30 mination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge,
of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due

...........................................................................................................................
pg 264
Examination, we have judg'd, we have done our duty, all that we
can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and 'tis not a fault,
but a perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to
the last result of a fair Examination.

5 § 48.

This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of

Freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: 'tis not an
Abridgment, 'tis the end and use of our Liberty; and the farther we
are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to Misery
and Slavery. A perfect Indifferency in the Mind, not determinable by
10 its last judgment of the Good or Evil, that is thought to attend its
Choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of
any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an imperfection,
as the want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by
the Will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A Man is at

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15 liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head, or let it rest quiet: He is
perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection
in him, if he wanted that Power, if he were deprived of that In-
differency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the
same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his Hand,
20 or its remaining in rest, when it would save his Head or Eyes from a
blow he sees coming: 'tis as much a perfection, that desire or the power of
Preferring should be determined by Good, as that the power of Acting
should be determined by the Will, and the certainer such determin-
ation is, the greater is the perfection. Nay were we determined by
25 any thing but the last result of our own Minds, judging of the good
or evil of any action, we were not free, the very end of our Freedom
being, that we might attain the good we chuse. And therefore every
Man is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent
Being, to be determined in willing by his own Thought and Judg-
30 ment, what is best for him to do: else he would be under the
determination of some other than himself, which is want of Liberty.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 265
And to deny, that a Man's will, in every determination, follows his
own Judgment, is to say, that a Man wills and acts for an end that
he would not have at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if
he prefers it in his present Thoughts before any other, 'tis plain he
5 then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other, unless
he can have, and not have it; will and not will it at the same time;
a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted.

§ 49.

If we look upon those superiour Beings above us, who enjoy

perfect Happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more
10 steadily determined in their choice of Good than we; and yet we have no
reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if
it were fit for such poor finite Creatures as we are, to pronounce
what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think, we might say,
That God himself cannot choose what is not good; the Freedom of
15 the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.

§ 50.

But to give a right view of this mistaken part of Liberty,

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 let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less
determined, by wise Considerations, than a wise Man? Is it worth
the Name of Freedom to be at liberty to play the Fool, and draw
20 Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the
conduct of Reason, and to want that restraint of Examination and
Judgment, which keeps us from chusing or doing the worse, be
Liberty, true Liberty, mad Men and Fools are the only Freemen:
But yet, I think, no Body would chuse to be mad for the sake of
25 such Liberty, but he that is mad already. The constant desire of
Happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no Body,
I think, accounts an abridgment of Liberty, or at least an abridg-
ment of Liberty to be complain'd of. God Almighty himself is under
the necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent Being is
30 so, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness.
That in this state of Ignorance we short-sighted Creatures might

...........................................................................................................................
pg 266
not mistake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to suspend
any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will, and
engaging us in action. This is standing still, where we are not
sufficiently assured of the way: Examination is consulting a guide.
5 The determination of the will upon enquiry is following the direction
of that Guide: And he that has a power to act, or not to act according
as such determination directs, is a free Agent; such determination
abridges not that Power wherein Liberty consists. He that has his
Chains knocked off, and the Prison-doors set open to him, is
10 perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes;
though his preference be determined to stay, by the darkness of the
Night, or illness of the Weather, or want of other Lodging. He
ceases not to be free; though the desire of some convenience to be
had there, absolutely determines his preference, and makes him
15 stay in his Prison.

§ 51.

As therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature,

lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so
the care of our selves, that we mistake not imaginary for real
happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty. The stronger
20 ties, we have, to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general,
which is our greatest good, and which as such our desires always

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 follow, the more are we free from any necessary determination of
our will to any particular action, and from a necessary compliance
with our desire, set upon any particular, and then appearing
25 preferable good, till we have duly examin'd, whether it has a
tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real happiness; and there-
fore till we are as much inform'd upon this enquiry, as the weight of
the matter, and the nature of the case demands, we are by the neces-
sity of prefering and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good,
30 obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desire in particular cases.

§ 52.

This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual

Beings in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution

...........................................................................................................................
pg 267
of true felicity, that they can suspend this prosecution in particular
cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves,
whether that particular thing, which is then proposed, or desired,
lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which
5 is their greatest good. For the inclination, and tendency of their
nature to happiness is an obligation, and motive to them, to take
care not to mistake, or miss it; and so necessarily puts them upon
caution, deliberation, and wariness, in the direction of their par-
ticular actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever neces-
10 sity determines to the pursuit of real Bliss, the same necessity, with
the same force establishes suspence, deliberation, and scrutiny of each
successive desire, whether the satisfaction of it, does not interfere
with our true happiness, and mislead us from it. This as seems to
me is the great privilege of finite intellectual Beings; and I desire it
15 may be well consider'd, whether the great inlet, and exercise of all
the liberty Men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and
that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this,
that they can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining
their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examin'd the
20 good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires.
This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our
duty, and all that is in our power; and indeed all that needs. For,
since the will supposes knowledge to guide its choice, all that we
can do, is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examin'd the
25 good and evil of what we desire. What follows after that, follows in

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 a chain of Consequences linked one to another, all depending on the
last determination of the Judgment, which whether it shall be upon
an hasty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature Examina-
tion, is in our power; Experience shewing us, that in most cases we
30 are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire.

§ 53.

But if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens)

possesses our whole Mind, as when the pain of the Rack, an

...........................................................................................................................
pg 268
impetuous uneasiness, as of Love, Anger, or any other violent Passion,
running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we
are not Masters enough of our own Minds to consider throughly,
and examine fairly; God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness,
5 and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and sees what was,
and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful
Father. But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our
desires, the moderation and restraint of our Passions, so that our
Understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed give
10 its judgment, being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct
to true Happiness depends; 'tis in this we should employ our chief
care and endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the relish
of our Minds to the true intrinsick good or ill, that is in things; and
not permit an allow'd or supposed possible great and weighty good
15 to slip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, any desire
of it self there, till, by a due consideration of its true worth, we have
formed appetites in our Minds suitable to it, and made our selves
uneasie in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. And how much
this is in every ones power, every one by making resolutions to
20 himself, such as he may keep, is easie for every one to try. Nor let
any one say, he cannot govern his Passions, nor hinder them from
breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do
before a Prince, or a great Man, he can do alone, or in the presence
of God, if he will.

25 § 54.

From what has been said, it is easie to give an account, how

it comes to pass, that though all Men desire Happiness, yet their

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 wills carry them so contrarily, and consequently some of them to what
is Evil. And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices, that
Men make in the World, do not argue, that they do not all pursue
30 Good; but that the same thing is not good to every Man alike. This
variety of pursuits shews, that every one does not place his happi-
ness in the same thing, or chuse the same way to it. Were all the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 269
Concerns of Man terminated in this Life, why one followed Study
and Knowledge, and another Hawking and Hunting; why one
chose Luxury and Debauchery, and another Sobriety and Riches,
would not be, because every one of these did not aim at his own
5 happiness; but because their Happiness was placed in different things.
And therefore 'twas a right Answer of the Physician to his Patient,
that had sore Eyes. If you have more Pleasure in the Taste of Wine,
than in the use of your Sight, Wine is good for you; but if the
Pleasure of Seeing be greater to you, than that of Drinking, Wine is
10 naught.

§ 55.

The Mind has a different relish, as well as the Palate; and

you will as fruitlesly endeavour to delight all Men with Riches or
Glory, (which yet some Men place their Happiness in,) as you
would to satisfy all Men's Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which,
15 though very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others
extremely nauseous and offensive: And many People would with
Reason preferr the griping of an hungry Belly, to those Dishes,
which are a Feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the Philo-
sophers of old did in vain enquire, whether Summum bonum consisted
20 in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And
they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish
were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided
themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not
on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or that
25 particular Palate, wherein there is great variety: So the greatest
Happiness consists, in the having those things, which produce the
greatest Pleasure; and in the absence of those, which cause any
disturbance, any pain. Now these, to different Men, are very
different things. If therefore Men in this Life only have hope; if in
30 this Life they can only enjoy, 'tis not strange, nor unreasonable,

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 that they should seek their Happiness by avoiding all things, that
disease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them; wherein

...........................................................................................................................
pg 270
it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. For if there be no
Prospect beyond the Grave, the inference is certainly right, Let us
eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to morrow we shall
die.* This, I think, may serve to shew us the Reason, why, though
5 all Men's desires tend to Happiness, yet they are not moved by the
same Object. Men may chuse different things, and yet all chuse
right, supposing them only like a Company of poor Insects, whereof
some are Bees, delighted with Flowers, and their sweetness; others,
Beetles, delighted with other kind of Viands; which having
10 enjoyed for a season, they should cease to be, and exist no more
for ever.

§ 56.

These things duly weigh'd, will give us, as I think, a clear

view into the state of humane Liberty. Liberty 'tis plain consists in
a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing as we will.
15 This cannot be deny'd. But this seeming to comprehend only the
actions of a Man consecutive to volition, it is farther enquired,
whether he be at Liberty to will, or no? and to this it has been
answered, that in most cases a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the
act of volition; he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action
20 proposed, is made to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a case
wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of willing, and that is the
chusing of a remote Good as an end to be pursued. Here a Man may
suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against
the thing proposed, till he has examined, whether it be really of a
25 nature in it self and consequences to make him happy, or no. For
when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his
Happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably gives him
uneasiness, which determines his will, and sets him at work in
pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer. And here we may see
30 how it comes to pass, that a Man may justly incur punishment,
though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 271
he does, and necessarily does will that, which he then judges to be

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 good. For though his will be always determined by that, which is
judg'd good by his Understanding, yet it excuses him not: Because,
by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself
5 wrong measures of good and evil; which however false and falla-
cious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they
were true and right. He has vitiated his own Palate, and must be
answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it.
The eternal Law and Nature of things must not be alter'd to comply
10 with his ill-order'd choice. If the neglect or abuse of the Liberty he
had, to examine what would really and truly make for his Happiness,
misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it, must be imputed
to his own election. He had a Power to suspend his determination:
It was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own
15 Happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never
judge, that it was better to be deceived, than not, in a matter of so
great and near concernment.

What has been said, may also discover to us the Reason, why Men
in this World prefer different things, and pursue Happiness by
20 contrary Courses. But yet since Men are always constant, and in
earnest, in matter of Happiness and Misery, the Question still
remains, How Men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to
chuse that, which, by their own Confession, has made them
miserable.

25 § 57.

To account for the various and contrary ways Men take,

though all aim at being happy, we must consider, whence the
various uneasinesses, that determine the will in the preference of each
voluntary action, have their rise.

1. Some of them come from causes not in our power, such as are
30 often the pains of the Body from want, disease, or outward injuries,
as the rack, etc. which when present, and violent, operate for the
most part forcibly on the will, and turn the courses of Men's lives

...........................................................................................................................
pg 272
from Virtue, Piety, and Religion, and what before they judged to
lead to happiness; every one not endeavouring, or through disuse,
not being able by the contemplation of remote, and future good, to

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 raise in himself desires of them strong enough to counter-balance
5 the uneasiness, he feels in those bodily torments; and to keep his
will steady in the choice of those actions, which lead to future
Happiness. A neighbour Country has been of late a Tragical
Theatre, from which we might fetch instances, if there needed any,
and the World did not in all Countries and Ages furnish examples
10 enough to confirm that received observation, Necessitas cogit ad
Turpia, and therefore there is great reason for us to pray Lead us not
into Temptation.*

2. Other uneasinesses arise from our desires of absent good; which

desires always bear proportion to, and depend on the judgment we
15 make, and the relish we have of any absent good; in both which we
are apt to be variously misled, and that by our own fault.

§ 58.

In the first place, I shall consider the wrong judgments Men

make of future Good and Evil, whereby their desires are misled.
For as to present Happiness and Misery, when that alone comes in
20 consideration, and the consequences are quite removed, a Man
never chuses amiss; he knows what best pleases him, and that, he
actually prefers. Things in their present enjoyment are what they
seem; the apparent and real good are, in this case, always the same.
For the Pain or Pleasure being just so great, and no greater, than it
25 is felt, the present Good or Evil is really so much as it appears. And
therefore were every Action of ours concluded within it self, and
drew no Consequences after it, we should undoubtedly never err
in our choice of good; we should always infallibly prefer the best.
Were the pains of honest Industry, and of starving with Hunger
30 and Cold set together before us, no Body would be in doubt which
to chuse: were the satisfaction of a Lust, and the Joys of Heaven

...........................................................................................................................
pg 273
offered at once to any one's present Possession, he would not
balance, or err in the determination of his choice.

§ 59.

But since our voluntary Actions carry not all the Happiness
and Misery, that depend on them, along with them in their present

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5 performance; but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil, which
they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are
passed, and cease to be; our desires look beyond our present enjoy-
ments, and carry the Mind out to absent good, according to the
necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of
10 our Happiness. 'Tis our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its
attraction: without that we are not moved by absent good. For in
this narrow scantling of capacity, which we are accustomed to, and
sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once, which,
when all uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts, sufficient to make us
15 think our selves happy, 'tis not all remote, and even apparent good,
that affects us. Because the indolency and enjoyment we have,
sufficing for our present Happiness, we desire not to venture the
change: Since we judge that we are happy already, being content,
and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as soon as any
20 new uneasiness comes in, this Happiness is disturb'd, and we are
set afresh on work in the pursuit of Happiness.

§ 60.

Their aptness therefore to conclude, that they can be

happy without it, is one great occasion, that Men often are not
raised to the desire of the greatest absent good. For whilst such
25 thoughts possess them, the Joys of a future State move them not;
they have little concern or uneasiness about them; and the will,
free from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of
nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which
it then feels in its want of, and longings after them. Change but a
30 Man's view of these things; let him see, that Virtue and Religion
are necessary to his Happiness; let him look into the future State of
Bliss or Misery, and see there God the righteous Judge, ready to
render to every Man according to his Deeds; To them who by patient

...........................................................................................................................
pg 274
continuance in well-doing, seek for Glory, and Honour, and Immortality,
Eternal Life; but unto every Soul that doth Evil, Indignation and Wrath,
Tribulation and Anguish:* To him, I say, who hath a prospect of the
different State of perfect Happiness or Misery, that attends all Men
5 after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the measures of
Good and Evil, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For
since nothing of Pleasure and Pain in this Life, can bear any pro-

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 portion to endless Happiness, or exquisite Misery of an immortal
Soul hereafter, Actions in his Power will have their preference, not
10 according to the transient Pleasure, or Pain that accompanies, or
follows them here; but as they serve to secure that perfect durable
Happiness hereafter.

§ 61.

But to account more particularly for the Misery, that Men

often bring on themselves, notwithstanding that they do all in
15 earnest pursue Happiness, we must consider, how Things come to be
represented to our desires, under deceitful appearances: and that is by the
Judgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To see how far
this reaches, and what are the Causes of wrong Judgment, we must
remember, that things are judged good or bad in a double sense.
20 First, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely Pleasure
or Pain.
Secondly, But because not only present Pleasure and Pain, but that
also which is apt by its efficacy, or consequences, to bring it upon
us at a distance, is a proper Object of our desires, and apt to move a
25 Creature, that has foresight; therefore things also that draw after
them Pleasure and Pain, are considered as Good and Evil.

§ 62.

The wrong Judgment that misleads us, and makes the Will
often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various
Comparisons of these. The wrong Judgment I am here speaking of,
30 is not what one Man may think of the determination of another;
but what every Man himself must confess to be wrong. For since I
lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent Being really seeks

...........................................................................................................................
pg 275
Happiness, which consists in the enjoyment of Pleasure, without any
considerable mixture of uneasiness; 'tis impossible any one should
willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave
out any thing in his power, that would tend to his satisfaction, and
5 the compleating of his Happiness, but only by a wrong Judgment.
I shall not here speak of that mistake, which is the consequence of
invincible Error, which scarce deserves the Name of wrong Judg-
ment; but of that wrong Judgment, which every Man himself must

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 confess to be so.

10 § 63.

I. Therefore, as to present Pleasure and Pain, the Mind, as

has been said, never mistakes that which is really good or evil; that,
which is the greater Pleasure, or the greater Pain, is really just as it
appears. But though present Pleasure and Pain shew their difference
and degrees so plainly, as not to leave room for mistake; yet when
15 we compare present Pleasure or Pain with future, (which is usually the
case in the most important determinations of the Will) we often make
wrong Judgments of them, taking our measures of them in different
positions of distance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought
greater, than those of a larger size, that are more remote: And so it
20 is with Pleasures and Pains, the present is apt to carry it, and those
at a distance have the disadvantage in the Comparison. Thus most
Men, like spend-thrift Heirs, are apt to judge a little in Hand
better than a great deal to come; and so for small Matters in
Possession, part with great ones in Reversion. But that this is a
25 wrong Judgment every one must allow, let his Pleasure consist in
whatever it will: since that which is future, will certainly come to
be present; and then, having the same advantage of nearness, will
shew it self in its full dimensions, and discover his wilful mistake,
who judged of it by unequal measures. Were the Pleasure of
30 Drinking accompanied, the very moment a Man takes off his Glass,
with that sick Stomack, and aking Head, which, in some Men, are
sure to follow not many hours after, I think no body, whatever
Pleasure he had in his Cups, would, on these Conditions, ever let
Wine touch his Lips; which yet he daily swallows, and the evil side

...........................................................................................................................
pg 276
comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time.
But if Pleasure or Pain can be so lessened only by a few hours removal,
how much more will it be so, by a farther distance, to a Man, that
will not by a right judgment do what time will, i.e. bring it home
5 upon himself, and consider it as present, and there take its true
dimensions? This is the way we usually impose on our selves, in
respect of bare Pleasure and Pain, or the true degrees of Happiness
or Misery: The future loses its just proportion, and what is present,
obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wrong
10 Judgment, whereby the absent are not only lessened, but reduced

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 to perfect nothing; when Men enjoy what they can in present,
and make sure of that, concluding amiss, That no evil will thence
follow. For that lies not in comparing the greatness of future Good
and Evil, which is that we are here speaking of; but in another sort
15 of wrong Judgment, which is concerning Good or Evil, as it is con-
sidered to be the cause and procurement of Pleasure or Pain, that
will follow from it.

§ 64.

The cause of our judging amiss, when we compare our present

Pleasure or Pain with future, seems to me to be the weak and narrow
20 Constitution of our Minds. We cannot well enjoy two Pleasures at
once, much less any Pleasure almost, whilst Pain possesses us. The
present Pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all,
fills our narrow Souls, and so takes up the whole Mind, that it
scarce leaves any thought of things absent: Or if among our
25 Pleasures there are some, which are not strong enough, to exclude
the consideration of things at a distance; yet we have so great an
abhorrence of Pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our Pleasures:
A little bitter mingled in our Cup, leaves no relish of the sweet.
Hence it comes, that, at any rate, we desire to be rid of the present
30 Evil, which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal; because
under the present Pain we find not our selves capable of any the
least degree of Happiness. Mens daily complaints are a loud proof

...........................................................................................................................
pg 277
of this: The Pain that any one actually feels, is still of all other the
worst; and 'tis with anguish they cry out, Any rather than this;
nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer. And therefore our
whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent, to get rid of the
5 present Evil, before all things, as the first necessary condition to our
Happiness, let what will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think,
can exceed, or almost equal, the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon
us. And because the abstinence from a present Pleasure, that offers
it self, is a Pain, nay, oftentimes a very great one, the desire being
10 inflamed by a near and tempting Object; 'tis no wonder that that
operates after the same manner Pain does, and lessens in our
Thoughts, what is future; and so forces us, as it were, blindfold
into its embraces.

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 § 65.

Add to this, that absent good, or which is the same thing,

15 future pleasure, especially if of a sort which we are unacquainted
with, seldom is able to counter-balance any uneasiness, either of
pain or desire, which is present. For its greatness being no more,
than what shall be really tasted when enjoyed, Men are apt enough
to lessen that, to make it give place to any present desire; and
20 conclude with themselves, that when it comes to trial, it may
possibly not answer the report, or opinion, that generally passes
of it, they having often found, that not only what others have
magnified, but even what they themselves have enjoyed with great
pleasure and delight at one time, has proved insipid or nauseous at
25 another; and therefore they see nothing in it, for which they should
forego a present enjoyment. But that this is a false way of judging,
when apply'd to the Happiness of another life, they must confess,
unless they will say, God cannot make those happy he designs to
be so. For that being intended for a State of Happiness, it must
30 certainly be agreeable to every one's wish and desire: Could we
suppose their relishes as different there as they are here, yet the
Manna in Heaven will suit every one's Palate. Thus much of the
wrong Judgment we make of present and future Pleasure and Pain,
when they are compared together, and so the absent considered as
35 future.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 278
§ 66.

II. As to things good or bad in their Consequences, and by the

aptness is in them to procure us good or evil in the future, we judge
amiss several ways.

1. When we judge that so much evil does not really depend on

5 them, as in truth there does.

2. When we judge, that though the Consequence be of that

moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise
fall out; or else by some means be avoided, as by industry, address,
change, repentance, etc. That these are wrong ways of judging, were
10 easy to shew in every particular, if I would examine them at large

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 singly: But I shall only mention this in general, viz. That it is a
very wrong, and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater
Good, for a less, upon uncertain guesses, and before a due exami-
nation be made, proportionable to the weightiness of the matter,
15 and the concernment it is to us not to mistake. This, I think, every
one must confess, especially if he considers the usual Causes of this
wrong Judgment, whereof these following are some.

§ 67.

I. Ignorance: He that judges without informing himself to

the utmost that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amiss.

20 II. Inadvertency: When a Man overlooks even that, which he does

know. This is an affected and present Ignorance, which misleads
our Judgments, as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balan-
cing an account, and determining on which side the odds lies. If
therefore either side be hudled up in haste, and several of the Sums,
25 that should have gone into the reckoning, be overlook'd, and left
out, this Precipitancy causes as wrong a Judgment, as if it were a
perfect Ignorance. That which most commonly causes this, is the
prevalency of some present Pleasure or Pain, heightned by our
feeble passionate Nature, most strongly wrought on by what
30 is present. To check this Precipitancy, our Understanding and
Reason was given us, if we will make a right use of it, to search, and
see, and then judge thereupon. Without Liberty the Understanding
would be to no purpose: And without Understanding, Liberty (if
it could be) would signify nothing. If a Man sees, what would do

...........................................................................................................................
pg 279
him good or harm, what would make him happy or miserable,
without being able to move himself one step towards or from it,
what is he the better for seeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble
in perfect darkness, what is his liberty better than if he were driven
5 up and down, as a bubble by the force of the wind? The being
acted by a blind impulse from without, or from within, is little
odds. The first therefore and great use of Liberty, is to hinder blind
Precipitancy; the principal exercise of Freedom is to stand still,
open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequence of
10 what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter
requires. How much sloth and negligence, heat and passion, the

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 prevalency of fashion, or acquired indispositions, do severally
contribute on occasion, to these wrong Judgments, I shall not here
farther enquire. I shall only add one other false Judgment, which I
15 think necessary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice
of, though of great influence.

§ 68.

All Men desire Happiness, that's past doubt: but, as has

been already observed, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to
take up with any pleasure at hand, or that custom has endear'd to
20 them; to rest satisfied in that; and so being happy, till some new
desire by making them uneasy, disturbs that happiness, and shews
them, that they are not so, they look no farther; nor is the will
determined to any action in pursuit of any other known or apparent
good. For since we find, that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good, but
25 one excludes another; we do not fix our desires on every apparent
greater good, unless it be judged to be necessary to our happiness:
If we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is
another occasion to Men of judging wrong, when they take not that
to be necessary to their Happiness, which really is so. This mistake
30 misleads us both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often
in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But, which way ever
it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the
means, as not necessary to it, when a Man misses his great end
Happiness, he will acknowledge he judg'd not right. That which
35 contributes to this mistake is the real or suppos'd unpleasantness
of the actions, which are the way to this end; it seeming so

...........................................................................................................................
pg 280
preposterous a thing to Men, to make themselves unhappy in
order to Happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.

§ 69.

The last enquiry therefore concerning this matter is,

Whether it be in a Man's power to change the pleasantness, and
5 unpleasantness, that accompanies any sort of action? and to that,
it is plain in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their
palates, and give a relish to what either has, or they suppose has
none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the Body, and

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 like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a mistake to think, that Men
10 cannot change the displeasingness, or indifferency, that is in
actions, into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their
power. A due consideration will do it in some cases; and practice,
application, and custom in most. Bread or Tobacco may be neglec-
ted, where they are shewn to be useful to health, because of an in-
15 indifferency or disrelish to them; reason and consideration at first
recommends, and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes
them pleasant. That this is so in Vertue too, is very certain. Actions
are pleasing or displeasing, either in themselves, or consider'd as a
means to a greater and more desirable end. The eating of a well-
20 season'd dish, suited to a Man's palate, may move the Mind by the
delight it self, that accompanies the eating, without reference to any
other end: To which the consideration of the pleasure there is in
health and strength (to which that meat is subservient) may add a
new Gusto, able to make us swallow an ill relish'd potion. In the
25 latter of these, any action is rendred more or less pleasing, only by
the contemplation of the end, and the being more or less perswaded
of its tendency to it, or necessary connexion with it: But the pleasure
of the action it self is best acquir'd, or increased, by use and practice.
Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we looked on
30 with aversion; and by repetition wears us into a liking, of what
possibly, in the first essay, displeased us. Habits have powerful
charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into
what we accustom our selves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at
least be easy in the omission of actions, which habitual practice has
35 suited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very visible,
and every one's Experience shews him he can do; yet it is a part, in
the conduct of Men towards their Happiness, neglected to a degree,
that it will be possibly entertain'd as a Paradox, if it be said, that
Men can make things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves;

...........................................................................................................................
pg 281
and thereby remedy that, to which one may justly impute a great
deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common Opinion having
settled wrong Notions, and education and custom ill habits, the
just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of Men corrup-
5 ted. Pains should be taken to rectify these; and contrary habits
change our pleasures, and give a relish to that, which is necessary,
or conducive to our Happiness. This every one must confess he can
do, and when Happiness is lost, and misery overtakes him, he will

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 confess, he did amiss in neglecting it; and condemn himself for it:
10 And I ask every one whether he has not often done so?

§ 70.

I shall not now enlarge any farther on the wrong Judgments,

and neglect of what is in their power, whereby Men mislead them-
selves. This would make a Volume, and is not my business. But
whatever false notions, or shameful neglect of what is in their
15 power, may put Men out of their way to Happiness, and distract
them, as we see, into so different courses of life, this yet is certain,
that Morality, established upon its true Foundations, cannot but
determine the Choice in anyone, that will but consider: and he that
will not be so far a rational Creature, as to reflect seriously upon
20 infinite Happiness and Misery, must needs condemn himself, as not
making that use of his Understanding he should. The Rewards and
Punishments of another Life, which the Almighty has established,
as the Enforcements of his Law, are of weight enough to determine
the Choice, against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can shew,
25 when the eternal State is considered but in its bare possibility,
which no Body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite
and endless Happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good
Life here, and the contrary state the possible Reward of a bad one,
must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude,
30 That a vertuous Life, with the certain expectation of everlasting
Bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the
fear of that dreadful state of Misery, which 'tis very possible may
overtake the guilty; or at best the terrible uncertain hope of Anni-
hilation. This is evidently so, though the vertuous Life here had

...........................................................................................................................
pg 282
nothing but Pain, and the vicious continual pleasure: which yet is
for the most part quite otherwise, and wicked Men have not much
the odds to brag of, even in their present possession; nay, all things
rightly considered, have, I think even the worse part here. But when
5 infinite Happiness is put in one Scale, against infinite Misery in the
other; if the worst, that comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be
the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, Who
can without madness run the venture? Who in his Wits would
chuse to come within a possibility of infinite Misery, which if he
10 miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on

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 the other side, the sober Man ventures nothing against infinite
Happiness to be got, if his Expectation comes to pass. If the good
Man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not
miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in
15 the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable.
Must it not be a most manifest wrong Judgment, that does not
presently see, to which side, in this case, the preference is to be
given? I have foreborn to mention any thing of the certainty, or
probability of a future State, designing here to shew the wrong
20 Judgment, that any one must allow, he makes upon his own
Principles laid how he pleases, who prefers the short pleasures of a
vicious Life upon any consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot
but be certain, that a future Life is at least possible.

§ 71.

To conclude this enquiry into humane Liberty, which as it

25 stood before, I my self from the beginning fearing, and a very
judicious Friend of mine, since the publication suspecting, to have
some mistake in it, though he could not particularly shew it me,
I was put upon a stricter review of this Chapter. Wherein lighting
upon a very easy, and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting
30 one seemingly indifferent word for another, that discovery open'd
to me this present view, which here in this second Edition, I sub-
mit to the learned World, and which in short is this: Liberty is a
power to act or not to act according as the Mind directs. A power to
direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular in-
35 stances, is that which we call the Will. That which in the train of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 283
our voluntary actions determines the Will to any change of opera-
tion, is some present uneasiness, which is, or at least is always
accompanied with that of Desire. Desire is always moved by Evil, to
fly it: Because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary
5 part of our Happiness: But every Good, nay every greater Good does
not constantly move Desire, because it may not make, or may not
be taken to make any necessary part of our Happiness. For all that
we desire is only to be Happy. But though this general Desire of
Happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction
10 of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will
to any subservient action, till we have maturely examin'd, whether

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 the particular apparent good, which we then desire, makes a part of
our real Happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The
result of our judgment upon that Examination is what ultimately
15 determines the Man, who could not be free if his will were determin'd
by any thing, but his own desire guided by his own Judgment. I know
that Liberty by some, is placed in an indifferency of the Man, ante-
cedent to the determination of his Will. I wish they, who lay so
much stress on such an antecedent indifferency, as they call it, had told
20 us plainly, whether this supposed indifferency be antecedent to the
Thought and Judgment of the Understanding, as well as to the
decree of the Will. For it is pretty hard to state it between them;
i.e. immediately after the Judgment of the Understanding, and
before the determination of the Will, because the determination of
25 the Will immediately follows the Judgment of the Understanding;
and to place Liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to the Thought
and Judgment of the Understanding, seems to me to place Liberty
in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any thing
of it; at least it places it in a subject incapable of it, no Agent being
30 allowed capable of Liberty, but in consequence of Thought and
Judgment. I am not nice about Phrases, and therefore consent to
say with those that love to speak so, that Liberty is plac'd in
indifferency; but 'tis in an indifferency that remains after the Judgment
of the Understanding; yea, even after the determination of the
35 Will: And that is an indifferency not of the Man, (for after he has
once judg'd which is best, viz. to do, or forbear, he is no longer
indifferent,) but an indifferency of the operative Powers of the Man,
which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating

...........................................................................................................................
pg 284
after, as before the decree of the Will, are in a state, which, if one
pleases, may be called indifferency; and as far as this indifferency
reaches, a Man is free, and no farther, v.g. I have the Ability to move
my Hand, or to let it rest, that operative Power is indifferent to
5 move, or not to move my Hand: I am then in that respect perfectly
free. My Will determines that operative Power to rest, I am yet
free, because the indifferency of that my operative Power to act, or
not to act, still remains; the Power of moving my Hand, is not at all
impair'd by the determination of my Will, which at present orders
10 rest; the indifferency of that Power to act, or not to act, is just as it
was before, as will appear, if the Will puts it to the trial, by order-
ing the contrary. But if during the rest of my Hand, it be seized by

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 a sudden Palsy, the indifferency of that operative Power is gone, and
with it my Liberty: I have no longer Freedom in that respect, but
15 am under a Necessity of letting my Hand rest. On the other side,
if my Hand be put into motion by a Convulsion, the indifferency
of that operative Faculty is taken away by that motion, and my
Liberty in that case is lost: For I am under a Necessity of having my
Hand move. I have added this, to shew in what sort of indifferency
20 Liberty seems to me to consist, and not in any other, real or
imaginary.

§ 72.

True notions concerning the nature and extent of Liberty

are of so great importance, that I hope I shall be pardon'd this
Digression, which my attempt to explain it, has led me into. The
25 Ideas of Will, Volition, Liberty, and Necessity, in this Chapter of
Power, came naturally in my way. In the former Edition of this
Treatise, I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 285
according to the light I then had: And now as a Lover of Truth,
and not a Worshipper of my own Doctrines, I own some change of
my Opinion, which I think I have discover'd ground for. In what I
first writ, I with an unbiassed indifferency followed Truth, whither
5 I thought she led me. But neither being so vain as to fancy Infalli-
bility, nor so disingenuous as to dissemble my mistakes for fear of
blemishing my reputation, I have with the same sincere design for
truth only, not been asham'd to publish what a severer enquiry has
suggested. It is not impossible, but that some may think my former
10 notions right, and some (as I have already found) these later; and
some neither. I shall not at all wonder at this variety in Men's
Opinions: Impartial deductions of reason in controverted points
being so very rare, and exact ones in abstract notions not so very
easy, especially if of any length. And therefore, I should think my
15 self not a little beholding to any one, who would upon these or any
other grounds fairly clear this subject of Liberty from any difficulties
that may yet remain.

Before I close this Chapter, it may perhaps be to our purpose, and

help to give us clearer conceptions about power, if we make our
20 thoughts take a little more exact survey of Action. I have said above,

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 that we have Ideas but of two sorts of Action, viz. Motion and
Thinking. These, in truth, though called and counted Actions, yet,
if nearly considered, will not be found to be always perfectly so. For,
if I mistake not, there are instances of both kinds, which, upon due
25 consideration, will be found rather Passions than Actions, and con-
sequently so far the effects barely of passive Powers in those subjects,
which yet on their account are thought Agents. For in these instan-
ces, the substance that hath motion, or thought, receives the im-
pression whereby it is put into that Action purely from without,
30 and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an im-
pression from some external Agent; and such a Power is not properly
an Active Power, but a mere passive capacity in the subject. Some-
times the Substance, or Agent, puts it self into Action by its own
Power, and this is properly Active Power. Whatsoever modification
35 a substance has, whereby it produces any effect, that is called
Action; v.g. a solid substance by motion operates on, or alters the
sensible Ideas of another substance, and therefore this modification

...........................................................................................................................
pg 286
of motion we call Action. But yet this motion in that solid substance
is, when rightly considered, but a passion, if it received it only
from some external Agent. So that the Active Power of motion is in
no substance which cannot begin motion in it self, or in another
5 substance when at rest. So likewise in Thinking, a Power to receive
Ideas, or Thoughts, from the operation of any external substance, is
called a Power of thinking: But this is but a Passive Power, or Capacity.
But to be able to bring into view Ideas out of sight, at one's own
choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an
10 Active Power. This reflection may be of some use to preserve us
from mistakes about Powers and Actions, which Grammar, and the
common frame of Languages, may be apt to lead us into: Since what
is signified by Verbs that Grammarians call Active, does not always
signify Action; v.g. this Proposition, I see the Moon, or a Star, or I
15 feel the heat of the Sun, though expressed by a Verb Active, does
not signify any Action in me whereby I operate on those Substances;
but the reception of the Ideas of light, roundness, and heat, wherein
I am not active but barely passive, and cannot in that position of my
Eyes, or Body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my Eyes
20 another way, or remove my Body out of the Sun-beams, I am
properly active; because of my own choice, by a power within my
self, I put my self into that Motion. Such an Action is the product

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 of Active Power.

§ 73.

And thus I have, in a short draught, given a view of our

25 original Ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which
they are made up; which if I would consider, as a Philosopher, and
examine on what Causes they depend, and of what they are made,
I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary, and
original ones, viz.

30 Extension,
Solidity,
Mobility, or the Power of being moved;

which by our Senses we receive from Body:

Perceptivity, or the Power of perception, or thinking;

35 Motivity, or the Power of moving;

which by reflection we receive from our Minds. I crave leave to

...........................................................................................................................
pg 287
make use of these two new Words, to avoid the danger of being
mistaken in the use of those which are æquivocal. To which if we
add

Existence,
5 Duration,
Number;

which belong both to the one, and the other, we have, perhaps, all
the Original Ideas on which the rest depend. For by these, I imagine,
might be explained the nature of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells,
10 and all other Ideas we have, if we had but Faculties acute enough to
perceive the severally modified Extensions, and Motions, of these
minute Bodies, which produce those several Sensations in us. But
my present purpose being only to enquire into the Knowledge the
Mind has of Things, by those Ideas, and Appearances, which God has
15 fitted it to receive from them, and how the Mind comes by that
Knowledge; rather than into their Causes, or manner of Production,
I shall not, contrary to the Design of this Essay, set my self to

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 enquire philosophically into the peculiar Constitution of Bodies,
and the Configuration of Parts, whereby they have the power to
20 produce in us the Ideas of their sensible Qualities: I shall not enter
any farther into that Disquisition; it sufficing to my purpose to
observe, That Gold, or Saffron, has a power to produce in us the
Idea of Yellow; and Snow, or Milk, the Idea of White; which we can
only have by our Sight, without examining the Texture of the
25 Parts of those Bodies, or the particular Figures, or Motion of the
Particles, which rebound from them, to cause in us that particular
Sensation: though when we go beyond the bare Ideas in our Minds,
and would enquire into their Causes, we cannot conceive any thing
else, to be in any sensible Object, whereby it produces different
30 Ideas in us, but the different Bulk, Figure, Number, Texture, and
Motion of its insensible Parts.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 288
CHAPTER XXII
Of Mixed Modes.

§ 1.

HAVING treated of Simple Modes in the foregoing Chapters,

and given several instances of some of the most considerable of
them, to shew what they are, and how we come by them; we are
now in the next place to consider those we call Mixed Modes, such
5 are the Complex Ideas, we mark by the names Obligation, Drunkenness,
a Lye, etc. which consisting of several Combinations of simple Ideas
of different kinds, I have called Mixed Modes, to distinguish them
from the more simple Modes, which consist only of simple Ideas of
the same kind. These mixed Modes being also such Combinations of
10 simple Ideas, as are not looked upon to be the characteristical Marks
of any real Beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and
independent Ideas, put together by the Mind, are thereby dis-
tinguished from the complex Ideas of Substances.

§ 2.

That the Mind, in respect of its simple Ideas, is wholly

15 passive, and receives them all from the Existence and Operations of
Things, such as Sensation or Reflection offers them, without being

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 able to make any one Idea, Experience shews us. But if we atten-
tively consider these Ideas I call mixed Modes, we are now speaking
of, we shall find their Original quite different. The Mind often
20 exercises an active Power in the making these several Combinations. For it
being once furnished with simple Ideas, it can put them together
in several Compositions, and so make variety of complex Ideas,
without examining whether they exist so together in Nature. And
hence, I think, it is, that these Ideas are called Notions: as if they had
25 their Original, and constant Existence, more in the Thoughts of
Men, than in the reality of things; and to form such Ideas, it
sufficed, that the Mind put the parts of them together, and that
they were consistent in the Understanding, without considering
whether they had any real Being: though I do not deny, but several

...........................................................................................................................
pg 289
of them might be taken from Observation, and the Existence of
several simple Ideas so combined, as they are put together in the
Understanding. For the Man who first framed the Idea of Hypocrisy,
might have either taken it at first from the observation of one, who
5 made shew of good Qualities which he had not; or else have framed
that Idea in his Mind, without having any such pattern to fashion
it by. For it is evident, that in the beginning of Languages and
Societies of Men, several of those complex Ideas, which were conse-
quent to the Constitutions established amongst them, must needs
10 have been in the Minds of Men, before they existed any where
else; and that many names that stood for such complex Ideas, were
in use, and so those Ideas framed, before the Combinations they
stood for, ever existed.

§ 3.

Indeed, now that Languages are made, and abound with

15 words standing for such Combinations, an usual way of getting these
complex Ideas, is by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For
consisting of a company of simple Ideas combined, they may by
words, standing for those simple Ideas, be represented to the Mind
of one who understands those words, though that complex Com-
20 bination of simple Ideas were never offered to his Mind by the real
existence of things. Thus a Man may come to have the Idea of
Sacrilege, or Murther, by enumerating to him the simple Ideas
which these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them

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 committed.

25 § 4.

Every mixed Mode consisting of many distinct simple Ideas, it

seems reasonable to enquire, whence it has its Unity; and how such a
precise multitude comes to make but one Idea, since that Combin-
ation does not always exist together in Nature. To which I answer
it is plain, it has its Unity from an Act of the Mind combining those
30 several simple Ideas together, and considering them as one complex
one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this Union, or that
which is looked on generally to compleat it, is one name given to
that Combination. For 'tis by their names, that Men commonly
regulate their account of their distinct Species of mixed Modes,
35 seldom allowing or considering any number of simple Ideas, to make

...........................................................................................................................
pg 290
one complex one, but such Collections as there be names for. Thus,
though the killing of an old Man be as fit in Nature to be united into
one complex Idea, as the killing a Man's Father; yet, there being no
name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of Parricide
5 to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex Idea, nor
a distinct Species of Actions, from that of killing a young Man, or
any other Man.

§ 5.

If we should enquire a little farther, to see what it is, that

occasions Men to make several Combinations of simple Ideas into distinct,
10 and, as it were, settled Modes, and neglect others, which in the
Nature of Things themselves, have as much an aptness to be
combined, and make distinct Ideas, we shall find the reason of it to
be the end of Language; which being to mark, or communicate
Men's Thoughts to one another, with all the dispatch that may be,
15 they usually make such Collections of Ideas into complex Modes,
and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way
of Living and Conversation, leaving others, which they have but
seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names, that tie
them together: they rather chusing to enumerate (when they have
20 need) such Ideas as make them up, by the particular names, that
stand for them, than to trouble their Memories, by multiplying of

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 complex Ideas with names to them, which they shall seldom or never
have any occasion to make use of.

§ 6.

This shews us how it comes to pass that there are in every Language
25 many particular words, which cannot be rendred by any one single word of
another. For the several Fashions, Customs, and Manners of one
Nation, making several Combinations of Ideas familiar and necessary
in one, which another people have had never any occasion to make,
or, perhaps, so much as take notice of, Names come of course to be
30 annexed to them, to avoid long Periphrases in things of daily
Conversation; and so they become so many distinct complex Ideas
in their Minds. Thus ὀστρακισμόϛ amongst the Greeks, and Pro-
scriptio amongst the Romans, were words which other Languages

...........................................................................................................................
pg 291
had no names that exactly answered; because they stood for com-
plex Ideas, which were not in the Minds of the Men of other Nations.
Where there was no such Custom, there was no notion of any such
Actions; no use of such Combinations of Ideas, as were united, and,
5 as it were, tied together by those terms: and therefore in other
Countries there were no names for them.

§ 7.

Hence also we may see the Reason, Why Languages constantly

change, take up new, and lay by old terms. Because change of
Customs and Opinions bringing with it new Combinations of Ideas,
10 which it is necessary frequently to think on, and talk about, new
names, to avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them; and so
they become new Species of complex Modes. What a number of
different Ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound,
and how much of our Time and Breath is thereby saved, any one
15 will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the Ideas, that
either Reprieve or Appeal stand for; and instead of either of those
Names use a Periphrasis, to make any one understand their meaning.

§ 8.

Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large,

when I come to treat of Words, and their Use: yet I could not avoid

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20 to take thus much notice here of the names of mixed Modes, which
being fleeting, and transient Combinations of simple Ideas, which
have but a short existence any where, but in the Minds of Men,
and there too have no longer any existence, than whilst they are
thought on, have not so much any where the appearance of a constant and
25 lasting existence, as in their Names: which are therefore, in these sort of
Ideas, very apt to be taken for the Ideas themselves. For if we should
enquire where the Idea of a Triumph, or Apotheosis exists, it is evident,
they could neither of them exist altogether any where in the things
themselves, being Actions that required time to their performance,
30 and so could never all exist together: and as to the Minds of Men,
where the Ideas of these Actions are supposed to be lodged, they
have there too a very uncertain existence; and therefore we are apt
to annex them to the Names, that excite them in us.

§ 9.

There are therefore three ways whereby we get the complex Ideas
35 of mixed Modes. 1. By Experience and Observation of things themselves.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 292
Thus by seeing two Men wrestle, or fence, we get the Idea of
wrestling or fencing. 2. By Invention, or voluntary putting together
of several simple Ideas in our own Minds: So he that first invented
Printing, or Etching, had an Idea of it in his Mind, before it ever
5 existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of
Actions we never saw, or Notions we cannot see; and by enumerat-
ing, and thereby, as it were, setting before our Imaginations all
those Ideas which go to the making them up, and are the constituent
parts of them. For having by Sensation and Reflection stored our
10 Minds with simple Ideas, and by use got the Names, that stand for
them, we can by those Names represent to another any complex
Idea, we would have him conceive; so that it has in it no simple
Idea, but what he knows, and has, with us, the same name for. For
all our complex Ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple Ideas, of
15 which they are compounded, and originally made up, though per-
haps their immediate Ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex
Ideas. Thus the mixed Mode, which the word Lye stands for, is made
of these simple Ideas: 1. Articulate Sounds. 2. Certain Ideas in the
Mind of the Speaker. 3. Those words the signs of those Ideas. 4.
20 Those signs put together by affirmation or negation, otherwise

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 than the Ideas they stand for, are in the mind of the Speaker. I think
I need not go any farther in the Analysis of that complex Idea, we
call a Lye: What I have said is enough to shew, that it is made up of
simple Ideas: And it could not but be an offensive tediousness to my
25 Reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every
particular simple Idea, that goes to this complex one; which, from
what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself.
The same may be done in all our complex Ideas whatsoever; which
however compounded, and decompounded, may at last be resolved
30 into simple Ideas, which are all the Materials of Knowledge or
Thought we have or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear,
that the Mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of Ideas, if we
consider, what an inexhaustible stock of simple Modes, Number,
and Figure alone affords us. How far then mixed Modes, which admit
35 of the various Combinations of different simple Ideas, and their
infinite Modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily
imagine. So that before we have done, we shall see, that, no Body
need be afraid, he shall not have scope, and compass enough for his

...........................................................................................................................
pg 293
Thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only
to simple Ideas received from Sensation or Reflection, and their
several Combinations.

§ 10.

It is worth our observing which of all our simple Ideas have

5 been most modified, and had most mixed Modes made out of them, with names
given to them: And those have been these three; Thinking, and
Motion, (which are the two Ideas which comprehend in them all
Action,) and Power, from whence these Actions are conceived to
flow. These simple Ideas, I say, of Thinking, Motion, and Power,
10 have been those, which have been most modified; and out of whose
Modifications have been made most complex Modes, with names
to them. For Action being the great business of Mankind, and the
whole matter about which all Laws are conversant, it is no wonder,
that the several Modes of Thinking and Motion, should be taken
15 notice of, the Ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory,
and have Names assigned to them; without which, Laws could be
but ill made, or Vice and Disorder repressed. Nor could any Com-
munication be well had amongst Men, without such complex Ideas,

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 with Names to them: and therefore Men have setled Names, and
20 supposed setled Ideas in their Minds, of modes of Actions distin-
guished by their Causes, Means, Objects, Ends, Instruments, Time,
Place, and other circumstances; and also of their Powers fitted for
those Actions: v.g. Boldness is the Power to speak or do what we
intend, before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call
25 the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name παῤῥησία: Which
power or ability in Man, of doing any thing, when it has been
acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that Idea, we name
Habit; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion, to break
into Action, we call it Disposition: Thus Testiness is a disposition or
30 aptness to be angry.

To conclude, Let us examine any Modes of Action, v.g. Considera-

tion and Assent, which are Actions of the Mind; Running and Speaking,
which are Actions of the Body; Revenge and Murther, which are
Actions of both together, and we shall find them but so many
35 Collections of simple Ideas, which together make up the complex ones
signified by those Names.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 294
§ 11.

Power being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the
Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power
into Act, are called Causes; and the Substances which thereupon are
produced, or the simple Ideas which are introduced into any subject
5 by the exerting of that Power, are called Effects. The efficacy
whereby the new Substance or Idea is produced, is called, in the
subject exerting that Power, Action; but in the subject, wherein any
simple Idea is changed or produced, it is called Passion: Which
efficacy however various, and the effects almost infinite; yet we
10 can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual Agents, to be nothing else
but Modes of Thinking, and Willing; in corporeal Agents, nothing
else but Modifications of Motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive
it to be any other but these two: For whatever sort of Action,
besides these, produces any effects, I confess my self to have no
15 Notion, nor Idea of; and so it is quite remote from my Thoughts,
Apprehensions, and Knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as
five other Senses, or as the Ideas of Colours to a blind Man: And

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 therefore many words, which seem to express some Action, signify nothing
of the Action, or Modus Operandi at all, but barely the effect, with some
20 circumstances of the Subject wrought on, or Cause operating; v.g.
Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no Idea of the Action or
Manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the Cause, and
the thing done. And when a Country-man says, the Cold freezes
Water, though the word Freezing seems to import some Action,
25 yet truly it signifies nothing, but the effect, viz. that Water, that
was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing
any Idea of the Action whereby it is done.

§ 12.

I think I shall not need to remark here, that though Power

and Action make the greatest part of mixed Modes, marked by
30 Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other
simple Ideas, and their several Combinations, are not excluded;
much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed
Modes, which have been settled, with Names to them. That would
be to make a Dictionary of the greatest part of the Words made use of
35 in Divinity, Ethicks, Law, and Politicks, and several other Sciences.
All, that is requisite to my present design, is to shew, what sort of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 295
Ideas those are which I call Mixed Modes; how the Mind comes by
them; and that they are Compositions, made up of simple Ideas got
from Sensation and Reflection, which, I suppose, I have done.

CHAPTER XXIII
Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

§ 1.

THE Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great

5 number of the simple Ideas, conveyed in by the Senses, as they are
found in exteriour things, or by Reflection on its own Operations,
takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple Ideas go
constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing,
and Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of
10 for quick dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name;
which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider

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 as one simple Idea, which indeed is a complication of many Ideas
together; Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple
Ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, to suppose
15 some Substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do
result, which therefore we call Substance.

§ 2.

So that if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion

of pure Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it at all,
but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such
20 Qualities, which are capable of producing simple Ideas in us; which
Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any one should be
asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he
would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if
he were demanded, what is it, that that Solidity and Extension

...........................................................................................................................
pg 296
inhere in, he would not be in a much better case, than the Indian
before mentioned; who, saying that the World was supported by a
great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which
his answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know
5 what gave support to the broad-back'd Tortoise, replied, some-
thing, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where
we use Words without having clear and distinct Ideas, we talk like
Children; who, being questioned, what such a thing is, which they
know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, That it is something;
10 which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by Children
or Men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they
pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct Idea of
at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The Idea
then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being
15 nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities,
we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante,
without something to support them, we call that Support Substantia;
which, according to the true import of the Word, is in plain English,
standing under, or upholding.

20 § 3.

An obscure and relative Idea of Substance in general being

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 thus made, we come to have the Ideas of particular sorts of Substances,
by collecting such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience
and Observation of Men's Senses taken notice of to exist together,
and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal
25 Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come
to have the Ideas of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, etc. of which Sub-
stances, whether any one has any other clear Idea, farther than of
certain simple Ideas coexisting together, I appeal to every one's own
Experience. 'Tis the ordinary Qualities, observable in Iron, or a
30 Diamond, put together, that make the true complex Idea of those
Substances, which a Smith, or a Jeweller, commonly knows better

...........................................................................................................................
pg 297
than a Philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of,
has no other Idea of those Substances, than what is framed by a
collection of those simple Ideas which are to be found in them; only
we must take notice, that our complex Ideas of Substances, besides
5 all these simple Ideas they are made up of, have always the confused
Idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist:
and therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a
thing having such or such Qualities, as Body is a thing that is ex-
tended, figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit a thing capable of
10 thinking; and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we
say, are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. These, and the like
fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed
always something besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion,
Thinking, or other observable Ideas, though we know not what it is.

15 § 4.

Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of

corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, etc. though the Idea, we have
of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those
several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, which we use to find
united in the thing called Horse or Stone, yet because we cannot
20 conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we
suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject;
which Support we denote by the name Substance, though it be certain, we
have no clear, or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support.

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 § 5.

The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind,

25 viz. Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, etc. which we concluding not to
subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to
Body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of
some other Substance, which we call Spirit; whereby yet it is evident,
that having no other Idea or Notion, of Matter, but something
30 wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do
subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein Thinking, Knowing,
Doubting, and a power of Moving, etc. do subsist, We have as clear a
Notion of the Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body; the one being
supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the Substratum to
35 those simple Ideas we have from without; and the other supposed
(with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the Substratum to those

...........................................................................................................................
pg 298
Operations, which we experiment in our selves within. 'Tis plain
then, that the Idea of corporeal Substance in Matter is as remote from
our Conceptions, and Apprehensions, as that of Spiritual Substance,
or Spirit; and therefore from our not having any notion of the
5 Substance of Spirit, we can no more conclude its non-Existence, than
we can, for the same reason, deny the Existence of Body: It being as
rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we have no clear and
distinct Idea of the Substance of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit,
because we have no clear and distinct Idea of the Substance of a
10 Spirit.

§ 6.

Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract Nature of

Substance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of
Substances, are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas, co-
existing in such, though unknown, Cause of their Union, as makes
15 the whole subsist of itself. 'Tis by such Combinations of simple
Ideas and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of Sub-
stances to our selves; such are the Ideas we have of their several
species in our Minds; and such only do we, by their specifick
Names, signify to others, v.g. Man, Horse, Sun, Water, Iron, upon
20 hearing which Words, every one who understands the Language,
frames in his Mind a Combination of those several simple Ideas,

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 which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under
that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be, as it
were, adherent to that unknown common Subject, which inheres
25 not in any thing else. Though in the mean time it be manifest, and
every one upon Enquiry into his own thoughts, will find that he has
no other Idea of any Substance, v.g. let it be Gold, Horse, Iron, Man,
Vitriol, Bread, but what he has barely of those sensible Qualities,
which he supposes to inhere, with a supposition of such a Substratum,
30 as gives as it were a support to those Qualities, or simple Ideas,
which he has observed to exist united together. Thus the Idea of
the Sun, What is it, but an aggregate of those several simple Ideas,
Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a

...........................................................................................................................
pg 299
certain distance from us, and, perhaps, some other: as he who
thinks and discourses of the Sun, has been more or less accurate, in
observing those sensible Qualities, Ideas, or Properties, which are
in that thing, which he calls the Sun.

5 § 7.

For he has the perfectest Idea of any of the particular sorts of

Substance, who has gathered, and put together, most of those simple
Ideas, which do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its
active Powers, and passive Capacities; which though not simple
Ideas, yet, in this respect, for brevity's sake, may conveniently
10 enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the power of drawing
Iron, is one of the Ideas of the Complex one of that substance we call
a Load-stone, and a Power to be so drawn is a part of the Complex
one we call Iron; which Powers pass for inherent Qualities in those
Subjects. Because every Substance being as apt, by the Powers we
15 observe in it, to change some sensible Qualities in other Subjects,
as it is to produce in us those simple Ideas, which we receive
immediately from it, does, by those new sensible Qualities intro-
duced into other Subjects, discover to us those Powers, which do
thereby mediately affect our Senses, as regularly, as its sensible
20 Qualities do it immediately, v.g. we immediately by our Senses
perceive in Fire its Heat and Colour; which are, if rightly considered,
nothing but Powers in it, to produce those Ideas in us: We also by
our Senses perceive the colour and brittleness of Charcoal, whereby
we come by the Knowledge of another Power in Fire, which it has

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25 to change the colour and consistency of Wood. By the former Fire
immediately, by the latter it mediately discovers to us these several
Powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the Qualities
of Fire, and so make them a part of the complex Ideas of it. For all
those Powers, that we take Cognizance of, terminating only in the
30 alteration of some sensible Qualities, in those Subjects, on which
they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible Ideas,
therefore it is, that I have reckoned these Powers amongst the simple
Ideas, which make the complex ones of the sorts of Substances; though
these Powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex Ideas.
35 And in this looser sence, I crave leave to be understood, when I

...........................................................................................................................
pg 300
name any of these Potentialities amongst the simple ideas, which we
recollect in our Minds, when we think of particular Substances. For
the Powers that are severally in them, are necessary to be considered,
if we will have true distinct Notions of the several sorts of Sub-
5 stances.

§ 8.

Nor are we to wonder, that Powers make a great part of our com-
plex Ideas of Substances; since their secondary Qualities are those,
which in most of them serve principally to distinguish Substances
one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the
10 complex Idea of the several sorts of them. For our Senses failing us,
in the discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute
parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences
depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities, as the
characteristical Notes and Marks, whereby to frame Ideas of them
15 in our Minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which
secondary Qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare
Powers. For the Colour and Taste of Opium, are, as well as its
soporifick or anodyne Virtues, meer Powers depending on its
primary Qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different Opera-
20 tions, on different parts of our Bodies.

§ 9.

The Ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal Substances, are of
these three sorts. First, The Ideas of the primary Qualities of things,

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 which are discovered by our Senses, and are in them even when we
perceive them not, such are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation,
25 and Motion of the parts of Bodies, which are really in them,
whether we take notice of them or no. Secondly, The sensible secon-
dary Qualities, which depending on these, are nothing but the
Powers, those Substances have to produce several Ideas in us by our
Senses; which Ideas are not in the things themselves, otherwise than
30 as any thing is in its Cause. Thirdly, The aptness we consider in any
Substance, to give or receive such alterations of primary Qualities,
as that the Substance so altered, should produce in us different
Ideas from what it did before, these are called active and passive
Powers: All which Powers, as far as we have any Notice or Notion
35 of them, terminate only in sensible simple Ideas. For whatever

...........................................................................................................................
pg 301
alteration a Load-stone has the Power to make in the minute Particles
of Iron, we should have no Notion of any Power it had at all to
operate on Iron, did not its sensible Motion discover it; and I doubt
not, but there are a thousand Changes, that Bodies we daily handle,
5 have a Power to cause in one another, which we never suspect,
because they never appear in sensible effects.

§ 10.

