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Mission The mission of Studies in Intelligence is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community
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Studies in Intelligence
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Awards Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of
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i


ii 
 

Studies in Intelligence
Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)
CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE

Washington, DC 20505
Contents
EDITORIAL POLICY
Historical Perspectives
Articles for Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any historical, opera- Evolution of Surveillance Policy
tional, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of US Intelligence, Domestic Surveillance, and the
intelligence. Time of Troubles 1
David Robarge
The final responsibility for accepting
or rejecting an article rests with the Analytic Tug-of-War
Editorial Board. Cambodia’s Role in Shipping Arms to Communist
Forces in South Vietnam, 1966–70: Competing CIA
The criterion for publication is whether,
and US Military Estimates 11
in the opinion of the board, the article
Richard A. Mobley
makes a contribution to the literature of
intelligence. Board members are all ac- From the Archive
tive or former Intelligence Community
Unpopular Pessimism: Why CIA Analysts Were So
officers.
Doubtful About Vietnam 29
EDITORIAL BOARD Hal Ford

John M. Pulju (Chair) An Innovative Approach to Learning

Sheridan Bahar Project Management Training at CIA 41
Dawn Eilenberger Joe Keogh and Richard Roy
Jennifer Ewbank
James D. Fitzpatrick, III Commentary
Steven Galpern
Brent Geary
Paul Kepp
Martin Kindl 47
Maja Lehnus Chris Rasmussen
John McLaughlin
Manolis Priniotakis Intelligence in Public Media
Mark Sheppard
Monique N. Todd Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine 53
Reviewed by Michael J. Ard
EDITORS
North Korea & the Global Nuclear Order: When Bad
Joseph W. Gartin (Managing Editor) Behaviour Pays
Andres Vaart (Production Editor)
and
The United States–South Korea Alliance: Why It May Fail
and Why It Must Not 55
Reviewed by Yong Suk Lee

(Continued on the following page.)

 iii
 

Intelligence in Public Media (cont.)

Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender 59

Reviewed by Charles Long

Sparks: China’s Underground Historians and Their Battle for the Future 63
Reviewed by Emily Matson

Cashing Out: The Flight of Nazi Treasure 1945–1948 67

Reviewed by JR Seeger

The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s 69

Reviewed by James Van Hook

American Traitor: General James Wilkinson’s Betrayal of the

Republic and Escape from Justice 71
Reviewed by David A. Welker

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf—June 2024 73

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake and other contributors

v v v

iv Studies in Intelligence
 

C ontributors

Article Contributors
Hal Ford joined CIA in 1950 and served in a variety of positions focused on East Asia,
Vietnam, and China. He left CIA in the early 1970s to enter academe and work on
Capitol Hill. Ford returned to CIA in 1980 to lead the newly established National Intelli-
gence Council. He retired in 1986, but continued to serve as a contract historian on CIA’s
History Staff. He died in November 2010.
Richard A. Mobley was a career naval intelligence officer before entering and then com-
pleting a second career as a military analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis. With publi-
cation of this article, Mobley will have contributed six articles to Studies in Intelligence.
Joe Keogh and Richard Roy were career staff officers in CIA’s Directorate of Science and
Technology who helped develop and teach the PMC during the early 1990s. Both are now
retired.
David Robarge is CIA’s chief historian.
Chris Rasmussen is a Department of Defense officer and creator of the public-facing
OSINT product platform, www.tearline.mil.

Reviewers
Michael Ard is a former CIA officer. He is now a professor at Johns Hopkins University,
where he directs the graduate program in intelligence analysis.
John Ehrman is a retired CIA analyst.
Yong Suk Lee is a former senior CIA analyst and manager.
Charles Long is the pen name of a retired CIA operations officer.
Emily Matson is a new contributor. She is assistant teaching professor of Modern Chinese
History at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and
Georgetown College of Arts & Science, Department of History.
Hayden Peake served in CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology.
He has contributed to the Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf since 2002.
J.R. Seeger is a retired CIA paramilitary officer and a frequent media reviewer for Studies.
James Van Hook is a new contributor. He is an analyst in CIA’s Transnational and Tech-
nology Mission Center.
David Welker is a member of CIA History Staff.

v v v

Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  v

Evolution of Surveillance Policy

US Intelligence, Domestic Surveillance, and the Time of Troubles

David Robarge

After a prolonged debate, in April “old guard” on Capitol Hill that had
2024 Congress approved a two- run the oversight committees since
year extension of Section 702 of the the late 1940s had largely dwin-
Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance dled through retirements, electoral
Act (FISA).a Concerns about the risk defeats, and deaths. Replacing it
The IC’s protective to privacy of US citizens versus the was a younger, more liberal cadre
“old guard” on Capitol Intelligence Community’s role in of members much more inclined to
defending against terrorism, cyber, criticize what the IC was doing. CIA,
Hill that had run the and foreign malign influence and NSA, FBI, and Army activities that
oversight committees other threats with domestic compo- involved technical and physical
since the late 1940s nents recalled revelations during the surveillance and collection against
1970s of domestic spying. Fifty years Americans and appeared to violate
had largely dwindled ago the political fallout led to lasting departmental charters or consti -
through retirements, changes in IC practices and executive tutional limitations caused the
electoral defeats, and and congressional oversight. greatest alarm when they were
disclosed through media exposés and
deaths. Replacing it The 1970s was a difficult decade official investigations in 1974–76.
was a younger, more for the IC, as it suddenly found itself
under political attack from many
liberal cadre of mem- quarters for conducting activities that, Opening the Mail
bers much more in- although presidentially sanctioned,
For varying lengths of time
clined to criticize what were no longer considered appropri-
between 1952 and 1973 in four US
ate for intelligence agencies or about
the IC was doing. which Congress and the US public
cities, CIA conducted four programs
to cover (i.e., to record the sender and
had been unwitting. The IC was
recipient) and open mail sent between
caught up in the nation’s growing dis-
the United States and the Soviet
trust of government caused by official
Union, China, and Cuba.1b The pur-
evasion and prevarication about the
pose of the programs was to acquire
Vietnam War and the Watergate scan-
information about Soviet and Chinese
dal. In addition, the IC’s protective
intelligence activities in the United

a. According to the Director of National Intelligence Section 702 Overview, “Section 702
is a key provision of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 that permits the [US] government
to conduct targeted surveillance of foreign persons located outside the United States, with
the compelled assistance of electronic communication service providers, to acquire foreign
intelligence information. The government uses the information collected under Section 702
to protect the United States and its allies from hostile foreign adversaries, including terror-
ists, proliferators, and spies, and to inform cyber-security efforts.” (Source: https://www.
dni.gov/files/icotr/Section702-Basics-Infographic.pdf)
b. The postmasters general and chief postal inspectors concurred with the mail covering,
but only one inspector—a former CIA officer—clearly knew about the mail opening.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US
government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of
the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  1



Evolution of Surveillance Policy

States, conditions inside denied secret writing and censorship tech- governments—the Soviet Union and
areas, and tradecraft and potential niques and some counterintelligence the PRC, but possibly also North
counterintelligence leads. The pro- leads but did not provide enough Korea, North Vietnam, Algeria, and
grams took place in New York City intelligence to warrant the effort it others—and what the secret funding
(1952–73), Hawaii (1954–55), New required and the “flap potential” it and other support was being used
Orleans (1957), and San Francisco possessed. Angleton claimed the for. DCI Richard Helms remembers
(1969–71). The Soviet Union was operation had been valuable, but Johnson saying, “Can’t [the CIA] find
the target of the New York project, internal reviews in the 1960s reached out what’s going on here? Look at
known as SRPOINTER by the Office the opposite conclusion. DCI James these people in the streets; we can’t
of Security and HTLINGUAL by Schlesinger terminated HTLINGUAL imagine that good Americans do
the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff. in 1973, agreeing with operations things like this.”
Because the CI Staff directed the chief William Colby’s judgment that
operation longer, the latter cryptonym the “substantial political risk [was] Helms initially believed that CIA
is better known. not justified by the operation’s con- could support Johnson’s request and
tribution to foreign intelligence and stay inside the terms of its charter as
Soviet Russia Division in the counterintelligence collection.” long as it concentrated on the foreign
Directorate of Plans (the Directorate countries or networks and deferred
of Operation’s predecessor) and the to the FBI on the domestic side.
Office of Security ran the program at CIA’s “Domestic Espionage” Because MHCHAOS was so fraught
first, and the CI Staff took it over in with potential controversy, however,
On August 15, 1967, under
1955. At that time, James Angleton, Helms placed it inside the secretive
presidential direction, CIA began
head of the CI Staff, proposed that CI Staff and had the program chief
investigating possible links between
CIA review all mail to and from the report directly to him.
US antiwar protesters and hostile
Soviet Union that went through New
foreign governments.2 Codenamed CIA gave its first response to
York and open about 2 percent of the
MHCHAOS, the program expanded President Johnson in November
letters (approximately 400) monthly.
to include overseas collection on 1967. The operation had uncovered
Richard Helms, then the CIA’s sec-
the foreign contacts of other radical no significant foreign support for the
ond-ranking operations manager and
groups and a few operations inside protests. Several months later, the
later Director of Central Intelligence
the United States targeting American agency concluded that the radicalism
(DCI), approved this phase of the
citizens. The program was publi- of many of US and other nations’
program, which began in early 1956.
cized in 1974 and became one of the youth stemmed from genuine domes-
The FBI became aware of focuses of congressional and media tic social and political factors and was
HTLINGUAL in 1958 and began scrutiny of CIA that further eroded not the result of manipulation from
receiving information and levy- public trust in the CIA during its abroad. These findings, however,
ing requirements soon after. CIA’s “time of troubles” in the 1970s. only made the White House keener to
Technical Services Division opened uncover foreign connections, which
Seeing the growing intensity of
a facility in New York in 1961 to supposedly were so sophisticated that
domestic opposition to the war in
work exclusively on mail opening. CIA would have to use more creative
Vietnam, especially from American
According to CIA records that were methods to find them.
youth in urban areas and on college
disclosed to Congress in the mid-
campuses, President Lyndon Johnson At the behest of both the Johnson
1970s, more than 2,700,000 letters
became convinced that such dissent and Nixon White Houses, CIA pur-
were covered and more than 215,000
was not possible without foreign sued MHCHAOS more vigorously,
were opened during HTLINGUAL’s
(and likely Communist) backing. In including engaging in domestic
21 years of operation.
August 1967, Johnson tasked the espionage. In those instances—only a
The consensus of senior CIA offi- CIA, NSA, and FBI with tracking tiny part of the overall program—CIA
cers was that HTLINGUAL produced down the links he presumed to exist officers recruited three US citizens as
some useful information about Soviet between the protesters and foreign agents to penetrate dissident groups,

2  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

Evolution of Surveillance Policy

Seymour Hirsch’s revelations marked a turning point in the IC’s relationship with the media and congressional oversight. (Source: New
York Times)

collected intelligence on antiwar and Family Jewels changes occurred in the oversight
other left-wing groups, and amassed process.
One of the most consequential
files on US citizens engaged in purely
journalistic exposés in CIA’s history After hearing that CIA officers
domestic activity (most of the content
appeared on December 22, 1974, had earlier contact with the White
came from the FBI and open sources,
when the New York Times disclosed House “Plumbers” unit that con-
not CIA clandestine collection). CIA
details about a secret compilation ducted the Watergate break-in, DCI
served as the clearing house for the
of alleged CIA charter violations James Schlesinger on May 9, 1973,
information that it, FBI, and NSA
known as the Family Jewels.3 The ordered CIA employees to report any
collected. This comprised eventually
leak prompted White House and activities that seemed to violate CIA’s
300,000 names in its computer index
congressional inquiries into some charter.4 The Office of Security staffer
and approximately 7,200 files on US
of the agency’s more controversial es- in charge of the project flippantly
citizens and 6,000 on political groups.
pionage, covert action, and technical dubbed the hundreds of pages of
Despite the huge amount of material
operations. As a result, CIA’s political collected material the Family Jewels.
obtained, the idea that the antiwar
standing declined precipitously, its Schlesinger’s successor, William
movement was a massive influence
operational activities were curtailed Colby, felt obliged to tell CIA’s
operation run out of the Soviet Union
significantly, and major, lasting congressional oversight committees
or China was not demonstrated.
about the compilation, and Times

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  3



Evolution of Surveillance Policy

Myths and Misconceptions About the Family Jewels

For 50 years, the Family Jewels have clouded CIA’s reputation, even though most of their contents have long been known
from official reports and ad hoc disclosures. Colby, who oversaw the compilation of the Family Jewels while serving as the
agency’s operations chief and director-designate, is the source of some durable misconceptions about them. In his memoir
Honorable Men, he wrote that they consist of “693 pages of possible violations of, or at least questionable activities in regard
to, the CIA’s legislative charter”; that among the contents are “bizarre and tragic cases wherein the Agency experimented
with mind-control drugs”; and that accompanying them was “a separate and even more secret annex” that “summarized a
1967 survey of CIA’s involvement in assassination attempts or plans against [Fidel] Castro, [Congo’s Prime Minister Patrice]
Lumumba and [the Dominican Republic’s President Rafael] Trujillo.”
These misstatements were repeated at least in part in several widely read works, including Thomas Powers’s The Man Who
Kept the Secrets, John Ranelagh’s The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, G.J.A. O’Toole’s Encyclopedia of Amer-
ican Intelligence and Espionage, and Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen’s Spy Book. Less informed observers also have
suggested that the Family Jewels included details about political and paramilitary covert actions and definitive proof that
Angleton ran MHCHAOS.
The declassification and release of the Family Jewels in 200719 should have ended much of the mythology about them. To
begin with, the compendium is not a 693-page catalog of crime and immorality. Repetitive reports, duplicate documents,
blank pages, file dividers, cover sheets, distribution lists, and news clippings comprise approximately 30 percent of the total.
Among the remaining roughly 500 pages of substance, except for an account of the use of Mafioso Johnny Roselli in a plot
to kill Castro, there are only passing references to already disclosed assassination plots and drug-testing programs and next
to nothing of importance about purely foreign operations.
That should not be surprising because the whole point of Schlesinger’s order that produced the Family Jewels was to get
information about possible charter violations. Consequently, the collection is nearly all about activities involving US citizens
or occurring inside the United States—most of the latter, as a CIA officer noted in one of the documents, were “completely
innocent, although subject to misconstrual [sic]” in the political atmosphere of 1973—and includes many pages about CIA
contact with the Plumbers and now-obscure characters such as fugitive financier Robert Vesco. The hypersensitivity at the
time about anything that could be interpreted as having domestic political implications—or perhaps simply the bureaucratic
instinct for self-protection—might explain the inclusion of the lengthy set of mundane documents about a small CIA expen-
diture for postal services on behalf of the White House and a memo about the Office of Logistics disposing of the National
Security Council’s classified trash.

investigative reporter Seymour Hersh into retirement, the White House NSA and SHAMROCK
began to work on the story soon af- quickly initiated an inquiry led by
During this same time frame,
ter.a (The source of his information is Vice President Nelson Rockefeller,
NSA was investigated for its sur-
still unknown.) When Colby learned and the Senate and the House of
veillance of US citizens through two
in early December 1974 that Hersh Representatives set up investigative
programs.6 SHAMROCK, started
was looking into some potentially committees led by Frank Church
in 1945 by NSA’s predecessor and
controversial operations the Agency and Otis Pike, respectively. By
active until 1975, involved collecting
had conducted in the United States— the time the public furor subsided
microfilm copies of telegraphic mes-
particularly MHCHAOS—he met around 1977, the agency’s budget
sages from the major US communica-
with the journalist to try to set the had been cut, some of its operations
tions companies coming into, tran-
record straight. were restricted, and two permanent
siting, or being sent from the United
congressional committees oversaw its
Instead, Hersh went far beyond States and reviewing them for ac-
activities.
what the DCI had told him and tionable intelligence or law enforce-
described a “massive, illegal” oper- ment information, which was then
ation against US dissidents run by passed to CIA, the FBI, the Secret
Angleton’s CI Staff. In response to Service, the Justice Department,
Hersh’s story, Colby forced Angleton or the Defense Department. At

a. Hersh was one of a new cohort of investigative journalists working the national security beat that included Bob Woodward, Carl Bern-
stein, Daniel Schorr, and Jack Anderson later in his career. They moved beyond the gossipy reportage of Drew Pearson and made sensation-
al scoops—often driven by leaks—about real and perceived government malfeasance and ineptitude.

4  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

Evolution of Surveillance Policy

SHAMROCK’s peak, NSA collected

Did CIA Spy on Martin Luther King, Jr.?
150,000 messages a month. The pro-
gram had no court authorization and No. MHCHAOS investigated the foreign connections of, among other targets,
Black civil rights activists and Black organizations such as Stokely Carmichael,
did not operate under any warrants. Eldridge Cleaver, and the Black Panthers, but that is as far as CIA went in
looking at the civil rights movement in an organized fashion. The best treatment
More troubling in the context of of MHCHAOS, by Frank Rafalko, who worked on the program, does not mention
the times was MINARET, a parallel King as a target. In his book The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From SOLO
program to the CIA’s MHCHAOS, to Memphis, historian David Garrow references CIA memos written in 1975 that
run from 1967 to 1973. It developed contain denials that the CIA ever engaged in electronic surveillance or mail cov-
from a watch list begun in 1962 after ers against King and state that no CIA representatives reported on his activities
the Cuban Missile Crisis to moni- when he was overseas. The FBI, through its COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence
Program, below) activities, surveilled and harassed King.
tor who was traveling to Cuba and
violated customary SIGINT rules
by including information about US it represented a tiny fraction of the in an effort to gather logistics infor-
citizens along with that of foreigners. FBI’s workload over those 15 years, mation for the army’s use during civil
As dissent and violence intensified in it developed an outsized notoriety disturbances it might be called on to
the United States in the late 1960s, and was later criticized by Congress help quell. As riots and protests inten-
NSA expanded the watch list to and the public for abridging First sified in the later 1960s, it expanded
include domestic terrorist and foreign Amendment rights and in some cases well beyond those parameters. Run
radical suspects, drawing mainly using highly questionable methods, out of Fort Holabird, Maryland, the
on FBI information. Nearly 6,000 including forging documents, sending program appears to have been con-
foreigners and 1,700 organizations anonymous poison-pen letters, and ducted with little or no oversight by
and US citizens eventually were falsely labeling members of a violent civilian leaders in the army and the
included on the lists, which were used group as police informers.a FBI tech- Department of Defense.
for screening intercepted messages. niques did not include warrantless
searches and electronic surveillance. A former army intelligence officer
NSA’s Director, Lew Allen, testified
COINTELPRO remained secret until exposed the operation in a maga-
in 1975 that the NSA had issued over
March 8, 1971, when the Citizen’s zine article in 1970 that prompted
3,900 reports on the watch-listed
Commission to Investigate the FBI further journalistic investigations
Americans. Like SHAMROCK,
burgled the FBI field office in Media, and, in 1971, a hearing of the Senate
MINARET had no court authoriza-
Pennsylvania, took several files, and Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee
tion and did not operate under any
passed the material to news outlets. on Constitutional Rights, chaired by
warrants.
Sam Ervin (D-NC) of later Watergate
Committee fame. By that time,
COINTELPRO Army Surveillance Program the press coverage had prompted
Pentagon officials to curtail the
The FBI began COINTELPRO Starting around 1966, the US program. Ervin, angered at its evident
in 1956 to disrupt the activities of Army began tracking anti-war, civil violations of constitutional rights,
the Communist Party of the United rights, and other protesters in a held the hearing anyway, taking tes-
States.7 In the 1960s, it was expanded program that grew over several years timony from top-ranking civilian and
to include a number of other domestic to include more than 1,500 overt and military officials of the Departments
groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, undercover operatives who moni- of the Army, Defense, and Justice
the Socialist Workers Party, the Black tored and infiltrated domestic groups along with that of former intelligence
Panther Party, the American Indian and cataloged their members in a agents, analysts, and other witnesses.
Movement, and anti-Vietnam War computerized database shared with The subcommittee later issued two
organizers. All COINTELPRO oper- service intelligence units throughout publications: “Federal Data Banks,
ations were ended in 1971. Although the country.8 The program originated Computers, and the Bill of Rights” in

a. The FBI also ran a subsidiary operation to COINTELPRO called COMINFIL, which involved investigating legitimate non-Communist
organizations that it suspected had been infiltrated by Communists to determine the extent to which they were influenced.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  5



Evolution of Surveillance Policy

President Gerald Ford on January 4, 1975, established the

President’s Commission on CIA Activities within the Unit- a whitewash, not least because its
ed States, better known as the Rockefeller Commission conclusions on CIA domestic sur-
after its chairman, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. veillance were rather sympathetic.
For example, the rebuke of the
MHCHAOS operation depicted it as
1972 and “Military Surveillance of CIA had withheld from the Warren
serving a valid foreign intelligence
Civilian Politics” in 1973. Commission.
purpose and for being so compart-
The commission issued its final mented that it was not subject to
report on June 6, 1975. Although oversight. However, the commission
Investigations
defending the need for secret intel- did not address whether CIA should
Soon after Hersh’s article ran, the ligence and concluding that some have been ordered to undertake the
Ford administration and members of CIA’s domestic activities were operation, which eventually violated
of Congress mobilized in response. legal, the report said that some CIA the agency’s charter by involving it in
The White House’s principal mo- operations were “plainly unlawful infiltrating domestic dissident groups.
tive was damage control. Members and constituted improper invasions
of Congress had various purposes. Church Committee
upon the rights of Americans.”9 The
Critics of US intelligence sought Three weeks after the Rockefeller
commission recommended that CIA
to expose IC excesses as a way to Commission was established, the
be more clearly restricted to foreign
promote reform and meaningful Senate initiated its own investiga-
intelligence activities and that it
oversight; friends of the IC wanted tion into the IC.a, 10 On January 21,
receive greater legislative and exec-
to protect it from what they saw as a 1975, the Senate Select Committee to
utive oversight. It found no credible
threat to its operational effectiveness. Study Governmental Operations with
evidence of CIA involvement in the
Respect to Intelligence Activities—
Rockefeller Commission Kennedy assassination.
better known as the Church
President Gerald Ford on January Committee, after its chairman, Frank
The commission concluded this
4, 1975, established the President’s Church (D-ID)—came into existence
about MHCHAOS:
Commission on CIA Activities within and was the first significant probe
the United States, better known as It was probably necessary for into the IC’s activities that Congress
the Rockefeller Commission after the CIA to accumulate an infor- had ever made. It lasted 15 months;
its chairman, Vice President Nelson mation base on domestic dissi- held 126 full-committee hearings,
Rockefeller. The commission was dent activities in order to assess 40 subcommittee meetings, 250
charged was charged with inves- fairly whether the activities executive hearings, and 21 days of
tigating the allegations in Hersh’s had foreign connections…. But public hearings; conducted over 800
exposé. Ford also hoped to forestall the accumulation of domestic interviews; amassed 110,000 pages of
a congressional investigation into US data in the Operation exceeded documentation; issued 14 volumes of
intelligence, but the Senate and the what was reasonably required hearings and reports; and made 183
House of Representatives soon began to make such an assessment and recommendations to the Senate.
their own inquiries (see below). was thus improper.
Church started off the committee’s
The Rockefeller Commission The use of agents of the Op- work with his allegation that CIA
examined CIA activities such as eration on three occasions to was a “rogue elephant rampaging out
HTLINGUAL, MHCHAOS, and gather information within the of control” and with the intention to
mind-control and drug-testing exper- United States on strictly domes- investigate any “illegal, improper,
iments on unwitting subjects (part of tic matters was beyond the CIA’s or unethical” behavior by the IC,
MKULTRA). It also reviewed CIA authority. including “the conduct of domestic
documents concerning the assas- intelligence or counterintelligence
sination of John F. Kennedy that The commission’s report at the operations against American citi-
time was considered by many to be zens.” Much of the committee’s effort
a. See David Robarge, “Interview with Former US Senator Gary Hart,” Studies in Intelligence 65, No.4 (December 2021).

6  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

Evolution of Surveillance Policy

went toward examining CIA activi- rights of speech and association, the committee’s recommendations
ties in the Family Jewels, but it also on the theory that preventing the was one for a standing committee
addressed other sensational charges, growth of dangerous groups and in the House that would have juris-
such as assassination plots against the propagation of dangerous diction over all intelligence-related
foreign leaders and drug testing on ideas would protect the national legislation and oversight functions.
unwitting Americans, as well as some security and deter violence.
covert actions and the IC budget.
NSA and the FBI got their share of Pike Committee Congressional Oversight
the investigatory spotlight for their The Pike Committee, established
on February 19, 1975, is the common The committees significantly
domestic surveillance activities. added to the new political envi-
name for the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence during ronment in which US intelligence
In its multi-volume final report
the period when it was chaired by agencies were moved out of the
issued in April 1976, the Church
Otis Pike (D-NY).11 The commit- shadows and expected to adhere to
Committee concluded that rather than
tee’s inquiry was the first significant high standards of accountability.
being out of control, CIA operated
House investigation of the IC since The emergence of the Senate Select
under presidential authorization—
CIA’s creation in 1947. Pike and Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
sometimes vague, sometimes ex-
his colleagues had a mandate, set to and the House Permanent Select
plicit—but that congressional review
expire on January 31, 1976, to inves- Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)
of the IC had been lax. Among its
tigate similar subjects as the Church amidst a growing climate of suspi-
more significant recommendations
Committee, but unlike their Senate cion about US intelligence agencies
were the establishment of a standing
counterparts, they generally avoided marked a significant shift in public
Senate oversight committee, perma-
sensational operational topics and and congressional attitudes toward
nent intelligence agency charters, and
focused on more strategic matters like them and helped bring about a more
controls on potential violations of
the IC’s analytical, operational, and regularized and professional over-
individual rights.
budgetary effectiveness. sight of intelligence.
The committee investigated
SSCI
COINTELPRO at length, including in Despite that more measured ap-
Believing Congress had not ad-
a separate set of hearings over seven proach, the Pike Committee had con-
equately monitored US intelligence
days. It concluded: tentious relations with CIA and the
services, the Church Committee in its
White House over the committee’s
Many of the techniques used final report in April 1976 proposed
demand for voluminous documents,
would be intolerable in a dem- that a new body, the Senate Select
insistence on its own declassifica-
ocratic society even if all of the Committee on Intelligence (SSCI),
tion authority, and propensity for
targets had been involved in be created to provide the necessary
leaking. Its final report was never
violent activity, but COINTEL- degree of scrutiny.13 The Senate
officially published due to opposition
PRO went far beyond that. The moved quickly on that recommenda-
from House members troubled by
unexpressed major premise of the tion, taking up Senate Resolution 400
the potential effect on CIA activities.
program was that a law enforce- less than a month later. SR 400 stated
However, unauthorized versions of
ment agency has the duty to do that the IC members would keep the
the final draft were leaked to the
whatever is necessary to combat new committee “fully and currently
press, appearing first in The Village
perceived threats to the existing informed” of their activities, includ-
Voice. A full copy of the draft was
social and political order…. ing major anticipated ones.
later published in England.12 Like
[T]he Bureau conducted a Church, Pike backtracked from his On May 19, 1976, the Senate
sophisticated vigilante operation initial contention that CIA was out of voted 72–22 in favor of the reso-
aimed squarely at preventing control and concluded that it operated lution.a The word “select” in the
the exercise of First Amendment under presidential authority. Among

a. The Senate’s changing attitude toward oversight, reflective of the changing times, is demonstrated in its votes on various legislation.
In 1956, it voted down a proposal for a joint oversight committee, 59-27, and did so again 10 years later, 61-28. Then in 1975, the Senate

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  7



Evolution of Surveillance Policy

name meant that SSCI’s members sessions in the absence of the HPSCI The result of congressional
would be appointed by the Senate chairman. deliberations on this issue was the
majority leader and minority leader, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
who would choose eight and seven, Greater Accountability (FISA)—the first piece of legislation
respectively. In addition to being During the next few years, to emerge directly from the 1975–76
briefed on IC activities, SSCI also Congress rode the momentum to investigations.16 The law passed
would review the IC’s budget and launch several investigations into easily in both houses, and President
hold hearings on nominees for direc- various intelligence matters. The Carter signed it into law on October
tor and deputy director (and, later, Senate looked into IC estimates of 25, 1978. FISA established a special
the inspector general and general Soviet strategic weapons, the IC tribunal, the Foreign Intelligence
counsel). budget, and CIA covert action. The Surveillance Court (FISC)—located
House set up probes into CIA’s use at the Department of Justice and
HPSCI of journalists as assets, its connection operating in secret—to hear detailed
At the urging of newly elected to the Kennedy assassination, and its applications and justifications for
Speaker Thomas “Tip” O’Neill (D- crisis warning process, and it closely electronic surveillance warrants. The
MA), on July 14, 1977, the House examined CIA’s budget and covert new law set forth standards upon
passed a resolution creating HPSCI.14 activities. Congress also considered which such applications would be
The lengthy delay in creating an new charter legislation for the agency, granted.
oversight body on the House side and in 1980 it passed the Intelligence
is attributable in large part to the Oversight Act requiring that it be The law did not mention CIA per
partisan rancor and confrontational “fully and currently informed” about se and did not directly affect its activ-
approach of the Pike Committee. covert action programs.15 ities. However, if the agency wanted
The less-than-overwhelming vote to electronic surveillance to be carried
establish HPSCI, 227 to 171, re- out in the United States for foreign
flected lingering sentiments from that FISA intelligence purposes—which it typ-
episode. Although a broad statutory charter ically requested the FBI conduct—
for what the IC could and could such requests would have to meet the
Despite a purported reluctance in criteria of the FISA. Notwithstanding
not engage in proved too difficult
the House to repeat the disagreeable this potentially negative effect on op-
for Congress to enact, the adminis-
experience of the Pike Committee, erations, CIA supported the new law.
tration of President Jimmy Carter,
HPSCI was set up along distinctly
both chambers, and the IC were
partisan lines. Unlike the resolution
able to agree generally on the need
that created SSCI, which mandated Executive Orders
for more congressional oversight of
that no more than eight of the 15
intelligence, especially in the area As a result of the Rockefeller
members come from the majority
of domestic operations. Warrantless Commission and Church-Pike
party, the HPSCI resolution stipulated
electronic surveillance undertaken Committees inquiries, President
that membership of the committee
within the United States for foreign Gerald Ford issued the first execu-
would reflect the party strength in
intelligence purposes drew espe- tive order governing US intelligence
the House as a whole. Since 2003,
cially close attention on Capitol Hill. activities, E.O. 11905, on February
the committee has had 11 members
Members wanted to preserve Fourth 18, 1976. This order was intended
(excluding the chairman) from the
Amendment protections against not only to create clear guidelines
majority party and nine from the
unreasonable searches of US citizens for the intelligence agencies but also
minority party. Similarly, while the
by instituting a review mechanism to protect the IC from more drastic
SSCI vice chairman was drawn from
to ensure that only validated foreign curtailments Congress appeared set
the minority party, the next ranking
intelligence targets were subject to to impose. In an effort to address the
member of the majority party chairs
non-consensual eavesdropping. real and alleged excesses revealed

approved setting up the Church Committee with minuscule opposition and the next year established the SSCI in an overwhelming vote.
Four years later, the Senate passed the Intelligence Oversight Act by an 89-1 vote.

8  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

Evolution of Surveillance Policy

The US polity has never developed a societal consensus

in the various investigations, par- on how to balance trust and suspicion in the context of
ticularly when US persons were national security.
involved, CIA, NSA, and Defense
Intelligence Agency were prohibited within, the United States except the Alien and Sedition Acts and can
from collecting information on US as permitted by the procedures be seen in episodes such the sus-
persons, engaging in searches and established [elsewhere in the pension of habeas corpus and press
seizures within the United States E.O.]. censorship during the Civil War, Red
or against US persons, opening or Scare after World War I, internment
examining US mail, investigating tax No agency within the Intelli- of Japanese-Americans during World
returns, or experimenting with drugs gence Community shall use any War II, Second Red Scare in the late
on humans. The FBI, which the order electronic or mechanical device 1940s and early 1950s, the domestic
excluded as not being a “foreign surreptitiously and continuously surveillance during the 1960s de-
intelligence (collection) agency,” was to monitor any person within tailed, counterintelligence vigilance
not subject to these rules. the United States, or any United practiced after the arrest of Aldrich
States person abroad, except Ames in 1994, and NSA’s post-
President Jimmy Carter’s issued as permitted by the procedures 9/11 communications and internet
the more restrictive E.O. 12036 on established [elsewhere in the monitoring.
January 24, 1978. Intended to close E.O.].
loopholes in Ford’s order, E.O. 12036 As each period of conflict or per-
demonstrated Carter’s strong dis- No agency within the Intelli- ceived threat subsides, the public gets
trust of CIA and the other intelli- gence Community shall open “security fatigue” and swings in the
gence agencies in his early years in mail or examine envelopes in other direction until the next outbreak
office and the impact of the recent United States postal channels, of hostilities or the next security or
disclosures about the IC’s domestic except in accordance with appli- counterintelligence scandal. The US
operations. The new order contained cable statutes and regulations. polity has never developed a societal
provisions limiting certain collection No agency within the Intelli- consensus on how to balance trust
activities in ways to “protect constitu- gence Community shall open and suspicion in the context of na-
tional rights and privacy, ensure that mail of a United States person tional security. This bifurcated view,
information is gathered by the least abroad except as permitted by built into our civic culture, is an in-
intrusive means possible, and limit procedures established [else- evitable and unchangeable trait of the
use of such information to lawful where in the E.O.].17 US political system. Apropos here is
governmental purposes.” former DCI Robert Gates’s comment
a week after Soviet and Russian spy
No agency within the Intelli- Conclusion Robert Hanssen was caught in 2001:
gence Community shall engage
Debates about Section 702 “In any democratic society, counter-
in any electronic surveillance
renewal are the latest manifestation intelligence [or counterterrorism] is
directed against a United States
of Americans’ vacillation between decidedly difficult and will never be
person abroad or designed to
preferring an emphasis on liberty or perfect. It wasn’t perfect in the total-
intercept a communication sent
on security. This pattern goes back to itarian Soviet Union, and it certainly
from, or intended for receipt
the earliest days of the republic with won’t be in America.”18

v v v

The author: David Robarge is CIA’s chief historian.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  9



Evolution of Surveillance Policy

Endnotes
1. Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (GPO, June 1975; hereafter Rockefeller Commis-
sion Report), chap. 9; US Senate, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Book III, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (GPO, 23 April 1976;
hereafter Church Committee Report), 559636; “Mail Intercept Program,” January 21, 1975, CADRE doc. no. C01420864.
2. Rockefeller Commission Report, chap. 11; Church Committee Report, 688–721; Frank J. Rafalko, MH/CHAOS: The CIA’s Campaign
Against the Radical New Left and the Black Panthers (Naval Institute Press, 2011); Robert M. Hathaway and Russell Jack Smith, Rich-
ard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, 1966-1973 (CIA History Staff, 1993), 14–21.
3. Harold P. Ford, William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence, 1973-1976 (CIA History Staff, 1993), chap. 7; William Colby
and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (Simon and Schuster, 1978), chaps. 11 and 13; Cynthia M. Noland, “Seymour
Hersh’s Impact on the CIA,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 12:1 (1999), 18–34.
4. “Memorandum to All CIA Employees,” May 9, 1973, copy in CIA History Staff files.
5. CADRE doc. no. C01283341.
6. Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945–1989 (NSA Center for Cryptologic History, 1995; declassified
2013), 362–65; Church Committee Report, 735–76.
7. Ibid., 1–80; Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of
the United States, Volume 6, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 18, 19 November, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11 December 1975 (GPO, 1976).
8. Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980 (Yale University Press, 1991), 240-47; Karl E. Campbell, “Senator Sam
Ervin and the Army Spy Scandal of 1970–1971: Balancing National Security and Civil Liberties in a Free Society,” https://web.archive.
org/web/20050829231657/http://www.cmhpf.org/senator-sam-ervin.htm; US Senate, Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics: A Re-
port of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary (GPO, 1973).
9. Rockefeller Commission Report, 10.
10. L. Britt Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004 (CIA History Staff, 2008), 35–37, 177–78,
233–35, 275–77; Frank J. Smist Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, Second Edition, 1947–1994 (Uni-
versity of Tennessee Press, 1994), chap. 2; Gerald K. Haines, “The CIA and Congress: Years of Change, 1966–1980,” unpublished
manuscript (CIA History Staff, 1993), chap. 2; Ford, chap. 10; Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence (Dors-
ey Press, 1988); James Risen with Thomas Risen, The Last Honest Man: The CIA, the FBI, and Mafia, and the Kennedys—and One
Senator’s Fight to Save Democracy (Little, Brown, 2023), chaps. 12–27; Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The
Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and the FBI (University of North Carolina Press, 1996), chaps. 5, 7, 8..
11. Gerald K. Haines, “The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA,” Studies in Intelligence 41, No. 3 (Summer 1997), 81–92; Snider,
37–39, 178–79, 199–201, 236, 278–79; Ford, chap. 11; Smist, chap. 4; Olmsted, chaps. 6–8.
12. CIA: The Pike Report (Spokesman Books, 1977).
13. Snider, 51–52; Smist, 82–84; Haines, 154–61.
14. Snider, 53–54; Smist, 214–16; Haines, 218–27.
15. Snider, 56–60, 179–82, 201-04, 236–39, 279–82; Smist, 115–31, 242–50; Haines, chaps. 4 and 5.
16. Snider, 143–44; Smist, 234–35.
17. http://irpfas.org/offdocs/eo/eo-12036.htm.
18. The Literary Spy: The Ultimate Source for Quotations on Espionage and Intelligence, Charles E. Lathrop, comp. (Yale University
Press, 2004), 57.
19. CADRE doc. no. C01283341.
v v v

10  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

Analytic Tug-of-War

Cambodia’s Role in Shipping Arms to Communist Forces in South

Vietnam, 1966–70: Competing CIA and US Military Estimates
Richard A. Mobley
From the Introduction to ER IM 70-188, December 1970.

In September1970, this Agency [CIA] published ER IM [Economic Research

Intelligence Memorandum] 70-126, New Evidence On Military Deliveries to
Cambodia: December 1966 – April 1969, which presented our preliminary
analysis of documentary evidence on the flow of military supplies to VC/NVA
forces via the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). Since the publication
of IM 70-126, CIA has received and made available to the community more
than 12,000 pages of additional documentation providing detailed and highly
reliable data on the scope and nature of the Communists’ logistic activities
carried out through Cambodia to support VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam.

A special task force set up to exploit these documents has completed its val-
idation and analysis of the new evidence, and this memorandum is the first
product resulting from that effort. This memorandum presents revisions of the
estimates made in IM 70-126 of the volume of military supplies delivered via
Sihanoukville from December 1966 to April 1969 as well as new data on some
overland deliveries via Laos.1

v v v

With that extraordinary intro- of communist China’s shipments

duction to its revised estimates, into Cambodia’s relatively new
CIA essentially signaled that it had port, Sihanoukville, and underesti-
finally lost its extended debate with mated the amount of ordnance being
the Military Assistance Command transported from there to communist
Vietnam (MACV) and other mili- forces in South Vietnam.
tary commands about the quantities
and delivery routes of ordnance Vietnam-based military intelli-
shipped through Cambodia to North gence, in contrast, had consistently
Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet offered higher and—in hindsight—
Cong (VC) units in South Vietnam. more accurate figures about tonnage
It was a consequential dispute, the reaching the communists through
outcome of which had the potential to Cambodia. Gen. Bruce Palmer, a
influence US decisions to widen the deputy commander of US Army
Vietnam War to Cambodia and alter forces in South Vietnam (1966–67),
or end bombing campaigns in Laos. wrote in his 1984 assessment in
this journal of the IC’s performance
At cost to CIA’s credibility with during the Vietnam War that the
the Nixon administration, its analysts failure was “one of the very few
had misinterpreted the importance times CIA and the Washington-based

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US
government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of
the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024) 11



Analytic Tug-of-War

IC made a major misjudgment with in February 1971, CIA revised its that most of the cargo was arms and
respect to the Vietnam War.”2 This estimate to state more than 21,000 ammunition intended for transship-
essay uses declassified CIA and tons of munitions actually had been ment to enemy forces in much of
military records to account for the delivered along the Sihanoukville South Vietnam. CIA argued that the
failure while attempting to assess Route. (See bar graph below.)6 tonnage of munitions being delivered
why MACV’s estimates were closer could not be reliably estimated from
to the mark. As we will see in this article, the available sources, but it was likely
the divergences in CIA and MACV to be much less than the amounts
assessments reflected differences in MACV estimated.
The Beginning of the Un- how both organizations used evi-
raveling of CIA’s Position dence to answer key intelligence
questions about the Sihanoukville The Problem of Sourc-
As the introduction to ER IM Route. The questions pertained
70-188 tacitly noted, CIA’s failure es and Analytic Rigor
to the amount, composition, and
became apparent after improvements ultimate destination for unidenti- The multi-year debate between
in human intelligence (HUMINT) fied cargo delivered during at least CIA (and other elements of the IC)
reporting begun by 1968 on the so- nine port visits of Chinese-flagged and MACV shows that understand-
called Sihanoukville Route led to the ships to Sihanoukville following a ing the Sihanoukville issue was not
acquisition of more than 12,000 pages military agreement signed between straightforward, given major intel-
of manifests and shipping documents Cambodia and China in October ligence gaps and troves of human
of Chinese merchant ships offloading 1966. Subsidiary questions included intelligence reports of questionable
arms in Sihanoukville. This material the role of the alternative delivery provenance. The suspect nature of the
provided extraordinarily detailed and route overland down the Ho Chi available evidence helps explain why
reliable evidence about the magnitude Minh Trail, the amount of non-mil- a top-notch team of seasoned logis-
of the Sino-Cambodian transshipment itary cargo included in the Chinese tics analysts at CIA fared so poorly in
effort.3 deliveries, and the split in deliveries assessing a critical line of communi-
between the Cambodian military and cation while counterparts in MACV
The evidence provided a new,
the NVA/VC. MACV would argue
reliable baseline for assessing the
validity of MACV and CIA estimates
on the flow of munitions into South
Vietnam. The shipping manifests
and other documents supported
the conclusion that CIA analysts
had repeatedly underestimated the
extent of PRC arms deliveries to
Sihanoukville, its relative importance,
and the quantity of weapons and am-
munition transshipped from there to
enemy forces in South Vietnam.

For example, even in mid-1970,

CIA judged that only 7,100 tons of
ordnance (part of a total of 11,200
tons of all military supplies) had been
delivered via Sihanoukville; MACV,
by contrast, had estimated 17,800
tons of ordnance alone.4 5 With the This bar graph contained in the February 5, 1971, memorandum shows the 21,600 tons
publication of ER IM 70-188 and a of total volume of PRC military supply shipments (ordnance [21,000] and non-ordnance)
followup unclassified memorandum aboard 10 freighters unloaded in Sihanoukville from December 1966 through April 1969.

12  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

Analytic Tug-of-War

CIA Views on Reliability of Evidence

The following characterizations—relying on Ahern’s study, declassified contem-
poraneous analytic products, and memoirs and biographies of CIA officials—re-
veal how fraught was the process of evaluating Sihanoukville HUMINT, partic-
J-2 devised far more accurate tonnage ularly when trying to judge reporting from theater-controlled collection assets.
estimates. Describing the difficulty of the process, Ahern wrote, “the Sihanoukville traffic
required interpretation of each report, source authenticity and reliability, the
The CIA Point of View access of both primary and subsources, and the inherent plausibility of content.”
The logistics experts in the CIA’s He summarized: “Even the best reporting, up to the spring of 1969, was low-lev-
Office of Economic Research (OER) el and incomplete.”a Additional observations include the following.
were respected for their earlier Sihanoukville as an analytical problem arose in a welter of raw reports,
work in analyzing the effects of the some of them alleging an arms traffic that did not exist for a full two years
Rolling Thunder bombing cam- after the first claims for it.
paign.7 They had also had a long
record of evaluating the economic Fanciful early allegations of deliveries through Sihanoukville inevitably and,
to a point, legitimately discredited agent reporting. When knowledgeable
aspects of threats posed by the CIA sources began producing better information, some of it as early as
Soviet Union. According to a heavily 1967, it was at first fragmentary and always subject to inconsistencies and
redacted, declassified study of the even contradictions.
Sihanoukville case by contract CIA
historian Thomas Ahern in 2004,8, a The modest flow of well-sourced, plausible information tended to be ob-
OER analysts displayed great trust in scured by a flood of less credible material.b
their technically more rigorous con- Retired CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence R. Jack Smith would write of the
ceptual models and their judgment challenges his analysts faced in his memoir:
of all-source reporting than did their
counterparts in military intelligence. Unfortunately, the intelligence reports they had to work with were of poor
Analysts in OER also conducted peri- quality, full of hearsay from third- or fourth-hand sources. Exploiting the
shoddy material to the maximum, and guided to a degree by the judg-
odic internal reviews that challenged ment that the flow down the Ho Chi Minh Trail was in itself almost sizeable
the methodologies and conclusions enough to account for enemy materiel in South Vietnam, the DI analysts
of their previous analyses, according arrived at a figure for tonnage through South Vietnam that was approximate-
to Ahern.9 Unfortunately, the results ly half of MACV’s estimate.c
also revealed flawed assumptions
about transportation facilities through An October 1969 briefing paper on reporting and CIA analysis on the subject of
Sihanoukville’s relative importance noted:
Cambodia and about projected VC
logistic requirements, according to In recent months there has accumulated a large body of clandestine report-
Ahern’s treatment of the subject in ing that points to Cambodia as an important route for such supplies which,
his recently published memoir.10 as it is argued, arrive by sea at the port of Sihanoukville and are transported
surreptitiously . . . to the South Vietnamese border.”d
The CIA team was most vexed by
the challenge of finding HUMINT A January 1970 memo addressed to Secretary of Defense Laird observed:
sources which were deemed reliable Our knowledge of supply movements through Cambodia has improved
but also offering sufficiently broad markedly over the past several months. . . Nonetheless, we are not able to
perspective for national-level finished quantify the “Cambodian flow” with precision to permit meaningful arithmetic
intelligence reporting. CIA official comparison with the Laotian flow.”e
documents and oral histories reveal
the agency’s high standards of ana-
lytic tradecraft for using HUMINT a. Thomas L Ahern, Jr., Good Questions, Wrong Answers, 18, 41.
b. All quotes are from Good Questions, Wrong Answers, vii, 48 and 9, respectively.
c. R. Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Pergam-
a. Ahern’s monograph, Good Questions, on-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989), 34–35.
Wrong Answers provides a superb baseline d. CIA report, “An Evaluation of Recent Clandestine Reporting on Cambodia,” October
for understanding the CIA-MACV debate. 1969, iii, in [3] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200090001-8).
The book informed some of my conclusions
e. DCI Richard Helms to Secretary of Defense Laird, January 28, 1970, forward-
here. Most of the raw reporting Ahern used
ing blind memo “Logistics Flow to the Enemy in South Vietnam,” in [5] CIA-
has not been declassified so could not be
RDP78T02095R000600200001-1).
weighed independently.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  13



Analytic Tug-of-War

MACV admitted that many of its sources were low level

but wrote that it had access to more reliable ones. put this stuff together, and they
Describing ordnance shipments through Sihanoukville, came up one day, and we had a
big briefing and talk, and I said,
the Combined Intelligence Center wrote in May 1968 that
“Well, it sounds really good, but
they used “mostly low-level sources, many of which are I don’t think we have enough to
unconfirmed, laced with ambiguity, and even in some really go public with it at this
cases fabricated.” time. Let’s just keep watching
it.” And we did, and they were
reports and skepticism about many than their CIA counterparts, although very convincing, I thought.17
of the reports coming in about the MACV did divide some of the reports
Sihanoukville Route. Summaries of into “probable” and “possible” cate- Admiral Zumwalt also praised the
the reporting reveal that few sources gories. Additionally, CIA and MACV theater intelligence effort in his auto-
thought to be reliable were evident in some instances may have been biography: “He (Rectanus) had a very
during much of the route’s existence. referring to the same higher-quality good network of agents in Cambodia,
Even by late 1968, CIA reporting sources that had begun to appear in and he had a good network within the
suggested only modest improvements 1968. South Vietnamese. We were getting,
in sources, although OER analysts generally, very good intelligence.”18
concluded they had sufficient evi- MACV admitted that many of Zumwalt continued, saying that
dence to show complicity by ele- its sources were low level but wrote Rectanus
ments of the Cambodian government that it had access to more reliable
ones.14 Describing ordnance ship- had completed an analysis of
in shipping military supplies to the entire VC logistics system
Vietnam.11 ments through Sihanoukville, the
Combined Intelligence Center wrote that proved to be more accurate
That modest judgment, as we in May 1968 that they used “mostly than anything either CIA or DIA
have seen in the late 1970 and early low-level sources, many of which are had. He was the first person to
1971 memorandums cited above, unconfirmed, laced with ambiguity, conclude that Cambodia had be-
turned into the view that Cambodia and even in some cases fabricated.”15 come the major logistics depot
had “acquired significance” as an However, MACV J-2 reporting on for the VC delta operations and
arms supply channel in the last two arms deliveries into Sihanoukville in that this depot was being rein-
or so years, although the alternative 1968 came from a variety of sources, forced by Communist shipping
route through Laos continued to be including “two independent, reli- into Sihanoukville and then by
the “predominant” supply channel.12 able sources.” MACV reported that truck to the Cambodia border.19
The Sihanoukville Route by then its sources included the Australian Even with what he considered to
carried as much as half of the military military attaché in Phnom Penh, US be good sources during his 1968–69
supplies destined for Communist Naval Forces Vietnam coded sources, tour, Rectanus subsequently re-
forces in the southern part of South and CIA.16 called that convincing national-level
Vietnam, according to the revised intelligence analysts of Cambodia’s
CIA estimate.13 Under Adm. Elmo Zumwalt
(Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam logistics role in the conflict was
The MACV Point of View (CNFV)) and his deputy for intelli- problematic:
In contrast, MACV and subor- gence, Capt. Rex Rectanus, MACV The analysts that they (CIA and
dinate commands judged they had and CNFV made inroads against State) sent out there on numer-
good sources by 1968, notwithstand- the Sihanoukville target in 1968. ous occasions just couldn’t be
ing the IC’s reservations and the Gen. Phillip Davidson, the MACV budged. Now (I don’t know)
suspicion that theater analysts were J-2, lauded CNFV’s success in his whether it’s because the analysts
accepting sources and reporting with oral history: themselves really didn’t believe
unwarranted credulity. Oral histories us, didn’t believe that our analy-
suggested that leaders in theater had They had some agents working
in Sihanoukville. They began to sis was good as it was (although
better faith in some of the sources we went over everything with

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Analytic Tug-of-War

them ad nauseam), or whether

they were told by Washington.20

MACV’s precise methodology in

using each individual report is not
available in the declassified docu-
ments, but the command seemed
to have taken more of a statistical
approach than national production
centers in compiling its estimates.
Implicit in some of the theater
estimates seemed to be the concept
that the more reports stating an event
had occurred—however tactical
they might be—the more probable
it was. Reading the summaries from
the command today almost seems
like reviewing an early form of
crowd-sourcing.

MACV several times referred to

the number of reports as probable evi-
dence of the reliability of an estimate.
MACV Commander Gen. Creighton
Abrams, for example, repeatedly used
this technique in a “personal for”
message transmitted to the chairman
of JCS, in December 1968.21 He
sprinkled reporting statistics through-
out the message. Building a case for
the complicity of the Cambodian
army (known as the FARK, from
Map showing the four Corps Tactical Zones or Military Regions of the Vietnam War period.
the French Forces Armées Royales Source: Studies in Intelligence special edition, “Intelligence and the Vietnam War,” (1984).
Khmères), he wrote that 29 reports
of varying reliability had described In-Country Meetings to Re- held in Saigon during November–
enemy personnel in the act of un- solve the Dispute Inconclusive December 1968 illustrated how issues
loading ordnance from Cambodian of sourcing and estimates provided
Senior CIA officials— including
army vehicles. Continuing to build divergent answers to the questions
DDI Jack Smith, George Carver, and
the argument, Abrams observed that of Sihanoukville’s importance. In
James Graham (Office of National
since October 10, 1968, nine reports this instance, James Graham and
Estimates)—and analysts visited
from fairly reliable sources had impli- members of CIA, DIA, and State
MACV several times between 1966
cated senior FARK officers as active Department’s Bureau of Intelligence
and 1970 in fruitless attempts to
participants in the growing arms traf- and Research visited the Commander
establish common ground on the
fic. Another 33 reports depicted the in Chief/Pacific in Hawaii and major
Sihanoukville question. A summary
delivery of ordnance to border areas commands in Saigon to address the
of a single case illustrates the recur-
in II, III, and to a lesser extent in IV dispute.23
ring dynamics of the debate through-
Corps.22 This theme of conferring
out the period. A well-documented They were fully briefed in-coun-
validity based on reporting volume
exchange between IC analysts led by try on collection and analysis on
appeared in other MACV estimates.
James Graham and MACV personnel

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  15



Analytic Tug-of-War

arms shipments via Cambodia. They

examined MACV’s intelligence
holdings, reviewed the methodology
used to estimate munitions imports
into Sihanoukville, and discussed
problems relating to evaluation of
intelligence reporting.24 The ex-
changes revealed convergence on
the issue of FARK complicity in the
Sihanoukville Route and confirmed
that CIA had access to all theater
intelligence reports on Sihanoukville.
At the same time, the documenta-
tion shows the gaps between their
positions. The following illustrates
elements of the debate.

In Graham’s report of the meet-

ing, he wrote that “essential differ-
ences” remained between the two
commands:

• quantities of arms moving via

Sihanoukville to Vietnam,

• the relationship between arms

deliveries to Sihanoukville and
Cambodian military requirements, General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
and from 1968 until 1972, was a key proponent of the military’s argument that the quantity
of arms flows through Sihanoukville to southern South Vietnam was far higher than CIA
• the extent to which Communist acknowledged. Abrams appeared three times on the covers of the weekly between 1961 and
forces were denied access to other 1971. © Collection Serge Mouraret/Alamy Stock Photo.
supply routes, notably the over-
land route through Laos.25 In our view, MAC-V is consid- is sufficient to meet the external
erably overstating Cambodia’s needs of Communist forces in
The differences had also been present role in the VC/NVA lo- adjacent and more southerly
addressed at about the same time gistical system. We believe their areas of South Vietnam.26
in 1968, when reconsideration of long-standing north-south over-
US bombing strategy prompted land supply routes from North What’s more, a formal CIA/DI
General Abrams to send a cable to Vietnam through Laos, South Intelligence Memorandum directly
Washington strongly denouncing Vietnam and border areas of challenged Abrams’ assertion that a
proposals to end US bombing. The Cambodia are still the principal halt to bombing would drastically in-
Abrams cable led to a flurry of CIA supply channel for Communist crease the flow of equipment to com-
responses, both doubting the util- forces in South Vietnam. These munists. In effect, the then closely
ity of the bombing campaign and routes not only remain capable held memorandum said the bombing
MACV judgments about the role of of meeting Communist needs de- had been making no difference:
Cambodia as a arms supply route, for spite allied air strikes but actual
example: The experience of over three
truck traffic detected moving to and one-half years of observing
southern Laos indicates that the the impact of the Rolling Thun-
volume being moved southward

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Analytic Tug-of-War

General Abrams summarized MACV’s position by writing,

der bombing programs shows “The Cambodia option remains as the enemy’s logical if
little direct relationship between not his only choice. . . . Cambodia is the primary line of
the level and nature of given
communication for arms and ammunition reaching enemy
interdiction campaigns and
the movement of supplies from forces in II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ).”
North to South Vietnam. The
level of logistics activity is more Abrams wrote in December 1968 MACV previously cited imports over
directly related to the size of the that 11 probable arms shipments had 13,000 tons.37 The note added that the
enemy forces in South Vietnam, delivered more than 13,000 tons of CIA figure was “almost certainly low,
the level of combat, and enemy materiel to Sihanoukville.31 Abrams with “possible” tonnages added, it
intentions. Hanoi seems fully continued that, during the past year, might reach 7,000 to 8,000 tons.38
capable of delivering to South approximately 10,668 tons of sus-
Vietnam the level of men and pected ordnance had been delivered In his December 31, 1968, report
supplies it deems necessary, to Sihanoukville and 10,035 tons of on the visit to Vietnam noted above,
even though the bombings affect ordnance had been delivered to NVA/ senior team member Graham, citing
the ease, speed, and cost of VC camps along the Cambodian CIA positions, admitted that in theory
delivery.27 border.32 the tonnage of ordnance delivered to
the NVA/VC might be calculated by
Perhaps confidence in the effects Washington analysts instead establishing amounts off-loaded in
of the Rolling Thunder campaign argued that no one knew for certain port and subtracting Cambodian mil-
might explain MACV’s propensity how many tons of arms entered itary requirements. The CIA position
at the time to see, as George Carver Sihanoukville or what the consump- was, however, that there was insuf-
would explain in 1970, Sihanoukville tion, equipping and stockpile re- ficient reliable reporting to do this.39
as a “major factor” since October quirements of the FARK might be.33 Agency analysts noted that MACV
1966.28 He elaborated that the IC They saw a “considerably smaller was convinced that it had sufficient
felt there was little hard evidence volume” of confirmed deliveries intelligence to perform these calcu-
for serious or significant use of than MACV.”34 Another CIA mem- lations and to reach “firm conclu-
the Cambodia channel before mid- orandum complained, “MACV sions.”40 MACV’s position had been
1968.29 General Abrams summarized classed all the military deliveries to that the “bulk of these shipments”
MACV’s position by writing, Sihanoukville as arms and ammuni- went directly to the NVA/VC.41 CIA
tion and failed to distinguish between implied that MACV’s estimate that
The Cambodia option remains arms and other military supplies.”35 FARK required 350 tons of ordnance
as the enemy’s logical if not his George Carver later wrote in 1970 annually was low but did not offer an
only choice. . . . Cambodia is that some military supplies were not alternative.42
the primary line of communica- manifested as such and others were
tion for arms and ammunition mixed with ordnance consignment as- The argument over the role of a
reaching enemy forces in II, III, signed to FARK. His note concluded, southern extension of the Ho Chi
and IV Corps Tactical Zones “The spongy nature of much of this Minh Trail overland to Cambodia
(CTZ).30 evidence has not permitted precise was almost as fierce as the fight over
quantification of the supplies via this Sihanoukville, since the trails were
Accordingly, MACV offered linked in the eyes of the debaters.
sharply higher estimates for ordnance route.”36
The overland route extended overland
being delivered to Sihanoukville than Despite CIA’s official position that from North Vietnam through Laos,
those prepared by the IC, while CIA the tonnage delivered could not be re- the tri-border area, and southward on
publicly argued that it could not es- liably calculated, CIA internal studies a network of trails and road segments
timate the tonnage reliably given the suggested a minimum figure of only along the Cambodian border to the III
available numbers, attacked MACV’s 1,600 to 1,700 tons of arms and am- Corps. The CIA position was that the
methodology, and privately devel- munition had been delivered during evidence for the use of the extension
oped far lower estimates. General the same 21-month period for which was more substantial than evidence

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  17



Analytic Tug-of-War

Abrams in December 1968 argued, “The contention that

enemy forces in III CTZ are receiving the majority of their about the relative importance of the
ordnance via the Laotian overland route still fails to be two trails, ordnance deliveries to
Sihanoukville, long-term through-
substantiated by the facts.”
put on each trail, tonnage going to
FARK, and quantities of ordnance
of Sihanoukville’s importance and, Laotian overland route still fails to be finally reaching NVA/VC base camps
in effect, proved that the North substantiated by the facts,” continu- along the border. According to Ahern,
Vietnamese relied “primarily on the ing that in Laos “below BA 610 there then assigned to CIA’s Phnom Penh
overland route.”43 has been no change in the meager Station, a Cambodian officer named
traffic flow recorded since December Les Kosem, who had been responsi-
Hanoi would not need both trail 1967.”a 49 He reported that an average
systems to support its forces in ble for managing the flow of supplies
of 8 tons per day was moving south from China to the NVA, volunteered
southern South Vietnam since each of BA 610 toward the Cambodian
alone had the capacity to provide this to give CIA the records of all Chinese
border, and MACV judged that those munitions and supplies sent to the
support. So, the debate focused over shipments were primarily destined
which system was actually being used Vietnamese Communists through
for enemy forces in southern I CTZ Cambodia.b CIA headquarters sent its
more and (from CIA’s perspective) and local support forces in southern
which was more salient to Hanoi. The most knowledgeable analyst to work
Laos.50 with Kosem’s officer to exploit the
debate again entailed attacks on each
other’s evidence, but before 1970, Stalemate Continued 12,000 pages of data he provided.
CIA used indirect evidence, some of The result of the November– The insights became the foundation
it based on an unproven assumption, December 1968 IC-MACV meetings of CIA’s reevaluations of its earlier
to buttress its case.44 45 46 was a stalemate with little movement estimates published in 1970 and
on fundamental analytic issues, al- excerpted above.53
CIA also argued that all the evi- though some agreement on the issue
dence—efforts to improve roads and To establish its new baseline, CIA
of FARK complicity was reached. that December forwarded the ER IM
trails, shipments south to the tri-bor- CIA leadership, according to a for-
der area, a few reports of logistic 70-188, Communist Deliveries to
merly classified biography of then Cambodia for the VC/NVA Forces
activity along the trails, and use of CIA Director Richard Helms, con-
the trails for personnel movements— in South Vietnam, December 1966–
cluded that OER’s tonnage estimate April 1969, December 1970, along
sufficed to indicate that the overland was the best that could be established
route was the “basic channel” for with an attached CIA history of
from inferior materials.51 Their judg- the Sihanoukville Route to nation-
arms and ammunition to communist ments reflected their confidence in
forces in I, II, and III Corps.47 Agency al-level decisionmakers and theater
the high quality of the CIA’s logistics commanders. The memo noted, “We
analysts repeatedly argued that Hanoi analysis in the past and their recogni-
would not abandon the proven over- believe the documents constitute a
tion of “the penchant for the military virtually complete set of Cambodia’s
land trail for the Sihanoukville con- arriving at ‘worst case’ judgments,”
nection, a route it did not control, and records on the supplies and materials
according to the biography.52 furnished the Communists with the
which the Cambodian government
could deny or obstruct without much cooperation of the Cambodian gov-
warning—a judgment questioned in ernment.”54 Characterizing the 12,000
Ground Truth on
later investigations.48 pages of evidence, it explained, “The
Sihanoukville Route circumstances of acquisition were
In contrast, Abrams in December Finally Established in 1970 such as to establish the authenticity
1968 argued, “The contention that The major CIA intelligence break- of the material.”55 The documents of-
enemy forces in III CTZ are receiving through of 1970 finally answered the fered “the most conclusive available
the majority of their ordnance via the hotly contested questions, particularly

a. The general’s comment suggest that BA 610 was located 350 kilometers north of the Cambodian border.
b. At this point, Prince Sihanouk had been ousted and shipping of Chinese weaponry to Cambodia had ended.