Powers therefore, justly make a great part of our complex Ideas

of Substances. He, that will examine his complex Idea of Gold, will
find several of its Ideas, that make it up, to be only Powers, as the
10 Power of being melted, but of not spending it self in the Fire; of
being dissolved in Aqua Regia, are Ideas, as necessary to make up our
complex Idea of Gold, as its Colour and Weight: which if duly
considered, are also nothing but different Powers. For to speak
truly, Yellowness is not actually in Gold; but is a Power in Gold, to
15 produce that Idea in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due Light:
and the Heat, which we cannot leave out of our Idea of the Sun, is
no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it introduces into
Wax. These are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating, by the
Motion and Figure of its insensible Parts, so on a Man, as to make
20 him have the Idea of Heat; and so on Wax, as to make it capable to
produce in a Man the Idea of White.

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 § 11.

Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute particles

of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible
Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite
25 different Ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of
Gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an
admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure. This
Microscopes plainly discover to us: for what to our naked Eyes
produces a certain Colour, is by thus augmenting the acuteness of
30 our Senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus
altering, as it were, the proportion of the Bulk of the minute parts of
a coloured Object to our usual Sight, produces different Ideas, from
what it did before. Thus Sand, or pounded Glass, which is opaque,

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pg 302
and white to the naked Eye, is pellucid in a Microscope; and a Hair
seen this way, loses its former Colour, and is in a great measure
pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling Colours, such as
appear from the refraction of Diamonds, and other pellucid Bodies.
5 Blood to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good Microscope,
wherein its lesser parts appear, shews only some few Globules of
Red, swimming in a pellucid Liquor; and how these red Globules
would appear, if Glasses could be found, that yet could magnify
them 1000, or 10000 times more, is uncertain.

10 § 12.

The infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us,
hath fitted our Senses, Faculties, and Organs, to the conveniences of
Life, and the Business we have to do here. We are able, by our
Senses, to know, and distinguish things; and to examine them so
far, as to apply them to our Uses, and several ways to accommodate
15 the Exigences of this Life. We have insight enough into their
admirable Contrivances, and wonderful Effects, to admire, and
magnify the Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of their Author. Such a
Knowledge as this, which is suited to our present Condition, we
want not Faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended,
20 we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledge of them:
that perhaps is not in the Comprehension of any finite Being. We
are furnished with Faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover

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 enough in the Creatures, to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator,
and the Knowledge of our Duty; and we are fitted well enough with
25 Abilities, to provide for the Conveniences of living: These are our
Business in this World. But were our Senses alter'd, and made
much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward Scheme of
things would have quite another Face to us; and I am apt to think,
would be inconsistent with our Being, or at least well-being in this
30 part of the Universe, which we inhabit. He that considers, how little
our Constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this Air, not
much higher than that we commonly breath in, will have reason to
be satisfied, that in this Globe of Earth allotted for our Mansion,
the all-wise Architect has suited our Organs, and the Bodies, that
35 are to affect them, one to another. If our Sense of Hearing were but
1000 times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract

...........................................................................................................................
pg 303
us. And we should in the quietest Retirement, be less able to
sleep or meditate, than in the middle of a Sea-fight. Nay, if that
most instructive of our Senses, Seeing, were in any Man 1000, or
100000 times more acute than it is now by the best Microscope,
5 things several millions of times less than the smallest Object of his
sight now, would then be visible to his naked Eyes, and so he would
come nearer the Discovery of the Texture and Motion of the
minute Parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably
get Ideas of their internal Constitutions: But then he would be in a
10 quite different World from other People: Nothing would appear the
same to him, and others: The visible Ideas of every thing would be
different. So that I doubt, Whether he, and the rest of Men, could
discourse concerning the Objects of Sight; or have any Communi-
cation about Colours, their appearances being so wholly different.
15 And, perhaps, such a quickness and tenderness of Sight could not
endure bright Sun-shine, or so much as open Day-light; nor take in
but a very small part of any Object at once, and that too only at a
very near distance. And if by the help of such Microscopical Eyes,
(if I may so call them,) a Man could penetrate farther than ordinary
20 into the secret Composition, and radical Texture of Bodies, he
would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an
acute Sight would not serve to conduct him to the Market and
Exchange; If he could not see things, he was to avoid, at a con-
venient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those
25 sensible Qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to

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 see the Configuration of the minute Particles of the Spring of a
Clock, and observe upon what peculiar Structure and Impulse its
elastick Motion depends, would no doubt discover something very
admirable: But if Eyes so framed, could not view at once the Hand,
30 and the Characters of the Hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see
what a-Clock it was, their Owner could not be much benefited by
that acuteness; which, whilst it discovered the secret contrivance
of the Parts of the Machin, made him lose its use.

§ 13.

And here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture

35 of mine, viz. That since we have some Reason, (if there be any
Credit to be given to the report of things, that our Philosophy

...........................................................................................................................
pg 304
cannot account for,) to imagine, that Spirits can assume to them-
selves Bodies of different Bulk, Figure, and Conformation of Parts.
Whether one great advantage some of them have over us, may not
lie in this, that they can so frame, and shape to themselves Organs of
5 Sensation or Perception, as to suit them to their present Design,
and the Circumstances of the Object they would consider. For how
much would that Man exceed all others in Knowledge, who had
but the Faculty so to alter the Structure of his Eyes, that one
Sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of Vision,
10 which the assistance of Glasses (casually at first light on) has taught
us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit
his Eye to all sorts of Objects, as to see, when he pleased, the Figure
and Motion of the minute Particles in the Blood, and other juices of
Animals, as distinctly, as he does, at other times, the shape and
15 motion of the Animals themselves. But to us in our present State,
unalterable Organs, so contrived, as to discover the Figure and
Motion of the minute parts of Bodies, whereon depend those sensible
Qualities, we now observe in them, would, perhaps, be of no ad-
vantage. God has no doubt made us so, as is best for us in our
20 present Condition. He hath fitted us for the Neighbourhood of the
Bodies, that surround us, and we have to do with: And though we
cannot by the Faculties we have, attain to a perfect Knowledge of
Things; yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-
mentioned, which are our great Concernment. I beg my Reader's
25 Pardon, for laying before him so wild a Fancy, concerning the ways

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 of Perception in Beings above us: But how extravagant soever it be,
I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the Knowledge of
Angels, but after this manner, some way or other, in proportion
to what we find and observe in our selves. And though we cannot
30 but allow, that the infinite Power and Wisdom of God, may frame
Creatures with a thousand other Faculties, and ways of perceiving
things without them, than what we have: Yet our Thoughts can go
no farther than our own, so impossible it is for us to enlarge our
very Guesses, beyond the Ideas received from our own Sensation
35 and Reflection. The Supposition at least, that Angels do sometimes
assume Bodies, needs not startle us, since some of the most ancient,
and most learned Fathers of the Church, seemed to believe, that
they had Bodies: And this is certain, that their state and way of
Existence is unknown to us.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 305
§ 14.

But to return to the Matter in hand, the Ideas we have of

Substances, and the ways we come by them; I say our specifick Ideas
of Substances are nothing else but a Collection of a certain number of
simple Ideas, considered as united in one thing. These Ideas of Substances,
5 though they are commonly called simple Apprehensions, and the
Names of them simple Terms; yet in effect, are complex and com-
pounded. Thus the Idea which an English-man signifies by the Name
Swan is white Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs, and whole
Feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the
10 Water, and making a certain kind of Noise, and, perhaps, to a Man,
who has long observed those kind of Birds, some other Properties,
which all terminate in sensible simple Ideas, all united in one
common subject.

§ 15.

Besides the complex Ideas we have of material sensible

15 Substances, of which I have last spoken, by the simple Ideas we have
taken from those Operations of our own Minds, which we experi-
ment daily in our selves, as Thinking, Understanding, Willing,
Knowing, and Power of beginning Motion, etc. co-existing in some
Substance, we are able to frame the complex Idea of an immaterial

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20 Spirit. And thus by putting together the Ideas of Thinking, Perceiv-
ing, Liberty, and Power of moving themselves and other things,
we have as clear a perception, and notion of immaterial Substances,
as we have of material. For putting together the Ideas of Thinking
and Willing, or the Power of moving or quieting corporeal Motion,
25 joined to Substance, of which we have no distinct Idea, we have the
Idea of an immaterial Spirit; and by putting together the Ideas of
coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with Sub-
stance, of which likewise we have no positive Idea, we have the Idea
of Matter. The one is as clear and distinct an Idea, as the other: The
30 Idea of Thinking, and moving a Body, being as clear and distinct
Ideas, as the Ideas of Extension, Solidity, and being moved. For our
Idea of Substance, is equally obscure, or none at all, in both; it is
but a supposed, I know not what, to support those Ideas, we call
Accidents. It is for want of reflection, that we are apt to think, that

...........................................................................................................................
pg 306
our Senses shew us nothing but material things. Every act of sen-
sation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts
of nature, the Corporeal and Spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing
or hearing, etc. that there is some Corporeal Being without me, the
5 Object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is
some Spiritual Being within me, that sees and hears. This I must be
convinced cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever
could be without an immaterial thinking Being.

§ 16.

By the complex Idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all

10 other sensible Qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as
far from the Idea of the Substance of Body, as if we knew nothing at
all: Nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine
we have with Matter, and the many Qualities Men assure themselves
they perceive and know in Bodies, will it, perhaps, upon examination
15 be found, that they have any more, or clearer, primary Ideas belonging
to Body, than they have belonging to immaterial Spirit.

§ 17.

The primary Ideas we have peculiar to Body, as contradistin-

guished to Spirit, are the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable

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 parts, and a power of communicating Motion by impulse. These, I think,
20 are the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body: for Figure is but
the consequence of finite Extension.

§ 18.

The Ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to Spirit, are Think-

ing, and Will, or a power of putting Body into motion by Thought,
and, which is consequent to it, Liberty. For as Body cannot but
25 communicate its Motion by impulse, to another Body, which it
meets with at rest; so the Mind can put Bodies into Motion, or
forbear to do so, as it pleases. The Ideas of Existence, Duration, and
Mobility, are common to them both.

§ 19.

There is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I

30 make Mobility belong to Spirit: For having no other Idea of Motion,
but change of distance, with other Beings, that are considered as at
rest; and finding that Spirits, as well as Bodies, cannot operate, but
where they are; and that Spirits do operate at several times in
several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite
35 Spirits: (for of the infinite Spirit, I speak not here.) For my Soul
being a real Being, as well as my Body, is certainly as capable of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 307
changing distance with any other Body, or Being, as Body it self;
and so is capable of Motion. And if a Mathematician can consider a
certain distance, or a change of that distance between two Points;
one may certainly conceive a distance, and a change of distance
5 between two Spirits; and so conceive their Motion, their approach,
or removal, one from another.

§ 20.

Every one finds in himself, that his Soul can think, will, and
operate on his Body, in the place where that is; but cannot operate
on a Body, or in a place, an hundred Miles distant from it. No Body
10 can imagine, that his Soul can think, or move a Body at Oxford,
whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that being united
to his Body, it constantly changes place all the whole Journey,
between Oxford and London, as the Coach, or Horse does, that

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 carries him; and, I think, may be said to be truly all that while in
15 motion: Or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear Idea
enough of its motion, its being separated from the Body in death,
I think, will: For to consider it as going out of the Body, or leaving
it, and yet to have no Idea of its motion, seems to me impossible.

§ 21.

If it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because

20 it hath none, for Spirits are not in Loco, but Ubi; I suppose that way
of talking, will not now be of much weight to many, in an Age, that
is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived,
by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is
any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present
25 purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; and then
from thence draw a reason to shew that immaterial Spirits are not
capable of Motion. Indeed, Motion cannot be attributed to GOD,
not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an Infinite Spirit.

§ 22.

Let us compare then our complex Idea of an immaterial

30 Spirit, with our complex Idea of Body, and see whether there be any
more obscurity in one, than in the other, and in which most. Our
Idea of Body, as I think, is an extended solid Substance, capable of
communicating Motion by impulse: and our Idea of our Soul, as an

...........................................................................................................................
pg 308
immaterial Spirit, is of a Substance that thinks, and has a power of
exciting Motion in Body, by Will, or Thought. These, I think, are
our complex Ideas of Soul and Body, as contra-distinguished; and now let
us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be
5 apprehended. I know that People, whose Thoughts are immersed in
Matter, and have so subjected their Minds to their Senses, that
they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they
cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which, perhaps, is true: But
I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend
10 an extended thing.

§ 23.

If any one says, he knows not what 'tis thinks in him; he

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 means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing:
No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing.
Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks; I answer, Neither
15 knows he how he is extended; how the solid parts of Body are
united, or cohere together to make Extension. For though the
pressure of the Particles of Air, may account for the cohesion of
several parts of Matter, that are grosser than the Particles of Air, and
have Pores less than the Corpuscles of Air; yet the weight, or
20 pressure of the Air, will not explain, nor can be a cause of the
coherence of the Particles of Air themselves. And if the pressure of
the Æther, or any subtiler Matter than the Air, may unite, and hold
fast together the parts of a Particle of Air, as well as other Bodies;
yet it cannot make Bonds for it self, and hold together the parts,
25 that make up every the least corpuscle of that materia subtilis. So that
that Hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by shewing, that
the parts of sensible Bodies are held together, by the pressure of
other external insensible Bodies, reaches not the parts of the Æther
it self; and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts
30 of other Bodies are held together, by the external pressure of the
Æther, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion
and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark, concerning
the cohesion of the parts of the Corpuscles of the Æther it self:
which we can neither conceive without parts, they being Bodies,
35 and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that
cause of cohesion, which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all
other Bodies.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 309
§ 24.

But in truth, the pressure of any ambient Fluid, how great

soever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of
Matter. For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two
polished Superficies, one from another in a Line perpendicular to
5 them, as in the Experiment of two polished Marbles: Yet it can
never, in the least, hinder the separation by a Motion, in a Line
parallel to those Surfaces. Because the ambient fluid, having a full
liberty to succeed in each point of Space, deserted by a lateral
motion, resists such a motion of Bodies so joined, no more, than it
10 would resist the motion of that Body, were it on all sides environed

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 by that Fluid, and touched no other Body: And therefore, if there
were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of Bodies must be easily
separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the
Æther be the adequate cause of cohesion, where-ever that cause
15 operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate
against such a lateral separation, (as has been shewed,) therefore in
every imaginary plain, intersecting any mass of Matter, there could
be no more cohesion, than of two polished Surfaces, which will
always, notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a Fluid, easily
20 slide one from another. So that, perhaps, how clear an Idea soever
we think we have of the Extension of Body, which is nothing but
the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his Mind,
may have reason to conclude, That 'tis as easie for him to have a clear
Idea, how the Soul thinks, as how Body is extended. For since Body is no
25 farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the union and cohesion of
its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the extension of Body,
without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of
its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible, as the manner of
Thinking, and how it is performed.

30 § 25.

I allow, it is usual for most People to wonder, how any one

should find a difficulty in what they think, they every day observe.
Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of Bodies stick
firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt
can there be made of it? And the like, I say, concerning Thinking,
35 and voluntary Motion: Do we not every moment experiment it in our
selves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of Fact is clear,
I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and
consider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a loss, both in the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 310
one, and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of
Body cohere, as how we our selves perceive, or move. I would have
any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of Gold, or Brass,
(that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the
5 Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glass,) come in a few
moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another,
that the utmost force of Mens arms cannot separate them: A con-
sidering Man will, I suppose, be here at a loss, to satisfie his own, or

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 another Man's Understanding.

10 § 26.

The little Bodies that compose that Fluid, we call Water,

are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one, who by a
Microscope, (and yet I have heard of some, that have magnified to
10000; nay, to much above 100,000 times,) pretended to perceive
their distinct Bulk, Figure, or Motion: And the Particles of Water
15 are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force
sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion,
we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and yet
let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these
little Atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable.
20 He that could find the Bonds, that tie these heaps of loose little
Bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the Cement,
that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a
great, and yet unknown Secret: And yet when that was done, would
he be far enough from making the extension of Body (which is the
25 cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could shew wherein
consisted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those Bonds, or
of that Cement, or of the least Particle of Matter that exists. Where-
by it appears that this primary and supposed obvious Quality of
Body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible, as
30 any thing belonging to our Minds, and a solid extended Substance, as
hard to be conceived, as a thinking immaterial one, whatever difficulties
some would raise against it.

§ 27.

For to extend our Thoughts a little farther, that pressure,

which is brought to explain the cohesion of Bodies, is as unintelli-
35 gible, as the cohesion it self. For if Matter be considered, as no
doubt it is, finite, let any one send his Contemplation to the
Extremities of the Universe, and there see what conceivable Hoops,
what Bond he can imagine to hold this mass of Matter, in so close a

...........................................................................................................................
pg 311
pressure together, from whence Steel has its firmness, and the parts
of a Diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If Matter be finite,
it must have its Extremes; and there must be something to hinder

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 it from scattering asunder. If to avoid this difficulty, any one will
5 throw himself into the Supposition and Abyss of infinite Matter,
let him consider, what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of
Body; and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by
resolving it into a Supposition, the most absurd and most incom-
prehensible of all other: So far is our Extension of Body, (which is
10 nothing but the cohesion of solid parts,) from being clearer, or more
distinct, when we would enquire into the Nature, Cause, or Manner
of it, than the Idea of Thinking.

§ 28.

Another Idea we have of Body, is the power of communication

of Motion by impulse; and of our Souls, the power of exciting of Motion
15 by Thought. These Ideas, the one of Body, the other of our Minds,
every days experience clearly furnishes us with: But if here again we
enquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For in the com-
munication of Motion by impulse, wherein as much Motion is lost
to one Body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinariest case, we
20 can have no other conception, but of the passing of Motion out of
one Body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and uncon-
ceivable, as how our Minds move or stop our Bodies by Thought;
which we every moment find they do. The increase of Motion by
impulse, which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet
25 harder to be understood. We have by daily experience clear evi-
dence of Motion produced both by impulse, and by thought; but
the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are
equally at a loss in both. So that however we consider Motion, and
its communication either from Body or Spirit, the Idea which belongs
30 to Spirit, is at least as clear, as that, that belongs to Body. And if we con-
sider the active power of Moving, or, as I may call it, Motivity, it is
much clearer in Spirit than Body; since two Bodies, placed by one
another at rest, will never afford us the Idea of a power in the one to
move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the Mind, every
35 day, affords us Ideas of an active power of moving of Bodies; and
therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not

...........................................................................................................................
pg 312
the proper attribute of Spirits, and passive power of Matter. Hence
may be conjectured, that created Spirits are not totally separate
from Matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure Spirit,

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 viz. God, is only active; pure Matter is only passive; those Beings
5 that are both active and passive we may judge to partake of both.
But be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear Ideas
belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body, the Substance
of each being equally unknown to. us; and the Idea of Thinking in
Spirit, as clear as of Extension in Body; and the communication of
10 Motion by Thought, which we attribute to Spirit, is as evident, as
that by impulse, which we ascribe to Body. Constant Experience
makes us sensible of both of these, though our narrow Under-
standings can comprehend neither. For when the Mind would look
beyond those original Ideas we have from Sensation or Reflection,
15 and penetrate into their Causes, and manner of production, we find
still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.

§ 29.

To conclude, Sensation convinces us, that there are solid

extended Substances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones:
Experience assures us of the Existence of such Beings; and that the
20 one hath a power to move Body by impulse, the other by thought;
this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes
us with the clear Ideas, both of the one, and the other. But beyond
these Ideas, as received from their proper Sources, our Faculties will
not reach. If we would enquire farther into their Nature, Causes,
25 and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extension, clearer than
we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as
easie as the other; and there is no more difficulty, to conceive how
a Substance we know not, should by thought set Body into motion,
than how a Substance we know not, should by impulse set Body into
30 motion. So that we are no more able to discover, wherein the Ideas
belonging to Body consist, than those belonging to Spirit. From
whence it seems probable to me, that the simple Ideas we receive
from Sensation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts;
beyond which, the Mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not
35 able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it
would prie into the Nature and hidden Causes of those Ideas.

§ 30.

So that, in short, the Idea we have of Spirit, compared with the

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 pg 313
Idea we have of Body, stands thus: The substance of Spirit is un-
known to us; and so is the substance of Body, equally unknown to
us: Two primary Qualities, or Properties of Body, viz. solid coherent
parts, and impulse, we have distinct clear Ideas of: So likewise we
5 know, and have distinct clear Ideas of two primary Qualities, or
Properties of Spirit, viz. Thinking, and a power of Action; i.e. a
power of beginning, or stopping several Thoughts or Motions. We
have also the Ideas of several Qualities inherent in Bodies, and have
the clear distinct Ideas of them: which Qualities, are but the various
10 modifications of the Extension of cohering solid Parts, and their
motion. We have likewise the Ideas of the several modes of Thinking,
viz. Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Hoping; all which,
are but the several modes of Thinking. We have also the Ideas of
Willing, and Moving the Body consequent to it, and with the Body
15 it self too; for, as has been shewed, Spirit is capable of Motion.

§ 31.

Lastly, if this Notion of immaterial Spirit may have, per-

haps, some difficulties in it, not easie to be explained, we have
therefore no more reason to deny, or doubt the existence of such
Spirits, than we have to deny, or doubt the existence of Body;
20 because the notion of Body is cumbred with some difficulties very
hard, and, perhaps, impossible to be explained, or understood by
us. For I would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of
Spirit more perplexed, or nearer a Contradiction, than the very
notion of Body includes in it; the divisibility in infinitum of any
25 finite Extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in con-
sequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehen-
sions consistent; Consequences that carry greater difficulty, and
more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the Notion
of an immaterial knowing substance.

30 § 32.

Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but

some few superficial Ideas of things, discovered to us only by the
Senses from without, or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experi-
ments in it self within, have no Knowledge beyond that, much less
of the internal Constitution, and true Nature of things, being

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35 destitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and

...........................................................................................................................
pg 314
discovering in our selves Knowledge, and the power of voluntary
Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without
us, the cohesion and separation of solid Parts, which is the Exten-
sion and Motion of Bodies; we have as much Reason to be satisfied with our
5 Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body; and the Existence
of the one, as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction,
that Thinking should exist, separate, and independent from
Solidity; than it is a contradiction, that Solidity should exist,
separate, and independent from Thinking, they being both but
10 simple Ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and
distinct Ideas in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not, why
we may not as well allow a thinking thing without Solidity, i.e.
immaterial, to exist; as a solid thing without Thinking, i.e. Matter, to
exist; especially since it is no harder to conceive how Thinking
15 should exist without Matter, than how Matter should think. For
whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple Ideas, we have
from Sensation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature
of Things, we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity, Per-
plexedness and Difficulties; and can discover nothing farther, but
20 our own Blindness and Ignorance. But which ever of these complex
Ideas be clearest, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident,
that the simple Ideas that make them up, are no other than what we
have received from Sensation or Reflection; and so is it of all our
other Ideas of Substances, even of God himself.

25 § 33.

For if we examine the Idea we have of the incomprehensible

supreme Being, we shall find, that we come by it the same way; and
that the complex Ideas we have both of God, and separate Spirits,
are made up of the simple Ideas we receive from Reflection; v.g. having
from what we experiment in our selves, got the Ideas of Existence
30 and Duration; of Knowledge and Power; of Pleasure and Happiness;
and of several other Qualities and Powers, which it is better to have,
than to be without; when we would frame an Idea the most suitable
we can to the supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with
our Idea of Infinity; and so putting them together, make our
35 complex Idea of God. For that the Mind has such a power of enlarg-

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 315
ing some of its Ideas, received from Sensation and Reflection, has
been already shewed.

§ 34.

If I find, that I know some few things, and some of them, or

all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an Idea of knowing twice as
5 many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to Number,
and thus enlarge my Idea of Knowledge, by extending its Compre-
hension to all things existing, or possible: The same also I can do of
knowing them more perfectly; i.e. all their Qualities, Powers, Causes,
Consequences, and Relations, etc. till all be perfectly known, that is
10 in them, or can any way relate to them, and thus frame the Idea of
infinite or boundless Knowledge: The same may also be done of
Power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the Duration
of Existence, without beginning or end; and so frame the Idea of an
eternal Being: The Degrees or Extent, wherein we ascribe Existence,
15 Power, Wisdom, and all other Perfection, (which we can have any
Ideas of) to that Sovereign Being, which we call God, being all
boundless and infinite, we frame the best Idea of him our Minds
are capable of; all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple
Ideas, we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by
20 Reflection; or by our Senses, from exterior things, to that vastness,
to which Infinity can extend them.

§ 35.

For it is Infinity, which, joined to our Ideas of Existence,

Power, Knowledge, etc. makes that complex Idea, whereby we
represent to our selves the best we can, the supreme Being. For
25 though in his own Essence, (which certainly we do not know, not
knowing the real Essence of a Peble, or a Fly, or of our own selves,)
God be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say we have
no other Idea of him, but a complex one of Existence, Knowledge,
Power, Happiness, etc. infinite and eternal: which are all distinct
30 Ideas, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of
others; all which being, as has been shewn, originally got from
Sensation and Reflection, go to make up the Idea or Notion we have
of God.

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 § 36.

This farther is to be observed, that there is no Idea we

35 attribute to God, bating Infinity, which is not also a part of our
complex Idea of other Spirits. Because being capable of no other
simple Ideas, belonging to any thing but Body, but those which by

...........................................................................................................................
pg 316
Reflection we receive from the Operation of our own Minds, we can
attribute to Spirits no other, but what we receive from thence: And
all the difference we can put between them in our Contemplation
of Spirits, is only in the several Extents and Degrees of their Know-
5 ledge, Power, Duration, Happiness, etc. For that in our Ideas, as well
of Spirits, as of other things, we are restrained to those we receive from
Sensation and Reflection, is evident from hence, that in our Ideas of
Spirits, how much soever advanced in Perfection, beyond those of
Bodies, even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have any Idea of the
10 manner, wherein they discover their Thoughts one to another:
Though we must necessarily conclude, that separate Spirits, which
are Beings that have perfecter Knowledge, and greater Happiness
than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating
their Thoughts, than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal
15 Signs, and particularly Sounds, which are therefore of most general
use, as being the best, and quickest we are capable of. But of im-
mediate Communication, having no Experiment in our selves, and
consequently, no Notion of it at all, we have no Idea, how Spirits,
which use not Words, can with quickness; or much less, how
20 Spirits that have no Bodies, can be Masters of their own Thoughts,
and communicate or conceal them at Pleasure, though we cannot
but necessarily suppose they have such a Power.

§ 37.

And thus we have seen, what kind of Ideas we have of Sub-

stances of all kinds, wherein they consist, and how we come by them.
25 From whence, I think, it is very evident.

First, That all our Ideas of the several sorts of Substances, are
nothing but Collections of simple Ideas, with a Supposition of
something, to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though
of this supposed something, we have no clear distinct Idea at all.

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30 Secondly, That all the simple Ideas, that thus united in one com-
mon Substratum make up our complex Ideas of the several sorts of
Substances, are no other but such, as we have received from
Sensation or Reflection. So that even in those, which we think, we are

...........................................................................................................................
pg 317
most intimately acquainted with, and come nearest the Compre-
hension of, our most enlarged Conceptions, cannot reach beyond
those simple Ideas. And even in those, which seem most remote
from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing, we
5 can perceive in our selves by Reflection, or discover by Sensation
in other things, we can attain to nothing, but those simple Ideas,
which we originally received from Sensation or Reflection, as is evi-
dent in the complex Ideas we have of Angels, and particularly of
God himself.

10 Thirdly, That most of the simple Ideas, that make up our complex
Ideas of Substances, when truly considered, are only Powers, how-
ever we are apt to take them for positive Qualities; v.g. the greatest
part of the Ideas, that make our complex Idea of Gold, are Yellowness,
great Weight, Ductility, Fusibility, and Solubility, in Aqua Regia,
15 etc. all united together in an unknown Substratum; all which Ideas, are
nothing else, but so many relations to other Substances; and are not
really in the Gold, considered barely in it self, though they depend
on those real, and primary Qualities of its internal constitution,
whereby it has a fitness, differently to operate, and be operated on
20 by several other Substances.

CHAPTER XXIV
Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

§ 1.

BESIDES these complex Ideas of several single Substances,

as of Man, Horse, Gold, Violet, Apple, etc. the Mind hath also
complex collective Ideas of Substances; which I so call, because such
Ideas are made up of many particular Substances considered
25 together, as united into one Idea, and which so joined, are looked on
as one; v.g. the Idea of such a collection of Men as make an Army,
though consisting of a great number of distinct Substances, is as
much one Idea, as the Idea of a Man: And the great collective Idea of

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 all Bodies whatsoever signified by the name World, is as much one
30 Idea, as the Idea of any the least Particle of Matter in it; it sufficing,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 318
to the unity of any Idea, that it be considered as one Representation,
or Picture, though made up of never so many Particulars.

§ 2.

These collective Ideas of Substances, the Mind makes by its

power of Composition, and uniting severally either simple or
5 complex Ideas into one, as it does, by the same Faculty make the
complex Ideas of particular Substances, consisting of an aggregate
of divers simple Ideas, united in one Substance: And as the Mind by
putting together the repeated Ideas of Unity, makes the collective
Mode, or complex Idea of any number, as a Score, or a Gross, etc. So
10 by putting together several particular Substances, it makes collec-
tive Ideas of Substances, as a Troop, an Army, a Swarm, a City, a
Fleet; each of which, every one finds, that he represents to his own
Mind, by one Idea, in one view; and so under that Notion con-
siders those several Things as perfectly one, as one Ship, or one
15 Atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an Army of ten Thousand
Men, should make one Idea, than how a Man should make one Idea;
it being as easie to the Mind, to unite into one, the Idea of a great
number of Men, and consider it as one; as it is to unite into one
particular, all the distinct Ideas, that make up the composition of a
20 Man, and consider them altogether as one.

§ 3.

Amongst such kind of collective Ideas, are to be counted most

part of artificial Things, at least such of them as are made up of
distinct Substances: And, in truth, if we consider all these collec-
tive Ideas aright, as ARMY, Constellation, Universe; as they are
25 united into so many single Ideas, they are but the artificial Draughts
of the Mind, bringing things very remote, and independent on one
another, into one view, the better to contemplate, and discourse of
them, united into one conception, and signified by one name. For
there are no Things so remote, nor so contrary, which the Mind
30 cannot, by this art of Composition, bring into one Idea, as is visible
in that signified by the name Universe.

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 319
CHAPTER XXV
Of Relation.

§ 1.

BESIDES the Ideas, whether simple or complex, that the Mind

has of Things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets
from their comparison one with another. The Understanding,
in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise
5 Object: It can carry any Idea, as it were, beyond it self, or, at least,
look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other.
When the Mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were,
bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to
t'other: This is, as the Words import, Relation and Respect; and the
10 Denominations given to positive Things, intimating that Respect,
and serving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject it
self denominated, to something distinct from it, are what we call
Relatives; and the Things so brought together, Related. Thus when
the Mind considers Cajus, as such a positive Being, it takes nothing
15 into that Idea, but what really exists in Cajus; v.g. when I consider
him, as a Man, I have nothing in my Mind, but the complex Idea of
the Species, Man. So likewise, when I say Cajus is a white Man, I
have nothing but the bare consideration of Man, who hath that
white Colour. But when I give Cajus the name Husband, I intimate
20 some other Person: and when I give him the name Whiter, I
intimate some other thing: in both cases my Thought is led to
something beyond Cajus, and there are two things brought into con-
sideration. And since any Idea, whether simple, or complex, may be
the occasion, why the Mind thus brings two things together, and,
25 as it were, takes a view of them at once, though still considered as
distinct: therefore any of our Ideas, may be the foundation of
Relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the Contract, and
Ceremony of Marriage with Sempronia, is the occasion of the
Denomination, or Relation of Husband; and the colour White, the
30 occasion why he is said whiter than Free-stone.

§ 2.

These, and the like Relations, expressed by relative terms, that

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 320
have others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as Father, and
Son; Bigger, and Less; Cause, and Effect, are very obvious to every
one, and every Body, at first sight, perceives the Relation. For
Father, and Son; Husband and Wife, and such other correlative
5 terms, seem so nearly to belong one to another, and, through
Custom, do so readily chime, and answer one another in Peoples
Memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the Thoughts
are presently carried beyond the Thing so named; and no body
over-looks, or doubts of a Relation, where it is so plainly intimated.
10 But where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there
the Relation is not always so easily taken notice of. Concubine is no
doubt, a relative Name, as well as Wife: But in Languages where
this, and the like Words, have not a correlative term, there People
are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident Mark
15 of Relation, which is between Correlatives, which seem to explain
one another, and not to be able to exist but together. Hence it is,
that many of those Names, which duly considered, do include
evident Relations, have been called External Denominations. But all
Names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some Idea,
20 which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then
it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in the
Thing to which the Denomination is given: or else it arises from the
respect the Mind finds in it, to something distinct from it, with
which it considers it; and then it includes a Relation.

25 § 3.

Another sort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on
to be either relative, or so much as external Denominations: which
yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something abso-
lute in the Subject do conceal a tacit, though less observable,
Relation. Such are the seemingly positive terms of Old, Great, Imperfect,
30 etc. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the
following Chapters.

§ 4.

This farther may be observed, That the Ideas of Relation,

may be the same in Men, who have far different Ideas of the Things
that are related, or that are thus compared. v.g. Those who have far

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35 different Ideas of a Man, may yet agree in the notion of a Father:
which is a notion superinduced to the Substance, or Man, and
refers only to an act of that thing called Man; whereby he con-

...........................................................................................................................
pg 321
tributed to the Generation of one of his own kind, let Man be what
it will.

§ 5.

The nature therefore of Relation, consists in the referring, or

comparing two things, one to another; from which comparison, one
5 or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be
removed, or cease to be, the Relation ceases, and the Denomination
consequent to it, though the other receive in it self no alteration at
all. v.g. Cajus, whom I consider to day as a Father, ceases to be so to
morrow, only by the death of his Son, without any alteration made
10 in himself. Nay, barely by the Mind's changing the Object, to
which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having
contrary Denominations, at the same time. v.g. Cajus, compared
to several Persons, may truly be said to be Older, and Younger;
Stronger and Weaker, etc.

15 § 6.

Whatsoever doth, or can exist, or be considered as one thing,

is positive: and so not only simple Ideas, and Substances, but Modes
also are positive Beings; though the parts, of which they consist,
are very often relative one to another; but the whole together
considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex Idea of
20 one thing; which Idea is in our Minds, as one Picture, though an
aggregate of divers parts; and under one name, it is a positive or
absolute Thing, or Idea. Thus a Triangle, though the parts thereof,
compared one to another, be relative, yet the Idea of the whole, is a
positive absolute Idea. The same may be said of a Family, a Tune,
25 etc. for there can be no Relation, but betwixt two Things, con-
sidered as two Things. There must always be in relation two Ideas,
or Things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as
distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.

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 § 7.

Concerning Relation in general, these things may be con-

30 sidered:

First, That there is no one thing, whether simple Idea, Substance,

Mode, or Relation, or Name of either of them, which is not capable
of almost an infinite number of Considerations, in reference to other
things: and therefore this makes no small part of Men's Thoughts
35 and Words, v.g. One single Man may at once be concerned in, and
sustain all these following Relations, and many more, viz. Father,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 322
Brother, Son, Grandfather, Grandson, Father-in-Law, Son-in-Law,
Husband, Friend, Enemy, Subject, General, Judge, Patron, Client,
Professor, European, English-man, Islander, Servant, Master,
Possessor, Captain, Superior, Inferior, Bigger, Less, Older, Younger,
5 Contemporary, Like, Unlike, etc. to an almost infinite number: he
being capable of as many Relations, as there can be occasions of
comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, dis-
agreement, or respect whatsoever: For, as I said, Relation is a way of
comparing, or considering two things together; and giving one, or
10 both of them, some appellation from that Comparison, and some-
times giving even the Relation it self a Name.

§ 8.

Secondly, This farther may be considered concerning Relation,

That though it be not contained in the real existence of Things,
but something extraneous, and superinduced: yet the Ideas which
15 relative Words stand for, are often clearer, and more distinct, than
of those Substances to which they do belong. The Notion we have
of a Father, or Brother, is a great deal clearer, and more distinct,
than that we have of a Man: Or, if you will, Paternity is a thing
whereof 'tis easier to have a clear Idea, than of Humanity: And I can
20 much easier conceive what a Friend is, than what GOD. Because
the knowledge of one Action, or one simple Idea, is oftentimes
sufficient to give me the Notion of a Relation: but to the knowing
of any substantial Being, an accurate collection of sundry Ideas is
necessary. A Man, if he compares two things together, can hardly
25 be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: So

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 that when he compares any Things together, he cannot but have
a very clear Idea of that Relation. The Ideas then of Relations are
capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our Minds, than those
of Substances. Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple
30 Ideas, which are really in any Substance, but for the most part easie
enough to know the simple Ideas that make up any Relation I
think on, or have a Name for. v.g. Comparing two Men, in reference
to one common Parent, it is very easy to frame the Ideas of Brothers,
without having yet the perfect Idea of a Man. For significant rela-
35 tive Words, as well as others, standing only for Ideas; and those

...........................................................................................................................
pg 323
being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the
knowing the precise Idea the relative term stands for, to have a
clear conception of that, which is the foundation of the Relation;
which may be done without having a perfect and clear Idea of the
5 thing it is attributed to. Thus having the Notion, that one laid the
Egg, out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear Idea of
the Relation of Dam and Chick, between the two Cassiowaries in
St. James's Park; though, perhaps, I have but a very obscure and
imperfect Idea of those Birds themselves.

10 § 9.

Thirdly, Though there be a great number of Considerations,

wherein Things may be compared one with another, and so a
multitude of Relations: yet they all terminate in, and are concerned
about those simple Ideas, either of Sensation or Reflection; which I
think to be the whole Materials of all our Knowledge. To clear this,
15 I shall shew it in the most considerable Relations, that we have any
notion of; and in some that seem to be the most remote from Sense
or Reflection: which yet will appear to have their Ideas from thence,
and leave it past doubt, that the Notions we have of them, are
but certain simple Ideas, and so originally derived from Sense or
20 Reflection.

§ 10.

Fourthly, That Relation being the considering of one thing

with another, which is extrinsical to it, it is evident, that all Words,
that necessarily lead the Mind to any other Ideas, than are supposed

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 really to exist in that thing, to which the Word is applied, are
25 relative Words. v.g. A Man Black, Merry, Thoughtful, Thirsty, Angry,
Extended; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither
signify nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is supposed
really to exist in the Man thus denominated: But Father, Brother,
King, Husband, Blacker, Merrier, etc. are Words, which, together with
30 the thing they denominate, imply also something else separate,
and exterior to the existence of that thing.

§ 11.

Having laid down these Premises concerning Relation in

general, I shall now proceed to shew, in some instances, how all the
Ideas we have of Relation, are made up, as the others are, only of
35 simple Ideas; and that they all, how refined, or remote from Sense

...........................................................................................................................
pg 324
soever they seem, terminate at last in simple Ideas. I shall begin
with the most comprehensive Relation, wherein all things that do,
or can exist, are concerned, and that is the Relation of Cause and
Effect. The Idea whereof, how derived from the two Fountains of all
5 our Knowledge, Sensation and Reflection, I shall in the next place
consider.

CHAPTER XXVI
Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.

§ 1.

IN the notice, that our Senses take of the constant Vicissitude

of Things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both
Qualities, and Substances begin to exist; and that they receive this
10 their Existence, from the due Application and Operation of some
other Being. From this Observation, we get our Ideas of Cause and
Effect. That which produces any simple or complex Idea, we denote
by the general Name Cause; and that which is produced, Effect.
Thus finding, that in that Substance which we call Wax, Fluidity,
15 which is a simple Idea, that was not in it before, is constantly pro-
duced by the Application of a certain degree of Heat, we call the
simple Idea of Heat, in relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Cause of it,
and Fluidity the Effect. So also finding that the Substance, Wood,

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 which is a certain Collection of simple Ideas, so called, by the
20 Application of Fire, is turned into another Substance, called Ashes;
i.e. another complex Idea, consisting of a Collection of simple Ideas,
quite different from that complex Idea, which we call Wood; we
consider Fire, in relation to Ashes, as Cause, and the Ashes, as
Effect. So that whatever is considered by us, to conduce or operate,
25 to the producing any particular simple Idea, or Collection of simple
Ideas, whether Substance, or Mode, which did not before exist, hath
thereby in our Minds the relation of a Cause, and so is denominated
by us.

§ 2.

Having thus, from what our Senses are able to discover, in

30 the Operations of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of Cause

...........................................................................................................................
pg 325
and Effect; viz. That a Cause is that which makes any other thing,
either simple Idea, Substance, or Mode, begin to be; and an Effect is
that, which had its Beginning from some other thing. The Mind
finds no great difficulty, to distinguish the several Originals of
5 things into two sorts.

First, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part

thereof did ever exist before; as when a new Particle of Matter doth
begin to exist, in rerum natura, which had before no Being, and this
we call Creation.

10 Secondly, When a thing is made up of Particles, which did all of

them before exist, but that very thing, so constituted of pre-existing
Particles, which considered altogether make up such a Collection
of simple Ideas, had not any Existence before, as this Man, this
Egg, Rose, or Cherry, etc. And this, when referred to a Substance,
15 produced in the ordinary course of Nature, by an internal Principle,
but set on work by, and received from some external Agent, or
Cause, and working by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we
call Generation; when the Cause is extrinsical, and the Effect pro-
duced by a sensible Separation, or juxta Position of discernible
20 Parts, we call it Making; and such are all artificial things. When any
simple Idea is produced, which was not in that Subject before, we
call it Alteration. Thus a Man is generated, a Picture made, and

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 either of them altered, when any new sensible Quality, or simple
Idea, is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and
25 the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are
Effects; and those things, which operated to the Existence, Causes.
In which, and all other Cases, we may observe, that the Notion of
Cause and Effect, has its rise from Ideas, received by Sensation or
Reflection; and that this Relation, how comprehensive soever,
30 terminates at last in them. For to have the Idea of Cause and Effect, it
suffices to consider any simple Idea, or Substance, as beginning to
exist, by the Operation of some other, without knowing the manner
of that Operation.

§ 3.

Time and Place are also the Foundations of very large

35 Relations, and all finite Beings at least are concerned in them. But
having already shewn in another Place, how we get these Ideas, it
may suffice here to intimate, that most of the Denominations of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 326
things, received from time, are only Relations; thus, when any one
says, that Queen Elizabeth lived sixty nine, and reigned forty five
years; these Words import only the Relation of that Duration to
some other, and means no more but this, That the Duration of her
5 Existence was equal to sixty nine, and the Duration of her Govern-
ment to forty five Annual Revolutions of the Sun; and so are all
Words, answering, how long. Again, William the Conqueror in-
vaded England about the year 1070. which means this; That taking
the Duration from our Saviour's Time, till now, for one entire
10 great length of time, it shews at what distance this Invasion was
from the two Extremes: and so do all Words of time, answering to
the Question when, which shew only the distance of any point of
time, from the Period of a longer Duration, from which we measure,
and to which we thereby consider it, as related.

15 § 4.

There are yet besides those, other Words of time, that

ordinarily are thought to stand for positive Ideas, which yet will,
when considered, be found to be relative, such as are Young, Old,
etc. which include, and intimate the Relation any thing has, to a

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 certain length of Duration, whereof we have the Idea in our Minds.
20 Thus having setled in our Thoughts the Idea of the ordinary
Duration of a Man to be seventy years, when we say a Man is
Young, we mean, that his Age is yet but a small part of that which
usually Men attain to: And when we denominate him Old, we mean,
that his Duration is run out almost to the end of that which Men do
25 not usually exceed. And so 'tis but comparing the particular Age, or
Duration of this or that Man, to the Idea of that Duration which we
have in our Minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of Animals:
Which is plain, in the application of these Names to other Things;
for a Man is called Young at Twenty years, and very Young at
30 Seven years old: But yet a Horse we call Old at Twenty, and a Dog
at Seven years; because in each of these, we compare their Age to
different Ideas of Duration which are settled in our Minds, as belong-
ing to these several sorts of Animals, in the ordinary course of
Nature. But the Sun, and Stars, though they have outlasted several
35 Generations of Men, we call not old, because we do not know what
period GOD hath set to that sort of Beings. This Term belonging
properly to those Things, which we can observe in the ordinary
course of Things, by a natural decay to come to an end, in a certain
period of time; and so have in our Minds, as it were, a Standard, to

...........................................................................................................................
pg 327
which we can compare the several parts of their Duration; and by
the relation they bear thereunto, call them Young, or Old; which
we cannot therefore do to a Ruby, or a Diamond, things whose
usual periods we know not.

5 § 5.

The Relation also that things have to one another, in their

Places and Distances, is very obvious to observe; as Above, Below,
a Mile distant from Charing-cross, in England, and in London. But as in
Duration, so in Extension and Bulk, there are some Ideas that are
relative, which we signify by Names, that are thought positive; as
10 Great, and Little, are truly Relations. For here also having, by obser-
vation, settled in our Minds the Ideas of the Bigness of several
Species of Things, from those we have been most accustomed to,
we make them, as it were, the Standards whereby to denominate
the Bulk of others. Thus we call a great Apple, such a one as is
15 bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to; and a

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 little Horse, such a one as comes not up to the size of that Idea,
which we have in our Minds, to belong ordinarily to Horses: And
that will be a great Horse to a Welsh-man, which is but a little one
to a Fleming; they two having from the different Breed of their
20 Countries, taken several siz'd Ideas to which they compare, and in
relation to which they denominate their Great, and their Little.

§ 6.

So likewise Weak and Strong, are but relative Denominations of

Power, compared to some Idea we have, at that time, of greater or
less Power. Thus when we say a Weak Man, we mean one that has
25 not so much Strength, or Power to move, as usually Men have, or
usually those of his size have; which is a comparing his Strength to
the Idea we have of the usual Strength of Men, or Men of such a
size. The like when we say the Creatures are all weak Things;
Weak, there, is but a relative term, signifying the disproportion
30 there is in the Power of GOD, and the Creatures. And so abundance
of Words, in ordinary Speech, stand only for Relations, (and,
perhaps, the greatest part,) which at first sight, seem to have no
such signification: v.g. The Ship has necessary Stores. Necessary, and
Stores, are both relative Words: one having a relation to the ac-
35 complishing the Voyage intended, and the other to future use. All
which Relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in Ideas

...........................................................................................................................
pg 328
derived from Sensation, or Reflection, is too obvious to need any
Explication.

1
CHAPTER XXVII
Of Identity and Diversity.

§ 1.

ANOTHER occasion, the mind often takes of comparing, is the

very Being of things, when considering any thing as existing at any
5 determin'd time and place, we compare it with it self existing at
another time, and thereon form the Ideas of Identity and Diversity.
When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time,
we are sure, (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not
another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like

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10 and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: And
in this consists identity, when the Ideas it is attributed to vary not
at all from what they were that moment, wherein we consider their
former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we
never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the
15 same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly
conclude, that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all
of the same kind, and is there it self alone. When therefore we
demand, whether any thing be the same or no, it refers always to
something that existed such a time in such a place, which 'twas
20 certain, at that instant, was the same with it self and no other:
From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two begin-
nings of Existence, nor two things one beginning, it being im-
possible for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same
instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing in differ-
25 ent places. That therefore that had one beginning is the same
thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place
from that, is not the same but divers. That which has made the
Difficulty about this Relation, has been the little care and attention
used in having precise Notions of the things to which it is attri-
30 buted.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 329
§ 2.

We have the Ideas but of three sorts of Substances; 1. God.

2. Finite Intelligences. 3. Bodies. First, God is without beginning,
eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore concerning his
Identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite Spirits having
5 had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the
relation to that time and place will always determine to each of
them its Identity as long as it exists.

Thirdly, The same will hold of every Particle of Matter, to which

no Addition or Substraction of Matter being made, it is the same.
10 For though these three sorts of Substances, as we term them, do not
exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive
but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same
kind out of the same place: Or else the Notions and Names of
Identity and Diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such

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15 distinction of Substances, or any thing else one from another. For
Example, could two Bodies be in the same place at the same time;
then those two parcels of Matter must be one and the same, take
them great or little; nay, all Bodies must be one and the same. For
by the same reason that two particles of Matter may be in one
20 place, all Bodies may be in one place: Which, when it can be sup-
posed, takes away the distinction of Identity and Diversity, of one
and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction,
that two or more should be one, Identity and Diversity are relations
and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the Under-
25 standing. All other things being but Modes or Relations ultimately
terminated in Substances, the Identity and Diversity of each
particular Existence of them too will be by the same way deter-
mined: Only as to things whose Existence is in succession, such as
are the Actions of finite Beings, v.g. Motion and Thought, both which
30 consist in a continued train of Succession, concerning their Diver-
sity there can be no question: Because each perishing the moment it
begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as
permanent Beings can at different times exist in distant places; and
therefore no motion or thought considered as at different times can
35 be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of
Existence.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 330
§ 3.

From what has been said, 'tis easy to discover, what is so

much enquired after, the principium Individuationis, and that 'tis plain
is Existence it self, which determines a Being of any sort to a
particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the
5 same kind. This though it seems easier to conceive in simple
Substances or Modes; yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in
compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is applied; v.g. Let
us suppose an Atom, i.e. a continued body under one immutable
Superficies, existing in a determined time and place: 'tis evident,
10 that, considered in any instant of its Existence, it is, in that instant,
the same with it self. For being, at that instant, what it is, and
nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue, as long as its
Existence is continued: for so long it will be the same, and no other.
In like manner, if two or more Atoms be joined together into the

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15 same Mass, every one of those Atoms will be the same, by the fore-
going Rule: And whilst they exist united together, the Mass,
consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same
Body, let the parts be never so differently jumbled: But if one of
these Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer
20 the same Mass, or the same Body. In the state of living Creatures,
their Identity depends not on a Mass of the same Particles; but
on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of
Matter alters not the Identity: An Oak, growing from a Plant to
a great Tree, and then lopp'd, is still the same Oak: And a Colt
25 grown up to a Horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while
the same Horse: though, in both these Cases, there may be a
manifest change of the parts: So that truly they are not either of
them the same Masses of Matter, though they be truly one of them
the same Oak, and the other the same Horse. The reason whereof is,
30 that in these two cases of a Mass of Matter, and a living Body,
Identity is not applied to the same thing.

§ 4.

We must therefore consider wherein an Oak differs from a

Mass of Matter, and that seems to me to be in this; that the one is
only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other
35 such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an Oak; and

...........................................................................................................................
pg 331
such an Organization of those parts, as is fit to receive, and distri-
bute nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the Wood, Bark, and
Leaves, etc. of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life. That
being then one Plant, which has such an Organization of Parts in
5 one coherent Body, partaking of one Common Life, it continues to
be the same Plant, as long as it partakes of the same Life, though that
Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to
the living Plant, in a like continued Organization, conformable to
that sort of Plants. For this Organization being at any one instant
10 in any one Collection of Matter, is in that particular concrete
distinguished from all other, and is that individual Life, which
existing constantly from that moment both forwards and back-
wards in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding Parts united
to the living Body of the Plant, it has that Identity, which makes
15 the same Plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same Plant,

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 during all the time that they exist united in that continued Organi-
zation, which is fit to convey that Common Life to all the Parts so
united.

§ 5.

The Case is not so much different in Brutes, but that any one
20 may hence see what makes an Animal, and continues it the same.
Something we have like this in Machines, and may serve to illus-
trate it. For Example, what is a Watch? 'Tis plain 'tis nothing but a
fit Organization, or Construction of Parts, to a certain end, which,
when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we
25 would suppose this Machine one continued Body, all whose organ-
ized Parts were repair'd, increas'd or diminish'd, by a constant
Addition or Separation of insensible Parts, with one Common Life,
we should have something very much like the Body of an Animal,
with this difference, That in an Animal the fitness of the Organi-
30 zation, and the Motion wherein Life consists, begin together, the
Motion coming from within; but in Machines the force, coming
sensibly from without, is often away, when the Organ is in order,
and well fitted to receive it.

§ 6.

This also shews wherein the Identity of the same Man con-
35 sists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 332
by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally
united to the same organized Body. He that shall place the Identity
of Man in any thing else, but like that of other Animals in one fitly
organized Body taken in any one instant, and from thence continued
5 under one Organization of Life in several successively fleeting
Particles of Matter, united to it, will find it hard, to make an
Embryo, one of Years, mad, and sober, the same Man, by any
Supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates,
Pilate, St. Austin, and Cæsar Borgia to be the same Man. For if the
10 Identity of Soul alone makes the same Man, and there be nothing in
the Nature of Matter, why the same individual Spirit may not be
united to different Bodies, it will be possible, that those Men, living
in distant Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the same

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 Man: Which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the
15 Word Man, applied to an Idea, out of which Body and Shape is ex-
cluded: And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the
Notions of those Philosophers, who allow of Transmigration, and
are of Opinion that the Souls of Men may, for their Miscarriages, be
detruded into the Bodies of Beasts, as fit Habitations with Organs
20 suited to the satisfaction of their Brutal Inclinations. But yet I think
no body, could he be sure that the Soul of Heliogabalus were in one
of his Hogs, would yet say that Hog were a Man or Heliogabalus.

§ 7.

'Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all

sorts of Identity, or will determine it in every Case: But to conceive,
25 and judge of it aright, we must consider what Idea the Word it is
applied to stands for: It being one thing to be the same Substance,
another the same Man, and a third the same Person, if Person, Man,
and Substance, are three Names standing for three different Ideas; for
such as is the Idea belonging to that Name, such must be the Iden-
30 tity: Which if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would
possibly have prevented a great deal of that Confusion, which often
occurs about this Matter, with no small seeming Difficulties;
especially concerning Personal Identity, which therefore we shall in
the next place a little consider.

35 § 8.

An Animal is a living organized Body; and consequently, the

same Animal, as we have observed, is the same continued Life

...........................................................................................................................
pg 333
communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen suc-
cessively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever
is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past
doubt, that the Idea in our Minds, of which the Sound Man in our
5 Mouths is the Sign, is nothing else but of an Animal of such a
certain Form: Since I think I may be confident, that whoever should
see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, though it had no more
reason all its Life, than a Cat or a Parrot, would call him still a Man;
or whoever should hear a Cat or a Parrot discourse, reason, and
10 philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a Cat or a Parrot;

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 and say, the one was a dull irrational Man, and the other a very
intelligent rational Parrot. A Relation we have in an Author of
great note is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational
Parrot. His Words(α) are,

15 "I had a mind to know from Prince Maurice's own Mouth, the
account of a common, but much credited Story, that I had heard so
often from many others, of an old Parrot he had in Brasil, during his
Government there, that spoke, and asked, and answered common
Questions like a reasonable Creature; so that those of his Train
20 there, generally concluded it to be Witchery or Possession; and one
of his Chaplains, who lived long afterwards in Holland, would never
from that time endure a Parrot, but said, they all had a Devil in
them. I had heard many particulars of this Story, and assevered by
People hard to be discredited, which made me ask Prince Maurice
25 what there was of it. He said, with his usual plainess, and dryness in
talk, there was something true, but a great deal false, of what had
been reported. I desired to know of him, what there was of the
first; he told me short and coldly, that he had heard of such an
old Parrot when he came to Brasil, and though he believed nothing
30 of it, and 'twas a good way off, yet he had so much Curiosity as to
send for it, that 'twas a very great and a very old one; and when it
came first into the Room where the Prince was, with a great many
Dutch-men about him, it said presently, What a company of white Men
are here? They asked it what he thought that Man was, pointing at
35 the Prince? It answered, Some General or other; when they brought it

...........................................................................................................................
pg 334
close to him, he asked it, D'ou venes vous? it answered, De Marinnan.
The Prince, A qui estes vous? The Parrot, A un Portugais. Prince, Que
fais tu la? Parrot, Je garde les poulles. The Prince laughed and said,
Vous gardez les poulles? The Parrot answered, Ouy, moy et je scay bien
5 faire; and made the Chuck four or five times that People use to
make to Chickens when they call them.† I set down the Words of
this worthy Dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said them to
me. I asked him in what Language the Parrot spoke, and he said, in
Brasilian; I asked whether he understood Brasilian; he said No, but
10 he had taken care to have two Interpreters by him, the one a
Dutch-man, that spoke Brasilian, and the other a Brasilian, that spoke
Dutch; that he asked them separately and privately, and both of
them agreed in telling him just the same thing that the Parrot said.

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 I could not but tell this odd Story, because it is so much out of the
15 way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for
I dare say this Prince, at least, believed himself in all he told me,
having ever passed for a very honest and pious Man; I leave it to
Naturalists to reason, and to other Men to believe as they please
upon it; however, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve or enliven
20 a busie Scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the
purpose or no."

I have taken care that the Reader should have the Story at large
in the Authors own Words, because he seems to me not to have
thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a Man
25 as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the Testimonies he
gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had
nothing to do, to pin so close, not only on a Man whom he mentions
as his Friend, but on a Prince in whom he acknowledges very great
Honesty and Piety, a Story which if he himself thought incredible,
30 he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince, 'tis plain, who
vouches this Story, and our Author who relates it from him, both of
them call this Talker a Parrot; and I ask any one else who thinks
such a Story fit to be told, whether if this Parrot, and all of its kind,
had always talked as we have a Princes word for it, this one did,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 335
whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of rational
Animals, but yet whether for all that, they would have been
allowed to be Men and not Parrots? For I presume 'tis not the Idea of
a thinking or rational Being alone, that makes the Idea of a Man in
5 most Peoples Sense; but of a Body so and so shaped joined to it; and
if that be the Idea of a Man, the same successive Body not shifted all
at once, must as well as the same immaterial Spirit go to the making
of the same Man.

§ 9.

This being premised to find wherein personal Identity consists,

10 we must consider what Person stands for; which, I think, is a think-
ing intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can con-
sider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times
and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is
inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It

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15 being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that
he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or
will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our
present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to
himself, that which he calls self: It not being considered in this case,
20 whether the same self be continued in the same, or divers Sub-
stances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and
'tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby
distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone
consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being: And as
25 far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past
Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is
the same self now it was then; and 'tis by the same self with this
present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.

§ 10.

But it is farther enquir'd whether it be the same Identical

30 Substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of,
if these Perceptions, with their consciousness, always remain'd
present in the Mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be
always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently
the same to it self. But that which seems to make the difficulty is
35 this, that this consciousness, being interrupted always by forget-
fulness, there being no moment of our Lives wherein we have the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 336
whole train of all our past Actions before our Eyes in one view: But
even the best Memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are
viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of
our Lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our
5 present Thoughts, and in sound sleep, having no Thoughts at all,
or at least none with that consciousness, which remarks our waking
Thoughts. I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being inter-
rupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised
whether we are the same thinking thing; i.e. the same substance
10 or no. Which however reasonable, or unreasonable, concerns not
personal Identity at all. The Question being what makes the same
Person, and not whether it be the same Identical Substance, which
always thinks in the same Person, which in this case matters not at
all. Different Substances, by the same consciousness (where they do

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15 partake in it) being united into one Person; as well as different
Bodies, by the same Life are united into one Animal, whose
Identity is preserved, in that change of Substances, by the unity of
one continued Life. For it being the same consciousness that makes
a Man be himself to himself, personal Identity depends on that only,
20 whether it be annexed only to one individual Substance, or can be
continued in a succession of several Substances. For as far as any
intelligent Being can repeat the Idea of any past Action with the
same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same conscious-
ness it has of any present Action; so far it is the same personal self.
25 For it is by the consciousness it has of its present Thoughts and
Actions, that it is self to it self now, and so will be the same self as far
as the same consciousness can extend to Actions past or to come;
and would be by distance of Time, or change of Substance, no more
two Persons than a Man be two Men, by wearing other Cloaths to
30 Day than he did Yesterday, with a long or short sleep between: The
same consciousness uniting those distant Actions into the same
Person, whatever Substances contributed to their Production.

§ 11.

That this is so, we have some kind of Evidence in our very

Bodies, all whose Particles, whilst vitally united to this same
35 thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touch'd, and
are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to
them, are a part of our selves: i.e. of our thinking conscious self. Thus

...........................................................................................................................
pg 337
the Limbs of his Body is to every one a part of himself: He sympa-
thizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby
separate it from that consciousness, we had of its Heat, Cold, and
other Affections; and it is then no longer a part of that which is
5 himself, any more than the remotest part of Matter. Thus we see the
Substance, whereof personal self Consisted at one time, may be varied at
another, without the change of personal Identity: There being no
Question about the same Person, though the Limbs, which but now
were a part of it, be cut off.

10 § 12.

But the Question is, whether if the same Substance, which

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 thinks, be changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining the
same, it can be different Persons.

And to this I answer first, this can be no Question at all to those,

who place Thought in a purely material, animal, Constitution, void
15 of an immaterial Substance. For, whether their Supposition be true
or no, 'tis plain they conceive personal Identity preserved in some-
thing else than Identity of Substance; as animal Identity is pre-
served in Identity of Life, and not of Substance. And therefore those,
who place thinking in an immaterial Substance only, before they
20 can come to deal with these Men, must shew why personal Identity
cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial Substances, or
variety of particular immaterial Substances, as well as animal
Identity is preserved in the change of material Substances, or variety
of particular Bodies: Unless they will say, 'tis one immaterial Spirit,
25 that makes the same Life in Brutes; as it is one immaterial Spirit
that makes the same Person in Men, which the Cartesians at least
will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking things too.

§ 13.

But next, as to the first part of the Question, Whether if the

same thinking Substance (supposing immaterial Substances only to
30 think) be changed, it can be the same Person. I answer, that cannot
be resolv'd, but by those, who know what kind of Substances they
are, that do think; and whether the consciousness of past Actions
can be transferr'd from one thinking Substance to another. I grant,
were the same Consciousness the same individual Action, it could
35 not: But it being but a present representation of a past Action, why
it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the Mind
to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shewn. And

...........................................................................................................................
pg 338
therefore how far the consciousness of past Actions is annexed to
any individual Agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will
be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of Action it is,
that cannot be done without a reflex Act of Perception accompany-
5 ing it, and how perform'd by thinking Substances, who cannot
think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same
consciousness, not being the same individual Act, why one intellectual
Substance may not have represented to it, as done by it self, what

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 it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent, why I
10 say such a representation may not possibly be without reality of
Matter of Fact, as well as several representations in Dreams are,
which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to
conclude from the Nature of things. And that it never is so, will by
us, till we have clearer views of the Nature of thinking Substances,
15 be best resolv'd into the Goodness of God, who as far as the
Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible Creatures is concerned
in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs transfer from one to another,
that consciousness, which draws Reward or Punishment with it.
How far this may be an Argument against those who would place
20 Thinking in a System of fleeting animal Spirits, I leave to be
considered. But yet to return to the Question before us, it must be
allowed, That if the same consciousness (which, as has been shewn,
is quite a different thing from the same numerical Figure or Motion
in Body) can be transferr'd from one thinking Substance to another,
25 it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one
Person. For the same consciousness being preserv'd, whether in the
same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv'd.

§ 14.

As to the second part of the Question, Whether the same

immaterial Substance remaining, there may be two distinct
30 Persons; which Question seems to me to be built on this, Whether
the same immaterial Being, being conscious of the Actions of its
past Duration, may be wholly stripp'd of all the consciousness of its
past Existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving
again: And so as it were beginning a new Account from a new
35 Period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new
State. All those who hold pre-existence, are evidently of this Mind,
since they allow the Soul to have no remaining consciousness of
what it did in that pre-existent State, either wholly separate from

...........................................................................................................................
pg 339
Body, or informing any other Body; and if they should not, 'tis
plain Experience would be against them. So that personal Identity
reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent
Spirit not having continued so many Ages in a state of Silence,
5 must needs make different Persons. Suppose a Christian Platonist
or Pythagorean, should upon God's having ended all his Works of

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 Creation the Seventh Day, think his Soul hath existed ever since;
and should imagine it has revolved in several Humane Bodies, as I
once met with one, who was perswaded his had been the Soul of
10 Socrates (how reasonably I will not dispute. This I know, that in the
Post he fill'd, which was no inconsiderable one, he passed for a very
rational Man, and the Press has shewn, that he wanted not Parts or
Learning) would any one say, that he, being not conscious of any of
Socrates's Actions or Thoughts, could be the same Person with
15 Socrates? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, that he has
in himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him,
and in the constant change of his Body keeps him the same; and is
that which he calls himself: Let him also suppose it to be the same
Soul, that was in Nestor or Thersites, at the Siege of Troy, (For Souls
20 being, as far as we know any thing of them in their Nature, in-
different to any parcel of Matter, the Supposition has no apparent
absurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the
Soul of any other Man: But he, now having no consciousness of any
of the Actions either of Nestor or Thersites, does, or can he, conceive
25 himself the same Person with either of them? Can he be concerned
in either of their Actions? Attribute them to himself, or think them
his own more than the Actions of any other Man, that ever existed?
So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of
either of those Men, he is no more one self with either of them, than
30 if the Soul or immaterial Spirit, that now informs him, had been
created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present
Body, though it were never so true, that the same Spirit that in-
formed Nestor's or Thersites's Body, were numerically the same that
now informs his. For this would no more make him the same Person
35 with Nestor, than if some of the Particles of Matter, that were once a
part of Nestor, were now a part of this Man, the same immaterial
Substance without the same consciousness, no more making the
same Person by being united to any Body, than the same Particle of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 340
Matter without consciousness united to any Body, makes the same
Person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the Actions
of Nestor, he then finds himself the same Person with Nestor.

§ 15.

And thus we may be able without any difficulty to con-

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5 ceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not
exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same
consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet
the Soul alone in the change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but
to him that makes the Soul the Man, be enough to make the same
10 Man. For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the con-
sciousness of the Prince's past Life, enter and inform the Body of a
Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he
would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the
Prince's Actions: But who would say it was the same Man? The
15 Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I guess, to every
Body determine the Man in this case, wherein the Soul, with all its
Princely Thoughts about it, would not make another Man: But he
would be the same Cobler to every one besides himself. I know that
in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same
20 Man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will
always have a liberty to speak, as he pleases, and to apply what
articulate Sounds to what Ideas he thinks fit, and change them as
often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire, what makes the
same Spirit, Man, or Person, we must fix the Ideas of Spirit, Man, or
25 Person, in our Minds; and having resolved with our selves what we
mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them,
or the like, when it is the same, and when not.

§ 16.

But though the same immaterial Substance, or Soul does

not alone, where-ever it be, and in whatsoever State, make the same
30 Man; yet 'tis plain consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended,
should it be to Ages past, unites Existences, and Actions, very
remote in time, into the same Person, as well as it does the Existence
and Actions of the immediately preceding moment: So that what-
ever has the consciousness of present and past Actions, is the same
35 Person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 341
that I saw the Ark and Noah's Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of
the Thames last Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more
doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the Thames overflow'd
last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was
5 the same self, place that self in what Substance you please, than that

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 I that write this am the same my self now whilst I write (whether
I consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no)
that I was Yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it
matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or
10 other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and as justly account-
able for any Action was done a thousand Years since, appropriated
to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, for what I did the last
moment.

§ 17.

Self is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance,

15 made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded,
it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain,
capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern'd for it self, as far
as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst
comprehended under that consciousness, the little Finger is as
20 much a part of it self, as what is most so. Upon separation of this
little Finger, should this consciousness go along with the little
Finger, and leave the rest of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger
would be the Person, the same Person; and self then would have
nothing to do with the rest of the Body. As in this case it is the
25 consciousness that goes along with the Substance, when one part is
separated from another, which makes the same Person, and con-
stitutes this inseparable self: so it is in reference to Substances
remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this present
thinking thing can join it self, makes the same Person, and is one self
30 with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it self, and owns
all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that conscious-
ness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

§ 18.

In this personal Identity is founded all the Right and Justice

of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Misery, being that, for

...........................................................................................................................
pg 342
which every one is concerned for himself, not mattering what
becomes of any Substance, not joined to, or affected with that con-
sciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the
consciousness went along with the little Finger, when it was cut

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5 off, that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole
Body Yesterday, as making a part of it self, whose Actions then it
cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the same Body should
still live, and immediately from the separation of the little Finger
have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little Finger knew
10 nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of it self, or
could own any of its Actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19.

This may shew us wherein personal Identity consists, not in

the Identity of Substance, but, as I have said, in the Identity of con-
sciousness, wherein, if Socrates and the present Mayor of Quinborough
15 agree, they are the same Person: If the same Socrates waking and
sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and
sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish Socrates waking,
for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never
conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin
20 for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because
their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished;
for such Twins have been seen.

§ 20.

But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly

lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of
25 retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them
again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had
those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now
forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice
what the Word I is applied to, which in this case is the Man only.
30 And the same Man being presumed to be the same Person, I is
easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. But if it
be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable
consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would
at different times make different Persons; which, we see, is the
35 Sense of Mankind in the solemnest Declaration of their Opinions,
Humane Laws not punishing the Mad Man for the Sober Man's
Actions, nor the Sober Man for what the Mad Man did, thereby
making them two Persons; which is somewhat explained by our

...........................................................................................................................

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 pg 343
way of speaking in English, when we say such an one is not himself, or
is besides himself; in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who
now, or, at least, first used them, thought, that self was changed,
the self same Person was no longer in that Man.

5 § 21.

But yet 'tis hard to conceive, that Socrates the same indivi-
dual Man should be two Persons. To help us a little in this, we must
consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual Man.

First, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking

Substance: In short, the same numerical Soul, and nothing else.

10 Secondly, Or the same Animal, without any regard to an im-

material Soul.

Thirdly, Or the same immaterial Spirit united to the same Animal.

Now take which of these Suppositions you please, it is impossible

to make personal Identity to consist in any thing but consciousness;
15 or reach any farther than that does.

For by the First of them, it must be allowed possible that a Man

born of different Women, and in distant times, may be the same
Man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it
possible, for the same Man to be two distinct Persons, as any two
20 that have lived in different Ages without the knowledge of one
anothers Thoughts.

By the Second and Third, Socrates in this Life, and after it, cannot
be the same Man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so
making Humane Identity to consist in the same thing wherein we
25 place Personal Identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the same
Man to be the same Person. But then they who place Humane
Identity in consciousness only, and not in something else, must
consider how they will make the Infant Socrates the same Man with
Socrates after the Resurrection. But whatsoever to some Men makes
30 a Man, and consequently the same individual Man, wherein per-
haps few are agreed, personal Identity can by us be placed in
nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what

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 we call self) without involving us in great Absurdities.

§ 22.

But is not a Man Drunk and Sober the same Person, why
35 else is he punish'd for the Fact he commits when Drunk, though he
be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same Person,
as a Man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same
Person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Humane

...........................................................................................................................
pg 344
Laws punish both with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledge:
Because in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is
real, what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in Drunkenness or
Sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed
5 to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the Drunkard
perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet Humane Judicatures
justly punish him; because the Fact is proved against him, but want
of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great Day,
wherein the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it may be
10 reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he
knows nothing of; but shall receive his Doom, his Conscience
accusing or excusing him.

§ 23.

Nothing but consciousness can unite remote Existences into

the same Person, the Identity of Substance will not do it. For what-
15 ever Substance there is, however framed, without consciousness,
there is no Person: And a Carcase may be a Person, as well as any
sort of Substance be so without consciousness.

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses

acting the same Body, the one constantly by Day, the other by
20 Night; and on the other side the same consciousness acting by
Intervals two distinct Bodies: I ask in the first case, Whether the
Day and the Night-man would not be two as distinct Persons, as
Socrates and Plato; and whether in the second case, there would not
be one Person in two distinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the
25 same in two distinct clothings. Nor is it at all material to say, that
this same, and this distinct consciousness in the cases above-mentioned,

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 is owing to the same and distinct immaterial Substances, bringing
it with them to those Bodies, which whether true or no, alters not
the case: Since 'tis evident the personal Identity would equally be
30 determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were
annexed to some individual immaterial Substance or no. For grant-
ing that the thinking Substance in Man must be necessarily
suppos'd immaterial, 'tis evident, that immaterial thinking thing
may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to
35 it again, as appears in the forgetfulness Men often have of their
past Actions, and the Mind many times recovers the memory of a

...........................................................................................................................
pg 345
past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty Years together.
Make these intervals of Memory and Forgetfulness to take their
turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Persons with
the same immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former instance two
5 Persons with the same Body. So that self is not determined by Iden-
tity or Diversity of Substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only
by Identity of consciousness.

§ 24.

Indeed it may conceive the Substance whereof it is now

made up, to have existed formerly, united in the same conscious
10 Being: But consciousness removed, that Substance is no more it
self, or makes no more a part of it, than any other Substance, as is
evident in the instance, we have already given, of a Limb cut off, of
whose Heat, or Cold, or other Affections, having no longer any
consciousness, it is no more of a Man's self than any other Matter of
15 the Universe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial
Substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am my
self to my self: If there be any part of its Existence, which I cannot
upon recollection join with that present consciousness, whereby
I am now my self, it is in that part of its Existence no more my self,
20 than any other immaterial Being. For whatsoever any Substance
has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my conscious-
ness make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to
me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been
thought or done by any other immaterial Being any where existing.

25

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 § 25.

I agree the more probable Opinion is, that this conscious-

ness is annexed to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial
Substance.

But let Men according to their divers Hypotheses resolve of that

as they please. This every intelligent Being, sensible of Happiness
30 or Misery, must grant, that there is something that is himself, that
he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this self has
existed in a continued Duration more than one instant, and there-
fore 'tis possible may exist, as it has done, Months and Years to
come, without any certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may
35 be the same self, by the same consciousness, continued on for the
future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the
same self which did such or such an Action some Years since, by

...........................................................................................................................
pg 346
which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account
of self, the same numerical Substance is not considered, as making
the same self: But the same continued consciousness, in which several
Substances may have been united, and again separated from it,
5 which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein
this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same self. Thus
any part of our Bodies vitally united to that, which is conscious in
us, makes a part of our selves: But upon separation from the vital
union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that, which a
10 moment since was part of our selves, is now no more so, than a part
of another Man's self is a part of me; and 'tis not impossible, but in a
little time may become a real part of another Person. And so we have
the same numerical Substance become a part of two different Per-
sons; and the same Person preserved under the change of various
15 Substances. Could we suppose any Spirit wholly stripp'd of all its
memory or consciousness of past Actions, as we find our Minds
always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all, the
union or separation of such a Spiritual Substance would make no
variation of personal Identity, any more than that of any Particle
20 of Matter does. Any Substance vitally united to the present
thinking Being, is a part of that very same self which now is: Any
thing united to it by a consciousness of former Actions makes also
a part of the same self, which is the same both then and now.

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 § 26.

Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Where-ever a

25 Man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the
same Person. It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their
Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law,
and Happiness and Misery. This personality extends it self beyond
present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it
30 becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it self
past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason,
that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for
Happiness the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that
which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring, that that self, that
35 is conscious, should be happy. And therefore whatever past Actions
it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by conscious-
ness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been
done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain; i.e. Reward or Punishment,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 347
on the account of any such Action, is all one, as to be made happy or
miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For suppos-
ing a Man punish'd now, for what he had done in another Life,
whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what
5 difference is there between that Punishment, and being created
miserable? And therefore conformable to this, the Apostle tells us,
that at the Great Day, when every one shall receive according to his
doings, the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open.* The Sentence shall
be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they
10 themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances
soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same, that committed
those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them.

§ 27.

I am apt enough to think I have in treating of this Subject

made some Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers,
15 and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet I think, they are
such, as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the Nature of
that thinking thing, that is in us, and which we look on as our
selves. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain
System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, or could not

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20 perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body
organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one
such Spirit shall ever be united to any but one such Body, upon the
right Constitution of whose Organs its Memory should depend, we
might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I have made.
25 But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these
Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Substance, independent
from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature
of things, be no Absurdity at all, to suppose, that the same Soul may,
at different times be united to different Bodies, and with them make
30 up, for that time, one Man; As well as we suppose a part of a Sheep's
Body yesterday should be a part of a Man's Body to morrow, and in that
union make a vital part of Melibœus himself as well as it did of his Ram.

§ 28.

To conclude, whatever Substance begins to exist, it must,

during its Existence, necessarily be the same: Whatever Compo-
35 sitions of Substances begin to exist, during the union of those

...........................................................................................................................
pg 348
Substances, the concrete must be the same: Whatsoever Mode
begins to exist, during its Existence, it is the same: And so if the
Composition be of distinct Substances, and different Modes, the
same Rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or
5 obscurity, that has been about this Matter, rather rises from the
Names ill used, than from any obscurity in things themselves. For
whatever makes the specifick Idea, to which the name is applied, if
that Idea be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the
same, and divers will easily be conceived, and there can arise no
10 doubt about it.

§ 29.

For supposing a rational Spirit be the Idea of a Man, 'tis

easie to know, what is the same Man, viz. the same Spirit, whether
separate or in a Body will be the same Man. Supposing a rational
Spirit vitally united to a Body of a certain conformation of Parts to
15 make a Man, whilst that rational Spirit, with that vital conformation
of Parts, though continued in a fleeting successive Body, remains, it
will be the same Man. But if to any one the Idea of a Man be, but the

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 vital union of Parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union and
shape remains, in a concrete no otherwise the same, but by a
20 continued succession of fleeting Particles, it will be the same Man.
For whatever be the composition whereof the complex Idea is made,
whenever Existence makes it one particular thing under any denom-
ination, the same Existence continued, preserves it the same
individual under the same denomination.

CHAPTER XXVIII
Of other Relations.

25 § 1.

Besides the before-mentioned occasions of Time, Place, and

Causality of comparing, or referring Things one to another, there
are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 349
First, The first I shall name, is some one simple Idea; which being
capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the
Subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple Idea,
v.g. Whiter, Sweeter, Bigger, Equal, More, etc. These Relations
5 depending on the Equality and Excess of the same simple Idea, in
several Subjects, may be called, if one will, Proportional; and that
these are only conversant about those simple Ideas received from
Sensation or Reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to
evince it.

10 § 2.

Secondly, Another occasion of comparing Things together, or

considering one thing, so as to include in that Consideration some
other thing, is the Circumstances of their origin or beginning;
which being not afterwards to be altered, make the Relations,
depending thereon, as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong;
15 v.g. Father and Son, Brothers, Cousin-Germans, etc. which have their
Relations by one Community of Blood, wherein they partake in
several degrees; Country-men, i.e. those who were born in the same
Country, or Tract of Ground; and these I call natural Relations:
Wherein we may observe, that Mankind have fitted their Notions
20 and Words to the use of common Life, and not to the truth and

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 extent of Things. For 'tis certain, that in reality, the Relation
is the same, betwixt the Begetter, and the Begotten, in the several
Races of other Animals, as well as Men: But yet 'tis seldom said,
This Bull is the Grandfather of such a Calf; or that two Pidgeons
25 are Cousin-Germains. It is very convenient, that by distinct
Names, these Relations should be observed, and marked out in
Mankind, there being occasion, both in Laws, and other Com-
munications one with another, to mention and take notice of Men,
under these Relations: From whence also arise the Obligations of
30 several Duties amongst Men: Whereas in Brutes, Men having very
little or no cause to mind these Relations, they have not thought
fit to give them distinct and peculiar Names. This, by the way, may
give us some light into the different state and growth of Languages,
which being suited only to the convenience of Communication, are
35 proportioned to the Notions Men have, and the commerce of
Thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality or extent
of Things, nor to the various Respects might be found among them;

...........................................................................................................................
pg 350
nor the different abstract Considerations might be framed about
them. Where they had no philosophical Notions, there they had no
Terms to express them: And 'tis no wonder Men should have
framed no Names for those Things, they found no occasion to dis-
5 course of. From whence it is easy to imagine, why, as in some
Countries, they may not have so much as the Name for a Horse;
and in others, where they are more careful of the Pedigrees of their
Horses, than of their own, that there they may have not only
Names for particular Horses, but also of their several Relations of
10 Kindred one to another.

§ 3.

Thirdly, Sometimes the foundation of considering Things,

with reference to one another, is some act, whereby any one comes
by a Moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do something. Thus a
General is one, that hath power to command an Army; and an Army
15 under a General, is a Collection of armed Men, obliged to obey
one Man. A Citizen, or a Burgher, is one who has a Right to certain
Privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon Men's
Wills, or Agreement in Society, I call Instituted, or Voluntary; and
may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not

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20 all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the
Persons, to whom they have sometimes belonged, though neither of
the Substances, so related, be destroy'd. Now though these are all
reciprocal, as well as the rest; and contain in them a reference of two
things, one to the other: yet because one of the two things often
25 wants a relative Name, importing that reference, Men usually take
no notice of it, and the Relation is commonly over-look'd, v.g. A
Patron and Client, are easily allow'd to be Relations: but a Constable,
or Dictator, are not so readily, at first hearing, considered as such.
Because there is no peculiar Name for those who are under the
30 Command of a Dictator, or Constable, expressing a Relation to
either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a
certain Power over some others; and so is so far related to them, as
well as a Patron is to his Client, or General to his Army.

§ 4.

Fourthly, There is another sort of Relation, which is the

35 Conformity, or Disagreement, Men's voluntary Actions have to a
Rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of:
which, I think, may be called Moral Relation; as being that, which

...........................................................................................................................
pg 351
denominates our Moral Actions, and deserves well to be examined,
there being no part of Knowledge wherein we should be more
careful to get determined Ideas, and avoid, as much as may be,
Obscurity and Confusion. Humane Actions, when with their
5 various Ends, Objects, Manners, and Circumstances, they are
framed into distinct complex Ideas, ate, as has been shewn, so many
mixed Modes, a great part whereof have Names annexed to them.
Thus supposing Gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and
return Kindness received; Polygamy to be the having more Wives
10 than one at once: when we frame these Notions thus in our Minds,
we have there so many determined Ideas of mixed Modes. But this is
not all that concerns our Actions; it is not enough to have deter-
mined Ideas of them, and to know what Names belong to such and
such Combinations of Ideas. We have a farther and greater Con-
15 cernment, and that is, to know whether such Actions so made up,
are morally good, or bad.

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 § 5.

Good and Evil, as hath been shewn, B.II.Ch.XX. § 2. and

Ch.XXI. § 42. are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which
occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. Morally Good and Evil
20 then, is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary
Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, from
the Will and Power of the Law-maker; which Good and Evil,
Pleasure or Pain, attending our observance, or breach of the Law, by
the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call Reward and Punishment.

25 § 6.

Of these Moral Rules, or Laws, to which Men generally

refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their
Actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different
Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For since it would be
utterly in vain, to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man,
30 without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil, to
determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose
also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law. It would be
in vain for one intelligent Being, to set a Rule to the Actions of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 352
another, if he had it not in his Power, to reward the compliance
with, and punish deviation from his Rule, by some Good and Evil,
that is not the natural product and consequence of the Action it
self. For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience,
5 would operate of it self without a Law. This, if I mistake not, is the
true nature of all Law, properly so called.

§ 7.

The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge
of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three.
1. The Divine Law. 2. The Civil Law. 3. The Law of Opinion or Repu-
10 tation, if I may so call it. By the Relation they bear to the first of
these, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins, or Duties; by the
second, whether they be Criminal, or Innocent; and by the third,
whether they be Vertues or Vices.

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 § 8.

First, The Divine Law, whereby I mean, that Law which God
15 has set to the actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the
light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation. That God has given a
Rule whereby Men should govern themselves, I think there is no
body so brutish as to deny. He has a Right to do it, we are his
Creatures: He has Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to
20 that which is best: and he has Power to enforce it by Rewards and
Punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another Life: for
no body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touch-
stone of moral Rectitude; and by comparing them to this Law, it is,
that Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their
25 Actions; that is, whether as Duties, or Sins, they are like to procure
them happiness, or misery, from the hands of the ALMIGHTY.

§ 9.

Secondly, The Civil Law, the Rule set by the Commonwealth,

to the Actions of those, who belong to it, is another Rule, to which
Men refer their Actions, to judge whether they be criminal, or no.
30 This Law no body over-looks: the Rewards and Punishments, that
enforce it, being ready at hand, and suitable to the Power that makes
it: which is the force of the Commonwealth, engaged to protect the
Lives, Liberties, and Possessions, of those who live according to its

...........................................................................................................................
pg 353
Laws, and has power to take away Life, Liberty, or Goods, from
him, who disobeys; which is the punishment of Offences committed
against this Law.

§ 10.

Thirdly, The Law of Opinion or Reputation. Vertue and Vice

5 are Names pretended, and supposed every where to stand for actions
in their own nature right and wrong: And as far as they really are
so applied, they so far are co-incident with the divine Law above-
mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these
Names, Vertue and Vice, in the particular instances of their appli-
10 cation, through the several Nations and Societies of Men in the
World, are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each

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 Country and Society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be
thought strange, that Men every where should give the Name of
Vertue to those actions, which amongst them are judged praise
15 worthy; and call that Vice, which they account blamable: Since
otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think
any thing Right, to which they allow'd not Commendation; any
thing Wrong, which they let pass without Blame. Thus the
measure of what is every where called and esteemed Vertue and
20 Vice is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret
and tacit consent establishes it self in the several Societies, Tribes,
and Clubs of Men in the World: whereby several actions come to
find Credit or Disgrace amongst them, according to the Judgment,
Maxims, or Fashions of that place. For though Men uniting into
25 politick Societies, have resigned up to the publick the disposing of
all their Force, so that they cannot employ it against any Fellow-
Citizen, any farther than the Law of the Country directs: yet they
retain still the power of Thinking well or ill; approving or dis-
approving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and

...........................................................................................................................
pg 354
converse with: And by this approbation and dislike they establish
amongst themselves, what they will call Vertue and Vice.

§ 11.

That this is the common measure of Vertue and Vice, will

appear to any one, who considers, that though that passes for Vice
5 in one Country, which is counted a Vertue, or at least not Vice, in
another; yet every-where Vertue and Praise, Vice and Blame, go
together. Vertue is every-where that, which is thought Praise-
worthy; and nothing else but that, which has the allowance of
publick Esteem, is called Vertue.† Vertue and Praise are so united

...........................................................................................................................
pg 355
that they are called often by the same Name. Sunt sua prœmia Laudi,
says Virgil;* and so Cicero, Nihil habet natura prœstantius, quam Hone-

...........................................................................................................................
pg 356
statem, quam Laudem, quam Dignitatem, quam Decus, which he tells
you, are all Names for the same thing, Tusc. l.2 This is the Lan-
guage of the Heathen Philosophers, who well understood wherein

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 their Notions of Vertue and Vice consisted. And though, perhaps, by
5 the different Temper, Education, Fashion, Maxims, or Interest of
different sorts of Men it fell out, that what was thought Praise-
worthy in one Place, escaped not censure in another; and so in
different Societies, Vertues and Vices were changed: Yet, as to the
Main, they for the most part kept the same every where. For since
10 nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with Esteem and
Reputation that, wherein every one finds his Advantage; and
to blame and discountenance the contrary: 'tis no Wonder, that
Esteem and Discredit, Vertue and Vice, should in a great measure
every-where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and
15 Wrong, which the Law of God hath established; there being noth-
ing, that so directly, and visibly secures, and advances the general
Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws, he has
set them, and nothing that breeds such Mischiefs and Confusion,
as the neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all
20 Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, which they are so
constantly true to, could not generally mistake, in placing their
Commendation and Blame on that side, that really deserved it not.
Nay, even those Men, whose Practice was otherwise, failed not to
give their Approbation right, few being depraved to that Degree,
25 as not to condemn, at least in others, the Faults they themselves
were guilty of: whereby even in the Corruption of Manners, the
true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule
of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the
Exhortations of inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to
30 common Repute. Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if
there be any Vertue, if there be any praise, etc. Philippians, 4.8.

§ 12.

If any one shall imagine, that I have forgot my own Notion

of a Law, when I make the Law, whereby Men judge of Vertue and
Vice, to be nothing else, but the Consent of private Men, who have
35 not Authority enough to make a Law: Especially wanting that,
which is so necessary, and essential to a Law, a Power to inforce it:
I think, I may say, that he, who imagines Commendation and
Disgrace, not to be strong Motives on Men, to accommodate
themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those, with whom they

...........................................................................................................................
pg 357

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 converse, seems little skill'd in the Nature, or History of Mankind:
the greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly,
if not solely, by this Law of Fashion; and so they do that, which
keeps them in Reputation with their Company, little regard the
5 Laws of God, or the Magistrate. The Penalties that attend the
breach of God's Laws, some, nay, perhaps, most Men seldom
seriously reflect on: and amongst those that do, many, whilst they
break the Law, entertain Thoughts of future reconciliation, and
making their Peace for such Breaches. And as to the Punishments,
10 due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, they frequently flatter
themselves with the hopes of Impunity. But no Man scapes the
Punishment of their Censure and Dislike, who offends against the
Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recom-
mend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and
15 insensible enough, to bear up under the constant Dislike, and
Condemnation of his own Club. He must be of a strange, and un-
usual Constitution, who can content himself, to live in constant
Disgrace and Disrepute with his own particular Society. Solitude
many Men have sought, and been reconciled to: But no Body, that
20 has the least Thought, or Sense of a Man about him, can live in
Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his Familiars,
and those he converses with. This is a Burthen too heavy for
humane Sufferance: And he must be made up of irreconcilable
Contradictions, who can take Pleasure in Company, and yet be
25 insensible of Contempt and Disgrace from his Companions.

§ 13.

These Three then, First, The Law of God. Secondly, The Law
of politick Societies. Thirdly, The Law of Fashion, or private
Censure, are those, to which Men variously compare their Actions:
And 'tis by their Conformity to one of these Laws, that they take
30 their measures, when they would judge of their Moral Rectitude,
and denominate their Actions good or bad.

§ 14.

Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touch-stone, we bring

our voluntary Actions, to examine them by, and try their Good-
ness, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark

...........................................................................................................................

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 pg 358
of the value we set upon them: Whether, I say, we take that Rule
from the Fashion of the Country, or the Will of a Law-maker, the
Mind is easily able to observe the Relation any Action hath to it;
and to judge, whether the Action agrees, or disagrees with the
5 Rule: and so hath a Notion of Moral Goodness or Evil, which is either
Conformity, or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: And
therefore, is often called Moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing
but a Collection of several simple Ideas, the Conformity thereto is
but so ordering the Action, that the simple Ideas, belonging to it,
10 may correspond to those, which the Law requires. And thus we
see, how Moral Beings and Notions, are founded on, and terminated
in these simple Ideas, we have received from Sensation or Reflection.
For Example, let us consider the complex Idea, we signify by the
Word Murther: and when we have taken it asunder, and examined
15 all the Particulars, we shall find them to amount to a Collection of
simple Ideas, derived from Reflection or Sensation, viz. First, From
Reflection on the Operations of our own Minds, we have the Ideas
of Willing, Considering, Purposing before-hand, Malice, or wishing
Ill to another; and also of Life, or Perception, and Self-motion.
20 Secondly, From Sensation, we have the Collection of those simple
sensible Ideas which are to be found in a Man, and of some Action,
whereby we put an end to Perception, and Motion in the Man; all
which simple Ideas, are comprehended in the Word Murther. This
Collection of simple Ideas, being found by me to agree or disagree,
25 with the Esteem of the Country I have been bred in; and to be held
by most Men there, worthy Praise, or Blame, I call the Action
vertuous or vitious: If I have the Will of a supreme, invisible Law-
maker for my Rule: then, as I supposed the Action commanded, or
forbidden by God, I call it Good or Evil, Sin or Duty: and if I com-
30 pare it to the civil Law, the Rule made by the Legislative of the
Country, I call it lawful, or unlawful, a Crime, or no Crime. So that
whencesoever we take the Rule of Moral Actions; or by what
Standard soever we frame in our Minds the Ideas of Vertues or
Vices, they consist only, and are made up of Collections of simple
35 Ideas, which we originally received from Sense or Reflection: and
their Rectitude, or Obliquity, consists in the Agreement, or
Disagreement, with those Patterns prescribed by some Law.

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 § 15.

To conceive rightly of Moral Actions, we must take notice

of them, under this two-fold Consideration. First, As they are in
themselves each made up of such a Collection of simple Ideas. Thus
Drunkenness, or Lying, signify such or such a Collection of simple
5 Ideas, which I call mixed Modes: and in this Sense, they are as much
positive absolute Ideas, as the drinking of a Horse, or speaking of
a Parrot. Secondly, Our Actions are considered, as Good, Bad, or
Indifferent; and in this respect, they are Relative, it being their
Conformity to, or Disagreement with some Rule, that makes them
10 to be regular or irregular, Good or Bad: and so, as far as they are
compared with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come
under Relation. Thus the challenging, and fighting with a Man, as
it is a certain positive Mode, or particular sort of Action, by par-
ticular Ideas, distinguished from all others, is called Duelling: which,
15 when considered, in relation to the Law of God, will deserve the
Name Sin; to the Law of Fashion, in some Countries, Valour and
Vertue; and to the municipal Laws of some Governments, a capital
Crime. In this Case, when the positive Mode has one Name, and
another Name as it stands in relation to the Law, the distinction
20 may as easily be observed, as it is in Substances, where one Name,
v.g. Man, is used to signify the thing, another, v.g. Father, to signify
the Relation.

§ 16.

But because, very frequently the positive Idea of the Action,

and its Moral Relation, are comprehended together under one Name,
25 and the same Word made use of, to express both the Mode or
Action, and its Moral Rectitude or Obliquity: therefore the
Relation it self is less taken notice of; and there is often no distinction
made between the positive Idea of the Action, and the reference it has to
a Rule. By which confusion, of these two distinct Considerations,
30 under one Term, those who yield too easily to the Impressions of
Sounds, and are forward to take Names for Things, are often misled
in their Judgment of Actions. Thus the taking from another what
is his, without his Knowledge or Allowance, is properly called
Stealing: but that Name, being commonly understood to signify
35 also the Moral pravity of the Action, and to denote its contrariety
to the Law, Men are apt to condemn, whatever they hear called

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 Stealing, as an ill Action, disagreeing with the Rule of Right. And

...........................................................................................................................
pg 360
yet the private taking away his Sword from a Mad-man, to prevent
his doing Mischief, though it be properly denominated Stealing, as
the Name of such a mixed Mode: yet when compared to the Law of
God; and considered in its relation to that supreme Rule, it is no
5 Sin, or Transgression, though the Name Stealing ordinarily carries
such an intimation with it.

§ 17.

And thus much for the Relation of humane Actions to a

Law, which therefore I call Moral Relations.

'Twould make a Volume, to go over all sorts of Relations: 'tis not

10 therefore to be expected, that I should here mention them all. It
suffices to our present purpose, to shew by these, what the Ideas
are, we have of this comprehensive Consideration, call'd Relation.
Which is so various, and the Occasions of it so many, (as many as
there can be of comparing things one to another,) that it is not very
15 easy to reduce it to Rules, or under just Heads. Those I have
mentioned, I think, are some of the most considerable, and such, as
may serve to let us see, from whence we get our Ideas of Relations,
and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this Argument,
from what has been said, give me leave to observe,

20 § 18.

First, That it is evident, That all Relation terminates in, and

is ultimately founded on those simple Ideas, we have got from Sen-
sation, or Reflection: So that all that we have in our Thoughts our
selves, (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning,) or would
signify to others, when we use Words, standing for Relations, is
25 nothing but some simple Ideas, or Collections of simple Ideas,
compared one with another. This is so manifest in that sort called
proportional, that nothing can be more. For when a Man says, Honey
is sweeter than Wax, it is plain, that his Thoughts in this Relation,
terminate in this simple Idea, Sweetness, which is equally true of all
30 the rest; though, where they are compounded, or decompounded,
the simple Ideas, they are made up of, are, perhaps, seldom taken
notice of: v.g. when the Word Father is mentioned: First, There is

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 meant that particular Species, or collective Idea, signified by the
Word Man; Secondly, Those sensible simple Ideas, signified by the
35 Word Generation; And, Thirdly, The Effects of it, and all the simple
Ideas, signified by the Word Child. So the Word Friend, being taken

...........................................................................................................................
pg 361
for a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all
those following Ideas to the making of it up. First, all the simple
Ideas, comprehended in the Word Man, or intelligent Being.
Secondly, The Idea of Love. Thirdly, The Idea of Readiness, or Dispo-
5 sition. Fourthly, The Idea of Action, which is any kind of Thought,
or Motion. Fifthly, The Idea of Good, which signifies any thing that
may advance his Happiness; and terminates at last, if examined, in
particular simple Ideas, of which the Word Good in general, signifies
any one, but if removed from all simple Ideas quite, it signifies
10 nothing at all. And thus also, all Moral Words terminate at last,
though, perhaps, more remotely, in a Collection of simple Ideas:
the immediate signification of Relative Words, being very often
other supposed known Relations; which, if traced one to another,
still end in simple Ideas.

15 § 19.

Secondly, That in Relations, we have for the most part, if not

always, as clear a Notion of the Relation, as we have of those simple
Ideas, wherein it is founded: Agreement or Disagreement, whereon
Relation depends, being Things, whereof we have commonly as
clear Ideas, as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distin-
20 guishing simple Ideas, or their Degrees one from another, without
which, we could have no distinct Knowledge at all. For if I have a
clear Idea of Sweetness, Light, or Extension, I have too, of equal or
more, or less, of each of these: If I know what it is for one Man to
be born of a Woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another
25 Man to be born of the same Woman, Sempronia; and so have as
clear a Notion of Brothers, as of Births, and, perhaps, clearer. For if
I believed, that Sempronia digged Titus out of the Parsley-Bed, (as
they use to tell Children,) and thereby became his Mother; and that
afterwards in the same manner, she digged Cajus out of the Parsley-
30 Bed, I had as clear a Notion of the Relation of Brothers between
them, as if I had all the Skill of a Midwife; the Notion that the same
Woman contributed, as Mother, equally to their Births, (though I

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 were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it,) being that on which
I grounded the Relation; and that they agreed in that Circumstance
35 of Birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their
descent from the same Person, without knowing the particular
Circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my Notion of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 362
their having, or not having the Relation of Brothers. But though the
Ideas of particular Relations, are capable of being as clear and distinct
in the Minds of those, who will duly consider them, as those of
mixed Modes, and more determinate, than those of Substances; yet
5 the Names belonging to Relation, are often of as doubtful, and
incertain Signification, as those of Substances, or mixed Modes; and
much more than those of simple Ideas. Because Relative Words,
being the Marks of this Comparison, which is made only by Men's
Thoughts, and is an Idea only in Men's Minds, Men frequently
10 apply them to different Comparisons of Things, according to their
own Imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of
others using the same Names.

§ 20.

Thirdly, That in these I call Moral Relations, I have a true

Notion of Relation, by comparing the Action with the Rule,
15 whether the Rule be true, or false. For if I measure any thing by a
Yard, I know, whether the thing I measure be longer, or shorter,
than that supposed Yard, though, perhaps, the Yard I measure by,
be not exactly the Standard: Which, indeed, is another Enquiry.
For though the Rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the
20 agreement, or disagreement observable in that which I compare
with it, makes me perceive the Relation. Though measuring by a
wrong Rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral
Rectitude; because I have tried it by that, which is not the true
Rule; but I am not mistaken in the Relation which that Action
25 bears to that Rule I compare it to, which is agreement, or dis-
agreement.

CHAPTER XXIX
Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confused Ideas.

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 § 1.

HAVING shewn the Original of our Ideas, and taken a view of

their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple

...........................................................................................................................
pg 363
and the complex; and observed how the complex ones are divided
into those of Modes, Substances, and Relations, all which, I think,
is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself
throughly with the progress of the Mind, in its Apprehension and
5 Knowledge of Things, it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt
long enough upon the Examination of Ideas. I must, nevertheless,
crave leave to offer some few other Considerations concerning
them. The first is, That some are clear, and others obscure; some
distinct, and others confused.

10 § 2.

The Perception of the Mind, being most aptly explained by

Words relating to the Sight, we shall best understand what is meant
by Clear, and Obscure in our Ideas, by reflecting on what we call
Clear and Obscure in the Objects of Sight. Light being that which
discovers to us visible Objects, we give the name of Obscure, to that,
15 which is not placed in a Light sufficient to discover minutely to us
the Figure and Colours, which are observable in it, and which, in a
better Light, would be discernable. In like manner, our simple Ideas
are clear, when they are such as the Objects themselves, from whence
they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered Sensation or
20 Perception, present them. Whilst the Memory retains them thus,
and can produce them to the Mind, when-ever it has occasion to
consider them, they are clear Ideas. So far as they either want any
thing of that original Exactness, or have lost any of their first
Freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by Time, so far are
25 they obscure. Complex Ideas, as they are made up of Simple ones; so
they are clear, when the Ideas that go to their Composition, are
clear; and the Number and Order of those Simple Ideas, that are the
Ingredients of any Complex one, is determinate and certain.

§ 3.

The cause of Obscurity in simple Ideas, seems to be either dull

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30 Organs; or very slight and transient Impressions made by the
Objects; or else a weakness in the Memory, not able to retain them
as received. For to return again to visible Objects, to help us to
apprehend this matter. If the Organs, or Faculties of Perception,
like Wax over-hardned with Cold, will not receive the Impression
35 of the Seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, like Wax
of a temper too soft, will not hold it well, when well imprinted; or

...........................................................................................................................
pg 364
else supposing the Wax of a temper fit, but the Seal not applied
with a sufficient force, to make a clear Impression: In any of these
cases, the print left by the Seal, will be obscure. This, I suppose,
needs no application to make it plainer.

5 § 4.

As a clear Idea is that whereof the Mind has such a full and
evident perception, as it does receive from an outward Object
operating duly on a well-disposed Organ, so a distinct Idea is that
wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other; and a
confused Idea is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable
10 from another, from which it ought to be different.

§ 5.

If no Idea be confused, but such as is not sufficiently dis-

tinguishable from another, from which it should be different, it will
be hard, may any one say, to find any where a confused Idea. For let
any Idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the Mind
15 perceives it to be; and that very perception, sufficiently distin-
guishes it from all other Ideas, which cannot be other, i.e. different,
without being perceived to be so. No Idea therefore can be un-
distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different,
unless you would have it different from it self: for from all other, it
20 is evidently different.

§ 6.

To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright,

what it is, that makes the confusion, Ideas are at any time chargeable
with, we must consider, that Things ranked under distinct Names,
are supposed different enough to be distinguished, that so each

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25 sort, by its peculiar Name, may be marked, and discoursed of apart,
upon any occasion: And there is nothing more evident, than that
the greatest part of different Names, are supposed to stand for
different Things. Now every Idea a Man has, being visibly what it
is, and distinct from all other Ideas but it self, that which makes it
30 confused is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another
Name, as that which it is expressed by, the difference which keeps
the Things (to be ranked under those two different Names)
distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and
some of them to the other of those Names, being left out; and so the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 365
distinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different
Names, is quite lost.

§ 7.

The Defaults which usually occasion this Confusion, I think, are

chiefly these following.

5 First, When any complex Idea (for 'tis complex Ideas that are most
liable to confusion) is made up of too small a number of simple Ideas, and
such only as are common to other Things, whereby the differences,
that make it deserve a different Name, are left out. Thus he, that
has an Idea made up of barely the simple ones of a Beast with Spots,
10 has but a confused Idea of a Leopard, it not being thereby sufficiently
distinguished from a Lynx, and several other sorts of Beasts that
are spotted. So that such an Idea, though it hath the peculiar Name
Leopard, is not distinguishable from those designed by the Names
Lynx, or Panther, and may as well come under the Name Lynx, as
15 Leopard. How much the custom of defining of Words by general
terms, contributes to make the Ideas we would express by them,
confused and undetermined, I leave others to consider. This is
evident, that confused Ideas are such as render the Use of Words
uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct Names. When the
20 Ideas, for which we use different terms, have not a difference answer-
able to their distinct Names, and so cannot be distinguished by
them, there it is that they are truly confused.

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 § 8.

Secondly, Another default, which makes our Ideas confused, is,

when though the particulars that make up any Idea, are in number
25 enough; yet they are so jumbled together, that it is not easily discern-
able, whether it more belongs to the Name that is given it, than
to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this
Confusion, than a sort of Pictures usually shewn, as surprizing
Pieces of Art, wherein the Colours, as they are laid by the Pencil on
30 the Table it self, mark out very odd and unusual Figures, and have
no discernable order in their Position. This Draught, thus made up
of parts, wherein no Symmetry nor Order appears, is, in it self, no
more a confused Thing, than the Picture of a cloudy Sky; wherein
though there be as little order of Colours, or Figures to be found,
35 yet no body thinks it a confused Picture. What is it then, that makes
it be thought confused, since the want of Symmetry does not? As it

...........................................................................................................................
pg 366
is plain it does not: for another Draught made, barely in imitation
of this, could not be called confused. I answer, That which makes it
be thought confused, is the applying it to some Name, to which it
does no more discernibly belong, than to some other. v.g. When it is
5 said to be the Picture of a Man, or Cæsar, then any one with reason
counts it confused: because it is not discernible, in that state, to
belong more to the name Man, or Cæsar, than to the name Baboon,
or Pompey: which are supposed to stand for different Ideas, from those
signified by Man, or Cæsar. But when a cylindrical Mirrour, placed
10 right, hath reduced those irregular Lines on the Table, into their
due order and proportion, then the Confusion ceases, and the Eye
presently sees, that it is a Man, or Cæsar; i.e. that it belongs to those
Names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a Baboon, or
Pompey; i.e. from the Ideas signified by those Names. Just thus it is
15 with our Ideas, which are, as it were, the Pictures of Things. No one
of these mental Draughts, however the parts are put together, can
be called confused, (for they are plainly discernible as they are,) till
it be ranked under some ordinary Name, to which it cannot be
discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other Name, of
20 an allowed different signification.

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 § 9.

Thirdly, A third defect that frequently gives the name of

Confused, to our Ideas, is when any one of them is uncertain, and
undetermined. Thus we may observe Men, who not forbearing to use
the ordinary Words of their Language, till they have learn'd their
25 precise signification, change the Idea, they make this or that term
stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of
uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his Idea of
Church, or Idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not
steady to any one precise Combination of Ideas, that makes it up, is
30 said to have a confused Idea of Idolatry, or the Church: Though this
be still for the same reason that the former, viz. Because a mutable
Idea (if we will allow it to be one Idea) cannot belong to one Name,
rather than another; and so loses the distinction, that distinct
Names are designed for.

35 § 10.

By what has been said, we may observe how much Names, as

supposed steady signs of Things, and by their difference to stand

...........................................................................................................................
pg 367
for, and keep Things distinct, that in themselves are different, are
the occasion of denominating Ideas distinct or confused, by a secret and
unobserved reference, the Mind makes of its Ideas to such Names.
This, perhaps, will be fuller understood, after what I say of Words,
5 in the Third Book, has been read and considered. But without
taking notice of such a reference of Ideas to distinct Names, as the
signs of distinct Things, it will be hard to say what a confused Idea is.
And therefore when a Man designs, by any Name, a sort of Things,
or any one particular Thing, distinct from all others, the complex
10 Idea he annexes to that Name, is the more distinct, the more
particular the Ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the
number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more
it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences,
whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all Ideas belonging to
15 other Names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby
all confusion with them is avoided.

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 § 11.

Confusion, making it a difficulty to separate two Things that

should be separated, concerns always two Ideas; and those most, which
most approach one another. Whenever therefore we suspect any
20 Idea to be confused, we must examine what other it is in danger to be
confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from, and
that will always be found an Idea belonging to another Name, and
so should be a different Thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently
distinct: being either the same with it, or making a part of it, or, at
25 least, as properly call'd by that Name, as the other it is ranked
under; and so keeps not that difference from that other Idea, which
the different Names import.

§ 12.

This, I think, is the confusion proper to Ideas; which still

carries with it a secret reference to Names. At least if there be any
30 other confusion of Ideas, this is that which most of all disorders
Men's Thoughts and Discourses: Ideas, as ranked under Names,
being those that for the most part Men reason of within themselves,
and always those which they commune about, with others. And
therefore where there are supposed two different Ideas, marked by
35 two different Names, which are not as distinguishable as the Sounds
that stand for them, there never fails to be confusion: And where any

...........................................................................................................................
pg 368
Ideas are distinct, as the Ideas of those two Sounds they are marked
by, there can be between them no confusion. The way to prevent it, is to
collect and unite into our complex Idea, as precisely as is possible,
all those Ingredients, whereby it is differenced from others; and to
5 them so united in a determinate number and order, apply steadily the
same Name. But this neither accommodating Men's ease or vanity,
or serving any design, but that of naked Truth, which is not always
the thing aimed at, such exactness, is rather to be wished, than
hoped for. And since the loose application of Names, to undeter-
10 mined, variable, and almost no Ideas, serves both to cover our own
Ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for
Learning and Superiority in Knowledge, it is no wonder that most
Men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others.
Though, I think, no small part of the confusion, to be found in the

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15 Notions of Men, might by care and ingenuity, be avoided; yet I am
far from concluding it every-where wilful. Some Ideas are so com-
plex, and made up of so many parts, that the Memory does not
easily retain the very same precise Combination of simple Ideas,
under one Name: much less are we able constantly to divine for
20 what precise complex Idea such a Name stands in another Man's use
of it. From the first of these, follows confusion in a Man's own
Reasonings and Opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent
confusion in discoursing and arguing with others. But having more at
large treated of Words, their Defects and Abuses in the following
25 Book, I shall here say no more of it.

§ 13.

Our complex Ideas being made up of Collections, and so

variety of simple ones, may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one
part, and very obscure and confused in another. In a Man who speaks of a
Chiliaëdron, or a Body of a thousand sides, the Idea of the Figure may
30 be very confused, though that of the Number be very distinct; so
that he being able to discourse, and demonstrate concerning that
part of his complex Idea, which depends upon the Number of a
Thousand, he is apt to think, he has a distinct Idea of a Chiliaëdron;
though it be plain, he has no precise Idea of its Figure, so as to
35 distinguish it, by that, from one that has but 999 sides: The not

...........................................................................................................................
pg 369
observing whereof, causes no small Error in Men's Thoughts, and
Confusion in their Discourses.

§ 14.

He that thinks he has a distinct Idea of the Figure of a Chiliaë-

dron, let him for Trial's-sake take another parcel of the same uniform
5 Matter, viz. Gold, or Wax, of an equal Bulk, and make it into a
Figure of 999 sides. He will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish
these two Ideas one from another by the Number of sides; and reason,
and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his Thoughts and
Reasoning to that part only of these Ideas, which is contained in
10 their Numbers; as that the sides of the one, could be divided into
two equal Numbers; and of the other, not, etc. But when he goes
about to distinguish them by their Figure, he will there be presently

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 at a loss, and not be able, I think, to frame in his Mind two Ideas,
one of them distinct from the other, by the bare Figure of these two
15 pieces of Gold; as he could, if the same parcels of Gold were made
one into a Cube, the other a Figure of five sides. In which incomplete
Ideas, we are very apt to impose on our selves, and wrangle with
others, especially where they have particular and familiar Names.
For being satisfied in that part of the Idea, which we have clear; and the
20 Name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing
that part also, which is imperfect and obscure, we are apt to use it
for that confused part, and draw deductions from it, in the obscure
part of its Signification, as confidently, as we do from the other.

§ 15.

Having frequently in our Mouths the Name Eternity, we

25 are apt to think, we have a positive comprehensive Idea of it, which
is as much as to say, that there is no part of that Duration, which is
not clearly contained in our Idea. 'Tis true, that he that thinks so,
may have a clear Idea of Duration; he may also have a very clear Idea of
a very great length of Duration; he may also have a clear Idea of the
30 Comparison of that great one, with still a greater: But it not being
possible for him to include in his Idea of any Duration, let it be as great
as it will, the whole Extent together of a Duration, where he supposes
no end, that part of his Idea, which is still beyond the Bounds of
that large Duration, he represents to his own Thoughts, is very
35 obscure and undetermined. And hence it is, that in Disputes and
Reasonings concerning Eternity, or any other Infinite, we are very
apt to blunder, and involve our selves in manifest Absurdities.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 370
§ 16.

In Matter, we have no clear Ideas of the smalness of Parts,

much beyond the smallest, that occur to any of our Senses: and
therefore when we talk of the divisibility of Matter in infinitum,
though we have clear Ideas of Division and Divisibility, and have
5 also clear Ideas of Parts, made out of a whole, by Division; yet we
have but very obscure, and confused Ideas of Corpuscles, or minute
Bodies, so to be divided, when by former Divisions, they are reduced
to a smalness, much exceeding the perception of any of our Senses;

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 and so all that we have clear, and distinct Ideas of, is of what Division
10 in general, or abstractly is, and the Relation of Totum and Pars: But
of the bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain
Progressions, I think, we have no clear, nor distinct Idea at all. For
I ask any one, Whether taking the smallest Atom of Dust he ever
saw, he has any distinct Idea, (bating still the Number which con-
15 cerns not Extension,) betwixt the 100 000, and the 1000 000 part
of it. Or if he think he can refine his Ideas to that Degree, without
losing sight of them, let him add ten Cyphers to each of those
Numbers. Such a degree of smalness is not unreasonable to be
supposed, since a Division carried on so far brings it no nearer the
20 end of infinite Division, than the first Division into two halfs does.
I must confess for my part, I have no clear, distinct Ideas of the differ-
ent Bulk, or Extension of those Bodies, having but a very obscure
one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of Division of
Bodies in infinitum, our Idea of their distinct Bulks, which is the
25 Subject and Foundation of Division, comes after a little progression,
to be confounded, and almost lost in Obscurity. For that Idea,
which is to represent only Bigness, must be very obscure and
confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big,
but only by Number: so that we have clear, distinct Ideas, we may
30 say of Ten and One, but no distinct Ideas of two such Extensions.
'Tis plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite Divisibility of
Body, or Extension, our distinct and clear Ideas are only of Numbers:
but the clear, distinct Ideas of Extension, after some Progress of
Division, is quite lost; and of such minute Parts, we have no dis-
35 tinct Ideas at all; but it returns, as all our Ideas of Infinite do, at last

...........................................................................................................................
pg 371
to that of Number always to be added; but thereby never amounts
to any distinct Idea of actual, infinite Parts. We have, 'tis true, a
clear Idea of Division, as often as we will think of it; but thereby we
have no more a clear Idea of infinite Parts in Matter, than we have a
5 clear Idea of an infinite Number, by being able still to add new
Numbers to any assigned Number we have: endless Divisibility
giving us no more a clear and distinct Idea of actually infinite Parts,
than endless Addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and
distinct Idea of an actually infinite Number. They both being only
10 in a Power still of increasing the Number, be it already as great as it
will. So that of what remains to be added, (wherein consists the
Infinity,) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused Idea;

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 from or about which we can argue, or reason with no Certainty or
Clearness, no more than we can in Arithmetick, about a Number of
15 which we have no such distinct Idea, as we have of 4 or 100; but
only this relative obscure one, that compared to any other, it is
still bigger: and we have no more a clear, positive Idea of it, when we
say or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we
should say, it is bigger than 40, or 4: 400,000,000, having no nearer
20 a proportion to the end of Addition, or Number, than 4. For he that
adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the end of
all Addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And so
likewise in Eternity, he that has an Idea of but four Years, has as
much a positive complete Idea of Eternity, as he that has one of
25 400,000,000 of Years: For what remains of Eternity beyond either
of these two Numbers of Years, is as clear to the one as the other;
i.e. neither of them has any clear positive Idea of it at all. For he that
adds only 4 Years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach Eternity, as
he that adds 400,000,000 of Years, and so on; or if he please,
30 doubles the Increase as often as he will: The remaining Abyss being
still as far beyond the end of all these Progressions, as it is from the
length of a Day, or an Hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion
to infinite; and therefore our Ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear
any. Thus it is also in our Idea of Extension, when we increase it by
35 Addition, as well as when we diminish it by Division, and would
enlarge our Thoughts to infinite Space. After a few doublings of
those Ideas of Extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to
have, we lose the clear distinct Idea of that Space: it becomes a
confusedly great one, with a Surplus of still greater; about which,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 372
when we would argue, or reason, we shall always find our selves at a
loss; confused Ideas, in our Arguings and Deductions from that part
of them which is confused, always leading us into confusion.