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Analytic Tug-of-War

evidence of the critical importance of

the Sihanoukville supply route.”56

ER IM 70-188 pointed out that

Cambodia in early 1966 had partic-
ipated in PRC programs to provide
mostly non-military supplies to
Communists in the II, III, and IV
Corps regions in South Vietnam.
By December,1966, however, the
Sihanoukville Route opened with the
arrival of a PRC-flag arms carrier to
Sihanoukville with arms bound for
South Vietnam; the route became
an “elaborate and sophisticated”
network.57

Chinese merchant ships delivered

21,600 tons of military supplies to
Sihanoukville from December 1966
through April 1969 as shown in the
bar graph on page 12, according
to the December 1970 intelligence
memorandum.58 Overall military
deliveries included weapons, ammu-
nition and explosives, radios, and
engineering equipment, which were
detailed in a separate memorandum
summarizing some of this informa-
tion in February 1971. The memo
began by noting that all the figures
were approximate, but were believed
accurate within 10 percent.59, a, 60

The Sihanoukville Route was

efficient because Cambodian officials
rapidly unloaded Chinese arms carri-
ers. Under FARK supervision, truck
convoys then moved the ordnance to
a storage depot at Kompong Speu for
transshipment to Communist forces.61
The FARK received a “cut” of sup-
plies ranging as high as 10 percent

a. From July 1968 through May 1969, four

Soviet arms carriers delivered ordnance
to Cambodia under the Soviet-Cambodian
military aid agreement of February 1968.
CIA analysts assessed that the cargo was
consigned to FARK.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  19



Analytic Tug-of-War

Sihanoukville reinforced “the negative impression of the

quality of CIA analysis held by members of the Nixon ad- For example, in a meeting with
ministration.” his Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board in mid-1970, President Nixon
wondered, “If such mistakes could be
of all deliveries entering the pipe- Sihanoukville, in their estimation
made on a fairly straightforward issue
line, or about 459 tons in addition to enough to equip on a one-time basis
such as this, how should we judge
822 tons of legitimate military aid.62 over 600 NVA/VC infantry battal-
CIA’s assessments of more important
Ultimately, CIA traced 18,000 tons— ions; the number of crew-served
developments such as Chinese com-
85 percent of military deliveries—to weapons would have equipped
munist military capabilities?”71
NVA/VC base camps in Cambodia slightly more than 200 battalions. The
arrayed from the far northeast to the deliveries included 222,000 individ- He went on to order the board to
southern border.63 These are shown in ual weapons, more than 16,000 crew investigate the “entire background” to
the map and table (facing page) that served-weapons, 173 million rounds the IC’s “misreading of the impor-
were included in the memorandum. for rifles and light machine guns, tance of Sihanoukville.”72 He closed
almost 11 million rounds for crew- that session by calling for the board
North Vietnam also occasionally served weapons, and over one-half to give “very close attention to the
used the overland route through million mines and hand grenades, ac- case,” which represented “one of the
Laos to funnel supplies directly into cording to the history accompanying worst records ever compiled by the
South Vietnam, according to the the new baseline memorandum.66 67 intelligence community.”73 Adding,
new study, but less than 4 percent of
that he
ordnance traffic to southern South Misjudging the Sihanoukville
Vietnam moved this way compared Route’s role further damaged the simply cannot put up with peo-
to the Sihanoukville Route.64 The agency’s reputation in the Nixon ple lying to the President of the
Vietnamese trucked ordnance down White House. Within two years of United States about intelligence.
Route 110 in Laos to the Tonle Kong the autumn 1968 meetings, CIA and If intelligence is inadequate
River where it was placed on boats its masters, including Nixon and or if the intelligence depicts a
and moved south to Stun Treng. National Security Advisor Henry bad situation, he wants to know
There, they loaded it on trucks and Kissinger, viewed the flawed anal- it and he will not stand being
delivered directly to Communist base ysis as a major intelligence failure served warped evaluations.74
camps along the Cambodian border demanding formal reviews. Richard
as far south as Snoul and Mimot. Helms stated the failure “was an Kissinger subsequently cited
Deliveries to Cambodia via this route acutely embarrassing moment for methodological problems as being
totaled only about 850 tons in four Directorate of Intelligence analysts, at the heart of the failure, during a
shipments occurring between 1966 and even more so for the Director of staff meeting in February 1971.75
and 1968, according to the December Central Intelligence.”68 Sihanoukville He said that Sihanoukville was
1970 memorandum.65 reinforced “the negative impression “one of our greatest intelligence
of the quality of CIA analysis held failures,” and added, “After all, it
by members of the Nixon administra- isn’t Outer Mongolia.”76 Kissinger
Impact and Investigations tion,” according to his formerly clas- wrote to Nixon that he was work-
Use of the Sihanoukville Route sified biography.69 In the eyes of the ing with DCI Richard Helms on
did not alter the war’s outcome, but it new administration, CIA was again “appropriate personnel changes in
provided the enemy a way of con- taking a negative, anti-war line. Its the Agency.”77 Nixon responded, “I
veniently shipping large volumes of delay in recognizing Sihanoukville’s want a real shakeup in CIA, not just
arms to South Vietnam without hav- importance followed its “opposition symbolism.”78
ing to take the much longer, tortuous to MACV’s order of battle figures
and its pessimistic assessment of the Helms, however, backed his team,
route down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In and CIA avoided a personnel purge,
the judgment of CIA analysts, North Rolling Thunder bombing program,”
according to the biography.70 and rather than punish his analysts he
Vietnam had shipped “extremely would praise them for their forth-
large quantities” of ordnance via rightness in revisiting their analysis

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Analytic Tug-of-War

A CIA internal review of its finished intelligence reporting

with the acquisition of reliable data.79 published in 1972 also questioned an underlying assump-
But the damage to CIA’s relationship tion that biased analysts against the Sihanoukville Route.
with the Nixon administration had
been done. George Carver com-
mented that Helms was “vulnerable support the Sihanoukville Route Vietnamese communists] would
because in any future major contro- hypothesis; Ahern noted, “Even the rely in any major way on such an
versy where he really held the line, best agent reporting on quantities important and indirect source [as the
he would have been vulnerable to: of munitions through Sihanoukville Sihanoukville Route].”84
‘Yes, but that’s what you said about had inconsistencies and gaps that the
orthodox school invoked to jus- George Carver judged in
Sihanoukville.’”80
tify skepticism about the maritime November 1970 that the CIA had
The CIA itself and the Foreign route.”81 been led astray by “capability judg-
Intelligence Advisory Board both ments which became controlling as-
completed investigations, the details In contrast, the same rigor was sumptions that took conscious or un-
of which remain largely classified. never applied to estimates of ord- conscious precedence over judgments
The CIA teams working on the nance asserted to be coming overland regarding intentions or actual per-
Sihanoukville connection were crit- south from the Laotian triborder area, formance.” He elaborated that those
icized for failing to fully adjust their about which there was little if any conclusions probably caused OER’s
model of arms transfers to reflect reporting. The lack of human sources analysts “to be a shade more critically
the wealth of evidence beginning to below the triborder area allowed con- rigorous in weighing evidence that
arrive to support the Sihanoukville tinuing faith in the overland thesis, contravened these assumptions than
assessment. They also were criti- but faith is what it was, according evidence which tended to support
cized for being insensitive to the to Ahern. He concluded, “When the them.”85 He also noted that a CIA
lack of direct reporting proving that overland intelligence vacuum per- analytic model of Sihanoukville’s
the overland routes through Laos to sisted as evidence for Sihanoukville cargo-handling capacity was “inge-
Cambodia were actively and currently grew, faith required rationalization to nious and logically impeccable,” but
being used to transport ordnance into survive.”82 “it bore little relationship to concrete
southern South Vietnam. reality.”86
A CIA internal review of its fin-
To provide perspective on the ished intelligence reporting published In 1984, General Palmer summa-
postmortems, historian Tom Ahern in 1972 also questioned an underly- rized the CIA key judgments of the
concluded that there were “substan- ing assumption that biased analysts post-mortem, which concluded that
tial flaws” in CIA analysis of the against the Sihanoukville Route—the the fact that Hanoi could service all
Sihanoukville Route, which emerged premise that Hanoi would be un- its needs via the overland route did
as a failure “only after the bulk of willing to risk relying heavily on a not necessarily mean that the regime
the empirical evidence, gradually trail not under its control, even if it would actually rely on the overland
increasing in volume and improv- had an entirely reliable trail system route. The low estimates on ordnance
ing in source authenticity, began as a fallback. The Office of National transshipment via Sihanoukville,
contradicting Agency estimates.” Estimates wrote that Sihanoukville coupled with the valid capability esti-
Ahern concluded the problem in part did not “surface in all its vigor” mate on the overland route, “resulted
was a “failure to modify conven- until 1968, but two Special National in a mindset that led CIA astray in its
tional wisdom.” CIA analysts failed Intelligence Estimates published in judgments as to what North Vietnam
to recognize they were applying a 1967 had a “clearly conservative was actually doing.”87
double standard as they attempted view” of Cambodia’s role—current
and potential—as a funnel for arms to The Foreign Intelligence Advisory
to compare the usage and relative
NVA/VC forces in South Vietnam.83 Board delivered the results of the
importance of the Sihanoukville
The study questioned the reasoning second inquiry to the President by
Route against the Laos overland trail.
in the January 1967 estimate that January 1971.88 The report may have
Instead, the analysts were more rigor-
“it seems unlikely that they [the used harsh language because Deputy
ous in attacking evidence that might

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Analytic Tug-of-War

Commenting on one of CIA’s internal postmortems on the

failure, CIA’s George Carver wrote in November 1970 that about which sources and raw reports
one such document was “not entirely free of a defensive could be reliably used to build their
cases in Washington and Saigon.95
tone or the subliminal imputation that it is better to have
Ironically, CIA’s use of more rigorous
been wrong for the right reasons than right for the wrong tradecraft than its military counter-
reasons.” parts in handling suspect HUMINT
sources contributed to its significantly
Director for Intelligence Jack Smith Closing Observations lower assessments. Commenting on
recalled that none of its “members one of CIA’s internal postmortems
CIA analysts attempted to apply
seemed to find our accounting con- on the failure, CIA’s George Carver
rigorous tradecraft to analyzing the
vincing.”89 Kissinger summarized wrote in November 1970 that one
North Vietnamese logistics flow
the board’s report in a memorandum such document was “not entirely free
related to Sihanoukville from 1966
written in January 1971, telling of a defensive tone or the subliminal
through 1970, but they underesti-
Nixon that the IC’s failure to properly imputation that it is better to have
mated the port’s overarching impor-
assess the flow of enemy material been wrong for the right reasons than
tance as an arms/ammunition conduit
through Sihanoukville resulted from right for the wrong reasons.”96
to enemy forces in southern South
“deficiencies in both intelligence
Vietnam as well as the quantity of Lessons
collection and analysis.”90 Kissinger
tonnage shipped through the port. What do we know about what
concluded that CIA was primarily
It simultaneously overestimated the CIA took to be the lessons of this ex-
responsible for the failure.91
importance and activity over the perience to be applied in the future?
In fairness to CIA’s analysts, competing overland route, but for Late in the Helms tenure as DCI, CIA
they had drawn attention to what different reasons. The analytic failure had been under pressure to examine
they perceived as Sihanoukville’s reflected intelligence gaps, the agen- more effective alternative analytic
growing significance, and estimated cy’s determination to set a high bar techniques than those employed
that it could be carrying nearly half for using HUMINT reporting, and ad- during the lengthy debate discussed
of the ordnance bound for enemy herence to an inaccurate, alternative above. Fragmented and heavily re-
forces in southern South Vietnam.92 theory of North Vietnamese logistics dacted archival material refers to the
Additionally, Ahern rightly im- routes feeding into southern South loss of analytic consensus within CIA
plied that the case supporting the Vietnam.94 (and even individual offices) on this
Sihanoukville Route was not a ‘slam- topic by 1968. CIA offices routinely
MACV estimates were closer to
dunk’ case even when better sourcing conducted periodic internal reviews
the truth, but they were also flawed
became available in early 1970. He that challenged the methodologies
in several ways. If the final tranche
refused to argue that “the DI should and conclusions of previous analyses.
of shipping documents is indeed an
have assigned to Sihanoukville with CIA did produce a lengthy scrub of
accurate baseline, then MACV also
the same degree of confidence—the clandestine reporting on the topic,
made mistakes in reporting on indi-
importance that it had earlier at- and OER even attempted a version of
vidual arms deliveries, including mis-
tributed to the overland route. There a Team A/Team B exercise to inform
identifying grain shipments as arms
were, after all, powerful circum- the debate, though it failed to change
deliveries, over- and underestimating
stantial arguments against it. And the minds of proponents of the estab-
the amount of ordnance in individual
if agent reporting had now proved lished analytical line.97
deliveries, and ascribing arms deliv-
a substantial flow of arms through
eries bound entirely for the FARK Thus, despite these efforts, CIA
Sihanoukville, exact quantification
as arms deliveries as ones destined analysis remained undermined by
still eluded the analysts.”93
for South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the underlying, flawed assumptions that
number of reports they decided to use were only reluctantly abandoned
got them closer to the truth than CIA. despite a steady increase of coun-
tervailing reporting, according to
The CIA-MACV debate ulti-
Ahern. CIA continued to judge that
mately hinged on determinations

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Analytic Tug-of-War

Hanoi would be unwilling to rely on mechanism” that DCI William according to a CIA history of the
the Sihanoukville Route because it Colby attempted to create after the Directorate of Intelligence.100
would be vulnerable to closure by the intelligence surprise of the October
neutralist Prince Sihanouk. In fact, 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Although The CIA’s experiments with
there was little cost in relying heavily the declassified record simply does alternative analysis continued during
on the route, which offered an easier not reveal what reforms—if any— the Nixon administration, despite
way of shipping munitions to south- were implemented following the the stormy relationship between the
ern South Vietnam than did use of the Sihanoukville failure, contemporary Nixon and CIA. By 1970, CIA had
overland route through Laos. When records reveal that CIA was consider- drafted alternative analysis on Soviet
Sihanouk was ousted in March 1970 ing such techniques as early as during strategic weapons programs for the
and Cambodia’s arrangement with the Lyndon B. Johnson adminis- White House, according to Marchio.
China ended, North Vietnam read- tration, when in 1966 it produced a The effort demonstrated a tentative
ily returned to the overland route to report on the Vietnamese communist interest in alternative analysis, which
transport ordnance to South Vietnam, will to persist that employed a red ultimately became institutionalized
according to Ahern’s account, which team approach, according to James in so-called “Structured Analytical
he focused on “a failure to modify Marchio’s recent study on devil’s Techniques” as discussed by Heuer
conventional wisdom.”98 advocacy in IC analysis.99 Analysts and others and addressed in a
had used “solid alternative analysis monograph, A Tradecraft Primer:
Such shortfalls called for CIA techniques (red team, devil’s advo- Structured Analytic Techniques for
to deploy more rigorous alternative cate, and competing hypotheses),” Improving Intelligence Analysis, pub-
analytic techniques, such as the lished by CIA’s Center for the Study
implementation of the “challenge of Intelligence in March 2009.101

v v v

The author: Richard A. Mobley was a career naval intelligence officer before entering and then completing a second
career as a military analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis. With publication of this article, Mobley will have contrib-
uted six articles to Studies in Intelligence since his first one, “UK Indications and Warning: Gauging the Iraqi Threat to
Kuwait in the 1960s,” appeared in volume 45, no. 3 in 2001. At the time he was still on active duty with the Navy. All
of his work has drawn heavily on officially declassified material.

Endnotes
All released documents can be found in CIA.GOV’s Freedom of Information Act Reading Room ((https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/
search/site/) by inserting the complete released document number in the search field at the top of the search page. For example the
intelligence memorandum cited in endnote 1 below would be searched by inserting “CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1” into the
search field. (N.b. Do not include the bracketed numbers found below in front of document numbers. Those are intended for ease of ref-
erence in the following bibliography.) In most cases, each released item contains more than one document, along with transmittal slips
and memos. The documents contained in the released packages are listed, along with release information, in the bibliography following
these notes. The URLs for all documents available in CIA.GOV are shown in the bibliography.

1. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum, ER IM 70-188, December 1970, “Communist Deliveries to Cambodia for
the VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam, December 1966-April 1969,” 1–15; contained in [2] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1
COMMUNIST MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CAMBODIA (hereafter ER IM 70-188, December 1970).
2. Gen. Bruce Palmer, “US Intelligence and Vietnam,” Studies in Intelligence (Special Edition), 1984, 78. Four years after Palmer retired
from the Army, he was invited to become a member of the CIA’s Senior Review Panel. In that position he suggested the study.
3. ER IM 70-188, December 1970, and CIA Memorandum, Subject: “Communist Supply Deliveries to Cambodia for the Viet
Cong/North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam, December 1966-April 1969,” February 5, 1971, 17–37. Both are in [2] CIA-
RDP78T02095R000200050001-1.
4. Ibid.
5. CIA Blind memo [a briefing script], “The North Vietnamese Logistical System—Capabilities and Vulnerabilities,” August 5, 1970,
2–16, in [6] CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1.
6. CIA DI ER IM 70-188, December 1970.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  23



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7. George Carver Memorandum for the Director, Subject: [Notes on] “Sihanoukville Post Mortem,” November 10, 1970, in [13] CIA-RD-
P80R01720R000600090052-6, 33.
8. Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. Good Questions, Wrong Answers: CIA’s Estimates of Arms Traffic Through Sihanoukville, Cambodia, During the
Vietnam War (CIA, Center for Study of Intelligence, 2004), xi.
9. Ibid.
10. Ahern, Nothing If Not Eventful, 103.
11. CIA Memorandum for the Director, “Cambodian Involvement in the Supply of Arms and Ammunition to Communist Forces in South
Vietnam” (“Graham Report”), December 13, 1968, in [8] CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020001-6.
12. DCI memorandum to SECDEF Laird forwarding blind memorandum, “Logistics Flows to the Enemy in South Vietnam,” January 28,
1970, in [5] CIA-RDP78T02095R000600200001-1).
13. CIA, Enclosure to memorandum to Director from Carver, “Notes on Background Matters Pertinent to Current ARVN and U.S. Opera-
tions in Cambodia,” June 15, 1970, in [12] (CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030002-1.
14. MACV J-2, “VC/NVA Use of Cambodia for Logistics Support,” November 22, 1968, 7 (archives in US Army Heritage and Education
Center).
15. MACV Combined Intelligence Center, “VC/NVA Use of Cambodia as a Source for Arms and Ammunition,” May 15, 1968, 8 (ar-
chives in U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center).
16. MACV J-2, “VC/NVA Use of Cambodia for Logistics Support,” November 22, 1968, 7.
17. Ted Gettinger, Oral history interview with Phillip Davidson, 30 June 1982, II–25 (1071628002), Vietnam Virtual Archive (https://
www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/).
18. Paul Stillwell, Reminiscences of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired),” (US Naval Institute, 2003), 502–503.
19. Elmo R. Zumwalt, On Watch (New York Times Books, 1976), 38.
20. Paul Stillwell, Draft of interview with VAdm. Earl F. Rectanus, 19 November 1982, 44–45 , accessed in Texas Tech University Viet-
nam Virtual Archive on 9 May 2024 (https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=6260111001).
21. General Creighton Abrams, “Personal for” message to General Wheeler, “Enemy Reliance on Cambodia,” December 15, 1968
(CK2349127747), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.
22. Ibid.
23. CIA, Memorandum for the Director, “Cambodian Involvement in the Supply of Arms and Ammunition to Communist Forces in South
Vietnam” (the “Graham Report”), December 31, 1968, in [8] CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020001-6.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. CIA, “OER Comments on Current MAC-V Views of VC/NVA/Logistics,” November 11, 1968, in [4] CIA-
RDP78T02095R000300180001-7.
27. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum, “The Impact of Change in US Bombing Programs on Communist Logistics
Activities,” October 4, 1968, in [4] CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7.
28. CIA, Enclosure to memorandum to CIA Director from Carver, “Notes on Background Matters Pertinent to Current ARVN and U.S.
Operations in Cambodia,” June 15, 1970, in [12] CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030002-1.
29. Ibid.
30. Abrams, “Personal for” message to General Wheeler.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. CIA, “Attachment to Memorandum on Cambodia as a Source of VC/NVA Arms and Ammunition,” October 31, 1968, 8, in [9]
CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030013-2.
34. CIA, “OER Comments on Current MAC-V Views of VC/NVA/Logistics,” November 11, 1968, in [4] CIA-
RDP78T02095R000300180001-7.
35. CIA, “Blind Memo re DCI Briefing Memo on the Communist Use of Sihanoukville,” May 18, 1970, 5, in [3] CIA-
RDP78T02095R000200090001-8.
36. CIA, Enclosure to memorandum to Director from Carver, “Notes on Background Matters Pertinent to Current ARVN and U.S. Opera-
tions in Cambodia,” June 15, 1970, in [12] CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030002-1.
37. CIA, Memorandum for the Director, “Cambodian Involvement in the Supply of Arms and Ammunition to Communist Forces in South
Vietnam” (the “Graham report”), December 31, 1968, in [8] CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020001-6.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. CIA, Blind memorandum, “The North Vietnamese Logistical System—Capabilities and Vulnerabilities,” August 5, 1970, in [5] CIA-
RDP78T02095R000600290001-1.
42. CIA, Memorandum, “OER Comments on Current MAC-V Views of VC/NVA Logistics,” November 11, 1968, in [4] CIA-
RDP78T02095R000300180001-7.

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43. CIA, “Attachment to Memorandum on Cambodia as a Source of VC/NVA Arms and Ammunition,” October 31, 1968, in [9] CIA-RD-
P79R00967A001200030013-2.
44. CIA Memorandum, “OER Comments on Current MAC-V Views of VC/NVA Logistics,” November 11, 1968, in [4] CIA-
RDP78T02095R000300180001-7.
45. CIA, “Attachment to Memorandum on Cambodia as a Source of VC/NVA Arms and Ammunition,” October 31, 1968, in [9] CIA-RD-
P79R00967A001200030013-2.
46. CIA, Memorandum for the Director, “Cambodian Involvement in the Supply of Arms and Ammunition to Communist Forces in South
Vietnam” (the “Graham report”), December 31, 1968, in [8] CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020001-6.
47. Ibid., 3–4.
48. CIA Blind memo, “DCI Briefing Memo on the Communist Use of Sihanoukville,” May 18, 1970, in [3] CIA-
RDP78T02095R000200090001-8.
49. Abrams, “Personal for” message to General Wheeler, “Enemy Reliance on Cambodia,” December 15, 1968 (CK2349127747), U.S.
Declassified Documents Online.
50. Ibid.
51. Robert Hathaway, Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, 1966-1973 (Center for Study of Intelligence, 1993), 33–34.
52. Ibid., 34.
53. Ahern, Nothing if not Eventful, 103.
54. CIA Intelligence Memorandum, ER IM 7-126, “New Evidence on Military Deliveries to Cambodia: December 1966–April 1969,” 3,
in [7] CIA-RDP78T02095R00200040001-3.
55. CIA Blind memo, “Communist Supply Deliveries to Cambodia for the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam, Decem-
ber 1966-April 1969,” February 5, 1971, attached to ER IM 70-188, December 1970, in [2] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1.
56. Ibid.
57. ER IM 70-188, December 1970, 2, in [2] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1.
58. Ibid., Table 1.
59. CIA memorandum, “Communist Supplies Deliveries to Cambodia for the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam,
December 1966–April 1969,” 5 February 1971 in [2] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1.
60. CIA memorandum from Chief of Trade and Aid Branch, “Possibility of Communist Military Deliveries to Sihanoukville Destined for
the Cambodian Armed Forces,” May 9, 1969, in [1] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200030001-4.
61. ER IM 70-188, December 1970, Table 1, in [2] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1, 3.
62. Ibid., 9–10.
63. Ibid., “The Sihanoukville Route,” 5.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., 8.
66. Ibid., 4.
67. Ibid.
68. Hathaway, Richard Helms, 35.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. “Record of President’s Meeting with the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, “Southeast Asia,” (Document 344) July 18, 1970 in
U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States [Hereafter FRUS], 1969–1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July
1970; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January
21, 1971 (Document 107), Subject: Sihanoukville Intelligence Failure, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January
1972.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 210. Editorial Note.
75. CIA, Memorandum for the Director, untitled, February 8, 1971, in [11] CIA-RDP80M01133A000900040010-5.
76. Ibid.
77. Document 224 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume II.
78. Ibid.
79. Hathaway, Richard Helms, 35–37.
80. Ibid., 35.
81. Ahern, Good Questions, Wrong Answers, 47, vii, 42.
82. Ibid., 42, 48
83. CIA, Office of National Estimates, “1967s Estimative Record—Five Years Later,” August 16, 1972, in [10] CIA-RD-
P79R00967A001500040010-1.
84. Ibid.

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Analytic Tug-of-War

85. CIA, Memorandum for the Director, “Sihanoukville Post Mortem,” 10 November 1970, in [13] CIA-RD-
P80R01720R000600090052-6.
86. Ibid.
87. Palmer, “U.S. Intelligence and Vietnam,” 78.
88. CIA, Memorandum for the Director, untitled, February 8, 1971, in [11] CIA-RDP80M01133A000900040010-5.
89. R. Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA, 211.
90. “Editorial Note” (Document 224), FRUS, Volume II, 1969–76, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972.
91. Ibid.
92. Enclosure to memorandum to Director from Carver, “Notes on Background Matters Pertinent to Current ARVN and U.S. Operations
in Cambodia,” June 15, 1970, in [12] CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030002-1.
93. Ahern, Good Questions, Wrong Answers, 47.
94. ER IM 70-188, December 1970, in [2] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1.
95. Ahern, Nothing If Not Eventful, 103.
96. CIA, Memorandum for the Director, “Sihanoukville Post Mortem,” November 10, 1970, in [13] CIA-RD-
P80R01720R000600090052-6.
97. Ahern, Good Questions, Wrong Answers, 22–25.
98. Ibid., vii.
99. James Marchio, “Instituting Devil’s Advocacy in IC Analysis after the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973,” Studies in Intelligence 67,
no. 4 (December 2023). (https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/610d592f509c5ad03f5a999827dd9bdb/Article-Instituting-Devils-Ad-
vocacy-in-IC-Analysis-after-October-1973-War.pdf).
100. CIA, The Directorate of Intelligence: Fifty Years of Informing Policy, 1952–2002 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002), 40–45.
101. Available at https://cia.gov/resources/csi/static/955180a45afe3f5013772c313b16face/Tradecraft-Primer-apr09.pdf

v v v

Bibliography
CIA Declassified Documents
Numbers in brackets are not part of document numbers on file; they are for reference in this article only. The documents can
be found by searching the document numbers at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/. Specific URLs are listed in the column
describing the key documents in each release.
Document number Description of key contents
[1] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200030001-4 CIA memorandum from Chief of Trade and Aid Branch, “Possibility of
COMMUNIST SUPPLY SHIPMENTS Communist Military Deliveries to Sihanoukville Destined for the Cambodian
THROUGH CAMBODIA AND LAOS APR- Armed Forces,” 9 May 1969. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/search/site/
MAY 1969; Released 2006/01/03; 50 pages. CIA-RDP78T02095R000200030001-4).
[2] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1 DI Intelligence Memorandum, ER IM 70-188, December 1970, “Communist
COMMUNIST MILITARY DELIVERIES TO Deliveries to Cambodia for the VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam, Decem-
CAMBODIA; 2007/10/23; 56 pages. ber 1966-April 1969,” 1–15; Also attached blind Memorandum of same title,
dated 5 February 1971, detailing points in ER IM 70-188, with more tables,
graph, and map showing “The Sihanoukville Route,” 17–37; unclassified
transmittal letters to senior military officers transmitting ER IM 70-126, Sep-
tember 1970, dated 8 September 1970; Intelligence Memorandum, ER IM
69 -177, “Chinese and Soviet Military Deliveries To Cambodia,” December
1969, 53–44 (Introduction only, 47 pages denied). (https://www.cia.gov/read-
ingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP78T02095R000200050001-1).
[3] CIA-RDP78T02095R000200090001-8 CIA memorandum, “Blind Memo re DCI Briefing Memo on the Com-
COMMUNIST MILITARY DELIVERIES TO munist Uses of Sihanoukville,” 18 May 1970, 5; CIA report, “An Evalu-
CAMBODIA; 2004/11/30; 15 pages. ation of Recent Clandestine Reporting on Cambodia,” October 1969,
iii (Foreword only). (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/search/site/CIA-
RDP78T02095R000200090001-8).