CHAPTER XXX
Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

§ 1.

BESIDES what we have already mentioned, concerning Ideas,

5 other Considerations belong to them, in reference to things from
whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent;

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 and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and
are,

First, Either real, or fantastical.

10 Secondly, Adequate, or inadequate.
Thirdly, True, or false.

First, By real Ideas, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature;

such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of
Things, or with their Archetypes. Fantastical or Chimerical, I call
15 such as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity
with that reality of Being, to which they are tacitly referr'd, as to
their Archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of Ideas before-
mentioned, we shall find, that,

§ 2.

First, Our simple Ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of
20 things. Not that they are all of them the Images, or Representations
of what does exist, the contrary whereof, in all but the primary
Qualities of Bodies, hath been already shewed. But though White-
ness and Coldness are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet those
Ideas of Whiteness, and Coldness, Pain, etc. being in us the Effects of
25 Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce
in us such Sensations; they are real Ideas in us, whereby we
distinguish the Qualities, that are really in things themselves.
For these several Appearances, being designed to be the Marks,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 373
whereby we are to know, and distinguish Things, which we have
to do with; our Ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are
as real distinguishing Characters, whether they be only constant
Effects, or else exact Resemblances of something in the things
5 themselves: the reality lying in that steady correspondence, they
have with the distinct Constitutions of real Beings. But whether
they answer to those Constitutions, as to Causes, or Patterns, it
matters not; it suffices, that they are constantly produced by them.
And thus our simple Ideas are all real and true, because they answer
10 and agree to those Powers of Things, which produce them in our
Minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not
fictions at Pleasure. For in simple Ideas, (as has been shewn,) the

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 Mind is wholly confined to the Operation of things upon it; and can
make to it self no simple Idea, more than what it has received.

15 § 3.

Though the Mind be wholly passive, in respect of its simple

Ideas: Yet, I think, we may say, it is not so, in respect of its complex
Ideas: For those being Combinations of simple Ideas, put together,
and united under one general Name; 'tis plain, that the Mind of
Man uses some kind of Liberty, in forming those complex Ideas:
20 How else comes it to pass, that one Man's Idea of Gold, or Justice, is
different from anothers? But because he has put in, or left out of his,
some simple Idea, which the other has not. The Question then is,
Which of these are real, and which barely imaginary Combinations:
what Collections agree to the reality of Things, and what not? And
25 to this I say, That

§ 4.

Secondly, Mixed Modes and Relations, having no other reality,

but what they have in the Minds of Men, there is nothing more
required to those kind of Ideas, to make them real, but that they
be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable
30 to them. These Ideas, being themselves Archetypes, cannot differ
from their Archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one
will jumble together in them inconsistent Ideas. Indeed, as any of
them have the Names of a known Language assigned to them, by
which, he that has them in his Mind, would signify them to others,
35 so bare Possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a

...........................................................................................................................
pg 374
Conformity to the ordinary Signification of the Name, that is
given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a Man
would give the Name of Justice to that Idea, which common use
calls Liberality. But this Fantasticalness relates more to Propriety
5 of Speech, than Reality of Ideas. For a Man to be undisturbed in
Danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to
execute it steadily, is a mixed Mode, or a complex Idea of an Action
which may exist. But to be undisturbed in Danger, without using
ones Reason or Industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as
10 real an Idea as the other. Though the first of these having the Name

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 Courage given to it, may, in respect of that Name, be a right or
wrong Idea: But the other, whilst it has not a common received
Name of any known Language assigned to it, is not capable of any
Deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but it self.

15 § 5.

Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances, being made all of

them in reference to Things existing without us, and intended to be
Representations of Substances, as they really are, are no farther
real, than as they are such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are
really united, and co-exist in Things without us. On the contrary,
20 those are fantastical, which are made up of such Collections of
simple Ideas, as were really never united, never were found together
in any Substance; v.g. a rational Creature, consisting of a Horse's
Head, joined to a body of humane shape, or such as the Centaurs are
described: Or, a Body, yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed;
25 but lighter than common Water: Or, an uniform, unorganized
Body, consisting as to Sense, all of similar Parts, with Perception
and voluntary Motion joined to it. Whether such Substances, as
these, can possibly exist, or no, 'tis probable we do not know: But
be that as it will, these Ideas of Substances, being made conformable
30 to no Pattern existing, that we know; and consisting of such
Collections of Ideas, as no Substance ever shewed us united together,
they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: But much more
are those complex Ideas so, which contain in them any Inconsistency
or Contradiction of their Parts.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 375
CHAPTER XXXI
Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

§ 1.

OF our real Ideas some are Adequate, and some are Inadequate.
Those I call Adequate, which perfectly represent those Archetypes,
which the Mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them
to stand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate Ideas are such,
5 which are but a partial, or incomplete representation of those
Archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is

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 plain,

§ 2.

First, That all our simple Ideas are adequate. Because being
nothing but the effects of certain Powers in Things, fitted and
10 ordained by GOD, to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot
but be correspondent, and adequate to those Powers: And we are
sure they agree to the reality of Things. For if Sugar produce in us
the Ideas, which we call Whiteness, and Sweetness, we are sure there
is a power in Sugar to produce those Ideas in our Minds, or else they
15 could not have been produced by it. And so each Sensation answer-
ing the Power, that operates on any of our Senses, the Idea so pro-
duced, is a real Idea, (and not a fiction of the Mind, which has no
power to produce any simple Idea;) and cannot but be adequate,
since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple Ideas
20 ate adequate. 'Tis true, the Things producing in us these simple
Ideas, are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only
the causes of them; but as if those Ideas were real Beings in them.
For though Fire be call'd painful to the Touch, whereby is signified
the power of producing in us the Idea of Pain; yet it is denominated
25 also Light, and Hot; as if Light and Heat, were really something in
the Fire, more than a power to excite these Ideas in us; and therefore
are called Qualities in, or of the Fire. But these being nothing, in

...........................................................................................................................
pg 376
truth, but powers to excite such Ideas in us, I must, in that sense, be
understood, when I speak of secondary Qualities, as being in Things;
or of their Ideas, as being in the Objects, that excite them in us. Such
ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar Notions,
5 without which, one cannot be well understood; yet truly signify
nothing, but those Powers, which are in Things, to excite certain
Sensations or Ideas in us. Since were there no fit Organs to receive
the impressions Fire makes on the Sight and Touch; nor a Mind
joined to those Organs to receive the Ideas of Light and Heat, by
10 those impressions from the Fire, or the Sun, there would yet be no
more Light, or Heat in the World, than there would be Pain if there
were no sensible Creature to feel it, though the Sun should con-
tinue just as it is now, and Mount Ætna flame higher than ever it
did. Solidity, and Extension, and the termination of it, Figure, with
15 Motion and Rest,whereof we have the Ideas, would be really in the

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 World as they are, whether there were any sensible Being to per-
ceive them, or no: And therefore those we have reason to look on,
as the real modifications of Matter; and such as are the exciting
Causes of all our various Sensations from Bodies. But this being an
20 Enquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it,
but proceed to shew, what complex Ideas are adequate, and what not.

§ 3.

Secondly, Our complex Ideas of Modes, being voluntary Collec-

tions of simple Ideas, which the Mind puts together, without
reference to any real Archetypes, or standing Patterns, existing any
25 where, are, and cannot but be adequate Ideas. Because they not
being intended for Copies of Things really existing, but for
Archetypes made by the Mind, to rank and denominate Things by,
cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combina-
tion of Ideas, and thereby that perfection which the Mind intended
30 they should: So that the Mind acquiesces in them, and can find
nothing wanting. Thus by having the Idea of a Figure, with three
sides meeting at three Angles, I have a complete Idea, wherein I
require nothing else to make it perfect. That the Mind is satisfied
with the perfection of this its Idea, is plain, in that it does not
35 conceive, that any Understanding hath, or can have a more com-
pleat or perfect Idea of that thing it signifies by the word Triangle,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 377
supposing it to exist, than it self has in that complex Idea of three
Sides, and three Angles: in which is contained all that is, or can be
essential to it, or necessary to complete it, where-ever or however
it exists. But in our Ideas of Substances, it is otherwise. For there
5 desiring to copy Things, as they really do exist; and to represent
to our selves that Constitution, on which all their Properties depend,
we perceive our Ideas attain not that Perfection we intend: We find
they still want something, we should be glad were in them; and so
are all inadequate. But mixed Modes and Relations, being Archetypes
10 without Patterns, and so having nothing to represent but them-
selves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being so to it self. He
that at first put together the Idea of Danger perceived, absence of
disorder from Fear, sedate consideration of what was justly to be
done, and executing of that without disturbance, or being deterred
15 by the danger of it, had certainly in his Mind that complex Idea

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 made up of that Combination: and intending it to be nothing else,
but what it is; nor to have in it any other simple Ideas, but what it
hath, it could not also but be an adequate Idea: and laying this up in
his Memory, with the name Courage annexed to it, to signifie it to
20 others, and denominate from thence any Action he should observe
to agree with it, had thereby a Standard to measure and denominate
Actions by, as they agreed to it. This Idea thus made, and laid up
for a Pattern, must necessarily be adequate, being referred to nothing
else but it self, nor made by any other Original, but the Good-
25 liking and Will of him, that first made this Combination.

§ 4.

Indeed, another coming after, and in Conversation learning

from him the word Courage, may make an Idea, to which he gives
that name Courage, different from what the first Author applied it
to, and has in his Mind, when he uses it. And in this case, if he
30 designs, that his Idea in Thinking, should be conformable to the
other's Idea, as the Name he uses in speaking, is conformable in
sound to his, from whom he learned it, his Idea may be very wrong
and inadequate. Because in this case, making the other Man's Idea
the pattern of his Idea in thinking, as the other Man's Word, or
35 Sound, is the pattern of his in speaking, his Idea is so far defective
and inadequate, as it is distant from the Archetype and Pattern he
referrs it to, and intends to express and signify by the name he uses
for it, which name he would have to be a sign of the other Man's
Idea, (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed,) and of his

...........................................................................................................................
pg 378
own, as agreeing to it: to which if his own does not exactly corre-
spond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§ 5.

Therefore these complex Ideas of Modes, when they are

referred by the Mind, and intended to correspond to the Ideas in
5 the Mind of some other intelligent Being, expressed by the Names
we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate.
Because they agree not to that, which the Mind designs to be their
Archetype, and Pattern: In which respect only, any Idea of Modes
can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. And on this account, our

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10 Ideas of mixed Modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but
this refers more to proper Speaking, than knowing right.

§ 6.

Thirdly, What Ideas we have of Substances, I have above shewed:

Now those Ideas have in the Mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes
they are referred to a supposed real Essence of each Species of
15 Things. 2. Sometimes they are only design'd to be Pictures and
Representations in the Mind, of Things that do exist, by Ideas of
those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways,
these Copies of those Originals, and Archetypes, are imperfect and
inadequate.
20 First, It is usual for Men to make the Names of Substances, stand
for Things, as supposed to have certain real Essences, whereby
they are of this or that Species: And Names standing for nothing
but the Ideas, that are in Men's Minds, they must consequently
referr their Ideas to such real Essences, as to their Archetypes. That
25 Men (especially such as have been bred up in the Learning taught
in this part of the World) do suppose certain specifick Essences of
Substances, which each Individual in its several kind is made con-
formable to, and partakes of, is so far from needing proof, that it will
be thought strange, if any one should do otherwise. And thus they
30 ordinarily apply the specifick Names, they rank particular Sub-
stances under, to Things, as distinguished by such specifick real
Essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it
should be doubted, whether he call'd himself Man, with any other
meaning, than as having the real Essence of a Man? And yet if you
35 demand, what those real Essences are, 'tis plain Men are ignorant,
and know them not. From whence it follows, that the Ideas they

...........................................................................................................................
pg 379
have in their Minds, being referred to real Essences as to Arche-
types which are unknown, must be so far from being adequate, that
they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all.
The complex Ideas we have of Substances, are, as it has been shewn,
5 certain Collections of simple Ideas, that have been observed or
supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex Idea
cannot be the real Essence of any Substance; for then the Properties
we discover in that Body, would depend on that complex Idea, and
be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be

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10 known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and as far as they
are discoverable, are deducible from the complex Idea of three Lines,
including a Space. But it is plain, that in our complex Ideas of Sub-
stances, are not contained such Ideas, on which all the other Quali-
ties, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common Idea
15 Men have of Iron, is a Body of a certain Colour, Weight, and
Hardness; and a Property that they look on as belonging to it, is
malleableness. But yet this Property has no necessary connexion
with that complex Idea, or any part of it: And there is no more
reason to think, that malleableness depends on that Colour,
20 Weight, and Hardness, than that that Colour, or that Weight
depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of
these real Essences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that Men
should attribute the sorts of Things to such Essences. The particu-
lar parcel of Matter which makes the Ring I have on my Finger, is
25 forwardly, by most Men, supposed to have a real Essence, whereby
it is Gold; and from whence those Qualities flow, which I find in it,
viz. its peculiar Colour, Weight, Hardness, Fusibility, Fixedness,
and change of Colour upon a slight touch of Mercury, etc. This
Essence, from which all these Properties flow, when I enquire into
30 it, and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover: the
farthest I can go, is only to presume, that it being nothing but Body,
its real Essence, or internal Constitution, on which these Qualities
depend, can be nothing but the Figure, Size, and Connexion of its
solid Parts; of neither of which, I having any distinct perception at
35 all, I can have no Idea of its Essence, which is the cause that it has
that particular shining yellowness; a greater weight than any
thing I know of the same bulk; and a fitness to have its Colour

...........................................................................................................................
pg 380
changed by the touch of Quicksilver. If any one will say, that the
real Essence, and internal Constitution, on which these Properties
depend, is not the Figure, Size, and Arangement or Connexion of
its solid Parts, but something else, call'd its particular form; I am
5 farther from having any Idea of its real Essence, than I was before.
For I have an Idea of Figure, Size, and Situation of solid Parts in
general, though I have none of the particular Figure, Size, or putting
together of Parts, whereby the Qualities above-mentioned are
produced; which Qualities I find in that particular parcel of Matter,
10 that is on my Finger, and not in another parcel of Matter, with
which I cut the Pen I write with. But when I am told, that something

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 besides the Figure, Size, and Posture of the solid Parts of that Body,
is its Essence, something called substantial form, of that, I confess, I
have no Idea at all, but only of the sound Form; which is far enough
15 from an Idea of its real Essence, or Constitution. The like ignorance
as I have of the real Essence of this particular Substance, I have also
of the real Essence of all other natural ones: Of which Essences, I
confess, I have no distinct Ideas at all; and I am apt to suppose
others, when they examine their own Knowledge, will find in
20 themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

§ 7.

Now then, when Men apply to this particular parcel of

Matter on my Finger, a general Name already in use, and denomi-
nate it Gold, Do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to
give it that Name as belonging to a particular Species of Bodies,
25 having a real internal Essence; by having of which Essence, this
particular Substance comes to be of that Species, and to be called by
that Name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name, by which Things
are marked, as having that Essence, must be referred primarily to
that Essence; and consequently the Idea to which that name is
30 given, must be referred also to that Essence, and be intended to
represent it. Which Essence, since they, who so use the Names,
know not, their Ideas of Substances must be all inadequate in that
respect, as not containing in them that real Essence, which the
Mind intends they should.

§ 8.

35 Secondly, Those who, neglecting that useless Supposition of

unknown real Essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour
to copy the Substances, that exist in the World, by putting

...........................................................................................................................
pg 381
together the Ideas of those sensible Qualities, which are found co-
existing in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of
them, than those who imagine, they know not what real specifick
Essences: yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate Ideas of those
5 Substances, they would thus copy into their Minds: nor do those
Copies, exactly, and fully, contain all that is to be found in their
Archetypes. Because those Qualities, and Powers of Substances,

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 whereof we make their complex Ideas, are so many and various, that
no Man's complex Idea contains them all. That our abstract Ideas of
10 Substances, do not contain in them all the simple Ideas, that are
united in the Things themselves, is evident, in that Men do rarely
put into their complex Idea of any Substance, all the simple Ideas
they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the
signification of their specifick Names as clear, and as little cumber-
15 some as they can, they make their specifick Ideas of the sorts of
Substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple Ideas which
are to be found in them: But these having no original precedency, or
right to be put in, and make the specifick Idea, more than others
that are left out, 'tis plain, that both these ways, our Ideas of
20 Substances are deficient, and inadequate. The simple Ideas whereof we
make our complex ones of Substances, are all of them (bating only
the Figure and Bulk of some sorts) Powers; which being Relations to
other Substances, we can never be sure that we know all the Powers,
that are in any one Body, till we have tried what Changes it is fitted to
25 give to, or receive from other Substances, in their several ways of
application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one Body,
much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate Ideas
of any Substance, made up of a Collection of all its Properties.

§ 9.

Whosoever first light on a parcel of that sort of Substance,

30 we denote by the word Gold, could not rationally take the Bulk and
Figure he observed in that lump, to depend on its real Essence, or
internal Constitution. Therefore those never went into his Idea of
that Species of Body; but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and Weight,
were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex Idea of
35 that Species. Which both are but Powers; the one to affect our Eyes,
after such a manner, and to produce in us that Idea, we call Yellow;
and the other to force upwards any other Body of equal bulk, they
being put into a pair of equal Scales, one against another. Another,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 382
perhaps, added to these, the Ideas of Fusibility, and Fixedness, two
other passive Powers, in relation to the operation of Fire upon it;
Another, its Ductility, and Solubility in Aqua Regia, two other
Powers, relating to the operation of other Bodies, in changing its
5 outward Figure or Separation of it, into insensible Parts. These, or

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 part of these, put together, usually make the complex Idea in Men's
Minds, of that sort of Body we call Gold.

§ 10.

But no one, who hath considered the Properties of Bodies in

general, or this sort in particular, can doubt, that this, call'd Gold,
10 has infinite other Properties, not contained in that complex Idea.
Some, who have examined this Species more accurately, could, I
believe, enumerate ten times as many Properties in Gold, all of them
as inseparable from its internal Constitution, as its Colour, or
Weight: And 'tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties, that
15 are by divers Men known of this Metal, there would an hundred
times as many Ideas, go to the complex Idea of Gold, as any one Man
yet has in his; and yet, perhaps, that not be the thousandth part of
what is to be discovered in it. The changes that that one Body is
apt to receive, and make in other Bodies, upon a due application,
20 exceeding far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to
imagine. Which will not appear so much a Paradox to any one,
who will but consider, how far Men are yet from knowing all
the Properties of that one, no very compound Figure, a Triangle,
though it be no small numbers, that are already by Mathematicians
25 discovered of it.

§ 11.

So that all our complex Ideas of Substances are imperfect and

inadequate. Which would be so also in mathematical Figures, if we
were to have our complex Ideas of them, only by collecting their
Properties, in reference to other Figures. How uncertain, and im-
30 perfect, would our Ideas be of an Ellipsis, if we had no other Idea of
it, but some few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain Idea,
the whole Essence of that Figure, we from thence discover those
Properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are in-
separable from it.

§ 12.

35 Thus the Mind has three sorts of abstract Ideas, or nominal

Essences:

...........................................................................................................................

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 pg 383
First, Simple Ideas, which are ἔκτυπα, or Copies; but yet certainly
adequate. Because being intended to express nothing but the power
in Things to produce in the Mind such a Sensation, that Sensation,
when it is produced, cannot but be the Effect of that Power. So the
5 Paper I write on, having the Power, in the Light, (I speak according
to the common Notion of Light,) to produce in me the Sensation,
which I call White, it cannot but be the Effect of such a Power, in
something without the Mind; since the Mind has not the Power to
produce any such Idea in it self, and being meant for nothing else
10 but the Effect of such a Power, that simple Idea is real and adequate:
the Sensation of White, in my Mind, being the Effect of that
Power, which is in the Paper to produce it, is perfectly adequate to
that Power; or else, that Power would produce a different Idea.

§ 13.

Secondly, The complex Ideas of Substances are Ectypes, Copies

15 too; but not perfect ones, not adequate: which is very evident to the
Mind, in that it plainly perceives, that whatever Collection of
simple Ideas it makes of any Substance that exists, it cannot be
sure, that it exactly answers all that are in that Substance. Since
not having tried all the Operations of all other Substances upon it,
20 and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or cause in
other Substances, it cannot have an exact adequate Collection of
all its active and passive Capacities; and so not have an adequate
complex Idea of the Powers of any Substance, existing, and its
Relations, which is that sort of complex Idea of Substances we have.
25 And, after all, if we could have, and actually had, in our complex
Idea, an exact Collection of all the secondary Qualities, or Powers
of any Substance, we should not yet thereby have an Idea of the
Essence of that Thing. For since the Powers, or Qualities, that are
observable by us, are not the real Essence of that Substance, but
30 depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatsoever of these
Qualities, cannot be the real Essence of that Thing. Whereby it is
plain, that our Ideas of Substances are not adequate; are not what the
Mind intends them to be. Besides, a Man has no Idea of Substance
in general, nor knows what Substance is in it self.

§ 14.

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35 Thirdly, Complex Ideas of Modes and Relations, are Originals,

...........................................................................................................................
pg 384
and Archetypes; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any
real Existence, to which the Mind intends them to be conformable,
and exactly to answer. These being such Collections of simple Ideas,
that the Mind it self puts together, and such Collections, that each
5 of them contains in it precisely all that the Mind intends it should,
they are Archetypes and Essences of Modes that may exist; and so
are designed only for, and belong only to such Modes, as when they
do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex Ideas. The
Ideas therefore of Modes and Relations, cannot but be adequate.

CHAPTER XXXII
Of True and False Ideas.

§ 1.

10 THOUGH Truth and Falshood belong, in Propriety of Speech,

only to Propositions; yet Ideas are oftentimes termed true or false (as
what Words are there, that are not used with great Latitude, and
with some deviation from their strict and proper Significations?)
Though, I think, that when Ideas themselves are termed true or
15 false, there is still some secret or tacit Proposition, which is the
Foundation of that Denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the
particular Occasions, wherein they come to be called true or false.
In all which, we shall find some kind of Affirmation, or Negation,
which is the Reason of that Denomination. For our Ideas, being
20 nothing but bare Appearances or Perceptions in our Minds, cannot
properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false, no more
than a single Name of any thing, can be said to be true or false.

§ 2.

Indeed, both Ideas and Words, may be said to be true in a

metaphysical Sense of the Word Truth; as all other Things, that any
25 way exist, are said to be true; i.e. really to be such as they exist.
Though in Things called true, even in that Sense, there is, perhaps,
a secret reference to our Ideas, look'd upon as the Standards of that
Truth, which amounts to a mental Proposition, though it be usually
not taken notice of.

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 § 3.

30 But 'tis not in that metaphysical Sense of Truth, which we

enquire here, when we examine, whether our Ideas are capable of

...........................................................................................................................
pg 385
being true or false; but in the more ordinary Acceptation of those
Words : And so I say, that the Ideas in our Minds, being only so many
Perceptions, or Appearances there, none of them are false. The Idea
of a Centaur, having no more Falshood in it, when it appears in
5 our Minds; than the Name Centaur has Falshood in it, when it is
pronounced by our Mouths, or written on Paper. For Truth or
Falshood, lying always in some Affirmation, or Negation, Mental or
Verbal, our Ideas are not capable any of them of being false, till the
Mind passes some Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies
10 something of them.

§ 4.

When-ever the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any thing

extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true or false.
Because the Mind in such a reference, makes a tacit Supposition of
their Conformity to that Thing: which Supposition, as it happens
15 to be true or false; so the Ideas themselves come to be denominated.
The most usual Cases wherein this happens, are these following:

§ 5.

First, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has, conformable to

that in other Men's Minds called by the same common Name; v.g.
when the Mind intends, or judges its Ideas of Justice, Temperance,
20 Religion, to be the same, with what other Men give those Names to.

Secondly, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has in it self, to be

conformable to some real Existence. Thus the two Ideas, of a Man, and
a Centaur, supposed to be the Ideas of real Substances, are the one
true, and the other false; the one having a Conformity to what has
25 really existed; the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real Constitu-
tion, and Essence of any thing, whereon all its Properties depend: and
thus the greatest part, if not all our Ideas of Substances, are false.

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 § 6.

These Suppositions, the Mind is very apt tacitly to make

30 concerning its own Ideas. But yet if we will examine it, we shall find
it is chiefly, if not only concerning its abstract complex Ideas. For
the natural tendency of the Mind being towards Knowledge; and
finding that, if it should proceed by, and dwell upon only particular
Things, its Progress would be very slow, and its Work endless:
35 Therefore to shorten its way to Knowledge, and make each

...........................................................................................................................
pg 386
Perception the more comprehensive; the first Thing it does, as
the Foundation of the easier enlarging its Knowledge, either by
Contemplation of the things themselves, that it would know; or
conference with others about them, is to bind them into Bundles,
5 and rank them so into sorts, that what Knowledge it gets of any of
them, it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort; and
so advance by larger steps in that, which is its great Business,
Knowledge. This, as I have elsewhere shewed, is the Reason, why
we collect Things under comprehensive Ideas, with Names annexed
10 to them into Genera and Species; i.e. into kinds, and sorts.

§ 7.

If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the

Mind, and observe what Course it usually takes in its way to
Knowledge, we shall, I think, find, that the Mind having got any
Idea, which it thinks it may have use of, either in Contemplation or
15 Discourse, the first Thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a
Name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as
containing the Essence of a sort of Things, of which that Name is
always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that
when any one sees a new Thing of a kind that he knows not, he
20 presently asks, what it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but
the Name. As if the Name carried with it the Knowledge of the
Species, or the Essence of it; whereof it is indeed used as the Mark,
and is generally supposed annexed to it.

§ 8.

But this abstract Idea, being something in the Mind between

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25 the thing that exists, and the Name that is given to it; it is in our
Ideas, that both the Rightness of our Knowledge, and the Propriety
or Intelligibleness of our Speaking consists. And hence it is, that
Men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract Ideas they have
in their Minds, are such, as agree to the Things existing without
30 them, to which they are referr'd; and are the same also, to which
the Names they give them, do by the Use and Propriety of that
Language belong. For without this double Conformity of their Ideas,
they find, they should both think amiss of Things in themselves,
and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

§ 9.

35 First then, I say, That when the Truth of our Ideas is judged of,
by the Conformity they have to the Ideas which other Men have, and com-
monly signify by the same Name, they may be any of them false. But yet
simple Ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken. Because a Man by his

...........................................................................................................................
pg 387
Senses and every Day's Observation, may easily satisfy himself,
what the simple Ideas are, which their several Names, that are in
common use stand for, they being but few in Number, and such, as
if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify by the Objects
5 they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom, that any one mistakes
in his Names of simple Ideas; or applies the Name Red, to the Idea of
Green; or the Name Sweet, to the Idea Bitter: Much less are Men
apt to confound the Names of Ideas, belonging to different Senses;
and call a Colour, by the Name of a Taste, etc. whereby it is evident,
10 that the simple Ideas, they call by any Name, are commonly the
same, that others have and mean, when they use the same Names.

§ 10.

Complex Ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect; and
the complex Ideas of mixed Modes, much more than those of Substances:
Because in Substances, (especially those, which the common and
15 unborrowed Names of any Language are applied to,) some remark-
able sensible Qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort
from another, easily preserve those, who take any Care in the use
of their Words, from applying them to sorts of Substances, to which
they do not at all belong. But in mixed Modes, we are much more

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20 uncertain, it being not so easy to determine of several Actions;
whether they are to be called Justice, or Cruelty; Liberality, or
Prodigality. And so in referring our Ideas to those of other Men,
call'd by the same Names, ours may be false; and the Idea in our
Minds, which we express by the word Justice, may, perhaps, be
25 that, which ought to have another Name.

§ 11.

But whether or no our Ideas of mixed Modes are more

liable than any sort, to be different from those of other Men, which
are marked by the same Names : This at least is certain, That this
sort of Falshood is much more familiarly attributed to our Ideas of mixed
30 Modes, than to any other. When a Man is thought to have a false Idea
of Justice, or Gratitude, or Glory, it is for no other Reason, but that
his agrees not with the Ideas, which each of those Names are the
Signs of in other Men.

§ 12.

The Reason whereof seems to me to be this, That the abstract

35 Ideas of mixed Modes, being Men's voluntary Combinations of such

...........................................................................................................................
pg 388
a precise Collection of simple Ideas; and so the Essence of each
Species, being made by Men alone, whereof we have no other
sensible Standard, existing any where, but the Name it self, or the
definition of that Name: We have nothing else to refer these our
5 Ideas of mixed Modes to as a Standard, to which we would conform
them, but the Ideas of those, who are thought to use those Names in
their most proper Significations; and so as our Ideas conform, or
differ from them, they pass for true or false. And thus much con-
cerning the Truth and Falshood of our Ideas, in reference to their
10 Names.

§ 13.

Secondly, As to the Truth and Falshood of our Ideas, in reference

to the real Existence of Things, when that is made the Standard of
their Truth, none of them can be termed false, but only our com-
plex Ideas of Substances.

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 § 14.

15 First, Our simple Ideas, being barely such Perceptions, as

God has fitted us to receive, and given Power to external Objects
to produce in us by established Laws, and Ways, suitable to his
Wisdom and Goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their
Truth consists in nothing else, but in such Appearances, as are
20 produced in us, and must be suitable to those Powers, he has placed
in external Objects, or else they could not be produced in us: And
thus answering those Powers, they are what they should be, true
Ideas. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of Falshood, if
the Mind (as in most Men I believe it does) judges these Ideas to be
25 in the Things themselves. For God in his Wisdom, having set them
as Marks of Distinction in Things, whereby we may be able to
discern one Thing from another; and so chuse any of them for our
uses, as we have Occasion, it alters not the Nature of our simple
Idea, whether we think, that the Idea of Blue, be in the Violet it self,
30 or in our Mind only; and only the Power of producing it by the
Texture of its Parts, reflecting the Particles of Light, after a certain
Manner, to be in the Violet it self. For that Texture in the Object,
by a regular and constant operation, producing the same Idea of
Blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our Eyes, that from any
35 other Thing, whether that distinguishing Mark, as it is really in
the Violet, be only a peculiar Texture of Parts, or else that very

...........................................................................................................................
pg 389
Colour, the Idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact resemblance.
And it is equally from that Appearance, to be denominated Blue,
whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that
causes in us that Idea: Since the Name Blue notes properly nothing,
5 but that Mark of Distinction, that is in a Violet, discernible only by
our Eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our Capacities
distinctly to know, and, perhaps, would be of less use to us, if we
had Faculties to discern.

§ 15.

Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our

10 simple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so
ordered, That the same Object should produce in several Men's Minds
different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet pro-

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 duced in one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Mari-
gold produced in another Man's, and vice versâ. For since this could
15 never be known: because one Man's Mind could not pass into
another Man's Body, to perceive, what Appearances were pro-
duced by those Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the Names,
would be at all confounded, or any Falshood be in either. For all
Things, that had the Texture of a Violet, producing constantly the
20 Idea, which he called Blue; and those which had the Texture of a
Marigold, producing constantly the Idea, which he as constantly
called Yellow, whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he
would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by
those Appearances, and understand, and signify those distinctions,
25 marked by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the Appearances, or
Ideas in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly
the same, with the Ideas in other Men's Minds. I am nevertheless
very apt to think, that the sensible Ideas, produced by any Object
in different Men's Minds, are most commonly very near and un-
30 discernibly alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many
Reasons offered: but that being besides my present Business, I shall
not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the
contrary Supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either
for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life;
35 and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 390
§ 16.

From what has been said concerning our simple Ideas, I

think it evident, That our simple Ideas can none of them be false, in
respect of Things existing without us. For the Truth of these Appear-
ances, or Perceptions in our Minds, consisting, as has been said,
5 only in their being answerable to the Powers in external Objects,
to produce by our Senses such Appearances in us: and each of them
being in the Mind, such as it is, suitable to the Power that produced
it, and which alone it represents, it cannot upon that Account, or as
referr'd to such a Pattern, be false. Blue or Yellow, Bitter or Sweet, can
10 never be false Ideas, these Perceptions in the Mind, are just such as
they are there, answering the Powers appointed by God to produce
them; and so are truly, what they are, and are intended to be.
Indeed the Names may be misapply'd: but that in this respect,

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 makes no Falshood in the Ideas: As if a Man ignorant in the English
15 Tongue, should call Purple, Scarlet.

§ 17.

Secondly, Neither can our complex Ideas of Modes, in reference

to the Essence of any Thing really existing, be false. Because whatever
complex Idea I have of any Mode, it hath no reference to any
Pattern existing, and made by Nature: it is not supposed to contain
20 in it any other Ideas, than what it hath; nor to represent any thing,
but such a Complication of Ideas, as it does. Thus when I have the
Idea of such an Action of a Man, who forbears to afford himself such
Meat, Drink, and Cloathing, and other Conveniencies of Life, as
his Riches and Estate will be sufficient to supply, and his station
25 requires, I have no false Idea; but such an one as represents an
Action, either as I find, or imagine it; and so is capable of neither
Truth, or Falshood. But when I give the name Frugality, or Vertue, to
this Action, then it may be called a false Idea, if thereby it be sup-
posed to agree with that Idea, to which, in propriety of Speech, the
30 name of Frugality doth belong; or to be conformable to that Law,
which is the Standard of Vertue and Vice.

§ 18.

Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances, being all referred to

Patterns in Things themselves, may be false. That they are all false, when
looked upon as the Representations of the unknown Essences of
35 Things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I
shall therefore pass over that chimerical Supposition, and consider
them as Collections of simple Ideas in the Mind, taken from Com-

...........................................................................................................................
pg 391
binations of simple Ideas existing together constantly in Things, of
which Patterns, they are the supposed Copies: And in this reference
of them, to the existence of Things, they are false Ideas, 1. When
they put together simple Ideas, which in the real Existence of
5 Things, have no union: as when to the Shape, and Size, that exist
together in a Horse, is joined, in the same complex Idea, the power
of Barking like a Dog: Which three Ideas, however put together into
one in the Mind, were never united in Nature: and this therefore
may be called a false Idea of an Horse. 2. Ideas of Substances are, in

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10 this respect, also false, when from any Collection of simple Ideas,
that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct
Negation, any other simple Idea, which is constantly joined with
them. Thus if to Extension, Solidity, Fusibility, the peculiar
Weightiness, and yellow Colour of Gold, any one join in his
15 Thoughts the Negation of a greater degree of fixedness, than is in
Lead or Copper, he may be said to have a false complex Idea, as well
as when he joins to those other simple ones, the Idea of perfect
absolute Fixedness. For either way, the complex Idea of Gold being
made up of such simple ones, as have no union in Nature, may be
20 termed false. But if he leave out of this his complex Idea, that of
Fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separating of
it from the rest in his Mind, it is, I think, to be looked on, as an
inadequate and imperfect Idea, rather than a false one: since though
it contains not all the simple Ideas, that are united in Nature, yet it
25 puts none together, but what do really exist together.

§ 19.

Though in compliance with the ordinary way of Speaking,

I have shewed in what sense, and upon what ground our Ideas may
be sometimes called true, or false; yet if we will look a little nearer in-
to the matter in all cases, where any Idea is call'd true, or false, it is
30 from some Judgment that the Mind makes, or is supposed to make,
that is true, or false. For Truth, or Falshood, being never without some
Affirmation, or Negation, Express, or Tacit, it is not to be found, but
where signs are joined or separated, according to the agreement, or
disagreement, of the Things they stand for. The signs we chiefly
35 use, are either Ideas, or Words, wherewith we make either mental,
or verbal Propositions. Truth lies in so joining, or separating these
Representatives, as the Things they stand for, do, in themselves,
agree, or disagree: and Falshood in the contrary, as shall be more
fully shewed hereafter.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 392
§ 20.

Any Idea then which we have in our Minds, whether con-

formable, or not, to the existence of Things, or to any Ideas in the
Minds of other Men, cannot properly for this alone be called false.

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 For these Representations, if they have nothing in them, but what
5 is really existing in Things without, cannot be thought false, being
exact Representations of something: nor yet if they have any thing
in them, differing from the reality of Things, can they properly be
said to be false Representations, or Ideas of Things, they do not
represent. But the mistake and falshood is,

§ 21.

10 First, When the Mind having any Idea, it judges and concludes
it the same, that is in other Men's Minds, signified by the same name; or
that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification, or
definition of that Word, when indeed it is not: Which is the most
usual mistake in mixed Modes, though other Ideas also are liable
15 to it.

§ 22.

Secondly, When it having a complex Idea made up of such a

Collection of simple ones, as Nature never puts together, it judges it
to agree to a Species of Creatures really existing; as when it joins the
weight of Tin, to the colour, fusibility, and fixedness of Gold.

§ 23.

20 Thirdly, When in its complex Idea, it has united a certain

number of simple Ideas, that do really exist together in some sorts of
Creatures, but has also left out others, as much inseparable, it judges
this to be a perfect complete Idea, of a sort of things which really it is not;
v.g. having joined the Ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most
25 heavy, and fusible, it takes that complex Idea to be the complete
Idea of Gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in Aqua
Regia are as inseparable from those other Ideas, or Qualities of that
Body, as they are one from another.

§ 24.

Fourthly, The Mistake is yet greater, when I judge, that this

30 complex Idea, contains in it the real Essence of any Body existing; when at
least it contains but some few of those Properties, which flow from
its real Essence and Constitution. I say, only some few of those
Properties; for those Properties consisting mostly in the active and

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 ...........................................................................................................................
pg 393
passive Powers, it has, in reference to other Things, all that are
vulgarly known of any one Body, and of which the complex Idea of
that kind of Things is usually made, are but a very few, in com-
parison of what a Man, that has several ways tried and examined
5 it, knows of that one sort of Things; and all that the most expert
Man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that
Body, and depend on its internal or essential Constitution. The
essence of a Triangle, lies in a very little compass, consists in a very
few Ideas; three Lines including a Space, make up that Essence: But
10 the Properties that flow from this Essence, are more than can be
easily known, or enumerated. So I imagine it is in Substances, their
real Essences lie in a little compass; though the Properties flowing
from that internal Constitution, are endless.

§ 25.

To conclude, a Man having no notion of any Thing with-

15 out him, but by the Idea he has of it in his Mind (which Idea, he has
a power to call by what Name he pleases) he may, indeed, make an
Idea neither answering the reality of Things, nor agreeing to the
Ideas commonly signified by other Peoples Words; but cannot make
a wrong, or false Idea of a Thing, which is no otherwise known to
20 him, but by the Idea he has of it. v.g. When I frame an Idea of the
Legs, Arms, and Body of a Man, and join to this a Horse's Head and
Neck, I do not make a false Idea of any thing; because it represents
nothing without me. But when I call it a Man, or Tartar, and ima-
gine it either to represent some real Being without me, or to be the
25 same Idea, that others call by the same name; in either of these
cases, I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be
termed a false Idea; though, indeed, the falshood lie not in the Idea,
but in that tacit mental Proposition, wherein a conformity and
resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having
30 framed such an Idea in my Mind, without thinking, either that
Existence, or the name Man or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it
Man, or Tartar, I may be justly thought fantastical in the Naming;
but not erroneous in my Judgment; nor the Idea any way false.

§ 26.

Upon the whole matter, I think, That our Ideas, as they are

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35 considered by the Mind, either in reference to the proper signifi-
cation of their Names; or in reference to the reality of Things, may

...........................................................................................................................
pg 394
very fitly be called right, or wrong Ideas, according as they agree, or
disagree to those Patterns to which they are referred. But if any one
had rather call them true, or false, 'tis fit he use a liberty which every
one has, to call Things by those Names he thinks best; though in
5 propriety of Speech, Truth, or Falshood, will, I think, scarce agree to
them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them
some mental Proposition. The Ideas that are in a Man's Mind,
simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein
inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other Ideas are in them-
10 selves right; and the knowledge about them right and true Know-
ledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their
Patterns and Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as
far as they disagree with such Archetypes.

CHAPTER XXXIII
Of the Association of Ideas.

§ 1.

THERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that
15 seems odd to him, and is in it self really Extravagant in the Opinions,
Reasonings, and Actions of other Men. The least flaw of this kind,
if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to
espie in another, and will by the Authority of Reason forwardly
condemn, though he be guilty of much greater Unreasonableness in
20 his own Tenets and Conduct, which he never perceives, and will
very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

§ 2.

This proceeds not wholly from Self-love, though that has

often a great hand in it. Men of fair Minds, and not given up to the
over weening of Self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in
25 many Cases one with amazement hears the Arguings, and is
astonish'd at the Obstinacy of a worthy Man, who yields not to the
Evidence of Reason, though laid before him as clear as Day-light.

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 § 3.

This sort of Unreasonableness is usually imputed to Edu-

cation and Prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, though

...........................................................................................................................
pg 395
that reaches not the bottom of the Disease, nor shews distinctly
enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly
assigned for the Cause, and Prejudice is a good general Name for the
thing it self: But yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther who
5 would trace this sort of Madness to the root it springs from, and
so explain it, as to shew whence this flaw has its Original in very
sober and rational Minds, and wherein it consists.

§ 4.

I shall be pardon'd for calling it by so harsh a name as

Madness, when it is considered, that opposition to Reason deserves
10 that Name, and is really Madness; and there is scarce a Man so free
from it, but that if he should always on all occasions argue or do as
in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for
Bedlam, than Civil Conversation. I do not here mean when he is
under the power of an unruly Passion, but in the steady calm
15 course of his Life. That which will yet more apologize for this
harsh Name, and ungrateful Imputation on the greatest part of
Mankind is, that enquiring a little by the bye into the Nature of
Madness, B.2. c.11. §13. I found it to spring from the very same
Root, and to depend on the very same Cause we are here speaking
20 of. This consideration of the thing it self, at a time when I thought
not the least on the Subject which I am now treating of, suggested
it to me. And if this be a Weakness to which all Men are so liable; if
this be a Taint which so universally infects Mankind, the greater
care should be taken to lay it open under its due Name, thereby to
25 excite the greater care in its Prevention and Cure.

§ 5.

Some of our Ideas have a natural Correspondence and Con-

nexion one with another: It is the Office and Excellency of our
Reason to trace these, and hold them together in that Union and
Correspondence which is founded in their peculiar Beings. Besides

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30 this there is another Connexion of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or
Custom; Ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so
united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis very hard to separate them,
they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time
comes into the Understanding but its Associate appears with it;
35 and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole
gang always inseparable shew themselves together.

...........................................................................................................................
pg 396
§ 6.

This strong Combination of Ideas, not ally'd by Nature, the

Mind makes in it self either voluntarily, or by chance, and hence
it comes in different Men to be very different, according to their
different Inclinations, Educations, Interests, etc. Custom settles
5 habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining
in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but
Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going con-
tinue on in the same steps they have been used to, which by often
treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes
10 easy and as it were Natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking,
thus Ideas seem to be produced in our Minds; or if they are not, this
may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual
train, when once they are put into that tract, as well as it does to
explain such Motions of the Body. A Musician used to any Tune
15 will find that let it but once begin in his Head, the Ideas of the
several Notes of it will follow one another orderly in his Under-
standing without any care or attention, as regularly as his Fingers
move orderly over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune
he has begun, though his unattentive Thoughts be elsewhere a
20 wandering. Whether the natural cause of these Ideas, as well as of
that regular Dancing of his Fingers be the Motion of his Animal
Spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever by this Instance
it appears to be so: But this may help us a little to conceive of
Intellectual Habits, and of the tying together of Ideas.

§ 7.

25 That there are such Associations of them made by Custom in

the Minds of most Men, I think no Body will question who has well

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 consider'd himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly
attributed most of the Sympathies and Antipathies observable in
Men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular Effects as if
30 they were Natural, and are therefore called so, though they at first
had no other Original but the accidental Connexion of two Ideas,
which either the strength of the first Impression, or future In-
dulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company
together in that Man's Mind, as if they were but one Idea. I say
35 most of the Antipathies, I do not say all, for some of them are truly
Natural, depend upon our original Constitution, and are born with

...........................................................................................................................
pg 397
us; but a great part of those which are counted Natural, would have
been known to be from unheeded, though, perhaps, early Im-
pressions, or wanton Phancies at first, which would have been
acknowledged the Original of them if they had been warily ob-
5 served. A grown Person surfeiting with Honey, no sooner hears
the Name of it, but his Phancy immediately carries Sickness and
Qualms to his Stomach, and he cannot bear the very Idea of it; other
Ideas of Dislike and Sickness, and Vomiting presently accompany it,
and he is disturb'd, but he knows from whence to date this Weak-
10 ness, and can tell how he got this Indisposition: Had this happen'd
to him, by an over dose of Honey, when a Child, all the same
Effects would have followed, but the Cause would have been mis-
taken, and the Antipathy counted Natural.

§ 8.

I mention this not out of any great necessity there is in this

15 present Argument, to distinguish nicely between Natural and
Acquired Antipathies, but I take notice of it for another purpose,
(viz.) that those who have Children, or the charge of their Edu-
cation, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and
carefully to prevent the undue Connexion of Ideas in the Minds of
20 young People. This is the time most susceptible of lasting Im-
pressions, and though those relating to the Health of the Body, are
by discreet People minded and fenced against, yet I am apt to doubt,
that those which relate more peculiarly to the Mind, and terminate
in the Understanding, or Passions, have been much less heeded than
25 the thing deserves; nay, those relating purely to the Understanding
have, as I suspect, been by most Men wholly over-look'd.

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 § 9.

This wrong Connexion in our Minds of Ideas in themselves,

loose and independent one of another, has such an influence, and is
of so great force to set us awry in our Actions, as well Moral as
30 Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and Notions themselves, that, per-
haps, there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked
after.

§ 10.

The Ideas of Goblines and Sprights have really no more to do

with Darkness than Light; yet let but a foolish Maid inculcate these

...........................................................................................................................
pg 398
often on the Mind of a Child, and raise them there together, possibly
he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives, but
Darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful Ideas,
and they shall be so joined that he can no more bear the one than
5 the other.

§ 11.

A Man receives a sensible Injury from another, thinks on

the Man and that Action over and over, and by ruminating on them
strongly, or much in his Mind, so cements those two Ideas together,
that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the Man, but the
10 Pain and Displeasure he suffered comes into his Mind with it, so
that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for
the one as the other. Thus Hatreds are often begotten from slight
and almost innocent Occasions, and Quarrels propagated and con-
tinued in the World.

§ 12.

15 A Man has suffered Pain or Sickness in any Place, he saw

his Friend die in such a Room; though these have in Nature nothing
to do one with another, yet when the Idea of the Place occurs to his
Mind, it brings (the Impression being once made) that of the Pain
and Displeasure with it, he confounds them in his Mind, and can as
20 little bear the one as the other.

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 § 13.

When this Combination is settled and whilst it lasts, it is

not in the power of Reason to help us, and relieve us from the
Effects of it. Ideas in our Minds, when they are there, will operate
according to their Natures and Circumstances; and here we see the
25 cause why Time cures certain Affections, which Reason, though in
the right, and allow'd to be so, has not power over, nor is able
against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in
other cases. The Death of a Child, that was the daily delight of his
Mother's Eyes, and joy of her Soul, rends from her Heart the whole
30 comfort of her Life, and gives her all the torment imaginable; use
the Consolations of Reason in this case, and you were as good preach
Ease to one on the Rack, and hope to allay, by rational Discourses,
the Pain of his Joints tearing asunder. Till time has by disuse
separated the sense of that Enjoyment and its loss from the Idea of
35 the Child returning to her Memory, all Representations, though
never so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some in whom the

...........................................................................................................................
pg 399
union between these Ideas is never dissolved, spend their Lives in
Mourning, and carry an incurable Sorrow to their Graves.

§ 14.

A Friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of Madness by

a very harsh and offensive Operation. The Gentleman, who was
5 thus recovered, with great sense of Gratitude and Acknowledg-
ment, owned the Cure all his Life after, as the greatest Obligation he
could have received; but whatever Gratitude and Reason suggested
to him, he could never bear the sight of the Operator: That Image
brought back with it the Idea of that Agony which he suffer'd from
10 his Hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

§ 15.

Many Children imputing the Pain they endured at School

to their Books they were corrected for, so joyn those Ideas together,
that a Book becomes their Aversion, and they are never reconciled
to the study and use of them all their Lives after; and thus Reading
15 becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might

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 have made the great Pleasure of their Lives. There are Rooms con-
venient enough, that some Men cannot Study in, and fashions of
Vessels, which though never so clean and commodious they cannot
Drink out of, and that by reason of some accidental Ideas which are
20 annex'd to them, and make them offensive; and who is there that
hath not observed some Man to flag at the appearance, or in the
company of some certain Person not otherwise superior to him, but
because having once on some occasion got the Ascendant, the Idea
of Authority and Distance goes along with that of the Person, and
25 he that has been thus subjected is not able to separate them.

§ 16.

Instances of this kind are so plentiful every where, that if

I add one more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a
young Gentleman, who having learnt to Dance, and that to great
Perfection, there happened to stand an old Trunk in the Room
30 where he learnt. The Idea of this remarkable piece of Houshold-
stuff, had so mixed it self with the turns and steps of all his Dances,
that though in that Chamber he could Dance excellently well, yet it
was only whilst that Trunk was there, nor could he perform well in
any other place, unless that, or some such other Trunk had its due
35 position in the Room. If this Story shall be suspected to be dressed

...........................................................................................................................
pg 400
up with some comical Circumstances, a little beyond precise
Nature; I answer for my self, that I had it some Years since from a
very sober and worthy Man, upon his own knowledge, as I report
it; and I dare say, there are very few inquisitive Persons, who read
5 this, who have not met with Accounts, if not Examples of this
Nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

§ 17.

Intellectual Habits and Defects this way contracted are not

less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the Ideas of
Being and Matter be strongly joined either by Education or much
10 Thought, whilst these are still combined in the Mind, what Notions,
what Reasonings, will there be about separate Spirits? Let custom
from the very Childhood have join'd Figure and Shape to the Idea of
God, and what Absurdities will that Mind be liable to about the

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 Deity?
15 Let the Idea of Infallibility be inseparably join'd to any Person,
and these two constantly together possess the Mind, and then one
Body in two Places at once, shall unexamined be swallowed for a
certain Truth, by an implicit Faith, when ever that imagin'd in-
fallible Person dictates and demands assent without enquiry.

§ 18.

20 Some such wrong and unnatural Combinations of Ideas

will be found to establish the Irreconcilable opposition between
different Sects of Philosophy and Religion; for we cannot imagine
every one of their Followers to impose wilfully on himself, and
knowingly refuse Truth offer'd by plain Reason. Interest, though it
25 does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole
Societies of Men to so universal a Perverseness, as that every one
of them to a Man should knowingly maintain Falshood: Some at
least must be allow'd to do what all pretend to, i.e. to pursue Truth
sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their
30 Understandings, and makes them not see the falshood of what
they embrace for real Truth. That which thus captivates their
Reasons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold from common Sence,
will, when examin'd, be found to be what we are speaking of: some
independent Ideas, of no alliance to one another, are by Education,
35 Custom, and the constant din of their Party, so coupled in their
Minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no
more separate them in their Thoughts, than if they were but one

...........................................................................................................................
pg 401
Idea, and they operate as if they were so. This gives Sence to
Jargon, Demonstration to Absurdities, and Consistency to Non-
sense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said, of all
the Errors in the World; or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the
5 most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains, it hinders Men from
seeing and examining. When two things in themselves disjoin'd,
appear to the sight constantly united; if the Eye sees these things
rivetted which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mis-
takes that follow in two Ideas, that they have been accustom'd so to
10 join in their Minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am
apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst
they are under the deceit of it, makes them uncapable of Con-

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 viction, and they applaud themselves as zealous Champions for
Truth, when indeed they are contending for Error; and the con-
15 fusion of two different Ideas, which a customary connexion of them
in their Minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their Heads
with false Views, and their Reasonings with false Consequences.

§ 19.

Having thus given an account of the original, sorts, and

extent of our Ideas, with several other Considerations, about these
20 (I know not whether I may say) Instruments, or Materials, of our
Knowledge, the method I at first proposed to my self, would now
require, that I should immediately proceed to shew, what use the
Understanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by
them. This was that, which, in the first general view I had of this
25 Subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but upon a
nearer approach, I find, that there is so close a connexion between
Ideas and Words; and our abstract Ideas, and general Words, have
so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to
speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists
30 in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature, Use, and
Signification of Language; which therefore must be the business of
the next Book.

Notes

* Ps. 121: 4.

* Ps. 16: 11.

* Horace, Epistles, I, ii, 42–3.

* I Cor. 7: 9.

* 1 Cor. 2: 9.

** Ps. 16: 11.

* Isa. 22: 13; 1 Cor. 15: 32.

* Matt. 6: 13; Luke 11: 4.

* Rom. 2: 6–9.

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1
The whole of this Chapter xxvii add. 2–5, with a consequent re-numbering in 2–5 of the
following chapters of Book II.

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 NOTES

(2) employ'd] 1–4 | apply'd 5

104(2) about] 1–4 | about, 5

(9) Being] 4–5 | being 1–3

(10) fore-going] 1–2, 4 (fore-/ 4) | foregoing 3, 5

(11) shewn] 2–5 | shewed 1

(14) one's] 4–5 | ones 1–3

(15) white Paper] 1–4 | White-Paper 5

(22) external,sensible] 1–4 | External sensible 5

(23) internal] 1–4 | Internal 5

(25) two] 1–4 | Two 5

105(1) particular] 2–5 | particular, 1

(6–8) , which … Perceptions ] add. 2–5

(7) external Objects] 4 | External Objects 5 | external objects 2–3

(10) the] 4–5 | our 1–3

(15) set] 4–5 (Set 5) | sett 1–3

(16) without:] 2–4 | without; 1, 5

(20) Understandings] 4–5 | Understanding 1–3

(22–4) external … internal ] 1–4 | External … Internal 5

(31) and] 1–4 | And 5

(33) Ideas] 2–5 | Idea's 1

106(5) two.] 2–5 | two: 1

External] 1er–5 | Eternal 1

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Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(6) produce] 2–5 | produced 1

(7) Paragraph break here in 5, not in 1–4.

(7) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(9) Modes, Combinations, and Relations] 4–5 | modes, and the Compositions made out of
them 1–3

(14) Senses;] 4–5 | Senses, 1–3

(18) these] 2–5 | those 1

(18) Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(27) late,] 4–5 | late 1–3

(31–2) all … World ] add. 4–5

(33) them] 4–5 | us 1–3

(33) Ideas] 2–5 | Idea's 1

(34) it] 2–5 | it, 1

(35) at] 5 | and at 1–4

107(1) Qualities] 2–5 | Qualities, 1

solicite] 4–5 | sollicite 1–3

(8) furnished] 4–5 | furnished, 1–3

(9) with,] 2–5 | with 1

(10) less] 1er–5 | lesser 1

(20) day] 4–5 | Day 1–3

(28) clear distinct] 2–5 | clear and distinct, 1 (',' om. 1T.er)

(29) turns] 2–5 | turn 1

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it] 4–5 | its 1–3

reflects] 2–5 | and reflect 1

(30) makes] 2–5 | make 1

(30)–108(4) Children … without ] 2–5 | Whereas Children at their first coming into the World,
seek particularly after nothing, but what may ease their Hunger, or other Pain: but take all
other Objects as they come, are generally pleased with all new ones, that are not painful 1

(32) solicitation] 4–5 | sollicitation 2–3

108(1) Objects] 4–5 | objects 2–3

(2–3) . Men's … acquaint ] 4er–5 | , and acquainting 2–4

(4) v. 107(30), n.

(9) perceive; … Ideas, ] 5 | perceive, … Ideas 1–4

(10) Coste 'Je sai bien qu'il y a une Opinion qui pose'; Coste2 'Je sai bien que certains
Philosophes assurent' and appends a note 'Les Cartesiens' on 'certains Philosophes'.

(11) [2nd] it] 3–5 | its 1–2

(14) Ideas] 2–5 | Idea's 1

(15, 16) its] add. 2–5

(18) of] 1–4 | or 5

(22) Ideas] 2–5 | its Ideas 1

(23) ; the] 5 | : the 1–4

(24) Ideas] 4–5 | Idea's, 1–3 (Ideas 2–3)

(25) one of its Operations] 2–5 | Operation 1

(28) thinking] 1–4 | Thinking 5

(2 ll. below 31) for] 4–5 | for, 2–3

(29) of] 4–5 | of all 1–3 (likewise Coste)

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109(1) That] 1–4 | That, 5

(5) [1st] is] 2–5 | is, 1

(6) Reason] 2–5 | Reasons 1

(9–30) 'Tis … it. ] add. 2–5

(12) dispute:] 2–4 | dispute; 5

(14) doubt,] 4–5 | doubt 2–3

(18) so:] 2–4 | so; 5

(23–5) but … sleep. ] Coste 'mais encore de faire dire à ceux qui ne sont pas de leur avis,
toute autre chose que ce qu'ils ont dit effectivement. C'est ce que j'ai éprouvé dans cette
occasion; car il s'est trouvé un Auteur qui ayant lû la prémière Edition de cet Ouvrage, et
n'étant pas satisfait de ce que je viens d'avancer contre l'opinion de ceux qui soûtiennent
que l'Ame pense toûjours, me fait dire, qu'une chose cesse d'exister parce que nous ne
sentons pas qu'elle existe pendant nôtre sommeil. Etrange conséquence qu'on ne peut
m'attribuer sans avoir l'Esprit rempli d'une aveugle préoccupation!'

(25) sleep.] 2–4 | sleep? 5

(26) sleep;] 2–4 | sleep: 5

(8) me] 1–2, 4–5 | be 3

110(8) happy or miserable] 1–4 | Happy or Miserable 5

(11) Concerns,] 2–5 | Concerns; 1

(12) in:] 5 | in. 3–4 | in, 1–2

(13) Person;] 1–4 | Person: 5

(14) sleeps] 1–3, 5 | Sleeps 4

(15) Persons:] 1–4 | Persons; 5

(18) it;] 4–5 | it, 1–3

(26) apart] 2–5 | a-part 1

(31) it] 2–5 | it is 1

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(33) should … have ] 2–5 | subsists and thinks, or has 1

111(1, 5) chuses] 4–5 | chooses 1–3

(3) [2nd] Soul] 4–5 | Soul, 1–3

(11) nor is] 1er–5 | nor is not 1

(12) Socrates] 4–5 | Socrates, 1–3

(14) Reason] 4–5 | reason 1–3

(15, 17) Persons] 2–5 | persons 1

(18, 19) Particles] 4–5 | particles 1–3

(20) Person] 2–5 | person 1

(22) drowsy Nod] 4–5 drousie nod 1–3

(34) Assertion,] 2–5 | Assertion 1

(37) day] 4 | Day 1–3, 5

112(4) dream'd] 1–4 | Dream'd 5

(7) one's] 4–5 | ones 1–3

Acquaintance] 2–5 | Acquaintance, 1

(8) dreaming] 1–4 | Dreaming 5

(11) little,] 1–4 | little 5

(13) footsteps] 1–4 | foot-steps 5

(27) Spirit,] 1–4 | Spirit 5

(28) lay them up] 4 | lay up them 5 | record them 1–3

(29) occasion] 5 | any occasion 1–4. (Coste 'dans l'occasion')

(29) recal] 2–5 | recall 1

(32) at … rate, ] 2–4 | , at … rate, 5 | , at … rate 1

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113(1) useful … noble ] 1–4 | Useful … Noble 5

(4) and] 1–4 | And 5

(10) it] 4–5 | its 1–3

(21) than] 1T.er, 2–5 | then, 1

(22) then] 1–3, 5 (likewise Coste) | than 4

(31) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(3) reasonable] 5 | reason 1–4

(12) and] add. 4–5

114(12) tangue] 1–4 | Tange 5

(17) , sometimes at least,] 1T.er, 2–5 | sometimes, at least 1

(17) [1st] it] 1–2, 4–5 | its 3

(18) which it had] 4–5 | it had 1T.er, 2–3 | had 1

(19) Body] 2–4 | Body, 1, 5

Operations … them: ] 2–5 | operations … them, 1

(21–3) either … them ] 2–5 | that Memory belongs only to Ideas, derived from the Body, and
the Operations of the Mind about them, or else that the Soul remembers something that the
Man does not 1

(23) Minds] 4–5 | minds 2–3

(25) or] 4–5 | or, 1–3

(28) This,] 1–3, W | This 4–5

(31) forces] 4–5 | force 1–3

(6) not to perceive] W | not perceive 1–4 | to perceive 5

115(7–10) Persons ... Man ... Men's ... Man ] 2–5 | persons ... man ... mens ... man 1

(8) considers] 4–5 | consider 1–3

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should] 5 | shall 1–4

(12) This,] 1–4 | This 5

(15) a body] 2–5 | any thing 1

(17) , or] 2–5 | ; without 1

(l. below 34) Marginal summary not in Coste, which applies the summary for § 18 also to §
19.

(19–26) Man ... Man ... Man's ... Man ... Man's ... Man ] 2–5 | man ... man ... man's ... man ...
man's ... man 1

(19) hungry] 1–4 | Hungry 5

(27) on.] 1–4 | on? 5

(1) when I declare, that] 2–5 | declare, That 1

(2) Dogs or Elephants] 2–5 | a Dog, or an Elephant, 1

when] 2–5 | though 1

(3) so.] Coste2 adds in a footnote: 'Il paroît visiblement par cet endroit, que c'est à Des
Cartes et à ses Disciples qu'en veut M. Locke dans tout ce Chapitre.'

(8) a] 1–4; om. 5

116(13) and,] 1–4 | and 5

(19) thinking] 1–4 | thinking, 5

(32) Impression on the Body] 4–5 | Idea 1–3

(l. below 32) Coste has separate marginal summaries for §§ 20 and 21, they being,
respectively, 'L'Ame n'a aucune idée que par Sensation ou par Reflexion.' and 'C'est ce que
nous pouvons observer évidemment dans les Enfans.'

117(1) it.] 2–5 | it, 1 | it: W

(2) a] 4–5 | a 1–3

Mother's] 1–4 | Mothers 5

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(9) Objects,] 4–5 | Objects 1–3

(11) makes,] 2–5 | makes; 1

Mind] 4–5 | mind 1–3

(29–30) produces some Perception] 4–5 | makes it be taken notice of 1–3

(30–33) 'Tis … etc. ] add. 5

(32) employ] edit. | imploy 5

(34)–118(2) In … Impressions ] 5 | The Impressions then, 1–4

(l. below 35) The original of all our Knowledge.] 4–5 | No Ideas but from Sensation or
Reflection, evident, if we observe Children. 2–3

118(1) set] edit. | Set 5

(2) v. 117(34), n.

(3) Mind;] 5 | Mind, 1–4

(3–6) proceeding … Thus ] 5 | about the [these 1–3] Impressions, reflected on by it [its
1–3] self, as proper Objects to be contemplated by it, are, I conceive, the Original of all
Knowledge; and 1–4

(7) mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

(10) Groundwork] Ground-/ work 1–4 | Ground-work 5

(13) it] 4–5 | its 1–3

(27) in] 1–4; om. 5

(l. below 31) for the most part] 4–5 | most of all 2–3

(27) out,] 1, 4–5 | out; 2–3

(28) it,] 4–5 | it 1–3

(31) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas, 1

119(l. above 1) Ideas] 2–5 | Idea's 1

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(11) feels] 1–4 | feel 5

(23) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotation from Locke's First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp.
35, etc.; prefaced by 'Against this, that the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested
and furnished to the Mind only by Sensation and Reflection, the Bishop of Worcester makes
Use of the Idea of Substance in these Words: If the Idea of Substance be grounded upon
plain and evident Reason, then we must allow an Idea of Substance, which comes not in by
Sensation, or Reflection, so we may be certain of something which we have not by those
Ideas. To which our Author answers: ...'

120(2) force] 2–5 | Force 1

(3) Man,] 2–5 | Man 1

(4) muchwhat] 1–2, 4 | much what 5 | much-what 3

(12) ; or by reflection] 4–5 | , or 1–3

(13) fancy] 4–5 | phansie 1–3

(15) this,] 1–4 | this/ 5

(21) things,] 1–4 | things 5

(22) Yet] 1, 4–5 | Yet, 2–3

(27) Notice] 2–5 | notice 1

(28) Sixth, Seventh, or Eighth] 1–4 | sixth,seventh, or eighth 5

be:] 4–5 | be, 2–3 | be; 1

(1) Opinion] 1, 3–5 | Opinions 2

121(8) then, There] 1–4 |, Then, there 5

(14) mind] 1–4 | Mind, 5

(15) Heads.] 2–5 | Heads: 1

(18) white, red, yellow, blue] 1–4 | White, Red, Yellow, Blue 5

(20) kinds] 1–4 | kind 5

(l. below 27) Division of simple Ideas.] 4–5 | As Colours of Seeing, Sounds of Hearing. 2–3

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Ideas of one Sense.] 4; not in 2–3, 5

(24) mind's] 2–5 | Mind's 1

(15) by … of ] 4–5 | are in Nature 1–3

(16) Bitter, Sowr, Harsh,] 4–5 | Bitter and Sowre, Harsh 1–3

(16–17) the Epithets] add. 4–5

(17) that numberless] 4–5 | all the 1–3

(19) , Fruit,] add. 4–5

(20) Colours and Sounds] 4–5 | Colour and Sound 1–3

122(23) though] 1, 3–5 | thought 2

(27) Solidity] 4–5 | Solidity, 1–3

(28) which] add. 4–5

(l. below 28: §2.) 2–4; om. 5

(28) resistance] 2–5 | Resistance 1

(5) which] add. 4–5

123(6) perceive,] 4–5 | perceive 1–3

(11) solid] 4–5 | solid 1–3

(18) negative,] 5 | negative; 1–4

(21) and] 4–5 | which 1–3

(21) matter:] 3–5 | matter; 1–2

(22) it] add. 4–5

(22–4) matter, of a bulk ... us; ... farther; ] 4–5 | matter of a bulk, ... us: ... farther, 1–3 (24)
it,] 4 | It, 5 | it 1–3

(25) exist;] 4–5 | exist, 1–3

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(32) removes] 4–5 | remove 1–3

(33) which] add. 4–5

(34) , which] add. 4–5 (',' om. 5)

(34) it] 4 | it, 1–3, 5

handle,] 4–5 | handle 1–3

(2) which] add. 4–5

(4–5) , which] add. 4–5 (',' om. 5)

124(6) [2nd] of] 2–5 | of 1

(8) from] add. 4–5

(8) Motion;] 4–5 | Motion, 1–3

(15) Place?] 4–5 | Place; which, 2–3 | Place? which, 1

(15) can:] 2–5 | can; 1

(18) Whether] 1–4 | whether 5

(20) another.] 4–5 | another? 1–3

(21) for,] 4–5 | for 1–3

(23) And,] 4–5 | And 3 | and 1–2

it] 1–2, 4–5 | is 3

(28) no:] 4–5 | no; 1–3

(28–9) nor … That ] 1–4 | Nor … that 5

(29) another,] 4–5 | another 1–3

(32) Solidity:] 4–5 | Solidity, 1–3

(33) Protrusion.] 2–5 | Protrusion: 1

(35) Vacuum] 4–5; rom. 1

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(36) Place.] 1–4 | Place. As 5

125(3–4) possesses; ... bulk,] 4–5 | possesses: ... bulk; 1–3

(5) indeed,] 1–4 | indeed 5

Soft] 4–5 | Soft, 1–3

(6) Names … relation ] 4–5 | , as apprehended by us, only relative Terms, 1–3

(7) own] add. 4–5

(10) easie,] 4–5 | easie 1–3

(18) a Diamond] 2–5 | an Adamant 1

(19) Diamond] 2–5 | Adamant 1

(29) hardest,] 4 | hardest 1–3, 5

(30) found,] 4–5 | found 1–3

(33) a trial] 2–5 | an Experiment 1

(34)–126(8) The … it. ] add. 2–5

(34) Football] 1–4 | Foot-Ball 5

126(2) golden] 2–4 | Golden 5

(3) by] 5 | with 2–4

(6–8) drops, … Engine, ] 4–5 (Drops 5) | drops … engine 2–3

(8) v. 125(34), n.

(10) Body being nothing,] 4–5 | Body, being nothing 1–3

(13) also] 4–5 | also, 1–3

(14) Impulse] edit. | impulse 1–5

(18–20) Body … Body: ] 4–5 | Body; whereof they think they have as clear an Idea, as of the
Extension of Body, 1–3

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(21) clear,] 4–5 | clear 1–3

(22–3) they … Space, ] 4–5 | That they have 1–3

(22) between:] 4 | between; 1–3, 5

(26) distinct] 4–5 | distinct, 1–3

(30) blind, or deaf] 1–4 | Blind, or Deaf 5

(32) blind] 1–4 | Blind 5

(33) fancied] 4–5 | fansied 2–3 | phansied 1

(34) asks] 4–5 | ask 1–3

(l. below 35: § 5.) Marginal summary not in Coste here, but only in his Table of Contents.

(34) this] 4–5; rom. 1–3

127(2) Explication] 1–2, 4–5 | Explanation 3

(5) perhaps,] 4–5 | perhaps 1–3

(6) we have are] 4–5 | are 3 | we have 1–2

(7) , by Words,] 4–5 | by Words 1–3

(9) blind] 1–4 | Blind 5

(11) shew,] 4–5 | shew 1–3

(15) [2nd] the] 1–4 | our 5

(17) these] 4–5 | these, 1–3

(19) Chapters] 2er–5 | Chapter 1–2

[2nd] it] 4–5 | its 1–3

(22) as] 1er–5 | as of 1

(3) 'em] add. 4–5

128(4) Thinking,] 2–5 | Thinking; 1

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(6–8) The … Faculties. ] 2–5 | The power in the Mind of producing these Actions we
denominate Faculties, and are called the Understanding, and the Will. 1

(8) Modes] 2–5 | modes 1

(13) Reflection] 1, 3–5 | Reflexion 2

(22) pleasure] 2–5 | pleasure, 1

129(2) Pleasure and Pain] 2–5; rom. 1

Delight] 1–4 | Delight, 5

(3) Names] 4–5 | names 1–3

(5) infinite] 4–5 | infinitely 1–3

(8) other] 1–4 | our 5

(9) Having] 2–5 | He having 1

(10) chuse, … Ideas, ] 2–5 | chuse … Ideas 1

(13) has] 2–5 | he has 1

(14) If this] 2–5 | This if it 1

were] 1–4 | where 5

(14) of] 2–5 | of 1

(17) Motion,] 1–4 | Motion 5

(18) Minds;] 4–5 | Minds, 1–3

(19) design;] 4–5 | design, 1–3

(21) their] 1, 4–5 | there 2–3

(22) state] 1–4 | state, 5

(25–6) to the Ideas which] 4–5 | the Ideas 1–3

(28) which] add. 4–5

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(32) [1st] this] 2–5 | the other 1

(33) Pain is] 4–5 | Pain is 2–3 | it is 1

(33) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(3) that] add. 4–5

130(3) do;] 4–5 | do, 1–3

(6) Ideas,] 4–5 | Ideas 1–3

(9) it,] 2–5 | it; 1

(12) vehemency] 4–5 | vehemence 1–3

(12) of] 1–4 | , of 5

(13) Sensation,] 3–4 | Sensation 5 | sensation, 1–2

(16) Functions] 4–5 | functions 1–3

(19) them:] 1–4 | them; 5

(20) [1st] that] 1–4 | the 5

(22) us:] 1–4 | us; 5

(24) and] add. 4–5

(26) confin'd] 4–5 | confined 1–3

(28) Pleasure and Pain] 4–5 | pleasure and pain 1–3

(31) complete] 2–3 | compleate 4 | compleat 1, 5

(32) which] 4–5 | of 1. (Neither in 2–3)

(33) fullness] 4 | fulness 1–3, 5

(16) selves,] 5 | selves, that we do, and can think; and 1–4

131(16) and] 4–5 | and 1–3

(17) Bodies,] 4–5 | Bodies 1–3

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(23) look] 5 | will look 1–4

(26) thought,] 1T.er, 2–4 | thought 1, 5

(30) is] 4–5 | are 1–3

(35) often,] 2–5 | often 1

(2–3) is not received] 4–5 | it received not 1–3

132(7) Fancies] 4–5 | Fansies 2–3 | Phansies 1

(11) the above-mentioned] 2–5 | these 1

(13) Extension] 1er–5 | Excursion 1

(17) thereby] 1–2, 4–5 | hereby 3

(29) Causes] 4–5 | causes 1–3 them:] 1–4 | them; 5

133(2) perceive,] 1 catchword, 2–5 | perceive 1

(4) Superficies,] 2–5 | Superficies 1

(5) White or Black] 2–5 | white or black 1

(6) Painter | 4–5 | Painter, 1–3

(8) distinctly] 2–5 | distinctly, 1

(15) Causes] 4 | causes 1–3, 5

(25) every one's] 1–3, 5 | ever ones 4

(30) And] 1–3, 5 | and 4

thing.] 1–3, 4er, 5 | thing 4

(30) Sun-shine] 4–5 | Sunshine 1–3

(33–4) which … absence. ] 4–5 | to which there be no positive Ideas; but they consist wholly
in negation of some certain Ideas, as Silence, Invisible; but these signifie not any Ideas in the
Mind, but their absence. 1–3

(33) Tast] 4 | Taste 5

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(36) dark] 1–4 | Dark 5

(1) [2nd] or] 4–5 | and 1–3

134(1) Figure … Painted ] 4–5 | figure … painted 1–3

(2) makes] 4–5 | make 1–3

(3) privative] 1–3, 5er (likewise Coste) | private 4–5

(6) privation] 4–5 | privation, 1–3

(9) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas, 1

(10) modifications of matter] add. 2–5

(11) us:] 1–4 | us; 5

(12–15) Resemblances … Names, ] 4–5 | resemblances … Names 1–3

(15) them,] 1–3 | them 4–5

(19) Power] 4–5 | power 1–3

(21) Powers] 4–5 | powers 1–3

(27)–135(14) Qualities … produce ] 4–5 | Concerning these Qualities, we may, I think,

observe these primary ones in Bodies, that produce 1–3

(27) Coste 'Cela posé, l'on doit distinguer dans les Corps deux sortes de Qualitez.'

(28) inseparable] 5 (and v. next note) | inseperable 4

(28)–135(13) such … certain Number. ] This passage preceded by 'These, which I call
original or primary Qualities of Body, are wholly inseparable from it; and' constitutes § 10 in
1–3.

(l. below 31: §§ 9, 10.) and Secondary] 2–3 (likewise Coste); om. 4–5, but in their Table of
Contents.

135(5) qualities;] 1–4 | Qualities: 5

(8) in] 1–2, 4–5 | it 3

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(10–13) two … a ] 2–5 | two distinct Bodies, or more, of one, which altogether after division
have their 1

(11) Matter] 4–5 | matter 2–3

before,] 1–4 | before; 5

(12), reckon'd … Bodies ] 4–5 | recond … bodies 2–3

(13, 14) v. 134(27, 28), nn.

(15–16) Figure … Number ] 4–5 | Motion or Rest, Number and Figure 1–3. (Coste 'la figure,
le nombre, le mouvement ou le repos')

(15) Rest,] 1–3, 5 | Rest 4

(17–30) 2dly … parts. ] 4–5

(17) 2dly,] 5 | 2dly. 4

(20) Tasts] 4 | Tastes 5

(21) secondary] 4 | Secondary 5. (Thus regularly in Bk. II in 5.)

(22–4) Powers ... I ... speaking ] 4 | Powers, ... I, ... speaking, 5

(29) Texture,] edit. | Texture/ 4–5

(31)–136(2) produce … in. ] 4–5 | operate one upon another, and that is manifestly by
impulse, and nothing else. It being impossible to conceive, that Body should operate on what
it does not touch, (which is all one as to imagine it can operate where it is not) or when it
does touch, operate any other [other om. 2–3] way than by [without 2–3 | than by 1] Motion.
1–3 (Coste like 2–3)

(31) is] 4–5 | is, 1–3

(2) v. 135(31), n.

(3) then] 4–5 | then Bodies cannot operate at a distance; if 1–3 (likewise Coste)

136(3) 12.] 1–3, 5 | 12, 4

(5) them] 4–5 | them, 1–3

(7) Brains or] 2–5 (Brains, 5) | Brains, 1

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(8) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(13) , which] add. 4–5

(16) secondary] 2–5 | secundary 1. (Thus regularly in 1.)

(18) is] 1–4 | are 5

(19) Senses,] 1–3 | Senses 4–5

(20) extremely] 2–5 | extreamly 1

(21) [2nd] smaller] 4–5 | less 1–3

(22) [2nd] Air] 4–5 | Air, 1–3

(24) Bulk,] 1–3 | Bulk/ 4–5

(27–30) that … be ] 2–5 | a Violet, by which impulse of those insensible Particles of Matter
of different figures and bulks, and in a different Degree and Modification, we may have the
Ideas of the blue Colour, and sweet Scent of a Violet 1

(29) blue] 1–4 | Blue 5

(31) impossible] 1er–5 | conceived impossible 1

(33)–137(1) piece of Steel] 2–5 | peice of Steel, 1

137(4) Tastes] 4 | Tastes, 1–3, 5

(5) , by mistake,] 4 | by mistake, 5 | by mistake 1–3

(7) depend] 1–3 | depend 4–5

(8) Texture,] 1–3 | Texture 4–5

as I have said] 4–5 | and therefore I call them Secundary Qualities 1–3

(8) parts] 4–5 | Parts 1–3

(9) I think] 4–5 | , I think, 1–3

(17) Parts … we ] 2–5 (',' not in 2–3) | Parts, in the Bodies themselves we 1

(18) denominated] 2–5 | denominated, 1

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Snow] 2–4 | Snow, 1, 5

(19) White] 4 | , White 5 | White, 2–3 | , White, 1

(23) he,] 2–5 | he 1

(24) Fire] 1–3, 5 | Fire 4er | Fier 4

(28) Fire] 1–3, 5 | Fier 4

(30) Fire] 4–5 | Fire 1–3

Pain not,] 4–5 | pain not/ 1–3

(32) Parts?] 2–5 | Parts. 1

(34) ones] 1–4 | one's 5

(35) because] add. 4–5

138(3) them;] 4–5 | them, 1–3

(5) Odors] 1–3, 4er–5 | Ordors 4

(7) Parts.] 4–5 | Parts? 1–3

(9) Idea] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(22) size] Coste 'la situation'

(23) Palate; ... Pain ... Sickness ] 4–5 | Palate, ... pain ... sickness 1–3

(24) nothing,] 4–5 | nothing 1–3

(25) size] Coste 'la contexture'

(26, 27, 29) operate] 1–4 | Operate 5

(32) size] Coste 'la situation'

(35–7) Pain ... Sickness ... Sweetness ... Whiteness ] 4–5 | pain ... sickness ... sweetness ...
whiteness 1–3

(36) no-where] 1–4 | no where 5

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(38) equally] 2–5 | equal 1

139(4) light] 4–5 | light, 1–3

Vanish] 4–5 | vanish 1–3

(10) Night … Day ] 4–5 | night … day 1–3

(11) apt] 4–5 | apt, 1–3

(14) texture,] 2–5 | texture 1

(17) Taste] 4–5 | Tast 1–3

(20) be] 1–3, 5 | he 4

140(1) have] 4–5 | have, 1–3

(2) , perhaps,] 1–4 | perhaps 5

(3) understood,] 4–5 | understood; 1–3

(6) impossible] 1–3, 5 | Impossible 4

(6) them;] 4–5 | them: 1–3

(7) Natural] 1–4 | natural 5

(10) Extension] 1–4 | Extention 5

Rest;] 4–5 | Rest, 1–3

(18) in Bodies] 2–5 | in in Bodies 1

(19) of] 4–5 | of 1–3

(21) those] 4–5 | these 1–3

(25) by] 1–3 | by 4–5

(l. below 33) This marginal summary, in 4–5, replaces 'Ideas of primary Qualities are
resemblances; of secondary, not.' that is in 2–3.

141(1) white … fluid ] 1–4 | White … Fluid 5

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(2) These … Powers. ] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste)

are] edit. | are 4–5

(4) real] 2–5 | real, 1

(10) Qualities] 4–5 | Qualities, 1–3

(16) Powers.] 1–3 | Powers, 4–5

(19) mere] 2–5 (meer 5) | barely 1

(20) melts] 4–5 | melts, 1–3

(22) it: Whereas] 2–5 | it: whilst yet we look on Light and Warmth to be real Qualities,
something more than bare Powers in the Sun. Whereas 1

(23) me] 4–5 | me, 1–3

(30) Idea of Light] 5 | Ideas of Light 4 | Ideas of Light, 1–3

(l. below 33) This marginal summary, in 4–5, replaces 'Reason of our mistake in this.' that is
in 2–3.

(5) Effects] 2–5 | Effect 1

(12) Motion] 2–5 | Motions 1

142(27) efficient] 1–4 | Efficient 5

(30) imagine] 1–3, 5 | imgine 4

(35) before mentioned primary] 1–4 | before-mentioned Primary 5

(8) think,] 1–3, 5 | think 4

(9) latter] 2–5 | later 1

143(19) better] 4–5 | better, 1–3

(21) in] 2–5 | in himself in 1

(29) sence] 4 | sense 1–3, 5

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(4–5) made … alteration ] 2–5 | which are brought in, though the same alteration be made
upon the Organ of Hearing 1

144(4) impressions] 4|5 | impressions, 1–3

(6) a] 1–4; om. 5

(11) the Man's] 2–5 | his 1

(14) and … Mind, ] add. 2–5

(14) Mind] 4–5 | mind 2–3

(15–16) Sense … and ] 4–5 | Sense … and 1–3

(23) Warmth] 1–4 | Warmth, 5

(33) of quite] 1–4 | quite of 5

(34) any] 2–5 | the 1

(5) necessities] 2–5 | necessity 1

145(5) Being] 4–5 | being 1–3

(6) born] 1–4 | Born 5

(15) order,] 2–5 | order 1

(26) reflections] 4–5 | reflexions 1–3

(33)–146(25) To … convinced. ] add. 2–5

(33) insert] 2–4 | Insert 5

(34–5) Knowledge,] 4–5 | Knowledge 2–3

146(1) this:] 4–5 | this, 2–3

(6) see. Quære] 2–4 | see: Quære 5

(8) Not.] 4–5 | Not, 2–3

(11) so;] 2–4 | so: 5

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(12) Cube.] 4–5 | Cube: 2–3

(13) whom] 4–5 | whom though I have never had the happiness to see, 2–3 (likewise Coste)

(20) improvement,] 4–5 (Improvement 5) | improvement 2–3

(25) v. 145(33), n.

(28) the] 2–5 | the far different 1

(29–30) the … Ideas ] add. 2–5

(31) Object] 2–5 | Objects 1

(32) we … selves ] 2–5 | it accustoms it self 1

(33) settled] 2–5 | setled 1

147 [1st] seem] 1–4 | seems 5

(35) is] 2–5 | is but 1

(1) or] 2–5 | and 1

(6) is … have ] 4–5 | takes up no space, has 1–3

(11) do] 2–5 | does 1

(16) which] add. 4–5

(17) us] 4–5 | us, 1–3

(19) escape] 4–5 | scape 1–3

(21) By-word] Coste adds a linguistic note.

(22) sounds,] 2–5 | sounds; 1

(23) hear,] 1–4 | hear 5

(5–6) , provided … few ] 2–5 (receptions 3) | provided for the reception of Sensations, are so
few by Nature 1

148(5) Avenues, … Nature ] 4–5 | Avenues … Nature, 2–3

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(7) extremely] 2–5 | extreamly |

(8) Animals:] 4–5 | Animals; 1–3

(10) made] 2–5 | constituted by Nature 1

(16) it,] 4–5 | it 1–3

(22) receive] 4er–5 | receives 1–4

(31) enter: or,] 4–5 | enter: Or 1–3

(32) Inlets] 4–5 | inlets 1–3

(33) retained.] 3–5 | retained, 1–2

(37) three] 1–4 | Three 5

149(1–2) been, ... him,] 4–5 | been … him 1–3

(2) degree] 2–5 | degrees 1

(3) The section index '§ 15.' add. 2–5

(6) are,] 4–5 | are 1–3

(14) too] 4 | too, 1–3, 5

(17) by the by] 4–5 | by the bye 1–3

Matter] 1–4 | matter 5

(20) which I call Retention,] 4–5 | I call Retention; 1–3

(22) received … First, ] 4–5 | received, which is done two ways; First, either 1–3

(23) some time] 1–4 | sometime 5

(25) other way of Retention] 4–5 | other, 1–3

(l. below 27) Knowledge] 2–4 | the Knowledge 5

(2) removed. This] 4–5 | removed; and this 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(6–16) But … obscurely. ] add. 2–5

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150(7–10) thing, ... them, ... Power, ... had, ] 4–5 | thing ... them ... Power ... had 2–3

(10) which] add. 4–5

(14) will,] 4–5 | will 2–3

(17) this Faculty] 2–5 | the Memory 1

(17) Faculty] 4–5 | faculty 2–3

(18) Understandings,] 2–5 | Understanding; 1 (',' 1er)

(22) the] 2–5 | our 1

(29) Children,] 4–5 | Children; 1–3

(34) Concerning] 4–5 | But concerning 1–3

(1–12) That … than ] 2–5 | First, That some of them being produced in the Understanding,
either by the Objects affecting the Senses once barely, and no more, especially if the Mind
then otherwise imployed, took but little notice of it, and set not on the stamp deep into it
self; or else, when through the Temper of the Body, or otherwise, the Memory is very weak,
such Ideas quickly fade, and vanish quite out of the Understanding, and leave it as clear
without any Foot-steps, or remaining Characters, as 1

151(5) of; … Children, ] 4–5 | of, … Children; 2–3

(9) Memory] 4–5 | memory 2–3

(11) footsteps] 2–4 | foot-steps, 5

(16) Pains,] 2–5 | Pains 1

(20) Young;] 4 | Young, 5 | young; 1–3

(25) , even] 2–5 | even, 1

(26) [2nd] of] add. 2–5

(27) Minds] 2–5 | the Minds 1

(29) on] 2–5 | about 1

(31) Children,] 2, 4–5 | Children 1, 3

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(4) , and … Spirits, ] add. 4–5

(5) the Brain] 4–5 | the Spirits and Brain 1–3

152(5) this;] 1–4 | this, 5

(6) in some it retains] 4–5 | some retain 1–3

(7) in – in] 4–5 | others like free Stone, and 1–3

than] 1–3 | then 4–5

(11) calcine] 2–5 | calcines 1

(13) graved] 5 | carved 1–4. (Coste 'si elles eussent été gravées')

(19) those,] 4–5 | those 1–3

(22) kinds] 2–5 | kind 1

(l. below 34: § 7.) In Coste, § 7 comes under the same marginal summary as § 6.

(24) bring] 1–2, 4–5 | being 3

(30) depending] 1–4 | Depending 5

153(2) Passion;] 4–5 | Passion, 1–3

(3–11) This … Understanding. ] add. 2–5

(7) Impression] 3–5 | impression 2

(12) intellectual] Coste 'raisonnable'

(17) defects.] 4–5 | defects: 1–3

(20) Idea … is ] 2–5 | Ideas of it, when they are 1

(32) and] 1–4; om. 5

(32–3) , consists] 4–5 | consists, 1–3

(34)–154(29) These … ours. ] add. 2–5, with § 9 in 1 consequently becoming § 10 in 2–5

(34) Memory] 3–5 | memory 2

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(4) Scene 2, 4 | Sence 3 | sense 5. (Coste 'sentiment')

154(17) yet,] 2–4 | yet 5

(20) by] 5 | in 2–4

(29, 30) v. 153(34), n.

(30–3) Ideas, ... Instances ...

them,] 4–5 | Ideas ... instances ... them 1–3

155(1) though] 4–5 | tho' 1–3

(4) Wings,] 2–5 | Wings; 1

(6) Preservation] 4–5 | preservation 1–3

(10) Bird's] 4–5 | Birds 1–3

But] 4–5 | But, 1–3

(18) after-endeavours,] 4–5 | after-endeavours 1–3

(24, 25) Perception] 4–5 | perception 1–3

(25) general:] 2–5 | general. 1

(27) Knowledge;] 4–5 | Knowledge, 1–3

156(3) different.] 4–5 | different: 1–3

(28) , one from another, Ideas,] 2–5 (one ... another Ideas, 2–3) | Ideas one from another, 1

(31) wherein,] 1–4 | wherein 5

(33–4) Fancy, … People; ] 4–5 | Fancy; ... People, 1–3

(36) Mind/] 4–5 | Mind, 1–3

(1) agreeableness] 4–5 | pleasantness 1–3

(6) that] 1–4; om. 5

157(10) Fever/] 4–5 | Fever, 1–3

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(16) the] 1–4; om. 5

(23) Circumstances] 4–5 | circumstances 1–3

(33) two] 1–3, 4er–5 (likewise Coste) | too 4

(l. below 35: § 3.) This marginal summary not in Coste, which applies that for § 2 also to § 3.

158(10) appear] 4–5 | appear, 1–3

(13) putting] 1–3 | puting 4–5

(14) Furlong] 4–5 | a Furlong 1–3

(15) Men] 5 (likewise Coste) | Man 1–4

(18) the] 5 | a 1–4

(18) him;] 4–5 | him, 1–3

(19) him:] 2–5 (in 2, the lower point of the punctuation could be ',') | him; 1

(20) Ideas.] 5 | Ideas. 4 | Ideas: 1–3

(27–33) And … lessen'd. ] add. 2–5

(32) them;] 4–5 | them, 2–3

(35) Signs.] 2–5 | Signs: 1

(3) others: These verbal Signs] 4–5 | others; which words 1–3

(9) that] add. 4–5

(13, 22) Existences] 4–5 | Existences 1–3

(27) quality] 2–5 | quali-/ 1

159(32) Abstracting] 4–5 | Abstracting, 1–3

160(9) And/] 4–5 | And, 1–3

(18) some … Instances ] add. 4–5

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(l. below 36) In Coste, the marginal summary for § 12 is 'Défaut des Imbecilles.', the
marginal summary for § 12 in 2–5 being applied to § 13 (and § 14) instead.

(19) sence] 4 | sense 1–3, 5

(27) Minds] 4–5 | Minds, 1–3

(30) reason] 1–4 | reason, 5

degree:] 3–5 | degree; 1–2

(34) Men's] 4–5 | Mens 1–3

(35) the] 4–5 | The 1–3

Naturals] 4–5 | Naturals, 1–3

(7) deductions] 2–5 | deduction 1

161(7) Fancies] 3–5 | Fansies 1–2

(8) fancying] 4–5 | fansying 2–3 | phansying 1

(9) require] 1T.er, 2–5 | requires 1

(10) Glass] 4–5 | glass 1–3

(13) particular … frantick, ] 4–5 | particular, … frantick 1–3

(24) and] 2–5 | which 1

(25) Instances] 4–5 | instances 1–3

(34) [2nd] the] 2–5 | our 1

(l. below 35) In Coste, § 14 comes under the same marginal summary as that for § 13 (v. p.
160, last n.)

(35) Men's] 4–5 | Mens 1–3

162(7) set] 4–5 | sett 1–3

Knowledge,] 1–4 | Knowledge 5

(8) Reflection;] 1–3, 5 | Reflection,; 4

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(19–20) by others to imagine] 4–5 | to imagine by others 1–3

(19) fancy] 4–5 | fansie 1–3

(25) that] add. 4–5

above] 1–4 | about 5

(28) seem] 1er–5 | seems 1

these] 1–4 | those 5

(29) which] add. 4–5

Method,] 4–5 | Method 1–3

(33) that] add. 4–5 (l. below 34: § 15.) beginnings] 2–4 | Beginning 5

(3) openings] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | opening/ 4–5

(4–5) would … Room ] 4–5 | which would they 1–3

(7) sight] 1er–5 | sights 1

(11) Modes,] 4–5 Modes 1–3

163(11) Ideas,] 1–4 | Ideas 5

(16) [1st] any] 1–4; om. 5

(17)–164(5) But … places. ] add. 4–5

(30) World] 4 | Word 5

(30) muchwhat] 4 | much what 5

(3) another,] 5 | another/ 4

(5) v. 163(17), n.

As] 4–5 | But as these 1–3

164(9) join'd] 2–5 | joined 1

(18) this] 1–4 | This 5

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(20) simple Ideas] 2–5 | these [those 1er], they 1

(21) of these] add. 2–5

(21–2) than what] 2–5 | simple Ideas, than as they 1

(23) Qualities,] 1–4 | Qualities 5

(25) these] 2–5 | those 1

(26) Observation] 1–3, 5 | Observation 4

(28) complex] 1–4 | Complex 5

(32) Heads.] 4–5 | Heads: 1–3

165(5) And] 2–5 | and 1

Mode,] 1, 4–5 | Mode 2–3

(6) sence] 3–4 | sense 1–2, 5

(9) , the latter whereof,] 2–5 | ; which 1

(16) Idea.] 1–4 | Idea, 5

(32) Man.]Paragraph-break here in Coste.

(33) Now] 1–4 | Now, 5

(34) or] 4–5 | or 1–3

(36) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

166(5): Of] 4–5 | , of 1–3

kinds] 4 | kinds, 1–3, 5

(12) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(13) from] add. 4–5

(15) [2nd] from] add. 4–5

(18) Mind,] 4–5 | Mind 1–3

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employed] 4–5 | employ'd 1–3

(19) [2nd] from] add. 4–5

(19) Ideas,] 2–4 | Ideas 1, 5

167(3) Idea,] 4–5 | Idea 1–3

which,] 2–4 | which 1, 5

(4) I call] 1–4; rom. 5

(6) that of One] 4–5 | that of Three 2–3 | Three 1

(7) it is] 4–5 | they are 1–3

(7) Number:] 4–5 | Number; 1–3

(8) Repetitions of this kind] 4–5 | these Repetitions 1–3 (20–1) The ... considered.] 4–5 |
When considered between the extremities of Matter, which fills he Capacity of Space with
something solid, tangible, and movable, it is properly called Extension. And so Extension is
an Idea belonging to Body only; but Space may, as is evident, be considered without it. At
least, I think it most intelligible, and the best way to avoid Confusion, if we use the Word
Extension for an Affection of Matter, or the distance of the Extremities of particular solid
Bodies; and Space in the more general Signification for distance, with or without solid Matter
possessing it. 1–3

(20–1) Extension … it, ] 4 | Extension, … it 5

(22) distance] 1–4 | Distance, 5

(24)–168(1) Men ... can,] 2–5 | Men having by accustoming themselves to stated lengths of
Space, which they use for measuring of other distances, as a Foot, a Yard, or a Fathom, a
League, or Diametre of the Earth, made those Ideas familiar to their Thoughts, can 1

(l. below 28: § 3.) In Coste, § 3 comes under the same marginal summary as § 2.

(1) v. 167(24), n.

168(1) can,] 2–4 | can 1, 5 Minds,] 2–5 | Minds 1

(3–4) Feet … Fathoms ] 2–5; rom. 1

(11) Idea] 4–5 | Idea of Space 1–3 (likewise Coste)

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(12) which]4–5 | of 1–3

(12–13) Extension, or circumscribed Space have] 4–5 | Capacity, or Extension 1–3. (Coste
'qui n'est autre chose que la relation qui est entre les parties qui terminent l'étenduë.')

(17) discernible] 1, 4–5 | discernable 1er–3

(22) coherent] 1–4 | co-herent 5. (Thus also elsewhere in 5.)

(33) ½ or ¼] 1–4 | one half, or one fourth 5

(1) sides,] 2–5 | sides 1

(9) it] 1–3, 5 | in 4

(17) considered] 1–3, 5 | consider'd 4

(24) its] 1–4 | it 5

(26) from] add. 2–5

(28) distance] 2–5 | distance, 1

(36) which] add. 4–5

169(36) though] 1–4 | tho'/ 5

170(7) Place] 4–5 | place 1–3

(25) Chess-man] 1er–5 | Chess-men 1

(28) black] 1–4 | Black 5

(33) report] 1–4 | Report 5

(34) were] 1–2, 4–5 | are 3 (likewise Coste)

(38) Æneids] 3–5 | Æneides 1–2

(40) Thousand] 1–4 | thousand 5

171(4) Place,] 1–4 | Place 5

(5) think,] 1–4 | think 5

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(7) Place] 4–5 | place 1–3

(12) than] 5 | but 1–4

(13) this though] 1, 4 | This, tho' 5 | this tho'/ 2–3

(17) Inane] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(18–19) Place, … Space, ] 1–4 | Place … Space 5

(20–3) The … Distance. ] 4–5; this forms § 11 in 1–3.

(20) Place.] Paragraph-break here in Coste.

means,] 1–4 | means 5

(22) Consideration)] 2–5 (, ~, 5) | Consideration 1

(24)–172(34) There … Space ] 4–5; this forms § 12 in 1–3.

(24) some] Coste2 adds in a footnote 'Les Cartesiens'.

(24) persuade] 1–4 | perswade 5

(27) others] Coste 'la Philosophie qui étoit en vogue avant eux'; and Coste2 adds, in a note,
a reference to 'La Philosophie Scholastique'. (l. below 35) In 1–3, this marginal summary is
applied to their §§11–14.

(28) doubtful] 4–5 | doubtful, 1–3

(30) the same, ...Body ... solid, ] 1–4 | , the same ... Body,... solid 5

172(1–2) Scarlet-Colour] 1–4 | Scarlet Colour 5

(3) Scarlet-Colour] 3–4 | Scarlet Colour 1–2, 5

(4) others] 2–5 | others, 1

(7) Motion:] 4–5 | Motion; 1–3

(17) another.] 2–5 | another: 1

(18–19) . For,/§ 12. First,] 4–5 | ; for First, 1–3

(19) resistance] 4–5 | resistence 1–3

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(20–1) does./ § 13. Secondly,] 4–5 | does. Secondly, 1–3

(25) actually,] 4–5 | actually 1–3

(26, 28, 39) Superficies] 1–4 | Superfices 5

(34) v. 171(24), n.

(34) Space.]No paragraph-break bere in Coste.

(35)–173(7) 'Tis … separately. ] 4–5; this forms § 13 in 1–3.

173(2) disjoin'd] 1–4 | dis-join'd 5

consideration] 1–4 | Consideration, 5

(7) v. 172(35), n.

(13) determined] 4–5 | clear and distinct 1–3

(l. below 35: § 15.) This marginal summary for §15 in 4–5 replaces 'Substance which we
know not, no proof against Space without Body'. for §§ 15–17 in 2–3.

(l. below 35: § 16.) This marginal summary for § 16, in 4–5 but not in 2–3.

(13) plainly,] 1–4 | plainly 5

(15) resistance] 2–5 | resistencc 1

(28) arc] 1–4 | are 5

(29) Dilemma.] 4–5 | Dilemma: 1–3

(33) , but solid Beings,] 4 | but solid Beings, 5 | but solid Beings 1–3

think;] 4–5 | think, 1–3

174(1) demanded … Space] 1–4 | demanded, … Space, 5

(2) not:] 4–5 | not; 1–3

(3) till] 1–4 | 'till 5

(6–7) Fallacies, … Ignorance, ] 1–4 | Fallacies … Ignorance 5

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(8) noise] 1–4 | Noise 5. (Further departures in 5 compared with 4 in respect of
capitalization of substantives in §§18–21 (174(5)–176(24)) are as follows; cf.p. 749, note on
11(24), above. 174(9) Pleasure; (10) Nature, ~Things; (11) Signs; (12) Stress, Sound; (18)
Nature; (19) Modification; (20) Sense, Nature; (21) Modification, Matter; (23) Significations;
(26) Name; (28) Names; (30) Use, Term; (31) Use; (32) Signification; 175(3, 5) Word; (22)
Nature; (26) Words; (29) Clearness; (30) Use; (33) Extremity; 176(4) Hindrance; (5) Power,
Parts; (11) Distance; (13) Bounds; (14) Motion; (16) Necessity; (18) Truth; (21) Bounds; (22)
End.)

(11) determined] 4–5 | clear and distinct 1–3

(14) Spirit] 5 | Spirits 1–4

(15) stands] 4–5 | stand 1–3

(18) any] add. 2–5

(18) otherwise] 1–4 | otherwise, 5

(20) Body] 1er–5 | bodied 1

(29) Errors,] 1–4 | Errors 5

(31) in ordinary use] add. 4–5

(l. below 34) In 4–5, this marginal summary is for §§17–18; in 2–3, it is for §§ 15–17, that for
§ 18 being 'Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy.'

(23) Letters] 1–4 | Letter 5

175(26) Paper.] 1–4 | Paper! 5

(29) and] 1–4 | and 5

(31) Idea] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(l. below 34: §§ 19, 20.) This marginal summary is for §§ 19–20 in 4–5; but in 2–3 it is for §§
18–19, that for § 20 being 'A Vacuum beyond the utmost bounds of Body.'

(l. below 34: § 21.) A ... Body.] 4–5 | The Power of annihilation proves a Vacuum. 2–3

(1) he] 1, 3–5 | be 2

176(6) God] 1–4 | GOD 5

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(6–7) it; … him:) ] 3–5 | it;) … him: 1–2

(9) Something or Nothing] 1–4 | something or nothing 5

(14) Bodies] 4–5 | Bodies, 1–3

(15) touch.] 1–4 | touch: 5

(25)–177(20) In 1–5, this section is numbered 21, as is the preceding one; in Coste, this
section is numbered 22, with a consequent re-numbering of the following sections.

(27) Matter.] 1, 3–5 | Matter, 2

(30) long as] 1–3, 5 | longas 4

(32) that] 1–2, 4–5 | that that 3

(33) Vacuum.] 1–4 | Vacuum: 5

177(13) Extension] 1–4 | Extension, 5

(20) v. 176(25), n.

(24) plainly] 1T.er, 2–5 | plain 1

(24) divide] 2–5 | devide 1

(25) Body,] 4–5 | Body 1–3

(26) way] 2–5 | way, 1

(35) holds] 4 (Coste 'si ce Vuide proportionnel est nécessaire dans le prémier cas') | hold
1–3, 5

178(8) Space] 1–4 | Space, 5

(27) wond'red] 4 | wondered 3, 5 | wondred 1–2

(29) Senses] 2–5 | Senses, 1

were] 1–4 | were, 5

(4) Essences] 2–5 | Essence 1

179(16) space] 2, 4 | Space 1, 3, 5

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(17) or Space] add. 2–5

(24) sence] 2–4 | sense 1, 5

(27) Matter] 2–5 | matter 1

coherent] 1–4 | co-herent 5

180(1) setled] 1–4 | settled 5

(7–14) But … speaking. ] add. 4–5

(13) this] 4 | this, 5

(24) , or Sects,] 2–4 | or Sects 5 | , or Sects 1

(28) jargon;] 1–4 | Jargon, 5

(31) Ideas,] 2–5 | Ideas, different Notions, 1

(32) discourse] 2–5 | discourse, 1

(33) Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

181(5) another:] 1–4 | another. 5

(15) Si …, (which ] 3–5 | (Si …, which 1–2

(15–16) was ... intelligo ... it; ] 1–4 | was, ... Intelligo ... it, 5

(16) understand] 1er–5 | understood 1

(18) are, not] 1–4 | are not, 5

(20) these] 3–5 | this 1–2

(23) these] 3–5 | those 1–2

(24) other] 2–5 | others 1

(25) self] 4–5 | self, 1–3

(5) the] add. 1er–5

182(11) Commensurate] 1–4 | commensurate 5

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(21) day;] 1–2, 4 | Day, 5 | day, 3

(25) seems] 5 (likewise Coste) | seem 1–4

(33) unites] 4–5 | unite 1–3

(35) dreams] 4–5 | dream 1–3

(35) dreams] 1–4 | Dreams 5

(37) [1st] a] add. 4–5

183(1) [2nd] the] 4–5 | the 1–3

(2) Understandings] 1–2, 4–5 | Understanding 3

(5) Man] 4–5 | Man, 1–3

(6) Notion] 2–5 | Notion, 1

(7) while] 2–5 | whilst 1

(10) has] 4–5 | have 1–3

(11) past] 1–4 | passed 5

(11) or … not: yet ] 4 | or … not; yet 5 | , or … not: Yet 1–3

(15) asleep] 1, 3–5 | a asleep 2

(19) the whole] 4–5 | that, and the following 1–3

(19, 20) 24] 1–4 | twenty four 5

(21) Account] 1–4 | Accompt 5

(30) Ideas.] 2–4 | Ideas, 5 | Ideas. 1

184(2) where-ever] 1–4 | wherever 5

(4) if] 1–3, 5 | f 4

(8) Reason, … though ] 1–4 | Reason … tho'/5

(20) to move] add. 5

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(21) wont] 2–5 | want 1

(22) perfect,] 2–5 | perfect 1

(23) Matter,] 1–4 | Matter 5

(34) conjecture] 1–4 | Conjecture, 5

185(1) Cannon-Bullet] 1–4 | Cannon Bullet 5

(2) fleshy] 1–3, 5 | fleshly 4. (Coste 'emporte quelque membre du Corps d'un homme')

(8) pain,] 1–4 | Pain 5

(19) moves] 4–5 | move 1–3

(22–3) Clocks, … where ] 1–4 | Clocks; … where, 5

(27) is] 4–5 | are 1–3

(28) Successions] 4–5 | Succession 1–3

(28–9) whereof … Ideas; ] 4–5 | which if it either exceeds their pace, 1–3

(32) turns;] 4–5 | turns, 1–3

(34) those,] 4 | those 1–3, 5

sight,] 1–4 | Sight 5

(35) , or Smells,] 1–2, 4 | or Smells 5 |, or Smells 3

186(8) his] 4–5 | his 1–3

(9) matter] 4 | Matter 1–3, 5

(14) Mind,] 4–5 | Mind 1–3

(18) difficult] 1–3, 5 | diffii-/ cult 4

(19) Idea] 1–4 | Idea, 5

(20) Considerations] 2–5 | Consideration 1

(27) observe] 4–5 | observe, 1–3

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(31) think] 4–5 | think, 1–3

(36) then,] 1–4 | then 5

(l. below 36) Idea] 2–3, 5 | Idea 4

187(4) Succession, and Duration] 1–4 | Succession and Duration, 5

(5) other] add. 2–5

(6) caused by] 2–5 | of 1

(7) sensible] add. 2–5

(11) is] 1–4 | is, 5

(20) of, … thing ] 1–4 | of … thing, 5

(23) Duration;] 1–4 | Duration, 5

(27) parcels] 4–5 | parts 1–3. (Coste 'parties')

(30) Periods.] 2–5 | Periods: 1

(34) and] 1–2 (likewise Coste) | and 3–5

188(1) diurnal,] 1–4 | diurnal 5

(11) Duration] 1–4 | Duration, 5

(12) those heavenly Bodies] 2–5 | the Heavens 1

(25) Motion?] 3, 5 (likewise Coste) | Motion 1–2, 4

(31–2) : and [And 5] ... effect … see,] 2–5 | ; and ... effect, ... see 1

(34)–189(2) For … Periods, ] 2–5 | For any Idea returning constantly at equidistant Periods,
as a Fit of an Ague; the Sense of Hunger, or Thirst; a Smell, or a Taste; 1

(34) Ague;] 1–4 | Ague, 5

189(1) Thirst; … Taste;] 1–4 | Thirst, … Taste, 5

(2) v. 188(34), n.

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(4) Thus] 4–5 | And 1–3

(6) not:] 4–5 | not. 1–3

(8) or] 4–5 | and 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(13) irregular:] 4 | irregular? 5 | irregular; 1–3

(16) them,] 2–5 | them 1

(17) Sun:] 4–5 | Sun; 1–3

(18) Æquator] 4–5 | Equator 1–3

(19) its] 4–5 | his 1–3

(21) supposes] Coste adds a marginal note citing Burnet, Telluris Theoria Sacra.

(31) Men's] 1–4 | Mens 5

(32–4) by … guessed ] 2–5 | whereby they guessed them 1

(33) [2nd] the artificial days,] add. 4–5

(1) exacter search has since] 4–5 | since exacter search has 1–3

190(1) : tho'] 4 | : Tho' 5 | ; tho' 2–3 | ; though 1

(3) : These] 2–5 | . Those 1

(3) Annual] 1–4 | annual 5

(5) (though … exactly) ] 2–5 | though … exactly, 1

(6) equal. We] ~2–5 | equal; we 1

(9) constant, equal, … Course: ] 4–5 | constant equal … Course; 1–3

(10) which] add. 4–5

(10) it, … of, ] 2–5 | it … of 1

so;] 4–5 | so, 1–3

(12) Duration,] 2–5 | Duration 1

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(13–15) The … Duration, ] 2–5 | That which the World used so long, and so confidently for an
exact measure of Duration, the motion of the Sun 1

(14) confidently] 1–3 | confident y 4 | confidently, 5

(16) and] 1–4 | And 5

(18) or (to] 1–3 | (or to 4–5. (Coste ', ou, pour mieux dire,')

(18) Sun] 1–4 | Sun, 5

(19) asked] 4–5 | asked, 1–3

(21) since] 1–4 | Since 5

(24) same: either] ~4–5 (Either 5) | same; either 1–3

191(3) Motion:] 4–5 | Motion; 1–3

(4) , who] 2–5 | that 1

(5) that,] 4–5 | that 1–3

Motion,] 1, 4–5 | Motion 2–3

(7) Computation,] 1–4 | Computation/ 5

(21) [2nd] of] add. 2–5

(22) as] add. 2–5

such Periods] 2–5 | them 1

(26) these] 3–5 | those 1–2

(27) but] ~1–4 | But 5

(29) others,] 2–5 | others 1

(30) now,] 2–5 | now; 1

(31) apparently] 3–5 | apparent 1–2

192(1) Foot, … Cubit] 2–4 | Foot … Cubit, 5 | Foot … Cubit 1

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(3) This and the following sections of this chapter are numbered 25, 26, and so on, in 1–5,
which contain no section numbered 24 although their Table of Contents lists § 24 and gives
its contents as 'The measure of Time two ways applied.' The present re-numbering follows
Coste.

(11) years,] 2–4 | Years 5 | years 1

(31) beg'd] 1–4 | begg'd 5

(8) Thought] 1T.er, 2–5 | Thoughts 1

193(13) Eternity;] 4–5 | Eternity, 1–3

(15) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas, 1

(26) Duration] 2–5 | duration 1

(27) The] 1–4 | the 5

(28) as] add. 2–5

(28–9) Duration … Night] 2–5 | duration … night 1

(29) co-exist] 1–3, 5 | co-excist 4

(35) Candlelight] 4–5 | Candle 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(35–6) the Duration of] add. 2–5 (l. below 36) Coste 'Comment nous vient l'Idée de
l'Eternité.'

(1) [2nd] the] 1–2, 4–5 | a 3 (likewise Coste)

(2) doth now] 1–2, 4–5 | now doth 3

194(6) Ideas] 1, 3–5 | Ideas, 2

(8) it] add. 1er-5

(9) Duration] 2–5 | Duration, 1

(10) the] 2–5 | this present 1

(10) Motion,] 2–5 | Motion 1

(14) Duration] 2–5 | Duration, 1

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(33) 1000] 5 | a 1000 1–4

195(3) Appearances] 4–5 | appearances 1–3

(6) Coste has the marginal summary 'De l'idée de l'Eternité.' for the final two sections of
this chapter.

(15) Minute more] 5 (Coste 'une minute de plus, & encore une autre,') | more Minute 1–4

(18) , and] 2–5 | . And 1

196(16) abstruse] 1er–5 | obstruse 1

(25) prefer] 3–5 | preferr 1–2

(27) permanent.] Paragraph-break here in Coste.

these,] 4–5 | these 1–3

197(4) till] 1–4 | 'till 5. (Thus also elsewhere in 5.)

(16) says] Coste 'lorsqu'il dit en parlant à Dieu'

(29) Immensity:] 1–4 | Immensity? 5

(31) where] 2–5 | Where 1

198(4) so:] 2–5 | so; 1

(7) Attribute.] 4–5 | Attribute: 1–3

(8) Body:] 4 | Body; 1–3, 5

(9) farther.] 4–5 | farther: 1–3

(11) Space:] 4 | Space; 1–3, 5

(13) [2nd] to] add. 4–5

, which] add. 4–5

(14) imaginary:] 4 | imaginary; 5 | imaginary, 1–3

(21) atomical] 1–4 | anatomical 5

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(23–5) And … sæcula. ]add. 4–5

(25) Epod.]edit. | Epod 4 | Epod, 5

(27) lanch] 1–4 | launch 5

(29) things:] 3–5 | things; 1–2

(4) out] 1–4 | our 5

199(5) Time … Place] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(7) setled] 1–4 | settled 5

(9) Confusion] 1er–5 | Confession 1

(15) is] 2–5 | it 1

(17) them:] 4–5 | them; 1–3

(18) before mentioned] 1–3 | beforementioned 4 | before-mentioned 5

(23) Within] 4–5 | Within, 1–3

(24) them] 1–4 | them, 5

(26) Extension and Place,] 4–5 | Extension, and Place 1–3

(30) Bodies] 4–5 | Bodies, 1–3

(10) of] add. 2–5

200(10) Inane] 4–5 | Inane, 1–3 (',' not in 2–3)

(31) thing;] 2–5 | thing, 1

(35) thing] 1, 3–5 | think 2

(l. below 36) all Beings] Coste 'tous les Etres finis'

(1) Space or Duration] 4–5 | Duration or Space1–3

201(3) Lord,] 1–4 | Lord 5

(6) Days,] 3, 5 | Days 2, 4 | days 1

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(6) and Years] 2–5 (, and 4–5) | and years 1

(10) Composition] 5 adds, in a footnote:

'It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if Space consists of Parts, as 'tis confessed in this
Place, he should not have reckoned it in the Number of Simple Ideas; because it seems to
be inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, That a Simple Idea is uncompounded, and
contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception of the Mind, and is not
distinguishable into different Ideas, pag. [119]. 'Tis farther objected, That Mr. Locke has
not given in the 2d [2d edit. | 11th 5] Chapter of the 2d Book, where he begins to speak
of Simple Ideas, an exact Definition of what he understands by the Word Simple Ideas.
To these Difficulties, Mr. Locke answers thus: To begin with the last, he declares, That
he has not treated his Subject in an Order perfectly Scholastick, having not had much
Familiarity with those sort of Books during the Writing of his, and not remembring at all the
Method in which they are written; and therefore his Readers ought not to expect Definitions
regularly placed at the Beginning of each new Subject. Mr. Locke contents himself to imploy
the principal Terms that he uses, so that from his Use of them the Reader may easily
comprehend what he means by them. But with Respect to the Term Simple Idea, he has
had the good Luck to define that in the Place cited in the Objection; and therefore there
is no Reason to supply that Defect. The Question then is to know, Whether the Idea of
Extension agrees with this Definition? Which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood
in the Sense which Mr. Locke had principally in his View; for that Composition which he
designed to exclude in that Definition, was a Composition of different Ideas in the Mind, and
not a Composition of the same kind in a Thing whose Essence consists in having Parts of the
same kind, where you can never come to a Part intirely exempted from this Composition. So
that if the Idea of Extension consists in having Partes extra Partes, (as the Schools speak,)
'tis always, in the Sense of Mr. Locke, a Simple Idea; because the Idea of having Partes
extra Partes, cannot be resolved into two other Ideas. For the remainder of the Objection
made to Mr. Locke, with Respect to the Nature of Extension, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as
may be seen in § 9. Ch. 15. of the 2d Book, where he says, That the least Portion of Space
or Extension, whereof we have a clear and distinct Idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be
consider'd by us as a Simple Idea of that kind, out of which our complex Modes of Space and
Extension are made up. So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be call'd a Simple
Idea, since it is the least Idea of Space that the Mind can form to it self, and that cannot be
divided by the Mind into any less whereof it has in it self any determined Perception. From
whence it follows, that it is to the Mind one Simple Idea; and that is sufficient to take away
this Objection; for 'tis not the Design of Mr. Locke, in this Place, to discourse of any thing but
concerning the Ideas of the Mind. But if this is not sufficient to clear the Difficulty, Mr. Locke
hath nothing more to add, but that if the Idea of Extension is so peculiar, that it cannot
exactly agree with the Definition that he has given of those Simple Ideas, so that it differs
in some manner from all others of that kind, he thinks 'tis better to leave it there expos'd to

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this Difficulty, than to make a new Division in his Favour. 'Tis enough for Mr. Locke that his
Meaning can be understood. 'Tis very common to observe intelligible Discourses spoiled by
too much Subtilty in nice Divisions. We ought to [to add. W] put things together, as well as
we can, Doctrinæ Causa; but, after all, several Things will not be bundled up together under
our Terms and Ways of Speaking.'