26  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

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[4] CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7 Boggs memorandum, including the key Abrams quote at its end, 6; CIA
(GENERAL ABRAMS ([various] COMMENTS memorandum, “OER Comments on Current MAC-V Views of VC/NVA Lo-
ON ABRAMS CABLES RE VIETNAM WAR); gistics,” 11 Nov 68; CIA IM: Impact of Change in US Bombing Programs on
2004/11/30; 66 pages. Communist Logistics Activities, 10–20; SCSAIGON 669 Oct 1968, Com-
ments on General Abrams assessment [dated 15 December 68] [“overly op-
timistic”] (Four Section Cable, 40-53); Blind memo, “Comments on General
Abrams’ Response to Mr. Rostow on the Effects of Ending the Bombing of
North Vietnam”; 26 August 68, 57–60. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/
search/site/CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7).
[5] CIA-RDP78T02095R000600200001-1 CIA memorandum, DCI Helms to Sec Def Laird, forwarding blind memo,
LOGISTICS FLOW ANALYSIS; 2007/03/07; “Logistics Flows to the Enemy in South Vietnam,” 28 January 1970, 2–14;
23 pages. Undated [ca. 24 March 1970], memorandum, “Communist Logistics in the
Laotian Panhandle and South Vietnam,” 19–23. (https///www.cia.gov/readin-
groom/search/site/CIA-RDP78T02095R000600200001-1).
[6] CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1 Blind memo (briefing script) “The North Vietnamese Logistical System—Ca-
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LOGISTICAL pabilities and Vulnerabilities,” 5 August 1970. Addresses how “the system
SYSTEM- -CAPABILITIES AND VULNERA- has stood up under US bombing campaigns with reference to period be-
BILITIES; 2006/11/07; 16 pages. tween March and November 1968,” 10. (https///www.cia.gov/readingroom/
search/site/ CIA-RDP78T02095R000600290001-1).
[7] CIA-RDP78T02095R00200040001-3 CIA ER IM 70-126, September 1970, “New Evidence on Military Deliver-
NEW EVIDENCE ON MILITARY DELIVER- ies to Cambodia: December 1966-April 1969,” 2–16; Memorandum for the
IES TO CAMBODIA: DECEMBER 1966 - Director, “Distribution of ER IM 70-126, September 1970,” 5 Sep 1970,
APRIL 1969; 2007/03/06; 23 pages. 17–21; Memo to DD/OER re. “second installment of Sihanoukville paper”,
33 pages all redacted. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/search/site/CIA-
RDP78T02095R00200040001-3).
[8] CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020001-6 CIA, Memorandum for the Director, “Cambodian Involvement in the Supply
CAMBODIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE of Arms and Ammunition to Communist Forces in South Vietnam” (the “Gra-
SUPPLY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO ham Report” re. consultations with MACV and other in-country intelligence
COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIET- components), 31 December 1968. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/search/
NAM; 2009/03/17; 18 pages. site/ CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020001-6).
[9] CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030013-2 Two CIA memorandums, “Attachments to Memorandum on Cambodia as a
ATTACHMENT TO MEMORANDUM ON Source of VC/NVA Arms and Ammunition,” [1] Memorandum: “Discussion
CAMBODIA AS A SOURCE OF VC/NVA of the Evidence,” 31 October 1968, 1-8; [2] Memorandum, “Summary and
ARMS AND AMMUNITION; 2007/03/06; 14 Conclusions,” 31 October 1968, 10–14. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/
pages. search/site/CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030013-2).
[10] CIA-RDP79R00967A001500040010-1 CIA Office of National Estimates, “1967s Estimative Record—Five Years
1967’S ESTIMATIVE RECORD - - FIVE Later,” 16 August 1972. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rd-
YEARS LATER; 2006/12/15; 37 pages. p79r00967a001500040010-1).
[11] CIA-RDP80M01133A000900040010-5 CIA, Memorandum for the Director, untitled, unsourced, re meeting with
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR; Henry Kissinger on planning of a Laos operation, including Kissinger com-
2002/08/21; 1 page. mentary on Sihanoukville as “one of our greatest intelligence failures,” 8
February 1971. (CIA-RDP80M01133A000900040010-5) (https://www.cia.
gov/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RDP80M01133A000900040010-5).
[12] CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030002-1 Transmittal to Director from Carver of “Notes on Background Matters Per-
MEMO TO THE DIRECTOR FROM G. A. tinent to Current ARVN and U.S. Operations in Cambodia” given to David
CARVER, JR.; 2004/06/14; 10 pages. Packard on 15 June 70. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/search/site/
CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030002-1).
[13] CIA-RDP80R01720R000600090052-6 CIA, Memorandum for the Director, [presumably from George Carver,
UNTITLED; 2004/10/12; 3 pages. SAVA, “[Notes on] Sihanoukville Post Mortem,” 10 November 1970 [shows
only 1 page of 4]. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/search/site/CIA-RD-
P80R01720R000600090052-6).

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Analytic Tug-of-War

US Military Documentary Sources

MACV Combined Intelligence Center “VC/NVA Use of Cambodia as a Source for Arms and Ammunition,” 15 May
1968 (archives in U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center).
MACV J-2 “VC/NVA Use of Cambodia for Logistics Support,” 22 November 1968 (ar-
chives in U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center).

US Army Declassified Document “Personal for” message from General Abrams to General Wheeler, “Enemy
Reliance on Cambodia,” 15 December 1968 (CK2349127747), U.S. Declas-
sified Documents Online (gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349127747/USDD?u=loc_
main&sid=bookmark-USDD&xid=e3d6533a&pg+2).
U.S. Department of State Histories
State Department’s History site, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments, is readily searchable. A simple search from its
home page on the word “Sihanoukville” produces 72 results.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy,
1969–1972.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972.
Other Published Material
Ahern, Thomas L., Jr. Good Questions, Wrong Answers: CIA’s Estimates of Arms Traffic Through
Sihanoukville, Cambodia, During the Vietnam War, (CIA, Center for the
Study of Intelligence, 2004). (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/4_
GOOD_QUESTIONS_WRONG_ANSWERS.pdf).
Ahern, Thomas L., Jr. Nothing if not Eventful: A Memoir of a Life in CIA (CIA, Center for Study
of Intelligence, 2023). (https://www.cia.gov/static/c7189a03edf1b72f-
fa0897f2b19120bf/AhernMemoir-14Dec2023-1.pdf).
Anonymous A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techinques for Improving Intelli-
gence Analysis (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2009). https://cia.gov/
resources/csi/static/955180a45afe3f5013772c313b16face/Tradecraft-Prim-
er-apr09.pdf.
Gettinger, Ted Oral history interview with Phillip Davidson, 30 June 1982, ii-25
(1071628002) Vietnam Virtual Archive. (https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtu-
alarchive/).
Hathaway, Robert and R. J. Smith Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, 1966-1973 (CIA, Center
for Study of Intelligence, 1993). (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docu-
ment/0005307558).
Marchio, James “Instituting Devil’s Advocacy in IC Analysis after the Arab-Israeli War of Octo-
ber 1973,” Studies in Intelligence 67, no. 4 (December 2023). (https://www.
cia.gov/resources/csi/static/610d592f509c5ad03f5a999827dd9bdb/Article-In-
stituting-Devils-Advocacy-in-IC-Analysis-after-October-1973-War.pdf).
Nguyen Duy Tuong History of the Annamite Mountain Troops of the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Hanoi,
People’s Publishing House, 1994).
Palmer, Bruce (BG USA Ret.) “U.S. Intelligence and Vietnam,” Studies in Intelligence (Special Edition),
1984. (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001433692.pdf).
Smith, R. Jack The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Pergam-
on-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989).
Stillwell, Paul Reminiscences of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired) (U.S.
Naval Institute, 2003).
Stillwell, Paul Draft of interview with VAdm. Earl F. Rectanus, 19 November 1982, 44–45 ,
accessed in Texas Tech University Vietnam Virtual Archive on 9 May 2024.
(https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=6260111001).
Zumwalt, Elmo R. On Watch (New York Times Books, 1976).

28  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

From the Archive

Unpopular Pessimism: Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful

About Vietnam
Hal Ford
Editor’s note: this article originally appeared in Studies in Intelligence
Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1996). It subsequently appeared in the 1997
annual unclassified edition of the journal. The content of this version is
identical to the original, although the formatting has been changed for
ease of reading selected quotes at the end of the narrative.
v v v

It is well documented and In traveling through Tonkin, to examine the sources of CIA
well known that for de- every vil­lage flew the Viet Minh ana­lyses’ doubts about successive
cades CIA analysts were flag, and had armed soldiers, administrations’ repeated assurances
skeptical of official pro- many with Japanese weapons and claims.
taken in raids. The women and
nouncements about the Not all CIA analysts thought
children were also organized,
Vietnam war and consis- and all were enthusiastic in alike, and at times there were
tently fairly pessimistic their support. The important substantial differences of view.
about the outlook for “light thing is that all were cognizant Skepticism and pessimism about
at the end of the tunnel.” of the fact that independence was Vietnam were present chiefly among
not to be gained in a day, and those officers who produced fin-
were prepared to continue their ished intelligence in the form of
struggle for years. In the rural National Intelligence Estimates and
areas, I found not one instance in Intelligence Directorate (then the
of opposition to the Viet Minh, DDI) publications: that is, analysts
even among former government in the Office of National Estimates
officials. (ONE), the Office of [Economic]
Research and Reports, and the
—0SS Report, October19452 South Vietnam Branch of the Office
of Current Intelligence (OCI).Such
It is well documented and well views were generally a bit less
known that for decades CIA analysts evident among officers of the North
were skeptical of official pronounce- Vietnam Branch of OCI, many of
ments about the Vietnam war and whom had been transferred there
consistently fairly pessimistic about from previous Soviet and North
the outlook for “light at the end of the Korean assign­ments. The situation
tunnel.” Less well known is why the among the Agency’s operational of-
Agency’s analysts were so doubtful, fices at home and abroad was mixed:
especially because CIA was all the some enthusiastically shared official
while a central player in US opera- White House views, while others
tional efforts to create and strengthen were remarkably caustic. In more
South Vietnam. Thus, it is important than a few cases, the Intelligence

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US
government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of
the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024) 29



From the Archive

The fact that CIA judgments often were more candid than
those of most other offices was due in important measure in Vietnam and experienced firsthand
to the bureaucratic advantage the Agency’s culture and such distortion by some senior US
officials there. The resulting candor
purpose afforded.
of CIA judgments flowed also from
the fact that the reports Headquarters
Community’s (IC) coordination Agency’s analysts simply, if unscien-
analysts received from CIA’s Saigon
processes and top CIA officers muted tifically, distilled their many sources
station were much more factual and
doubts about Viet­nam expressed in of doubt into judgments that often did
exacting in their demanded authen-
CIA’s analytic ranks, yet the finished not square with official pronounce-
ticity than was much of the other
intelligence produced by the DDI and ments—a record that the authors of
reporting from Vietnam.
ONE maintained definitely pessimis- The Pentagon Papers and numerous
tic, skeptical tones over the years. other historians have documented. Recognition of the Vietnamese Com-
munists’ (VC) enormous advantages.
The danger always existed that The following principal factors CIA’s analysts were aware that the
indi­vidual CIA analysts could get and forces are among the many basic stimulus among the politically
locked into constant dark points of reasons for the doubts exhibited by so conscious Vietnamese was national-
view, reluctant to accept new evi- many of CIA’s Vietnam analysts: ism and that, following World War
dence to the contrary. Also, at times
CIA’s cultural advantages. II, the VM had largely captured the
some CIA analysts overreacted to cer-
The fact that CIA judgments often nationalist movement. Ho Chi Minh’s
tain assertive personalities from other
were more candid than those of most apparatus came to be better led, better
offices who happened to be arguing
other offices was due in important organized, and more united than any
wholly unsupportable optimism. And
measure to the bureaucratic advan- of the other competing, divided na-
there were a few occasions where
tage the Agency’s culture and purpose tionalist Vietnamese parties. Through
CIA judgments on Vietnam badly
afforded. The job of CIA analysts a combination of some reforms
missed the boat, or where Agency
was to tell it like it is, freer from the and ruthless elimination of politi-
judgments were too wishy-washy to
policy pressures with which their cal rivals, the VM/VC dominated
serve the needs of policymaking or,
colleagues in Defense, the military the countryside. Local populations
in a handful of cases, where analytic
intelligence agencies, and, to a lesser seldom volunteered intelligence to
officers caved in to pressures from
extent, the Department of State had to the French, the South Vietnamese, or
above and produced mistakenly rosy
contend. Many CIA Vietnam ana­lysts
3 the Americans about Communist­led
judgments. Despite these hazards,
had been working on Indochina prob- forces in their midst.
and, as Robert McNamara’s recent
book In Retrospect maintains, the lems for some time, often longer than
Then, too, the VM’s 1954 victory
war’s outcome justified many of the most military intelligence officers.
over the French at Dien Bien Phu
CIA analyses’ doubts and warnings. Those Agency officers were familiar
and the end of French rule had been
with how intelligence reporting had
tremendous boosts to nationalist sen-
Officials in other entities, espe- been distorted during France’s fight
timent and Ho Chi Minh’s status and
cially in the Department of State’s against the Communist-led Viet Minh
popularity. At that time, most observ-
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, (VM) and how such unfounded opti-
ers of Indochina affairs, including US
often came up with similar doubting mism had contributed to the French
intelligence agencies, judged that if
judgments. At times, their doubts defeat.
nationwide elections were held, the
also were shared by certain officers in
CIA analysts subsequently wit- VM would win by a large margin.
DIA and elsewhere in the Department
of Defense and by certain junior nessed nearly identical patterns in
A similar view was even shared
and field grade intelligence officers much of the US military and diplo-
by DCI Allen Dulles, who, accord-
in Vietnam. CIA’s analysts had no matic reporting from Saigon. In addi-
ing to the record of a 1954 NSC
special sources of data not available tion,they were at times told confiden-
meeting, told that senior group that
to other US Government offices, no tially by mid­dle-grade US military
“The most disheartening feature of
unique analytic methodologies, no and Saigon Mission officers of such
the news from Indochina ... was the
pre-computer–age Window 95s. The practices. A few CIA analysts served

30  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

From the Archive

CIA analysts widely appreciated the fact that the enemy

evidence that the majority of the saw its battle as a long-range conflict and was prepared
people in Vietnam supported the to go the distance.
Vietminh rebels.”4 South Vietnam’s
Ngo Dinh Diem (with subtle US
backing) subsequently proceeded to patient outside powers and cause policymaking colleagues had been
frustrate the holding of elections, and them eventually to quit. For decades, “wrong, terribly wrong.”
this strengthened the determination CIA analysts again and again told
of VM forces to continue subverting Recognition of the great difficulties
policymakers that the enemy would
French and American military mea-
all Vietnam in order to redress their doubtless persevere, counter-escalate
sures encountered in trying to combat
grievance at being robbed of what as best it could, and do so despite
VM/VC political-military warfare.
they felt had been their victory in the suffering heavy damage.
Virtually all CIA Vietnam offi-
field and at Geneva.
Such Agency analysts’ doubts cers, in the field and in Washington,
And one of the greatest advan- were especially marked during the remained strongly influenced by the
tages Ho’s movement enjoyed, at months in 1964 and 1965, when French defeat in Indochina. They
times indicated in reporting from President Johnson’s administration recognized how ill suited French
the field, were the subversive assets was stum­bling toward carrying the military tactics had been for fighting
the VM and the VC had throughout war to North Vietnam and commit- the enemy; how the VM had chewed
South Vietnam. Thousands of their ting US combat forces in the South. up elite French military units; and
agents and sleepers existed through- During that time, and in the face of how the enemy had stunned the world
out South Vietnam’s government, pres­sures to “get on the team,” CIA by overwhelming the French forces
armed forces, and security/intelli­­ analysts (as well as intelligence offi- at Dien Bien Phu. Because Agency
gence organizations. The dramatic cers from other agencies) repeatedly officers were not burdened with
extent of that advantage was not warned decisionmakers that such US the operational task of training and
revealed until the fall of Saigon in military escalation would not in itself developing South Vietnamese armed
1975, when events disclosed how save South Vietnam unless it were forces, they were much freer of cer-
thoroughly the enemy had penetrated accompanied by substantial political- tain views more prevalent among US
the society of South Vietnam, includ- social progress in Saigon and military personnel, such as disdaining
ing some American offices there. especially in the villages of South the French experience, maintaining
Vietnam, where virtually all CIA that US military know-how could
Recognition of VM/VC determina- officers at all levels had long main- prevail, and trying to impose upon
tion to try to meet South Vietnamese Saigon governments US military
tained that the war had to be won.
and US escalation, and willingness tactics that were better suited to
Agency officers made this point to
to suffer great damage, if necessary, European battlefields.5 Such appreci-
policymakers through clan­destine ser-
in order to win eventual victory. ation by CIA officers found reflection
vice reports, DDI and ONE memos,
CIA analysts widely appreci- both in the field and at Headquarters
National Intelligence Estimates
ated the fact that the enemy saw its in CIA counterinsurgency measures
(NIEs), participation in JCS war
battle as a long-range conflict and that lost their effectiveness when later
games and in NSC-sanctioned
was prepared to go the distance. taken over by the US military, and
working groups, and, in the end,
To sustain VM/VC morale, Hanoi in numerous Headquarters analyses
warnings by DCI John McCone. But
repeatedly invoked past victorious that judged that US military tactics
no one in the administration wanted
Vietnamese heroes, even ancient were not substantially reducing the
to listen. It was not until about 1966
ones who for nearly a thousand enemy’s ability and determination to
that frustrations in the field caused
years had fought Chinese pressures continue the war.
certain previous senior true believ-
to dominate Indochina. Like those
ers to begin “defecting in place,”
heroes, Hanoi was confident that its Moreover, many Agency analysts
especially Secretary of Defense
many advantages in the field and the were sensitive to the geographic and
McNamara, whose In Retro­spect now
power of its forces to endure would terrain features in Indochina that
holds that CIA warnings had been
in time frustrate more powerful, less shielded enemy supply lines from
correct all along and that he and his

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  31



From the Archive

Then, when finally asked by the White House in mid-1964

for its view of the domino thesis, ONE replied heretically: continued to maintain that the Sino-
“We do not believe that the loss of South Vietnam and Soviet estrangement was a plot to
Laos would be followed by the rapid, successive commu- deceive the West.8
nization of the other states of the Far East.” Those CIA analysts who rejected
the official view that Moscow and
outer view and helped enemy guer- Rejection of official claims that Beijing were largely running the
rilla tactics but impeded US mech- Moscow and Beijing were directing Vietnam war effort based their skepti­
anized forces. CIA analysts long at the enemy war effort and that interna- cism on several sources. One was
Indochina assignments recalled how tional Communism was a monolith. appreciation of the degree of inde-
reluctant the JCS and the US Army Many senior policymakers pendence from outside Communist
had been in 1954 to try to bail out the judged for years that the ene- control Ho Chi Minh’s movement and
French militarily at Dien Bien Phu, in my’s war effort in Vietnam was fledgling government had enjoyed
part because US military studies had being run by” the Communist all along. Another was the fact that
concluded that Indochina’s location bloc.” One such example: Gen. following the French defeat at Dien
and terrain were not suited for ready Lyman Lemnitzer, at the time Bien Phu, Moscow and Beijing could
supply or effective US military ac- JCS Chairman, stated in 1962 that have given Hanoi more support at
tion. These analysts also recalled, as Vietnam’s fall was “a planned 1954’s Geneva Confer­ence than
most policymakers by the early 1960s phase in the Communist time they did. There also was evidence
seemingly did not, how reluctant US table for world domination” that all along the Soviets had less
Army leaders had been to become and that the adverse effects of interest in promoting Communist
engaged in war in Indochina, and Vietnam’s fall would be felt as far aims in Indochina than in buttressing
how at the time the JCS had held that away as Africa.7 Communist Party fortunes in France
”From the point of view of the United and Western Europe. Most CIA ana-
By contrast, virtually all CIA of-
States, with reference to the Far East lysts held that the various Communist
ficers held that available evidence
as a whole, Indochina is devoid of movements in Southeast Asia each
clearly indicated that, although
decisive military objectives, and the contained conflicting nationalis-
the USSR and Communist China
allocation of more than token US tic elements a­ s the later wars of
were giving Hanoi defense
armed forces to the area would be Communist China versus Communist
assistance, the Vietnam war was
a serious diversion of limited US North Vietnam and Communist
Hanoi’s show and had been from
capabilities.6 Cambodia versus Communist North
the outset. Moreover, with the
Vietnam illustrated.
Similar views following US exception largely of one CIA
expansion of the war to the North in office, Agency analysts had been These judgments contributed
1965, together with available posi- way ahead of the rest of the IC in to the doubts held by certain CIA
tive evidence, led most CIA and DIA pointing out—for years without analysts, especially within ONE, that
analysts to conclude that, despite US much impact—that the Sino-Soviet the loss of Vietnam would inexorably
bombing efforts, the level of Hanoi’s alliance was coming apart at the lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia
arms shipments to the VC were con- seams; that the USSR and China and the US defense position in the far
tinuing to rise. Subsequent accounts were competitive with respect to the Pacific. The doubts went unvoiced for
by Johnson administration decision- Vietnam war; and that their develop- years in the face of repeated em-
makers con­firm that those reports had ing estrangement offered US admin- braces of the domino thesis by senior
a definitely depressing influence upon istrations an exploitable opportunity. officials of the Truman, Eisenhower,
their earlier certainties, and, in some The principal exceptions to these Kennedy, and Johnson administra-
cases, were instrumental in causing views within CIA were largely con- tions. Then, when finally asked by the
some of those policymakers to lower fined to certain counterintelli­gence White House in mid-1964 for its view
their previous enthusiasm about the officers, who, even after the Sino- of the domino thesis, ONE replied
war’s prospects. Soviet firefights that occurred along heretically: “We do not believe that
the Ussuri River border in 1969, the loss of South Vietnam and Laos

32  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

From the Archive

Criticisms by Community ana­lysts raised a firestorm of

would be followed by the rapid, suc- protest among policymaking officers. They brought such
cessive communization of the other pressure on DCI McCone and ONE that the latter caved
states of the Far East.”9 The impact
in and agreed to a rewritten, decidedly more rosy NIE
of those doubts on policymakers was
nil. (53-63), in which the earlier criticisms of the ARVN were
muted and the tone of the Estimate changed
Recognition of the fact that South
Vietnam remained a fragile entity
But it cannot be evoked by poor tactical use of available forces, a
whose ability to cope effectively with
the VC should not be overestimated. men in white linen suits whose very inadequate intelligence system,
These views, held widely among CIA contact with the ordinary people and obvious Communist penetration
analysts, if less so among CIA opera- is largely through the rolled-up of the South Vietnamese military
tions officers, for years ran headlong into win­dows of a Mercedes-Benz.12 organization.”13
repeated assertions by successive US
administrations that Saigon’s military Subsequently published doc- Those criticisms by Community
effectiveness was rising. Subsequent uments indicate that MACV and ana­lysts raised a firestorm of pro-
events validated such CIA judgments: Mission officers occasionally voiced test among policymaking officers.
former NSC staff officer Chester L. despair at the Government of South They brought such pressure on DCI
Cooper, for example, later recorded that, Vietnam’s (GVN) lack of military and McCone and ONE that the latter
as of 1962, “The fact was that the war political progress, but tended to con- caved in and agreed to a rewritten,
was not going well, the Vietnamese Army
fine their doubts to official, classified decidedly more rosy NIE (53-63),
was not taking kindly to American advice,
channels. Public official admission of in which the earlier criticisms of
and Diem was not following through on
his promises to liberalize his regime or serious GVN shortcomings was rare. the ARVN were muted and the tone
increase its effectiveness.”10 Even more so, senior US military of the Estimate changed: the first
figures,at home and in the field, were sentence of the revised NIE now read,
In addition, over the years much almost always reluctant to admit that “We believe that Communist progress
field reporting underscored the fact for years South Vietnamese military has been blunted [in South Vietnam]
that President Diem’s government did units (the ARVN), usually much and that the situation is improving.”14
not enjoy wide support in Vietnam’s better armed than the enemy, were This was not one of CIA’s proudest
villages. His government was a no match for the VC. Criticisms of moments. And less than four weeks
minority Catholic one in a predomi- ARVN shortcomings were especially later, serious riots began in Hue
nantly Buddhist country.11 Diem was off limits, lest there be an implica- which introduced the chain of events
not a dynamic leader, and he could tion chat US military advisers were that culminated in the self-immo-
not compete with the widespread not doing a good job of converting lation of Buddhist monks and the
popularity Ho Chi Minh enjoyed. the ARVN into an effective fighting murder of President Diem.
He was remote from the people, as force.
attested even by Lyndon Johnson in
early 1961 while still Vice President: Such sensitivity was particu- Areas of Doubt
larly registered in early 1963, when
These, then, were the principal ar-
A final indication of the danger DCI McCone, the JCS, CINCPAC,
eas of doubt that for years lay behind
is the fact that the ordinary peo- MACV, the US Embassy in Saigon,
so many CIA analyses of the outlook
ple of the cities [of South Viet- and other policymakers took um-
in Vietnam. Except for those occa-
nam] and probably even more of brage at a draft NIE which ONE
sions where Agency officers produced
the rural areas are starved for and the IC’s working-level officers
flawed accounts or rosied up their
leadership with understanding had agreed upon. It held that among
judgments to meet pressures from
and warmth. There is an enor- Vietnam’s “very great weaknesses”
above, the areas of doubt translated
mous popular enthusiasm and were a lack of “aggressive and firm
into the following fairly stark mes­
great popular power waiting leadership at all levels of command,
sages to successive policymakers:
to be brought forth by friendly poor morale among the troops, lack
personal political leadership. of trust between peasant and soldier,

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  33



From the Archive

For years, CIA’s messages did not find ready response

downtown because they were up against fearful odds. • Top officials believed that sus­
tained US bombing programs will
• Do not underestimate the enemy’s What CIA Analyses disrupt North Vietnam’s supply
strength, ruthlessness, nationalist routes to the VC, and would cause
Were Up Against
appeal, and pervasive undercover Hanoi to back off for fear of losing
assets throughout South Vietnam. For years, CIA’s messages did such industrial development as it
not find ready response downtown has achieved.
• Do not underestimate the enemy’s because they were up against fearful
resilience and staying power. odds. Outweighing intelligence facts • Many senior decisionmakers were
He is in for the long run and is and judgments were many views, fac­ confident that Vietnam’s enormous
confident that US morale will give tors and forces which for years ob- complications could be reduced
way before his will. He will keep tained widely among the best and the to systems analysis and statistical
coming despite huge casualties. If brightest of our decisionmakers: measures such as body counts—
we escalate, he will too. attitudes epitomized by Secretary
• World Communism is essentially of Defense McNamara’s oft-cit-
• Do not overestimate the degree to monolithic, and the Vietnam war ed assurance (1962) that “every
which airpower will disrupt North is part of a world conspiracy run quantitative measure we have
Vietnam’s support of the VC or from Moscow and Beijing. shows we’re winning this war.”
will cause Hanoi to back off from
such support. • Khrushchev and the Russians are • Senior policymakers were too
testing us: if the United States harassed and bogged down in
• Do not overestimate the military does not fulfill its stated commit- their many day-to-day tactical
and political potential of our South ments in Vietnam, our credibility responsibili­ties to give intelligence
Vietnamese ally/creation. among our allies elsewhere in the or the longer range consequences
world will suffer seriously. of US initiatives in Vietnam the
• The war is essentially a political careful attention those matters
war that cannot be won by mili- • Vietnam is the first domino. If it
deserved.
tary means alone. It will have to goes, the rest of Southeast Asia,
be won largely by the South Viet- as well as America’s strategic • There existed among senior policy­
namese in the villages of South position in the far Pacific, will makers what a US Army-spon-
Vietnam. crumble. sored history has since called “a
massive and all-encompassing”
• The war is essentially a civil war, • Top policymakers were receptive
American ignorance of Vietnam-
run from Hanoi, not a Communist to the views of progress given
ese history and society.15
bloc plot to test the will of Ameri- them for years by senior military
ca to support its allies. and Mission officers, views that • Caught up by their commit­ments
in many cases were distorted, and operational enthusiasm, most
• Winning the hearts and minds of optimistic versions of more candid senior policymakers did not want
the Vietnamese is a tough task. appraisals initially registered by to hear doubts from below. They
Most Vietnamese simply want more junior officers in the field tended to ignore such views,
to be left alone, and most do not who were closer to the scene. especially those of more junior
identify with Saigon. And many experts unknown to them. Witness
are either too attracted to the VC • There was a profound hubris
McNamara’s subsequently telling
or too afraid to volunteer much in- among top policymakers. They
us that there were no experts on
formation about the VC presence believed their made-in-America
Vietnam.16 And Gen. William E.
in their midst. schemes would work in Vietnam,
DePuy (1988): “We did intervene
where similar schemes by the
on behalf of a very weak and
French had not. We would succeed
dubious regime, albeit better than
because of our superior firepower.
Communism, but very dubious
in terms of political weight and

34  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

From the Archive

Perhaps the most potent hurdle for intelligence was the

meaning. But I don’t remember fact that the decisions on what to do in Vietnam were not
anybody saying that. Do you? taking place within a vacuum but in a highly charged po-
Nobody. Not even the experts, not
litical arena.
even the scholastics and aca-
demics said that.”17 Or, at times,
policymakers denounced dissent- occasions where senior consumers an unprecedented Tet offensive in
ers for “not being on the team”; could use intelligence to buttress early1968, and in later underestimat-
or froze out doubters, as President their own arguments,or where they ing the amount of North Vietnamese
Johnson did with the dissenting had come to question the more opti­ military support being funneled to the
DCI McCone; or sent doubters to mistic reports they had been receiving VC through Cambodia.
new, Siberia-type assignments, from other sources, or where they
had begun to doubt their own ear- Not least, at all times analysts
as State did with Southeast Asia
lier enthusiasms. There has indeed had a much easier time of it than
expert Paul Kattenburg.
sel­dom been a better example than did harried decisionmakers: analysts
• Intelligence was only one of the Vietnam of the eternal occupational operated in a protected, quiet atmo-
many forces that crowded in upon hazards intelligence analysts face: that sphere, whereas policymakers were
policymakers. In addition, those the judgments they deliver do not beset by a weak Vietnamese ally, a
decisionmakers were aware of di- necessarily enjoy careful, rational tough Vietnamese enemy, and a US
mensions of which intelligence of- study, but disappear into a highly po- public that could not stay the dis-
ficers were not. The record shows liticized, sometimes chaotic process tance in what came to be regarded,
clearly that their chief concern where forces other than intelligence correctly or not, as an unwinnable
was the US position in the world, judgments often carry the day. war.
not Vietnam per se, and that in
This is what CIA and other an- v v v
their view Vietnam was so vital to
broad US interests that we had to alysts experienced during the long The author: Hal Ford joined CIA in
make a strong stand there. years of the war in Vietnam, breaking 1950 and served in a variety of posi-
their lances in trying to penetrate tions focused on East Asia, Vietnam,
• Perhaps the most potent hurdle for policymakers’ consciousness that and China. He left CIA in the early
intelligence, however, was the fact the actual facts of life were more 1970s to lead a program on ethics and
that the decisions on what to do grim than those senior consumers international affairs at Georgetown
in Vietnam were not taking place generally appreciated. Even so, those University. Ford also served on the
within a vacuum but in a highly analysts performed well in trying staffs of the Senate Select Committee
charged political arena. For some to produce candid appraisals—in- on Intelligence and then Senator
years, the Democratic Party had asmuch as the principal calling for Joseph Biden. He returned to CIA in
been vulnerable for having “lost” intelligence analysts at any one time 1980 to lead the newly established
China and having been “soft” in is to try to tell it like it is, to remain National Intelligence Council. Ford
Korea. Presidents Kennedy and a unique calling within a policymak- retired in 1986, but continued to
Johnson repeatedly stated that ing process overburdened with prior serve as a contract historian on CIA’s
they were not going to be the US commitments, emotion, special plead- History Staff. His book CIA and
presidents who “lost” Vietnam and ing, and hubris.18 the Vietnam Policymakers: Three
Southeast Asia.
Yet analysts have to keep in mind Episodes, 1962–1968, published in
that hubris is not a monopoly of pol- 1998, won an award for a history
Classic Analytic Hazards icymakers. Vietnam analysts some- published in the Federal Government.
times got locked into mindsets. This Ford died in November 2010.
In short, the often pessimistic
contributed to their being wrong on
intelligence judgments that CIA and
occasion. Sometimes very wrong—
other analysts gave our Vietnam
especially in not sounding clear alerts
decisionmakers over the years did not
that the enemy was about to launch
have much impact, except on those

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  35



From the Archive

Illustrative Quotations
• [CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 1950]: “The Vietnamese insurgents are predominantly nationalists rather than
Communists,but Communist leadership of the movement is firmly established. . . .These insurgents have long con-
trolled most of the interior of Vietnam. Before 1954, they will probably have gained control of most, if not all, of
Indochina..”19