This passage is not in Coste, but is in Coste2, where it begins 'C'est M. Barbeyrac, à présent
Professeur en droit à Groningue, qui me communiqua ces Objections dans une Lettre que je
fis voir à M. Locke. Et voici la réponse que M. Locke me dicta peu de jours après.'

(10) Composition,] 1–2, 4 | Composition; 3, 5

(n. (10), line 24) speak] edit. | speaks 5

(n. (10), lines 31–2) Simple Idea] 6, W | Simgle Idia 5

202(13) ones:] 4 | ones; 1–3, 5

(15) with.] 4–5 | with: 1–3

(16) is] W; not in 1–5. (Coste 'est regardée')

(20) its precise Bulk] 2–5 | the Idea of its precise Bulk 1

(24–5) Duration] 1–4 | Duration, 5

(25) [1st] Extension] 1–4 | Extension, 5

(6–7) Minute … Seconds ] 2–5 | Second 1

203(8) Expansion, … Duration] 1–4 | Expansion … Duration, 5

(14) separated] 2–5 | seperated 1

(17) which] add. 4–5

204(4) , and Time] 1T.er, 2–5 | and Time, 1

(32) can] 2–5 | can can 1

205(2) simple,] 4–5 | simple 1–3

(3) [2nd] or] 4er, 5 (likewise Coste) | nor 1–4

(3) One:] 4–5 | One; 3 | One, 1–2

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Variety] 1–3, 5 | Varity 4

(6) it.] 4–5 | it: 1–3

(7) is,] 4–5 | is 1–3

(8) have.] 4–5 | have: 1–3

(13) a Couple] 5 | two 1–4

(15) so] 1–4; om. 5

(18) that,] 4–5 | that 1–3

(19) two] 1–4 | Two 5

(20) [1st]Idea]edit. (likewise Coste) | Ideas 1–5

(25) it:] 2–5 | it? 1

(30) exact,] 2–5 | exact 1

(4) measured;] 4–5 | measured, 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(5) as] 4–5 | as in 1–3

(18) , which] add. 4–5

(20) Unites,] 1 catchword, 2–5 | Unites 1

206(26–7) Unites.] 4–5 | Unites: 1–3

((he,] 4 | he 1–3, 5

(29) again] 1–4 | again, 5

substracting] 4–5 | subtracting 1–3

(30) Collection] 1–4 | Collection, 5

(33) Numbers, … Minds, ] 4–5 | Numbers … Minds 1–3

(36) necessary,] 4–5 | necessary 1–3

207(3) Unites,] 1–4 | Unites; 5

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(5) in] 1–2, 4–5 | of 3

(15) multitude,] ~4–5 | multitude 1–3

(21) signifie] 1–4 | signify 5

(23) etc.]add. 2–5

(28) Quintilions] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | Quintrilions 4–5

(30) English] Coste adds a linguistic footnote.

(31) repeating] 1–3, 5 | repating 4

(33) the] add. 1er–5

the second six Figures] Coste 'la seconde sizaine, 368149'

(l. below 33) Coste 'Autre raison pour établir cette nécessité.'

(2 ll. below 33) This reference is in margin in 2–5,but in text after 'present:' in 1.

(11) in] 1T.er, 2–5 | to 1

(16) discourse] 1er–5 | in discourse 1

(208(22) reckon,] 2–5 | reckon 1

(30) Memory] 4–5 | memory 1–3

(33–4) another: … Numbering ] 4–5 | another; … Numbring 1–3

(3) and] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | and 4–5

(7) Duration, and Expansion] 2–5 (Expansion, 5) | Space and Expansion, or Duration, 1

209(10) one.] 4–5 | one: 1–3

(15) addition … better) ] 4–5 | addition 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(17) Infinity:] 4–5 | Infinity; 1–3

(23) Finite,] 1–4 | Finite 5

(27) part:] 4–5 | part; 1–3

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210(2) Infinite:] 4–5 | Infinite; 1–3

(3) supreme] 2–5 | supream 1

(4) Infinite,] 4–5 | Infinite 1–3

(9) intimation] 2–5 | imitation 1

(13) , as far as we can,] add. 5

(16) , without doubt,] 4–5 | without doubt 1–3

(17) perfection:] 4–5 | perfection; 1–3

(19) look'd] 4–5 | looked 1–3

(21) considered] 1–4 | considered, 5

(21–2) the … difficulty. ] 4–5 | the … difficulty; 1–3

(23–5) Finite: … Duration, ] 4–5 | Finite, … Duration; 1–3

(25–5) Lengths. The] 4–5 | Lengths: the 1–3

(27) , which] add. 4—5

(29–30) one, … finds, ] 4–5 | one … finds 1–3

(32) Foot;] 1–4 | Foot, 5

on,] 4–5 | on 1–3

(33) pleases] 4–5 | please 1–3

(l. below 34: § 2.) This marginal summary, in 4–5, replaces that in 2–3 which is 'How we
come by the Idea of Infinity.'

(l. below 34: § 3.) In Coste, § 3 comes under the same marginal summary as § 2.

(1) whichsoever] 5 | which-ever 1–4

211(1) Diameter] 2–5 | Diametre 1

Magnus:] 4–5 | Magnus; 1–3

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(3) finds,] 4–5 | finds 1–3

(12) yet,] 4–5 | yet 1–3

(15) it] W | its 1–5

(19) from] 1–2, 4–5 | for 3 (likewise Coste)

(21) where] 4–5 | where, 1–3

(28) perceives] 2–5 | perceive 1

(31) little,] 4–5 | little 1–3

(31) Bodies;] 4–5 | Bodies, 1–3

(34) Body's] 2–5 | Bodies 1

212(4–5) where-/ ever] where-ever 2–5 | wherever 1

(6–7) no-/ where] no-where 1–5

(7) bounds,] 1–3, 5 | bounds; 4

(8) it,] 2–5 |, it 1

(10) As,] 2–4 | As 1, 5

(19) And … say, ] add. 4–5

(19) this] this/ 4 | this, 5

(20) eternal. But] 4–5 | eternal, [; 3] but 1–3

(23) Power,] 2–5 | Power 1

(35) Duration,] 2–5 | Duration 1

213(1) less] 1, 4–5 | less, 2–3

(6) your] 2–5 | our 1

(25), (viz.)] 5 |, as 1–4 (as 1)

(29) it is] 4 | it, is, 5 | it, is 1–3

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(30) subtilty,] 4–5 | subtilty 1–3

(8) . Whatsoever] 2–5 | , whatsoever 1

(14) seems] 4–5 | seem 1–3

214(19, 20) mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

(32–3) inlarging, and Progression] 2–5 | Progression, and enlarging 1

(33) , it can] 1er–5 | it, can 1

(35) Instant] 4–5 | instant 1–3

, that] 2–4 | that 1, 5

(1) Bounds; … Infinity,] 1T.er, 2–5 | Bounds, … Infinity; 1

(6) use] 2–5 | uses 1

(8) so] 4–5 | as so 1–3

215(14) the] 2–5 | the 1

(18) are] 1er–5 | is 1

(25) Number] 1–3, 5 | Number, 4

(32) repeat] 2–5 | we repeat 1

(2) , still] 1T.er, 2–5 | still, 1

(4–5) , as … backwards] 2–5 | every way we consider 1

(8) Coste has a distinctive marginal summary for § 11: 'Comment nous concevons l'Infinité
de l'Espace.'

216(12) them,] 2–5 | them 1

(28) stop] 2–5 | step 1

(28) , that] 2–5 | that 1

(30) say,] 2–5 | say 1

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217(13–14) [1st] the … as] 1–2, 4–5 | thes/ … a-/ 3

(16) Power, … have ] 4–5 | Power, … have, 2–3 | Power … have, 1

(22–3) considers, ... Body ... Body, ] 2–5 | considers ... Body, ... Body 1

(26) Negation. Nor] 4–5 | Negation; nor 1–3

(l. below 39) positive,] 2–5, but ',' is hardly visible in some copies of 4.

218(1–3) Duration …. Sea,] 4–5 | Duration: … Sea; 1–3

(4) his] 1–2, 4–5; om. 3

bottom:] 4–5 | bottom, 1–3

(7–9) sink, … Infinity. In ] 4–5 | sink … Infinity; in 1–3

(11) it; … confused, ] 4–5 | it, … confused 1–3

(13–14) endeavouring to make it Infinite] 4–5 | this thought of Infinity 1–3

(13) of: But] 4–5 | of; but 1–3

(17–18) 1. Then] Coste 'D'où j'infère, 1.'

(17) Understanding: But] 4–5 | Understanding; but 1–3

(18 [twice], 19) Idea] 1–4 | Idea 5

(18) much] 1–4 | much, 5

(20) Negative;] 2–5 | Negative: 1

Not] 1–4 | not 5

Positive.] 4–5 | Positive; 1–3

(23) it:] 4–5 | it; 1–3

(27–8) Sea-shore … Twenty. ] 4–5 | Sea-shoar … Twenty: 1–3

(29) an infinite Space] 4–5 | Infinity, when he applies it to Space 1–3

(33) Obscurity;] 4–5 | Obscurity, 1–3

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(37) part,] 2–4 | part 1, 5

219(3) yet] 1–2, 4–5; om. 3

(4–6) greater. So ... is, ... words, ... bigger: And ] 4–5 | greater, so ... is ... words ... bigger;
and 1–3

(9) . Now] 4–5 | ; and 1–3

(9) Now] 1–4 | Now, 5

(12) those] 1–4 | those, 5

Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(14) does] 4–5 | do 1–3

(15–17) finite: Since … point; ] 4–5 | finite; since … point, 1–3

(18) Notion] 2–5 | Notions 1

forces] 2–5 | force 1

(19–20) to day … yesterday ] 1–4 | to Day … Yesterday 5. (Thus also elsewhere in 5.)

(21) suppose,] 4–5 | suppose 1–3

(25) Quantum] Coste adds marginal note 'Non est quantum, disent les Scholastiques.'

(l. below 35) In 2–3, marginal summary for § 16 is 'What is positive, what negative in our
Idea of Infinite.' and for § 17 is 'No positive Idea of Infinite.'

(25) signify] 4–5 | signifie 1–3. (Thus regularly in 1–3.)

(29) any] 1–2, 4–5; om. 3

(32) doubt,] 2–5 | doubt/ 1

(33) Idea,] 2–4 | Idea 1, 5

220(3) have.] 4–5 | have; 1–3

(5) Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(10) Space.] 4–5 | Space: 1–3

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(13) . All] 4–5 | ; for all 1–3

(15–18) bounds; ... bounds.... obscurity:] 4–5 | bounds, ... bounds:... obscurity; 1–3

(18) , which] add. 4–5

(20) other,] 4–5 | other 1–3

A] 4–5 | For a 1–3

(22) may,] 2–4 | may 1, 5

(23–4) Philosopher,… Mind, ] 2–5 | Philosopher … Mind 1

(24) it;] 4–5 | it, 1–3

(25) [1st] a] 1–2, 4–5 | the 3

(26) diameter] 2–5 | diametre 1

mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

(28) very little:] 4–5 | very very little, 1–3. (Coste 'd'extrêmement petit')

(29) Littleness] 4–5 | littleness 1–3

(35) which] add. 4–5

(l. below 35: § 18.) infinite Space] 4–5 | Infinite 2–3

(1) he] add. 4–5

221(2) mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

(3) to the] add. 2–5

(8) in] 4–5 | per 1–3

(11) Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(16) taking] 1–2, 4–5 | taken 3

to] 1, 3–5 | to, 2

Eternity:] 4er–5 | Eternity. 1–4

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(18) forwardly] 1–3, 5 | for wardly 4

conclude,] 2–5 | conclude 1

(20–1) collected … is] 4–5 | collected, the Existence of Matter being 1–3

(20) Matter.] 4–5 | Matter: 1–3

(27) a] 2–5 | his 1

(28) Nutshel] 2–5 | Nut–/ shell 1

it:] 4–5 | it; 1–3

(29) no] 1–4; om. 5

(30) an] 3–5 | any 1–2

(1) that] add. 4–5

222(6) to morrow] 1–4 | to Morrow 5. (Thus also elsewhere in 5.)

(8) Men] 2–5 | men 1

(11) Space: Yet] 4–5 | Space; yet 1–3

(14) an] add. 1er–5

(16) Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(20) pleases:] 4–5 | please; 1–3

(20–1) on, ... whereby, ... infinite ... Duration, ] 2–5 | on ... whereby ... Infinite ... Duration 1

(28) Communication.] 4–5 | Communication; 1–3

(32) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(35) them] 4–5 | it 1–3

(36) Names … have] 4–5 | Name they use for it, or 1–3 (Name, 2–3)

[2nd] or] 2–5 | or of 1

(3) leads] 4–5 | lead 1–3

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223(3) Contradictions;] 4–5 | Contradictions, 1–3

(4) mighty,] 1–4 | mighty 5

(11–13) Latitude: … Reflection;] 4–5 | Latitude, [; 3] … Reflection: 1–3

(19) , which] add. 4–5

(23) it] 4–5 | its 1–3

(24) Infinity .... may, ... others, ] 4–5 | Infinity; ... may ... others 1–3

(26) is] 1–2, 4–5 | was 3

Ideas:] 4 | Ideas; 5 | Ideas, 1–3

(29) enough of] 1er–5 | of enough 1

(l. below 30) In Coste, § 22 comes under the same marginal summary as § 21.

(29) Sensation;] 4–5 | Sensation, 1–3

(30) mind] 2, 4 | Mind 1, 3, 5

them:] 4–5 | them; 1–3

Methods] 1–4 | Method's 5

224(3) slide ... skip] 2–5; rom. 1

(4) others,] 4–5 | other 1–3

(5) one,] 2–5 | one 1

(7) Extension:] 4–5 | Extension; 1–3

(7–8) Swift ... Slow] 2–5; rom. 1

(12) Sound] 4–5 | Sound; 1–3

(13, 17) mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

(19) Fancy] 1, 4–5 | Fansic 2–3

(20) are also] 4–5 | might also be 1–3

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(20–2) various: ... of, ... Colour. ] 4–5 | various; ... of ... Colour: 1–3

(24) those] 4–5 | Those 1–3

(27) Beauty, Rainbow] 2–5; rom. 1

etc.] 2–4 | etc. 1, 5

(29) Senses.] 4–5 | Senses; 1–3

such,] 2–5 | such 1

(34) Idea;] 2–5 (, 5) | Idea; 1

(l. below 35: § 4.) Modes of Colours.] add. 4–5

(l. below 35: §§ 5, 6..) In 2–3, § 6 has marginal summary 'Modes of Colours.'

225(4) them;] 4–5 | them, 1–3

(7) [1st] our] 1er–5 | these 1

(7) Ideas] 4–5 | Ideas, 1–3

(25) so,] 2–5 | so 1

(31) or] 1–2, 4–5 | and 3

(32–5) them .... Operations .... understood.] 4–5 | them: ... Operations; ... understood; 1–3

(35) v.g.] Coste gives different, French examples 'frisser, amalgamer, sublimation,
cohobation', indicating in marginal notes that the first of these is a term in printing and the
others are terms in chemistry.

(35) Coltshire] 4 | Colshire 5 | Coltsher 1–3

(36) Ideas,] 4–5 | Ideas; 1–3

(1–2) seldom … Thoughts, ] 4–5 | not in the Minds of every body, they having no use of
them, 1–3

(3) Smiths] Coste 'imprimeurs'

226(4) Chymists] 2–5 | Chimists 1

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(6) others,] 2–5 | others 1

communication] 2–4 | communication, 1, 5

(7) Cohobation] 2–5; rom. 1

(11) more.] 4–5 | more; 1–3

(11) Names;] 1 (upper point of ';' not clear), 4–5 | Names, 2–3

(15) . This] 4–5 | , which 1–3

(17) it self] W | its self 1–5

(18–20) . In … Perception ] 4–5 | ; wherein it observes a great variety of Modifications, and

thereof frames to it self distinct Ideas. Thus the Perception, or Thought 1–3. (Coste '...
Modifications, qui luy fournissent différentes idées distinctes. Ainsi, la perception ou pensée')

(18) occurs] 3–5 | occurrs 1–2

(20–1) accompanies] 1er–5 | accompany 1

(22–3) being … Idea ] 4–5 | it frames a distinct Idea of 1–3

(25) Senses.] 1, 4–5 | Senses: 2–3

recurs] 4–5 | recurrs 1–3

(26) external] 2–5 | eternal 1

227(1) Remembrance:] 2–5 | Remembrance. 1

mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5. (Thus also for all other instances of 'mind' in this chapter.)

(3) Contemplation:] 2–5 | Contemplation. 1

(5) Reverie] 4–5 | Resvery 1–3

(6) it:] 2–5 | it. 1

(10) choice] 1T.er, 2–5 | a choice 1

(10) Attention:] 2–5 | Attention. 1

(12) sollicitation] 1–3, 5 | so-/licitation 4

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(13) Study:] 2–5 | Study. 1

these.] 4–5 | these; 1–3

(14) having] 4–5 | perception 1–3

(14) Ideas,] 4 | Ideas 1–3, 5

(18) all: ... that, ... Extasy ] 4–5 | all; ... that ... Extasie 1–3

(21) have] 4–5 | frame 1–3

(22) hath] 4–5 | does 1–3

(22) White ... Circle] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(24) : That] 4–5 | , that 1–3

(24) Reflection] 2–5; rom. 1

: That] 4–5 | , that 1–3

(26) these] 4–5 | those 1–3

(30) Modes of thinking] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(33–4) thinking, … mentioned, ] 4–5 | thinking; … mentioned 1–3

228(1) one's] 4–5 | ones 1–3

(10–11) Ideas, … directing, ] 2–5 | Ideas … directing 1

(14) Intention ... Remission] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(24) waking] 1–2, 4–5 | walking 3

(l. below 37) 'tis] add. 4–5

(25) thinking] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(26) Dreaming:] 4–5 | Dreaming, 1–3

(30) hence] 1–4 | hence, 5

(31) Thinking] 4–5; rom. 1–3

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(36) ask,] 2–5 | ask 1

(1–2) ; but] 1–3, 5 | . But 4

229(1–2) remission; but] 1–3, 4er, 5 | remission. But 4

(5) Sensation ... Reflection] 2–5; rom. 1

([2nd] and] 4–5 | and 1–3

(6) it self] W | its self 1–5

(7) Pain or Pleasure;] 2–5 (: 2–3) | Pain or Pleasure: 1

(8–9) Pleasure or Pain] 2–5; rom. 1

(11) them] 1–4 | them, 5

(12) Experience.] 4–5 | Experience: 1–3

(14) and] 1–3, 5 | aad 4

(17–18) Good or Evil … Pain. ] 4–5 | good or evil … Pain; 1–3

(18–20) is ... Evil] 2–5; rom. 1

(21–2) is ... Good] 2–5; rom. 1

(23) or] 1–2, 4–5 | and 3

(27) Pleasure ... Pain] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(29) and observe] add. 4–5

(30) us;] 4–5 | us, 1–3

230(2) Passions] 2–5; rom. 1

(3) thought] 4 | Thought 1–3, 5

(4) present,] 2–5 | present 1

(5) Autumn] 2–5; ital. 1

(6) them,] 4–5 | them; 1–3

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(7–9) loves ... love] 2–5; rom. 1

(10) Pain,] 2–5 | Pain 1

(14) remark,] 4–5 | remark 1–3 Love ... Hatred] 2–5; rom. 1

(16) which] add. 4–5

(17) Hatred or Love,] 4–5 | Love and Hatred 2–3 | Love and Hatred 1

(17) Destruction:] 4–5 | Destruction; 1–3

(18) Uneasiness] 4–5 | Pain 1–3

(19) , which … of ] 4–5 | we have in 1–3 (, we 2–3)

(19) Delight,] 2–5 | Delight 1

(20) Being,] 2, 4–5 | Being 1, 3

(22) love] 2–5; rom. 1

(note,] 2–5 | note 1

(23) Love ... Hatred] 2–5; rom. 1

(24) general,] 2–5 | general 1

(25) uneasiness] Coste adds a footnote, on the absence of a satisfactory French equivalent
of this word.

(28)–231(6) Where … place. ] add. 2–5

(28) by the bye] 2–4 | , by the by, 5

(29–30) Industry … Action ] 4–5 | industry … action 2–3

(6) v. 230(28), n.

231(11) it:] 4–5 | it; 1–3

(13) a State] 2–5 | an estate 1

(17) longer;] 4–5 | longer, 1–3

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(20) probable] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | profitable 4–5 §§ 15, 16. Pleasure and Pain what.

(21) thing,] 4–5 | thing 1–3

(23) befal] 2–5 | befall 1

(25) sometimes] 1–2, 4–5 | sometime 3

(27) Anger] 3–5 | Anger, 1–2

(28) receit] 1–4 | Receipt 5

(1–2) terminated] 4–5 | terminating 1–3

232(1–2) them: … Men.] 4–5 | them; … Men: 1–3

(3) love ... hope,] 2–5; rom. 1 (final ',' not in 1)

(4) hate, fear, and grieve] 2–5 | hate and fear, and are sad 1

: In fine all] 4–5 | ; and 1–3

(4) ultimately:] 4–5 | ultimately; 1–3 fine] 1–4 | fine, 5

(5) things, only] 2–5 | things only, 1

(6) [1st] or] 4–5 | and 1–3. (Coste 'en sorte que')

(10) good] 1–4 | Good 5

(12) again.] 4–5 | again; 1–3

(15) (as … intimated) ] 4–5 | , as … intimated, 1–3

(16) Delight or Uneasiness] 2–5; rom. 1

(17) grateful,] 2–5 | grateful 1

(20) lessening ... is] 2–5; rom. 1

(21) Pleasure] 2–5 (, 2–3) | Pleasure, 1

(23–5) it: … Passion. ] 4–5 | it; … Passion: 1–3

(27) the … us ] 4–5 | the Esteem we value 1–3

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(2 ll. below 34) Sensation] 2–3, 5 | Sensation, 4

233(1) Evil.] 2–5 | Evil; 1

(2) Hunger ... Thirst] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(3–7) to … Truth ] 2–5 | , when one is so: The pain of the Head-ach, or pleasure of rational
Conversation with one's Friend, or discovering of a speculative Truth upon study 1

(6) of] 1–2, 4–5 | a 3

(10) Mind,] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

(10–11) informed, … without; ] 2–5 | informed … without, 1

(16–18) choice; … made, ] 4–5 | choice, … made 1–3

(22–5) power] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(24) melted;] 1–4 | melted: 5

(27) room. In] 4–5 | room; in 2–3 | room: in 1

(28) Power] 4–5; rom. 1–3

234(4) considered] 1–4 | considered, 5

(5) and] 4–5 | and 1–3

(6) Matter 3–5 | matter 1–2

(6–9) active ... Power] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(8) alone,] 4–5 alone 1–3

(10) consideration.] 4–5 | consideration: 1–3

Enquiry] 4–5 enquiry 1–3

(12, 15) active Powers] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(14) such,] 4–5 such 1–3

(18) active Power] 4–5; rom. 1–3

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(24) visibly:] 4–5 | visibly; 1–3

(25) Powers] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(26) etc.] 1–4 | ? etc. 5

(31) make] 4–5 | makes 1–3

(31) principal] 2–5 | principle 1

(32) observe] 4–5 | shew 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(32) hereafter] 2–5 | here after 1

(33)–235(1) We … Substances ] 4–5 | Of passive Power, all sensible things abundantly

furnish us with Ideas; whose sensible Qualities and Beings we find 1–3

(1) v. 234(33), n.

235(2) flux:] 4–5 | flux, 1–3

(5) instances.] 4–5 | instances: 1–3

(7–8) yet, ... Bodies, ... Senses, ] 4–5 | yet ... Bodies ... Senses 1–3

(9–36) All instances of 'active Power' and 'Power' ital. 4–5, rom. 1–3.

(11) Action,] 4–5 | Action 1–3

(13) Powers,] 4–5 | Powers 1–3

(15) that: 2. Neither] 4–5 | that; neither 1–3

(17) [2nd] it] 4–5 | its 1–3

(18) it.] 4–5 | it: 1–3

(18–19) Billiard-/ stick] Billiard-stick 1–5

passion:] 4–5 | passion; 1–3

(20) it sets] 1–2, 4–5 | its set 3

(21) motion] 2–4 | Motion 1, 5. (Thus also elsewhere in §§4, 5; but at l. 24, 'motion' in 1.)

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(24) transfer] 4–5 | transferr 1–3

(26) Passion.] 4–5 | Passion: 1–3

motion] 1–4 (Motion 1) | Motion, 5

(27) another:] 4–5 | another; 1–3

(28) rest] 2–4 | Rest 1, 5

motion] 2–5 (Motion 5) | Motion, 1

Action,] 1–4 | Action 5

(29) blow] 1–4 | Blow, 5

(33) rest.] 4–5 | rest: 1–3

(37) thought] 2–4 | Thought 1, 5

if,] 2–5 | if 1

(38) Impulse] 1–4 | Impulse, 5

236(2, 4) mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

(3) Ideas:] 4–5 | Ideas; 1–3

(8) several actions] 2–5 | several, Thoughts 1

(8, 11) Power] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(9–11) a … action] 2–5 | the choice or preference of our Minds 1

(9) minds … motions ] 2–4 | Minds … Motions 1, 5

(10) or … were ] 2–4 | or, … were, 5

(11–12) which … order] 2–5 | the Mind has to prefer 1

(12–13) or the forbearing to consider] 2–5 | to the not considering 1

(12) consideration] 2–4 | Consideration 1, 5

(14) and … instance] add. 2–5

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that which] 4–5 | that 2–3 | that, I think, 1

(14) body … rest ] 2–4 | Body [, 1] … Rest 1, 5

instance] 2–4 | Instance, 5

(15–20) . The … Involuntary] 2–5 | ; and the actual preferring one to another, is that we call
Volition, or Willing 1

(15) Will.] 4–5 | Will; 1, 3 | Will: 2

(16) forbearance] 2–4 | Forbearance, 5

(17) or performance] 2–4; om. 5

(17) Willing.] 4–5 (Willing: 2–3

(18, 19) mind] 2–4 | Mind, 5

(18) Voluntary.] 4–5 | Voluntary: 2–3

(20) which] add. 4–5

(20) Involuntary] 4–5 | involuntary 2–3

Perception] 2–5 | Perception, 1

(21) Understanding.] 4–5 | Understanding: 1–3

(24) Connexion or Repugnancy,] add. 4–5

(25) , that … Ideas] 4–5 | of any distinct Ideas 1–3

(26) Understanding] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(27) the … understand] 4–5 | to the two latter, that in strictness of Speech, the act of
Understanding is usually applied 1–3

(l. below 31: § 6.) In Coste, § 6 comes under the same marginal summary as § 5.

(28) Perceiving ... Preferring] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(29) Name:] 4–5 | name; 1–3

(30) Understanding ... Will] 4–5; rom. 1–3 (Will,)

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(31) mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

237(4–6) Will ... superior ... inferior] 4–5 | Will ... superiour ... inferiour 1–3

(6–7) Understanding, etc.] 4–5 (etc. 5) | Understanding, etc.. 1–3

(10–11) sense: … Speaking of Faculties ] 4–5 | sense; … speaking of Faculties 1–3

(16) Power] 4–5 | power 1–3

(17–20) From … Necessity.] 2–5 | The power the Mind has at any time to prefer any
particular one of those Actions to its forbearance, or Vice versa, is that Faculty which, as
I have said, we call the Will; the actual exercise of that Power we call Volition; and the
forbearance or performance of that Action, consequent to such a preference of the Mind,
is call'd Voluntary. Hence we have the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity, which arise from the
consideration of the extent of this Power of the Mind over the Actions, not only of the Mind,
but the whole Agent, the whole Man. 1

(18) this] 5 | the 2–4

(24) or … mind] 2–5 | of his own choice 1

(25, 26) where-ever] 1–4 | where ever 5

(27) directing it] add. 5

(30) particular] add. 5. (Coste 'une certaine action')

(31) mind] 2–4 | Mind 1, 5

(1) Volition … Liberty] 2–5 | preference, there is not Liberty 1

238(2) [1st] that] 4–5 | That 1–3

(2, 4) Liberty] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(5) two] 1–4 | two, 5

(15–17) prefers … free ] 4–5 | preferrs … free 1–3

(19) it] add. 2–5

(19–20) , by … or] 2–5 | upon his Preference or Volition to 1

(26) preferrs] 1–4 | prefers 5

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(away.] 4–5 | away; 1–3

(27) it:] 4 | it; 1–3, 5

(31) or direct] add. 2–5

(32–3) where-/ ever] where-ever 2–4 | where ever 5 | whereever 1

(33) takes] 2–5 | , takes 1

(33) Power,] 1, 4–5 | Power; 2–3

compulsion] 2–5 | compulsion, 1

(34) of … acting,] 5 | to act, or not to act, [; 1–3] 1–4

(35) liberty] 4–5; rom. 1–3

239(3) in his | 1–2, 4–5 | is 3

(6) preferr] 2–4 | prefer 1, 5

free Agent] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(7) Legs,] 4–5 | Legs; 1–3

wills] 2–5; rom. 1

(12) or the Stocks] 4–5 | or Stocks 1–3. (Coste omits this phrase.)

(12) Stocks] 1, 4–5 | Stocks, 2–3

(13) transferr] 1–4 | transfer 5

(14) Freedom] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(15) [2nd] a] add. 2–5

(15) Paralytick] 2–5 | Paralitick 1

preferrs 1–4 | prefers 5

(16) voluntary.] 2–5 | voluntary: 1

(17) preferr] 2–4 prefer 1, 5

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(24, 25, 28, 33) liberty] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(25) his] 1–2, 4–5 this 3

(29) one to] 1–2, 4–5 | to one 3

(33) divert himself with] 4–5 | entertain 1–3

(l. below 35: § 11.) In Coste, § 11 comes under the same marginal summary as § 10.

(34) Contemplations:] 4–5 Contemplations; 1–3

240(1) chuse.] 4–5 | chuse: 1–3

(4) preferr] 2–4 | prefer 1, 5

(5) we then] 2–5 | then we 1

(6) Where-ever] 1–4 | Where ever 5

(7) according … Thought] add. 2–5

(10) hind'ring] 4–5 | hindring 1–3

(11) Coste uses 'Cohibition' for 'Restraint' here, and adds a linguistic note on it.

(12) necessary] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(17) no.] 1–4 | no? 5

follows,] 2–5 | follows 1

(18) ; and] 4–5 | : And 1–3

(19–28) Will ... Will] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(20) Swift] 1–4 | swift 5

square:] 4–5 | square; 1–3

(23) , as … these: ] 4–5 (these; 5) | as … these, 1–3

(24) belong] 1er–5 | being 1

(25) Vertue:] 4–5 | Vertue; 1–3

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(29)–241(2) Such … it?] add. 2–5

(l. below 34: § 14.) In 2–3, §§ 15–20 come under the same marginal summary as § 14.

belongs] 3–5 | belong 2

(33) Example,] 3–5 | Example 2

241(1) precisely.] 4–5 | precisely: 2–3

preferr] 2–4 | prefer 5. (Thus also elsewhere in 5.)

(2) v. 240(29), n.

(2–5) an … Action] 2–5 | nothing but the actual choosing or preferring forbearance to the
doing, or doing to the forbearance, of any particular Action in our power, that we think on 1

(2) Volition] 1, 4–5; rom. 2–3

(3–4) Mind … Man, ] 4–5 | mind … man 2–3

(4) witholding] 2, 4 | with-holding 5 | withold 3

(7–8) [1st] the … depends] 2–5 | preferring any Action to its Forbearance, or vice versâ, as
far as it appears to depend 1

(7) Mind … thought, ] 4–5 | mind … thought 2–3

(11) Will.] 1–4 | Will? 5

(12) power.] 4–5 | power; 1–3

Man] 1, 4–5 | man 2–3

(15) wills] 2–5; rom. 1

(18) Will has Freedom] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(21) Agents] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(23) Will be free,] 4–5 (free? 5); rom. 1–3

(24) Will] 4–5; rom. 1–3

Agent,] 1–4 | Agent? 5

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(27) that] add. 4–5

(31) suspected,] 4 | suspected 1–3, 5

(2–4) whereby … serve] 4–5 | so talked of it as acting, may by this appropriated term, seem
1–3

242(2) Will] 2–5; rom. 1

(4) absurdity;] 4–5 | absurdity, 1–3

(5) prefer] 4–5 | preferr 1–3

(6) : And … is] 4–5 | ; and when 1–3

(7–8) the … self] 4–5 | it will easily discover the absurdity, in saying it is free, or not free 1–3

(9) Faculties] 2–5; rom. 1

(10) Will ... Will] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(11–12) Faculty ... [2nd] Faculty] 2–5; rom. 1

(13) make] 4–5 | do 1–3

(14) Will ... Understanding] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(14–18) Faculties ... Will] 2–5; rom. 1

(16) Thinking:] 4–5 | Thinking; 1–3

(17) dances;] 4–5 | dances, 1–3

(18) chuses] 4–5 | chooses 1–3

(19) Will] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(20) Will:] 4–5 | Will. 2–3 | Will. 1

(25) confusion.] 4–5 | confusion; 1–3

(27) fit:] 4–5 | fit; 1–3

(29–30) Chusing, ... Chusing ... Thinking; ] 4–5 | Choosing; ... Choosing ... Thinking, 1–3

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(32–3) , who … this] 4–5 | may easily perceive, who will but consider; and yet that 1–3

(36) chuse] 4–5 | choose 1–3

243(4) Tune.] 4–5 | Tune: 1–3

(5–8) : But … [1st] that] 4–5 | ; [, 2–3] for Powers [Powers 2–3] are Relations, not Agents:
but [But 2–3] it is the Mind, or the Man, that operates, and exerts these Powers; that does
the Action, he has power, or is able to do. That 1–3. (Coste is closer to 1–3.)

(5) power] 2–5; rom. 1

(9) free,] 4–5 free; 1–3

(14)–244(4) Faculties ... Power] 2–5; rom. 1

(16) selves, 2–5 | selves; 1

(21) operate.] 4–5 | operate: 1–3

(31) Agents.] 2–5 Agents: 1

(32) It] 2–5 | it 1

(35) Mind,] 4–5 | Mind 1–3

244(10) strange,] 4–5 | strange 1–3

(15–16) the … preferring] 2–5 | choice, or preference of 1

(17–18) [2nd] exist, … free.] 4–5 | exist; … free: 1–3

(18–19) a … rest] 2–5 | the preference of the motion of my Finger to its rest, make it move 1

(26–7) , by ... being, ... Action, ] 2–5 | (by ... being; ... Action) 1

(27) will.] 4–5 | will: 1–3

(28) willing] 2–4; rom. 1, 5

it:] 1–4 | it; 5

(30) wills.] 2–5 | will: 1

(34) thoughts] 1–2, 4–5 | thoughte 3 (Coste 'la pensée')

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(35) state,] 2–5 | state 1

(1–2) : Freedom … that ] 4–5 | ; will have this to be no freedom, unless it reaches farther:
but is ready to say, 1

245(4) Liberty] 1–4 | Liberty, 5

(6) what is] 2–5 | that 1

(6) will] 2–5; rom. 1

free.] 4–5 | free: 1–3

(7) that] 4–5 | that, 1–3

(8) Volition] 5 | Chusing [Choosing 1–3] 1–4

(8) Willing] 2–5; rom. 1

(10) , or … when ] add. 5

is] add. 5

(11) as … done, ] add. 5

(13) Will] 2–5; rom. 1

(16) existence,] 1–4 | Existence 5

(17) prefer] 1, 4–5 | preferr 2–3

other:] 1–4 | other; 5

(19) Mind,] 4–5 | Mind; 1–3

it] 2–5 | it 1

(21) in such a case] W | in such Case 5. (Not in 1–4)

(21) willing] 2–5; rom. 1

(22–3) , upon such a proposal,] add. 5

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(23) not.] Coste adds a footnote: 'Pour bien entrer dans le sens de l'Auteur, il faut toûjours
avoir dans l'Esprit ce qu'il entend par Volition, et Volonté, comme il l'a expliqué cy-dessus §.
5 et §. 15. Cela soit dit une fois pour toutes.'

(23)–246(5) . For … once. ] 4–5 | : it being necessary, and unavoidable (any Action in
his power being once thought on) to prefer either its doing, or forbearance, upon which
preference, the Action, or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. 1–3. In
1–4, § 23 goes on '[Besides, to make a Man free after this manner, by making the Action of
willing to depend on his Will, 4] [So that to make a Man free in this sense, 1–3] there must
be another antecedent Will, to determine the Acts of this Will, and another to determine
that, and so in infinitum: For [for 1] where-ever one stops, the Actions of the last Will [Will 1]
cannot be free: Nor is any Being, as far as I can comprehend Beings above me, capable of
such a freedom of Will [Will 1], that it can forbear to Will, i.e. to prefer the Being [being 1–3],
or not Being [being 1–3] of any thing in its power, which it has once considered as such.'

(23) proposal] edit. | Proposal 5

(25) so] add. 5

(2–3) act of willing,] 5 | action 4

(246(2–3) act of willing] edit. | Act of Willing 5

(4–5) Free and Bound] 4 | free and bound 5

(5) v. 245(23), n.

(6–7) That … a ] 5 | A 1–4

(6) proposals] edit. | Proposals 5

(7–8) , because he cannot [cannot W | can 5] forbear willing:] 5 | any thing in his power, that
he once considers of: 1–4

(8) to forbear acting] 5 | not to act 1–4

(10–12) A … it. ] 1–4; om. 5

(10) also,] 4 | in that respect: 1–3

(10, 11) wills] 2–5 ((11) om. 5); rom. 1

(13) so likewise] 4–5 | nor 1–3

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(13) liberty;] 4–5 | liberty: 1–3

(14) [2nd] motion,] 4–5 | motion 1–3

(15) . This … that ] 4–5 | : But 1–3

(17) will … walking ] 4–5 | will will 1, 3 (likewise Coste) | will 2

(17) He] 2–5 | he 1

(18) prefer] 1, 4–5 | preferr 2–3

(19–25) [2nd] so … willing ] 5 | ; they being once proposed, the Mind 1–4

(21–2) number ... Actions, ... course ] edit. | Number ... Actions ... Course 5

(25) has not] 1–3 (had 3), 5 (likewise Coste) | has 4

(25) willing] edit. | willing, 5

(26) The Mind in that case] 4–5 | It 1–3

(27) some] 1–2, 4–5 | same 3

(27) willing;] 4–5 | willing, 1–3

(29) quick,] 2–5 | quick 1

(30) ; continues … [2nd] it ] add. 2–5

(30–1) . Whereby … manifest, ] 4–5 | : whereby … manifest 1–3

(31) , that] add. 4–5

(31–2) orders … other ] 2–5 | prefers one to the other 1

(32) with] add. 4–5

(32–3) continuation,] 1–4 | continuation 5

(1) that in most cases] add. 5

247(1 plain,] 1–4 | plain 5

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(2) no;] 5 | no; (for when [an action 2–4 | a thing 1] in his power is proposed to his Thoughts,
he cannot forbear Volition, he must determine one way or other;) 1–4 demanded] 5 | to be
demanded 1–4

(6) Will] 5 | Will in any case 1–4

(8) will ... wills] 2–5; rom. 1

(12) infinitum] 5 | infinitum, an absurdity before taken notice of 1–4

(14) determined Ideas] 4–5 | clear and steady Notions 1–3. (Coste 'Idées distinctes et
déterminées')

(15) Consideration.] 4–5 | Consideration: 1–3

(17) that] add. 5

(19) Men's] 2–5 | Mens 1

(27) Sea,] 4–5 | Sea; 1–3

(31) holds] 4–5 | hold 1–3

tumbles] 4–5 | tumble 1–3

(l. below 32: § 27.) In 2–3, § 27 comes under the same marginal summary as that for §§ 25–
6.

(32) forbearance] 4–5 | forbearance, 1–3

248(2) foot-square] 2–5 | foot square 1

(6) Freedom,] 4–5 | Freedom 1–3

(7) chuse] 4–5 | choose 1–3

will] 2–5; rom. 1

(8) Secondly] 1, 5 | Secondly 2–4. From here in 2–5, §§ 28–60 (until 'God the righteous
Judge') are different from contents of 1 and replace §§ 28–38 (until 'God the righteous
Judge') of 1; much of this material in 1 is, however, used in 2–5: § 29 in 1 corresponds to §§
41–2 in 2–5; § 30, to § 48; § 31, to § 49; §§ 32–3, to § 50; § 34, to § 54; § 35, to § 55; § 36, to §
56; § 37, to §§ 58–9. That material in 1 runs in full as follows:

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'§ 28. Secondly, In the next place we must remember, that Volition or Willing, regarding only
what is in our power, is nothing but the preferring the doing of any thing, to the not doing
of it; Action to Rest, et contra. Well, but what is this Preferring? It is nothing but the being
pleased more with the one, than the other. Is then a Man indifferent to be pleased, or not
pleased, more with one thing than another? Is it in his choice, whether he will, or will not be
better pleased with one thing than another? And to this, I think, every one's Experience is
ready to make answer, No. From whence it follows,

§ 29. Thirdly, That the Will, or Preference, is determined by something without it self: Let
us see then what it is determined by. If willing be but the being better pleased, as has been
shewn, it is easie to know what 'tis determines the Will, what 'tis pleases best: every one
knows 'tis Happiness, or that which makes any part of Happiness, or contributes to it; and
that is it we call Good. Happiness and Misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost
bounds whereof we know not: 'tis what Eye hath not seen, Ear hath not heard, nor hath
entred into the Heart of Man to conceive. But of some degrees of both, we have very lively
impressions made by several instances of Delight and Joy on the one side, and Torment
and Sorrow on the other: which, for shortness sake, I shall comprehend under the names
of Pleasure and Pain, there being pleasure and pain of the Mind, as well as the Body: With
Him is fulness of Joy, and Pleasures for evermore: Or to speak truly, they are all of the Mind;
though some have their rise in the Mind from Thought, others in the Body from Motion.
Happiness then is the utmost Pleasure we are capable of, and Misery the utmost Pain. Now
because Pleasure and Pain are produced in us, by the operation of certain Objects, either on
our Minds, or our Bodies; and in different degrees: therefore what has an aptness to produce
pleasure in us, is that we labour for, and is that we call Good; and what is apt to produce
pain in us, we avoid and call Evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce Pleasure
and Pain in us, wherein consists our happiness or misery. Farther, because the degrees of
Pleasure and Pain have also justly a preference; though what is apt to produce any degree
of Pleasure, be in it self good; and what is apt to produce any degree of Pain, be evil; yet it
often happens, that we do not call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its
sort. So that if we will rightly estimate what we call Good and Evil, we shall find it lies much
in comparison: For the cause of every less degree of Pain, as well as every greater degree of
Pleasure, has the nature of Good, and vice versâ, and is that which determines our Choice,
and challenges our Preference. Good then, the greater Good is that alone which determines
the Will.

§ 30. This is not an imperfection in Man, it is the highest perfection of intellectual Natures: it
is so far from being a restraint or diminution of Freedom, that it is the very improvement and
benefit of it: 'tis not an Abridgment, 'tis the end and use of our Liberty: and the farther we
are removed from such a determination to Good, the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery.
A perfect Indifferency in the Will, or Power of Preferring, not determinable by the Good
or Evil, that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an advantage and

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excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want
of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an imperfection
on the other side. A Man is at liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head, or let it rest quiet: He
is perfectly indifferent to either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that
Power, if he were deprived of that Indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection,
if he had the same Indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his Hand, or its
remaining in rest, when it would save his Head or Eyes from a blow he sees coming: 'tis as
much a perfection, that the power of Preferring should be determined by Good, as that the
power of Acting should be determined by the Will; and the certainer such determination is,
the greater is the perfection.

§ 31. If we look upon those superiour Beings above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we
shall have reason to judge they are more steadily determined in their choice of Good than
we: and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And
if it were fit for such poor finite Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and
Goodness could do, I think we might say, That God himself cannot choose what is not good;
the Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.

§ 32. But to consider this mistaken part of Liberty right, Would any one be a Changeling,
because he is less determined, by wise Considerations, than a wise Man? Is it worth the
Name of Freedom to be at liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's
self? If want of restraint to chuse, or to do the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, mad Men and
Fools are the only Free-men: but yet, I think, no Body would chuse to be mad for the sake of
such Liberty, but he that is mad already.

§ 33. But though the preference of the Mind be always determined by the appearance of
Good, greater Good; yet the Person who has the Power, in which alone consists liberty to
act, or not to act according to such preference, is nevertheless free, such determination
abridges not that Power. He that has his Chains knocked off, and the Prison-doors set open
to him, is perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes; though his
preference be determined to stay by the darkness of the Night, or illness of the Weather,
or want of other Lodging. He ceases not to be free; though that which at that time appears
to him the greater Good absolutely determines his preference, and makes him stay in his
Prison. I have rather made use of the Word Preferencethan Choice,to express the act of
Volition, because choice is of a more doubtful signification, and bordering more upon Desire,
and so is referred to things remote; whereas Volition, or the Act of Willing, signifies nothing
properly, but the actual producing of something that is voluntary.

§ 34. The next thing to be considered is, If our Wills be determined by Good, How it comes
to pass that Men's Wills carry them so contrarily, and consequently some of them to what
is Evil? And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices, that Men make in the World,
doe not argue, that they do not all chuse Good; but that the same thing is not good to every

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Man. Were all the Concerns of Man terminated in this Life; why one pursued Study and
Knowledge, and another Hawking and Hunting; why one chose Luxury and Debauchery, and
another Sobriety and Riches, would not be, because every one of these did not pursue his
own Happiness; but because their Happiness lay in different things: And therefore 'twas a
right Answer of the Physician to his Patient, that had sore Eyes. If you have more Pleasure in
the Taste of Wine, than in the use of your Sight, Wine is good for you: but if the Pleasure of
Seeing be greater to you, than that of Drinking, Wine is naught.

§ 35. The Mind has a different relish, as well as the Palate; and you will as fruitlesly
endeavour to delight all Men with Riches or Glory, (which yet some Men place their
Happiness in,) as you would to satisfie all Men's Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which,
though very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and
offensive: And many People would with Reason prefer the griping of an hungry Belly, to
those Dishes, which are a Feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the Philosophers of
old did in vain enquire, whether Summum bonumconsisted in Riches, or bodily Delights,
or Virtue, or Contemplation: And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the
best Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided themselves
into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their
agreeableness to this or that particular Palate, wherein there is great variety: So the
greatest Happiness consists, in the having those things which produce the greatest Pleasure,
and the absence of those which cause any disturbance, any pain, which to different Men
are very different things. If therefore Men in this Life only have hope; if in this Life they
can only enjoy, 'tis not strange, nor unreasonable, they should seek their Happiness by
avoiding all things that disease them here, and by preferring all that delight them; wherein
it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. For if there be no Prospect beyond the
Grave, the inference is certainly right, Let us eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in,
for to morrow we shall die.This, I think, may serve to shew us the Reason, why, though all
Men's Wills are determined by Good, yet they are not determined by the same Object. Men
may chuse different things, and yet all chuse right, supposing them only like a Company of
poor Insects, whereof some are Bees, delighted with Flowers, and their sweetness; others
Scarabes, delighted with other kind of Viands; which having enjoyed for a Season, they
should cease to be, and exist no more for ever.

§ 36. This sufficiently discovers to us, why Men in this World prefer different things, and
pursue Happiness by contrary Courses: But yet since Men are always determined by Good,
the greater Good; and are constant, and in earnest, in matter of Happiness and Misery, the
Question still remains, How Men come often to prefer the worse to the better;and to chuse
that, which by their own Confession has made them miserable?

§ 37. To this I answer, That as to present Happiness, or Misery; present Pleasure or Pain,
when that alone comes in Consideration, a Man never chuses amiss: he knows what best

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pleases him, and that, he actually prefers. Things in their present enjoyment, are what
they seem: the apparent and real good, are, in this case, always the same. For the Pain or
Pleasure being just so great, and no greater, than it is felt, the present Good or Evil is really
so much as it appears. And therefore were every Action of ours concluded within it self, and
drew no Consequences after it, we should undoubtedly always will nothing but Good; always
infallibly prefer the best. Were the pains of honest Industry, and of starving with Hunger and
Cold set together before us, no Body would be in doubt which to chuse: were the satisfaction
of a Lust, and the Joys of Heaven offered at once to any one's present Possession, he would
not balance, or err in the choice, and determination of his Will. But since our voluntary
Actions carry not all the Happiness, and Misery, that depend on them, along with them in
their present performance; but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil, which they draw
after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are passed, and cease to be; that
which has the Preference, and makes us will the doing or omitting any Action in our Power,
is the greater Good, appearing to result from that choice in all its Consequences, as far as at
present they are represented to our view.

§ 38. So that, that which determines the choiceof the Will, and obtains the preference, is
still Good, the greater Good: But it is also only Good that appears; that which carries with
it the Expectation of Addition to our Happiness, by the increase of our Pleasures, either in
Degrees, Sorts, or Duration, or by the preventing, lessening, or shortning of pain. Thus the
Temptation of a pleasant Taste, brings a Surfeit, a Disease, and, perhaps, Death too, on
one, who looks no farther than that apparent Good, than the present Pleasure; who sees not
the remote and concealed Evil: and the hopes of easing or preventing some greater pain,
sweetens another Man's Draught, and makes that willingly be swallowed, which in it self is
nauseous and unpleasant. Both these Men were moved to what they did by the appearance
of Good, though the one found Ease and Health, and the other a Disease and Destruction:
and therefore to him that looks beyond this World, and is fully persuaded, that God the
righteous Judge,'

(8) Volition, or Willing] 4–5 | Volition or Willing 2–3

(12) Action,] 4–5 | Action 2–3

proposed;] 4–5 | proposed 3 | proposed, 2

(13) one's] 4 | ones 2–3, 5

(1) Thirdly] 5 | Thirdly 2–4

249(4) mind.] 4–5 | mind; 2–3

(7) satisfies] 4–5 | satisfie 2–3

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(13) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4. (Coste adds a note on 'inquiétude' with a cross-
reference to his note at II. xx. 6.)

(13) uneasiness:] edit. | Uneasiness: 5 | uneasiness: 4 | uneasiness; 2–3

(14) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(14) uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(26) Caution] 4–5 | caution 2–3

(31) Men] Coste2 adds in a note: 'M. Locke en vouloit ici au P. Malebranche.'

(3) is, … be, ] 4–5 | as much as may be 2–3

250(5) mind,] 4–5 | mind 2–3

(6–7) but … nothing, ] 2–4; om. 5

(10–11) . This … that ] 4–5 | : Whereby 2–3

(14) persuasions] 2, 4–5 | persuasion 3

(15) speaking,] 4–5 | speaking 2–3

(16) counter.] 4–5 | counter: 2–3

(20–4) removed, ... where-ever ... apprehends, ... pain. ] 4–5 | removed; ... whereever ...
apprehends ... pain; 2–3

(26) ; and consequently that] 4–5 | : and so 2–3

(27) , is] add. 4–5

(27) Desire] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(28–9) is … Actions? ] 5 | it is … Actions. 2–4

(29) thoughts] 4–5 | thoughts, 2–3

(31) uneasiness] 4–5; rom. 2–3. (All instances of this word, and of its plural, in italic in §§ 31–
47 replace in 4 and/or 5 the corresponding form in roman in 2–3.)

(2) This] 4–5 | This, 2–3

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251(2) This] 4–5 | This, 2–3

(3) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(3) call, … is, Desire;] 4–5 | call … is, Desire; 3 | call, … is Desire, 2

uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(5) mind,] 4–5 | mind 2–3

(7, 10, 19, 20) desire] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(9) [1st] ease] Coste adds a note on 'quiétude'.

(13) equal.] 4–5 | equal: 2–3

(14) it.] 4–5 | it: 2–3

(15) acknowledg'd] 4–5 | acknowledg'd, and confess'd 2–3

(23) Desire] 5 | Desire 2–4

(23) Wise-man] 4 | Wise Man 2–3 (wise 3), 5

Hope,] 4–5 | Hope 2–3

(24) deferr'd] 3–5 | defer'd 2

sick,] 2–4 | sick? 5

* Prov. 13: 12.

(25) proportionable] 4–5 | proportionably 2–3

Desire,] 5 | Desire, 4 | Desire 2–3

(27) die?] 5 (likewise Coste) | die: 2–4

** Gen. 30: 1.

ch
252(1–2) [1st] and ... and ... which] 3–5 | & ... & ... w 2

(1) Evil,] 4–5 | Evil; 2–3

(2–3) Will, ... time, ... Action, ] 4–5 | Will ... time ... action 2–3 (Action 2 catchword)

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(7) Lives] 4–5 | lives 2–3

(14–15) All-/ wise] All-/ wise 4 | All-wise 2–3, 5

(22) will] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(24) Paul;] 5 (likewise Coste) | Paul, 2–4

where] 4–5 | whereby 2–3 (likewise Coste)

(7) uneasy] 5 | uneasy 2–4

253(7) uneasy] 5 | uneasy 4 | uneasie 2–3

(10) penury:] 4 | penury; 2–3, 5

(15) life:] 4–5 | life; 2–3

* Matt. 5: 6.

(18) uneasinesses] 5 | uneasiness 4 | uneasiness 2–3

(20) wastes;] 4–5 | wastes, 2–3

(21) Drink,] 2–4 | Drink 5

(22) follows:] 4–5 | follows; 2–3

(23) Companions;] 4 | Companions, 2–3, 5

Cups, … time, ] 4–5 | Cups … time 2–3

(24) has] 4–5 | have 2–3

(25) life:] 4–5 | life; 2–3

(26) as] 4–5 | as, 2–3

(27) palate] 4–5 | palatt 2–3

(29) good:] 4 | good; 2–3, 5

(30) pursue] 2–4 | persue 5

254(2) action;] 4–5 | action, 2–3

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(3) against] 4–5 | again 2–3

(3) occasion,] 4–5 | occasion; 2–3

(6) And ... is, ... time, ] 4–5 | And, ... is ... time 2–3

(7) proboque,] 4–5 | proboque 2–3

(8) sequor:] 4–5 | sequor; 2–3

* Ovid, Metamorphoses, VII, 20–1.

(9) other, way] 4 | other way, 5 | other way 2–3

(15) , that] 4–5 | that 2–3

(16, 20) which] add. 4–5

(16) will, in order] 4–5 | will in order, 2–3

(18) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(18) uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(19–21) being, ... one, ... happiness; ... have: ] 4–5 | being ... one ... happiness, ... have; 2–3

(26) will,] 4–5 | will 2–2

(31) there:] 4 | there; 2–3, 5

(2) , which] add. 4–5

255(6) work:] 4–5 | work; 2–3

(13) , towards] 4–5 | toward 2–3

(14) life] 2–4 | Life, 5

(15) good] 2–4 | Good 5. (Thus regularly in II. xxi.)

(17) that,] 4 | that 2–3, 5

(18) by,] 4–5 | by; 2–3

(21) alone] 2–4 | alone, 5

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(28) end:] 4–5 | end, 2–3

out-weighing] 4–5 (out-/ 5) | outweighing 2–3

(30) which] add. 4–5

(3) could not] 4–5 | cannot 2–3

256(5–6) again: … thoughts,] 4–5 | again …. thoughts 2–3

(6) , would, if it were so,] 4–5 | will 2–3

(9) that, 2 – 4 I that 5

(10) good; but] 5 | good. But 2–4

(12) uneasiness] 5 | uneasinesses 2–4

(13) though] 4–5 | tho 2–3

(15) will] 5 | will 2–4

(15) will] edit. | Will 5 | will 2–4

(16) will,] 4–5 | will 2–3

(19–20) love; … revenge, ] 4–5 | love, … revenge 2–3

(20–1) determined] 2–4 | determin'd, 5

(23) determinations] 5 | determination 2–4

(23) determinations] edit. | Determinations 5 | determination 2–4

(24) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(24) topping] 3–5 | toping 2

uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(26) uneasiness:] 5 | uneasiness: 2–4 ( ; 2–3)

(26) other,] 4–5 | other 2–3

(29–30) will …. will] 4–5 | will; … will 2–3

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(31) , without] 4–5 | without 2–3

257(1) why] 4–5 | why, 2–3

(2) uneasiness] 4–5 | uneasinesses, 2–3

(5) uneasiness] 5 | uneasinesses 2–4

(6–8) Passions ... discourse ... name, ] 4–5 | passions ... discourse, ... name 2–3

(9) Nay] 2–4 | Nay, 5

(10) desire join'd] 4–5 | desire joyn'd 2–3

(11) where-ever] 2–4 | where ever 5

: For] 4–5 | ; for 2–3

(12) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(12) uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(13) , 'tis certain, … happiness; ] 4–5 | 'tis certain … happiness, 2–3

(15) Besides,] 5 (likewise Coste) | Besides 2–4

(17) it.] 4–5 | it: 2–3

(24) desires] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(26) , that ordinarily,] 4–5 | that ordinarily 2–3

(27) those,] 2–4 | those 5

(30) : That] 4–5 | ; for that 2–3

258(1) act,] 2–4 | act 5

(2) will] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(3) They, in that case,] 4–5 | Those therefore 2–3

(5) , we … that, ] 2–4 | we … that 5

(8) felt] 5 | most felt 2–4

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(11) by, … it,] 4–5 | by … it 2–3

(14–15) happiness] 2–4 | Happiness, 5

(15) Happiness ... Misery] 4–5; rom. 2–3. (Thus in all instances of italicized forms of
'happiness' and 'misery' in §§ 42–4.)

(16) extremes] 2–4 | Extreams 5

not;] 4–5 | not: 2–3

(17) it] add. 4–5

(19) Delight] 2–4 | Delight, 5

(19–20) side; … other; ] 4–5 | side, … other: 2–3

(22–3) Coste omits this quotation.

(23) Pleasure] 5 | pleasure 4 | Pleasures 2–3

(23) fullness] 4 | Fulness 5 | fulness 2–3

Or] 2–4 | Or, 5

(25) certain modifications of] add. 4–5

(28) so much ease from] 4–5 | the being eas'd of 2–3

(29) so much present Pleasure] 4–5 | enjoying so much Pleasure 2–3

259(1) Minds] 4–5 | Minds, 2–3

(2) degrees:] 2–4 | Degrees; 5

(3) Good,] 4–5 | Good; 2–3

(6) Farther,] 4–5 | Farther, because the degrees of Pleasure and Pain have also justly a
preference; 2–3

(9–11) ; because … preference] add. 4–5

(10) competition] 4 | Competition, 5

(14) Pleasure] 2–4 | Pleasure, 5

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good,] 4–5 | good 2–3

(15) good and evil; and] 4–5 | good and evil: And 2–3

(15–16) good ... evil ... good ... good ] 2–4 | Good ... Evil ... Good ... Good 5

(18, 21) Man's] 4–5 | Mans 2–3

(20) appearance,] 4–5 | appearance 2–3

(21) desires] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(22–3) Happiness] 5 | Happiness 2–4 (',' add. 4–5)

(23) , under] 4–5 | under 2–3

desires] 4–5 | desires, 2–3

(25) desire] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(26–9) There … Now] add. 4–5

(l. below 31) In Coste, § 43 comes under the same marginal summary as § 42.

(1) pursues;] 4–5 | pursues; (For I think there is no Body so sensless as to deny, that there is
Pleasure in knowledge; and also Pleasure in the taste of good Meats and Drinks:) 2–3

260(2) desires] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(5) will] 5 | will 2–4

(5) uneasie] 4–5; rom. 2–3

will] edit. | Will 5 | will 2–4

(6) or] 2–4; om. 5

(7–8) Hunger ... Thirst, [',' om. 5] ... Eating ... Drinking ] 4–5 | hunger ... thirst, ... eating ...
drinking 2–3

(9) indifferency,] 2–4 | indifferency 5

(12) uneasie] 4–5; rom. 2–3

Thus,] 2–4 | Thus 5

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(14, 15, 20) good] 2–4 | Good 5

(16) Though,] 2–4 | Though 5

(17) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(17) uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(18) uneasie] 5 | uneasie 2–4. (Coste adds a note on 'inquiéts'.)

(21) desire] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(22) , | think,] 4–5 | | think 2–3

(26) get] 2–4 | git 5

(27) and] 4–5 | , and 2–3

(3) some] 5 | a 2–4

(3–4) Pleasure in a succession of ordinary Enjoyments] 5 | succeeding Pleasures 2–4

261(3–4) Enjoyments] edit. | Injoyments 5

(7) Lives] 4–5 | lives 2–3

(9) desire … good. ] 4–5 | desire … good: 2–3

(10) think,] 4 | think 2–3, 5

(13) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(13, 28, 30) uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5 | uneasiness 2–4

(14) for ever] 4–5 | forever 2–3

(15) possible,] 2–4 | possible/ 5

(16) Nay] 2–4 | Nay, 5

(19) : But yet] 4–5 | ; but yet, 2–3

(22) here,] 2–4 | here 5

(28) uneasiness] 5 | uneasinesses 2–4

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(29) Sleepiness] 4–5 | Sleepishness 2–3

(30) uneasiness,] 5 | uneasinesses 2–4

(31) etc.] 2–3 | etc. 4–5

(31) Fashion] 4–5 | fashion 2–3

(l. below 31) , it] 4–5 | it 2–3

(1) Example,] 5 | Example 2–4

262(1) Education] 2–4 | Education, 5

setled] 2–4 | settled 5

(5) good.] 4–5 | good: 2–3

sollicitation] 2–5 (∏ 5), but some copies of 4 read solicitation

(7) out] 4–5 | , out 2–3

(8) turns;] 5 | turns, 2–4

(11) with,] 4–5 | with 2–3

(15) jostled] 4–5 | jostel'd 2–3

(16–17) Contemplation ... Mind] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

(19) rest,] 5 | rest 2–4

(l. below 31) Coste 'Deux considerations excitent le desir en nous.'

(20) pressure,] 2–4 | Pressure 5

(22–3) consideration ... power, ... desires, ] 2–4 | Consideration, ... Power ... Desires 5

(25) will] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(27) Minds] 4–5 | minds 2–3

(27–8) uneasie ... [1st] wills] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(30) which,] 2–4 | which 5

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263(1, 3) Mind] 4–5 | mind 2–3

(1) only,] 4 | only 2–3, 5

(2) satisfied, … removed. ] 4–5 | satisfied; … removed, 2–3

(4) , barely as such,] 4–5 | barely as such 2–3

(8) removed:] 4–5 | removed, 2–3

(9) wants,] 2–4 | Wants 5

(12) uneasinesses] 5 | uneasinesses 2–4

(12) uneasinesses] edit. | Uneasinesses 5 | uneasinesses 2–4

(17–18) suspend ... desires, ... all, ... another, ] 4–5 | suspend ... desires; ... all ... another 2–3

(21) faults which] 4–5 | faults, 2–3

(24) Examination ... suspend] 4–5; rom. 2–3

this] 2–4 | this, 5

(25) daily] 4–5 | dayly 2–3

(27) that,] 2–4 | that 5

(28) suspension] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(l. below 31) desire] 2–4 | Desire, 5

264(1, 4) Examination] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(3) according] 4–5 | accordingly 2–3

(6) Freedom] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(7) Liberty;] 4–5 | Liberty: 2–3

(9) Mind,] 4–5 | Mind, or Power of Preferring, 2–3

(14, 23) Will] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(16) in] 4–5 | to 2–3

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(19) whether] 2–4 | whither 5

(19) prefer] 4–5 | preferr 2–3

(21) desire] 2–4 | Desire, 5

(24) Nay] 2–4 | Nay, 5

(26) free,] edit. | free. 2–5

(26)–265(7) the [edit. | The 5] ... admitted.] add. 5

(26–31) the ... end ... good ... necessity ... constitution ... else ... determination ] edit. | The ...
End ... Good ... Necessity ... Constitution ... Else ... Determination 5

(l. below 31) judgment] 2–4 | Judgment, 5

265(1–2) will ... determination ... end] edit. | Will ... Determination ... End 5

(7) v. 264(26), n.

(7) admitted.] edit. | admitted! 5

(8) superiour] 4 | superior 2–3, 5

(9) that] add. 4–5

(9) judge] 2–4 | judge, 5

(13) think,] 4–5 | think 2–3

(14) choose] 2–4 | chuse 5

(16) give a right view of] 4–5 | consider 2–3

Liberty,] 5 | Liberty 2–4

(17) let me ask] 4–5 | right 2–3

(19) Freedom] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(21–2) Examination … Judgment ] 4–5 | examination … judgment 2–3

(23) Liberty] 4–5; rom. 2–3. (Thus in all instances of italicized forms of 'liberty' in §§ 50–2.)

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Freemen] 4 | Free-men 5 | Free-/ men 2–3

(26) Happiness … Body ] 4–5 | happiness … body 2–3

(31) Ignorance] 4–5 | ignorance, 2–3

266(3) action. This … still,] 4–5 | action; this … still 2–3

(4–5) Examination … upon enquiry ] 2–4 | Examination, . . , upon Enquiry, 5

(8) Liberty 4–5 | liberty 2–3

(19) liberty. The] 4–5 | liberty, and the 2–3

(19) happiness,] 4–5 | happiness 2–3

(20) , we have, 4 | we have 2–3, 5

(21) as such] 2–4 | , as such, 5

(23) and] 4–5 | or 2–3

(25) preferable] 5 | greater 2–4. (Coste 'le plus important')

(25) duly] 4–5 duely 2–3

(26) inconsistent] 2–4 | inconstant 5

(26–7) therefore] add. 5

(29) prefering … happiness ] 4–5 | preferring … happiness, 2–3

(30) desire] 5 | desires 2–4

(30) desire] edit. | Desire 5 | desires 2–4

(32) a] add. 5

(l. below 32: § 51.) the] 2–4 | , the 5

267(1) suspend] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(3–5) proposed, … good. For ] 2–4 | proposed … Good; for 5

(11–18) suspeuce ... suspend] 4–5; rom. 2–3

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(12–14) it, ... as ... me ] 2–4 | it ... , as ... me, 5

(14) Beings] 2, 4–5 | Being 3

(17) this,] 4–5 | this; 2–3

(19) duly] 4–5 | duely 2–3

(19–24) examin'd ... examin'd] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(22) . For] 4–5 | ; for 2–3

(26–7) Consequences … Judgment ] 4–5 | consequences … judgment 2–3 (28–9)

Examination,] 4–5 | Examination 2–3

(28–9) view … Examination] 4–5 | , or due and mature Examination 2–3

(29) shewing] 4er–5 | she wings 4 | shewing 2–3

(32) Rack] 4–5 | rack 2–3

(1) uneasiness] 5 | uneasiness 2–4

268(1) uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5 | uneasiness 2–4

Love … Passion,] 4–5 | love … passion 2–3

(4) ; God,] 4–5 | , God 2–3

(6) power,] 2–4 | Power; 5

(8–9) desires, ... Passions ... free ] 4–5 | desires; ... passions ... free 2–3

(10) that, whereon] 2–4 (where on 2) | that whereon 5

(11, 26) Happiness] 4–5 | happiness 2–3

(11) depends;] 4 | depends: 5 | depends, 2–3

(12) endeavours.] 4–5 | endeavours: 2–3

(13) things;] 4 | things, 2–3, 5

(16) till, … worth, ] 4–5 | till … worth 2–3

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(19) ones] 2–4 | one's 5

(20–1) try … Passions ] 4–5 | trie … passions 2–3

(24) God,] 4–5 | God 2–3

(25) an] 2–4; om. 5

(28) Evil.] 4–5 | Evil? 2–3

choices,] 2–4 | Choices 5

(30–1) . This … not] 4–5 | ; nor does every one 2–3

(32) it.] 4–5 | it: 2–3

269(1) Life,] 4–5 | Life; 2–3

(5) happiness] 4 | Happiness 2–3, 5

Happiness … things. ] 4–5 | Happiness … things: 2–3

(6) Patient,] 2–4 | Patient 5

(7) Eyes.] 4 | Eyes: 5 | Eyes; 2–3

(8) you;] 4–5 | you: 2–3

(9) you,] 2–4 | you 5

(14) Men's … which, ] 2–4 | Mens … which 5

(15) fare] 2–4 | Fair 5

(17) preferr … Belly, ] 2–4 | prefer … Belly 5

(20) Virtue, or Contemplation:] 2–4 | Virtue or Contemplation? 5

(25–6) : So … consists, ] 2–4 | ; so … consists 5

(26) things,] 4 | things 2–3, 5

(27) in] add. 4–5

(27) Pleasure;] 4–5 | Pleasure, 2–3

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those,] 4 | those 2–3, 5

(28) . Now these] 5 | ; now these, 4 | , which 2–3

(28) Now] edit. | Now, 5 | now 2–4

Men,] 4–5 | Men 2–3

(31) [1st] that] add. 4–5

(31) things,] 4 | things 2–3, 5

(32) pursuing] 4–5 | preferring 2–3

270(5) Men's] 2–4 | Mens 5

(8) Flowers, … others, ] 2–4 | Flowers … others 5

(12)–271(18) These … Reason] 5 | This sufficiently discovers to us 2–4

(13) view ... state ... humane ] edit. | View ... State ... Human 5

(16) actions … volition ] edit. | Actions … Volition 5

(17) will,] edit. | will 5

(19) act ... volition ... act ... will ... action ] edit. | Act ... Volition ... Act ... Will ... Action 5

(20–2) case ... willing ... good ... end ] edit. | Case ... Willing ... Good ... End 5

(23–5) act ... choice ... till ... nature ... consequences ... happy, ] edit. | Act ... Choice ... 'till ...
Nature ... Consequences ... happy 5

(25) it] W | its 5

(27–9) desire ... will ... pursuit ... choice ... occasions ] edit. | Desire ... Will ... Pursuit ...
Choice ... Occasions 5

(28) uneasiness] edit. | Uneasiness 5

(30–1) punishment … actions ] edit. | Punishment … Actions 5

271(1–2) that, ... will ... that,] edit. | that ... Will ... that 5

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(4–6) choice ... measures ... good ... evil ... influence ... conduct ] edit. | Choice ...
Measures ... Good ... Evil ... Influence ... Conduct 5

(8) sickness … death ] edit. | Sickness … Death 5

(10–13) ill-order'd choice ... neglect ... abuse ... had, ... miscarriages ... election ...
determination ] edit. | ill-orderd Choice ... Neglect ... Abuse ... had ... Miscarriages ...
Election ... Determination 5

(16–17) not, ... matter ... concernment ] edit. | not ... Matter ... Concernment 5

(18) v. 270(12), n.

(18) , why] 2–4 | why, 5

(20) Courses.] 4–5 | Courses: 2–3

(23) which,] 4 | which 2–3, 5

(23–4) Confession, … miserable. ] 4–5 | Confession … miserable? 2–3

(26–8) though ... uneasinesses ... action, ] 4–5 | tho ... uneasinesses ... action 2–3

(31) violent, operate] 3–5 | violent operate, 2

(32) will] 5 | will 2–4

(l. below 32) pains] 2–3 | pain 4–5. (In 2–3, this marginal summary faces the first paragraph,
and not subsection 1, of § 57.)

(3 ll. below 32) Pleasures] Pleasure 1T.er

(32) will] edit. | Will 5 | will 2–4

Men's] 2–4 | Mens 5

272(1) what … judged] 2–4 | what, … judged, 5

(2) through disuse,] add. 5

(2) disuse] edit. | Disuse 5

(3) able] 4–5 | able, 2–3

remote,] 2–4 | remote 5

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(5) uneasiness,] 2–4 | Uneasiness 5

(6) will] 5 | will 2–4

(6) actions,] 2–4 | Actions 5

(7–8) A … any] om. Coste

(13) uneasinesses] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(16) misled] 4–5 | mislead 2–3

(18) Good ... Evil ... misled. ] 4–5 | good ... evil ... mislead; 2–3

(21) amiss;] 4–5 | amiss: 2–3

that,] 2–4 | that 5

(22) enjoyment] 2–4 | Enjoyment, 5

(23) seem; … good ] 4–5 | seem: … good, 2–3

(28) prefer] 3–5 | preferr 2

(30) Cold] 2–4 | Cold, 5

273(5) performance;] 2–4 | Performance, 5

(8) good] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(9) which] add. 4–5

it,] 4–5 | them 2–3

(10–11) 'Tis … good.] add. 4–5 (not add. 4er–5)

(12) which] add. 4–5

(13) once,] 4–5 | once; 2–3

(15) , 'tis] 4–5 | . 'Tis 2–3

(16) us.] 4–5 | us: 2–3

(18) judge that] 4–5 | judge, 2–3

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already,] 5 (likewise Coste) | already 2–4

(19) enough.] 4–5 | enough; 2–3

content] 2–4 | content, 5

(23) occasion,] 2–4 | Occasion 5

(24–7) good ... them; ... will, ... desires, ] 4–5 | good ... them, ... will ... desires 2–3

(28) to] add. 4–5

which] add. 4–5

(30) Virtue] 4–5 | Vertue 2–3

(32) ready to] 2–5 | will 1

(32) God] 2–4 | God, 5

(33)–274(3) render ... Anguish] 2–5; rom. 1

274(1) well-doing] 4–5 | well doing 2–3 | well doing 1

(4) Happiness] 4–5 | , 1–3

(8–10) immortal … Pleasure, ] 1–4 | Immortal … Pleasure 5

(13) §§ 61–4 in 2–5 correspond, respectively, to §§ 39–42 in 1.

But … particularly] 2–5 | He that will account 1

(13) Misery,] 1–4 | 5

(14) notwithstanding] 1–3 | notwithstand 4–5

(15) we] 2–5 | and always prefer the greater apparent Good, 1

(16) desires] 2–5 | choice 1

(16) is] 4–5 | is, 1–3

(19) sense] 4 | Sense 1–3, 5

(23–5) efficacy, … Creature, ] 1–4 | Efficacy … Creature 5

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(24) is … move] 2–5 | cannot but move the Will, and determine the choice of 1

(29) wrong Judgment] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(1–2) which ... uneasiness] 2–5 | and would enjoy all the pleasures he could, and suffer no
pain 1

(2) considerable] add. 4–5

275(3–4) ingredient … power] 2–4 | Ingredient … Power 1, 5

(4–5) would ... Happiness] 4–5 | he could desire, or would ... Happiness 2–3 | could add to its
sweetness 1

(5) a] 1–4; om. 5

(5–8) wrong ... Judgment] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(6) mistake,] 1–4 | Mistake 5

(10) Mind,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(11) said] Coste adds a marginal reference to § 58 of this chapter.

(11) evil;] 4–5 | eveil: 1–3

that,] 2–4 | ~ 1, 5

(12) just] 2–5 | just, 1

(14) mistake;] 4–5 | mistake: 1–3

(15–16) (which ... Will)] add. 2–5

(16) Will] 3–5 | will 2

(18) Objects,] 2–5 | Objects/ 1

(19) greater,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(24) Reversion.] 4–5 ~; 2–3 | ~: 1

(25) wrong Judgment] 4–5; rom. 1–3

Pleasure] 2–5 | pleasure 1

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(26) will:] 1, 4–5 | will, 1 catchword, 2–3

(27) then,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(28) it] 4–5 | its 1–3

(28) wilful] 1, 3–5 | willful 2

(31) Stomack,] 1–4 | 5

aking] 2–5 | akeing 1

, in some Men,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(34) daily] 3–5 | gaily 1–2

(2) hours] 1–4 | Hour 5

(4) by a right judgment] 4–5 | (by a due consideration, 1–3. (Coste 'un juste examen de la
chose même')

276(4) do] 4–5 | do, 1–3

(5) himself, and] 4–5 | himself) 1–3

(9–15) wrong ... Judgment] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(12) That] 1–4 | that 5

(13) follow.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(14); but] 4–5 | : But 1–3

(16) to] 2–5 | , to 1

(20) Constitution] 2–5 | Constitutions 1

(23) the whole Mind] 2–5 | all our Minds 1

(24–5) among ... which] 4–5 | many of our Pleasures 1–3

(25) some,] 4 | ~ 5

enough,] 4 | 1–3, 5

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(27) Pleasures:] 4–5 | ~. 1–3

(28–9) . Hence] 4–5 | : [; 2–3] and hence 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(29) , at any rate,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(30–1) because ... Pain] 4–5 | since while the Pain remains, 1–3

(32)–277 (1) Mens ... other] 4–5 | Hence we see the present Pain, any one suffers, is always
1–3

(32) complaints] 4 | Complaints, 5

(1) v. 276(32), n.

(2) Any] 4–5 | Any other 1–3 (likewise Coste)

277(4) intent,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(5) condition to our] 2–5 | step towards 1

(5) Evil,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(7–8) uneasiness ... us.] 4–5 | Pain we feel: 1–3

(7–10) equal, ... Pleasure, ... wonder ] 4–5 | equal ... Pleasure ... wonder, 1–3

(9) Pain,] 2–5 (; 2–3) | sort of Pain; 1

(9–10) the ... Object;] add. 2–5

(12) Thoughts,] 2–4 | ~ 1, 5

future;] 2–5 | ~, 1

(13) In 1, this section concludes with what is, in 2–5, the concluding sentence 'Thus ...
future.' of § 65.

(14–32) Add ... Palate.] 2–5

(15) which] add. 4–5

(17) desire,] 3–5 | ~; 2

present.] 4–5 | ~; 3 | ~, 2

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more,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(21) possibly] 2–4 | possible 5

(21) opinion,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(26–33) false ... Judgment] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(30) : Could we] 4–5 | ; though we could 2–3

(30) one's … desire: ] 4–5 | ones … desire; 2–3

(31) there] 4 | ~, 2–3, 5

(32–5) Thus ... future.] 2–5; cf. (13), n.

(32) one's] 4–5 | ones 2–3

(34) together,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(1) §§ 66–7 in 2–5 correspond, respectively, to §§ 43–4 in 1.

278(2, 4) evil] 2–4 | Evil 1, 5

(4–9) judge ... judging] 4–5; rom. 1–3 (but at l. 9 'etc.' 1–5)

(9) That] 4–5 | But that 1–3

(10) shew] 1–4 | ~, 5

(11) : But] 4–5 | ; but 1–3

(13) Good] 2–5 | Good and Evil 1

(13–15) [2nd] a ... mistake] 2–5 | due, and through examination, as far as a Man's
knowledge can, by any endeavours or assistance, attain 1

(19) judging amiss] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(20) that,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(24–5) Sums … overlook'd, ] 4–5 | Summs … overlook'd 1–3

(26) wrong a Judgment] 4–5; rom. 1–3

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(28) or Pain] add. 2–5

(32)–279(11) Without ... requires.] add. 4–5

(34) sees,] 4 | ~ 5

279(5–8) down, ... therefore ... Freedom] 4 | down ... therefore, ... Freedom, 5

(11) v. 278(32), n.

much] 1, 4–5 | much, 2–3

(13) contribute] 2–5 | ~, 1

occasion,] 1er–5 | ~ 1

wrong Judgments] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(14–16) [1st] I ... influence.] add. 2–5

(17)–281(10) All ... so?] add. 2–5

(17) doubt:] 4–5 | ~; 2–3

(20) them;] 2–4 | ~, 5

that;] 4–5 | ~, 2–3

(21) desire] 2–4 | Desire, 5

uneasy] 4–5 | uneasie 2–3

(23) known] 4er–5 | knowledge 2–4 (likewise Coste)

(24) that] add. 4–5

(28) judging wrong] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(29) so.] 4–5 | so; 2–3

(35) mistake] 2–4 | Mistake, 5

matter] 2–4 | Matter, 5

(8) mind] 2–4 | Mind, 5

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(16–18) finds, ... too, ... displeasing, ] 4–5 | finds ... too ... displeasing 2–3

(19) greater] 2–3, 5 | geater 4

(19–20) well-season'd] 4–5 | well season'd 2–3

(23) strength] 2–4 | Strength, 5

(24) Gusto] 4–5 | gusto 2–3 (ill relish'd] 2–4 | ill-relish'd 5

(28–31) increased, ... liking, ... possibly, ... essay, ] 4–5 | increased ... liking ... possibly ...
essay 2–3

(34) actions,] 2–4 | Actions; 5

(36) one's] 4–5 | ones 2–3

(38) Paradox,] 2–3, 5 | Paradox,, 4

281(4) misplaced] mis-/ placed 4–5 | misplaced 2–3

(5) rectify] 4–5 | rectifie 2–3

(9) it;] 4 | it, 2–3, 5

(10) v. 279(17), n.

(11) § 70 in 2–5 corresponds to § 45 in 1.

(11–17) I ... that] 2–5 | This, I think, is certain, That the choice of the Will is every-where
determined by the greater apparent Good, however it may be wrong represented by the
Understanding; and it would be impossible Men should pursue so different Courses as they
do in the World, had they not different Measures of Good and Evil. But yet 1

(11) wrong Judgments] 4–5 | wrong judgments 2–3

(16) , as we see,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(18) one,] 4–5 | one 1–3 consider:] 1, 3–5 | ~; 2

(22) established,] 4–5 (apoc. ''d' 5) | ~ 1–3

(25) but] add. 4–5

(26) make any doubt of] 2–5 | deny 1

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(28) and] 5 | or 1–4

282(1) pleasure:] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(2) for … part ] 1–4 | , for … part, 5

(4–7) think ... worst, ... Who] 1–4 | think, ... worst ... who 5

(6) mistakes] 4–5 | mistake 1–3

(13) mistakes] 4–5 | mistake 1–3

(13, 15) happy;] 2–5 | ~: 1

(15) mistakes] 4–5 | mistake 1–3

(18) given?] 2–5 | ~. 1

foreborn] 4–5 | forborn 1–3

(19–20) wrong Judgment] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(20) allow,] 1–4 | ~ 5

makes] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(21) Principles] 1–4 | ~, 5 prefers] 1, 4–5 | preferrs 2–3

(24)–283(16) To ... Judgment.] add. 2–5

(l. below 35) Recapitulation.] 4–5; in 2–3 and Coste, §§ 71–3 come under the same marginal
summary as § 70.

(26) suspecting,] 2–4 | , ~ 5

(31) second] 2–4; ital. 5

283(1) Will] 4–5 | will 2–3

(3) . Desire] add. 2er–5

(4) fly it:] 4 | fly it; 5 | flie it. 2–3

(5) Happiness:] 4–5 | ~. 2–3

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nay] 2–4 | nay, 5

(6) Desire] 4–5 | desire 2–3

(8) desire] 2–4 | ~, 5

(10) desire] 2–4 | Desire, 5

(12) , which ... makes] 4–5 | we then desire make 2–3

(14–15) Examination … free] 2–4 | Examination, … free, 5

(16) v. 282(24), n.

(16)–284(21) I ... imaginary.] add. 5

(17) indifferency] edit. | Indifferency 5. (Thus throughout remainder of § 71.)

(18) determination] edit. | Determination 5. (Thus throughout remainder of § 71.)

(22) decree] edit. | Decree 5

(28–30) state of darkness ... subject ... consequence ] edit. | State of Darkness ... Subject ...
Consequence 5

(35–7) Man, ... indifferent,] edit. | Man; ... indifferent 5

284(1) decree … state edit. | Decree … State 5

(3) v.g.] edit. | V.g. 5

(5–10) respect ... rest ... rest ] edit. | Respect ... Rest ... Rest 5

(11–12) trial … rest ] edit. | Trial … Rest 5

(14) Liberty: ... respect] edit. | Liberty, ... Respect 5

(16–18) motion ... motion ... case ] edit. | Motion ... Motion ... Case 5

(21) v. 283(16), 2nd n.

(22) § 72 in 2–5 replaces the section numbered 46 in 1: '§ 46. Under this simple Idea of
Power, I have taken occasion to explain our Ideas of Will, Volition, Liberty, and Necessity;
which having a greater mixture in them, than belongs barely to simple Modes, might
perhaps, be better placed amongst the more complex. For Will, for example, contains in

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it the Idea of a Power to prefer the doing, to the not doing any particular Action (et vice
versâ) which it has thought on; which preference is truly a Mode of Thinking, and so the Idea
which the word Will stands for, is a complex and mixed one, made up of the simple Ideas of
Power, and a certain Mode of Thinking: and the Idea of Liberty is yet more complex, being
made up of the Idea of a Power to act, or not to act, in conformity to Volition. But I hoped
this transgression, against the method I have proposed to my self, will be forgiven me, if
I have quitted it a little, to explain some Ideas of great importance; such as are those of
the Will, Liberty, and Necessity, in this place, where they, as it were, offered themselves,
and sprang up from their proper roots. Besides, having before largely enough instanced
in several simple Modes, to shew what I meant by them, and how the Mind got them, (for
I intend not to enumerate all the particular Ideas of each sort,) these of Will, Liberty, and
Necessity, may serve as instances of mixed Modes, which are that sort of Ideas I purpose
next to treat of.'

(22) Liberty] 2–4 | Liberty, 5

(24) led] 4–5 | lead 2–3

285(1) now] 2–4 | now, 5

(5) fancy] 4–5 | fansie 2–3

(6) mistakes] 2–4 | Mistakes, 5

(7) reputation,] 2er–5 | reputation. 2

(15–16) these … grounds ] 2–4 | these, … Grounds, 5

(17) Paragraph break here in 5, not in 4.

(18)–286(23) Before ... Power.] add. 4–5

(20) above] Coste adds marginal reference to § 4.

(23) nearly] 5 | nearly, 4

(28–32) impression ... merely ... mere] 4 | Impression, ... meerly ... meer 5

(31) Agent;] 5 | Agent, 4

(36) Action;] 5 | Action: 4

286(1) motion] 4 | Motion, 5

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(3) Active … motion] 4 | active … Motion, 5

(5) substance] 4 | Substance, 5

(7–10) Passive … Active] 4 | passive … active 5

(15–16) Active … me] 4 | active … me, 5

(17) roundness,] edit. | roundness 4–5

(20) Sun-beams] Sun-/ beams 4–5

(22–3) Action … Active] 4 | Action, … active 5

(23) v. 285(18), n.

(23) original] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(24) § 73, in 2–5, corresponds to § 47, in 1.

(26) which] 1–4 | ~, 5

(32) , or ... moved] add. 4–5

(34–5) Perceptivity ... moving] 4–5 | Thinking, and the / Power of Moving 1–3

(36)–287(2) I ... æquivocal.] add. 4–5. (Coste further adds a linguistic footnote.)

(36) Minds.] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(2) v. 286(36), n.

287(2) To] 4–5 | to 1–3

(8) Original] 2–4; ∩ 1, 5

Ideas] 1–4 | Ideas, 5

(11) Motions,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(13) only to enquire] 4–5 | to enquire only 1–3

(14) , which] add. 2–5

(14–18) Ideas, ... Knowledge; ... philosophically] 1–4 Ideas – Knowledge, ... Philosophically 5

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(22–3) Gold, ... Snow,] 1–4 Gold ... Snow 5

(24) only have] 4–5 | have only 1–3

(27) though] 4 | Though 1–3, 5

(29) else,] 1–4 ~ 5

(5) mark] 1T.er, 2–5 | make 1

288(5) Complex] 1–4; ∩ 5

(5–6) Obligation ... Lye] 2–5 (Lie 2–3, 5); rom. 1 (Lie 1).

(6) etc.] 2–4 | etc. 1

consisting] 1–2, 4–5 | consist 3

(7) distinguish] 1–4 | distinguished 5

(8) consist] 2er–5 | consists 1–2

(10) be the] 1–4 | be/ 5. (Coste 'qu'on ne regarde pas comme des marques
caracteristiques')

(10) characteristical] 1–4; ∏ 5

(16) Reflection] 1–3, 5 | reflection 4

(17) Idea,] 1er–5 | Idea 1

(19) often] 2–5 | here often 1

(20) the] 1–4; om. 5

(20) Combinations.] 4 | ~: 1–3, 5

(24) these Ideas] 2–5 | these sort of Ideas 1

(24) Notions:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

(25) Existence,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(27) put] 1–4 | puts 5

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(29) Being:] 4–5 | ~. 1–3

289(3) Understanding.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

Hypocrisy] 4–5 | Hypocrisie 2–3 | Hypocrisie 1

(7) Languages] 2–5 | Languages, 1

(11) names] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(15) such Combinations] 2–5 | them 1

(16) Ideas] 2–5; ital. 1

(22) Sacrilege, or Murther] 2–5 (',' om. 5); rom. 1

(23) which] add. 4–5

(26) seems reasonable to enquire] 4–5 | may be well enquired 1–3

(28–9) . [?5] To ... Unity] 4–5 | : And this, it is plain, it has 1–3

(l. below 35: § 4.) [2nd] the] 2–4; om. 5

(29) it] 4 | , It 5

290(3) yet,] 4–5 | yet 1–3

(4) Parricide] 2–5; rom. 1

(9) Ideas] 2–5; ital. 1

(10) settled] 4–5 | setled 1–3

(14) Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

(18) tie] 4–5 | tye 1–3

(21) Memories,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(24) shews us] 2–5 | gives us the Reason 1

(24) pass] 4 | ~, 1–3, 5

(25) many particular] add. 2–5 one single word] 2–5 | words 1

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(28) have] add. 5 (likewise Coste)

(30) Periphrases] 1-3, 5 (likewise Coste) | Paraphrases 4, 4er

(32) ὀστρακισμόϛ] edit. | ὀϛρακισμὸϛ 1–5

(32–3) Proscriptio] 2–5 | Proscripto 1

(33)–291(2) were ... Nations.] 4–5 | stood for complex Ideas, which were not in the Minds of
other People, nor had therefore any names in other Languages that answered them. 1–3

(2) v. 290(33), n.

291(4–5) Actions; ... terms:] 4–5 | Actions, ... terms; 1–3

(9) it] 4–5 | them 1–3

(11) names,] 4–5 | names 1–3

(17) Periphrasis,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(19) Words] Coste adds marginal reference to Book III.

Use:] 1–3, 5 | Use. 4

(19) Use:] 4 | Use; 1–3, 5

(22) Men,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(25) Names:] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(27) Triumph ... Apotheosis] 4–5; rom. 1–3 (Apetheosis 1–3)

(33) Names,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(34) the] 5 | these 1–4

(34) Ideas] 2–5; ital. 1

292(1–2) wrestle ... wrestling] 4–5 | wrastle ... wrastling 1–3

(12) would] 2–5 | could 1

(12) conceive;] 2–5 | ~: 1

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(13) Idea] 1–4 | Ideas 5

(17, 23) Lye] 4–5 | Lye 1–3

(21) mind] 4; ∏ 1–3, 5

(28) which] 1–4 | ~, 5

(31) [1st] have] 1–4 | ~, 5

(34) affords] 1–2, 4–5 | afford 3

(38) need] 1–3, 5 | needs 4

not] add. 1T.er, 2–5

293(3) Combinations] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(4) Ideas] 2–5; ital. 1

(15) observed,] 4–5 | observed 1–3

(17) Disorder] 5 (likewise Coste) Disorders 1–4

(17) ill made] 1–4 | ill-made 5

(19) them:] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(19) setled] 1–4 | settled 5

(23–4) what we intend,] add. 2–5

(23) Actions:] 2–4 | ~, 5 | ~; 1

(27) is that Idea,] 1T.er (without ','), 2–5 | is, that the Idea 1

(l. below 36) Thinking,] 5 Thinking 2–4

(29) call] 2–5 | call 1

Testiness] 2–5; rom. 1

(31) v.g.] 2–5 | v.g. 1

(31–3) Consideration ... Murther] 2...5; rom. 1

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(34) Actions] 1–2, 4–5 | the Actions 3

294(1) proceeds, the] 2–5 | proceeds. The 1

(3) Causes] 2–5; rom. 1

(5) Effects ... efficacy] 2–5; rom. 1

(7) [1st] subject] 2–5 | ~, 1

Action] 2–5; rom. 1

(8) Passion] 2–5; rom. 1

(10–11) it, ... Willing;] 1er–5 | it ... Willing, 1

(15) it is] 2er, 4–5 | it is they are 3 | they are 1–2

(16) [2nd] and] 2er–5 | and are 1–2

(16) me] 4–5 | me, 1–3

(17) as] add. 4–5

(20) Cause] 1–3, 5 | cause 4

(20) operating;] 1–4 | ~, 5

(23) Country-man] 2–5 | Country man 1

(24) seems] 4–5 | seem 1–3

(24) Action] 2–5; rom. 1

(32–3) the ... settled ... them.] 4–5 | the setled ... them: 1–3

(35) Sciences] 1–3, 5 | Siences 4

(36) All,] 2–4 | All 1, 5

is to shew,] 1–4 | is, to shew 5

(2 ll. below 36) also] 2–3, 5 | alse 4

(1) are which] 4–5 | are, 1–3

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295(3) Reflection,] 1–4 | ~; 5

(6) exteriour] 4–5 | exterior 1–3

(9) [1st] and] 4–5 | and, 1–3

(10–11) called ... by ... we ... of ] 1–4 | called, ..., by ..., we ... of, 5

(12) simple] 1T.er, 2–5 | single 1

(13) together;] 4 | together: 1–3, 5

(16) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotations from the Bishop of Worcester's Discourse in

Vindication of the Trinity, p. 236, and Locke's Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 27, etc.;
prefaced by 'This Section, which was intended only to shew how the Individuals of distinct
Species of Substances came to be look'd upon as simple Ideas, and so to have simple
Names, viz. from the supposed simple Substratum or Substance, which was look'd upon as
the thing it self in which inhere, and from which resulted that Complication of Ideas by which
it was represented to us, hath been mistaken for an Account of the Idea of Substance in
general; and as such hath been reprehended in these Words: ... To which Objection of the
Bishop of Worcester, our Author answers thus:'

(16) result,] 1–4 | ~; 5

(l. below 24: § 1.) Ideas] 4–5; ital. 2–3

Substances] 2–4 | ~, 5

(21) . If] 4–5 | : And if 1–3

(2) mentioned] Coste adds marginal reference to II. xiii. 19.

296(2) before mentioned;] 1–4 | before-mentioned, 5

who,] 4–5 | who 1–3

(3) on;] 1–4 | on? 5

(4) was, a] 5 | was a 4 | was, A 1–3

(8) who,] 4–5 | who 1–3

(9) it is something] 4–5 | it is something 1er, 2–3 | is something 1

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(9) not,] 4–5 | not; 1–3

(10) more,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(11) know] 2–5 | knew 1

(13) it,] 4–5 | it 1–3

(15) Qualities,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(18) of] 1–3, 5 | of 4

(19) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotations from Locke's Letter to the Bishop of Worcester,
pp. 6, etc., and his Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 381; prefaced by 'From
this Paragraph, there hath been raised an Objection by the Bishop of Worcester, as if our
Author's Doctrine here concerning Ideas, had almost discarded Substance out of the World.
His Words in this second Paragraph being brought to prove, that he is one of the Gentlemen
of this new way of Reasoning, that have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable
part of the World. To which our Author replies:'

(23) Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

Senses] 1–4 | ~, 5

(28) coexisting] 1–4 | co-existing 5

(3) which] add. 4–5

297(6–13) something ... something] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(10) thinking;] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(11) These, and] 2–5 | These and, 1

(12) speaking] 1–4 | ~, 5

(16) Horse, Stone] 4–5; rom. 1–3

Idea,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(17) Collection] 4–5 | Collection, 1–3

(19) Horse or Stone,] 4–5 (Stone; 5) | Horse, or Stone 1–3

(21) existing] 2–5 | to exist 1

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(22–3) Support … clear, ] 1–4 | ~, … ~ 5

thing] 4–5 | thing, 1–3

(28) Substance ... Spirit] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(29) something] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(33) Substance] 4–5 | Nature, or Substance 1–3

298(1) Operations,] 1–4 | ~/ 5

(2) Substance] 4–5; rom. 1–3. (Thus in rest of § 5 and in §§ 6–7.)

(4) Spirit;] 4–5 | Spirit: 1–3

(7–8) have ... distinct] 4–5 ('clear and distinct' not in Coste) | cannot know its Essence, as
'tis called, or have no 1–3

(9–10) have ... Spirit] 4–5 ('clear and distinct' not in Coste) | know not its Essence, or have
no Idea of a Spiritual Substance 1–3

(11) secret and] not in Coste

(12) sorts of] add. 4–5

(13) co-/ existing] co-existing 2–5 | coexhisting 1

(16–17) sorts of Substances] 4–5 | Substances 1–3

(16) Ideas] 4 | ~, 1–3, 5

(18) species] 4–5 | sorts 1–3

(18) we,] 4–5 | we 1–3

(19) Man ... Iron,] 4–5 (Iron; 5); rom. 1–3

(20) one 1–4 | one, 5

(22) fancied] 1, 4–5 | fansied 2–3

(25) else.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(26) one] 4–5 | one, 1–3

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find] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(27–8) Gold ... Bread] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(29) inhere,] 2–5 | inhere 1

(32) the Sun] 4–5 | the Sun 1T.er, 2–3 | Sun 1

those] 4–5 | these 1–3

299(1) : as] 4 | ? As 1, 3, 5 | ; As 2

(2) Sun] 4–5 | Sun 1–3

(4) Sun.] 4–5 | Sun. 1–3 | Sun? 1T.er

(5–6) [2nd] of ... Substance] 4–5 | particular Substance 1–3

(8) not] 4–5 | not strictly 1–3

(9) brevity's] 4–5 | brevities 1–3

(10) power] 1–3, 5 | powor 4

(12–14) Load-stone ... Substance] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(14) being as apt,] 4–5 |, ~ 1–3

(16) which] add. 4–5

(17) does,] 4–5 | does 1–3

Qualities] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(19) regularly,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(21) Fire] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(23) Charcoal,] 4–5 | Charcoal; 1–3

(25) Wood.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(26) latter] 2–5 | later 1

(l. below 35) Powers] 2–4 | Power 5

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(27) Powers,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(29) Powers,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(30–2) Subjects, ... Ideas, ... is,] 1–4 | Subjects ... Ideas; ... is 5

(35) sence] 4 | Sense 5 | sense 1–3

(4) the several sorts of] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste)

(7) Qualities] Coste adds marginal reference to II. viii.

300(10) us,] 1–4 | us/ 5

(12) parts] 1–2, 4–5 | part 3

(16) shewn] Coste adds marginal reference to II. viii. 13.

(17) its] 1–4 | it's 5

(18) anodyne] 2–5 | anodyn 1

(20) , on] 1–4 | on 5

(21) '§9.' add. 2–5

(21) Ideas] 2–5; ital. 1

(25) parts] 4–5; ∏ 1–3

(26) take notice of] 4–5 | perceive 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(32–3) altered, ... before,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~; 5

(35) Ideas.] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

301(1) Load-stone] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(3) it;] 1–3, 5 | it, 4

(4) not,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(7) therefore,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(10) not spending it self] 4–5 | keeping its weight 1–3

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(10–12) Fire; ... Weight:] 4–5 | ~ , ... ~; 1–3

(12) which 1–4 | ∏ ~, 5

(15) Light:] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(17) into] 2–5 | in 1

(19) Parts,] 2–3, 5 | Parts 4 | Parts; 1 (l. below 33: § 10.) 4–5. In 2–3, the marginal summary
for § 10 is the same as that for § 11 in 4–5, whereas in Coste § 10 comes under the same
marginal summary as that for § 9.

(28) us:] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(32) Ideas,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

302(2) loses] 2–5 | looses 1

(4) appear] 1–2, 4–5 | appears 3

(5) Eye] 1–4 | ~, 5

(8) found,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(10) infinite] 2–5 | infinitely 1

(14) [3rd] to] add. 4–5

(15) Exigences] 1–2, 4–5 | Exigencies 3

(17) magnify] 4–5 | magnifie 1–3. (Thus regularly in 1–3.)

(19) intended,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(23) Creatures] 1–2, 4–5 | Creature 3 (likewise Coste)

(25–6) living: ... World.... alter'd] 4–5 | ~.... ~: ... altered 1–3

(27) acuter] 1–4 | accuter 5

(30) , which] add. 4–5

(32) breath] 1–4 | breathe 5

(33) allotted] 2–4 | alloted 5 | alotted 1

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(35) them,] 2–5 | them 1

(1) us.] 4–5 | us? 1–3

(4) times] add. 4–5. (Coste 'dix mille fois')

303(4) acute] 1–4 | ac-/cute 5

(5–6) things ... [2nd] would] 4–5 | he would see things 1000 or 100000 less than he does
now, and so 1–3

(11) thing] 1–4 | ~, 5

(23) , at] 1er–5 | at 1

(23) If] 1–4; ∩ 5

things,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(24) ; nor] 1–4 |, nor 5

(27) Impulse] 2–5 | ~, 1

(31) a-Clock] 1–4 | a/ Clock 5

(32) , whilst] 1T.er, 2–5 | ~, 1

(33) Machin] 1–4 | Machine 5

(35) Reason,] 1–4 | ~ 5

304(2–3) . Whether] 2–5 | , ~ 1

(10) at] 2–5 | at at 1

(12) see,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

pleased,] 2–5 | ~ 1

(14) distinctly,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

does, ... times,] 4–5 | ~ ... ~ 1–3

(15) us] 1–4 | us, 5

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(18–22) Qualities, ... no doubt ... Bodies, ... cannot] 1–4 | ~ ... , ~, ... ~ ... ~, 5

(23–4) above-mentioned] 2–5 | above mentioned 1

(25) Fancy] 4–5 | Fansie 2–3 | Phansie 1

(26) Perception] 1er–5 | Conception 1

(29) though] 2–5 | tho'/ 1

(32) have:] 1–4 | ~; 5

(34) Guesses,] 2–4 | ~ 1 (/), 5

(36) needs] 4–5 | need 1–3

(39) Existence] 1–4 | ~, 5

305(1) hand] 4–5; ∏ 1–3

(2) specifick] add. 4–5

(2) Substances, ... them;] 4–5 | ~; ... ~, 1–3

(7) signifies] 2–5 | signified 1

(8) Swan] 2–4 | Swan, 5 | Swan, 1

(10) , perhaps,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(12–13) , all ... subject] add. 4–5

(16) which] add. 2–5

(18, 24) Power] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(18) co-existing] 2–5 | coexisting 1

(19) an immaterial] 4–5 | a 1–3

(19) Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(20) thus] 1–4 | ~, 5

(21) Power] 2–5; ∩ 1

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(22) notion] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(26) an immaterial] add. 4–5

(32) all,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(34)–306(8) It ... Being.] add. 4–5

(8) v. 305(34), n.

306(15, 17, 22) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(16) immaterial] add. 4–5

(17) contradistinguished] 1–4 | contra-distinguished 5

(32) finding ... operate,] 1–4 | ~, ... ~ 5

(33) in] 2–5 |, at 1

(35) Spirits:] 1–4 | ~; 5

(1) distance] 2–5 | of distance 1

307(3) Points;] 1–4 | ~, 5

(5–6) , or] 1–4 | or 5

(9) [2nd] a] add. 2–5

(13) Coach,] 1–4 | ~ 5

does,] 4–5 | , ~ 1–3

(14) , I think,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(15) : Or] 1–4 | , or 5

(17) as ... leaving] 2–5 | , to go out of the Body, or leave 1

(20) in] 1–3 | in 4–5

(20) in ... Ubi] Coste adds a linguistic note on these Latin expressions.

(21) many,] 1–4 | ~ 5

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Age,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(22) deceived,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(24) that it is] add. 4–5

(25) English] 5 | English 1–4

(26) immaterial] add. 4–5

(26) shew] 4 | ~, 1–3, 5

(27) Indeed,] 1–3 | Indeed 4–5

attributed] 1–4 | attribute 5

(28) an immaterial] 4–5 | a Spirit 1–3

(28) immaterial] 1–3, 5 | mmaterial 4

(29) an immaterial] add. 4–5. (No† in Coste)

(33)–308(1) Soul ... Spirit,] 4–5 | Souls, 1–3

(1) v. 307(33), n.

308(3) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

contra-distinguished;] 4–5 | contradistinguished: 1–3 (contra- 2–3)

(5) know] 1–4 | ~, 5

(11) one says] 1–3 | ones say 4 | one say 5

(12) means] 4 | ~, 1–3, 5

(20) pressure] 3–5. | ~, 1–2

(23) together] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(31), and] 4–5 | ; ~ 1–3

(32) dark,] 2–4 | ~ 1, 5

(33) self:] 1–4 | ~; 5

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(34) Bodies,] 1 catchword, 2–5 | ~ 1

(35) divisible;] 4 | ~, 1–3, 5

309(5) : Yet] 1–4 | ; yet 5

(7) those Surfaces] 4–5 | those Superficies 2–3 | these Superficies 1

(8) deserted] 4–5 | diserted 1–3

(10) environed] 1–4 | invironed 5

(14) where-ever] 1–4 | where ever 5

(18) Surfaces,] 4–5 | Superficies; 1–3

(20) another.] 4–5 | another: 1–3

(20) . So] 4–5 | : so 1–3

that,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(26) extension] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(30) allow,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(31) what] 1, 4–5 | ~, 2–3

think,] 2–4 | ~ 1, 5

(34–5) Thinking ... Motion] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(36) Fact] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

310(9) Man's] 2–5 | Man s 1

(10) Water] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(11) extremely] 2–5 | extreamly 1

(14) Water] 4–5 | Water, 1–3

(16) separates] 1–4 | seperates 5

(17) cohesion … another; ] 4–5 | ~, … ~: 1–3

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(20–1) Bonds, ... Cement,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(28) appears] 1–4 | ~, 5

(30) Minds,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(31) immaterial] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste)

(37) the] add. 2–5

(38) imagine] 1–3, 5 | imagin 4

311(1) together,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(3) Extremes] 2–5 | Extreams 1

(4) asunder] 1–3, 5 | a sunder 4

(9) Body,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(14) and] 4–5 | and 1–3

(19) other,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(25) experience] 1–4 | ∏ ~, 5

(29) from] 2–5 | in 1

(29) Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(30) that,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(34) motion] Coste adds marginal reference to II. xxi. 4.

(l. below 36) intelligible] Coste 'inintelligible'

(1–5) Hence ... both.] add. 4–5

312(10) evident,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(14) those] 4–5 | these 1–3

(14) Sensation] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

Reflection,] 2–5 | ~; 1

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(16) still] 2–5 | ~, 1

(22) one,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(25) Extension,] 1–4 | ~ / 5

(27) other;] 2–5 | ~: 1

difficulty,] 1–4 | ∏ ~/ 5

(30) discover,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(32) Ideas] 2–5 | ~, 1

(35) jot;] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(36) Nature] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

313(1–2) Idea ... Body,] 1–4 | Idea … Body 5

(3) , or] 1–3, 5 | or 4

(4) impulse,] 1–3, 5 | impulse 4

(5) Qualities,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(6) [2nd] of] add. 1er–5

(7) Thoughts] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(15) shewed] Coste adds marginal reference to §§ 19–21 of this chapter.

(16) immaterial] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste)

(16) Spirit] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(17) easie] 1–4 | easy 5. (Thus usually in 5.)

(18) therefore] 4–5 | thereby 1–3 such] add. 4–5

(19) Body;] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(20) cumbred] 1–4 | cumbered 5

(26–7) in our apprehensions] add. 3–5.

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(5) immaterial] add. 4–5

314(8) exist,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(13) , to] 1–3 | to 4–5

(13) Matter,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(14) conceive] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(21) immaterial] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste)

(28) Reflection;] 1–3, 5 | Reflection, 4

(28) Ideas] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(30) Knowledge … Pleasure ] 4–5 | ~, … ~, 1–3

(34) Infinity] Coste adds marginal reference to II. xvii.

(2) Shewed] Coste adds marginal reference to II. xi. 6 etc.

315(3) things,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(14–18) Being: ... of;] 1–4 | Being.... of: 5

(20) Reflection] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(25) though] 1–4 | tho'/ 5

(26) Peble] 1, 4–5 | Peb-/ ble 2–3

(36) Because] 1–4 | ~, 5

316(1) Reflection] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(11) separate] add. 4–5

(12) Beings] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(15) particularly] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | particular 4–5

(19) quickness;] 2–5 | ~, 1

(21) communicate] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

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(30–2) simple ... other] 4–5 | complex Ideas we have of Substances, are made up of no other
simple Ideas, 1–3

(31–2) the several sorts of Substances] edit. | several sorts of the Substances 4–5. (Coste
'les Idées complexes que nous avons de différentes sortes de substances')

(2) of,] 1–3 | of 4–5

(6) those] 4–5 | these 1–3

317(7) or] 4–5 | , or 1–3

(17) , considered barely in] add. 4–5

(17) though] 1–4 | tho'/ 5

(1) Idea,] 1–3, 5 | Idea 4

318(4–5) severally … does, ] 1–4 | ~, … ~ 5

(5) Faculty] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(7) Mind] 1–4 | ~, 5

(14) those several Things] 4–5 | the Things themselves 1–3

(24) Universe;] 1–4 (upper point of ';' hardly visible in 1) | ~, 5

(26–7) on one another] 2–5 | one from another 1

(5) Idea] 1er–5 | Ideas 1

(13) Related] Coste 'sujets de la Relation', with a marginal note 'Relata.'

319(13) Thus] 1–4 | ~, 5

(17) Man.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(20) Person:] 4–5 | ~; 1–3 (person 1)

(21) thing] Coste adds 'par exemple l'yvoire'. thing: [; 2–3] ... cases] 1er–5 | thing ... cases:
1

(26) Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ 5

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(27) . As] 4–5 | , as 1–3

(27–9) Contract, ... Denomination,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(l. below 31: § 1.) what.] 2–3, 5 | ~ 4

(30) Free-stone] Coste 'l'yvoire'

320(1) Father,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(2) ; Bigger, ... ; Cause,] 1–4 | , ~ … , ~ 5

(3) , at ... sight,] 4–5 |j ~ ... ~ 1–3

(4) , and Son;] 1–4 | ~, 5

(11–12) Concubine ... Wife:] 4–5 | Concubine ... Wife; 1–3

(18) . But] 4–5 | : ~ 1–3

(22) given:] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(26) : which] 4 | ; which 1–3, 5

(28) Subject] 4 | ~, 1–3, 5

(29) Relation.] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(29–30) Old ... etc.] 4–5; rom. 1–3 (etc. 1–3, 5)

(34) compared.] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

Those] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(35) Father:] 4–5 | Father; 1–3

(37) he] 4–5 (Coste 'cet homme') | it 1–3

321(3–4) referring, … things, ] 1–4 | ~ … ~ 5

(5) denominated.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(8) all.] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

v.g. … day ] 1–4 | V.g. … Day 5

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(10) himself.] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(12) , at ... time.] 4–5 | ~ ... ~; 1–3

(12, 35) v.g.] 1–4 | V.g. 5

(13) Older, and Younger] 1–4 | ∩ ~ and ∩ ~ 5

(14) Stronger and Weaker] 2–4 | ~, and ~ 1 | ∩ ~ and ∩ ~ 5

(16) positive: … Ideas, ] 4–5 | ~; … ~ 1–3

(18) ; but [But 4]] 2–5 | : but 1

(19) considered] 1–4 | consider'd 5

(28) a] add. 2–5.

(34) things:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

(35) Words…. One ] 4–5 | ~; … one 1–3

concerned] 1–3, 5 | concerned 4

(1) Grandfather,|Grandson] 1–3 | Grand-/ father, Grand-son 4–5

(3) Islander] 2–5 | Islanders 1

322(3) European, English-] 1–4; ital. 5

(4) Superior, Inferior] 2–5 | Superiour, Inferiour 1

(5) number:] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(7–8) in … whatsoever] 2–5 | with which he may agree, or disagree, or have any respect 1

(8, 12) Relation] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(13) though] 1, 4–5 | tho 2–3

(14) superinduced] 1–4 | super-induced 5 : yet] 4 | ; ~ 1–3, 5

(18) Paternity] 4–5; rom. 1–3

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(19) Humanity] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(23) Ideas] 1–4 | ~, 5

(24) compares] 4–5 | compare 1–3

(29) Substances.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(32) . v.g. Comparing] 4–5 | ; v.g. ∩ ~ 1–3

323(6) Egg,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(7) Dam and Chick] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(12) Relations:] 4 | ~; 5 | ~, 1–3

(15) Relations,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(16) in] add. 4–5

(16–17) of; … Reflection: ] 4–5 | ~, … ~; 1–3

(18) leave it past doubt,] add. 4–5

(23) lead] 4–5 | infer, and lead 1–3

(25) Words.] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(25–9) Man ... Merrier] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(30) separate,] 4–5 | separate 1–3

(2 ll. below 35: § 10.) Relative] 2, 4–5 | Related 3

(32) Relation] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(34) Relation,] 4–5 (',' om. 5) | Relation 1–3

324(3) concerned,] 2–5 | ~; 1

(3–4) Cause and Effect] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(7) notice,] 1–4 | ∏ ~ 5

(9) Qualities, and Substances] 1–4 | ~ and ~, 5

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(17) it,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(19–20) , by … is turned] 4–5 | , is by ... turned 3 | , will by ... be turned 1–2 (but 2er 'is
turned')

(30) Cause] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(l. below 30: § 1.) Ideas] 2–3, 5 | Ideas 4

325(1, 2) Effect] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(1) Cause] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(5) sorts.] 2–5 | ~: 1

(8) Being,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(11–12) thing, ... altogether] 1–4 | ~ ... ~, 5

(19) discernible] 2–5 | discernable 1

(28, 30) Cause and Effect] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(34) Place] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(35) Beings] 1er–5 | Beings, 1

(36) get] 2–5 | got 1

326(1); thus] 1–4 | : Thus 5

(11) Extremes] 1–4 | Extreams 5

(15–20) yet ... include, ... has, ... setled] 1–4 | ~, ... ~ ... ~ ... settled 5

(18) thing] 2–5 | things 1

(29) [1st] Young] 2–5; ∩ 1

(29–31) Twenty ... Young ... Seven ... Twenty ... Seven ] 2–4; ∩ 1, 5

(32) settled] 2–5 | setled 1

(34) outlasted] 1–4 | out-lasted 5

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327(2) Young, or Old] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(9–10) Names, ... Great,]1–4 | ~ … ~ 5

(11) settled] 4–5 | setled 1–3

(13) denominate] 1–4 | dinominate 5

(14) [2nd] a] 4–5 | an 1–3

(16) a] 4–5 | an 1–3

(23) Idea] 1–4 | Ideas 5

(26) Strength] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(33) Stores.] 4–5 | ~; 3 | ~: 1–2 (upper point of ':' in 2 hardly visible)

(34) Words:] 2–4 | ~; 1, 5

(35) Voyage] 2–5 | thing 1

328(1), or] 1–4 | ~ 5

(3) occasion,] 2–4 | ∏~ 5

(18) no,] 2–4 | ~? 5

refers] 3–5 | referrs 2

(27) same] 2–4 | ~, 5

(29) Notions] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

329(7) Identity] 2–4 | ~, 5

(16) , could] 2–4 | ; ∏ ~ 5

time;] 2–4 | ~? 5

(21) Diversity,] 2–4 | ~ 5

(24–5) Understanding.] Paragraph-break here in Coste

(32) times,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

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330(1) discover,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(3) a Being of any sort] 4–5 | any sort of Being 2–3

(3) is] 2, 4–5 | in 3

(6) Modes;] 2–4 | ~, 5

(9–11) place: … being, ] 2–4 | ~; … ~ 5

(11) instant,] 2–3 | instant 4–5

(11) is,] 4–5 | is; 2–3

(13) continued:] 2–4 | ~; 5

(15–16) fore-/ going] foregoing 4

(17–18) or the same Body,] add. 4–5

(19) no longer] 4–5 | not 2–3

(20) , or the same Body] add. 4–5

(26) may] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste)

(26) Horse:] 2–4 | ~; 5

(28) Masses] 2, 4–5 | Mass 3 (likewise Coste)

331(5, 17, 27) Common] 2–4; ∩ 5

(14) [1st] the] 4–5 | the same 2–3

(15) and ... Plant,] add. 4–5

(16) they exist] 4er–5 (likewise Coste) | they exist, 4 | it exists, one Body, 2–3

(29) in an Animal] add. 4–5

(30) , and] 4–5 | and 2–3

(32) away,] 2–4 | ~ 5

332(9) Borgia] 2–4 | ~, 5

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(14) be] 2–4 | be, 5

(18) , be] 4–5 | be 2–3

(19) Habitations with] 4–5 | Habitations with, and 3 | Habitants and 2

(19) with] 2–4 | , ~ 5

(24) determine] 2–3, 4er–5 | determinate 4

(26) [1st] to] 2–4 | to, 5

(27) , if] 4–5 | . If 2–3

(30) Which] 2–4 | ~, 5

(32) occurs] 3–5 | occurrs 2

Difficulties;] 2–4 | ~, 5

(2–6) . And ... Form:] 5 | : and that our Notion of a Man, whatever is talked of other
definitions, is but of a particular sort of Animal, I doubt not. 2–4

333(3) definitions ... observation] edit.; ∏ 5

(8, 9, 10, 12) Parrot] 4–5 | Parret 2–3

(9–10) discourse ... philosophize] 5 | Discourse, Reason and Philosophize 4 | discourse

Reason and Philosophize 2–3 (likewise Coste)

(12)–335(3) A ... Parrots?] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste, but in Coste2.)