• [General Bruce Palmer, Jr., 1984]: “The first national estimate on Indochina, NIE 5, 29 December 1950, Indochina:
Current Situation and Probable Developments, was a very pessimistic estimate.”20

• [General Palmer]: “During the period 1950–October 1964, ONE pro­duced 48 NIEs and SNIEs . . . dealing with
Vietnam. In addition to estimates, ONE produced 51 Memorandums for the DCI concerning Vietnam over the same
period. Indeed, ONE published more on Vietnam than any other single subject.”21

• [NIE 35/1, 1952]: “Through mid-1952, the probable outlook in Indochina is one of gradual deterioration of the
Franco-Vietnamese military position. . . . The longer term outlook is for continued improvement in the combat ef-
fectiveness of the Viet Minh and an increased Viet Minh pressure against the Franco-Vietnamese defenses.” Unless
present trends are reversed, this growing pressure, coupled with the difficulties which Franee may continue to face
in supporting major military efforts in both Europe and Indochina, may lead to an eventual French withdrawal from
Indochina.”22

• [NIE 91, 1953]: “If present trends . . . continue through mid-1954, the French Union political and military position
may subsequently deteriorate very rapidly.”23

• [Senator John F. Kennedy, 1954]: “I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in In-
dochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, ‘an enemy of the people’ which
has the sympathy and covert support of the people. . . . In November of 1951, I reported upon my return from the
Far East as follows: ‘In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to
the remnants of empire. There is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam Government among the people of
that area. . . . [To try to win military victory] apart from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells fore-
doomed failure.’”24

• [Former CIA officer Joseph Burkhalter Smith, 1978]: “I was stationed in Singapore then [1954], and British intelli-
gence officers told me that they thought the United States was mad to prop up South Viernam.”25

• [General Palmer]: “Overall, the situation in Vietnam inherited by the United States from France in 1955 was disad-
vantageous, if not hopeless. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the United States in deliberately pushing the
French out of the way and replacing them in Vietnam acted unwisely.”26

• [ONE Memorandum, 1960]: “The catalog of public discontent [in South Vietnam] includes a widespread dislike and
distrust of Ngo family rule . . . Diem’s tightly centralized control and his unwillingness to delegate authority . . . the
growing evidence of corruption in high places;the harsh manner in which many persons, particularly the peasants,
have been forced to contribute their labor to government programs . . . and the government’s increasing resort to
harsh measures as a means of stifling criticism.”27

• [Gen. William E. DePuy, undated]: “Well, there wasn’t a Vietnamese government as such. There was a military junta
that ran the country. Most of the senior Vietnamese officers, as you know, had served in the French Army. A lot of
them had been sergeants. Politically, they were inept. The various efforts at pacification required a cohesive, efficient
government, which simply did not exist. Furthermore, corruption was rampant. There was coup after coup, and mil-
itarily, defeat after defeat. . . . The basic motivation of the ARVN seldom equaled the motivation of the VC and the
NVA [North Vietnam­ese] . . . the ARVN was losing the war just the way the French had lost the war, and for many
of the same reasons.”28

36  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

From the Archive

• [Former Director of the CORDS program in South Vietnam, Amb. Robert W. Komer, 1986]: “In the first analysis,
the US effort in Vietnam failed largely because it could not sufficiently revamp or adequately substitute for a South
Vietnamese leadership, administration, and armed forces inadequate to the task. . . . As George Ball put it in his well­
known 1964 memorandum on ‘Cutting Our Losses in South Vietnam,’ ‘Hanoi has a government and a purpose and
a discipline. The ‘government’ in Saigon is a travesty.’ In a very real sense, South Vietnam is a country with an army
and no government.”29

• [The authors of The Pentagon Papers, undated ]: “In this instance, and as we will see, later, the Intelligence Com-
munity’s estimates of the likely results of US moves are conspicuously more pessimistic (and more realistic) than
the other staff papers presented to the President. This SNIE [October 1961] was based on the assumption that the
SEATO force would total about 25,000 men. It is hard to imagine a more sharp contrast between this paper, which
foresees no serious impact on the [VC] insurgency from proposed intervention, and Supplemental Note 2, to be
quoted next . . . ” the JCS estimate that 40,000 US forces will be needed to cleanup the Viet Cong threat.”30

• [ONE Memorandum, 1962]: “The real threat, and the heart of the battle, is in the villages and jungles of Vietnam
and Laos. That battle can be won only by the will, energy, and political acumen of the resisting governments them-
selves. US power can supplement and enlarge their power, but it cannot be substituted. Even if the US could defeat
the Communists militarily by a massive injection of its own forces, the odds are that what it would win would be not
a political victory which created a stable and independent government, but an uneasy and costly colony.”31

• [Judgment by the intelligence panel of an NSC interagency working group, March 1964]: “It is not likely that North
Vietnam would (if it could) call off the war in the South even though US actions [systematically bombing North
Vietnam] would in time have serious economic and political impact. Overt action against North Vietnam would be
unlikely to produce reduction in VC activity sufficiently to make victory on the ground possible in South Vietnam
unless accompanied by new US bolstering actions in South Vietnam and considerable improvement in the govern-
ment there.”32

• [NSC Action Memorandum 288,17 March 1964]: “We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. Unless
we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dom-
inance . . . accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective US and anti-Communist influence or fall under
the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so. Even the Philippines would
become shaky, and the threat to India on the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and
Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.”33

• [ONE Memorandum for the Director, June 1964]: “We do not believe that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos
would be followed by the rapid, successive communization of the other states of the Far East. . . . With the possible
exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Commu­nism as a result of
the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore,a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not
be inexorable, and any spread which did occur would take time—time in which the total situation might change in
any of a number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause. . . . [Moreover]the extent to which individual coun-
tries would move away from the US towards the Communists would be significantly affected by the substance and
manner of US policy in the area following the loss of Laos and South Vietnam.”34

• [CIA officers’ comment on JCS war game, April 1964]: “Widespread at the war games were facile assumptions that
attacks against the North would weaken DRV capability to support the war in South Vietnam, and that such attacks
would cause the DRV leadership to call off the VC. Both assumptions are highly dubious, given the nature of the
VC war. . . . The impact of US public and Congressional [and world] opinion was seriously underestimated. There
would be widespread concern that the US was risking major war, in behalf of a society that did not seem anxious to
save itself, and by means not at all certain to effect their desired ends in the South. In sum, we feel that US thinking
should grind in more careful consideration than has taken place to date. This does not mean that the United States

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  37



From the Archive

should not move against the DRV, but that . . . we do so only if it looks as if there is enough military-political po-
tential in South Vietnam to make the whole Vietnam effort worthwhile. Otherwise, the United States would only be
exercising its great, but irrelevant, armed strength.”35

• [The authors of The Pentagon Papers]: “However, the intelligence panel [of an NSC interagency working group,
November 1964] did not concede very strong chances for breaking the will of Hanoi [by instituting a program of
sustained US bombing of North Vietnam]. They thought it quire likely that the DRV was willing to suffer damage
‘in the course of a test of wills with the United States over the course of events in South Vietnam.’ . . . The panel
also viewed Hanoi as estimating that the United States’ will to maintain resistance in Southeast Asia could in time be
eroded—that the recent US election would provide the Johnson administration with ‘greater policy flexibility’ than
it previously felt it had.”36

• [ONE officer memorandum, April 1965, written shortly after President Johnson’s decision to begin bombing North
Vietnam and committing US troops to combat in the South]: “This troubled essay proceeds from a deep concern that
we are becoming progressively divorced from reality in Vietnam, that we are proceeding with far more courage than
wisdom toward unknown ends. . . . There seems to be a congenital American disposition to underestimate Asian
enemies. We are doing so now. We cannot afford so precious a luxury. Earlier, dispassionate estimates, war games,
and the like told us that the DRV/VC would persist in the face of such pressures as we are now exerting on them. Yet
we now seem to expect them to come running to the conference table, ready to talk about our high terms. The chanc-
es are considerably better than even that the United States will in the end have to disengage in Vietnam, and do so
considerably short of our present objectives.”37

• [General Palmer, 1984]: “[In late 1965,] W. W. Rostow requested an analysis of the probable political and social
effect of a postulated escalation of the US air offensive. CIA’s somber reply was that even an escalation against all
major economic targets in North Vietnam would not substantially affect Hanoi’s ability to supply its forces in South
Vietnam, nor would it be likely to persuade the Hanoi regime to negotiate. Similar judgments were to be repeated
consistently by CIA for the next several years.”38

• [General Palmer, 1984]: “With respect to Vietnam, the head of the CIA was up against a formidable array of senior
policymakers . . . all strong personalities who knew how to exercise the clout of their respective offices. . . . [But]
McNamara was not entirely satisfied with his intelligence from the Defense Department and beginning in late 1965,
relied more and more on the CIA for what he believed were more objective and accurate intelligencejudgments.”39

• [Former NSC staff officer Chester L. Cooper, 1984]: “It is revealing that Presi­dent Johnson’s memoirs, which are
replete with references to and long quotations from documents which influenced his thinking and decisions on Viet-
nam, contain not a single reference to a National Intelligence Estimate or, indeed,to any other intelligence analysis.
Except for Secretary McNamara, who became a frequent requester and an avid reader of Estimates dealing with So-
viet military capabilities and with the Vietnam situation, and McGeorge Bundy, the ONE had a thin audience during
the Johnson administration.”40

• [From a US Army-sponsored history, 1985]: “Added to this propensity to try to make something out of noth­ing was
an American ignorance of Vietnamese history and society so massive and all-encompassing that two decades of fed-
erally funded fellowships, crash language programs, television specials, and campus teachins made hardly a dent. . .
. If there is any lesson to be drawn from the unhappy tale of American involvement in Vietnam it is that, before the
United States sets out to make something out of nothing in some other corner of the world, American leaders might
consider the historical and social factors involved.41

v v v

38  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

From the Archive

Endnotes
1. Editor’s Note: The author of this study drafted his first National Intel­ligence Estimate on Indochina in 1952, and subsequently had
Vietnam-related duties as staff chief of CIA’s Office of National Esti­mates and as a CIA representative to certain interagency working
bodies. Since retiring from CIA in 1986, when he was Acting Chairman of CIA’s National Intelligence Coun­cil, he has prepared classi-
fied studies on Vietnam for CIA’s History Staff.
2. OSS (Secret Intelligence Branch), “Political Information [from Swift],” October 17, 1945; Appendix to Causes, Origins, and
Lessons of the Vietnam War, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, May 9, 10,
and 11, 1972 (USGPO, 1973), 319.
3. There were a few occasions where certain Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs) brought pressure on Agency officers to make their
Vietnam analyses more palatable to policymakers. In addition, numerous authorities attest that George A . Carver, who was CIA’s
Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA) for several years following 1966 and who enjoyed remarkable entree among the
USG’s top decisionmakers, fairly regularly gave them more optimistic judgments than CIA’s analysts were holding at the time.
4. Report of NSC meeting of February 4, 1954. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Volume -XIII, Indochina, Part I, 1,014
(Hereafter, FRUS.)
5. As of 1959, for example, CIA’s Saigon station officers were distraught because the then US military advisory group was bent upon train-
ing the nascent South Vietnamese in corps maneuvers rather than in effective small-unit counterinsurgency tactics. (This is from the
author’s personal experience.)
6. JCS Chairman Adm. Arthur Radford, Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, May 20, 1954. FRUS, 1952–1954, Volume XIII, Indo-
china, Part 2, 1,591.
7. Lemnitzer, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, January 13, 1962. US Department of Defense, 1962. US Department of
Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, (The Pentagon Papers), Book 12, “US Involvement in the War, Internal Documents, The
Kennedy Administration: January 1961–November 1963,” Book II, 449, 450.
8. The author’s personal experience. In holding their dissenting views, these counterintelligence officers and their boss, James
Angleton, had been heavily influenced by the testimony of a defecting Soviet officer. By contrast, other offices of CIA’s clandestine
service had for a decade before 1969 been doing a superb job of reporting serious back stage rifts in the Sino-Soviet relationship.
9. Memorandum to DCI John McCone, 9 June 1964. FRUS, 1964–68, Vol. I, 485. See fuller quotation in Illustrative Quotations section.
Without quoting that part of the memorandum, Robert McNamara claimed that ONE supported the domino thesis. In Retrospect: The
Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York Times Books, 1995), 124–25.
10. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (Dodd, Mead & Co., 1970), 196. (Emphases in the original).
11. ”Because most of the people of Vietnam were Buddhists, President Eisenhower asked whether it was possible to find a good Buddhist
leader to whip up some real fervor. . . . It was pointed out to the President that, unhappily, Buddha was a pacifist rather than a fighter
(laughter).” Report of NSC meeting of February 4, 1954. FRUS, 1952–54, Volume XIII, Indochina, Part I, 1,014.
12. Trip Report by the Vice President, May 1961. FRUS, 1961–63, Vol. I, 154.
13. Harold P. Ford, “The US Decision to Go Big in Vietnam,” Studies in Intelligence 29, No. 1 (Spring 1985), 3. (Originally Secret,
declassified August 27, 1986).
14. CIA was not the only recipient of such policymaker wrath. Eight months after the above episode, INR issued a sharp critique of
claimed ARVN military progress, which “evoked a monumental outcry” from Secretary McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor.
McNamara, heavily influenced by the testimony, phoned Secretary Rusk, denouncing INR for second-guessing military analysis; Rusk
apologized to McNamara. Thomas L. Hughes (who had been INR’s chief at the time), “Experiencing McNamara,” Foreign Policy, No.
100 (Fall 1995), 161–62.
15. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Sup­port: The Early Years of the United States Army in Vietnam, 1941–60, rev. ed. (The Free Press, 1985), X,
xi.
16. In Retrospect, (passim).
17. Statement made 1 August 1, 1988, to William C. Gibbons, principal author of The US Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and
Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part III, January–July 1965, prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress, (USGPO, 1988), 455. General DePuy had been J-3 of General Westmoreland’s
MACV, and later commanded the Army’s 1st Division in Vietnam.
18. See the Illustrative Quotations section.
19. Intelligence Memorandum No. 271: “Initial Alignments in the Event of War Before 1954,” March 24, 1950. (Initially Secret, declassi-
fied January 4, 1978).
20. “US Intelligence and Vietnam,” Studies in Intelligence (special issue, 1984), 4. (Initially Secret, subsequently declassified). General
Palmer had been General Westmoreland’s deputy in Vietnam and Army Vice Chief of Staff. After retiring, he was a member of the
DCI’s Senior Review Panel.
21. “US Intelligence and Vietnam,” 12.
22. “Probable Developments in Indochina Through Mid-1952,” March 3, 1952. FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. XIII, 54, 55.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  39



From the Archive

23. “Probable Developments in Indochina Through Mid-1954,” June 4, 1953. FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. XIII, 594.
24. Congressional Record-Senate, April 6, 1954, 4,673.
25. “Nation-Builders, Old Pros, Paramilitary Boys, and Misplaced Persons,” The Washington Monthly, February 1978, 25.
26. “US Intelligence and Vietnam,” 23.
27. Memorandum for the DCI, “Approaching Crisis in South Viet­nam?,” July 28, 1960. (Originally Secret; declassified 6 November 1980).
28. Lt. Cols. Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, An Oral His­tory of General William E. DePuy, USA, Retired (United States Mili-
tary History Institute, n.d.), 123.
29. Robert Komer, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Con­flict (Westview Press, 1986), 21.
30. (Govt. ed.), Book II, 82, 83.
31. Memorandum for the Director, “The Communist Threat in South­east Asia,” May 24, 1962. (Originally Confidential; declassified
June 25, 1980).
32. As quoted in The Pentagon Papers, Gravel, ed. (Beacon Press, 1975), Vol. III, 156. The author of this article was a CIA member of that
working group.
33. As quoted in The Pentagon Papers (Bantam/New York Times, ed., 1971), 283, 285. That portion of NSC 288 repeated, verbatim,
a text which Secretary of Defense McNamara had written the day before. McNamara, Memorandum to the President, March 16,
1964. FRUS, 1964–68, Vietnam, Vol. I, 154.
34. As quoted in FRUS, 1964–68, Vol. I, 485.
35. Memorandum for the Record sent to the DCI [by an ONE analyst and an FE operations officer], “Comment on the Vietnam War
Games, SIGMA I-64, April 6–9, 1964,” April 16, 1964. As quoted in Ford, “The US Decision to Go Big in Vietnam,” 7–8.
36. Gravel, ed., Vol. III, 213. The author of this article chaired that intelligence panel.
37. Memorandum sent to the DCI, “Into the Valley,” April 8, 1965, as cited in Ford, ”The US Decision to Go Big in Vietnam,” 10,
11.
38. “US Intelligence and Vietnam,” 43.
39. Palmer, The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), 166.
40. Cooper, ”The CIA and Decision-Making,” Foreign Affairs, January 1972, 227.
41. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Sup­port: The Early Years of the United States Army in Vietnam, 1941–60, rev. ed. (The Free Press,
1985), x, xi.
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40  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

An Innovative Approach to Learning

Project Management Training at CIA

Joe Keogh and Richard Roy

The Project Management managing complex operations devel-

Course (PMC) was an initiative by oped a project cycle for operations,
CIA’s Directorate of Science and based on the structure of the DS&T
Technology (DS&T) in the 1980s to project cycle.
improve the management of technical
The PMC had a considerable in-
Under this initiative, projects across the directorate. The
learning content was based on lessons fluence on how industry partners and
a DS&T senior intelli- from historical CIA development other government agencies worked
gence officer teamed projects and best practices in indus- with the CIA by providing a forum
for discourse about the behaviors of
with two private sector try. Under this initiative, a DS&T
senior intelligence officer teamed each in managing CIA projects.
consultants and con- with two private sector consultants
ceived, based on expe- and conceived, based on experience,
Origins of PMC
rience, a revolutionary a revolutionary method of training
students in the techniques of project The first PMC was taught in
method of training management and systems engineer- 1989, and ultimately the course was
students in the tech- ing. The course introduced a unique delivered 130 more times until 2001.
niques of project man- project management model that The two-week course was attended
became internationally recognized by more than 2,600 CIA, NSA, NRO,
agement and systems and formed the basis of a widely used and IC staff personnel along with in-
engineering. project management book. dustry partners. The course was cer-
tified as Level III training, meaning
The course and its derivatives had that surveys showed students applied
a positive impact on the CIA’s project what they learned on the job; it was
performance. A one-week Directorate the first course to be so designated.
of Support course called Managing
Agency Projects was based on the The course was unclassified and
concepts of the PMC but tailored to taught in CIA facilities and a con-
less complex projects. It was taught ference center in West Virginia. A
to hundreds of support officers and DS&T office director briefed the
received high ratings for its relevance students about project management
and impact on mission. The PMC successes and challenges in their
also spawned a DS&T Software components during each course,
Project Management Course using demonstrating executive leadership
applicable project management commitment for the training and its
concepts from the PMC but designed importance to mission.
for software projects and taught by
computer science professors Richard During the late 1990s there was
Fairley and Richard Thayer. The increased demand for more non-resi-
Directorate of Operations’ course for dential local training to better balance

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US
government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of
the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  41



An Innovative Approach to Learning

theory in the DS&T mission environ-

The PMC Model
ment and PMI training for the DS&T
The PMC was built around a model of project management developed by Kevin was terminated. As a replacement, the
Forsberg, Hal Mooz, and Howard Cotterman, authors of Visualizing Project
DS&T instituted a new case-study-
Management (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1996). The book provided clear visual-
izations of complex processes, simplified understanding of the interaction of the based training approach embodying
many diverse players involved, and showed how to assess a project’s progress. the principles from both PMC and
Their companion book, Communicating Project Management, provided the first PMI to develop employee’s skills
integrated vocabulary of project management and systems engineering. This im- in system engineering and project
portant addition served to resolve the gaps and overlaps caused by the Project management. This case-study–based
Management Institute (PMI) and International Council on Systems Engineering
course continues today.
(INCOSE) separately developing concepts and lexicons.

The model had five essentials.

Why PMC?
1. Project cycle containing three aspects (business, budget, and technical).
Two system development cultures
2. Ten project management elements, each containing the techniques and tools existed in the DS&T. There were
of that element: large, complex, highly visible, and
• Project requirements expensive systems expanding the way
intelligence was collected, such as
• Organizational options KENNEN, a near-real-time imaging
satellite system launched in 1976.
• Project team
These large and complex projects
• Project planning could not be accomplished by the
CIA alone or by a single company.
• Opportunities and their risks
These projects utilized many docu-
• Project control ments, sophisticated configuration
control techniques, and had signifi-
• Project visibility cant oversight. DS&T along with its
• Project status partners in industry had developed
techniques that enabled the success-
• Corrective action ful management of these types of
projects meeting cost, schedule, and
• Leadership
performance.
3. Teamwork between the buyer and seller.
At the same time, there were
4. Integrated project management and system engineering terminology. many smaller projects in the CIA
such as the Tropel camera, for ex-
5. Management commitment.
ample, which was built by a single
person and was so small that it was
the work and life of employees, and to be nationally certified in project
able to be integrated into many types
the agency sought options other management.
of concealments such as a pen, a
than two weeks of offsite training.
In 2009, a DS&T project man- lighter, or a key chain. The camera
In 2000, the CIA held a competi-
agement task force in 2009 lead by was made with such precision and
tion for DS&T project management
James Wilkerson and composed of unique craftsmanship that it could not
training to address this concern.
representatives of each office in the be replicated by others. There were
The winner provided the CIA with
DS&T found that PMI based training companies employing fewer than 10
Project Management Institute (PMI)
was not providing DS&T officers with people working with DS&T officers
certified project management train-
an understanding of how to apply the to build devices such as the “Jack-in-
ing, enabling DS&T staff officers
project management principles and the-Box,” a two-dimensional pop-up
to take local one-week courses and

42  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

An Innovative Approach to Learning

manikin that would look like a of the DS&T and began sharing ideas Unique Aspects
passenger in a car seat. These projects on teaching project management.
Looking back, a few things
were successful without the full suite Len’s concept of a project cycle and
distinguished the PMC from general
of project management and system Hal’s PM elements model along
courses.
integration processes needed on the with a repertoire of techniques were
larger more complex endeavors. combined to form the beginning of a Government and industry part-
unique PM model. ners (buyers and sellers) jointly
During the early 1980s, when
attending an in-residence two-week
the CIA was experiencing a growth During the PMC development
course. The PMC introduced the
in budgets under President Reagan, Hal and Kevin formed the Center for
practice of teamwork through a novel
a many DS&T projects were expe- Systems Management (CSM) dedi-
teaching concept that emphasized
riencing budget overruns and late cated to serving the government, in-
managing the relationship between
deliveries. To address this issue, R. dustry, and academia in all matters re-
the CIA buyer and industry seller.
Evans Hineman, the deputy director lating to managing complex technical
Recognizing the issues caused by
of the DS&T, asked Len Malinowski developments. Clients ranged from
a lack of a mutual understanding
to develop a project management CIA, NSA, NASA, and Department
and differing goal, the PMC trained
training course for the directorate. of State to most CIA partner con-
buyers and sellers together to fos-
Len was a senior intelligence officer tractors and academic institutions
ter teamwork focusing on mission
in the DS&T with more than 20 years including George Washington
success. The team focus was on
of CIA experience managing complex University, Massachusetts Institute of
mission success while maintaining a
technical projects in the directorate. Technology, Stanford University, and
professional, ethical business rela-
Len also had industry experience prior the Naval Postgraduate School.
tionship. To our knowledge the PMC
to joining the CIA.
Initially the PMC was jointly is the first and only course dedicated
Len solicited help from Consulting taught by these three individuals, to improving the communication and
Resources International (CRI) in enabling the students to gain experi- understanding of the relationship be-
San Francisco. Hal Mooz was the enced insight into both the world of tween government and industry part-
founder of CRI, and had a master’s industry as well as the Agency. Later, ners throughout the project lifecycle.
degree in in engineering and more the CIA and CSM added qualified
This joint training was imple-
than 25 years’ experience as a chief instructors to handle the increasing
mented in three ways. First, the
systems engineer and project man- demand for the PMC. Discourse often
instructor team was composed of an
ager at Lockheed Missiles and Space evolved into a lively back and forth
experienced DS&T officer and an
Corporation (LMSC), now Lockheed debate exploring both industry and
experienced industry project man-
Martin Corporation. Most of Hal’s CIA perspectives and rational for the
ager. Second, CIA officers and their
experience was on CIA projects. Later actions taken by each.
industry development project man-
Dr. Kevin Forsberg joined Hal as a
Both Hal and Kevin received a CIA ager attended the course together,
principal in the company. Kevin had
seal medallion in recognition for their worked class exercises together,
more than 30 years of experience
unique contribution to project manage- took identical final examinations,
as a materials engineer and project
ment methodology and to the CIA’s and shared meals together. Third, the
manager of NASA’s Space Shuttle tile
mission. The CIA Seal Medallion officer–industry pair were provided
program. Both Hal and Kevin worked
(now the Agency Seal Medal) is with living arrangements containing a
with Len to develop the PMC and the
awarded to non-CIA personnel who private area to discuss the application
three jointly taught the first running of
have made significant contributions of their learning experience to their
the course.
to the CIA’s intelligence efforts. Hal specific project.
Len was introduced to Hal at a and Kevin were also awarded the
The course attendees started
PM course Hal was teaching at TRW. International Council on Systems
skeptical on day one of what value
Len felt the ideas being taught by Hal Engineering (INCOSE) Pioneer Award
the course could provide them but
were consistent with the philosophy for their pioneering work.
were vocal with praise at the end of

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  43



An Innovative Approach to Learning

cycle contained three periods—study,

acquisition, and operations—later
updated to four with deactivation
as the final stage. The logic used in
selecting activities and control gates
for the transition from development
to operations was based on best prac-
tices lessons learned from technical
collection operations. The cycle
provides control gates to control the
progress and manage risk.

A copy of the project cycle was

given to each student as a large,
fold-out chart that included logically
sequenced activities, associated
documents, and control gates. Bear
in mind this was before the advent of
automated dashboards like Tableau.
An appendix to the course material
The Technical Aspect of the Project Cycle, or the Vee diagram, depicts decomposition and
integration in the vertical dimension. Decomposition is a set of steps that breaks down the contained exemplar documents and
overall functions of a system into its smaller parts that can be analyzed and built. An exam- guides for control gates as an aid to
ple of decomposition in designing a house would be to identify the functions and needs of understanding the context and value.
each room before construction. Integration is the process of bringing together the smaller
components into a single system. An example of integration in building a house would be Tailoring the project manage-
adding the plumbing, heating, and air conditioning to the building. The Vee diagram was ment to the needs of the project.
first presented in Chattanooga, Tennesee, in 1991 at the first INCOSE convention (then Recognizing that projects in the
known as NCOSE, it became “International” in 1995). The Vee diagram has since been
DS&T can have a range of complexi-
incorporated into the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook and has spread worldwide
as the systems-engineering standard. ties, different motivation factors, and
different execution tactics, the project
the second week. It gave both buyers This was a different approach than cycle and project techniques included
and sellers valuable insight for more most of the technical support to the flexibility to address these differ-
effective communication and helped HUMINT operations which was to ences. Participants were encouraged
gain appreciation of each other’s cir- build something and deploy it quickly to tailor or adapt the project processes
cumstances that could not be obtained to meet the dynamics and urgency to the uniqueness of their project and
in any other way. This was the true of the mission. The most successful not to follow the project cycle and
uniqueness and value-added provided CIA projects were ones in which the elements blindly.
by the PMC. development team knew exactly what
was needed. The effort expended do- Integration of system engineer-
Project cycle matched to the ing studies allowed the development ing and project management. The
best business practices of the team to understand the operational KENNEN project had seven major
DS&T. One of the lessons learned opportunity or problem and identify segments. The development team
from the KENNEN project was to the “right” and affordable thing to do had the challenge of identifying the
start a project with a series of stud- to be successful. necessary systems image quality,
ies; including requirements analysis, feasibility of the concept and how to
program definition, and system vul- The PMC project cycle incorpo- partition the system into segments
nerability, and to conduct advanced rated this lesson along with additional that could be built within industry’s
technology development activities lessons learned from other DS&T capabilities at the time. The devel-
prior to commencing development. and industry projects. The original opment of these multiple segments

44  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

An Innovative Approach to Learning

required different contractor capabil- have a purpose to keep the project • Proceed as planned; all required
ities along with options preserved in on plan and are more appropriately accomplishments were almost
each and yet be able to be integrated called “corrective action reviews.” achieved, and plans are execut-
into a system. Strong system engi- This requires the project have a plan, able, with minor corrections to be
neering talent in the government as a mechanism for authorizing activity resolved within a set date.
well as project management capabil- to expend resources against the plan,
ity was required to frame and direct reporting project status by comparing • Redo the control gate after all
the system definition studies. activity accomplished to the plan, and required accomplishments have
then taking the actions necessary to been achieved and plans execut-
Once the definition studies were get the project on plan or keeping on able.
complete the requirements and in- plan. Students often commented that
terface documents had to be updated • Terminate the project. Industry
action items assigned at the routine
requiring robust system engineering was expected to provide evidence
“periodic” reviews often do not relate
talent in the government. The de- that the criteria had been met.
to getting the project back or keep-
velopment of this system required Control gates were scheduled
ing on plan and become unplanned
integrated system engineering and when the evidence was complete,
work that contributes to cost and
project management on the DS&T not at an arbitrary target date. The
schedule overruns on completion type
and industry sides to build and suc- message was that both govern-
contracts.
cessfully integrate the seven seg- ment and industry had active roles
ments into an operational system. The Active project leadership. at a control gate with a joint focus
successful development and operation Project leadership was emphasized as on mission success.
of this system fostered the integration an active role in managing a project.
of system engineering and project One memorable Hal Mooz quote:
management throughout the DS&T. “Project management is not a specta- Importance to Stakeholders
tor sport.” The image of a symphony One of the PM elements in the
The integration of system engi- conductor was used to convey the model is the project team. The natural
neering and project management was important role of the project manager. tendency is to think about the person-
implemented into the course in two nel executing the project, but there
ways: through the technical aspect of are often many additional personnel
the project cycle (the Vee diagram) Control Gates that have a stake in the project. The
and through the project requirements course provided insight and tools
Another key innovation intro-
that covered all aspects of managing necessary to involve all critical
duced in the course was the use of
requirements in a systematic and logi- stakeholders.
joint control gates rather than mile-
cal way.
stones. A control gate was labeled as
The first two phases of a project
Cards-on-the-wall planning “a milestone with teeth” meaning a
are typically performed by the CIA
technique. Planning is a key part of decision had to be made at a control
system engineer, COTR, and industry
any project, but difficult to accom- gate. The purpose of a control gate
contractor. The role of operations and
plish with a team larger than a few was twofold; measure accomplish-
mission data user personnel is typi-
people. The course introduced the ment and establish an executable
cally not well understood, and many
Cards-on-the-Wall technique, which plan. Criteria for completing the con-
times not considered during these
used the wall as a planning landscape trol gate was established by the gov-
phases. The course provided role
enabling teams to visibly interact, ernment and included in the contract
definition of system validation for
establish, and challenge the plan. Statement of Work. The decision-
the operations officer and intelligence
maker was the government project
analyst during these initial periods of
Periodic corrective action manager who had four options:
a project life cycle.
reviews. The course clarified the
purpose of periodic reviews used on • Proceed as planned; all required
The transition from development
cost reimbursable contracts by in- accomplishments were achieved,
COTR to operations personnel is
troducing the idea that these reviews and plans are executable.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  45



An Innovative Approach to Learning

often “throw it over the transom” be- used. They also shared experiences to the multi-billion satellite
havior. Instead, PMC treated the man- and gained insight into each other’s development programs) that
agement of this transition activity as environment. An important aspect staff members began to see the
control gates—dubbed readiness and for an executive is the critical points value of applying the project
acceptance reviews—with criteria to engage with a project and the management precepts, even if
established by the operations officers types of resources needed. Robert notionally. The gap between no
and intelligence analysts to be satis- Wallace, an experienced Directorate formal oversight processes and
fied by the COTR prior to transition. of Operations and DS&T leader, full-blown oversight processes
The course material was written in attended the executive course and gradually closed. Application of
engineering terms, but instructors recounted: project management guidelines
were able to convert this terminol- on a level suited to the scope
ogy into terms used by the CIA’s The criticality of a positive, and cost of projects became
non-technical workforce using “war mutually respectful COTR-con- more routine.
stories” and case studies to enable the tractor relationship, technical
understanding and application to the and personal, the lack of which When industry partners returned
entire life cycle of a project. became an element of every to their companies after attending the
project requiring attention. PMC, their positive feedback often
On the industry side, compa- prompted their companies to contract
nies are initially concerned with For Office of Technical Services with CSM to teach the PMC mes-
winning the competition and invest (OTS) project managers, “fluen- sages to their internal project teams.
corporate independent research and cy” in project management was This secondary effect enabled partner
development funds to increase their as important to their success industries to incorporate PMC tech-
probability of winning. The course as language training was to a niques for managing projects and to
emphasized the value of integrating case officer being assigned to a have a clearer understanding of how
system engineering into these early foreign county.” to work with the CIA.
activities and highlighted the need to
ensure these activities were on track Project management is a natural
with what the customer was requiring PMC’s Legacy partner to all aspects of the agency
by utilizing internal corporate control The Office of Technical Collection because it is about doing things and
gates with criteria important to the (OTC) had a mix of projects, some doing things “right.” While the joint
capture team. complex and some simple. The chal- training has been lost, the value of
lenge the OTC director had was how teamwork to the agency both in its
The language used in projects is to consistently apply adequate and relationships with industry and other
not always understood by the broader efficient PM practices across this mix entities is an important characteristic
industrial and CIA communities. To of projects. Peter Daniher, the OTC and value to accomplishing its mis-
remedy this, there was a three-day director, commented: sion. These unique PMC practices are
course for executives, partnered with key to the CIA project management
industry senior executive to explain At some point, circa 1993, philosophy, continue to be taught, and
the PM model, terminology, and need enough staff members had been will benefit the agency long into the
for senior management commitment. through the Project Manage- future, especially for today’s mis-
Executive attendees commented that ment Course to reach a tipping sion-center structure where multiple
the executive course allowed them point where the training caught cultures must be integrated.
to quickly learn the broad concept on. There had been enough
of how projects were executed, the issues in many small to me-
logic of the steps, and the language dium cost programs (relative

v v v

The authors: Joe Keogh and Richard Roy were career staff officers in CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology who
helped develop and teach the PMC during the early 1990s. Both are now retired.