(l. below 35) [Memoires ..., by Sir William Temple]

(14) Words(α)] edit. | Words* 4–5

(15)–334(21) In 4–5, the beginning of each line is marked by double inverted commas, and
with none at the end of the passage.

(17) others,] 4 | ~ 5

(25–6) plainess ... false,] 4 | Plainness ... ~ 5

(28) ; he] 4 | ? He 5

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(29) Brasil,] 4 | ~; 5

(l. below 35) past ... from 1672.] 4 | pass'd ..., ~ 5

(1) it,] 5 | it; 4

334(3) Je] edit. | Ie 4–5

(9) Brasilian;] 4 | ~, 5

said] 4 | ~, 5

(11) -man,] 4 | – 5

(19) , perhaps,] 4 | ~ 5

amiss] 5 | a miss 4

(22) In 4–5, the marginal sectional summary 'Same Man.' is repeated facing the beginning of
this paragraph.

(2 ll. below 34) Portugeze.] 5 | Portugez 4

(23) Authors] 4 | Author's 5

(27–9) close, ... Prince ... Story] 4 | ~ ... ~, ... ~, 5

(31–4) Author ... else ... talked ... Princes ] 4 | ~, ... ~, ... ~, ... Prince's 5

ye? ... belong?] 5 | ye? ... belong? 4

laughed] 4 | ~, 5

Chickens?] 5 | Chickens? 4

335(2–3) Animals, … Men ] 4 | ~; … ~, 5

(3) v. 333(12), n.

(5) Body … shaped ] 2–4 | ~, … ~, 5

(7) must … Spirit ] 2–4 | ~, … ~, 5

(10–11) thinking] 4–5 | ~, 2–3

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(15) perceiving,] 2–4 | ~ 5

(19) himself,] 2–4 | ~ 5

self:] 2–4 | Self; 5.

(Mostly in rest of this chapter, the reading in 5 is 'Self', or 'Selves', where the reading in 2–4
is 'self', or 'selves', respectively.)

(20, 21) Coste adds linguistic footnotes on 'self' and 'consciousness'.

(22) to] add. 4–5

(22–3) be, ... things,] 2–4 | ~ ... ~; 5

(29) enquir'd] 4 | ~, 2–3, 5

(30) . This] 2–4 | ? ~ 5

(33) , as ... thought,] 4–5 | ~ … ~ 2–3

(34) is] 4 | , is 2–3, 5

336(6) at least] 2–4 | , ~, 5

, which] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(7–8) say, ... selves] 4–5 ~ ... selves 2–3

(9) substance] 2–4 | ∏ ~, 5

(10) not] 2–3 (likewise Coste) | no 4–5

(11) all.... being] 2–4 ~? ... ~, 5

(12) , which] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(14) consciousness 2–4 ∏ ~, 5

(26) [3rd] self] 2–4 | Self, 5

(29) Cloaths] 4–5 | Cloths 2–3

(32) Person,] 4–5 | Person 2–3

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(37) selves] 4–5; rom. 2–3 : i.e.] 4 | ; i.e. 2–3, 5

self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

337(1, 5) himself] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(3–4) consciousness, ...; and] 2–4 | ∏ ~ ..., ~ 5

(7) : There] 2–4 | ; there 5

(8) Person,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(10) Substance,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(13) first, this] 2–4 | , ~, This 5

those,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(14) animal,] 2–4 | ~ 5

(15) an immaterial Substance] 4–5 | Spirit 2–3

(22) immaterial Substances,] 4–5 | Spirits 2–3

(31) those,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(3) is,] 2–4 | is; 5

(4) without] 2er–5 | with 2

338(8) it,] 4–5 | it 2–3

(9–10) , why I say] 2–4 | ; why, ~, 5

(12) , whilst dreaming,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(15) who] 2–4 | ~, 5

(17) transfer] 4–5 | transferr 2–3

another,] 2–4 | ~ 5

(18) with] 4–5 | after 2–3. (Coste 'entraîne après luy')

(18) , which] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

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(22) allowed,] 4–5 | ~/ 2–3

(25) possible,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(27) preserv'd.] 2–4 | ~? 5

(29) , there] 3–5 | there, 2

(30) Persons;] 2–4 | ~? 5

(31) Being,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

339(2) plain] 2–4 | ~, 5

(5) Christian] 2, 4–5 (ital. 5) | ~, 3

(6) should] 2–4 | ~, 5

(10) Socrates] 2–4 | ~, 5

(19) Soul, ... (For] 2–4 | ~ ... (for 5

(27) Man,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(29) self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(30) Spirit,] 2–4 | ~ 5

(35–6) Matter, ... Man,] 2–4 | ~ ... ~; 5

(38)–340(2) the ... Person.] Coste 'les mêmes particules de matière unies à quelque Corps
sans une conscience commune, peuvent faire la même personne.'

340(1) Matter] 2–4 | ~, 5

(4–5) able ... conceive,] 2–4 (conceive 2–3) | ~, ... Difficulty, to conceive 5

(5) , the ... Resurrection] 4–5 | at the Resurrection the same Person 2–3

(6) which] add. 4–5

(12) sees,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(16) Body] 2–4 | ~, 5

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(17–18) he ... besides] 4–5 | it would to every one be the same Cobler beside 2–3

(20) indeed] 2–4 | ~, 5

(24) [2nd] Spirit] 2er–5 | Spirits 2

(24) Man, ... Man,] 4–5 | ~ ... ~ 2–3

(26) determine,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(28) , or Soul] 2–4 | ~, 5

(29) -ever] v. Register

(29) where–ever] 2–3, 5 | whereever 4

(31) Actions,] 4–5 | Actions 2–3

(l. below 35) makes] 2–3 | make 4–5

(31) Existences,] 2–4 | ~ 5

(1) [2nd] that] add. 3–5

341(3) I,] 2–4 | I 5

(5) [2nd] self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(9) self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(12) self-consciousness] Coste adds a marginal linguistic note.

(12) am,] 4 | am 2–3, 5

(14) Substance, / | 2–3, 5 | Substance / 4

(14) Self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(14–16) (whatever ... not)] 4–5 | ~ ... not, 2–3

(15) Spiritual, or Material, Simple] 2–4; ∩ 5 Compounded] 3–4; ∩ 2, 5

(23) self] 2–3 (likewise Coste) | self 4–5

(26) separated] 2–3 (likewise Coste) | separate 4–5

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(27) Substances] 2–4 | Substance 5

(27–32) : so ... time. That ... farther;] 4–5 | . So ... time, that ... farther, 2–3

(30) attributes] 2–3, 5 | atrributes 4

self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(33) Identity] 2–4 | ~, 5

(34) Punishment;] 4–5 | Punishment, 2-3

(l. below 34: §§ 18–20.) Punishment] 2–3 | Punishments 4–5

(34) Misery, ... that,] 2–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

342(2) to,] 3–5 | to 2

(6) Yesterday] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

(6, 10) self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(8) from … Finger ] 2–4 | , ~ … ~, 5

(12) personal Identity] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(14) Mayor of Quinborough] Coste 'Roy de Mogol'

(15) Socrates] 2–4 | ~, 5

(17) sleeping] 2–4 | ~, 5

(21) like,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(23) I] add. 2er5

(26) Person,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(29) , which ... case] 2–4 | ; ~, … Case, 5

(30) , I] 3–5 | I, 2

(36) Humane] 2–4 | Human/ 5

Man's] 2–3, 5 | Man's 4

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(2) , as] 4–5 | as 2–3

343(4) self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(5–6) the … Man ] 2–4 | , ~ … ~, 5

(9) Substance:] 2–3, 5 | Substance; 4

(13) Now] 2–4 | ~, 5

(16) possible] 2–4 | ~, 5

(18) which] 2–4 | ~, 5

(19) possible,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(20–1) Ages … anothers ] 2–4 | ~, … another's 5

(24, 26) Humane] 2–4 | human 5

(25) Personal] 4; ∩ 2–3, 5

(32) consciousness] 2–4 | ∏ ~, 5

(34) Drunk and Sober] 2–4; ∩ 5

(38) Humane] 2–4 | Human 5

344(1) Knowledge:] 2–4 | ~; 5

(4–8) For ... him.] add. 2er–5

(4) Sleep] 2–4 | ~, 5

(6) be] 4–5 | is 2er–3

(6) Humane Judica– tures] 3–4 | ∩ ~ ∩ ~ 2er | Human π ~ 5

(7) justly] 2er, 4–5; om. 3 (likewise Coste)

(7) him;] 4–5 | ~: 2er–3 Fact] 3–5; ∩ 2er

(10) think,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(11) [2nd] his] 4–5 | his own 2–3

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(15) consciousness,] 4–5 | consciousness 2–3

(20–1) on ... side ... consciousness ... Intervals ] 2–4 | , on ... ~, ... ∏ ~, ... ~, 5 (23) Plato;]
2–4 | ~? 5

(26–8) in … which ] 2–4 | , ~ … ~, 5

(31–2) granting that] 4–5 | though 2–3

(31–2) Substance … granting] 2–4 | ~, … ~, 5

345(1) Years] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

(3) two] 4–5 | the two 2–3

(4) instance] 2–4 | ∏ ~, 5

(11–19) self ... [2nd] self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(11–13) it, ... Heat,] 4–5 | ~ ... ~ 2–3

(12) instance, ... given,] 4 | ~ ... ~ 2–3, 5

(14) self,] 2–4 | ~, 5

(17) : If ... which] 4–5 | ; so that 2–3

(18) join] 4–5 | join any part of its Existence 2–3

(18) consciousness,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(19) [2nd] self,] 4–5 | self 2–3

(22) it] add. 4–5

(28) Hypotheses] 3–5 | Hypothesis 2

(28) Men] 2–4 | ~, 5

(29) every] 2er–5 | very 2

(31) self] 4–5 | self 2–3

346(2, 3, 11) self] 4–5; rom. 2–3

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(2) considered,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(7, 9) that,] 2–4 | ~ 5

(8, 10) selves] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(18) Spiritual] 2–4; ∩ 5

(19) Particle] 4–5 | Particles 2–3

(19) Identity,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(22) Actions] 2–4 | ~, 5

(24) Person] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(25) finds,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(25–6) himself ... same] 2–4 | ∏ ~ ... same 5

(28) [2nd] and] 4–5 | or 2–3 (likewise Coste)

(28, 30, 34, 36) self] 4–5 (but (34) Self 5); rom. 2–3

(29) Existence] 4–5 | ~, 2–3

(31) reason,] 2–4; ∏ ~ 5

(33) Happiness] 2–4 | ~, 5

(34) of] add. 2er–5

desiring,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(35) conscious, ... happy.] 4–5 | ~ ... ~: 2–3

(36) or] 2–4 | , or 5

(38) Pain;] 2–4 | ~, 5

Reward] 4–5 | ~, 2–3

347(3) now,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(6–7) , that] add. 4–5

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(10) themselves] 2–4 | ~, 5

appear,] 4–5 | ~/ 2–3

(11) same,] 4 | ~ 2, 5 | same 3

(13) in … Subject ] 2–4 | , ~ … ~, 5

(15) yet] 2–4 | ~, 5

think,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(16) such,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(17) thing,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(18) selves] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(22–3) Body, ... Memory] 4–5 | ~ ... ∩ ~ 2–3

(25) these] 2er–5 | those 2

(l. below 35) In Coste, §§ 28, 29 come under the same marginal summary as that for §§ 26,
27.

(25) do,] 2–4 | do 5

(27) can] 4–5 | ~, 2–3

(28–9) things, ... times] 2–4 | ∏ ~ ... ~, 5

(30) Man;] 4 | ~: 2–3, 5

(31–2) yesterday ... morrow ... himself ] 2–4 | ∏ ~ ... ∏ ~ ... ~, 5

348(3) , and] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

(5) obscurity,] 2–4 | ∏ ~ 5

Matter,] 4–5 | ~/ 2–3

(7–9) applied … divers ] 4–5 | apply'd … ~, 2–3

(12) know,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

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same Spirit] 4–5; rom. 2–3

(13) Body] 2–4 | ~, 5

the] 4–5 I the 2–3

(15) Man ... Spirit,] 4–5 | Man … ~ 2–3

(17) be,] 4 | be 2–3, 5

(18) shape;] 4–5 | ~, 2–3

(19–20) remains, ... Particles,] 4–5 | remains ... Particles 2–3

(21) whereof] 2–4 | , ~ 5

(24) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotations from Locke's Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester,
pp. 165, etc.; prefaced by 'The Doctrine of Identity and Diversity, contained in this Chapter,
the Bishop of Worcester pretends to be inconsistent with the Doctrine of the Christian Faith,
concerning the Resurrection of the Dead. His Way of arguing from it, is this: He says, The
Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon Mr. Locke's Grounds, is from
the Idea of Identity. To which our Author answers:'

(l. below 24) XXVIII] 2–5 | XXVII 1

(l. above 25) Relations] Coste adds ', et sur tout, des Relations Morales'

(26) Causality] 1–4 | Casualty 5

349(4) Whiter ... More, etc.] 4–5; rom. 1–3 (etc. 1–3)

(12) origin] 2–5 | origine 1

(13–14), depending thereon,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(15) Father ... -Germans, etc.] 4–5; rom. 1–3 (-Germanes 1) (etc. 1–3)

(16) Blood] 3–5 | Bloud 1–2

(17) Country-men] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(19) we] 2–5 | me 1

(24) Pidgeons] 2–5 | Pigeons 1

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(25) -Germains] 2–4 | -Germans 5 | -Germanes 1

(26) Names,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(27) Laws,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(28) Men,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(31) these] 2–5 | those 1

(33) Languages,] 1–4 | ~; 5

(1) nor] 4–5 | or 1–3

350(4) Things,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(6) a] 4–5 | an 1–3

(12) act,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(14–16) General ... Burgher] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(14) one,] 4 | ~/ 1–3, 5

(15) Men,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(17) Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

(18) Instituted, or Voluntary;] 1–4 | ∩ ~, or ∩ ~, 5

(21) Persons,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

though] 1, 4–5 | tho 2–3

(22–6) Now ... rest; ...: yet ... reference, ... A] 1–4 | ~, ... ~, ...; ~, ... ∏ ~ ... a 5

(27–8) Patron ... Dictator] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(28) such.] 1–4 | ~; 5

(35) Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

(36) Rule,] 1–4 | ~ 5 of:] 4 | of; 1–3, 5

(37) Relation;] 1–4 | ~, 5

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that,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(3) determined] 4–5 | clear and distinct 1–3

(6) are ... shewn] 2–5 | they are, as has been shewed 1

351(8) Thus] 1–4 | ~, 5

(11) determined] 4–5 | clear and distinct 1–3

(12) that concerns] 2er–5 | concerning 1–2

(12–13) determined] 4–5 | clear and distinct 1–3

(14) Ideas.] 4–5 | Ideas, as make up the complex Idea belonging to such a Name. [: 2–3] 1–3

(15–16) up, ... good,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(17–18) hath ... § 42.] 4–5 | has been shewed [shewn 2–3] in another place, 1–3

(19) occasions,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(21) us,] 1–4 | us 5

(26) refer] 1, 3–5 | referr 2

(30) Evil,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(32) Law] 4–5 | Rule 1–3

(33) Being,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(1–2) the ... punish] 2–5 | and punish the compliance with, or 1

352(1) Power,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(7, 29) refer] 1, 3–5 | referr 2

(9–10) [3rd] Law ... Reputation] 2–5 | philosophical Law 1

(9–10) Reputation,] 3–5 | ~/ 2

(11) Men judge whether their] 2–5 | we judge whether our 1

(12) Criminal … Innocent ] 1–4 ; ∩ 5

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(13) Vertues] 2–5 | Virtues 1

(14–17) The ... themselves] 2–5 | That GOD has given a Law to Mankind 1

(16) Nature] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

(17) think] 2–5 | ~, 1

(20) it by Rewards] 4–5 | it by Reward 2–3 | by Reward 1

(21) Life:] 1–4 | ~; 5

(22–3) This ... and] add. 2–5

(22–3) touch-/ stone] touchstone 2–4 | Touch-stone 5

(23) is,] 1–4 | is 5

(26) , or misery,] 1–4 | or ∩ ~ 5

(27) Secondly,] add. 2–5

(27) Civil] 2–5; rom. 1

Commonwealth,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(28) those,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

Rule,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(29) , or] 1–4 | or 5

(30) Punishments,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(31) it,] 1–4 | it 5

(32) engaged] 2–5 | which is engaged 1

(32) it:] 4 | it; 5 | it, 1–3

(l. below 33: § 8.) Law,] 4–5 | ~ 2–3

353(1) Goods,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(2) him,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

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(4–18) The ... Thus] 2–5 | The third, which I call the philosophical Law, not because
Philosophers make it, but because they have most busied themselves to enquire after it,
and talk about it, is the Law of Vertue, and Vice; which though it be more talked of, possibly,
than either of the other, yet how it comes to be established with such Authority as it has,
to distinguish and denominate the Actions of Men; and what are the true measures of it,
perhaps, is not so generally taken notice of. To comprehend this aright, we must consider,
that Men uniting into Politick Societies, though they have resigned up to the Publick the
disposing of all their force; so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-Citizen, any
farther than the Law of their Country directs: yet they retain still the Power of Thinking well
or ill; approving or disapproving the Actions of those they live amongst, and converse with. If
therefore we examine it right, we shall find, that 1. (Cf. (24)–354(2).)

(5) Names] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

(7–8) above-/ mentioned] above-mentioned 2–5

(8–9) yet, ... Vice,] 4–5 ... ~ 2–3

(9) Names, Vertue] 4–5 | names of Vertue 2–3

(13) Name] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

(19) every where] 2–5 every-where 1

(20) Vice] 2–4 | ~, 1, 5

which] 2–5 | ~, 1

(21) consent 2–4 | ∏ ~ 5 | ∏ ~, 1

(22) World:] 1–4 | ~; 5

(24)–354(2) For ... Vice] add. 2–5

(26–7) Fellow-Citizen,] 4 | ~ 5 | Fellow Citizen, 2–3

(27) directs:] 4 | ~; 2–3, 5

(28) ill;] 2–4 | ~, 5

(29) whom] add. 4–5

354(1) dislike] 2–4 | ∏ ~, 5

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(2) v. 353(24), n.

(2) themselves,] 4 | ~ 2–3, 5

(4–5) Vice ... Vertue] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(5) , or at least not Vice] add. 4–5

(6) another;] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(6, 7) every-where] 1–4 | every where 5

(6–9) Vertue ... [2nd] Vertue] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(7) that,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(7–8) Praise-/ worthy] Praise-worthy 1–5

(9) called] add. 2–5

355(2) Nihil] 3–5; ∩ 1–2

356(6) Men] 1–4 | ~, 5

(6–7) Praise-/ worthy] 2–5 | Praise-worthy 1

(8) changed] 1–4 | chang'd 5

Yet,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(12) contrary:] 1–4 | ~; 5

(13) Discredit,] 2–5 | ~; 1

(14) every-where] 4 | every where 1–3, 5

(15–16) nothing, ... directly, ... secures,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~ 5 (17) Laws,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(21–4) mistake, ... side, ... Degree,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~ 5

(28–9) Vice ... in[spired]] This corresponds to p. 196, line 47 in 4; that place is entered,
followed, however, by a blank, in 4er.

(29) Teachers] 2–5 | ~, 1

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(31) etc.] 4–5 | etc. 1–3

(39) those,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

357(1) Mankind:] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(2) whereof] 2–5 | ~, 1

(3) that,] 1–4 | ~/ 5

(5) Penalties] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(7) on:] 1, 4 | on; 2–3, 5

many,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(9) Breaches.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

Punishments,] 1–4 | ~/ 5

(10) Commonwealth] 2–5 | Common-Wealth 1

(11) scapes] 1–4 | 'scapes 5

(15) enough, ... Dislike,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(17) himself,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(20) Thought] 2–5 | Thoughts 1. (Coste 'quelque sentiment de sa propre nature')

(l. below 34: §§ 14, 15.) In Coste, § 14 comes under the same marginal summary as that for
§ 13, the summary for § 14 in 2–5 being there applied to § 15.

(20–1) , or ... Society, ... Dislike,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~ 5

(23) irreconcilable] 2–5 | irreconcileable 1

(26) Three] 1–4; ∩ 5 [2nd] The] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(27) The] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

358(1) them:] 4–5 | ~, 2–3 | ~ . 1

(5) Rule:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

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(7) therefore,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(10–13) those, ... see, ... Ideas, ... Idea,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~ ... ~/ 5

(12) Reflection] 4–5 | Reflection, besides which, we have nothing at all in our
Understandings, to employ our Thoughts about 1–3

(14) Murther:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

(16) Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(18) before-hand] 2–5 | before hand 1

(20) those] 4–5 | the 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(21) which ... in] 4–5 | of 1–3

(22) Perception] 4–5 | that Perception 1–3

(22) Perception,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(24–7) ideas, ... disagree, ... in; ... Praise, ... vertuous ... vicious] 1–4 (vitious 1–3) | ~ ... ~ ...
~, ... ~ ... ∏ ~ ... ∏ ~ 5

(27–8) Law-/ maker] Law-maker 1–5

(28) Rule:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

(29) Duty:] 1, 4–5 | ~; 2–3

(30) [1st] the] add. 2–5

(31) lawful … unlawful ] 1–4; ∏ 5

(32) we] 4–5 | , we 1–3 Actions;] 1–4 | ~, 5

(33) soever] 2–5 | ~, 1

(35) Reflection:] 4 | ~, 5 | ~; 1–3

(36) , or ..., or] 4 | or ... or 1–3, 5

(37) , with] 1–4 | ~ 5

(1) rightly] 1er–5 | a Right 1

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359(4) Drunkenness ... Lying] 4–5; rom. 1–3

, or Lying,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(5) Modes:] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(7) Good, Bad] 1–4; ∩ 5

(8) Indifferent;] 2–5 | ∩ ~: 1

(9) Disagreement] 1–3, 5 | Disagreemrnt 4

Rule,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(10) Good ... Bad:] 1–4 (; 1–3); ∩ 5

(12) , and] 1–4 | ~ 5

(14) Duelling:] 2–5 (; 2–3) ; rom. 1 (; 1)

(17) municipal] 1–3, 5 | mnnicipal 4

(21) Man] 2–5 | Man 1

Father] 2–5; rom. 1

(23) because,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(24) Relation,] 2–5 | ~ 1

(25) of,] 1–4 | of 5

(26) Obliquity:] 1, 4 | ~; 2–3, 5

(29) a Rule] 2–5 (rule 2–3) | rule 1

(29) confusion, ... Considerations,] 1–4 | ∏ ~ ... ~ 5

(34) Name,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(36) condemn,] 4 | ~ 1–3, b

360(2) Stealing] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(3–5) Mode: ... God; ... Sin, ] 1–4 | ~; ... ~, ... ~ 5

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(4) and] 4–5 | when 1–3

(7) humane] 1–4 | Human 5

(8–9) Moral ... Relations] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(9) Volume,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(12) are,] 2–4 | ~ 1, 5

Relation.] 4 | ~: 5 | ~, 1–3

(17) see,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(19) leave] 2–5; ∏ 1

(20) it] 2–5 | It 1

(22) , or] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(27) proportional] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(32) Father] 1–4 | Farther 5

(32) of:] 4 | ~; 2–3, 5 | ~. 1

(33) Species,] 1er–5 (',' not in 1er–3) | of Species 1

(l. below 36: § 18.) Relations terminate] 2, 4–5 | Relation terminates 3

(34–6) Man; ...; And ... Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ ... : ~ ... ~ 5

361(4) [1st] The] 3–5; ∩ 1–2

(5–6) , or] 1–4, W | of 5

(8–10) Good ... one, ... all.] 4–5 | Good ... ~; ... ~: 1–3

(11) remotely,] 2–5 | ~/ 1

(16) [1st] of] 1–4, W | for 5

(19) ; it] 2–5 | : it 1

(22) equal] 1–4 | ~, 5

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(29–30) Parsley-Bed] Coste adds a marginal note on the corresponding phrase in French.

(33) or] 4–5 | , or 1–3

362(1–2) , or ... , are] 1–4 | ~ … ~ 5

(2–5) Relations ... Relation] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(5–6) doubtful, ... Substances,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(7) Words,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(8, 9) Men's] 1–4 | Mens 5

(9) Minds] 1–3, 5 | Mind's 4

(13) Moral Relations] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(16) know, ... longer,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(19) mistaken] 2–5 | mistake 1

(19) it;] 2–5 | it: 1

(20) observable in] 4–5 | of 1–3

(20) , or] 1–4 | or 5

(21) makes ... Relation] 4–5 | is evidently known by me; wherein consists my knowledge of
Relation 1–3

(23) Rectitude; ... that,] 1–4 (that 1) | ~, … ~ 5

(24) I] add. 4–5

which] add. 4–5

(24) Rule;] 2–5 | ~: 1

(2 ll. below 26) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(l. below 28) to] 4–5 | to, 2–3

(27) shewn] 2–5 | shewed 1

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(27)–363(2) taken ... Relations] 2–5 | considered the several sorts of them, as Simple and
Complex; and shewed the difference in Complex ones, betwixt those of Modes, Relations,
and Substances 1

(l. below 26) XXIX] 2–5 | XXVIII 1

363(1) complex;] 2–4 | ~, 5

(2) , and] edit. | and 2–5

v. 362(27), n.

(4–5) Mind, ... Things,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~; 5

(10) The] add. 2–5

(10) Mind,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(12) Clear, ... Obscure] 2–4 (∩ 5; ',' om. 5); rom. 1

(13) Clear ... Obscure] 2–4 (∩ 5) ; rom. 1

(14) Obscure, ... that,] 1–4 | ∩ ~ ... ~ 5

(15) Light] 2–5 | ~, 1

(17) In like manner,] 4–5 | Thus 1–3

(17) manner,] 4 | ∏ ~ 5

(19) or might] add. 4–5

(21) them] 4–5 | them so, 1–3 (likewise Coste)

(21) when-ever] 1–4 | when ever 5

(22) clear] 2–5 | clear 1

(25) obscure ... Simple ones;] 4 | ~ ... ∩ ~ ~, 5 | ~ [rom. 1] ... ~ ~: 1–3

(27–8) Simple … Complex ] 1–4; ∩ 5

(30–4) Organs; ... Memory, ... matter.... Organs, ... -hardned ] 1–4 | ~, ... ~ ... ∏ ~: ... ~ ... -
harden'd 5

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(36) well,] 1–4 | ~ 5

364(2) force,] 1–4 | ∏ ~ 5

(3) obscure] 2–5; rom. 1

This,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(5) such] add. 4–5

(6–7) as ... Organ,] add. 4–5

(8) perceives] 1–4 | perceive 5

(11, 13) confused] 2–5; rom. 1

(13) any where] 2–5 | anywhere 1

(15) perception,] 1–4 | ∏ ~ 5

(21–2) aright, ... is,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(22) confusion,] 2–4 | ∏ ~ 5 | confusion, 1

(23–5) ranked ... may] 2–5 | are supposed different enough to have different Names,
whereby to 1

(23–5) Names ... sort, ... Name] 4–5 | ∩ ~ ... ~ ... ∩ ~ 2–3

(25) apart] 1–4 | a-part 5

(27–8) Names, ... Now] 1–4 | ~ ... ~, 5

(29) Ideas] 2–5 | ~, 1

(30) is] 1–4 | , is 5

(31) keeps] 1T.er, 2–5 | keep 1

(31) by,] 2–5 | by: 1

(33) some of] add. 2–5

(33–4) [2nd] and ... Names] 2–5 | than the other of them 1

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(34) Names] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

out;] 1–4 | ~, 5

(l. below 34: § 4.) Confused] 4; ∩ 2–3, 5

365(4) following.] 4 | ~: 1–3, 5

(8) it] 1–4, W | it, 5

(8) he,] 1–4 | ~/ 5

(16) them,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(20) use] 2–5 | used 1

(25–6, 31) discernable] 1–4 | discernible 5

(35) then,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(36) not? As] 4–5 | ~: as 1–3

366(1) not:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

(2) confused.] 4–5 | ~? 1–3

(3) is] 1–4 | is, 5

(4) discernibly] 2–5 | discernably 1 . v.g.] 4–5 (V.g. 5) | ; v.g. 1–3

(5) then] 1–2, 4–5 | than 3

(6) discernible] 2–5 | discernable 1

(8) Pompey:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(10) Table,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(19) Name,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(22) Confused, ..., is] 1–4 | confused ..., is, 5

(29) Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ 5

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(33) , that] 1–4 | ~ 5

367(1) distinct,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(2) of] 2–5 | if 1

(2) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(3) , the] 1–4 | ~ 5

(7, 20) confused] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(23) Thing,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(24) distinct:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

(28, 36) confusion] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(28) Ideas;] 1–4 | ~, 5

(29) least 1–4 | ~, 5

(31) Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

(33) commune] 2–5 | communicate 1

(l. below 36: § 11.) In Coste, this marginal summary is applied to §§ 11 and 12.

(4) it] 1–2, 4–5 | is 3

368(6–9) Men's ... exactness, ... Names,] 1–4 (Mens 1) | Mens ... Exactness ... ~ 5

(9–10) undetermined, variable] 4–5 | uncertain 1–3

(14) Though] 4–5 | Though yet 1–3

(14, 21, 23) confusion] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(14) , to] 1–4 | ~ 5

(15) might] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

, be] 1–4 | ~ 5

(16) concluding] 4–5 | thinking 1–3

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(16) every-where] 1–4 | every where 5

(19) Name:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

(25) here] 1–4 | hear 5

(27) ones,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(29) Chiliaëdron] 2–4 | Chiliaedron 5 | Chiliaderon 1

(30) distinct;] 2–5 | ~: 1

(33) think,] 1–4 | ~ 5

Chiliaëdron] 1–4 | Chiliaedron 5 (also thus at369(3–4))

369(1) Men's] 1–4 | Mens 5

(2) Confusion] 3–5; ∩ 1–2

(7) reason,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(16) incomplete] 2–4 | incompleat 5 | in compleat 1

(21) also,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(23) confidently,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(26) Duration,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(l. below 37: § 14.) This] 2–4 | ~, 5

(36) very] 1–4; om. 5

370 (1–2) Parts, ... smallest,] 1–4 | ~ … ~ 5

(2) occur] 4–5 | occurr 1–3 (5–8) Parts, ... whole, ... obscure, ... Bodies, ... Divisions, ...
smalness,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~ ... ~/ ... ~ ... Smallness 5

(8) Senses;] 2–5 | ~: 1

(9–10) clear, ... general,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(10) Pars:] 2–5 | ~; 1

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(12) Idea] 4–5 | Ideas 1–3

(12) clear,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(15) 100 000] 2–4 | 100,000 1, 5

1000 000] 4 | 1000, 000 1, 5 | 1,000 000 2–3

(16) think] 1–4 | thinks 5

(18–20) . Such … does] 4–5 | ; for that will bring it no nearer the end of infinite Division than
the first half does 1–3

(19) far] 4 | ~, 5

(21–3) confess ... clear, ... Bulk,] 1–4 | ~, ... ~ ... ~ 5

(24) Bulks] 4–5 | Bulks or Extension 1–3

(25) Division] 4–5 | Divisions 1–3

after a little progression,] add. 4–5

(25) comes] 1–4 | ~, 5

(29) Number:] 1, 4 | ~; 2–3, 5

(30) Ten and One] 1–4; ∩ 5

(32) Numbers:] 1, 4–5 | ~; 2–3

(34) lost;] 2–5 | ~: 1

371(3) it;] 2–5 | it: 1

(8) gives] 1–4 | give 5

(9) . They] 4–5 | : they 1–3

(13) argue,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(18, 19, 22, 25, 29) 400,000,000] 1, 4–5 | 400, 000 000 2–3

(19) 400,000,000] 2–5 | 4000,000,000 1

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(19) 4:] 1–4 | 4; 5

(21) to 4] 1–2, 4–5 | to/ to 4 3

(24) complete] 2–4 | compleat 1, 5

(25) [1st] of] 1–4 | , of 5

(32) finite] 2–5 | ~, 1

(34) increase] 1–4 | encrease 5

372(1) argue,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(2 ll. above 5) Fantastical] 2–5 | Phantastical 1. (Likewise throughout Chapter xxx.)

(2–3) that … confused] 4–5 | them 1–3

(l. below 3) XXX] 2–5 | XXIX 1

(14) Chimerical] 4–5 | chymerical 1–3 (∏ 2–3)

(17–18) before-/ mentioned] before-mentioned 4

(20) Representations] 2–5; ∏ 1

(22) shewed] Coste adds marginal reference to II. viii. 9, 10 to end of that chapter.

(24) Whiteness,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(27) Qualities,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(28)–373(5) Appearances, ... Marks, ... know, ... with; ... themselves: ... correspondence,] 1–4
| ~ ... ~ ... ~ ... ~, ... ~; ... ∏ ~ 5

(1) , which] add. 4–5

(7) those] 2–5 | these 1

373(7) Causes,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(8) suffices,] 1–4 | ~/ 5

(10) Things,] 1–4 | ~ 5

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(12) fictions] 2–5 | fictious 1

shewn] 2–5 | shewed 1

(13) it;] 1–4 | it, 5

(16) Ideas: … so, ] 1–4 | ~; … ~ 5

(18) plain,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(19) Ideas:] 4–5 | ~. 1–3

(21) anothers?] 4–5 | another's: 1–3

(21–5) his, ... Idea, ... Combinations: ... That] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~? ... ~, 5

(26) reality,] 4 | Reality 5 | reality, 1–3

(28) real] 4–5 | real 1–3

(30) Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(34) which, ... Mind,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

signify] 4 | signifie 1–3, 5

(35) bare] 1T.er, 2–5 | barely 1

374(1) Name,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(4) Liberality.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(6) sedately] 2–5 | but sedately 1

(10) these] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(14) Deformity] 1T.er, 2–5 | Rectitude or Deformity 1

it] 4–5 | its 1–3

(15) Substances,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(18) [2nd] as] 2–5 | that 1

(19) contrary] 2–5; ∏ 1

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(21) Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(23) humane] 1–4 | Human 5

(27–9) , as these, ... Substances,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(30) existing,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

know;] 1–4 | ~, 5

375 (l. above 1) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(1–2) Adequate ... Inadequate ... Adequate ... Archetypes,] 1–4 | ∩ ~ ... ∩ ~ ... ∩ ~ ... ~ 5

(33) so] add. 1er–5

(1) In Coste, 'Entre nos Idées réelles quelques-unes sont completes et quelques autres
incompletes.'; notes are there appended on the italicized epithets, 'En Latin adæquattæ.'
and 'Inadæquattæ.', respectively.

(4) for,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(5) incomplete] 2–4 | incompleat 1, 5

(8) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(11) correspondent,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(13) Ideas] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(15) by it] add. 4–5

(16) Power,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(17–18) (and ... Idea;)] 5 | and ... Idea; 4er (likewise Coste) | (and not a fiction of the Mind,)
which ... Idea; 1–4. (Coste adds 'comme nous l'avons déja prouvé')

(23) painful] Coste adds a linguistic marginal note.

is] 4–5 | it 1–3

(24) Pain;] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(25) [2nd] Light] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

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(27) Qualities] 4–5 | Qualities 1er–3 | ~: 1

376(2) secondary Qualities] 4–5 | secundary Qualities 1–3

(3) Objects,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(5) signify] 4–6 | signifie 1–3

(6) Powers,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(9) Organs] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(11) Pain] 4 | Pain, 1–3, 5

(11) Light,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(21) shew,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

adequate] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(22) Ideas] 2, 4–5 | Ideas 1, 3

(25) are,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(29) which] add. 4–5

(32) sides] 4–5 | sides, 1–3

(32) complete] 2–4 | compleat 1, 5

(34) plain,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(35–6) compleat] 1, 4–5 | complete 2–3

(36) Triangle] 4–5; rom. 1–3

377(2) Angles:] 1–4 | ~; 5

(3) complete] 2–4 | compleat 1, 5

where-ever] 1–4 | wherever 5

however] 2–5 | howe-ever 1

(4) Substances] 4–5; rom. 1–3

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(6) Constitution,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(7) Ideas] 1–3, 5 | Idas 4

(8) something,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(9) inadequate ... Relations] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(16) Combination:] 1–4 | ~, 5

(18, 23) adequate] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(24–5) Good-/ liking] Good-liking 4

(25) him,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(32) wrong] 4–5 |~, 1–3

(33, 36) inadequate] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(37) referrs] 3–4 (referes in some copies of 4) | refers 1–2, 5

(38) it,] 4 | it; 5 | it: 1–3

378(3) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(5) Names] 3–5 | ~, 1–2

(8) Archetype,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(8–9) Modes ... inadequate] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(10) mixed Modes] 4–5; rom. 1–3

other;] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(11) Speaking,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(12) shewed] Coste adds marginal reference to II. xxiii.

(13) Now] 1–4 | ~, 5

(16–17) of those qualities] add. 2–5

(16–18) Mind, ... exist, ... Originals,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~ 5

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(18) those] 2–5 | their 1

(23) Ideas, ... Men's] 1–4 | ~ ... Mens 5

(24) referr] 2–4 | refer 1, 5

(27) kind] 1–4 | kinds 5

(27) Individual … is ] 1–4 | ~, … is, 5

(29) strange,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(33) call'd] 1–4 | called 5

(34) meaning,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(below 36) referr'd ... Essences] 2–4 | refer'd … Essences, 5

(1) [2nd] to] add. 4–5

379(2) adequate] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(4) it has been shewn] 4–5 | has been shewn 2–3 | has been shewed 1. (Coste 'j'ai déja
montré')

(5) Ideas] 1–4 | ~ 5

(7) Substance;] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(10) and] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(15) Iron] 4–5 | Iron 1–3

(18) or] 5 (likewise Coste) | nor 1–4

(20) [2nd] Weight] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(24) Matter] 1–4 | ~, 5

(26) Gold] 4–5 | Gold 1–3

(27) peculiar] 2–5 | ~, 1

(35) Essence] 4–5 | real Essence 1–3 (likewise Coste)

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(37) bulk;] 1–4 | Bulk, 5

380(4) form] 2–5 | form 1

(5) before.] 1–3 | before, 4 | before; 5

(7) putting] 1–3, 5 | puting 4

(7) though] 1–4 | tho' 5

(9) Matter,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(10) Matter,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(13) substantial form] 2–5 (';' 5); rom. 1

(14) Form] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(18) suppose] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(24) Name] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(27) name,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(31) it.] 4–5 | it: 1–3

they,] 2–5 | ~ 1

(32) not,] 1er–5 | not 1

(33) Essence,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(34) Mind] 1–4 | Minds 5

(37) Substances,] 1–4 | ~ 5

381(1) co-/ existing] co-existing 4

(3) imagine,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(5–6) Substances, ... Minds: ... Copies,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~; ... ~ 5

(6) exactly, 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

fully,] 1–4 1–5

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(7) Powers] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(10) Ideas,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(18) Idea,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(19) plain,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

Ideas 2–5 | Ideas 1

(20) deficient,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(22) Powers;] 1–3 (likewise Coste) | Powers 4 | Powers, 5

(23) that] add. 4–5

(23) Powers,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(29) Substance,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(31) , or] 4–5 | ; on its 1–3

(31) Essence,] 4 | ~ 5

(33) Body;] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(35) both] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

Eyes,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(36) Idea,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

382(1) Fusibility,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(2–3) ; Another] 4–5 (∩ 5) | : ~ 1–3

(3) Ductility,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

Riffa,] 1–4 | ~; 5

(5) insensible] 2–5 | sensible 1

(5) Figure] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

it,] 1–4 | it 5

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(6) Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

(7) Gold] 4–5 | Gold 1–3

(9) doubt,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(10) Idea.] 2–5 | ~: 1

(12) Gold,] 4–5 | Gold; 1–3

(14–16) And ... Properties, ... Ideas, ] 1–4 | ~, ... ~ ... ~ 5

(16) Gold] 4–5 | Gold 1–3

(17) , perhaps, that not] 4–5 | that not, perhaps, 1–3. (Coste 'ce ne seroit peut-être pas')

(22) consider,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(23) Triangle] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(24) though] 1–4 | thought 5

numbers] 1–2, 4 | number 3, 5 (likewise Coste)

(24) , that] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(26) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(27) inadequate.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(29) Properties,] 1–3, 5 (',' om. 5) | Propetires, 4

uncertain,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(30) Ellipsis] 4–5 | Elypsis 1–3

383(1, 35) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(2, 12, 15, 21, 32) adequate] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(5, 8) Power] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(8–10) Mind; ... Power,] 1–4 | ~, ... ~; 5

(9) it] 4–5 | its 1–3

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(11) Sensation] 4–5; ∩ 1–3

(12) adequate] Coste adds a linguistic footnote.

(14) '§ 13.' add. 2–5

are] 1–3, 5 (likewise Coste) | or 4

(l. below 35: § 14.) Ideas] 2–3, 5 | Idea 4

(14) Substances] 1–4 | ~, 5

(18) Substance.] 1–4 | ~: 5

(23) Substance,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(26–8) Qualities, ... Powers,] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ 5

(l. below 35) , inadequate] 2–4 | ~ 5

Relations] 2–4 , 5

384(6) exist;] 2–5 | ~: 1

(l. above 10) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

(10) Falshood] 2–5 | ~, 1

(13) Significations?] 2–5 | ~, 1

(22) thing,] 1–4 | ~ 5 true or false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(24) Truth;] 1–4 | ~, 5

(26) true] 4–5 | true 1–3

(2 ll. below 31) Idea … Mind] 2–4 | ~, ... ~, 5

385(1, 15) true or false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(3, 28) false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(11) When-ever] 2–4 | Whenever 5 | When ever 1

refers] 1, 4–5 | referrs 2–3. (Sim. at (26))

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(18–20) Men's … same, ] 1–4 | Mens … ~ 5

(24) true … false ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(30–1) yet … only ] 1–4 | ~, … ~, 5

(l. below 35) thing] 2–4 | ~, 5

(2 ll. below 35) refer] 4–5 | referr 2–3

(33) that,] add. 4–5

386(7) that,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(8) Reason,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(10) them ... Species; ... kinds, ] 1–4 | ~, ... ~, ... ∏ ~ 5

(12) Course] 1T.er, 2–5 | Couse 1

(15) Discourse,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(20) asks,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

Enquiry] 1–4 | ~, 5

(22) it;] 1–4 | it, 5

(24) Idea,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(25) it;] 4–5 | it, 1–3

(27) Speaking] 1–4 | ~, 5

(29) such,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(31) do] 1–4 | do, 5

(32) belong.] 4–5 | ~: 1–3

(38) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

so] 4–5 | so 1–3

387(1) Senses] 4 | ~, 1–3, 5

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satisfy] 4–5 | satisfie 1–3

himself,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(2) Names,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(3) use] 1–5 | use, 1er

Number,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(4) doubts] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

rectify] 4–5 | rectifie 1–3

(8) of Ideas] add. 4–5. (Not in Coste)

(10–11) Ideas, … same, ] 1–4 | ~Ideas, ... same, ... ~ 5

(15–20) to, ... Substances, ... Actions; ] 1–4 | ~to, ... Substances, ... Actions; ... ~ ... ~, 5

(23) Names] 1er–5 | Name 1

(23–4) [2nd] the … Justice ] 2–5 | our Idea we call Justice 1

(23) false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(25) that,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

Name.] 2–5 | ~, 1

(28) Names] 1er–5 | Name 1

(32) Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(34) '§ 12.' add. 2–5

(35) Men's] 1–4 | Mens 5

(l. below 35) sense] 4–5 (∏ 5) | sence 2–3

388(2–3) Species, … Standard, ] 1–4 | ~ … ~ 5

(4) refer] 1, 4–5 | referr 2–3

(5) a Standard] 2er–5 | Standards 1–2

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(5) as] 1–4 | , as 5

(9) Truth … Falshood ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(15–20) Ideas, ... Laws, ... else, ... Appearances, ... Powers, ] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~ ... ~ ... ~ 5

(23) Falshood] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(25–7) God … another; ] 1–4 | ~, ... ~, 5

(28–9) Occasion, … think, ] 4–5 | ~: … ~ 1–3

(33) by … operation ] 4–5 | operating regularly and constantly 1–3

(36) Violet] 4–5; rom. 1–3

389(2, 4) Blue] 4–5 | Blue 1–3

(5) Violet] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(7) us] Coste adds marginal reference to II. xxiii. 12.

(8) In § 14, 'Violet' and 'Blue', in italic or in roman, are given by Coste as 'souci' ['marigold']
and 'jaune' ['yellow'], respectively.

(9) Falshood] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(11) Men's] 1–4 | Mens 5

(12) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

Idea,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(12–14) Violet … Marigold ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(15) known:] 1–4 | ~; 5

(18–19) Falshood … Violet ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(19) Things,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(20) Blue] Coste 'bleuâtre'

(20, 21) Idea,] 1–4 | ~ 5

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(20–1) Blue … Marigold ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(22–5) Yellow … Yellow ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(22–4) Mind; … understand, ] 1–4 | ~, … ~ 5

(25) Blue] Coste 'bleu'

(l. below 35) Though] 2, 4–5 | The 3

(27) same,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(27, 29) Men's] 1–4 | Mens 5

(29–31) undiscernibly … offered [''d' 5] :] 4–5 | undiscernably … ~; 1–3

(l. below 35) Though] 4–5 | Tho 2–3

Blue,] 2–4 | ~ 5

390(2) think] 4–5 | ~, 1–3

(6) us:] 1–4 | us, 5

(9) false … Sweet ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(12–13) truly, … misapply'd: ] 4 | ~truly, ... misapply'd: ... ~; 1–3, 5

(15) Purple, Scarlet] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(21) Ideas,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(23) Conveniencies] 1–3, 5 | Conveniences 4

(25) an one] add. 4–5

(25, 28) false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(26) find,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(27) Truth … Venue] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(30) Frugality] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(33) [2nd] false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

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(36) that] 1–2, 4–5 | this 3

391(2) Patterns,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(3) Ideas.] 4–5 | ~: 2–3 | Ideas: 1

(5) Things,] 1–4 | ~ 5

union:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

Shape, … Size, ] 1–4 | ~ … ~ 5

(8) Nature:] 4 | ~; 1–3, 5

(9, 10, 23) false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(10) when] 4–5 | when 1–3

(10–12) Ideas, … Idea, ] 1–4 | ~Ideas, ... Idea, ... ~ 5

(14) Weightiness,] 4–5 | ~ 1–3

(15), than] 1–4 | ~ 5

(16–18) Lead ... Copper, ... Fixedness. ] 4–5 | ~, ... ~; ... ~: 1–3

(23) one:] 1–4 | ~; 5

(24) Ideas,] 4 | ~ 1–3, 5

(25) together,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(28, 29, 31) true … false ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(31–4) true, ... Truth, ..., or ..., or ..., of ] 1–4 | ~true, ... Truth, ..., or ..., or ..., of ... ~ ... ~ ...
~5

(35) Words,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

mental,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(36–8) Truth … Falshood ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

joining, ... do, ..., agree, ...: and ] 1–4 | ~ ... ~ ... ~ ...; ~ 5

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(1) which] add. 4–5

392(2) , or not,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(3, 5) false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(4) Representations] 1–4 | Representation 5

(l. below 33: § 21.) In Coste, the summaries for §§ 21–4 are 'En quel cas elles sont fausses.
Prémier cas.', 'Second cas.', 'Troisiéme cas.', 'Quatriéme cas.', respectively.

(9) falshood is] 4–5 (is 5); rom. 1–3

(11) same,] 1–4 | ~ 5

Men's] 2–4 | Mens 1, 5

(12), or] 1–4 | or 5

(23) complete] 2–4 | compleat 1, 5

Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(25) complete] 2–4 | compleat 1, 5

(27) Regia … Ideas, ] 1–4 | ~, … ~ 5

those] 1–2, 4–5 | the 3

(30) Idea] 2–5 | Idea 1

(31) Properties,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(l. below 33) When] 4–5; ∩ 2–3

(3 ll. below 33) adequate] 2–4 | ~, 5

393(2) Body,] 4–5 | ~; 1–3

(9) including a Space] 4–5 | meeting at three Angles 1–3

(11–12), their ... lie] 2–5 | their ... lie, 1

(15–16) (which ... Idea, ... pleases) ] 4 | , (~ ... ~ ... ~) 5 | ; ~ ... ~, ... ~, 1–3

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(19) wrong, … Thing, ] 1–4 | ~wrong, ... Thing, ... ~ 5

(19, 22, 27, 33) false] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(23, 31, 32) Man … Tartar ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(25) Idea,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(27) lie] 1–4 | lies 5

(l. below 36: § 25.) Coste 'Cinquiéme cas.' in Table of Contents but not in text.

(27) falshood] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(31) [2nd] or] 4–5 | , or 1–3

(32) , or] 1–4 | or 5

fantastical] 2–5 | phantastical 1

(36) Names;] 1–4 | ~, 5

(1) right, or wrong] Coste adds a linguistic footnote.

394(1) Ideas] 2–5 | Ideas 1

agree,] 1–4 | ~ 5

(3–5) true … Falshood ] 4–5; rom. 1–3

(3, 5) , or] 1–4 | or 5

(6) virtually] 1–4 | vertually 5

(10) them] 2–4 | them, 1, 5

(11) refer] 1, 4–5 | referr 2–3

[The text of Bk. II, Chap. xxxii in W is representative of its departures in formal respects—
both in sorts and extent—from its sources in 5 and 6. In each section, throughout the
Essay, the readings in 5 and 6 are almost or entirely the same, whereas W frequently
diverges from them in the use of capitals, of apocopated forms, of italic type, and of
punctuation; the lastmentioned is relevant in considering whether the departures of 5 from
4 in pointing, which are quite common in Bk. II, are authentically Lockian: many of them
(and of other formal departures) are, in my estimation, not Lockian but compositorial. I

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record here, by sections, the readings in W that diverge from 5 in Bk. II, Chap. xxxii, §§ 1–13
(384(10)–388(14)); marginal summaries are disregarded. The inferior caret ‸ marks absence
of punctuation.

§ 1. Tho ... term'd ... false‸ ... Tho ... term'd ... Occasions‸ ... call'd ... Affirmation‸ ... reason ...
Ideas‸ ...

§ 2. Indeed‸ ... word ... things ... Tho ... things call'd ... sense ... ‸perhaps‸ ... tho ...

§ 3.... Truth‸ ... examine‸ ... words ... Minds‸ ...false; the ... name pronounc'd ... Mouths‸ ...
Falshood‸ ... mental or verbal ...

§ 4.... call'd ... Reference‸ ... false, ...

§ 5.... call'd ... [2nd para.] ... Man‸ ... suppos'd ... [3rd para.] ... to ...

§ 6.... Suppositions‸ ... Knowledg ... by‸ ... things ... Knowledg ... thing ... Knowledg ...
things ... themselves‸ ... Knowledg ... business, Knowledg ... shew'd ... reason ... things ...
annex'd ...

§ 7.... [386(13)] Knowledg; ... find‸ ... use ... thing ... [(16)] name ... thing ... kind ... Enquiry‸
... carry'd ... Knowledg ... of it; ... suppos'd annex'd ...

§ 8.... Knowledg ... things ... refer'd ... ‸do‸ ... Language‸ ... of their ... things ...

§ 9.... judg'd ... Ideas are ... of all ...; because ... use ... for; number ... such‸ ... Idea Green ...
Sweet ... Bitter: much ... Colour‸ ... [(9)] name ... mean‸ ...

§ 10.... respect ... mix'd ... Substances‸ (... apply'd ... care ... words ... Substances,... mix'd
Modes‸ ... uncertain; ... call'd Justice‸ ... Cruelty, Liberality‸ ... word‸ ... ‸perhaps‸ ...

§ 11.... mix'd ... sort‸ ... mark'd ...; this ... our ... of mix'd ... reason ...

§ 12. The ... whereof ... [(4)] we ... mix'd ... Standard‸ ... those‸ ... so‸ ... conform‸ ...
reference ...

§ 13.... of our Ideas ... reference ... things; ... term'd ....]

(13) This chapter (and Book II) concludes in 1–3 with a further section, § 27, which is omitted
here in 4–5 but is the concluding section, § 19, of the next chapter, added in 4–5

(l. below 13) This chapter add. 4–5.

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394(15) Extravagant] 4; ∩ 5

(18) espie] 4 | espy 5

395(4) farther] 4 | ~, 5

(11) always … occasions ] 4 | ~, … ∏ ~, 5

(13) Civil] 4; ∩ 5

(17) bye] 4 | by 5

(20) consideration] edit. (∏ 5) | consideration 4

(21) suggested] 5 | suggest'd 4

(30) this] 4 | ~, 5

(31) Custom;] 5 | Custom, 4

(l. below 36: § 4.) Coste 'Pourquoy on luy donne le nom de folie?'

(34–5) Understanding ... two ... gang ... inseparable ] 4 | ~, ... ~, ... ∏ ~, ... ~, 5

396(2) chance,] 4 | ∏ ~; 5

(7–10) going ... treading ... easy ... Natural ] 4 | ~, ... ~, .–. . ~, ... ∩ ~ 5

(8) on] 4; om. 5

(11) Minds;] 5 | Minds, 4

(14–17) Tune ... find ... Understanding] 4 | ~, ... ~, ... ~, 5

(21) Fingers] 4 | ~, 5

(22) Spirits,] 5 | Spirits: 4 determine,] 5 | determine 4

(22) soever] so-/ ever 4–5

by … Instance ] 4 | , ~ … ~, 5

(24) Intellectual] 4; ∩ 5

(26) question] 4 | ~, 5

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(30) Natural] 4; ∩ 5. (Thus throughout §§ 7–8.)

397(4) them] 4 | ~, 5

(8) Dislike ... Vomiting] 4 | ~, … ~, 5

(14) In Coste, § 8 has a separate marginal summary: 'Combien il importe de prévenir de

bonne heure cette bizarre connexion d'Idées.'; this is applied also to § 9.

(16) purpose,]5 | purpose 4

(16) purpose] 4; ∩ 5

(25) deserves; nay,] 5 | deserves, nay / 4

(28) another,] 5 | another 4

(30–1) , perhaps,] 4 | ~ 5

(33) Sprights] 4 | ~, 5

(34) Light;] 5 | Light, 4

(l. below 34:§§ 10–12.) In Coste, 'Exemple de cette liaison d'idées.', 'Autre exemple.', and
'Troisiéme exemple.' are the marginal summaries for §§ 10, 11, and 12, respectively.

(34) Darkness] 4 | ~, 5

398(4) joined] 4 | ~, 5

(8) Mind,] 5 | Mind 4

(10) suffered] 4 | ~, 5

(16) Room;] 5 | Room, 4

(29) Mother's] 5 | Mothers 4

(l. below 36) Coste 'Quatriéme exemple.'

(30) ; use] 4 | : Use 5

(34) and] 4 | , ~ 5

399(12) joyn] 4 | join 5

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(18) commodious] 4 | ~, 5

(25) subjected] 4 | ~, 5

(30–1) Houshold-/ stuff] thus also 4 (presumably, intrinsic hyphen) | Hous-/ hold Stuff 5

(l. below 35) Instances] 5 | Instnaces 4

400(7) contracted] 4 | ~, 5

(12) Childhood] 4 | ~, 5

(15–19) Let … enquiry. ] Not in Coste

(15) Infallibility] edit. | Infallibility 4 | Infability 5

(17) Body] 4 | ~, 5

(18–19) infallible] 4 | infalible 5

(21) Irreconcilable] 4; ∩ 5

(24) Interest,] 5 | Interest 4

(32) Sence] 4 | Sense 5

401(1) Sence] 4 | Sense 5

(5) obtains,] 5 | obtains 4

(6) disjoin'd,] 5 | disjoin'd 4

(8) rivetted] 4 | riveted, 5

(12) it,] 5 | it. 4

(18) This section is § 27 of Book II, Chapter xxxi in 1 and Chapter xxxii in 2–3.

(21) at] 1–2, 4–5; om. 3

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