46  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

Commentary: Future of Open Source

How the Intelligence Community Has Held Back Open-Source

Intelligence, and How It Needs to Change
Chris Rasmussen
Plans and strategies for improving the point where the words and terms
open-source intelligence (OSINT) are not reevaluated with frequency in
operations in the Intelligence relation to changing business, politi-
Community often suffered from cal, or technological dynamics leads
Integration is not the framing challenges. Many proposals to groupthink and hinders the flow
main problem to solve for the way forward framed OSINT of new ideas. The overuse of jargon
when it comes to im- primarily as a collection challenge, within a specialized field causing
which reduced OSINT to a collection harm by reducing honest dialogue
proving OSINT op- supplement to classified analysis. and obscuring problems is not unique
erations. Overuse of This collection framing did not ade- to the IC. The physicist Richard
mission-integration quately help OSINT professionalize Feynman, who helped investigate
as a full-fledged analytic discipline. the Challenger space shuttle disaster
jargon has hampered Moreover, it perpetuated the thinking in 1986, argued that if you cannot
the professionalization that OSINT requires more “integra- explain advanced scientific concepts
of OSINT. In fact, in my tion” into classified operations to without the use of jargon, there are
be successful. Integration is not the not only gaps in your knowledge
view more OSINT si- main problem to solve when it comes of the subject itself, but the inflated
los—clusters of tightly to improving OSINT operations. jargon-laden language creates an illu-
connected business Overuse of mission-integration jargon sion of authority on the subject itself
has hampered the professionalization that lacks introspection and limits
functions—are critically of OSINT. In fact, in my view more creative thinking.
necessary to improve OSINT silos—clusters of tightly con-
nected business functions—are crit- Common IC jargon used often
OSINT operations in within the context of OSINT includes
ically necessary to improve OSINT
the IC. operations in the IC.a the words “integration,” “tipping
and queuing,” “enhancement,” and
All businesses and endeavors, “foundational.” All these terms are
public or private, for profit, or reductionist and subordinate OSINT
non-profit, or mission driven, form to classified operations. Was SIGINT
specialized and shared vocabular- professionalized in the 1950s and
ies around their execution of tasks 1960s to “enhance” imagery intel-
and labor. Jargon helps specialized ligence (what we now refer to as
teams communicate and coordinate. geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT)?
However, the overuse of jargon to Was GEOINT professionalized in

a. Recently, there has been positive energy and movement around OSINT in the IC, includ-
ing promulgation of the IC OSINT Strategy 2024–2026 in March 2024. Framing OSINT
more as an analytic discipline, in addition to collection, would add to the momentum. The
strategy document is available on both odni.gov and cia.gov.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US
government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of
the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  47



Commentary: Future of Open Source

Integration was and remains a noble goal. However, the

word’s overuse as a remedy for most intelligence chal-
lenges beyond the context of post-9/11 horizontal-sharing classified environment is the ultimate
end state. Of course, serious policy
reforms is impeding the professionalization of OSINT as a decisions are made with all avail-
full-fledged analytic discipline. able intelligence. No one debates
that. What is up for debate is how
the early 2000s with an eye toward joint-duty credit) with Intelink under to achieve integration with OSINT
“tipping and queuing” HUMINT? the new ODNI structure.a I was an front and center, not just supplement-
No, these INTs were developed energetic advocate for the deploy- ing other INTs or serving only as a
through labor specialization, clear ment, growth, and use of new Web tipping and cueing tool.
mastery levels tied to promotion 2.0 collaborative technologies inside
paths, tradecraft and quality stan- the IC such as Intellipedia (wiki tech- As in academia, the IC uses cita-
dards, flagship outputs, journals to nology), blogging and social book- tions to demonstrate research, share
advance the field, and intentional marking software, and collaborative information, and enhance credibility.
hiring and recruitment. The objective picture and video tagging services to GEOINT reports cite SIGINT reports,
was to create intelligence insights that flatten the IC and bust silos. SIGINT reports cite GEOINT reports,
could stand shoulder to shoulder with and so on. How is OSINT cited cur-
one another. Only OSINT is viewed Before the introduction of these rently? Some IC products use endnote
as a building block for other INTs Web 2.0 technologies, IC users relied citations with formatting modeled on
and nested under adjacent disciplines. on email, message traffic, and maybe academic styles mostly noting open
OSINT also lacks many elements of some boutique collaborative func- press reporting. But where is the
professionalization noted above such tions in Lotus Notes to share content. more analytic, professionalized, and
as the lack of a flagship product. Web 2.0 collaborative technologies official OSINT report for citation? It
helped change the information shar- does not exist in the IC. How does an
ing culture, and the IC is a far more INT professionalize without a flag-
Integration integrated place today than it was ship publication? It cannot.
before 9/11. While I am appreciative
The IC’s focus on integration has Datasets, requests for information
and proud I was able to be a part of
turned it into unchecked jargon that (RFIs), librarian notes, and collection
this, more integration won’t scale and
adversely affects OSINT in a unique summary reports are not the same as
professionalize OSINT.
way. It has been used extensively in an official, serialized analytic product
the wake of the 2004 Intelligence Integration was and remains a no- line with an agency logo on it. There
Reform and Terrorism Prevention ble goal. However, the word’s over- is something special about the written
Act (IRTPA) as a rallying cry to pull use as a remedy for most intelligence word when narratives are typed out,
information together and to reduce challenges beyond the context of the content is coordinated for feed-
stovepiping. Although still a continu- post-9/11 horizontal-sharing reforms back, and editors are involved with
ing challenge in the IC, the infor- is impeding the professionalization sharpening the words. Looking at an
mation-integration push has had the of OSINT as a full-fledged analytic open-data dashboard or commercial
opposite effect on OSINT by reduc- discipline. It misidentifies the prob- data-visualization system simply
ing it to a collection supplement for lem to be solved with OSINT as one does not carry the same gravitas and
classified content. needing more integration rather than seriousness of the written word.
the need for more OSINT silos to
On a personal note, I started and
help with OSINT professionalization.
advanced my career heeding the post- Silos and Stovepipes Are Good
9/11 integration call after the IRTPA The groupthink in the IC holds
created the Office of the Director of Silos and stovepipes are good
the view that multi-INT fusion
National Intelligence (ODNI). During things. I know this sounds coun-
where OSINT, SIGINT, HUMINT,
2005–2009, I worked (and received terintuitive because the operative
and GEOINT come together in a

a. Intelink was organized under ODNI’s Central Information Office after the standup of ODNI. This was fertile agency-neutral territory
where Web 2.0 tools were protected and grown.

48  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

Commentary: Future of Open Source

word in the IC since 9/11 has been it has been executed as a support In 2006, ICD 301 was drafted in
integration. Even outside the IC, the function within the other silos that an effort to make OSINT the “INT of
concept of breaking silos in the busi- have formed over time. More simply, first resort.” However, note that the
ness world is viewed primarily as an OSINT is a support function of the 300 series deals with collection, not
unalloyed good. The negative mental other INTs and is therefore not really analysis (200 series). ICD 301 was a
image of information hoarding and an INT at this time. progressive move at the time—it was
the connected power plays within rescinded in 2012—to nudge along
an organization is the dominant one, Substantial OSINT silos can be the discipline of OSINT, but the
but the positive aspects of silos when formed within existing organizations, ordering as a 300 series shows that
it comes to professionalizing and but this has not materialized to date even helpful OSINT moves in the
effectively executing a discipline or in the IC as the residue of embedding past were viewed through the col-
function is often overlooked. For minor OSINT functions with other lection lens. This collection framing
substantial tasks, you need specialists classified INTs hinders the evolution undermines the professionalization of
working closely together. To do this, of the silos needed for OSINT to OSINT as a real analytic discipline
silos frequently form within orga- professionalize and scale. To restate in the long term. Collection is a part
nizations to focus expenditures and the elements of siloing mentioned of any holistic INT, but not the whole
execute core functions: recruiting, previously in the context of OSINT thing in the way that OSINT has been
training and development, profes- professionalization as questions: Is defined. I would add the term collec-
sional standards, customer service, there a substantial OSINT recruitment tion to the list of the words we need
knowledge management, labor pipeline? Are there many OSINT to rethink in the context of OSINT
segmentation, and so forth. Jargon jobs available in the IC? Are new job professionalization.
emerges to convey specialized tasks. titles being developed to handle labor
specialization? Is there an OSINT
Looking back at the history and school? Is there an OSINT journal?
evolution of SIGINT, GEOINT, and Does OSINT have specialized and
IC as Large Publisher
HUMINT, one can see how silos large IT investments? Does OSINT The US IC is arguably one of
formed over time to effectively exe- have a content or product voice? the larger publishers in the world
cute the function of the INT, just as in Does OSINT have official narrative measured by the number of analysts.
other sectors. OSINT is often called outputs? Are there clear promotion The IC is substantially larger than
an INT but few of the things noted in paths for OSINT specialization? the reporting arms of the New York
the silos above exist in the current ex- Compared to the other INTs, the Times, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street
ecution of OSINT in IC, nor does the answer is no to all the above. Journal, Bloomberg News, and CNN
history of OSINT match the history combined.a However, when it comes
of professionalization compared to to doing more OSINT work at greater
the other INTs. From Collection Mind- scale, a common retort is “we don’t
have the resources.” This is reflective
OSINT needs its own silos and set to Analytic Mindset
of the groupthink around classi-
must go through the evolution of OSINT’s framing as a collection fied-first workflows; it is not solely
siloed formation and function noted discipline to supplement classified about money. As one of the largest
previously just like every other INT. operations needs to shift to thinking publishing labor forces, the IC has
If OSINT is not “siloed,” OSINT of OSINT as full-fledged analytic dis- the existing resources to create more
in the IC will never be effectively cipline on its own. For example, the quality and shareable OSINT content.
professionalized because without ordering of Intelligence Community It is time to reimagine workflow and
the elements noted previously, no Directives (ICDs) as shown above labor. Additional funding requests
enterprise can effectively operate at reinforces the idea of OSINT as col- should be pursued after classi-
scale. Because OSINT lacks silos, lection, not analysis. fied-centric workflows have been
a. Judging from various corporate and journalism websites, the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg News,
and CNN employ approximately 10,000–13,000 reporters and editorial staff as of early 2024. Conservatively, IC analysts number in the
tens of thousands.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  49



Commentary: Future of Open Source

I posit that creating an ODNI-hosted OSINT product line

akin to CIA’s WIRe or DIA’s Defense Intelligence Digest
on unclassified networks would help jumpstart broader informing existing classified product
lines.
OSINT professionalization.

reimagined with OSINT production and places leadership at the ODNI Bigger Silos for OSINT
serving as the base of operations. level where OSINT professionaliza- Production
tion belongs, not buried within other By deliberate design stretching
agencies’ functions.a The “INT of over seven decades, OSINT in the
Culture is not an Excuse first resort” claim would finally be IC has been primarily regarded as
OSINT, a hot topic within the IC credible. an input to classified production, not
and industry conference circuit for a coequal. In fact, the majority of
Building on the first-resort
several years, garnered new atten- IC OSINT functions are housed in
concept, IC research and writing
tion after Russia invaded Ukraine collection or technology components,
labor would be focused to answer
in February 2022. Commercial not analytic components. OSINT
and publish official OSINT reports
GEOINT, social media, and other collection informs classified analysis
tackling the intelligence topics with
open sources created new avenues for but is not formally involved in its
judgements drawn only from unclas-
open-source analysis. When the ques- production. This traditional workflow
sified sources.
tion is asked of panel members why should be inverted. OSINT collectors,
OSINT is not the INT as first resort After this professionalized OSINT who typically work mostly in the
or why OSINT does not receive equal output is published, a classified annex open domain, should start the OSINT
billing with other INTs, the answer can fill any remaining gaps and linked production effort with analytic line
typically given is “culture.” By this, together with registration numbers workers joining them on the unclas-
people seem to mean there’s a lack of for pairing and discovery. The official sified domain to create OSINT-first
desire to put unclassified work on a OSINT report version is then distrib- analysis. This would cluster OSINT
par with traditional, classified work. uted to the widest possible audience expertise together in larger silos and
to include allies and coalition part- help professionalize OSINT.
The culture argument is too vague,
ners on unclassified networks and the
in my view. Instead, the core issues Because the analytic product
classified version is then distributed
are twofold. First, we lack flagship would reside on unclassified domains,
on classified networks, which reduces
analytic products. Second, OSINT the IC could shift workers off of the
exquisite expenditures with OSINT
in the IC is centered within the “high side” (i.e., classified) to the
truly leading as the first analytic
classified domain, rather than in the “low side,” where most data resides.
resort. The reduction in classified re-
unclassified domain where OSINT It would have the added benefit of
search labor would be channeled into
originates. Let me elaborate. reducing the amount of work spent
unclassified work; classified inputs
would be added toward the end of the verifying or debunking open-source
I posit that creating an ODNI-
production process. analysis produced outside of the IC.
hosted OSINT product line akin
The IC’s current classified-first de-
to CIA’s WIRe or DIA’s Defense
This new OSINT report would sign principles must be reimaginged
Intelligence Digest on unclassified
be a real professionalized INT that with new design principles, otherwise
networks would help jumpstart
can be cross-referenced and cited we will continue to tinker around the
broader OSINT professionalization.
after going through a professional- edges as we have for decades.
It would elevate OSINT above just
ized quality control process like the
collection, making the unclassified
other INTs. OSINT is now co-equal,
domain the locus of open-source
officially. Fusion or integration
work, focus multi-agency labor
is achieved through citation, not
against common topics and priorities,
nested unofficial collection formats

a. Based on my Intelink experience, I posit that substantial OSINT moves should also be protected and grown initially within agency-neu-
tral space under the ODNI.

50  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 

Commentary: Future of Open Source

Tools-driven Discipline and has responded primarily by develop- of practitioners, founding an OSINT
Misaligned Industry Incentives ing front-end portals aimed to “save journal, and upskilling the workforce.
time” from “information overload,” Some of these fundamentals require
Viewing OSINT as collection
which has been a sales rallying cry tech investments but most are not
has produced an environment where
for over 20 years with mixed results. tech related but desperately needed to
chasing the latest data-management
If the IC internally shifts its focus on truly professionalize OSINT.
technology has obscured the focus
OSINT toward a full-fledged analytic
on analytic fundamentals. Staying In addition, a robust training
discipline backed by officially written
current on tools and technology is a program focused on creating OSINT
products, the messaging to industry
large part of any knowledge work- analysis should be established to help
would change more toward the deliv-
er’s portfolio, but the focus on tools launch this new OSINT production
ery of fully analyzed and shareable
in the OSINT world seems to top line. Existing courses on analytic
OSINT content rather than collection
most discussions in OSINT circles standards, writing, user design, and
dashboards, data scraping, or embed-
when compared to other INT work- data science could be consolidated
ding cleared personnel in secure facil-
ing-group meetings and conferences and integrated with private-sector
ities to assist with collection-centric
that are less tools-focused. OSINT consulting advice and other
workflows.
IC OSINT creation exemplars to es-
Because OSINT in the IC lacks
tablish a prestigious “schoolhouse.”
product lines and the number of
OSINT practitioners is limited, Focus on Fundamentals
I ask all readers moving forward
technology discussions often fill the OSINT is a technical discipline to reduce and rethink terms like inte-
void. This tech and contracting focus and all practitioners need a high gration, tipping and cueing, enhance-
in OSINT is somewhat logical as it data IQ and must stay current on ment, foundational, and collection
can be easier to put millions on con- the evolving tech landscape such as when talking about OSINT. As a
tracts to buy services and tools from advances in AI. However, buying community, we need to construct
industry than it is to create or redirect more AI-fueled tech is like buying a new vocabulary that matches the
government billets and labor to write a baseball pitching machine when goals of making OSINT a real INT
narrative intelligence in official chan- OSINT in the IC cannot hit well off a that can stand shoulder to shoulder
nels. However, perpetual outsourcing batting tee. OSINT needs to focus on with the other INTs, with official
and chasing the latest technology the fundamentals of professionaliza- products, analytic disciplines, official
delay the critical reforms needed for tion first and then work technological citations, professionalized work roles,
OSINT to professionalize. advancements with haste. OSINT and even organizational silos.
fundamentals include creating official
The emphasis on collection and product lines, growing the number
tools has also meant that industry

v v v

The author: Chris Rasmussen is a Department of Defense Agency officer and the creator of the public-facing OSINT
product platform, www.tearline.mil.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  51

 Intelligence in Public Media

Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine

David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts (Harper 2023), 544 pages, maps, bibli-
ography, notes, index, photos.

Reviewed by Michael J. Ard

Former CIA director and USCENTCOM commander Falklands War

David Petraeus and renowned historian and biographer (1982) victory over
Andrew Roberts join forces to present an often insightful, Argentina. (163) In
if conventional, overview of how war has evolved since Ukraine, superior
the end of World War II. Roberts serves as lead author, training and morale
with Petraeus contributing an analysis on Vietnam and his have permitted
first-person perspective on our wars in Afghanistan and Ukrainian forces
Iraq. The book is strong on detail and Roberts, a virtuoso to stave off defeat.
of narrative history, spices the account with telling anec- Even in high-tech
dotes and quotations. The book joins other notable efforts, modern warfare,
like Lawrence Freedman’s The Future of War” (2017) and “Man still stands
Sean McFate’s The New Rules of War (2019), that assess at the center of the
and forecast the nature of contemporary armed struggle. picture.” (152)

Conflict has two purposes: tracking the uneven evolu- Another lesson is the paradox of war’s regressions.
tion of conflict and emphasizing the importance of lead- The use of gas in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) is one
ership in command. The authors describe war’s protean example; the use of famine in Somalia (1991–) another. In
nature; on one hand, its increasing reliance on high-tech, Yugoslavia (1991–96), militias employed rape and death
civilian-driven technology, and on the other, its inexora- squads and commandeered UN peacekeepers as human
ble tendency to regress to more brutal forms. War’s rapid shields. (Meanwhile, their NATO opponents employed
advances can shock—as can its sudden reversals. precision guided munitions.) (219). In the South Ossetian
War (1991–92), virulent nationalism, ethnic cleansing,
At 442 pages of main text, the book is hardly short, yet deliberate attacks on civilians, cities divided into warring
it is selective in what it covers, focusing on conflicts the zones—all sinister elements that reappear in later con-
authors judge contributed to warfare’s evolution. (2) The flicts. (209)
book surveys a variety of unique conflicts of our era, such
as the “slow burn” of Kashmir (39), and near-forgotten Modern sensibilities about war also come into play.
wars in Borneo (1963–66) and Oman (1962–76), which The authors claim a new feature—especially seen in
later influenced counterinsurgency theory. This reader the 1991 Gulf War—is “democracies worried about the
would have welcomed the authors’ views on the Middle acceptable level of enemy deaths.” (199) Likewise, if a
East twilight wars now led by Iran’s “axis of resistance” democratic government fails to recognize that “all wars
militias. are profoundly political,” (230) its army may be under-
mined by betraying its nation’s principles, as happened to
What are the main lessons of war in our era? The the French Army in the Algerian War (1954–62). (65)
authors point out that the Korean conflict (1950–53)
foreshadowed how modern wars end “more messily.” Modern commanders must understand the type of war
(35) Likewise, they maintain that superior technology not that they’re in—not always an easy feat. (44) As disciples
always—or even often—is the deciding factor. Training of Clausewitz, Petraeus and Roberts insist that strategic
and morale still are decisive. In the Arab-Israeli War leaders master four major tasks: grasp the overall strategic
of October 1973, the superb training of Israeli soldiers situation, the “big idea”; communicate sound strategy
enabled them to prevail. High morale was key to Britain’s effectively; press the campaign “relentlessly and

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  53



Conflict

determinedly;” and adapt strategy to changing circum- progress with the Sunni Arab tribes and opened the door
stances, “again and again.” (4) Successful leaders like to the ISIS insurgency.
Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War (1927–49) and
David Ben Gurion in Israel’s war for independence (1948) Petraeus argues he executed the major tasks of coun-
intuitively executed these tasks; unsuccessful command- terinsurgency theory, and he clearly believes sound strat-
ers, like General Westmoreland in Vietnam, did not. (130) egy leads to success. But after two attempts employing
his counterinsurgency model, Petraeus might have offered
In Vietnam, we “failed the Clausewitz test” (79) by more analysis on how theory matched practice. Did our
misunderstanding the nature of the conflict. The authors lack of ultimate success in Afghanistan and Iraq reveal
believe a better strategy emerged after 1968, which also some inherent flaws in modern counterinsurgency strate-
featured the CIA-led Phoenix program to weaken the Viet gy? Can we win in the long run against an enemy fight-
Cong. But efforts were made too late to secure the pop- ing for their homes—a key factor he recognizes in other
ulation. Vietnam ended messily indeed; the Paris Peace conflicts—with an American public tired of long-running
Accords in 1973 permitted 200,000 North Vietnamese conflict and unclear of the “big picture”? Petraeus laments
troops to remain in the south. (123) Getting “the big idea” the inconsistent support from Barack Obama for US
right ultimately might not have mattered against a more efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. But Obama did seem to
determined enemy. recognize that wars are indeed political, especially those
fought by our impatient democracy.
The Afghanistan chapter is a frank portrayal of the
challenges of counterinsurgency. With its tradition-mind- Conflict offers an inspiring chapter on Ukraine’s
ed population and mountainous terrain, obstacles to innovative and spirited defense against Russia’s clumsy
success in Afghanistan were well known. Petraeus invasion in 2022. The book underscores the importance of
acknowledges our rapid early success outstripped policy. President Zelensky’s inspiring leadership and the “moral
(246). We never solved the Taliban sanctuary problem, forces” of people fighting for their homes. Russians, the
and many of our warlord allies were abusive and corrupt. supposed asymmetric-war masters, were surprised by
We lacked an able and willing partner in the distrust- their own non-military tactics. (363) The authors high-
ful President Hamid Karzai. Moreover, the war never light this first “open-source war” and enthuse about the
achieved the wholehearted commitment of Presidents Ukrainians’ embrace of new technology. As of now, the
Bush and Obama. After a major troop reinforcement, Russians are still in Ukraine and far from beaten. Yet the
Obama compromised by announcing a timetable for with- authors strike a hopeful note. Since 1914, they ask, when
drawal. Petraeus calls this a failure of policy and strategy. has a war of aggression ended in a positive result? (361)
(274) He still believes success was possible if we had
maintained our commitment while the Afghan National How do modern wars end? They don’t, really. War
Army matured. (277) and peace are blurred, perhaps because new technolo-
gy and hybrid-war concepts make it easier to compete
Petraeus also presents the painful tragedy of errors in without open combat. (406) Petraeus and Roberts em-
Iraq. The policy of firing Saddam’s military and civil- phasize that money spent on deterrence is well spent,
ian leaders— “de-Baathfication” —led to self-created and we should not skimp on air-power dominance—no
insurgency, an outcome CIA predicted. (297) Eventually F-35 second-guessing here. Nuclear weapons have placed
by employing a new counterinsurgency doctrine and the undefined limits on war (435), but otherwise, the authors
surge of more troops, we better secured the population avoid contemplating the worst outcomes of the nuclear
and reduced violence. Theory can look a lot smarter with age. As for disinformation, we must get there “first with
more well-armed and highly motivated battalions behind the truth.” (439) Conflict says little about what war might
it. As in Afghanistan, we were foiled by a local partner, look like for modern navies, but if Beijing maintains its
the vengeful Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (iron- Taiwan ambition, we may find out before long.
ically backed by our enemy Iran), who dismantled our
v v v

The reviewer: Michael J. Ard is director of intelligence analysis studies at Johns Hopkins University.

54 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 Intelligence in Public Media

North Korea & the Global Nuclear Order: When Bad Behaviour Pays
Edward Howell (Oxford University Press, 2023) 300 pages, bibliography.
The United States–South Korea Alliance: Why It May Fail and Why It Must Not
Scott A. Snyder (Columbia University Press, 2023), 318 pages, notes, index.

Reviewed by Yong Suk Lee

The two Koreas are a study in and threatening the world order bring
contradiction. In the northern half of benefits. North Koreans who suffer
the peninsula is a hermit kingdom ruled from economic sanctions and chronic
by a despotic, hereditary dictatorship. food shortages are not priorities for
In the south, the most free, abundant, Kim Jong Un and his elites. Kim may
and successful political entity in Korean genuinely care for his people and want
history. One thing they have in common to improve their lives but this desire
is that relations with the United States, takes the backseat in policymaking,
positive or negative, are key influences when eternal perpetuation of the Kim
in their national security thinking. First- family rule remains the top goal.
time author Edward Howell and long-
time Korea watcher Scott Snyder offer Howell shows that North Korea
readers a close look at how different made its nuclear goals clear as early as
opinions about Washington shape this the 1990s, when the United States and
debate in Pyongyang and Seoul. its allies began their hopeful engage-
ment with Pyongyang. An unnamed US
North Korea’s transgressions are official told Howell that Pyongyang’s
well documented: prison camps, drug lead negotiator claimed that a nucle-
and wildlife trafficking, counterfeiting, ar-armed North Korea could be a US
cyber-attacks, and now selling missiles ally and the North could become “your
to Russia for use against Ukraine. Kim Jong Un is the Israel in East Asia.” (107) A decade later, during the Six-
third generation of Kims to lead the North, founded by his Party Talks, former US officials claimed that the North
grandfather Kim Il Song in 1949. Already there is spec- wanted to be accepted as a legal nuclear weapons state
ulation that a fourth generation is in training: Kim Jong and saw the talks with the US, China, Japan, Russia, and
Un’s young daughter lately has been seen accompanying South Korea as an opportunity to draw attention and get
him on inspections of factories and farms. free goods. (138)

North Korea & the Global Nuclear Order traces the North Korea & the Global Nuclear Order is Edward
history of the North’s nuclear program and its negoti- Howell’s first book. A lecturer in politics at New College,
ations with the United States. Howell describes North University of Oxford, he places North Korea’s foreign
Korea’s stratagem as “strategic delinquency” and asks policy behavior of the last 30 years in a theoretical
“how North Korea has become a nuclear-armed state and framework. The book does not offer solutions; instead,
how we might account for its behavior over the past thirty it spotlights, dissects, and examines a story well known
years?” (2) Howell argues that Pyongyang has benefited among international observers and assumed as an inevita-
materially and socially from delinquency and flouting ble cycle of threats, negotiations, and lies. Readers are left
international norms. Its weapons of mass destruction deter with little doubt that this is a course of action the leaders
rivals, help to shore up the regime, and convey status in Pyongyang will continue in the future.
in negotiations during bilateral and multilateral talks.
(72–81) The collective lessons the international communi- What is left out in Howell’s excellent debut is dis-
ty taught Pyongyang’s leaders is that breaking global rules cussions about North Korea’s strategic credibility. North
Korea has not bargained in good faith and most experts
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  55



Recent Books on the Koreas

agree that it is not likely to give up nuclear weapons, yet Nuclear Order as vindication of their analysis that
policymakers are drawn to the negotiating table again Pyongyang has lied and cheated for the last 30 years.
and again, looking for a deal or are encouraged to do so. While analysts can feel proud for telling truth to power,
Pyongyang is able to get away with bad behavior because facts and hard-nosed analysis do not help policymakers
it has convinced the world that it will follow through come up with a solution nor make military action on
with its threats to drown its neighbors in a “sea of fire” the Korean Peninsula any more palatable. How far can
if the United States and its allies try to forcibly disarm all-source intelligence help policymakers discern North
the regime. The North’s strategic credibility goes hand in Korea’s threats? How much assurance can the Intelligence
hand with its strategic delinquency. Washington and its Community provide? And, how are our leaders supposed
allies may have overwhelming military advantage over to balance threats of delinquency with possible loss of
the North, but Pyongyang has managed to erode this lead thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage to one
by developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. of the most populous corners of the world? Regardless of
who wins the 2024 US presidential election, one thing is
Former and current intelligence analysts who worked for sure in North Korea policy: Washington’s choices are
on Korea issues will grin and cringe while reading likely to remain the least worst options in a warehouse
Howell. Some may see North Korea & the Global full of bad options.

v v v
With so much attention focused the United States and South Korea are
on North Korea’s bad behavior, South eroding this foundation, according to
Korea is frequently overlooked. Scott Snyder.
Snyder in The United States-South
Korea Alliance: Why It May Fail and The United States-South Korea
Why It Must Not argues that a key Alliance is focused on the here and
linchpin of the US security system in now. Snyder touches on but does not
Asia is often taken for granted and dive into the history of US-South
provides a passionate argument for why Korea relations, which provides helpful
it must not. context when trying to understand the
dilemma Washington and Seoul face
Snyder is a Korea specialist who has today. The Cold War made for strange
spent a large part of his career studying bedfellows, and the United States
South Korea. His last book was South supported leaders who were less than
Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy democratic but were staunchly an-
and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers ti-communist and pledged allegiance to
(Columbia University Press, 2018). Washington. In South Korea, longtime
While North Korea frequently hijacks US support for brutal dictatorships
the center stage, South Korea has fueled left-wing radicals in the 1970s
moved from an impoverished devel- and the 1980s, who distrusted US
oping country to a G20 nation, its consumer electronics motives and are now in positions of influence and power.
and pop culture exports ubiquitous worldwide. South
Korea today is also a thriving democracy, having shed its Broadly labeled as progressives, most of the current
authoritarian roots. US aid, investment, and access to op- leaders and future progressive presidential candidates for
portunities abroad played a big role in South Korea’s rise, the foreseeable future suffered under US-backed South
and the US-South Korean alliance was the bedrock of its Korean dictators either as labor activists, human rights
economic, social, and political transformation. However, lawyers, or student protesters. The progressives are cur-
domestic political antagonism and populist politics within rently in the opposition after losing the 2022 presidential
election by less than 1 percent to the conservatives, who

56 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 
Recent Books on the Koreas

are generally pro-US in their world view. Progressives pro-North Korea to anti-North Korea—makes longterm
returning to power in Seoul is a question of when, not if, planning and trust-building difficult. In the end, such a
and distrust of the United States and improving relations schizophrenic approach only benefits North Korea and
with North Korea are their core national security prin- China, which share the strategic goal of eroding US influ-
ciples. Snyder writes, “South Korean progressives have ence in Asia. Snyder shows that deeply divided and po-
tended to believe that the United States perceives contin- larized domestic politics is not only an American problem
ued Korean division as being in its interest because it pro- but a global phenomenon; it is not any less disconcerting
vides a pretext for maintaining US forces on the Korean for it.
Peninsula.” (89)
The United States-South Korea Alliance outlines
The progressive-conservative divide in Korean politics the key drivers of domestic politics in US-South Korea
extends to Japan as well, especially the issue of “how relations, with precise analysis of how they shaped the
to deal with the legacy of the Japanese imperial rule.” alliance in the last five years. It is a wonderful addition to
(108) The starkest example of this is how quickly Seoul’s the field, and Snyder shows his mettle as a key observer
ties to Tokyo changed following the election of conser- of Korean affairs. In the end, Snyder falls victim to his
vative President Yoon Suk Yeol, who shelved historical own successes. He does such a great job identifying the
grievances to prioritize security relations with Japan and challenges facing the alliance, his policy recommen-
the United States to counter North Korea. This was in dations come across as shallow and unconvincing. The
stark contrast with his predecessor progressive President author, in the last chapter, recommends that “as part of its
Moon Jae-in who weaponized historical grievances alliance-strengthening efforts, the United States should
against Japan for domestic political purposes. (115) As consistently make the case for forward-deployed influ-
South Korean dictators once unfairly labeled progressive ence on the Korean Peninsula through the deepening of
activists “communists,” the Moon administration labeled institutionalized policy coordination between the two
critics of its Japan policy as “Japanese sympathizers,” sides” and that the United States should “critically evalu-
evoking “historical analogies to play on Korean emotions ate domestic South Korean obstacles to the perpetuation
in opposition to Japan.” (115) of the alliance and pursue counters to overcome such
obstacles.” (270) Internationalists in the United States and
Hotly contested elections and changes in policy South Korea who value allies and alliances can hope for
orientation are characteristics of a healthy democracy. such an outcome, but this reader is left to wonder if it’s
However, the possibility of a dramatic shift in Washington not a bridge too far.
and Seoul—from pro-alliance to anti-alliance or from

v v v

The reviewer: Yong Suk Lee is a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024) 57

 Intelligence in Public Media

Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender

Samuel Ramani (Oxford University Press, 2023), 455 pages, introduction,
postscript, notes, index.

Reviewed by Charles Long

When reflecting on their long-standing distrust of their with ruling parties

Russian neighbor, Finns often observe that “a Russian is a in South Africa,
Russian even fried in butter.” Despite the nearly 4,000-ki- Zimbabwe,
lometer distance from Finland to Africa, this word of Namibia, Angola
caution is equally appropriate to African countries cur- and Mozambique
rently engaging with Russia. Dr. Samuel Ramani authori- that grew out of
tatively analyzes the several stages of Russia’s experience movements at least
in Africa in his book, Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great partially supported
Power or Bellicose Pretender? Little of Ramani’s book by the USSR, one
concerns Russian intelligence, but his serious research can conclude the
is well worth the attention of intelligence, security, and United States lost
policy professionals who focus on Africa, Russian power the Cold War.
projection, and the attraction of African governments to
Russia. Ramani re-
counts the low points in Russia’s Africa policy. Burdened
Ramani, an associate fellow at the Royal United by its own socio-economic and political crises in the
Services Institute (RUSI), based his analyses on an im- late 1980s and 1990s, Russia was forced to scale back
pressive body of research that included scholarly literature its activities and presence. It lowered Africa’s strategic
on the Soviet Union’s Africa policy, media coverage of priority, reduced arms sales, and closed 10 embassies on
Russia’s more notable recent actions on the continent and the continent. It even allowed its normally close bilateral
the products of reputable think tanks and subject matter relations with Libya and Sudan to atrophy, and at times it
experts of mostly non-Russian origin. As he points out, coordinated with the United States on African initiatives
there is a lack of published work on Russia’s post-1991 in the UN.
Africa policy. Ramani does not let this keep him from
offering his readers a broad and objective analysis. Ramani also illustrates how, under Foreign Minister
Primakov, Russia reversed course and became more
He begins with a brief but very useful history of independently engaged on the continent. To reassert itself,
Russia’s experience in Africa, beginning with the spread Russia used a combination of debt forgiveness (in return
of Orthodox Christianity in the Maghreb (particularly for privileged access to African markets), closer com-
Egypt) and the Horn in the late 16th century. These part- mercial ties with key countries and expanded arms sales
nerships evolved over time and the regions have remained to traditional partners and fragile states. These have been
key Russian zones of influence. As the Cold War kicked some of the underpinnings of Russia’s strategy in Africa.
off and Africa states decolonized, the USSR amplified its Years later, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group and other
efforts across the continent. Russia made inroads through private military contractors conveniently dovetailed into
weapons sales and military and development assistance. this strategy by supporting weak or authoritarian regimes
Cuban and Warsaw Pact surrogates in Africa acted as in return for allowing the Russians to engage in predatory
force multipliers for Russian interests. Ramani points out mining and exploitation of valuable natural resources.
that while the US supported decolonization to counter African regimes apparently agreed to these practices with
Soviet outreach in the newly independent countries, little regard to Russia’s sloppy environmental record.
Russia armed and supported national liberation move-
ments. As a celebrated CIA Africa officer has observed,

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  59



Russia in Africa

By the mid-2000s, Russia began devoting even more Russian-supported security. a b African countries partner-
attention to Africa, supporting development through ing with Russia on security may soon learn the hard way
institutions such as the UN, the African Union, various that Russia’s poor record in transnational counterterrorism
African regional organizations, and the BRICS alliance. and its disastrous “Grozny Model” of counterinsurgency
Russia presented its Africa policy as principled. It increas- could very well accelerate terrorist and popular threats to
ingly used soft power such as foreign aid and commercial their regimes.
relations to advance its interests. This allowed Russia to
portray itself as an alternative partner to the West, a critic The book’s chronicle of Russia’s return as a great
of France on the continent, a bridge between underdevel- power in Africa can make readers conclude that Moscow
oped and developed economies, and a crisis mediator. capitalized off a corresponding drop in Western interest
in the continent, perhaps due to wars, threats, and crises
As Ramani points out, at the same time, Russia often elsewhere. This conclusion has merit. As Ramani points
showed counterrevolutionary tendencies by dithering out, in recent years the United States has been more
on popular uprisings against old regimes during the focused on China’s actions in Africa and has dealt with
Arab Spring and by opposing Libyan dictator Gaddafi’s Russian initiatives there on an ad hoc basis. At least
overthrow and international efforts to intervene on symbolically, the US position in Africa was not helped
behalf of popularly elected Ivoirian President Ouattara when then President Trump omitted any mention of
when incumbent Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down. Africa during his 2019 address to the UN. Some observ-
Russia’s anti-Western tone in Africa also became more ers believe Russia is filling a vacuum left by the West in
pronounced. Russia opposed and undermined US initia- the Sahel and in the Central African Republic (CAR).
tives in Africa and capitalized on apparent US neglect. It Russia may in fact be chiefly responsible for this vacuum
reached out to smaller nations to garner more support (or through disinformation that incites fragile and exploitable
less opposition) in the UN to its global activities. African governments into believing the narratives that the
West is unreliable and that Russia offers a panacea to their
Ramani documents how, by Vladimir Putin’s fourth problems.
term as president, Russia appeared to have regained its
status as a continent-wide great power in Africa. A highly Russia is often the partner of last resort for African
symbolic event, the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019 pariah states and countries that have exhausted the
in Sochi, highlighted Russia’s accomplishments on the budgets and patience of traditional partners in develop-
continent and its commitment to Africa’s future. Amid the ment. These regimes still need basic assistance to operate
flash and the customary anti-Western hyperbole, Russia (or to protect their skins from their own people) and tend
trumpeted $12.5 billion in new ventures with African to under-price their mineral wealth in return for Russian
partners. Ramani carefully researched Russian commer- security lifelines. As a préfet (governor equivalent) in a
cial activity across the continent and their mixed results. particularly violent area of the CAR told the BBC, “When
your house burns and you shout: ‘Fire! Fire!’ You don’t
Russia’s bread and butter, however, remains its mili- care if the water you are given is sweet or salty. All you care
tary sales. Intervention in Syria created new opportunities about is that it extinguishes the flames.” c
for security cooperation across Africa and showcased
Russian military equipment and capabilities it then Russia’s poor record of delivering on its promises calls
promoted on the continent. Credible reports of civilian into question the longterm sustainability of its model in
massacres conducted by Russian mercenaries in the Africa. By the time of the second Russia-Africa Summit
Sahel, however, called into question the effectiveness of in 2023 in St. Petersburg, Russia direct investment in

a. Catrina Doxsee, Jared Thompson, “Massacres, Executions, and Falsified Graves: The Wagner Group’s Mounting Humanitarian Cost
in Mali,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 11, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsi-
fied-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali.
b. “Central African Republic: Human Rights Violations against Civilians by the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) Are Unacceptable,
Says UN Expert.” February 20, 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/central-african-republic-human-rights-viola-
tions-against-civilians-central. Accessed April 15, 2024.
c. Yemisi Adegoke, “Why Russia Is Winning Hearts in the Central African Republic” BBC News, December 10, 2023. https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-67625139.

60 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 
Russia in Africa

Africa remained at about 1 percent of the continent’s total Ramani finished this work before the Wagner mutiny
inflow. Despite the lofty promise Putin made four years and before Prigozhin had cause to worry too much about
earlier in Sochi to double trade with Africa in five years, air travel. Therefore, the book does not cover Russia in
Russian trade with Africa had in fact fallen.a Seventy Africa in the post-Prigozhin era, but Ramani addresses
percent of that trade was with four countries: Egypt, the minimal adverse impact Russia’s now two-year war
Algeria, Morocco, and South Africa. b in Ukraine has had on its Africa strategy and relations.
Indeed, as this review was written, Russia continued pre-
Ramani also analyzes how Russia used instruments of paring its summer offensive against Ukraine and Russian
national power in six of its interventions in Africa from military advisers had arrived in Niger at a time when the
2018 to 2020: Guinea, CAR, Libya, Sudan, Madagascar US-Niger security partnership was under unprecedented
and Mozambique. Not all the interventions were suc- stress.
cessful, but the Russian approaches were illuminating.
Ramani’s examples of Moscow’s diplomatic, informa- Russia in Africa is well written and straightforward.
tional, military, and economic levers would be suitable Readers who are not steeped in Russia or Africa will
for military war college students researching the DIME find it easy to follow. In addition to the book’s thorough
framework. His chapters on Russia’s COVID-19 policy research and balanced analysis, Ramani does a service to
and the new frontiers of Russian security in Africa are readers wanting to undertake further study by listing his
timely retrospectives of significant recent Russian actions wide range of sources. Had there been room for another
on the continent. chapter or two in this book, Africa watchers would have
probably welcomed a longer and deeper look at the
In Africa at least, Russia’s default is to act unilaterally. history of Russia in Africa to better appreciate Russia’s
Russia and China may appear to have common interests, long legacy. Intelligence officers working Africa will find
but the two countries do not really cooperate with each this book exceptionally useful in gaining a solid under-
other on Africa outside of UN Security Council voting. standing of Russia’s national strategy and its methods in
As Ramani points out, Russia sees instability in Africa Africa.
as a geopolitical opportunity while China sees it as an
existential threat to its Belt and Road Initiative, which is Perhaps African governments and regimes that partner
intended to expand China’s economic and political power with Russia will find another Finnish proverb useful:
(249). Despite its attention-getting recent gains, Russia “When you’ll try to be a friend with a Russian, keep the
may ultimately be destined to remain a second-tier power knife near!”
in Africa, alongside the UK, India, Japan and Turkey and
looking up at the US, China, and France (246).

v v v

The reviewer: Charles Long is the pen name of a retired CIA operations officer who served in Africa.

a. Vadin Zaytsev, “Second Russia-Africa Summit Lays Bare Russia’s Waning Influence,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
July 31, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90294.
b. Joseph Siegle, “The Russia-Africa Summit is coming, but Putin barely invests in the continent while the mercenary Wagner Group rages
across the countryside,” Fortune, July 24, 2023, https://fortune.com/europe/2023/07/24/why-russia-africa-summit-vladimir-putin-yevge-
ny-prigozhin-wagner-group/.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024) 61

 Intelligence in Public Media

Sparks: China’s Underground Historians and Their Battle for the

Future
Ian Johnson (Oxford University Press, 2023), 381 pages, illustrations.

Reviewed by Emily Matson

“Even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect or blazing suns,” that
some illumination,” states Hannah Arendt in her introduc- illuminates the past
tion to Men in Dark Times (1968). As a German Jew who and challenges the
observed the rise to power of Hitler and the Third Reich, Western misconcep-
Arendt herself knew well what the “darkest of times” tion that China today
meant. After she fled Germany in 1933 and emigrated to is merely an authori-
the United States in 1941, Arendt became one of the 20th tarian monolith. (xv)
century’s most esteemed philosophers and historians. To de-
scribe how a seemingly ordinary man like Adolf Eichmann Spark also was
could become so heavily implicated in the Nazi atrocities of the name of a short-
the Holocaust, Arendt coined the now famous phrase “the lived, 1960 stu-
banality of evil.” Yet alongside such men existed others dent-run journal in
who gave Arendt hope: “Whether their light was the light of the town of Tianshui
a candle or that of a blazing sun.” (near Wuhan) that challenged official accounts of the Great
Leap Forward (1958–62). While the CCP claimed it was a
It may come as a surprise that Ian Johnson used resounding success, it tragically became the greatest man-
Arendt’s quote to open a book not on early to mid-20th made famine in world history.a The first issue of Spark
century Europe, but rather 20th and 21st century China. draws on the theme of flickering light to illuminate the
Furthermore, Johnson’s protagonists are not well-known crimes of an oppressive regime through a poem written by
dissidents such as Rosa Luxemburg or Karl Jaspers one of its founders, Peking University student Lin Zhao. In
or others chronicled in Arendt’s book, but rather ordi- “A Day in Prometheus’s Passion,” Lin details an encounter
nary Chinese such as Ai Xiaoming and Jiang Xue who between the Olympian god Zeus and Prometheus, who
often remain inside the system to attempt to “correct the is eternally damned for daring to give humans fire. Zeus
[Chinese Communist] Party’s misrepresentation of the explains it thus to Prometheus:
past and change their country’s slide toward ever-stron-
ger authoritarian control.”(x) This, however, is precisely But you ought to know, Prometheus,
why Johnson chooses to open his latest book with Arendt. for the mortals, we do not want to leave even a spark.
These ordinary Chinese, who Johnson calls “histori- Fire is for the gods, for incense and sacrifice.
ans”—meaning “shorthand for a broad group of some How can the plebeians have it for heating or lighting in
of China’s brightest minds: university professors, inde- the dark? (74)
pendent filmmakers, underground magazine publishers,
Spark would challenge the presumption that “fire is
novelists, artists, and journalists.”(x) To Johnson, these
for the gods” and provide at least a “spark” of truth to the
historians represent a “spark,” whether “flickering candles
“plebeians.”b Although Spark was quickly snuffed out,

a. The Great Leap Forward was originally envisioned as a two-pronged campaign by Mao for rapid collectivization and industrialization.
However, it failed on both counts – the intensive “backyard furnace” campaign meant that farmers were even “stripped of the tools they
needed to farm.” Furthermore, efforts at collectivization within a system that brooked no opposition meant that statistics of grain yields
were often inflated in order to placate higher-ups. This, in turn, led to the heavy taxation of the countryside for grain that did not, in fact, ex-
ist, meaning that people starved to death. (49–50) For one of the most complete works on this period, Johnson recommends Yang Jisheng’s
Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958–1962, translated by Stacy Mosher and Guo Jian (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013)
b. Perhaps ironically, the name of the journal Spark invoked a phrase popularized by Mao Zedong’s writings: “xinghuo liaoyuan,” or “a
single spark can start a prairie fire” (75).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  63



Sparks

its rediscovery decades later by underground historians However, I prefer to use the English translation “sites
such as Hu Jie and Cui Weiping unearthed the bravery of memory” rather than “places of memory” to empha-
of individuals such as Lin Zhao, Zhang Chunyuan, and size that while many of these “sites” are indeed physical
Tan Chanxue, who were ultimately martyred for daring to locations, Nora’s original definition is actually more
speak out. all-encompassing. According to Nora, a “site of memory”
includes “any significant entity, whether material or
Between 2008 and 2020, Johnson visited many under- nonmaterial in nature, which by dint of human will or
ground historians in their homes and as they worked in the work of time has become a symbolic element in any
the fields to uncover the truth about China’s recent history community.”a Thus, while a concrete physical site such
in the vein of the jianghu—a term that literally means as the notorious Ditch (Jiabiangou)—at the edge of the
“rivers and lakes,” connoting an untamed wilderness and Gobi Desert in Gansu Provinceb—or a museum such as
a place of escape for bandits who lived outside of the law. the National Museum of Chinac can be “sites of memory,”
Yet these jianghu bandits in traditional Chinese culture so, too, could the journal Sparks or even the concept
often lived by their own strict code of moral conduct, of the jianghu that informs so much of the zeitgeist of
acting as Robin Hood figures who stole from the rich underground historians in China today. While the dozen
and corrupt and championed the poor and downtrodden. vignettes that Johnson includes were indeed powerful, I
Jianghu historians, as Johnson calls them, have existed do wish that each “site of memory” was a bit more dis-
since the beginning years of the People’s Republic of tinctly defined.
China but, he asserts, more recently have “melded into
a nation-wide network that has survived repeated crack- This quibble aside, I highly recommend Sparks to
downs,”(xi) in part thanks to new digital technologies and anyone who wants to understand China better today. In
other techniques that more successfully bypass the CCP’s Johnson’s in-depth coverage of so many inspiring in-
sophisticated censorship apparatus. dividuals and their important work, Sparks challenges
the notion that the CCP has succeeded in thoroughly
In chronicling these historians and their work, Sparks whitewashing history to adhere to its perspective.d The
is divided not only chronologically (past, present, and books chronological span, from the Yan’an era of the
future), but also geographically (the book takes us from 1930s to the Covid-19 pandemic, is impressive, as is the
the northwest Hexi Corridor in a roughly clockwise direc- diversity of its subjects. Moreover, I particularly ap-
tion to the north, east, and south, until we end up on the preciated Johnson’s conclusion, which challenges us to
Tibetan Plateau to the southwest) and by a dozen evoca- “retire certain cliched ways of seeing China” (298). We
tive vignettes that Johnson labels as “memories.” Here, must engage with China’s “counter-historians” and their
Johnson borrows from Pierre Nora’s early 20th century important contributions to global conversations about
concept of “places of memory,” or lieux de mémoire. the past, present, and future. Furthermore, we must avoid
Johnson defines these “places of memory” as “physical making the mistake, which the CCP is all too keen to
locations where history resonates – battlefields, museums, promote, that the party is China and the sole representa-
or execution grounds” (xiii). tive of 1.4 billion people. With increased authoritarian
rule under Xi Jinping in China and threats to democracy

a. Pierre Nora, ‘Preface to English Language Edition: From Lieux de Mémoire to Realms of Memory,’ in Pierre Nora, ed., Realms of Mem-
ory: Rethinking the French Past (Vol. 1: Conflicts and Divisions) (Columbia University Press, 1996), xvii.
b. This was the “most notorious labor camp in China, a place where thousands were worked and starved to death in the late 1950 and early
1960s” (16). For a detailed description, see Richard Brody, Dead Souls, Reviewed: A Powerful New Documentary About Political Persecu-
tion in China” in New Yorker, December 19, 2018.
c. Xi Jinping made his famous visit here in 2012 to visit the exhibit “The Road to Rejuvenation” (fuxing zhilu), which summarizes the
CCP’s legitimizing narrative – after the Century of Humiliation by Western powers and Japan, the CCP saved the Chinese people from
disgrace and destruction after coming to power in 1949. The Great Leap Forward and the equally tragic Cultural Revolution, however, are
all but skipped over. (130)
d. According to the CCP, its armies did the majority of the fighting against Japan; the party’s campaign of land reform was just; Lei Feng
did indeed write the patriotic diary entries published by the People’s Liberation Army as a model of loyalty and selflessness; and China
entered the Korean War in self-defense. Although Johnson admits that “some of these issues might seem trivial,” he effectively argues that
“allowing a discussion on these topics would challenge key tenets of why the Chinese Communist Party ruled China” (123).

64 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 
Sparks

on a global scale, Johnson has reminded intelligence and for positive change, even in places as tightly controlled as
national security professionals to nevertheless remain on China.
the lookout for the “sparks” that might ignite the passion

v v v
The reviewer: Emily Matson is assistant teaching professor of Modern Chinese History at Georgetown University’s
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Georgetown College of Arts & Science, Department of History.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024) 65

 Intelligence in Public Media

Cashing Out: The Flight of Nazi Treasure 1945–1948

Neill Lochery (Public Affairs, 2023), preface, acknowledgments, notes, in-
dex, photos, 336 pages.

Reviewed by JR Seeger

Cashing Out provides an interesting perspective on Lochery pri-

a well-known story of the looting of European treasures marily researched
by senior Nazis and their efforts to evade capture at the British archives,
end of the war. While most books focus on Allied efforts so it should come
to hunt down Nazis and recover art and other valuables, as no surprise that
Neill Lochery used extensive archival research (primarily his chapters are
from the UK national archive) to tell the story from the very much British
perspective of the Nazis involved. His research included centric. He often
reviewing the interrogation files of captured Abwehr and refers to UK and US
Sicherheitdienst (SD) intelligence officers resident in intelligence stations
neutral countries in 1944–45. For this reason, the book in neutral countries,
is important to anyone interested in how some Nazis but provides few
successfully evaded capture and moved funds into neutral details on how those
areas for this success. stations conducted their business or how (or even if) they
coordinated their efforts. Further, he periodically strays
Lochery, a historian who has written extensively on into a common prejudice by the British Secret Intelligence
World War II and modern European history, begins with Service members that their Office of Strategic Services
a detailed account of the interrogations of senior SD counterparts were amateurs. His discussions of local
intelligence officer Walter Schellenberg, whose eventual conflicts between the two organizations always offer a UK
revelations assisted the US-UK intelligence effort known perspective, although he acknowledges, “[OSS Director
as Operation Safehaven. Safehaven was designed to William] Donovan had a much more future facing, global
build a detailed picture of the efforts by Nazi seniors to perspective than his British counterpart.” (54)
evade capture beginning shortly after D-Day. As the war
progressed, Safehaven became the tool for the US and UK One criticism is that Lochery jumps back and forth
intelligence services to prevent the escape of Nazi war in the timeline as he looks at different ratlines, or escape
criminals and their use of the ill-gotten funds and trea- routes. Rather than a chronological review, each chapter
sures. Schellenberg was a reluctant and unreliable witness focuses on a specific person, place, or looted material. It
because he knew that he would eventually be indicted in can be hard to follow the transition from Nazi looting as
Nuremberg. What he and other witnesses revealed over a national strategy, through a program where Nazi seniors
time was the extensive network in Spain, Portugal, and were building their own personal wealth, to the final days
Sweden that Nazis leaders used to move themselves and when Nazis were doing everything they could to escape
their fortunes. Lochery makes clear that some of Nazis justice, whether at the hands of the Red Army or in Allied
were able to move funds and treasures from Portugal to courts. Regardless, for any intelligence officers interested
South America. By 1945, that route was closed and many in operations against Nazi Germany or, for that matter,
low-ranking Nazis and their interlocutors from neutral interested in how war criminals past and present might
countries ended up Spain. use a conflict to enrich themselves, Cashing Out is an
essential read.

v v v
The reviewer: JR Seeger is a retired CIA operations officer.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  67

 Intelligence in Public Media

The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s

William I. Hitchcock (Simon and Schuster, 2018), 672 pages, acknowledg-
ments, notes, bibliography, index, photos.

Reviewed by James Van Hook

Occasionally, we realize that we have overlooked an since the Roosevelt

important contribution to the literature of intelligence. administration.
Reviewer James Van Hook corrects one such oversight in
this assessment of William Hitchcock’s best-selling history Central to
of the Eisenhower administration, first published in 2018. Eisenhower’s presi-
– Ed. dency was his strat-
egy for the Cold
The 1950s—and especially the Dwight D. Eisenhower War. He became
administration (1953–61)—were foundational in CIA’s president in 1953 in
development. Although created in 1947, not until the early part by promising
1950s did the CIA begin to develop its place in national to end the Korean
security policy making, consolidating around a stable War, which he felt
bureaucratic structure and able to undertake long-term had grown into a
collection and analytic programs that by the end of the quagmire. He walked away from that conflict determined
decade provided a more detailed and strategically accu- to avoid getting entangled in proxy wars, as shown by
rate picture of the Soviet threat. Intelligence professionals his frantic efforts to avoid involvement in Vietnam, when
today continue to look to the 1950s for lessons learned French forces there collapsed in 1954. Instead, he aimed
on everything from covert action to analytic support to to develop a long-term strategy for the Cold War that
policymakers. Yet one of the enduring challenges for in- would survive the vicissitudes of US politics and econom-
telligence professionals and scholars is placing the agency ic fluctuations.
into its historical context.
On the surface, Eisenhower’s strategy, and that of
William Hitchcock’s history of the Eisenhower admin- Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (brother of CIA
istration provides just such context. Hitchcock has spent Director Allen Dulles), offered a “New Look” that prom-
his career writing about the Western allies during the ised to roll back Soviet influence rather than just contain
early Cold War—his first book was on US policy toward it. In reality, however, recognizing that the United States
post-World War II France—and he is now Corcoran could not match the Soviet Union weapon by weapon or
Professor of History at the University of Virginia. In in manpower, Eisenhower reshaped the nascent national
The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the security enterprise into a system centered on policymak-
1950s, Hitchcock aims to make three general points ing led by the National Security Council and based on
about the Eisenhower presidency. First, he shows how a manageable defense budget focused around nuclear
Eisenhower established the foundations for a long-term weapons rather than expensive conventional forces.
Cold War strategy, instead of Truman’s ad hoc contain- Eisenhower’s reliance on CIA-led covert action—about
ment approach epitomized by the Korean War. Second, which more below—were crucial to this strategy.
Eisenhower set out to create an enduring political-so-
cial consensus in the United States that combined core The flip side of Eisenhower’s long-term Cold War
elements of the New Deal, such as social security, with strategy was his effort to guide American politics and
traditional moderate, pro-business Republicanism. Lastly, ease, or at least, recast, the ideological conflicts that had
and perhaps the element least appreciated at the time, he driven the US political system since the Great Depression.
established a modern presidential mode of governance To that end, he was determined to shape American
that lent a greater discipline to structures that had arisen conservatism in the Republican Party in ways that lasted

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  69



The Age of Eisenhower

until the arrival of Ronald Reagan 30 years later. As he offers a brilliant narrative of how all the different strands
entered the race for the party’s presidential nomination in of Eisenhower’s governing strategy—an enduring Cold
1952, he blocked the Old Guard around Senator Robert War defense posture resting on a continuum from nuclear
Taft, a wing that with the help of McCarthyism had threats to covert action combined with balanced budgets
come to dominate the Republicans. Taft, and by exten- and sober administration—began to fall apart under the
sion McCarthy, represented the small-town Midwestern onslaught of a reinvigorated Democratic Party with a
form of conservatism: suspicious of government and youthful leader in John F. Kennedy.
virulently anti-communist. To relative moderates in the
party who felt more comfortable with two-time nominee Eisenhower’s approach had always been vulner-
Thomas Dewey, Eisenhower saved the party and able to the widespread fear during the 1950s that the
big-business capitalism from the radical populists. As Soviets represented a larger, almost omnipresent threat.
president, Eisenhower shaped a consensus later known as Unbeknown to most of the public until 1960, Eisenhower
Rockefeller Republicanism that ideologically pushed back administration officials and some in Congress benefited
against the dynamic of the New Deal while retaining its from the groundbreaking U-2 intelligence that revealed
popular programs, with balanced budgets and pro-market the Soviet Union’s nuclear forces were not as robust as
ideology. commonly thought. When the Soviets launched Sputnik
in 1957, however, the dam holding back the sum of all
CIA played a crucial role not just in Eisenhower’s fears broke and the administration struggled to address
Cold War strategy, but indirectly in his overall govern- public pressures to acknowledge—inaccurately, accord-
ing philosophy of keeping costs low; a prime motive for ing to CIA assessments at the time—that Eisenhower had
making use of CIA’s covert action capabilities was to underestimated the Soviet threat. Democrats, including
achieve vital foreign policy ends on the cheap. Hitchcock Kennedy, who had access to CIA analysis, hammered the
adopts a critical view of CIA’s role within Eisenhower’s Eisenhower administration relentlessly on all manner of
overall Cold War strategy. He implies that DCI Allen domestic and foreign policies, especially Eisenhower’s
Dulles, who took over from Bedell Smith in 1953 and led containment strategy as both too dangerous (as it relied
the CIA until John F. Kennedy fired him after the Bay of too much on nuclear retaliation), and too weak (with
Pigs disaster, capitalized on Eisenhower’s effort to avoid insufficient conventional forces to counter Soviet proxy
a hot war with communist forces after the Korean War wars in the developing world), including in Southeast
ended in 1953, while pushing back on perceived commu- Asia. With this in mind, the Bay of Pigs invasion,
nist inroads into what Eisenhower administration officials green-lighted by the Eisenhower administration in 1960,
and the coalescing foreign policy establishment referred represented an ignominious end to Eisenhower’s foreign
to as the “free world.” Dulles spotted this willingness of policy and the Allen Dulles era at CIA.
Eisenhower to embrace covert action with the 1953 coup
against Iranian premier Mohammed Mossadegh, a feat Hitchcock offers a comprehensive and helpful history
repeated in Guatemala with the ouster of Jacobo Arbenz of the Eisenhower administration that should resonate
Guzman in 1954. Along with covert action, Eisenhower among readers who may not specialize in any particular
enthusiastically embraced Dulles’s sponsorship of the U-2 aspect of the Eisenhower era but who require a good
program, which provided a gold mine of intelligence on overview to guide them to the larger arena of historical
Soviet strategic capabilities. literature on the 1950s and America’s role in the Cold
War. For intelligence historians and readers of this publi-
By the late 1950s, Eisenhower’s system began cation in particular, The Age of Eisenhower offers a well
to unravel. Hitchcock’s account of the last years of written, judicious, and appropriately critical account of
Eisenhower’s presidency is the book’s most dramatic and Eisenhower presidency that is well worth the read.

v v v
The reviewer: James Van Hook is an analyst in CIA’s Transnational and Technology Mission Center.

70 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

 Intelligence in Public Media

American Traitor: General James Wilkinson’s Betrayal of the

Republic and Escape from Justice
Howard W. Cox (Georgetown University Press, 2023), 367 pages,
illustrations, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by David A. Welker

Former assistant CIA inspector general Howard Cox’s but later removed
look at one of America’s worst—and the highest placed— him for “lack of
traitors in the nation’s nearly 250-year history is a well aptitude.”
researched, thorough volume that stands as the definitive
work on this unfortunate figure. Although most Americans Settling in
know about Benedict Arnold, Rick Ames, and other infa- Kentucky after the
mous spies’ treachery, Wilkinson’s has long gone unno- war, Wilkinson
ticed, even though it had the potential to inflict significant led efforts to split
damage on the United States. Moreover, unlike those trai- the region from
tors, Wilkinson repeatedly evaded justice throughout his Virginia. In 1787
long life. Cox’s volume examines not only Wilkinson’s he traveled to the
deceit but, perhaps most importantly, how and why he Spanish colonial
evaded justice for so long. It marks a welcome contrast to capital New Orleans to arrange trade deals for Kentucky
some earlier biographies. but found instead an unexpected opportunity for personal
profit and advancement. Meeting with Spanish officials,
Cox weaves the fascinating story of Wilkinson’s life he proposed leading Kentucky not into statehood but
throughout. Born March 24, 1757, in Charles County, rather into becoming a Spanish possession—which he
Maryland, Wilkinson studied medicine before the would head—and offered to spy for Spain in exchange
Revolution interrupted and in 1775 was commissioned an for support and money. Spain quickly accepted, dubbing
infantry captain. He took part in the Battle of Bunker Hill Wilkinson “Agent 13.” This bit of good timing was
and operations around Boston. Exceptionally ambitious, followed by another when Wilkinson’s failed business
he quickly realized that line command was thankless work efforts led him back into the US Army at just the moment
and instead obtained a position as an aide to Generals President Washington needed to rebuild the military from
Nathaniel Greene and later Benedict Arnold during the the Continental Army’s remains. By swearing allegiance
retreat from Canada. In 1777, Wilkinson became General to the United States as a military officer, having just
Horatio Gates’ adjutant-general, carrying messages sworn allegiance to the king of Spain, James Wilkinson
between Gates, Arnold, and other senior commanders at became a spy and traitor to the United States.
the Battles of Saratoga. This role took Wilkinson’s natural
penchant for self-serving intrigue and backstabbing to a Rising exceptionally rapidly through the ranks of the
new level, leading to his playing a central role in infight- infant US Army, in 1792 Wilkson was appointed sec-
ing between the top Continental generals that denied ond-in-command to army chief and Revolutionary War
Arnold credit for his leadership accomplishments, feeding hero General Anthony Wayne. This assignment offered
bitterness that played into the onetime patriot hero’s later new possibilities for his career and for spying for Spain.
treason. Rising again through scheming, Wilkinson played Tension between the two appeared instantly, and upon
a central role in the Conway Cabal, which used back- discovering his deputy’s Spanish ties, Wayne moved to
channel maneuvering to attempt to replace Washington file charges. But Wayne’s sudden death—Wilkinson was
with Gates as army commander. Forced by the Cabal’s suspected of poisoning him—not only ended the investi-
exposure to resign his commission, Congress appointed gation but at once made Spain’s Agent 13 the US Army’s
Wilkinson the army’s “clothier-general” supply master, commander.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  71



American Traitor

Switching his political affiliation and the Founders’ either useful or inconvenient to political leaders’ agendas.
disdain for things military enabled Wilkinson’s to remain Wilkinson became helpful in Jefferson’s ongoing strug-
as head of the army through four presidential adminis- gle with Burr, but leaders like Washington, Adams, and
trations. Throughout much of that time Agent 13 was Madison seemingly chose to ignore inconvenient facts
reporting to his Spanish handlers and readily taking about their army commander lest those issues further
their money in return. Although Wilkinson flirted with complicate or undermine their administrations’ policy
Aaron Burr’s cabal, which was planning to create a new efforts. Cox, a former trial attorney, brings a unique mix
nation beyond the Appalachians, in the end calculated of legal and historical analysis in evaluating and explain-
self-interest led him to abandon Burr and become one of ing each of these cases that will stand for years as the best
Jefferson’s key witnesses in advancing charges against the explanation for Wilkinson’s surviving these professional
former vice president. Yet Wilkinson was more loyal to legal storms.
Spanish gold than to President Jefferson, not only reveal-
ing to Spain the routes of American exploration parties of If Cox wrote this volume in part to fill a void left by
Lewis and Clark and others, but advising Spain to attack the only other recent biography of Wilkinson—a work
or capture them and offering other ideas to boost Spain at that has been criticized for being too indecisive and
America’s expense. Although later Spain’s retreat from “fair” in weighing Wilkinson’s actions—then he succeeds
much of North America gradually ended his value as a spy, admirably.a Readers never wonder about Cox’s view that
Wilkinson never ceased pursuing a pension from the king. Wilkinson’s life was one of self-serving treachery, betray-
ing the nation that had given him so much. Reflecting this,
Cox explains and explores these and many more of nearly every chapter carries subhead quotes by contempo-
Wilkinson’s failed and often despicable acts—lapsed raneous fellow Wilkinson critics that will have the reader
leadership during the War of 1812, leaving his troops in periodically laughing aloud with their intended snark.
starving squalor so he could pursue his wealthy soon-to-
be second wife, and backstabbing rivals, colleagues, and My only quibbles with Cox’s work are minor. His
presidents—through the 1815 end of his army career and pursuit of detail sometimes heads so deep into rabbit
his 1825 death in Mexico City, where he was trying to holes that a reader must pause to recall how it fits with
exploit that nation’s political upheaval for his own gain. the main narrative, although patience is rewarded in each
Nowhere will readers find a more detailed, thorough biog- case. Infrequently, the author misuses intelligence termi-
raphy of James Wilkinson. nology—for example, labeling Wilkinson in one instance
a double agent, when in fact he was never doubled and
Perhaps of even greater value, however, are the book’s spied only for Spain—but this is offset by applying his
later chapters that explore the 1808, 1811, and 1815 legal valuable legal insight to these historic intelligence issues.
inquiries and courts martial convened to weigh charges
brought against Wilkinson for spying, malfeasance, Cox’s book is particularly valuable as the nation
and corruption. That despite the weight of considerable begins celebrating its 250th birthday, adding scholarly
evidence in each of these cases Wilkinson managed to insight about a little known—if despicable—figure whose
dodge justice each time has long challenged historians’ account deserves to be recalled honestly and accurately.
understanding. Cox’s conclusion shows that Wilkinson Intelligence officers interested in the early American role
was as lucky as he was deceitful, in each case benefit- of their craft will particularly find Cox’s American Traitor
ing from facing imperfect and nascent US laws or being an informative, enjoyable read.

v v v
The reviewer: David A. Welker is a member of the CIA History Staff.

a. Andro Linklater, An Artist in Treason (Walker Books, 2009).

72 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)

Intelligence in Public Media

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf—June 2024

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake and other contributors

General
A New Vision of Spycraft: Or Necessary Notations on Espionage, by Daniele-Hadi Irandoost

Memoir
CLASSIFIED!: The Adventures of a Molehunter, by Nigel West

History
Alfred Dreyfus: The Man at the Center of the Affair, by Maurice Samuels
The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin’s Propaganda War,
by Alan Philps
Women In Intelligence: The Hidden History of Two World Wars, by Helen Fry
World War I and the Foundations of American Intelligence, by Mark Stout

Fiction
Ilium, by Lea Carpenter

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the reviewers. Nothing in the article should be
construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024) 73

 
Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

General
A New Vision of Spycraft: Or Necessary Notations on Espionage, by Daniele-Hadi Irandoost (Manticore Press,
2023), 184 pages, endnotes, bibliography, no index.

In his preface to this book, British poet and essayist His semantic difficulties continue when he turns to what
David William Parry notes, after some muddled irrelevant he terms the mechanics of espionage. After outlining the
commentary, that “Spycraft and the world of espionage traditional basic functions of intelligence, he concludes
have always been very far from me.” But this doesn’t that “mass of practical inferences that flow from it in
stop him from “heartily recommending” A New Vision of moral and political calculation, and the method I adopt is
Spycraft to anyone interested in the mechanics of espio- to clear the ground, more rigorously than ever, penetrated
nage including its institutional links to the “deepest and by the genial dew of the soil in which socio-political-
darkest type of occultism.” (11) cultural melioration is found to germinate.” (25)

Aberystwyth University historian, Daniele-Hadi With similar clarity, the balance of the narrative discuss-
Irandoost does state that a connection between intelli- es the ethics of intelligence, as exemplified by the ticking
gence and occultism—oracles—is affirmable in ancient bomb scenario, the “deontology of torture,” Irandoost’s
societies, though he doesn’t suggest any contemporary version of the “Just Intelligence Theory,” the legal
relevance. But he does add semantically confusing com- weaknesses of cyberspace, and intelligence oversight in a
ment on the notion that spying is the second oldest profes- democratic society.
sion: “in reality, what a strain of astonishment and terror,
a concerted hypocrisy and conspiracy, an ambition of Throughout, his views on espionage remain well con-
intrigue and secret influence, and a series of servility and cealed and the precise parameters of his new vision of
cabal, does this scene present to the present state of mod- spycraft are never articulated. His afterword strengthens
ern times!” This assessment leads to the equally ambigu- these assessments. Caveat Lector!
ous statement that the “civilizing of intelligence opens a
door to the revisal of our intelligence community.” (14)

Memoir
CLASSIFIED!: The Adventures of a Molehunter, by Nigel West (Biteback Publishing, 2024), 362 pages, endnotes,
photos, index.

Before he had any thought of becoming Nigel West, Profumo case had diminished, but young Rupert’s interest
Rupert Allason, in his early teens, became aware of the in intelligence matters was permanently established.
British intelligence services—MI5 and MI6—during
the Profumo Affair. That scandal contributed to the fall Classified! tells the story of how his interests developed
of the Macmillan government in 1963 and the disgrace at school, thanks in part to a teacher, Henry Coombe-
of John Profumo, secretary of state for war, after he lied Tennant, a former Benedictine monk and MI6 officer who
to Parliament about his affair with 19 year old Christine also served OSS as a Jedburgh during the war. Coombe-
Keeler who was also seeing a GRU officer. Tennant’s best friend from MI6 was David Cornwell (aka:
John le Carré), who had retired in 1965 and occasionally
Allason’s interest followed naturally from two facts of spoke to the class. Seeking further information, a trip to
the case. The first was that Profumo’s personal private the library revealed a single volume on intelligence: The
secretary was young Allason’s father, also an MP. The Venlo Incident (1951), by former MI6 officer, Sigismund
second fact was that the Profumos and Allasons were Payne Best.
close family friends. By 1964 public attention in the

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 68, No. 2 (June 2024)  75


Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

This was a defining moment for Allason in several re- Geoffrey Elliott to name a few. One that he came to know
spects. First it led to a job as researcher for espionage au- well, in a sense—though never met—was Guy Liddell,
thor Richard Deacon. Second, the Best book was engulfed who became MI5 deputy-director general. Liddell kept
in controversy and efforts to sort things out, including diaries of his MI5 duties—often involving US agencies—
Allason’s finding and interviewing the reclusive Best him- for the last 14 years of his service. After MI5 released
self, established part of his research methodology. Third, them, West edited and published those covering the war
on Deacon’s recommendation, he became an adviser on a years in two volumes.
six-part BBC film series and then wrote the book version
SPY! by Richard Deacon and Nigel West (1980). This was West’s account of the Tsarev connection is interesting
the first appearance of that pen name. West would write and informative in its origins and execution. Two ex-
more than 30 more books over the next 44 years. traordinary, co-authored books, both published by Yale
University Press and based on KGB documents—transla-
The broad scope of West’s work includes intelligence tions included—were the result. The Crown Jewels (1999)
service histories, molehunts, World War II double agents, revealed the existence of an Oxford spy ring analogous
defectors, cryptography, published fabricated accounts, to the Cambridge Five, but provided no names. It also
biographies, military intelligence, and the occasional explained the recruiting roles of the illegal rezidents
teaser. For example, West shows how he confirmed that Alexander Orlov, Arnold Deutsch (Philby’s case of-
Admiral Canaris’ mistress, Halina Szymańska, served as ficer), and other KGB agents. Triplex: Secrets From the
his link to MI6. (147) Whatever the topic, he includes Cambridge Spies (2009) exposed Blunt’s role among
related cases, books and legal battles, thus providing valu- others, in the MI5–MI6 Triplex project, which routinely
able ancillary and bibliographic data. opened the diplomatic pouches of foreign missions in
London during the war.
West’s first independent book, MI5: British Security
Service Operations 1909–1945 (1981) set several prec- When New York banker Geoffrey Elliott wrote West
edents. First, its subject did not officially exist. Second, in 1996 requesting information on Elliott’s father, who
its very interesting case studies were not sourced. Third, had served in the Special Operations Executive (SOE),
ironically, scholars cited the book anyway. Classified! neither man could have anticipated that they would create
finally identifies the sources, many of them senior of- St. Ermin’s Press and publish a number of important intel-
ficers, and explains how he gained their confidence, why ligence books.
he couldn’t mention them earlier, and how they assisted in
later books. Classified! mentions them all, and West’s comments
about one, The Private Life of Kim Philby: The Moscow
While doing his research, West observed that many Years, by Rufina Philby with Mikhail Lyubimov and
books about WWII intelligence operations excluded Hayden Peake (1999), require clarification. West explains
interviews with the agents involved—they were hard to that we took Rufina to dinner in Moscow to encourage
find. He worked to fill the gap and tells how he found and her to accept me as a co-author of the English edition and
debriefed 40 WWII sources, including Anthony Blunt, St. Ermin’s as the publisher. He then explains that she
John Cairncross, and George Blake. The most difficult agreed after learning we shared the same birthday and
case concerned GARBO, the Doublecross agent who year. (319) That discovery was indeed a factor in her deci-
made a difference in the success of D-Day. GARBO was sion she later told me, but the conversation occurred at the
long thought to be dead, but West tells how he found and Philby flat the following day, not at the restaurant.
presented GARBO to Prince Philip at Buckingham Palace
and later co-authored the story with GARBO. Classified!—that title is not explained—tells too little
about the most prolific contemporary intelligence his-
Not all topics in Classified! deal directly with espionage torian, a great deal about his writings, and much about
agents. West recounts interesting contacts with Sir Dick his sources and related books, some not well known. A
White—the only officer to head both MI5 and MI6— unique and valuable contribution to intelligence literature.
CIA Director Bill Casey, KGB officer Oleg Tsarev, and

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History
Alfred Dreyfus: The Man at the Center of the Affair, by Maurice Samuels (Yale University Press, 2024), 224 pages,
notes, acknowledgments, index. Reviewed by John Ehrman.

Few of the dozens of books on the Dreyfus Affair pay to the point of blandness, had an enormous impact on
much attention the man at the core of the political convul- his times and the decades that followed. Samuels brings
sion that engulfed France at the end of the nineteenth cen- Dreyfus to life and does a masterful job of explaining him
tury. After all, as the drama unfolded, Alfred Dreyfus— in his various contexts—as a Frenchman, an Alsatian, an
the Jewish French army captain wrongly accused of army officer, and a French Jew—as well as the object of
espionage and then railroaded in a rigged trial—was thou- hope and hatred.
sands of miles offstage, rotting in a small hut on Devil’s
Island off the coast of French Guiana. Some 130 years Samuels assumes a familiarity with the Affair, so Alfred
later the Dreyfus Affair continues to affect French politics, Dreyfus is not for readers new to Dreyfus. But for any-
but Alfred Dreyfus himself remains little understood. one seeking to learn more about the life and times of an
important figure in counterintelligence history, it is well
This is why Maurice Samuels’s short biography of worth reading.
Dreyfus, part of Yale University Press’s Jewish Lives
series, is so welcome. At about 170 pages of text, it is The reviewer: John Ehrman is a retired CIA intelligence
admirably concise but still packed with detail and insights analyst and frequent contributor to Studies.
about Dreyfus who, though in many respects ordinary

The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin’s Propaganda War, by Alan
Philps (Pegasus Books, 2023), 451 pages, footnotes, photos, index.

In the summer of 1998, retired DIA senior intelligence As the Wehrmacht advanced, Prime Minister Winston
executive Jack Dziak and I had lunch at the Metropole Churchill persuaded Stalin to allow some journalists to be
Hotel in Moscow with the former case officer of the based in Moscow and to visit the battlefield to document
Cambridge Five, retired KGB Colonel Yuri Modin. the heroic Soviet resistance. Few will argue with Philps
Although the announced reason for the meeting was to that Stalin’s concurrence was not a tribute to the principle
discuss Kim Philby and his colleagues, Modin’s initial of a free press but given to keep the flow of British, and
comments were about the Metropole which he had last eventually American, aid coming. The journalists were
visited in the Stalin era. Somewhat in awe, he said it was one of three groups working in and from the Metropole.
now refurbished though it retained many of its signature
features, especially the fountain in the dining room with The second group consisted of translators, usually mul-
its glass dome. As the conversation shifted to Modin’s tilingual women. Each journalist was assigned one, who
relations with the Cambridge Five, thoughts about the became their eyes and ears. Some, at huge personal risk
Metropole in Stalin’s time faded. In The Red Hotel, revealed the truth about life under Stalin to their journal-
British journalist Alan Philps tells the story we missed. ist. Philps writes that their story is told here for the first
time. (3) The third group, NKVD security officers, moni-
Opened in 1905, the Metropole became the playground tored the first two in the hotel and in the field.
of wealthy Tsarist era merchants and high society. After
the Bolshevik revolution it served as a home for the “girls To the surprise of all the journalists—British and
of the Metropole.” (48) By the time Germany invaded the American, communist and non-communist—who had
Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, it had seen much better struggled to be assigned to Moscow, not a one ever saw
days, although it was still the best hotel in town. the Red Army in action. Every word they wrote was
censored to meet Stalin’s propaganda objectives. Philps
shows they were treated well and went on many field

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trips, but reporting on the war was not permitted. The survived the war. Tanya’s story follows a different path
most outspoken and dedicated communist of the group and depended at first on her English language skills. She
on arrival, Charlotte Haldane, eventually returned to would marry her correspondent in the hotel and despite
England frustrated and disillusioned with communism. her anti-communist views, survive. Philps makes her an
George Bernard Shaw saw things differently and dined important character in the story.
with Stalin, though he didn’t stay long. One British cor-
respondent and Moscow friend of Guy Burgess, Ralph The Red Hotel conveys a detailed view of Stalin’s Soviet
Parker, was apparently converted from a trustworthy MI6 Union as it dealt with the press at the working level. It
informant to a Kremlin asset. (149, 195) will come as no surprise that Philps finds many parallels
with contemporary Russia. The Metropole has been refur-
The translators were in a precarious situation. Some bished but, Philps concludes, the Russian government has
had served the NKVD and GRU for years. All had valu- not.
able language skills. GRU agents Alex and Nadya (aka:
Ulanovsky), worked with Richard Sorge in China and Well written, well documented, and a valuable and un-
later recruited Whittaker Chambers in America. (198) usual contribution.
Nadya’s quiet opposition to Stalin is impressive and she

Women In Intelligence: The Hidden History of Two World Wars, by Helen Fry (Yale University Press, 2023), 435
pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

While researching British intelligence operations prior But these accounts are exceptions. The presumptive
to WWI, historian Helen Fry became convinced that for entry level position for women was as a secretary. Fry
intelligence leaders the idea of “employing women in in- describes many cases of “well educated, highly efficient
telligence … was absolutely unthinkable.” (5) Of neces- and feisty characters,” overcoming this potential limita-
sity, this view would change forever during WWI, though tion and successfully running agent networks, serving as
in many cases the details of their contributions, and those analysts, field radio operators, codebreakers, debriefing
of their successors in WWII, received relatively little at- defectors, and photo-interpreters. (88ff) An outstanding
tention. Based on interviews with participants and recent- example is Jane Archer, who became one of the first MI5
ly released official documents, Women In Intelligence tells staff officers and also served in MI6. (103)
stories of previously unknown contributions by women
and adds operational detail to some formerly reported. With two exceptions, Mata Hari and Virginia Hall, Fry’s
The case of the British nurse is an example of the latter. subjects are British. Mata Hari is included to contrast the
popular misconceptions of the spy-seductress with the
Google “Edith Cavell,” and one discovers she was a realities of cases Fry presents. Virginia Hall, although
British nurse who operated a medical clinic and nursing American, is included because of her distinguished
school in Brussels at the start of the war in August 1914. service in Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE)
But as some historians have noted, she was also prob- before she joined OSS.
ably a spy, and that is the reason she was killed by the
Germans. Fry uses recently released archival material to Women In Intelligence contains a most curious and
document her espionage and names her sub-agents for the unexplained factual error: Fry’s observation that “France
first time. remained neutral and unoccupied” during WWI. (10)

The WWII account of Lesley Wyle’s unusual recruit- A principal conclusion of Women In Intelligence is that
ment and her secret recording, transcription, and transla- the contributions of women to the secret world of intel-
tion of Nazi communications finally places her in the ligence, too long obscured by official secrecy, are now
public record. Fry notes that she is just one of many who known to history. A valuable contribution to the literature.
performed similar tasks.

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World War I and the Foundations of American Intelligence, by Mark Stout (University Press of Kansas, 2023), 388
pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Former CIA analyst and lecturer at Johns Hopkins after WWII, that is when modern American intelligence
University, Mark Stout, has written an interesting and pro- began.
vocative account reconsidering the origins of “American
intelligence.” The use of quotes here is intended to em- Stout doesn’t accept either view and World War I and the
phasize the importance of the term to Stout’s thesis, which Foundations of American Intelligence presents a chronol-
he articulates first in his introduction. ogy of the sometimes bumpy growth of intelligence in the
United States from the Civil War to WWII that he argues
On page one Stout writes: “Ask an American intelli- supports his position. The development of new military
gence officer to tell you when the country started doing intelligence organizations such as the Office of Naval
modern intelligence, and you will probably hear some- Intelligence “some fifty-eight years before the OSS was
thing about the Office of Strategic Services in World War created,” and the War Department’s Military Intelligence
II or the National Security Act of 1947 and the formation Division shortly thereafter (13) are principal examples,
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).” (1) though the State and Justice Department had intelligence
units. And when necessary, ad hoc groups were created to
Stout attributes this view to the general acceptance of assist the president.
two “CIA-centric” myths about modern American intel-
ligence that originated more than 25 years after World In this thoroughly documented account, Stout dis-
War I. “According to the first, the United States neglected cusses the principal intelligence concepts and functions,
intelligence for far too long, and it really took World the foreign liaison relationships developed, the players
War II to change things … little of importance happened involved, and how the units were employed in all the wars
before the establishment in 1941 of the Office of the and threats before WWII. He concludes that by the end
Coordinator of Information, which was reorganized as of World War I, almost all the ideas that define modern
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).” (2) Stout quotes American intelligence, including the moral necessity
several intelligence officers who have expressed related of espionage, were commonplace among intelligence
views including former director Allen Dulles, who wrote personnel and that “World War I laid the foundations for
“in each of our crises, up to Pearl Harbor, workers in the establishment of a self-conscious profession of intel-
intelligence have had to start in all over again.” (264) ligence.” (14)
Also cited: “a glossy publication from the CIA’s History
Staff—which should know better—is titled The Office of The one question not addressed concerns the need for a
Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency.” central source of national intelligence for the president as
recognized by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. WWI
The second myth focuses on the Intelligence Community intelligence certainly helped, as Stout makes clear, but at
and the National Security Act of 1947. “This myth says the outbreak of WWII the military intelligence organiza-
that a necessary component of modern American intel- tions were still independent and competing. Donovan’s
ligence is the existence of a community of agencies that Central Intelligence Group was the first step toward that
somehow exhibits centralization, a function of how intel- goal and one reason modern American intelligence is
ligence agencies interact rather than what goes on inside reckoned from that event. In short, the answer depends on
them.” (3) Since these organizations did not exist until whether one views “American intelligence” as a reference
to national or subordinate unit control.

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Fiction
Ilium, by Lea Carpenter (Alfred A. Knopf, 2024), 220 pages. Reviewed by John Ehrman.
Lea Carpenter’s Ilium at first glance appears to be a in the hands of Raja—“the one person on whom I had, in
straightforward novel of espionage, love, and revenge. It an instant, become entirely dependent.”
is all those things, but also an ambitious novel, with much
to say. It doesn’t work quite as well as Carpenter must Most of the remaining two-thirds of the book is a com-
have hoped, but before we get to that, here’s something to plex story of personalities and relationships. Edouard is
keep in mind: Ilium is the Latin name for Troy, the setting an artist and lover of the classics who instructs his visitor
of Homer’s epic poem. on the finer points of Homer and the Iliad; she, in turn,
becomes ever closer to Edouard’s wife, her daughter and,
Carpenter’s story revolves around an unnamed woman especially, Felix, Edouard’s young soccer-obsessed son
narrator who relates events from two decades ago, when from a previous relationship.
she was 21. Already orphaned by then, she had grown
up in London, where her mother had been a housekeeper Eventually Raja lets her in on the rest of the secret,
for a wealthy widow but tried to elevate her status by which we need not go into here, and our narrator, in turn,
claiming to be a “personal assistant.” Thus, our narrator embraces her new world and self. “Espionage is simply
explains, she learned early in life how to pretend to be human interaction performed under exceptional circum-
someone she wasn’t, and that “pretending is freedom.” stances…at its essence, [it is] observation, seduction,
Later, too, she’s told that “espionage loves an orphan,” patience…you have to be willing to forget who you are
and especially one who is naïve, poor, and still lack- in order to inhabit someone else.” Indeed, it turns out that
ing in self-awareness. In other words, she was born for almost everyone else in Ilium also has transformed their
espionage. identity at some point and has a secret past. The gradual
revelation of who has done what to whom and what moti-
Espionage, and love, come in the form of Marcus. He’s vates them makes this a very human tale.
a mysterious man, some 30 years older than our narrator,
whom she meets at a party in London. Marcus sweeps her But it’s also a very complicated story, especially with
off her feet and they quickly marry, seeming to be des- Carpenter’s thoughts about the nature of espionage and
tined to live happily ever after in Paris. the fluidity of identity running through the narrative.
“Most people take a lifetime to find themselves,” our
Of course, it’s not that simple. Before our narrator can heroine says, even as she admits that Marcus “was hand-
live her dream, Marcus’s equally mysterious Lebanese ing me an identity I had been looking for without knowing
friend Raja asks her to do a small favor for them—visit it.” Shifting identities is not a new theme in spy novels
some friends at their family compound at Cap Ferret, on but, perhaps in a reflection of today’s concerns, these
the Atlantic coast of France, and report back on the com- musings about its fluidity sometimes go on a bit too long.
ings and goings of the father of the family, a mysterious You’ll mostly forgive this, however, as Carpenter is a
Russian named Edouard. We want to know everything writer of great skill and subtlety. Her prose is elegant and
you can learn about him,” Raja tells her. Naturally, there’s she never lets things get bogged down. Indeed, the story
also a cover story and a legend for her new identity. moves along, the tension builds and, at under 250 pages
in the print edition, it is concise by today’s standards. The
Now realizing that Marcus has recruited her into espio- climax of the book is what you expect, though the end
nage, our heroine slips into her role and performs per- contains some interesting surprises.
fectly. On her return from Cap Ferret, she reports to Raja
and he, in turn, begins to let her in on the secret behind But then there is the part doesn’t quite work. Carpenter
her mission. Unfortunately, however, Marcus is man with says in her author’s note that Ilium is about “war’s es-
health problems and he dies almost immediately after the sential subjectivity, how a hero to one side is an assassin
Cap Ferret assignment, leaving our narrator pregnant and to another.” For Carpenter, the Trojan War and the Iliad
are templates for using the worlds of intelligence and

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espionage to make this point. Edouard recounts the story not just giver her protagonist a name—Helen would do
of the rage of Achilles after Hector kills his close friend, nicely—and be done with it? And what’s with introduc-
Patroclus. Achilles kills Hector in revenge, and Hector’s ing a character, late in the story, a CIA officer called Tracy
father, Priam, sneaks into Achilles tent to confront him Barnes, the name of the man who oversaw the Bay of Pigs
and convince him to return the body. “Priam knew he and invasion? Is this a less-than-subtle hint that all intelligence
Achilles shared in the slaughter, in different ways,” says operations tend toward disaster? If so, I’m pretty sure it’s
Edouard. Carpenter agrees and, ultimately, comes to see lost on almost all of Carpenter’s readers, few of whom are
it all as pointless. If only the spies in Ilium had “been able likely to know the reference.
to sit, and talk, like Piram and Achilles, they might have
discovered the things they shared, like loss. They might Ilium isn’t for everyone. Those looking for realism or
have wept and seen at once the joy and futility in their thriller-style action had best go elsewhere. If your taste
work, that the reckoning they sought was the real chime- runs toward psychological or literary approaches—think
ra.” Carpenter lays it on a bit thick, and I suspect that few Graham Greene—you’ll enjoy this, despite its flaws. But
readers of Studies will find this convincing. if you want something Homeric, stick with the original.

Carpenter isn’t above playing a few more literary games. The reviewer: John Ehrman is a retired CIA analyst and
With all the talk of Greeks, love, war, and revenge, why frequent contributor to Studies.

v v v

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